JANUARY 2011

Contents
key projects
3 Dabhol – Bangalore Natural Gas Pipeline

welding
5  NV RP F118: Unravelling the requirements for
D
offshore AUT systems

TECHNICAL
7 P ropagation buckling in deep subsea pipelines
9 GRTgaz’ strategy for asset management
13 Environmental considerations for pipeline
abandonment: a case study from abandonment
of a Southern Alberta pipeline

NEWS WRAP
19 January 2011 News Wrap
A summary of the latest pipeline news from
around the world

1 Pipelines International digest | JANUARY 2011

INTRODUCTION

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2 Pipelines International digest | JANUARY 2011

key projects

Dabhol – Bangalore
Natural Gas Pipeline
Construction has commenced on the approximately 1,370 km Dabhol – Bangalore Natural Gas Pipeline, which will form a
key segment of the Indian national gas grid. With commissioning scheduled to be completed by mid-2012, the Dabhol –
Bangalore Pipeline represents a significant development for the south Asian pipeline industry.

W
ith a planned transmission capacity of 16 MMcm/d, Site camps have been established along the entire route
the pipeline will extend south from Dabhol through of the pipeline in each spread of the pipeline which is
the states of Maharashtara, Karnataka and Goa before connected to state base camps, the central co-ordination
terminating in Bangalore. group office in Bangalore and Head Office in Gurgaon through
GAIL has awarded a number of pipeline construction contracts V-Satellite.
with a combined value of $US153 million for the natural gas Construction on Punj Lloyd’s ten spreads is expected to
project. be completed by November 2011 and commissioning will be
Works associated with construction of the pipeline have been completed by February 2012.
divided into ten spreads. The main trunk line, which will extend KazStroyService was awarded Spread-D and Spread-J of the
from Dabhol to Bidadi, will be constructed in eight spreads. pipeline, which will require the construction of approximately
The remaining spreads are the two spur lines, one of which 132 km of pipeline.
will extend from Gokak to Goa and the other from Bhachenalli The company commenced construction on its spreads in
(approximately 30 km north of Bidadi) to Bangalore. November 2010.
Punj Lloyd has been awarded the construction contracts for
seven of the ten spreads, comprising 820 km of the pipeline. Dabhol – Bangalore Pipeline spreads
In preparation for the commencement of construction the
Spread-A 100.65 km long, 36 inch Punj Lloyd
company completed a pre-construction survey of the pipeline
diameter
route, finalised the execution methodologies to be utilised on
the project, completed geotechnical and hydrological surveys Spread-B 97.60 km long, 36 inch Punj Lloyd
of water body crossings as well as crossing surveys, obtained diameter
approval of welding procedures and mobilised equipment and
personnel to the site. Spread-C 50.9 km long, 36 inch Punj Lloyd
diameter (This spread also
Manouvering through India’s mountains covers some part of the 75.8
The Dabhol – Bangalore Pipeline route traverses through tough km long, 24 inch diameter
terrain of Western Ghats, a mountain range along the western side Gokak – Goa spur line)
of India.
Spread-D 99.53 km long, 24 inch KazStroyService
Punj Lloyd says that the mountainous terrain creates a number
diameter
of challenges to construction. Pipeline crews must lay pipe through
areas of rock, forest and steep incline. Spread-E 125.82 km long, 30 inch Punj Lloyd
The pipeline route area is also prone to heavy rains for long periods, diameter
significantly limiting the times in which construction can take place.
The scale of this project requires mobilisation of huge resources Spread-F 127.58 km long, 30 inch Punj Lloyd
including numerous construction equipment like sidebooms, diameter
pipelayers, cranes, excavators, dozers, rock breakers, automatic
welding equipment and over 5,000 workers. Spread-G 126.5 km long, 30 inch Punj Lloyd
diameter
Special construction techniques Spread-H 117.25 km long, 30 inch Punj Lloyd
Punj Lloyd will be using a number of special construction diameter
techniques to overcome the numerous challenges including:
1. Horizontal directional drilling; Spread-I 42 km long, 18 inch diameter Advance Stimul
2. Specialised techniques for trenching in urban areas; Consortium
3. Cable cranes for crossing steep terrain; and,
4. Automatic welding machines and ultrasound automatic Spread-J 31.6 km long, 18 inch KazStroyService
testing machines in substantial parts of the project. diameter

3 Pipelines International digest | JANUARY 2011

key projects
Map of the Dabhol – Bangalore Pipeline route.
KazStroyService has outlined the three most critical aspects of
the project.
1. The 4.2 km section of the pipeline which crosses the
hilly terrain of Tillari ghat is the most critical part of
Spread-D and will be treated as a separate spread and
executed independently. A separate methodology will be
developed after a detailed survey of the entire stretch is
completed.
2. The Zuari river crossing is particularly complicated
as there is no space for stringing of pipe for HDD as
there is marshy area on one side and steep hills on the
other side.
4 Pipelines International digest | JANUARY 2011
3. Elevation difference is very high in several locations. So
hydro testing is to be sectionalised after calculating the
impact of elevation on pressure.
Spread-J, the 31.6 km, 18 inch diameter pipeline, is to be laid
inside existing alleys in Bangalore City to limit impacts to the
surrounding urban environment.
The remaining spread has been awarded to Advance Stimul
Consortium.
The construction work for all thirteen spreads is targeted for
completion by March 2012. The Dabhol – Bangalore Pipeline
is planned to become operational in June 2012, following
commissioning activities.
WELDING
DNV RP F118: Unravelling the
requirements for offshore AUT
systems
Det Norske Veritas (DNV) has recently published a recommended practice paper providing a more detailed procedure
for the qualification and validation of pipeline girth weld automatic ultrasonic testing (AUT) systems used on offshore
pipeline systems.
The recommended practice paper DNV RP F118 provides a uniform guideline to the offshore pipeline industry to ensure
that the qualification and project specific validation of any AUT system is consistently performed to comply with the
specific requirements of DNV OS-F101. This article summarises the main points of the DNV recommendation.
Qualification refers to the process that comprises
evaluation, testing and analysis of the specific AUT system
operated according to a general AUT procedure on a typical
industrial application, where the specific AUT system is
tested for repeatability, stability, reliability and accuracy.
Validation refers to the process and assessment required
to determine and verify whether a specific AUT system
exhibiting a qualification status in accordance to the DNV
recommend practice paper can be utilised on a project-
specific application.
RP F118 provides detailed procedures for industry members to
comply with DNV OS-F101’s requirements regarding qualification
programmes, test welds, qualification testing, destructive reference
testing, analysis of data, validity of qualification, certificate of
qualification, and project-specific AUT procedure validation.
Qualification programmes
The paper recommends that the AUT system’s qualification
programme must:
• Contain the qualification objectives, including materials, weld
process, groove geometries, and performance requirement;
• Establish and document environmental and application
related tolerances such as temperature consistency, beam
and focal law consistency, mechanical stability and electronic
interference sensitivity; and,
• Be specific to the AUT system, AUT procedure, welding
method, and weld bevel configuration being tested.
The paper also recommends that a qualification programme for
any AUT system shall comprise the following stages:
• Review of the technical documentation of the AUT system;
• Review of the operating methodology for the AUT system;
• Review of the quality assurance system for development,
verification, maintenance and operation of the AUT system;
• Review of available performance data for the AUT system
(detection abilities and defect sizing accuracy);
• Evaluations and conclusions based on the information made
available;
• Identification and evaluation of significant parameters and
their variability;
• Planning and execution of a repeatability test programme;
• Planning and execution of a reliability test programme;
5 Pipelines International digest | JANUARY 2011
• Documentation of results from the repeatability and reliability
test programmes;
• Supplementary non-destructive testing (NDT) and destructive
testing; and,
• Analysis of data from the deriving from the above activities.
Establish the probability of detection and sizing accuracy.
Variables that will be taken into account for any AUT system
qualification include but are not limited to:
• Welding method(s) and geometry of welding groove(s);
• Base material(s);
• Wall thickness limitations;
• Pipe diameter limitations;
• Root and cap set-up;
• Set-up for other channels;
• Focal law design procedure;
• Reference reflectors;
• Temperature consistency;
• AUT system including data acquisition and processing;
• Software version; and,
• AUT operator/interpreter training and qualification.
Test welds
Under the DNV OS-F101 standard, qualification testing must
be performed using test welds containing intentionally induced
defects. The AUT system’s probability of detection (PoD) is the
principle description of the AUT system capability, and as such is
the main factor to be considered when assessing the specific AUT
system suitability for a given application. The paper recommends
that the induced defects are limited in vertical height, and as
minimum not to exceed the assumed maximum height relevant for
the weld process used.
The paper details:
• How test welds should be completed;
• How to determine the types and number of defects to be
included in the test welds;
• The types of supplementary NDT testing that must be
performed on each weld.
Qualification testing
The standard sets out that qualification testing will comprise
three different test programmes:
• A repeatability test programme to establish the repeatability
capacity of the AUT system;
WELDING
• A temperature sensitivity test programme; and,
• A reliability test programme to establish the detection
and sizing capabilities of the AUT system under different
conditions.
The paper sets out detailed procedures to conduct the tests and
outlines what documentation should be maintained for each of
the tests undertaken.
Destructive reference testing
The welds from the reliability test programme must be subject
to destructive reference testing (DT) by weld cross sectioning to
establish the detection and sizing capabilities of the AUT system
to comply with the DNV OS-F101 standard. The standard also
permits the use of other well-documented reference techniques.
The paper provides recommendations regarding the:
• Extent of weld cross sectioning;
• Marking of test specimens;
• Marking of cross section locations; and,
• Salami cross sectioning.
Analysis of data
DNV OS-F101 requires data analyses to be performed in
accordance with the established and recognised statistical
methods such as Nordtest NT Technical Report 394.
The paper provides recommendations on the analysis of data
received from the:
• Repeatability test programme;
• Temperature sensitivity test programme;
• Reliability test programme; and,
• Evaluation of detection and sizing ability.
Validity of qualification
The essential variables listed in DNV OS-F101 Appendix
E Section I 100 states the validity of a qualification. RP F118
recommends the following clarifications to the list of variables in
listed in DNV OS-F101 Appendix E Section I 201:
1. Root and cap transducer set-up: this involves the use of
hybrid systems where a combination of phased array
technology and pulse echo single or dual or tandem
configurations are used.
2. Wall thickness variations will not require re-qualification,
provided that the principles for focal law set up do not
change i.e. the number of sequences required to obtain
required sensitivity, area of focus and zone height as
demonstrated during qualification. Over trace values shall
remain within the qualified range.
3. Reference reflectors: it is not permitted to change from flat
bottom hole (FBH) or notches to other types of geometries.
Diameter of FBH and notch depth may be reduced provided
that necessary area focus and resolution is maintained.
4. Diameter is not an essential variable provided that the
mechanical platform for which the transducers are
manipulated around the girth weld can be demonstrated
to provide equal stability and accuracy as for the nominal
scanner platform.
Certificate of qualification
If a successful qualification is obtained in accordance with
recommended practice paper DNV RP F118, a Certificate of
Qualification shall be issued by the nominated third party. The
6 Pipelines International digest | JANUARY 2011
certificate shall reference and contain essential information
deriving from the based on the results documented in the specific
qualification report valid for this qualification.
Project-specific AUT procedure validation
DNV identified that the DNV OS-F101 standard does not
adequately distinguish between qualification and project specific
validation and has therefore included a project-specific validation
procedure in its recommended practice paper DNV RP F118.
The paper provides that project-specific AUT procedure
validation shall be performed in order to demonstrate that the
project specific AUT procedure can accomplish the qualified
performance capabilities. The project-specific AUT validation
shall normally only comprise the reliability aspects provided that
all essential variables remain within reason equivalent to what
has been qualified. The reliability aspect shall not include any
new PoD analysis. The project-specific AUT validation does not
replace requirements referenced in OS-F101 Appendix E Section E
Field Inspection.
A project-specific AUT procedure validation shall consist of the
following minimum activities:
• Review of project-specific AUT procedure including any
pertaining ITP, cal block design reports (WPS), AUT set up
files and project-specific AUT acceptance criteria including
supporting ECA or fatigue reports;
• A compliance assessment of the proposed project specific
AUT procedure and AUT system qualification results and pre
requisites;
• Verification of hardware and software including calibration
block fabrication tolerances;
• Verification of AUT set up on relevant calibration block;
• Review deliberately induced defect weld plan and verify
that welds are made with relevant process and geometries
(minimum 29 defects required for validation);
• Perform supplementary NDT;
• Perform AUT inspection on deliberately induced defect welds
(minimum 29 representative defects);
• Perform weld evaluation at relevant interpretation/reporting
threshold, report defect height, depth and length; and,
• Select minimum 29 ultrasonically independent areas for
macro validation testing and perform macro sectioning and
reporting as per RP F118’s recommendations.
The performance requirement – AUT system capabilities in
terms of PoD and sizing accuracy – will be verified adequate in
relation to the smallest allowable weld defect permitted by either
ECA/fatigue analysis derived acceptance criteria or other quality
standard description. If the AUT system performance results as
concluded in the AUT system qualification are not in compliance
with the project-specific demands then this situation shall lead to
a new qualification as per the paper.
The project-specific AUT procedure shall be verified against
the validity range and pre requisites stated in the AUT system
qualification. Reasonable judgment shall be made to minor
variations not deemed to impact on PoD and sizing.
Influencing industry practice
DNV has said that the implementation of this recommended
practice paper will ensure the consistent compliance with the
DNV OS-F101 requirements and enable the industry to assess the
AUT system and procedure suitability on equal terms.
technical

Propagation buckling in
deep subsea pipelines
By F.Albermani, Reader in Structural Engineering, and H. Khalilpasha and H. Karampour, PhD candidates,
School of Civil Engineering, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia

Exploration in remote deep subsea regions poses many engineering challenges. It is vital to develop new engineering
solutions that will allow safe and economic implementation of these resources without compromising the environmental
health of the ocean. Propagation buckling, particularly in deep water, can damage many kilometres of a pipeline.

O
il and natural gas are the main source for the world’s
energy, let alone being the raw material for numerous
industries ranging from plastics to medicines. At present,
oil and natural gas represent over 60 per cent of the world’s
energy, and even with the advent of ‘greener’ forms of energy, it is
expected that global demand for oil and gas will increase by
22 per cent by 2015. This demand necessitates new exploration
in remote and deep offshore areas. The recent failure of BP’s
Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico and the resulting oil
spill of 40,000–60,000 bbl/d, which took nearly three months to
contain, is a reminder of the risk involved in deepwater subsea
operations. In August 2009, offshore Australia, the spill from the
Montara field’s West Atlas rig also took months to contain. The full
environmental, social and economic impact of these catastrophes
is substantial and will take many years to quantify. In terms of
dollars, the latest estimate of the Deepwater Horizon spill is
$US32 billion.
Exploration in remote deep subsea regions poses many
engineering challenges, and it is important that new engineering
solutions are developed that will allow safe and economic
exploitation of these resources without compromising the
environmental health of the ocean.
A subsea pipeline can experience a number of structural
instabilities such as snaking buckling, upheaval buckling, span
formation, and propagation buckling. Among these, propagation
buckling is the most critical, particularly in deep water, and it can
damage many kilometres of a pipeline. A local buckle, ovalisation,
or dent in the pipe wall can transform the pipe cross-section into a
dumb-bell (or dog bone) shape that propagates along the pipeline
very quickly, as shown in Figure1. The lowest pressure that
maintains propagation is the propagation pressure which is only
Figure 1: Propagation buckling.
Figure 2: Hyperbaric chamber at the School of Civil Engineering,
The University of Queensland.
a small fraction of the elastic collapse pressure of the intact pipe.
This results in a substantial increase in material and installation
cost of the pipeline, since design is therefore governed by
propagation pressure.
A new hyperbaric chamber testing facility has been recently
constructed at the School of Civil Engineering at the University of
Queensland, Australia. Experimental results conducted on a 3 m
long pipe in the hyperbaric chamber, and finite-element analysis
results verified against the experimental results, are briefly
summarised here. A new pipeline design is proposed that has the
potential to increase the propagation buckling capacity, and it
is expected that this new design will have additional benefits in
alleviating other possible instabilities that may take place in the
pipeline.
Experimental results from the hyperbaric chamber
A stiff 4 m long hyperbaric chamber rated for 20 MPa
(equivalent to 2,000 m water depth) internal pressure was
used for testing (Figure 2). A 3 m long pipe section was sealed
at both ends by welding on a thick disc, filled with water, and
placed inside the hyperbaric chamber. The pipe specimen
inside the chamber was vented to the atmosphere by a small
tube projecting through the chamber wall. The chamber was
sealed, filled with water, and pressurised at a slow rate using
a high-pressure pump. When the pressure reached a certain
value – the initiation pressure (PI) – a section of the pipe sample
collapsed leading to a significant drop in chamber pressure,
and water flowed out from the pipe sample through the vent.

7 Pipelines International digest | JANUARY 2011

technical
Figure 3: Pipe specimens after testing.
By maintaining a low rate of pumping, the chamber pressure
was stabilised at the propagation pressure (Pp), with the buckle
longitudinally propagating along the pipe sample accompanied
by uniform water flow from the vent. Figure 3 shows some pipe
specimens after testing in the hyperbaric chamber.
Finite-element simulation of 3 m long pipe samples used in the
hyperbaric chamber tests was also conducted. The initiation and
propagation pressures obtained from this analysis were found to
be in reasonable agreement with the experimental results from
the hyperbaric chamber. A typical experiment and the finite-
element results are shown Figure 4.
New pipe design
The ratio of PI/PP from the hyperbaric chamber tests varies
from 2.6 to 4.0. These results highlight the vulnerability of deep
subsea pipelines to propagation buckling which can quickly
spread and damage long sections of the pipeline. One of the
solutions used to guard against this form of buckling is the
use of buckle arrestors at various locations along the pipeline.
The effect of buckle arrestors is to locally stiffen the pipe
circumference and hence contain possible collapse within the
pipe to segments between two arrestors.
The post-buckling configuration of an axially-loaded
cylindrical shell offers some useful structural characteristics,
8 Pipelines International digest | JANUARY 2011
Figure 4: Experimental and FE results (pressure against volume
change, normalised).
in particular high circumferential flexural rigidity. In order
to exploit this rigidity, a faceted pipe is proposed instead of a
conventional cylindrical pipe of the same diameter/thickness
(D/t) ratio. It is envisaged that the faceted geometry will converge
to smooth cylindrical geometry at both ends of the pipe to
facilitate welding to adjacent pipe segments.
The response of the proposed faceted pipe under external
pressure is obtained numerically, as shown in Figure 4. It is clear
from this figure that the faceted geometry should result in a
76 per cent increase in initiation pressure and a 127 per cent
increase in propagation pressure for the same D/t ratio. Following
design guidelines for subsea pipelines, this increase in buckling
capacity for the same D/t ratio can be translated to around a
22 per cent material saving. A number of possible faceted
topologies that are cylindrical in the overall sense do exist and
are yet to be explored together with other issues related to the
production of such new pipe design.
Acknowledgment
This research is being undertaken within the CSIRO Wealth
from Oceans Flagship Cluster on Subsea Pipelines with funding
from the CSIRO Flagship Collaboration Fund. The authors would
like to acknowledge the technical assistance provided by the
technical staff at the Structures laboratory in the School of Civil
Engineering at the University of Queensland.
technical

GRTgaz’ strategy for

asset management
By S. Akel, V.Le Magueresse, M.Poitou, P.Pelle, M.Meyer, D.Caron, P.L.Lucille, and G.Anger, GRTgaz, Paris, France
GRTgaz owns and operates the longest high pressure natural gas transmission network in Europe composed of
32,000 km of steel pipelines. Part of it was created more than 60 years ago and GRTgaz, as a prudent and responsible
operator, proactively works on the maintenance policy of the pipelines. This work is triggered by GRTgaz’ permanent
search for higher safety levels regarding people and property, higher quality regarding gas transmission and sustainable
development based on environmental preservation. However, for the sake of commercial viability, the financial impact
of such a trend needs to be accurately evaluated. Moreover, GRTgaz has to ensure the continuous balance between the
requirements of industrial safety and financial issues related to pipeline maintenance and renewal.
GRTgaz has recently developed a policy proposing operational means to carry out objective technical and economic
analyses. The analyses will allow for the prioritisation of maintenance works according to the corrosivity of the soil and/or
environment and to inform decisions about the rehabilitation or the replacement of ageing pipelines. This policy has been
applied to a pipeline of approximately 100 km length, located around Paris, in an urban area. The company’s Val de Seine
District played an important role in developing this policy.
This article describes the policy and the decision-making process related to pipeline replacement versus rehabilitation with
respect to technical as well as economical considerations.

G
as pipeline inspection may reveal external metal defects
induced mainly by steel corrosion. These defects depend
on the technical characteristics of the pipe itself (coating,
cathodic protection), its adjacent environment (aggressive soil,
electric currents) and its overall past maintenance. Such metal
losses may affect pipeline integrity, the worst scenario resulting in
an unintentional gas release possibly leading to an ignition with
a high level of thermal radiation potentially harmful to persons,
property and environment. Therefore, a prudent transmission-
system operator (TSO) must reasonably anticipate such events in
order to ensure a permanent high degree of safety of the network,
by mitigating all possible sources of risks. This can sometimes lead
to the replacement of the pipeline itself.
In any case, in order to anticipate and adopt a wise decision, it
is very important to assess the mechanical state of the pipe and,
if possible, its future progressive degradation, i.e. the corrosion
process’ evolution. Two technical means are currently available to
help carry out such an assessment:
• In-line inspection (ILI): technology which allows detection,
location, and sizing of metal losses of the pipeline’s wall
thickness, by directly sensing the whole inner pipeline wall.
• External corrosion direct assessment (ECDA): technology
which, through above-ground inspection techniques relying
upon electrical current leaks at coating defects, allows
detection and location of coating damage that could contain
external metal losses and, together with excavation and
direct examinations of selected coating-damaged zones and
a specific assessment process, allows the potential existence
and severity of metal defects in the non-excavated zones
(usually used when ILI is not compatible with the pipeline
configuration) to be inferred.
In both cases, it is possible to obtain an assessment of the
current mechanical state of the pipeline (with high precision
using ILI, and with less precision using ECDA).
A model may then be used in order to predict the behaviour
of such metal losses in the future. After having successfully
implemented this step, and in order to complete the analysis
and take a decision, an economic approach is applied to identify
whether and, if so, when best to replace or refurbish the pipeline.
All these steps are discussed below.
Methodology
The methodology developed on which the decision is based
regarding replacement or rehabilitation of a pipeline section is
based on a predictive approach estimating the residual minimum
lifetime of the pipeline. Two steps are needed to develop such an
approach; the technical step and the economical step.
Technical step aiming at evaluating the intrinsic failure rate
of the pipeline in the time interval before performing the next
inspection.
According to the French Transmission Pipelines Safety Code
[1] which defines the procedure to follow for safety studies, this
failure rate is given by a linear function of Fgen, the generic
frequency of gas releases per km and per year obtained according
to the available incident feedback recorded during 20 years
(1970/1990).
(1)
where a is a technical factor and LSLE is the characteristic length
related to significant lethal effects (the radius of a zone in which
human loss induced by thermal radiation is significant).
This failure rate P applied to exposed persons is compared to
national risk thresholds as shown in Table 1.
Because Equation 1 is based on a generic frequency of gas
releases regardless of the age of the pipeline, it cannot be used
as it stands in order to study the behaviour of a specific pipeline.
However, the same formula may be used provided that the
generic frequency is replaced by one which, if available, precisely
characterises the mechanical state of the pipeline under analysis.
This frequency can be estimated by means of a mathematical
model. For this purpose, GRTgaz chose a probabilistic model to
perform such an evaluation.

9 Pipelines International digest | JANUARY 2011

technical

Exposed persons N P ≤ 5.10 -7 5.10-7 < 10 -6 < 5.10-6 < 10 -5 < P 10 -4 < P 10 -3 < P
P ≤ 10 -6 P ≤ 5.10-6 P ≤ 10-5 ≤ 10-4 ≤ 10-3
N > 300
100 < N ≤ 300
30 < N ≤ 100
10 < N ≤ 30
1 < N ≤ 10
N≤ 1
Table 1: French national risk thresholds: black cells = unacceptable; grey cells = acceptable with mitigation measures; white cells = acceptable.

Since the mechanical state of the pipeline can be assessed Age at Residual
from two types of inspection tool (ILI and ECDA), two predictive Pipeline Length Inspection
inspection lifetime
probabilistic numerical tools were therefore developed for this
1 5 km ILI 50 years 30 years
purpose by the Research and Innovation Division of GDF Suez
(DRI/CRIGEN). The goal of these tools is to evaluate the number 2 17 km ILI 50 years 35 years
or frequency of gas releases F with respect to an empirical 3 76 km ILI 50 years 50 years
expression, adapted from BS7910 [4, 5], giving the failure pressure 4 76 km ILI 50 years 50 years
Pf of the corroded pipeline:
5 32 km ILI 45 years 30 years
(2) Table 2: The five pipeline sections inspected by ILI.

soil corrosiveness, the electrical interferences in the pipeline

where e designates the pipe wall thickness, D the pipe diameter,
Rm the steel tensile strength, a the corrosion defect depth, and Q
the Folias factor given by:
(3)
where L designates the axial length of the corrosion defect.
The technical parameters used above are either deterministic
(for instance pipe diameter D, wall thickness e, and tensile
strength Rm) or random (for instance metal loss depth a and
length L). For the random parameters, probabilistic distributions
issued from field feedback are selected and a Monte Carlo
approach is used to predict the number of gas leaks within the
prescribed time interval (until the next inspection, for instance).
The failure rate P is then calculated as described in the French
Transmission Pipelines Safety Code.
Economical step
According to an estimation of the number of potential future
defects to be repaired, the TSO can then either decide to replace
the pipeline or continue to repair it. This decision is based on an
economic balance between replacement cost and that related to
rehabilitation. As regards rehabilitation cost, the cost estimate is
based on the long-term bath-tub curve extrapolation generated
by the above technical step (Figure 1). This extrapolation gives
the estimated number of repairs per year to be performed in order
to maintain the safety level of the pipeline consistent with the
French Transmission Pipelines Safety Code thresholds.
Decision support procedure
For a given gas pipeline, the procedure used to take the
final decision (replacement versus rehabilitation) includes the
following phases:
• Segmenting the pipe into homogeneous sections according
to the risk of external corrosion mainly on the basis of the
environment, history of cathodic protection and its adequacy
to corrosion threats, and the technical characteristics of the
pipeline.
• Estimation of the failure rate for each section, using the
probabilistic tools, based on the results of the inspection of
the pipe (ILI or ECDA).
• Determination of the risk acceptability resulting from a
combination of the failure rate and the potential human
impact (see Table 1, from the French Transmission Pipelines
Safety Code).
• If the risk is unacceptable, extrapolation of a repair plan
in the coming years using the probabilistic tool and then
comparison of the economic return between the cost of the
long-term repair plan and the cost of the renewal of the
section.
• In case of an ILI, the economic return can allow to decide
between the renewal of the pipeline or the completion of the
repair plan.
• In case of an ECDA, the repair plan cannot be accurately
known, further analysis (in-line inspection of a section,
additional excavations, pressure reduction) must be
performed, in order to lower the uncertainty associated
with the ECDA process which, most of the time, leads to a
decrease in the failure rate.
For the sake of illustration, the following real example shows,
for a 5 km pipeline inspected by both ILI and ECDA, when
it would be appropriate to stop rehabilitation and decide to
replace. As shown in Figure 2, the inspection was made in the
fiftieth year after construction of the pipeline and therefore,
according to the economic balance curve, the minimum residual
lifetime of the pipeline is estimated at 30 years (i.e. a global
lifetime of around 80 years). An inspection will be done before
the end of the estimated minimum residual lifetime (around
the seventieth year after its construction). This inspection will
undoubtedly improve the prediction as well as the predictive
model itself.

10 Pipelines International digest | JANUARY 2011

technical
Moreover, as another potential result of the simulation, the
TSO is sometimes, for subjective safety reasons (such as the
vicinity of built-up areas), prompted to decide to replace (or
remove) the pipeline. This safety-related decision, if it is taken
long before the estimated minimum lifetime of the pipeline, has
a cost. For instance, according to Figure 2, if the TSO takes the
decision to replace the pipeline in the sixtieth year following
its construction, this decision has the impact of an extra cost of
around 15 per cent of the overall replacement expense.
Figure 3 shows the different steps that need to be applied in
order to decide whether to rehabilitate or replace a section of a
pipeline.
Simulation of real cases – observed trends
In order to illustrate the decision-making process, several
numerical simulations were performed on five real pipelines
inspected by ILI, as shown in Table 2. Although the pipeline
Figure 1: A half bath-tub curve showing the number of predicted
repairs per year.
Figure 2: Minimum residual lifetime calculation.
Figure 3: The different steps required in deciding to rehabilitate or
replace a pipe section.
11 Pipelines International digest | JANUARY 2011
cases that were studied serve only as an illustration, the first
trend shows that the lifetime of a gas transmission pipeline
according to its mechanical status can be estimated to be at
least 75 years; of course, this result depends on the technical
as well as the financial assumptions. As regards the technical
assumptions, those concerning corrosion will certainly evolve,
with a relatively insignificant effect; on the other hand, if the
economic assumptions (from the mandatory economic model
in France for a TSO) are modified, the lifetime expectations will
certainly change significantly.
Case study – Paris loop (96 km) inspected by
ECDA
The Paris loop is a pipeline of around 96 km length, and has
a diameter of 12 inches and an operating pressure of 40 bar. As
it cannot be inspected by ILI technology, only ECDA results are
available. Seventy per cent of the pipeline was laid before 1958,
and all of it is located in a densely built-up area. The Paris loop
was used as a case study to develop the methodology described
above when applied to ECDA results, and produced the following
results:
• 222 homogeneous sections were found with the risk of
external corrosion, on the basis of the corrosivity of the soil,
the history of cathodic protection, electrical interference
from the environment, and the technical characteristics of
the pipeline.
• For each section, the determination of the risk acceptability
resulting from the intersection of the failure rate and the
potential human impact was carried out based on the
methodology used in the French Transmission Pipelines
Safety Code. Eleven sections (total length of 7,980 m) were
identified as ‘sensitive’, corresponding to grey or black cells
in Table 1.
• For each of the sensitive sections, the probabilistic tool was
used to predict the number of defects to be repaired in the
coming years, based on the ECDA results and the physical
parameters of each section. The economic model was then
used to assess an economic balance curve for each section.
No replacement measures were necessary according to
the results of this methodology, and the economic results
showed that it is still appropriate to repair the pipeline
instead of replacing it. As an example, the economic curve of
the most sensitive section is given in Figure 4.
• However, the whole of the length of the Paris loop cannot be
inspected by ILI in order to confirm totally, or even partially,
the predicted results. Only ECDA data are available, which
makes it difficult to accurately localise the possible defects,
which in turn impacts on the definition of an accurate
long-term repair plan. It has therefore been decided to carry
out further analyses on the sections identified as ‘sensitive’
in order to refine the methodology and to better assess the
failure rate of each section so as to refine the predictive
probabilistic tool. The next steps will consist in:
»» Replacing a 400 m long section identified as the most
sensitive (and refining the parameters to better assess for
how long the replacement could be postponed); and
»» Studying the possibility of making two 2000 m long
sections inspectable by ILI. Several technical means are
being studied, including an ultrasonic inspection using
water in the pipeline as an ultrasonic link.
technical
Concluding remarks
As a prudent and responsible gas transmission operator,
GRTgaz considers safety a priority. The company elaborates and
executes many action plans in order to increasingly improve
the integrity level of its network. Some of these action plans
envisage ultimate replacement of some sections of pipeline,
especially in the case where ILI is not possible. The method
used for this purpose is an innovative one since it is based on a
probabilistic approach, derived from a state-of-the-art method
which is still developing in the field of gas pipeline risk analysis,
and validation renders this approach complex to handle.
Nevertheless, the method can result in improvements if used at
an industrial scale where the feedback will be used for technical
calibrations as well as for introduction of safety factors.
References
1. Arrêté du 4 Août 2006 portant règlement de la sécurité
des canalisations de transport de gaz combustibles,
d’hydrocarbures liquides ou liquéfiés et de produits
chimiques. (Safety rule for transmission pipelines of
flammable gases, liquid or liquefied hydrocarbons and
chemical products dated 4August, 2006, France.)
12 Pipelines International digest | JANUARY 2011
2. A.Francis, M.Gardiner, A.Goodfellow, M.McCallum, G.Senior,
and B.Greenwood, 2001. A systematic risk and reliability-
based approach to integrity management of piggable and
non-piggable pipelines. Pipeline Integrity and Safety
Conference, Houston, Texas, September, 2001.
3. M.Stephens, 2009. Guidelines for reliability based pipeline
integrity methods. Report L145 prepared by C-FER
Technologies for Pipeline Research Committee International
project PR-244-05302 (confidential to PRCI), March.
4. British Standard, 1999. BS7910:1999 Guide on methods
for assessing the acceptability of flaws in fusion welded
structures.
5. Le Bastard, 2007. Guide d’analyse des défauts Niveau
2 – Corrosion – Tenue à l’éclatement; norme BS7910 – 1999.
Fiche n°2212 ind B du GAD.
This paper was presented at the Evaluation, Rehabilitation,
and Repair of Pipelines Conference held in Berlin, Germany,
from 20–21 October, 2010, and organised by Tiratsoo
Technical (a Division of Great Southern Press) and Clarion
Technical Conferences.
technical

Environmental considerations
for pipeline abandonment:
a case study from abandonment of a Southern Alberta pipeline
By Jessica M.Swanson [1], Tom Kunicky [2], and Pete Poohkay [3]
1. TERA Environmental Consultants, Calgary, Alberta, Canada
2. Cutbank Inspection, Calgary, Alberta, Canada
3. ATCO Pipelines, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada

Since the 1920s, over 400,000 km of petroleum pipelines have been installed in Alberta. Pipeline abandonment is
an increasingly relevant issue as the pipeline network ages. The full or partial abandonment of pipeline systems is
necessitated by factors such as wind or water erosion issues, pipeline integrity issues, changes in source supply and
customer demand, urban development encroachment and regulatory requirements.
Pipeline abandonment-in-place is generally the preferred option based on the technical condition and environmental
sustainability of the pipeline; however, in some cases pipeline removal or partial removal cannot be avoided. In all cases,
the planning process for abandonment includes technical evaluation, risk assessment, environmental assessment,
landowner consultation, and/or evaluation of future land use. Abandonment plans must also include environmental
protection measures to be implemented during the removal of any pipeline segment and consideration of the post-
abandonment implications of any pipeline left in place. These measures include topsoil conservation, erosion/sediment
control and reclamation.
This article discusses environmental protection measures for pipeline abandonment, using issues faced during
abandonment of one of the oldest natural gas pipelines in Alberta as a case study. Challenges faced during this project
included gathering of appropriate historical information including leak history and maintenance records, removal of all
above-ground facilities, accommodations for future land use plans including road development, and measures taken to
minimise the risk of the abandoned pipeline becoming a water conduit. In addition, the article will discuss the extensive
planning and construction effort required to undertake pipeline abandonment at several fish-bearing watercourse
crossings, where pipeline exposures during high-water events necessitated pipeline removal. A primary objective in the
planning and the removal of the abandoned pipeline was minimal disturbance of the land.

S
ince the 1920s, over 400,000 km of petroleum pipelines have
been installed in Alberta. Abandonment of older pipelines
is an increasing issue as the pipeline network ages. In
addition, Canadian regulators are increasingly requiring pipeline
companies to consider the issue of end-of-life liability in the early
planning stages of a pipeline.
This article discusses some of the major challenges faced during
pipeline abandonment projects, using the historical Turner Valley
No 2 (TV2) Pipeline as a case study. For the project, the major
objectives were to abandon the pipeline in a safe, timely and cost-
effective manner, with as little disturbance to the environment
as possible. Some of the major challenges encountered during
the project included: constraints due to current and future land
use; abandonment at road crossings; potential for the pipeline to
become a conduit for water; disposal of waste pipe; and pipeline
abandonment at watercourse crossings.
Abandonment background
Under the National Energy Board’s (NEB) Onshore Pipeline
Regulations [1], ̒abandonʼ means to permanently cease operation
such that the cessation results in the discontinuance of service.
A section of pipeline can be abandoned in place, or removed.
When a pipeline is abandoned in place, cathodic protection of
the pipeline is generally discontinued and no other measures
are taken to maintain the structural integrity of the abandoned
pipeline, other than the potential use of solid fill material at
roadway and railway crossing sites or other locations sensitive
to ground subsidence [2]. In addition, in accordance with the
regulations for pipeline abandonment, all surface equipment,
including pig traps, risers, block valves, and line heaters must be
removed.
Full or partial pipeline abandonment is necessitated by a
number of factors including: regulatory requirements; structural
failure; safety issues; and future road development or other utility
developments.
Regulatory framework
In Canada, the major standards and regulations which
provide guidance with respect to pipeline abandonment
include the Canadian Standards Association’s (CSA's) Oil
and Gas Pipeline Systems (CSA Z662-07), the NEB’s Onshore
Pipeline Regulations, and Provincial or Territorial Pipeline(s)
Acts and Regulations.
According to the CSA, the decision to abandon “shall
be made on the basis of an assessment that includes
consideration of the current and future land use and the
potential for safety hazards and environmental damage
to be created by ground subsidence, soil contamination,
groundwater contamination and the creation of water
conduits”.

13 Pipelines International digest | JANUARY 2011

technical
Figure 1: Pipeline construction in the Turner Valley, Alberta, circa
1929 (believed to be the TV2 Pipeline). Photo source: Glenbow
Archives NA-711-27.
In addition, the CSA requires piping that is abandoned in place
to be:
• Emptied of service fluids;
• Purged or appropriately cleaned or both;
• Physically separated from any in-service piping; and,
• Capped, plugged, or otherwise effectively sealed.
Most provinces and territories in Canada have their own
requirements for abandonment. In general, abandonment
regulations require operator companies to conduct a review of
historical records on the pipeline system, review pipeline crossing
agreements, inventory all surface facilities, and identify any
environmental concerns associated with the pipeline segment.
Provincially-regulated pipelines in Alberta are required to
submit a licence amendment application notifying the Alberta
Energy Resources Conservation Board (ERCB) or Alberta Utilities
Commission (AUC) of a pipeline abandonment in accordance with
ERCB Guide 56.
In Alberta, under the Alberta Pipeline Act and Regulations,
where a pipeline is abandoned in place, the operator is still
responsible for maintaining and updating pipeline warning signs,
as well as responding to inquiries including the Alberta One-Call
‘Call before you dig’ system. Essentially, abandoning in place
does not release the operator from continuing liabilities related
to the abandoned pipeline. The only way to be released of this
liability is to sell the pipeline system to another licensed operator
14 Pipelines International digest | JANUARY 2011
Figure 2: Photo showing exposed segment of TV2 Pipeline in
heavily-treed area, 31 August 2007.
Figure 3: Photo showing removal of exposed segment of TV2
Pipeline from the heavily-treed area in Figure 2 with minimal
disturbance, 4 September 2007.
or to remove the pipeline from the ground, reclaim the land, and
cancel any existing easements.
In addition to the ERCB requirements for provincially-regulated
pipelines in Alberta, if large segments of the pipeline are to be
removed, then the abandonment is considered the equivalent to
a new pipeline project by Alberta Environment. If the length and
pipe diameter of the abandonment sections of a pipeline project
to be removed are over the conservation and reclamation (C&R)
index (i.e. OD of the pipeline (mm) x length of the pipeline (km)
>2690), then a C&R Approval is required for abandonment [3]. The
C&R Report and application must include a detailed soil survey
and site-specific soils handling recommendations to ensure land
can be returned to equivalent land capability post-abandonment.
Other environmental permits and considerations are similar
to those required for new pipelines and include approvals
or compliance with provincial codes of practice, and best
technical
Figure 4: Photo showing sod salvage in native pasture area. Note
subsoil on surface remaining from original pipeline construction,
18 July 2009.
management practices contained within operational statements
from Fisheries and Oceans Canada for watercourse crossings.
Currently, for Federally-regulated pipelines, the NEB requires
that abandonment planning be completed as part of an
application for Leave to Abandon. The NEB’s Onshore Pipeline
Regulations do not allow the NEB to continue to regulate a
pipeline site after an abandonment order comes into force since,
after abandonment, there is no pipeline defined under the Act
for the NEB to regulate. For this reason, the NEB usually issues
abandonment orders subject to conditions that they must be
fulfilled to its satisfaction before the order comes into force. At
that point, further development of the site is regulated by local
authorities [4].
The NEB is currently reviewing financial and physical issues
associated with pipeline abandonment as part of its Land Matters
Consultation Initiative (LMCI). In May 2009, the Board adopted a
report on the financial issues of pipeline abandonment that will
require companies to set aside funds within the next five years to
cover future abandonment costs [5]. As part of this requirement,
Group 1 companies are to prepare and file a preliminary estimate
of pipeline abandonment costs and the amount required to be set
aside for abandonment by May 2011.
In addition, in the May 2009 NEB report, a number of
recommendations with respect to the physical issues of pipeline
abandonment were made, including the development of a multi-
stakeholder study group to address knowledge gaps related to the
physical issues of abandonment.
A number of other changes to the pipeline abandonment
requirements are anticipated as a result of the LMCI. How these
changes will impact federally-regulated pipelines is yet to be
determined; however, the outcome of the LMCI is expected
to bring much more clarity and transparency with respect
to pipeline abandonment for both operators and affected
landowners.
Case study: abandonment of Turner Valley No 2
The TV2 Pipeline was constructed in 1925 by a company called
Canadian Western Natural Gas, Light, Heat and Power Co. The
15 Pipelines International digest | JANUARY 2011
Figure 5: Photo showing replacement of sod following removal of
the pipeline and topsoil replacement, same areas as Figure 4.
24 July 2009.
273 mm OD (NPS 10 inch) pipeline was constructed to transport
sweet natural gas from the original Turner Valley gas plant to the
City of Calgary. It was trenched in by hand and pipe joints were
mechanically coupled using Dresser-type couplings, and not
welded (Figure 1).
In 2005, the current owner of the TV2 Pipeline, an Alberta
utility company, initiated the abandonment process for the
system after approximately 80 years of operation. The company
currently owns a number of older pipelines and has completed
pipeline abandonments for many years. The unique situations
encountered along the TV2 Pipeline provide a good example of
the some of the challenges that are presented during pipeline
abandonment and how they can be overcome.
The age of the TV2 Pipeline created numerous challenges,
among which was that the history of the pipeline was limited. The
shallow depth of cover due to the shallow original trench depth,
as well as erosion over the years, was a risk along many segments.
Floods in southern Alberta over the years created numerous
washouts at creeks all over Alberta and left the pipeline exposed
at some of the watercourse crossings encountered by the pipeline.
Land use changed over the years, large trees grew in around the
pipeline in a number of areas, and the pipeline right-of-way was
located in close proximity to large estate homes.
The owning company’s primary goals were to safely abandon
the pipeline, while minimising environmental disturbance and
increasing the probability of reclamation success.
Environmental issues related to pipeline
abandonment
Land use
The owning company has developed a procedure for
abandonment planning that includes development of quarter-
section (i.e. 0.25 square mile) specific abandonment plans that
take into consideration technical information, safety concerns,
environmental issues, land use, and landowner requests and/
or concerns. The company has developed a risk management
framework that provides a structured process for making
technical
Figure 6: Photo of a native pasture location near the location shown
in Photos 4 and 5, showing right-of-way immediately following sod
replacement, 22 July 2009.
decisions with respect to pipeline abandonment. The framework
takes into account pipeline abandonment technical and
environmental factors and their likelihood, consequences, and
impacts.
Land use is one of the most important factors to consider in
determining whether a pipeline section should be abandoned in
place or removed. For the TV2 Pipeline, the shallow depth of cover
and current land use necessitated removal of lengthy segments of
the pipeline. The TV2 Pipeline was generally located within the
soil A horizon, and depth of cover ranged from at the surface to
approximately 6 inches into the soil B horizon.
The pipeline crosses seeded pasture, hay, bush, and bush
pasture land, native prairie and cultivated land. Scheduling
constraints faced were similar to those encountered during
planning and construction of a new pipeline: construction had
to be scheduled around restricted activity periods for fish and
wildlife; farming activities; and periods of suitable soil conditions.
In addition, individual abandonment plans took into account
specific landowner requests. As an example, one of the families
impacted by the pipeline removal plays a predominant role in
the Calgary Stampede, and requested that pipeline construction
not take place during the weeks leading up to and during the
Stampede.
Locations where trees had grown up around the pipeline
presented a challenge to physical abandonment activities since
the aim was to maintain the existing land use and minimise
disturbance. Clearing trees in order to remove the pipeline would
have created a large disturbance and altered the land use. Instead,
the environmental inspector and construction team worked
together to minimise the number of trees that would have to be
removed. Clearing, where absolutely necessary, was conducted by
hand. Where possible, pipe segments were cut and pulled from
one or both sides of a stand of trees. To minimise disturbance
in treed areas, small Bobcat excavators that could manoeuvre
between the trees were used where possible (Figures 2 and 3).
Where pipeline removal was required on native prairie, the
environmental inspector used special mitigation to minimise
environmental disturbance and increase the chance of
16 Pipelines International digest | JANUARY 2011
Figure 7: Exposed pipelines at road crossing, 24 September 2008.
reclamation success. Large pieces of sod were salvaged from the
right-of-way and then replaced as soon as possible after removal
of the pipe (Figures 4 and 5). This technique was relatively
labour intensive and could only be conducted under certain
soil conditions: it was not feasible when the soil was pulverised
or excessively dry. However, when conducted along segments
with adequate soil moisture and a well-established sod layer,
this technique was extremely successful, and allowed native
vegetation along the right-of-way to be re-established much sooner
than if vegetation had been seeded or simply allowed to grow back
in along the ditch line (Figure 6).
The environmental inspector made efforts to return the original
trench spoil, which was left on either side of the pipeline, to the
trench following pipeline removal. It was sometimes necessary to
strip a wider area of topsoil in order to salvage the original trench
spoil, which was often hard to identify after such a long period of
time.
Road crossings
Abandonment of pipeline segments at road, rail and
utility crossings was a major challenge for the TV2 Pipeline
abandonment project. Since road and railway crossings may be
sensitive to slight ground depressions that would result from
subsidence of an abandoned pipeline, it was often necessary
to fill the abandoned pipeline with grout or concrete to
accommodate current and future roads and railways for the TV2
Pipeline.
In general, the following procedures were used where there was
potential for future road development or upgrading at a current
road crossing:
• Ensure the pipeline or part of the pipeline is cleared of all gas
and purged;
• Install pig traps where required, pig the pipeline segment to
be abandoned;
• Expose the pipeline on both sides of road;
• Check the pipeline for any remaining fluid;
• Cut the pipeline at the road allowance boundaries and at the
property lines(s) (Figure7);
• Remove the pipeline from the bar ditches to allow for road
maintenance or widening;
technical
Figure 8: Photo showing pipeline coating peeling off of the pipeline,
8 December 2006.
• Install vent stacks on both sides of the road to facilitate
pumping of grout or cement;
• Leave pipeline in place and fill with grout or cement and cap
at the edge of the road; and
• Install pipeline warning signs on both sides of the road at the
property lines.
Pipeline abandonments at road crossings were labour
intensive. In general, it took an approximately 12–15 person crew
about three days per road crossing to complete the abandonment
work at road crossings along the TV2 Pipeline.
Conduit for water
A report prepared for the Pipeline Abandonment Steering
Committee (CPSC) in 1996 identified the potential for abandoned
pipelines to become a conduit for water as a major concern. This
issue can occur once the cathodic protection is removed and the
pipeline starts to corrode, and can eventually allow water to seep
in and travel through the pipe.
In theory, corroded pipelines could drain wetlands or change
the flow of groundwater. In addition, if the pipeline has not been
completely cleaned, there could be potential for contamination to
travel to surface or groundwater. The identification and mitigation
of pipeline segments with the potential to become conduits for
water was a major concern for the owner of the TV2 Pipeline.
In general, where potential was identified (i.e. steep slopes,
wetlands, or where test sections were found to be filled with
water), the pipeline was removed or cut and capped at strategic
locations. In wetlands, a plug was generally placed immediately
downstream of the wet area, to prevent its drainage, and also
at an appropriate location upstream of the wet area, to prevent
potential contamination of the wet area.
On slopes, plugs were installed at the top and bottom of the
slope and, depending on the length of the slope, plugs were
sometimes installed mid-way down as well.
Disposal of old pipe
Disposal of waste pipe was a substantial issue for the owner
of the TV2 Pipeline due to the large amount of pipeline that was
removed and the coating that was used when the pipeline was
17 Pipelines International digest | JANUARY 2011
Figure 9: Photo of exposed pipeline in Threepoint Creek, Alberta,
29 September 2009.
constructed. For the owner of the TV2 Pipeline, waste-disposal
plans involved a review of historic records, sampling and testing
of coating samples, and waste-pipe classification.
Waste pipe in Alberta is classified as either a non-dangerous
oilfield waste or a dangerous oilfield waste depending on its
characteristics. Generally in Alberta, waste pipe not containing
any hazardous substances is classified as a non-dangerous
oil field waste and can typically be recycled as scrap metal.
Waste pipe containing a hazardous substance can be either
decontaminated and recycled as scrap metal or disposed of at an
approved landfill.
Some older pipelines installed between the 1940s and
1970s were coated with coal-tar enamel containing PCBs and/
or wrapped with a felt containing asbestos. Segments of the
TV2 Pipeline that were replaced in the 1950s were found to
have a coating of hazardous material including a tar coating
with a felt paper cover that contained asbestos (Figure 8). The
environmental inspector and construction crew found that this
coating flaked off when the pipe was disturbed and had the
potential to fall into the trench and/or scatter. This was overcome
by wrapping the pipe with a plastic wrap before removing it from
the trench.
Negative salvage is the net cost of abandoning a pipeline
through removal, calculated as the cost of removal less salvage
revenue generated from the sale of the removed material for
scrap or use by others (CPSC 1996). Negative salvage used to be
a hot topic as industry speculated that if the price of steel was
high enough, it may actually become profitable for a company to
remove its pipeline(s). However, in today’s market, the value one
might receive for scrap pipe (approximately $US50/tonne) would
not even cover the cost of transporting it to a dealer.
In addition to the negative salvage value of steel, the costs
of removing pipe include the environmental requirements
of pipeline abandonment and pipeline disposal, including
requirements associated with the disposal of some pipe coatings.
Currently, most scrap dealers will not accept pipe segments
coated with yellow jacket (plastic) or with hazardous substances
(such as asbestos, PCBs, NORMs). There is also a requirement
to ensure the inside of the pipe is cleaned before disposal (i.e.
technical
pigging waste). Considering the costs associated with pipeline
removal, an owner undertaking a removal would not typically
anticipate financial gain.
Watercourse crossings
Filling the pipeline with an inert material and abandoning in
place is the most viable option at watercourse crossings if the
crossing is stable and environmentally sustainable. However,
in some cases, abandoning in place is not an option. As an
example, during the Alberta floods in 2005, there were washouts
of a number of creeks and a number of pipelines were left
exposed (Figure 9). In this case, for safety and environmental
reasons, pipelines often have to be removed from the watercourse
crossings. As an example of the safety concerns, exposed pipe
forms an eddy that can be dangerous for canoeists.
The removal of pipelines from watercourses in Alberta
generally requires the same regulatory permits and approvals
as the installation of a new pipeline crossing. Restricted activity
periods for fish rearing, wintering and spawning have to be
observed.
Where pipelines have to be removed from watercourses,
a viable option for the owning company has been to pull the
pipeline from one or both sides. Pipeline segments on this project
could be successfully pulled from watercourses using the large
rigs that are used to carry drilling equipment, or any other large
piece of equipment with a hydraulic cable attachment. In keeping
with the goal to minimise environmental disturbance, the river
banks were kept intact, and boreholes were excavated about 10 m
back from the bank.
Conclusion
The abandonment of the approximately 33 km long TV2
Pipeline took place over three years. It required a total of 170 days
of work, 90 cuts and caps, 12 road crossings, and removal of four
creek crossings using a pull technique. Approximately 11 km of
pipeline was removed, and the remaining approximately 22 km
was abandoned in place. The mitigation measures and careful
implementation of these measures resulted in the successful
abandonment of the TV2 Pipeline with minimal adverse effect on
18 Pipelines International digest | JANUARY 2011
the environment or land use.
The cost for the removal of an abandoned pipeline is site-
specific and depends on factors such as pipe size, location,
landscape and product carried. For pipeline removals, industry
in Canada generally estimates a cost of 30 per cent to 50 per cent
the cost of the same size of a new pipeline installed at the same
location and landscape.
Abandonment procedures and costs will be major consideration
for currently operating pipelines and owners should be aware of
the challenges and costs involved with pipeline abandonment.
Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank the owner of the TV2 Pipeline for the
opportunity to be involved in this interesting project, Pat O’Brien
for providing details on the project, as well as Howard Heffler
and the Pipeline Abandonment Steering Committee, whose 1996
document titled Pipeline abandonment: a discussion paper on
technical and environmental issues continues to be a valuable
source of information on pipeline abandonment.
References
1. National Energy Board, 1999. Onshore pipeline regulations.
2. Pipeline Abandonment Steering Committee, 1996. Pipeline
abandonment: a discussion paper on technical and
environmental issues.
3. Alberta Environment, 1994. Conservation and Reclamation
information letter environmental protection guidelines for
pipelines, C&R/IL/94-5.
4. National Energy Board, 2009. Land matters consultation
initiative. Streams 1, 2 and 4 Final Report, May.
5. National Energy Board, 2009. LMCI Stream 3 RH-2-2008
Reason for decision summary.
This paper was presented at the International Pipeline
Conference held in Calgary in September, 2010, and
organised by ASME, and is published here by permission
of the authors and ASME.
news wrap

January 2011 News Wrap

As demand for petroleum resources ramps up around the world in 2011, the pipeline industry is moving to develop the
pipeline infrastructure needed to connect oil and gas reserves with global markets. Major pipeline projects have been
granted key approvals in Canada and China, and a feasibility study will be conducted into the proposed pipeline link
between Poland and Lithuania. Construction has commenced on the second stage of the Kazakhstan – China Pipeline
and contracts have been awarded for an onshore pipeline in Thailand and a project off the coast of Brazil. Here, Pipelines
International provides a wrap of these and other recent developments in the international pipeline industry.

Asia coast of Lebanon, following the completion of the project’s

Punj Lloyd has been awarded an engineering procurement,
construction and commissioning contract for a 294 km onshore
gas pipeline project in Thailand.
The 42 inch diameter pipeline will transport gas from an LNG
terminal at the Maptaphut Industrial Estate near Rayong to a
tie-in station on the existing Wang Noi to Kaeng Khoi Pipeline,
located in Saraburi Province.
The project will involve 45 horizontal directional drilling
crossings close to city dwellings and highways.
The project is expected to be completed by the end of 2013.
The third Shaanxi – Beijing Gas Pipeline was completed in
December 2010, and put into operation on 4 January 2011. The
new pipeline will transport additional 20 MMcm/d of natural gas
per day from northwestern China’s Shaanxi Province to Beijing
and surrounding areas to ease the shortage of gas supply for
winter heating.
The 896 km, 40 inch diameter pipeline is capable of delivering
15 Bcm/a of natural gas.
Construction has commenced on the Beineu – Bozoy –
Shymkent Gas Pipeline, which is the second stage of the
Kazakhstan – China Gas Pipeline.
The main purpose of the 1,475 km Beineu – Bozoy –
Shymkent Gas Pipeline project is to ensure energy security and
reliability of gas supply of the southern regions of Kazakhstan,
through shipments of Kazakh gas from fields in the country’s
western regions.
The pipeline runs along the Mangystau, Aktobe, Kyzylorda and
South Kazakhstan regions and will interconnect with the first
stage of the Kazakhstan – China Pipeline, which runs
1,300 km from the Uzbekistani and Kazakh border to
Khorgos, China.
The Beineu – Bozoy – Shymkent gas pipeline is a joint venture
between KazTransGas and CNPC Central Asia Gas Pipeline
Company Limited. The first stage of the project is planned to be
operational at the end of 2012.
China’s National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC), has approved construction of the 492 km Changqing –
Huhhot natural pipeline.
The pipeline is expected to pump natural gas produced in
Changqing oilfield to Huhhot, capital city of north China’s
Inner Mongolia.
Middle East
Lebanon’s Energy and Water Minister Gebran Bassil has
unveiled a draft project to build a gas pipeline along the
feasibility study.
The project would involve the construction of a 174 km,
36 inch diameter pipeline that would stretch from the Deir
Ammar power station in Northern Lebanon to the Southern city
of Tyre.
The ministry invited tenders in November 2010 for the
construction of the pipeline, which is expected to take 28 months
to be completed.
Mr Bassil said that the pipeline still requires the approval of the
Lebanese Cabinet.
North America
Canada’s National Energy Board (NEB) has approved the
application, first lodged in 2004, for the construction and
operation of the Mackenzie Gas Project, which includes the
construction of 1,653 km of pipeline.
The Mackenzie Gas Project includes construction of the
1,196 km Mackenzie Valley Pipeline, development of three
onshore natural gas fields, construction of a 457 km pipeline to
carry natural gas liquids from Inuvik, Northwest Territories, to an
existing oil pipeline at Norman Wells, Northwest Territories and
other related facilities.
The Mackenzie Gas Pipeline would run from the Beaufort Sea
to northwestern Alberta, and is designed to carry up to 1.2Bcf/d of
natural gas.
The NEB attached 264 conditions to the project’s approval in
areas such as engineering, safety and environmental protection.
If the proponents decide to build the Mackenzie Gas Project,
they would also be required to obtain various permits and
authorisations from other boards and government agencies before
construction could commence.
The Mackenzie Valley Project is a joint venture between
Imperial Oil Resources Ventures, ConocoPhillips Canada, Shell
Canada, ExxonMobil Canada and Aboriginal Pipeline Group.
TransCanada has completed construction of its Groundbirch
Pipeline, and it is now operational. The pipeline consists of
77 km of 36 inch diameter pipe that will connect natural gas
supplies in the Montney shale and tight gas formation to the
Alberta System.
Spectra Energy has filed an application with the United
States Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for the
expansion of its Texas Eastern Transmission and Algonquin
Gas Transmission interstate pipeline systems to transport an
additional 800 MMcf/d of natural gas supplies to high demand
markets in northern New Jersey and New York City.

19 Pipelines International digest | JANUARY 2011

news wrap
The New Jersey-New York Project will include the construction
of a 25 km pipeline, which will run through parts of Bayonne,
Jersey City and offshore Hoboken in New Jersey, as well as parts
of Staten Island and Manhattan in New York; the replacement of
approximately 8 km of pipeline in Linden, New Jersey, and Staten
Island, New York; and, the modification existing facilities in New
York, New Jersey and Connecticut.
The estimated $US850 million project is expected to be in
service in November 2013.
Kinder Morgan Energy Partners and Copano Energy will build
119 km of pipeline to increase gathering and processing
capacity to producers in the Eagle Ford Shale, Texas, USA.
The partnership will construct an 87 km, 24 inch diameter
crossover pipeline between existing Kinder Morgan pipelines,
and an additional 32 km, 20 inch diameter pipeline that will
enable the joint venture to deliver gas to Formosa Hydrocarbons
Company.
Kinder Morgan will construct and operate the two additional
pipelines.
The crossover pipeline will have capacity in excess of
400 MMcf/d, which will give the joint venture additional options
to provide services to Eagle Ford Shale producers.
Kinder Morgan and Copano will invest approximately
$US100 million to construct the crossover pipeline and related
facilities and expect to complete the new facilities by year-
end 2011.
South America
Acergy has been awarded a contract from Petrobras for the
Sul-Norte Capixaba Project, located offshore Brazil in water
depths of between 30 and 100 m.
20 Pipelines International digest | JANUARY 2011
Acergy’s project scope includes the installation of an 18 inch
diameter, 150 km rigid gas pipeline linking the Camarupim Field
gas pipeline to the Parque das Baleias complex together with
associated diving, construction and pre-commissioning activities.
Engineering will begin immediately with offshore installation
scheduled to commence late 2011, using the Acergy Polaris and
Acergy Harrier.
Europe
Construction works on three pipelines designed to expand
capacity on Russia’s gas transmission system into Northwestern
Russia are on schedule.
The linear part of the 900 km Gryazovets – Vyborg gas
pipeline has now been completed. The pipeline is designed to
supply natural gas from Russia’s Unified Gas Supply System to
the Nord Stream Pipeline and to consumers of the Northwestern
region.
In addition, nearly 300 km of the 650 km Pochinki –
Gryazovets gas pipeline have been built and the 1,300 km,
56 inch diameter Ukhta – Torzhok Pipeline is on track to be
commissioned in the third quarter of 2012 after construction
commenced in December 2008.
The European Commission will provide $US549,000 to help
fund a feasibility study for the Poland – Lithuania Pipeline.
If the results of the first stage of the work are satisfactory, the
next step will be the decision regarding the preparation of a
feasibility study for the project, including the technical, economic
and environmental assumptions for the project.
The results of the feasibility study may constitute the basis for
an open season to assess the demand for gas transmission through
the Poland – Lithuania Gas Pipeline.