108.A21-D – RPC Arts.

21-48
Penalties

Instructions.
1. Answer this as if it were the Bar Exam.
2. Do not refer to notes or other materials when answering this exam.
3. Answer the exam in no more than xx minutes.

1. Discuss the maxim “Nullum crimen, nulla poena, sine lege” and its rationale.
Translated literally, it means “[There is] No crime without a law punishing [it].” An act or omission cannot be
punished by the State if at the time it was committed there was no law prohibiting it, because a law cannot be
rationally obeyed unless it is first shown, and a man cannot be expected to obey an order that has not been given.
2. A man sold fraudulent copies of works of art of another between the years 1970 and 2000. By 2012, the first
copyright law was effective. Decide on the man’s criminal liability, if any.
A was charged with "fraud or infringement of literary rights or property," because A allegedly reproduced
and sold fraudulent copies of another's literary work. At that time, we had no copyright law. Can A be punished for
such act? No, because there was no law at that time defining and penalizing the act. (U.S. vs. Yam Tung Way, 21 Phil.
67)
3. A man was charged for violation of Law ABC punishable by a fine but not imprisonment. During the pendency of
his case, Law DEF was passed that provided imprisonment for failure to pay the fine. Decide whether the judge
should include imprisonment as a penalty.
Subsidiary penalty for a crime cannot be imposed, if it was "not prescribed by law prior to its commission."
Macasaet was charged with and convicted of a violation of the Internal Revenue Law (Act No. 1189)
punishable by a fine. That law did not provide imprisonment for failure to pay the fine by reason of insolvency.
During the pendency of his case, Act No. 1732 took effect and provided subsidiary imprisonment for failure to pay the
fine under Act No. 1189. Inasmuch as Act No. 1732 did not go into force until after the commission of the crime by
Macasaet, subsidiary imprisonment cannot be lawfully imposed. (U.S. vs. Macasaet (11 Phil. 447))
4. Discuss the applicability of Art. 22 to the provisions of the RPC.
Its application to the Revised Penal Code can only be invoked where some former or subsequent law is under
consideration. It must necessarily relate (1) to penal laws existing prior to the Revised Penal Code, in which the
penalty was less severe than those of the Code; or (2) to laws enacted subsequent to the Revised Penal Code, in which
the penalty is more favorable to the accused.
5. Discuss the rules and exceptions relating to the effectivity of criminal laws.
The general rule is to give criminal laws prospective effect, except when the law is favorable to the accused or
if the accused is a habitual criminal.
However, the exception may be overruled if the law provides otherwise as in the case of R.A. No. 4661: "The
provisions of this amendatory Act shall not apply to cases of libel already filed in court at the time of approval of this
amendatory Act." The rule that criminal laws have retroactive effect when favorable to the accused has no application
where the new law is expressly made inapplicable to pending actions or existing causes of action. (Tavera vs. Valdez,
1 Phil. 468, 470-471)
Art. 22 applies to a law dealing with prescription of an offense which is intimately connected with that of the
penalty, for the length of time for prescription depends upon the gravity of the offense. (People vs. Moran, 44 Phil.
387, 400) When the new law reduces the period of prescription of criminal actions or establishes easier requirements
to give the prescription effect, the reduction conceded by the new law implies an acknowledgment on the part of the
sovereign power that the more severe requirements of the former law were unjust in regard to the essence of the
criminal action. (People vs. Parel, 44 Phil. 437, 442)
Art. 22 is applicable even if the accused is already serving sentence. (Escalante vs. Santos, 56 Phil. 483, 485).
The favorable retroactive effect of a new law may find the defendant in one of these three situations:
a) The crime has been committed and prosecution begins;
 b) Sentence has been passed but service has not begun;

c) The sentence is being carried out. (Escalante vs. Santos, 56 Phil. 483)

In any case, the favorable new statute benefits him and should apply to him.

The sovereign, in enacting a subsequent penal law more favorable to the accused, has recognized that the
greater severity of the former law is unjust. The sovereign would be inconsistent if it would still enforce its right
under conditions of the former law. (People vs. Moran, 44 Phil. 387, 414)
The principle that criminal statutes are retroactive so far as they favor the culprit does not apply to civil
liability, because the rights of offended persons or innocent third parties are not within the gift of arbitrary disposal of
the State. But a new law increasing the civil liability cannot be given retroactive effect. (People vs. Panaligan, C.A., 40
O.G. 207)
6. Define a habitual criminal.
A person shall be deemed to be a habitual delinquent if within a period of ten years from the date of his
release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robbery, theft, estafa, or falsification,
he is found guilty of any said crimes a third time or oftener. (last paragraph of Rule 5, Art. 62)
7. Discuss the characteristic of an ex post facto law.
An ex post facto law is one which:
a) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such
an act;

b) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed;

c) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed;

d) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required
at the time of the commission of the offense;

e) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for
something which when done was lawful; and

f) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.

(Mejia vs. Pamaran, Nos. L-56741-42, April 15,1988, 160 SCRA 457, 472)
CAPTAD (Criminalization, aggravation, punishment, testimony, assumption, depravation)

8. The petitioner slapped and use offensive language to a teacher in the public school, then was found guilty of
assault upon a public official and sentenced to the penalty of Art. 251 of the old Penal Code. Article 149 of the
Revised Penal Code does not prescribe a penalty for such an act. Discuss whether the convicted person should
be set free in view of the amendatory law. (Lagrimas case)
The intention of the Legislature in embodying this provision of Art. 366 in the Revised Penal Code was to
insure that the elimination from this Code of certain crimes penalized by former acts before the enforcement of this
Code should not have the effect of pardoning guilty persons who were serving their sentences for the commission of
such crimes. Lagrimas vs. Director of Prisons (57 Phil. 249)
Dissenting: If the new law totally eliminates the penalty, it is decidedly favorable to the accused and the new
law should be applied in accordance with Art. 22.
9. The accused was convicted in a Justice of the Peace Court for the violation of a municipal ordinance. While his
appeal was pending, a subsequent municipal ordinance expressly repealed the prior ordinance. (Tamayo case)
A person cannot be prosecuted, convicted, and punished for acts no longer criminal. Case dismissed.
10. Distinguish between the Lagrimas case and the Tamayo case.
It would seem that in the Lagrimas case, the Legislature reenacted in the Revised Penal Code the provision of
Art. 251 of the old Penal Code, with the difference that Art. 149 of the Revised Penal Code does not punish an assault
upon a public school teacher. If this is the case, Art. 149 of the Revised Penal Code did not absolutely repeal Art. 251
of the old Code. On the other hand, in the Tamayo case, the repeal was absolute. When the repeal is by reenactment,
the court has jurisdiction to try and punish an accused person under the old law. Criminal liability under a former law
is obliterated when the repeal is absolute. (U.S. vs. Cuna, 12 Phil. 241, 247)
11. Discuss the effect to criminal liability due to a repeal of a law.
Criminal liability under the repealed law subsists:
a) When the provisions of the former law are reenacted; or

b) When the repeal is by implication; or

c) When there is a saving clause. (U.S. vs. Cuna, 12 Phil. 241; Wing vs. U.S., 218 U.S. 272)

The right to punish offenses committed under an old penal law is not extinguished if the offenses are still
punished in the repealing penal law. (U.S. vs. Cuna, 12 Phil. 241; People vs. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328)
When a penal law, which impliedly repealed an old law, is itself repealed, the repeal of the repealing law
revives the prior penal law, unless the language of the repealing statute provides otherwise.
There is no retroactive effect of penal laws as regards jurisdiction of court. The jurisdiction of a court to try a
criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the time of instituting the action, not at the time of the
commission of the crime. (People vs. Romualdo, 90 Phil. 739, 744)
The jurisdiction of the courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or
information, and not by the findings the court may make after trial. (People vs. Mission, 87 Phil. 641, 642)
12. Discuss the effect of a pardon by the offended party.
Even if the injured party already pardoned the offender, the fiscal can still prosecute the offender. Such
pardon by the offended party is not even a ground for the dismissal of the complaint or information. A crime
committed is an offense against the State. In criminal cases, the intervention of the aggrieved parties is limited to being
witnesses for the prosecution. (People vs. Despavellador, 53 O.G. 21797) Only the Chief Executive can pardon the
offenders. (Art. 36)
The offended party in the crimes of adultery and concubinage cannot institute criminal prosecution, if he shall
have consented or pardoned the offenders. (Art. 344, par. 2) But the pardon afforded the offenders must come before
the institution of the criminal prosecution. (People vs. Infante, 57 Phil. 138 — adultery; People vs. Miranda, 57 Phil.
274 — seduction) When a complaint has already been filed in court, a motion to dismiss based solely on the pardon by
the offended party will be denied by the court.
13. Discuss the effect of a compromise to criminal liability.
A public offense must be prosecuted and punished by the Government on its own motion even though
complete reparation should have been made of the damage suffered by the offended party. (People vs. Benitez, 59
O.G. 1407) There may be a compromise upon the civil liability arising from an offense; but such compromise shall not
extinguish the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty. (Art. 2034, Civil Code)
14. Discuss why the enumerations in Art. 24 are not considered penalties.
They are not penalties, because they are not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. Those mentioned in
paragraphs Nos. 1,3 and 4 are merely preventive measures before conviction of offenders. The commitment of a minor
mentioned in paragraph 2 is not a penalty, because it is not imposed by the court in a judgment of conviction. The
imposition of the sentence in such case is suspended. The "fines" mentioned in paragraph 4 are not imposed by the
court, because when imposed by the court, they constitute a penalty. (See Art. 25) The Commissioner of Civil Service
may, on certain grounds, fine an employee in an amount not exceeding six months' salary.
15. A person accused of estafa under the old Penal Code pleaded guilty upon arraignment and thereafter began
serving sentence. While serving sentence, the Revised Penal Code took effect. Under the old Penal Code, plea of
guilty was not a mitigating circumstance. Discuss the effect of the of the effectivity of the RPC to the person’s
sentence.
The Supreme Court took into account the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty provided for in Art. 13,
par. 7, of the Revised Penal Code, as such mitigating circumstance had the effect of decreasing the penalty already
imposed. (Rodriguez vs. Director of Prisons, 57 Phil. 133, 135-136)
16. Discuss the effect of a judgment sentencing an individual to serve “five years in Bilibid,” “ cadena perpetua,” or
“hard labor.”
The penalties which may be imposed, according to the RPC are those included in Art. 25 only. Any other
sentence cannot be imposed because it is not authorized by the RPC. Such errors may be corrected in appeal.
17. A RTC judge tried and convicted a man for the crimes of robbery with homicide and attempted homicide and
sentenced him to “reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.” (People vs. Penillos, 205 SCRA 546, G.R. No. 65673)
Discuss the effect of such judgment.
The RPC does not prescribe the penalty of life imprisonment for any of the felonies therein defined. Reclusion
perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years (Under R.A. No. 7659, the duration of reclusion perpetua
is now from 20 years and 1 day to 40 years.) after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon. It also carries
with it accessory penalties. It is not the same as life imprisonment which, for one thing, does not carry with it any
accessory penalty, and for another, does not appear to have any definite extent or duration.
"As early as 1948, in People vs. Mobe, reiterated in PP vs. Pilones and in the concurring opinion of Justice
Ramon Aquino in People vs. Sumadic, this Court already made it clear that reclusion perpetua is not the same as
imprisonment for life or life imprisonment. Every Judge should take note of the distinction and this Court expects
that, henceforth, no trial judge should mistake one for the other."
18. Enumerate and discuss the penalties (in the RPC) according to: classification and divisibility, subject matter, and
gravity.
There are two classes of penalties:
a) principal penalties, those expressly imposed by the court in the judgment of conviction, and may be further
classified into

1. divisible penalties, which are those that have fixed duration and are divisible into three
periods; and
2. indivisible penalties, which are:
a. death;
b. reclusion perpetua;
c. perpetual absolute or special disqualification; and
d. public censure; and
b) accessory penalties, those deemed included in the imposition of the principal penalties.

There are five classes of penalties according to subject matter:

a) Corporal (death).

c) Deprivation of freedom (reclusion, prision, arresto).

d) Restriction of freedom (destierro).

e) Deprivation of rights (disqualification and suspension).

f) Pecuniary (fine).
 There are four classes of penalties according to gravity:
a) Capital,

g) Afflictive (a fine exceeding PHP 6000),

h) Correctional (a fine not less than PHP 200 but not exceeding PHP 6000),

i) Light (a fine of less than PHP 200).

19. Discuss the appropriateness of a court’s criticism of the actions of an acquitted accused.
In the case of People vs. Abellera, the accused was reprimanded by the court in his capacity as clerk of court
for various acts not material to the issue, such as his acceptance of free meals and transportation from litigants, while
the charge was infidelity in the custody of public documents, of which he was acquitted. (People vs. Meneses, 74 Phil.
119, 125, 127)