RULE 72

Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules

Section 1. Subject matter of special proceedings. — Rules of special proceedings are provided for in the following
cases:

a. Settlement of estate of deceased persons;

b. Escheat;
c. Guardianship and custody of children;
d. Trustees;
e. Adoption;
f. Rescission and revocation of adoption;
g. Hospitalization of insane persons;
h. Habeas corpus;
i. Change of name;
j. Voluntary dissolution of corporations;
k. Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural children;
l. Constitution of family home;
m. Declaration of absence and death;
n. Cancellation of correction of entries in the civil registry.

Section 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. — In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary
actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.

CASE 1
PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner
vs.
HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO – LETICIA DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA
DEL RESORIO – MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO FUENTES, ALBERTO FUENTES,
EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and EDUARDO DEL ROSARIO, respondent
G.R. No. 133000           October 2, 2001

FACTS:
1. Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land.
2. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children entered into an extrajudicial
settlement of Graciana's estate.
3. Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children received 1/14 share of the
said property.
4. Graciano then donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land amounting to
4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under Graciano's name. The said
remaining lot was further subdivided into two separate (1st lot: 80.90 square meter, and 2nd lot: 396.70 square
meter). Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot to a third person but retained ownership over the second lot.
5. On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher.
6. During their marriage, Graciano sold the land to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 186059 was
issued in the latter's name.
7. Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.
8. The Children of Graciano filed a complaint against Natcher stating that she employed fraud, misrepresentation
and forgery, acquired the land by making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale in favor of herein
petitioner, and that as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.
9. Natcher contention: That she was legally married to Graciano, hence considered a compulsory heir; that
Graciano already distributed, in advance, the properties to his children during his lifetime.

RTC: The Deed of Sale is prohibited by law, not a valid donation, and even if it is a donation, it may however be
regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher.

CA: Reversed and set aside the decision ratiocinating that it is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make
a just and legal distribution of the estate; that the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as advance
inheritance. What the court should have done was merely to rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on
advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for that purpose.

ISSUE:
Whether the RTC may adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person
particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs.

RULING:
NO.
 Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in this
wise:
"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong.
"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are government by the rules for ordinary civil actions,
subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.
"XXX
"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact."

As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a special
proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by
the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The term "special
proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular
fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In
special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion."

Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action,
whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by
the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific
rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated the long standing principle that
although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all
heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by
the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the
question of ownership.16

A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case, reveals that the
trial court failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del
Rosario.
 CASE 2
LUISA KHO MONTAÑER, ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, JR., LILLIBETH MONTAÑER-BARRIOS, AND RHODORA
ELEANOR MONTAÑER-DALUPAN, Petitioners,
vs.
SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY, LILING DISANGCOPAN,
AND ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAÑER, Respondents.
G.R. No. 174975               January 20, 2009

FACTS:
1. On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montañer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montañer, Sr. at the
Immaculate Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City. Petitioners Alejandro Montañer, Jr., Lillibeth Montañer-
Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor Montañer-Dalupan are their children. On May 26, 1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr.
died.
2. On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S. Montañer,
both Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the judicial partition of properties before the Shari’a District Court.
3. In the said complaint, private respondents made the following allegations:
o (1) in May 1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died;
o (2) the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr. is a Muslim;
o (3) petitioners are the first family of the decedent;
o (4) Liling Disangcopan is the widow of the decedent;
o (5) Almahleen Liling S. Montañer is the daughter of the decedent; and
o (6) the estimated value of and a list of the properties comprising the estate of the decedent. 
4. Private respondents prayed for the Shari’a District Court to order, among others, the following:
o (1) the partition of the estate of the decedent; and
o (2) the appointment of an administrator for the estate of the decedent.
5. Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the grounds that the Shari’a District Court has
no jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr., because he was a Roman Catholic.
6. The Shari’a District Court dismissed the private respondents’ complaint. The district court held that Alejandro
Montañer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction extends only to the settlement and distribution of the
estate of deceased Muslims. Private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration and petitioners filed an
Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, alleging that the motion for reconsideration lacked a notice of
hearing.
7. Shari’a District Court reconsidered its order of dismissal and ordered the continuation of trial, trial on the
merits, adducement of further evidence, and pre-trial conference. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Respondent Shari’ah District Court-Marawi did not acquire jurisdiction over "the estates
and properties of the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr."

RULING:
NO.

Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding as "a remedy by which a party seeks
to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."

The underlying assumption in petitioners’ second argument, that the proceeding before the Shari’a District
Court is an ordinary civil action against a deceased person, rests on an erroneous understanding of the proceeding
before the court a quo. Part of the confusion may be attributed to the proceeding before the Shari’a District Court, where
the parties were designated either as plaintiffs or defendants and the case was denominated as a special civil action.
We reiterate that the proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and
distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a special proceeding.

This Court has applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate
of a deceased Muslim.31 In a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate,
the applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the
decedent’s heirs, which would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the
estate of the decedent.32 Here, the respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death and,
subsequently, for private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montañer to be recognized as among his heirs, if such is the
case in fact.

Petitioners’ argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a party defendant in a
civil action33 applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of the estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a
civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite adverse party. The definitions of a
civil action and a special proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in which "a party
sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong" 34 necessarily has
definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or defendant. 35 On the other hand, a special proceeding, "by which a
party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact," 36 has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a
declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that
the estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding, the purpose of the
settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate, pay its liabilities,38 and to distribute
the residual to those entitled to the same.
 CASE 3
ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, Petitioner
vs
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G.R. No. 230751 April 25, 2018
VELASCO, JR., J.:

Nature of the Case:

This is an appeal assailing the Decision dated November 28, 2016 and Resolution dated March 20, 2017 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467.

Doctrine:
1. Judicial declaration of presumptive death is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent
marriage under Art. 41 of the Family Code.
2. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code involve a presumption of death already established by law. There is no
need to file such petition under said provisions before the court.

Facts:
1. Estrellita Tadeo-Matias (Petitioner) was married to Wilfredo Matias who was a member of the Philippine
Constabulary and assigned in Araya, Pampanga. They were married on January 7, 1968.
2. On September 15, 1979, Wilfredo left their conjugal home at San Miguel, Tarlac City in order to serve his
duties. He was never seen or heard from again and has never made contact with any of his or Petitioner’s
relatives. Petitioner constantly sought updates from the Philippine Constabulary regarding the whereabouts of
her husband to no avail.
3. After 3 decades of waiting, Petitioner sought for a claim of death benefits under P.D. 1638 from the Philippine
Veteran’s Affair Office (PVAO) of the AFP. One of its requirements is a judicial declaration of presumptive
death.
4. On April 10, 2012, petitioner filed before the Regional Trail Court (RTC) of Tarlac City a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Wifredo N. Matias (Wilfredo).
a. The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 4850 and was raffled to Branch 65 of the Tarlac City
RTC.

RTC Ruling:
1. Affirmed Petitioner and declared Petitioner’s husband presumptively dead under Art. 41 of the Family Code.
2. The Republic questioned the decision of the RTC via a petition for certiorari

CA Ruling:
1. Reversed RTC ruling since Art. 41 only allows such declaration in cases of remarriage which Petitioner did not
seek.

Issue:
Whether or not the Petitioner can validly be granted the judicial declaration of presumptive death.

Ruling:
No, it cannot be validly granted moreover, the petitioner erred in filing for judicial declaration of presumptive
death since it is not a viable suit.

Art. 41 of the Family Code states that “A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse
had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present
must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.”

In this case, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the presumptive death
Wilfredo as a prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the declaration of presumptive death, petitioner categorically
stated that the same was filed "not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 a
amended.

Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the purpose of
remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the presumption of death under either Article 390 or Article 391 of
the Civil Code as the basis of her petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code express the general rule regarding
presumption s of death for any civil purpose, to wit:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absence still lives, he shall be
presumed dead for all purposes except for those of succession.
 The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of
five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the
heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not
been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;
(3) a person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not
been known for four years.

Verily, the RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the presumptive death of Wilfredo was
misleading and grossly improper. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by the petitioner was
based on the Civil Code, and not on Article 41 of the FC.

Additional Notes:
1. Since the petition filed by the petitioner merely seeks the declaration of presumptive death of Wilfredo under
the Civil Code, the RTC should have dismissed such petition outright. This is because, in our jurisdiction, a
petition whose sole objective is to have a person declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code
is not regarded as a valid suit and no court has any authority to take cognizance of the same.
2. Dissecting the rulings of Szatraw, Gue and Lukban collectively, we are able to ascertain the considerations
why a petition for declaration of presumptive death based on the Civil Code was disallowed in our jurisdiction,
viz:
a) Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence that only allow a court or a
tribunal to presume that a person is dead upon the establishment of certain facts.
b) Since Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence, an action brought
exclusively to declare a person presumptively dead under either of the said articles actually
presents no actual controversy that a court could decide. In such action, there would be no actual
rights to be enforces, no wrong to be remedied nor any status to be established.
c) A judicial pronouncement declaring a person presumptively dead under Article 390 or Article 391 of the
Civil Code, in an action exclusively based thereon, would never really become "final" as the same only
confirms that existence of a prima facie or disputable presumption. The function of a court to render
decisions that is supposed to be final and binding between litigants is thereby compromised.
d) Moreover, a court action to declare a person presumptively dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil
Code would be unnecessary. The presumption in the said articles is already established by law.
 CASE 4
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON YPON,
VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEÑALOSA, PETITIONERS,
vs.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 198680               July 8, 2013
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Nature of the Case:

This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Branch 59 (RTC), through a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising a pure question of law. In particular,
petitioners assail the July 27, 2011 and August 31, 2011 Orders of the RTC, dismissing Civil Case No. T-2246 for lack
of cause of action.

Doctrine:
1. Determination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such
purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession.
2. Civil Action vs. Special Proceeding
a. Civil Action- defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong (Sec. 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court)
b. Special Proceeding – a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special
proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

Facts:
1. On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins, filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title
and Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a.
"Gaudioso E. Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246.
a. In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on
June 28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A.
b. Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and
caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their subsequent
transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638, to the prejudice of petitioners who are
Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.
2. In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno
a. as evidenced by:
i. his certificate of Live Birth;
ii. two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and
iii. a certified true copy of his passport.
b. Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that:
i. petitioners have no cause of action against him;
ii. the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and
iii. the case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the
petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.

RTC Ruling:
1. On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order, finding that the subject complaint failed to
state a cause of action against Gaudioso.
a. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with Magdaleno in a
previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration, this did not mean that they
could already be considered as the decedent’s compulsory heirs.
b. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is Magdaleno’s son – and
hence, his compulsory heir – through the documentary evidence he submitted.
2. The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied on August 31, 2011 due to
the counsel’s failure to state the date on which his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of
Compliance was issued.
3. Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-2246, sought direct recourse to the
Court through the instant petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state a
cause of action was proper.

Ruling:
Yes, the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action
was proper.
 Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made
in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and
possession of property. 

Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party
sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may
be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to
the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently
rendered judgment thereon, or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and
terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.

In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there lies the
need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately
resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.

Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same fails to state a cause of
action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it. Thus,
concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for
recovery of ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light, it
must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed
out and determined in the proper special proceeding.
 CASE 5
Petitioners: Heirs of TEOFILO GABATAN, namely: LOLITA GABATAN, POMPEYO GABATAN, PEREGRINO
GABATAN, REYNALDO GABATAN, NILA GABATAN AND JESUS JABINIS, RIORITA GABATAN TUMALA and
FREIRA GABATAN
vs.
Respondents: Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES EVERO PACANA
G.R. No. 150206               March 13, 2009

Facts:
Respondent alleges that she is the sole owner of a land located in Cagayan de Oro City which she inherited
from her mother, Hermogena, the only child of Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana Clarito. Furthermore, that upon the
death of Juan Gabatan, the lot was entrusted to his brother, Teofilo Gabatan (Teofilo), and Teofilo’s wife, Rita Gabatan,
for administration. It was also claimed that prior to her death Hermogena demanded for the return of the land but to no
avail. After Hermogena’s death, respondent also did the same but petitioners refused to heed the numerous demands to
surrender the subject property.

Petitioners denied that respondent’s mother Hermogena was the daughter of Juan Gabatan with Laureana
Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent is the rightful heir of Juan Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that Juan
Gabatan died single in 1934 and without any issue and that Juan was survived by one brother and two sisters, namely:
Teofilo (petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest), Macaria and Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs, inherited the subject
land from Juan Gabatan and have been in actual, physical, open, public, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted
possession thereof in the concept of owners for more than fifty (50) years and enjoyed the fruits of the improvements
thereon, to the exclusion of the whole world including respondent.

RTC rendered decision in favor of respondent on the Civil case filed for an action for Recovery of
Property and Ownership and Possession, thereat commenced by respondent.

CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA declared that respondent’s claim of filiation with Juan Gabatan
was sufficiently established during trial.

Issue: (In relation to Special Procedure)

Whether or not the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper
special proceedings in court.

Ruling:
Yes, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special
proceedings in court.

Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party
sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. Further, in a
case decided by the Supreme Court, it explained that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be
ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of
determining such rights.

However, in a case decided by the Supreme Court, where the Court relaxed its rule and allowed the trial
court in a proceeding for annulment of title to determine the status of the party therein as heirs, when the only
property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of
the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of
petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an
administration proceeding.

Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending
parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to dispense with a separate special
proceeding for the determination of the status of respondent as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan, specially in light of the
fact that the parties to Civil Case No. 89-092, had voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their
evidence regarding the issue of heirship in these proceeding. Also the RTC assumed jurisdiction over the same and
consequently rendered judgment thereon.

OUTCOME OF THE CASE:

The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the CA affirming the RTC because those evidences
presented by the respondent was dismally failed to substantiate proof that she is the sole heir of Juan Gabatan.

Respondent’s cause of action is the filiation of her mother to Juan Gabatan to be entitled with the inheritance of Juan
Gabatan.

Law to establish filiation: (Important phrase)

 Article 265 – record of birth in the Civil Register
  Article 266 – proof of continuous possession of status of a legitimate child
 Article 267 – other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws

Respondent’s presented evidences and Supreme Court’s ruling on such:

1. Birth Certificate of the respondent in typewritten with her mother’s maiden name, “Hermogena Clarito
Gabatan” as Exhibit A.

The SC give credence to the submitted handwritten respondent’s Birth Certificate with respondet’s mother’s
full maiden name as “Hermogena Calarito” by the petitioner which was supported with two competent witness
as the custodian of public records as Exhibit 1.

Furthermore, even Exhibit A was accepted, the same cannot prove that “Hermogena Clarito Gabatan” is the
daughter of Juan Gabatan.

2. Testimony of respondent’s witnesses

The SC ruled that it cannot be said to be credible and impartial witnesses and such were, in a word, hearsay.

3. Photocopied Dead of Sale presented by respondent and which appeared to be signed by the siblings and the
heirs of the siblings of Juan Gabatan. In this document involving the sale of a lot different from Lot 3095 C-5,
"Hermogena Gabatan as heir of the deceased Juan Gabatan" was indicated as one of the vendors. The RTC
deemed the statement therein as an affirmation or recognition by Teofilo Gabatan, petitioners’ predecessor in
interest, that Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan. The CA considered the same statement as a
declaration against interest on the part of Teofilo Gabatan.

The SC applies the best evidence rule. Although it admits exceptions, the respondent did not present any
reasonable ground to exempt from providing a secondary copy of it. Furthermore, the copy presented does not
provide evidence of the existence of an original copy of it.
 CASE 6
Petitioner: ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER
Respondent: ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER, VICTORIA S. MEDINA-Administratrix
G.R. No. 157912               December 13, 2007

Facts:
Victoria S. Medina is the duly appointed administratrix of the estateof Alice O. Sheker, which is pending
adjudication before the RTC of Iligan City. Alan Joseph Sheker filed a money claim against the estate, a continent claim
for agent’s commission due him amounting to approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels
of land belonging to the estate, and the amount of P275,000.00 as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be
incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of said realties. Victoria moved to dismiss the money claim,
on the following grounds: 1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7 (a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,had
not been paid; 2) petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum shopping; and 3) petitioner failed to attach a
written explanation why the money claim was not filed and served personally. Then, RTC dismiss the money claim.
Hence, Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed.

Issue:
Whether or not RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non-
forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim
considering that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special
proceedings only in a suppletory manner.

Ruling:
Yes, RTC erred in strictly applying the rules in ordinary actions but not entirely correct as the petitioner’s
contention of its supplementary application to rules in special proceedings.

Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides: Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. -
In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable,
applicable in special proceedings.

The word "practicable" is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into practice, done
or accomplished (Webster's Third New International Dictionary). This means that in the absence of special provisions,
rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so would not
pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in ordinary
actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings.

Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory
pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money claims
against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special proceedings
such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the present case.

OUTCOME OF THE CASE:

The Court decided to reverse and set aside RTC’s decision because those issues raised by the respondent was either
not applicable or relaxed by the Court.

1. “the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7 (a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been
paid”

This is not a ground for dismissing the case because the filling fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment
pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 141 of the RoC or the trial court may order the payment of such within a reasonable
time.

2. “petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum shopping”

The certification of non-forum shopping is not applicable to the contingent money claim of the petitioner
because the claim was not being an initiatory pleading and is only incidental matter in the main action the
whole probate proceeding upon filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent’s will.

3. “petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money claim was not filed and served
personally”

In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for respondent and
the RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The lower court should have taken judicial
notice of the great distance between said cities and realized that it is indeed not practicable to serve and file
the money claim personally. Thus, following Medina v. Court of Appeals, the failure of petitioner to submit a
written explanation why service has not been done personally, may be considered as superfluous and the
RTC should have exercised its discretion under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of
petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice.
 CASE 6
ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS HOLDING CORP., petitioners,
vs.
CA, HON. AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge, RTC-Manila, Vr. 21, and ADMINISTATRIX JULITA CAMPOS
BENEDICTO, respondents.
G.R. No. 164108, May 8, 2009

SUMMARY:
Petitioners were plaintiffs in two pending civil cases involving decedent Roberto Benedicto (intestate). Private
respondent Julita was appointed as administrator of the late Roberto’s estate.
Petitioners sought three specific reliefs that were denied by both RTC-Manila and the CA:
(1) They prayed that they be furnished “copies of all processes and orders issued” by the intestate court as
well as the pleadings filed by administatrix Julita Benedicto with said court,
(2) They prayed that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by administatrix Julita to submit a
verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof, order the inheritance tax
appraisers of the BIR to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same, and
(3) Petitioners moved that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by administatrix Julita of her
verified annual count, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with
respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and
disposition of the estate.

FACTS:
1. In 2000, well-known sugar magnate Roberto Benedicto died intestate.
a. He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita (administatrix), and his only daughter
Francisca.
2. At the time of his death, there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners:
a. Civil Case No. 95-9137 – pending with RTC-Bacolod, Br. 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of
the plaintiffs therein; and
b. Civil Case No. 11178 – then pending with RTC-Bacolod, Br. 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar
Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein.
c. The civil cases were based on TORT – they arose from Benedicto’s actions in connection with
Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank.
3. In May 2000, private respondent Julita filed with the RTC-Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor, pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the RoC.
a. This was raffled to Branch 21, presided by respondent Judge Amor.
b. Said petition acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent to be P5 million, “net of
liabilities.”
c. On Aug. 2, 2000, the RTC-Manila issued an order appointing Julita as administrator of the estate of
her deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in her favor.
4. In January 2001, Julita submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and
Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband.
a. In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent included as among the liabilities,
the above-mentioned two pending claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City courts.
b. Private respondent Julita stated that the amounts of liability corresponding to the two cases as:
i. P136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137, and
ii. P35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178.
c. Thereafter, RTC-Manila required private respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and
appraisal report pertaining to the estate.
5. On Sept. 24, 2001, petitioners filed with the RTC-Manila a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, praying
that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings.
a. To this, private respondent opposed, disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in the
intestate proceedings of her husband.
b. Even before the RTC-Manila acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus motion
praying that the RTC-Manila set a deadline for the submission by private respondent of the required
inventory of the decedent’s estate.
c. Petitioners likewise filed other pleadings or motions with the RTC-Manila, alleging lapses on the part
of private respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the inventory that had been
submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.

RTC-Manila Ruling:
1. On January 2, 2002, the RTC-Manila issued an order denying the (petitioners’) manifestation/motion, on the
ground that petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of the RoC to intervene in the
intestate proceedings.
2. The petitioners’ MR was also denied.

Court of Appeals
1. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
a. They argued that they had the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto,
the latter being the defendant in the civil cases they lodged with RTC-Bacolod.
 2. On February 27, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition and declared that the RTC-Manila did not abuse its
discretion.
a. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene, according to the appellate court, is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
b. The CA also cited the fact that the claims of petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent
or expectant, as these were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts.
3. Thus, the petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
WON the lower courts erred in denying the petitioners the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of
Roberto Benedicto.
Interestingly, the rules of procedure they cite in support of their argument is not the rule on
intervention, but rather various other provisions of the Rules on Special Proceedings.

RULING:
NO, the lower courts did NOT err in denying the petitioners the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings
of Roberto Benedicto.

The settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under RoC, not the
Rules on Civil Procedure. Sec. 2, Rule 72 further provides that “[i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules provided
for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special proceedings.”

HOWEVER, notwithstanding Sec. 2, Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to
creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim.

IN THIS CASE, the petitioners’ claim against the estate of the decedent is MERELY CONTINGENT AND
EXPECTANT.
The CA chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed by the rule on intervention (the Supreme
Court AGREED on this wise). Sec. 1, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor
“has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution of property in the custody of the court x x x”
While the language of Sec. 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in the
intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an intervenor
“must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and NOT simply contingent and expectant.”

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the CA is correct. Nonetheless, as we have explained,
petitioners should not be deprived of their prerogatives under the Rules on Special Proceedings as enunciated in this
decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as persons interested in the
intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and rights provided for such interested persons in the
Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons under the Rules on Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.

ADDITIONAL IMPORTANT ISSUES:

1. Even if it were declared that petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would NOT
necessarily mean the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the right to intervene is not one of those
reliefs.
a. While there is no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to
seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if
the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there is no other
modality under the Rules by which such interests can be protected.
2. Prayer 1: That petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in connection with the
intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the administrator of the estate.
a. SC Ruling: To impose a precedent that would mandate the service of all court processes and
pleadings to anybody posing a claim to the estate, much less contingent claims, would unduly
complicate and burden the intestate proceedings, and would ultimately offend the guiding principle of
speedy and orderly disposition of cases.
b. FORTUNATELY, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized by the
Supreme Court:
i. Sec. 2, Rule 135 states that “the records of every court of justice shall be public records
and shall be available for the inspection of any interested person x x x.”
ii. Sa madaling sabi, hindi macompel ang court na magserve ng court processes sa persons
na CONTINGENT lang ang interest. Instead, said persons may inspect the court records
(kasi interested parties pa rin sila) in the intestate proceedings.
iii. Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate
proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of court
processes and pleadings upon them.
3. Prayers 2 and 3: Please refer sa summary above.
a. SC Ruling: There are reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either duty (true
inventory and appraisal, and annual count), BUT A PERSON WHOSE CLAIM AGAINST THE
ESTATE IS STILL CONTINGENT IS NOT THE PARTY ENTITLED TO DO SO.
b. Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the proper remedy is to
seek the removal of the administrator in accordance with Sec. 2, Rule 82. While the provision is
silent as to who may seek with the court the removal of the administrator, a creditor, even a
contingent one, would have the personality to seek such relief. After all, the interest of the creditor in
the estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the general
competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such purpose.
 Settlement Of Estate Of Deceased Persons

RULE 73

Venue and Process

Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedents is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time
of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of
his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or
when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

Section 2. Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. — When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the
husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid,
in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall
be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either.

Section 3. Process. — In the exercise of probate jurisdiction, Courts of First Instance may issue warrants and process
necessary to compel the attendance of witnesses or to carry into effect theirs orders and judgments, and all other
powers granted them by law. If a person does not perform an order or judgment rendered by a court in the exercise of
its probate jurisdiction, it may issue a warrant for the apprehension and imprisonment of such person until he performs
such order or judgment, or is released.

Section 4. Presumption of death. — For purposes of settlement of his estate, a person shall be presumed dead if
absent and unheard from for the periods fixed in the Civil Code. But if such person proves to be alive, he shall be
entitled to the balance of his estate after payment of all his debts. The balance may be recovered by motion in the same
proceeding.

CASE 1
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, respondent.
G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013

SUMMARY:
Respondent Elise, claiming to be the natural daughter (thus, compulsory heir) of Eliseo Quiazon (who died
intestate) filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the RTC of Las Piñas City. Said petition was opposed by
the petitioners (who claimed to be the legal wife of the decedent, and children) due to, among others, improper venue.

The petitioners claimed that Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac as shown in his Death Certificate. As such,
the Petition should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac, and not in Las Piñas.

FACTS:
1. Eliseo Quiazon died intestate on December 12, 1992.
2. On Sept. 12, 1994, herein respondents (Eliseo’s common-law wife and daughter) filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration of the Estate of Eliseo before RTC-Las Piñas City.
a. In her petition, respondent Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived
and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other.
i. To prove her filiation, Elise, among others, attached her Certificate of Live Birth signed by
Eliseo as her father.
b. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and respondent Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity
of Eliseo’s marriage to petitioner Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted
during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito).
c. In this petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth P2,040,000 and personal
properties worth P2,100,000.
d. In order to preserve the estate, Elise sought her appointment as administatrix of her father’s estate.
3. The above petition was opposed by herein petitioners (by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss) Amelia
(joined by her children) to whom Eliseo was married.
a. The petitioners claim that the venue of the petition was improperly laid.
b. That as shown by his Death Certificate, Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las
Piñas City, at the time of his death.
 i. That pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 73 of the Revised RoC, the petition for settlement of
decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City.
c. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal
bases for Elise to be appointed administatrix of Eliseo’s estate.

RTC Ruling:
1. Issued a Decision directing the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond
amounting to P100,000.
a. That the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position
taken by the petitioners that Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas as hearsay.

CA Ruling:
1. Affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
a. That Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by
establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City,
from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992.
2. Denied the petitioners’ MR.
3. Thus, the present petition for review on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45.

ISSUE:
WON the Petition for Letters of Administration was properly filed with the RTC of Las Piñas.

RULING:
YES, the Petition for Letters of Administration was properly filed with RTC-Las Piñas.

Under Sec. 1, Rule 73 of the RoC, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should
be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.

The term “resides” connotes ex vi termini “actual residence” as distinguished from “legal residence or
domicile.” This term “resides,” like terms “residing” and “residence,” is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the
object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Sec, 1,
Rule 73 of the RoC is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.

IN THIS CASE, it is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting
Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in
said city.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:
1. Some cases make a distinction between the terms “residence” and “domicile” but as generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term “inhabitant.” In other
words, “resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.

2. In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseo’s Death
Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate should be settled. While the
recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at the time of his death, the
contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts.
a. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting
themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is
consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against
Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is void for
being bigamous.

3. Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and
binding upon this Court.

4. Elise can be appointed as administatrix pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule 78, and Sec. 2, Rule 79. – as compulsory
heir, Elise is an interested party.

5. Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring Amelia’s marriage
to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the
source of rights.
a. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally.
b. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.
c. It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot
be the source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to
the marriage.
d. Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be
prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after
 the death of her father.

6. WON decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous. – YES, void.
a. Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between
Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by
the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in
Capas, Tarlac.
b. Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time
Amelia and Eliseo’s marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage
is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.
 CASE 2
ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES CUENCO,
CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA
CUENCO GONZALEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973

Summary:
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two minor sons, residing in
Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage,
filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the CFI Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a
resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon City. The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano
Cuenco, the second wife, filed a petition with CFI Rizal for the probate of the last will and testament, where she was
named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but SC held in abeyance resolution
over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted on the probate proceedings. Lourdes filed an opposition and
motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu
already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Upon appeal
CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.

Facts:
1. 25 February 1964: Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors' Hospital, Manila.
a. He was survived by his widow, (Petitioner), and their two (2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and
Jesus Salvador, both surnamed Cuenco, all residing at 69 Pi y Margal St., Sta. Mesa Heights,
Quezon City; and
b. By his children of the first marriage,(Respondents) namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco,
Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita Cuenco
Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu.
2. 5 March 1964: Respondent Lourdes filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with CFI Cebu, alleging
among other things, that:
a. The late senator died intestate in Manila on 25 February 1964;
b. He was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and
c. He left real and personal properties in Cebu and Quezon City.
3. On the same date, CFI Cebu issued an order setting the petition for hearing, directing that due notice be given
to all the heirs and interested persons, and ordering the requisite publication thereof at LA PRENSA, a
newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of Cebu.
a. The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a new and modified one
released on 13 March 1964, in view of the fact that the petition was to be heard at Branch II instead
of Branch I of the said Cebu court.
4. A third order was further issued stating that Lourdes’ petition for the appointment of a special administrator
was not yet ready for the consideration of the said court, giving as reasons the following:
a. It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try
this proceeding, the requisite publication of the notice of hearing not yet having been complied with.
b. Moreover, copies of the petition have not been served on all of the heirs specified in the basic
petition for the issuance of letters of administration.
5. 12 March 1964: Petitioner filed a petition with CFI Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the deceased's last
will and testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow and
executrix in the said last will and testament.
a. Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed
in said Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, as well as an Opposition to Petition for
Appointment of Special Administrator.
6. 10 April 1964: CFI Cebu issued an order holding in abeyance its resolution on petitioner's motion to dismiss
until after CFI Quezon City shall have acted on the petition for probate of that document purporting to be the
last will and testament of the deceased.
a. The order of CFI Cebu deferring to the probate proceedings in the Quezon City court was neither
excepted to nor sought by respondents to be reconsidered or set aside by the Cebu court nor did
they challenge the same by certiorari or prohibition proceedings in the appellate courts.
b. Instead, respondents filed CFI Quezon City an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, opposing probate
of the will and assailing the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to entertain petitioner's petition
for probate and for appointment as executrix in view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by
her petition in the Cebu court.
7. 11 April 1964: CFI Quezon City denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a principal reason the "precedence of
probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding."
a. Further found in said order that the residence of the late senator at the time of his death was at No.
69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City.
b. Respondents’ MR and second MR were also denied.
8. 11 May 1964: the hearing for probate of the last will of the decedent was called three times at half-hour
intervals, but notwithstanding due notification none of the oppositors appeared and the Quezon City court
proceeded at 9:00 a.m. with the hearing in their absence.
9. 15 May 1964: the Quezon City court noted that Respondents had opposed probate under their opposition and
motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
 a. That the will was not executed and attested as required by law;
b. That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
beneficiary or some other persons for his benefit;
c. That the testator's signature was procured by fraud and/or that the testator acted by mistake and did
not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time he affixed his signature thereto.
Probate Proceedings (CFI Quezon City):
1. The requisite publication of the notice of the hearing had been duly complied with and that all the heirs had
been duly notified of the hearing.
2. Three instrumental witnesses testified to the decedent's last will, namely Atty. Florencio Albino, Dr. Guillermo
A. Picache and Dr. Jose P. Ojeda, and of the notary public, Atty. Braulio A. Arriola, Jr., who ratified the said
last will, and the documentary evidence (such as the decedent's residence certificates, income tax return,
diplomatic passport, deed of donation) all indicated that the decedent was a resident of 69 Pi y Margal St.,
Quezon City, as also affirmed by him in his last will.
3. 15 May 1964: CFI Quezon City admitted to probate the late senator's last will and testament as having been
"freely and voluntarily executed by the testator" and "with all formalities of the law" and appointed petitioner--
widow as executrix of his estate without bond "following the desire of the testator" in his will as probated.
4. Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the will to probate and naming
Petitioner as executrix, Respondents filed a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction with respondent Court of Appeals to bar the Rizal court from proceeding with the case.

Court of Appeals:
1. CA rendered a decision in favor of Respondents, holding that:
a. Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person, covers both testate and intestate proceedings. The case in Cebu CFI having been
filed ahead, it is that court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and which first attached.
b. It is that court which can properly and exclusively pass upon the factual issues of
i. whether the decedent left or did not leave a valid will, and
ii. whether or not the decedent was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death.
c. Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the Cebu CFI, it follows that the said
court must exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the petition for probate was
filed by the Petitioner.
i. Petitioner should assert her rights within the framework of the proceeding in the Cebu CFI,
instead of invoking the jurisdiction of another court.
d. As to the order of CFI Cebu stating that the petition for appointment of special administrator was "not
yet ready for the consideration of the Court today. It would be premature for this Court to act thereon,
it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding”, it is sufficient to state in this
connection that the said judge was certainly not referring to the court's jurisdiction over the res, not to
jurisdiction itself which is acquired from the moment a petition is filed, but only to the exercise of
jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings. At all events, jurisdiction is conferred and
determined by law and does not depend on the pronouncements of a trial judge.
2. Petitioner’s MR was denied.

Issue:
1. WON CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition against Quezon City court ordering it to refrain from
proceeding with the testate proceedings.
2. WON the Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance
and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings.

Ruling:
1. YES.

Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The residence of the decedent or the location of his estate is not an
element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue.

HOWEVER, such court may, upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been
presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow
and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate
may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and
instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will.

In this case, upon Petitioner’s filing with it a motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, CFI Cebu issued its
order holding in abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon City court, awaiting its action
on the petition for probate before that court. Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to
probate, by the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition
which would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court,
to the exclusion of all other courts.

2. NO.
 Based on the above-mentioned ruling, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City
court. Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of and acting on the probate petition.

Applying Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and
must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is
undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal and
coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.

In this case, Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed
jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now,
by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

Addt’l Notes:
◊ Opposition to jurisdiction of trial court in settlement proceedings should be by appeal:
Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate
on the basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City was the first choice
of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home and domicile therein — with the deference in comity duly
given by the Cebu court — could not be contested except by appeal from said court in the original case except when
want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

◊ When proceedings for settlement of estate will not be annulled even if court had improper venue:
The mischievous effect in the administration of justice of considering the question of residence as affecting the
jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the whole proceedings only to start all over again the same proceedings
before another court of the same rank in another province is too obvious to require comment. It would be an unfair
imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his estate
in accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the law on jurisdiction to require her
to spend much more time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court every time she has an
important matter of the estate to take up with the probate court.
 CASE 3
ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 230751 April 25, 2018

Summary:
Estrellita’s husband is a PH Constabulary. He was missing for at least 3 decades. Estrellita wanted to claim
death benefits under PD1638 so she was instructed by PVAO/AFP to get a court declaration of presumptive death. RTC
granted under Art. 41 of the Family Code, which the CA reversed. Supreme Court said a court declaration under Art. 41
is not warranted because this is a case under NCC Arts. 390/391, which does not need a court declaration. PVAO/AFP
can decide on the presumptive death of their members for the purpose of claiming benefits.

Facts:
1. Wilfredo Matias is a Constabulary assigned in Arayat, Pampanga since August 24, 1967
2. January 7, 1968: Estrellita Tadco-Matias and Wilfredo got married in Panagasinan
a. They acquired a conjugal home in 106 Molave St., Zpne B, San Miguel, Tarlac City.
3. September 15, 1979: went back to Pampanga to serve as constabulary
a. Wilfredo never came back since then
b. According to the service record of National Police Commission, he was declared missing since 1979
c. Estrellita pestered the PH Constabulary about his whereabouts but to no avail: all they know was
that he was assigned to a place frequented by NPAs
4. After 3 decades of hoping: it is necessary for her to get a proof of death of at least a declaration of
presumptive death in order to request for the benefits that rightfully belong to her in order to survive (since she
has a meager source of income + old age)
5. April 10, 2012: Estrellita filed for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Wilfredo Matias
a. She filed for no other purpose than that to avail the benefit under PD 1638 (AFP Military Personnel
Retirement and Separation Decree)

RTC Ruling: GRANTED

1. Wilfredo is declared presumptively dead under Art. 41 of the Family Code for the purposes of claiming
financial benefits due to him as former military officer
2. Republic, through OSG, questioned this pronouncement via petition for certiorari

CA Ruling: REVERSED
1. RTC erred when it used Art. 41 of FC as the basis since it is not Estrellita’s purpose to remarry, which is the
purpose of Art. 41 of the FC.
a. IF ANYTHING, it must be under Arts. 390 and 391 of the New Civil Code
2. RTC has no jurisdiction to declare presumptive death under Arts. 390 or 391 of NCC.
a. Jurisprudence provides that Arts. 390 or 391 of NCC merely express rules of evidence that allow a
court or a tribunal to presume that a person is dead-which presumption may be invoked in any action
or proceeding, but itself cannot be the subject of an independent civil action or proceeding.
3. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied.

Issue:
WON RTC has the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.

Ruling: NO.

In the case of In re: Petition for the Presumption of Death of Nicolai Szatraw, the rule invoked by the latter is
merely one of the evidence which permits the court to presume that a person had been unheard from in seven years
had been established. This presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in a
special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent court. Independently of such
an action or special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of
an action or special proceeding.

Furthermore, the petition is for a declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve the petitioner's
situation, because such a presumption is already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if
final and executory, would be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be
the subject of judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is that only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which
a competent court has to pass.

In this case, the petition filed merely seeks the declaration of presumptive death under Civil Code so RTC
must have dismissed it outright since in our jurisdiction, it is not a valid suit, thus no court has the authority to entertain
such case. No actual right is enforced nor a wrong to be remedied since NCC 390/391 merely express rules of
evidence. Judicial pronouncement under NCC 390/391 would never become final as the articles only confirms the
existence of prima facie or disputable presumption.

Addt’l Notes:
◊ WON the declaration of presumptive death under FC 41 is proper in this case
 The petition for declaration of presumptive death is not an action that would have warranted the application of
FC 41 since Estrellita was not seeking to remarry. FC 41 is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid
subsequent marriage under the law.

In this case, Estrellita was clearly relying on the presumption of death under the Civil Code, NCC 390 or 391.
In Estrellita’s petition, she files “not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under PD 1638 as
amended”. NCC 390 and 391 arises through operation of law without the need of a court declaration, once factual
conditions mentioned in the articles are established. Philippine Veterans’ Affairs Office and AFP are the source of
Estrellita’s misconception since they require a declaration of presumptive death before beneficiaries can claim death
benefits. The PVAO and AFP can decide claims of death benefits of missing soldier without requiring the claimant to
first produce a court declaration of the presumptive death of such soldier. The claimants of the death benefits need only
to present “evidence” proving the circumstances under NCC 390 or 391 except a court declaration.
 RULE 74

Summary Settlement of Estate

Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — If the decedent left no will and no debts and the
heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the
purpose, the parties may without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit
by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in
an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an
affidavit filled in the office of the register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial settlement, whether by public
instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself
by means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of the public instrument,
or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said
register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property involved as certified to under oath by
the parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may be filed under section 4 of this rule.
It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two
(2) years after the death of the decedent.

The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
manner provided in the nest succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who
has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.

Section 2. Summary settlement of estate of small value. — Whenever the gross value of the estate of a deceased
person, whether he died testate or intestate, does not exceed ten thousand pesos, and that fact is made to appear to
the Court of First Instance having jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of an interested person and upon hearing,
which shall be held not less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months from the date of the last publication of a
notice which shall be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the province, and after such other notice to interest persons as the court may direct, the court may proceed summarily,
without the appointment of an executor or administrator, and without delay, to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if
any there be, to determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate, and to apportion and divide it
among them after the payment of such debts of the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and such persons, in
their own right, if they are of lawful age and legal capacity, or by their

guardians or trustees legally appointed and qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into
the possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to them respectively. The court shall make such order as may
be just respecting the costs of the proceedings, and all orders and judgments made or rendered in the course thereof
shall be recorded in the office of the clerk, and the order of partition or award, if it involves real estate, shall be recorded
in the proper register's office.

Section 3. Bond to be filed by distributees. — The court, before allowing a partition in accordance with the provisions of
the preceding section, my require the distributees, if property other than real is to be distributed, to file a bond in an
amount to be fixed by court, conditioned for the payment of any just claim which may be filed under the next succeeding
section.

Section 4. Liability of distributees and estate. — If it shall appear at any time within two (2) years after the settlement
and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the first two sections of this rule, that an heir
or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation in the estate, such heir or such other person may
compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such
lawful participation. And if within the same time of two (2) years, it shall appear that there are debts outstanding against
the estate which have not been paid, or that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation
payable in money, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the
amount of such debts or lawful participation and order how much and in what manner each distributee shall contribute in
the payment thereof, and may issue execution, if circumstances require, against the bond provided in the preceding
section or against the real estate belonging to the deceased, or both. Such bond and such real estate shall remain
charged with a liability to creditors, heirs, or other persons for the full period of two (2) years after such distribution,
notwithstanding any transfers of real estate that may have been made.

Section 5. Period for claim of minor or incapacitated person. — If on the date of the expiration of the period of two (2)
years prescribed in the preceding section the person authorized to file a claim is a minor or mentally incapacitated, or is
in prison or outside the Philippines, he may present his claim within one (1) year after such disability is removed.

CASE 1
 SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG and VILLAFRlA, DR. RUEL B. SPOUSES MARIA FRANCISCO substituted by
VILLAFRIA, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. GRACIA RINOZA PLAZO and MA. FE RINOZA ALARAS, Respondents.

G.R. No. 187524               August 5, 2015

Summary:

Pedro L. Riñoza died intestate, leaving several heirs including herein respondents, as well as several
properties including a resort and a family home, both located in Nasugbu, Batangas. In their Amended Complaint for
Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession, respondents alleged that their co-heirs sold the
subject properties to herein petitioners without their knowledge and consent. Subsequently, respondents discovered an
extra-judicial settlement of estate of their late father was published in a tabloid called Balita, thus, they caused the
annotation of adverse claim of the subject properties. In their Answer, petitioners denied the allegations of the
complaint on the ground of lack of personal knowledge and good faith in acquiring the subject properties. However, the
trial court decided in favor of herein respondents and annulled the transfer of the subject properties to petitioners and
spouses Bondoc due to irregularities in the documents of conveyance offered by petitioners particularly, the notary
public was not commissioned to do so, the date of execution was not indicated, the amount of consideration was
superimposed, and it was not presented in the ROD of Nasugbu, Batangas. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the
trial court. Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. It was elevated before the Supreme Court but it was
automatically dismissed for failure to comply with the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice regarding competent evidence of
affiant's identities. Both motion for reconsideration and the subsequent 2 nd motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied. Petitioner’s son wrote a letter addressed to the Chief Justice seeking to decide the petition on merits instead of
technical defects but it was ignored. When the trial court’s judgment attained finality, it issued an order of partial writ of
execution. Notwithstanding, petitioner filed a petition for annulment of judgment and order before the CA on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. However, CA dismissed the petition as well as the motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the special
proceeding for the settlement of estate of Pedro Rinoza and the Civil Action for annulment of title of heirs and third
persons in one proceeding. Considering that settlement of estate is a special proceeding cognizable by a probate court
of limited jurisdiction while judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession are ordinary civil actions
cognizable by a court of general jurisdiction, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining the latter while it was
sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction.

Ruling:

No, the CA did not act with grave abuse of discretion.

Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides in part: “If the decedent left no will and no debts and the
heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the
purpose, the parties may without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they
see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may
do so in an ordinary action of partition…”

Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides: “Complaint in action for partition of real estate. - A person
having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint
the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded
and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property.”

Here, it must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name
an executor in his will or the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the bond required
by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint
a qualified administrator in the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. An exception to this rule,
however, is found in the aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 74 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left no will and no debts
due from his estate, may divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an ordinary action for partition without submitting
the same for judicial administration nor applying for the appointment of an administrator by the court. The reason is
that where the deceased dies without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an
administrator to administer the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their possession to which they
are immediately entitled. In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not disputed, that Pedro died
without a will, leaving his estate without any pending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner's contention,
respondents were under no legal obligation to submit the subject properties of the estate to a special
proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and are, in fact, encouraged to have the same partitioned,
judicially or extrajudicially.

Additional Notes:
 In Pereira v. Court of Appeals: Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not
preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no" debts or obligations, if they do
not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the
estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not
compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. It should be noted that recourse to
an administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not
resorting to an action for partition. Where' partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be
burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons.

Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his
heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long and
costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the
judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings.
 CASE 3
JOSEPH CUA, petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA A. VARGAS, AURORA VARGAS, RAMON VARGAS, MARITES VARGAS, EDELINA VARGAS AND
GEMMA VARGAS, respondents.

G.R. No. 156536             October 31, 2006

FACTS:
A parcel of residential land with an area of 99 square meters located in San Juan, Virac, Catanduanes was left
behind by the late Paulina Vargas. On February 4, 1994, a notarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was
executed by and among Paulina Vargas' heirs, namely Ester Vargas, Visitacion Vargas, Juan Vargas, Zenaida V.
Matienzo, Rosario V. Forteza, Andres Vargas, Gloria Vargas, Antonina Vargas and Florentino Vargas, partitioning and
adjudicating unto themselves the lot in question, each one of them getting a share of 11 square meters. Florentino,
Andres, Antonina and Gloria, however, did not sign the document. Only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario
signed it. The Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was published in the Catanduanes Tribune for three consecutive
weeks.

On November 15, 1994, an Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale 4 was again executed by and
among the same heirs over the same property and also with the same sharings. Once more, only Ester, Visitacion,
Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed the document and their respective shares totaling 55 square meters were sold to
Joseph Cua, petitioner herein.

According to Gloria Vargas, the widow of Santiago Vargas and one of respondents herein, she came to know
of the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale dated November 16, 1994 only when the original house built on
the lot was being demolished sometime in May 1995.5 She likewise claimed she was unaware that an earlier Extra
Judicial Settlement Among Heirs dated February 4, 1994 involving the same property had been published in the
Catanduanes Tribune.

After knowing of such sale to petitioner, Gloria Vargas tried to redeem the property.
When the offer to redeem was refused, Gloria Vargas and her children filed a case for annulment of Extra Judicial
Settlement and Legal Redemption of the lot with the MTC.

The MTC dismissed the complaint, declaring the Deed of Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale
valid and binding.

The RTC affirmed the MTC decision.

The CA reversed the ruling of both lower courts, declaring that the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs
and the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale were void and without any legal effect.

The CA held that, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the extrajudicial settlement made by
the other co-heirs is not binding upon respondents considering the latter never participated in it nor did they ever signify
their consent to the same.

Petitioner argued among others, that the acquisition by petitioner of the subject property subsequent to the
extrajudicial partition was valid because the partition was duly published. The publication of the same constitutes due
notice to respondents and signifies their implied acquiescence thereon. Respondents are therefore estopped from
denying the validity of the partition and sale at this late stage. Considering that the partition was valid, respondents no
longer have the right to redeem the property.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the heirs are deemed constructively notified and bound, regardless of their failure to participate
therein, by an extrajudicial settlement and partition of estate when the extrajudicial settlement and partition has
been duly published.
2. Assuming a published extrajudicial settlement and partition does not bind persons who did not participate
therein, whether the written notice required to be served by an heir to his co-heirs in connection with the sale
of hereditary rights to a stranger before partition under Article 1088 of the Civil Code 17 can be dispensed with
when such co-heirs have actual knowledge of the sale such that the 30-day period within which a co-heir can
exercise the right to be subrogated to the rights of a purchaser shall commence from the date of actual
knowledge of the sale.

RULING:
The petition lacks merit.

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however,
that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It
contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon
(i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not
after such an agreement has already been executed as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the
first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.

The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or
did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution.

The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive
heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent’s estate. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind
respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned.

This is not to say, though, that respondents’ co-heirs cannot validly sell their hereditary rights to third persons
even before the partition of the estate. The heirs who actually participated in the execution of the extrajudicial
settlements, which included the sale to petitioner of their pro indiviso shares in the subject property, are bound by the
same.

Nevertheless, respondents are given the right to redeem these shares pursuant to Article 1088 of the Civil
Code. The right to redeem was never lost because respondents were never notified in writing of the actual sale by their
co-heirs. Based on the provision, there is a need for written notice to start the period of redemption, thus:

Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs
may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within
the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.

It bears emphasis that the period of one month shall be reckoned from the time that a co-heir is notified in
writing by the vendor of the actual sale. Written notice is indispensable and mandatory, actual knowledge of the sale
acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner notwithstanding. It cannot be counted from the time advance notice
is given of an impending or contemplated sale. The law gives the co-heir thirty days from the time written notice of the
actual sale within which to make up his or her mind and decide to repurchase or effect the redemption.

It should be kept in mind that the obligation to serve written notice devolves upon the vendor co-heirs because
the latter are in the best position to know the other co-owners who, under the law, must be notified of the sale
Considering, therefore, that respondents’ co-heirs failed to comply with this requirement, there is no legal impediment to
allowing respondents to redeem the shares sold to petitioner.
 CASE 4
SPOUSES EDUARDO ARENAS DOMINGO & JOSEFINA CHAVEZ DOMINGO, petitioners,
vs.
LILIA MONTINOLA ROCES, CESAR ROBERTO M. ROCES, ANA INES MAGDALENA ROCES TOLENTINO, LUIS
MIGUEL M. ROCES, JOSE ANTONIO M. ROCES and MARIA VIDA PRESENTACION ROCES, respondents.

G.R. No. 147468            April 9, 2003

Facts:
The spouses Cesar and Lilia Roces were the owners of two contiguous parcels of land located on Arayat
Street, Mandaluyong, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) caused the annotation of an affidavit of
adverse claim on the titles alleging that the spouses have mortgaged the same to it.4

Subsequently, GSIS wrote a letter to Cesar Roces demanding the surrender of the owner's duplicates of titles.
When Roces failed to comply, GSIS filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, praying that the
owner's duplicates in Roces' possession be declared null and void and that the Register of Deeds of Pasig be directed
to issue new owner's duplicates to GSIS.5 

The Court of First Instance issued an order granting the petition.6 The order became final and executory, and
TCT Nos. 57217 (11663) and 57218 (11664) were issued in the name of GSIS.7

Cesar Roces died intestate on January 26, 1980.8 He was survived by the respondents in this case.

Reynaldo L. Montinola, a nephew of Lilia Roces, executed an affidavit of self-adjudication over properties. He
alleged that the properties were owned by the spouses Cesar and Lilia Roces, both of whom died intestate and that the
properties were acquired during the existence of their marriage; that the spouses left no heirs except the brother of Lilia
Roces, who was his father; that neither of the spouses left any will nor any debts; and that he was the sole heir of the
Roces spouses.9

Montinola filed a petition against GSIS with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, praying for the cancellation of
TCT Nos. 57217 (11663) and 57218 (11664).10 During the trial, GSIS failed to produce any document evidencing the
alleged real estate mortgage by Roces of the properties. Hence, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Montinola.
GSIS did not appeal the aforesaid judgment; thus, the same became final and executory.
Montinola executed a deed of absolute sale of the property covered by TCT No. 7299 in favor of petitioner spouses
Eduardo and Josefina Domingo.13 Thereafter, TCT No. 7673 was issued in the names of petitioners.

Both TCT Nos. 7299 and 7673 contained the following annotation:
Subject to the provision of Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court with respect to the inheritance left by the
deceased SPS. CESAR ROCES & LILIA MONTINOLA.14

When respondents learned of the sale, they filed a complaint against Montinola and petitioners with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig. They argued that the affidavit of self-adjudication was fraudulent because Montinola was
not an heir of the Roces spouses and it was not true that Lilia Roces was dead. Therefore, the affidavit of self-
adjudication, as well as the deed of absolute sale, TCT No. 7299, and TCT No. 7673, all covering the subject property,
were null and void.15

In their answer, petitioners alleged that they were buyers in good faith and that their action was barred by
estoppel and laches.16

After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of respondents.

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, The Decision of the Court a quo appealed from is SET ASIDE
AND REVERSED. Another Decision is hereby rendered in favor of the Appellants.as follows:

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 20 which was denied in a Resolution dated March 15,
2000.21 Hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of appeals erred in holding that the annotation in the title regarding section 4, Rule
74 is an encumbrance which disqualifies petitioners from being innocent purchaser for value.

Ruling:
The Petition lacks merit.

It is true that one who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need not go beyond the same,
but only has to rely on the title. He is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title.
However, this principle does not apply when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would
impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of
title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the
property in litigation. One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor
a purchaser in good faith.23

As stated above, the titles, namely, TCT Nos. 7299 and 7673, contained annotations which made reference to
the provisions of Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, viz:

SEC. 4. Liability of distributees and estate. — If it shall appear at any time within two (2) years after the
settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the first two sections of
this rule, that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation in the estate, such
heir or such other person may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter
provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. And if within the same time of two (2) years, it
shall appear that there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not been paid, or that an heir or
other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation payable in money, the court having
jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of such debts or lawful
participation and order how much and in what manner each distributee shall contribute in the payment thereof,
and may issue execution, if circumstances require, against the bond provided in the preceding section or
against the real estate belonging to the deceased, or both. Such bond and such real estate shall remain
charged with a liability to creditors, heirs, or other persons for the full period of two (2) years after such
distribution, notwithstanding any transfers of real estate that may have been made.24

The foregoing rule clearly covers transfers of real property to any person, as long as the deprived heir or
creditor vindicates his rights within two years from the date of the settlement and distribution of estate. Contrary to
petitioners' contention, the effects of this provision are not limited to the heirs or original distributees of the estate
properties, but shall affect any transferee of the properties.

In David v. Malay,25 it was held that the buyer of real property the title of which contain an annotation pursuant
to Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court cannot be considered innocent purchasers for value. In the same vein, the
annotation at the back of TCT No. 7299 in this case referring to Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court was sufficient
notice to petitioners of the limitation on Montinola's right to dispose of the property. The presence of an irregularity which
excites or arouses suspicion should prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the
vendor appearing on the face thereof.26 Purchasers of registered land are bound by the annotations found at the back of
the certificate of title.27

Hence, petitioners cannot be considered buyers in good faith and cannot now avoid the consequences
brought about by the application of Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
 RULE 75

Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary

Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution. — No will shall pass either real or personal estate unless
it is proved and allowed in the proper court. Subject to the right of appeal, such allowance of the will shall be conclusive
as to its due execution.

Section 2. Custodian of will to deliver. — The person who has custody of a will shall, within twenty (20) days after he
knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will to the court having jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will.

Section 3. Executor to present will and accept or refuse trust. — A person named as executor in a will shall, within
twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testate, or within twenty (20) days after he knows that he is named
executor if he obtained such knowledge after the death of the testator, present such will to the court having jurisdiction,
unless the will has reached the court in any other manner, and shall, within such period, signify to the court in writing his
acceptance of the trust or his refusal to accept it.

Section 4. Custodian and executor subject to fine for neglect. — A person who neglects any of the duties required in
the two last preceding sections without excused satisfactory to the court shall be fined not exceeding two thousand
pesos.

Section 5. Person retaining will may be committed. — A person having custody of a will after the death of the testator
who neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same, when ordered so to do, to the court having jurisdiction, may
be committed to prison and there kept until he delivers the will.

CASE 1
In the matter of the will of Donata Manahan. TIBURCIA MANAHAN, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ENGRACIA MANAHAN, opponent-appellant.

G.R. No. 38050           September 22, 1933

Summary:

Pursuant to the will left by Donata Manahan, petitioner was, thereby named as the executrix of the testatrix.
Prior thereto, she instituted a special proceeding to probate the will. Upon hearing and after the presentation of
evidence, no opposition challenged the will. As a result, it was probated. One year and seven months later, respondent
motioned for reconsideration praying that the order admitting the will to probate be vacated and be declared null and
void ab initio. Petitioner opposed and the RTC ruled on petitioner’s favor. Respondent appealed contending the
following: that she’s an interested party to the proceeding but was not notified; that the RTC did not probate the will but
only limited its authentication; and that the will is null and void ab initio on the ground that the external formalities
prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied with in the execution thereof.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent can still challenge the order granting the probate of the will.

Ruling:

No. Respondent cannot anymore challenge the will after it was probated by the court. The issue was resolved
by the court as follows:

But there is another reason which prevents the appellant herein from successfully maintaining the present
action and it is that inasmuch as the proceedings followed in a testamentary case are in rem, the trial court's decree
admitting the will to probate was effective and conclusive against her, in accordance with the provisions of section 306
of the said Code of Civil Procedure which reads as follows:

SEC. 306. EFFECT OF JUDGMENT. — . . . .

1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the
administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal
condition or relation of a particular person the judgment or order is conclusive upon the title of the thing,
 the will or administration, or the condition or relation of the person: Provided, That the probate of a will or
granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or
intestate; . . . .

XXX

Before closing, we wish to state that it is not timely to discuss herein the validity and sufficiency of the
execution of the will in question. As we have already said, this question can no more be raised in this case on
appeal. After due hearing, the court found that the will in question was valid and effective and the order
admitting it to probate, thus promulgated, should be accepted and respected by all. The probate of the will in
question now constitutes res judicata.
 CASE 2
In the matter of the petition for probate of the will of Consuelo Santiago Garcia
Vs.
Natividad Garcia Santos
G.R. No. 204793. June 8, 2020

Characters:

1. Consuelo: The owner of the will, married to Anastacio Garcia.

2. Remedios Garcia Tanchanco: Daughter of Consuelo, died before her mom, leaving her children to be the party in
interest to the case.
3. Natividad Garcia Santos: Daughter of Consuelo, sister of Remedios, and the defending party to this case.
4. Catalino Tanchanco and Ronaldo Tanchanco: children of Remedios, the ones challenging the probate proceeding.

Summary:
Following the death of Consuelo, Catalino, one of her grandchild, filed for probate proceeding praying among
others, that he be appointed as the executrix. Then, Natividad, one of Consuelo’s children, opposed the filing
contending that she already filed for the same proceeding in the other RTC branch. In there, Natividad prayed the same.
Catalino petitioned against the probate proceeding filed by Natividad inquiring the intrinsic validity of the will; and that
the intestate proceeding be converted into a testate one. RTC favored Catalino but CA reversed the pronouncement.

Issue:
Whether or not probate proceeding can resolve inquiry as to intrinsic validity of the will.

Ruling:
No. the probate proceeding cannot resolve inquiry as to the intrinsic validity of a will.

“The main issue which the court must determine in a probate proceeding is the due execution or the extrinsic
validity of the will’ as provided by Section 1, Rule 75 of the Rules of Court. The probate court cannot inquire into the
intrinsic validity of the will or the disposition of the estate by the testator, Thus, due execution is ”whether the testator,
being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law” as mandated by
Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code.”

In this case, Catalino, by petitioning to the court, inquiring regarding the intrinsic validity of the will on the
occasion of the probate proceeding is cannot be allowed. The court can only determine the validity as to the execution
of the will during the probate proceeding.
 CASE 3
REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,
vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.

G.R. No. L-23445             June 23, 1966

Wills; Succession; Probate of will; Court’s area of inquiry is limited to extrinsic validity of will; When Court may rule on
intrinsic validity.—In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and
resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix’s testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only
after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand
that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the Court should meet that issue

Same; Preterition; Omission of forced heirs in the will.—Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate, but she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line—her parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly
disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of preterition of the parents, not a case of
ineffective disinheritance.

FACTS:

Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her parents and 6 brothers and
sisters.

Remedios, one of the sisters, filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario instituting the
former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She prayed that she will be admitted to probate and that letter of
administration be issued to her. Felix and Paz, Rosario’s parents, opposed on the probate of the will on the ground that
by the institution of Remedios as the universal heir of the decedent, oppositors, who are compulsory heirs in the direct
ascending line – were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is void.

ISSUE(s):

1) WON the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal heir preterited the compulsory
heirs.
2) WON the court may rule on the intrinsic validity of the will.

RULING:

1) Yes, the compulsory heirs were preterited.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because
they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited.

Here, the holographic will allegedly executed by the decedent assigned Remedios as the sole, universal heir
despite the fact that Rosario’s parents and siblings are still living at the time of her death. This thus resulted in
the preterition of compulsory heirs.

2) No, the court may not rule on the intrinsic validity of the will.

The law provides that in a special proceeding for the allowance of the will, the probate court may only pass
upon the extrinsic validity of the will.  The due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the
compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented, and
to be acted upon, by the court. Said court at this stage of the proceedings — is not called upon to rule on
the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein.
 CASE 4
In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian. FELIX BALANAY, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch VI; AVELINA B. ANTONIO
and DELIA B. LANABAN, respondents.

G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975

Special proceedings; Testate succession; Probate court may pass upon intrinsic validity of a will before passing
upon its formal validity.—The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will’s intrinsic validity even before its formal
validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be
intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.

Same; Same; Invalidity of one testamentary disposition does not necessarily invalidate all other dispositions
made therein.—The rule is that “the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the
invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other
dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made” (Art 792, Civil Code).

Facts:
Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973 in Davao City at the age of
sixty-seven.  She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and by their six legitimate Children named Felix
Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.

Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition dated February 27, 1973 for the probate of his mother's
notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in English.  In that will Leodegaria Julian declared (a) that she
was the owner of the "southern half" of nine conjugal lots (par. II); (b) that she was the absolute owner of two parcels of
land which she inherited from her father (par. III) and (c) that it was her desire that her properties should not be divided
among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of the
properties.

Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband's death (he was eighty-two years old in
1973) her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands (which she described as "my properties") should be divided and
distributed in the manner set forth in that part of her will.  She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were
all owned by her.  She disposed of in the will her husband's one-half share of the conjugal assets.

Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the grounds of lack of
testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband and alleged improper partition of the conjugal estate. 
The oppositors claimed that Felix Balanay, Jr. should collate certain properties which he had received from the testatrix.

The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty. Montaña, assumed that the issuance of a notice to creditors
was in order since the parties had agreed on that point. It adopted the view of Attys. Montaña and Guyo that the will was
void.  So, in its order of February 28, 1974... it dismissed the petition for the probate, converted the testate proceeding
into an intestate proceeding, ordered the issuance of a notice to creditors and set the intestate proceeding for hearing
on April 1 and 2, 1974.  The lower court did not abrogate its prior orders of June 18 and October 15, 1973.  The notice
to creditors was issued on April 1, 1974 and published on May 2, 9 and 16 in the Davao Star in spite of petitioner's
motion of April 17, 1974 that its publication be held in abeyance.

Issues:
WON the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or
formal validity, and in declaring it void.

Ruling:
No, the probate court did not err.

The law provides Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon,
even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
Here, the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been
established.  The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. 
Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated,
the court should meet the issue.

The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of
the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the
first invalid disposition had not been made").  "Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the
valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or
interfering with the general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries"
 CASE 5
SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ, OSCAR JUGO ANG, CARMELITA
JUGO, respondents.

G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985

Doctrine: Succession; Wills; Jurisdiction; The fact that the probate court declared a devise made in a will null and void
will be sustained where no useful purpose will be served by requiring the filing of a separate civil action and restricting
the court only to the issue of extrinsic validity of the will.—We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual
provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition f or probate
(which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization), the trial court acted correctly in
passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might
become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that
the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid v.
Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang v. Ramagosa, L-23135, December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA
1369; Cacho v. Udan, L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693). Nepomuceno vs. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 206, No.
L-62952 October 9, 1985

Facts:

Martin Jugo left a duly executed and notarizes Last Will and Testament before he died which named herein
petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as the sole executor. The will clearly states that he was previously married to Rufina
Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children and that he was long estranged from his wife. The petitioner and the
testator were married before a Justice of Peace in Tarlac City despite the subsisting marriage. In 1974, the petitioner
filed for a petition for probate. In 1975, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging undue and improper
influence by the petitioner to the testator alleging that the testator was already very sick during and that she is wanting
for integrity for living in concubinage.

Petitioner’s Contention:

Whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and
Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provision in favor of herein petitioner.

Respondent’s contention:

The fact that the last Will and Testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the meretricious
relationship between the testator and the petitioner and the fact that petitioner herself initiated the presentation of
evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led private respondents to present
contrary evidence, merits the application of the doctrine enunciated in Nuguid v. Felix Nuguid, et al. (17 SCRA 449)**
and Felix Balanay, Jr. v. Hon. Antonio Martinez, et al. (G.R. No. L- 39247, June 27, 1975). Respondents also submit
that the admission of the testator of the illicit relationship between him and the petitioner put in issue the legality of the
devise. 

Issue:

Whether or not the CA acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and Testament of
the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision.

Ruling:

No, the CA acted within its jurisdiction.

The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court
should meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid)

The Will is void under Article 739. The following donations shall be void: (1) Those made between persons
who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation; and Article 1028. The prohibitions mentioned in
Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions.

There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when Martin Jugo executed
his Will. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the
properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.
 The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it went on to
pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void. The general
rule is that in probate proceedings, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic
validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court
is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.
 CASE 6
NELSON NUFABLE, SILMOR NUFABLE and AQUILINA NUFABLE, petitioners,
vs.
GENEROSA NUFABLE, VILFOR NUFABLE, MARCELO NUFABLE, and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

G.R. No. 126950 July 2, 1999

Doctrine: Civil Law; Wills; As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited only to passing upon the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated, the due execution thereof, the testator’s testamentary
capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law.—As a general rule, courts in
probate proceedings are limited only to passing upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated,
the due execution thereof, the testator’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the
intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provision of the will. The question of the intrinsic validity of a will normally
comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. Nufable vs. Nufable, 309
SCRA 692, G.R. No. 126950 July 2, 1999

Facts:

Edras Nufable owned an untitled parcel of land located at Poblacion, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, consisting of
948 square meters, more or less. He died on August 9, 1965 and was survived by his children, namely: Angel Custodio,
Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo, all surnamed Nufable. Upon petition for probate filed by said heirs and after due
publication and hearing, the then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental (Branch II) issued an Order dated March 30,
1966 admitting to probate the last will and testament executed by the deceased Edras Nufable. However, one of the
heirs, Angel actually mortgaged the entire property to DBP two months prior to the settlement which property was
eventually foreclosed. Thereafter, Nelson, son of the mortgagors, purchased said property from DBP. The other heirs
now filed for the annulment of sale in favor of Nelson. The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting
one-fourth of the property to Nelson and the other three-fourths to the other heirs.

Petitioners filed this present petition contending that the probate of the Last Will and Testament of Edras
Nufable did not determine the ownership of the land in question as against third parties.

Petitioner’s Contention:

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in considering as controlling the probate of the Last Will and Testament of
Esdras Nufable, the probate thereof not being an issue in this case;

2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not considering the fact that the Development Bank of the Philippines
became the absolute, exclusive, legal, and rightful owner of the land in question, from whom petitioner Nelson Nufable
acquired the same by purchase and that, therefore, no award can be made in favor of private respondents unless and
until the Development Bank of the Philippines title thereto is first declared null and void by the court.

Respondent’s Contention:

Respondents stipulated that they were not aware of the mortgage by petitioners of the subject property. This
being the case, a co-owner does not lose his part ownership of a co-owned property when his share is mortgaged by
another co-owner without the formers knowledge and consent16 as in the case at bar. It has likewise been ruled that the
mortgage of the inherited property is not binding against co-heirs who never benefitted.

Issue:

Whether or not the Last Will and Testament of Esdras Nufable and its subsequent probate are pertinent and
material to the question of the right of ownership of petitioner Nelson Nufable who purchased the land in question from,
and as acquired property of the Development Bank of the Philippines.

Ruling:

No, the Last Will and Testament of Edras and its subsequent probate do not affect the title of Nelson.

At the time when the entire property was mortgaged, the other heirs of Edras had already acquired
successional rights over the said property. This is so because the rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent. Accordingly, for the purpose of transmission of rights, it does not matter whether the
Last Will and Testament of the late Esdras Nufable was admitted or that the Settlement of Estate was approved. It is to
be noted that the probated will of the late Esdras Nufable specifically referred to the subject property in stating that “the
land situated in the Poblacion, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, should not be divided because this must remain in common
for them, but it is necessary to allow anyone of them brothers and sisters to construct a house therein.” It was there for
the will of the decedent that the subject property should undivided, although the restriction should not exceed twenty
(20) years pursuant to Article 870 of the Civil Code.

Thus, when Angel Nufable and his spouses mortgaged the subject property to DBP on March 15, 1966, they
had no right to mortgage the entire property. Angel’s right over the subject property was limited only to 1/4 pro indiviso
share. As co-owner of the subject property, Angel’s right to sell, assign or mortgage is limited to that portion that may be
allotted to him upon termination of the co-ownership. Well-entrenched is the rule that a co-owner can only alienate his
pro indiviso share in the co-owned property. Hence, The Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that Angel Custodio
Nufable “had no right to mortgage thesubject property in its entirety. His right to encumber said property was limited only
to 1/4pro indiviso share of the property in question.”