NO.

____________ JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT

B96A6CCC-8B40-4DC8-9F3C-AB6C8BB5D210 : 000001 of 000024

DIVISION_________
JUDGE______________

ELECTRONICALLY FILED

MARGO BORDERS PLAINTIFF

v. COMPLAINT

BRETT HANKISON, individually

and

WES TROUTMAN, individually

and

STEVEN CONRAD, individually and in his Official Capacity

and

ERIC BLACK, individually

and

THOMAS SCHARDEIN, individually

and

MICHAEL KING, individually

and

UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS, individually

and

MONCELL ALLEN

and

TIN ROOF ACQUISITION COMPANY, LLC DEFENDANTS

1610 16th Ave South
Nashville, TN 37212

1
 Serve: English Goldsborough

B96A6CCC-8B40-4DC8-9F3C-AB6C8BB5D210 : 000002 of 000024

3921 Shelbyville Rd.
Louisville, KY 40207

*** *** *** *** ***

Comes the Plaintiff, Margo Borders, by and through counsel, and hereby

states and avers as follows in support of her Complaint against the Defendants:

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Brett Hankison is a 44-year-old sexual predator. For years, he has used his

police uniform and secondary night club employment as mechanisms to prey on

innocent women who are two decades younger than him. Hankison’s playbook has

been confirmed by several courageous victims: spot young women which fit his type;

build trust with them through law enforcement status; add the women as friends to

social media accounts; identify the women when they are at the bar in a vulnerable

or intoxicated state; take the women home as their designated driver in a police

uniform; make advances towards the women; sexually pursue the women and, if they

do not consent or are otherwise incapable of consenting, sexually assault them.

When Margo Borders visited Tin Roof by herself on April 20, 2018 Hankison used his

playbook to sexually assault her, leaving her physically injured and mentally

battered. 1

This is an action for compensatory and punitive damages associated with

Defendant Hankison’s conduct. Additionally, this is an action against those who,

despite knowing of Defendant Hankison’s regular practice of preying on vulnerable

women while acting with the coercive authority of the power vested in police officers,

1Margo arrived at Tin Roof on April 20, 2018. She was sexually assaulted by the Defendant after the
bar closed on the morning of April 21, 2018.

2
took no action to report his abuse, took no reasonable steps to investigate his abuse,

B96A6CCC-8B40-4DC8-9F3C-AB6C8BB5D210 : 000003 of 000024

took no action to safeguard against his abuse, cleared complaints against him

internally without making a record of the complaints and/or took other action to

actively conceal Defendant Hankison’s conduct.

PARTIES

1. Plaintiff is an adult female and resident of Louisville, Kentucky.

2. Defendant Brett Hankison was, at all times relevant herein, a Louisville

Metro Police Officer residing in both Louisville and Taylorsville, KY. Hankison, at all

times relevant herein, also worked for Tin Roof in an agency and/or employment

capacity. Hankison is sued in his individual capacity.

3. Defendants Wes Troutman, Eric Black, Thomas Schardein, Michael

King, Steve Conrad and Unknown Defendants were, at all times relevant herein,

members of the Louisville Metro Police Department who worked with Defendant

Hankison and who knew or should have known of Hankison’s predatory conduct.

They are each sued in their individual capacities.

4. Defendant Conrad was, at all times relevant herein, the police chief of

the Louisville Metro Police Department. He is sued both in his individual capacity and

his official capacity.

5. Upon information and belief, Defendant Moncell Allen is a resident of

Tennessee who, at all times relevant herein, was a manager at the Tin Roof bar on

Shelbyville Road in Louisville, Jefferson County, KY.

6. Upon information and belief, Defendant Tin Roof Acquisition Company

is a foreign limited liability company with a principal place of business in Nashville,

3
Tennessee. This Defendant, at all times relevant herein, operated a bar at 3921

B96A6CCC-8B40-4DC8-9F3C-AB6C8BB5D210 : 000004 of 000024

Shelbyville Road in Louisville.

7. Upon information and belief, there are Unnamed Defendants (hereafter

“Unknown Defendants”) who were, at all times relevant herein, employed by

Louisville Metro Government and who ratified, concealed or failed to act upon

Hankison’ conduct as described herein. They are sued in their individual capacities.

8. The addresses of the individual Defendants herein have not been

affixed to this Complaint due to privacy concerns.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

9. Jurisdiction and venue in this Court are proper as Plaintiff, a resident of

Jefferson County, Kentucky, seeks damages in excess of the jurisdictional thresholds

of this Court and the conduct giving rise to this action took place in Louisville,

Jefferson County, Kentucky.

FACTS

10. In 2018, Defendant Hankison was a detective with the Louisville Metro

Police Department.

11. By this point, Hankison had accumulated a record of red flagged

conduct which LMPD continuously overlooked and ignored.

12. Hankison had been the subject of at least two Public Integrity Unit

investigations which included allegations of sexual misconduct.

13. In one, it was alleged that Hankison demanded sexual favors in

exchange for not placing criminal charges on a victim. Hankison was exonerated.

4
 14. In another, it was alleged that Hankison made advances towards a

B96A6CCC-8B40-4DC8-9F3C-AB6C8BB5D210 : 000005 of 000024

woman and tried to date her while she was the subject of an active investigation.

Hankison was exonerated.

15. Hankison, while employed with LMPD, also engaged in dozens of use

of force incidents and was exonerated on all of them.

16. Hankison’s red flags even existed at the time of his hiring. When he left

the Lexington Police Department, it was noted that the department would not

recommend him for employment elsewhere. LMPD elected to disregard this advice

and hired him anyways.

17. Hankison’s file reflects more than 50 internal incident reports

surrounding his actions which resulted in no discipline whatsoever.

18. Beginning in 2013, Hankison engaged in secondary employment with

Tin Roof.

19. Hankison, while working at Tin Roof, wore an LMPD uniform.

20. Hankison, while working at Tin Roof, had the authority and obligation,

as a member of LMPD, to enforce the law within the course and scope of his position

as a police officer.

21. Hankison, throughout his years of working secondary employment,

made several investigative stops, detentions, searches, seizures and arrests while

on the clock in his secondary employment role.

22. Hankison, between 2013 and 2018, also worked secondary

employment at additional bars, events and nightclubs throughout Louisville.

23. These officers were routinely paid cash by the bars for their work.

5
 24. These officers would routinely clear $150 to more than $200 for a few

B96A6CCC-8B40-4DC8-9F3C-AB6C8BB5D210 : 000006 of 000024

hours of maintaining a police presence at the bars.

25. Upon information and belief, Hankison recruited additional LMPD

members to work secondary employment details for bars and events and also was

responsible for the scheduling of these members. Amongst these LMPD members

was the Defendant Wes Troutman.

26. Troutman, at all times relevant herein, worked with Hankison in the

same LMPD division and also was one of Hankison’s closest friends.

27. While working in his secondary employment positions with Tin Roof and

other establishments, Hankison met several women in their 20’s who he befriended

and added to his social media accounts.

28. Over time, Hankison built a large network of these unsuspecting

women.

29. Over time, Hankison identified several of these women who were in

intoxicated states, insisted on taking them home as a good deed being done by a

cop, and then used the power of the badge, combined with the vulnerability of the

women, to sexually assault them.

30. For years, Hankison’s methods worked. Women were assaulted, but

they also knew that the predator was a police officer who would insist that the two

were friends and that each had consented.

31. Margo Borders met Brett Hankison in 2017.

32. Margo was 22 years old.

33. The two had a mutual friend.

6
 34. Hankison added Margo to Snapchat and frequently messaged her.

B96A6CCC-8B40-4DC8-9F3C-AB6C8BB5D210 : 000007 of 000024

35. Hankison was having problems with his girlfriend and routinely reached

out to Margo for advice.

36. Throughout this time, Hankison understood that Margo had a serious

boyfriend.

37. On April 20, 2018 Margo experienced a rough day. She was a law

student, final exams were approaching and the stress of the semester had caught up

with her. Margo noticed on social media that some friends were going to Tin Roof

and decided to head there as well.

38. Margo proceeded to Tin Roof and found her friends. When they

eventually left, Margo noticed Defendant Hankison, who was working outside the bar

in his capacity as both a Tin Roof hired security officer and as a Louisville Metro

police officer.

39. Hankison encouraged Margo to remain close to him. Given that Margo

was alone and that Hankison was sober and the police, she liked having that

protection. The two looked over social media and laughed over the actions of some

other patrons of the bar.

40. When it came time for Tin Roof to close, Margo was intoxicated.

41. Margo’s intention was to take an Uber home, but Hankison insisted

upon giving her a ride.

42. Margo had no objections to a ride home from a police officer. She

wouldn’t have to pay for an Uber and felt protected with an officer making sure she

got home safely.

7
 43. None of the interactions leading up to this point gave Margo the

B96A6CCC-8B40-4DC8-9F3C-AB6C8BB5D210 : 000008 of 000024

impression that Hankison’s intentions were nefarious.

44. Hankison, who was sober, proceeded to drive he and Margo, who was

not sober, to her apartment. He walked her to the door, invited himself inside her

apartment and sat on her couch.

45. Margo left Hankison on the couch and went to her room to change.

She’d had plenty to drink and went to sleep rather than returning to the living room.

46. While Margo was unconscious, Hankison went into her room, stripped

off his clothes and willfully, intentionally, painfully and violently sexually assaulted

Margo.

47. Margo did not consent to the acts set forth above.

48. When Margo regained consciousness and yelled for Hankison to get

off her, he simply grabbed his uniform and left her room.

49. True to his playbook, Hankison then messaged Margo later in the day

to try and suggest that the two had engaged in consensual relations.

50. Meanwhile, Margo was in tremendous physical pain and both her

sheets and mattress were covered in blood.

51. Margo was physically injured, mentally horrified and remained in

extreme emotional duress over both the assault and the feeling that any efforts made

to hold Officer Hankison accountable for his actions would backfire.

52. In June of 2020, another courageous victim of sexual assault by Brett

Hankison publicly shared her story.

53. Following that, Margo came forward.

8
 54. Since that time, several additional women have shared their similar

B96A6CCC-8B40-4DC8-9F3C-AB6C8BB5D210 : 000009 of 000024

stories. Each detail an eerily similar account of the events.

55. According to one victim:

I first met him when it was closing time at tin roof. Literally everyone was already
kicked outside be it was 4 am. it was just me inside and all the cops/security/bar staff.
I had clearly been drinking and i didn't already have an uber on the way. I didn't want
to pay for an uber back to prospect because I was pretty broke at the time and was
reluctant to spend the $30. So I jokingly asked all the cops, “hey does anyone have
a route out to hunting creek?” Brett laughed and said no one did, but he didn't mind
driving me home. for some reason, he thought it was appropriate to have his hand
on my left knee/thigh during the ride and squeeze me there every now and then. I
kept telling him how I lived at home with my dad and then I must've said “yea this is
my DADS HOUSE” at least 5 different times once he turned onto my street because
I was so uncomfortable and thought it would make him stop touching me. It didn't. I
didn't want to be rude or get in trouble or offend him. After all, it was a cop who was
giving me a ride home. But why was he hitting on a girl he knew had been drinking
all night? When he pulled up to my dad's house, he parked. and then he tried to make
out with me. Another time, i ran into him in Cincinnati. You know how sometimes high
waisted jeans will gap out a bit in the front by your stomach? WELL the next morning
at brunch, it was found out that he had posted on his snapchat story a video of him
trying to point the camera angle down the front of my jeans. I didn't know what to do
and was so embarrassed and felt violated…

56. According to another victim:

This man is terrible. I have personal experience with him. He was very unprofessional
and mishandled a situation. He went through my cell phone and said he was going
to keep it if I didn't allow him to check it. I was not being investigated and he had no
right to do things he did. I was naive. While taking advantage of my lack of knowledge
of the law and my rights, he proceeded to ask me about my dating life and asked me
why I would be with that person. Then said he would date me if I wasn't with my
boyfriend at the time, As if he was some great prize. Ughh, no thanks. He certainly
used his power to his advantage.

57. A third victim stated:

While leaving a bar in Louisville, this uniformed officer approached me and asked me
to hand over my phone. I did. He took my number and scanned my Snapchat ID. He
then tried tirelessly to persuade me to get me into his car. He even begged under the
guise to provide me with "a safe ride home." I turned him down over and over, and
luckily walked away unscathed. Weeks later he started sending pictures and videos
of himself masturbating via snapchat. I blocked him immediately.

9
 B96A6CCC-8B40-4DC8-9F3C-AB6C8BB5D210 : 000010 of 000024
58. According to a fourth:

A police officer pulled up next to me and offered me a ride home. I thought to myself,
“Wow, That is so nice of him.” And willingly got in. He began making sexual advances
towards me; rubbing my thigh, kissing my forehead, and calling me “baby.” Mortified,
I did not move. I continued to talk about my grad school experiences and ignored
him. As soon as he pulled up to my apartment building, I got out of the car and ran to
the back. My friend reported this the next day, and of course nothing came from it.

59. A fifth courageous woman identified an encounter where she stood up

to Defendant Hankison at Tin Roof. It was late, her friend was very intoxicated and

Hankison approached the two while they were waiting for an Uber. He became hands

on with the friend and insisted that he drive the women home. When the woman

would not allow Hankison to force her friend into a ride home, he became angry and

kept persisting. Thankfully, the women left in the Uber.

60. A sixth woman reported that Defendant Hankison attempted to sexually

assault her in her driveway after giving her a ride home in uniform from Tin Roof.

61. A seventh woman identified Defendant Hankison from working beside

him at a different bar. She identified the manners by which Hankison “would always

make sexual advances at women who were both working and trying to enjoy a nice

evening out.”

62. An eighth woman stated that she knew five different young women who

came forward about being raped/assaulted/stalked by Hankison, who was using the

same exact playbook. She also stated that when the situations were reported to the

police afterwards, nothing happened.

63. A ninth woman, upon seeing other women came forward, identified a

similar encounter with Defendant Hankison.

10
 64. Notably, multiple women claim that reports made to LMPD over the

B96A6CCC-8B40-4DC8-9F3C-AB6C8BB5D210 : 000011 of 000024

incidents were made, but were not pursued.

65. Upon information and belief, Defendant Hankison’s sergeants

throughout the relevant time periods herein were Defendants Eric Black, Thomas

Schardein and Michael King.

66. Upon information and belief, none of these sergeants ever reported

Hankison’s conduct, investigated Hankison’s conduct, requested for an investigation

be done into Hankison’s conduct, intervened to prevent Hankison’s conduct or even

disclosed reports of Hankison’s conduct to others.

67. Upon information and belief, Defendant Troutman was aware of

Hankison’s conduct, yet failed to report it or intervene to prevent it. He was

deliberately indifferent to Hankison’s sexual assaults and consequentially of the

rights, well-being and safety of those he was duty-bound to protect.

68. Upon information and belief, Defendant Conrad was, at all times

relevant herein, responsible for deciding whether or not to pursue or close a citizen

complaint against an officer. If the complaint was not opened within 90 days of the

report, it was purged from LMPD’s files and no record was made to reflect the

complaint and the reported conduct.

69. Upon information and belief, at all times relevant herein, there was a

pattern and practice within LMPD, which was condoned by Defendant Conrad, to

conceal citizen complaints against members in a manner which left members of the

public oblivious to reports of misconduct and thus susceptible to becoming victims of

the conduct.

11
 70. Upon information and belief, at all times relevant herein, there was a

B96A6CCC-8B40-4DC8-9F3C-AB6C8BB5D210 : 000012 of 000024

pattern and practice within LMPD of Defendant Conrad and others to internally clear

officers of allegations of misconduct, which was alleged by citizen complaints, in a

manner which was in direct violation of LMPD’s Standard Operating Procedures.

Because these actions were concealed from the public, citizens were deprived of

knowledge necessary to timely pursue actions against these LMPD members for their

conduct in failing to report, failing to supervise, failing to monitor and failing to

terminate the culprits. Additionally, this concealment prevented citizens from timely

pursuing actions for the failure to intervene.

71. The actions of Defendants Conrad, Troutman, Black, Schardein and

King in failing to open investigations against Hankison, terminate him, properly

monitor and supervise him and to report his misconduct were the product of the

department’s inadequate policies, deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens and

a direct and proximate cause of the Plaintiff’s injuries and damages.

72. Defendants Conrad, Troutman, Black, Schardein and King had actual

or constructive knowledge of Defendant Hankison’s actions and failed to carry out

their duties to correct them.

73. The gross negligence of these Defendants in the failure to properly

report, supervise, investigate, intervene and discipline was a direct and proximate

cause of the Plaintiff’s injuries and damages.

74. Defendant Conrad’s inaction resulted in a de facto approval/ratification

of Defendant Hankison’s conduct.

12
 75. Defendant Conrad’s tenure as Louisville Metro Police Department was

B96A6CCC-8B40-4DC8-9F3C-AB6C8BB5D210 : 000013 of 000024

riddled with officer sexual assault allegations which were neglected, ignored,

concealed and not properly investigated.

76. Defendant Conrad’s inaction in relation to credible allegations of officer

sexual assault was pervasive enough to constitute a policy and custom

demonstrating that officers could continue to engage in sexual misconduct without

scrutiny or accountability.

77. At all times relevant herein, the need to monitor, supervise, investigate,

discipline and terminate Defendant Hankison was obvious. The failure to do so was

a deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of citizens and a moving force

behind the Plaintiff’s injuries and damages.

78. The policy and custom of LMPD, at all times relevant herein, was to

ignore red flags in supervising, monitoring, retaining and investigating officers. Officer

performance reviews never addressed citizen complaints, never addressed internal

reports against officers for misconduct, never addressed sexual misconduct, never

discussed conduct associated with secondary employment and never resulted in

investigations or discipline.

79. By way of example, several LMPD officers were alleged to have

engaged in sexual abuse of minors as part of the LMPD Explorer program. Despite

this, the officers continued to maintain employment, continued to receive raises and

accommodations and internal investigations were closed without a substantive

disposition.

13
 80. In another example, two LMPD detectives who work in the same

B96A6CCC-8B40-4DC8-9F3C-AB6C8BB5D210 : 000014 of 000024

division as Defendants Hankison and Troutman are alleged to have coerced an

informant into performing sexual favors. Despite knowledge of the allegations, LMPD

ignored them and one of the detectives remains on regular duty. The other one of the

implicated detectives was only placed on reassignment after a civil lawsuit was filed

and a second victim alleged to have sexually been assaulted by him.

81. In a third example, LMPD hired an officer with a troubled past who was

passed over by four other police departments. After joining LMPD, at least five

women accused him of sexual assault. Despite this, LMPD continued to employ him

for two more years.

82. The harms suffered by Margo were foreseeable to the Defendant LMPD

members, along with any and all Unknown Officers who were aware of Hankison’s

conduct and did not report it or otherwise intervene. The failure of these Defendants

to intervene and prevent Defendant Hankison from harming young female victims,

despite the ministerial obligation of the officers under their governing policies to report

conduct of this nature and intervene to prevent it from occurring, was unreasonable,

unconscionable, conducted in bad faith and a proximate cause of the harms suffered

by Margo.

83. Upon information and belief, Defendant Hankison’s routine practice of

identifying vulnerable women in Louisville bars and sexually exploiting them was well

known and widely ignored, dismissed, or actively concealed by Unknown

Defendants, who failed to or refused to take protective or corrective action, including

14
but not limited to the termination of his employment. Their inaction placed the Plaintiff

B96A6CCC-8B40-4DC8-9F3C-AB6C8BB5D210 : 000015 of 000024

in foreseeable and imminent danger.

84. Upon information and belief, Defendant Allen (who goes by “Turtle”), at

all relevant times herein, was aware of reports of Hankison’s conduct, yet failed to

report it or intervene to prevent it. The harms suffered by Margo were foreseeable to

Allen and his failure to intervene and prevent Defendant Hankison from harming

young female victims was unreasonable and a proximate cause of the harms suffered

by Margo. Defendant Allen’s concealment of Hankison’s conduct prevented the

Plaintiff from timely pursuing actions against him and his employer, Tin Roof.

85. The concealment of Defendant Hankison’s actions by the remaining

Defendants herein was only discovered in June of 2020, when multiple victims

reported that they were sexually assaulted by Hankison, reported the conduct to

LMPD and had the reports ignored.

86. All Defendants herein acted with oppression, fraud and/or malice in a

manner warranting the imposition of punitive damages.

COUNT I

Assault and Battery: Defendant Hankison

87. Plaintiff adopts and incorporates by reference all the foregoing

paragraphs as if set forth fully herein and further states as follows:

88. On or about April 21, 2018 the Defendant intentionally and willfully, and

without the consent, encouragement or inducement of the Plaintiff, violently and

forcibly engaged in harmful and offensive sexual contact with the Plaintiff.

15
 89. The Defendant’s willful, harmful, intentional and violent sexual assault

B96A6CCC-8B40-4DC8-9F3C-AB6C8BB5D210 : 000016 of 000024

of the Plaintiff without her consent resulted in damages recoverable under Kentucky

law and all such conduct falls under K.R.S. § 413.140 and § 413.2485.

90. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages for physical pain and

suffering and mental and emotional anguish.

91. Further, as a direct result of the Defendant Hankison’s willful, wrongful,

malicious and intentional conduct, Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages. Punitive

damages are necessary to deter the Defendant from acting so callously, maliciously,

and wrongfully in the future against the citizens of this community whom he was

sworn to protect from harm, rather than cause harm.

COUNT II

Failure to Report and Intervene: Defendants Troutman, Conrad, King,

Schardein, Black and Unknown Defendants

92. Plaintiff adopts and incorporates by reference all the foregoing

paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.

93. These Defendants knew that the Defendant Hankison was engaging in

sexual misconduct with young women and other conduct which was unbecoming of

an officer and which warranted reporting, investigation, discipline, termination and

notice to the public so that the conduct would not extend to more potential victims,

including the Plaintiff.

94. These Defendants were duty-bound to report Defendant Hankison’s

sexual misconduct and other conduct unbecoming of an officer and to intervene to

prevent it.

16
 95. These Defendants had a ministerial duty to report and investigate

B96A6CCC-8B40-4DC8-9F3C-AB6C8BB5D210 : 000017 of 000024

wrongful conduct by their employees and co-workers who engage in conduct that is

dangerous, potentially criminal in nature, and offensive to citizens of the

Commonwealth. 2

96. These Defendants had a duty to the Plaintiff and the general public to

disclose their knowledge of sexual abuse perpetrated by Defendant Hankison against

vulnerable women in the community.

97. These Defendants had several reasonable opportunities to prevent

Defendant Hankison from using his law enforcement status as a manner to induce

intoxicated women into his vehicle, whereby he would initiate sexual advances and

misconduct without the consent of the women.

98. These Defendants, upon receiving reports of this conduct, did nothing

in response, thus acting with a deliberate indifference to the rights and safety of the

victims and the public and thus failing to deter the likelihood of similar incidents taking

place in the future.

99. These Defendants, in not reporting Defendant Hankison’s actions or

otherwise intervening, ratified his conduct and were complicit in allowing it to proceed.

100. These Defendants concealed Hankison’s misconduct from the public

and the Plaintiff.

101. These Defendants knew or should have known that Hankison posed an

unreasonable and foreseeable risk of danger to the public, especially when acting in

his capacity as a uniformed police officer, yet took no action to prevent these risks

2 Louisville Metro Police Department Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) 2.11.3.

17
and kept knowledge of Defendant Hankison’s sexual predation and misconduct

B96A6CCC-8B40-4DC8-9F3C-AB6C8BB5D210 : 000018 of 000024

hidden from the public, the Plaintiff, and law enforcement.

102. The active concealment of these Defendants’ knowledge of Defendant

Hankison’s routine sexual misconduct and other egregious misconduct did not

become known until June of 2020.

103. These Defendants had a reasonable opportunity to intervene and

prevent Defendant Hankison’s actions and failed to do so, thus depriving Margo

Borders of rights, privileges, and immunities secured to her by the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

104. Upon information and belief, this omissive and/or affirmative conduct

by these Defendants was either grossly negligent or was otherwise designed to

coerce the Plaintiff into silence.

105. Plaintiff is entitled to damages because of the Defendants’ conduct.

She has incurred and will continue to incur expenses for mental health treatment and

has endured and will continue to endure physical pain and suffering and emotional

distress.

106. The Defendants’ conduct warrants the imposition of punitive damages.

COUNT III

Negligent Supervision, Retention: Conrad, Allen and Tin Roof

107. Plaintiff adopts and incorporates by reference all the foregoing

paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.

18
 108. Defendants Conrad, Tin Roof and Allen had a duty to monitor and

B96A6CCC-8B40-4DC8-9F3C-AB6C8BB5D210 : 000019 of 000024

supervise Defendant Hankison.

109. Conrad, Tin Roof and Allen failed to properly supervise the conduct of

Defendant Hankison.

110. Conrad, Tin Roof and Allen had a duty to terminate Defendant

Hankison upon obtaining notice of the harms he was causing.

111. Conrad, Tin Roof and Allen willfully, recklessly and negligently retained

Defendant Hankison in spite of the harms he caused Tin Roof’s patrons.

112. Conrad, Tin Roof and Allen knew or should have known that Defendant

Hankison posed a foreseeable risk of harming additional individuals, including but not

limited to the Plaintiff.

113. Conrad, Tin Roof and Allen had knowledge of, anticipated, concealed,

authorized and/or ratified Defendant Hankison’s conduct as described herein with the

purpose of protecting Defendant Hankison to the detriment of Margo and others.

114. Tin Roof, by and through its employees and agents, including Allen,

was aware that Defendant Hankison routinely identified intoxicated young women,

put them in his vehicle while in uniform and left the premises with them while already

beginning to engage in visible misconduct. Tin Roof and Allen knew or should have

known of his sexual deviancy and harms he caused. Tin Roof and Allen failed to

properly supervise Hankison, report his conduct, intervene to prevent it and/or

terminate him for his actions.

115. As a direct and proximate cause of the aforementioned conduct, the

Plaintiff was sexually assaulted and injured, both physically and emotionally.

19
 116. Defendants Conrad and Tin Roof ratified Defendant Hankison’s

B96A6CCC-8B40-4DC8-9F3C-AB6C8BB5D210 : 000020 of 000024

conduct and should have anticipated it.

117. Plaintiff is entitled to damages because of the Defendants’ conduct.

She has incurred and will continue to incur expenses for mental health treatment and

has endured and will continue to endure physical pain and suffering and emotional

distress.

118. The Defendants’ conduct warrants the imposition of punitive damages.

COUNT IV

Vicarious Liability - Tin Roof

119. Plaintiff adopts and incorporates by reference all the foregoing

paragraphs as if set forth fully herein and further states as follows:

120. At all times relevant herein, Defendants Hankison and Allen were acting

within the scope and ordinary course of their employment and/or agency relationships

with Tin Roof.

121. Hankison’s actions were foreseeable.

122. Defendant Tin Roof is vicariously liable for the actions of Defendants

Hankison and Allen.

123. That Tin Roof’s employees and agents, upon information and belief,

took steps to actively conceal and/or fraudulently omit Defendant Hankison’s

conduct, which caused the Plaintiff to remain oblivious to her potential causes of

action against them until other women came in June of 2020.

124. Tin Roof ratified Defendant Allen’s and Hankison’s conduct and should

have anticipated it.

20
 125. Plaintiff is entitled to damages because of the Defendants’ conduct.

B96A6CCC-8B40-4DC8-9F3C-AB6C8BB5D210 : 000021 of 000024

She has incurred and will continue to incur expenses for mental health treatment and

has endured and will continue to endure physical pain and suffering and emotional

distress.

126. The Defendants’ conduct warrants the imposition of punitive damages.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Margo Borders, by Counsel, demands as follows:

a. A trial by jury on all issues so triable.

b. Compensatory damages in an amount to be shown at trial;

c. Punitive damages in an amount to be shown at trial;

d. Costs incurred in this action and reasonable attorney fees;

e. Prejudgment and post-judgment interest; and

f. Such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

Respectfully Submitted,

SAM AGUIAR INJURY LAWYERS, PLLC

/s/ Sam Aguiar

Sam Aguiar
Lonita Baker
1201 Story Avenue, Suite 301
Louisville, KY 40206
Telephone: (502) 400-6969
Facsimile: (502) 491-3946
sam@kylawoffice.com
lonita@kylawoffice.com
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff

21
ROMINES, WEIS & YOUNG PSC

B96A6CCC-8B40-4DC8-9F3C-AB6C8BB5D210 : 000022 of 000024

Steve Romines
600 W. Main St.
Suite 200
Louisville, KY 40202
502-587-8822
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff

BORDERS & BORDERS ATTORNEYS

Harry Borders
920 Dupont Rd.
Louisville, KY 40207
502-894-9200
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff

22
NO.____________ JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT

B96A6CCC-8B40-4DC8-9F3C-AB6C8BB5D210 : 000023 of 000024

DIVISION_________
JUDGE______________

ELECTRONICALLY FILED

MARGO BORDERS PLAINTIFF

v. NOTICE OF ELECTION OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE

BRETT HANKISON, individually, et al. DEFENDANTS

*** *** *** *** ***

Comes the Plaintiff, by counsel, pursuant to CR 5.02(2), and hereby gives

notice that counsel for Plaintiff elects to effectuate and receive service of documents

via electronic means. The undersigned counsel agrees to accept electronic service

at the following addresses:

sam@kylawoffice.com
lonita@kylawoffice.com
pleadings@kylawoffice.com

Pursuant to CR 5.02(2), all Parties are requested to promptly provide counsel

for Plaintiff with an electronic address at which they may be served with documents

via electronic means.

Respectfully Submitted,

SAM AGUIAR INJURY LAWYERS, PLLC

/s/ Sam Aguiar

Sam Aguiar
Lonita Baker
1201 Story Avenue, Suite 301
Louisville, KY 40206
Telephone: (502) 400-6969
Facsimile: (502) 491-3946
sam@kylawoffice.com
lonita@kylawoffice.com
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

B96A6CCC-8B40-4DC8-9F3C-AB6C8BB5D210 : 000024 of 000024

I hereby certify that the foregoing Plaintiff’s Notice of Election of Electronic
Service was electronically filed with the Complaint and Summonses in this action and
a request made of the Circuit Clerk that the Notice be served with the Complaint and
Summons to all named Defendants.

/s/ Sam Aguiar

Counsel for Plaintiff