1NC v Homestead PL – r5 Michigan

1NC – T

Criminal justice refers to the entire complex of institutions and people involved with
crime
Shlomo Shinnar and Reuel Shinnar, 75 - Albert Einstein College of Medicine, and School of
Engineering; both from the City College of New York (“The Effects of the Criminal Justice System on the
Control of Crime: A Quantitative

Approach” Law & Society Review, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Summer, 1975), pp. 581-612, JSTOR //DH

5. We use the term "criminal justice system" to denote the entire complex of institutions and people
involved in dealing with crime and criminals. These include the police, the district attorney's office, the judiciary, the parole
system and the prisons

Substantial reform requires a wholesale approach to the overall criminal justice

system
Norval Morris, 78 – professor of law at Harvard ( Reviewed Work(s): Denial of Justice: Criminal Process
in the United States by Lloyd L. Weinreb Review by: Norval Morris Source: Harvard Law Review, Vol. 91,
No. 6 (Apr., 1978), pp. 1367-1371, JSTOR //DH

It is often unfair, though common, to criticize a book for not being a different book; an author may surely select his own topics. But in this case
one cannot but regret the failure to offer at least a primitive guide to the reformer's path. Few scholars take as holistic
an approach to
the criminal justice system as Lloyd Wein- reb does in Denial of Justice. Undoubtedly, such an overarching perspective is essential
to serious and substantial reform of our present anarchic, inefficient, and unjust system; to leave the book with a sense of a chapter or
chapters missing, however, is a dis- appointment. The truly difficult task in criminal justice reform is to define politically viable
courses of legislative, regulatory, and judicial conduct which are capable of avoiding the formidable
ability of existing institutions to swallow changes without affecting the overall system. There should have been
at least one long chapter, of this prescriptive nature, sketching the path between the diagnosis in the first five chapters and Weinreb's utopian
"alternative model." Am I condemning Weinreb for not writing a different book? I think not. It may be true, as Weinreb argues, that
fundamental change in our criminal justice system is needed. But this does not necessarily imply that such a grand vision of a new goal cannot
be achieved by means of politically viable incremental steps. Weinreb, in neglecting (or rejecting) this pos- sibility, fails to fulfill the promise of
his earlier critical analysis of the criminal justice system and leaves this book troublesomely incomplete.

Forensic science is used in a general sense in the resolution – that means focusing on
the entire field, not a sub-discipline
Cole, 15 - Associate Professor of Criminology, Law & Society, University of California, Irvine. (Simon,
“Forensic Science Reform: Out of the Laboratory and into the Crime Scene” Texas Law Review [Vol.
91:123 http://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Cole.pdf //DH
In 2009, the National Research Council (NRC), the research arm of the National Academies, often called the
most prestigious scientific
institution in the United States, released what has been called a “landmark” report entitled Strengthening Forensic Science in the United
States: A Path Forward. 1 The Report was the first NRC report to address forensic science in a general sense, rather than

focusing on a single forensic discipline, technique, or even case.2 The Report was written by an NRC Committee that was convened in
response to a request by Congress for a report to “assess . . . the resource needs of the forensic science community.”3 This request, in turn, was a response to a
number of factors including lobbying by the Consortium of Forensic Science Organizations (CFSO), legal admissibility challenges to forensic evidence, and
widespread criticism of current practices and standards in forensic science from a variety of sources, including the National Academies themselves. 4 The Report has
attracted attention for its generally critical comments on the current state of practice in American forensic science and for its thirteen recommendations for
improvement, including one calling for the creation of a new federal agency, the National Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS).5 Of particular relevance to legal
scholars were the Report’s highly critical statements about the performance of the American judiciary in its role as a “gatekeeper” for forensic science.6 In one
notable passage, the Committee wrote: “The bottom line is simple: In a number of forensic science disciplines, forensic science professionals have yet to establish
either the validity of their approach or the accuracy of their conclusions, and the courts have been utterly ineffective in addressing this problem.”7 Such a statement
was all the more remarkable coming from a Committee that— unusually, if not unprecedentedly, for an NRC committee—was cochaired by a federal judge.8 The
NRC Report has already generated a great deal of commentary from the legal academy.9 Professor Laurin’s new article Remapping the Path Forward: Toward a
Systemic View of Forensic Science Reform and Oversight contributes to the discussion by drawing attention to a key omission in the NRC Report: its overwhelming
focus on the laboratory, rather than the crime scene, as the locus of forensic science.10 While I cannot speak for Professor Laurin in this regard, I should note that in
speaking of an “omission,” I do not intend any criticism of the work of the NRC Committee, As already noted, the
NRC Committee did not have
the luxury of focusing its attention on a single technique or discipline, but rather had to address the
broad, messy, variegated, and ill-defined field called “forensic science .” It did so, moreover, under an extremely broad and
vague remit from Congress.11 Under such circumstances, the Committee had to make choices, and it is no criticism of their efforts to point out omissions of this
sort.12

Violation – the plan targets a subset of one of the areas specified in the resolution
rather than changing policy across the entire area

Voting issue to preserve predictable limits and ground – they make it topical to
decriminalize or increase enforcement of any crime on the books– or they allow affs to
focus on single federal agencies enforcing or decriminalizing any crime or regulation,
or allow changing any small technique related to evidence collection – that’s tens of
thousands of affs
Minuscule affs let them spike out of core neg ground like Election and Crime DAs
because they don’t create controversy – that kills education and fairness because we
are forced to read.

ASPEC is a voter – destroys agent counterplan, lets the aff link out of every disad, and
makes the aff a moving target.
 1NC – CP
The National Governors’ Association should inform the White House that state
cooperation with federal initiatives, will be contingent upon the United States federal
government amending the Electronic Communications Privacy Act to require a warrant
when seeking access to suspect’s communications.

The CP solves by forcing federal follow-on AND is an aggressive use of uncooperative

federalism.
Heather Gerken 17, J. Skelly Wright Professor of Law at Yale Law School, JD from the University of
Michigan Law School, AB from Princeton University, and Joshua Resevz, JD from Yale Law School, BA in
Political Science from Yale University, now Civil Attorney with the Appellate Staff at the United States
Department of Justice, “Progressive Federalism: A User’s Guide”, Democracy: A Journal of Ideas,
Number 44, Spring 2017, https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/44/progressive-federalism-a-users-
guide/ [language modified]

Progressives have lost power in Washington. Every national institution now lies in the hands of the Republican Party. Given the
slim chances of Democrats’ winning back Congress in 2018, many think that the best progressives can do is hunker down
for the next four years, blocking legislation on the Hill and challenging it in court. It’s a depressing picture for those on the left. No one
wants to be a member of a party whose “victories” are all in the kill, whose only role in national politics is that of the gadfly. But if
progressives can simply look outside the Beltway, they will find that they still have access to one of the
most powerful weapons in politics: federalism . Using the power they wield in states and cities across the
country, progressives can do a good deal more than mourn and obstruct. They can resist Washington overreach,
shape national policies, and force the Republicans to compromise. Cities and states have long been at the center of
the fight over national values. And it’s time progressives recognized that federalism isn’t just for conservatives. Unfortunately, the moment one mentions
federalism many progressives stop listening. The language of “states’ rights” has an ugly history, invoked to shield slavery and Jim Crow. Federalism’s checkered past led political scientist
William H. Riker to remark in 1964 that “if one disapproves of racism, one should disapprove of federalism.” Even today, many progressives think of federalism as a parochial anachronism,
better suited for stymieing change than for effecting it. But they are making a mistake. This is not your father’s federalism. These days, state and local
governments are often led by dissenters and racial minorities, the two groups progressives think have the most to fear from federalism.
And this has allowed them to not only take
advantage of the enormous power that federalism confers within their
own cities and states, but to affect national debates , influence national policy, and force national actors to
the bargaining table. Their success shows that federalism is a neutral and powerful tool for change, not an intrinsically conservative
quirk of U.S. government. The call for progressive federalism is not a new one. In 2004, Duke law professor Ernie Young invited liberals to come to the “Dark Side” and embrace the
power of the states. (And one of the authors of this essay has spent more than a decade arguing—including in the pages of this journal— that federalism doesn’t have a political valence.) But
having a Democrat in the White House was just too tempting for most progressives. They turned their attention to Washington while neglecting what was going on in California, Massachusetts,
or New York City. We suspect that most progressives aren’t even aware that the Democrats have lost 27 state legislative chambers since 2008. But perhaps the 2016 election will help

though, the
devil is in the details. So below we offer
progressives shake loose the notion that D.C. is the center of the political universe. Needless to say,

a “user’s guide” that identifies four ways that progressive leaders—from Jerry Brown and Bill de Blasio to small-city mayors—can push
back against federal policy and force compromise. And, in doing so, we hope to persuade even the most fervent nationalist
to become a fan of federalism. While we fashion this as a progressive user’s guide, it could, in theory, work just as well for conservatives should
they lose the presidency in 2020. That’s precisely the point. Types of Resistance We often forget that the
federal government’s
administrative capacity is modest, relatively speaking. Excluding the military, it employs just short of three million
personnel. Its 2015 budget (excluding defense, Social Security, and mandatory spending obligations) was less than $600 billion.
Together, state and local governments [swamp] dwarf these figures, with more than 14 million workers and a combined
budget of more than $2.5 trillion. Because of this, Washington can’t go it alone. When Congress makes a law, it
often lacks the resources to enforce it. Instead, it relies on states and localities to carry out its policies.
Without those local actors, the feds cannot enforce immigration law, implement environmental policy,
build infrastructure, or prosecute drug offenses. Changing policies in these areas—and many more—is
possible only if cities and states lend a hand. This arrangement creates opportunities for federal-state cooperation. But
it also allows for “uncooperative federalism”: State and local officials can use their leverage over the feds to
shape national policy. This means that states can shape policy simply by refusing to partner with the
federal government. This form of resistance involves more than mere obstruction. It allows progressive states to help set the
federal agenda by forcing debates that conservatives would rather avoid and by creating incentives for
compromise. When states opt out of a federal program, it costs the federal government resources and
political capital. That’s why President Trump has a lot more incentive to compromise with Democrats in
Sacramento than with those on the Hill.

Uncooperative federalism solves warming.

Jean Galbraith 17, Assistant Professor at University of Pennsylvania Law School, JD from the
University of California-Berkeley School of Law, Order of the Coif, BA in Social Studies and the
Comparative Study of Religion from Harvard University, “Book Review: Cooperative and Uncooperative
Foreign Affairs Federalism, Foreign Affairs Federalism: The Myth of National Exclusivity”, Harvard Law
Review, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 2131, Lexis

D. Climate Policy Mitigating

climate change is a challenge for all levels of government -- international,
national, state, and local. As Glennon and Sloane note, some states and cities have embraced climate change
mitigation measures (pp. 62-63). In doing so, states have often coordinated with each other and with foreign
counterparts in both practical and [*2149] expressivist ways (pp. 62-63). California's efforts are exceptionally notable. State
legislation requires sweeping emissions reductions; California and Quebec have sought to integrate their
cap-and-trade programs; and California has spearheaded a coalition of state and local governments around the world who have
committed to climate policy. California even sent a large and high-profile delegation to the United Nations conference on climate change in
Paris in 2015. The issue of climate policy is a rebuttal to all three of the "myths" identified by Glennon and Sloane. It is self-evidently a matter of
both domestic and foreign affairs; states and local governments are acting in this space; and some states and local governments are doing so in
progressive ways. The actions of state and local governments in this space invite constitutional inquiry. Can
California constitutionally regulate carbon emissions, enter into a highly formalized agreement with Quebec and softer
agreements with other subnational governments, and send delegations to international negotiating conferences? Yet
focusing exclusively on these questions would lead to a highly incomplete sense of the legal scope of California's power to act. For although
Glennon and Sloane do not mention it, California is acting amidst a welter of federal laws, regulations, and other executive branch actions
applicable to climate change. In 2007, in a lawsuit brought by liberal states against the EPA, the Supreme Court held that the federal Clean Air
Act applies to greenhouse gas emissions. This Act explicitly delegates authority to California to pursue stronger emissions [*2150] measures for
new motor vehicles than are undertaken at the federal level and in general involves states in the Act's enforcement through cooperative
federalism. During the Obama Administration, state and local government efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
were not only congruent with the aims of the Clean Air Act (as interpreted to apply to greenhouse gases), but also with the
goals of the executive branch. The EPA during the Obama Administration applauded and sought to facilitate state and local efforts. Its
leading rule on climate change mitigation measures, known as the Clean Power Plan, explicitly gave states substantial autonomy in crafting
their own approaches, although this rule is currently facing a court challenge brought by states that oppose federal efforts to regulate
emissions. The Obama White House expressed approval of the transnational coalitions that California and other state and local governments
have joined in seeking to address climate change. All this positive reinforcement will presumably diminish or disappear under the
Trump Administration. The Trump Administration may even try to roll back climate change mitigation efforts by
progressive states and cities, in addition to undermining or reversing Obama era regulations and international
commitments. If it does so, however, the legal questions that such efforts would raise probably have fairly [*2151] little to do
with the constitutional issues posed by traditional foreign affairs federalism. Instead, they would center on administrative law -- around
the interpretation of the Clean Air Act and the laws and norms that govern regulatory practice -- as they had already come to
do by the end of the George W. Bush Administration. * * * These four illustrations are far from unique. Sometimes state and local
government activity in relation to foreign affairs occurs against a backdrop of federal inaction , as is the case with the
incorporation of unratified human rights treaties into the municipal law of progressive cities. But interaction is far more common,
sometimes cooperative and sometimes full of contestation. The executive branch approves of and provides some support for states
and cities seeking to promote tourism or encourage exports abroad. The federal government collaborates with states in determining U.S.
international negotiating positions with respect to insurance. In private international law, the federal government has shown strong interest in
using state law rather than federal law to implement certain treaties. And all levels of government deal with security -- both traditional and
cyber -- and interact with each other over it. To understand what is going on, we must focus on the political branches as much as (or even more
than) the courts. And we must think not just in terms of constitutional law, but also in terms of international law, administrative law, and state
law. [*2152] III. COOPERATIVE AND UNCOOPERATIVE FEDERALISM IN THE CONTEXT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS As foreign affairs federalism becomes
increasingly interactive, how much will it resemble cooperative and uncooperative federalism in the domestic context? At the very least,
scholarship on cooperative and uncooperative federalism as a domestic matter, especially work focused on the political branches, provides a
valuable starting point for understanding foreign affairs federalism today. This scholarshipoffers insights into how the federal
government can incentivize state and local governments to help advance federal interests, how these state and local governments
can in turn influence and resist federal policy, and how Congress and the executive branch can each use state and local action to
build power at the expense of the other branch. These broad themes manifest themselves in the foreign affairs context as
well. Yet the foreign affairs context brings some additional complexities because of its ties to international law and global governance and
because it comes with stronger presidential powers. This
leads to certain differences between cooperative and
uncooperative federalism in the realm of foreign affairs, in terms of both how practice proceeds and of what doctrine should
be. A. Structural Implications The interactions between the federal government and state and local governments in relation to foreign affairs
mean that federal policy shapes state and local policy. By providing assistance, financial and otherwise, to the sister-cities program, the federal
government makes it easier for cities to participate. By signaling its support for state "Buy American" laws, Congress encourages them -- and
the Department of Transportation incentivizes them even further by refusing to participate in contracts governed by state "Buy American" laws
that are less strict than the federal ones. In the context of immigration and climate change, the federal government incentivizes (and
sometimes comes close to forcing) state and local action in support of federal policy. All of these examples in the foreign affairs context
reflect an "increasing concentration of power at Washington in the instigation and supervision of local policies," just as
cooperative federalism arrangements do in the domestic context. In work focused on the domestic context, Heather Gerken shows that the
interactive nature of modern federalism also provides state and local governments with ways to influence
federal policy. State and local actors exercise "the power . . . of the servant," which offers the [*2153]
chance "not just to complain about national policy, but to help set it." In shaping federal policy, these actors
are not simply employing the traditional tools of process federalism; rather, it is their role in administering federal policy that gives them a say
in the shape that this implementation will take. Yet the scope of this role also limits what they can do: "power dynamics are fluid; minority rule
is contingent, limited, and subject to reversal by the national majority." In related work, Gerken and Jessica Bulman-Pozen elaborate on the
ways in which state and local governments
can engage in "uncooperative federalism," including by resisting
federal policies that they are charged with enforcing . Building on the core insight that state and local governments
can help shape federal policy through their roles in implementing federal law , Bulman-Pozen further shows that
these interactions can affect the distribution of power between Congress and the executive branch. In a pair of articles,
she describes the ways in which state and local activities can strengthen the powers of one branch against the other. The more that Congress
invites or effectively requires state and local participation in the administration of a federal statutory regime, the more these actors can serve
as checks on the executive branch's power to implement this regime. On the flip side, such shared roles in implementing previously enacted
statutory schemes can empower the executive branch and subnational executive actors to work together in ways that crowd out the current
Congress. [*2154] Similar dynamics can occur with respect to foreign affairs federalism. Indeed, some of the examples that Gerken and Bulman-
Pozen focus on are issues that have transnational implications. With
regard to climate, for example, they show how states have
used the power of the servant to try to shape federal policy, including efforts by conservative states to
push back against the federal regulatory scheme and by progressive states to make it stronger. Bulman-
Pozen also uses climate as an example of how "federal and state executives negotiate without Congress" once a broad statutory scheme is in
place. Some payoffs for the foreign affairs context here are simply derivative: the
more that state and local governments
enhance or reduce federal efforts to mitigate climate change, then the more or less the United States does with
respect to addressing this global problem. But other implications relate specifically to how the United States engages
internationally. Continuing with the climate context, the extent to which President Obama could make commitments on behalf of the United
States during the negotiations for the 2015 Paris Agreement was largely limited by the scope of the Clean Air Act, since he had no realistic
chance of getting new congressional legislation that would advance his goals with respect to climate. But since California and other progressive
state and local actors were doing more than what the Clean Air Act required, President Obama could take this into account in setting the target
to which the United States was committing with respect to climate change mitigation. President Obama's option set was thus enhanced by
state and local action in the climate context.

Extinction.
Dr. Yew-Kwang Ng 19, Winsemius Professor of Economics at Nanyang Technological University, Fellow
of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia and Member of Advisory Board at the Global Priorities
Institute at Oxford University, PhD in Economics from Sydney University, “Keynote: Global Extinction and
Animal Welfare: Two Priorities for Effective Altruism”, Global Policy, Volume 10, Number 2, May 2019,
pp. 258–266

Catastrophic climate
change Though by no means certain, CCC causing global extinction is possible due to
interrelated factors of non-linearity, cascading effects, positive feedbacks, multiplicative factors, critical
thresholds and tipping points (e.g. Barnosky and Hadly, 2016; Belaia et al., 2017; Buldyrev et al., 2010; Grainger, 2017; Hansen and
Sato, 2012; IPCC 2014; Kareiva and Carranza, 2018; Osmond and Klausmeier, 2017; Rothman, 2017; Schuur et al., 2015; Sims and Finnoff, 2016;
Van Aalst, 2006).7 A possibly imminent tipping point could be in the form of ‘an abrupt ice sheet collapse
[that] could cause a rapid sea level rise’ (Baum et al., 2011, p. 399). There are many avenues for positive
feedback in global warming, including: • the replacement of an ice sea by a liquid ocean surface from melting
reduces the reflection and increases the absorption of sunlight, leading to faster warming; • the drying of forests
from warming increases forest fires and the release of more carbon; and • higher ocean temperatures may
lead to the release of methane trapped under the ocean floor, producing runaway global warming. Though there
are also avenues for negative feedback, the scientific consensus is for an overall net positive feedback
(Roe and Baker, 2007). Thus, the Global Challenges Foundation (2017, p. 25) concludes, ‘The world is currently completely
unprepared to envisage, and even less deal with, the consequences of CCC’. The threat of sea-level rising from global
warming is well known, but there are also other likely and more imminent threats to the survivability of
mankind and other living things. For example , Sherwood and Huber (2010) emphasize the adaptability limit to
climate change due to heat stress from high environmental wet-bulb temperature. They show that ‘even
modest global warming could ... expose large fractions of the [world] population to unprecedented heat
stress’ p. 9552 and that with substantial global warming, ‘the area of land rendered uninhabitable by heat
stress would dwarf that affected by rising sea level’ p. 9555, making extinction much more likely and the
relatively moderate damages estimated by most integrated assessment models unreliably low. While imminent extinction is very
unlikely and may not come for a long time even under business as usual, the main point is that we cannot rule it out. Annan and
Hargreaves (2011, pp. 434–435) may be right that there is ‘an upper 95 per cent probability limit for S [temperature
increase] ... to lie close to 4°C, and certainly well below 6°C’. However, probabilities of 5 per cent, 0.5
per cent, 0.05 per cent or even 0.005 per cent of excessive warming and the resulting extinction
probabilities cannot be ruled out and are unacceptable. Even if there is only a 1 per cent probability that
there is a time bomb in the airplane, you probably want to change your flight. Extinction of the
whole world is more important to avoid by literally a trillion times.
 1NC – CP
The Supreme Court of the United States should rule that the evidence collected under
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act is unconstitutional unless a warrant is
produced on the grounds of the Fourth Amendment.
 1NC – K
“Expert” security assessments are shrouded in ideological bias towards militarism –
their threat assessments presume US primacy is the solution which causes intelligence
failures and loops of military intervention. Maintaining a high level of skepticism
towards their impact claims is more effective at curtailing surveillance than the plan
Rana, Prof of Law @ Cornell, 12
(Aziz, “Who Decides on Security?,” CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW 44(5): 1417-1490.
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2473&context=facpub)

The ideological transformation in the meaning of security has helped to generate a massive and largely
secret infrastructure of overlapping executive agencies, all tasked with gathering information and
keeping the country safe from perceived threats. In 2010, The Washington Post produced a series of articles outlining the
buildings, personnel, and companies that make up this hidden national security apparatus. According to journalists Dana Priest and William
Arkin, thereexist "[s]ome 1,271 government organizations and 1,931 private companies" across 10,000
locations in the United States, all working on "counterterrorism, homeland security, and intelligence. ' "303 This
apparatus is especially concentrated in the Washington, D.C. area, which amounts to "the capital of an alternative geography of the United
States. ' 3°4 Employed by these hidden agencies and bureaucratic entities are some 854,000 people (approximately 1.5 times as many people as
live in Washington itself) who hold top-secret clearances.3 °5 As Priest and Arkin make clear, the most elite of those with such clearance are
highly trained experts, ranging from scientists and economists to regional specialists. " To do what it does, the NSA [National Security
Agency] relies on the largest number of mathematicians in the world. It needs linguists and technology experts, as well
as cryptologists, known as 'crippies. ' ' 30 6 These professionals cluster together in neighborhoods that are among the wealthiest in the country-
six of the ten richest counties in the United States according to Census Bureau data.307 As the executive of Howard County, Virginia, one such
community, declared, "[t]hese are some of the most brilliant people in the world .... They demand good schools and a high quality of life. 30 8
School excellence is particularly important, as education holds the key to sustaining elevated professional and financial status across
generations. In fact, some schools are even "adopting a curriculum . ..that will teach students as young as 10 what kind of lifestyle it takes to get
a security clearance and what kind of behavior would disqualify them. 30 9 The implicit aim of this curriculum is to ensure that the children of
NSA mathematicians and Defense Department linguists can one day succeed their parents on the job. In effect, what Priest and Arkin detail is a
striking illustration of how security has transformed from a matter of ordinary judgment into one of elite skill. They also underscore how this
transformation is bound to a related set of developments regarding social privilege and statusdevelopments that would have been welcome to
Frankfurter but deeply disillusioning to Brownson, Lincoln, and Taney. Such
changes highlight how one's professional
standing increasingly drives who has a right to make key institutional choices. Lost in the process, however,
is the longstanding belief that issues of war and peace are fundamentally a domain of common care
marked by democratic intelligence and shared responsibility . Despite such democratic concerns, a large part of what
makes today's dominant security concept so compelling are two purportedly objective sociological claims about the nature of modern threat.
As these claims undergird the current security concept, this conclusion assesses them more directly and,
in the process, indicates what they suggest about the prospects for any future reform . The first claim is
that global interdependence means that the United States faces near continuous threats from abroad .
Just as Pearl Harbor presented a physical attack on the homeland justifying a revised framework, the American position in the world since has
been one of permanent insecurity in the face of new, equally objective dangers. Althoughtoday these threats no longer come
from menacing totalitarian regimes like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, they nonetheless create a world of
chaos and instability in which American domestic peace is imperiled by decentralized terrorists and
aggressive rogue states."' Second, and relatedly, the objective complexity of modem threats makes it
impossible for ordinary citizens to comprehend fully the causes and likely consequences of existing
dangers. Thus, the best response is the further entrenchment of the national security state , with the U.S.
military permanently mobilized to gather intelligence and to combat enemies wherever they strike-at
home or abroad. Accordingly, modem legal and political institutions that privilege executive authority and insulated decision-making are
simply the necessary consequence of these externally generated crises. Regardless of these trade-offs, the security benefits of an empowered
presidency-one armed with countless secret and public agencies as well as with a truly global military footprint3 '-greatly outweigh the costs.
Yet although these sociological views have become commonplace, the
conclusions that Americans should draw about
security requirements are not nearly as clear cut as the conventional wisdom assumes . In particular, a closer
examination of contemporary arguments about endemic danger suggests that such claims are not
objective empirical judgments, but rather are socially complex and politically infused interpretations .
Indeed, the openness of existing circumstances to multiple interpretations of threat implies that the presumptive need for secrecy and
centralization is not self evident. And as underscored by high profile failures in expert assessment, claims to
security expertise are themselves riddled with ideological presuppositions and subjective biases . All this
indicates that the gulf between elite knowledge and lay incomprehension in matters of security may be far less
extensive than is ordinarily thought. It also means that the question of who decides-and with it the issue of how
democratic or insular our institutions should be-remains open as well. Clearly, technological changes, from airpower
to biological and chemical weapons, have shifted the nature of America's position in the world and its
potential vulnerability. As has been widely remarked for nearly a century, the oceans alone cannot guarantee our permanent safety.
Yet in truth, they never fully ensured domestic tranquility. The nineteenth century was one of near continuous violence, especially with
indigenous communities fighting to protect their territory from expansionist settlers. 12 But
even if technological shifts make
doomsday scenarios more chilling than those faced by Hamilton, Jefferson, or Taney, the mere existence of these
scenarios tells us little about their likelihood or how best to address them. Indeed, these latter security
judgments are inevitably permeated with subjective political assessments-assessments that carry with
them preexisting ideological points of view-such as regarding how much risk constitutional societies
should accept or how interventionist states should be in foreign policy. In fact, from its emergence in the 1930s and
1940s, supporters of the modem security concept have-at times unwittingly-reaffirmed the political rather than purely objective nature of
interpreting external threats. In particular, commentators have repeatedly noted the link between the idea of insecurity and America's post-
World War II position of global 313 primacy, one which today has only expanded following the Cold War. In 1961, none other than Senator
James William Fulbright declared, in terms reminiscent of Herring and Frankfurter, that security imperatives meant that "our basic
constitutional machinery, admirably suited to the needs of a remote agrarian republic in the 18th century," was no longer "adequate" for the
"20th-century nation. '314 For Fulbright, the
driving impetus behind the need to jettison antiquated constitutional
practices was the importance of sustaining the country's "pre-eminen[ce] in political and military power .'
'315 Fulbright believed that greater executive action and war-making capacities were essential precisely because the United States found itself
"burdened with all the enormous responsibilities that accompany such power., 316 According
to Fulbright, the United States
had both a right and a duty to suppress those forms of chaos and disorder that existed at the edges of
American authority.3 17 Thus, rather than being purely objective, the American condition of permanent
danger was itself deeply tied to political calculations about the importance of global primacy. What
generated the condition of continual crisis was not only technological change, but also the belief that the
United States' own national security rested on the successful projection of power into the internal
affairs of foreign states. The key point is that regardless of whether one agrees with such an underlying
project, the value of this project is ultimately an open political question . This suggests that whether distant crises
should be viewed as generating insecurity at home is similarly as much an interpretative judgment as an empirically verifiable conclusion.3 18
To appreciate the open nature of security determinations, one need only look at the presentation of terrorism as a principle and overriding
danger facing the country. According to National Counterterrorism Center's 2009 Report on Terrorism, in 2009 there were just twenty-five U.S.
noncombatant fatalities from terrorism worldwide-nine abroad and sixteen at home.3 19 While the fear of a terrorist attack is a legitimate
concern, these numbers-which have been consistent in recent years-place the gravity of the threat in perspective. Rather than a condition of
endemic danger-requiring everincreasing secrecy and centralization-such facts are perfectly consistent with a reading that Americans do not
face an existential crisis (one presumably comparable to Pearl Harbor) and actually enjoy relative security. Indeed, the disconnect between
numbers and resources expended, especially in a time of profound economic insecurity, highlights the political choice of policymakers and
citizens to persist in interpreting foreign events through a World War II and early Cold War lens of permanent threat. In fact, the continuous
alteration of basic constitutional values to fit national security aims emphasizes just how entrenched Herring's old vision of security as pre-
political and foundational has become, regardless of whether other interpretations of the present moment may be equally compelling. It also
underscores a telling and often ignored point about the nature of modem security expertise, particularly as reproduced by the United States'
massive intelligence infrastructure. To
the extent that political assumptions -like the centrality of global primacy or
the view that instability abroad necessarily implicates security at home -shape the interpretative
approach of executive officials , what passes as objective security expertise is itself intertwined with
contested claims about how to view external actors and their motivations . These assumptions mean that while
modem conditions may well be complex, the conclusions of the presumed experts may not be systematically less liable
to subjective bias than judgments made by ordinary citizens based on publicly available information. It further underlines
that the question of who decides cannot be foreclosed in advance by simply asserting deference to elite knowledge. If anything, one can argue
that the presumptive gulf between elite awareness and suspect mass opinion has generated its own very dramatic political and legal
pathologies. In recent years, the country has witnessed a variety of security crises built on the basic failure of
"expertise."32 ° At present, part of what obscures this fact is the very culture of secret information sustained by the modem security
concept. Today, it is commonplace for government officials to leak security material about terrorism or external threats to newspapers as a
method of shaping the public debate.321 These "open" secrets allow greater public access to elite information and embody a central and
routine instrument for incorporating mass voice into state decision-making. But this mode of popular involvement comes at a key cost. Secret
information generally is treated as worthy of a higher status than information already present in the public realm-the shared collective
information through which ordinary citizens reach conclusions about emergency and defense. Yet, oftentimes,
as with the lead up
to the Iraq War in 2003, although the actual content of this secret information is flawed ,322 its status as
secret masks these problems and allows policymakers to cloak their positions in added authority. This
reality highlights the importance of approaching security information with far greater collective skepticism; it also means that security
judgments may be more Hobbesian-marked fundamentally by epistemological uncertainty as opposed to verifiable fact-than policymakers
admit. If the objective sociological claims at the center of the modem security concept are themselves profoundly contested, what does
this mean for reform efforts that seek to recalibrate the relationship between liberty and security? Above
all, it indicates that the central problem with the procedural solutions offered by constitutional scholars-emphasizing
new statutory frameworks or greater judicial assertiveness- is that they mistake a question of politics for one of law. In other
words, such scholars ignore the extent to which governing practices are the product of background
political judgments about threat, democratic knowledge, professional expertise, and the necessity for insulated
decision-making. To the extent that Americans are convinced that they face continuous danger from hidden
and potentially limitless assailants-danger too complex for the average citizen to comprehend
independently-it is inevitable that institutions (regardless of legal reform initiatives) will operate to
centralize power in those hands presumed to enjoy military and security expertise. Thus, any systematic
effort to challenge the current framing of the relationship between security and liberty must begin by
challenging the underlying assumptions about knowledge and security upon which legal and political
arrangements rest. Without a sustained and public debate about the validity of security expertise, its supporting
institutions, and the broader legitimacy of secret information, there can be no substantive shift in our constitutional
politics. The problem at present, however, is that it remains unclear which popular base exists in society to raise these questions. Unless such
a base fully emerges, we can expect our prevailing security arrangements to become ever more entrenched.

Capitalism causes endless structural violence and extinction from climate change
Robinson ‘16 (William I, PhD, professor of sociology, global studies and Latin American studies at the
University of California at Santa Barbara http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/35596-sadistic-
capitalism-six-urgent-matters-for-humanity-in-global-crisis)
In these mean streets of globalized capitalism in crisis, it has become profitable to turn poverty and inequality into a tourist attraction. The South African Emoya Luxury Hotel and Spa company
has made a glamorized spectacle of it. The resort recently advertised an opportunity for tourists to stay "in our unique Shanty Town ... and experience traditional township living within a safe
private game reserve environment." A cluster of simulated shanties outside of Bloemfontein that the company has constructed "is ideal for team building, braais, bachelors [parties], theme
parties and an experience of a lifetime," read the ad. The luxury accommodations, made to appear from the outside as shacks, featured paraffin lamps, candles, a battery-operated radio, an
outside toilet, a drum and fireplace for cooking, as well as under-floor heating, air conditioning and wireless internet access. A well-dressed, young white couple is pictured embracing in a field
with the corrugated tin shanties in the background. The only thing missing in this fantasy world of sanitized space and glamorized poverty was the people themselves living in poverty.

Faced
Escalating inequalities fuel capitalism's chronic problem of over-accumulation. The "luxury shanty town" in South Africa is a fitting metaphor for global capitalism as a whole.

with a stagnant global economy, elites have managed to turn war, structural violence and inequality into
opportunities for capital, pleasure and entertainment. It is hard not to conclude that unchecked capitalism has
become what I term "sadistic capitalism," in which the suffering and deprivation generated by capitalism
become a source of aesthetic pleasure, leisure and entertainment for others . I recently had the opportunity to travel through
several countries in Latin America, the Middle East, North Africa, East Asia and throughout North America. I was on sabbatical to research what the global crisis looks like on the ground around
the world. Everywhere I went, social polarization and political tensions have reached explosive dimensions. Where is the crisis headed, what are the possible outcomes and what does it tell us

This crisis is not like earlier structural crises of world capitalism , such as in the 1930s or 1970s.
about global capitalism and resistance?

This one is fast becoming systemic. The crisis of humanity shares aspects of earlier structural crises of
world capitalism, but there are six novel, interrelated dimensions to the current moment that I highlight
here, in broad strokes, as the "big picture" context in which countries and peoples around the world are experiencing a descent into chaos and uncertainty. 1) The level of
global social polarization and inequality is unprecedented in the face of out-of-control, over-
accumulated capital. In January 2016, the development agency Oxfam published a follow-up to its report on global inequality that had been released the previous year.
According to the new report, now just 62 billionaires -- down from 80 identified by the agency in its January 2015 report -- control as much wealth as one half of the world's population, and

Beyond the transnational capitalist class and the upper echelons of the
the top 1% owns more wealth than the other 99% combined.

global power bloc, the richest 20 percent of humanity owns some 95 percent of the world's wealth,
while the bottom 80 percent has to make do with just 5 percent. This 20-80 divide of global society into
haves and the have-nots is the new global social apartheid. It is evident not just between rich and poor
countries, but within each country, North and South, with the rise of new affluent high-consumption
sectors alongside the downward mobility, "precariatization," destabilization and expulsion of majorities.
Escalating inequalities fuel capitalism's chronic problem of over-accumulation: The transnational
capitalist class cannot find productive outlets to unload the enormous amounts of surplus it has
accumulated, leading to stagnation in the world economy. The signs of an impending depression are
everywhere. The front page of the February 20 issue of The Economist read, "The World Economy: Out of Ammo?" Extreme levels of social polarization present a challenge to
dominant groups. They strive to purchase the loyalty of that 20 percent, while at the same time dividing the 80 percent, co-opting some into a hegemonic bloc and repressing the rest.
Alongside the spread of frightening new systems of social control and repression is heightened dissemination through the culture industries and corporate marketing strategies that

another strategy of co-optation is

depoliticize through consumerist fantasies and the manipulation of desire. As "Trumpism" in the United States so well illustrates,

the manipulation of fear and insecurity among the downwardly mobile so that social anxiety is
channeled toward scapegoated communities. This psychosocial mechanism of displacing mass anxieties
is not new, but it appears to be increasing around the world in the face of the structural destabilization
of capitalist globalization. Scapegoated communities are under siege , such as the Rohingya in Myanmar, the Muslim minority in India,
the Kurds in Turkey, southern African immigrants in South Africa, and Syrian and Iraqi refugees and other immigrants in Europe. As with its 20th century predecessor, 21st century

fascism hinges on such manipulation of social anxiety at a time of acute capitalist crisis. Extreme
inequality requires extreme violence and repression that lend to projects of 21st century fascism. 2) The
system is fast reaching the ecological limits to its reproduction. We have reached several tipping points
in what environmental scientists refer to as nine crucial "planetary boundaries." We have already
exceeded these boundaries in three areas -- climate change, the nitrogen cycle and diversity loss. There
have been five previous mass extinctions in earth's history. While all these were due to natural causes, for the first time ever, human conduct
is intersecting with and fundamentally altering the earth system. We have entered what Paul Crutzen, the Dutch environmental scientist and Nobel Prize winner, termed the

Anthropocene -- a new age in which humans have transformed up to half of the world's surface. We are
altering the composition of the atmosphere and acidifying the oceans at a rate that undermines the
conditions for life. The ecological dimensions of global crisis cannot be understated. "We are deciding, without quite
meaning to, which evolutionary pathways will remain open and which will forever be closed," observes Elizabeth Kolbert in her best seller, The Sixth Extinction. "No other creature has ever

The Sixth Extinction will continue to determine the course of life long after everything people
managed this ...

have written and painted and built has been ground into dust. " Capitalism cannot be held solely responsible. The human-nature
contradiction has deep roots in civilization itself. The ancient Sumerian empires, for example, collapsed after the population over-salinated their crop soil. The Mayan city-state network

collapsed about AD 900 due to deforestation. And the former Soviet Union wrecked havoc on the environment. However, given capital's implacable impulse to
accumulate profit and its accelerated commodification of nature, it is difficult to imagine that the
environmental catastrophe can be resolved within the capitalist system. "Green capitalism" appears as an oxymoron, as sadistic
capitalism's attempt to turn the ecological crisis into a profit-making opportunity, along with the conversion of poverty into a tourist attraction . 3) The sheer magnitude

of the means of violence is unprecedented, as is the concentrated control over the means of global
communications and the production and circulation of knowledge, symbols and images. We have seen
the spread of frightening new systems of social control and repression that have brought us into the
panoptical surveillance society and the age of thought control. This real-life Orwellian world is in a sense more perturbing than that
described by George Orwell in his iconic novel 1984. In that fictional world, people were compelled to give their obedience to the state ("Big Brother") in exchange for a quiet existence with

Now, however, the corporate and political powers that be force

guarantees of employment, housing and other social necessities.

obedience even as the means of survival are denied to the vast majority. Global apartheid involves the
creation of "green zones" that are cordoned off in each locale around the world where elites are
insulated through new systems of spatial reorganization, social control and policing. "Green zone" refers to the nearly
impenetrable area in central Baghdad that US occupation forces established in the wake of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The command center of the occupation and select Iraqi elite inside that

Urban areas around the world are now green zoned

green zone were protected from the violence and chaos that engulfed the country.

through gentrification, gated communities, surveillance systems, and state and private violence. Inside
the world's green zones, privileged strata avail themselves of privatized social services, consumption and
entertainment. They can work and communicate through internet and satellite sealed off under the
protection of armies of soldiers, police and private security forces. Green zoning takes on distinct forms
in each locality. In Palestine, I witnessed such zoning in the form of Israeli military checkpoints, Jewish settler-only roads and the apartheid wall. In Mexico City, the most exclusive
residential areas in the upscale Santa Fe District are accessible only by helicopter and private gated roads. In Johannesburg, a surreal drive through the exclusive Sandton City area reveals rows
of mansions that appear as military compounds, with private armed towers and electrical and barbed-wire fences. In Cairo, I toured satellite cities ringing the impoverished center and inner
suburbs where the country's elite could live out their aspirations and fantasies. They sport gated residential complexes with spotless green lawns, private leisure and shopping centers and
English-language international schools under the protection of military checkpoints and private security police. In other cities, green zoning is subtler but no less effective. In Los Angeles,
where I live, the freeway system now has an express lane reserved for those that can pay an exorbitant toll. On this lane, the privileged speed by, while the rest remain one lane over, stuck in
the city's notorious bumper-to-bumper traffic -- or even worse, in notoriously underfunded and underdeveloped public transportation, where it may take half a day to get to and from work.
There is no barrier separating this express lane from the others. However, a near-invisible closed surveillance system monitors every movement. If a vehicle without authorization shifts into
the exclusive lane, it is instantly recorded by this surveillance system and a heavy fine is imposed on the driver, under threat of impoundment, while freeway police patrols are ubiquitous.

Outside of the global green zones, warfare and police containment have become normalized and
sanitized for those not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression. "Militainment" -- portraying and even glamorizing war and
violence as entertaining spectacles through Hollywood films and television police shows, computer games and corporate "news" channels -- may be the epitome of sadistic capitalism. It

desensitizes, bringing about complacency and indifference. In between the green zones and outright warfare are prison industrial
complexes, immigrant and refugee repression and control systems, the criminalization of outcast
communities and capitalist schooling. The omnipresent media and cultural apparatuses of the corporate
economy, in particular, aim to colonize the mind -- to undermine the ability to think critically and
outside the dominant worldview. A neofascist culture emerges through militarism, extreme
masculinization, racism and racist mobilizations against scapegoats. 4) We are reaching limits to the
extensive expansion of capitalism. Capitalism is like riding a bicycle: When you stop pedaling the bicycle, you fall over. If the capitalist system
stops expanding outward, it enters crisis and faces collapse. In each earlier structural crisis, the system
went through a new round of extensive expansion -- from waves of colonial conquest in earlier
centuries, to the integration in the late 20th and early 21st centuries of the former socialist countries,
China, India and other areas that had been marginally outside the system. There are no longer any new
territories to integrate into world capitalism. Meanwhile, the privatization of education, health care, utilities, basic services and public land are turning
those spaces in global society that were outside of capital's control into "spaces of capital." Even poverty has been turned into a commodity. What is there left to

commodify? Where can the system now expand? With the limits to expansion comes a turn toward
militarized accumulation -- making wars of endless destruction and reconstruction and expanding the
militarization of social and political institutions so as to continue to generate new opportunities for
accumulation in the face of stagnation. 5) There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a
"planet of slums," alienated from the productive economy, thrown into the margins and subject to
these sophisticated systems of social control and destruction. Global capitalism has no direct use for
surplus humanity. But indirectly, it holds wages down everywhere and makes new systems of 21st
century slavery possible. These systems include prison labor, the forced recruitment of miners at
gunpoint by warlords contracted by global corporations to dig up valuable minerals in the Congo,
sweatshops and exploited immigrant communities (including the rising tide of immigrant female caregivers for affluent populations). Furthermore,
the global working class is experiencing accelerated "precariatization." The "new precariat" refers to the
proletariat that faces capital under today's unstable and precarious labor relations -- informalization,
casualization, part-time, temp, immigrant and contract labor. As communities are uprooted everywhere,
there is a rising reserve army of immigrant labor. The global working class is becoming divided into
citizen and immigrant workers. The latter are particularly attractive to transnational capital, as the lack
of citizenship rights makes them particularly vulnerable, and therefore, exploitable. The challenge for
dominant groups is how to contain the real and potential rebellion of surplus humanity, the immigrant
workforce and the precariat. How can they contain the explosive contradictions of this system? The 21st century megacities become the battlegrounds between mass
resistance movements and the new systems of mass repression. Some populations in these cities (and also in abandoned countryside) are at risk of genocide, such as those in Gaza, zones in

6) There is a disjuncture between a globalizing economy and a nation-state-

Somalia and Congo, and swaths of Iraq and Syria.

based system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and do not wield
enough power and authority to organize and stabilize the system, much less to impose regulations on
runaway transnational capital. In the wake of the 2008 financial collapse, for instance, the governments of the G-8 and G-20 were unable to impose transnational
regulation on the global financial system, despite a series of emergency summits to discuss such regulation. Elites historically have attempted to resolve the problems of over-accumulation by

state policies that can regulate the anarchy of the market. However, in recent decades, transnational capital has broken free from the
constraints imposed by the nation-state. The more "enlightened" elite representatives of the transnational capitalist class are now clamoring for transnational
mechanisms of regulation that would allow the global ruling class to reign in the anarchy of the system in the interests of saving global capitalism from itself and from radical challenges from
below. At the same time, the division of the world into some 200 competing nation-states is not the most propitious of circumstances for the global working class. Victories in popular struggles
from below in any one country or region can (and often do) become diverted and even undone by the structural power of transnational capital and the direct political and military domination
that this structural power affords the dominant groups. In Greece, for instance, the leftist Syriza party came to power in 2015 on the heels of militant worker struggles and a mass uprising. But
the party abandoned its radical program as a result of the enormous pressure exerted on it from the European Central Bank and private international creditors. The Systemic Critique of Global
Capitalism A growing number of transnational elites themselves now recognize that any resolution to the global crisis must involve redistribution downward of income. However, in the
viewpoint of those from below, a neo-Keynesian redistribution within the prevailing corporate power structure is not enough. What is required is a redistribution of power downward and
transformation toward a system in which social need trumps private profit. A global rebellion against the transnational capitalist class has spread since the financial collapse of 2008. Wherever
one looks, there is popular, grassroots and leftist struggle, and the rise of new cultures of resistance: the Arab Spring; the resurgence of leftist politics in Greece, Spain and elsewhere in Europe;
the tenacious resistance of Mexican social movements following the Ayotzinapa massacre of 2014; the favela uprising in Brazil against the government's World Cup and Olympic expulsion
policies; the student strikes in Chile; the remarkable surge in the Chinese workers' movement; the shack dwellers and other poor people's campaigns in South Africa; Occupy Wall Street, the
immigrant rights movement, Black Lives Matter, fast food workers' struggle and the mobilization around the Bernie Sanders presidential campaign in the United States. This global revolt is
spread unevenly and faces many challenges. A number of these struggles, moreover, have suffered setbacks, such as the Greek working-class movement and, tragically, the Arab Spring. What
type of a transformation is viable, and how do we achieve it? How we interpret the global crisis is itself a matter of vital importance as politics polarize worldwide between a neofascist and a

The systemic critique of global capitalism must strive to influence, from this vantage point, the
popular response.

discourse and practice of movements for a more just distribution of wealth and power. Our survival may
depend on it.

Join the party!

Escalante 18
(Alyson Escalante is a Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. “PARTY ORGANIZING IN THE 21ST CENTURY”
September 21st, 2018 https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century/ cVs)

I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly
theorized or forwarded within the movement. My goal in this essay is to argue that base
building and dual power strategy can
be best forwarded through party organizing , and that party organizing can allow this emerging
movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States. One of the crucial
insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which
revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist
propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them.
The base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions
which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the
oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work
to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding
endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed. The
question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? If
it turns out that establishing
socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of
communism, how can we mobilize that base? Put simply: in order to mobilize the base which base builders
hope to create, we need to have already done the work of building a communist party. It is not enough
to simply meet peoples needs. Rather, we must build the institutions of dual power in the name of
communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist
party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are
organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must
be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party
organizing. By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such
organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line
determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for
holding party members accountable, unifying party member action around democratically determined
goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis. A communist organization utilizing the
party model works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to serve. Organizations
which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for revolutionary socialism. They
function as the forefront of political organizing, empowering local communities to theorize their
liberation through communist theory while organizing communities to literally fight for their liberation. A
party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism. Party organizing
has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and
informed by a unified national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on particular and unique
form at the local level, we need to remember that our
struggle is against a material base which functions not only at
the national but at the international level. The formal structures provided by a democratic centralist
party model allow individual locals to have a voice in open debate, but also allow for a unified strategy
to emerge from democratic consensus. Furthermore, party organizing allows for local organizations and
individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions. It allows criticism to function not as one
independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal
organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct chauvinist
ideas and actions. In the context of the socialist movement within the United States, such accountability is crucial. As a
movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently
infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these
ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing. Having a formal
party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples
needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to
occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows
community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and
participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in
communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions. We also must recognize
that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of such a national unified party in the present moment. Since
base building strategy is being undertaken in a number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon
these organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately undertake such complete
unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth
is currently occurring. What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside
building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth. The
movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the right direction. The independent party
emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to
explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal. In the meantime, individual
base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations
ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community
members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres
capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror. Dual power institutions must be unified openly and
transparently around these organizations in order for them to operate as more than “red charities.” Serving the people means meeting their
material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. The party model remains
the most useful method for achieving these ends. The use of the party model by local organizations allows base builders to
gain popular support, and most importantly, to mobilize their base of popular support towards revolutionary ends, not simply towards the
construction of a parallel economy which exists as an end in and of itself. It is my hope that we will see future unification of
the various local base building organizations into a national party, but in the meantime we must push for party
organizing at the local level. If local organizations adopt party organizing, it ought to become clear that a unified national
party will have to be the long term goal of the base building movement. Many of the already existing
organizations within the base building movement already operate according to these principles. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, my
hope is to suggest that we ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the
party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is
pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism. The long term details of base building and dual power organizing will
arise organically in response to the conditions the movement finds itself operating within. I
hope that I have put forward a useful
contribution to the discussion about base building organizing, and have demonstrated the need for
party organizing in order to ensure that the base building tendency maintains a revolutionary
orientation. The finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion. I
strongly believe party organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only
possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions from a loose network of
individual organizations into a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing
movement can succeed.
 1NC – DA
New CJR legislation becomes a gateway for mens rea reform – that guts enforcement
of corporate crimes.
Takei, 17 - Staff Attorney at the National Prison Project of the ACLU (Carl, "FROM MASS INCARCERATION TO MASS CONTROL, AND BACK AGAIN: HOW BIPARTISAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM MAY LEAD TO A FOR-
PROFIT NIGHTMARE," https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol20/iss2/3/ gac

- Mens rea means intention of committing a crime

Many in the left also harbor suspicions about the motives of conservative criminal justice reform
advocates. The Koch brothers and the Heritage Foundation frequently claim that companies and
businesspeople are “overcriminalized” and need protection from white-collar regulatory offenses with
loose mens rea requirements.259 As a result, some have accused conservatives of using criminal
justice reform as a “Trojan Horse” to advance corporate interests and weaken environmental
regulations.260 The conflict came to a head in late 2015 and early 2016, when Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-UT)
and Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R-VA) insisted that any bipartisan criminal justice legislation must include
provisions that stiffen mens rea requirements for white-collar crimes .261

Mens rea reform makes it impossible to prosecute corporate crimes.

Greg Dotson, 16 - is the Vice President for Energy Policy at the Center for American Progress. "Three Ways Congressional Mens rea Proposals Could Allow White Collar Criminals to Escape Prosecution"
3/11, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/criminal-justice/reports/2016/03/11/133113/three-ways-congressional-mens-rea-proposals-could-allow-white-collar-criminals-to-escape-prosecution/   DH

The Criminal Code Improvement Act, as introduced in the House of Representatives and advanced by the House Judiciary Committee, would
depart from this approach. The bill establishes a default mens rea requirement for federal criminal offenses if the relevant statute or regulation
is silent on it—in other words, where “no state of mind is required by law for a Federal criminal offense.” The default standard consists of two
parts. First, prosecutors would need to prove that defendants acted knowingly. That means that the defendants knew—or were not willfully
blind to—the facts that constitute their offense. For instance, if the law prohibits taking a specific action, such as transporting a dangerous
substance, prosecutors would need to prove that the defendants knew that they took that action. The second part of the proposed default
standard would add a significantly higher burden of proof for the prosecutor. The bill states: If the offense consists of conduct that a reasonable
person in the same or similar circumstances would not know, or would not have reason to believe, was unlawful, the Government must prove
that the defendant knew, or had reason to believe, the conduct was unlawful. In effect, prosecutors would not only have to prove that
defendants knew they took a prohibited action but also that they knew the action was prohibited by law. For example, in the case of the Peanut
Corporation of America, company officials were sentenced to prison for their roles in shipping salmonella-infected peanut products that
poisoned more than 700 people and killed nine people. If the proposed mens rea provision applied to conspiracy—one of the charges brought
in the case—prosecutors would have needed to prove both that the officials worked together to ship tainted peanut products and that they
understood that such action constituted an illegal conspiracy in order to convict on that charge. Meanwhile, S. 2298—the Mens rea Reform Act
—requires, with some exceptions, federal prosecutors to prove that defendants acted “willfully, with respect to any element [of a criminal
statute or regulation] for which the text of the covered offense does not specify a state of mind.” The bill defines “willfully” as acting “with
knowledge that the person’s conduct was unlawful.” The bill also heightens the challenge of prosecuting alleged criminals under a “knowingly”
standard by redefining that term to mean that they are “aware that it is practically certain” that their conduct will cause a criminal result. The
House and Senate language would have practical implications for the federal prosecution of corporate crime, as described in the following
section. Three ways the proposed mens rea requirements would hinder the prosecution of white-collar crime
The Criminal Code Improvement Act and the Mens rea Reform Act would impose a default mens rea standard that could make it more
difficult for federal prosecutors to win cases against corporate criminals. These bills could tip the scales of
justice toward alleged corporate criminals in three important ways. Allow white-collar criminals to
claim ignorance of the law—and win To prosecute a federal crime successfully under the new default standard, prosecutors
would have to prove that defendants actually knew or should have known that a certain action was prohibited by law. This overturns the age-
old maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse for breaking it. Corporate executives would have an incentive to remain ignorant of certain
company practices and the laws and regulations that apply to them in order to maintain a plausible defense. Current law allows prosecutors to
prove a defendant’s guilt based on the defendant’s “conscious avoidance” or “willful blindness.” In contrast, the DOJ expressed concern that
the default mens rea standard could allow criminal defendants to “escape liability—or at a minimum waste the federal judiciary’s time in
attempts to do so—by arguing that they did not know their conduct was illegal.” The Senate bill would apply the default mens rea standard
even in cases where questions about the applicable mens rea standard for a specific offense have already been resolved by the courts. This
could have the effect of trumping well-understood, settled law with a new requirement—that prosecutors prove that defendants acted with
knowledge that their conduct was unlawful. Robert Weissman, president of Public Citizen, testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee
about efforts to establish a default mens rea standard. He warned that the nature of corporate crimes “may pose special problems
of proof in establishing willfulness” and intent to commit a crime. Specifically, he noted that “diffuse responsibility
and decentralized decision-making may make it difficult to establish who, exactly, made a decision to break the law.” According to Anthony
Romero of the American Civil Liberties Union, if the mens rea proposal were implemented, it would “require prosecutors to prove that a
defendant was aware of the illegal nature of his or her actions and intended to cause them. Proving such intent would be nearly impossible for
many financial, environmental and regulatory crimes but relatively simple for drug and property crimes.” Even proponents of a default mens
rea standard have admitted that this provision could result in CEOs and other high-level executives avoiding prosecution. John G. Malcolm, a
senior legal fellow at the Heritage Foundation, wrote: “Will some senior corporate
management ‘fat cats’ benefit because
stricter mens rea requirements make it more difficult to prosecute them successfully? Possibly.” Weaken enforcement
of critical environmental, health, and safety statutes The DOJ testified that a default mens rea requirement “would
severely weaken important statutes critical to protecting public health and safety” and “insulate from liability those who profit from activities
that, if not carefully conducted, can kill or injure innocent citizens.” The DOJ noted that some health
and safety laws deliberately
exclude a mens rea requirement in order to place “the burden of compliance on those who are in the
best position to ensure their products and activities are safe.” It offered the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act as a
case study. This law does not apply an explicit mens rea requirement to the sale of adulterated foods, drugs, and medical devices. As a result,
the DOJ has been able to prosecute companies with lax hygiene and safety practices that led to consumer illness and death. In recent years, for
example, the DOJ successfully prosecuted two egg company executives who failed to adhere to food safety standards, causing a deadly
salmonella outbreak. Create years of costly litigation and legal uncertainty The proposed legislation contains ambiguous
language that guarantees there would be legal challenges based on interpretation. As a result, the default mens rea proposals could lead to
years of costly litigation that would only hamper criminal prosecution of guilty individuals. The proposed language could create confusion—and
therefore opportunities for litigation—in several ways. The House bill specifies that the default mens rea provision would apply to federal
criminal offenses where “no state of mind is required by law.” The bill fails to define “state of mind” and “required by law,” raising uncertainties
about whether the default mens rea standard would apply in cases where a mens rea standard has been established by judicial interpretation
of a federal statute rather than the statute itself. Similarly, the Senate bill applies the default requirement “to any element for which the text of
the covered offense does not specify a state of mind.” This language would create tremendous uncertainty by subjecting every element of an
offense to the default mens rea standard. Additionally, under the alternative mens rea standards in both bills, uncertainties would be raised
regarding how those standards might apply to new and existing laws and regulations. In the case of the Senate bill, the proposal’s redefinition
of the term “knowingly” would create new uncertainties even around criminal statutes that have applied the “knowingly” standard with clarity
for decades or longer. The proposed House legislation introduces additional confusion by applying the default mens rea standard “if the offense
consists of conduct that a reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances would not know, or would not have reason to believe, was
unlawful.” Therefore, before building a case that the defendant knew the conduct was unlawful—already a high burden of proof—the
prosecutor would have to conduct a broadly defined and unprecedented inquiry into whether a “reasonable” person would or would not know
whether certain conduct would violate the law. Defendants with good lawyers would be sure to use the ambiguity of this language to embroil
prosecutors in protracted litigation. The Senate bill carves out several exceptions to the default mens rea standard, but the exceptions are
limited and provide ample fodder for litigation. For example, it specifies that the default standard does not apply to “any element for which the
text of the covered offense makes clear that Congress affirmatively intended not to require the Government to prove any state of mind with
respect to such element.” The DOJ testified that this and other exceptions in the Senate proposal “would spawn numerous challenges to
whether elements of federal statutes meet the ambiguous ‘exceptions’ carved out by the legislation.” Conclusion If the default mens rea
provisions under discussion in the House of Representatives and the Senate become law, they could make it harder for prosecutors
to bring white-collar corporate criminals to justice. Language with such potentially significant consequences for human health,
the environment, and public safety has no place in a meaningful criminal justice reform effort .

U.S. kleptocrats link up globally – causes global kleptocracies and state collapse.
Judah 16, ~ featured in the New York Times, the Evening Standard, the Financial Times, the Independent, the Guardian, and Standpoint. His first book, Fragile Empire, was published by Yale University Press in 2013. His second book, This Is London, was published in
2016 and is long-listed for the Baillie Gifford Prize for Non-Fiction. In 2016, Ben was chosen as one of Forbes magazine's 30 under 30 in European media, The Kleptocracy Curse: Rethinking Containment, October,
https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/files/publications/20161020JudahTheKleptocracyCurseRethinkingContainment.pdf~~

The United States needs to start paying attention to what has happened to the world economy. Gigantic sums of money are now traveling the
world incognito. This has turned globalization into the golden
age of money laundering. Nestling in Western
economies are offshore financial structures (and their professional enablers) which allow funds to
instantaneously and anonymously jump between countries, empowering authoritarians and
corrupting Western institutions. This now presents a growing national security threat. Across the
world, money laundering on an epidemic scale is undermining American foreign policy: crippling development, threatening
democracy, damaging Western soft power and fueling state collapse. Across the West ,
this staggering flow of illicit funds has
turned authoritarian kleptocrats into powerful players increasingly able to wield power inside
Western institutions and game them to their own ends. There is only one way to block the illicit flows that empower
kleptocrats and undermine democracy: Ending anonymous shell companies must become a national security priority for the U.S. The
Kleptocrats Are Coming Until recently, most experts in the White House and the Kremlin believed that globalization was undermining
authoritarianism. Frenetic travel and instantaneous, at-a-click global finance–which allowed every moneyed actor to become a cross-border
operator if they chose to be–seemed to be eroding the autocrats’ institutions. Dictators, single parties, secret police chiefs, and embezzling
kleptocrats appeared to be globalizing badly. The United States and the European Union believed that the openness of the new century
generated an advantage for emerging middle classes, online-dissidents, NGOs, and democratic movements. The assumption that globalization’s
deep, structural motor undermines authoritarianism and furthers Western values and power underwrites much of the Obama administration’s
strategic thinking. Russia is viewed as a brittle power, whose institutions and actions “belong to the nineteenth century.”1 America, the current
administration believes, must approach Russia, China, and many other authoritarian states with “a strategic patience.”2 When Obama says
Russia “is on the wrong side of history” or that the U.S. is on the “right side of history,” this is much what he means.3 Panglossian confidence
has underestimated 21st century authoritarianism. Rather than retreat, democratize, and reform towards the rule of law, the autocratic ruling
classes of Russia, China, Central Asia, the Arabian Gulf, and beyond have globalized with great success. The openness of the new century, the
U.S. and the EU are now finding, is in fact rather well suited to the kleptocratic dictator–with a coterie of American lawyers, French bankers,
German accountants, and British public relations teams in tow. This is because globalization has created the golden age of money laundering.
Today, according to the International Monetary Fund, up to 5 percent of the world’s GDP is laundered money–and only 1 percent of it ever gets
spotted.4 It has never been simpler or safer to be a kleptocrat. Globalization’s deep, structural motors are in fact enabling authoritarian s.
Not
only can capital now mask itself and disappear without any trace, but gigantic sums of money are now
traveling the world in a concealed manner. Little by little, this has made the Western financial system
hospitable to kleptocrats.

Global kleptocracies cause extinction and amplify every conflict risk

Dziedzic 18, ~ not our Dziedzic, retired Colonel with over 20 years of experience in the international civil/military and stabilization field whose career blended the worlds of theory and practice. His scholarly
positions have included Professor at the Air Force Academy, the National War College, and Georgetown University and Senior Fellow and Senior Program Officer at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Institute for
National Strategic Studies, and US Institute of Peace. His field experience includes postings in a number of societies emerging from protracted conflict, including El Salvador, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. His publications include
works that have shaped the way the U.S. approaches peace and stability operations: Policing the New World Disorder identified a recurring "public security gap" in international interventions which led to the creation of the Center
of Excellence for Stability Police Units; Quest for Viable Peace proposed that "conflict transformation" is the essence of the transition from war to sustainable peace, and this concept was adopted by the State Department's
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization as the paradigm for U.S. strategic planning and was incorporated into the US Army Field Manual 3-07 on Stability Operations. His most recent publications (2016) are Criminalized
Power Structures: The Overlooked Enemies of Peace and Combating Criminalized Power Structures: A Toolkit, Kleptocratic Regimes and National Security: A Pervasive Threat and How it Can be Neutralized, traccc.gmu.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/Dziedzic_Report.pdf~

Taken together, President Trump’s declaration that corruption and human rights abuse constitute a national emergency and the catalogue of
threats identified in the NSS have recognized all of the topics discussed in this report (i.e., great power competitors, nuclear aspirants,
terrorism, organized crime, state failure, genocide, and obstruction of peace and stability operations). The central lesson that should be derived
is that kleptocratic
regimes are not an added threat that is competing in a zero-sum manner for scarce
national security resources; rather they are a cross-cutting national security threat that either causes
or contributes decisively to the threat actors already identified by the Trump Administration. Our first order of business is to
catalogue why kleptocratic regimes constitute a pervasive threat to national security. Our second purpose is to propose recommendations for
neutralizing this threat by being smarter about how we deal with it. These arguments are summarized below. Kleptocratic Regimes: A Pervasive
Threat to National Security ● Russian/Chinese kleptocracy, a systemic threat, and the general systemic threats posed by kleptocratic regimes
One of the greatest threats to U.S. national security is the corrosive impact of kleptocracy on geopolitical order. Kleptocracy and
financial secrecy have metastasized into an existential threat to our civilization. Vladimir Putin has
“weaponized” use of corruption for geopolitical ends. The convergence of corrupt values and practices in the former Soviet Union,
reformulated for the 21st century and exported to the West, now pose an encompassing threat. The
economic power of
kleptocrats like Putin is safeguarded in the West by our lack of transparency regarding the real owners
of corporations which allows kleptocrats to launder their illicit revenue in shell companies . We must
address these threats by enhancing transparency and closing off our financial system to those intent on damaging our country. ● Kleptocracy
and the Link to Terrorism, Radicalization, Fragile States, and Political Instability Inherent
in the nature of kleptocracies is
massive diversion of public funds for private gain. The consequences – inadequate resources for public
services, de-legitimization of the regime, and repression of dissent – fuel radicalization, state fragility,
and conflict. Extremist groups draw on public anger at the abuse of power. Prominent current
examples include the Houthi rebels in Yemen, the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria, and Boko Haram in Nigeria. The most salient cases where kleptocractic actors have posed a clear threat to U.S. counter-
terrorism and stabilization efforts are Afghanistan and Iraq. Systemic and high-level corruption – within governments we supported and funded
– funneled revenue out of the domestic economy, further impoverished the country, hollowed out security institutions, undermined the
legitimacy of the state, and fueled recruitment by insurgent and terrorist groups. Kleptocracy also has economic effects that slow growth,
thereby undercutting political stability. Corruption distorts markets by adding costs and creating inefficiencies, and it deters Foreign Direct
Investment. ● The “Convergence” among terrorism, organized crime, corruption and illicit power structures The
convergence of
terrorism, organized crime, corruption, and illicit power structures constitutes an alternative,
parasitic, global political economy that represents an existential threat to societies based on the rule of law. Their
effects have been exacerbated by the dramatic increase in the flow of goods and services, money, people, and data that have resulted from
globalization. Terrorists and criminals take advantage of these same flow paths and are able to do so invisibly as their transactions are lost in
the overwhelming volume of licit and illicit transactions. There is an increasing level of organizational collusion between international terrorist
organizations, organized crime and networked insurgencies (e.g., Hezbollah and the Sinaloa cartel). This threat is compounded by the collusion
of “mafia states” that utilize the traditional tools of statecraft, such as passports, airline and shipping registries, and diplomatic pouches, to
provide free passage to engage in criminal activity. ● Criminalized Power Structures: Leading Spoilers of Peace and Stability Operations
Criminalized power structures, defined as regimes that obtain and maintain power through
exploitation of illicit revenue, have been responsible for obstructing or thwarting peace processes in
at least 70% of the internal conflicts in which the United Nations has intervened since 1990.7 When the
U.S. has been involved--and this has included both peace and stability operations--the figure rises to 100% (i.e., Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo,
Afghanistan, and Iraq). Both the U.S. and the international community chronically overlook this problem. In the ten case studies examined in
Criminalized Power Structures: The Overlooked Enemies of Peace, almost five years elapsed before missions had the mandate and means to
mount a strategy to confront their kleptocratic spoilers.8 Not only had the “golden hour” been squandered, the legitimacy of the mission had
typically been severely compromised. This is perhaps the most likely explanatory factor for the 50% rate of return to conflict within five years
after an international intervention, as claimed by Kofi Annan.9
Case - cloud computing
 1NC – No Disease

1 – infectious diseases don’t cause extinction

Owen Cotton-Barratt 17, et al, PhD in Pure Mathematics, Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford,
Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute, 2/3/2017, Existential Risk: Diplomacy and
Governance, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf
For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37 However, there are some reasons to
believe thatnatural pandemics are very unlikely to cause human extinction. Analysis of the International Union for
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that of the 833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions
known to have occurred since 1500, less than 4% (31 species) were ascribed to infectious disease.38
None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors aside from
infectious disease also contributed to their extinction. It therefore seems that our own species, which is
very numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of a rational response to problems, is very unlikely to
be killed off by a natural pandemic.

One underlying explanation for this is that

highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a chance to
spread, so there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal. Therefore, pathogens are likely to co-
evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts.39

2 – no burnout - No extinction- burnout

Adalja 16—infectious-disease physician at the University of Pittsburgh [Amesh, “Why Hasn't Disease Wiped out the Human Race?”
6/17/2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/06/infectious-diseases-extinction/487514/ Accessed 5 July 2017]

In Michael Crichton’s The Andromeda Strain, the canonical book in the disease-outbreak genre, an alien microbe threatens the human
race with extinction, and humanity’s best minds are marshaled to combat the enemy organism. Fortunately, outside of fiction,
there’s no reason to expect alien pathogens to wage war on the human race any time soon , and my
analysis suggests that any real-life domestic microbe reaching an extinction level of threat probably is
just as unlikely. When humans began to focus their minds on the problems posed by infectious disease, human life ceased
being nasty, brutish, and short. Any apocalyptic pathogen would need to possess a very special
combination of two attributes. First, it would have to be so unfamiliar that no existing therapy or
vaccine could be applied to it. Second, it would need to have a high and surreptitious
transmissibility before symptoms occur. The first is essential because any microbe from a known
class of pathogens would, by definition, have family members that could serve as models for
containment and countermeasures. The second would allow the hypothetical disease to spread
without being detected by even the most astute clinicians. The three infectious diseases most
likely to be considered extinction-level threats in the world today— influenza, HIV, and Ebola—
don’t meet these two requirements. Influenza, for instance, despite its well-established ability to kill
on a large scale, its contagiousness, and its unrivaled ability to shift and drift away from our vaccines, is still what I
would call a “known unknown.” While there are many mysteries about how new flu strains emerge, from at least the time
of Hippocrates, humans have been attuned to its risk. And in the modern era, a full-fledged industry of
influenza preparedness exists, with effective vaccine strategies and antiviral therapies. HIV , which
has killed 39 million people over several decades, is similarly limited due to several factors. Most importantly,
HIV’s dependency on blood and body fluid for transmission (similar to Ebola) requires intimate
human-to-human contact, which limits contagion. Highly potent antiviral therapy allows most people to live
normally with the disease, and a substantial group of the population has genetic mutations that render them impervious to infection in
the first place. Lastly, simple prevention strategies such as needle exchange for injection drug users and
barrier contraceptives—when available—can curtail transmission risk. Ebola, for many of the same reasons as
HIV as well as several others, also falls short of the mark. This is especially due to the fact that it spreads
almost exclusively through people with easily recognizable symptoms , plus the taming of its once
unfathomable 90 percent mortality rate by simple supportive care. Beyond those three, every other known disease falls
short of what seems required to wipe out humans—which is, of course, why we’re still here. And
it’s not that diseases are ineffective. On the contrary, diseases’ failure to knock us out is a testament to just how resilient
humans are. Part of our evolutionary heritage is our immune system, one of the most complex on the
planet, even without the benefit of vaccines or the helping hand of antimicrobial drugs. This
system, when viewed at a species level, can adapt to almost any enemy imaginable. Coupled to
genetic variations amongst humans—which open up the possibility for a range of advantages,
from imperviousness to infection to a tendency for mild symptoms —this adaptability ensures
that almost any infectious disease onslaught will leave a large proportion of the population
alive to rebuild, in contrast to the fictional Hollywood versions. While the immune system’s role can never be understated, an
even more powerful protector is the faculty of consciousness . Humans are not the most prolific, quickly
evolving, or strongest organisms on the planet, but as Aristotle identified, humans are the rational animals—and it is this
fundamental distinguishing characteristic that allows humans to form abstractions, think in principles, and plan long-range. These
capacities, in turn, allow humans to modify, alter, and improve themselves and their
environments. Consciousness equips us, at an individual and a species level, to make nature safe
for the species through such technological marvels as antibiotics, antivirals, vaccines, and
sanitation. When humans began to focus their minds on the problems posed by infectious disease, human life ceased being nasty,
brutish, and short. In many ways, human consciousness became infectious diseases’ worthiest adversary.

3 – globalization makes disease ! inev

 1NC – No Ag impact
No farmageddon (castellaw)
1. There’s no warrant for agriculture causing NOKO, Russia, and China war – that
paragraph is just listing general security threats
2. The US can’t solve migration and famine – the US is causing the worst famine
crisis in Yemen
3. Population boom is about fragile African countries – the US doesn’t change that
Food insecurity is unlinked from war.
Cliffe 16 – Sarah F. Cliffe, the director of New York University’s Center on International Cooperation,
International Relations and International Economic Policy MA at Columbia University. [Food Security,
Nutrition, and Peace, 4-3-16, https://cic.nyu.edu/news_commentary/food-security-nutrition-and-
peace]//BPS

However, current research does not yet indicate a clear link between climate change, food insecurity and conflict ,
except perhaps where rapidly deteriorating water availability cuts across existing tensions and weak institutions. But a series of interlinked problems – changing
global patterns of consumption of energy and scarce resources, increasing demands for food imports (which draw on land, water, and energy inputs) can create
pressure on fragile situations. Food security – and food prices – are a highly political issue, being a very immediate and visible source of popular welfare or popular
uncertainty. But their link to conflict (and the wider links between climate change and conflict) is indirect rather than direct. What makes
some countries more resilient than others? Many countries face food price or natural resource shocks without falling

into conflict. Essentially, the two important factors in determining their resilience are: First, whether food insecurity is
combined with other stresses – issues such as unemployment, but most fundamentally issues such as political exclusion or human rights abuses.
We sometimes read nowadays that the 2006-2009 drought was a factor in the Syrian conflict, by driving rural-urban migration that caused societal stresses. It may
of course have been one factor amongst many but it
would be too simplistic to suggest that it was the primary driver of the
Syrian conflict. Second, whether
countries have strong enough institutions to fulfill a social compact with their citizens,
providing help quickly to citizens affected by food insecurity, with or without international assistance. During the 2007-2008
food crisis, developing countries with low institutional strength experienced more food price protests than those with higher institutional strengths, and more than
half these protests turned violent. This for example, is the difference in the events in Haiti versus those in Mexico or the Philippines where far greater institutional
strength existed to deal with the food price shocks and protests did not spur deteriorating national security or widespread violence.
 1NC – AT Healthcare
1 – health care fraud non unique – private sector has too much discretion in the squo
2 – Big Data doesn’t solve health care --- not integrated or interoperable, and patients
are biased against its use
Neff 13 (Gina Neff, PhD, Department of Communications University of Washington, Seattle,
Washington, “Why Big Data Won't Cure Us,” NCBI, Sep 2013,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4114418/)

The biggest challenge for the use of “big data” in health care is social , not technical. Data-intensive approaches
to medicine based on predictive modeling hold enormous potential for solving some of the biggest and most intractable problems of health
care. The challenge now is figuring out how people, both patients and providers, will actually use data in practice. To
understand how data-intensive solutions could have an impact on health care, our research team talked to frontline providers in impoverished
and rural areas, technology enthusiasts in mobile health and health IT startups, clinicians and researchers in major research hospitals,
Quantified Self members at data-driven meetup presentations of massive amounts of tracking data, and attendees at the growing number of
conferences for health technology and innovation up and down both coasts. I found the buzz as feverishly loud around health information
innovation as it was during my research on the first dot-com boom. One of our findings from this research seems at first blush so obvious that it
is hard to believe it has been overlooked in the design and implementation of health-care innovation technologies. Namely, people
imagine data in very different ways. Understanding this key fact about data helps us understand why so-
called “big data” solutions to health care are so difficult to implement in practice. Doctors, patients, and
health-care entrepreneurs all value data in very different ways . One physician simply said, “I don't need more data; I
need more resources.”* Saying this in Silicon Valley or at TedMed would be tantamount to heresy. Ditto for those of us who work in research
and spend our careers collecting, massaging, managing, analyzing, and interpreting data. From the doctor's perspective, though, data require
(and do not save) extra interpretive, clerical, and managerial labor. This perspective on “data,” at least with regard to current clinical practice, is
that data use up more resources than the benefits they provide. In other words, most
doctors think data innovation means
more work for them, not less, and takes away time from what they see as their key priorities in
providing quality care. In another setting, we observed nurse-practitioner case managers in a Medicare demonstration project working
with a simple algorithm parsing patient-entered health data. Combined with case management, these data provided a look into the daily health
of chronically ill elderly patients and a pathway for the care when it was needed. The data in that project were tightly tied to medical expertise
within an existing clinic where a trusted person could initiate a chain of care responses. Although widely recognized as a clinical
success, Medicare pulled the plug on the project for financial reasons—expertise is expensive. These two reactions to
data-intensive pilot projects highlight the dilemmas of data-analytic approaches to health care. Businesses are in
the thrall of the possibilities of ever-increasing predictive analysis on expanding troves of generated data. While the business and
technology sectors see data as valuable, doctors often see data as costs, risks, and liabilities . And for
many in health care, data are not seen as a source of value, but of additional work . Without the work
needed to make data valuable and useful in particular settings in particular contexts in health care, big data will never solve
problems. To turn a technology truism on its head, data in health care will never be free. And yet, the ways in which health
technology innovators have talked about the power of data neglects key aspects of the social
interoperability or integration of data into health solutions. How will such data be integrated into care providers' work
practices; through the complex routines of clinics and hospitals; and into existing legal, social, political, and economic frameworks? These
questions are enormous. Until we solve these questions of social interoperability, the risks presented by
“big data” in health will outweigh the benefits to any particular individual, regardless of whether we're talking about terabyte-
scale analytics or the “small-data” of n=1 individuals. What follows is an outline of how to tackle these questions based upon what our team has
seen throughout our research. Why Think About Big Data in Health? Two types of data are generating excitement for application in the health-
care field. The first type is big data, or analytics of multiple types of data across a population, potentially from multiple sources, of structured
and unstructured nature (i.e., readily merged into traditional database structures or not) and of heterogeneous kinds of objects (text, numbers,
images, documents, locations). The hope for such data is simply stated by Ginger.io—one of the many rapidly emerging startups in this field
because of what they might reveal across many people—in their tagline “Big data, better health.”1 Such data are neither new nor novel, but
more are being generated. This is not so much a new kind of data but huge amounts of it. Assembled and analyzed, it could all be a potential
valuable resource. Or it could be what privacy guru Bruce Schneier calls the “pollution” of the information age, a byproduct produced by
virtually every technological process,2 something that is more costly to manage than its value. The second type is what Cornell NYC Tech
professor Deborah Estrin has called “small data,” the output of a whole host of pervasive tracking processes about any one individual user.3 On
the avant-garde of using this type of data are those involved in the “quantified self,” or QS movement, who enthusiastically measure and track
a variety of aspects of their everyday lives. As any reader of Benjamin Franklin knows, personal tracking is not new, but it is made newly
relevant and accessible with the possibilities presented by ubiquitous and pervasive computing of smartphones, digital activity trackers, Wi-Fi–
enabled scales, and other such devices. Melanie Swan's recent review in this publication addresses the potential of such small data approaches,
technologies, and practices for creating the QS founders term an “exoself,” a digital representation modeling the body, the self, and the
behavior.4 Such “big” and “little” data both hold exciting possibilities for the discovery of patterns. Patterns in this data can be inspiring,
wondrous, curious, surprising, and yet frustratingly tough to interpret. Big data approaches to health-care research promise the possibility of
larger study populations than ever thought possible. Advances in computing and communication mean more, and different types of data can be
linked and analyzed across more people in novel ways. Recent initiatives such as the Health Data Exploration Project, based at the University of
California at San Diego (UCSD) and backed by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation's Pioneer Portfolio, are trying to figure out practically and
ethically how to scale up and aggregate personal health data across many individuals for larger-scale research.5 The potential for the discovery
of new, previously unseen connections makes data-intensive health an exciting research frontier, and the possibility of contributing to discovery
and the public good may be a big motivator for people in allowing their data to be used by researchers. But data discoveries do not necessarily
benefit the same people generating, producing, and sharing the most minute and intimate details of their lives. Data-driven discovery
in health care may produce a public benefit that comes at a cost or risk to the privacy of the individuals
who make such discovery possible . Applying cutting-edge research from any domain to routine clinical
care is challenging. As always, just because there is exciting research that presents a lot of possibilities, it doesn't mean that a very
traditional set of social institutions will change. We can talk about how big data may disrupt health care in the future, but what we have found
through our research is that the established ways of practicing and organizing health care are deeply entrenched. Big Data Solutions Are Not Yet
Connected to Care To use a medical metaphor, “bench science,” or data-intensive health research, is currently further advanced than
“translational science,” or the clinical practice of data-intensive medicine. We need now to connect data-derived insights to clinical care and
translational medical expertise. Whether data are gathered across a population or for a consumer's own personal use, there exist few
mechanisms for using these types of data as resource for the diagnosis and care of individuals. Making these types of data socially
interoperable means understanding the differences in how people generate, use, and even talk about data. Big
data has a rhetoric
problem. When people talk about data-driven health innovation they often neglect the power of
framing information as “data.” They also assume that everyone thinks about health data the same way they do. Regardless of how it
is generated, digital information only becomes data when it is created as such. Calling traces of digital behavior or personal histories data masks
bigger questions: data for whom and what purposes; data when and data why? Information useful for the online marketer is not necessarily
useful for the patient or the clinician or the researcher. Data are meaningful because of how someone collects, interprets, and forms arguments
with it. Data are not neutral . This is why Lisa Gitelman calls raw data an “oxymoron,” a contradiction in terms that hides the reality of
the work involved in creating data.6 Data, I argue in an article with Brittany Fiore-Silfvast, are so important precisely because people make (or
imagine) data function across multiple social worlds.7 Data are not inherently important or interesting, rather, by definition, data are used to
make arguments relative. Put simply, data is only data in the eye of the stakeholder . Take patients' own mobile health and
wellness data. Patients feel, in part, that such data are significant because they reflect their stories and provide opportunities to connect and
converse with care providers and others. Consumer-directed (as opposed to medically regulated) mobile apps offer new ways of encouraging
and supporting the behavioral changes that improve health, whether or not medical expertise is brought to the data. A primary care doctor isn't
likely to be interested in routine pedometer readings for most of her patients but is very interested in encouraging sedentary patients to be
more active. Here, data are not as useful for diagnosis or clinical decision making (although we can imagine several scenarios in which they
could be) as they are for self-reflection and individual change. Yet, when clinicians talk about data, they tend to prioritize what data can do
clinically for diagnosis, treatment, or decision making. Data from mobile health and wellness applications may have little utility for clinical
decisions. Individuals' mobile health data may be problematic for their health-care providers because these
data bring issues of reliability, liability, and cost to the clinician for clerical and diagnostic time, with little
promise—at least for now—of improving clinical outcomes . This is one example of how different stakeholders have
different expectations for what they call data. Even as people's use of digital media for getting and sharing health
information increases, such data are not yet routine parts of conversations between patients and their
providers. Patients are using digital media for social support with family, friends, and people with similar conditions, but cannot use these
tools to communicate with their health-care providers. Translating what counts as data across the social worlds of patients and health-care
providers is the first step. Sharing data across the social worlds of patients and providers is one of the significant obstacles in big data health.
Researchers have these data translation problems, too . A biostatistician highlighted this difference between the different
data cultures of clinicians and researchers: “Physicians are typing away madly. All that information is actually very rich.”8 Where a
biostatistician may have seen value in physician's notes for a while, the rest of us are only now coming to see that they might be data that can
be mined for value. On the other hand, contexts, not just numbers, matter to health-care providers. This was evident when we watched how
clinical care case managers talked about and made allowances for algorithmically parsed data about their patients. They explained variation
within and across the numbers of each of their cases from first-hand experience and interpersonal interactions, in effect doing data
interpretation on the fly. As one clinical information systems researcher put this adjudication between data and context, “A computer usually
looks at one small aspect of the patient's problem but doesn't get the context. An expert doctor can understand the huge picture of what's
going on with a patient.”9 People
in the different social worlds of health care —such as lab analysts, startup
entrepreneurs, clinical health-care providers, patient, online consumers, and insurers—all think of data
differently and do (or hope to do) varying work with that data. Currently, we don't have very good bridges
for data to cross these social worlds of health care . The routines and practices of the clinical care for
patients are not connected, for the most part, to data analytics . The guidelines being issued by the Office of the National
Coordinator for Health IT go a long way in providing the kind of leadership necessary for translational data science.10 For example, the first of
these guidelines maps how hospitals and other stakeholders can use analytics of their patients' electronic health records to reduce hospital
readmission rates. These data-intensive strategies may work better for larger organizations with more resources than in smaller clinics or for
individual doctors. Care
providers do not have the time, expertise, or resources to utilize predictive analytics
or quantified self–inspired metrics for patient care , and translating research into clinical care takes time
and work. There is little time to go over data from medical devices in the course of a clinical visit, much
less from the plethora of lifestyle devices that are being marketed for self-tracking.

3 – wakefield ev is in the context of access to affordable health insurance – they don’t

solve
Case – encryption
 1NC – No nuke terror
1 – no nuke terror – people like Allison are hacks
 Two decades of threats haven’t panned out
 Too many things can go wrong:
Getting trusted collaborators
Stealing and transporting guarded material
Getting the top technicians in the world
No ability to test
Skilled detonation crew
All that while attracting zero attention
 Weapons have safety devices, are stored in pieces in different places
 Terrorists are like Bond villains that scheme instead of accomplishing anything
 Most attacks are bombs which don’t even work

Mueller and Stewart 10/29/18 [John Mueller is Woody Hayes Senior Research Scientist, Mershon
Center for International Security Studies, and adjunct professor of Political Science, at Ohio State
University. He is also a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington. Mark G. Stewart is Professor of
Civil Engineering and Director of the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at The
University of Newcastle in Australia. Terrorism and Bathtubs: Comparing and Assessing the Risks.
October 29, 2018. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2018.1530662?
journalCode=ftpv20]

However, there is of course no guarantee that things will remain that way, and the 9/11 attacks inspired the remarkable
extrapolation that, because the terrorists were successful with box cutters, they might soon be able to
turn out weapons of mass destruction— particularly nuclear ones—and then detonate them in an American
city. For example, in his influential 2004 book, Nuclear Terrorism, Harvard’s Graham Allison relayed his “considered judgment”
that “on the current path, a nuclear terrorist attack on America in the decade ahead is more likely than
not.”11 Allison has had a great deal of company in his alarming pronouncements. In 2007, the distinguished physicist Richard Garwin put the
likelihood of a nuclear explosion on an American or European city by terrorist or other means at 20 percent per year, which would work out to
91 percent over the eleven-year period to 2018.12

Allison’s time is up, and so is Garwin’s. These off-repeated warnings have proven to be empty. And it is important to
point out that not only have terrorists failed to go nuclear, but as William Langewiesche, who has assessed the process in
detail, put it in 2007, “The best information is that no one has gotten anywhere near this. I mean, if you look
carefully and practically at this process, you see that it is an enormous undertaking full of risks for the
would-be terrorists.”13 That process requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other
criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with
top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into
position to be detonated by a skilled crew, all the while attracting no attention from outsiders.

Nor have terrorist groups been able to steal existing nuclear weapons—characteristically burdened with
multiple safety devices and often stored in pieces at separate secure locales—from existing arsenals as was once
much feared. And they certainly have not been able to cajole leaders in nuclear states to palm one off to
them—though a war inflicting more death than Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined was launched against Iraq in 2003 in major part under the
spell of fantasies about such a handover.14
More generally, the actual terrorist “adversaries” in the West scarcely deserve accolades for either
dedication or prowess. It is true, of course, that sometimes even incompetents can get lucky, but such instances, however tragic, are
rare. For the most part, terrorists in the United States are a confused, inadequate, incompetent,
blundering, and gullible bunch, only occasionally able to get their act together. Most seem to be far
better at frenetic and often self-deluded scheming than at actual execution. A summary assessment by RAND’s
Brian Jenkins is apt: “their numbers remain small, their determination limp, and their competence poor .”15 And
much the same holds for Europe and the rest of the developed world .16 Also working against terrorist success in the
West is the fact that almost all are amateurs: they have never before tried to do something like this . Unlike criminals they
have not been able to develop street smarts.

Except perhaps for the use of vehicles to deliver mayhem (though this idea is by no means new in the history of terrorism), there
has been
remarkably little innovation in terrorist weaponry or methodology since 9/11.17 Like their predecessors, they
have continued to rely on bombs (many of which fail to detonate or do much damage) and bullets.18

2 – only solves domestic application - all of their ev is about international terrorists –

no ev that says people in the US will hav nukes now
3 – bunn roth and toby about Pakistan having nukes