HIRING OF EMPLOYEE
PT&T vs. NLRC
Doctrine: The policy of not accepting or considering as
disqualified from work any woman who contracts marriage is
not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the
Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind
of stipulation against marriage in connection with her
employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and public
policy. It deprives a woman of the freedom to choose her
status, a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual
as an intangible and inalienable right.
Facts: Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a
reliever for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April
20, 1991 vice on C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave.
Under the Reliever Agreement which she signed with PT&T
Company, her employment was to be immediately terminated
upon expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, from June
10, 1991 to July 1, 1991, and from July 19, 1991 to August 8,
1991, private respondent’s services as reliever were again
engaged by petitioner, this time in replacement of one Erlinda
F. Dizon who went on leave during both periods. After August
8, 1991, and pursuant to their Reliever Agreement, her
services were terminated.
It now appears that private respondent had made the a
representation that she was single even though she contracted
marriage months before, in the two successive reliever
agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8,
1991. When petitioner supposedly learned about the same
later, its branch supervisor sent to private respondent a
memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that
memorandum, she was reminded about the company’s policy
of not accepting married women for employment.
Private respondent was dismissed from the company effective
January 29, 1992, which she readily contested by initiating a
complaint for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter handed down a
decision declaring that private respondent, who had already
gained the status of a regular employee, was illegally
dismissed by petitioner. On appeal to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), said public respondent upheld
the labor arbiter and it ruled that private respondent had
indeed been the subject of an unjust and unlawful
discrimination by her employer, PT&T.
Issue: WON discrimination merely by reason of the marriage
of a female employee is expressly prohibited by Article 136.
E.R.D.DIMAUNAHAN -EH409
Ruling: SC ruled that the stipulation is violative of Art. 136 of
the Labor Code. An employer is free to regulate, according to
his discretion and best business judgment, all aspects of
employment, “from hiring to firing,” except in cases of unlawful
discrimination or those which may be provided by law.
Petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering as
disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts
marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against,
discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws
and by no less than the Constitution.
Respondent’s act of concealing the true nature of her status
from PT&T could not be properly characterized as willful or in
bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly
because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable
company. In other words, she was practically forced by that
very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil
status for fear of being disqualified from work.
The government, to repeat, abhors any stipulation or policy in
the nature of that adopted by petitioner PT&T.
Under American jurisprudence, job requirements which
establish employer preference or conditions relating to the
marital status of an employee are categorized as a “sex-plus”
discrimination where it is imposed on one sex and not on the
other. Further, the same should be evenly applied and must
not inflict adverse effects on a racial or sexual group which is
protected by federal job discrimination laws.
Petitioner’s policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of
Article 136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be
free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection
with her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and
public policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman of the
freedom to choose her status, a privilege that by all accounts
inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right.
Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may
establish any agreements, terms, and conditions that they may
deem convenient, the same should not be contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Carried to
its logical consequences, it may even be said that petitioner’s
policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit
or common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of
marriage.
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 HIRING OF EMPLOYEE

Duncan Asso. Of Detailman-PTGWO

vs. Glaxo Wellcome Phils.

Facts: Petitioner Pedro Tecson was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philppines (glaxo) as medical representative on
Oct.24,1994 thereafter signed a contract of employment which stipulates among others that he agrees to study and abide existing
company rules; to disclose to management any existing of future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or
employees of competing drug companies and if ever that such management find such conflict of interest,he must resign. The
Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly
provides that an employee is expected to inform management of any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with
co-employees or employees of competing drug companies. If management perceives a conflict of interest or a potential conflict
between such relationship and the employee’s employment with the company, the management and the employee will explore the
possibility of a “transfer to another department in a non-counterchecking position” or preparation for employment outside the company
after six months.

Reminders from Tecson’s district manager did not stop him from marrying. Tecson married Bettsy, an Astra’s Branch Coordinator in
Albay. She supervised the district managers and medical representatives of her company and prepared marketing strategies for Astra
in that area.

Tecson was reassigned to another place and was not given products that the Astra company has and he was not included in products
seminars and training.

Tecson requested for time in complying said policy by asking for a transfer in the Glaxo’s milk division in which the other company
had no counterpart. Thereafter, he bought the matter to Grievance Committee but the parties failed to resolve such issue, Glaxo
offered Tecson a separation pay of one-half (½) month pay for every year of service, or a total of P50,000.00 but he declined the
offer. On November 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered its Decision declaring as valid Glaxo’s
policy on relationships between its employees and persons employed with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxo’s right to
transfer Tecson to another sales territory.

Tecson filed for a petition for review on the CA and the CA promulgated that the NCMB did not err in rendering its decision. A recon
was filed in appellate court but it was denied, hence this petition for certiorari. Petitioners contention it was violative of constitutional
law which is the equal protection clause and he was constructively dismissed while the respondents contention that it is a valid
exercise of its management prerogatives.

Issue: WON the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of another pharmaceutical
company is valid?
Ruling: This petition was denied. Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other
confidential programs and information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive
pharmaceutical industry.

The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo’s employees is
reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. In laying
down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor company will gain
access to its secrets and procedures.

That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No less than the Constitution recognizes the right
of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and
growth.

The challenged company policy does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution as petitioners erroneously suggest. It
is a settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those acting under color of
its authority.

From the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its employee handbook, it is clear that Glaxo does not impose an
absolute prohibition against relationships between its employees and those of competitor companies. Its employees are free to
cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their own choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest
between the employee and the company that may arise out of such relationships.

E.R.D.DIMAUNAHAN -EH409 2
 HIRING OF EMPLOYEE

There was no merit in Tecson’s contention that he was constructively dismissed when he was transferred from the Camarines Norte-
Camarines Sur sales area to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area, and when he was excluded from attending the
company’s seminar on new products which were directly competing with similar products manufactured by Astra. Constructive
dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible,
unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or when a clears discrimination, insensibility or
disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. The record does not show that Tecson was demoted or unduly
discriminated upon by reason of such transfer.

Star Paper Corp., vs. Simbol

Doctrine: The policy of the employer banning spouses from
working in the same company violates the rights of the
employee under the Constitution and the Labor Code if the
company cannot reasonable prove that it will be detrimental
to their company.
Facts: Star Paper has this company policy as to marriage in
1995:
“1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case
he/she has [a] relative, up to [the] 3rd degree of relationship,
already employed by the company.
In case of two of our employees (both singles [sic], one male
and another female) developed a friendly relationship during
the course of their employment and then decided to get
married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy
stated above.”
Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine Operator, married Alma
Dayrit, then an employee of the Repacking Section. Wilfreda
Comia, then a Production Helper in the Selecting
Department, married Howard Comia, then a helper in the
cutter-machine. Because of the company policy, Simbol and
Comia were allegedly forced to resign. Estrella was hired on
July 29, 1994. She met Luisito Zuñiga (Zuñiga), also a co-
worker. Petitioners stated that Zuñiga, a married man, got
Estrella pregnant. Estrella was allegedly dismissed because
of her immorality, and was forced to sign resignation papers
in order to claim her 13th month pay.
The company denied the allegations and said the Simbol,
Comia and Estrella voluntarily resigned in accordance with
the company policy, hence, the complaint should be
dismissed.
Labor Arbiter and NLRC sided with the company. CA sided
with the employees who resigned.
Issue: Is the dismissal illegal and contrary to Art 136 of the
Labor Code?
Ruling: YES. The Labor Code is the most comprehensive
piece of legislation protecting labor. The case at bar involves
Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides:
Art. 136. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a
condition of employment or continuation of employment that a
woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate
expressly or tacitly that upon getting married a woman
employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to
actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise
prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her
marriage.
Respondents submit that their dismissal violates the above
provision. Petitioners allege that its policy "may appear to be
contrary to Article 136 of the Labor Code" but it assumes a
new meaning if read together with the first paragraph of the
rule. The rule does not require the woman employee to
resign. The employee spouses have the right to choose who
between them should resign. Further, they are free to marry
persons other than co-employees. Hence, it is not the marital
status of the employee, per se, that is being discriminated. It
is only intended to carry out its no-employment-for-relatives-
within-the-third-degree-policy which is within the ambit of the
prerogatives of management.
To justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer
must prove two factors: (1) that the employment qualification
is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job
involved; and, (2) that there is a factual basis for believing
that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification
would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.
The concept of a bona fide occupational qualification is not
foreign in our jurisdiction. We employ the standard of
reasonableness of the company policy which is parallel to the
bona fide occupational qualification requirement. In the recent
case of Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO and Pedro
Tecson v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc., we passed on
the validity of the policy of a pharmaceutical company
prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any
competitor company. We held that Glaxo has a right to guard
its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing
strategies and other confidential programs and information
from competitors. We considered the prohibition against
personal or marital relationships with employees of
competitor companies upon Glaxo’s employees reasonable
under the circumstances because relationships of that nature
might compromise the interests of Glaxo. In laying down the
assailed company policy, we recognized that Glaxo only aims

E.R.D.DIMAUNAHAN -EH409 3
 HIRING OF EMPLOYEE

to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor
company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.
The requirement that a company policy must be reasonable
under the circumstances to qualify as a valid exercise of
management prerogative was also at issue in the 1997 case
of Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company v. NLRC. In
said case, the employee was dismissed in violation of
petitioner’s policy of disqualifying from work any woman
worker who contracts marriage.
personal reason(s) to dissociate himself from employment. It
is done with the intention of relinquishing an office,
accompanied by the act of abandonment. Thus, it is illogical
for Estrella to resign and then file a complaint for illegal
dismissal. Given the lack of sufficient evidence on the part of
petitioners that the resignation was voluntary, Estrella’s
dismissal is declared illegal.
Hence, the decision of CA is hereby affirmed

We held that the company policy violates the right against

discrimination afforded all women workers under Article 136
of the Labor Code, but established a permissible exception,
viz.:

requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried

could be justified as a "bona fide occupational qualification,"
or BFOQ, where the particular requirements of the job would
justify the same, but not on the ground of a general principle,
such as the desirability of spreading work in the workplace. A
requirement of that nature would be valid provided it reflects
an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job
performance. (Emphases supplied.)

The cases of Duncan and PT&T instruct us that the

requirement of reasonableness must be clearly established to
uphold the questioned employment policy. The employer has
the burden to prove the existence of a reasonable business
necessity. The burden was successfully discharged in
Duncan but not in PT&T. We do not find a reasonable
business necessity in the case at bar. Petitioners’ sole
contention that "the company did not just want to have two (2)
or more of its employees related between the third degree by
affinity and/or consanguinity" is lame. That the second
paragraph was meant to give teeth to the first paragraph of
the questioned rule is evidently not the valid reasonable
business necessity required by the law. Petitioners failed to
show how the marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine
Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of the Repacking
Section, could be detrimental to its business operations.
Neither did petitioners explain how this detriment will happen
in the case of WilfredaComia, then a Production Helper in the
Selecting Department, who married Howard Comia, then a
helper in the cutter-machine. The policy is premised on the
mere fear that employees married to each other will be less
efficient.

The contention of petitioners that Estrella was pressured to

resign because she got impregnated by a married man and
she could not stand being looked upon or talked about as
immoral43 is incredulous. If she really wanted to avoid
embarrassment and humiliation, she would not have gone
back to work at all. Nor would she have filed a suit for illegal
dismissal and pleaded for reinstatement. We have held that
in voluntary resignation, the employee is compelled by

E.R.D.DIMAUNAHAN -EH409 4
 HIRING OF EMPLOYEE
Del Monte Phils vs. Velasco
Doctrine: The company cannot dismiss a female employee if
her frequent absences were due to illnesses as a
consequence of her pregnancy provided that such were
justified.
Facts: Lolita M. Velasco (respondent) started working with Del
Monte Philippines (petitioner) on October 21, 1976 as a
seasonal employee and was regularized on May 1, 1977. Her
latest assignment was as Field Laborer.
On June 16, 1987, respondent was warned in writing due to
her absences. On May 4, 1991, respondent, thru a letter, was
again warned in writing by petitioner about her absences
without permission and a forfeiture of her vacation leave
entitlement for the year 1990-1991 was imposed against her.
On September 14, 1992, another warning letter was sent to
respondent regarding her absences without permission during
the year 1991-1992. Her vacation entitlement for the said
employment year affected was consequently forfeited.
In view of the said alleged absences without permission, on
September 17, 1994, a notice of hearing was sent to
respondent notifying her of the charges filed against her for
violating the Absence Without Official Leave rule: that is for
excessive absence without permission on August 15-18, 29-
31 and September 1-10, 1994. The hearing was set on
September 23, 1994. Respondent having failed to appear on
September 23, 1994 hearing, another notice of hearing was
sent to her resetting the investigation on September 30, 1994.
It was again reset to October 5, 1994.
On January 10, 1995, after hearing, the petitioner terminated
the services of respondent effective January 16, 1994 due to
excessive absences without permission.
Feeling aggrieved, respondent filed a case for illegal dismissal
against petitioner asserting that her dismissal was illegal
because she was on the family way suffering from urinary
tract infection, a pregnancy-borne, at the time she committed
the alleged absences. She explained that for her absence
from work on August 15, 16, 17 & 18, 1994 she had sent an
application for leave to her supervisor, Prima Ybañez.
Thereafter, she went to the company hospital for check-up
and was advised accordingly to rest in quarters for four (4)
days or on August 27 to 30, 1994. Still not feeling well, she
failed to work on September 1, 1994 and was again advised
two days of rest in quarters on September 2-3, 1994. Unable
to recover, she went to see an outside doctor, Dr. Marilyn
Casino, and the latter ordered her to rest for another five (5)
consecutive days, or from September 5 to 9, 1994. She
E.R.D.DIMAUNAHAN -EH409
declared she did not file the adequate leave of absence
because a medical certificate was already sufficient per
company policy. On September 10, 1994 she failed to report
to work but sent an application for leave of absence to her
supervisor, Prima Ybañez, which was not anymore accepted.
Labor Arbiter sided with Del Monte. However, NLRC and CA
sided with Velasco.
Issue: Was Velasco illegally dismissed?
Ruling: YES.
It is violative of Article 137 of the Labor Code. Article 137 of
the Labor Code provides that it shall be unlawful to “(1) To
deny any woman employee the benefits provided for in this
Chapter or to discharge any woman employed by him for the
purpose of preventing her from enjoying any of the benefits
provided under this Code; (2) To discharge such woman on
account of her pregnancy, while on leave or in confinement
due to her pregnancy; or(3) To discharge or refuse the
admission of such woman upon returning to her work for fear
that she may again be pregnant.”
In this case, by the measure of substantial evidence, what is
controlling is the finding of the NLRC and the CA that
respondent was pregnant and suffered from related ailments.
It would be unreasonable to isolate such condition strictly to
the dates stated in the Medical Certificate or the Discharge
Summary. It can be safely assumed that the absences that
are not covered by, but which nonetheless approximate, the
dates stated in the Discharge Summary and Medical
Certificate, are due to the continuing condition of pregnancy
and related illnesses, and, hence, are justified absences. The
petitioner admits these facts in its Petition for Review.8 And,
as the CA aptly held, it was no less than the company doctor
who advised the respondent to have "rest-in-quarters" for four
days on account of a pregnancy-related sickness.
Medical and health reports abundantly disclose that during the
first trimester of pregnancy, expectant mothers are plagued
with morning sickness, frequent urination, vomiting and fatigue
all of which complainant was similarly plagued with. The Filflex
Industrial and Manufacturing Co. case is not applicable,
principally because the nature and gravity of the illness
involved in that case – chronic asthmatic bronchitis – are
different from the conditions that are present in the instant
case, which is pregnancy and its related illnesses. The Court
takes judicial notice of the fact that the condition of asthmatic
bronchitis may be intermittent, in contrast to pregnancy which
is a continuing condition accompanied by various symptoms
and related illnesses.
Velasco was able to subsequently justify her absences in
accordance with company rules and policy. The Court finds no
5
 HIRING OF EMPLOYEE

cogent reason to disturb the findings of the NLRC and the CA

that the respondent was able to subsequently justify her
absences in accordance with company rules and policy; that
the respondent was pregnant at the time she incurred the
absences; that this fact of pregnancy and its related illnesses
had been duly proven through substantial evidence; that the
respondent attempted to file leaves of absence but the
petitioner’s supervisor refused to receive them; that she could
not have filed prior leaves due to her continuing condition; and
that the petitioner, in the last analysis, dismissed the
respondent on account of her pregnancy, a prohibited act.

Petitioner cannot use her history of absences to lay down a

pattern of absenteeism or habitual disregard of company rules
to justify the dismissal of respondent. Petitioner puts much
emphasis on respondent’s "long history" of unauthorized
absences committed several years beforehand. However,
petitioner cannot use these previous infractions to lay down a
pattern of absenteeism or habitual disregard of company rules
to justify the dismissal of respondent. The undeniable fact is
that during her complained absences in 1994, respondent was
pregnant and suffered related illnesses.

In fine, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings

of the CA and the NLRC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The

Decision dated July 23, 2001 and the Resolution dated May 7,
2002 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

E.R.D.DIMAUNAHAN -EH409 6
 HIRING OF EMPLOYEE
Yrasuegui vs. Phil Air Lines
Doctrine: Failure to comply with the weight standards of flight
companies is a ground for legal dismissal, it being under the
principle of “bona fide occupational qualification”. The Supreme
Court cited Star Paper Corporation vs. Simbol.
Facts: Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former
international flight steward of Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL). He
stands five feet and eight inches (5’8") with a large body frame.
The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is
from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as
mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual1 of
PAL.
The weight problem of petitioner dates back to 1984. Back then,
PAL advised him to go on an extended vacation leave from
December 29, 1984 to March 4, 1985 to address his weight
concerns. Apparently, petitioner failed to meet the company’s
weight standards, prompting another leave without pay from
March 5, 1985 to November 1985. Despite the suggestion of the
company to consult their company physician and their requests
to comply with the weight standards, Yrasuegui still failed to
comply.
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that
due to his inability to attain his ideal weight, and considering the
utmost leniency extended to him which spanned a period
covering a total of almost five (5) years, his services were
considered terminated effective immediately. Hence, the
petitioner claimed that he was illegally dismissed.
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC ruled in favour of Yrasuegui. CA
reversed the decision of NLRC.
Issue: Was the petitioner illegally dismissed?
Ruling: NO.
Our Ruling
I. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article
282(e) 44 of the Labor Code.
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other
conclusion than that they constitute a continuing qualification of
an employee in order to keep the job. Tersely put, an employee
may be dismissed the moment he is unable to comply with his
ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards. The
dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of
the Labor Code. As explained by the CA:
E.R.D.DIMAUNAHAN -EH409
x xx [T]he standards violated in this case were not mere "orders"
of the employer; they were the "prescribed weights" that a cabin
crew must maintain in order to qualify for and keep his or her
position in the company. In other words, they were standards
that establish continuing qualifications for an employee’s
position. In this sense, the failure to maintain these standards
does not fall under Article 282(a) whose express terms require
the element of willfulness in order to be a ground for dismissal.
The failure to meet the employer’s qualifying standards is in fact
a ground that does not squarely fall under grounds (a) to (d) and
is therefore one that falls under Article 282(e) – the "other
causes analogous to the foregoing."
In British Columbia Public Service Employee Commission
(BSPSERC) v. The British Columbia Government and Service
Employee’s Union (BCGSEU),63 the Supreme Court of Canada
adopted the so-called "Meiorin Test" in determining whether an
employment policy is justified. Under this test, (1) the employer
must show that it adopted the standard for a purpose rationally
connected to the performance of the job;64 (2) the employer
must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary65 to
the accomplishment of that work-related purpose; and (3) the
employer must establish that the standard is reasonably
necessary in order to accomplish the legitimate work-related
purpose.
CITING STAR PAPER CORPORATION VS SIMBOL:
Similarly, in Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol,66 this Court held
that in order to justify a BFOQ, the employer must prove that (1)
the employment qualification is reasonably related to the
essential operation of the job involved; and (2) that there is
factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons
meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform
the duties of the job.67
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has
committed itself to safely transport its passengers. In order to
achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most
particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the
aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as
imposing strict norms of discipline upon its employees.
In other words, the primary objective of PAL in the imposition of
the weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety. It cannot be
gainsaid that cabin attendants must maintain agility at all times
in order to inspire passenger confidence on their ability to care
for the passengers when something goes wrong. It is not
farfetched to say that airline companies, just like all common
carriers, thrive due to public confidence on their safety records.
People, especially the riding public, expect no less than that
airline companies transport their passengers to their respective
destinations safely and soundly. A lesser performance is
unacceptable.
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 HIRING OF EMPLOYEE

The task of a cabin crew or flight attendant is not limited to

serving meals or attending to the whims and caprices of the
passengers. The most important activity of the cabin crew is to
care for the safety of passengers and the evacuation of the
aircraft when an emergency occurs. Passenger safety goes to
the core of the job of a cabin attendant. Truly, airlines need
cabin attendants who have the necessary strength to open
emergency doors, the agility to attend to passengers in cramped
working conditions, and the stamina to withstand grueling flight
schedules.

On board an aircraft, the body weight and size of a cabin

attendant are important factors to consider in case of
emergency. Aircrafts have constricted cabin space, and narrow
aisles and exit doors. Thus, the arguments of respondent that
"[w]hether the airline’s flight attendants are overweight or not
has no direct relation to its mission of transporting passengers
to their destination"; and that the weight standards "has nothing
to do with airworthiness of respondent’s airlines," must fail.

In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is

used because it is parallel to BFOQ.68 BFOQ is valid "provided
it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for
satisfactory job performance."

Hence, the petitioner was legally dismissed. However, he is

entitled to separation pay. Normally, a legally dismissed
employee is not entitled to separation pay. This may be
deduced from the language of Article 279 of the Labor Code that
"[a]n employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement."
Luckily for petitioner, this is not an ironclad rule.

Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed

employee as an act "social justice,"101 or based on "equity."102
In both instances, it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for
serious misconduct; and (2) does not reflect on the moral
character of the employee. Here, We grant petitioner separation
pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) month’s pay for every year of
service.

E.R.D.DIMAUNAHAN -EH409 8