G.R. No. 129546. December 13, 2005.
* supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only
PROVINCE OF RIZAL, MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MATEO, PINTONG
BOCAUE MULTIPURPOSE COOPERATIVE, CONCERNED CITIZENS OF
RIZAL, INC., ROLANDO E. VILLACORTE, BERNARDO HIDALGO,
ANANIAS EBUENGA, VILMA T. MONTAJES, FEDERICO MUNAR, JR.,
ROLANDO BEÑAS, SR., ET AL., and KILOSBAYAN, INC.,
petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF
ENVIRONMENT & NATURAL RESOURCES, LAGUNA LAKE
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS &
HIGHWAYS, SECRETARY OF BUDGET & MANAGEMENT, METRO
MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents.
Civil Law; Contracts; The freedom of contract under our system of
government is not meant to be absolute.—In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp., this
Court stated: “The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not
meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable
legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and
welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of
obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in
the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.” The reason for this
is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York,quoted in Philippine American Life
Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, to wit: “ ‘Under our form of government the use
of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of
public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental
interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for
government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of
his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally
fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common
interest.’ ” In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the
state.
Same; Same; Natural Resources; The protection of watersheds ensures an
adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of
_______________
*
 EN BANC.
437
VOL. 477, DECEMBER 13, 2005  437  absolute, but is defined by the declared policies of the state, and is subject to the law
Province of Rizal vs. Executive Secretary
flashfloods that not only damage to property but also cause loss of lives.—
Water is life, and must be saved at all costs. In Collado v. Court of Appeals, we had
occasion to reaffirm our previous discussion in Sta. Rosa Realty Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, on the primordial importance of watershed areas,
thus: “The most important product of a watershed is water, which is one of the most
important human necessities. The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate
damage property but also cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an
“intergenerational” responsibility that needs to be answered now.”
Same; Same; Same; Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) was mandated to be the primary government agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development and proper use of the country’s
environment and natural resources specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral
resources including those in reservation and watershed areas and lands of the public
domain.—The state is, and always has been, zealous in preserving as much of our
natural and national heritage as it can, enshrining as it did the obligation to preserve
and protect the same within the text of our fundamental law. It was with this
objective in mind that the respondent DENR was mandated by then President
Corazon C. Aquino, under Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192, otherwise known
as “The Reorganization Act of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources,” to be “the primary government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the country’s environment and natural
resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral resources, including those
in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain.
Same; Same; Same; The right to a balance and healthful ecology is a
fundamental legal right that carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment.—We expounded on this matter in the landmark case
of Oposa v. Factoran, where we held that the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is a fundamental legal right that carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment. This right implies, among other things, the
judicious management and conservation of the country’s resources, which duty is
reposed in the DENR under the aforequoted Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192.
Same; Same; Same; Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) was entrusted with the guardianship and safekeeping of
438
438  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Province of Rizal vs. Executive Secretary
the Marikina Watershed Reservation and our other natural treasures.—The
Administrative Code of 1987 and Executive Order No. 192 entrust the DENR with
the guardianship and safekeepingof the Marikina Watershed Reservation and our
other natural treasures. However, although the DENR, an agency of the government,
owns the Marikina Reserve and has jurisdiction over the same, this power is not
and higher authority. Section 2, Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987, while specifically referring to the mandate of the DENR, makes particular
reference to the agency’s being subject to law and higher authority, thus: SEC.
2. Mandate.—(1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be
primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy. (2) It
shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State’s
1
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization, and conservation of the country’s natural resources.
Same; Same; Same; Under the Local Government Code, two requisites must
be met before a national project that affects the environmental and ecological
balance of local communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the
affected local communities and prior approval of the project by the appropriate
sanggunian.—Under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before
a national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local
communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local
communities, and prior approvalof the project by the appropriate sanggunian.
Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the project’s implementation is
illegal.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Jovito R. Salonga, Roberto L. Mendoza, Fernando A. Santiago, Jose Manuel
I. Diokno and Wigberto Tañada, Jr.for petitioners.
     The Solicitor General for respondents.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The earth belongs in usufruct to the living.1 
At the height of the garbage crisis plaguing Metro Manila and its environs, parts of
the Marikina Watershed Reservation were set aside by the Office of the President,
through Proclamation No. 635 dated 28 August 1995, for use as a sanitary landfill
and similar waste disposal applications. In fact, this site, extending to more or less 18
hectares, had already been in operation since 19 February 19902 for the solid wastes
of Quezon City, Marikina, San Juan, Mandaluyong, Pateros, Pasig, and Taguig.3  Barangay Pintong Bocaue, San Mateo, Rizal, and nearby localities." Said
This is a petition filed by the Province of Rizal, the municipality of San Mateo, and
various concerned citizens for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41330, denying, for lack of cause of action, the petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for a temporary
restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction assailing the legality and
constitutionality of Proclamation No. 635.
The facts are documented in painstaking detail.
On 17 November 1988, the respondent Secretaries of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and the Governor of the Metropolitan Manila Commission
(MMC) entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA),4 which provides in part:
1. The DENR agrees to immediately allow the utilization by the Metropolitan Manila
Commission of its land property located at Pintong Bocaue in San Mateo, Rizal as a
sanitary landfill site, subject to whatever restrictions that the government impact
assessment might require. 
2. Upon signing of this Agreement, the DPWH shall commence the
construction/development of said dumpsite.
3. The MMC shall: a) take charge of the relocation of the families within and around
the site; b) oversee the development of the areas as a sanitary landfill; c)
coordinate/monitor the construction of infrastructure facilities by the DPWH in the
said site; and d) ensure that the necessary civil works are properly undertaken to
safeguard against any negative environmental impact in the area.
On 7, 8 and 10 February 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo wrote Gov.
Elfren Cruz of the MMC, Sec. Fiorello Estuar of the DPWH, the Presidential Task
Force on Solid Waste Management, Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, and Sec.
Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., pointing out that it had recently passed a Resolution banning
the creation of dumpsites for Metro Manila garbage within its jurisdiction, asking
that their side be heard, and that the addressees "suspend and temporarily hold in
abeyance all and any part of your operations with respect to the San Mateo Landfill
Dumpsite." No action was taken on these letters.
It turns out that the land subject of the MOA of 17 November 1988 and owned by the
DENR was part of the Marikina Watershed Reservation Area. Thus, on 31 May
1989, forest officers of the Forest Engineering and Infrastructure Unit of the
Community Environment and Natural Resource Office, (CENRO) DENR-IV, Rizal
Province, submitted a Memorandum5 on the "On-going Dumping Site Operation of
the MMC inside (the) Upper Portion of Marikina Watershed Reservation, located at
Memorandum reads in part:
Observations:
3.1 The subject area is arable and agricultural in nature;
3.2 Soil type and its topography are favorable for agricultural and forestry
productions; 
...
3.5 Said Dumping Site is observed to be confined within the said Watershed
Reservation, bearing in the northeastern part of Lungsod Silangan Townsite
2
Reservation. Such illegal Dumping Site operation inside (the) Watershed
Reservation is in violation of P.D. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry
Code, as amended. . . 
Recommendations:
5.1 The MMC Dumping Site Inside Marikina Watershed Reservation, particularly
at Brgy. Pintong Bocaue, San Mateo, Rizal and at Bo. Pinugay, Baras/Antipolo,
Rizal which are the present garbage zones must totally be stopped and
discouraged without any political intervention and delay in order to save our
healthy ecosystems found therein, to avoid much destruction, useless efforts and
lost (sic) of millions of public funds over the land in question; (Emphasis ours)
On 19 June 1989, the CENRO submitted another Investigation Report6 to the
Regional Executive Director which states in part that:
1. About two (2) hectares had been excavated by bulldozers and garbage dumping
operations are going on.  know, the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) has
2. The dumping site is without the concurrence of the Provincial Governor, Rizal
Province and without any permit from DENR who has functional jurisdiction over
the Watershed Reservation; and
3. About 1,192 families residing and cultivating areas covered by four (4) Barangays
surrounding the dumping site will adversely be affected by the dumping operations
of MMC including their sources of domestic water supply. x x x x
On 22 January 1990, the CENRO submitted still another Investigation Report7 to the
Regional Executive Director which states that:
Findings show that the areas used as Dumping Site of the MMC are found to be
within the Marikina Watershed which are part of the Integrated Social Forestry
Project (ISF) as per recorded inventory of Forest Occupancy of this office.
It also appears that as per record, there was no permit issued to the MMC to utilize
these portions of land for dumping purposes.
It is further observed that the use of the areas as dumping site greatly affects the
ecological balance and environmental factors in this community.
On 19 February 1990, the DENR Environmental Management Bureau, through
Undersecretary for Environment and Research Celso R. Roque, granted the Metro
Manila Authority (MMA [formerly MMC]) an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) for the operation of a two-and-a-half-hectare garbage dumpsite. 
The ECC was sought and granted to comply with the requirement of Presidential
Decree No. 1586 "Establishing an Environmental Impact Statement System," Section
4 of which states in part that, "No persons, partnership or corporation shall undertake
or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area without first
securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate." Proclamation No. 2146, passed
on 14 December 1981, designates "all areas declared by law as national
parks, watershed reserves, wildlife preserves, and sanctuaries" as "Environmentally
Critical Areas."
On 09 March 1990, respondent Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA),
through its Acting General Manager, sent a letter8 to the MMA, which reads in part:
Through this letter we would like to convey our reservation on the choice of the sites
for solid waste disposal inside the watershed of Laguna Lake. As you may already
scheduled the abstraction of water from the lake to serve the needs of about 1.2
million residents of Muntinlupa, Paranaque, Las Pinas and Bacoor, Cavite by
1992. Accordingly, the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) is accelerating
its environmental management program to upgrade the water quality of the
lake in order to make it suitable as a source of domestic water supply the whole
year round. The said program regards dumpsites as incompatible within the
watershed because of the heavy pollution, including the risk of diseases,
generated by such activities which would negate the government’s efforts to
upgrade the water quality of the lake. Consequently, please consider our objection
to the proposed location of the dumpsites within the watershed. (Emphasis supplied
by petitioners)
On 31 July 1990, less than six months after the issuance of the ECC, Undersecretary
Roque suspended the ECC in a letter9 addressed to the respondent Secretary of
DPWH, stating in part that:
Upon site investigation conducted by Environmental Management Bureau staff on
development activities at the San Mateo Landfill Site, it was ascertained that
ground slumping and erosion have resulted from improper development of the
site. We believe that this will adversely affect the environmental quality in the area if
the proper remedial measures are not instituted in the design of the landfill site. This
is therefore contradictory to statements made in the Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) submitted that above occurrences will be properly mitigated.
3
In view of this, we are forced to suspend the Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC) issued until appropriate modified plans are submitted and approved by this
Office for implementation. (Emphasis ours)
On 21 June 1993, the Acting Mayor of San Mateo, Enrique Rodriguez, Jr., Barangay
Captain Dominador Vergara, and petitioner Rolando E. Villacorte, Chairman of the
Pintong Bocaue Multipurpose Cooperative (PBMC) wrote10 then President Fidel V.
Ramos expressing their objections to the continued operation of the MMA dumpsite
for causing "unabated pollution and degradation of the Marikina Watershed
Reservation."  2. The proposed Integrated Social Forestry Project be pushed through or be
On 14 July 1993, another Investigation Report11 submitted by the Regional Technical
Director to the DENR Undersecretary for Environment and Research contained the
following findings and recommendations:
Remarks and Findings:
. . . .  conflict with the local government of San Mateo and the nearby affected residents
5. Interview with Mr. Dayrit, whose lot is now being endangered because soil
erosion have (sic) caused severe siltation and sedimentation of the Dayrit Creek
which water is greatly polluted by the dumping of soil bulldozed to the creek;
6. Also interview with Mrs. Vilma Montajes, the multi-grade teacher of Pintong
Bocaue Primary School which is located only about 100 meters from the landfill site.
She disclosed that bad odor have (sic) greatly affected the pupils who are sometimes
sick with respiratory illnesses. These odors show that MMA have (sic) not
instituted/sprayed any disinfectant chemicals to prevent air pollution in the area.
Besides large flies (Bangaw) are swarming all over the playground of the school. The
teacher also informed the undersigned that plastic debris are being blown whenever
the wind blows in their direction.
7. As per investigation report … there are now 15 hectares being used as landfill
disposal sites by the MMA. The MMA is intending to expand its operation within the
50 hectares.
8. Lots occupied within 50 hectares are fully planted with fruit bearing trees like
Mangoes, Santol, Jackfruit, Kasoy, Guyabano, Kalamansi and Citrus which are now
bearing fruits and being harvested and marketed to nearby San Mateo Market and
Masinag Market in Antipolo.  On 21 August 1995, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo issued a
....
Recommendations:
1. As previously recommended, the undersigned also strongly recommend(s) that the
MMA be made to relocate the landfill site because the area is within the Marikina
Watershed Reservation and Lungsod Silangan. The leachate treatment plant ha(s)
been eroded twice already and contaminated the nearby creeks which is the source of
potable water of the residents. The contaminated water also flows to Wawa Dam and
Boso-boso River which also flows to Laguna de Bay.
approved. ISF project will not only uplift the socio-economic conditions of the
participants but will enhance the rehabilitation of the Watershed considering that
fruit bearing trees are vigorously growing in the area. Some timber producing species
are also planted like Mahogany and Gmelina Arboiea. There are also portions where
dipterocarp residuals abound in the area.
3. The sanitary landfill should be relocated to some other area, in order to avoid any
who have been in the area for almost 10-20 years.
On 16 November 1993, DENR Secretary Angel C. Alcala sent MMA Chairman
Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. a letter12 stating that "after a series of investigations by field
officials" of the DENR, the agency realized that the MOA entered into on 17
November 1988 "is a very costly error because the area agreed to be a garbage
dumpsite is inside the Marikina Watershed Reservation." He then strongly
recommended that all facilities and infrastructure in the garbage dumpsite in Pintong
Bocaue be dismantled, and the garbage disposal operations be transferred to another
area outside the Marikina Watershed Reservation to protect "the health and general
welfare of the residents of San Mateo in particular and the residents of Metro Manila
in general." 
On 06 June 1995, petitioner Villacorte, Chairman of the PBMC, wrote13 President
Ramos, through the Executive Secretary, informing the President of the issues
involved, that the dumpsite is located near three public elementary schools, the
closest of which is only fifty meters away, and that its location "violates the
municipal zoning ordinance of San Mateo and, in truth, the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board had denied the then MMA chairman’s application for a locational
clearance on this ground." 
Resolution14 "expressing a strong objection to the planned expansion of the landfill
operation in Pintong Bocaue and requesting President Ramos to disapprove the draft
Presidential Proclamation segregating 71.6 Hectares from Marikina Watershed
Reservation for the landfill site in Pintong Bocaue, San Mateo, Rizal."
4
Despite the various objections and recommendations raised by the government
agencies aforementioned, the Office of the President, through Executive Secretary
Ruben Torres, signed and issued Proclamation No. 635 on 28 August 1995,
"Excluding from the Marikina Watershed Reservation Certain Parcels of Land
Embraced Therein for Use as Sanitary Landfill Sites and Similar Waste Disposal
Under the Administration of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority." The
pertinent portions thereof state:
WHEREAS, to cope with the requirements of the growing population in Metro
Manila and the adjoining provinces and municipalities, certain developed and open
portions of the Marikina Watershed Reservation, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources should now be
excluded form the scope of the reservation;
WHEREAS, while the areas delineated as part of the Watershed Reservations are
intended primarily for use in projects and/or activities designed to contain and
preserve the underground water supply, other peripheral areas had been included
within the scope of the reservation to provide for such space as may be needed for
the construction of the necessary structures, other related facilities, as well as other
priority projects of government as may be eventually determined;
WHEREAS, there is now an urgent need to provide for, and develop, the necessary
facilities for the disposal of the waste generated by the population of Metro Manila
and the adjoining provinces and municipalities, to ensure their sanitary and /or
hygienic disposal;
WHEREAS, to cope with the requirements for the development of the waste disposal
facilities that may be used, portions of the peripheral areas of the Marikina
Watershed Reservation, after due consideration and study, have now been identified
as suitable sites that may be used for the purpose;
WHEREAS, the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
has recommended the exclusion of these areas that have been so identified from the
Marikina Watershed Reservation so that they may then be developed for the purpose;
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the aforecited premises, I, Fidel V.
Ramos, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do
hereby ordain:
Section 1. General – That certain parcels of land, embraced by the Marikina
Watershed Reservation, were found needed for use in the solid waste disposal
program of the government in Metropolitan Manila, are hereby excluded from that
which is held in reserve and are now made available for use as sanitary landfill and
such other related waste disposal applications.
Section 2. Purpose – The areas being excluded from the Marikina Watershed
Reservation are hereby placed under the administration of the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority, for development as Sanitary Landfill, and/or for use in the
development of such other related waste disposal facilities that may be used by the
cities and municipalities of Metro Manila and the adjoining province of Rizal and its
municipalities.
Section 3. Technical Description – Specifically, the areas being hereby excluded
from the Marikina Watershed Reservation consist of two (2) parcels, with an
aggregate area of approximately ONE MILLION SIXTY THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED TWENTY NINE (1,060,529) square meters more or less, as follows: x x
xx
Section 4. Reservations – The development, construction, use and/or operation of
any facility that may be established within the parcel of land herein excluded from
the Marikina Watershed Reservation shall be governed by existing laws, rules and
regulations pertaining to environmental control and management. When no longer
needed for sanitary landfill purposes or the related waste disposal activities, the
parcels of land subject of this proclamation shall revert back as part of the Marikina
Watershed Reservation, unless otherwise authorized.
On 06 September 1995, Director Wilfrido S. Pollisco of the Protected Areas and
Wildlife Bureau wrote the DENR Secretary to express the bureau’s stand against the
dumpsite at Pintong Bocaue, and that "it is our view . . . that the mere presence of a
garbage dumpsite inside a watershed reservation is definitely not compatible with the
very purpose and objectives for which the reservation was established."
On 24 November 1995, the petitioners Municipality of San Mateo and the residents
of Pintong Bocaue, represented by former Senator Jovito Salonga, sent a letter to
President Ramos requesting him to reconsider Proclamation No. 635. Receiving no
reply, they sent another letter on 02 January 1996 reiterating their previous request.
On 04 March 1996, then chairman of the Metro Manila Development Authority
(MMDA [formerly MMA]) Prospero I. Oreta addressed a letter to Senator Salonga,
stating in part that:
….
2. Considering the circumstances under which we are pursuing the project, we are
certain you will agree that, unless we are prepared with a better alternative, the
project simply has to be pursued in the best interest of the greater majority of the
population, particularly their health and welfare."
5
2.1 The San Mateo Sanitary Landfill services, at least, 38% of the waste disposal site
requirements of Metro Manila where an estimated 9 million population reside.
2.2 Metro Manila is presently estimated to be generating, at least, 15,700 cubic
meters of household or municipal waste, a 1.57 hectare of land area will be filled in a
month’s time with a pile 31 meters high of garbage, or in a year, the accumulated
volume will require 18.2 hectares.
....
4. The sanitary landfill projects are now on their fifth year of implementation. The
amount of effort and money already invested in the project by the government cannot
easily be disregarded, much more set aside in favor of the few settlers/squatters who
chose to ignore the earlier notice given to them that the area would be used precisely
for the development of waste disposal sites, and are now attempting to arouse
opposition to the project.
4.2 There is no place within the jurisdiction of Metro Manila, with an area big
enough to accommodate at least 3 to 5 years of waste disposal requirements. x x x x
4.21 The present site at San Mateo was selected because, at the time consideration
was being made, and up to the present, it is found to have the attributes that
positively respond to the criteria established:
4.21.1 The site was a government property and would not require any outlay for it to
be acquired.
4.21.2 It is far from any sizeable community/settlements that could be affected by the
development that would be introduced and yet, was within economic hauling
distance from the areas they are designed to serve.
4.21.21 At the time it was originally decided to locate the landfills at the present site,
there were not more that fifteen (15) settlers in the area and they had hardly
established themselves. The community settlements were located far from the site.
4.21.22 The area was hardly accessible, especially to any public transport. The area
was being served by a public utility jeep that usually made only two (2) trips daily.
During the rainy season, it could only be reached by equipping the vehicle with tire
chains to traverse the slippery muddy trail roads.
4.21.3 There was, at least, seventy-three (73) hectares available at the site.
4.3 While the site was within the Marikina Watershed Reservation under the
administration of the DENR, the site was located at the lower periphery of the buffer
zone; was evaluated to be least likely to affect the underground water supply; and
could, in fact, be excluded from the reservation.
4.31 It was determined to be far from the main water containment area for it to pose
any immediate danger of contaminating the underground water, in case of a failure in
any of the mitigating measures that would be installed.
4.32 It was likewise too far from the nearest body of water, the Laguna Lake, and the
distance, plus the increasing accumulation of water from other tributaries toward the
lake, would serve to dilute and mitigate any contamination it may emit, in case one
happened.
4.33 To resolve the recurring issue regarding its being located within the Marikina
Watershed Reservation, the site had been recommended by the DENR, and approved
by the President, to already be excluded from the Marikina Watershed reservation
and placed under the administration of MMDA, since the site was deemed to form
part of the land resource reserve then commonly referred to as buffer zone.
5. Contrary to the impression that you had been given, relocating the site at this point
and time would not be easy, if not impracticable, because aside from the investments
that had been made in locating the present site, further investments have been
incurred in:
5.1 The conduct of the technical studies for the development being implemented.
Through a grant-in-aid from the World Bank, US$600,000 was initially spent for the
conduct of the necessary studies on the area and the design of the landfill. This was
augmented by, at least, another P1.5 million from the government for the studies to
be completed, or a total cost at the time (1990) of approximately P20 million.
5.2. Additionally, the government has spent approximately P33 million in improving
on the roadway to make the site accessible from the main road/highway.
5.3 To achieve the necessary economies in the development of the site, the utilities
had been planned so that their use could be maximized. These include the access
roads, the drainage system, the leacheate collection system, the gas collection
system, and the waste water treatment system. Their construction are designed so
that instead of having to construct independent units for each area, the use of existing
facilities can be maximized through a system of interconnection. On the average, the
government is spending P14.8 million to develop a hectare of sanitary landfill area.
6
6. Despite the preparations and the investments that are now being made on the
project, it is estimated that the total available area, at an accelerated rate of disposal,
assuming that all open dump sites were to be closed, will only last for 39 months.
6.1 We are still hard pressed to achieve advanced development on the sites to assure
against any possible crisis in garbage from again being experienced in Metro Manila,
aside from having to look for the additional sites that may be used after the capacities
shall have been exhausted.
6.2 Faced with the prospects of having the 15,700 cubic meters of garbage generated
daily strewn all over Metro Manila, we are certain you will agree that it would be
futile to even as much as consider a suspension of the waste disposal operations at
the sanitary landfills.
On 22 July 1996, the petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a civil action
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for a temporary
restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction. The hearing on the prayer for
preliminary injunction was held on 14 August 1996.  responsible government agencies and non-partisan officials concerned with
On 13 June 1997, the court a quo rendered a Decision,15 the dispositive part of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
application for a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction for lack
of cause of action, is hereby DENIED.16  The Court of Appeals erred when it readily swallowed respondents’ assertion that the
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari of the above decision on the following
grounds:
I VI
The Court of Appeals erred and abused its discretion in deliberately ignoring the
significant fact that Presidential Proclamation No. 635 was based on a brazen forgery
– it was supposedly issued, as stated in the proclamation itself and repeatedly
asserted by respondents in their comment, on the basis of the alleged
recommendation of the DENR Secretary dated June 26, 1995 but which assertion
was denounced by the then Secretary Angel C. Alcala himself – in a sworn statement
dated September 18, 1996 and again during the special hearing of the case in the
Court of Appeals on November 13, 1996 – as a forgery since his signature on the
alleged recommendation had been falsified, as now admitted by respondents
themselves in their comment filed with the Court of Appeals, through the Office of
the Solicitor General.
II
The Court of Appeals erred and abused its discretion in completely ignoring the
significant fact that the respondents are operating the landfill based on a spurious
Environmental Compliance Certificate. 
III
The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the respondents did not violate R.A. 7586
when they issued and implemented Proclamation No. 635 considering that the
withdrawal or disestablishment of a protected area or the modification of the
Marikina Watershed can only be done by an act of Congress.
IV
The Court of Appeals erred and abused its discretion when it deliberately and
willfully brushed aside the unanimous findings and adverse recommendations of
environmental protection in favor of the self-serving, gratuitous assertions found in
the unsolicited, partisan letter of former Malabon Mayor, now Chairman Prospero
Oreta of the MMDA who is an interested party in this case.
V
San Mateo Dumpsite "is located in the ‘Buffer Zone’ of the reservation" and is
therefore outside of its boundaries, and even declared in its decision that it took
"serious note" of this particular argument.
The Court of Appeals erred and abused its discretion when it encroached on the
function of Congress by expressing its unjustified fear of mini-smokey mountains
proliferating in Metro Manila and justifying its decision in favor of "an integrated
system of solid waste management like the San Mateo Landfill.
On 05 January 1998, while the appeal was pending, the petitioners filed a Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order,17 pointing out that the effects of the El
Niño phenomenon would be aggravated by the relentless destruction of the Marikina
Watershed Reservation. They noted that respondent MMDA had, in the meantime,
continued to expand the area of the dumpsite inside the Marikina Watershed
Reservation, cutting down thousands of mature fruit trees and forest trees, and
leveling hills and mountains to clear the dumping area. Garbage disposal operations
7
were also being conducted on a 24-hour basis, with hundreds of metric tons of
wastes being dumped daily, including toxic and infectious hospital wastes,
intensifying the air, ground and water pollution.18 
The petitioners reiterated their prayer that respondent MMDA be temporarily
enjoined from further dumping waste into the site and from encroaching into the area
beyond its existing perimeter fence so as not to render the case moot and academic.
19 
On 28 January 1999, the petitioners filed a Motion for Early Resolution, calling
attention to the continued expansion of the dumpsite by the MMDA that caused the
people of Antipolo to stage a rally and barricade the Marcos Highway to stop the
dump trucks from reaching the site for five successive days from 16 January 1999.
On the second day of the barricade, all the municipal mayors of the province of Rizal
openly declared their full support for the rally, and notified the MMDA that they
would oppose any further attempt to dump garbage in their province.20  Although the petitioners may be deemed to have waived or abandoned the issues
As a result, MMDA officials, headed by then Chairman Jejomar Binay, agreed to
abandon the dumpsite after six months. Thus, the municipal mayors of Rizal,
particularly the mayors of Antipolo and San Mateo, agreed to the use of the dumpsite
until that period, which would end on 20 July 1999.21 
On 13 July 1999, the petitioners filed an Urgent Second Motion for Early
Resolution22 in anticipation of violence between the conflicting parties as the date of
the scheduled closure of the dumpsite neared.
On 19 July 1999, then President Joseph E. Estrada, taking cognizance of the gravity
of the problems in the affected areas and the likelihood that violence would erupt
among the parties involved, issued a Memorandum ordering the closure of the
dumpsite on 31 December 2000.23 Accordingly, on 20 July 1999, the Presidential
Committee on Flagship Programs and Projects and the MMDA entered into a MOA
with the Provincial Government of Rizal, the Municipality of San Mateo, and the
City of Antipolo, wherein the latter agreed to further extend the use of the dumpsite
until its permanent closure on 31 December 2000.24  31 December 2000, at which time it would be permanently closed.
On 11 January 2001, President Estrada directed Department of Interior and Local
Government Secretary Alfredo Lim and MMDA Chairman Binay to reopen the San
Mateo dumpsite "in view of the emergency situation of uncollected garbage in Metro
Manila, resulting in a critical and imminent health and sanitation epidemic."25  uncollected garbage in Metro Manila, resulting in a critical and imminent health and
Claiming the above events constituted a "clear and present danger of violence
erupting in the affected areas," the petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for Restraining
Order26 on 19 January 2001. 
On 24 January 2001, this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for,
"effective immediately and until further orders."27 
Meanwhile, on 26 January 2001, Republic Act No. 9003, otherwise known as "The
Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000," was signed into law by President
Estrada.
Thus, the petitioners raised only two issues in their Memorandum28 of 08 February
2005: 1) whether or not respondent MMDA agreed to the permanent closure of the
San Mateo Landfill as of December 2000, and 2) whether or not the permanent
closure of the San Mateo landfill is mandated by Rep. Act No. 9003.
We hold that the San Mateo Landfill will remain permanently closed.
raised in their previous pleadings but not included in the memorandum,29 certain
events we shall relate below have inclined us to address some of the more pertinent
issues raised in the petition for the guidance of the herein respondents, and pursuant
to our symbolic function to educate the bench and bar.30 
The law and the facts indicate that a mere MOA does not guarantee the dumpsite’s
permanent closure. 
The rally and barricade staged by the people of Antipolo on 28 January 1999, with
the full support of all the mayors of Rizal Province caused the MMDA to agree that
it would abandon the dumpsite after six months. In return, the municipal mayors
allowed the use of the dumpsite until 20 July 1999.
On 20 July 1999, with much fanfare and rhetoric, the Presidential Committee on
Flagship Programs and Projects and the MMDA entered into a MOA with the
Provincial Government of Rizal, the Municipality of San Mateo, and the City of
Antipolo, whereby the latter agreed to an extension for the use of the dumpsite until
Despite this agreement, President Estrada directed Department of Interior and Local
Government Secretary Alfredo Lim and MMDA Chairman Binay to reopen the San
Mateo dumpsite on 11 January 2001, "in view of the emergency situation of
sanitation epidemic;" our issuance of a TRO on 24 January 2001 prevented the
dumpsite’s reopening.
8
Were it not for the TRO, then President Estrada’s instructions would have been
lawfully carried out, for as we observed in Oposa v. Factoran, the freedom of
contract is not absolute. Thus:
….. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp., this Court stated: "The freedom of contract,
under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is
understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion
of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of
the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and
general welfare." The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New
York, quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, to wit:
"'Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are
normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both
shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract
rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his
property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work
them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to
regulate it in the common interest.'" In short, the non-impairment clause must yield
to the police power of the state. (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
We thus feel there is also the added need to reassure the residents of the Province of
Rizal that this is indeed a final resolution of this controversy, for a brief review of the
records of this case indicates two self-evident facts. First, the San Mateo site has
adversely affected its environs, and second, sources of water should always be
protected.  country was gripped by a shortage of potable water so serious, it necessitated its own
As to the first point, the adverse effects of the site were reported as early as 19 June
1989, when the Investigation Report of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer of DENR-IV-1 stated that the sources of domestic water supply of
over one thousand families would be adversely affected by the dumping
operations.31 The succeeding report included the observation that the use of the areas
as dumping site greatly affected the ecological balance and environmental factors of
the community.32 Respondent LLDA in fact informed the MMA that the heavy
pollution and risk of disease generated by dumpsites rendered the location of a
dumpsite within the Marikina Watershed Reservation incompatible with its program
of upgrading the water quality of the Laguna Lake. 33 
The DENR suspended the site’s ECC after investigations revealed ground slumping
and erosion had resulted from improper development of the site.34 Another
Investigation Report35 submitted by the Regional Technical Director to the DENR
reported respiratory illnesses among pupils of a primary school located
approximately 100 meters from the site, as well as the constant presence of large
flies and windblown debris all over the school’s playground. It further reiterated
reports that the leachate treatment plant had been eroded twice already,
contaminating the nearby creeks that were sources of potable water for the
residents. The contaminated water was also found to flow to the Wawa Dam and
Boso-boso River, which in turn empties into Laguna de Bay.
This brings us to the second self-evident point. Water is life, and must be saved at all
costs. In Collado v. Court of Appeals,36 we had occasion to reaffirm our previous
discussion in Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,37 on
the primordial importance of watershed areas, thus: "The most important product of a
watershed is water, which is one of the most important human necessities. The
protection of watersheds ensures an adequate supply of water for future generations
and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but also cause loss of
lives. Protection of watersheds is an "intergenerational" responsibility that needs to
be answered now.38 
Three short months before Proclamation No. 635 was passed to avert the garbage
crisis, Congress had enacted the National Water Crisis Act39 to "adopt urgent and
effective measures to address the nationwide water crisis which adversely affects the
health and well-being of the population, food production, and industrialization
process. One of the issues the law sought to address was the "protection and
conservation of watersheds."40 
In other words, while respondents were blandly declaring that "the reason for the
creation of the Marikina Watershed Reservation, i.e., to protect Marikina River as the
source of water supply of the City of Manila, no longer exists," the rest of the
legislation.
Respondents’ actions in the face of such grave environmental consequences defy all
logic. The petitioners rightly noted that instead of providing solutions, they have,
with unmitigated callousness, worsened the problem. It is this readiness to wreak
irrevocable damage on our natural heritage in pursuit of what is expedient that has
compelled us to rule at length on this issue. We ignore the unrelenting depletion of
our natural heritage at our peril. 
I.
The Reorganization Act of the DENR Defines and 
Limits Its Powers over the Country’s Natural Resources
The respondents next point out that the Marikina Watershed Reservation, and thus
the San Mateo Site, is located in the public domain. They allege that as such, neither
9
the Province of Rizal nor the municipality of San Mateo has the power to control or
regulate its use since properties of this nature belong to the national, and not to the
local governments.  the public domain. It is also responsible for the licensing and regulation of all natural
It is ironic that the respondents should pursue this line of reasoning.  benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations
In Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,41 we had occasion to
observe that "(o)ne of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional
Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of the
country. There was an overwhelming sentiment in the convention in favor of the
principle of state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian
doctrine. State ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point
to secure recognition of the state’s power to control their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization."42 
The Regalian doctrine was embodied in the 1935 Constitution, in Section 1 of Article
XIII on "Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources." This was reiterated in
the 1973 Constitution under Article XIV on the "National Economy and the
Patrimony of the Nation," and reaffirmed in the 1987 Constitution in Section 2 of
Article XII on "National Economy and Patrimony," to wit:
Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora
and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights
for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development
of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.43  resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance
Clearly, the state is, and always has been, zealous in preserving as much of our
natural and national heritage as it can, enshrining as it did the obligation to preserve
and protect the same within the text of our fundamental law.  generations.
It was with this objective in mind that the respondent DENR was mandated by then
President Corazon C. Aquino, under Section 4 of Executive Order No.
192, 44 otherwise known as "The Reorganization Act of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources," to be "the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the
country’s environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands,
mineral resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of
resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the
of Filipinos."
We expounded on this matter in the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran,45 where we
held that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is a fundamental legal right
that carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
This right implies, among other things, the judicious management and conservation
of the country’s resources, which duty is reposed in the DENR under the aforequoted
Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192. Moreover:
Section 3 (of E. O. No. 192) makes the following statement of policy:
SEC. 3. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure
the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including
the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable
access of the different segments of the population to the development and use of the
country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future
generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true
value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their
utilization; development and conservation of our natural resources. (Emphasis ours)
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated in Title XIV, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987, specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
SEC. 1. Declaration of Policy. - (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the
Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of
making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources
equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into
account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.
10
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment."46 (Emphasis
ours.) 
In sum, the Administrative Code of 1987 and Executive Order No. 192 entrust the
DENR with the guardianship and safekeeping of the Marikina Watershed
Reservation and our other natural treasures. However, although the DENR, an
agency of the government, owns the Marikina Reserve and has jurisdiction over the
same, this power is not absolute, but is defined by the declared policies of the state,
and is subject to the law and higher authority. Section 2, Title XIV, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987, while specifically referring to the mandate of the
DENR, makes particular reference to the agency’s being subject to law and higher
authority, thus:
SEC. 2. Mandate. - (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall
be primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the
State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.
With great power comes great responsibility. It is the height of irony that the public
respondents have vigorously arrogated to themselves the power to control the San
Mateo site, but have deftly ignored their corresponding responsibility as guardians
and protectors of this tormented piece of land.
II.
The Local Government Code Gives to Local Government Units All the Necessary
Powers to Promote the General Welfare of Their Inhabitants
The circumstances under which Proclamation No. 635 was passed also violates Rep.
Act No. 7160, or the Local Government Code.  From a careful reading of said provisions, we find that these apply only to national
Contrary to the averment of the respondents, Proclamation No. 635, which was
passed on 28 August 1995, is subject to the provisions of the Local Government
Code, which was approved four years earlier, on 10 October 1991.  27 of the Local Government Code.
Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the policy of the state " to require all
national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local
government units, non-governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned
sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their
respective jurisdictions." Likewise, Section 27 requires prior consultations before a
program shall be implemented by government authorities and the prior approval of
the sanggunian is obtained.
During the oral arguments at the hearing for the temporary restraining order, Director
Uranza of the MMDA Solid Waste Management Task Force declared before the
Court of Appeals that they had conducted the required consultations. However, he
added that "(t)his is the problem, sir, the officials we may have been talking with at
the time this was established may no longer be incumbent and this is our difficulty
now. That is what we are trying to do now, a continuing dialogue." 47 
The ambivalent reply of Director Uranza was brought to the fore when, at the height
of the protest rally and barricade along Marcos Highway to stop dump trucks from
reaching the site, all the municipal mayors of the province of Rizal openly declared
their full support for the rally and notified the MMDA that they would oppose any
further attempt to dump garbage in their province. 48 
The municipal mayors acted within the scope of their powers, and were in fact
fulfilling their mandate, when they did this. Section 16 allows every local
government unit to "exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare," which involve, among other things, "promot(ing) health and safety,
enhance(ing) the right of the people to a balanced ecology, and preserv(ing) the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. "
In Lina , Jr. v. Paño,49 we held that Section 2 (c), requiring consultations with the
appropriate local government units, should apply to national government projects
affecting the environmental or ecological balance of the particular community
implementing the project. Rejecting the petitioners’ contention that Sections 2(c) and
27 of the Local Government Code applied mandatorily in the setting up of lotto
outlets around the country, we held that:
programs and/or projects which are to be implemented in a particular local
community. Lotto is neither a program nor a project of the national government, but
of a charitable institution, the PCSO. Though sanctioned by the national government,
it is far fetched to say that lotto falls within the contemplation of Sections 2 (c) and
Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with Section 26 thereof.
Section 26 reads:
SECTION 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of
Ecological Balance. It shall be the duty of every national agency or government-
11
owned or controlled corporation authorizing or involved in the planning and
implementation of any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change,
depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover,
and extinction of animal or plant species, to consult with the local government units,
nongovernmental organizations, and other sectors concerned and explain the goals
and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the people and the
community in terms of environmental or ecological balance, and the measures that
will be undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof.  addition to said services and facilities, …providing for the establishment,
Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted
to mean projects and programs whose effects are among those enumerated in
Section 26 and 27, to wit, those that: (1) may cause pollution; (2) may bring
about climatic change; (3) may cause the depletion of non-renewable resources;
(4) may result in loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover; (5) may eradicate
certain animal or plant species from the face of the planet; and (6) other
projects or programs that may call for the eviction of a particular group of
people residing in the locality where these will be implemented. Obviously, none
of these effects will be produced by the introduction of lotto in the province of
Laguna. (emphasis supplied)
We reiterated this doctrine in the recent case of Bangus Fry Fisherfolk v.
Lanzanas,50 where we held that there was no statutory requirement for
the sangguniang bayan of Puerto Galera to approve the construction of a mooring
facility, as Sections 26 and 27 are inapplicable to projects which are not
environmentally critical.  communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.
Moreover, Section 447, which enumerates the powers, duties and functions of the
municipality, grants the sangguniang bayan the power to, among other things, "enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of th(e) Code." These include:
(1) Approving ordinances and passing resolutions to protect the environment and
impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment, such as
dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing, illegal logging and
smuggling of logs, smuggling of natural resources products and of endangered
species of flora and fauna, slash and burn farming, and such other activities which
result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of
ecological imbalance; [Section 447 (1)(vi)]
(2) Prescribing reasonable limits and restraints on the use of property within
the jurisdiction of the municipality, adopting a comprehensive land use plan for
the municipality, reclassifying land within the jurisdiction of the city, subject to the
pertinent provisions of this Code, enacting integrated zoning ordinances in
consonance with the approved comprehensive land use plan, subject to existing laws,
rules and regulations; establishing fire limits or zones, particularly in populous
centers; and regulating the construction, repair or modification of buildings within
said fire limits or zones in accordance with the provisions of this Code; [Section 447
(2)(vi-ix)]
(3) Approving ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of
the basic services and facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in
maintenance, protection, and conservation of communal forests and watersheds,
tree parks, greenbelts, mangroves, and other similar forest development
projects ….and, subject to existing laws, establishing and providing for the
maintenance, repair and operation of an efficient waterworks system to supply water
for the inhabitants and purifying the source of the water supply; regulating the
construction, maintenance, repair and use of hydrants, pumps, cisterns and
reservoirs; protecting the purity and quantity of the water supply of the
municipality and, for this purpose, extending the coverage of appropriate
ordinances over all territory within the drainage area of said water supply and
within one hundred (100) meters of the reservoir, conduit, canal, aqueduct,
pumping station, or watershed used in connection with the water service; and
regulating the consumption, use or wastage of water." [Section 447 (5)(i) & (vii)]
Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites must be met before a
national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local
communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local
Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the project’s implementation is
illegal.
III.
Waste Disposal Is Regulated by the Ecological 
Solid Waste Management Act of 2000
The respondents would have us overlook all the abovecited laws because the San
Mateo site is a very expensive - and necessary - fait accompli. The respondents cite
the millions of pesos and hundreds of thousands of dollars the government has
already expended in its development and construction, and the lack of any viable
alternative sites. 
The Court of Appeals agreed, thus:
12
During the hearing on the injunction, questions were also asked. "What will happen need to tackle the remaining issues raised in the petition and the parties’ respective
if the San Mateo Sanitary Landfill is closed? Where will the daily collections of memoranda.
garbage be disposed of and dumped?" Atty. Mendoza, one of the lawyers of the
petitioners, answered that each city/municipality ‘must take care of its own.’ A final word. Laws pertaining to the protection of the environment were not drafted
Reflecting on that answer, we are troubled: will not the proliferation of separate open in a vacuum. Congress passed these laws fully aware of the perilous state of both our
dumpsites be a more serious health hazard (which ha(s) to be addressed) to the economic and natural wealth. It was precisely to minimize the adverse impact
residents of the community? What with the galloping population growth and the humanity’s actions on all aspects of the natural world, at the same time maintaining
constricting available land area in Metro Manila? There could be a ‘mini-Smokey and ensuring an environment under which man and nature can thrive in productive
Mountain’ in each of the ten cities…comprising Metro Manila, placing in danger the and enjoyable harmony with each other, that these legal safeguards were put in place.
health and safety of more people. Damage to the environment could be aggravated They should thus not be so lightly cast aside in the face of what is easy and
by the increase in number of open dumpsites. An integrated system of solid waste expedient.
management, like the San Mateo Sanitary Landfill, appears advisable to a populous
metropolis like the Greater Metro Manila Area absent access to better technology.51  WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 41330, dated 13 June 1997, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
We acknowledge that these are valid concerns. Nevertheless, the lower court should temporary restraining order issued by the Court on 24 January 2001 is hereby made
have been mindful of the legal truism that it is the legislature, by its very nature, permanent.
which is the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and
expediency of any law.52  SO ORDERED.

Moreover, these concerns are addressed by Rep. Act No. 9003. Approved on 26
January 2001, "The Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000" was enacted
pursuant to the declared policy of the state "to adopt a systematic, comprehensive
and ecological solid waste management system which shall ensure the protection of
public health and environment, and utilize environmentally sound methods that
maximize the utilization of valuable resources and encourage resource conservation
and recovery."53 It requires the adherence to a Local Government Solid Waste
Management Plan with regard to the collection and transfer, processing, source
reduction, recycling, composting and final disposal of solid wastes, the handling and
disposal of special wastes, education and public information, and the funding of solid
waste management projects.

The said law mandates the formulation of a National Solid Waste Management
Framework, which should include, among other things, the method and procedure for
the phaseout and the eventual closure within eighteen months from effectivity of the
Act in case of existing open dumps and/or sanitary landfills located within an
aquifer, groundwater reservoir or watershed area.54 Any landfills subsequently
developed must comply with the minimum requirements laid down in Section 40,
specifically that the site selected must be consistent with the overall land use plan
of the local government unit, and that the site must be located in an area where
the landfill’s operation will not detrimentally affect environmentally sensitive
resources such as aquifers, groundwater reservoirs or watershed areas.55 

This writes finis to any remaining aspirations respondents may have of reopening the
San Mateo Site. Having declared Proclamation No. 635 illegal, we see no compelling

13

G.R. No. 96401. April 6, 1992.*
NEMESIO N. ATIS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ORLANDO S.
DELATINA (DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS, NAMELY:
MANSUETA BAGON VDA. DE DELATINA & THEIR CHILDREN, DELIA,
ELSIE & ORLANDO, JR., SURNAMED DELATINA, respondents, SPS.
ARTURO M. PACULANANG AND ELEUTERIA (LILIAN) B.
PACULANANG, Intervenors.
Civil Law; Easement; P.D. 1067; Words and Phrases; Appropriation,
defined.—“Appropriation” as used in the Water Code means the “acquisition of
rights over the use of waters or the taking or diverting of waters from a natural
source”; while “use of water for fisheries is the utilization of water for the
propagation and culture of fish as a commercial enterprise.”
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; When National Water Resources Council
has jurisdiction.—Where there is a grant existing in favor of the petitioner, and there
is a violation of grantee’s right by closure of the irrigation canal, it is the enjoyment
of the right emanating from the grant that is in litigation, and the case is not within
the jurisdiction of the National Water Resources Council.
APPEAL by certiorari from the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Marigomen, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Josie Sar. Pacatang for petitioner.
     Arturo M. Paculanang for intervenors.
     Orlando O. Barrera for private respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, from the
judgment of the Court of Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 15534 (Nemesio N. Atis,
Plaintiff-Appellant, versus Orlando Delatina, Defendant-Appellee, Spouses Arturo
M. Paculanang and Eleuteria (Lilian) Bobes Paculanang, Intervenors-Appellees),
dated 23 November 1989, affirming "in full" the Resolution dated 30 July 1987 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch X, Dipolog City, which dismissed the case "for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, under Presidential Decree No. 1067."
The material allegations of the Complaint for "Judicial Abatement of Nuisance,
Mandatory Injunction and Damages," which the Trial Court dismissed, read:
4. Lot 1 of the plaintiff, together with Lots 2, 3 & 4 of the persons
named, have been devoted primarily, directly and solely for
fishpond purposes, the nature of the realty being for these purposes
as there is a natural watercourse, stream, or continuous water
between the banks;
5. Since time immemorial the water flows from these higher estates
down to the sea of Dapitan Bay, passing through a lower estate
claimed by one Eleuteria Lilian Bobis, the wife of Arturo M.
Paculanang, municipal trial judge of Liloy and Sindangan,
Zamboanga del Norte;
6. The natural watercourse, since time immemorial, has been freely
flowing from the upper estates aforestated, unimpeded and
continuously into the sea, through the land claimed by the said
Eleuteria Lilian Bobis-Paculanang, even as during high tide of the
sea, sea water also goes upwards into the fishpond of plaintiff. This
condition has been by nature, existing since time immemorial and
all riparian or littoral estate owners have recognized it, since as the
public and government authorities have also respected it;
7. Sometime in the middle of August 1986, without plaintiff's
knowledge or permission, defendant closed the natural waterway
by constructing and building a dike on the land claimed by
Eleuteria Lilian Bobis-Paculanang thereby completely blocking
and obstructing the flow of the water from the higher estate of
plaintiff and his relatives, and thus causing the water in plaintiff's
fishpond to remain stagnant, and leading to the poisoning of
plaintiff's growing shrimps, prawns, bangus (milkfish) and others
to the great and irreparable damage and injury to plaintiff;
8. When plaintiff knew and realized defendant's tortious acts, the
effect of which was to create a nuisance, plaintiff readily
confronted him and asked for an explanation why he did that, when
as a Barangay Captain of San Pedro, Dapitan City, defendant has
always known of the condition of the watercourse that freely
empties its water into the sea, and vice versa, the sea water also
goes upwards during high tides, but defendant merely said that he
closed the waterflow because he was making or constructing a dike
for the fishpond which he said, he was authorized to make for
Judge & Mrs. Paculanang; (pp. 36-38, Rollo).
As prayed for in the Complaint and reiterated by Petitioner in his Motion, dated 25
November 1986, the Trial Court issued, on 27 November 1986, a Temporary
Mandatory Restraining Order which directed Respondent Delatina "to demolish or
destroy immediately the dyke he has constructed on the land of Mrs. Eleuteria Bobis
Paculanang and restore the condition of the water way prior to August, 1986, and to
14
refrain from further acts that may change the contour in the area surrounding Mrs.
Paculanang's fishpond and the plaintiff's fishpond."
In due time, Respondent Delatina (now deceased and substituted by his heirs) filed
his Answer denying the material allegations of the Complaint.
Spouses Arturo and Eleuteria Paculanang filed an Answer-in-Intervention with
Counterclaim making common cause with Respondent Delatina, which Answer the
Trial Court admitted in an Order, dated 8 January 1987. Intervenors maintained
among others:
2. Defendant (Delatina) is a mere caretaker of the intervenors in
this case because the intervenors are the true owners of the
property in question:
3. That the action for nuisance by plaintiff is not actionable
because the community is not affected, as in fact the people around
the area are happy with the construction of intervenors dike
because they have utilized the same as their bridge and parthway
which they have not availed in the property of the plaintiff;
4. That the fishpond in question is a titled property of the
intervenors;
5. That plaintiff's complaint against defendant and/or intervenors is
unfounded and not true for there was never any moment that they
have obstructed completely the free flow and passage of water
which may passed (sic) on their property because of the
construction of an irrigation dike and canal in their property, as
shown in the sketch plan hereto attached as Annex "1" of
intervenor and made integral part of this answer;
In an Order bearing the same date, or on 8 January 1987, the Trial Court directed its
Clerk of Court, who was earlier designated as Commissioner, to supervise the
drainage experiment on the fishponds involved.
In his Report dated 13 April 1987, the Commissioner recommended "the immediate
demolition of all dykes, obstructions and the like introduced in August, 1986 and
thereafter by defendant Delatina."
On 30 June 1987, Respondent Delatina filed a Motion to Dismiss the case on the
following grounds: (1) the Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action, the same being vested in the National Water Resources Council
by Pres. Decree No. 424; 2 and (2) Petitioner failed to exhaust administrative
remedies as no prior recourse was made to said Council.
Acting on said Motion, the Trial Court dismissed the case on 30 July 1987, for
Petitioner's "failure to exhaust administrative remedies under Presidential Decree No.
1067."
As the Court of Appeals, to which Petitioner appealed, affirmed "in full" the Trial
Court's order of dismissal, herein Petitioner availed of this recourse claiming that the
Court of Appeals erred: (1) in failing to consider the main issue raised by the
ultimate facts which is whether the acts of Private Respondents/Intervenors caused
damage or injury to the rights of Petitioner, no "dispute as to water rights" being
involved; (2) in applying the general rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies,
the instant case being an exception thereto; and (3) in not ruling that Private
Respondents/Intervenors could no longer question the jurisdiction of the Trial Court
after submitting to its jurisdiction and seeking reliefs from it.
Private Respondents/Intervenors, on the other hand, have taken a contrary position.
The decisive issue pivots around whether or not, under the material allegations of the
Complaint, the case falls under the jurisdiction of the Trial Court.
As earlier stated, the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals entertained a negative
view. Both Courts agreed with the Private Respondents/Intervenors that the case falls
under the jurisdiction of the National Water Resources Council.
Presidential Decree No. 1067 otherwise known as "The Water Code of the
Philippines" has spelled out in Article 3 thereof the underlying principles of the
Code, one of which is:
d. The utilization, exploitation, development, conservation and
protection of water resources shall be subject to the control and
regulation of the government through the National Water
Resources Council,herein referred to as the Council. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Article 88 of the same Code provides that:
Art. 88. The Council shall have original jurisdiction over all
disputes relating to appropriation, utilization, exploration,
development, control, conservation and protection of waters within
the meaning and context of this Code. (Emphasis supplied)
15
The case at bar does not involve any dispute relating to appropriation or use of
waters. "Appropriation" as used in the Water Code means that "acquisition of rights
over the use of waters or the taking or diverting of waters from a natural source"
(Art. 9); while "use of water for fisheries is the utilization of water for the
propagation and culture of fish as a commercial enterprise." In fact, Petitioner is the
holder of: (1) WATER PERMIT NO. 10974 to use water from the San Pedro Creek,
Dapitan City, and (2) WATER PERMIT NO. 10975 to use sea water, "for purposes
of Fisheries," issued to him by no less than the National Water Resources Council on
January 4, 1988 (pp. 93 and 94, Rollo). The issuance of said permits served to grant
petitioner water rights or the privilege to appropriate and use water (Art. 13, Pres.
Decree No. 1067) from the San Pedro Creek and sea water from Dapitan Bay for his
fishpond.
Private Respondents/Intervenors do not dispute the water rights petitioner had
acquired by reason of those permits but maintain that said licenses were issued by the
National Water Resources Council to Petitioner only on 4 January 1988, or more
than a year after the case was filed in Court. The crucial point is, however, that
"since time immemorial" water had been flowing from the higher estates down to
Dapitan Bay and to the sea passing through the lower estate belonging to the
Intervenors. There is nothing in the records before us controverting this statement of
fact.
Obviously, therefore, no dispute lies relative to the use or appropriation by Petitioner
of water from the San Pedro Creek and sea water from the Dapitan Bay. The case
does not involve a determination of the parties' respective water rights, which would
otherwise be within the competence and original jurisdiction of the National Water
Resources Council. Rather, the issue is whether or not the construction of the dike,
obstructed the natural water course or the free flow of water from Petitioner's higher
estate to Intervenors' lower estate thereby causing injury to petitioners' rights and
impairing the use of his fishpond. This issue necessitates resort to judicial
intervention. As held in the case of Amistoso v. Ang (L-60219, 29 June 1984, 130
SCRA 228), where there is a grant existing in favor of the petitioner, and there is a
violation of grantee's right by closure of the irrigation canal, it is the enjoyment of
the right emanating from the grant that is in litigation, and the case is not within the
jurisdiction of the National Water Resources Council.
In fine, it is the Regional Trial Court, Branch X, Dipolog City, and not the National
Water Resources Council, that has jurisdiction over the instant case. It follows that
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies on the basis of which the case
was dismissed by both Courts below, does not come into play.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the case is
ordered REMANDED to the Trial Court for further proceedings, with costs against
respondents/intervenors.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132209. April 29, 2005.*
CARLOS C. BUENDIA, petitioner, vs. CITY OF ILIGAN, respondent.
Actions; Certiorari; The Supreme Court has ruled, as early as 20 January
1992 in a Resolution in PHILEC Workers’ Union v. Hon. Romeo A. Young, “that the
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court must be filed
within a reasonable period of only three (3) months.”—From receipt of the NWRB
order denying its opposition and/or appeal, respondent did not file a Motion for
Reconsideration but proceeded to file a Petition for Certiorari with the RTC after
almost six (6) months from the issuance of said order. Certainly, filing said petition
almost six (6) months later does not fall within what this Court considers as
a reasonable period to institute a petition for certiorari. Although the applicable
rules on special 
_______________
*
 SECOND DIVISION.
563
VOL. 457, APRIL 29, 2005  563 
Buendia vs. City of Iligan
civil action for certiorari, at the time of the filing of the petition, did not
provide for a definite time frame within which to file the petition, this Court has
ruled, as early as 20 January 1992 in a Resolution in PHILEC Workers’ Union v.
Hon. Romeo A. Young, “that the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court must be filed within a reasonable period of only three (3)
months.” “The failure to file the certiorari petition within a reasonable time renders
the petitioner [respondent in this case] susceptible to the adverse legal consequences
of laches.”
Natural Resources; National Water Resources Board (NWRB);The NWRB
exercises original jurisdiction over issues involving water rights controversies.—
Absent a discussion by the NWRB of the substantial issues raised in the Opposition
and/or Appeal, the trial court should not have decided said questions especially since
16
they were not passed upon by the Board which exercises original jurisdiction over
issues involving water rights controversies.
Same; Same; Administrative Law; Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies; If the case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because
technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be
obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the
courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court; The
question as to who between two persons has the better right to a water source should
be left to the determination of the NWRB.—Time and again, this Court has upheld
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in deference to the specialized expertise of
administrative agencies to act on certain matters. As held by the Court in the case
of Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: . . . [I]f the case is such that its
determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper
administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are
involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a
remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper
jurisdiction of a court. Therefore, the question of as to who between the City of
Iligan and Carlos Buendia has the better right to the water source should have been
left to the determination of the NWRB via a timely protest filed during the pendency
of the water permit applications. However, said issue could not have been adjudi-
564
564  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Buendia vs. City of Iligan
cated upon by the NWRB since the application was never properly contested.
Hence, in the absence of a timely protest filed before the NWRB, no water rights
controversy arose wherein the NWRB can properly discuss the substantial issues
raised by respondent.
Same; Same; Same; The failure of the party to timely oppose the water permit
application of another, and later on to file the Petition for Certiorari within a
reasonable period of time, has the effect of rendering the grant of the water permits
to the latter final and executory.—From a reading of the above provisions, it is
evident that after an application to obtain a water permit has been made known to the
public, any interested party must file his protest thereto, in order that the application
may be properly evaluated. Otherwise, after the application for a water permit has
been approved, the grantee of the permit now acquires an exclusive right to use the
water source, reckoned from the date of the filing of the applications. Thus, after
petitioner’s right to the water permit has been properly adjudicated, respondent may
no longer belatedly question said grant. By virtue of respondent’s failure to lodge a
timely protest, petitioner has already acquired the right to appropriate the water from
the spring inside the latter’s property. In conclusion, the failure of respondent City of
Iligan to timely oppose the water permit applications, and later on to file the Petition
for Certiorari within a reasonable time has the effect of rendering the grant of the
water permits to petitioner Buendia final and executory.
Same; Same; City of Iligan; The Charter of the City of Iligan (R.A. 525)
shows no grant of the power to appropriate water resources—Section 15 of the
Charter merely provides for the power to “provide for the maintenance of
waterworks for supplying water to the inhabitants of the city.”—As to the fourth
issue of whether or not respondent has the right to appropriate water under its
charter, suffice it to say that a perusal of the charter of the City of Iligan (Rep. Act
No. 525) shows no grant of the power to appropriate water resources. Section 15 of
the charter merely provides for the power to “provide for the maintenance of
waterworks for supplying water to the inhabitants of the city.”
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
565
VOL. 457, APRIL 29, 2005  565 
Buendia vs. City of Iligan
     Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & Delos Angeles Law Offices for
petitioner.
     Thomas Dean Quijano and Wilson Namocot for respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Norte, Branch 2, which set aside the
Order2 of the National Water Resources Board (NWRB), the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted and the
question (sic) NWRB order of March 10, 1994, is hereby set aside and
rendered of no effect for being issued in grave abuse of discretion.3 
THE FACTS
On 05 October 1992, petitioner Buendia filed with the NWRB an application for the
appropriation of water from a spring located within his property in Ditucalan, Iligan
City.  Said application was docketed as Application No. 11913 (for commercial
purposes) and No. 11917 (for domestic water supply).4 
In the absence of protests to the applications being timely filed, the NWRB, after
evaluating petitioner's applications, issued on 25 June 1993, Water Permits No.
13842 and No. 138275 in his favor.
17
On 17 November 1993, almost five (5) months after petitioner's Water Permits were
issued, respondent City of Iligan filed with the NWRB an "Opposition and/or
Appeal"6 contesting the issuance of said water permits to petitioner.   The Opposition
and/or Appeal sought to serve as both a protest against petitioner's water permit
applications, as well as an appeal to the NWRB's grant of the water permits to
petitioner.
On 10 March 1994, the NWRB issued an Order7 dismissing respondent's Opposition
and/or Appeal. The "Opposition" part was dismissed for being filed out of time,
while the "Appeal" part was dismissed as a consequence of the denial of the
opposition to the application, i.e., in the absence of a verified protest having been
seasonably filed, no water rights controversy arose; hence, there was no decision
from which respondent may appeal from.
Respondent City of Iligan did not move for a reconsideration of said order, nor did it
appeal to the appropriate Executive Department,8 but instead filed on 09 September
1994, with the RTC of Lanao del Norte, Branch 2, a Petition for Certiorari assailing
the legality of the NWRB Order for being issued in excess of its jurisdiction and/or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Respondent sought to annul the NWRB Order on the following specific grounds:
1.  The NWRB did not notify the City of Iligan of Buendia's Water Permit
Application No. 11913 and No. 11917.  Neither did the NWRB give the
City of Iligan an opportunity to be heard with respect to the applications
because no public hearing was conducted; and
2.  The NWRB's March 10, 1994 Order was issued without due process, the
NWRB having "arbitrarily and despotically" denied the City of Iligan's
Opposition and/or Appeal notwithstanding the fact that the latter was not
furnished a copy (sic) of Buendia's Water Permits.9  and/or Appeal because there is "nothing which can be the subject of an
In his Answer, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition claiming inter-
alia that: (a) the petition was not filed within a reasonable period, as it was filed
more than five (5) months after petitioner received a copy of the order it seeks to
annul; (b) the petition lacks cause of action for failure of the City of Iligan to file a
Motion for Reconsideration which is a prerequisite to the filing of a petition
for certiorari; (c) the City of Iligan did not exhaust all administrative remedies, since
it did not avail itself of its right to appeal as provided under the Administrative Code
of 1987; and (d) the NWRB appropriately dismissed the Opposition and/or Appeal.10  admissions by the parties, as herein above specified, reveal material and
After all the issues were joined with the filing of the last pleading, the case was set
for pre-trial.  As reflected in the pre-trial order of 28 June 1996 which was amended
on 02 July 1996, the parties specifically agreed to limit the issue of the case
to "whether or not the NWRB Order dated March 10, 1994 was rendered by the
NWRB with grave abuse of discretion or contrary to law."11 
On 15 August 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision.  Although the
court a quo upheld the dismissal of the "Opposition and/or Appeal" on procedural
grounds, it nonetheless annulled the NWRB Order, to wit:
From the aforesaid established facts, it could be safely deduced that as
early as October 22, 1992 or eight months prior to the issuance of
respondent Buendia's water permits on June 23, 1993, petitioner City of
Iligan was already aware of respondent Buendia's water permit application
and had all the opportunity to protest or oppose the same.
…
In this particular case, as emphatically stressed in respondent Buendia's
memorandum, it is not disputed that no verified protest or opposition was
filed during all the time, respondent Buendia's applications were being
processed by respondent NWRB.  Hence, under the prevailing
circumstances, it being uncontested, no water rights controversy arose and
respondent NWRB directly evaluated the technical aspect of the
applications pursuant to the Implementing Rules and Regulations as
explained above.  In fact, on March 11-12, 1993, respondent NWRB, had
conducted the physical investigation of the spring, which is the subject
matter of the application.
…
Accordingly, based only upon the foregoing considerations, it would appear
that respondent NWRB was correct in dismissing petitioner's Opposition
appeal" as there is nothing for respondent NWRB to decide considering the
absence of water rights controversy.
Considering, however, that the instant case is a clash between an individual
or private right as against an assertion for the public welfare, involving, as a
matter of fact, the water supply for the City of Iligan, this Court has to
examine more closely the facts and the law in their broadest perspective.  A
more careful scrutiny of the records as well as the stipulations of facts and
substantial aspects of the case, not taken into consideration by the
respondent NWRB, which entirely changes the complexion of the
case.12 [Emphases ours]
18
According to the lower court, the appropriation by the Iligan City Waterworks
Sewerage System (ICWSS) and its predecessors-in-interest of the water source at
Ditucalan spring was from 1927 up to the present, as shown by the following:
1.  That the Iligan Waterworks Sewerage System has been existing as early
as 1927 and the same was taken over by the NAWASA on April 1, 1956;
2.  That in 1971, R. A. No. 6234 was passed and by virtue of the same, the
MWSS took over the NAWASA, and on August 19, 1973, a Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA) was issued between the MWSS and the City Mayor
of Iligan, transferring the power of the MWSS to Iligan City.13 
Thus, following the rule on acquisitive prescription that the right to the use of public
water may be acquired through prescription for twenty (20) years, the court a quo
ruled that the ICWSS had already acquired by acquisitive prescription the right to
appropriate water from the Ditucalan spring prior to Buendia's application for water
rights before the NWRB and that the Board no longer had any jurisdiction to issue
any water right over the same water source.
Thereafter, on 30 September 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which was subsequently denied by the trial court in an Order14 dated 05 January
1998.
Raising purely questions of law, petitioner filed the present petition.
ISSUES
In this Petition for Certiorari, petitioner raises the following issues:
1.        Whether the court a quo went beyond the issues it was empowered to
adjudicate, as delineated in the Pre-Trial Order, and thus departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, as well as deprived
petitioner of his right to present evidence to support the case;
2.        Assuming that the court a quo may validly pass upon the issue of
who has the better right to appropriate water from petitioner's property,
whether it decided this question of substance in accord with law or with the
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;
3.        Whether the court a quo correctly ruled that since respondent had
already acquired by acquisitive prescription the right to appropriate water
from the Ditucalan spring then the NWRB no longer had any jurisdiction to
issue any water right over the same water source; and
4.        Whether the court a quo correctly ruled that respondent has the right
to appropriate water under its charter, Republic Act No. 525.
RULING OF THE COURT
In order to properly settle the issues raised in the instant case, a perusal of the
NWRB Order of 10 March 1994 is of utmost importance since, as determined by the
parties during pre-trial and recognized by the trial court in its decision, the pivotal
issue of the case is the legality of the NWRB Order dismissing respondent's
Opposition and/or Appeal.
It bears stressing that respondent's Opposition and/or Appeal was dismissed by the
NWRB solely on procedural grounds, the opposition being filed out of time. 
According to the NWRB:
As against this gratuitous claim by the oppositors, however, the record is
replete with evidence that Iligan City, was in point of fact and in law, very
much aware of these applications as early as October 22, 1992, yet no
verified protest nor opposition was filed by Iligan City during all the time
that these applications were being processed, investigated and evaluated
and despite having ample opportunity to do so…
On the other point raised which pertains to the "appeal issue," a careful
examination of these articles alluded to (Art. 88 and 89, P.D. 1067) shows
beyond doubt that these refers to decisions of the Council (now Board) on
water rights controversies or disputes, which in this particular case does not
exist.  In the case at bar, there was NO decision of a water right
controversy in the pre-issuance of subject water permits which may be the
subject of an appeal.  Considering further that there was NO verified protest
seasonably filed against said applications, logically therefore, there is no
controversy to speak of ….
In essence, the "Opposition and/or Appeal" filed by Iligan City, has no leg
to stand on, because it was filed "OUT OF TIME" and secondly, because of
want of legal and factual basis.15 [Italics ours]
Clearly, therefore, the only question which the court a quo should have resolved is
whether or not the NWRB had correctly dismissed the "Opposition and/or Appeal"
for being filed out of time.  To said issue, the trial court opined:
In this particular case, as emphatically stressed in respondent Buendia's
memorandum, it is not disputed that no verified protest or opposition was
filed during all the time, respondent Buendia's applications were being
19
 processed by respondent NWRB.  Hence, under the prevailing
circumstances, it being uncontested, no water rights controversy arose…
… examine more closely the facts and the law in their broadest perspective.  A
Accordingly, based only upon the foregoing considerations, it would appear
that respondent NWRB was correct in dismissing petitioner's Opposition
and/or Appeal because there is "nothing which can be the subject of an
appeal" as there is nothing for respondent NWRB to decide considering the
absence of water rights controversy.16 [Emphasis Ours]
Respondent's penchant for disregarding the rules of procedure is evident from the
facts of the case.  Both the NWRB and the trial court deduced that as early as 22
October 1992 or eight (8) months prior to the issuance of petitioner's water permits,
respondent City of Iligan was already aware of Buendia's applications and had all the
opportunity to protest the same but failed to do so and instead, filed it's opposition
and/or appeal almost five months after the permits have been issued.  Further, from
receipt of the NWRB order denying its opposition and/or appeal, respondent did not
file a Motion for Reconsideration but proceeded to file a Petition for Certiorari with
the RTC after almost six (6) months from the issuance of said order.  Certainly, filing
said petition almost six (6) months later does not fall within what this Court
considers as a reasonable period to institute a petition for certiorari.  Although the
applicable rules on special civil action for certiorari, at the time of the filing of the
petition, did not provide for a definite time frame within which to file the
petition,17 this Court has ruled, as early as 20 January 1992 in a Resolution
in PHILEC Workers' Union v. Hon. Romeo A. Young,18 "that the special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court must be filed within a reasonable
period of only three (3) months."19  has the better right to the water source should have been left to the determination of
"The failure to file the certiorari petition within a reasonable time renders the
petitioner [respondent in this case] susceptible to the adverse legal consequences of
laches."20 The essence of laches is the failure, or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert a right within
a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it.21 
Notwithstanding the conclusion that the dismissal of said opposition and/or appeal
was in accordance with law, the court a quo proceeded to resolve the question of as
to who between the City of Iligan and Carlos Buendia has the better right to the
water source, certainly going beyond the issue delineated in the pre-trial.  The RTC
reasoned:
Considering, however, that the instant case is a clash between an individual
or private right as against an assertion for the public welfare, involving, as a
matter of fact, the water supply for the City of Iligan, this Court has to
more careful scrutiny of the records as well as the stipulations of facts and
admissions by the parties, as herein above specified, reveal material and
substantial aspects of the case, not taken into consideration by the
respondent NWRB, which entirely changes the complexion of the case.22 
Absent a discussion by the NWRB of the substantial issues raised in the Opposition
and/or Appeal, the trial court should not have decided said questions especially since
they were not passed upon by the Board which exercises original jurisdiction over
issues involving water rights controversies.23 
Time and again, this Court has upheld the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in
deference to the specialized expertise of administrative agencies to act on certain
matters.  As held by the Court in the case of Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals:24 
. . . [I]f the case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies
because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then
relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a
remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the
proper jurisdiction of a court.
Therefore, the question of as to who between the City of Iligan and Carlos Buendia
the NWRB via a timely protest filed during the pendency of the water permit
applications.  However, said issue could not have been adjudicated upon by the
NWRB since the application was never properly contested.  Hence, in the absence of
a timely protest filed before the NWRB, no water rights controversy arose wherein
the NWRB can properly discuss the substantial issues raised by respondent.
Furthermore, Articles 16 and 17 of the Water Code of the Philippines provide:
Art. 16.  Any person who desires to obtain a water permit shall file an
application with the Council [now Board] who shall make known said
application to the public for any protests.
In determining whether to grant or deny an application, the Council [now
Board] shall consider the following: protests filed, if any; prior permits
granted; the availability of water; the water supply needed for beneficial
20
 use; possible adverse effects; land-use economics; and other relevant knowledge of the true owner when it constructed the in-take dam over the
factors. land in 1978 constitute bad faith…27 

Upon approval of an application, a water permit shall be issued and
recorded.
Art. 17.  The right to the use of water is deemed acquired as of the date of
filing of the application for a water permit in case of approved permits, or
as of the date of actual use in a case where no permit is required. [Emphases
ours]
From a reading of the above provisions, it is evident that after an application to
obtain a water permit has been made known to the public, any interested party must
file his protest thereto, in order that the application may be properly evaluated. 
Otherwise, after the application for a water permit has been approved, the grantee of
the permit now acquires an exclusive right to use the water source, reckoned from
the date of the filing of the applications.  Thus, after petitioner's right to the water
permit has been properly adjudicated, respondent may no longer belatedly question
said grant.  By virtue of respondent's failure to lodge a timely protest, petitioner has
already acquired the right to appropriate the water from the spring inside the latter's
property.
In conclusion, the failure of respondent City of Iligan to timely oppose the water
permit applications, and later on to file the Petition for Certiorari within a reasonable
time has the effect of rendering the grant of the water permits to petitioner Buendia
final and executory.
Therefore, based on respondent's previous allegations, the ICWSS cannot be said to
have acquired a right to the use of the water source by acquisitive prescription, since
it only entered the premises two (2) years before the enactment of the Water Code of
the Philippines and only eighteen (18) years before petitioner applied with the
NWRB for water permits.  Furthermore, respondent's alleged exercise of its right to
appropriate the water source since 1927 is negated by its belated application with the
NWRB for water permits.  If indeed the City of Iligan has the right to appropriate
water from the spring located inside petitioner's property, then respondent would not
have filed said application after the water permits over said water source have
already been issued to petitioner.
As to the fourth issue of whether or not respondent has the right to appropriate water
under its charter, suffice it to say that a perusal of the charter of the City of Iligan
(Rep. Act No. 525) shows no grant of the power to appropriate water resources. 
Section 15 of the charter merely provides for the power to "provide for the
maintenance of waterworks for supplying water to the inhabitants of the city."
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch 2, dated 15 August
1997, is hereby SET ASIDE.  The Order of the National Water Resources Board
dated 10 March 1994 is AFFIRMED.  No costs.
SO ORDERED.

As to the issue of acquisitive prescription, the Court cannot now accept hook, line,
and sinker the lower court's findings on the issue based on two reasons.  First, said
determination was not passed upon by the agency that exercises original jurisdiction
to settle said question of fact, which brings us to the conclusion that the court a
quoshould have declined to decide on the matter. Second, such determination is
contradicted by the allegations made by the City of Iligan in a previous case that has
become final involving the same parties.  It has been established in the decision25 of
the RTC of Lanao del Norte, Branch 1, entitled, Buendia v. City of Iligan, and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals,26 that respondent entered petitioner's property only
in 1974 and constructed an in-take dam thereon for purposes of appropriating water
from the spring only in 1978.  According to the said decision:

On the other hand, the defendant City of Iligan's allegations that its entry
and clearing over the area in1974was acted upon in good faith as allowed
by the administratrix of the estate of plaintiff's father in the person of Aurea
Buendia is right.  But its failure later on to obtain the consent and

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