Republic of the Philippines produce the complete record pertaining to the mental condition of the said
SUPREME COURT defendant. Pursuant to this order, Dr. Toribio Joson appeared before the court on
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45130             February 17, 1937
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,  of the Psychopathic Hospital, rendered his report, Exhibit 5, on June 11, 1935. On
vs.
CELESTINO BONOAN Y CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
Paulino Sevilla, Fernando Arce and Gaudencio Garcia for appellant.
Undersecretary of Justice for appellee.
LAUREL, J.:
On January 5, 1935, the prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila filed an
information charging Celestino Bonoan, the defendant-appellant herein, with the
crime of murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1934, in the City of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the said accused, with evident premeditation and
treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without any
justifiable motive and with the decided purpose to kill one Carlos Guison,
attack, assault and stab the said Carlos Guison on the different parts of his
body with a knife, thereby inflicting upon him the following injuries, to wit:
"One stab wound at the right epigastric region penetrating one cm. into the
superior surace of the right lobe of the liver; and three non-penetrating stab
wounds located respectively at the posterior and lateral lumbar region, and
left elbow", which directly caused the death of the said Carlos Guison three
days afterwards.
On January 16, 1935, the case was called for the arraignment of the accused. The
defense counsel forthwith objected to the arraignment on the ground that the
defendant was mentally deranged and was at the time confined in the Psychopatic
Hospital. The court thereupon issued an order requiring the Director of the Hospital
to render a report on the mental condition of the accused. Accordingly, Dr. Toribio
Joson, assistant alientist, rendered his report,Exhibit 4, hereinbelow incorporated.
On March 23, 1935, the case was again called for the arraignment of the accused,
but in view of the objection of the fiscal, the court issued another order requiring the
doctor of the Psyhopatic Hospital who examined the defendant to appear and
March 26, 1935 for the necessary inquiry. Thereafter, the prosecution and the
defense asked the court to summon the other doctors of the hospital for questioning
as to the mental condition of the accused, or to place the latter under a competent
doctor for a closer observation. The trial court then issued an order directing that the
accused be placed under the chief alienist or an assistant alienist of the Psychopatic
Hospital for his personal observation and the subsequent submission of a report as
to the true mental condition of the patient. Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, assistant alienist
June 28, 1935, the case was called again. Dr. Fernandez appeared before the court
and ratified his report, Exhibit 5, stating that the accused was not in a condition to
defend himself. In view thereof, the case was suspended indefinitely.
On January 21, 1936, Dr. Dr. Fernandez reported to the court that the defendant
could be discharged from the hospital and appear for trial, as he was "considered a
recovered case." Summoned by the court, Dr. Fernandez, appeared and testified
that the accused "had recovered from the disease." On February 27, 1936, the
accused was arraigned, pleaded "not guilty" and trial was had.
After trial, the lower court found the defendant guilty of the offense charged in the
information above-quoted and sentenced him to life imprisonment, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs.
The defendant now appeals to this court and his counsel makes the following
assignment of errors:
A. The court a quo  erred in finding that the evidence establishes that the
accused has had dementia  only occasionally and intermittently and has not
had it immediately prior to the commission of the defense.
B. The court a quo  erred in finding that the evidence in this case further
shows that during and immediately after the commission of the offense, the
accused did not show any kind of abnormality either in behavior, language
and appearance, or any kind of action showing that he was mentally
deranged.
C. The court a quo erred in declaring that under the circumstances that
burden was on the defense to show hat the accused was mentally deranged
at the time of the commission of the offense, and that the defense did not
establish any evidence to this effect.
D. The court a quo in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged and
in not acquitting him thereof.
It appears that in the morning of December 12, 1934, the defendant Celestino
Bonoan met the now deceased Carlos Guison on Avenida Rizal near a barbershop
close to Tom's Dixie Kitchen. Francisco Beech, who was at the time in the
barbershop, heard the defendant say in Tagalog, "I will kill you." Beech turned
around and saw the accused withdrawing his right hand, which held a knife, from the
side of Guison who said, also in Tagalog, "I will pay you", but Bonoan replied saying
that he would kill him and then stabbed Guison thrice on the left side. The assaultt
was witnessed by policeman Damaso Arnoco who rushed to the scene and arrested
Bonoan and took possession of the knife, Exhibit A. Guison was taken to the
Philippine General Hospital where he died two days later. Exhibit C is the report of
the autopsy performed on December 15, 1934, by Dr. Sixto de los Angeles.
As the killing of the deceased by the defendant-appellant is admitted, it does not
seem necessary to indulge in any extended analysis of the testimony of the
witnesses for the prosecution. The defense set up being that of insanity, the only
question to be determined in this appeal is whether or not the defendant-appellant
was insane at the time of the commission of the crime charged.
On the question of insanity as a defense in criminal cases, and the incidental
corollaries as to the legal presumption and the kind and quantum of evidence
required, theories abound and authorities are in sharp conflict. Stated generally,
courts in the United States proceed upon three different theories. (See Herzog,
Alfred W., Medical Jurisprudence [1931], sec. 655 et seq., p. 479 et
seq.; also Lawson, Insanity in Criminal Cases, p. 11et seq.) The  first view is that
insanity as a defense in a confession and avoidance and as must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt when the commission of a crime is established, and the defense
of insanity is not made out beyond a reasonable doubt, conviction follows. In other
words, proof of insanity at the time of committing the criminal act should be clear
and satisfactory in order to acquit the accused on the ground of insanity
(Hornblower, C. J., in State vs. Spencer, 21 N. J. L., 196). The second view  is that
an affirmative verdict of insanity is to be governed by a preponderance of evidence,
and in this view, insanity is not to be established beyond a reasonable doubt.
According to Wharton in his "Criminal Evidence" (10th ed.,vol. I, sec. 338), this is the
rule in England (Reg. vs. Layton, 4 Cox, C. C., 149; Reg. vs. Higginson, 1 Car. & K.,
130), and in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas,
Virginia and West Virginia. Thethird view  is that the prosecution must prove sanity
beyond a reasonable doubt (Dais vs. United States, 160 U. S. 496; 40 Law. ed.,
499; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep., 353; Hotema vs. United States, 186 U. S., 413; 46 Law. ed.,
1225; 22 Sup. Ct. Rep., 895; United States vs. Lancaster, 7 Biss., 440; Fed. Cas.
No. 15,555; United States vs. Faulkner, 35 Fed., 730). This liberal view is premised
on the proposition that while it is true that the presumption of sanity exists at the
outset, the prosecution affirms every essential ingredients of the crime charged, and
hence affirms sanity as one essential ingredients, and that a  fortiori where the
accused introduces evidence to prove insanity it becomes the duty of the State to
prove the sanity of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the Philippines, we have approximated the first and stricter view (People vs.
Bacos [1922], 44 Phil., 204). The burden, to be sure, is on the prosecution to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime, but insanity is
presumed, and ". . . when a defendant in a criminal case interposes the defense of
mental incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests upon him. . . ." (U. S. vs.
Martinez [1916], 34 Phil., 305, 308, 309; U. S. vs. Bascos, supra.) We affirm and
reiterate this doctrine.
In the case at bar, the defense interposed being that the defendant was insane at
the time he killed the deceased, the obligation of proving that affirmative allegation
rests on the defense. Without indulging in fine distinctions as to the character and
degree of evidence that must be presented sufficiently convincing evidence, direct
or circumstantial, to a degree that satisfies the judicial mind that the accused was
insane at the time of the perpetration of the offense? In order to ascertain a person's
mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the
condition of his mind a reasonable period both before and after that time. Direct
testimony is not required (Wharton, Criminal Evidence, p. 684; State vs. Wright, 134
Mo., 404; 35 S. W., 1145; State vs. Simms, 68 Mo., 305; Rinkard vs. State, 157 Ind.,
534; 62 N. E., 14; People vs. Tripler, I Wheeler, Crim. Cas., 48), nor are specific
acts of derangement essential (People vs. Tripler, supra) to established insanity as
a defense. Mind can only be known by outward acts. Thereby, we read the thoughts,
the motives and emotions of a person and come to determine whether his acts
conform to the practice of people of sound mind. To prove insanity, therefore,
cicumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, suffice (People vs. Bascos [1922],
44 Phil., 204).
The trial judge arrived at the conclusion that the defendantwas not insane at the
time of the commission of the act for which he was prosecuted on the theory that the
insanity was only occassional or intermittent and not permanentor continuous (32 C.
J., sec. 561, p. 757). We are appraised of the danger of indulging in the
preseumption ofcontinuity in cases of temporary or spasmodic insanity.We
appreciate the reason forthe contrary rule. To be sure, courts should be careful to
distinguish insanity in law from passion or eccentricity, mental weakness or mere
depression resulting from physical ailment. The State should guard against sane
murderers escaping punishment through a general plea of insanity. In the case at
bar, however, we are not cconcerned with connecting two or more attacks of
insanity to show the continuance thereof during the intervening period or periods but
with the continuity of a particular and isolated attack prior to the commission of the
crime charged, and ending with a positive diagnosis of insanity immediately
following the commission of the act complained of. Upon the other hand, there are
facts and circumstances of record which can not be overlooked.The following
considerations have weighed heavily upon the minds of the majority of this court in
arriving at a conclusion different from that reached by the court below:.
(a) From the evidence presented by the defense, uncontradicted by the
prosecution, it appears that the herein defendant-appellant, during the
periods from April 11 to April 26, 1922, and from January 6 to January 10,
1926, was confined in the insane department of the San Lazaro Hospital
suffering from a disease diagnosed as dementia præcox. His confinement
during these periods, it is true, was long before the commission of the
offense on December 12, 1934, but this is a circumstance which tends to
show that the recurrence of the ailment at the time of the occurence of the
crime is not entirely lacking of any rational or scientific foundation.
(b) All persons suffering from dementia præcox are clearly to be regarded
as having mental disease to a degree that disqualifies them for legal
responsibility for their actions (Mental Disorder in Medico-Legal Relations by
Dr. Albert M. Barrett in Peterson, Haines and Webster, Legal Medicine and
Toxology, vol. I, p. 613). According to Dr. Elias Domingo, chief alienist of the
Insular Psychopathic Hospital, the symptoms ofdementia præcox, in certain
peeriods of excitement, are similar to those of manic depresive
psychosis  (p. 19, t. s. n.) and, in either case, the mind appears
"deteriorated" because, "when a person becomes affected by this kind of
disease, either dementia præcox or manic depresive psychosis, during the
period of excitement, he has no control whatever of his acts." (P. 21, t. s. n.)
Even if viewed under the general medico-legal classification of manic-
depressive insanity, "it is largely in relation with the question of irrestible
impulse that forensic relations of manic actions will have to be considered.
There is in this disorder a pathologic lessening or normal inhibitions and the
case with which impulses may lead to actions impairs deliberations and the
use of normal checks to motor impulses" (Peterson, Haines and Webster,
Legal Medicine and Toxology [2d ed., 1926], vol, I, p. 617).
(c) According to the uncontradicted testimony of Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco,
at one time an interne at San LazaroHospital, for four (4) days immediately
preceding December 12, 1934 — the date when the crime was committed
— the defendant and appellant had "an attack of insomnia", which is one of
the symptoms of, and may lead to, dementia præcox (Exhibit 3, defense
testimony of Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco, pp. 13, 14, t. s. n.).
(d) The defendant-appellant appears to have been arrested and taken to the
police station on the very same day of the perpetration of the crime, and
although attempted were made by detectives to secure a statement from
him (see Exhibit B and D and testimony of Charles Strabel, t. s. n. pp. 9, 10)
he was sent by the police department to the Psychopathic Hospital the day
following the commission of the crime. This is an indication that the police
authorities themselves doubted the mental normalcy of the acused, which
doubt found confirmation in the official reports submitted by the specialists
of the San Lazaro Hospital.
(e) According to the report (Exhibit 4) of the alienist in charge, Dr. Toribio
Joson, which report was made within the first month of treatment, the
defendant was suffering from a form of psychosis, called manic depressive
psychosis.We quote the report in full:
INSULAR PSYCHOPATIC HOSPITAL
MANDALUYONG, RIZAL
January 15, 1935.
MEMORANDUM FOR: The chief Alienist, Insular Psychopatic 
Hospital, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
SUBJECT: Patient Celestino Bonoan, male, 
Filipino, 30 years old, sent by the 
Secret Service of the City of Manila 
for mental examinition.
1. MENTAL STATUS:
(a) General behavior. — The patient is undetective, staying most of
the time in his bed with his eyes closed and practically totally
motionless. At other times, however, but on very rare occassions
and at short intervals he apparently wakes up and then he walks
around, and makes signs and ritualistic movements with the
extremities and other parts of the body. Ordinarily he takes his meal
but at times he refuses to take even the food offered by his mother
or sister, so that there have been days in the hospital when he did
not take any nourishment. On several occassions he refused to
have the bath, or to have his hair cut and beard shaved, and thus
appear untidy. He would also sometimes refuse his medicine, and
during some of the intervals he displayed impulsive acts, such as
stricking his chest or other parts of the body with his fists and at one
time after a short interview, he struck strongly with his fist the door
of the nurse's office without apparent motivation. He also
sometimes laughs, or smiles, or claps his hands strongly without
provocation.
(b) Stream of talk. — Usually the patient is speechless, can't be
persuaded to speak, and would not answer in any form the
questions propounded to him. Very often he is seen with his eyes
closed apparently praying as he was mumbling words but would not
answer at all when talked to. At one time he was seen in this
condition with a cross made of small pieces of strick in his hand. He
at times during the interviews recited passages in the literature as
for example the following.
"La virtud y las buenas costumbres son la verdadera
nobleza del hombre. (Truthfulness, honesty and loyalty are
among the attributes of a dependable character.)"
At one time he tried to recite the mass in a very loud voice in the
hospital.
(c) Mood.  — Patient is usually apathetic and indifferent but at times
he looks anxious and rather irritable. He himself states that the
often feels said in the hospital.
(d) Orientation. — During the periods that he was acccessible he
was found oriented as to place and person but he did not know the
day or the date.
(e) Illusion and hallucination. — The patient states that during the
nights that he could not sleep he could hear voices telling him many
things. Voices, for example, told that he should escape. That he
was going to be killed because he was benevolet. That he could
sometimes see the shadow of his former sweetheart in the hospital.
There are times however when he could not hear or see at all
anything.
(f ) Delusion and misinterpretation. — On one occassion he told the
examiner that he could not talk in his first day in the hospital
because of a mass he felt he had in his throat. He sometimes thinks
that he is already dead and already buried in the La Loma
Cemetery.
(g) Compulsive phenomena. — None.
(h) Memory. — The patient has a fairly good memory for remote
events, but his memory for recent events or for example, for events
that took place during his stay in the hospital he has no recollection
at all.
(i) Grasp of general informartion. — He has a fairly good grasp of
general information. He could not, however, do simple numerial
tests as the 100-7 test.
(  j) Insight and judgment. — At his fairly clear periods he stated that
he might have been insane during his first days in the hospital, but
just during the interview on January 14, 1935, he felt fairly well.
Insight and judgment were, of course, nil during his stuporous
condition. During the last two days he has shown marked
improvement in his behavior as to be cooperative, and coherent in
his speech.
2. OPINION AND DIAGNOSIS:
The patient during his confinement in the hospital has been found
suffering from a form of physchosis, called Manic depressive
psychosis.
(Sgd.) TORIBIO JOSON, M. D.
Assistant Alienist
In the subsequent report, dated June 11, 1935 (Exhibit 5), filed by Dr. Jose A.
Fernandez, another assistant alienist in the Insular Pshychopatic Hospital, the
following conclusion was reached:
I am of the opinion that actually this patient is sick. He is suffering
from the Manic Depressive form of psychosis. It might be premature
to state before the court has decided this case, but I believe it a
duty to state, that this person is not safe to be at large. He has a
peculiar personality make-up, a personality lacking in control,
overtly serious in his dealings with the every day events of this
earthly world, taking justice with his own hands and many times
executing it in an impulsive manner as to make his action over
proportionate — beyond normal acceptance. He is sensitive, overtly
religious, too idealistic has taste and desires as to make him queer
before the average conception of an earthly man.
He will always have troubles and difficulaties with this world of
realities.
(Sgd.) J. A. Fernandez, M. D.
Assistant Alienist
To prove motive and premeditation and, indirectly, mental normlacy of the accused
at the time of the commission of the crime, the prosecution called on policeman
Damaso Arnoco. Arnoco testified that upon arresting the defendant-appellant he
inquired from the latter for the reason for the assault and the defendant-appellant
replied that the deceased Guison owed him P55 and would pay; that appellant
bought the knife, Exhibit A, for 55 centavos in Tabora Street and that for two days
he had been watching for Guison in order to kill him (pp. 5, 6, t. s. n.). Benjamin
Cruz, a detective, was also called and corroborated the testimony of policeman
Arnoco. That such kind of evidence is not necessarily proof of the sanity of the
accused during the commission of the offense, is clear from what Dr. Sydney Smith,
Regius Professor of Forensic Medicine, University of Edinburg, said in his work on
Forensic Medicine (3d ed. [London], p. 382), that in the type of dementia præcox,
"the crime is ussually preceded by much complaining and  planning. In these people,
homicidal attcks are common, because of delusions that they are being interfered
with sexually or that their property is being taken."
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the defendant-appellant was
demented at the time he perpetrated the serious offense charged in the information
and that conseuently he is exempt from criminal liability. Accordingly, the judgment
of the lower court is hereby reversed, and the defendant-appellant acquitted, with
costs de oficio  in both instances. In conforminty with paragraph 1 of article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code, the defendant shall kept in confinement in the San Lazaro
Hospital or such other hospital for the insane as may be desiganted by the Director
of the Philippine Health Service, there to remain confined until the Court of First
Instance of Manila shall otherwise order or decree. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
IMPERIAL, J., dissenting:
I agree with the dissenting opinions of Hustices Diaz and Concepcion.
There is not question as to the facts constituting the crime imputed to the accused.
The disagreement arises from the conclusions which both opinions attempt to infer
therefrom. The majority opinon establishes the conclusion that the accused was not
in his sound mind when he committed the crime because he was then suffering
fromdementia præcox. The dissenting opinions, in establishing the conclusion that
the accused was then in the possession of his mental facilities, or, at leats, at a lucid
interval, are based on the fact admitted by the parties and supported by expert
testimony, that the accused, before the commission of the crime, had been cured
ofdementia præcox and later of manic depressive psychosis. The majority opinion
admits that there is no positive evidence regarding the mantal state of the accused
when he comitted the crime, but it infers from the facts that he must have then been
deprived of his reason. This inference is not sufficiently supported by the
circumtantial evidence. I it is admitted that the legal presumption is that a person
who commits a crime is in his right mind (U. S. vs. Hontiveros Carmona, 18 Phil., 62;
U. S. vs. Guevara, 27 Phil., 547; U. S. vs. Zamora, 32 Phil., 218; U. S. vs. Martinez,
34 Phil., 305; People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil., 204), because the law presumes all acts
and ommissions punishable by law to be voluntary (art. 1, Penal Code; article 4,
subsection 1, Revised Penal Code), and if, as it appears, there is sufficient or
satisfactory evidence that the accused was mentally incapacitated when he
committed the crime, the conclusion of fact must be the same presumption
established by law, that is, that he was in his right mind, and the conclusion of law
must be that he is criminal liable.
There is another detail worth mentioning which is that no credit was given to the
conclusions of fact arrived at by the judge who tried the case. He observed and
heard the witnesses who testified and he had the advantage of testing their
credibility nearby. After weighing all the evidence he arrived at the conclusion that
the accused committed the crime while he was in his right mind. This court generally
gives much weight to the conclusions of fact of the judge who tried the case in the
first instance and does not reject them useless they are clearly in conflict with the
evidence.
DIAZ, J., dissenting:
I do not agree to the majority opinion. The appellant committed the crime while he
was sane, or at least, during a lucid interval. He did not kill his victim without rhyme
or reason and only for the sake of killing him. He did so to avenge himself or to
punish his victim for having refused, according to him, to pay a debt of P55 after
having made him many promises. He so stated clearly to the policeman who
arrested him immediately after the incident; and he made it so understood to the
witness Mariano Yamson, a friend of both the appellant and his victim, before the
commission of the crime.
The law presumes that everybody is in his sound mind because ordinarily such is
his normal condition. Insanity is an exception which may be said to exist only when
thereis satisfactorily evidence establishing it and it certainly is not always permanent
because there are cases in which it comes and takes place only occasionaly and
lasts more or less time according to the circumstances of the individual, that is, the
condition of his health, his environment, and the other contributory causes thereof.
The law itself recognizes this, so much so that in establishing the rule that insane
persons are excempt from criminal liability, because they commit no crime, it also
makes the exception that this is true only when they have not acted during a lucid
intervals (art. 12, subsec. 1, of the Revised Penal Code).
The appellant was afflicted with insanity only for a few days during the months
stated in the majority opinion; April 1922 and January 1926, but he was later
pronounced cured in the hospital where he had been confined because he had
already returned to normalcy by recovering his reason. For this one fact alone,
instead of stating that he acted during a lucid interval on said occasion, it should be
said on the contrary, taking into consideration the explanations given by him to the
policemen who arrested him and to other witnesses for the prosecution with whom
he had been talking before and after the incident, that he acted while in the full
possession of his mental faculties.
The fact that the appellant was aflicted with manic depressive psychosis after the
crime, as certified by Drs. Toribio Joson, J. A. Fernandez and Elias Domingo who
examined him, does not prove that he was so afflicted on the date and at the time of
the commission of the crime nor that said ailment, taking for granted that he was
suffering therefrom, had deprived him of his reason to such an extent that he could
not account for his acts.
There is no evidence of record to show that the appellant was actually insane when
he committed the crime or that he continued to be afflicted with said ailment for
which he had to be confined in the insane asylum for some days during the months
above-stated, in 1922 and 1926. The most reasonable rule which should be adopted
in these cases is the one followed by various courts of the United States stated in 32
C. J., 757, section 561, and 16 C. J., 538, 539, section 1012 as follows:
If the insanity, admitted, or proved, is only occassional or intermittent in its
nature, the presumption of its continuance does not arise, and he who relies
on such insanity proved at another time must prove its existence also at the
time alleged. (32 C. J., 757, sec. 561.)
Where it is shown that defendant had lucid intervals, it will be presumed that
the offense was committed in one of them. A person who has been
adjudged insane, or who has been committed to a hospital or to an asylum
for the insane, is presumed to continue insane; but as in the case of prior
insanity generally, a prior adjudication of insanity does not raise a
presumption of continued insanity, where the insanity is not of a permanent
or continuing character, or where, for a considerable period of time, the
person has been on parole from the hospital or asylum to which he was
committed, or where he escaped from the asylum at a time when he was
about to be discharged. (16 C. J., 538, 539, sec. 1012.)
On the other hand, in Clevenger's Medical Jirusprudence of Insanity (vol. 1, pp. 482
and 484, the following appears:
Fitful and exceptional attacks of insanity are not presumed to be continuous.
And the existence of prior or subsequent lunacy, except where it is habitual,
does not suffice to change the burden of proof. And where an insane person
has lucid intervals offenses committed by him will be presumed to have
been committed in a lucid intervals unless the contrary appears. The maxim
"Once insane presumed always to be insane" does not apply where the
malady or delusion under which the alleged insane person labored was in
its nature accidental or temporary, or the effect of some sickness or
disease.
And in order to raise a presumption of continuance it must be of permanent
type or a continuing nature or possessed of the characteristics of an
habitual and confirmed disorder of the mind. And it must appear to have
been of such duration and character as to indicate the probability of its
continuance, and not simply the possibility or probability of its recurrence.
And there should be some evidence tending to show settled insanity as
contradistinguished from temporary aberration or hallucination, to justify an
instruction which does nor recognize such a distinction.
It is alleged that the appellant was suffering from insomia before he committed the
crime in question. Such condition does not necessarily prove that on the day in
question he was actually insane. Insomia, according to Dr. Elias Domingo, is not an
exlcusive symptom of insanity; other diseases and ailments also have it (t. s. n.,
p.19).
In view of the foregoing considerations and of those stated in the dissenting opinion
of Justice Concepcion, I vote for the affirmance of the appealed sentence, because
in my opinion it is supported by the evidence and in accordance with law.
CONCEPCION, J.,  dissenting:
I dissent: Above all, I wish to state: (1) that the crime committed by the accused is
an admitted fact; and (2) that I adhere to the statement of the majority that it is
settled in this jurisdiction that a defense based upon the insanity of the accused
should be established by means of clear, indubitable and satisfactory evidence.
On December 12, 1934, the accused stabbed the deceased Carlos Guison who, as
a result the wounds received by him, died in the hospital two days after the
aggression.
It is alleged that the accused was insane at the time he committed this crime. What
evidence is there of record in support of this defense? Mention has been made of
the fact that the accused had been confined in the san Lazaro Hospital and later in
the Psychopathic Hospital. He was confined in the San Lazaro Hospital from April
11 to April 26, 1922. He returned to the hospital on January 6, 1926, and left on the
10th of said month and years. Dr Elias Domingo, chief alienist of the Psychopathic
Hospital was questioned as follows:
and he even appeared to be prudent, knowing how to take advantage of advice
favorable to him, as that given him by Cruz of the Bureau of Labor. Furthermore it
cannot be said hat the accused had stabbed Guison through hallucination because
it is an established fact that his victim really owed him money as confirmed by the
fact that when Guison was stabbed he cried to the accused "I am going to pay you",
according to the testimony of an eyewitness. Therefore the motive of the aggression
was a real and positive fact: vengeance.

Q. When he left the hospital, can you state whether he was already
completely cured of his insanity? — A. He wassocially adjustable.
Q. What do you mean by socially adjustable? — A. That he could adapt
himself to environment.
There is no evidence that from the month of January, 1926, when he was declared
cured at the Psychopathic Hospital, to December 12, 1934, the date of the crime, he
had shown signs of having had a relapse. Therefore it is a proven fact during the
long period of nine years the accused had been sane.
Some days after the commission of the crime, the accused was placed under
observation in the Psychopathic Hospital because he showed symptoms of a form of
psychosis called depressive psychosis from which he had already been cured when
the case was tried. This pyschosis is of course evidence that the accused was
afflicted with this ailment after the commission of the crime. It would not be casual to
affirm that the commission of the crime had affected his reason. Nervous shock is
one of the causes of insanity (Angeles, Legal Medicine, p. 728); but it cannot be
logically inferred therefrom that the accused was also mentally deranged on the day
of the crime, aside from the ciscumstance that the evidence shows just the contrary.
I am, therefore, of the opinion that the appealed sentence should be affirmed.

It is alleged, however, that four days before the crime the accused was under
treatment by Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco because he was suffering from insomia. Dr.
Francisco admitted that he was not a specialist in mental diseases. He is, therefore,
disqualified from testifying satisfactorily on the mental condition of the accused four
days before the crime; and in fact neither has Dr. Francisco given any convincing
testimony to prove that when the accused was under treatment by him he was
suffering from dementia præcox, as the only thing he said was that the accused-
appellant had an attack of insomia which is one of the symptoms of and may lead
to dementia præcox (Exhibit 3; t. s. n., pp. 13, 14). This is not an affirmation of a fact
but of a mere possibility. The innoncence of the accused cannot be based on mere
theories or possibilities. To prove insanity as a defense, material, incontrovertible
facts, although circumstantial, are necessary.

On the contrary the evidence shows that on the day the accused committed the
crime he talked and behaved as an entirely normal man. Policemen Damaso T.
Arnoco and Benjamin Cruz testified that the accused, after having been asked why
he had attacked Carlos Guison, replied that it was because Guison owed him P55
for a long time and did not pay him. The accused stated that he bought the knife
with which he had stabbed Guison on Tabora Street for fifty centavos and he had
been waiting for two days to kill Guison. The accused took his dinner at noon on
December 12th. The statement of the accused which was taken in writing by
detectives Charles Strubel and Manalo on December12th was left unfinished
because Cruz of the Bureau of Labor arrived and told the accused not to be a fool
and not to make any statement. Thereafter the accused refused to continue his
statement. All of these show that on that day the accused behaved as a sane man
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 89420 July 31, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,  identified as the accused, went to the place where Mrs. Sigua was holding office at
vs.
ROSALINO DUNGO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
PARAS, J.:p
This is an automatic review of the Decision * of the Regional Trial Court of the Third
Judicial Region, Branch 54, Macabebe, Pampanga, convicting the accused of the
crime of murder.
The pertinent facts of the case are:
On March 24, 1987, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Pampanga filed an
information charging Rosalino Dungo, the defendant-appellant herein, with the
felony of murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of March, 1987 in the Municipality of
Apalit, Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
ROSALINO DUNGO, armed with a knife, with deliberate intent to
kill, by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab Mrs. Belen Macalino Sigua with a knife hitting her in the chest,
stomach, throat and other parts of the body thereby inflicting upon
her fatal wounds which directly caused the death of said Belen
Macalino Sigua.
All contrary to law, and with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia,
evident premeditation and the generic aggravating circumstance of
disrespect towards her sex, the crime was committed inside the
field office of the Department of Agrarian Reform where public
authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, taking
advantage of superior strength and cruelty. (Record, p. 2)
On arraignment, accused-appellant Rosalino Dungo pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The prosecution, through several witnesses, has established that on March 16, 1987
between the hours of 2:00 and 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a male person,
the Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga. After a brief talk, the
accused drew a knife from the envelope he was carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua
several times. Accomplishing the morbid act, he went down the staircase and out of
the DAR's office with blood stained clothes, carrying along a bloodied bladed
weapon. (TSN, pp. 4-19, 33-46, April 13, 1987; TSN, pp. 5-21, 28-38, April 20,
1987).
The autopsy report (Exh. "A") submitted by Dra. Melinda dela Cruz Cabugawan
reveals that the victim sustained fourteen (14) wounds, five (5) of which were fatal.
Rodolfo Sigua, the husband of the deceased, testified that, sometime in the latter
part of February, 1987, the accused Rosalino Dungo inquired from him concerning
the actuations of his wife (the victim) in requiring so many documents from the
accused. Rodolfo Sigua explained to the accused the procedure in the Department
of Agrarian Reform but the latter just said "never mind, I could do it my own way."
Rodolfo Sigua further testified that his wife's annual salary is P17,000.00, and he
spent the amount of P75,000.00 for the funeral and related expenses due to the
untimely death of his wife. (TSN, pp. 4-21, April 22, 1987).
The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he was insane at the time of
the commission of the offense.
The defense first presented the testimony of Andrea Dungo, the wife of the accused.
According to her, her husband had been engaged in farming up to 1982 when he
went to Lebanon for six (6) months. Later, in December 1983, her husband again
left for Saudi Arabia and worked as welder. Her husband did not finish his two-year
contract because he got sick. Upon his arrival, he underwent medical treatment. He
was confined for one week at the Macabali Clinic. Thereafter he had his monthly
check-up. Because of his sickness, he was not able to resume his farming. The
couple, instead, operated a small store which her husband used to tend. Two weeks
prior to March 16, 1987, she noticed her husband to be in deep thought always;
maltreating their children when he was not used to it before; demanding another
payment from his customers even if the latter had paid; chasing any child when their
children quarrelled with other children. There were also times when her husband
would inform her that his feet and head were on fire when in truth they were not. On
the fateful day of March 16, 1987, at around noon time, her husband complained to
her of stomach ache; however, they did not bother to buy medicine as he was
immediately relieved of the pain therein. Thereafter, he went back to the store.
When Andrea followed him to the store, he was no longer there. She got worried as
he was not in his proper mind. She looked for him. She returned home only when
she was informed that her husband had arrived. While on her way home, she heard
from people the words "mesaksak" and "menaksak" (translated as "stabbing" and
"has stabbed"). She saw her husband in her parents-in-law's house with people
milling around, including the barangay officials. She instinctively asked her husband
why he did such act, but he replied, "that is the only cure for my ailment. I have a
cancer in my heart." Her husband further said that if he would not be able to kill the
victim in a number of days, he would die, and that he chose to live longer even in
jail. The testimony on the statements of her husband was corroborated by their
neighbor Thelma Santos who heard their conversation. (See TSN, pp. 12-16, July
10, 1987). Turning to the barangay official, her husband exclaimed, "here is my
wallet, you surrender me." However, the barangay official did not bother to get the
wallet from him. That same day the accused went to Manila. (TSN, pp. 6-39, June
10, 1981)
Dra. Sylvia Santiago and Dr. Nicanor Echavez of the National Center for Mental
Health testified that the accused was confined in the mental hospital, as per order of
the trial court dated August 17, 1987, on August 25, 1987. Based on the reports of
their staff, they concluded that Rosalino Dungo was psychotic or insane long before,
during and after the commission of the alleged crime and that his insanity was
classified under organic mental disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or
stroke. (TSN, pp. 4-33, June 17, 1988; TSN, pp. 5-27, August 2, 1988).
Rosalino Dungo testified that he once worked in Saudi Arabia as welder. However,
he was not able to finish his two-year contract when he got sick. He had undergone
medical treatment at Macabali Clinic. However, he claimed that he was not aware of
the stabbing incident nor of the death of Mrs. Belen Sigua. He only came to know
that he was accused of the death of Mrs. Sigua when he was already in jail. (TSN,
pp. 5-14, July 15, 1988)
Rebuttal witnesses were presented by the prosecution. Dr. Vicente Balatbat testified
that the accused was his patient. He treated the accused for ailments secondary to
a stroke. While Dr. Ricardo Lim testified that the accused suffered from oclusive
disease of the brain resulting in the left side weakness. Both attending physicians
concluded that Rosalino Dungo was somehow rehabilitated after a series of medical
treatment in their clinic. Dr. Leonardo Bascara further testified that the accused is
functioning at a low level of intelligence. (TSN, pp. 620, September 1, 1988; TSN,
pp. 4-29, November 7, 1988).
On January 20, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as principal for the crime of murder, the Court hereby renders
judgment sentencing the accused as follows:
1. To suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the accessories of
the law;
2. To indemnify the family of the victim in the amount of P75,000.00
as actual damage, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and
P30,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED. (p. 30, Rollo)
The trial court was convinced that the accused was sane during the perpetration of
the criminal act. The act of concealing a fatal weapon indicates a conscious
adoption of a pattern to kill the victim. He was apprehended and arrested in Metro
Manila which indicates that he embarked on a flight in order to evade arrest. This to
the mind of the trial court is another indication that the accused was sane when he
committed the crime.
It is an exercise in futility to inquire into the killing itself as this is already admitted by
the defendant-appellant. The only pivotal issue before us is whether or not the
accused was insane during the commission of the crime changed.
One who suffers from insanity at the time of the commission of the offense charged
cannot in a legal sense entertain a criminal intent and cannot be held criminally
responsible for his acts. His unlawful act is the product of a mental disease or a
mental defect. In order that insanity may relieve a person from criminal
responsibility, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of cognition; that he acts
without the least discernment; that there be complete absence or deprivation of the
freedom of the will. (People v. Puno, 105 SCRA 151)
It is difficult to distinguish sanity from insanity. There is no definite defined border
between sanity and insanity. Under foreign jurisdiction, there are three major criteria
in determining the existence of insanity, namely: delusion test, irresistible impulse
test, and the right and wrong test. Insane delusion is manifested by a false belief for
which there is no reasonable basis and which would be incredible under the given
circumstances to the same person if he is of compos mentis. Under the delusion
test, an insane person believes in a state of things, the existence of which no
rational person would believe. A person acts under an irresistible impulse when, by
reason of duress or mental disease, he has lost the power to choose between right
and wrong, to avoid the act in question, his free agency being at the time destroyed.
Under the right and wrong test, a person is insane when he suffers from such
perverted condition of the mental and moral faculties as to render him incapable of
distinguishing between right and wrong. (See 44 C.J.S. 2)
So far, under our jurisdiction, there has been no case that lays down a definite test
or criterion for insanity. However, We can apply as test or criterion the definition of
insanity under Section 1039 of the Revised Administrative Code, which states that
insanity is "a manifestation in language or conduct, of disease or defect of the brain,
or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality,
functional or organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or by disordered
function of the sensory or of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered
volition." Insanity as defined above is evinced by a deranged and perverted
condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in language or conduct. An
insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequence of
his act.
Thus, insanity may be shown by surrounding circumstances fairly throwing light on
the subject, such as evidence of the alleged deranged person's general conduct and
appearance, his acts and conduct inconsistent with his previous character and
habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, and his improvident bargains.
Evidence of insanity must have reference to the mental condition of the person
whose sanity is in issue, at the very time of doing the act which is the subject of
inquiry. However, it is permissible to receive evidence of his mental condition for a
reasonable period both before and after the time of the act in question. Direct
testimony is not required nor the specific acts of derangement essential to establish
insanity as a defense. The vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts:
thereby we read the thoughts, motives and emotions of a person; and through which
we determine whether his acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind.
(People v. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87)
In the case at bar, defense's expert witnesses, who are doctors of the National
Center for Mental Health, concluded that the accused was suffering from psychosis
or insanity classified under organic mental disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular
accident or stroke before, during and after the commission of the crime charged.
(Exhibit L, p. 4). Accordingly, the mental illness of the accused was characterized by
perceptual disturbances manifested through impairment of judgment and impulse
control, impairment of memory and disorientation, and hearing of strange voices.
The accused allegedly suffered from psychosis which was organic. The defect of the
brain, therefore, is permanent.
Dr. Echavez, defense's expert witness, admitted that the insanity of the accused
was permanent and did not have a period for normal thinking. To quote
Q Is there such a lucid intervals?
A In this case, considering the nature of the organic
mental disorder, the lucid intervals unfortunately are
not present, sir.
(TSN, p. 36, August 2, 1988)
However, Dr. Echavez disclosed that the manifestation or the symptoms of
psychosis may be treated with medication. (TSN, p. 26, August 2, 1988). Thus,
although the defect of the brain is permanent, the manifestation of insanity is
curable.
Dr. Echavez further testified that the accused was suffering from psychosis since
January of 1987, thus:
Q In your assessment of the patient, did you
determine the length of time the patient has been
mentally ill?
A From his history, the patient started (sic) or had a
stroke abroad. If I may be allowed to scan my
record, the record reveals that the patient had a
stroke in Riyadh about seven (7) months before his
contract expired and he was brought home.
Sometime in January of 1987, the first
manifestation is noted on the behavioral changes.
He was noted to be in deep thought, pre-occupied
self, complaining of severe headache, deferment of
sleep and loss of appetite; and that was about
January of 1987, Sir. (TSN, pp. 21-22, August 2,
1988)
The defense reposed their arguments on the findings of the doctors of the National
Center for Mental Health, specifically on Dr. Echavez's assessment that the accused
has been insane since January of 1987 or three (3) months before the commission
of the crime charged. The doctors arrived at this conclusion based on the
testimonies of the accused's wife and relatives, and after a series of medical and
psychological examinations on the accused when he was confined therein.
However, We are still in quandary as to whether the accused was really insane or
not during the commission of the offense.
The prosecution aptly rebutted the defense proposition, that the accused, though he
may be insane, has no lucid intervals. It is an undisputed fact that a month or few
weeks prior to the commission of the crime charged the accused confronted the
husband of the victim concerning the actuations of the latter. He complained against
the various requirements being asked by the DAR office, particularly against the
victim. We quote hereunder the testimony of Atty. Rodolfo C. Sigua:
Q In the latter part of February 1987 do you remember
having met the accused Rosalino Dungo?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where?
A At our residence, sir, at San Vicente, Apalit, Pampanga.
Q Could you tell us what transpired in the latter part of
February 1987, when you met the accused at your
residence?
A Accused went to our residence. When I asked him what
he wanted, accused told me that he wanted to know from
my wife why she was asking so many documents: why she
was requiring him to be interviewed and file the necessary
documents at the Office of the DAR. Furthermore, he
wanted to know why my wife did not want to transfer the
Certificate of Land Transfer of the landholding of his
deceased father in his name.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When the accused informed you in the latter part of
February 1987 that your wife the late Belen Macalino Sigua
was making hard for him the transfer of the right of his
father, what did you tell him?
A I asked the accused, "Have you talked or met my wife?
Why are you asking this question of me?"
Q What was his answer?
A Accused told me that he never talked nor met my wife but
sent somebody to her office to make a request for the
transfer of the landholding in the name of his deceased
father in his name.
Q When you informed him about the procedure of the DAR,
what was the comment of the accused?
A The accused then said, "I now ascertained that she is
making things difficult for the transfer of the landholding in
the name of my father and my name."
(TSN, pp. 5-7, April 22, 1987)
If We are to believe the contention of the defense, the accused was supposed to be
mentally ill during this confrontation. However, it is not usual for an insane person to
confront a specified person who may have wronged him. Be it noted that the
accused was supposed to be suffering from impairment of the memory, We infer
from this confrontation that the accused was aware of his acts. This event proves
that the accused was not insane or if insane, his insanity admitted of lucid intervals.
The testimony of defense witness Dr. Nicanor Echavez is to the effect that the
appellant could have been aware of the nature of his act at the time he committed it.
To quote:
Q Could you consider a person who is undergoing trial, not
necessarily the accused, when asked by the Court the
whereabouts of his lawyer he answered that his lawyer is
not yet in Court and that he is waiting for his counsel to
appear and because his counsel did not appear, he asked
for the postponement of the hearing of the case and to
reset the same to another date. With those facts, do you
consider him insane?
A I cannot always say that he is sane or insane, sir.
Q In other words, he may be sane and he may be insane?
A Yes, sir.
COURT
Q How about if you applied this to the accused, what will be
your conclusion?
A Having examined a particular patient, in this particular
case, I made a laboratory examination, in short all the
assessment necessary to test the behavior of the patient,
 like for example praying for postponement and fleeing from
the scene of the crime is one situation to consider if the
patient is really insane or not. If I may elaborate to explain
the situation of the accused, the nature of the illness, the
violent behavior, then he appears normal he can reason out
and at the next moment he burst out into violence
regardless motivated or unmotivated. This is one of the
difficulties we have encountered in this case. When we
deliberated because when we prepared this case we have
really deliberation with all the members of the medical staff
so those are the things we considered. Like for example he
shouted out "Napatay ko si Mrs. Sigua!" at that particular
moment he was aware of what he did, he knows the
criminal case.
COURT
Q With that statement of yours that he was aware when he
shouted that he killed the victim in this case, Mrs. Sigua, do
we get it that he shouted those words because he was
aware when he did the act?
A The fact that he shouted, Your Honor, awareness is
there.  (TSN, pp. 37-41, August 2, 1983; emphasis supplied)
Insanity in law exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence. The
statement of one of the expert witnesses presented by the defense, Dr. Echavez,
that the accused knew the nature of what he had done makes it highly doubtful that
accused was insane when he committed the act charged. As stated by the trial
court:
The Court is convinced that the accused at the time that he
perpetrated the act was sane. The evidence shows that the
accused, at the time he perpetrated the act was carrying an
envelope where the fatal weapon was hidden. This is an evidence
that the accused consciously adopted a pattern to kill the victim.
The suddenness of the attack classified the killing as treacherous
and therefore murder. After the accused ran away from the scene of
the incident after he stabbed the victim several times, he was
apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila, an indication that he
took flight in order to evade arrest. This to the mind of the Court is
another indicia that he was conscious and knew the consequences
of his acts in stabbing the victim (Rollo, p. 63)
There is no ground to alter the trial court's findings and appreciation of the evidence
presented. (People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646). The trial court had the privilege of
examining the deportment and demeanor of the witnesses and therefore, it can
discern if such witnesses were telling the truth or not.
Generally, in criminal cases, every doubt is resolved in favor of the accused.
However, in the defense of insanity, doubt as to the fact of insanity should be
resolved in fervor of sanity. The burden of proving the affirmative allegation of
insanity rests on the defense. Thus:
In considering the plea of insanity as a defense in a prosecution for
crime, the starting premise is that the law presumes all persons to
be of sound mind. (Art. 800, Civil Code: U.S. v. Martinez, 34 Phil.
305) Otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary,
and that it is improper to presume that acts were done
unconsciously (People v. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288). . . . Whoever,
therefore, invokes insanity as a defense has the burden of proving
its existence. (U.S. v. Zamora, 52 Phil. 218) (People v. Aldemita,
145 SCRA 451)
The quantum of evidence required to overthrow the presumption of sanity is proof
beyond reasonable doubt. Insanity is a defense in a confession and avoidance and
as such must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Insanity must be clearly and
satisfactorily proved in order to acquit an accused on the ground of insanity.
Appellant has not successfully discharged the burden of overcoming the
presumption that he committed the crime as charged freely, knowingly, and
intelligently.
Lastly, the State should guard against sane murderer escaping punishment through
a general plea of insanity. (People v. Bonoan, supra) PREMISES CONSIDERED,
the questioned decision is hereby
AFFIRMED without costs. SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., concurs in the result.
Footnotes
* Penned by Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion.
 Republic of the Philippines fancied seeing his wife really wounded and in desperation wounded himself. As his
SUPREME COURT enemies seemed to multiply around him, he attacked everybody that came his way.
Manila
The evidence shows that the defendant not only did not have any trouble with his
EN BANC wife, but that he loved her dearly. Neither did he have any dispute with Tanner and
Malinao, or have any motive for assaulting them.
G.R. No. L-37673             March 31, 1933
Our conclusion is that the defendant acted while in a dream and his acts, with which
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,  he is charged, were not voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability.
vs.
POTENCIANO TANEO, defendant-appellant. In arriving at this conclusion, we are taking into consideration the fact that the
apparent lack of a motive for committing a criminal act does not necessarily mean
Carlos S. Tan for appellant. that there are none, but that simply they are not known to us, for we cannot probe
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee. into depths of one's conscience where they may be found, hidden away and
inaccessible to our observation. We are also conscious of the fact that an extreme
moral perversion may lead a man commit a crime without a real motive but just for
AVANCEÑA, C.J.:
the sake of committing it. But under the special circumstances of the case, in which
the victim was the defendant's own wife whom he dearly loved, and taking into
Potenciano Tadeo live with his wife in his parent's house of the barrio of Dolores, consideration the fact that the defendant tried to attack also his father, in whose
municipality of Ormoc, Leyte. On January 16, 1932, a fiesta was being celebrated in house and under whose protection he lived, besides attacking Tanner and Malinao,
the said barrio and visitors were entertained in the house. Among them were Fred his guests, whom he himself invited as may be inferred from the evidence
Tanner and Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon, Potenciano Taneo, went to sleep and presented, we find not only a lack of motives for the defendant to voluntarily commit
while sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand and, upon meeting his the acts complained of, but also motives for not committing said acts.
wife who tried to stop him, he wounded her in the abdomen. Potenciano Taneo
attacked Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao and tried to attack his father after which he
Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of the same opinion. The
wounded himself. Potenciano's wife who was then seven months pregnant, died five
days later as a result of her wound, and also the foetus which was asphyxiated in doctor stated that considering the circumstances of the case, the defendant acted
while in a dream, under the influence of an hallucination and not in his right mind.
the mother's womb.

We have thus far regarded the case upon the supposition that the wound of the
An information for parricide was filed against Potenciano Taneo, and upon
deceased was direct result of the defendant's act performed in order to inflict it.
conviction he was sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua with the
Nevertheless we may say further that the evidence does not clearly show this to
accessory penalties, to indemnity the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500 and
have been the case, but that it may have been caused accidentally. Nobody saw
to pay the costs. From this sentence, the defendant appealed.
how the wound was inflicted. The defendant did not testify that he wounded his wife.
He only seemed to have heard her say that she was wounded. What the evidence
It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission of the crime the shows is that the deceased, who was in the sala, intercepted the defendant at the
defendant had a quarrel over a glass of "tuba" with Enrique Collantes and Valentin door of the room as he was coming out. The defendant did not dream that he was
Abadilla, who invited him to come down to fight, and when he was about to go down, assaulting his wife but he was defending himself from his enemies. And so,
he was stopped by his wife and his mother. On the day of the commission of the believing that his wife was really wounded, in desperation, he stabbed himself.
crime, it was noted that the defendant was sad and weak, and early in the afternoon
he had a severe stomachache which made it necessary for him to go to bed. It was
In view of all these considerations, and reserving the judgment appealed from, the
then when he fell asleep. The defendant states that when he fell asleep, he
courts finds that the defendant is not criminally liable for the offense with which he is
dreamed that Collantes was trying to stab him with a bolo while Abadilla held his
charged, and it is ordered that he be confined in the Government insane asylum,
feet, by reason of which he got up; and as it seemed to him that his enemies were
whence he shall not be released until the director thereof finds that his liberty would
inviting him to come down, he armed himself with a bolo and left the room. At the
no longer constitute a menace, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
door, he met his wife who seemed to say to him that she was wounded. Then he
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132319 May 12, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
What distinguishes man from beast is his intellect. Man's action is guided and
controlled by his mind. Law is designed for rational beings as it is based on our
inherent sense of right which is inseparable from reason. Thus, when man's
reasoning is so distorted by disease that he is totally incapable of distinguishing right
from wrong, he loses responsibility before the law. In the case at bar, we are asked
to resolve whether or not the accused, invoking insanity, can claim exemption from
liability for the crime he committed.
Accused FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO was charged with parricide for killing
his wife LILIA MADARANG in an Information 1 which reads:
That on or about September 3, 1993, at Poblacion, municipality of
Infante, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
evident premeditation and treachery, armed with a bladed weapon,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and
stab LILIA M. MADARANG, his legitimate wife, inflicting upon her
stab wound 4 1/2 inches by 1 1/2 inch(es) long and 3/16 of an inch
wide, located just below the left clavicle 1 3/4 inch(es) lateral to the
supra-sternal notch, and plowed along the interpace slightly
coursing upward and posteriorly and stab wound 1 inch in length,
gaping and 3 1/2 inch(es) deep, located at the right arm at its
medial aspect, coursing upwards and medially towards the apex of
the right axilla which caused her instantaneous death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of Lilia M. Madarang.
Contrary to Art. 246 of the Revised Penal Code.
At the arraignment, the accused refused to enter a plea. Pursuant to the Rules, the
trial court entered a "not guilty" plea for him. At the initial hearing of the case on May
5, 1994, the accused's counsel manifested that his client had been observed
behaving in an abnormal manner inside the provincial jail. Thus, the Court called the
accused to the stand but he refused to answer any of the questions propounded by
the court. Hence, on the same date, the Court issued an Order 2 directing the
transfer of the accused to the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) for
psychiatric evaluation to determine his fitness to stand trial.
The initial examination of the accused at the NCMH revealed that he was suffering
from a form of psychosis known as schizophrenia. The accused was detained at the
hospital and was administered medication for his illness. On June 19, 1996, after
more than two (2) years of confinement, the accused was discharged from the
NCMH and recommitted to the provincial jail as he was already found fit to face the
charges against him. 3
At the resumption of the hearing, a reverse trial was conducted. The accused
proceeded to adduce evidence on his claim of insanity at the time he committed the
offense.
As culled from the testimonies of the accused, his mother-in-law AVELINA
MIRADOR, and his daughter LILIFER MADARANG, the following facts were
established: The accused and Lilia Mirador were legally married and their union was
blessed with seven (7) children. The accused worked as a seaman for sixteen (16)
years. He was employed in a United States ship until 1972. In 1973, he worked as a
seaman in Germany and stayed there for nine (9) years, or until 1982. Thereafter,
he returned to his family in Infanta, Pangasinan, and started a hardware store
business. His venture however failed. Worse, he lost his entire fortune due to
cockfighting. 4
In the latter part of July 1993, the accused, his wife Lilia and their children were
forced to stay in the house of Avelina Mirador as the accused could no longer
support his family. Moreover, Lilia was then already heavy with their eight child and
was about to give birth. 5
On September 3, 1993, at about 5:00 p.m., the accused and Lilia had a squabble.
The accused was jealous of another man and was accusing Lilia of infidelity. In the
heat of the fight and in the presence of their children, the accused stabbed Lilia,
resulting in her untimely demise. 6
AVELINA MIRADOR was then in the pigpen when she heard the children of the
accused shouting and crying inside her house. She called out to them and asked
what was wrong. She received no reply. Her nephew barged into the house and
brought out the children one at a time, leaving the accused with Lilia. While passing
by Avelina, her nephew warned her: "You better run." Avelina then saw the accused
emerge from the house holding a bolo. She scampered for safety. 7
She declared that during the period that the accused and his family stayed in her
house, she did not notice anything peculiar in accused's behavior that would
suggest that he was suffering from any mental illness. Neither did she know of any
reason why the accused killed his wife as she never saw the two engage in any
argument while they were living with her. 8
The accused declared that he has absolutely no recollection of the stabbing
incident. He could not remember where he was on that fateful day. He did not know
the whereabouts of his wife. It was only during one of the hearings when his mother-
in-law showed him a picture of his wife in a coffin that he learned about her death.
He, however, was not aware of the cause of her demise. He claimed that he did not
know whether he suffered from any mental illness and did not remember being
confined at the NCMH for treatment. 9
DR. WILSON S. TIBAYAN, a resident doctor of the National Center for Mental
Health (NCMH), declared that the accused was committed to the NCMH on July 4,
1994 upon order of the court. The NCMH conducted three (3) medical and
psychiatric evaluations of the accused during his confinement therein. Based on the
first medical report, dated August 2, 1994, 10 the accused was found to be suffering
from insanity or psychosis, classified as schizophrenia. Dr. Tibayan explained that
schizophrenia is a mental abnormality characterized by impaired fundamental
reasoning, delusions, hallucinations, preoccupation with one's thoughts, poor self-
care, insight and judgment, and impaired cognitive, social and occupational
functions. The patient may be incapable of distinguishing right from wrong or know
what he is doing. He may become destructive or have a propensity to attack any
one if his hallucinations were violent. 11 A schizophrenic, however, may have lucid
intervals during which he may be able to distinguish right from wrong. 12 Dr. Tibayan
opined that the accused's mental illness may have begun even prior to his
admission to the NCMH and it was highly possible that he was already suffering
from schizophrenia prior to his commission of the crime. 1
By December 21, 1994, as per the second medical report, the accused was still
suffering from schizophrenia. After one and a half years of confinement, the third
psychiatric evaluation of the accused, dated May 27, 1996, 14showed that his mental
condition considerably improved due to continuous medication. The accused was
recommended to be discharged from the NCMH and recommitted to jail to stand
trial. 15
The trial court convicted the accused as his evidence failed to refute the
presumption of sanity at the time he committed the offense. The dispositive portion
of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing facts and circumstances
of this case, this Court is of the view that accused Fernando
Madarang is of sound mind at the time of the commission of the
offense and that he failed to rebut by convincing proof the evidence
on record against him to exempt him from criminal liablity. And
since the death penalty was suspended or abolished at the time of
the commission of the offense, this Court hereby sentences the
accused FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the amount
of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos.
SO ORDERED. 16
Hence this appeal.
The appellant insists that at the time he stabbed his wife, he was completely
deprived of intelligence, making his criminal act involuntary. His unstable state of
mind could allegedly be deduced from the following:
First. He had no recollection of the stabbing incident. Hence, he was completely
unaware of his acts that fateful day and must have committed the crime without the
least discernment.
Second. His behavior at the time of the stabbing proved he was then afflicted with
schizophrenia. He cited the testimony of Dr. Tibayan that a schizophrenic may go
into extremes — he may be violent and destructive, or very silent and self-focused.
The appellant exhibited his violent tendencies on that fateful day. He killed his wife
and Avelina and her nephew were so frightened that they ran away at the sight of
him holding a bolo. He did not seem to recognize anybody and could have turned to
anyone and inflicted further injury. He avers that this is peculiar only to persons who
are mentally deranged for a sane person who just committed a crime would have
appeared remorseful and repentant after realizing that what he did was wrong.
Third. The appellant also relies on Dr. Tibayan's opinion that there was a high
possibility that he was already suffering from insanity prior to his commission of the
crime on September 3, 1993. 17 The defense posits that his mental illness may have
been caused by his loss of fortune. His hardware business, which he started through
16 years of working as a seaman, went bankrupt. He ended up virtually dependent
on his mother-in-law for his family's support and all these may have been beyond
his capacity to handle.
The appellant further contends that the fact that he and his wife never engaged in a
fight prior to that fateful day should be considered. The marked change in his
behavior when he uncharacteristically quarreled with his wife on that day and
suddenly turned violent on her confirms that he was mentally disturbed when he
committed the crime.
Lastly, the appellant urges that he had no motive to kill Lilia who was scheduled to
give birth to their eighth child three (3) days prior to the killing. Unless overpowered
by something beyond his control, nobody in his right mind would kill his wife who
was carrying his child. Jealousy, the appellant posits, is not a sufficient reason to kill
a pregnant spouse.
We find these arguments without merit.
In all civilized nations, an act done by a person in a state of insanity cannot be
punished as an offense. The insanity defense is rooted on the basic moral
assumption of criminal law. Man is naturally endowed with the faculties of
understanding and free will. The consent of the will is that which renders human
actions laudable or culpable. Hence, where there is a defect of the understanding,
there can be no free act of the will. An insane accused is not morally blameworthy
and should not be legally punished. No purpose of criminal law is served by
punishing an insane accused because by reason of his mental state, he would have
no control over his behavior and cannot be deterred from similar behavior in the
future. 18
A number of tests evolved to determine insanity under the law. In Anglo-American
jurisprudence, the traditional test is the M'Naghten rule of 1843 which states that "to
establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the
time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of
reason from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he
was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong."
The M'Naghten rule is a cognitive measure of insanity as the accused is required to
know two things: the nature and quality of the act, and that the act was wrong. This
rule has been criticized for its ambiguity. It was debated whether the word "wrong"
referred to moral or legal wrong. The importance of the distinction was illustrated by
Stephen 19 as follows: A kills B knowing that he is killing B and it is illegal to kill B but
under an insane delusion that God has commanded him to kill B to obtain the
salvation of the human race. A's act is a crime if the word "wrong" means illegal but
it is not a crime if the word "wrong" means morally wrong. The word "know" was also
assailed as it referred solely to intellectual reason and excluded affective or
emotional knowledge. It was pointed out that the accused may know in his mind
what he is doing but may have no grasp of the effect or consequences of his
actions. 20 M'Naghten was condemned as based on an obsolete and misleading
concept of the nature of insanity as insanity does not only affect the intellectual
faculties but also affects the whole personality of the patient, including his will and
emotions. It was argued that reason is only one of the elements of a personality and
does not solely determine man's conduct. 21
Subsequently, M'Naghten was refined by the "irresistible impulse" test which means
that "assuming defendant's knowledge of the nature and quality of his act and
knowledge that the act is wrong, if, by reason of disease of the mind, defendant has
been deprived of or lost the power of his will which would enable him to prevent
himself from doing the act, then he cannot be found guilty." Thus, even if the
accused knew that what he was doing was wrong, he would be acquitted by reason
of insanity if his mental illness kept him from controlling his conduct or resisting the
impulse to commit the crime. This rule rests on the assumption that there are mental
illnesses that impair volition or self-control, even while there is cognition or
knowledge of what is right and wrong. 22 This test was likewise criticized on the
following grounds: (1) the "impulse" requirement is too restrictive as it covers only
impulsive acts; (2) the "irresistible" requirement is also restrictive as it requires
absolute impairment of the freedom of the will which cases are very rare; (3) it will
not serve the purpose of criminal law to deter criminals as the will to resist
commission of the crime will not be encouraged, and; (4) it is difficult to prove
whether the act was the result of an insane, irresistible impulse. 2
Then came the Durham "product" test in 1954 which postulated that "an accused is
not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or
defect." 24 Critics of this test argued that it gave too much protection to the accused.
It placed the prosecution in a difficult position of proving accused's sanity beyond
reasonable doubt as a mere testimony of a psychiatrist that accused's act was the
result of a mental disease leaves the judge with no choice but to accept it as a fact.
The case thus becomes completely dependent on the testimonies of experts. 25
Then came the ALI "substantial capacity" test, integrated by the American Law
Institute (ALI) in its Model Penal Code Test, which improved on the M'Naghten and
irresistible impulse tests. The new rule stated that a person is not responsible for his
criminal act if, as a result of the mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his act or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law. 26 Still, this test has been criticized for its use of ambiguous
words like "substantial capacity" and "appreciate" as there would be differences in
expert testimonies whether the accused's degree of awareness was
sufficient. 27 Objections were also made to the exclusion of psychopaths or persons
whose abnormalities are manifested only by repeated criminal conduct. Critics
observed that psychopaths cannot be deterred and thus undeserving of
punishment. 28
In 1984, however, the U.S. Congress repudiated this test in favor of the M'Naghten
style statutory formulation. It enacted the Comprehensive Crime Control Act which
made the appreciation test the law applicable in all federal courts. The test is similar
to M'Naghten as it relies on the cognitive test. The accused is not required to prove
lack of control as in the ALI test. The appreciation test shifted the burden of proof to
the defense, limited the scope of expert testimony, eliminated the defense of
diminished capacity and provided for commitment of accused found to be insane. 29
In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity
to be exempting as it is required that there must be a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason; he acted
without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to
discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental
faculties will not exclude imputability. 30
The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the mind, not
susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man can know what is going on in
the mind of another, the state or condition of a person's mind can only be measured
and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion
testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the
accused, by a witness who has rational basis to conclude that the accused was
insane based on the witness' own perception of the accused, or by a witness who is
qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist. 31 The testimony or proof of the
accused's insanity must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the
commission of the offense with which he is charged. 32
In the case at bar, the appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from schizophrenia
when he was committed to the NCMH months after he killed his wife. Medical books
describe schizophrenia as a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to
distinguish between fantasy and reality and often accompanied by hallucinations
and delusions. Formerly called dementia pracecox, it is the most common form of
psychosis. 3 Symptomatically, schizophrenic reactions are recognizable through odd
and bizarre behavior apparent in aloofness or periods of impulsive destructiveness
and immature and exaggerated emotionality, often ambivalently directed. The
interpersonal perceptions are distorted in the more serious states by delusions and
hallucinations. In the most disorganized form of schizophrenic living, withdrawal into
a fantasy life takes place and is associated with serious thought disorder and
profound habit deterioration in which the usual social customs are
disregarded. 34 During the initial stage, the common early symptom is aloofness, a
withdrawal behind barriers of loneliness, hopelessness, hatred and fear. Frequently,
the patient would seem preoccupied and dreamy and may appear "far away." He
does not empathize with the feelings of others and manifests little concern about the
realities of life situations. The schizophrenic suffers from a feeling of rejection and
an intolerable lack of self-respect. He withdraws from emotional involvement with
other people to protect himself from painful relationships. There is shallowness of
affect, a paucity of emotional responsiveness and a loss of spontaneity. Frequently,
he becomes neglectful of personal care and cleanliness. 35 A variety of subjective
experiences, associated with or influenced by mounting anxiety and fears precede
the earliest behavioral changes and oddities. He becomes aware of increasing
tension and confusion and becomes distracted in conversation manifested by his
inability to maintain a train of thought in his conversations. Outwardly, this will be
noticed as blocks or breaks in conversations. The schizophrenic may not speak or
respond appropriately to his companions. He may look fixedly away, or he may
appear to stare, as he does not regularly blink his eyes in his attempt to hold his
attention. 36
None of the witnesses presented by the appellant declared that he exhibited any of
the myriad symptoms associated with schizophrenia immediately before or
simultaneous with the stabbing incident. To be sure, the record is bereft of even a
single account of abnormal or bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant prior to
that fateful day. Although Dr. Tibayan opined that there is a high possibility that the
appellant was already suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing, he
also declared that schizophrenics have lucid intervals during which they are capable
of distinguishing right from wrong. 37 Hence the importance of adducing proof to
show that the appellant was not in his lucid interval at the time he committed the
offense. Although the appellant was diagnosed with schizophrenia a few months
after the stabbing incident, the evidence of insanity after the fact of commission of
the offense may be accorded weight only if there is also proof of abnormal behavior
immediately before or simultaneous to the commission of the crime. Evidence on the
alleged insanity must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the
very moment of its execution. 38
In the case at bar, we find the evidence adduced by the defense insufficient to
establish his claim of insanity at the time he killed his wife. There is a dearth of
evidence on record to show that the appellant was completely of unsound mind prior
to or coetaneous with the commission of the crime. The arguments advanced by the
appellant to prove his insanity are speculative and non-sequitur. For one, his claim
that he has absolutely no recollection of the stabbing incident amounts to a mere
general denial that can be made with facility. The fact that Avelina and her nephew
were frightened at the sight of the appellant holding a bolo after he killed his wife
does not, by any stretch of imagination, prove that the appellant has lost his grip on
reality on that occasion. Neither is the appellant's seemingly non-repentant attitude
immediately after he stabbed his wife an indicium of his alleged insanity. Even
criminals of stable mental condition take this non-remorseful stance. Similarly, that
the appellant and his wife were never seen quarreling prior to that fateful day does
not by itself prove the appellant's unstable mental condition. Neither can it be said
that jealousy is not a sufficient reason to kill a pregnant spouse. Our jurisprudence is
replete with cases where lives had been terminated for the flimsiest reason.
The appellant attributes his loss of sanity to the fact that he lost his business and
became totally dependent on his mother-in-law for support. We find this, however,
purely speculative and unsupported by record. To be sure, there was no showing of
any odd or bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant after he lost his fortune and
prior to his commission of the crime that may be symptomatic of his mental illness.
In fact, the appellant's mother-in-law declared that during the time that she knew the
appellant and while he lived in her house, she did not notice anything irregular or
abnormal in the appellant's behavior that could have suggested that he was
suffering from any mental illness.
An accused invoking the insanity defense pleads not guilty by reason thereof. He 23
 Id., p. 321-323.
admits committing the crime but claims that he is not guilty because he was insane 24
 Durham vs. U.S., 214 F. 2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954)
at the time of its commission. Hence, the accused is tried on the issue of sanity 25
 Linda Anderson Foley, A Psychological View of the Legal System, 1993 edition, p. 267;
alone and if found to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial LaFave,supra, p. 325.
on the issue of guilt as he had already admitted committing the crime. 39 As the 26
 LaFave, supra, p. 325.
appellant, in the case at bar, failed to establish by convincing evidence his alleged 27
 Id., p. 331, citing, inter alia, Kuh, The Insanity Defense — An Effort to Combine Law and
insanity at the time he killed his wife, we are constrained to affirm his conviction. Reason, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 771, 797-99 (1962).
28
 LaFave, supra, p. 331.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the trial court convicting the appellant of the 29
 Foley, supra, p. 268, citing the Report to the Nation on Crime and Justice, 1988, p. 87; 18
crime of parricide is AFFIRMED in toto. U.S.C.A. 20.
30
 People vs. Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451 (1986); People vs. Ambal, 100 SCRA 324 (1980);
SO ORDERED. People vs. Renegado, 57 SCRA 275 (1974); People vs. Cruz, 109 SCRA 288 (1960); People vs.
Forigones, 87 Phil. 658 (1950).
Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur. 31
 California Criminal Law and Procedure, William D. Raymond, Jr. and Daniel E. Hall, 1999
ed., pp. 227-228.
32
Footnotes  People vs. Aldemita, supra.
33
 Miller and Keane, Encyclopedia of Medicine and Nursing, 1972 ed., at p. 860.
1 34
 Rollo, p. 5.  Kolb's Modern Clinical Psychiatry, 1973 ed., p. 308.
2 35
 Original Records, p. 40.  Id., at p. 319.
3 36
 As per note of Mrs. Clarita A. Aguilar, Administrative Officer III, Pavilion IV, NCMH; Original  Id., at p. 318.
37
Records, p. 54.  January 8, 1997 TSN, Original Records, pp. 104 & 106.
4 38
 TSN, Apellant Madarang, February 6, 1997, Original Records, pp. 118, 121, 124-125; TSN,  People vs. Aldemita, supra.
39
Avelina Mirador, March 19, 1997, Original Records, pp. 148, 155-156.  California Criminal Law and Procedure, supra, p. 228.
5
 TSN, Avelina Mirador, March 19, 1997, Original Records, pp. 151, 154-155.
6
 TSN, Lilifer Madarang, April 2, 1997, Original Records, pp. 166-168.
7
 TSN, Avelina Mirador, March 19, 1997, Original Records, pp. 150-152.
8
 Id., pp. 149-150, 152 and 154.
9
 February 6, 1997 TSN, Original Records, pp. 117-123.
10
 Original Records, pp. 45-46.
11
 January 8, 1997 TSN, Original Records, pp. 97-100.
12
 Id., pp. 104 & 106.
13
 Id., pp. 101-102.
14
 Original Records, p. 52.
15
 January 8, 1997 TSN, Original Records, pp. 100-101.
16
 Decision, dated September 16, 1997, penned by Executive Judge Angel L. Hernando,
Jr.; Rollo, at p. 20.
17
 January 8, 1997 TSN, pp. 5-6.
18
 California Criminal Law and Procedure, William D. Raymond, Jr. and Daniel E. Hall, 1999
ed., at p. 223, citing Lord Mathew Hale's treatise.
19
 A History of Criminal Law of England (1883), vol. ii, p. 149.
20
 LaFave and Scott, Jr., Criminal Law, Second Edition, 1986, pp. 310-313.
21
 Id., p. 317.
22
 Id., p. 320.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 147674-75             March 17, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,  on a bench.4
vs.
ANACITO OPURAN, appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Appellant Anacito Opuran was charged with two counts of murder before the
Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 29, for the death of Demetrio
Patrimonio, Jr., and Allan Dacles under separate informations, the accusatory
portions of which respectively read:
Criminal Case No. 4693
That on or about November 19, 1998, at nighttime, at Km. 1, South Road,
Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, with deliberate intent to kill and
treachery, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and
stab Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., with the use of a bladed weapon (5" long from tip to
handle with scabbard), thereby inflicting upon the victim fatal stab wounds on the
back of his body, which wounds resulted to his instantaneous death.
All contrary to law, and with attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery. 1
Criminal Case No. 4703
That on or about November 19, 1998, at nighttime, at Purok 3, Barangay 7,
Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, with deliberate intent to kill, with
treachery, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab one Allan Dacles, who was lying on the bench, with the use of a bladed
weapon, locally known as ‘pisao,’ thereby inflicting upon the victim fatal stab wounds
on the different parts of his body, which wounds resulted to his instantaneous death.
All contrary to law, and with attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery. 2
After Anacito entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment, trial ensued. 3
The evidence for the prosecution discloses that on 19 November 1998, at about
6:30 p.m., prosecution witness Bambi Herrera was studying his lessons inside his
house. His brother and a certain Jason Masbang were outside sitting side by side
with each other on a plastic chair; opposite them was Allan Dacles, who was lying
Moments later, Jason barged into Bambi’s house, shouting: "There’s a long-haired
man!" Bambi stood up and looked through the open door. He saw appellant Anacito
Opuran stab Allan on the chest with a knife while the latter appeared to be trying to
stand up from the bench. Although Allan had several stab wounds on different parts
of his body, he managed to stand up and run inside Bambi’s house, with Anacito
chasing him. Bambi immediately locked the door from the inside to prevent Anacito
from entering. But the latter tried to force the door open by thrusting a knife at the
door shutter. He also threw stones at the door. After a short while, Anacito left. 5
With Anacito gone, Bambi went out to ask the aid of his neighbors so he could bring
Allan to the hospital. He saw Anacito’s two brothers and asked for their assistance.
But one of them merely said: "Never mind because he [referring to Anacito] is
mentally imbalanced."6 As nobody from among his neighbors responded to his plea
for help, Bambi carried Allan on his shoulders and dragged him to the lower portion
of the neighborhood. Several persons, who were having a drinking session, helped
Bambi bring Allan to the hospital. Allan, however, died about fifteen minutes later. 7
At about 7:45 p.m. of the same day, prosecution witness Tomas Bacsal, Jr., of
Barangay San Pablo, Catbalogan, Samar, was in the house of Demetrio Patrimonio,
Sr., seeking medical advice from the latter’s wife. While there, Tomas heard a
commotion outside. He looked out from the balcony and saw people running. He
learned that Anacito had stabbed somebody.8
After about fifteen minutes, while Tomas was on his way home, he saw Demetrio
Patrimonio, Jr. He likewise noticed Anacito hiding in a dark place. When Demetrio
Jr. reached the national highway, near the so-called "lover’s lane," Anacito emerged
from his hiding place and stabbed Demetrio Jr. with a knife about three to four
times.9
Tomas immediately ran to the house of the Demetrios to inform them of what he had
just witnessed. He then saw Demetrio Jr. running towards his parents’ house, but
the latter did not make it because he collapsed near the fence. Tomas also caught
sight of Anacito running towards the direction of the house of the Opurans.
Meanwhile, Demetrio Jr. was brought by his parents to the Samar Provincial
Hospital, where he died the following day.10
Dr. Angel Tan, Medical Specialist II of the Samar Provincial Hospital, conducted an
autopsy on the cadavers of Allan and Demetrio Jr. He found five stab wounds on
Allan’s body, one of which was fatal because it affected the upper lobe of the right
lung and bronchial vessel.11 Demetrio Jr. sustained four stab wounds and died of
pulmonary failure due to hypovolemia from external and internal hemorrhage. 12
For its part, the defense presented, as its first witness, the appellant himself, Anacito
Opuran. He declared that on the evening of 19 November 1998, he was resting in
their house in Canlapwas, another barangay in Catbalogan, Samar. He never went
out that night. While he was sleeping at about 8:30 p.m., eight policemen entered
his house, pointed their guns at him, and arrested him. He was brought to the police
station and detained there until the following morning. He denied being present at
the place and time of the stabbing incidents. He admitted knowing Demetrio Jr. as a
distant relative and friend whom he had not quarreled with. As for Allan, he never
knew him. He had no misunderstanding with prosecution witness Bambi Herrera. He
asserted that the accusations against him were fabricated because he was envied
and lowly regarded by his accusers.13
Subsequent hearings were postponed owing principally to the failure of the defense
to present witnesses. Then on 16 February 2000, the defense moved for the
suspension of the hearing on the following grounds: (1) on 10 January 2000, upon
motion of the defense, the trial court issued an Order authorizing the psychiatric
examination of Anacito; (2) in consonance with that Order, Anacito underwent a
psychiatric examination on 26 January 2000 conducted by Dr. Angel P. Tan; (3) Dr.
Tan issued a Medical Certificate dated 26 January 2000 stating that Anacito had a
"normal" mental status on that date but was "suffering from some degree of Mental
Aberration," which required further psychiatric evaluation at Tacloban City. 14
The trial court thus ordered a deferment of the hearing and granted the motion for
the psychiatric examination of Anacito at the Eastern Visayas Regional Medical
Center (EVRMC), Tacloban City.15
On 3 August 2000, the trial court received the Medical Report of Dr. Lyn Verona,
physician-psychiatrist of the EVRMC, on the psychiatric examination she conducted
on Anacito. At the resumption of the hearings on 20 November 2000, Dr. Verona
testified that she examined Anacito three times through interviews. From her
interview with Anacito’s sister, Remedios Opuran Manjeron, she learned of Anacito’s
psychiatric history of "inability to sleep and talking irrelevantly." She found that
Anacito had a psychotic disorder characterized by flight of ideas and auditory
hallucinations. She confirmed her medical findings that Anacito was psychotic
before and during the commission of the crime and even up to the present so that
he could not stand trial and would need treatment and monthly check-up. Her
diagnosis was that Anacito was suffering from schizophrenia. 16
Remedios Opuran Manjeron testified that she brought his brother Anacito to the
National Center for Mental Health (NCMH), Mandaluyong, in 1986 because Anacito
had difficulty sleeping and was talking "irrelevantly."17 Anacito was treated as an out-
patient, and was prescribed thorazine and evadyne.18 They stayed in Manila for one
month. In 1989, they returned to the NCMH, and Anacito was prescribed the same
medicine. Since they could not afford to stay long in Manila for follow-up treatments,
Remedios requested that her brother be treated in Catbalogan. Dr. Belmonte of the
NCMH, however, referred them to the EVRMC. Sometime in 1990, Remedios
accompanied Anacito to the EVRMC for examination. A certain Dra. Peregrino
prescribed an injectable medicine. But it was a certain Dr. Estrada of the NCMH who
came to Catbalogan to administer the medicine in that same year. Since then until
the year 2000, Anacito did not take any medicine, nor was he subjected to
examination or treatment.19
Anacito’s other sibling, Francisco Opuran, testified that at about 6:00 p.m. of 19
November 1998, he heard a loud voice outside their house. Anacito heard also the
loud voices and then went out. When Francisco went out to verify, he did not see
anything. A few minutes later he saw Anacito at the corner of the street carrying a
knife. He surmised that Anacito had committed a crime, and so he hugged him.
Anacito struggled to free himself, but Francisco brought him to Remedios’ house.
Before the incident, he observed Anacito to be "sometimes laughing, shouting, and
uttering bad words, and sometimes silent."20
In its decision21 of 23 January 2001, the trial court found Anacito guilty of murder for
the death of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., and homicide for the death of Allan Dacles. It
decreed:
WHEREFORE, the Court Finds Anacito Opuran y Balibalita GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes specified hereunder, to wit:
Murder, in Criminal Case No. 4693, and sentences him to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr. in the amount
of P50,000.00 plus P43,500.00 by way of actual damages, and to pay the costs; and
Homicide, in Criminal Case No. 4703, and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, sentences him to suffer an imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum to indemnify the heirs of Allan Dacles in the amount
of P50,000.00 plus P10,000.00 for burial expenses and to pay the costs.
Anacito seasonably appealed to us from the decision attributing to the trial court
grave error in disregarding the exempting circumstance of insanity. 22 He contends
that he was suffering from a psychotic disorder and was, therefore, completely
deprived of intelligence when he stabbed the victims. Even assuming in gratis
argumenti that he is criminally liable, he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance
under paragraph 9, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, which is "illness as would
diminish the exercise of the willpower of the offender without however depriving him
of the consciousness of his acts." He likewise maintains that since treachery was
not specifically alleged in the Information as a qualifying circumstance, he cannot be
convicted of murder for the death of Demetrio Jr.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagrees and avers that Anacito failed to
establish with the required proof his defense of insanity or his claim of the mitigating
circumstance of diminished willpower. The mental state of Anacito, as testified to by
Dr. Verona, corresponds to the period after the stabbing incidents. Further, Dr.
Verona was certain that Anacito was not grossly insane, but she was uncertain that
Anacito was "unconscious" at the time he stabbed the two victims. The OSG also
argues that treachery was duly alleged and proved by the prosecution and should,
therefore, be treated as a qualifying circumstance in the killing of Demetrio Jr.
We agree with the OSG and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
In the determination of the culpability of every criminal actor, voluntariness is an
essential element. Without it, the imputation of criminal responsibility and the
imposition of the corresponding penalty cannot be legally sanctioned. The human
mind is an entity, and understanding it is not purely an intellectual process but is
dependent to a large degree upon emotional and psychological appreciation. A
man’s act is presumed voluntary.23 It is improper to assume the contrary, i.e. that
acts were done unconsciously,24 for the moral and legal presumption is that every
person is presumed to be of sound mind,25 or that freedom and intelligence
constitute the normal condition of a person.26 Thus, the presumption under Article
800 of the Civil Code is that everyone is sane. This presumption, however, may be
overthrown by evidence of insanity, which under Article 12(1) of the Revised Penal
Code exempts a person from criminal liability.27
He who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving
it,28 for insanity as a defense is in the nature of confession and avoidance. 29 An
accused invoking insanity admits to have committed the crime but claims that he is
not guilty because he is insane. The testimony or proof of an accused's insanity
must, however, relate to the time immediately preceding or coetaneous with the
commission of the offense with which he is charged.30 It is, therefore, incumbent
upon accused’s counsel to prove that his client was not in his right mind or was
under the influence of a sudden attack of insanity immediately before or at the time
he executed the act attributed to him.31
Since insanity is a condition of the mind, it is not susceptible of the usual means of
proof. As no man can know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or
condition of a person's mind can only be measured and judged by his
behavior.32 Thus, the vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts, by
means of which we read the thoughts, motives, and emotions of a person, and then
determine whether the acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind. 33
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties
which is manifested in language and conduct.34 However, not every aberration of the
mind or mental deficiency constitutes insanity.35 As consistently held by us, "A man
may act crazy, but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally
so."36 Thus, we had previously decreed as insufficient or inconclusive proof of
insanity certain strange behavior, such as, taking 120 cubic centimeters of cough
syrup and consuming three sticks of marijuana before raping the victim; 37 slurping
the victim’s blood and attempting to commit suicide after stabbing him; 38 crying,
swimming in the river with clothes on, and jumping off a jeepney. 39
The stringent standard established in People v. Formigones40 requires that there be
a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused acted
without the least discernment because of a complete absence of the power to
discern or a total deprivation of the will.
In People v. Rafanan, Jr.,41 we analyzed the Formigones standard into two
distinguishable tests: (a) the test of cognition – whether there was a "complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal act" and (b) the test of volition –
whether there was a "total deprivation of freedom of the will." We observed that our
case law shows common reliance on the test of cognition, rather than on the test of
volition, and has failed to turn up any case where an accused is exempted on the
sole ground that he was totally deprived of the freedom of the will,i.e., without an
accompanying "complete deprivation of intelligence." This is expected, since a
person’s volition naturally reaches out only towards that which is represented as
desirable by his intelligence, whether that intelligence be diseased or healthy. 42
Establishing the insanity of an accused often requires opinion testimony which may
be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused; has rational
basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on his own perception; or is
qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.43
Let us examine the evidence offered to support Anacito’s defense of insanity. The
appellant points to the testimony of prosecution witness Bambi Herrera that Anacito
was a silent man who would sharply stare at the lady boarders a few days before
the stabbing incident, and would wear Barong Tagalog and long pants when there
was no occasion requiring a formal attire. The appellant also highlights that the
testimony of prosecution witness Tomas Bacsal, Jr., that there was a 15-minute time
interval between the two stabbing incidents shows that the stabbing spree was
without any known motive.44
The testimonial evidence of the defense also attempted to prove the alleged
behavioral oddity of Anacito two to three days prior to the killing. His sister
Remedios noticed that his eyes were reddish and that he was angry with her. 45 His
brother Francisco also observed that he (Anacito) would sometimes talk to himself,
laugh, shout, and utter bad words, and , at times, he was just quiet. 46 Also relied
upon by the appellant are the testimony of Remedios on his psychiatric history and
the expert testimony of the EVRMC psychiatrist, Dr. Verona.
A careful scrutiny of the records, however, indicates that Anacito failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence the defense of insanity. For one thing, it was only
Bambi’s personal perception that there was no reason or occasion for Anacito to
wear Barong Tagalog. Tested against the stringent criterion for insanity to be
exempting, such deportment of Anacito, his occasional silence, and his acts of
laughing, talking to himself, staring sharply, and stabbing his victims within a 15-
minute interval are not sufficient proof that he was insane immediately before or at
the time he committed the crimes. Such unusual behavior may be considered as
mere abnormality of the mental faculties, which will not exclude imputability. 47
Anacito’s psychiatric history likewise fails to meet the stringent yardstick established
by case law. What it shows is that Anacito was prescribed thorazine and evadyne,
and later an injectable medicine to remedy "his lack of sleep and noisiness." As the
trial court noted, it was never shown that these drugs were for a mental illness that
deprived Anacito of reason. Further, Anacito was just an out-patient at the NCMH,
EVRMC, and Samar Provincial Hospital. While Remedios claimed that she
requested the confinement of Anacito and that the doctors did not refuse her, the
fact remains that Anacito was never confined in a mental institution. Although Dr.
Verona testified that there was a recommendation for Anacito’s confinement, there
was no indication in the records as to when the recommendation was made, who
made the recommendation, and the reason for the recommendation. 48
49
At any rate, in People v. Legaspi,  we discarded the confinement of the accused at
the NCMH prior to the incident in question to be by itself proof of his insanity, there
being no proof that he was adjudged insane by the institute. Applying this principle
to Anacito’s case, we find another cogent reason to reject his plea of insanity.
The records are likewise clear that Anacito was not subjected to treatment from
1991 until 1999. While Remedios insisted that the medicine prescribed for Anacito
ran out of stock allegedly in 1990, there was no proof that Anacito needed the
medicine during that period. In fact, there was no intimation that he needed the
medicine prior to the stabbing incident. She bought medicine for Anacito only in April
2000 because he was "again noisy in the jail."50 It seems that it was only after the
stabbing incident, when he was in jail, that his symptoms reappeared.
Moreover, as found by the trial court, the results of Dr. Verona’s examinations on
Anacito were based on incomplete or insufficient facts. 51 For one thing, she admitted
to have examined Anacito for only three sessions lasting one to two hours
each.52 Her one-page medical report53 reads in part:
Patient came in accompanied by policemen and sister. He was fairly kempt in
appearance, wearing blue shirt and pants. Mesomorphic, dark complexion with
earring on the left ear. Had flight of ideas, with auditory hallucination, "kabastosan,"
"kanan yawa." He further said his sleep was "minanok" and complained of
occasional headache. He had no delusion. Judgment and insight fair. Fair impulse
control.
Comments:
From the foregoing interviews and examinations, it is determined that the patient
has a psychiatric disorder. It is most likely that the patient is psychotic before and
during the commission of the crime. He is presently psychotic and cannot stand trial.
He would need treatment and monthly check-up.
We observe that Dr. Verona’s conclusions have no supporting medical bases or
data. She failed to demonstrate how she arrived at her conclusions. She failed to
show her method of testing.54 Further, she did not have Anacito’s complete
behavioral and psychiatric history. On the witness stand, she mentioned that Anacito
could not distinguish right from wrong, but she was not certain that he was not
conscious of killing his victims in 1998. She also declared that Anacito had a
diagnostic case of schizophrenia, but stated in the next breath that Anacito was not
grossly insane.55
Truly, there is nothing that can be discerned from Dr. Verona’s short psychiatric
evaluation report and her testimony that Anacito’s judgment and mental faculties
were totally impaired as to warrant a conclusion that his mental condition in 1998
when he killed his victims was the same in 2000 when he was psychiatrically
examined. The most that we can conclude is that her findings refer to the period
after the stabbing accident and, hence, would prove Anacito’s mental condition only
for said time. It could be that Anacito was insane at the time he was examined by
Dr. Verona. But, in all probability, insanity could have been contracted during the
period of his detention pending trial. He was without contact with friends and
relatives most of the time. He was perhaps troubled by his conscience, by the
realization of the gravity of his offenses, or by the thought of a bleak future for him.
The confluence of these circumstances may have conspired to disrupt his mental
equilibrium.
It must be stressed that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate
to the period immediately before or at the precise moment of the commission of the
act which is the subject of the inquiry.56 His mental condition after that crucial period
or during the trial is inconsequential for purposes of determining his criminal
liability.57
Interestingly, Anacito failed to raise insanity at the earliest opportunity. He invoked it
for the first time in the year 2000 and only after he had already testified on his
defenses of alibi and denial. It has been held that the invocation of denial and alibi
as defenses indicates that the accused was in full control of his mental
faculties.58Additionally, the trial judge observed that, during the hearings, Anacito
was attentive, well-behaved, and responsive to the questions propounded to him.
Thus, the shift in theory from denial and alibi to a plea of insanity, made apparently
after the appellant realized the futility of his earlier defenses, is a clear indication that
insanity is a mere concoction59 or an afterthought.60 In any event, Anacito failed to
establish by convincing evidence his alleged insanity at the time he killed Demetrio
Jr. and Allan Dacles. He is thus presumed sane, and we are constrained to affirm
his conviction.61
We likewise reject the alternative plea of Anacito that he be credited with the
mitigating circumstance of diminished willpower. In the cases where we credited this
mitigating circumstance after rejecting a plea of insanity, it was clear from the
records that the accused had been suffering from a chronic mental disease that
affected his intelligence and willpower for quite a number of years prior to the
commission of the act he was being held for.62The situation does not exist in the
cases at bar. It was only in 2000 that Anacito was diagnosed as "psychotic" with
flight of ideas and auditory hallucinations and was found to be schizophrenic. There
is nothing on record that he had these symptoms the previous years or at the time
he stabbed the victim. Curiously, Dr. Verona did not make a diagnosis of
schizophrenia in her report, only at the witness stand.
We agree with the trial court that treachery cannot be appreciated as far as the
killing of Allan is concerned because the sole eyewitness did not see the
commencement of the assault.63 For treachery to be considered, it must be present
and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack. Where no particulars are
known as to how the killing began, the perpetration with treachery cannot be
supposed.64
Treachery was correctly appreciated in the killing of Demetrio Jr. Anacito was lying
in wait for his victim in a dark place at the national highway. When Demetrio Jr.
reached the "lover’s lane," Anacito emerged from his hiding place and stabbed the
former several times. Anacito’s attack came without warning; it was deliberate and
unexpected, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no opportunity
to resist or defend himself.65
We do not find merit in appellant’s contention that he cannot be convicted of murder
for the death of Demetrio Jr. because treachery was not alleged with "specificity" as
a qualifying circumstance in the information. Such contention is belied by the
information itself, which alleged: "All contrary to law, and with the attendant
qualifying circumstance of treachery." In any event, even after the recent
amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, qualifying circumstances need not
be preceded by descriptive words such as qualifying or qualified by to properly
qualify an offense.66
We, therefore, sustain the penalty imposed by the trial court on Anacito. For the
crime of murder, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, he was
correctly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua, the lower of the two indivisible
penalties, since there was no other aggravating circumstance attending the
commission of the crime. For the crime of homicide, which is punishable by
reclusion temporal, he may be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty whose
minimum is within the range of prision mayor and whose maximum is within the
range of reclusion temporal in its medium period, there being no modifying
circumstances.
Coming now to the matter of damages. While Demetrio Sr. testified that he
spent P43,500 for the wake and burial of his son, only P11,94567 is substantiated by
receipts. Hence, in lieu of actual damages we shall award to Demetrio Jr.’s heirs
temperate damages68 of P25,00069 conformably with current jurisprudence.70
As to the burial expenses for Allan, his father Alfredo Dacles testified that he
spent P10,000. However, he failed to present receipts to substantiate his claim.
Nevertheless, we also grant temperate damages in the amount ofP10,000 on the
ground that it was reasonable to expect that the family of the victim incurred
expenses for the coffin, wake, and burial.
The award of civil indemnity of P50,000 for the respective heirs of Demetrio Jr. and
Allan is affirmed in line with recent jurisprudence.71 Civil indemnity is mandatory and
is granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission
of the crime.72
Apart from the civil indemnity, we shall award in favor of the heirs of each victim
moral damages in the amount ofP50,000 consistent with controlling case
law.73 Moral damages are awarded despite the absence of proof of mental and
emotional suffering of the victim’s heirs. As borne out by human nature and
experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain
and anguish on the part of the victim’s family.74
We shall also award in favor of the heirs of Demetrio Jr. exemplary damages in the
amount of P25,000 in view of the presence of the qualifying aggravating
circumstance of treachery.75

Thus, Anacito shall indemnify the heirs of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., damages in the
total amount of P161,945 and the heirs of Allan damages in the total amount
of P110,000.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM, with modifications as to the damages, the Decision of

the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 29, finding appellant Anacito
Opuran guilty of the crimes of murder in Criminal Case No. 4693 and homicide in
Criminal Case No. 4703, and sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua and an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, respectively.
Apart from the P50,000 civil indemnity, he is ordered to pay (1) the heirs of Demetrio
Patrimonio, Jr., in the amounts of (a) P50,000 as moral damages; (b) P25,000 as
temperate damages; and (c) P25,000 as exemplary damages, or a total
of P150,000; and (2) the heirs of Allan Dacles in the amounts of (a) P50,000 as
moral damages; and (b) P10,000 as temperate damages, or a total ofP110,000.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Panganiban, J., on official leave.

Footnotes

68
 Art. 2224, Civil Code, which provides: "Temperate or moderate damages,
which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be
recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered
but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with
certainty."

69
 Art. 2225, Civil Code, which provides: "Temperate damages must be
reasonable under the circumstances."
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 46539           September 27, 1939
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,  blow with his fist, to which the deceased answered that he did not want to
vs.
VALENTIN DOQUEÑA, defendant-appellant.
Primicias, Abad, Mencias and Castillo for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor-General Concepcion and Assistant Attorney Paredes, Jr., for
appellee.
DIAZ, J.:
The accused-appellant, who is a minor, was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, for having killed Juan Ragojos by stabbing him in the
breast with a knife on November 19, 1938, in the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan.
The court, after trying the case, held that the accused acted with discernment in
committing the act imputed to him and, proceeding in accordance with the
provisions of article 80 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Commonwealth
Act No. 99, ordered him to be sent to the Training School for Boys to remain therein
until he reaches the age of majority. From this order the accused interposed an
appeal alleging that the court erred in holding that he had acted with discernment
and in not having dismissal the case.
On the date of the crime, the appellant was exactly thirteen years, nine months and
five days old. The incident that gave rise to the aggression committed by him on the
deceased is narrated in the appealed order as follows:
Between 1 and 2 o'clock in the afternoon of November 19, 1938, the now
deceased Juan Ragojos and one Epifanio Rarang were playing volleyball in
the yard of the intermediate school of the municipality of Sual, Province of
Pangasinan. The herein accused, who was also in said yard, intervened
and, catching the ball, tossed it at Juan Ragojos, hitting him on the stomach.
For this act of the accused, Juan Ragojos chased him around the yard and,
upon overtaking him, slapped him on the nape. Said accused then turned
against the deceased assuming a threatening attitude, for which the reason
said deceased struck him on the mouth with his fist, returning immediately
to the place where Epifanio Rarang was in order to continue playing with
him. The accused, offended by what he considered an abuse on the part of
Juan Ragojos, who was taller and more robust than he, looked around the
yard for a stone with which to attack the now deceased Juan Ragojos, but
finding none, he approached a cousin of his named Romualdo Cocal, to ask
the latter to lend him his knife. Epifanio Rarang, who had heard what the
accused had been asking his cousin, told the latter not to give the accused
his knife because he might attack Juan Ragojos with it. The accused,
however, succeeded in taking possession of the knife which was in a pocket
of his cousin's pants. Once in possession of the knife, Valentin Doqueña
approached Juan Ragojos and challenged the latter to give him another
do so because he (Juan Ragojos) was bigger that the accused. Juan
Ragojos, ignorant of the intentions of the accused, continued playing and,
while he was thus unprepared and in the act of stopping the ball with his two
hands, the accused stabbed him in the chest with the knife which he carried.
The order also contains the following conclusions and findings of fact which we are
not at liberty to alter, not being called upon or authorized to do so, in view of the
nature of the appeal before us, by section 138 of the Administrative Code, as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 3:
Taking into account the fact that when the accused Valentin Doqueña
committed the crime in question, he was a 7th grade pupil in the
intermediate school of the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan, and as such
pupil, he was one of the brightest in said school and was a captain of a
company of the cadet corps thereof, and during the time he was studying
therein he always obtained excellent marks, this court is convinced that the
accused, in committing the crime, acted with discernment and was
conscious of the nature and consequences of his act, and so also has this
court observed at the time said accused was testifying in his behalf during
the trial of this case.
The proven facts, as stated by the lower court in the appealed order, convinces us
that the appeal taken from said order is absolutely unfounded, because it is error to
determine discernment by the means resorted to by the attorney for the defense, as
discussed by him in his brief. He claims that to determine whether or not a minor
acted with discernment, we must take into consideration not only the facts and
circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the minor, but also his state
of mind at the time the crime was committed, the time he might have had at his
disposal for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the
degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment. It is clear that the attorney
for the defense mistakes the discernment referred to in article 12, subsection 3, of
the Revised Penal Code, for premeditation, or at least for lack of intention which, as
a mitigating circumstance, is included among other mitigating circumstances in
article 13 of said Code. The discernment that constitutes an exception to the
exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine,
who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should
be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded
by the records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very
comportment and behaviour of said minor, not only before and during the
commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial (U.S. vs. Maralit, 36
Phil., 155). This was done by the trial court, and the conclusion arrived at by it is
correct.

Wherefore, the appealed order is affirmed, with the costs to the appellant. So
ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 151085             August 20, 2008
JOEMAR ORTEGA, petitioner,  offense charged.9Thus, trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the trial, two
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 2 dated
October 26, 2000 which affirmed in toto the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 50, dated May 13, 1999, convicting petitioner Joemar
Ortega4 (petitioner) of the crime of Rape.
The Facts
Petitioner, then about 14 years old,5 was charged with the crime of Rape in two
separate informations both dated April 20, 1998, for allegedly raping AAA, 6 then
about eight (8) years of age. The accusatory portions thereof respectively state:
Criminal Case No. 98-19083
That sometime in August, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of
YYY, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did
then and there, (sic) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had carnal
knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with the said AAA, a minor, then
about 6 years old, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Criminal Case No. 98-19084
That on or about the 1st day of December, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX,
Province of YYY, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there, (sic) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously (sic)
had carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with the said AAA, a
minor, then about 6 years old, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
Upon arraignment on September 10, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the
varying versions arose.
Version of the Prosecution
On February 27, 1990, AAA was born to spouses FFF and MMM. 10 Among her
siblings CCC, BBB, DDD, EEE and GGG, AAA is the only girl in the family. Before
these disturbing events, AAA's family members were close friends of petitioner's
family, aside from the fact that they were good neighbors. However, BBB caught
petitioner raping his younger sister AAA inside their own home. BBB then informed
their mother MMM who in turn asked AAA.11 There, AAA confessed that petitioner
raped her three (3) times on three (3) different occasions.
The first occasion happened sometime in August 1996. MMM left her daughter AAA,
then 6 years old and son BBB, then 10 years old, in the care of Luzviminda
Ortega12 (Luzviminda), mother of petitioner, for two (2) nights because MMM had to
stay in a hospital to attend to her other son who was sick. 13 During the first night at
petitioner's residence, petitioner entered the room where AAA slept together with
Luzviminda and her daughter. Petitioner woke AAA up and led her to the sala. There
petitioner raped AAA. The second occasion occurred the following day, again at the
petitioner's residence. Observing that nobody was around, petitioner brought AAA to
their comfort room and raped her there. AAA testified that petitioner inserted his
penis into her vagina and she felt pain. In all of these instances, petitioner warned
AAA not to tell her parents, otherwise, he would spank her. 14AAA did not tell her
parents about her ordeal.
The third and last occasion happened in the evening of December 1, 1996.
Petitioner went to the house of AAA and joined her and her siblings in watching a
battery-powered television. At that time, Luzviminda was conversing with MMM.
While AAA's siblings were busy watching, petitioner called AAA to come to the room
of CCC and BBB. AAA obeyed. While inside the said room which was lighted by a
kerosene lamp, petitioner pulled AAA behind the door, removed his pants and brief,
removed AAA's shorts and panty, and in a standing position inserted his penis into
the vagina of AAA.15 AAA described petitioner's penis as about five (5) inches long
and the size of two (2) ballpens. She, likewise, narrated that she saw pubic hair on
the base of his penis.16
This last incident was corroborated by BBB in his testimony. When BBB was about
to drink water in their kitchen, as he was passing by his room, BBB was shocked to
see petitioner and AAA both naked from their waist down in the act of sexual
intercourse. BBB saw petitioner holding AAA and making a pumping motion.
Immediately, BBB told petitioner to stop; the latter, in turn, hurriedly left. Thereafter,
BBB reported the incident to his mother, MMM. 17
MMM testified that when she asked AAA about what BBB saw, AAA told her that
petitioner inserted his fingers and his penis into her vagina. MMM learned that this
was not the only incident that petitioner molested AAA as there were two previous
occasions. MMM also learned that AAA did not report her ordeal to them out of fear
that petitioner would spank her. MMM testified that when BBB reported the matter to
her, petitioner and Luzviminda already left her house. After waiting for AAA's
brothers to go to sleep, MMM, with a heavy heart, examined AAA's vagina and she
noticed that the same was reddish and a whitish fluid was coming out from it.
Spouses FFF and MMM were not able to sleep that night. The following morning, at
about four o'clock, MMM called Luzviminda and petitioner to come to their house.
MMM confronted Luzviminda about what petitioner did to her daughter, and
consequently, she demanded that AAA should be brought to a doctor for
examination.18
MMM, together with Luzviminda, brought AAA to Dr. Lucifree Katalbas 19 (Dr.
Katalbas), the Rural Health Officer of the locality who examined AAA and found no
indication that she was molested.20Refusing to accept such findings, on December
12, 1996, MMM went to Dr. Joy Ann Jocson (Dr. Jocson), Medical Officer IV of the
Bacolod City Health Office. Dr. Jocson made an unofficial written report 21 showing
that there were "abrasions on both right and left of the labia minora and a small
laceration at the posterior fourchette." She also found that the minor injuries she
saw on AAA's genitals were relatively fresh; and that such abrasions were
superficial and could disappear after a period of 3 to 4 days. Dr. Jocson, however,
indicated in her certification that her findings required the confirmation of the
Municipal Health Officer of the locality.
Subsequently, an amicable settlement22 was reached between the two families
through the DAWN Foundation, an organization that helps abused women and
children. Part of the settlement required petitioner to depart from their house to
avoid contact with AAA.23 As such, petitioner stayed with a certain priest in the
locality. However, a few months later, petitioner went home for brief visits and in
order to bring his dirty clothes for laundry. At the sight of petitioner, AAA's father
FFF was infuriated and confrontations occurred. At this instance, AAA's parents
went to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which assisted them in filing the
three (3) counts of rape. However, the prosecutor's office only filed the two (2)
instant cases.
Version of the Defense
Petitioner was born on August 8, 1983 to spouses Loreto (Loreto) and Luzviminda
Ortega.24 He is the second child of three siblings ― an elder brother and a younger
sister. Petitioner denied the accusations made against him. He testified that: his
parents and AAA's parents were good friends; when MMM left AAA and her brothers
to the care of his mother, petitioner slept in a separate room together with BBB and
CCC while AAA slept together with Luzviminda and his younger sister; he never
touched or raped AAA or showed his private parts to her; petitioner did not threaten
AAA in any instance; he did not rape AAA in the former's comfort room, but he
merely accompanied and helped AAA clean up as she defecated and feared the
toilet bowl; in the process of washing, he may have accidentally touched AAA's
anus; on December 1, 1996, petitioner together with his parents, went to AAA's
house;25 they were dancing and playing together with all the other children at the
time; while they were dancing, petitioner hugged and lifted AAA up in a playful act,
at the instance of which BBB ran and reported the matter to MMM, who at the time
was with Luzviminda, saying that petitioner and AAA were having sexual
intercourse;26 petitioner explained to MMM that they were only playing, and that he
could not have done to AAA what he was accused of doing, as they were together
with her brothers, and he treated AAA like a younger sister; 27 BBB was lying; AAA's
parents and his parents did not get angry at him nor did they quarrel with each
other; petitioner and his parents peacefully left AAA's house at about nine o'clock in
the evening; however, at about four o'clock in the morning, petitioner and his
parents were summoned by MMM to go to the latter's house; upon arriving there
they saw BBB being maltreated by his father as AAA pointed to BBB as the one who
molested her; and MMM and Luzviminda agreed to bring AAA to a doctor for
examination.28
Luzviminda corroborated the testimony of her son. She testified that: her son was a
minor at the time of the incident; CCC and BBB were the children of MMM in her first
marriage, while AAA and the rest of her siblings were of the second marriage; CCC
and BBB are half-brothers of AAA; when MMM entrusted AAA and her brothers to
her sometime in August of 1996, she slept with AAA and her youngest daughter in a
separate room from petitioner; on December 1, 1996, she was at AAA's house
watching television and conversing with MMM, while FFF and Loreto were having a
drinking spree in the kitchen; from where they were seated, she could clearly see all
the children, including petitioner and AAA, playing and dancing in the dining area;
she did not hear any unusual cry or noise at the time; while they were conversing,
BBB came to MMM saying that petitioner and AAA were having sexual intercourse;
upon hearing such statement, Luzviminda and MMM immediately stood up and
looked for them, but both mothers did not find anything unusual as all the children
were playing and dancing in the dining area; Luzviminda and MMM just laughed at
BBB's statement; the parents of AAA, at that time, did not examine her in order to
verify BBB's statement nor did they get angry at petitioner or at them; and they
peacefully left AAA's house. However, the following day, MMM woke Luzviminda up,
saying that FFF was spanking BBB with a belt as AAA was pointing to BBB nor to
petitioner as the one who molested her. At this instance, Luzviminda intervened,
telling FFF not to spank BBB but instead, to bring AAA to a doctor for examination.
Luzviminda accompanied MMM to Dr. Katalbas who found no indication that AAA
was molested. She also accompanied her to Dr. Jocson. After getting the results of
the examination conducted by Dr. Jocson, they went to the police and at this
instance only did Luzviminda learn that MMM accused petitioner of raping AAA.
Petitioner vehemently denied to Luzviminda that he raped AAA. Thereafter, MMM
and Luzviminda went to their employer who recommended that they should seek
advice from the Women's Center. At the said Center, both agreed on an amicable
settlement wherein petitioner would stay away from AAA. Thus, petitioner stayed
with a certain priest in the locality for almost two (2) years. But almost every
Saturday, petitioner would come home to visit his parents and to bring his dirty
clothes for laundry. Every time petitioner came home, FFF bad-mouthed petitioner,
calling him a rapist. Confrontations occurred until an altercation erupted wherein
FFF allegedly slapped Luzviminda. Subsequently, AAA's parents filed the instant
cases.29
The RTC's Ruling
On May 13, 1999, the RTC held that petitioner's defenses of denial cannot prevail
over the positive identification of petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime by AAA
and BBB, who testified with honesty and credibility. Moreover, the RTC opined that it
could not perceive any motive for AAA's family to impute a serious crime of Rape to
petitioner, considering the close relations of both families. Thus, the RTC disposed
of this case in this wise:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Joemar Ortega Y
Felisario GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as Principal by Direct
Participation of the crime of RAPE as charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 98-
19083 and 98-19084 and there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Two (2) Reclusion
Temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the accused shall be imprisoned for each case for a period of Six (6) years
and One (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Fifteen (15) years of
Reclusion Temporal, as maximum. The accused is condemned to pay the
offended party AAA, the sum of P100,000.00 as indemnification for the two
(2) rapes (sic).
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA. 30
Taking into consideration the age of petitioner and upon posting of the
corresponding bail bond for his provisional liberty in the amount of P40,000.00, the
RTC ordered the petitioner's release pending appeal. 31
The CA's Ruling
On October 26, 2000, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC, holding that the
petitioner's defense of denial could not prevail over the positive identification of the
petitioner by the victim AAA and her brother BBB, which were categorical, consistent
and without any showing of ill motive. The CA also held that the respective medical
examinations conducted by the two doctors were irrelevant, as it is established that
the slightest penetration of the lips of the female organ consummates rape; thus,
hymenal laceration is not an element of rape. Moreover, the CA opined that
petitioner acted with discernment as shown by his covert acts. Finally, the CA
accorded great weight and respect to the factual findings of the RTC, particularly in
the evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses.
Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration32 of the assailed Decision which the
CA denied in its Resolution33 dated November 7, 2001.
Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS OVERLOOKED CERTAIN
FACTS OF SUBSTANCE AND VALUE WHICH IF CONSIDERED MIGHT
AFFECT THE RESULT OF THE CASE.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR
WHEN IT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE MEDICAL FINDINGS OF DR.
LUCIFREE KATALBAS.
III.
THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT, AFFIRMED BY THE
APPELLATE COURT, THAT PETITIONER-APPELLANT IN FACT
COMMITTED AND IS CAPABLE OF COMMITTING THE ALLEGED RAPE
WITHIN THE RESIDENCE OF THE VICTIM WHERE SEVERAL OF THE
ALLEGED VICTIM'S FAMILY MEMBERS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE
MOTHERS WERE PRESENT IS IMPROBABLE AND CONTRARY TO
HUMAN EXPERIENCE.
IV.
 THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
FACTS SET FORTH BY THE ALLEGED VICTIM REGARDING THE
CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING THE COMMISSION OF RAPE
SOMETIME IN AUGUST 1996.34
Petitioner argues that, while it is true that the factual findings of the CA are
conclusive on this Court, we are not prevented from overturning such findings if the
CA had manifestly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which if
considered might affect the result of the case. Petitioner stresses that from the
testimonies of AAA and BBB, it can be deduced that penetration was achieved;
thus, AAA felt pain. Petitioner contends that assuming the allegations of AAA are
true that petitioner inserted his fingers and his penis into her vagina, certainly such
acts would leave certain abrasions, wounds and/or lacerations on the genitalia of
AAA, taking into consideration her age at the time and the alleged size of petitioner's
penis. However, such allegation is completely belied by the medical report of Dr.
Katalbas who, one day after the alleged rape, conducted a medical examination on
AAA and found that there were no signs or indications that AAA was raped or
molested. Petitioner submits that the CA committed a grave error when it
disregarded such medical report since it disproves the allegation of the existence of
rape and, consequently, the prosecution failed to prove its case; thus, the
presumption of innocence in favor of the petitioner subsists. Moreover, petitioner
opines that like AAA, petitioner is also a child of the barrio who is innocent,
unsophisticated and lacks sexual experience. As such, it is incredible and contrary
to human reason that a 13- year-old boy would commit such act in the very dwelling
of AAA, whose reaction to pain, at the age of six, could not be controlled or
subdued. Petitioner claims that poverty was MMM's motive in filing the instant case,
as she wanted to extort money from the parents of the petitioner. Petitioner points
out that the medical report of Dr. Jocson indicated that the abrasions that were
inflicted on the genitalia of AAA were relatively fresh and the same could disappear
within a period of 3 to 4 days. Considering that Dr. Jocson conducted the medical
examination on December 12, 1996, or after the lapse of eleven (11) days after the
alleged incident of rape, and that AAA's parents only filed the instant case after
almost a year, in order to deter Luzviminda from filing a case of slander by deed
against FFF, it is not inconceivable that MMM inflicted said abrasions on AAA to
prove their case and to depart from the initial confession of AAA that it was actually
BBB who raped her. Finally, petitioner submits that AAA and BBB were merely
coached by MMM to fabricate these stories.35
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) contends that: the arguments raised by the petitioner are
mere reiterations of his disquisitions before the CA; the RTC, as affirmed by the CA,
did not rely on the testimonies of both doctors since despite the absence of
abrasions, rape is consummated even with the slightest penetration of the lips of the
female organ; what is relevant in this case is the reliable testimony of AAA that
petitioner raped her in August and December of 1996; even in the absence of force,
rape was committed considering AAA's age at that time; as such, AAA did not have
any ill motive in accusing petitioner; and it is established that the crime of rape could
be committed even in the presence of other people nearby. Moreover, the OSG
relies on the doctrine that the evaluation made by a trial court is accorded the
highest respect as it had the opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of a
witness and to determine whether said witness was telling the truth or not. Lastly,
the OSG claims that petitioner acted with discernment when he committed the said
crime, as manifested in his covert acts.36
However, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344,37 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
2006, was enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and it took effect on May 20,
2006.38 The law establishes a comprehensive system to manage children in conflict
with the law39 (CICL) and children at risk40 with child-appropriate procedures and
comprehensive programs and services such as prevention, intervention, diversion,
rehabilitation, re-integration and after-care programs geared towards their
development. In order to ensure its implementation, the law, particularly Section
841 thereof, has created the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC) and
vested it with certain duties and functions42 such as the formulation of policies and
strategies to prevent juvenile delinquency and to enhance the administration of
juvenile justice as well as the treatment and rehabilitation of the CICL. The law also
provides for the immediate dismissal of cases of CICL, specifically Sections 64, 65,
66, 67 and 68 of R.A. No. 9344's Transitory Provisions. 43
The said Transitory Provisions expressly provide:
Title VIII
Transitory Provisions
SECTION 64. Children in Conflict with the Law Fifteen (15) Years Old and
Below. — Upon effectivity of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15) years old
and below at the time of the commission of the crime shall immediately be
dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social
welfare and development officer. Such officer, upon thorough assessment of
the child, shall determine whether to release the child to the custody of
his/her parents, or refer the child to prevention programs, as provided under
this Act. Those with suspended sentences and undergoing rehabilitation at
the youth rehabilitation center shall likewise be released, unless it is
contrary to the best interest of the child.
SECTION 65. Children Detained Pending Trial. — If the child is detained
pending trial, the Family Court shall also determine whether or not
continued detention is necessary and, if not, determine appropriate
alternatives for detention. If detention is necessary and he/she is detained
 with adults, the court shall immediately order the transfer of the child to a
youth detention home.
SECTION 66. Inventory of "Locked-up" and Detained Children in Conflict
with the Law. — The PNP, the BJMP and the BUCOR are hereby directed
to submit to the JJWC, within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Act,
an inventory of all children in conflict with the law under their custody.
SECTION 67. Children Who Reach the Age of Eighteen (18) Years Pending
Diversion and Court Proceedings. — If a child reaches the age of eighteen
(18) years pending diversion and court proceedings, the appropriate
diversion authority in consultation with the local social welfare and
development officer or the Family Court in consultation with the Social
Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the Supreme Court, as the
case may be, shall determine the appropriate disposition. In case the
appropriate court executes the judgment of conviction, and unless the child
in conflict with the law has already availed of probation under Presidential
Decree No. 603 or other similar laws, the child may apply for probation if
qualified under the provisions of the Probation Law.
SECTION 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving
Sentences. — Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence
at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of
eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which
they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from
the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate
dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted
accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they are so qualified
under this Act or other applicable laws.
Ostensibly, the only issue that requires resolution in this case is whether or not
petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as found by both
the RTC and the CA. However, with the advent of R.A. No. 9344 while petitioner's
case is pending before this Court, a new issue arises, namely, whether the pertinent
provisions of R.A. No. 9344 apply to petitioner's case, considering that at the time
he committed the alleged rape, he was merely 13 years old.
In sum, we are convinced that petitioner committed the crime of rape against AAA.
In a prosecution for rape, the complainant's candor is the single most important
factor. If the complainant's testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused can
be convicted solely on that basis.44 The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did not doubt
AAA's credibility, and found no ill motive for her to charge petitioner of the heinous
crime of rape and to positively identify him as the malefactor. Both courts also
accorded respect to BBB's testimony that he saw petitioner having sexual
intercourse with his younger sister. While petitioner asserts that AAA's poverty is
enough motive for the imputation of the crime, we discard such assertion for no
mother or father like MMM and FFF would stoop so low as to subject their daughter
to the tribulations and the embarrassment of a public trial knowing that such a
traumatic experience would damage their daughter's psyche and mar her life if the
charge is not true.45 We find petitioner's claim that MMM inflicted the abrasions
found by Dr. Jocson in the genitalia of AAA, in order to extort money from
petitioner’s parents, highly incredible. Lastly, it must be noted that in most cases of
rape committed against young girls like AAA who was only 6 years old then, total
penetration of the victim's organ is improbable due to the small vaginal opening.
Thus, it has been held that actual penetration of the victim's organ or rupture of the
hymen is not required.46Therefore, it is not necessary for conviction that the
petitioner succeeded in having full penetration, because the slightest touching of the
lips of the female organ or of the labia of the pudendum constitutes rape. 47
However, for one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting circumstances,
although he commits a crime, by the complete absence of any of the conditions
which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability
arises.48 Therefore, while there is a crime committed, no criminal liability attaches.
Thus, in Guevarra v. Almodovar,49 we held:
[I]t is worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the
exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete
absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence
of negligence on the part of the accused. In expounding on intelligence
as the second element of dolus, Albert has stated:
"The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power,
necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a
licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because . . . the infant
(has) no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal liability."
It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are
not capable of performing a criminal act.
In its Comment50 dated April 24, 2008, the OSG posited that petitioner is no longer
covered by the provisions of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 since as early as 1999,
petitioner was convicted by the RTC and the conviction was affirmed by the CA in
2001. R.A. No. 9344 was passed into law in 2006, and with the petitioner now
approximately 25 years old, he no longer qualifies as a child as defined by R.A. No.
9344. Moreover, the OSG claimed that the retroactive effect of Section 64 of R.A.
No. 9344 is applicable only if the child-accused is still below 18 years old as
explained under Sections 67 and 68 thereof. The OSG also asserted that petitioner
may avail himself of the provisions of Section 3851of R.A. No. 9344 providing for
automatic suspension of sentence if finally found guilty. Lastly, the OSG argued that
while it is a recognized principle that laws favorable to the accused may be given
retroactive application, such principle does not apply if the law itself provides for
conditions for its application.
We are not persuaded.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly and explicitly provides:
SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15)
years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be
exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an
intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall
likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention
program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such
child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with
this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with
existing laws.
Likewise, Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15
years old and below, at the time of the commission of the crime, shall immediately
be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare
and development officer (LSWDO). What is controlling, therefore, with respect to the
exemption from criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICL's age at the time of the
promulgation of judgment but the CICL's age at the time of the commission of the
offense. In short, by virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has
been raised from 9 to 15 years old.52
Given this precise statutory declaration, it is imperative that this Court accord
retroactive application to the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 9344 pursuant to
the well-entrenched principle in criminal law - favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa
restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive
effect.53 This principle is embodied in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides:
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is
not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this
Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws, a final sentence
has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
We also have extant jurisprudence that the principle has been given expanded
application in certain instances involving special laws. 54 R.A. No. 9344 should be no
exception.
In fact, the legislative intent for R.A. No. 9344's retroactivity is even patent from the
deliberations on the bill in the Senate, quoted as follows:
Sections 67-69 On Transitory Provisions
Senator Santiago. In Sections 67 to 69 on Transitory Provisions, pages 34
to 35, may I humbly propose that we should insert, after Sections 67 to 69,
the following provision:
ALL CHILDREN WHO DO NOT HAVE CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER THIS
LAW PENDING THE CREATION OF THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE
WELFARE AND RESTORATION (OJWR) AND THE LOCAL COUNCIL
FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN (LCPC) WITHIN A YEAR, SHALL
BE IMMEDIATELY TRANSFERRED TO DSWD INSTITUTIONS, AND
DSWD SHALL UNDERTAKE DIVERSION PROGRAMS FOR THEM,
PRIORITIZING THE YOUNGER CHILDREN BELOW 15 YEARS OF AGE
AND THE LIGHTER OFFENSES.
The only question will be: Will the DSWD have enough facilities for these
adult offenders?
Senator Pangilinan, Mr. President, according to the CWC, the DSWD does
not have the capability at the moment. It will take time to develop the
capacity.
Senator Santiago. Well, we can say that they shall be transferred whenever
the facilities are ready.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes. Mr. President, just a clarification. When we speak
here of children who do not have criminal liability under this law, we are
referring here to those who currently have criminal liability, but because of
the retroactive effect of this measure, will now be exempt. It is quite
confusing.
Senator Santiago. That is correct.
Senator Pangilinan. In other words, they should be released either to their
parents or through a diversion program, Mr. President. That is my
understanding.
Senator Santiago. Yes, that is correct. But there will have to be a process of
sifting before that. That is why I was proposing that they should be given to
the DSWD, which will conduct the sifting process, except that apparently,
the DSWD does not have the physical facilities.
Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, conceptually, we have no argument. We
will now have to just craft it to ensure that the input raised earlier by the
good Senator is included and the capacity of the DSWD to be able to
absorb these individuals. Likewise, the issue should also be incorporated in
the amendment.
The President. Just a question from the Chair. The moment this law
becomes effective, all those children in conflict with the law, who were
convicted in the present Penal Code, for example, who will now not be
subject to incarceration under this law, will be immediately released. Is
that the understanding?
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Santiago. They would immediately fall under . . . .
Senator Pangilinan. The diversion requirements, Mr. President.
Senator Santiago. Yes.
The President. But since the facilities are not yet available, what will happen
to them?
Senator Santiago. Well, depending on their age, which has not yet been
settled . . . . . provides, for example, for conferencing family mediation,
negotiation, apologies, censure, et cetera. These methodologies will apply.
They do not necessarily have to remain in detention.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, that is correct, Mr. President. But it will still require
some sort of infrastructure, meaning, manpower. The personnel from the
DSWD will have to address the counseling. So, there must be a transition in
terms of building the capacity and absorbing those who will benefit from this
measure.
The President. Therefore, that should be specifically provided for as an
amendment.
Senator Pangilinan. That is correct, Mr. President.
The President. All right. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none,
the Santiago amendment is accepted.55
xxxx
PIMENTEL AMENDMENTS
xxxx
Senator Pimentel.
xxxx
Now, considering that laws are normally prospective, Mr. President, in their
application, I would like to suggest to the Sponsor if he could
incorporate some kind of a transitory provision that would make this
law apply also to those who might already have been convicted but are
awaiting, let us say, execution of their penalties as adults when, in
fact, they are juveniles.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We do have a provision under
the Transitory Provisions wherein we address the issue raised by the
good Senator, specifically, Section 67. For example, "Upon effectivity
of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15) years old and below at the
time of the commission of the crime shall immediately be dismissed
and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare
and development officer." So that would be giving retroactive effect.
Senator Pimentel. Of cases that are still to be prosecuted.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes.
Senator Pimentel. What about those that have already been prosecuted? I
was trying to cite the instance of juvenile offenders erroneously convicted as
adults awaiting execution.
Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, we are willing to include that as an
additional amendment, subject to style.
 Senator Pimentel. I would certainly appreciate that because that is a reality
that we have to address, otherwise injustice will really be . . .
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President, we would also include that as a
separate provision.
The President. In other words, even after final conviction if, in fact, the
offender is able to prove that at the time of the commission of the offense he
is a minor under this law, he should be given the benefit of the law.
Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. That is correct.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We accept that proposed
amendment.56
The Court is bound to enforce this legislative intent, which is the dominant factor in
interpreting a statute. Significantly, this Court has declared in a number of cases,
that intent is the soul of the law,viz.:
The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect
according to the purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital
part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to
ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of the legislature in
enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained,
although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts
will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent
and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the
general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to
a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and
follow the true intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes
best with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and
objects of the legislature.57
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. 58 In this case,
the plain meaning of R.A. No. 9344's unambiguous language, coupled with clear
lawmakers' intent, is most favorable to herein petitioner. No other interpretation is
justified, for the simple language of the new law itself demonstrates the legislative
intent to favor the CICL.
It bears stressing that the petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the
commission of the alleged rape. This was duly proven by the certificate of live birth,
by petitioner's own testimony, and by the testimony of his mother. Furthermore,
petitioner’s age was never assailed in any of the proceedings before the RTC and
the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the commission of the crime, was
below 15 years of age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal liability.
However, while the law exempts petitioner from criminal liability for the two (2)
counts of rape committed against AAA, Section 6 thereof expressly provides that
there is no concomitant exemption from civil liability. Accordingly, this Court sustains
the ruling of the RTC, duly affirmed by the CA, that petitioner and/or his parents are
liable to pay AAA P100,000.00 as civil indemnity. This award is in the nature of
actual or compensatory damages, and is mandatory upon a conviction for rape.
The RTC, however, erred in not separately awarding moral damages, distinct from
the civil indemnity awarded to the rape victim. AAA is entitled to moral damages in
the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape, pursuant to Article 2219 of the
Civil Code, without the necessity of additional pleading or proof other than the fact of
rape. Moral damages are granted in recognition of the victim's injury necessarily
resulting from the odious crime of rape.59
A final note. While we regret the delay, we take consolation in the fact that a law
intended to protect our children from the harshness of life and to alleviate, if not
cure, the ills of the growing number of CICL and children at risk in our country, has
been enacted by Congress. However, it has not escaped us that major concerns
have been raised on the effects of the law. It is worth mentioning that in the
Rationale for the Proposed Rule on Children Charged under R.A. No. 9165, or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, it was found that:
The passage of Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006 raising the age of criminal irresponsibility from 9 years old to 15
years old has compounded the problem of employment of children in the
drug trade several times over. Law enforcement authorities, Barangay
Kagawads and the police, most particularly, complain that drug syndicates
have become more aggressive in using children 15 years old or below as
couriers or foot soldiers in the drug trade. They claim that Republic Act No.
9344 has rendered them ineffective in the faithful discharge of their duties in
that they are proscribed from taking into custody children 15 years old or
below who openly flaunt possession, use and delivery or distribution of illicit
drugs, simply because their age exempts them from criminal liability under
the new law. 60
The Court is fully cognizant that our decision in the instant case effectively
exonerates petitioner of rape, a heinous crime committed against AAA who was only
a child at the tender age of six (6) when she was raped by the petitioner, and one
who deserves the law’s greater protection. However, this consequence is inevitable
because of the language of R.A. No. 9344, the wisdom of which is not subject to
 review by this Court.61 Any perception that the result reached herein appears unjust I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
or unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
give statutes a meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language of the
law. Our task is constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
to the proven facts, and we have done so in this case. 62 Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Criminal Case Nos. 98-19083 and 98-
19084 filed against petitioner Joemar F. Ortega are hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner
is hereby referred to the local social welfare and development officer of the locality
for the appropriate intervention program. Nevertheless, the petitioner is hereby
ordered to pay private complainant AAA, civil indemnity in the amount of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and moral damages in the amount of One CERTIFICATION
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). No costs.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the two Houses of Congress and the Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC). been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Footnotes

*
 Additional member replacing Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes per Raffle
dated July 30, 2008.

WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
*
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
4
 Also referred to as Jomar Ortega, Joemar Ortiga and Joemart Ortiga in
other pleadings and documents.
5
 As the birth certificate shows that petitioner was born on August 8, 1983
(records, p. 157), he was only thirteen (13) years old in August and
December 1, 1996. He was already fourteen (14) years old at the time of the
RENATO C. CORONA filing of the two Informations charging him of rape.
Associate Justice
6
 Per this Court's Resolution dated September 19, 2006 in A.M. No. 04-11-
09-SC, as well as our ruling in People v. Cabalquinto (G.R. No. 167693,
September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419), pursuant to Republic Act No. 9262
also known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004" and its implementing rules, the real name of the victim and those of
her immediate family members other than the accused are to be withheld
and fictitious initials are instead used to protect the victim's privacy.
Likewise, the exact address of the victim is to be deleted (People v.
Rentoria, G.R. No. 175333, September 21, 2007, 533 SCRA 708).
37
 Entitled AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE (8) living in a community with a high level of criminality or drug
JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE abuse; and
AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. (9) living in situations of armed conflict.
38
 Declarador v. Gubaton, G.R. No. 159208, August 18, 2006, 499 SCRA 41
 SECTION 8. Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC). — A Juvenile
341, 350. Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC) is hereby created and attached to the
Department of Justice and placed under its administrative supervision. The
39
 SECTION 4. Definition of Terms. — The following terms as used in this JJWC shall be chaired by an Undersecretary of the Department of Social
Act shall be defined as follows: Welfare and Development. It shall ensure the effective implementation of
this Act and coordination among the following agencies:
xxxx
(a) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC);
(e) "Child in Conflict with the Law" refers to a child who is alleged
as, accused of, or adjudged as, having committed an offense under (b) Department of Education (DepEd);
Philippine laws.
(c) Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG);
xxxx
(d) Public Attorney's Office (PAO);
40
 (d) "Child at Risk" refers to a child who is vulnerable to and at the risk of
committing criminal offenses because of personal, family and social (e) Bureau of Corrections (BUCOR);
circumstances, such as, but not limited to, the following:
(f) Parole and Probation Administration (PPA);
(1) being abused by any person through sexual, physical,
psychological, mental, economic or any other means and the (g) National Bureau of Investigation (NBI);
parents or guardian refuse, are unwilling, or, unable to provide
protection for the child;
(h) Philippine National Police (PNP);
(2) being exploited including sexually or economically;
(i) Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP);
(3) being abandoned or neglected, and after diligent search and
inquiry, the parent or guardian cannot be found; (j) Commission on Human Rights (CHR);

(4) coming from a dysfunctional or broken family or without a parent (k) Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA);
or guardian;
(l) National Youth Commission (NYC); and
(5) being out of school;
(m) Other institutions focused on juvenile justice and intervention
(6) being a street child; programs.

(7) being a member of a gang; The JJWC shall be composed of representatives, whose ranks shall not be
lower than director, to be designated by the concerned heads of the
following departments or agencies:
 (a) Department of Justice (DOJ);
(b) Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD);
(c) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC);
(d) Department of Education (DepEd);
(e) Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG);
(f) Commission on Human Rights (CHR);
(g) National Youth Commission (NYC); and
(h) Two (2) representatives from NGOs, one to be designated by
the Secretary of Justice and the other to be designated by the
Secretary of Social Welfare and Development.
The JJWC shall convene within fifteen (15) days from the effectivity of this
Act. The Secretary of Justice and the Secretary of Social Welfare and
Development shall determine the organizational structure and staffing
pattern of the JJWC.
The JJWC shall coordinate with the Office of the Court Administrator and
the Philippine Judicial Academy to ensure the realization of its mandate and
the proper discharge of its duties and functions, as herein provided.
42
 SECTION 9. Duties and Functions of the JJWC. — The JJWC shall have
the following duties and functions:
(a) To oversee the implementation of this Act;
(b) To advise the President on all matters and policies relating to
juvenile justice and welfare;
(c) To assist the concerned agencies in the review and redrafting of
existing policies/regulations or in the formulation of new ones in line
with the provisions of this Act;
(d) To periodically develop a comprehensive 3 to 5-year national
juvenile intervention program, with the participation of government
agencies concerned, NGOs and youth organization;
(e) To coordinate the implementation of the juvenile intervention
programs and activities by national government agencies and other
activities which may have an important bearing on the success of
the entire national juvenile intervention program. All programs
relating to juvenile justice and welfare shall be adopted in
consultation with the JJWC;
(f) To formulate and recommend policies and strategies in
consultation with children for the prevention of juvenile delinquency
and the administration of justice, as well as for the treatment and
rehabilitation of the children in conflict with the law;
(g) To collect relevant information and conduct continuing research
and support evaluations and studies on all matters relating to
juvenile justice and welfare, such as, but not limited to:
(1) the performance and results achieved by juvenile
intervention programs and by activities of the local
government units and other government agencies;
(2) the periodic trends, problems and causes of juvenile
delinquency and crimes; and
(3) the particular needs of children in conflict with the law in
custody.
The data gathered shall be used by the JJWC in the improvement
of the administration of juvenile justice and welfare system.
The JJWC shall set up a mechanism to ensure that children are
involved in research and policy development.
(h) Through duly designated persons and with the assistance of the
agencies provided in the preceding section, to conduct regular
inspections in detention and rehabilitation facilities and to undertake
spot inspections on their own initiative in order to check compliance
with the standards provided herein and to make the necessary
recommendations to appropriate agencies;
(i) To initiate and coordinate the conduct of trainings for the
personnel of the agencies involved in the administration of the
juvenile justice and welfare system and the juvenile intervention
program;
 56
(j) To submit an annual report to the President on the  Deliberations of the Senate on Senate Bill No. 1402, November 22, 2005,
implementation of this Act; and pp. 27-29 (Emphasis supplied).

57
(k) To perform such other functions as may be necessary to  Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No.
implement the provisions of this Act. 160528, October 9, 2006, 504 SCRA 91, 101-102, citing Inding v.
Sandiganbayan, 434 SCRA 388 (2004), National Tobacco Administration v.
51
 Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides, to wit: Commission on Audit, 370 Phil. 793 (1999), and Philippine National Bank v.
Office of the President, 322 Phil. 6, 14, (1996); Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 86
Phil. 50, 57 (1950); Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141, 145-146 (1931) citing
SECTION 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. — Once the
SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, Vol. II, pp. 693-695.
child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged,
the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may
have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of
pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the
child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without
need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of
sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already
eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various

circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate
disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.

52
 Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) Circular No. 115-2006 entitled
GUIDELINES ON THE TRANSITORY PROVISIONS OF R.A. 9344 OR
THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT, dated August 10, 2006.

53
 People v. Quiachon, G.R. No. 170236, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 704,
718.

54
 Go v. Dimagibac, G.R. No. 151876, June 21, 2005, 460 SCRA 451, citing
People v. Langit, 392 Phil. 94, 119 (2000), Gonzales v. Court of Appeals,
343 Phil. 297, 306 (1997), People v. Ganguso, 320 Phil. 324, 340 (1995),
and People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555, 570 (1994).

This doctrine follows the rule enunciated under Art. 10 of the Revised Penal
Code which provides that the provisions thereof apply supplementarily to
special laws.

55
 Deliberations of the Senate on Senate Bill No. 1402, November 9, 2005,
pp. 47-50 (Emphasis supplied).
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5418             February 12, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,  the edge of which stood the shack. There is some contradiction between the
vs.
CECILIO TAÑEDO, defendant-appellant.
O'Brien & De Witt, for appellant.  however, testified that he did not invite the deceased to go hunting with him, neither
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
The defendant in this case was accused of the crime of murder committed, as
alleged in the information, as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of January of this year, the said accused, with
the intention of killing Feliciano Sanchez, invited him to hunt wild chickens,
and, upon reaching the forest, with premeditation shot him in the breast with
a shotgun which destroyed the heart and killed the said Sanchez, and
afterwards, in order to hide the crime, buried the body of the deceased in a
well. The motive is unknown. The premeditation consists in that the accused
had prepared his plans to take the deceased to the forest, there to kill him,
so that no one could see it, and to bury him afterwards secretly in order that
the crime should remain unpunished.
The defendant was found guilty of homicide by the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Tarlac and sentenced to fourteen years eight months and one day
of reclusion temporal, accessories, indemnification and costs. The defendant
appealed.
There is very little dispute about the facts in this case, in fact no dispute at all as to
the important facts. The accused was a landowner. On the morning of the 26th of
January, 1909, he, with Bernardino Tagampa, Casimiro Pascual, Valeriano Paulillo,
and Juan Arellano, went to work on a malecon  or dam on his land. The defendant
took with him a shotgun and a few shells, with the intention to hunt wild chickens
after he had set his laborers at work. He remained with his laborers an hour or so
and then went a short distance away across a stream to see how the alteration
which he had made in the malecon  affected the flow of water from the rice filed on
the other side of the stream. He carried his shotgun with him across the stream. On
the other side of the stream he met the deceased, who, with his mother and uncle,
had been living in a small shack for a month or so during the rice-harvesting season.
The accused asked the uncle of the deceased where he could find a good place in
which to hunt wild chickens. The uncle was lying on the floor in the interior of the
shack sick of fever. The deceased, a young man about 20 years of age, was
working at something under a manga tree a short distance from the shack. Although
the accused directed his question to the uncle inside of the shack, the deceased
answered the question and pointed out in a general way a portion of the forest near
testimony of the accused and the Government witnesses just at this point. The uncle
of the deceased testified that the boy and the accused invited each other mutually to
hunt wild chickens and that the accused accepted the invitation. The accused,
did the deceased go with him, but that he remained under the manga tree "trying
something." At any rate the accused went into the forest with his gun. What took
place there is unknown to anybody except the accused. Upon that subject he
testified as follows:
And after Feliciano Sanchez pointed out that place to me, that place where
the wild chickens were to be found, I proceeded to hunt, because, in the first
place, if I could kill some wild chickens we would have something to eat on
that day. So when I arrived at that place I saw a wild chickens and I shot
him. And after I shot that chicken I heard a human cry. I picked up the
chicken and went near the place where I heard the noise, and after I saw
that I had wounded a man I went back toward the malecon, where my
companions were working, running back, and when I arrived there I left my
shotgun behind or by a tree not far from where my companions were
working; and I called Bernardino Tagampa to tell him about the occurrence,
and to him I told of that occurence because he is my friend and besides that
he was a relative of the deceased, and when Tagampa heard of this he and
myself went together to see the dead body.
Only one shot was heard that morning and a chicken was killed by gunshot wound.
Chicken feathers were found in considerable qualities at the point where the chicken
was shot and where the accident occurred. The defendant within a few minutes after
the accident went out of the woods to the malecon where he had left his laborers at
work, carrying the dead chicken with him. The accused called Bernardino Tagampa,
on of the laborers, to go with him and they disappeared for some time. Tagampa
says that they went a little way toward the woods and came back. The accused says
that they went to the place where the body of the deceased lay and removed it to a
place in the cogon grass where it would not be easily observed. It is certain,
however, that the body was concealed in the cogon grass. During the afternoon
Tagampa left the malecon, where his fellow laborers were working, probably to hunt
for a place in which to hide the body. The rest of the laborers saw the witness Yumul
take the chicken which had been killed by the accused. He delivered it to the wife of
the accused, who testified that she received the chicken from Yumul and that it had
been killed by a gunshot wound. That evening the accused and Tagampa went
together to dispose of the body finally. They took it from the cogon grass where it lay
concealed and carried it about seventeen or eighteen hundred meters from the
place where it had originally fallen, and buried it in an old well, covering it with straw
and earth and burning straw on top of the well for the purpose of concealing it.
Tagampa said that he helped the accused dispose of the body because he was
afraid of him, although he admits that the accused in no way threatened or sought to
compel him to do so. The defendant prior to the trial denied all knowledge of the
death of the deceased or the whereabouts of the body. On the trial, however, he
confessed his participation in the death of the deceased and told the story
substantially as above.
So far as can be ascertained from the evidence the prior relations between the
accused and the deceased had been normal. The deceased was a tenant on land
belonging to a relative of the accused. There was no enmity and no unpleasant
relations between them. No attempt was made to show any. There appears to have
been no motive whatever for the commission of the crime. The Government has not
attempted to show any. The only possible reason that the accused could have for
killing the deceased would be found in the fact of a sudden quarrel between them
during the hunt. That idea is wholly negative by the fact that the chicken and the
man were shot at the same time, there having been only one shot fired.
Article 1 of the Penal Code says:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntary
unless the contrary shall appear.
Article 8, subdivision 8, reads as follows:
He who, while performing a legal act with due care, causes some injury by
mere accident without liability or intention of causing it.
Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is as follows:
A defendant in a criminal action shall be presumed to be innocent until the
contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt that his guilt is
satisfactorily shown he shall be entitled to an acquittal.
The American doctrine is substantially the same. It is uniformly held that if life is
taken by misfortune or accident while in the performance of a lawful act executed
with due care and without intention of doing harm, there is no criminal liability.
(Tidwell vs. State, 70 Ala., 33; State vs. Benham, 23 Ia., 154, 92 Am. Dec., 417;
Bertrong vs.State, 2 Tex. Ap., 160; Williamson vs. State, 2 Ohio C. C., 292; U.
S. vs. Meagher, 37 Fed. Rep., 875; U. S. vs.Castro, Fed. Cas., 14752;
State vs. Legg, 3 L. R. A., N. S., 1152.)
In this case there is absolutely no evidence of negligence upon the part of the
accused. Neither is there any question that he was engaged in the commission of a
lawful act when the accident occurred. Neither is there any evidence of the intention
of the accused to cause the death of the deceased. The only thing in the case at all
suspicious upon the part of the defendant are his concealment and denial.
In the case of the State vs. Legg, above referred to, it is said (p.1165):
Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the accused is not
required to prove such a defense by a preponderance of the evidence,
because there is a denial of intentional killing, and the burden is upon the
State to show that it was intentional, and if, from a consideration of all the
evidence, both that for the State and the prisoner, there is a reasonable
doubt as to whether or not the killing was accidental or intentional, the jury
should acquit. . . . But where accidental killing is relied upon, the prisoner
admits the killing but denies that it was intentional. Therefore, the State
must show that it was intentional, and it is clearly error to instruct the jury
that the defendant must show that it was an accident by a preponderance of
the testimony, and instruction B in the Cross case was properly held to be
erroneous.
In 3 L. R. A., N. S., page 1163, it is said:
Evidence of misadventure gives rise to an important issue in a prosecution
for homicide, which must be submitted to the jury. And since a plea of
misadventure is a denial of criminal intent (or its equivalent) which
constitutes an essential element in criminal homicide, to warrant a
conviction it must be negative by the prosecution beyond a reasonable
doubt.
In support of such contention the author cites a number of cases.
We are of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment of
conviction.
The judgment of conviction is, therefore, reversed, the defendant acquitted, and his
discharge from custody ordered, costs de oficio. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and Johnson, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

CARSON, J.,  concurring:

I concur.

I am in entire agreement with the conclusions of the majority in this case. I think it
proper to estate, nevertheless, that the doctrine laid down in the somewhat loosely
worded West Virginia case of State vs. Legg, cited in the majority opinion, and in the
citation from 3 L. R. A., N. S., can not be said to be in conformity with the general
doctrine in this jurisdiction, as laid down in the decisions of this court, without
considerable modification and restriction limiting its scope to cases wherein it is
properly applicable.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 172695              June 29, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, 
vs.
ISAIAS CASTILLO y COMPLETO, Appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In an Information1 dated January 19, 1994, appellant Isaias Castillo y Completo was
charged with the crime of parricide, committed as follows:
That on or about November 5, 1993, in the Municipality of Cabuyao, Province of
Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Isaias Castillo y
Completo, while conveniently armed with illegally possessed sling and deadly arrow,
with intent to kill his wife Consorcia Antiporta with whom he was united in lawful
wedlock did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot and hit his wife
Consorcia Antiporta with the aforesaid deadly arrow, hitting the latter on the right
side of her neck causing the laceration of the jugular vein which caused her
instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8590-B and raffled to Branch 24 of
the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna.
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on April 15, 1994. Trial
thereafter ensued.
The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
There is no dispute that the victim, Consorcia Antiporta Castillo, died violently in the
evening of November 5, 1993. The cause of her death was massive hemorrhage
due to "laceration of the jugular vein of her neck". According to Dr. Solita P. Plastina,
Municipal Health Officer of Calamba, Laguna, who conducted the autopsy on the
victim’s body, the fatal weapon could have been a "pointed instrument like a nail".
There is no dispute likewise that the accused shot with a dart from a rubber sling,
his wife hitting her at the neck and causing her instantaneous death. The letters
written by the accused from his detention cell addressed to his mother-in-law, to his
father-in-law, and lastly, the victim’s sister, speak so eloquently of someone who
accepts the fault for the early demise of the victim. Asking forgiveness from the
close relatives of the victim is a clear admission of authorship of the fatal act.
In the same letters, the accused raised as an issue his lack of intent to do the fatal
harm to his wife. This is the same issue to be resolved by this Court. Whether or not
the fatal injury sustained by the victim was accidental.
xxxx
Guillermo Antiporta, father of the victim, narrated in Court that in the evening of
November 5, 1993, between 9:00 o’clock to 10:00 o’clock, the accused came home
drunk and was in an angry mood. The accused kicked the door and table, and then
threw the electric fan away. He was prevailed upon by Guillermo to take a rest. But
the accused did not heed the advice of Guillermo as he took instead his sling and
arrow from the house ceiling where he was keeping them. Dejectedly, Guillermo
transferred to the adjacent house of her x x x daughter [in-law] Yolanda. From there,
Guillermo heard the victim crying and, afterwards, shouting at the accused.
Guillermo concernedly ordered Yolanda to see what was happening inside the
house of Consorcia, and Yolanda obeyed. On her way, Yolanda met the accused
carrying the bloodied body of Consorcia. Guillermo, the accused, and Yolanda
brought Consorcia to the hospital but to no avail.
From all the circumstances gathered, the infliction of the fatal injury upon Consorcia
was preceded by a quarrel between her and the accused. This spat negated the
accused’s version that he was practicing the use of the weapon when Consorcia
was hit by the arrow, and lends credence to the prosecution’s contention that the
shooting was intentional.
x x x To sustain the accused’s assertion that he was practicing the use of said
weapon at the time of the incident is patently absurd. The defense even failed to
rebut Guillermo Antiporta’s testimony that the accused was keeping said sling and
arrow inside his house.
It might be true that the accused was one of those who rushed the victim to the
hospital and while on the way, he sounded remorseful. But Guillermo Antiporta
further testified that while the victim was being attended to by the medical personnel
of said hospital, the accused stayed outside the hospital premises, then he
disappeared. He was later on apprehended by police authorities while hiding inside
the comfort room of a premises in an adjoining barangay. The accused’s omission to
surrender himself to the authorities is a clear indication of guilt. 3
After several hearings, the trial court rendered on October 5, 1998, a decision, 4 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby finds accused ISAIAS CASTILLO Y COMPLETO
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of PARRICIDE and hereby
sentences him to a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify the heirs
of the victim in the sum of P50,000.00, as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.5
Appellant filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, alleging that the prosecution
failed to sufficiently establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, in a
Decision6 dated February 28, 2005, the Court of Appeals denied appellant’s appeal
and affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated October 5, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 24 of Biñan, Laguna is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that accused-appellant Isaias Castillo y Completo is further ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.7
Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated
June 16, 2005.
Hence, this appeal.
Appellant alleged that the pieces of circumstantial evidence on which his conviction
was based did not sufficiently establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; that the
prosecution failed to prove his motive in killing his wife; or that they had a quarrel
immediately prior to the incident.
Appellant likewise claimed that it was not established that he was the one who shot
his wife with a deadly arrow considering that at the time of the incident, he and his
drinking buddies were all engaged in target shooting using the sling and arrow.
Hence, he surmised that any one of them could have shot the victim. At any rate,
even assuming that he was the one who killed his wife, the same was accidental
and not intentional.
Furthermore, he claimed that his presence at the crime scene did not establish his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. His arrest while hiding inside a toilet in the adjoining
barangay, while his wife was being treated in the hospital, likewise does not prove
his complicity since the prosecution did not prove that he deliberately hid inside the
toilet.
Finally, the letters he sent to his father-in-law, mother-in-law and sister-in-law where
he asked for forgiveness should not be considered as admission of guilt.
The petition lacks merit.
Direct evidence of the commission of the offense is not the only matrix wherefrom a
trial court may draw its conclusions and finding of guilt. Conviction can be had on
the basis of circumstantial evidence provided that: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity
of circumstantial evidence which will suffice in a given case, all the circumstances
proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The
circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only one
fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the
guilty person.8Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean the degree of proof
excluding the possibility of error and producing absolute certainty. Only moral
certainty or "that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind" is required.9
In the instant case, all the essential requisites for circumstantial evidence to sustain
a conviction, are present. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, the following
pieces of circumstantial evidence indubitably established that appellant was the
perpetrator of the crime, to wit:
1. Consortia would often confide to her sister Leticia about the violent behavior of
her (Consortia) husband, herein accused-appellant. And even if Consortia would not
tell Leticia about the beatings, the latter would see her face with black eyes as
evident proofs of maltreatment.
2. On the night of the incident, accused-appellant arrived at their house drunk and
displaying violent behavior, kicking the door and table.
3. Accused-appellant was last seen holding and practicing his sling and arrow.
4. Immediately afterwards, Consortia was heard crying and shouting.
5. Accused-appellant was thereafter seen carrying Consortia, bloodied and
unconscious, to be brought to the hospital where she later died.
6. The autopsy findings indicate that Consortia sustained a punctured wound in the
neck which fatally lacerated her jugular vein. The cause of the wound was a pointed
object.
7. While detained, accused-appellant wrote letters to the parents and sister of
Consortia asking for forgiveness.
Also notable is accused-appellant’s behavior immediately after the incident. He
disappeared and did not enter the clinic where Consortia was rushed for treatment.
And when Consortia’s sister later sought police assistance in searching for accused-
appellant, the latter was found by the police hiding inside a toilet at a nearby
barangay.10
There is no merit in appellant’s contention that the prosecution failed to prove motive
in killing his wife. Intent to kill and not motive is the essential element of the offense
on which his conviction rests.11 Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against
persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature,
location and number of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the
malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim, the
circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the
accused. If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to
kill is presumed.12
In the instant case, the following circumstances satisfactorily established appellant’s
intent to kill his wife:
First: The killing was immediately preceded by a quarrel between the appellant and
his wife. Leticia, the victim’s sister, testified that the deceased suffered from the
violent behavior of the appellant who would often lay hand on the victim during their
marital squabbles.
Guillermo, appellant’s father-in-law, testified that on the night of the incident,
appellant arrived in their conjugal abode drunk and in a foul mood. He kicked the
door and table and threw away the electric fan. Guillermo tried to prevail upon
appellant but to no avail. Instead, appellant got his sling and arrow which he kept
near the ceiling.
Guillermo left appellant’s house and went to the house of his daughter-in-law,
Yolanda, located about four meters away; but he could still hear the victim and
appellant arguing and shouting at each other. After a while, Guillermo requested
Yolanda to look on her sister-in-law. On her way, Yolanda met the appellant carrying
Consorcia soaked in blood.
Second: It has always been said that criminal cases are primarily about human
nature.13 In the instant case, appellant disappeared after his wounded wife was
rushed to the hospital. This is indeed contrary to human nature. A husband is
expected to lend comfort to his dying wife up to her last breath. In this case,
however, appellant took flight. It is well-established that the flight of an accused is
competent evidence to indicate his guilt, and flight, when unexplained, as in this
case, is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. 14
Appellant alleged that his arrest by police authorities inside a toilet at the adjoining
barangay is not an indication of guilt because the prosecution failed to prove that he
deliberately hid in order to evade being arrested. 15
The contention lacks merit.
As above-discussed, it is contrary to human nature for a husband to leave his dying
wife, more so if his absence is unexplained. Appellant did not offer any explanation
for his flight. In appellant’s brief, he claimed that in "all probability, it might have
happened that he (appellant) was merely answering the call of nature at the precise
time when he was arrested."16 However, we find it is highly illogical for appellant to
go as far as the adjoining barangay to answer the call of nature especially since he
could do so inside the premises of the hospital. Moreover, the allegation that he was
fearful of reprisal coming from the victim’s relatives17 is contrary to his claim of
innocence.
Third: The location of the wound and its extent likewise proved appellant’s intent to
kill the victim. The autopsy report revealed that the victim sustained a punctured
wound in the neck, a vital organ, which fatally lacerated her jugular vein causing
massive hemorrhage. The extent of the physical injury inflicted on the deceased
manifests appellant’s intention to extinguish life.18
Fourth: As regards appellant’s act of carrying the body of his wounded wife and
bringing her to the hospital, the same does not manifest innocence. It is merely an
indication of an act of repentance or contrition on the part of appellant. 19
In fine, all these circumstances prove appellant’s intent to harm his wife.
There is likewise no merit in appellant’s contention that he was not the one who shot
the deadly arrow because at the time of the incident, he and his drinking buddies
were all playing and practicing target shooting with the use of the sling and arrow.
Prosecution witness Guillermo Antiporta categorically testified that appellant was
alone with his wife inside their house when the incident happened. This completely
discounts the possibility that other than appellant, there could be another person or
persons who could have perpetrated the crime. There is no paucity of evidence
because the time when Guillermo left the appellant and the victim up to the time
Yolanda saw him carrying his wife, were all accounted for. Moreover, the testimony
of defense witness Galang supports the prosecution’s contention that appellant was
alone with his wife at the time of the incident. As noted by the Court of Appeals:
Defense witness, Jose Nelson Galang, testified that he left his drinking buddies and
headed home at about 9:00 p.m., as in fact he was already in bed at about 10:00
p.m. when he saw that Consortia was being rushed to the hospital. Instead of
weakening the evidence for the prosecution, Galang’s testimony even supports the
prosecution’s version that between 9:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. of that fateful night,
accused-appellant arrived at their house drunk, presumably going home from that
drinking session with his friends. x x x20
There is likewise no merit in appellant’s contention that assuming he was the one
who killed his wife, the same was accidental and not intentional. The exempting
circumstance of accident is not applicable in the instant case. Article 12, par. 4 of
the Revised Penal Code, provides:
ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. – The following are
exempt from criminal liability:
xxxx
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by
mere accident without fault or intention of causing it.
"Accident" is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to prove, with
clear and convincing evidence.21 The defense miserably failed to discharge its
burden of proof. The essential requisites for this exempting circumstance, are:
1. A person is performing a lawful act;
2. With due care;
3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident;
4. Without fault or intention of causing it.22
By no stretch of imagination could playing with or using a deadly sling and arrow be
considered as performing a "lawful act." Thus, on this ground alone, appellant’s
defense of accident must be struck down because he was performing an unlawful
act during the incident. As correctly found by the trial court:
Furthermore, mere possession of sling and arrow is punishable under the law. In
penalizing the act, the legislator took into consideration that the deadly weapon was
used for no legal purpose, but to inflict injury, mostly fatal, upon other persons. Let it
be stressed that this crude weapon can not attain the standards as an instrument for
archery competitions. To sustain the accused’s assertion that he was practicing the
use of said weapon at the time of the incident is patently absurd. The defense even
failed to rebut Guillermo Antiporta’s testimony that the accused was keeping said
sling and arrow inside his house.23
Furthermore, by claiming that the killing was by accident, appellant has the burden
of proof of establishing the presence of any circumstance which may relieve him of
responsibility, and to prove justification he must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution, for even if this be weak, it can
not be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing. 24 Other than his claim
that the killing was accidental, appellant failed to adduce any evidence to prove the
same.
Likewise, we cannot lend credence to appellant’s contention that the letters he wrote
to his parents-in-law and sister-in-law, where he asked for forgiveness, should not
be considered as an implied admission of guilt. He claimed that he wrote the letters
in order to explain that what happened was an accident and that he was to be
blamed for it because he allowed his drinking buddies to play with the sling and
arrow.
Settled is the rule that in criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or
those allowed by law to be settled through mutual concessions, an offer of
compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission
of guilt. Evidently, no one would ask for forgiveness unless he had committed some
wrong and a plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to
compromise.25 Under the present circumstances, appellant’s plea for forgiveness
should be received as an implied admission of guilt. Besides, contrary to appellant’s
assertion, the killing of Consorcia was deliberate, and not by accident.
Finally, we find no cogent reason to review much less depart now from the findings
of the lower court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. When the trial court’s factual
findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally
conclusive and binding upon this Court, for it is not our function to analyze and
weigh the parties’ evidence all over again except when there is serious ground to
believe a possible miscarriage of justice would thereby result. Our task in an appeal
via certiorari is limited, as a jurisdictional matter, to reviewing errors of law that might CERTIFICATION
have been committed by the Court of Appeals.26
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is punishable by reclusion Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
perpetua to death. The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Likewise, civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 the opinion of the Court’s Division.
and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 were properly awarded by the
courts below. REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
February 28, 2005 which affirmed with modification the judgment of the Regional Footnotes
Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24, finding appellant Isaias Castillo y Completo
guilty of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and 8
 Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago,
ordering him to pay the heirs of his victim P50,000.00 as moral damages People v. Galvez, G.R. No. 157221, March 30, 2007.
and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, is AFFIRMED.

With costs.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice 
Chairperson, Third Division

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 124058               December 10, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
JESUS G. RETUBADO alias "JESSIE," appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Branch
29, in Criminal Case No. TCS-2153 convicting the appellant Jesus G. Retubado of
murder, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and directing him to indemnify the
heirs of the victim Emmanuel Cañon the sum of P50,000.00.
The appellant was indicted for murder in an Information, the accusatory portion of
which reads:
That on the 5th day of November, 1993 at 9:30 o’clock in the evening, more or less,
at Barangay I Poblacion, Municipality of Tuburan, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
deliberate intent to kill, by means of treachery, evident premeditation and taking
advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot Emmanuel Cañon with the use of unlicensed
revolver of unknown caliber, thereby hitting the latter on his forehead, resulting to
the instantaneous death of the said victim.
2
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Shortly before November 5, 1993, someone played a joke on Edwin Retubado, the
appellant’s younger brother who was mentally ill. Someone inserted a lighted
firecracker in a cigarette pack and gave it to Edwin. He brought the cigarette home
and placed it on the dining table as he was having dinner with his father.
Momentarily, the firecracker exploded. The suspect was Emmanuel Cañon, Jr., The
Cañons and the appellant were neighbors. The matter was brought to the attention
of the barangay captain who conducted an investigation. It turned out that
Emmanuel Cañon, Jr. was not the culprit. The barangay captain considered the
matter closed. The appellant, however, was bent on confronting Emmanuel Cañon,
Jr.
On November 5, 1993, at about 9:00 p.m., 50-year-old Emmanuel Cañon, Sr., a
pedicab driver called it a day and decided to go home after a day’s work. He drove
his pedicab and stopped at the junction of Rizal and Gallardo Streets, at the
poblacion of Tuburan. The appellant, who was conversing with Marcial Luciño saw
him. "Noy, why is [it] your son did something to my brother?" Emmanuel ignored the
appellant. The appellant was incensed and ran after Emmanuel. He overtook
Emmanuel, grabbed and pushed the pedicab which nearly fell into a canal.
Emmanuel again ignored the appellant and pedaled on until he reached his house.
His wife, Norberta Cañon was in the balcony of their house, above the porch waiting
for him to arrive. Emmanuel, Jr., meanwhile, was already asleep. Undeterred, the
appellant continued following Emmanuel.
Shortly after Emmanuel had entered his house, the appellant arrived and tarried at
the porch. Emmanuel suddenly opened the door and demanded to know why he
was being followed. The appellant told Emmanuel that he just wanted to talk to
Emmanuel, Jr., but Emmanuel told the appellant that his son was already asleep.
Norberta went down from the balcony and placed her hand on her husband’s
shoulder to pacify him.
The appellant forthwith pulled out a handgun from under his T-shirt and shot
Emmanuel on the forehead. The latter fell to the floor as the appellant walked away
from the scene. Norberta shouted for help. The neighbors, her daughter, and her
son-in-law arrived. They brought Emmanuel to the Tuburan District Hospital, but the
victim died shortly thereafter. Dr. Ivar G. Arellano, the Municipal Health Officer,
performed an autopsy on the cadaver of Emmanuel and prepared a report thereon
with the following findings:
Examination in Detail:
On detailed examination, a gunshot wound was found at the left side of the
forehead, measuring 1 cm. in diameter. At the skin surrounding this wound was
found powder burns which measured 3 cms. in diameter as the skin had been
blackened and burned by powder of the bullet. The underlying frontal bone was
fractured and depressed. The underlying meninges of the brain as well as the frontal
area of the brain was traumatized and injured. Blood and cerebrospinal fluid were
leaking from this wound. The edges of this bullet wound was inverted thus this was
the gunshot entry wound. The wound was found to be circular in shape. The exit
wound was found at the left parietal bone measuring 1.2 cm. in size or diameter for
this wound communicated with the entry wound of the left side of the forehead. The
connection from the wound of entry to the exit wound measured 8 cms. The parietal
bone was fractured and was depressed and the parietal part of the brain and
meninges was traumatized. Blood and cerebrospinal fluid as well as brain tissues
leaked out from this wound.
Possible cause of death:
1. Gunshot wound at the head (left side) with injury to brain and meninges
2. Hypovolemic shock secondary to loss of blood (Severe loss of blood)
(Sgd.) Ivar G. Arellano
MUN. Health Officer3
Dr. Charity Patalinghug and the victim’s daughter Loreta C. Claro signed
Emmanuel’s Certificate of Death.4 The appellant surrendered to the police
authorities but failed to surrender the firearm he used to kill the victim. Forensic
Officer Myrna P. Areola of the PNP Regional Office subjected the appellant to
paraffin tests. The Chemical Analysis of the paraffin casts gave the following results:
FINDINGS:
...
1. POSITIVE for the presence of gunpowder residue on his left hand cast.
2. NEGATIVE for the presence of gunpowder residue on his right hand cast. 5
Norberta also testified on the expenses incurred by her family due to her husband’s
death. No documentary evidence was, however, offered to support the same. She
declared that she felt sad and lonely as a result of her husband's death.
The Case for the Appellant
The appellant admitted shooting the victim but claimed that he was merely
performing a lawful act with due care; hence, cannot be held criminally liable for the
victim’s death. He testified that when he insisted that Emmanuel wake up his son,
Emmanuel went to his room and emerged therefrom holding a handgun with his
right hand. Emmanuel’s trigger finger was outside the trigger guard, and he held the
firearm with the muzzle facing downward. Fearing that he would be shot, the
appellant took hold of Emmanuel’s right hand with his left, and pulled the gun
towards Emmanuel’s stomach. The appellant grabbed Emmanuel’s free hand with
his right hand, and the old man almost fell on his knees to the ground. Emmanuel
still resisted. The appellant pulled the gun to the level of Emmanuel’s forehead, and
the gun suddenly went off. The bullet hit Emmanuel’s forehead. Norberta fled from
the house. For his part, the appellant rushed to his house to change clothes. He
placed the gun on the dining table before entering his bedroom. When he went back
to the dining room to get the gun, his younger sister, Enrica told him that their
brother Edwin had taken the gun. He found Edwin outside their house near the
church, and the latter told the appellant that he threw the gun into the sea. When the
appellant asked his brother to show him where he threw the gun, Edwin refused to
do so.
Marcial Luciño corroborated the appellant’s testimony. He testified that he was
talking with the appellant at around 9:00 p.m. at the junction of Rizal and Gallardo
streets when the victim Emmanuel passed by in his pedicab. When the appellant
called the victim, the latter ignored the call, prompting the appellant to chase the
victim, and eventually push the pedicab into a canal.
The appellant’s father, Iñigo Retubado, testified that on the evening of November 5,
1993, he was in their house with Edwin, his son who was mentally-ill. It was already
late when the appellant arrived. The appellant was disheveled, and laid down the
gun he was carrying on the table. The appellant told his father that he would
surrender to the police because he had shot somebody. 6 The appellant thereafter
went to his room to change clothes while Iñigo went to the comfort room to answer
the call of nature. When he was done, he saw the appellant frantically looking for the
gun. As Edwin was also nowhere to be found, Iñigo concluded that Edwin might
have taken the gun with him. He also testified on Edwin’s mental imbalance and on
the latter’s confinement at the Psychiatric Department of the Don Vicente Sotto
Memorial Medical Center in Cebu City sometime in 1991.7
On November 6, 1993, the appellant surrendered to the police authorities. Although
he was required by the municipal trial court to file his counter-affidavit, the appellant
refused to do so.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. TCS-
2153, convicting the appellant of murder, and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under Art. 248 R.P.C. and sentences the
accused to the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased the sum of P50,000.00.
However, accused is given full credit of his preventive imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.8
On appeal, the appellant assails the decision of the trial court contending that:
I commit any felony; hence, under paragraph 4 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal
First Assignment of Error
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE DEATH OF THE DECEASED
AS CAUSED BY MERE ACCIDENT WITHOUT FAULT OR INTENTION OF
CAUSING IT WHILE THE ACCUSED WAS PERFORMING A LAWFUL ACT WITH
DUE CARE OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, IT ERRED IN NOT CONVICTING HIM
JUST MERELY OF HOMICIDE INSTEAD OF MURDER.
II
Second Assignment of Error
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE VERY RELEVANT AND
MATERIAL CONTENTS OF EXHIBIT "B" OF THE PROSECUTION --- CHEMISTRY
REPORT, PARAFFIN TEST -- WHICH ARE FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED.
III
Third Assignment of Error
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE TESTIMONY OF THE
SOLE WITNESS OF THE PROSECUTION IS SATISFACTORY AND SUFFICIENT
TO CONVICT THE ACCUSED OF MURDER.
IV
Fourth Assignment of Error
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT THE ACCUSED
HAS EXPLAINED WHY HE FAILED TO SURRENDER THE GUN WHICH HE GOT
FROM THE DECEASED.9
The appellant asserts that he was merely performing a lawful act of defending
himself when he grabbed the victim’s hand which held the gun. The gun accidentally
fired and the bullet hit the victim’s forehead. The accident was not the appellant’s
fault. The appellant asserts that when he wrestled with the victim for the possession
of the gun, he was merely defending himself. He contends that he had no intention
of killing the victim, as he merely wanted to talk to his son. If he had wanted to kill
the victim, he could have easily done so when he met the latter for the first time that
fateful night of November 5, 1993. Moreover, the appellant submits, he did not
Code, he is not criminally liable for the death of the victim. 10 In the alternative, the
appellant asserts that he should be convicted only of the crime of homicide under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, since the qualifying circumstance of
treachery is wanting. He and the victim had a heated exchange of words before they
grappled for the possession of the gun. Such heated discussion had already
forewarned the victim and placed him on guard; thus, treachery cannot be legally
considered.
The contention of the appellant has no merit. Article 11, paragraph 4 of the Revised
Penal Code reads:
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. –
...
4) Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes
damage to another provided that the following requisites are present:
First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;
Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.
The provision was taken from Article 8, paragraph 7 of the Spanish Penal Code,
which reads:
ARTICULO 8.
7. El que para evitar un mal ejecuta un hecho que produzca dañ en la propiedad
ajena, siempre que concurran las circumstancias siguientes:
Primera. Realidad del mal que se trata de evitar.
Segunda. Quesea mayor que el causado para evitarlo.
Tercera. Que no haya otro medio practicable y menos
perjudicial para impedirlo.
Article 11, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code is not an accurate translation of
the Spanish Penal Code. The phrase "an injury" does not appear in the first
paragraph in the Spanish Penal Code. Neither does the word "injury" appear in the
second subparagraph of the Spanish Penal Code.
The justification is what is referred to in the Spanish Penal Code as el estado de
necessidad:
Es una situacion de peligro, actual o immediato para bienes, juridicamente
protegides que solo puede ser evitada mediante, la lesion de bienes, tambien
juridicamento protegidos, pertenecientes a otra personas. 11
The phrase "state of necessity" is of German origin. Countries which have embraced
the classical theory of criminal law, like Italy, do not use the phrase. The justification
refers to a situation of grave peril (un mal), actual or imminent (actual o imminente).
The word propiedad covers diverse juridical rights (bienes juridicos) such as right to
life, honor, the integrity of one’s body, and property (la vida, la integridad corporal, el
pudor, el honor, bienes patrimoniales) belonging to another. 12
It is indispensable that the state of necessity must not be brought about by the
intentional provocation of the party invoking the same. 13
A number of legal scholars in Europe are of the view that the act of the accused in a
state of necessity is justifying circumstance; hence, lawful. Under Article 12,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, a "state of necessity" is a justifying
circumstance. The accused does not commit a crime in legal contemplation; hence,
is not criminally and civilly liable. Civil liability is borne by the person/persons
benefited by the act of the accused. Crimes cannot exist unless the will concurs with
the act, and when, says Blackstone, "a man intending to do a lawful act, does that
which is unlawful, the deed and the will act separately" and there is no conjunction
between them which is necessary to constitute a crime. 14 Others are of the view that
such act is a cause for exclusion from being meted a penalty; still others view such
act as a case of excluding the accused from culpability.
According to Groizard, rights may be prejudiced by three general classes of acts,
namely, (a) malicious and intentional acts; (b) negligent or reckless acts; (c) acts
which are neither malicious, imprudent nor negligent but nevertheless cause
damages.
Nuestra propiedad puede ser perjudicada, puede sufrir detrimentos por tres clases
de hechos.1âwphi1 Por actos maliciosos, intencionales, encaminados directamente
a causarnos daño; por actos que, sin llevar ese malicioso fin y por falta de
prudencia, por culpa o temeridad del que los ejecuta, den ese mismo resultado, y
por actos que, sin concurrir en su ejecucion un proposito doloso, ni culpa, ni
negligencia sin embargo produzcan menocabo en nuestros bienes. 15
The defense of a state of necessity is a justifying circumstance under Article 12,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code. It is an affirmative defense that must be
proved by the accused with clear and convincing evidence. By admitting causing the
injuries and killing the victim, the accused must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution because if
such evidence is weak but the accused fails to prove his defense, the evidence of
the prosecution can no longer be disbelieved. Whether the accused acted under a
state of necessity is a question of fact, which is addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court. The legal aphorism is that the findings of facts by the trial court, its
calibration of the testimony of the witnesses of the parties and of the probative
weight thereof as well as its conclusions based on its own findings are accorded by
the appellate court high respect, if not conclusive effect, unless the trial court
ignored, misconstrued or misapplied cogent facts and circumstances of substance
which, if considered, will change the outcome of the case. We have meticulously
reviewed the records and find no basis to deviate from the findings of the trial court
that the appellant was the provocateur, the unlawful aggressor and the author of a
deliberate and malicious act of shooting the victim at close range on the forehead.
First: When Norberta heard her husband and the appellant arguing with each other
in the porch of their house, she went down from the balcony towards her husband
and placed her hand on the latter’s shoulders. She was shocked when the appellant
pulled out his handgun and deliberately shot the victim on the forehead, thus:
Q Now, you said that when your husband was about to go out again in order to see
his trisicad and as he opened the door he saw Jesus Retubado near the door. What
happened after that?
A He asked Jesus Retubado why Jesus Retubado chased him when he was driving
his trisicad.
Q Now, as your husband was asking this question to the accused Jesus Retubado
what was the distance to your husband at the time?
A Just very near to him.
Q And you to the accused at that very moment what was more or less your
distance?
A About an armslength.
Q When your husband asked Jesus Retubado why the latter chased him while your
husband was driving his trisicad what was the answer of Jesus Retubado, if any?
A My husband asked the accused Jesus Retubado what is his grudge to him and
Jesus Retubado answered that it is not you who has a grudge to me but it is your
son.
Q When Jesus Retubado uttered that statement what transpired after that?
A He immediately pointed his firearm that he was bringing (sic) to my husband
Emmanuel Cañon.
Q By the way considering that you were just near to both your husband and the
accused where did that firearm that you said was pointed by the accused to your
husband come (sic) from?
A While the accused was standing in front of our door his hands were placed inside
his T-shirt covered by his T-shirt.
Atty. Pepito:
We move to strike out the answer. It is not responsive, Your Honor. The question
was, where did it come from?
COURT:
Let the answer stay in the record but let the witness answer again.
A From the hands of accused Jessie.
Fiscal Pansoy:
Q Now, just a while ago you were making a motion using your hand placed inside
your T-shirt. Now, when you saw the firearm for the first time where did you saw
(sic) the firearm for the first time where did the firearm come from as you saw it from
the hands of the accused?
Atty. Pepito:
Already answered. It came from the hands of the accused.
Fiscal Pansoy:
I will reform.
Q Before you saw the firearm in the hands of the accused where did the firearm
come from?
Atty. Pepito:
She is incompetent. We object.
COURT:
Reform the question.
Fiscal Pansoy:
Q Now, Mrs. Witness, before this question was asked to you as to where the firearm
came from you were making a motion by placing your hands inside your shirt when
you were only asked as to where the firearm came from?
A That was what the position of the accused when he was standing in front of our
door and I do not know what was inside his T-shirt. I only know that he was carrying
a firearm when it fired.
Q Now, when the accused pointed the firearm to your husband and fired the same
more or less what was the distance between the accused and your husband at the
very precise time when the firing was made?
A It was just very near because his hand did not bend. (Witness demonstrating by
pointing to her forehead).
Q Now, more or less, describe to the Court the approximate distance between the
firearm that was pointed to your husband and the forehead of your husband at the
time when the firing was done?
A It touched the forehead of my husband.
Q That was the very time that you heard the gunburst?
A Yes.
Q When the accused fired the firearm that was carried by him, what happened to
your husband?
A My husband fell down backward to the ground inside the house.
Q By the way, what was the flooring of your house where your husband fell
backward to the ground?
A Cemented.
Q By the way considering that you were just very near to where the incident
occurred can you describe the length of the firearm that was used by the accused in
firing your husband?
A It was a short firearm about 6 inches.
Q Now, as your husband fell down to the floor where did the accused proceed and
what did the accused do?
A He was just casually walking away as if nothing had happened.
Q Now, what did you do to your husband, if any, after he fell down to the floor?
A I have done nothing because I was somewhat shocked. I could not move because
I was shocked.16
Second: After shooting the victim, the appellant fled from the situs criminis. He
surrendered to the police authorities only on November 6, 1993, but failed to
surrender the gun he used to kill the victim. The appellant’s claim that he placed the
gun on the dining table before entering his bedroom to change his clothes is
incredible. There is no evidence that the appellant informed the police authorities
that he killed the victim in a state of necessity and that his brother, Edwin, threw the
gun into the sea. The appellant never presented the police officer to whom he
confessed that he killed the victim in a state of necessity.
Third: The appellant had the motive to shoot and kill the victim.1avvphi1 The victim
ignored the appellant as the latter talked to him at the junction of Rizal and Gallardo
streets, in the poblacion of Tuburan. The appellant was incensed at the effrontery of
the victim, a mere pedicab driver. The appellant followed the victim to his house
where the appellant again confronted him. The appellant insisted on talking with the
victim’s son but the victim refused to wake up the latter. The appellant, exasperated
at the victim’s intransigence, pulled out a gun from under his shirt and shot the
victim on the forehead. It was impossible for the victim to survive. With the
appellant’s admission that he shot the victim, the matter on whether he used his
right or left hand to shoot the latter is inconsequential.
We agree with the contention of the Solicitor General that there is no treachery in
the present case to qualify the crime to murder. To appreciate treachery, two (2)
conditions must be present, namely, (a) the employment of the means of execution
that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (b)
the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. 17 The prosecution
failed to adduce an iota of evidence to support the confluence of the
abovementioned conditions. Thus, the appellant is guilty only of homicide under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Although the Information alleges that the
appellant used an unlicensed firearm to shoot the victim, the prosecution failed to
prove that the appellant had no license to possess the same. Hence, the
aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm to commit homicide
should not be appreciated against the appellant.
The appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. He
turned himself in to the police authorities prior to the issuance of any warrant for his
arrest.
The trial court awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity18 to the heirs of the deceased.
In addition, the heirs are entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 19
and the temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 since no sufficient proof of
actual damages was offered.20
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The
appellant Jesus G. Retubado alias "Jessie" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of homicide defined in and penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal
 16
Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years TSN, 26 July 1994, pp. 4-6.
of prision mayor, in its medium period, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion
17
temporal, in its medium period, as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the victim, People vs. Parba, 364 SCRA 488 (2001).
Emmanuel Cañon, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; 18
People vs. Delim, G.R. No. 142773, January 28, 2003.
and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
19
See People vs. Cortez, 348 SCRA 663 (2000).
SO ORDERED.
20
See People vs. Abrazaldo, G.R. No. 124392, February 7, 2003.
Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1
Penned by Executive Judge Gualberto P. Delgado.
2
Record, p. 1.
3
Exhibit "C," Records, p. 15.
4
Exhibit "A," Id. at 10.
5
Exhibit "H," id. at 9.
6
TSN, 11 July 1995, pp. 8-9.
7
Id. at 3-4.
8
Rollo, p. 68.
9
Id. at 41-42.
10
Supra.
11
Id. at 362, 365.
12
Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Volume I, 8th ed., p. 202.
13
"Que la situacion de necessidad no haya sido provocado intencionadamente por
el sujeto." Id. at 368.
14
Burdick, Law of Crimes, Volume l, p. 238.
15
Groizard, El Derecho Penal de 1870, Volume 1, 1929 ed.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 1352            March 29, 1905
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appelle,
vs.
APOLONIO CABALLEROS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Hipolito Magsalin for appellants.Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
MAPA, J.:
The defendants have been sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Cebu to the
penalty of seven years of presidio mayor as accessories after the fact in the crime of
assassination or murder perpetrated on the persons of the American school-
teachers Louis A. Thomas, Clyde O. France, John E. Wells, and Ernest Eger,
because, without having taken part in the said crime as principals or as
accomplices, they took part in the burial of the corpses of the victims in order to
conceal the crime.
The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this sentence. As regards Roberto
Baculi, although he confessed to having assisted in the burial of the corpses, it
appears that he did so because he was compelled to do so by the murderers of the
four teachers. And not only does the defendant affirm this, but he is corroborated by
the only eyewitness to the crime, Teodoro Sabate, who, by the way, is a witness for
the prosecution. This witness says he was present when the Americans were killed;
that Roberto Baculi was not a member of the group who killed the Americans, but
the he was in a banana plantation on his property gathering some bananas; that
when he heard the shots he began to run; that he was, however, seen by Damaso
and Isidoro, the leaders of the band; that the latter called to him and striking him with
the butts of their guns they forced him to bury the corpses.
The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the act by reason
of irresistible force (par. 9, art. 8). Baculi acted, doubtless, under such
circumstances when he executed the acts which are charged against him.
As regards the other defendant, Apolonio Caballeros, there is no proof that he took
any part in any way in the execution of the crime with which he has been charged;
there is conclusive proof to the contrary, since Baculi, as well as one of the
witnesses for the prosecution, Teodoro Sabate, expressly declare that he,
Caballeros, did not take any part in the burial of the aforesaid corpses, nor was he
even in the place of the occurrence when the burial took place. The confession of
his supposed liability and guilt, made before an official of the division of information
of the Constabulary, Enrique Calderon, as the latter states when testifying as a
witness, can not be considered as legal proof, because the same witness says that
Roberto Baculi was the only one of the defendants who made a confession to him
voluntarily. It appears besides, from the statements of another witness for the
prosecution, Meliton Covarrubias, that the confession of Apolonio Caballeros was
made through the promise made to him and to the other defendants that nothing
would be done to them. Confessions which do not appear to have been made freely
and voluntarily, without force, intimidation, or promise of pardon, can not be
accepted as proof on a trial. (Sec. 4, Act No. 619 of the Philippine Commission).
The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration of the
crime, which seems to be one of the motives for the conviction and which the court
below takes into consideration in his judgment, is not punished by the Penal Code
and therefore that can not render the defendants criminally liable according to law.
By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and with a reversal of the judgment
appealed from, we acquit the defendants, appellants, with the costs de oficio in both
instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-54414 July 9, 1984
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUSTAQUIO LORENO y MALAGA and JIMMY MARANTAL y LONDETE,
accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo Herrera for accused-appellants.
CONCEPCION JR., J.:
In an information filed before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, accused
Eustaquio Loreno y Malaga and Jimmy Marantal y Londete were charged with tile
crime of Robbery with Double Rape, committed as follows:
That on or about the 7th of January, 1978, in the Barangay of Magsaysay,
Municipality of Libmanan, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, together with John
Doe, Jose Doe, Richard Doe, Peter Doe, Charlie Doe, and Ricky Doe, who are still
at large, armed with firearms, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, with intent to gain and rob, taking advantage of nighttime to
better accomplish their purpose, did then and there were Ifully unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and use violence and intimidation upon the person of
Elias Monge by tying his two hands and the hands of the members of his fully and
on the occasion hereof, while they were made lying flat on the floor, the herein
accused take, rob and carry away, without the consent of said Elias Monge, owner
thereof, of the following properties, to wit:
One camera with trademark Olympus worth P400.00
Two birthstones rings worth 700.00
One wedding ring with name MONDING 100.00
One pair of earrings heartshape 100.00
Two pieces of necklace solid worth 400.00
Two pieces of mosquito net 110.00
Three pieces of blankets color orange and spotted 200.00
Three men pants and also one cut of cloth 235.50
One beach towel, with decoration 35.00
One aluminum Reynold kettle 30.00
One One caserola 15.00
Two pieces of pillow case 12.00
Two cans of rice 70.00
One flashlight Eveready two batteries 30.00
TOTAL P10,619.50
all in the total amount of TEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED NINETEEN PESOS and
FIFTY CENTAVOS (P10,619.50), Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice
of the owner thereof in the aforementioned amount. That on the occasion thereof,
the abovenamed accused with lewd design, and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual
intercourse with Monica Monge, a virgin of 16 years old, and with Cristina Monge, all
against their will. 1
Upon arraignment, both accused Eustaquio Loreno y Malaga and Jimmy Marantal y
Londete entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment adverse to the accused, the dispositive
portion of which read:
ACCORDINGLY, we find the guilt of the accused Eustaquio Loreno has been
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt and hereby find him GUILTY of
Robbery with Double Rape, penalized by Par. 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code. There being present aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
offense, Eustaquio Loreno is hereby sentenced to LIFE IMPRISONMENT, the
maximum penalty provided by law.
Likewise, the Court finds that the guilt of the accused Jimmy Marantal has been
established beyond reasonable doubt and hereby finds him GUILTY of the crime of
ROBBERY penalized under Par. 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. Jimmy
Marantal is sentenced to indeterminate penalty ranging from TWO (2) YEARS and
ELEVEN (11) DAYS of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, in view of the aggravating circumstances present.
Said accused Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal shall indemnify jointly and
severally Elias Monge in the sum of P10,619.50 without subsidiary imprisonment, In
addition, Eustaquio Loreno shall indemnify Monica Monge and Cristina Monge in the
sum of P10,000.00 each or a total of P20,000.00 as damages, without subsidiary
imprisonment.
2
The accused herein shall pay one-half of the costs each.
The facts of the case as stated by the Solicitor General in his Brief, areas follows:
In the evening of January 7, 1978, Barangay Captain Elias Monge was at his house
located at barrio Magsaysay, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. He and his two young
daughters, namely: Monica Monge, single, then 14 years old, and Cristina Monge,
married, then 22 years old, were preparing to attend the dance to be held in the
barrio proper that evening. But they had to wait for a while because his wife, Beata
Monge, was still changing the diaper of baby Rachel Baybayon, four-month old
daughter of Cristina Monge. The other occupants present in the house that evening
were his sons, Mario, then 11 years old, and Nilo, then 13 years old, and their farm
helper, also staying with them, by the name of Francisco Fable. Cristina was then
vacationing at her parents' house. Her husband, Raymundo Baybayon, was in
Manila (pp. 2-5, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM: pp, 2-3, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM: pp. 2-4, tsn,
Oct. 19, 1979 AM: pp. 2-3, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM: pp. 2-3, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).
At about 7:40 o'clock that same evening, while he was at the balcony of said house,
Francisco Fable saw at first four men with flashlights approaching. When they came
near, he heard one of them call Elias Monge saving that there was a letter from the
chief hepe). Fable called Elias Monge who was in the sala, informing him that there
was a letter from the chief. Two of the visitors, one wearing red clothes and the
other in dark sweater. came up the house. When Elias Monge went out to the
balcony the man in dark sweater handed to him the letter. Because it was dark to
read it, Elias Monge invited the man in dark sweater to come inside the sala. The
other man in red clothes posted himself near the post of the balcony (pp. 4-5, tsn,
Oct. 19, 1979 AM: pp. 6-7, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM: pp. 4-9, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979
AMOUNT pp. 4-7, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM: pp. 4, 12-13, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
When be and the man in dark sweater were inside the sala Elias Monge asked his
daughter, Monica to fetch his reading glasses. On reading the letter, Elias Monge
and Monica read the following: "Kami mga NPA", which caused Monica to run to her
mother, seized with fear, informing her what she came to know about camme
visitors. Cristina Morgagor came attempted to run to the kitchen to get a bolo but
she was held back by the man in dark sweater who then announced to all those
inside not to make any scandal. kitchen Elias Monge turned to look at him the man
in dark sweater poked his gun at him, and ordered all those inside the on the floor
(pp. 13-14, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 Pvl p. 7, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 4 4, 12-13, tsn,
Oct. 29, 1979 AM pp. 4, 13, 16, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM)
In the meantime outside at the balcony the man in red clothe asked Fable for a
glass of water arid the latter asked Mario Monge to get the glass of later, but Mario
did not obey and instead went to the sala Hence, fabie himself outside inside the
house to the the glass of water. But, as he went inside the sala, he noticed the man
in red clothes following him. As Fabie reached the door to the sala, the man in red
clothes poked his gun on Fabie's back and pointed a sharp instrument on his neck
and then he wish pushed to go inside the sala. Once inside the sala, which Aras
lighted, Fable saw and recognized the man in red clothes these to Estaquio loreno.
Also Elias Monge and his two daughters, Monica and Cristina, saw and recognized
Eustaquio Loreno as he entered the sala as one of the companions of the man in
dark sweater. All tile occupants of the house were ordered by the man in dark
sweater and Loreno to remain lying flat on their stomachs on the floor (pp. 5-6, tsn,
Oct. 19, 1979 AM: pp. 10-12, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM pp. 1-8, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM
pp. 21-22, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 5, 17-18, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM p. 5, tsn, Oct.
29, 1979 AM).
Thereafter, the man in dark sweater instructed loreno to tie all their victims on the
floor. Loreno tied them with rattan. The man in dark sweater cut the baby's
hammock (duyan) and got the ropes with which he and Loreno used to reinforce in
tying the victim's hands together behind their backs. Thereafter, the man in dark
sweater instructed Loreno to go downstairs and drive the barking dog away. Loreno
held Fable and brought him downstairs to drive the barking dog away (pp, 8-9, tsn,
Oct. 18, 1979 AM p. 6, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM).
On reaching the corner of the house below the flashlight used by Loreno happened
to focus on the person of Jimmy Marantal. Fable immediately recognized Jimmy
Marantal as one of the visitors who remained on the ground as lookouts. Jimmy
Marantal beamed his flashlight on the face of Fable, and seeing the latter, he kicked
him (Fabie) on the right side of his rib which caused him to fall on the ground.
Marantal kicked Fable who managed to roll on his side and was hit on his left thigh.
After a while, Loreno lifted Fable bodily from the ground, and brought am back
upstairs (pp. 6-7, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp. 13-14, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM).
After Loreno and Fable returned to the sala, the man in dark sweater got hold of
Monica Monge and dragged her up to a room located above the balcony. She tried
to resist but she was then still tied, Inside the room, Monica was asked to reveal the
whereabouts of her piggy bank savings. She said there was none. He ransacked the
room but found none. The man in dark sweater then seized Monica and forcibly
removed her pants. Monica resisted and shouted at her parents for help. He boxed
and slapped her. Despite her struggle, he was able to remove her panty and then
made her he on the floor near the bed. After undressing himself, he forcibly went on
top of her. She kept on struggling and shouting for help, but he succeeded in
inserting his organ into her vagina. She felt pain. He proceeded to have sexual
intercourse with her. She could not do anything to stop him from consummating his
lust as she was still tied. When he was through with her, she noticed blood in her
private part (p. 9, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM p. 7, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp. 5, 14, tsn,
Oct. 29, 1979 PM pp. 5-6, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).
Below in the sala, Monica Monge's parents and others heard her shouts for help and
the struggle she put up inside the room. Hearing her shouts for help, Loreno
menacingly pointed his gun at them, telling them not to rise if they wanted to live,
Then Loreno brought Beata Monge first to the masters room and then to the
teacher's room. During these two occasions, he forced Beata Monge to open the
aparador and the trunk respectively, with her keys, and he got their contents, which
he brought to the sala, holding on to Beata Monge who remained tied. All the things
he got from the two rooms were poured on the floor of the sala (pp. 7, 9, tsn, Oct.
19, 1979 AM pp. 10-1 1, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 7-13, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp.
5-6, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM pp. 17-19, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM).
Thereafter, the man in dark sweater returned to the sala, dragging along Monica
Monge whose hair was dishevelled and was crying, and he made her joined the
others on the floor of the sala. He reached for a can of pineapple j nice from the
aparador and the sala and drank its contents. Not long thereafter, he turned his
attention to Cristina Monge, and he dragged her to the room which was then rented
by school teacher Miss Olitoquit (who was then in Naga City). Inside the room, the
man in dark sweater forced his lewd designs on her but she resisted and struggled
although her hands were still tied behind her back. He boxed her, hitting her on her
right eye which caused her to lose consciousness. He then proceeded to satisfy his
lust on her. When she regained consciousness, the man in dark sweater returned
her shorts. She then realized that he had succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with her (p. 6, 17-19, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM pp. 7-8, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp. 11-
12, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 6, 14-15, 18, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
While the man in dark sweater and Cristina Monge were still inside the teacher's
room, a third man entered the sala, and he told Loreno to cover their victims on the
floor with a mat. Loreno found instead a piece of lawanit with which they covered
their victims. The third man proceeded to the kitchen, and when he returned to the
sala, he was bringing along some rice. Then, a fourth man entered the sala and he
asked from Elias Monge for a cigarette. Elias Monge stood up and told him to get it
from his pocket as he was still tied. Reacting to Monge's reply, the fourth man boxed
him, hitting him on his breast and solar plexus which caused him to fall on the floor.
Then Loreno asked Elias Monge to accompany him to the house of a nearby
neighbor. On reaching the balcony, Elias Monge protested and refused to
accompany Loreno who then held Elias Monge by the neck, pointing his gun at him.
Beata Monge protested, telling her husband not to go along. loreno desisted from
his plan to go to the nearby neighbor's house, Elias Monge did not recognize the
Identities of both the third and fourth men (pp. 12-15, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 16-
17, 25-26, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 12-13, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM pp. 7, 14-15, tsn,
Oct. 29, 1979 AM).
Thereafter Loreno entered the room where Cristina Monge was earlier brought by
the man in dark sweater, and he found her still lying on the floor. Loreno embraced
her trying to kiss her and touch her private parts. One of the malefactors on the
ground called those upstairs to hurry because a man was approaching. Loreno then
released Cristina Monge and told her to return to the sala to breastfeed her daughter
who was continuously crying. Thereafter, the malefactors went down from the house
one by one, bringing along all the things they robbed from their victims. The man in
dark sweater returned to the sala and touched the thighs of Cristina Monge, who
was already wearing her shorts, and he told them not to tell anybody what happened
to them, otherwise he will kill them. And then all the malefactors left the place (pp.
15-16, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 16, 18, 19-20, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
Soon thereafter, Elias Monge heard Sixto Agapito who was On the ground near the
fence of the house calling him, asking if he was going to the dancehall Elias Monge
replied from upstairs that he was not feeling well, and Agapito left. EUSTAQUIO
Monge was able to untie himself, and then he also untied the others. Fable then
revealed to him that earlier when he had gone down with Loreno, he (Fabie) saw
and recognized Jimmy Marantal as among those left on the ground as lookout for
the group that had just robbed them. Cristina and Monica Monge also told their
father that they were abused by the man in dark sweater when they were brought
inside the rooms. For the rest of the night, they remained on guard and could hardly
sleep (pp. 15-16, 17, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 10-11, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM p. 7,
tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
Elias Monge and his family later discovered that they were robbed of their following
personal properties: jewelry valued at Pl,000.00' two mosquito nets, P70.00; three
bets, P200.00; one caldero of rice, P30.00; one reversible jacket, P40.00; three
chickens, P30.00; one camera, P400.00; one beach towel, P35.00; cash in the
amount of P6,500,00; and several others, all in the total of P10,305.00, more or less
(pp. 4-6, 8, 14-17, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979; pp. 16-17, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM).
Fabie had often seen and had known Loreno because the latter's daughter married
a member of the youth organization in the barrio when he (Fabie) was its president.
Elias Monge had already known Loreno whose occupation was catching wild pigs,
and the latter used to place bobby traps in his (Monge's) place to catch pigs, during
which occasions Loreno usually slept in his house, Monica Monge and Cristina
Monge also had already known Loreno because his daughter married a neighbor
near their house. Monica often saw Loreno traverse the playground of the
Magsaysay Elementary School where he was studying. Fable had also known
Jimmy Marantal because the latter often attended dances held by the barrio youth
organization, and he (Marantal) even married one of its members, He had engaged
Marantal in conversations many times p. 3, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp. 2-3, tsn, Oct.
22, 1979 AM pp. 2-3, 8-9, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM pp. 2-3, 7-8, tsn, Oct. 18-1979 AM
pp. 2-3, 21-22, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 2, 8-10, 17-18, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
Despite the revelation of her daughters to him that they were sexually abused that
fateful evening, Elias Monge forced himself to report the following day, Sunday the
robbery-rape incident at the PC detachment in Sipocot, but there was no one to talk
there. So he proceeded to the PC headquarters at Camp Tara, bringing along the
ropes and rattan which were used by the malefactors in tying him and his family
during the robbery-rape incident. He was given a written recommendation from the
PC to the hospital with instructions to have himself and his daughter Monica be
physically examined. Cristina Monge was informed that there was no need for her to
submit for physical examination because she was already married. (pp. 18-19, tsn,
Oct. 18, 1979 AM p. 18; tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM p. 8, tsn., Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
Sgt. Victoriano del Socorro, the chief of the investigation section of the 243rd PC
Company, stationed at Tara, Camarines Sur, investigated on January 10, 1978 the
robbery-rape incident. He was informed by Barangay Captain Elias Monge that his
house was robbed and his two daughters were raped by the robbers in the evening
of January 7, 1978 in their house and that he (Monge) was able to Identify two of the
robbers, mentioning their names as Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal of Barrio
Calabnigan, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. After Sgt. del Socorro and his team made
an ocular inspection of the place on that same day, they proceeded to barrio
Calabnigan where they picked up Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal and
brought them to the PC camp. At the PC camp on January 17, 1978, the two
suspects were duly Identified upon confrontation as two of the robbers by the above-
mentioned barrio captain, his daughters Monica and Cristina Monge, and their
helper Fable. During the investigation, the two suspects refused to give their written
statements. Thus, Sgt. del Socorro was able to secure the written statements of
Elias Monge, Francisco Fable, Monica Monge, and Cristina Monge about the
robbery-rape incident. Upon being Identified both said suspects told their victims ff
they could just talk and settle the matter, but Elias Monge replied that what they did
that evening was an oppression (kaapihan) against him and his family, The two
suspects retorted that it was up to him (pp. 19-21, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 18-20,
tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 1-5, 6, 8- 12, tsn, Oct. 30, 1979 AM).
Dr. Jesus H. Miraflores, resident physician of the Camarines Sur Provincial Hospital
at Naga City, examined Elias Monge on January 10, 1978. The X-Ray examination's
result was negative. But the doctor found him to have sustained an external injury
which he classified as "resolving hematoma, right cestal region" a close wound,
already spread out but and the process of healing, located on the right side of the
middle portion of the thorax. He gave Elias Monge a prescription for anti-infection to
stop the bleeding as there was still slight bleeding and to subside the swelling.
Afterwards he gave the corresponding medical certificate to Elias Monge (Exhibit
"A"; pp. 22-26, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM p. 19, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM
Dr. Erlie S. Cabral, another resident physician of the same provincial hospital
examined Monica Monge on January 10, 1978. The doctor did not find any fresh
wound on her body, but examining her hymen, she found fresh and incomplete
lacerations of said hymen at 3:00 and 9:00 o'clock locations and, inserting her index
finger inside her patient's sex orifice, lt easily admitted her forefinger. She had the
patient's vagina smeared for spermatozoa but none was found after laboratory
examination The doctor observed that the lacerations did not reach the base of the
hymen but the edges of the lacerated portions were still reddish and slightly swollen.
The doctor opined that the lacerations could have been caused by the forcible
penetration of a male's penis into the patient's vagina. The doctor further expeled
that the laceration of the hymen heals after five days. She also expeled that male
spermatozoa stays inside the female vagina at the most for 72 hours. She stated
that, admitting there was orgasm during the forcible sexual intercourse, any sperm
must have already disappeared when she examined Monica Monge on January 10,
1978 which was already beyond 72 hours since she was raped in the evening of
January 7, 1978 (pp. 26-28, 31, 33-34, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM; Exhibit "B"). 3
Appellants Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal claimed that they acted under the
compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of
equal or greater injury. They admitted that they were in the house of Elias Monge on
the night of January 7, 1978, 4 but they were only forced by a man wearing black
sweater and his five companions who claimed to be members of the New People's
Army (NPA), operating in the locality, with the threat that if they did not obey,
appellants and their families would be killed. We, however, find the contention
untenable.
A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts
under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury is exempt from
criminal liability because he does not act with freedom. The force must be irresistible
to reduce him to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will.
The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending
and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of Appellee's Brief.
death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A threat of future injury is not
enough. The compulsion must be of Such a character as to leave no opportunity to
the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat. 5
A perusal of the appellants' statement of the robbery-rape incident as summarized in
their joint brief (pp. 3-10), showed that they admitted their participation in the
commission of the crimes of robbery and rape against Elias Monge and his family on
January 7, 1978. Further established were facts inconsistent with appellant's claim
of having acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, to wit:
1. Appellant Eustaquio Loreno was armed with a short firearm when he and the man
in dark sweater went up the house of Elias Monge. While inside the house, Loreno
pointed the gun to the victims which enabled the malefactors to ransack the house
(p. 38, tsn, Oct. 30, 1979 PM
2. When Eustaquio Loreno and the man in dark sweater reached the balcony,
Loreno positioned himself next to the post in the balcony, while the man in dark
sweater delivered the letter to Elias Monge. Loreno admitted that, without prior
instructions, he immediately positioned himself near the post of the balcony (p. 10,
tsn, Id.), an act which showed his voluntary participation in the criminal acts.
3. Eustaquio Loreno himself tied the victim with rattan and thereafter, with ropes of
the hammock. Loreno in fact admitted that he was the one who furnished the rattan
which he got from inside the house (pp. 14-15, tsn, Id.).
4. When Monica Monge was struggling and shouting for help from inside the room
where she was earlier dragged by the man in dark sweater, Loreno's immediate
reaction was to point his gun to the victims who were then lying on the floor, telling
them not to rise if they wanted to live (p. 38, tsn., Id.).
The records likewise revealed that on the two occasions Eustaquio Loreno brought
Beata Monge to the master's room and the teacher's room where he made her open
the trunk and the "aparador" with her keys and got the contents which he brought
and poured on the floor of the sala, appellant Loreno acted alone, without the threat
and assistance of the man in dark sweater. And after the man in dark sweater
consummated his lust on Cristina Monge in the teacher's room and seeing Cristina
Monge still lying on the floor, Loreno embraced her and tried to kiss and touch her
private parts.
When Eustaquio Loreno and Francisco Fable went downstairs to drive the barking
dog away, the flashlight of Loreno happened to be focused on the face of Jimmy
Marantal who in turn beamed his flashlight on the approaching Fable. Upon seeing
Fable, Jimmy Marantal kicked the former twice causing him (Fabie) to fall to the
ground. Marantal's reaction towards Fable was due to the fact that Fable had
recognized him and the blows which he gave to Fable who was still tied at the
moment was to serve as a warning to Fable not to report his presence and
participation in the robbery-rape incident to the authorities.
Jimmy Marantal, who was standing at the gate of the house below, must have heard
the shouts of Monica Monge for help and must have known by then that Monica
Monge was being abused by his two companions who earlier went up the house. As
a "lookout" or guard, Jimmy Marantal gave his companions effective means and
encouragement to commit the crimes of robbery and rape. There was no showing
that Jimmy Marantal raised a voice of protest or did an act to prevent the
commission of the crimes.
All these demonstrated the voluntary participation and the conspiracy of the Appellant Jimmy Marantal is guilty of robbery only no clear proof that he know
appellants. The foregoing acts, though separately performed from those of their Monge Monge was being raped and even if he did, he could not prevent it if he was
unidentified companions, clearly showed their community of interest and concert of on the ground outside the house as look out.
criminal design with their unidentified companions which constituted conspiracy
without the need of direct proof of the conspiracy itself. 6 Conspiracy may be inferred
and proven by the acts of the accused themselves and when said acts point to joint
Footnotes
purpose and concert of action and community of interest, which unity of purpose and
concert of action serve to establish the existence of conspiracy, 7 and the degree of 1 Rollo, pp. 8-9.
actual participation petition by each of the conspirators is immaterial. 8 Conspiracy
having been establish, all the conspirators are liable as co-penpals regardless of the 2 Decision, pp. 4-5.
extent and character of their participation because in contemplation of law, the act of
one is the act of all. 9 3 pp. 6-18,5 People vs. Villanueva, 104 Phil. 450.

The foregoing crime of robbery with double rape was combat muted on January 7, 4 p. 2, Appellants' Brief.
1978, by more than three persons, all armed, 10 in conspiracy with each other,
5 People vs. Villanueva, 104 Phil. 450.
attended by the aggravating circumstances of band, nighttime and dwelling and is,
under P.D. 767, promulgated on August 15, 1975, punishable by death. But, for lack 6 People vs. Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868.
of the required number of votes, the accused should suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. 7 People vs. Verzo, 65 SCRA 324.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, AFFIRMED, 8 People vs. Reyes, 17 SCRA309; People vs. Akiram, 18 SCRA
with the modification that the accused cused JIMMY MARANTAL is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. With costs against appellants. 9 People Vas. Chan Lit Wat 50 PhiL 182; People vs. Pareja 28 SCRA 764.

SO ORDERED. 10 P. 15, Brief of the Defendant A

Aquino, Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente
and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J., and Teehankee, J., took no part.

Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions 
Republic of the Philippines
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:
SUPREME COURT
 Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 127755 April 14, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO y PASCUAL, accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J
ON AUTOMATIC REVIEW is the decision of the court a quo finding accused
Joselito del Rosario y Pascual guilty as co-principal in the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and sentencing him to death, and to pay the heirs of victim Virginia Bernas
P550,000.00 as actual damages and P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages. 1
Joselito del Rosario y Pascual, Ernesto Marquez alias "Jun," Virgilio Santos alias
"Boy Santos" and John Doe alias "Dodong" were charged with the special complex
crime of Robbery with Homicide for having robbed Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old
businesswoman, of P200,000.00 in cash and jewelry and on the occasion thereof
shot and killed her. 2
While accused Joselito del Rosario pleaded not guilty, 3 Virgilio "Boy" Santos and
John Doe alias "Dodong" remained at large. Ernesto "Jun" Marquez was killed in a
police encounter. Only Joselito del Rosario was tried.
These facts were established by the prosecution from the eyewitness account of
tricycle driver Paul Vincent Alonzo: On 13 May 1996 between 6:00 and 6:30 in the
evening, Alonzo stopped his tricycle by the side of Nita's Drugstore, General Luna
St., Cabanatuan City, when three women flagged him. Parked at a distance of about
one and a-half (1 1/2) meters in front of him was a tricycle driven by accused
Joselito del Rosario. At that point, Alonzo saw two (2) men and a woman grappling
for possession of a bag. After taking hold of the bag one of the two men armed with
a gun started chasing a man who was trying to help the woman, while the other
snatcher kicked the woman sending her to the ground. Soon after, the armed man
returned and while the woman was still on the ground he shot her on the head. The
bag taken by the man was brought to the tricycle of accused del Rosario where
someone inside received the bag. The armed man then sat behind the driver while
his companion entered the sidecar. When the tricycle sped away Alonzo gave chase
and was able to get the plate number of the tricycle. He also recognized the driver,
after which he went to the nearest police headquarters and reported the incident. 4
Accused Joselito del Rosario gave his own version of the incident: At around 5:30 in
the afternoon he was hired for P120.00 5 by a certain "Boy" Santos, 6 his co-accused.
Their original agreement was that he would drive him to a cockpit at the Bias
Edward Coliseum. 7 However despite their earlier arrangement Boy Santos directed
him to proceed to the market place to fetch "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya. He
(del Rosario) acceded. 8 Marquez and Bisaya boarded in front of the parking lot of
Merced Drugstore at the public market. 9 Subsequently, he was asked to proceed
and stop at the corner of Burgos and General Luna Sts. where Bisaya alighted on
the pretext of buying a cigarette. The latter then accosted the victim Virginia Bernas
and grappled with her for the possession of her bag. Jun Marquez alighted from the
tricycle to help "Dodong" Bisaya. 10 Accused del Rosario tried to leave and seek help
but "Boy Santos" who stayed inside the tricycle prevented him from leaving and
threatened in fact to shoot him.
Meanwhile, "Dodong" Bisaya succeeded in taking the victim's bag, but before
boarding the tricycle "Jun" Marquez mercilessly shot the victim on the head while
she was lying prone on the ground. After the shooting, "Dodong" Bisaya boarded the
sidecar of the tricycle while "Jun" Marquez rode behind del Rosario and ordered him
to start the engine and drive towards Dicarma. While inside his tricycle, del Rosario
overheard his passengers saying that they would throw the bag at Zulueta St. where
there were cogon grasses. 11 Upon arriving at Dicarma, the three (3) men alighted
and warned del Rosario not to inform the police authorities about the incident
otherwise he and his family would be harmed. 12 Del Rosario then went home. 13
Because of the threat, however, he did not report the matter to the owner of the
tricycle nor to the barangay captain and the police. 14
As earlier stated, the court a quo found accused Joselito del Rosario guilty as
charged and sentenced him to death. He now contends in this automatic review that
the court a quo erred in: (1) Not finding the presence of threat and irresistible force
employed upon him by his co-accused Virgilio "Boy" Santos, Ernesto "Jun" Marquez
and "Dodong" Bisaya; (2) Not considering his defense that he was not part of the
conspiracy among co-accused "Boy" Santos, "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya
to commit the crime of Robbery with Homicide; (3) Not considering the violations on
his constitutional rights as an accused; and, (4) Not considering that there was no
lawful warrantless arrest within the meaning of Sec. 5, Rule 113, of the Rules of
Court. 15
The conviction of del Rosario must be set aside. His claim for exemption from Q: What was that unusual incident that transpired in that place at that time?
criminal liability under Art. 12, par. 5, Revised Penal Code as he acted under the
compulsion of an irresistible force must be sustained. He was then unarmed and A: I saw two men and a lady grappling for the possession of a bag,
unable to protect himself when he was prevented at gunpoint by his co-accused
sir . . . .
from leaving the crime scene during the perpetration of the robbery and killing, and
was only forced to help them escape after the commission of the crime. 16 Q: What happened after the bag of the lady was grabbed by the two men?
But the trial court ruled that his fear was merely speculative, fanciful and remote, A: One helper of the lady was chased by the other man, sir.
hence, could not be considered uncontrollable; and that a gun pointed at him did not
constitute irresistible force because it fell short of the test required by law and Q: Who was that man who chased the helper of the lady?
jurisprudence. 17
A: He was the one holding the gun, sir . . . .
We disagree. A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like
one who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, Q: What happened when the bag of the woman was already taken by the two men
is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with freedom. Actus me who grappled the same from her?
invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me against my will is not my act.
A: The man who chased the helper of the lady returned to the scene while the other
The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere
man was then kicking the lady who in turn fell to the ground, sir.
instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear
or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to Q: What happened to the lady who fell to the ground?
induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be
done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a A: The man who chased the helper of the lady returned and then shot the woman
character as to leave no opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in who was then lying on the ground, sir . . . .
equal combat. 18
Q: What about the bag, what happened to the bag?
As a rule, it is natural for people to be seized by fear when threatened with
weapons, even those less powerful than a gun, such as knives and clubs. People A: The bag was taken to a motorcycle, sir.
will normally, usually and probably do what an armed man asks them to do, nothing
Q: Will you please state before the the Court what you noticed from the tricycle
more, nothing less. In the instant case, del Rosario was threatened with a gun. He
which was at a distance of about one and a half meter?
could not therefore be expected to flee nor risk his life to help a stranger. A person
under the same circumstances would be more concerned with his personal welfare A: There was a passenger inside the tricycle, sir . . . .
and security rather than the safety of a person whom he only saw for the first time
that day. 19 Q: What happened to that woman that was shot by the man who grappled for the
possession of the bag?
Corollary with the defense of del Rosario, we hold that the trial court erred when it
said that it was "Boy" Santos who left the tricycle to chase the companion of the A: She was no longer moving and lying down, sir.
victim and then shot the victim on the head, instantly killing her. 20 A careful and
meticulous scrutiny of the transcripts and records of the testimonies of witness Q: After the shooting by one of the two men of the woman what else happened?
Alonzo and del Rosario himself, reveals that it was "Jun" Marquez who ran after the
A: They went away, sir . . . .
victim's helper and fired at the victim. Witness Alonzo testified on direct examination
—
Q: Will you please tell the Court in what portion of the tricycle did these men sit in Q: . . . . On the evening of May 13, 1996 you were the driver of the tricycle as
the tricycle? testified to by Eduardo Nalagon?

A: The man who was holding the gun sat himself behind the driver while the other A: Yes, sir.
man entered the sidecar, sir. 21
Q: Now, you also heard that there was a shoot out near the Cathedral and the Nita's
On the continuation of his direct examination, after an ocular inspection on the crime Drugstore at Gen. Tinio St.?
scene conducted by the trial court, witness Alonzo categorically
A: Yes, sir.
stated —
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Will you please tell us where in particular did you see the accused who was then
holding the gun fired at the victim? Court: At that time you were seated at the tricycle, which tricycle was used by the
assailants?
A: At the time one man was kicking the victim it was then his other companion
holding a gun chased the helper of the deceased going towards Burgos Avenue, sir. A: Yes, sir.

Q: What happen (sic) afterwards? Q: Then what did you do?

A: The man with the gun returned and then while the victim was lying down in this A: I tried to escape, sir, but I was stopped by them.
spot the man holding a gun shot the victim, sir. 22
Q: When you said "they" to whom are you referring?
On cross-examination, the same witness further clarified —
A: Boy Santos and Jun Marquez, sir.
Q: So, you saw the two other accused returned back to the tricycle?
Q: And at that time where was Boy Santos?
A: Yes, sir.
A: He was inside the tricycle, sir.
Q: And one of their companion was already inside the tricycle?
Q: And what about Jun Marquez?
xxx xxx xxx
A: He alighted from the tricycle and helped him grabbed (sic) the bag of the victim.
Court: There was somebody inside the tricycle where the handbag was given.
Q: And was the bag grabbed and by whom?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, sir, by Dodong Visaya was able to grab the bag.
Q: And the one who sat at the back of the tricycle driver was the person with the
Q: And after that what happened?
gun?
A: Both of them rode inside my tricycle, sir.
A: Yes, sir. 23
Court: Did you not see any shooting?
On the other hand, accused Del Rosario declared during the direct examination that
— A: There was, sir.
Q: Who was shot? Q: How about your two companions, what are (sic) they doing while Dodong Bisaya
was grabbing the bag of the woman?
A: Jun Marquez shot the woman, sir . . . .
A: Jun Marquez was helping Dodong Bisaya, sir.
Q: When the bag of the woman was being grabbed you know that what was
transpiring was wrong and illegal? Q: What happened after Jun Marquez helped Dodong Bisaya?

A: Yes, sir. A: I heard a gunshot and I saw the woman lying down . . . .

Q: But you did not try to leave? Q: You could have ran away to seek the help of the police or any private persons?

A: I tried to leave but Boy Santos who was inside my tricycle prevented me. A: I was not able to ask for help because Boy Santos pointed his gun to me, sir.

Q: During that time before you leave (sic) how many firearms did you see? Q: Was the gun being carried by Boy Santos, is the one that is used in shooting the
old woman?
A: Two firearms, sir, one in the possession of Boy (Jun?) Marquez and one in the
possession of Boy Santos . . . . A: No, sir . . . .

Q: And at the time when the shooting took place where was Boy Santos?
A: He was still inside my tricycle, sir.
Q: And during the shooting when Boy Santos was inside the tricycle and when you
tried to escape that was the time when Boy Santos threatened you if you will escape
something will happen to your family?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where was Boy Santos when Dodong Bisaya and Jun Marquez were grappling
for the possession of the handbag?
A: He was then inside the tricycle, sir . . . . 25
Q: Mr. Witness, you testified that the reason why you just cannot leave the area
where the incident occurred is because a gun was pointed to you by Boy Santos
and he was telling you that you should not do anything against their will, they will kill
you and your family will be killed also, is that correct?

Q: After the shooting who first boarded the tricycle, Boy (Jun?) Marquez or Dodong A: Yes, sir.
Visaya?
Q: Now, is it not a fact that at the time you stop (sic) your tricycle which was loaded
A: Dodong Visaya, sir. by your other three co-accused in this case, all of them alighted and that Boy Santos
ran after a helper of the victim going towards the public market along Burgos Street?
Q: And immediately thereafter Jun Marquez boarded your tricycle sitting at your
back? A: He did not alight from the tricycle, sir.

A: Yes, sir. 24 Court: Are you quite sure of that?

On cross-examination, accused further stated — A: Yes, sir. 26

Q: After stopping in that place for one minute what else happened? Del Rosario maintains that "Boy" Santos never left the tricycle and that the latter
pointed his gun at him and threatened to shoot if he tried to escape. He also asserts
A: I saw Dodong Bisaya grabbing the bag of the woman, sir.
that it was "Jun" Marquez who shot the victim and sat behind him in the tricycle.
From the narration of witness Alonzo, these events stood out: that after the bag of
the victim was grabbed, her male helper was chased by a man holding a gun; that
the gunwielder returned and shot the victim and then sat behind the driver of the
tricycle; and, that the bag was given to a person who was inside the tricycle. Taking
the testimony of witness Alonzo in juxtaposition with the testimony of del Rosario, it
can be deduced that "Jun" Marquez was the person witness Alonzo was referring to
when he mentioned that a helper of the lady was chased "by the other man," and
that this "other man" could not be "Boy" Santos who stayed inside the tricycle and to
whom the bag was handed over. This conclusion gives credence to the claim of del
Rosario that "Boy" Santos never left the tricycle, and to his allegation that "Boy"
Santos stayed inside the tricycle precisely to threaten him with violence and to
prevent him from fleeing; that there could have been no other plausible reason for
"Boy" Santos to stay in the tricycle if the accused was indeed a conspirator; that
"Boy" Santos could have just left the tricycle and helped in the commission of the
crime, particularly when he saw the victim grappling with "Dodong" Bisaya and
resisting the attempts to grab her bag; and, that "Boy" Santos opted to remain inside
the tricycle to fulfill his preordained role of threatening del Rosario and insuring that
he would not escape and leave them behind. 27
Even if the tricycle of del Rosario was only parked one meter and a half (1-1/2) in
front of the tricycle of witness Alonzo, the latter still could not have totally seen and
was not privy to events that were transpiring inside the vehicle, i.e., the pointing of
the gun by "Boy" Santos at del Rosario simultaneously with the robbing and
shooting of the victim. From the exhibits submitted by the prosecution panel the
back of the sidecar of del Rosario tricycle was not transparent. 28
There is no doubt that the fear entertained by del Rosario because of the gun
directly pointed at him was real and imminent. Such fear rendered him immobile and
subject to the will of Boy Santos, making him for the moment an automaton without
a will of his own. In other words, in effect, he could not be any more than a mere
instrument acting involuntarily and against his will. He is therefore exempt from
criminal liability since by reason of fear of bodily harm he was compelled against his
will to transport his co-accused away from the crime scene.
On the issue of conspiracy, the trial court anchored del Rosario's conviction on his
participation in the orchestrated acts of "Boy" Santos, "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong"
Bisaya. According to the trial court, del Rosario facilitated the escape of the other
malefactors from the crime scene and conspiracy between accused and his
passengers was evident because "while the grappling of the bag, the chasing of the
helper of the victim and the shooting that led to the death of Virginia Bernas were
happening, accused Joselito del Rosario was riding on his tricycle and the engine of
the motor was running;" 29 that the "accused did not deny that the tricycle driven by
him and under his control was hired and used by his co-accused in the commission
of the crime; neither did he deny his failure to report to the authorities the incident of
robbery, killing and fleeing away from the scene of the crime." 30
We disagree with the trial court. A conspiracy in the statutory language exists when
two or more concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The
objective of the conspirators is to perform an act or omission punishable by law.
That must be their intent. There is need for "concurrence of wills" or "unity of action
and purpose" or for "common and joint purpose and design." Its manifestation could
be shown by "united and concerted action." 31
Admittedly, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy. Since by its nature
conspiracy is planned in utmost secrecy, it can rarely be proved by direct evidence.
Consequently, the presence of the concurrence of minds which is involved in
conspiracy may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken
together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If it
is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment
of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy
may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved.
That would be termed an implied conspiracy. 32 Nevertheless, mere knowledge,
acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation or agreement to
cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, but that there
must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of
the common design and purpose. Conspiracy must be established, not by
conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. In fact, the same degree of
proof necessary to establish the crime is required to support a finding of the
presence of a criminal conspiracy, which is, proof beyond reasonable doubt. 33
In the instant case, while del Rosario admits that he was at the locus criminis as he
was the driver of the getaway vehicle, he nonetheless rebuts the imputation of guilt
against him by asserting that he had no inkling of the malevolent design of his co-
accused to rob and kill since he was not given any briefing thereof. He was merely
hired by Boy Santos to drive to an agreed destination and he was prevented at
gunpoint from leaving the scene of the crime since he was ordered to help them
escape.
In this case, the trial court stated that "there is no evidence that the accused came
to an agreement concerning the commission of the felony and decided to commit
the same." 34 Therefore, in order to convict the accused, the presence of an implied
conspiracy is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. However, the fact
that del Rosario was with the other accused when the crime was committed is
insufficient proof to show cabal. Mere companionship does not establish conspiracy.
35
The only incriminating evidence against del Rosario is that he was at the scene of
the crime but he has amply explained the reason for his presence and the same has
not been successfully refuted by the prosecution. As stated earlier, he feared for his
safety and security because of the threat made by his co-accused that he would be
killed should he shout for help. No complicity can be deduced where there is
absolutely no showing that the accused directly participated in the overt act of
robbing and shooting although he was with the persons who robbed and killed the
victim. 36
That del Rosario did not disclose what he knew about the incident to the authorities,
to his employer or to the barangay captain does not affect his credibility. The natural
hesitance of most people to get involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice. 37 It
must be recalled that del Rosario was merely a tricycle driver with a family to look
after. Given his quite limited means, del Rosario understandably did not want to get
involved in the case so he chose to keep his silence. Besides, he was threatened
with physical harm should he squeal.
Del Rosario further contends that there was violation of his right to remain silent,
right to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and
right to be informed of these rights as enshrined and guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.
38
As testified to by SPO4 Geronimo de Leon, the prosecution witness who was the
team leader of the policemen who investigated the 13 May incident, during his
cross-examination —
Upon finding the name of the owner of the tricycle, they proceeded to Bakod Bayan
in the house of the barangay captain where the owner of the tricycle was summoned
and who in turn revealed the driver's name and was invited for interview. The driver
was accused Joselito del Rosario who volunteered to name his passengers on May
13, 1996. On the way to the police station, accused informed them of the bag and
lunch kit's location and the place where the hold-uppers may be found and they
reported these findings to their officers, Capt. Biag and Capt. Cruz. After lunch, they
proceeded to Brgy. Dicarma composed of 15 armed men where a shoot-out
transpired that lasted from 1:00 to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. After a brief
encounter, they went inside the house where they found Marquez dead holding a
magazine and a gun. While all of these were happening, accused del Rosario was
at the back of the school, after which they went back to the police station. The
investigator took the statement of the accused on May 14, 1996, and was only
subscribed on May 22, 1996. All the while, he was detained in the police station as
ordered by the Fiscal. His statements were only signed on May 16, 1996. He also
executed a waiver of his detention. His Sinumpaang Salaysay was done with the
assistance of Ex-Judge Talavera. 39
A further perusal of the transcript reveals that during the encounter at Brgy.
Dicarma, del Rosario was handcuffed by the police because allegedly they had
already gathered enough evidence against him and they were afraid that he might
attempt to escape. 40
Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation
that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is well-settled that it
encompasses any question initiated by law enforces after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprive of his freedom of action in any significant way. 41
This concept of custodial investigation has been broadened by RA 7438 42 to include
"the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection
with an offense he is suspected to have committed." Section 2 of the same Act
further provides that —
. . . . Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or in his place,
who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense
shall inform the latter, in a language known and understood by him, of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own
choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer privately with the person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services
of his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent and independent counsel
by the investigating officer.
From the foregoing, it is clear that del Rosario was deprived of his rights during
custodial investigation. From the time he was "invited" for questioning at the house
of the baranggay captain, he was already under effective custodial investigation, but
he was not apprised nor made aware thereof by the investigating officers. The police
already knew the name of the tricycle driver and the latter was already a suspect in
the robbing and senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since the prosecution failed to
establish that del Rosario had waived his right to remain silent, his verbal
admissions on his participation in the crime even before his actual arrest were
inadmissible against him, as the same transgressed the safeguards provided by law
and the Bill of Rights.
Del Rosario also avers that his arrest was unlawful since there was no warrant
therefor. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of provides: 43
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; (b) When an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and,
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
It must be recalled that del Rosario was arrested by SPO4 De Leon during the
police raid at the place of "Jun" Marquez at Brgy. Dicarma on 14 May 1996. In
People vs. Sucro 44 we held that when a police officer sees the offense, although at
a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the
scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5, par.
(a), Rule 113, since the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his
view. In essence, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, requires that the accused be caught in
flagrante delicto or caught immediately after the consummation of the act. The arrest
of del Rosario is obviously outside the purview of the aforequoted rule since he was
arrested on the day following the commission of the robbery with homicide.
On the other hand, Sec. 5, par. (b), Rule 113, necessitates two (2) stringent
requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just
been committed; and, (2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed it. Hence, there must
be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense was committed and
the time of the arrest, and if there was an appreciable lapse of time between the
arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured. Aside
from the sense of immediacy, it is also mandatory that the person making the arrest
must have personal knowledge of certain facts indicating that the person to be taken
into custody has committed the crime. 45 Again, the arrest of del Rosario does not
comply with these requirements since, as earlier explained, the arrest came a day
after the consummation of the crime and not immediately thereafter. As such, the
crime had not been "just committed" at the time the accused was arrested. Likewise,
the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person
to be arrested had committed the offense since they were not present and were not
actual eyewitnesses to the crime, and they became aware of his identity as the
driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.
However, the conspicuous illegality of del Rosario's arrest cannot affect the
jurisdiction of the court a quo because even in instances not allowed by law, a
warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect and any objection thereto is waived
when the person arrested submits to arraignment without any objection, as in this
case. 46
A transgression of the law has occurred. Unfortunately, an innocent person lost her
life and property in the process. Someone therefore must be held accountable, but it
will not be accused Joselito del Rosario; we must acquit him. Like victim Virginia
Bernas, he too was a hapless victim who was forcibly used by other persons with
nefarious designs to perpetrate a dastardly act. Del Rosario's defense of "irresistible
force" has been substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. On the other hand,
conspiracy between him and his co-accused was not proved beyond a whimper of a
doubt by the prosecution, thus clearing del Rosario of any complicity in the crime
charged.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City
convicting accused JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO Y PASCUAL of Robbery with
Homicide and sentencing him to death, is REVISED and SET ASIDE, and the
accused is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. His immediate RELEASE from
confinement is ordered unless held for some other lawful cause. In this regard, the
Director of Prisons is directed to report to the Court his compliance herewith within
five (5) days from receipt hereof.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ.,
concur.
Footnotes
1 Decision penned by Judge Feliciano V. Buenaventura, RTC-Br. 27, Cabanatuan
City.
2 Rollo, p. 24.
3 Id., p. 25.
4 TSN, 9 July 1996, pp. 3-9; 11 July 1996, pp. 27-28, 31-32. 23 Id., pp. 31-32.

5 Id., 4 September 1996, p.15. 24 Id., 28 August 1996, pp. 3-6.

6 Id., p. 10. 25 Id., 12 September 1996, pp. 9-10.

7 Id., p. 15. 26 Id., 13 September 1996, p. 2.

8 Id., 12 September 1996, p. 6. 27 Comment on Appellee's Brief, pp. 12-13.

9 See Note 4, p. 16. 31 People v. Taaca, No. L-35652, 29 September 1889, 178 SCRA 56.

10 See Note 7, p. 8. 32 People v. Orodio, G.R. No. 57519, 13 September 1988, 165 SCRA 316.

11 TSN, 28 August 1996, pp. 3-7. 33 People v. Furugganan, G.R. Nos. 90191-96, 28 January 1991, 193 SCRA 471.

12 Id., 13 September 1996, p. 21. 37 People v. Estocada, No. L-31024, 28 February 1977, 75 SCRA 295.

13 See Note 10, p. 7. 38 Rollo, p. 224.

14 See Note 7, p. 16. 39 Id., p. 24.

15 Appellant's Brief, pp. 56-57. 40 TSN, 3 July 1996, p. 5.

16 Id., p. 82. 41 People v. Herson Tan y Verro, G.R. No. 117321, 21 February 1998.

17 See Note 1, p. 75. 42 An Act Defining Certain Rights of Person Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial
Investigation As Well As the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining and Investigating
18 People v. Lorena, G.R. No. 54414, 9 July 1984, 130 SCRA 311. Officer and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof. Approved 15 May 1992.

19 Rollo pp. 407-408. 43 Rollo, pp. 244-245.

20 The decision reads (p. 74) . . . they rode in the tricycle of the accused and went 44 G.R. No. 93239, 18 March 1991, 195 SCRA 388.
near NITA'S DRUG STORE at Juan Luna Street, Cabanatuan City; while there, JUN
MARQUEZ and DODONG BISAYA waylaid VIRGINIA BERNAS, grappled with her 45 Pamaran, Manuel R., The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure Annotated, 1998
for the possession of the bag; while were grapping, BOY SANTOS saw the male Ed., p. 204.
helper of VIRGINIA BERNAS and he after him and in a few seconds returned to the
place where he found VIRGINIA BERNAS lying down; BOY SANTOS shot the victim 46 Regalado, Florenz D., Remedial Law Compendium, 1995 Ed., p. 323.
and from there, they fled to Dicarma, Cabanatuan City, where JUN MARQUEZ,
DODONG BISAYA and BOY SANTOS alighted from the tricycle . . .
Republic of the Philippines
21 TSN, 9 July 1996, pp. 4-7.
SUPREME COURT
22 Id., 11 July 1996, pp. 27-28. Manila
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 45186           September 30, 1936
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSEFINA BANDIAN, defendant-appellant.
Jose Rivera Yap for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
DIAZ, J.:
Charged with the crime of infanticide, convicted thereof and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and the corresponding accessory penalties, with the costs of the suit, Josefina
Bandian appealed from said sentence alleging that the trial court erred:
I. In taking into consideration, to convict her, her alleged admission to Dr. Nepomuceno
that she had thrown away her newborn babe, and
II. In holding her guilty of infanticide, beyond reasonable doubt, and in sentencing her to
reclusion perpetua, with costs.
The facts of record ma be summarized as follows:
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin Aguilar, the appellant's
neighbor, saw the appellant go to a thicket about four or five brazas from her house,
apparently to respond to a call of nature because it was there that the people of the place
used to go for that purpose. A few minutes later, he again saw her emerge from the thicket
with her clothes stained with blood both in the front and back, staggering and visibly
showing signs of not being able to support herself. He ran to her aid and, having noted that
she was very weak and dizzy, he supported and helped her go up to her house and placed
her in her own bed. Upon being asked before Aguilar brought her to her house, what
happened to her, the appellant merely answered that she was very dizzy. Not wishing to be
alone with the appellant in such circumstances, Valentin Aguilar called Adriano Comcom,
who lived nearby, to help them, and later requested him to take bamboo leaves to stop the
hemorrhage which had come upon the appellant. Comcom had scarcely gone about five
brazas when he saw the body of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the thicket where
the appellant had gone a few moments before. Comcom informed Aguilar of it and latter
told him to bring the body to the appellant's house. Upon being asked whether the baby
which had just been shown to her was hers or not, the appellant answered in the
affirmative.
Upon being notified of the incident at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of said day, Dr. Emilio
Nepomuceno, president of the sanitary division of Talisayan, Oriental Misamis, went to the
appellant's house and found her lying in bed still bleeding. Her bed, the floor of her house
and beneath it, directly under the bed, were full of blood. Basing his opinion upon said
facts, the physician in question declared that the appellant gave birth in her house and in
her own bed; that after giving birth she threw her child into the thicket to kill it for the
purpose of concealing her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with whom she had
theretofore been living maritally, because the child was not his but of another man with
whom she had previously had amorous relations. To give force to his conclusions, he
testified that the appellant had admitted to him that she had killed her child, when he went
to her house at the time and on the date above-stated.
The prosecuting attorney and the lower court giving absolute credit to Dr. Nepomuceno
whose testimony was not corroborated but, on the contrary, was contradicted by the very
witnesses for the prosecution and by the appellant, as will be stated later, they were of the
opinion and the lower court furthermore held, that the appellant was an infanticide. The
Solicitor-General, however, does not agree with both. On the contrary, he maintains that
the appellant may be guilty only of abandoning a minor under subsection 2 of article 276 of
the Revised Penal Code, the abandonment having resulted in the death of the minor
allegedly abandoned.
By the way, it should be stated that there is no evidence showing how the child in question
died. Dr. Nepomuceno himself affirmed that the wounds found in the body of the child
were not caused by the hand of man but by bites animals, the pigs that usually roamed
through the thicket where it was found.
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed wilfully or
consciously, or at least it must be result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission.
Even in cases where said crimes are committed through mere imprudence, the person who
commits them, under said circumstances, must be in the full enjoyment of his mental
faculties, or must be conscious of his acts, in order that he may be held liable.
The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant, in causing her child's death in one
way or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so wilfully, consciously or
imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death, because her affair
with a former lover, which was not unknown to her second lover, Luis Kirol, took place
three years before the incident; her married life with Kirol — she considers him her
husband as he considers her his wife — began a year ago; as he so testified at the trial, he
knew that the appellant was pregnant and he believed from the beginning, affirming such
belief when he testified at the trial, that the child carried by the appellant in her womb was
his, and he testified that he and she had been eagerly waiting for the birth of the child. The
appellant, therefore, had no cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol.
If to the foregoing facts is added the testimony of the witnesses Valentin Aguilar and
Adriano Comcom that the child was taken from the thicket and carried already dead to the
appellant's house after the appellant had left the place, staggering, without strength to
remain on her feet and very dizzy, to the extent of having to be as in fact she was helped to
go up to her house and to lie in bed, it will clearly appear how far from the truth were Dr.
Nepomuceno's affirmation and conclusions. Also add to all these the fact that the appellant
denied having made any admission to said physician and that from the time she became
pregnant she continuously had fever. This illness and her extreme debility undoubtedly
caused by her long illness as well as the hemorrhage which she had upon giving birth,
coupled with the circumstances that she is a primipara, being then only 23 years of age, and
therefore inexperienced as to childbirth and as to the inconvenience or difficulties usually
attending such event; and the fact that she, like her lover Luis Kirol — a mere laborer
earning only twenty-five centavos a day — is uneducated and could supplant with what she
had read or learned from books what experience itself could teach her, undoubtedly were
the reasons why she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur to her or
she was unable, due to her debility or dizziness, which causes may be considered lawful or
insuperable to constitute the seventh exempting circumstance (art. 12, Revised Penal
Code), to take her child from the thicket where she had given it birth, so as not to leave it
abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing its life.
The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by going into the thicket,
according to her, to respond to call of nature, notwithstanding the fact that she had fever
for a long time, was perfectly lawful. If by doing so she caused a wrong as that of giving
birth to her child in that same place and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence or
any other reason than that she was overcome by strong dizziness and extreme debility, she
should not be blamed therefor because it all happened by mere accident, from liability any
person who so acts and behaves under such circumstances (art. 12, subsection 4, Revised
Penal Code).
In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and considerations, and granting that
the appellant was aware of her involuntary childbirth in the thicket and that she later failed
to take her child therefrom, having been so prevented by reason of causes entirely
independent of her will, it should be held that the alleged errors attributed to the lower
court by the appellant are true; and it appearing that under such circumstances said
appellant has the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances in her favor, is hereby
acquitted of the crime of which she had bee accused and convicted, with costs de oficio,
and she is actually confined in jail in connection with this case, it is ordered that she be
released immediately. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., and Abad Santos, J., concur.
Separate Opinions
VILLA-REAL, J., concurring:
I concur in the acquittal of the accused Josefina Bandian not on the ground that she is
exempt from criminal liability but because she has committed no criminal act or omission.
The evidence conclusively shows that on the day in question the accused Josefina Bandian
had spent a year of marital life with her lover Luis Kirol by whom she was begotten with a
child for the first time. Her said lover knew that she was pregnant and both were waiting
for the arrival of the happy day when the fruit of their love should be born. Since she
became pregnant she continuously had fever, was weak and dizzy. On January 31, at about
7 o'clock in the morning, she went down from her house and entered a thicket about four
or five brazas away, where the residents of said place responded to the call of nature. After
some minutes the accused emerged from the thicket staggering and apparently unable to
support herself. Her neighbor Valentin Aguilar, who saw her enter the thicket and emerged
therefrom, ran to help her, supported her and aided her in going up to her house and to
bed. Asked by Aguilar what happened to her, she merely answered that she was very dizzy.
Thinking that he alone was unable to attend to her, Valentin Aguilar called Adriano
Comcom, who lived nearby, and requested him to take bamboo leaves to stop the
appellant's hemorrhage. Adriano had scarcely gone about five brazas, when he saw the
body of a newborn child near the path adjoining the thicket where the accused had been a
few moments before. Upon being informed of the discovery, Valentin Aguilar told Adriano
Comcom to bring the child into the appellant's house. Upon being asked whether or not the
child shown to her was hers, the appellant answered in the affirmative. After an autopsy
had been made of the body, it was found that the child was born alive.
Unconscious, precipitate or sudden deliveries are well known in legal medicine among
young primiparæ who, by reason of their ignorance of the symptoms of parturition and of
the process of expulsion of fetus, are not aware that they are giving birth when they are
responding to an urgent call of nature (Dr. A. Lacassagne, Precis de Medicine Legale, pages,
799-781; Annales de Medicine Legale, December 1926, page 530; Vibert, Manual de
Medicina Legal y Toxicologia, vol. I, pages 512-514). There is no doubt that the accused, in
her feverish, weak and dizzy condition when she went into the thicket to defecate and
being a primipara with no experience in childbirth, was not aware that upon defecating she
was also expelling the child she was carrying in her womb. Believing that she did nothing
more to respond to an urgent call of nature which brought her there, she returned home
staggering for lack of strength to support herself and for being dizzy, without suspecting
that she was leaving a newborn child behind her, and she only knew that she had given
birth when she was shown the already dead child with wounds on the body produced by
the bites of pigs.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that acts and omissions punishable by law are
felonies, which may be committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of
fault (culpa); there being deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent, and fault
when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.
As the herein accused was not aware that she had delivered and that the child had been
exposed to the rough weather and to the cruelty of animals, it cannot be held that she
deceitfully committed the crime of infanticide or that of abandonment of a minor, because
according to the above-cited legal provision there is deceit when the act punishable by law
is performed with deliberate intent. Suffering from fever and from dizziness, the appellant
under the circumstances was not aware that she had given birth and, consequently, she
could not have deliberately intended to leave her child, of whose existence she was
ignorant, to perish at the mercy of the elements and of the animals. Neither can it be held
that she faultily committed it because, as already stated, not knowing for lack of experience
in childbirth that in defecating — a perfectly lawful physiological act, being natural — she
might expel the child she carried in her womb, she cannot be considered imprudent, a
psychological defect of a person who fails to use his reasoning power to foresee the
pernicious consequences of his willful act. Having had no knowledge of the fact of her
delivery, the accused could not think that by leaving the child in the thicket, it would die as
a consequence of the rough weather or of the cruelty of animals. Neither can she be
considered negligent because negligence is the omission to do what the law or morals
obliges one to do, which implies knowledge of the thing which is the subject matter of the
compliance with the obligation. Inasmuch as the accused was not aware of her delivery, her
mind cannot contemplate complying with her legal and moral duty to protect the life of her
child. Neither can it be held that the appellant lacked foresight because, having been
absolutely ignorant of her delivery, she could not foresee that by abandoning her child in a
thicket it would die. Neither can it be held that her act was the result of lack of skill because
she did not know that to defecate in a state of pregnancy might precipitate her delivery,
and as defecation is a natural physiological function, she could not refrain from satisfying it.
We cannot apply to the accused fourth exempting circumstance of article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code which reads: "Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care,
causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it," because
although the lawful act of satisfying a natural physiological necessity accidentally provoked
the delivery, the delivery itself was not an injury, but the exposure of the child at the mercy
of the elements and of the animals which cased its death. As the child was born alive, if the
accused had been aware of her delivery and she had deliberately abandoned the child, her
accidental delivery would not exempt her from criminal liability because then the death of
said child no longer would have been accidental. Neither can we consider the seventh
exempting circumstance of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code consisting in the failure to
perform an act required by law, when prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause,
because this exempting circumstance implies knowledge of the precept of the law to be
complied with but is prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause, that is by some
motive which has lawfully, morally or physically prevented one to do what the law
commands. In the present case, what the law requires of the accused-appellant, with
respect to the child, is that she care for, protect and not abandon it. Had she been aware of
her delivery and of the existence of the child, neither her debility nor her dizziness resulting
from the fever which consumed her, being in the full enjoyment of her mental faculties and
her illness not being of such gravity as to prevent her from asking for help, would constitute
the lawful or insuperable impediment required by law. Having been ignorant of her delivery
and of the existence of the child, to her there was subjectively no cause for the law to
impose a duty for her to comply with.
Having had no knowledge of the expulsion of her fetus, the death thereof resulting from its
exposure to the rough weather and to the cruelty of the animals cannot be imputed to the
accused, because she had neither deceitfully nor faultily committed any act or omission
punishable by law with regard to the child.
Imperial and Laurel, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
 Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 34917           September 7, 1931
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LUA CHU and UY SE TIENG, defendants-appellants.
Gibbs and McDonough, Gullas, Lopez and Tuaño, H. Alo and Manuel G. Briones for
appellants.Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
The defendants Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng appeal from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu convicting them of the illegal importation of opium, and sentencing them
each to four years' imprisonment, a fine of P10,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency not to exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to pay the proportional
costs.
In support of their appeal, the appellants assigned the following alleged errors as
committed by the court below in its judgment to wit:
The lower court erred:
1. In refusing to compel the Hon. Secretary of Finance of the Insular Collector of Customs to
exhibit in court the record of the administrative investigation against Joaquin Natividad,
collector of customs of Cebu, and Juan Samson, supervising customs secret service agent of
Cebu, both of whom have since been dismissed from service.
2. In holding it as a fact that "no doubt many times opium consignments have passed thru
the customhouse without the knowledge of the customs secret service."
3. In rejecting the defendants' theory that the said Juan Samson in denouncing the accused
was actuated by a desire to protect himself and to injure ex-collector Joaquin Natividad, his
bitter enemy, who was partly instrumental in the dismissal of Samson from the service.
4. In finding that the conduct of Juan Samson, dismissed chief customs secret service agent
of Cebu, is above reproach and utterly irreconcilable with the corrupt motives attributed to
him by the accused.
5. In permitting Juan Samson, prosecution star witness, to remain in the court room while
other prosecution witnesses were testifying, despite the previous order of the court
excluding the Government witnesses from the court room, and in refusing to allow the
defense to inquire from Insular Collector of Customs Aldanese regarding the official
conduct of Juan Samson as supervising customs secret service agent of Cebu.
6. In giving full credit to the testimony of said Juan Samson.
7. In refusing to hold that Juan Samson induced the defendant Uy Se Tieng to order the
opium from Hongkong.
8. In accepting Exhibits E and E-1 as the true and correct transcript of the conversation
between Juan Samson and the appellant Uy Se Tieng.
9. In accepting Exhibit F as the true and correct transcript of the conversation between Juan
Samson and the appellant Lua Chu.
10. In finding each of the appellants Uy Se Tieng and Lua Chu guilty of the crime of illegal
importation of opium, and in sentencing each to suffer four years' imprisonment and to pay
a fine of P10,000 and the costs, despite the presumption of innocence which has not been
overcome, despite the unlawful inducement, despite the inherent weakness of the
evidence presented by the prosecution, emanating from a spirit of revenge and from a
contaminated, polluted source.
The following are uncontradicted facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt at the trial:
About the middle of the month of November, 1929, the accused Uy Se Tieng wrote to his
correspondent in Hongkong to send him a shipment of opium.
About November 4, 1929, after the chief of the customs secret service of Cebu, Juan
Samson, had returned from a vacation in Europe, he called upon the then collector of
customs for the Port of Cebu, Joaquin Natividad, at his office, and the latter, after a short
conversation, asked him how much his trip had cost him. When the chief of the secret
service told him he had spent P2,500, the said collector of customs took from a drawer in
his table, the amount of P300, in paper money, and handed it to him, saying: "This is for
you, and a shipment will arrive shortly, and you will soon be able to recoup your travelling
expenses." Juan Samson took the money, left, and put it into the safe in his office to be kept
until he delivered it to the provincial treasurer of Cebu. A week later, Natividad called
Samson and told him that the shipment he had referred to consisted of opium, that it was
not about to arrive, and that the owner would go to Samson's house to see him. That very
night Uy Se Tieng went to Samson's house and told him he had come by order of Natividad
to talk to him about the opium. The said accused informed Samson that the opium
shipment consisted of 3,000 tins, and that he had agreed to pay Natividad P6,000 or a P2 a
tin, and that the opium had been in Hongkong since the beginning of October awaiting a
ship that would go direct to Cebu.
At about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of November 22, 1929, one Nam Tai loaded on the
steamship Kolambugan, which the Naviera Filipina — a shipping company in Cebu had had
built in Hongkong, 38 cases consigned to Uy Seheng and marked "U.L.H." About the same
date Natividad informed Samson that the opium had already been put on board the
steamship Kolambugan, and it was agreed between them that Samson would receive
P2,000, Natividad P2,000, and the remaining P2,000 would be distributed among certain
employees in the customhouse.
Meanwhile, Uy Se Tieng continued his interviews with Samson. Towards the end of
November, Natividad informed the latter that the Kolambugan had returned to Hongkong
on account of certain engine trouble, and remained there until December 7th. In view of
this, the shipper several times attempted to unload the shipment, but he was told each
time by the captain, who needed the cargo for ballast, that the ship was about to sail, and
the 30 cases remained on board.
The Kolambugan arrived at Cebu on the morning of December 14, 1929. While he was
examining the manifests, Samson detailed one of his men to watch the ship. After
conferring with Natividad, the latter instructed him to do everything possible to have the
cargo unloaded, and to require Uy Se Tieng to pay over the P6,000. On the morning of
November 16, 1929, Natividad told Samson that Uy Se Tieng already had the papers ready
to withdraw the cases marked "U.L.H." from the customhouse. Samson then told Natividad
it would be better for Uy Se Tieng to go to his house to have a talk with him. Uy Se Tieng
went to Samson's house that night and was told that he must pay over the P6,000 before
taking the opium out of the customhouse. Uy Se Tieng showed Samson the bill of lading
and on leaving said: "I will tell the owner, and we see whether we can take the money to
you tomorrow." The following day Samson informed Colonel Francisco of the Constabulary,
of all that had taken place, and the said colonel instructed the provincial commander,
Captain Buenconsejo, to discuss the capture of the opium owners with Samson.
Buenconsejo and Samson agreed to meet at the latter's house that same night. That
afternoon Samson went to the office of the provincial fiscal, reported the case to the fiscal,
and asked for a stenographer to take down the conversation he would have with Uy Se
Tieng that night in the presence of Captain Buenconsejo. As the fiscal did not have a good
stenographer available, Samson got one Jumapao, of the law firm of Rodriguez & Zacarias,
on the recommendation of the court stenographer. On the evening of December 17, 1929,
as agreed, Captain Buenconsejo, Lieutenant Fernando; and the stenographer went to
Samson's house and concealed themselves behind a curtain made of strips of wood which
hung from the window overlooking the entrance to the house on the ground floor. As soon
as the accused Uy Se Tieng arrived, Samson asked him if he had brought the money. He
replied that he had not, saying that the owner of the opium, who was Lua Chu, was afraid
of him. Samson then hold him to tell Lua Chu not to be afraid, and that he might come to
Samson's house. After pointing out to Uy Se Tieng a back door entrance into the garden, he
asked him where the opium was, and Uy Se Tieng answered that it was in the cases
numbered 11 to 18, and that there were 3,252 tins. Uy Se Tieng returned at about 10
o'clock that night accompanied by his codefendant Lua Chu, who said he was not the sole
owner of the opium, but that a man from Manila, named Tan, and another in Amoy were
also owners. Samson then asked Lua Chu when he was going to get the opium, and the
latter answered that Uy Se Tieng would take charge of that. On being asked if he had
brought the P6,000, Lua Chu answered, no, but promised to deliver it when the opium was
in Uy Se Tieng's warehouse. After this conversation, which was taken down in shorthand,
Samson took the accused Lua Chu aside and asked him: "I say, old fellow, why didn't you
tell me about this before bringing the opium here?" Lua Chu answered: "Impossible, sir;
you were not here, you were in Spain on vacation." On being asked by Samson how he had
come to bring in the opium, Lua Chu answered: "I was in a cockpit one Sunday when the
collector called me aside and said there was good business, because opium brought a good
price, and he needed money." All this conversation was overheard by Captain Buenconsejo.
It was then agreed that Uy Se Tieng should take the papers with him at 10 o'clock next
morning. At the appointed hour, Uy Se Tieng and one Uy Ay arrived at Samson's house, and
as Uy Se Tieng was handing certain papers over to his companion, Uy Ay, Captain
Buenconsejo, who had been hiding, appeared and arrested the two Chinamen, taking the
aforementioned papers, which consisted of bills of lading (Exhibits B and B-1), and in
invoice written in Chinese characters, and relating to the articles described in Exhibit B.
After having taken Uy Se Tieng and Uy Ay to the Constabulary headquarters, and notified
the fiscal, Captain Buenconsejo and Samson went to Lua Chu's home to search it and arrest
him. In the pocket of a coat hanging on a wall, which Lua Chu said belonged to him, they
found five letters written in Chinese characters relating to the opium (Exhibits G to K).
Captain Buenconsejo and Samson also took Lua Chu to the Constabulary headquarters, and
then went to the customhouse to examine the cases marked "U.L.H." In the cases marked
Nos. 11 to 18, they found 3,252 opium tins hidden away in a quantity to dry fish. The value
of the opium confiscated amounted to P50,000.
In the afternoon of December 18, 1929, Captain Buenconsejo approached Lua Chu and impeach the witness Juan Samson, for it is not one of the means prescribed in section 342
asked him to tell the truth as to who was the owner of the opium. Lua Chu answered as of the Code of Civil Procedure to that end.
follows: "Captain, it is useless to ask me any questions, for I am not going to answer to
them. The only thing I will say is that whoever the owner of this contraband may be, he is With regard to the trial judge's refusal to order the exclusion of Juan Samson, the principal
not such a fool as to bring it in here without the knowledge of those — " pointing towards witness of the Government, from the court room during the hearing, it is within the power
the customhouse. of said judge to do so or not, and it does not appear that he has abused his discretion (16
Corpus Juris, 842).
The defense attempted to show that after Juan Samson had obtained a loan of P200 from
Uy Se Tieng, he induced him to order the opium from Hongkong saying that it only cost Neither did the trial judge err when he admitted in evidence the transcript of stenographic
from P2 to P3 a tin there, while in Cebu it cost from P18 to P20, and that he could make a notes of the defendants' statements, since they contain admissions made by themselves,
good deal of money by bringing in a shipment of that drug; that Samson told Uy Se Tieng, and the person who took them in shorthand attested at the trial that they were faithfully
furthermore, that there would be no danger, because he and the collector of customs taken down. Besides the contents are corroborated by unimpeached witnesses who heard
would protect him; that Uy Se Tieng went to see Natividad, who told him he had no the statements.
objection, if Samson agreed; that Uy Se Tieng then wrote to his correspondent in Hongkong
As to whether the probatory facts are sufficient to establish the facts alleged in the
to forward the opium; that after he had ordered it, Samson went to Uy Se Tieng's store, in
information, we find that the testimony given by the witnesses for the prosecution should
the name of Natividad, and demanded the payment of P6,000; that Uy Se Tieng then wrote
be believed, because the officers of the Constabulary and the chief of the customs secret
to his Hongkong correspondent cancelling the order, but the latter answered that the
service, who gave it, only did their duty. Aside from this, the defendants do not deny their
opium had already been loaded and the captain of the Kolambugan refused to let him
participation in the illegal importation of the opium, though the accused Lua Chu pretends
unload it; that when the opium arrived, Samson insisted upon the payment of the P6,000;
that he was only a guarantor to secure the payment of the gratuity which the former
that as Uy Se Tieng did not have that amount, he went to Lua Chu on the night of December
collector of customs, Joaquin Natividad, had asked of him for Juan Samson and certain
14th, and proposed that he participate; that at first Lua Chu was unwilling to accept Uy Se
customs employees. This assertion, however, is contradicted by his own statement made to
Tieng's proposition, but he finally agreed to pay P6,000 when the opium had passed the
Juan Samson and overheard by Captain Buenconsejo, that he was one of the owners of the
customhouse; that Lua Chu went to Samson's house on the night of December 17th,
opium that had been unlawfully imported.
because Samson at last agreed to deliver the opium without first receiving the P6,000,
provided Lua Chu personally promised to pay him that amount. But the defendants' principal defense is that they were induced by Juan Samson to import
the opium in question. Juan Samson denies this, and his conduct in connection with the
The appellants make ten assignments of error as committed by the trial court in its
introduction of the prohibited drug into the port of Cebu, bears him out. A public official
judgment. Some refer to the refusal of the trial judge to permit the presentation of certain
who induces a person to commit a crime for purposes of gain, does not take the steps
documentary evidence, and to the exclusion of Juan Samson, the principal witness for the
necessary to seize the instruments of the crime and to arrest the offender, before having
Government, from the court room during the hearing; others refer to the admission of the
obtained the profit he had in mind. It is true that Juan Samson smoothed the way for the
alleged statements of the accused taken in shorthand; and the others to the sufficiency of
introduction of the prohibited drug, but that was after the accused had already planned its
the evidence of the prosecution to establish the guilt of the defendants beyond a
importation and ordered said drug, leaving only its introduction into the country through
reasonable doubt.
the Cebu customhouse to be managed, and he did not do so to help them carry their plan
With respect to the presentation of the record of the administrative proceedings against to a successful issue, but rather to assure the seizure of the imported drug and the arrest of
Joaquin Natividad, collector of customs of Cebu, and Juan Samson, supervising customs the smugglers.
secret service agent of Cebu, who were dismissed from the service, the trial court did not
err in not permitting it, for, whatever the result of those proceedings, they cannot serve to
The doctrines referring to the entrapment of offenders and instigation to commit crime, as customhouse, in order the better to assure the seizure of said opium and the arrest of its
laid down by the courts of the United States, are summarized in 16 Corpus Juris, page 88, importers, is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the latter.
section 57, as follows:
By virtue whereof, finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby
ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. — While it has been said that the practice of entrapping affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored,
and while instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Romualdez, and Imperial, JJ., concur.
and has sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the
general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilitates for its
commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the
"decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning
complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is
this true in that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and
the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the
detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him free from the
influence or the instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent of an owner acts as
supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny,
provided the original design was formed independently of such agent; and where a person
approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public authorities,
and, being authorized by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out the plan, the
larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution
for an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a "spotter," detective, or hired
informer; but there are cases holding the contrary.

As we have seen, Juan Samson neither induced nor instigated the herein defendants-
appellants to import the opium in question, as the latter contend, but pretended to have an
understanding with the collector of customs, Joaquin Natividad — who had promised them
that he would remove all the difficulties in the way of their enterprise so far as the
customhouse was concerned — not to gain the P2,000 intended for him out of the
transaction, but in order the better to assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the
arrest of the surreptitious importers. There is certainly nothing immoral in this or against
the public good which should prevent the Government from prosecuting and punishing the
culprits, for this is not a case where an innocent person is induced to commit a crime
merely to prosecute him, but it simply a trap set to catch a criminal.

Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that the mere fact that the chief of the customs
secret service pretended to agree a plan for smuggling illegally imported opium through the
Republic of the Philippines
 SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 125299 January 22, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "NENETH," accused-
appellants.
PUNO, J.:
On December 7, 1995, accused-appellants Florencio Doria y Bolado and Violeta Gaddao y
Catama @ "Neneth" were charged with violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. 1 The information reads:
That on or about the 5th day of December, 1995 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another and without having been
authorized by law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, administer,
deliver and give away to another eleven (11) plastic bags of suspected marijuana fruiting
tops weighing 7,641.08 grams in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
The prosecution contends the offense was committed as follows: In November 1995,
members of the North Metropolitan District, Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics
Command (Narcom), received information from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one
"Jun" was engaged in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City. The Narcom agents
decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust operation. As arranged by one of the CI's, a
meeting between the Narcom agents and "Jun" was scheduled on December 5, 1995 at E.
Jacinto Street in Mandaluyong City.
On December 5, 1995, at 6:00 in the morning, the CI went to the PNP Headquarters at
EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City to prepare for the buy-bust operation. The Narcom agents
formed Team Alpha composed of P/Insp. Nolasco Cortes as team leader and PO3 Celso
Manlangit, SPO1 Edmund Badua and four (4) other policemen as members. P/Insp. Cortes
designated P03 Manlangit as the poseur-buyer and SPO1 Badua as his back-up, and the rest
of the team as perimeter security. Superintendent Pedro Alcantara, Chief of the North
Metropolitan District PNP Narcom, gave the team P2, 000. 00 to cover operational
expenses. From this sum, PO3 Manlangit set aside P1,600.00 — a one thousand peso bill
and six (6) one hundred peso bills 3 — as money for the buy-bust operation. The market
price of one kilo of marijuana was then P1,600.00. P03 Manlangit marked the bills with his
initials and listed their serial numbers in the police blotter. 4 The team rode in two cars and
headed for the target area.
At 7:20 of the same morning, "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as
interested in buying one (1) kilo of marijuana. P03 Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills
worth P1,600.00. "Jun" instructed P03 Manlangit to wait for him at the corner of Shaw
Boulevard and Jacinto Street while he got the marijuana from his associate. 5 An hour later,
"Jun" appeared at the agreed place where P03 Manlangit, the CI and the rest of the team
were waiting. "Jun" took out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to P03
Manlangit. P03 Manlangit forthwith arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the
arrest. They frisked "Jun" but did not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, "Jun"
revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate named "Neneth. 6 "Jun" led
the police team to "Neneth's" house nearby at Daang Bakal.
The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and a woman inside. "Jun" identified
the woman as his associate. 7 SPO1 Badua asked "Neneth" about the P1,600.00 as PO3
Manlangit looked over "Neneth's" house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a
carton box under the dining table. He saw that one of the box's flaps was open and inside
the box was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared
similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicion aroused, PO3
Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box
and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from
"Neneth." 8 The policemen arrested "Neneth." They took "Neneth" and "Jun," together with
the box, its contents and the marked bills and turned them over to the investigator at
headquarters. It was only then that the police learned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado
while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama. The one (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves
recovered from "Jun" plus the ten (10) bricks recovered from "Neneth's" house were
examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory. 9 The bricks, eleven (11) in all, were found to be
dried marijuana fruiting tops of various weights totalling 7,641.08 grams. 10
The prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants Florencio Doria and Violeta
Gaddao. Florencio Doria, a 33-year old carpenter, testified that on December 5, 1995, at
7:00 in the morning, he was at the gate of his house reading a tabloid newspaper. Two men
appeared and asked him if he knew a certain "Totoy." There were many "Totoys" in their
area and as the men questioning him were strangers, accused-appellant denied knowing
any "Totoy." The men took accused-appellant inside his house and accused him of being a
pusher in their community. When accused-appellant denied the charge, the men led him to
their car outside and ordered him to point out the house of "Totoy." For five (5) minutes,
accused-appellant stayed in the car. Thereafter, he gave in and took them to "Totoy's"
house.
Doria knocked on the door of "Totoy's" house but no one answered. One of the men, later
identified as P03 Manlangit, pushed open the door and he and his companions entered and
looked around the house for about three minutes. Accused-appellant Doria was left
standing at the door. The policemen came out of the house and they saw Violeta Gaddao
carrying water from the well. He asked Violeta where "Totoy" was but she replied he was
not there. Curious onlookers and kibitzers were, by that time, surrounding them. When
Violeta entered her house, three men were already inside. Accused-appellant Doria, then
still at the door, overheard one of the men say that they found a carton box. Turning
towards them, Doria saw box on top of the table. The box was open and had something
inside. P03 Manlangit ordered him and Violeta to go outside the house and board the car.
They were brought to police headquarters where they were investigated.
Accused-appellant Doria further declared that his co-accused, Violeta Gaddao, is the wife of
his acquaintance, Totoy Gaddao. He said that he and Totoy Gaddao sometimes drank
together at the neighborhood store. This closeness, however, did not extend to Violeta,
Totoy's wife. 11
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao, a 35-year old rice vendor, claimed that on December 5,
1995, she was at her house at Daang Bakal, Mandaluyong City where she lived with her
husband and five (5) children, namely, Arvy, aged 10, Arjay, aged 8, the twins Raymond and
Raynan, aged 5, and Jason, aged 3. That day, accused-appellant woke up at 5:30 in the
morning and bought pan de sal for her children's breakfast. Her husband, Totoy, a
housepainter, had left for Pangasinan five days earlier. She woke her children and bathed
them. Her eldest son, Arvy, left for school at 6:45 A.M. Ten minutes later, she carried her
youngest son, Jayson, and accompanied Arjay to school. She left the twins at home leaving
the door open. After seeing Arjay off, she and Jayson remained standing in front of the
school soaking in the sun for about thirty minutes. Then they headed for home. Along the
way, they passed the artesian well to fetch water. She was pumping water when a man clad
in short pants and denim jacket suddenly appeared and grabbed her left wrist. The man
pulled her and took her to her house. She found out later that the man was P03 Manlangit.
Inside her house were her co-accused Doria and three (3) other persons. They asked her
about a box on top of the table. This was the first time she saw the box. The box was closed
and tied with a piece of green straw. The men opened the box and showed her its contents.
She said she did not know anything about the box and its contents.
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao confirmed that her co-accused Florencio Doria was a
friend of her husband, and that her husband never returned to their house after he left for
Pangasinan. She denied the charge against her and Doria and the allegation that marked
bills were found in her person. 12
After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City convicted the accused-appellants.
The trial court found the existence of an "organized/syndicated crime group" and
sentenced both accused-appellants to death and pay a fine of P500,000.00 each. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the guilt of accused, FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA
GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" having been established beyond reasonable doubt, they
are both
CONVICTED of the present charge against them.
According to the amendatory provisions of Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 7659 which cover
violations of Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 and which was exhaustively discussed in
People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555, the penalty imposable in this case is reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. Taking into
consideration, however, the provisions of Sec. 23, also of Republic Act No. 7659 which
explicitly state that:
The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any person who
belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons collaborating,
confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission of
any crime.
the Court is hereby constrained to sentence (hereby sentences) said FLORENCIO DORIA y
BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" to DEATH and to pay a fine
of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) each without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
The confiscated marijuana bricks (7,641.08 grams) shall be turned over to the Dangerous
Drugs Board, NBI for destruction in accordance with law.
Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused DORIA from the
Mandaluyong City Jail to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City and also for accused
GADDAO for her transfer to the Correctional Institute for Women, Mandaluyong City.
Let the entire records of this case be forwarded immediately to the Supreme Court for
mandatory review.
SO ORDERED. 13
Before this Court, accused-appellant Doria assigns two errors, thus:
I of accused-appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and house, and the admissibility of
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE
WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION WHEN THEIR TESTIMONIES WERE SHOT WITH
DISCREPANCIES, INCONSISTENCIES AND THAT THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE MARIJUANA
ALLEGEDLY TAKEN FROM APPELLANT WAS NOT POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE POSEUR-
BUYER.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE MARIJUANA
FRUITINGS FOUND INSIDE THE CARTON BOX AS THESE WERE OBTAINED THROUGH A
WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND DOES NOT COME WITHIN THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE. 14
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao contends:
I but ductile persons into lapses that they might otherwise resist. 20
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY DESPITE THE INCREDIBILITY OF
THE POLICE VERSION OF THE MANNER THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST WAS CONDUCTED.
II
THE PNP OFFICERS' VERSIONS AS TO WHERE THE BUY-BUST MONEY CAME FROM ARE
INCONSISTENT WITH ONE ANOTHER AND ALSO REEKS WITH INCREDIBILITY.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY AND SENTENCING HER TO
DEATH DESPITE THE MANIFESTLY IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCIES IN THE VERSIONS OF
THE POLICE AS TO HOW AND BY WHOM THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST MONEY WAS RECOVERED
FROM HER, WHICH IN CONSEQUENCE RESULTS IN THE EVIDENCE, OF RETRIEVAL FROM HER
OF THE SAME, NEBULOUS, AT BEST, NIL, AT WORST.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH
LEADING TO THE SEIZURE OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY FOUND INSIDE THE HOUSE OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT. 15
The assigned errors involve two principal issues: (1) the validity of the buy-bust operation in
the apprehension of accused-appellant Doria; and (2) the validity of the warrantless arrest
the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom.
Accused-appellants were caught by the police in a buy-bust operation. A buy-bust
operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers as an effective way of
apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of an offense. 16 Entrapment has
received judicial sanction when undertaken with due regard to constitutional and legal
safeguards. 17
Entrapment was unknown in common law. It is a judicially created twentieth-century
American doctrine that evolved from the increasing use of informers and undercover
agents in the detection of crimes, particularly liquor and narcotics offenses. 18 Entrapment
sprouted from the doctrine of estoppel and the public interest in the formulation and
application of decent standards in the enforcement of criminal law. 19 It also took off from a
spontaneous moral revulsion against using the powers of government to beguile innocent
In the American jurisdiction, the term "entrapment" has a generally negative meaning
because it is understood as the inducement of one to commit a crime not contemplated by
him, for the mere purpose of instituting a criminal prosecution against him. 21 The classic
definition of entrapment is that articulated by Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United States, 22
the first Supreme Court decision to acknowledge the concept: "Entrapment is the
conception and planning of an offense by an officer, and his procurement of its commission
by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, percuasion or fraud of
the officers." 23 It consists of two (2) elements: (a) acts of percuasion, trickery, or fraud
carried out by law enforcement officers or the agents to induce a defendant to commit a
crime; and (b) the origin of the criminal design in the minds of the government officials
rather than that of the innocent defendant, such that the crime is the product of the
creative activity of the law enforcement officer. 24
It is recognized that in every arrest, there is a certain amount of entrapment used to outwit
the persons violating or about to violate the law. Not every deception is forbidden. The
type of entrapment the law forbids is the inducing of another to violate the law, the
"seduction" of an otherwise innocent person into a criminal career. 25 Where the criminal
intent originates criminal in the mind of the entrapping person and the accused is lured into
the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him, there is entrapment and
no conviction may be had. 26 Where, however, the criminal intent originates in the mind of
the accused and the criminal offense is completed, the fact that a person acting as a decoy
for the state, or public officials furnished the accused an opportunity for commission of the
offense, or that the accused is aided in the commission of the crime in order to secure the
evidence necessary to prosecute him, there is no entrapment and the accused must be
convicted. 27 The law tolerates the use of decoys and other artifices to catch a criminal.
Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense 28 that can be raised by an accused and
partakes of the nature of a confession and avoidance. 29 It is a positive defense. Initially, an
accused has the burden of providing sufficient evidence that the government induced him
to commit the offense. Once established, the burden shifts to the governmet to show
otherwise. 30 When entrapment is raised as a defense, American federal courts and a
majority of state courts use the "subjective" or "origin of intent" test laid down in Sorrells v.
United States 31 to determine whether entrapment actually occurred. The focus of the
inquiry is on the accused's predisposition to commit the offense charged, his state of mind
and inclination before his initial exposure to government agents. 32 All relevant facts such as
the accused's mental and character traits, his past offenses, activities, his eagerness in
committing the crime, his reputation, etc., are considered to assess his state of mind before
the crime. 33 The predisposition test emphasizes the accused's propensity to commit the
offense rather than the officer's misconduct 34 and reflects an attempt to draw a line
between a "trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal." 35 If the
accused was found to have been ready and willing to commit the offense at any favorable
opportunity, the entrapment defense will fail even if a police agent used an unduly
persuasive inducement. 36 Some states, however, have adopted the "objective" test. 37 This
test was first authoritatively laid down in the case of Grossman v. State 38 rendered by the
Supreme Court of Alaska. Several other states have subsequently adopted the test by
judicial pronouncement or legislation. Here, the court considers the nature of the police
activity involved and the propriety of police conduct. 39 The inquiry is focused on the
inducements used by government agents, on police conduct, not on the accused and his
predisposition to commit the crime. For the goal of the defense is to deter unlawful police
conduct. 40 The test of entrapment is whether the conduct of the law enforcement agent
was likely to induce a normally law-abiding person, other than one who is ready and willing,
to commit the offense; 41 for purposes of this test, it is presumed that a law-abiding person
would normally resist the temptation to commit a crime that is presented by the simple
opportunity to act unlawfully. 42 Official conduct that merely offers such an opportunity is
permissible, but overbearing conduct, such as badgering, cajoling or importuning, 43 or
appeals to sentiments such as pity, sympathy, friendship or pleas of desperate illness, are
not. 44 Proponents of this test believe that courts must refuse to convict an entrapped
accused not because his conduct falls outside the legal norm but rather because, even if his
guilt has been established, the methods employed on behalf of the government to bring
about the crime "cannot be countenanced." To some extent, this reflects the notion that
the courts should not become tainted by condoning law enforcement improprieties. 45
Hence, the transactions leading up to the offense, the interaction between the accused and
law enforcement officer and the accused's response to the officer's inducements, the
gravity of the crime, and the difficulty of detecting instances of its commission are
considered in judging what the effect of the officer's conduct would on a normal person. 46
Both the "subjective" and "objective" approaches have been criticized and objected to. It is
claimed that the "subjective" test creates an "anything goes" rule, i.e, if the court
determines that an accused was predisposed to commit the crime charged, no level of
police deceit, badgering or other unsavory practices will be deemed impermissible. 47
Delving into the accused's character and predisposition obscures the more important task
of judging police behavior and prejudices the accused more generally. It ignores the
possibility that no matter what his past crimes and general disposition were, the accused
might not have committed the particular crime unless confronted with inordinate
inducements. 48 On the other extreme, the purely "objective" test eliminates entirely the
need for considering a particular accused's predisposition. His predisposition, at least if
known by the police, may have an important bearing upon the question of whether the
conduct of the police and and their agents was proper. 49 The undisputed fact that the
accused was a dangerous and chronic offender or that he was a shrewd and active member
of a criminal syndicate at the time of his arrest is relegated to irrelevancy. 50
Objections to the two tests gave birth to hybrid approaches to entrapment. Some states in
the United States now combine both the "subjective" and "objective" 51 In Cruz v. State, 52
the Florida Supreme Court declared that the permissibility of police conduct must first be
determined. If this objective test is satisfied, then the analysis turns to whether the accused
was predisposed to commit the crime. 53 In Baca v. State, 54 the New Mexico Supreme Court
modified the state's entrapment analysis by holding that "a criminal defendant may
successfully assert a defense of entrapment, either by showing lack of predisposition to
commit the crime for which he is charged, or, that the police exceeded the standards of
proper investigation. 55 The hybrid approaches combine and apply the "objective" and
"subjective" tests alternatively or concurrently.
As early as 1910, this Court has examined the conduct of law enforcers while apprehending
the accused caught in flagrante delicto. In United States v. Phelps, 56 we acquitted the
accused from the offense of smoking opium after finding that the government employee, a
BIR personnel, actually induced him to commit the crime in order to prosecute him. Smith,
the BIR agent, testified that Phelps' apprehension came after he overheard Phelps in a
saloon say that he liked smoking opium on some occasions. Smith's testimony was
disregarded. We accorded significance to the fact that it was Smith who went to the
accused three times to convince him to look for an opium den where both of them could
smoke this drug. 57 The conduct of the BIR agent was condemned as "most reprehensible." 58
In People v. Abella, 59 we acquitted the accused of the crime of selling explosives after
examining the testimony of the apprehending police officer who pretended to be a
merchant. The police officer offered "a tempting price, . . . a very high one" causing the
accused to sell the explosives. We found that there was inducement, "direct, persistent and
effective" by the police officer and that outside of his testimony, there was no evidence
sufficient to convict the accused. 60 In People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng, 61 we convicted the
accused after finding that there was no inducement on the part of the law enforcement
officer. We stated that the Customs secret serviceman smoothed the way for the
introduction of opium from Hongkong to Cebu after the accused had already planned its
importation and ordered said drug. We ruled that the apprehending officer did not induce
the accused to import opium but merely entrapped him by pretending to have an
understanding with the Collector of Customs of Cebu to better assure the seizure of the
prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers. 62
It was also in the same case of People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng 63 we first laid down the
distinction between entrapment vis-a-vis instigation or inducement. Quoting 16 Corpus
Juris, 64 we held:
ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. — While it has been said that the practice of entrapping
persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored,
and while instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned
and has sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the
general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its
commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the
'decoy solicitation' of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning
complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is
this true in that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and
the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the
detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him, free from the
influence or instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent of an owner acts as a
supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny,
provided the original design was formed independently of such agent; and where a person
approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public authorities, and,
being authorised by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out the plan, the larceny is
nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an
illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a "spotter," detective, or hired
informer; but there are cases holding the contrary. 65
The distinction above-quoted was reiterated in two (2) decisions of the Court of Appeals. In
People v. Galicia, 66 the appellate court declared that "there is a wide difference between
entrapment and instigation." The instigator practically induces the would-be accused into
the commission of the offense and himself becomes a co-principal. In entrapment, ways
and means are resorted to by the peace officer for the purpose of trapping and capturing
the lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan. 67 In People v. Tan Tiong, 68 the Court of
Appeals further declared that "entrapment is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of
the lawbreaker. 69
The pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in People v. Galicia was affirmed by this Court
in People v. Tiu Ua. 70 Entrapment, we further held, is not contrary to public policy. It is
instigation that is deemed contrary to public policy and illegal. 71
It can thus be seen that the concept of entrapment in the American jurisdiction is similar to
instigation or inducement in Philippine jurisprudence. Entrapment in the Philippines is not a
defense available to the accused. It is instigation that is a defense and is considered an
absolutory cause. 72 To determine whether there is a entrapment or instigation, our courts
have mainly examined the conduct of the apprehending officers, not the predisposition of
the accused to commit the crime. The "objective" test first applied in United States v.
Phelps has been followed in a series of similar cases. 73 Nevertheless, adopting the
"objective" approach has not precluded us from likewise applying the "subjective" test. In
People v. Boholst, 74 we applied both tests by examining the conduct of the police officers in
a buy-bust operation and admitting evidence of the accused's membership with the
notorious and dreaded Sigue-Sigue Sputnik Gang. We also considered accused's previous
his convictions of other crimes 75 and held that his opprobrious past and membership with
the dreaded gang strengthened the state's evidence against him. Conversely, the evidence
that the accused did not sell or smoke marijuana and did not have any criminal record was
likewise admitted in People v. Yutuc 76 thereby sustaining his defense that led to his
acquittal.
The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be very material in anti-
narcotics operations. In recent years, it has become common practice for law enforcement
officers and agents to engage in buy-bust operations and other entrapment procedures in
apprehending drug offenders. Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws are regulatory
statutes. 77 They are rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of
the affairs of society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita. 78 They are not
the traditional type of criminal law such as the law of murder, rape, theft, arson, etc. that
deal with crimes mala in se or those inherently wrongful and immoral. 79 Laws defining
crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior directed, not against particular individuals, but
against public order. 80 Violation is deemed a wrong against society as a whole and is
generally unattended with any particular harm to a definite person. 81 These offenses are
carried on in secret and the violators resort to many devices and subterfuges to avoid
detection. It is rare for any member of the public, no matter how furiously he condemns
acts mala prohibita, to be willing to assist in the enforcement of the law. It is necessary,
therefore, that government in detecting and punishing violations of these laws, rely, not
upon the voluntary action of aggrieved individuals, but upon the diligence of its own
officials. This means that the police must be present at the time the offenses are committed
either in an undercover capacity or through informants, spies or stool pigeons. 82
Though considered essential by the police in enforcing vice legislation, the confidential
informant system breeds abominable abuse. Frequently, a person who accepts payment
from the police in the apprehension of drug peddlers and gamblers also accept payment
from these persons who deceive the police. The informant himself maybe a drug addict,
pickpocket, pimp, or other petty criminal. For whatever noble purpose it serves, the
spectacle that government is secretly mated with the underworld and uses underworld
characters to help maintain law and order is not an inspiring one. 83 Equally odious is the
bitter reality of dealing with unscrupulous, corrupt and exploitative law enforcers. Like the
informant, unscrupulous law enforcers' motivations are legion — harassment, extortion,
vengeance, blackmail, or a desire to report an accomplishment to their superiors. This
Court has taken judicial notice of this ugly reality in a number of cases 84 where we observed
that it is a common modus operandi of corrupt law enforcers to prey on weak and hapless
persons, particularly unsuspecting provincial hicks. 85 The use of shady underworld
characters as informants, the relative ease with which illegal drugs may be planted in the
hands or property of trusting and ignorant persons, and the imposed secrecy that inevitably
shrouds all drug deals have compelled this Court to be extra-vigilant in deciding drug cases.
86
Criminal activity is such that stealth and strategy, although necessary weapons in the
arsenal of the police officer, become as objectionable police methods as the coerced
confession and the unlawful search. As well put by the Supreme Court of California in
People v. Barraza, 87
[E]ntrapment is a facet of a broader problem. Along with illegal search and seizures,
wiretapping, false arrest, illegal detention and the third degree, it is a type of lawless
enforcement. They all spring from common motivations. Each is a substitute for skillful and
scientific investigation. Each is condoned by the sinister sophism that the end, when dealing
with known criminals of the 'criminal class,' justifies the employment of illegal means. 88
It is thus imperative that the presumption, juris tantum, of regularity in the performance of
official duty by law enforcement agents raised by the Solicitor General be applied with
studied restraint. This presumption should not by itself prevail over the presumption of
innocence and the constitutionally-protected rights of the individual. 89 It is the duty of
courts to preserve the purity of their own temple from the prostitution of the criminal law
through lawless enforcement. 90 Courts should not allow themselves to be used as an
instrument of abuse and injustice lest an innocent person be made to suffer the unusually
severe penalties for drug offenses. 91
We therefore stress that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the
details of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start
from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase,
the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the
delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. 92 The manner by which the initial contact was
made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment
of the "buy-bust" money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant
alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that
law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be
caught but not at all cost. At the same time, however, examining the conduct of the police
should not disable courts into ignoring the accused's predisposition to commit the crime. If
there is overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal
proclivity, then this must also be considered. Courts should look at all factors to determine
the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to
determine the validity of the defense of inducement.1âwphi1.nêt
recovered from appellant Doria inside the carton box lumping it together with the ten (10)
bricks inside. This is why the carton box contained eleven (11) bricks of marijuana when
brought before the trial court. The one (1) brick recovered from appellant Doria and each of
the ten (10) bricks, however, were identified and marked in court. Thus:
ATTY. ARIAS, Counsel for Florencio Doria:

In the case at bar, the evidence shows that it was the confidential informant who initially
contacted accused-appellant Doria. At the pre-arranged meeting, the informant was
accompanied by PO3 Manlangit who posed as the buyer of marijuana. P03 Manlangit
handed the marked money to accused-appellant Doria as advance payment for one (1) kilo
of marijuana. Accused-appellant Doria was apprehended when he later returned and
handed the brick of marijuana to P03 Manlangit.
Mr. Police Officer, when you identified that box,. Tell the court, how were you able to
identify that box?
A This is the box that I brought to the crime laboratory which contained the eleven pieces
of marijuana brick we confiscated from the suspect, sir.
Q Please open it and show those eleven bricks.

PO3 Manlangit testified in a frank, spontaneous, straightforward and categorical manner PROSECUTOR Witness bringing out from the said box. . .
and his credibility was not crumpled on cross-examination by defense counsel. Moreover,
P03 Manlangit's testimony was corroborated on its material points by SPO1 Badua, his ATTY. VALDEZ, Counsel for Violeta Gaddao:
back-up security. The non-presentation of the confidential informant is not fatal to the
Your Honor, I must protest the line of questioning considering the fact that we are now
prosecution. Informants are usually not presented in court because of the need to hide
dealing with eleven items when the question posed to the witness was what was handed to
their identity and preserve their invaluable service to the police. 93 It is well-settled that
him by Jun?
except when the appellant vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are
material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers, 94 or there are reasons COURT So be it.
to believe that the arresting officers had motives to testify falsely against the appellant, 95 or
that only the informant was the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the entire ATTY. ARIAS May we make it of record that the witness is pulling out them after item from
transaction, 96 the testimony of the informant may be dispensed with as it will merely be the box showed to him and brought in front of him.
corroborative of the apprehending officers' eyewitness testimonies. 97 There is no need to
present the informant in court where the sale was actually witnessed and adequately COURT Noted.
proved by prosecution witnesses. 98
Q Now tell the court, how did you know that those are the eleven bricks?
The inconsistencies in P03 Manlangit's and SPO1 Badua's testimonies and the other police
xxx xxx xxx
officers' testimonies are minor and do not detract from the veracity and weight of the
prosecution evidence. The source of the money for the buy-bust operation is not a critical A I have markings on these eleven bricks, sir.
fact in the case at bar. It is enough that the prosecution proved that money was paid to
accused-appellant Doria in consideration of which he sold and delivered the marijuana. Q Point to the court, where are those markings?

Contrary to accused-appellant Doria's claim, the one kilo of marijuana "sold" by him to PO3 A Here, sir, my signature, my initials with the date, sir.
Manlangit was actually identified by PO3 Manlangit himself before the trial court. After
PROSECUTOR Witness showed a white wrapper and pointing to CLM and the signature.
appellants' apprehension, the Narcom agents placed this one (1) brick of marijuana
Q Whose signature is that? A This one, the signature, I made the signature, the date and the time and this Exhibit "A."

ATTY. VALDEZ Your Honor, may we just limit the inquiry to the basic question of the fiscal as Q How about this one?
to what was handed to him by the accused Jun, your Honor?
A I don't know who made this marking, sir.
PROSECUTOR Your Honor, there is already a ruling by this Honorable Court, your Honor,
despite reconsideration. PROSECUTOR May it be of record that this was just entered this morning.

COURT Let the prosecution do its own thing and leave the appreciation of what it has done Q I am asking you about this "itim" and not the "asul."
to the court.
A This CLM, the date and the time and the Exhibit "A," I was the one who made these
ATTY. VALDEZ We submit, your Honor. markings, sir.

A This brick is the one that was handed to me by the suspect Jun, sir. PROSECUTOR May we place on record that the one that was enclosed. . .

COURT Why do you know that that is the thing? Are you sure that is not "tikoy?" ATTY. ARIAS Your Honor, there are also entries included in that enclosure where it appears
D-394-95 also Exhibit "A," etc. etc., that was not pointed to by the witness. I want to make
A Yes, your Honor. it of record that there are other entries included in the enclosure.

Q What makes you so sure? COURT Noted. The court saw it.

A I am sure that this is the one, your Honor. This is the Exhibit "A" which I marked before I Q Now, and this alleged brick of marijuana with a piece of paper, with a newspaper
brought it to the PCCL, your Honor. wrapping with a piece of paper inside which reads: "D-394-95, Exhibit A, 970 grams SSL" be
marked as our Exhibit "D-2?"
Q What are you sure of?
COURT Tag it. Mark it.
A I am sure that this is the brick that was given to me by one alias Jun, sir.
Q This particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the contents was given to you
Q What makes you so sure? by whom?

A Because I marked it with my own initials before giving it to the investigator and before we A It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.
brought it to the PCCL, your Honor.
Q Whereat?
xxx xxx xxx
A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto St., sir.
PROSECUTOR May we request that a tag be placed on this white plastic bag and this be
marked as Exhibit "D?" Q How about the other items that you were able to recover?

COURT Mark it as Exhibit "D." xxx xxx xxx

Q To stress, who made the entries of this date, Exhibit "A" then the other letters and figures
on this plastic?
A These other marijuana bricks, because during our follow-up, because according to Jun the
money which I gave him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the house of
Neneth, sir.
xxx xxx xxx 99
The first brick identified by P03 Manlangit was the brick of marijuana "given to [him] by
suspect Jun" at the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Streets. This brick, including the
newspaper and white plastic wrapping were marked as Exhibits "D," "D-l," and "D-2" and
described as weighing nine hundred seventy (970) grams. 100
We also reject appellant's submission that the fact that P03 Manlangit and his team waited
for almost one hour for appellant Doria to give them the one kilo of marijuana after he
"paid" P1,600.00 strains credulity. Appellant cannot capitalize on the circumstance that the
money and the marijuana in the case at bar did not change hands under the usual
"kaliwaan" system. There is no rule of law which requires that in "buy-bust" operations
there must be a simultaneous exchange of the marked money and the prohibited drug
between the poseur- buyer and the pusher. 101 Again, the decisive fact is that the poseur-
buyer received the marijuana from the accused-appellant. 102
We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful.
Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
xxx xxx xxx 103
Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he
"has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Appellant
Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in
flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized but
duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant. 104
The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and
the seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills are different matters.
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence
obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 105 The
rule is, however, not absolute. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the
evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: 106 (1) search
incident to a lawful arrest;107 (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; 108 (3) search in
violation of customs laws; 109 (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; 110 (5) when the accused
himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. 111
The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a warrant of arrest
and the search and seizure of the box of marijuana and the marked bills were likewise
made without a search warrant. It is claimed, however, that the warrants were not
necessary because the arrest was made in "hot pursuit" and the search was an incident to
her lawful arrest.
To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the three
(3) instances enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
as aforequoted. The direct testimony of PO3 Manlangit, the arresting officer, however
shows otherwise:
ATTY. VALDEZ, Counsel for appellant Gaddao:
We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will be no basis for that question.
Q This particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the contents was given to you
by whom?
A It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Street, sir.
Q How about, the other items that you were able to recover? A I saw her outside, sir.

ATTY. VALDEZ: We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will be no basis for that Q She was fetching water as a matter of fact?
question.
A She was 'sa bandang poso.'
COURT There is. Answer.
Q Carrying a baby?
A These other marijuana bricks, because during our follow-up, because according to Jun the
money which I gave him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the house of A No, sir.
Neneth, sir.
Q At that particular time when you reached the house of Aling Neneth and saw her outside
Q Whereat? the house, she was not committing any crime, she was just outside the house?

A At Daang Bakal near the crime scene at Shaw Boulevard, sir. A No, sir.

Q And what happened upon arrival thereat? Q She was not about to commit any crime because she was just outside the house doing
her daily chores. Am I correct?
A We saw alias Neneth inside the house and we asked him to give us the buy-bust money,
sir. A I just saw her outside, sir.

Q You mentioned "him?" Q And at that point in time you already wanted to arrest her. That is correct, is it not?

A Her, sir. We asked her to give us the money, the marked money which Jun gave her, sir. A Yes, sir.

Q And what happened? Q Now, if any memory of your testimony is correct, according to you SPO1 Manlangit
approached her?
A At this instance, it was SPO1 Badua who can testify regarding this buy-bust money, sir.
A PO3 Manlangit, sir.
xxx xxx xxx 112
Q You did not approach her because P03 Manlangit approached her?
SPO1 Badua testified on cross-examination that:
A Yes, sir.
Q What was your intention in going to the house of Aling Neneth?
Q During all the time that this confrontation, arrest or whatever by SPO3 Manlangit was
A To arrest her, sir. taking place, you were just in the side lines?

Q But the fact is, Mr. Witness, when you reached the house of Aling Neneth, Aling Neneth A I was just watching, sir.
was there?
Q So you were just an on-looker to what Manlangit was doing, because precisely according
A Yes, sir. to you your role in this buy-bust operation was as a back-up?

Q As far as you can see, she was just inside her house? A Yes, sir.
Q Who got the alleged marijuana from inside the house of Mrs. Neneth? Q It was taken from the house of Aling Neneth, not from the person of Aling Neneth. Is that
what you are trying to tell the Court?
A P03 Manlangit, sir.
A No, sir.
Q Manlangit got the marijuana?
ATTY. VALDEZ:
A Yes, sir.
I am through with this witness, your Honor. 113
Q And the money from Aling Neneth?
Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to
A I don't know, sir. give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any
crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for appellant
Q You did not even know who got the money from Aling Neneth?
Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit." 114 In fact, she was
PROSECUTOR: going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her.

There is no basis for this question, your Honor. Money, there 's no testimony on that. Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule
113. "Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule
ATTY. VALDEZ: 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion." 115 The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of
I was asking him precisely.
actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is
PROSECUTOR: probably guilty of committing the offense, is based an actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
No basis. person to be arrested. 116 A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 117
COURT:
Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification
Sustained. made by her co-accused. PO3 Manlangit, however, declared in his direct examination that
appellant Doria named his co-accused in response to his (PO3 Manlangit's) query as to
Q Alright. I will ask you a question and I expect an honest answer. According to the records,
where the marked money was. 118 Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his
the amount of P1,600.00 was recovered from the person of Aling Neneth. That's right?
associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This
A Yes, sir, the buy-bust money. identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired
with her co-accused in pushing drugs. Appellant Doria may have left the money in her
Q What you are now saying for certain and for the record is the fact that you were not the house, 119 with or without her knowledge, with or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-
one who retrieved the money from Aling Neneth, it was Manlangit maybe? appellant Doria 's word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she
was engaged in drug pushing. If there is no showing that the person who effected the
A I saw it, sir.
warrantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested
Q It was Manlangit who got the money from Aling Neneth? to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable. 120

A The buy-bust money was recovered from the house of Aling Neneth, sir.
Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the Q Badua demanded from Aling Neneth the buy-bust money?
search of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and
marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest. This brings us to the A Yes, sir.
question of whether the trial court correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain
Q At that particular instance, you saw the carton?
view, making its warrantless seizure valid.
A Yes, sir.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that
view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and maybe introduced in Q This carton, according to you was under a table?
evidence. 121 The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the
law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or A Yes, sir, dining table.
is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in
Q I noticed that this carton has a cover?
plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. 122 The A Yes, sir.
law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position
from which he can particularly view the area. 123 In the course of such lawful intrusion, he Q I ask you were the flaps of the cover raised or closed?
came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. 124 The object
must be open to eye and A It was open, sir. Not like that.

hand 125 and its discovery inadvertent. 126 COURT

It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The Go down there. Show to the court.
difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was
INTERPRETER
inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized
without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its Witness went down the witness stand and approached a carton box.
distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then
the contents are in plain view and may be seized. 127 In other words, if the package is such A Like this, sir.
that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited
PROSECUTOR
article, then the article is deemed in plain view. 128 It must be immediately apparent to the
police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or Can we describe it?
otherwise subject to seizure. 129
ATTY. VALDEZ
PO3 Manlangit, the Narcom agent who found the box, testified on cross-examination as
follows: Yes.

ATTY. VALDEZ: PROSECUTOR

So here we are. When you and Badua arrived, Aling Neneth was inside the house? One flap is inside and the other flap is standing and with the contents visible.

A Yes, sir. COURT

Noted. A Yes, sir.

Q At this juncture, you went inside the house? Q You did not have any search warrant?

A Yes, sir. A Yes, sir.

Q And got hold of this carton? Q In fact, there was nothing yet as far as you were concerned to validate the fact that Mrs.
Gadao was in possession of the buy-bust money because according to you, you did not
A Yes, sir. know whether Badua already retrieved the buy-bust money from her?

Q Did you mention anything to Aling Neneth? A Yes, sir.

A I asked her, what's this. . . Q How far was this from the door?

Q No, no. no. did you mention anything to Aling Neneth before getting the carton? A Two and a half meters from the door, sir. It was in plain view.

A I think it was Badua who accosted Aling Neneth regarding the buy-bust money and he Q Under the table according to you?
asked "Sa iyo galing ang marijuanang ito, nasaan ang buy-bust money namin?" sir.
A Yes, sir, dining table.
Q Making reference to the marijuana that was given by alias Jun?
Q Somewhere here?
A Yes, sir.
A It's far, sir.
Q When you proceeded to take hold of this carton, Aling Neneth was not yet frisked, is it
not [sic]? PROSECUTOR

A I just don't know if she was frisked already by Badua, sir. May we request the witness to place it, where he saw it?

Q Who got hold of this? A Here, sir.

A I was the one, sir. Q What you see is a carton?

Q You were the one who got this? A Yes, sir, with plastic.

A Yes, sir. Q Marked "Snow Time Ice Pop?

Q At that particular point in time, you did not know if the alleged buy-bust money was A Yes, sir.
already retrieved by Badua?
Q With a piece of plastic visible on top of the carton?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q You went inside the house?
Q That is all that you saw?
A Yes, sir. Q Siopao?

PROSECUTOR A Yes, sir.

For the record, your Honor. . . Q Canned goods?

Q You were only able to verify according to you . . . A Yes, sir.

PRESECUTOR Q It could be ice cream because it says Snow Pop, Ice Pop?

Panero, wait. Because I am objecting to the words a piece of plastic. By reading it . . . A I presumed it was also marijuana because it may . . .

ATTY. VALDEZ Q I am not asking you what your presumptions are. I'm asking you what it could possibly be.

That's a piece of plastic. A It's the same plastic, sir.

PROSECUTOR ATTY. VALDEZ

By reading it, it will connote . . . this is not a piece of plastic. I'm not even asking you that question so why are you voluntarily saying the information. Let
the prosecutor do that for you.
ATTY. VALDEZ
COURT
What is that? What can you say, Fiscal? I'm asking you?
Continue. Next question.
PROSECUTOR
xxx xxx xxx 130
With due respect, what I am saying is, let's place the size of the plastic. A piece of plastic
may be big or a small one, for record purposes. P03 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao's house because they were
led there by appellant Doria. The Narcom agents testified that they had no information on
COURT appellant Gaddao until appellant Doria name her and led them to her. 131 Standing by the
door of appellant Gaddao's house, P03 Manlangit had a view of the interior of said house.
Leave that to the court.
Two and a half meters away was the dining table and underneath it was a carton box. The
PROSECUTOR box was partially open and revealed something wrapped in plastic.

Leave that to the court.
Q The only reason according to you, you were able to . . . Look at this, no even
Superman . . . I withdraw that. Not even a man with very kin [sic] eyes can tell the contents
here. And according to the Court, it could be "tikoy," is it not [sic]?
A Yes, sir.
In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box
were marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said contents. 132 On cross-
examination, however, he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be marijuana
because it had the same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana." A close scrutiny of
the records reveals that the plastic wrapper was not colorless and transparent as to clearly
manifest its contents to a viewer. Each of the ten (10) bricks of marijuana in the box was
individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed inside plastic bags — white, pink or blue
in color. 133 PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on cross-examination that the contents of the
box could be items other than marijuana. He did not know exactly what the box contained
that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents. 134 It was not immediately apparent
to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana. The marijuana was not in
plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law
and the Constitution. 135 It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded
and never considered by the trial court. 136
The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuana 137 was found in the house
of accused-appellant Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime
charged. 138 Apropos is our ruling in People v. Aminnudin, 139 viz:
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals.
The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their
intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of the
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice
Holmes, again, said, 'I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
government should play an ignoble part.' It is simply not allowed in the free society to
violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself. 140
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 7659 punishes the "sale, administration, delivery,
distribution and transportation of a prohibited drug" with the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million, to wit:
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs.
— The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch
in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.
xxx xxx xxx
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the submission
of proof that the sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof and the
presentation of the drug, i.e., the corpus delicti, as evidence in court. 141 The prosecution has
clearly established the fact that in consideration of P1,600.00 which he received, accused-
appellant Doria sold and delivered nine hundred seventy (970) grams of marijuana to PO3
Manlangit, the poseur-buyer. The prosecution, however, has failed to prove that accused-
appellant Gaddao conspired with accused-appellant Doria in the sale of said drug. There
being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua
must be imposed. 142
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City acting as
a Special Court in Criminal Case No. 3307-D is reversed and modified as follows:
1. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
2. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is acquitted.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Martinez, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., please see concurring opinion.
Separate Opinions
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring opinion;
I fully concur with the exhaustive and incisive ponencia of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. This
Decision rightfully brings the Court back to well-settled doctrines on warrantless arrests and
searches, which have seemingly been modified through an obiter in People v. Ruben
Montilla. 1 I just wish to outline some guidelines on when an arrest or a search without a
warrant is valid. Hopefully, they would be of help, especially to our law enforcers who are
often faced with actual situations that promptly call for their application.
Valid Arrests
Without Warrants
Sec. 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court lays down the basic rule on when an arrest without
a warrant is lawful. It states:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
xxx xxx xxx
I shall focus my discussion on the first two rules, which have been most frequently
misapplied and misinterpreted, not only by law enforcers but some trial judges and lawyers
as well.
At the very outset, I wish to underscore that in both cases the arresting officer must have
personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense. Under Section 5 (a), the
officer himself is a witness to the crime; under Section 5 (b), he knows for a fact that a
crime has just been committed. Let me elaborate.
1. In Flagrante
Delicto Arrests
Sec. 5 (a) is commonly referred to as the rule on in flagrante delicto arrests. 2 The accused is
apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just
committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. There are two elements that
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. 3
It is not sufficient that the suspect exhibits unusual or strange acts or simply appears
suspicious. Thus, in the recent en banc case of Malicat v. Court of Appeals, 4 the Court,
through now Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., held that the fact that the appellant's eyes
were "moving very fast" and looking at every approaching person were not sufficient to
suspect him of "attempting to commit a crime," much less to justify his arrest and
subsequent search without a warrant. The Court said that "there was nothing in [Malacat's]
behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion" that he was
armed with a deadly weapon. In other words, there was no overt physical act on the part of
the suspect, positively indicating that he had just committed a crime or was committing or
attempting to commit one. There was, therefore, no valid reason for the police officers to
arrest or search him.
The same was true in People v. Mengote, 5 where the arresting police tried to justify the
warrantless arrest of the appellant on the ground that he appeared suspicious. The
"suspicious" acts consisted of his darting eyes and the fact that his hand was over his
abdomen. The Court, rejecting such justification, stated: "By no stretch of the imagination
could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or
was actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in their presence. 6
In other words, the behavior or conduct of the person to be arrested must be clearly
indicative of a criminal act. If there is no outward indication at all that calls for an arrest, the
suspect cannot be validly apprehended under this paragraph, notwithstanding a tip from an
informant that he would at the time be undertaking a felonious enterprise.
This doctrine found strength in People v. Aminnudin 7 and again in People v. Encinada. 8 In
both cases, the appellants were arrested while disembarking from a ship, on account of a
tip received from an informant that they were carrying prohibited drugs. The Court
invalidated their warrantless arrests, explaining that at the moment of their arrests, the
appellants were simply descending the gangplank, without manifesting any suspicious
behavior that would reasonably invite the attention of the police. To all appearances, they
were not committing a crime; nor was it shown that they were about to do so or had just
done so. There was, therefore, no valid reason for their arrests.
Adhering to (and having faith in) the above rules, I respectfully disagreed with the
distinguished Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado in People v. Montilla, 9 when he upheld the
validity of the warrantless arrest of the appellant while the latter was merely alighting from
a passenger jeepney. I opined that Montilla could not have been perceived as committing a
crime while merely alighting from a jeepney carrying a traveling bag and a carton. He did
not exhibit any overt act or strange conduct that would reasonably arouse in the minds of
the police suspicion that he was embarking on a felonious undertaking. There was no
outward manifestation that he had just committed or was committing or attempting to
commit an offense. Mercifully, the statement of the Court that Montilla's arrest was valid
because he was caught in flagrante delicto was only an obiter, for what finally nailed him
down was his implied waiver of any objection to the validity of his arrest.
2. "Hot Pursuit"
Arrests
Sec. 5 (b) is otherwise known as the rule on "hot pursuit" arrests. 10 Here, two elements
must also concur prior to the arrest: (1) and "offense has in fact been committed," (2) the
arresting officer "has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested .
. . committed [the offense]." In effecting this type of arrest, "it is not enough that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A
crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. . . . The fact of the commission of
the offense must be undisputed. 11
Thus, while the law enforcers may not actually witness the execution of acts constituting
the offense, they must have direct knowledge or view of the crime right after its
commission. They should know for a fact that a crime was committed. AND they must also
perceive acts exhibited by the person to be arrested, indicating that he perpetrated the
crime. Again, mere intelligence information that the suspect committed the crime will not
suffice. The arresting officers themselves must have personal knowledge of facts showing
that the suspect performed the criminal act. Personal knowledge means actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion, based on actual facts, that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing the crime. 12
In several cases wherein third persons gave law enforcers information that certain
individuals or groups were engaged in some felonious activities, such relayed information
was not deemed equivalent to personal knowledge of the lawmen. In People v. Burgos, 13 a
certain Masamlok informed police authorities that the appellant was involved in subversive
activities. Acting on the strength of such information and without securing a judicial
warrant, the police proceeded to appellant's house to arrest him. There, they also allegedly
recovered an unlicensed firearm and subversive materials.
The Court held that there was no personal knowledge on the part of the arresting officers,
since the information came in its entirety from Masamlok, a civilian. We pointed out that at
the time of his arrest, appellant was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive
document; neither was he committing a subversive act. 14 His warrantless arrest, therefore,
could not be allowed under any of the instances in Rule 113, Section 6 (now 5) of the Rules
of Court.
Also in Encinada, the appellant was arrested without a warrant, on the justification that the
arresting officer "received an intelligence report that appellant who was carrying marijuana
would arrive the next morning aboard M/V Sweet Pearl." The Court categorically stated
that such "[r]aw intelligence information is not a sufficient ground for a warrantless arrest."
15
And since, at the time of his arrest, no act or fact demonstrating a felonious enterprise
could be ascribed to appellant, there was no valid justification for his arrest.
To be distinguished from the above cases are those involving continuing offenses for which
the culprit could be arrested any time in flagrante delicto. In Umil v. Ramos, 16 there were
strong objections to the warrantless arrest of a suspected member of the New People's
Army (NPA), while he was being treated for a gunshot wound in a hospital. He alleged that
there was no valid justification for his arrest without a warrant, because he was not then
committing any offense nor were there any indications that he had just committed or was
about to commit one; he was in fact confined in a hospital.
The Court held that subversion, for which he was arrested and subsequently charged, was a
continuing offense. For purposes of arrest, the Court said, the NPA member "did not cease
to be, or became less of a subversive, . . . simply because he was, at the time of his arrest,
confined in the . . . [hospital]." "Unlike other so-called 'common' offenses, i.e., adultery,
murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission, subversion and rebellion
are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of
lawlessness and violence until the overriding object of overthrowing organized government
is attained. 17
In the above instances where the arrests without warrants were held unlawful, so were the
searches conducted subsequent thereto. Thus, the items seized consequent to the invalid
search, though clearly prohibited by law (e.g. marijuana or unlicensed firearm), were
considered inadmissable as evidence against the person wrongfully arrested. Important to
bear in mind always is that any search conducted without a judicial warrant must be
prcceded by a lawful arrest, whether with or without a warrant duly issued therefor.
To underscore the rationale behind these strict rules, I deem it quite apt to quote these
inspiring words from the precedent-setting case of People v. Burgos: 18
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any
deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which
allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any
exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd
or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule
on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically provided
by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often
violated and so deserving of full protection.
Valid Searches
Without Warrant
The general rule is that a judicial warrant must first be duly obtained before search and
seizure may be conducted. The only allowable instances in which a search may be
conducted without a warrant are: (1) search incident to lawful arrest, (2) search pursuant to
the "plain view" doctrine, (3) search of moving vehicles, (4) searches incidental to violation
of customs laws, (5) search with consent, and (6) a "stop and frisk. 19
1. Search Incident
to Lawful Arrest
Section 12 of Rule 126 provides that a lawfully arrested person may be searched without a
warrant for dangerous weapons or anything else that may be used as evidence of the
offense. Such incidental search is, however, limited to the person of the arrestee at the
time of the apprehension. The search cannot be extended to or made in a place other than
the place of the arrest. 20
2. The "Plain View"
Doctrine
The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law
enforcement officer is in a position where he has a clear view of a particular area or has
prior justification for an intrusion; (2) said officer inadvertently comes across (or sees in
plainview) a piece of incriminating evidence; and (3) it is immediately apparent to such
officer that the item he sees may be evidence of a crime or a contraband or is otherwise
subject to seizure. 21
3. Search of
Moving Vehicles
The warrantless search of moving vehicles (including shipping vessels and aircraft) is
justified by practicability, viz.: 22
The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures construed as
recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure
in respect of which a search warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship,
motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to
secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
xxx xxx xxx
The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle . . . Constructed as covered vehicles to
standard form in immense quantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling express trains
they furnish for successful commission of crime a distinguishing means of silent approach
and swift escape unknown in the history of the world before their advent. The question of
their police control and reasonable search on highways or other public place is a serious
question far deeper and broader than their use in so-called 'bootlegging' or 'rum running,'
which in itself is no small matter. While a possession in the sense of private ownership, they
are but a vehicle constructed for travel and transportation on highways. Their active use is
not in homes or on private premises, the privacy of which the law especially guards from
search and seizure without process. The baffling extent to which they are successfully
utilized to facilitate commission of crime of all degrees, from those against morality,
chastity, and decency to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a matter of common
knowledge. Upon that problem, a condition, and not a theory, confronts proper
administration of our criminal laws. Whether search of and seizure from an automobile
upon a highway or other public place without a search warrant is unreasonable is in its final
analysis to be determined as a judicial question in view of all the circumstances under
which it is made.
4. Customs Searches
Under the Tariff and Customs Code, searches, seizures and arrests may be made even
without warrants, for purposes of enforcing customs and tariff laws. Without mention of
the need to priorly obtain a judicial warrant, the Code specifically allows police authorities
to "enter, pass through or search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store or building, not
being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and
any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board[;]or stop and search and
examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or
prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law. 23
5. Search With Consent
Waiver of any objection to the unresonableness or invalidity of a search is a recognized
exception to the rule against a warrantless search. 24 The consent to the search, however,
must be express knowing and voluntary. A search based merely on implied acquiescene is
not valid, because such consent is not within the purview of the constitutional gurantee,
but only a passive conformity to the search given under intimidating and coercive
circumstances. 25
6. Stop and Frisk
The "stop and frisk" concept is of American origin, the most notable case thereon being
Terry v. Ohio. 27 The idea is that a police officer may after properly introducing himself and
making initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person manifesting unusual and suspicious
conduct, in order to check, the latter's outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The
strict manner in which this notion should be applied has been laid down as follows: 28
. . . where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in the light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the
course of investigating this behaviour, he identifies himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to
dispel his reasonable fear for his own and others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of
such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
As in the warrantless arrest of a person reasonably suspected of having just committed a
crime, mere suspicious behavior would not call for a "stop and frisk." There must be a
genuine reason, in accordance with the police officer's experience and the surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons (or contraband)
concealed about him. 29
A valid application of the doctrine was recognized in Posadas v. Court of Appeals 30 and in
Manalili v. Court of Appeals. 31 In Manalili, the law enforcers who were members of the
Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, observed during their surveillance that
appellant had red eyes and was walking in a wobby manner along the city cemetery which,
according to police information, was a popular hangout of drug addicts. Based on police
experience, such suspicious behaviour was characteristic of persons who were "high" on
drugs. The Court held that past experience and the surrounding circumstances gave the
police sufficient reason to stop the suspect and to investigate if he was really high on drugs.
The marijuana that they found in the suspect's possession was held to be admissible in
evidence.
Before I end, I must reiterate that the above exceptions to the general rule on the necessity
of a judicial warrant for any arrest, search and seizure must all be strictly construed.
Foremost in our minds must still be every person's prized and fundamental right to liberty
and security, a right protected and guaranteed by our Constitution.
WHEREFORE, I vote to ACQUIT Appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama, as well as to REDUCE
the penalty of Appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado to reclusion perpetua and a fine of
P500,000.
Footnotes
28 Woo Wai v. United States, 233 Fed. 412 (6th Cir. 1916); Sorrells v. United States, supra,
at 452 — the defense is available, not in the view that the accused though guilty may go
free, but that the government cannot be permitted to contend that he is guilty of the crime
when the government officials are the instigators of his conduct; see also 22 C.J.S.,
"Criminal Law," Sec. 45, [1940 ed.].
20 Christopher Moore, "The Elusive Foundation of the Entrapment Defense," Northwestern
University Law Review, vol. 89: 1151, 1153-1154 [Spring 1995]; Scott C. Paton, "The
Government Made Me Do It: A Proposed Approach to Entrapment under Jacobson v.
United States," Cornell Law Review, vol. 79: 885, 1000-1001 [1994]; Roger Park, "The
Entrapment Controversy," Minnesota Law Review, vol. 60: 163, 165 [1976].
31 The "subjective" test is also referred to as the Sherman-Sorrells doctrine, a reference to
the fact that the test was adopted by a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court in the cases of
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 2 L Ed 2d 848, 78 S Ct 819 [1958] and Sorrells v.
United States, supra — Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law, Hornbook
series, 2d ed., p. 422 [1986].
57 This case was interpreted in People v. Hilario and Aguila, 93 Phil. 386, 390 [1953], where
the Supreme Court declared that the "criminal intent" to smoke opium "originated in the
mind of the entrapping agent" and the accused was merely induced to commit the act by
repeated and persistent solicitation. In Phelps, the court disregarded the evidence of
Phelps' predisposition to commit the crime.
72 Absolutory causes are those causes where the act committed is a crime but for reasons
of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed — Reyes, Revised Penal Code,
Book I, pp. 231-232 [1993].
74 152 SCRA 263, 271 [1987]. Although the accused did not raise the defense of instigation,
the court examined the conduct of the police at the buy-bust operation and admitted
evidence of the accused's past and predisposition to commit the crime.
75 Accused was previously convicted of frustrated murder, robbery, hold-up and drug
pushing. In the drug-pushing case, he was detained at Welfareville but escaped — People v.
Boholst, 152 SCRA 263, 271 [1987].
77 Richard C. Donnelly, "Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons and Agent
Provocateurs," The Yale Law Journal, vol. 60: 1091, 1093 [1951].
80 Donnelly, supra, at 1093. Instead of "mala prohibita," Donnelly uses the term
"regulatory statutes.
88 Id. at 955. The Supreme Court of California quoted Richard C. Donnelly, "Judicial Control
of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons and Agent Provocateurs," Yale Law Journal, vol. 60:
1091, 1111 [1951], also herein cited; See also Paton, Cornell Law Review, supra, at Note 55.
It must be noted, however, that entrapment is not based on constitutional grounds as
search and seizure and forced confessions — United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 430, 36
L Ed 2d 366, 372-373, 93 S Ct 1637 [1973].
97 People v. Lucero, 229 SCRA 1, 9-10 [1994]; People v. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455, 464 [1994];
People v. Solon 244 SCRA 554, 561 [1995]; People v. Herrera, 247 SCRA 433 [1995].
106 Hizon v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 517, 527 [1996]; People v. Fernandez, 239 SCRA
174, 182-183 [1994]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687, 697 [1986]; see also Bernas, The
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, p. 169 [1996]; Cruz, Constitutional Law, pp.
147-153 [1986].
114 Compare with People v. Bati, 189 SCRA 97, 103 [1990], where the two accused were
pursued and arrested a few minutes after consummating the sale of marijuana. "Hot
pursuit" has a technical meaning. It is a doctrine in International Law which means the
pursuit in the high seas of a foreign vessel undertaken by the coastal state which has good
reason to believe that the ship has violated the laws and regulations of that state (Salonga
and Yap, Public International Law, p. 90 [19921).
115 Umil v. Ramos, 202 SCRA 251, 263 [1991]; United States v. Santos, 36 Phil. 851 [1917].
Police officers had personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime after
conducting a surveillance of the accused (People v. Bati, 189 SCRA 97 [1990]; People v.
Sucro, 195 SCRA 388 [1990]), or a prior test-buy operation (People v. Ramos, 186 SCRA 184
[1990).
118 P03 Manlangit affirmed this fact in his cross-examination by counsel for appellant
Gaddao — TSN of February 20, 1996, pp. 42-43.
119 SPO1 Badua's testimony does not clearly establish where he found the marked bills —
whether from appellant Gaddao's person or after a search of her house.
134 In People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597, 612 [1993], the Narcom agents found marijuana in a
plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen. The agents had no clue as to the contents
of the bag and had to ask the accused what it contained. The Supreme Court held that the
marijuana was not in plain view.
137 The total weight of 7,641.08 grams or 7.6 kilos of marijuana included the 970 grams (or
almost one kilo) of "buy-bust marijuana" given by appellant Doria (See "Request for
Laboratory Examination," Exhibit "S"). Deducting this 970 grams, the ten bricks of marijuana
found in the box weigh 6,671.08 grams or approximately 6 kilos.
141 People v. Zervoulakos, 241 SCRA 325 [1995]; People v. Martinez, 235 SCRA 171 [1994]
People v. Rigodon, 238 SCRA 27 [1994]. The exclusion or absence of the marked money
does not create a hiatus in the prosecution's evidence as long as the drug subject of the
illegal transaction was presented at the trial court — People v. Nicolas, 241 SCRA 573
[1995]; People v. Lucero, 229 SCRA 1 [1994].
142 Section 23, R.A. 7659 amending Article 62 of the Dangerous Drugs Act; see also Section
17 (5), R.A 7659 amending Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
17 The Anti-Subversion Law, which prohibited mere membership in a subversive
organization, has since been repealed.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 181409               February 11, 2010
INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG, represented by
MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG, as Administratrix, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and WILLIAM SATO, Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. – No criminal, but only civil liability shall
result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling, or malicious mischief
committed or caused mutually by the following persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line;
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the deceased
spouse before the same shall have passed into the possession of another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together.
The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers participating
in the commission of the crime. (emphasis supplied)
For purposes of the aforementioned provision, is the relationship by affinity created
between the husband and the blood relatives of his wife (as well as between the wife and
the blood relatives of her husband) dissolved by the death of one spouse, thus ending the
marriage which created such relationship by affinity? Does the beneficial application of
Article 332 cover the complex crime of estafa thru falsification?
Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix1 of petitioner
intestate estate of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong, filed a
complaint-affidavit2 for estafa against her brother-in-law, William Sato, a Japanese national.
Her complaint-affidavit read:
I, MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG Y GONZALE[S], Filipino, of legal age, single, and resident of
Unit 1111, Prince Gregory Condominium, 105 12th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, after being
duly sworn, depose and state that:
1. I am the duly appointed Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Manolita Carungcong Y
Gonzale[s], docketed as Spec. Procs. No. [Q]-95-23621[,] Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 104, being one (1) of her surviving daughters. Copy of the Letters of
Administration dated June 22, 1995 is hereto attached as Annex "A" to form an integral part
hereof.
2. As such Administratrix, I am duty bound not only to preserve the properties of the
Intestate Estate of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], but also to recover such funds and/or
properties as property belonging to the estate but are presently in the possession or
control of other parties.
3. After my appointment as Administratrix, I was able to confer with some of the children of
my sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato[,] who predeceased our mother Manolita Carungcong Y
Gonzales, having died in Japan in 1991.
4. In my conference with my nieces Karen Rose Sato and Wendy Mitsuko Sato, age[d] 27
and 24 respectively, I was able to learn that prior to the death of my mother Manolita
Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], [s]pecifically on o[r] about November 24, 1992, their father
William Sato, through fraudulent misrepresentations, was able to secure the signature and
thumbmark of my mother on a Special Power of Attorney whereby my niece Wendy
Mitsuko Sato, who was then only twenty (20) years old, was made her attorney-in-fact, to
sell and dispose four (4) valuable pieces of land in Tagaytay City. Said Special Power of
Attorney, copy of which is attached as ANNEX "A" of the Affidavit of Wendy Mitsuko Sato,
was signed and thumbmark[ed] by my mother because William Sato told her that the
documents she was being made to sign involved her taxes. At that time, my mother was
completely blind, having gone blind almost ten (10) years prior to November, 1992.
5. The aforesaid Special Power of Attorney was signed by my mother in the presence of
Wendy, my other niece Belinda Kiku Sato, our maid Mana Tingzon, and Governor Josephine
Ramirez who later became the second wife of my sister’s widower William Sato.
6. Wendy Mitsuko Sato attests to the fact that my mother signed the document in the
belief that they were in connection with her taxes, not knowing, since she was blind, that
the same was in fact a Special Power of Attorney to sell her Tagaytay properties.
7. On the basis of the aforesaid Special Power of Attorney, William Sato found buyers for
the property and made my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign three (3) deeds of absolute sale
in favor of (a) Anita Ng (Doc. 2194, Page No. 41, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary Public
Vicente B. Custodio), (b) Anita Ng (Doc. No. 2331, Page No. 68, Book No. V, Series of 1992
of Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio) and (c) Ruby Lee Tsai (Doc. No. II, Page No. 65, Book
No. II, Series of 1993 of Notary Public Toribio D. Labid). x x x
8. Per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, the considerations appearing on the deeds
of absolute sale were not the true and actual considerations received by her father William
Sato from the buyers of her grandmother’s properties. She attests that Anita Ng actually
paid P7,000,000.00 for the property covered by TCT No. 3148 and P7,034,000.00 for the
property covered by TCT No. 3149. All the aforesaid proceeds were turned over to William
Sato who undertook to make the proper accounting thereof to my mother, Manolita
Carungcong Gonzale[s].
9. Again, per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, Ruby Lee Tsai paid P8,000,000.00 for
the property covered by Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0735, and the proceeds thereof were
likewise turned over to William Sato.
10. The considerations appearing on the deeds of sale were falsified as Wendy Mitsuko C.
Sato has actual knowledge of the true amounts paid by the buyers, as stated in her
Affidavit, since she was the signatory thereto as the attorney-in-fact of Manolita
Carungcong Y Gonzale[s].
11. Wendy was only 20 years old at the time and was not in any position to oppose or to
refuse her father’s orders.
12. After receiving the total considerations for the properties sold under the power of
attorney fraudulently secured from my mother, which total P22,034,000.00, William Sato
failed to account for the same and never delivered the proceeds to Manolita Carungcong Y
Gonzale[s] until the latter died on June 8, 1994.
13. Demands have been made for William Sato to make an accounting and to deliver the
proceeds of the sales to me as Administratrix of my mother’s estate, but he refused and
failed, and continues to refuse and to fail to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the
estate of the deceased Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] and of the heirs which include his
six (6) children with my sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato. x x x3
Wendy Mitsuko Sato’s supporting affidavit and the special power of attorney allegedly
issued by the deceased Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong in favor of Wendy were
attached to the complaint-affidavit of Mediatrix.
In a resolution dated March 25, 1997, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed the
complaint.4 On appeal, however, the Secretary of Justice reversed and set aside the
resolution dated March 25, 1997 and directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to file an
Information against Sato for violation of Article 315, paragraph 3(a) of the Revised Penal
Code.5 Thus, the following Information was filed against Sato in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 87:6
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses WILLIAM SATO of the crime of ESTAFA under Article 315[,] par.
3(a) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of November, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, by means of deceit, did, then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG in the following manner,
to wit: the said accused induced said Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong[,] who was
already then blind and 79 years old[,] to sign and thumbmark a special power of attorney
dated November 24, 1992 in favor of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, daughter of said accused,
making her believe that said document involved only her taxes, accused knowing fully well
that said document authorizes Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, then a minor, to sell, assign,
transfer or otherwise dispose of to any person or entity of her properties all located at
Tagaytay City, as follows:
1. One Thousand Eight Hundred Seven(ty) One (1,871) square meters more or less and
covered by T.C.T. No. 3147;
2. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3148 with
Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0722, Cadastral Lot No. 7106;
3. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3149 with
Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0721, Cadastral Lot No. 7104;
4. Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (888) square meters more or less with Tax Declaration No.
GR-016-1735, Cadastral Lot No. 7062;
registered in the name of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, and once in the
possession of the said special power of attorney and other pertinent documents, said
accused made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale covering
Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] No. 3148 for P250,000.00, [TCT] No. 3149 for P250,000.00
and [Tax Declaration] GR-016-0735 for P650,000.00 and once in possession of the proceeds
of the sale of the above properties, said accused, misapplied, misappropriated and
converted the same to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of
the heirs of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong who died in 1994.
Contrary to law.7
Subsequently, the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information so as to
increase the amount of damages from P1,150,000, the total amount stated in the deeds of
sale, to P22,034,000, the actual amount received by Sato.
Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that under Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code, his relationship to the person allegedly defrauded, the deceased
Manolita who was his mother-in-law, was an exempting circumstance.
The prosecution disputed Sato’s motion in an opposition dated March 29, 2006.
In an order dated April 17, 2006,8 the trial court granted Sato’s motion and ordered the
dismissal of the criminal case:
The Trial Prosecutor’s contention is that the death of the wife of the accused severed the
relationship of affinity between accused and his mother-in-law. Therefore, the mantle of
protection provided to the accused by the relationship is no longer obtaining.
A judicious and thorough examination of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code convinces
this Court of the correctness of the contention of the [d]efense. While it is true that the
death of Zenaida Carungcong-Sato has extinguished the marriage of accused with her, it
does not erase the fact that accused and Zenaida’s mother, herein complainant, are still
son[-in-law] and mother-in-law and they remained son[-in-law] and mother-in-law even
beyond the death of Zenaida.
Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, is very explicit and states no proviso. "No criminal,
but only civil liability[,] shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling or
malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by xxx 1) spouses, ascendants and
descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line."
Article 332, according to Aquino, in his Commentaries [to] Revised Penal Code, preserves
family harmony and obviates scandal, hence even in cases of theft and malicious mischief,
where the crime is committed by a stepfather against his stepson, by a grandson against his
grandfather, by a son against his mother, no criminal liability is incurred by the accused only
civil (Vicente Alavare, 52 Phil. 65; Adame, CA 40 OG 12th Supp. 63; Cristobal, 84 Phil. 473).
Such exempting circumstance is applicable herein.
WHEREFORE, finding the Motion to Quash Original Information meritorious, the same is
GRANTED and, as prayed for, case is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.9 (underlining supplied in the original)
The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration10 was denied in an order dated June 2, 2006.11
Dissatisfied with the trial court’s rulings, the intestate estate of Manolita, represented by
Mediatrix, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals12 which, however, in a
decision13 dated August 9, 2007, dismissed it. It ruled:
[W]e sustain the finding of [the trial court] that the death of Zenaida did not extinguish the
relationship by affinity between her husband, private respondent Sato, and her mother
Manolita, and does not bar the application of the exempting circumstance under Article
332(1) of the Revised Penal Code in favor of private respondent Sato.
We further agree with the submission of the [Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)] that
nothing in the law and/or existing jurisprudence supports the argument of petitioner that
the fact of death of Zenaida dissolved the relationship by affinity between Manolita and
private respondent Sato, and thus removed the protective mantle of Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code from said private respondent; and that notwithstanding the death of
Zenaida, private respondent Sato remains to be the son-in-law of Manolita, and a brother-
in-law of petitioner administratrix. As further pointed out by the OSG, the filing of the
criminal case for estafa against private respondent Sato already created havoc among
members of the Carungcong and Sato families as private respondent’s daughter Wendy
Mitsuko Sato joined cause with her aunt [Mediatrix] Carungcong y Gonzales, while two (2)
other children of private respondent, William Francis and Belinda Sato, took the side of
their father.
There is a dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries elaborating on the provision of
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code. However, from the plain language of the law, it is
clear that the exemption from criminal liability for the crime of swindling (estafa) under
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code applies to private respondent Sato, as son-in-law of
Manolita, they being "relatives by affinity in the same line" under Article 332(1) of the same
Code. We cannot draw the distinction that following the death of Zenaida in 1991, private
respondent Sato is no longer the son-in-law of Manolita, so as to exclude the former from
the exempting circumstance provided for in Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Basic is the rule in statutory
construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.
There should be no distinction in the application of law where none is indicated. The courts
could only distinguish where there are facts or circumstances showing that the lawgiver
intended a distinction or qualification. In such a case, the courts would merely give effect to
the lawgiver’s intent. The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the
law does not include the power to correct by reading into the law what is not written
therein.
Further, it is an established principle of statutory construction that penal laws are strictly
construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Any reasonable doubt
must be resolved in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of Article 332 (1) of
the Revised Penal Code’s simple language is most favorable to Sato.14
The appellate court denied reconsideration.15 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the orders of the trial
court. It cites the commentary of Justice Luis B. Reyes in his book on criminal law that the
rationale of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code exempting the persons mentioned
therein from criminal liability is that the law recognizes the presumed co-ownership of the
property between the offender and the offended party. Here, the properties subject of the
estafa case were owned by Manolita whose daughter, Zenaida Carungcong-Sato (Sato’s
wife), died on January 28, 1991. Hence, Zenaida never became a co-owner because, under
the law, her right to the three parcels of land could have arisen only after her mother’s
death. Since Zenaida predeceased her mother, Manolita, no such right came about and
the mantle of protection provided to Sato by the relationship no longer existed.
Sato counters that Article 332 makes no distinction that the relationship may not be
invoked in case of death of the spouse at the time the crime was allegedly committed.
Thus, while the death of Zenaida extinguished her marriage with Sato, it did not dissolve
the son-in-law and mother-in-law relationship between Sato and Zenaida’s mother,
Manolita.
For his part, the Solicitor General maintains that Sato is covered by the exemption from
criminal liability provided under Article 332. Nothing in the law and jurisprudence supports
petitioner’s claim that Zenaida’s death dissolved the relationship by affinity between Sato
and Manolita. As it is, the criminal case against Sato created havoc among the members of
the Carungcong and Sato families, a situation sought to be particularly avoided by Article
332’s provision exempting a family member committing theft, estafa or malicious mischief
from criminal liability and reducing his/her liability to the civil aspect only.
The petition has merit.
The resolution of this case rests on the interpretation of Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code. In particular, it calls for the determination of the following: (1) the effect of death on
the relationship by affinity created between a surviving spouse and the blood relatives of
the deceased spouse and (2) the extent of the coverage of Article 332.
Effect of Death on Relationship By Affinity as Absolutory Cause
Article 332 provides for an absolutory cause16in the crimes of theft, estafa (or swindling)
and malicious mischief. It limits the responsibility of the offender to civil liability and frees
him from criminal liability by virtue of his relationship to the offended party.
In connection with the relatives mentioned in the first paragraph, it has been held that
included in the exemptions are parents-in-law, stepparents and adopted children.17 By
virtue thereof, no criminal liability is incurred by the stepfather who commits malicious
mischief against his stepson;18 by the stepmother who commits theft against her stepson;19
by the stepfather who steals something from his stepson;20 by the grandson who steals
from his grandfather;21 by the accused who swindles his sister-in-law living with him;22 and
by the son who steals a ring from his mother.23
Affinity is the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse. It is a
relationship by marriage or
a familial relation resulting from marriage.24 It is a fictive kinship, a fiction created by law in
connection with the institution of marriage and family relations.
If marriage gives rise to one’s relationship by affinity to the blood relatives of one’s spouse,
does the extinguishment of marriage by the death of the spouse dissolve the relationship
by affinity?
Philippine jurisprudence has no previous encounter with the issue that confronts us in this
case. That is why the trial and appellate courts acknowledged the "dearth of jurisprudence
and/or commentaries" on the matter. In contrast, in the American legal system, there are
two views on the subject. As one Filipino author observed:
In case a marriage is terminated by the death of one of the spouses, there are conflicting
views. There are some who believe that relationship by affinity is not terminated whether
there are children or not in the marriage (Carman vs. Newell, N.Y. 1 [Denio] 25, 26).
However, the better view supported by most judicial authorities in other jurisdictions is
that, if the spouses have no living issues or children and one of the spouses dies, the
relationship by affinity is dissolved. It follows the rule that relationship by affinity ceases
with the dissolution of the marriage which produces it (Kelly v. Neely, 12 Ark. 657, 659, 56
Am Dec. 288). On the other hand, the relationship by affinity is continued despite the death
of one of the spouses where there are living issues or children of the marriage "in whose
veins the blood of the parties are commingled, since the relationship of affinity was
continued through the medium of the issue of the marriage" (Paddock vs. Wells, 2 Barb. Ch.
331, 333).25
The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity terminates
with the dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce which gave rise to the
relationship of affinity between the parties.26 Under this view, the relationship by affinity is
simply coextensive and coexistent with the marriage that produced it. Its duration is
indispensably and necessarily determined by the marriage that created it. Thus, it exists
only for so long as the marriage subsists, such that the death of a spouse ipso facto ends
the relationship by affinity of the surviving spouse to the deceased spouse’s blood relatives.
The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues even after the
death of one spouse when there is a surviving issue.27 The rationale is that the relationship
is preserved because of the living issue of the marriage in whose veins the blood of both
parties is commingled.28
The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity
between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after
the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced children or
not.29 Under this view, the relationship by affinity endures even after the dissolution of the
marriage that produced it as a result of the death of one of the parties to the said marriage.
This view considers that, where statutes have indicated an intent to benefit step-relatives
or in-laws, the "tie of affinity" between these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not
to be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the married parties.30
After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two views, we hold that
the second view is more consistent with the language and spirit of Article 332(1) of the
Revised Penal Code.
First, the terminated affinity view is generally applied in cases of jury disqualification and
incest.31 On the other hand, the continuing affinity view has been applied in the
interpretation of laws that intend to benefit step-relatives or in-laws. Since the purpose of
the absolutory cause in Article 332(1) is meant to be beneficial to relatives by affinity within
the degree covered under the said provision, the continuing affinity view is more
appropriate.
Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of "relatives by affinity in the same
line" is couched in general language. The legislative intent to make no distinction between
the spouse of one’s living child and the surviving spouse of one’s deceased child (in case of
a son-in-law or daughter-in-law with respect to his or her parents-in-law)32 can be drawn
from Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code without doing violence to its language.
Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of the family as a
basic autonomous social institution are policies of the State and that it is the duty of the
State to strengthen the solidarity of the family.33 Congress has also affirmed as a State and
national policy that courts shall preserve the solidarity of the family.34 In this connection,
the spirit of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal.35 The view that
relationship by affinity is not affected by the death of one of the parties to the marriage
that created it is more in accord with family solidarity and harmony.
Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is to resolve
all doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the accused.36
This is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the accused shall be presumed
innocent unless and until his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt.37
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity.38 The rule applies
when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is
prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the
adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to the accused.
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the lens of the
basic purpose of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to preserve family harmony by
providing an absolutory cause. Since the goal of Article 332(1) is to benefit the accused, the
Court should adopt an application or interpretation that is more favorable to the accused.
In this case, that interpretation is the continuing affinity view.
Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold that the
relationship by affinity created between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the
deceased spouse survives the death of either party to the marriage which created the
affinity. (The same principle applies to the justifying circumstance of defense of one’s
relatives under Article 11[2] of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance of
immediate vindication of grave offense committed against one’s relatives under Article
13[5] of the same Code and the absolutory cause of relationship in favor of accessories
under Article 20 also of the same Code.)
Scope of Article 332 of The Revised Penal Code
The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to the
felonies of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the State
condones the criminal responsibility of the offender in cases of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the State waives its right to prosecute the offender
for the said crimes but leaves the private offended party with the option to hold the
offender civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein.
The plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies
exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply
where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another crime,
such as theft through falsification or estafa through falsification.39
The Information against Sato charges him with estafa. However, the real nature of the
offense is determined by the facts alleged in the Information, not by the designation of the
offense.40 What controls is not the title of the Information or the designation of the offense
but the actual facts recited in the Information.41 In other words, it is the recital of facts of
the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the
crime being charged in the Information.42 It is the exclusive province of the court to say
what the crime is or what it is named.43 The determination by the prosecutor who signs the
Information of the crime committed is merely an opinion which is not binding on the
court.44
A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being charged not with
simple estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents. In particular, the Information states that Sato, by means of deceit, intentionally
defrauded Manolita committed as follows:
(a) Sato presented a document to Manolita (who was already blind at that time) and
induced her to sign and thumbmark the same;
(b) he made Manolita believe that the said document was in connection with her taxes
when it was in fact a special power of attorney (SPA) authorizing his minor daughter Wendy
to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of Manolita’s properties in Tagaytay City;
(c) relying on Sato’s inducement and representation, Manolita signed and thumbmarked
the SPA in favor of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, daughter of Sato;
(d) using the document, he sold the properties to third parties but he neither delivered the
proceeds to Manolita nor accounted for the same and
(d) despite repeated demands, he failed and refused to deliver the proceeds, to the damage
and prejudice of the estate of Manolita.
The above averments in the Information show that the estafa was committed by attributing
to Manolita (who participated in the execution of the document) statements other than
those in fact made by her. Manolita’s acts of signing the SPA and affixing her thumbmark to
that document were the very expression of her specific intention that something be done
about her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark were the affirmation of her statement on
such intention as she only signed and thumbmarked the SPA (a document which she could
not have read) because of Sato’s representation that the document pertained to her taxes.
In signing and thumbmarking the document, Manolita showed that she believed and
adopted the representations of Sato as to what the document was all about, i.e., that it
involved her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark, therefore, served as her conformity to
Sato’s proposal that she execute a document to settle her taxes.
Thus, by inducing Manolita to sign the SPA, Sato made it appear that Manolita granted his
daughter Wendy a special power of attorney for the purpose of selling, assigning,
transferring or otherwise disposing of Manolita’s Tagaytay properties when the fact was
that Manolita signed and thumbmarked the document presented by Sato in the belief that
it pertained to her taxes. Indeed, the document itself, the SPA, and everything that it
contained were falsely attributed to Manolita when she was made to sign the SPA.
Moreover, the allegations in the Information that
(1) "once in the possession of the said special power of attorney and other pertinent
documents, [Sato] made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale"
and
(2) "once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said accused,
misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same to his own personal use and benefit"
raise the presumption that Sato, as the possessor of the falsified document and the one
who benefited therefrom, was the author thereof.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the prosecution moved for the amendment of the
Information so as to increase the amount of damages from P1,150,000 to P22,034,000. This
was granted by the trial court and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on certiorari. This
meant that the amended Information would now state that, while the total amount of
consideration stated in the deeds of absolute sale was only P1,150,000, Sato actually
received the total amount of P22,034,000 as proceeds of the sale of Manolita’s properties.45
This also meant that the deeds of sale (which were public documents) were also falsified by
making untruthful statements as to the amounts of consideration stated in the deeds.
Therefore, the allegations in the Information essentially charged a crime that was not
simple estafa. Sato resorted to falsification of public documents (particularly, the special
power of attorney and the deeds of sale) as a necessary means to commit the estafa.
Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not simple estafa but the complex
crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, Sato cannot avail himself of the
absolutory cause provided under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code in his favor.
Effect of Absolutory Cause Under Article 332 on Criminal Liability For The Complex Crime
of Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents
The question may be asked: if the accused may not be held criminally liable for simple
estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, should
he not be absolved also from criminal liability for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents? No.
True, the concurrence of all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification of
public document is required for a proper conviction for the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public document. That is the ruling in Gonzaludo v. People.46 It
means that the prosecution must establish that the accused resorted to the falsification of
a public document as a necessary means to commit the crime of estafa.
However, a proper appreciation of the scope and application of Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code and of the nature of a complex crime would negate exemption from criminal
liability for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, simply
because the accused may not be held criminally liable for simple estafa by virtue of the
absolutory cause under Article 332.
The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes against
property, namely, the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Thus, all
other crimes, whether simple or complex, are not affected by the absolutory cause
provided by the said provision. To apply the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code to one of the component crimes of a complex crime for the purpose of
negating the existence of that complex crime is to unduly expand the scope of Article 332.
In other words, to apply Article 332 to the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public document would be to mistakenly treat the crime of estafa as a separate simple
crime, not as the component crime that it is in that situation. It would wrongly consider the
indictment as separate charges of estafa and falsification of public document, not as a
single charge for the single (complex) crime of estafa through falsification of public
document.
Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to hold the offender
criminally liable for the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief and
considers the violation of the juridical right to property committed by the offender against
certain family members as a private matter and therefore subject only to civil liability. The
waiver does not apply when the violation of the right to property is achieved through (and
therefore inseparably intertwined with) a breach of the public interest in the integrity and
presumed authenticity of public documents. For, in the latter instance, what is involved is
no longer simply the property right of a family relation but a paramount public interest.
The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal.47 Thus, the
action provided under the said provision simply concerns the private relations of the parties
as family members and is limited to the civil aspect between the offender and the offended
party. When estafa is committed through falsification of a public document, however, the
matter acquires a very serious public dimension and goes beyond the respective rights and
liabilities of family members among themselves. Effectively, when the offender resorts to
an act that breaches public interest in the integrity of public documents as a means to
violate the property rights of a family member, he is removed from the protective mantle
of the absolutory cause under Article 332.
In considering whether the accused is liable for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents, it would be wrong to consider the component crimes
separately from each other. While there may be two component crimes (estafa and
falsification of documents), both felonies are animated by and result from one and the
same criminal intent for which there is only one criminal liability.48 That is the concept of a
complex crime. In other words, while there are two crimes, they are treated only as one,
subject to a single criminal liability.
As opposed to a simple crime where only one juridical right or interest is violated (e.g.,
homicide which violates the right to life, theft which violates the right to property),49 a
complex crime constitutes a violation of diverse juridical rights or interests by means of
diverse acts, each of which is a simple crime in itself.50 Since only a single criminal intent
underlies the diverse acts, however, the component crimes are considered as elements of a
single crime, the complex crime. This is the correct interpretation of a complex crime as
treated under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the case of a complex crime, therefore, there is a formal (or ideal) plurality of crimes
where the same criminal intent results in two or more component crimes constituting a
complex crime for which there is only one criminal liability.51 (The complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public document falls under this category.) This is different from a
material (or real) plurality of crimes where different criminal intents result in two or more
crimes, for each of which the accused incurs criminal liability.52 The latter category is
covered neither by the concept of complex crimes nor by Article 48.
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the formal plurality of crimes (concursus
delictuorum or concurso de delitos) gives rise to a single criminal liability and requires the
imposition of a single penalty:
Although [a] complex crime quantitatively consists of two or more crimes, it is only one
crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed and the two or more crimes constituting
the same are more conveniently termed as component crimes.53 (emphasis supplied)
—∞——∞——∞—
In [a] complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute
only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender. The
offender has only one criminal intent. Even in the case where an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other, the evil intent of the offender is only one.54
For this reason, while a conviction for estafa through falsification of public document
requires that the elements of both estafa and falsification exist, it does not mean that the
criminal liability for estafa may be determined and considered independently of that for
falsification. The two crimes of estafa and falsification of public documents are not separate
crimes but component crimes of the single complex crime of estafa and falsification of
public documents.
Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that, to be criminally liable for the complex crime
of estafa through falsification of public document, the liability for estafa should be
considered separately from the liability for falsification of public document. Such approach
would disregard the nature of a complex crime and contradict the letter and spirit of Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code. It would wrongly disregard the distinction between formal
plurality and material plurality, as it improperly treats the plurality of crimes in the complex
crime of estafa through falsification of public document as a mere material plurality where
the felonies are considered as separate crimes to be punished individually.
Falsification of Public Documents May Be a Necessary Means for Committing Estafa Even
Under Article 315 (3[a])
The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article 315 (3[a]) of the Revised Penal
Code are as follows:
(1) the offender induced the offended party to sign a document;
(2) deceit was employed to make the offended party sign the document;
(3) the offended party personally signed the document and
(4) prejudice is caused to the offended party.
While in estafa under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the law does not require
that the document be falsified for the consummation thereof, it does not mean that the
falsification of the document cannot be considered as a necessary means to commit the
estafa under that provision.
The phrase "necessary means" does not connote indispensable means for if it did, then the
offense as a "necessary means" to commit another would be an indispensable element of
the latter and would be an ingredient thereof.55 In People v. Salvilla,56 the phrase "necessary prepared for her signature, but what was presented to her for her signature was an SPA),
means" merely signifies that one crime is committed to facilitate and insure the commission the crime would have only been the simple crime of falsification.64
of the other.57 In this case, the crime of falsification of public document, the SPA, was such
a "necessary means" as it was resorted to by Sato to facilitate and carry out more WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 9, 2007 and the
effectively his evil design to swindle his mother-in-law. In particular, he used the SPA to sell resolution dated January 23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 95260 are
the Tagaytay properties of Manolita to unsuspecting third persons. REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court which is directed to try
the accused with dispatch for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts of falsification documents.
enumerated in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code as a necessary means to commit
another crime, like estafa, theft or malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime SO ORDERED.
under Article 48 of the same Code.58 The falsification of a public, official or commercial
RENATO C. CORONA
document may be a means of committing estafa because, before the falsified document is
actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been Associate Justice
consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of
falsification of a public, official or commercial document.59 In other words, the crime of Chairperson
falsification was committed prior to the consummation of the crime of estafa.60 Actually
WE CONCUR:
utilizing the falsified public, official or commercial document to defraud another is estafa.61
The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the
document.621avvphi1 PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARD

Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the Information show that the Associate Justice Associate Justice
falsification of public document was consummated when Sato presented a ready-made SPA
to Manolita who signed the same as a statement of her intention in connection with her
taxes. While the falsification was consummated upon the execution of the SPA, the DIOSDADO M. PERALTA JOSE C. MENDOZA
consummation of the estafa occurred only when Sato later utilized the SPA. He did so
particularly when he had the properties sold and thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the Associate Justice Associate Justice
sale. Damage or prejudice to Manolita was caused not by the falsification of the SPA (as no
damage was yet caused to the property rights of Manolita at the time she was made to sign ATTESTATION
the document) but by the subsequent use of the said document. That is why the
falsification of the public document was used to facilitate and ensure (that is, as a necessary I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
means for) the commission of the estafa. the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

The situation would have been different if Sato, using the same inducement, had made RENATO C. CORONA
Manolita sign a deed of sale of the properties either in his favor or in favor of third parties.
Associate Justice
In that case, the damage would have been caused by, and at exactly the same time as, the
execution of the document, not prior thereto. Therefore, the crime committed would only Chairperson
have been the simple crime of estafa.63 On the other hand, absent any inducement (such as
if Manolita herself had been the one who asked that a document pertaining to her taxes be CERTIFICATION
 34
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the Section 2, Republic Act No. 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997).
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
35
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. Aquino and Griño Aquino, supra note 19.

36
REYNATO S. PUNO See Justice Renato C. Corona’s separate (concurring) opinion in People v. Temporada (G.R.
No., 173473, 17 December 2008, 574 SCRA 258, 318-328).
Chief Justice
37
See Section 14 (2), Article III, Constitution.
Footnotes
38
Justice Corona’s separate (concurring) opinion in People v. Temporada, supra.
1
Per letters of administration dated June 22, 1995 issued by the Regional Trial Court of
39
Quezon City, Branch 104 in SP. Proc. Q-95-23621. Regalado, Florenz, supra note 16, p. 736.

40
5
Resolution No. 313, s. 2000 dated February 17, 2000. Id., pp. 81-84. Malto v. People, G.R. No. 164733, 21 September 2007, 533 SCRA 643.

41
13
Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and concurred in by Associate Id. citing People v. Resayaga, G.R. No. 49536, 30 March 1988, 159 SCRA 426 and Santos v.
Justices Regalado E. Maambong (retired) and Sixto C. Marella, Jr. of the Seventeenth People, G.R. No. 77429, 29 January 1990, 181 SCRA 487.
Division of the Court of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 28-40. 42
Id. citing People v. Elesterio, G.R. No. 63971, 09 May 1989, 173 SCRA 243.
16
An absolutory cause is a circumstance which is present prior to or simultaneously with 43
Herrera, Oscar, Remedial Law, Volume Four – Criminal Procedure, 59 (1992 Edition
the offense by reason of which the accused who acts with criminal intent, freedom and
reprinted in 2001).
intelligence does not incur criminal liability for an act that constitutes a crime (Regalado,
Florenz, Criminal Law Conspectus, Third Edition, 61-62 [2007]). 44
People v. Gorospe, 53 Phil. 960 (1928).
27
In this connection, one of the commentators on the Revised Penal Code wrote: 45
While the parties as well as the CA and RTC decisions spoke of an amended Information,
the said amended Information was not included in the records of this case.
Death of the spouse terminates the relationship by affinity (Kelly v. Neely, 12 Ark. 6[5]7,
659, 56 AmD 288; Chase v. Jennings, 38 Me. 44, 45) unless the marriage has resulted in 53
Id., p. 176.
issue who is still living, in which case the relationship of affinity continues (Dearmond v.
54
Dearmond, 10 Ind. 191; Bigelow v. Sprague, 140 Mass. 425, 5 NE 144). Reyes, supra note 8, p. 650.

58
See Reyes, Luis B., Revised Penal Code, Book I, Fifteenth Edition Revised 188, (2001). Reyes, supra note 20 at p. 226.

63
31
Indeed, Kelly v. Neely, supra note 27, Paddock v. Wells, 2 Barb. Ch. 331, 333, Chase v. See United States v. Berry, 5 Phil. 370 (1905) and United States v. Malong, 36 Phil. 821
Jennings, supra note 27, Dearmond v. Dearmond, supra note 27 and Bigelow v. Sprague, (1917).
supra note 27 are all jury disqualification cases. 64
See United States v. Capule, 24 Phil. 12 (1913).
32
Or between the child of a living parent and the surviving child of a deceased parent (in
case of a stepchild with respect to the stepparent).

33
Section 12, Article II and Section 1, Article 15.