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Addressing Challenges to Public Understanding of Science: Epistemic

Cognition, Motivated Reasoning, and Conceptual Change

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DOI: 10.1080/00461520.2014.916216

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Addressing Challenges to Public Understanding of

Science: Epistemic Cognition, Motivated Reasoning,
and Conceptual Change
a b c
Gale M. Sinatra , Dorothe Kienhues & Barbara K. Hofer
a
Rossier School of Education University of Southern California
b
Department of Psychology University of Muenster
c
Department of Psychology Middlebury College
Published online: 16 May 2014.

To cite this article: Gale M. Sinatra, Dorothe Kienhues & Barbara K. Hofer (2014): Addressing Challenges to Public
Understanding of Science: Epistemic Cognition, Motivated Reasoning, and Conceptual Change, Educational Psychologist,
DOI: 10.1080/00461520.2014.916216

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 EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGIST, 1–16, 2014
Copyright Ó Division 15, American Psychological Association
ISSN: 0046-1520 print / 1532-6985 online
DOI: 10.1080/00461520.2014.916216

Addressing Challenges to Public Understanding

of Science: Epistemic Cognition, Motivated
Reasoning, and Conceptual Change
Gale M. Sinatra
Rossier School of Education
University of Southern California

Dorothe Kienhues
Department of Psychology
Downloaded by [Dr Gale Sinatra] at 07:09 20 May 2014

University of Muenster

Barbara K. Hofer
Department of Psychology
Middlebury College

Science is of critical importance to daily life in a knowledge society and has a significant
influence on many everyday decisions. As scientific problems increase in their number and
complexity, so do the challenges facing the public in understanding these issues. Our
objective is to focus on 3 of those challenges: the challenge of reasoning about knowledge
and the processes of knowing, the challenge of overcoming biases in that reasoning, and the
challenge of overcoming misconceptions. We propose that research in epistemic cognition,
motivated reasoning, and conceptual change can help to identify, understand, and address
these obstacles for public understanding of science. We explain the contributions of each of
these areas in providing insights into the public’s understandings and misunderstandings
about knowledge, the nature of science, and the content of science. We close with
educational recommendations for promoting scientific literacy.

Science is of growing relevance in daily life and influences
many everyday decisions. An understanding of science is
needed to be an active member of knowledge societies, and
every society needs citizens who are able to make informed
decisions about science-related issues. As scientific prob-
lems increase in number and complexity, and as access to
information from diverse sources increases, so do the chal-
lenges facing the public in understanding scientific issues.
Indeed, there are a myriad of challenges when confronted
with understanding not only the complex scientific issues
of our time but also the need to make personally relevant
decisions that have a scientific basis. An individual might
listen to discussions in the media about climate change,
vote on whether to require genetically modified organism
Correspondence should be addressed to Gale M. Sinatra, Rossier
School of Education, University of Southern California, 3470 Trousdale
Parkway, Waite Phillips Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0013. E-mail:
gsinatra@usc.edu
(GMO) labeling, decide whether to pay more for a car that
might have different environmental consequences, or won-
der whether it is helpful or harmful to give an iPad to a
small child. Individuals need to evaluate choices of action
for health care issues, from deliberating about whether
to vaccinate a child to assessing alternative treatments
for medical conditions. This need to understand scientific
information and to make sense of the amount of informa-
tion available to the general public has never been so
pronounced.
Our objective is to focus on three critical challenges in
thinking and reasoning that have received the attention of
researchers in educational, developmental, social, and cog-
nitive psychology that might be useful as a basis for educa-
tional intervention designed to enhance an understanding
of science. These are the challenge of reasoning about
knowledge and the processes of knowing, the challenge of
overcoming biases in reasoning, and the challenge of over-
coming misconceptions. Three areas of psychology and
 2 SINATRA, KIENHUES, HOFER
education research, which have made recent theoretical
and empirical advances —epistemic cognition, motivated
reasoning, and conceptual change—may help to shed light
on these challenges. As scholars in these three areas, we
hope to bring the findings in these areas to the foreground
of research on the public understanding of science.
First, people are quite commonly confronted with ques-
tions of how to cope with the tentativeness of scientific
results, make decisions in the face of uncertain information,
or think critically about a socio-scientific issue; all issues
that involve epistemic cognition (Greene, Azevedo, &
Torney-Purta, 2008; Sinatra & Chinn, 2011). Epistemic
cognition includes the epistemic beliefs and theories people
hold, which are their conceptions of the nature of knowl-
edge and knowing (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997, 2002). Episte-
mic beliefs are a critical part of epistemic cognition
because individuals bring these beliefs, either tacitly or
explicitly, to their reasoning about knowledge and know-
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ing. Research on epistemic cognition can help us under-
stand some of the challenges the public faces when
grappling with science topics. We also hope our voice will
join the others calling for instruction in thinking and rea-
soning throughout formal education (see Bybee, 2013) that
fosters the types of epistemic cognition necessary for
understanding both the epistemology of science and how to
evaluate scientific claims. In many countries, such instruc-
tion is indeed becoming part of formal education standards.
In the United States, for example, the Next Generation
Science Standards (NGSS Lead States, 2013) and the
Framework on which these new standards are based
(National Research Council, 2011) call for instruction in
these areas. Similarly, the Conference of the Ministers of
Education and Cultural Affairs of the Federal States of Ger-
many (KMK) includes standards for understanding science,
e.g., physics, as well as the nature of scientific knowledge
in these subjects (Beschl€ usse der Kultusministerkonferenz,
2004).
Second, individuals’ attitudes and moral convictions also
influence how science-related information is processed cog-
nitively and emotionally. Research on motivated reasoning
(Kundra, 1990) refers to unconscious biases in information
processing. Such biases can affect science understanding or
restrain people from an understanding of science and
research. For example, the assessment of the credibility and
weight of scientific evidence may be biased in such a way
that the evidence fits the recipient’s preexisting attitudes or
moral convictions, or contrary evidence may be ignored or
confuted. Later, we outline the role of motivated reasoning
about socio-scientific information, and how this process
may hinder science understanding. We also point to issues
of communicating ideas to the public. Science writers and
other journalists may benefit from being aware of such pat-
terns of reasoning when reporting on science topics.
Third, decades of research in developmental, cognitive,
and educational psychology, as well as science education,
have shown that individuals have either fragmented or
well-structured prior knowledge about many scientific
topics based on their own experience (Vosniadou, 2013).
This knowledge is often in conflict with scientific perspec-
tives, and individuals can be motivated to retain their
existing conceptions (Dole & Sinatra, 1998). Conceptual
change researchers explore the cognitive, affective, and
motivational factors involved in knowledge restructuring.
Thus, we believe research in this area has implications for
communicating science not only in the classroom but also
to the public. Research in conceptual change may help to
explain why individuals can find it difficult to change their
thinking when confronted with accurate scientific informa-
tion. Promoting conceptual change in students or in mem-
bers of the public can also help dampen negative emotions
(Broughton, Sinatra, & Nussbaum, 2011) and shift attitudes
on science in a more positive direction (Heddy, Sinatra,
Danielson, & Graham, 2013; Sinatra & Seyranian, in press).
MAPPING THE CHALLENGE LANDSCAPE
Easy access to vast amounts of scientific information in our
knowledge society and the role science plays in many
everyday decisions place cognitive demands on the recipi-
ents. An informed citizenry has a continuously expanding
need to possess not only basic scientific knowledge but
also, and in particular, an understanding of the sciences—
of how they work, of their complexity, and, at times, limita-
tions on the certainty of scientific knowledge (Bybee, 1997;
Driver, Newton, & Osborne, 2000; Sadler, 2004). Public
understanding of science not only includes basic scientific
knowledge, complicated by the growing differentiation of
scientific disciplines and the continuing expansion of scien-
tific knowledge, but also understanding of the epistemology
of science.
Many concerns have been raised about science literacy
among the general public. Science illiteracy can lead to
decisions that may not be in society’s or an individual’s
best interest (Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, &
Cook, 2012). The public is rarely deeply or broadly
engaged with basic scientific research that is decontextual-
ized and purely scientific in nature. More often, the public
is engaged or needs to be engaged with scientific issues that
are embedded in a complex social and political context
such as stem cell research, vaccines, and climate change.
Referred to as socio-scientific issues due to their inherently
social and contextual nature, these issues are often subject
to considerations that may be economic, social, political,
and/or ethical (Sadler, 2004; 2009), Nielsen (2012) pointed
out that “socioscientific decisions are not simply inferred
from a range of factual premises; they will always reflect
the ideological and personal principles to which the decid-
ing party adheres” (p. 429). Thus it is important to consider
not only individuals’ knowledge about a scientific topic but
 ADDRESSING CHALLENGES TO PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF SCIENCE
also motivational, affective, and cognitive components
of their attitudes towards the topic. In the case of socio-sci-
entific issues, attitudes and knowledge about the science
may be interwoven with attitudes and knowledge about the
broader social and contextual issues within which the topic
is embedded.
INTERACTIONS AMONG EPISTEMIC COGNITION,
MOTIVATED REASONING, AND
CONCEPTUAL CHANGE
Research on epistemic cognition, motivated reasoning, and
conceptual change, when considered together and in inter-
action, provides rich explanations of psychological mecha-
nisms involved in the public understanding of science
information and socio-scientific issues. Each of these mech-
anisms has a “default mode”—and research has shown this
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default mode of thinking is difficult to overcome (Shtulman
& Valcarcel, 2012). That is, evidence has been accumulat-
ing that our cognitive processing system has developed
over the course of millennia to think and react quickly, to
avoid threats, to value ideas from our ingroup more so than
those from outgroup members, and to maintain our current
conceptions if they have proved useful to us (Geary, 2008;
Stanovich, 2010). Science is a very recent invention in the
course of human history and requires individuals to think
and act against these default modes and to instead be reflec-
tive. In some cases understanding science requires a sus-
pension of belief in what our own senses seem to tell us.
So, for example, astronomy tells us the earth revolves
around the sun, but to our sensory experience, it appears
that the sun revolves around the earth. To accept the helio-
centric view of our solar system requires suspending one’s
interpretation of sensory experience. The difficulties
involved in doing so may explain why the geocentric
view persisted for centuries until the time of Copernicus
(T. Kuhn, 1957).
To consider how epistemic cognition, motivated reason-
ing, and conceptual change interact to influence public
understanding of science, consider the case of vaccines and
autism spectrum disorders. Briefly, the vaccine controversy
stemmed from publication of a fraudulent research article
published in, and later retracted by, the respected medical
journal The Lancet, linking the measles, mumps, and
rubella (MMR) vaccine with the onset of autism spectrum
disorders. Since the publication of the original article, vac-
cination rates dropped in the United Kingdom and Ireland
and cases of measles spiked (Flaherty, 2011), and similar
trends are being observed in the United States as well.
If one were to create a plotline for a movie illustrating a
scientific controversy, it would likely have all the character-
istics of the vaccine tragedy. Cast a poorly understood phe-
nomena (the causes of autism), concerned individuals
weighing complex and contradictory evidence about a topic
3
(vaccine safety), include a villain (an unscrupulous
researcher), and innocent victims (young children), and the
stage is set. And yet this is no fictitious drama, but a real-
life situation with the highest of stakes riding on individu-
als’ ability to interpret scientific information and make crit-
ical decisions. Nor is this example unrepresentative.
Members of the public often find themselves in similar sit-
uations when they attempt to make difficult decisions by
critically considering scientific information. That is, well-
understood, clear, and straightforward scientific findings
rarely engage widespread public interest or attention. Sci-
entific events such as the NASA Mars Rover landing
engage public interest but do not require understanding of
the basic science or require the public to make personally
relevant decisions based on their understanding of the
science.
The persistence of the vaccine controversy for more than
a decade after the retraction of the fraudulent report illus-
trates several aspects of our three constructs of interest. The
topic is complex (the etiology of autism) and uncertain (the
causes of autism are not well understood). Individuals may
reason about the evidence based on more naive views of sci-
entific knowledge in regard to how scientific knowledge is
justified or how to evaluate the weight of scientific evi-
dence. They may value the epistemic authority of persons
with firsthand experience (parents whose children were
diagnosed with autism and who had had vaccinations) over
the epistemic authority of scientists (who maintain that
there is no causal connection between MMR vaccination
and autism in empirical studies). Furthermore, a commit-
ment to knowledge as tentative and evolving is necessary to
understand that the Lancet study was flawed and that other
studies conclude there is no causal relation between vacci-
nation and autism and reject the inferences drawn from that
data.
It requires critical thinking to weigh the scientific evi-
dence, perhaps against one’s preferred interpretation, which
may be difficult for parents who are making what may be
an emotionally involved decision. When celebrities or sup-
port groups come out against vaccines, parents may per-
ceive them as part of their ingroup (parents concerned
about autism, just like them) and trust their views more
than those of outgroup members (scientists or doctors, not
like them). If a child become symptomatic immediately fol-
lowing a vaccination, it may be difficult for individuals to
suppress the predisposition toward seeing events that are
close in time as causally linked. Parents may be motivated
to find an environmental cause for autism and thus are
favorably disposed in their reasoning toward the vaccine
connection. Finally, some individuals may hold the miscon-
ception that there is scientific support for the linkage
because they are not aware that the original report was
discredited.
A consideration of how these mechanisms serve as
leverage points for addressing three critical challenges
 4 SINATRA, KIENHUES, HOFER
(thinking and reasoning about knowledge, biases in reason-
ing, and misconceptions) for the public’s understanding of
science is at the heart of this contribution. This could also
provide a foundation for developing ideas on how to
help the public come to understand or appreciate scientific
information. We next review each of these cognitive mech-
anisms in more detail.
EPISTEMIC COGNITION AND THE PUBLIC (MIS)
UNDERSTANDING OF SCIENCE
Epistemic cognition influences one’s understanding and
interpretation of scientific claims. Therefore, research on
epistemic cognition can help us understand some of the
challenges the public faces when grappling with science
topics. We are using epistemic cognition as an umbrella
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term for the beliefs people hold about the nature of knowl-
edge and knowing (epistemic beliefs) and the application
and influence of such beliefs when considering scientific
and socio-scientific everyday problems. We use the term
epistemic cognition to emphasize an orientation toward
cognitive processes (e.g., Chinn, Buckland, & Samarapun-
gavan, 2011; Greene et al., 2008; Kitchener, 2002) and the
role epistemic beliefs play in these processes, in the sense
that epistemic cognition includes reasoning about the epis-
temology of science. Increasingly, epistemic cognition is
the term used in the current literature, as an umbrella term
similar to personal epistemology (Hofer, 2001; Hofer &
Pintrich, 2002). However, we acknowledge that the current
usage does not mean that all researchers employ the same
definition of the construct. For example, Chinn et al. (2011)
argued for a broad conceptualization of epistemic cognition
by integrating current philosophical ideas into psychologi-
cal approaches to epistemic cognition, extending the con-
cept to include epistemic values and epistemic aims. In
contrast, Greene et al. (2008) argued for a model that
restricts epistemic cognition to two justification factors,
labeling other aspects as ontological. We anchor our
perspective on epistemic cognition in the vast research
on epistemic cognition, personal epistemology, epistemic
beliefs, nature of science, and other constructs related to
how individuals employ epistemic reasoning in understand-
ing science (see Hofer & Bendixen, 2012, for a review).
Science Information and the Activation
of Epistemic Cognition
As just briefly outlined, epistemic beliefs often come into
play when people grapple with science information. As a
kind of intuitive or naive theory of science, epistemic
beliefs can provide a basic orientation toward scientific
information (e.g., regarding the explanatory possibilities
and boundaries of science) and can specify standards for
the evaluation of science-based information (Bromme,
Kienhues, & Porsch, 2010).
When people are confronted with science-related issues
in everyday life, they might come across issues that are not
yet sufficiently resolved or that are contradictory. Epistemic
cognition is especially salient when people are confronted
with contradictory knowledge statements, as they are
pressed to find explanations for the contradictions as well
as to decide what counts as scientific evidence, evaluate
information critically, coordinate theory and evidence, and
obtain a balanced view of the science problem at hand.
Thus, epistemic cognition affects how well people are
equipped to resolve competing knowledge claims (King &
Kitchener, 2002) and their confidence in doing so. In addi-
tion, epistemic cognition influences how people integrate
new knowledge with prior knowledge (Jacobson & Spiro,
1995), as well as how information from multiple informa-
tion sources, such as different sites on the Internet or differ-
ent experts in a talk show, will be integrated into a coherent

representation of the issue (Braten, Britt, Strømsø, & Rouet,
2011). In a study on reasoning about information from mul-
tiple sources in history, Wolfe and Goldman (2005) pointed
out that the adolescents they studied did not try to incorpo-
rate all information available but focused on gathering fac-
tual information, probably because they did not realize that
there are multiple perspectives, opinions, and evidence in
history and that the interpretation of historical events is
complex.
Specificity and Contextuality of Epistemic Cognition
Epistemic cognition can be considered at different levels of
specificity. Research suggests that individuals hold both
general and discipline-specific beliefs about knowledge and
knowing (Hofer, 2006; Muis, Bendixen, & Haerle, 2006).
For example, they may in general expect authorities to
hand down knowledge that is true and needs no verification
(see King & Kitchener, 2002; D. Kuhn, 1991, for well-sub-
stantiated models of generality). These beliefs may differ to
some degree by discipline (Hofer, 2000); for example, indi-
viduals may think that knowledge in psychology is less cer-
tain and less likely to be handed down by authority than
knowledge in physics. Furthermore, epistemic cognition
can also be considered on a more fine-grained level, varying

by topic within disciplines (Braten, Strømsø, & Samuel-
stuen, 2008; Kienhues, Stadtler, & Bromme, 2011). Such
topic specific consideration takes into account that individ-
uals may judge different topics belonging to one discipline
differently. For example, the certainty of historical knowl-
edge about World War II may differ from that about the

Persian Wars (Braten, Gil, Strømsø, & Vidal-Abarca,
2009).
Recent theoretical work has emphasized the generative
nature of epistemic cognition (Bromme, Kienhues, & Stahl,
2008; Stahl, 2011): People are believed to activate different
 ADDRESSING CHALLENGES TO PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF SCIENCE
cognitive elements when they need to evaluate a specific
knowledge claim. For example, people may activate both
general and discipline-specific beliefs, and, if available,
topic-specific beliefs. However, people are highly unlikely
to hold advanced, widely explored epistemic beliefs about
every scientific discipline or topic (as these derive from the
exposure to questions tackling the epistemology of the spe-
cific discipline and topic). When they do not hold such spe-
cific beliefs, general beliefs are likely to be more influential
(Kienhues, Bromme, & Stahl, 2008). Furthermore, episte-
mic cognition is also influenced by the knowledge people
hold about research methods within specific disciplines
(Stahl, 2011), for example, recognizing that the process by
which scientists conduct research differs from that of his-
torians (Hofer, Harris, & Goldstein, 2011). In addition,
individuals hold beliefs about the disciplines themselves
and about the questions a discipline addresses (ontological
knowledge). Content knowledge about a topic will also
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influence epistemic cognition.
In consequence, this generative nature of epistemic cog-
nition points to its contextuality. Epistemic cognition is
context dependent in that it can differ regarding the cogni-
tive elements that are activated in a specific context. For
example, in a context a person knows a lot about, it is likely
that elaborated discipline-specific beliefs, topic-specific
beliefs, ontological knowledge, content knowledge, and
knowledge about research methods contribute to epistemic
cognition—whereas when a person does not have a real
understanding of the topic at hand, epistemic cognition is
likely to be influenced more by rather general epistemic
beliefs (Stahl, 2011).
In a similar vein, Chinn et al. (2011) argued that episte-
mic cognition is likely to vary between different contexts
and that it is important to know the specific cognitive com-
ponents that are operative in a given situation. They dis-
cussed different components that contribute to such specific
epistemic cognition, such as epistemic aims (goals to find
out something), epistemic values (e.g., valuing theoretical
knowledge over practical knowledge), epistemic virtues and
vices (e.g., open-mindedness vs. closed-mindedness, which
respectively either facilitates or impedes the achievement of
understanding), and beliefs about the reliability of different
processes for achieving knowledge. A consideration of this
cluster of interrelated cognitions allows for a better under-
standing of the contextuality of epistemic cognition.1
To summarize, contextuality means that a unique set of
epistemic beliefs and further cognitive elements is evoked
in a particular setting. However, we wish to emphasize that
this does not imply that epistemic cognition inevitably
1
Hammer and Elby (e.g., Louca, Elby, Hammer, & Kagey, 2004) have
also emphasized that epistemic cognition is context dependent and more
fine-grained, although they do not address the role of relatively more stable
elements (such as epistemic beliefs) that have been identified by others as
contributing to contextualized epistemic cognition.
5
varies widely across contexts or has no patterned or predict-
able processes, as it is likely that similar elements are acti-
vated in similar contexts.
Productivity of Epistemic Cognition
in Different Contexts
The idea of contextuality implies that differing epistemic
cognitions may be differently productive or useful for spe-
cific topics or in differing contexts. This claim stands on
the shoulders of a body of research that addresses the devel-
opment and change of epistemic cognition (King & Kitch-
ener, 2002; D. Kuhn, Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000;
Schommer, 1990; Schraw, Bendixen, & Dunkle, 2002).
Such developmental and educational psychology research
indicates—despite different underlying theoretical assump-
tions—that epistemic cognition ranges from what is often
called less advanced, na€ıve views to more advanced,
sophisticated views. For instance, beliefs such as that
knowledge is unchanging and absolute, is an accumulation
of isolated facts, and resides only in external authority have
been commonly perceived as na€ıve views about the nature
of knowledge and knowing. On the other hand, believing
that knowledge is tentative, consists of interrelated knowl-
edge bits, and is constructed actively in interaction with
others has been commonly perceived as a more sophisti-
cated view.
However, we wish to emphasize that this designation of
what counts as advanced or sophisticated does not acknowl-
edge the contextuality of epistemic cognition. For example,
although it might be useful and sophisticated to believe in
the tentative nature of science and the evolving nature of
knowledge, it is also useful to know which aspects of sci-
ence are grounded in a substantial body of evidence and
which continue to be investigated. No one would likely
argue that believing scientists view gravity as an uncertain
claim would represent an epistemically sophisticated view
of science. It would not be beneficial to an understanding of
science to think that there is an ever-present, similar degree
of uncertainty on every topic. Consider the issue of climate
change: Although it is useful to understand that science is
tentative and evolving and that a substantial body of mount-
ing evidence was necessary for scientists to state that cli-
mate change has human causes, it is also beneficial to
understand that nearly all climate scientists are quite certain
about this claim now.
Such examples suggest that for estimating the adequacy,
usefulness, and predictive value of epistemic cognition,
topic and subject have to be taken into account. What has
been commonly perceived as sophisticated is not always
representative of the ideal—or contextually sophisticated—
epistemic cognition and this needs considerably more atten-
tion in future research. For instance, the common deco-
ntextualized measurement of epistemic beliefs (with
 6 SINATRA, KIENHUES, HOFER
Likert-scaled questionnaires) is not likely to be meaningful
in its application to all topics (Hofer & Bendixen, 2012).
Dimensions of Epistemic Cognition
For a deeper understanding of the contextuality and useful-
ness of epistemic cognition, a consideration of the different
dimensions of epistemic cognition is necessary. Although
there are multiple conceptions of the dimensions of episte-
mic cognition (see earlier, e.g., Chinn et al., 2011; Greene
et al., 2008), four dimensions regarding the nature of
knowledge and knowing have been identified across several
models (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997), and each of these dimen-
sions is relevant to an individual’s understanding of scien-
tific claims.2 A consideration of the ways in which the four
dimensions influence how the public grapples with scien-
tific issues can provide insight into the public’s understand-
ing of science and provide a potential basis for helping
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individuals overcome cognitive and motivational barriers
to scientific literacy.
Certainty of knowledge. The dimension of certainty
of knowledge refers to how tentative or absolute and stable
knowledge is perceived to be. The tentativeness of science
is one of the foundations of scientific inquiry, and scientists
generally focus their work on the edge of uncertainty
(Lakatos, 1970). Thus, this is a dimension with particular
importance to the public’s understanding of science. Yet
the lay public may erroneously believe that an absence of
complete certainty diminishes scientific claims.
To exemplify, a recent study of adolescent development
of epistemic cognition sheds light on how individuals can
interpret the tentativeness of science as a discounting of sci-
entific claims (Hofer, Schoenefeld, Greis, Murphy, & Boyd,
2010). In think-aloud protocols during Internet searching,
followed by an epistemological interview, students showed
a poor understanding of scientific uncertainty. In responses
to questions about whether scientists could ever know for
certain how bees communicate (following an online search
on the topic), the majority of participants’ responses indi-
cated that the uncertainty on this matter meant that science
is a matter of diverse opinions that may not necessarily be
resolved. When science is not seen as a rational enterprise
with tested means for assessing competing claims, individu-
als are poorly prepared to make decisions that rest on
science.
Consider again the issue of climate change: When cli-
mate change is presented as being supported by 97% of
climate scientists (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, 2013), or when scientists attest that more research
is needed on a topic, then the claims may be dismissed
2
Researchers have varied in whether they envision the dimensions as
more or less independent (Schommer, 1990) or whether they form coherent
developmental patterns (King & Kitchener, 2002).
because they do not appear completely substantiated and
“certain.”
Rabinovich and Morton (2012) investigated how people
deal with uncertainty in the communication of possible
impacts of climate change (see also Maier, Rothmund,
Retzbach, Otto, & Besley, this issue). They found that par-
ticipants who hold the concept that science searches for
absolute truth find messages that communicate high uncer-
tainty less persuasive than messages that communicate low
uncertainty. Reverse results were found for participants
who understand science as debate: these individuals find
messages that communicate high uncertainty more persua-
sive. In the same vein, Pieschl, Stahl, and Bromme (2008)
found that people holding (topic-specific) beliefs in the ten-
tativeness of knowledge about genetics spend more time
reading information covering uncertain aspects in compari-
son to people believing in the stability of such knowledge.
These findings imply that an alignment between people’s
certainty beliefs and the framing of the scientific messages
makes communication most successful.
Beliefs about the certainty of knowledge not only influ-
ence how people process scientific information, but also its
acceptance. In a longitudinal survey of college students’
beliefs about evolution (Hofer, DeLisi, & Lam, 2009),
researchers found that those who increased in their personal
acceptance of evolution over a 2-year period were those
who recognized the relative certainty of scientists’ position
on the topic. Others have also found a relationship between
evolution acceptance and epistemic beliefs (Sinatra, South-
erland, McConaughy, & Demastes, 2003).
Furthermore, certainty beliefs will influence how people
deal with contradictory science-based information. Such
contradictory information is common when considering
everyday scientific issues—be it contradictory because the
issue is genuinely unsettled or because it is ambiguously

discussed by those with different aims. Braten and col-
leagues (2011) pointed out that individuals who believe in
absolute knowledge will be confused and frustrated when
confronted with contradictory information. Furthermore,
Kienhues and Bromme (2011) noted that the explanations
people seek for the contradictions they experience are likely
to be influenced by the beliefs they hold about the certainty
of knowledge.
Structure of knowledge. The dimension structure of
knowledge refers to how interrelated or isolated knowledge
is perceived to be. In terms of this dimension, one might
assume that people who believe that knowledge about a
specific science issue is simple will probably not integrate
information from different viewpoints (Rukavina &
Daneman, 1996). They are more likely to accumulate iso-
lated facts and process only one-sided information. Such
information-processing behavior would hinder a change of
preexisting false beliefs (see the upcoming Motivated
Reasoning section for an in-depth discussion of the
 ADDRESSING CHALLENGES TO PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF SCIENCE
consequences of such one-sidedness in information proc-
essing). Furthermore, the assumed complexity of the prob-
lem at hand might also influence how capable one seems to
be in justifying a knowledge claim; a person might feel
able to collect various “facts” to solve a problem; however,
she might not feel capable of integrating knowledge.
The dimension of structure of knowledge has been fur-
ther elaborated by Chinn and colleagues (2011), who
argued that the dimension includes more than just simplic-
ity versus complexity. They suggested the addition of uni-
versality versus particularity of knowledge (the extent to
which knowledge is perceived to be particularized and con-
textual, such as whether a specific knowledge claim is valid
for every context regarding this claim) and deterministic
versus stochastic knowledge (the extent to which knowl-
edge is believed to be at least partly probabilistic, as the
world is not fully predictable). Such beliefs may influence
how people approach learning situations, including infor-
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mal learning when people encounter scientific information
in everyday life.
Justification for knowing. Beliefs about the justifica-
tion for knowing refer to how knowledge claims can be
warranted, how individuals evaluate the use of evidence,
and their assessment of authority and expertise. Students
often lack an understanding of basic scientific methodol-
ogy, such as the type and amount of evidence needed to
substantiate claims, or the process of sampling, and when
generalizations are warranted. For example, in the study by
Hofer and colleagues on adolescents’ learning about bee
communication (Hofer et al., 2010), several gave responses
similar to this one: “There are just so many bees out there
to test and I think if they wanted to get closer to a better
answer they would have to test as many bees as possible.”

Braten and colleagues (2011) pointed to the special role
of justification beliefs in multiple text comprehension.
Aspects regarding justification for knowing are important
when people need to decide whether there are really differ-
ent standpoints on a topic or whether there are streams of
information (often intentional) that are opposite to estab-
lished facts (e.g., information on climate change).
Results from these studies and others highlight that
beliefs about the justification of knowledge are important
for the public’s understanding and acceptance of science,
with implications for science education. They help illumi-
nate why individuals have difficulty accepting various types
of scientific information and may have problems in accept-
ing reasonable scientific conclusions they have seen in vari-
ous sources of media.
Source of knowledge. The dimension source of
knowledge refers to where individuals believe knowledge
originates and resides. When people believe that knowledge
originates in external authority, they might not think they
are able to deal with many science issues, as they are
7
nonexperts. An overreliance on epistemic authority might
therefore result in an uncritical trust in the information such
authority provides. People then might be overwhelmed by
the authority and accept any information without a critical

evaluation (Latifian & Bashash, 2004). Strømsø, Braten,
and Britt (2011) described negative correlations between
beliefs about the source of knowledge and the assessment
of the trustworthiness of texts, indicating that students trust
more in sources if they rely more on external authority.
However, trust in sources is not necessarily naive. Peo-
ple need to rely on information experts provide. Ideally
they will assess the reliability of a source and whether one
source is more reliable than another for informed decision
making. Bromme and colleagues (2010) outlined that such
a thoughtful grappling with knowledge sources character-
izes well-developed epistemic cognition. In the same vein,
Chinn and colleagues (2011) argued that epistemic cogni-
tion research has been overly focused on the role of author-
ity and firsthand experience and that another relevant
aspect of the source of knowledge is the role of testimony.
This reconceptualization to include testimony as one of the
central means of learning from others may be particularly
relevant in regard to scientific claims, which are unlikely to
be experienced firsthand. As Chinn and colleagues noted,
even scientists depend on testimony from colleagues in
building their own understanding.
Furthermore, when people think that firsthand experi-
ence is important, they might avoid conclusions about a
topic where they lack direct experience, and this severely
restricts the range of science-related problems about which
they can decide. Related to this, an overreliance on the
importance of firsthand experience might result in the belief
that information is unavoidably true when the informant
refers to one’s own experiences (e.g., trusting the online
report of a parent whose child had an autism diagnosis and
who made causal claims related to vaccination).
MOTIVATED REASONING
Another factor that directly influences how the public
thinks about scientific issues is their motivation for process-
ing the information. Motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990)
explains how individuals’ motivations, more specifically
their goals, affect their judgments through biased cognitive
processing (see also Maier et al., this issue). Individuals
often attempt to be rational, make justified decisions, take
different information into account, and weigh the issues,
but their motivations bias what information they attend to
and what strategies they use to construct, assess, and evalu-
ate that information. For example, individuals are moti-
vated to put forth extra effort to recall knowledge they can
use to refute information perceived as a threat to their posi-
tion. At the same time, individuals are also prone to sup-
press evidence that contradicts a belief they prefer to hold
 8 SINATRA, KIENHUES, HOFER
(see, e.g., Ho, Brossard, & Scheufele, 2008; Kahan, Jen-
kins-Smith, & Braman, 2011; Kunda, 1990; Munro, 2010).
Two forms of motivated reasoning can be described that
make these outcomes clear. Individuals can be accuracy
driven, meaning their goal is driven by the desire “to arrive
at an accurate conclusion” (Kunda, 1990, p. 480), or they
can be driven by the desire to arrive at a particular conclu-
sion, which is referred to as holding a “directional goal”
(Kunda, 1990). When motivated by accuracy-driven goals,
individuals are more likely to expend the effort necessary
to weigh the arguments on both sides of an issue. They are
more likely to attend to relevant information and even pro-
cess it more deeply. Accuracy-driven individuals tend to
slow down, think more carefully, and reflect. (These are
also the strategies that are well documented to support con-
ceptual change; see Dole & Sinatra, 1998.)
However, there is a cost to such effortful processing.
Even with a desire to be accurate, one must weigh the cost/
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accuracy trade-off (Kunda, 1990). For example, an individ-
ual concerned about climate change, yet unsure about
whether the science supports a causal role of human activ-
ity, but who is accuracy driven, may seek out information
on both sides of the issue and think deeply about the infor-
mation. In contrast, when individuals have a directional
goal, a goal to arrive at a particular conclusion, they may
“search memory for those beliefs and rules that could sup-
port their desired conclusion” or “creatively combine
accessed knowledge to construct new beliefs that support
the desired conclusion” (Kunda, 1990, p. 483). So individu-
als with a directional goal of denying climate change may
utilize their memory of cold snaps or unusually heavy
snowstorms as evidence against global climate change.
Thus the process of knowledge construction itself is influ-
enced by directional goals.
Since Kundra’s early work, a number of factors have
been empirically demonstrated to influence whether indi-
viduals take up accuracy or directional goals. A few of
these relevant to the public’s understanding of science war-
rant mention here, although this is by no means an exhaus-
tive list. Individuals’ motivations for processing messages
about science may be influenced by their epistemic
motives, cognitive biases, vested interests, values, social
norms, social identity, message framing, or information
source. We consider several of these briefly next (see also
Maier et al., this issue), but caution the reader that each
construct is grounded in a large body of research that war-
rants in-depth examination well beyond the scope of the
current work.
Epistemic Motives
Kruglanski and colleagues have described how epistemic
motivations, such as seeking and avoiding closure, can
influence information processing. “Need for closure”
describes individual differences in comfort with ambiguity
and uncertainty and the desire for definitive answers
(Kruglanski, 1989, 1990). Individuals with a high need for
closure tend to evaluate information with insufficient
vetting. Thus, they “freeze” the decision-making process
prematurely. This can result in relative closed-mindedness
on an issue (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Conversely,
individuals who have a low need for closure tend to seek
new information, question current ideas, and solve discrep-
ancies and problems. Individuals who are comfortable with
ambiguity “unfreeze” the decision-making process and are
more likely to engage in the cognitive processes that under-
lie knowledge restructuring (Dole & Sinatra, 1998).
In several studies, Sinatra and colleagues (Lombardi &
Sinatra, 2012; Sinatra, Kardash, Taasoobshirazi, & Lom-
bardi, 2012; Sinatra et al., 2003) have shown that individu-
als’ epistemic motives relate to their judgments about
scientific theories. Lombardi and Sinatra (2012) found that
epistemic motives were related to judgments about the
plausibility of human-induced climate change. Specifically,
stronger need for closure was associated with individuals
finding human impact on the climate implausible. Plausibil-
ity is also positively related to acceptance of scientific theo-
ries (Lombardi, Sinatra, & Nussbaum, 2013), so indirectly,
high need for closure may be associated with less accep-
tance. Sinatra et al. (2012) also found that as individuals
expressed greater openness, they expressed greater willing-
ness to take mitigative actions.
Epistemic motivations are closely related to dispositions
such as actively open-minded thinking (Stanovich, 1999)
and need for cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, &
Jarvis, 1996). Higher levels of these dispositions are associ-
ated with greater acceptance of controversial scientific
theories (Sinatra et al., 2003).
Cognitive Biases
Several forms of cognitive bias such as proximal thinking,
myside bias, and the availability heuristic (see Kahneman,
2011) can be linked to directional goals. Directional goals
seem to be evoked when individuals are not motivated to
take the time and effort to be reflective and actively assess
the viability of nonpreferred conclusions. Recent research
suggests that such effort may be necessary to employ rea-
soning based on accepted scientific conclusions: Individu-
als who accept a scientific perspective must inhibit the
previously accepted na€ıve conception to give scientifically
accurate answers. Shtulman and Valcarcel (2012) asked
participants with scientific expertise to verify the accuracy
of statements that were either consistent or inconsistent
with na€ıve and scientific theories under speeded conditions.
When pressured to make a quick response, individuals were
slower to verify that na€ıve statements were inconsistent
with scientific theories. A recent neuroimaging study repli-
cated this finding, showing that experts, compared to novi-
ces, activate areas of the brain associated with inhibition
 ADDRESSING CHALLENGES TO PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF SCIENCE
when they observe a scientifically incorrect phenomenon
(a circuit lighting a bulb with just one wire attached; Mas-
son, Potvin, Riopel, & Foisy, 2014). Taken together, these
studies suggest that prior na€ıve positions continue to coexist
with current scientific understanding and must be inhibited
to employ scientifically accurate conceptions.
Furthermore, scientific topics such as climate change are
so complex that individuals may misjudge the depth of their
own understanding. As individuals form opinions about poli-
cies, such as whether to support cap and trade (the use of
economic incentives as a means to reduce emissions), they
may suffer from an “illusion of understanding” (Fernbach,
Rogers, Fox, & Sloman, 2013; see also Keil and colleagues
for their work on the illusion of explanatory depth, i.e.,
Rozenblit & Keil, 2002). That is, individuals are often over-
confident in their knowledge about the issues or feel they
have more depth of understanding than they do. Fernbach
and colleagues (2013) demonstrated that asking individuals
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to explain how complex policies would actually work tended
to moderate extreme views. They argued that asking for an
explanation exposes the limits of individuals’ understanding.
Fernbach et al. posited that in contrast to asking for reasons
for their views, which could be based on “values, hearsay,
and general principles that do not require much knowledge”
(p. 6), individuals shifted their attitudes toward a more mod-
erate position in favor of the policy after providing explana-
tions because individuals came to realize that “initial
extreme positions were supported by unjustified confidence
in understanding” (Fernbach et al., 2013, p. 4).
Vested Interest
A sizable body of literature has shown that having a stake in
the outcome, self-interest, personal relevance, ego-involve-
ment, or what is more broadly called “vested interest,”
motivates information processing (Lehman & Crano,
2002). The pattern over many studies that explore varia-
tions of these constructs indicates that the presence of
“meaningful personal consequences” (C. H. Miller, Adame,
& Moore, 2013, p. 6) related to the issue significantly
increases the predictive relationship between attitudes and
behaviors. Not surprisingly, when individuals perceive a
direct personal consequence of supporting or not supporting
a policy, they tend to behave in a manner consistent with
those consequences. To consider how this influences per-
ceptions of science, individuals whose livelihood depends
on oil production would be considered to have a vested
interest in climate policy that influences the industry and
are expected to be less likely to support a policy they per-
ceive as unfavorable to their livelihood. Similarly, Lewan-
dowsky et al. (2012) found that an endorsement of free
markets predicts rejection of the scientific facts of climate
change (as does a belief in conspiracy theories).
Danielson and Lombardi (in press) showed a significant
relationship between countries per capita gross domestic
9
product (GDP) and their citizen’s climate change accep-
tance, with those countries with higher GDP’s showing less
acceptance, which may be an indicator of vested interest.
The data they analyzed showed that Denmark, a country
with a very high GDP, has a less than 50% acceptance of
anthropogenic3 climate change (Danielson & Lombardi, in
press).
Notably, individuals with a vested interest may or may
not engage in motivated reasoning. In other words, if a
business leader consciously votes against a cap and trade
policy because he or she is aware that it could have harm-
ful impact on their bottom line, this individual is exhibit-
ing vested interest behavior but not necessarily motivated
reasoning. However, if an individual’s vested interest
leads him or her to adopt directional goals, which influ-
ence the processing of information about the policy, then
this individual could be considered to be motivated in his
or her reasoning. The key is whether the goals effect how
one processes the information, not just the behavior.
Social Identity/Social Identify Framing
A very important source of potential motivated reasoning
comes from our tendency as social beings to identify with
the members and norms of particular groups. Norms are
“shared patterns of thought, feeling, and behavior, and in
groups, what people do and say communicates information
about norms” (Hogg & Reid, 2006, p. 8). These shared
views might lead members of a group to adopt the norma-
tive view of their group toward science or policy. The per-
vasive availability of online, print, broadcast, and social
media that take a particular political slant has arguably
made it easier for individuals to identify with and follow
like-minded social groups. Today, with little effort, one can
quickly be “in the know” about how a group perceives the
latest developments in science and science policy.
Social identity and social norms can have a powerful
influence not only on attitudes but also prescriptive norma-
tive behavior. In other words, “in-group prototypes not
only describe behavior but also prescribe it—telling us how
we ought to behave as group members” (Hogg & Reid,
2006, p. 13). Thus, norms associated with a particular group
can powerfully influence how individuals think about sci-
ence and what related actions one should take (such a buy-
ing a hybrid car or installing solar panels if one’s valued
ingroup supports sustainability).
The potential of social identity to promote motivated
reasoning comes from differential processing of messages
based on the source’s group membership status. That is,
individuals tend to pay closer attention to prototypical
members of their group (Hogg & Reid, 2006), which leads
to biased processing of information coming from an
3
Anthropogenic climate change refers to human causes.
 10 SINATRA, KIENHUES, HOFER
ingroup member relative to information coming from an
outgroup member.
In addition, leaders of a group can employ social identity
framing communication strategies to influence groups to
adopt or reject change (Seyranian, 2013). Because group
leaders often tend to be prototypical members of their
group, they are in a unique position to influence their mem-
bers. Through rhetorical strategies such as the use of inclu-
sive language (“we,” “us”), group leaders frame their
message or signal to their group members what is norma-
tive for the group (Seyranian, in press). In other words, a
persuasive communicator in the United States, for example,
might suggest that as Americans, we care about the environ-
ment, and thus we should support climate change policies.
Or conversely, as Americans, we value entrepreneurship,
and thus we should limit overly restrictive government
regulation on business (Seyranian & Bligh, 2008). Social
identity framing can influence how individuals process per-
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suasive communication. According to Seyranian (2013),
the use of inclusive language provides a cue that the
message is personally relevant and thus promotes deeper
processing of the message.
Just as group leaders can profoundly influence how indi-
viduals perceive a message, there are also strong effects of
minority sources. In social psychology, a minority can be
defined by its relative power and size or by group character-
istics, opinions, beliefs, or points of view (see Seyranian,
Atuel, & Crano, 2008). For example, a conservative who
supports climate change policies in the United States that
impose strict regulations on businesses would be considered
a minority source from a social psychological perspective
as this individual holds a counternormative point of view
(see Seyranian et al., 2008). In this sense, scientists are
often minority sources of information in that they hold
counternormative views on a variety of science topics such
as human evolution and anthropogenic (human-caused)
climate change compared to the majority of citizens
(Danielson & Lombardi, in press; Heddy & Nadelson,
2012). These relationships vary by country, but by no
means is the finding of science acceptance as counternor-
mative (particularly of controversial topics) exclusively an
American phenomenon. Evolution acceptance rates in the
United States hover below 50%, globally they range from
below 50% (Turkey) to above 75% (Denmark; see J. D.
Miller, Scott, & Okamota, 2006). Climate change accep-
tance is also counternormative in several countries other
than the United States (see Danielson & Lombardi, in
press).
Counternormative sources are often regarded with suspi-
cion by group members, particularly if they are perceived
to be in conflict with group norms such as a conservative
arguing in favor of environmental regulations. If a minority
view is perceived as an attack on a strongly held majority
position, then “some form of defense will be mounted, be it
strong counter argumentation, source derogation, biased
processing, or distortion” (Crano & Seyranian, 2009,
p. 338). Thus, we may be motivated in how we process
communications from both group leaders and group mem-
bers based on whether they hold a normative or counternor-
mative point of view.
Overall, the findings on motivated reasoning reviewed
here, and a wealth of research too voluminous to include,
suggest that if individuals have a directional goal when con-
sidering science information, they might be quick to decide
and make heuristic judgments. They may forestall decision
making until more information is available or they may
differentially attend to and process messages depending on
source characteristics such as ingroup and outgroup mem-
bership, positions of leadership and prototypicality, and
minority and majority status. All of these outcomes could
lead to biased reasoning.
THE “HAT TRICK” OF CHANGE: CONCEPTUAL,
ATTITUDINAL, AND EPISTEMIC CHANGE
Conceptual Change
Because individuals come to their understanding of any sci-
entific idea through the lens of their own prior knowledge
and experience, they often hold notions that are in sharp
contrast to accepted scientific understanding. Thus, they are
described as having misconceptions, na€ıve conceptions, or
alternative frameworks (Vosniadou, 2013). Well-docu-
mented misconceptions among members of the public
include the idea that the earth is less than 6,000 years old
(Evans, 2008), that there is no distinction between weather
and climate (Lombardi & Sinatra, 2012), and not distin-
guishing among various forms of genetically modified
plants such as those present in most of the vegetables we
eat, which have been genetically modified by humans for
thousands of years, and more recent, such as adding genetic
material from a different organism (Heddy et al., 2013).
Instructional approaches that promote the restructuring of
individuals’ knowledge to overcome their misconceptions
and align their understanding with scientifically accepted
ideas involves what researcher call a “conceptual change”
approach (Dole & Sinatra, 1998; Vosniadou, 2013).
Traditional views of conceptual change were based in a
knowledge deficit perspective. That is, individuals who
held a scientifically inaccurate conception (such as children
who believed the earth was flat) were presumed to either
lack key knowledge or hold misconceptions about the topic
(Vosniadou, 2013). The early research agenda focused on
providing the missing knowledge or correcting the miscon-
ceptions though pedagogical techniques that juxtaposed the
two competing ideas. The tacit assumption was that once
the knowledge deficit was overcome, individuals would
readily accept the scientific point of view (Posner, Strike,
Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982).
 ADDRESSING CHALLENGES TO PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF SCIENCE
More recently, conceptual change models have taken
into account the range of factors other than knowledge that
lead one to accept or reject scientific perspectives (Sinatra,
2005; Sinatra & Mason, 2013). Sinatra and Mason (2013)
described research empirically demonstrating the role of
“hot constructs” such as goals, epistemic motivations, epi-
stemic beliefs, personality dispositions, interest, self-effi-
cacy, and emotions, in the conceptual change process.
Conceptual change is now more commonly recognized as a
motivated process of restructuring one’s knowledge that is
influenced by a complex array of cognitive, motivational,
affective, and sociocultural factors. These factors must be
taken into account when considering the public’s under-
standing of science content.
Consider the public’s view of topics perceived as contro-
versial in science such as human’s relation to other species,
stem cell research, and human-induced climate change.
Most scientists with expertise in the area would not con-
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sider these topics to be controversial. For example, 97% of
climate scientists agree that humans are contributing signif-
icantly to the current warming trend in global temperatures
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2013). In
cases such as these, correcting the public misconceptions
about the scientific content is a process that will likely be
met with resistance if individuals have social, motivational,
or affective reasons to reject the scientific view.
A large body of research (for an overview, see Rose-
ngren, Evans, Brem, & Sinatra, 2012) has documented a
variety of factors that contribute to the majority of the pub-
lic in the United States rejecting the scientific perspective
on biological evolution. They hold a number of well-
documented misconceptions (Shtulman, 2006). Efforts to
overcome these misconceptions have met with modest
success (Heddy & Sinatra, 2013), but the number of U.S.
citizens who reject the scientific view of evolution has held
rather constant for several decades, suggesting that social,
emotional, and motivational change would have to accom-
pany conceptual change to move the acceptance numbers.
Attitude Change
In addition to their motivated conceptual knowledge about
scientific topics, members of the public also have attitudes
toward scientific ideas. An attitude is the valence (e.g., pos-
itive or negative) evoked by an attitude object (Eagly &
Chaiken, 1993). When examining public understanding and
acceptance of scientific ideas, both knowledge and attitudes
should be taken into account.
Sinatra and Seyranian (in press) posited that individuals’
knowledge and attitudes can be conceptualized as a 2 £ 2
framework. Their view of attitude change draws conceptu-
ally on models such as the elaboration likelihood model
posited by Petty and Cacioppo (1986) and the Dole and
Sinatra model (1998), which draws heavily on the elabora-
tion likelihood model. Knowledge about a scientific topic
11
can be either consistent or inconsistent with scientifically
accepted knowledge. At the same time, attitudes about the
scientific idea may be either positively or negatively
valenced. This yields four profiles of attitude and knowl-
edge, each of which represents a different stance a member
of the public may take toward socio-scientific topics and
might require a different approach to promoting attitude
change.
The first profile, what Sinatra and Seyranian call the
“Pro-Justified profile,” describes a member of the public
who has accurate knowledge about a science topic and a
positive attitude toward the topic, say anthropogenic cli-
mate change (positive in this case means that they are
accepting of the scientific evidence and likely to support
climate change mitigation efforts and policies). An individ-
ual who accepts the view held by the majority of climate
scientists (that humans are exacerbating global warming)
and has a favorable attitude toward the topic represents the
best-case scenario for public understanding of a scientific
topic like human-induced climate change. Individuals with
accurate knowledge are more likely to take mitigative
actions to reduce their carbon footprint, as well as support
public policies initiatives designed to reduce human impact
on the climate. In cases such as this, attitude change is not
necessary for developing public understanding.
In contrast, the “Pro-Unjustified” profile describes an
individual with a favorable attitude about a topic but mis-
conceived knowledge (Sinatra & Seyranian, in press). This
profile described a member of the public who accepts cli-
mate change but believes, for example, that the cause is air
pollution. This is not optimal, because even though this per-
son has a favorable attitude toward toward the topic, he or
she may take only mitigative actions toward reducing air
pollution (such as taking public transportation) and support
only the policies that affect air pollution while rejecting
other strategies and policies that might mitigate sea level
rise. In this case again, it is knowledge change that would
support greater public understanding, not attitude change.
The third profile, “Con-Justified” (Sinatra & Seyranian,
in press), describes members of the public with accurate
scientific understanding but negative attitudes, such as an
individual who believes that humans are affecting the
climate but who is negative about the topic. In this case, the
individual may hold an unfavorable attitude toward climate
change legislation due to values (e.g., preference for small
government and low deficits) and not due to their under-
standing of climate science. In this case, attitude change
would likely promote greater understanding as individuals
with such a profile may engage in motivated reasoning.
The final profile, “Con-Unjustified,” describes a member
of the public who holds both a misconception as well as a
negative attitude toward a topic (Sinatra & Seyranian, in
press). This profile is a familiar one as it is the situation
often explored in the conceptual change literature (Heddy
et al., 2013). In this case, an individual may have
 12 SINATRA, KIENHUES, HOFER
unfavorable attitudes about a scientific topic due to a mis-
conception. An example might be an individual who
opposes stem cell research because she believes stem cells
can be obtained only from aborted fetuses. In other words,
the attitude can become an obstacle to knowledge change.
In this case, employing a conceptual change pedagogical
approach might both overcome the misconception and pro-
mote a more positive attitude toward stem cell research.
Epistemic Conceptual Change
A major hurdle for the public’s understanding of science
that may be even more challenging than knowledge and
attitude change, is changing how individuals think and rea-
son about the nature of knowledge itself. Sinatra and Chinn
(2011) described this as epistemic conceptual change. They
argued that individuals come to their understandings about
science “with not only misconceptions about science con-
Downloaded by [Dr Gale Sinatra] at 07:09 20 May 2014
tent, but with misconceptions about the nature of knowl-
edge, thinking, and reasoning that must be overcome” (p.
276). They agreed with the bourgeoning evidence that
thinking and reasoning scientifically is not normative (Sta-
novich, 2010). Rather, individuals are equipped to make
quick, heuristic judgments that served our ancestors long
before formal science was a glimmer in a prehistoric homi-
nid’s eye (Geary, 2008). The rational weighing of evidence,
the reflective consideration of alternative explanations, and
the judgments of uncertainty demanded by scientific think-
ing all require problem solving and critical thinking skills,
but moreover may require the suppression of our prior pre-
scientific modes of thought (Shtulman & Valcarcel, 2012).
Thus, changing one’s views about knowledge and how one
thinks and reasons about scientific information is an impor-
tant but elusive shift for the public to make, as this usually
requires the effort and demands characteristic of advanced
study.
Promoting Attitude, Conceptual, and Epistemic
Change
Recent research has shown that it is possible to promote
attitude, conceptual, and epistemic change and that indeed
change in one of more of these constructs is often associ-
ated with change in the others (see, e.g., Broughton et al.,
2011; Heddy et al., 2013; Lombardi et al. 2013). In several
studies, Sinatra and colleagues have begun to demonstrate
that conceptual change can leverage attitude change and
has the promise of influencing epistemic change. Broughton
et al. (2011) showed that promoting conceptual change
through a combination of refutation texts and classroom
discussion softened elementary students’ resistance toward
Pluto’s reclassification. Heddy et al. (2013) showed reduc-
ing misconceptions promoted a more accepting attitude
towards GMOs.
Recently, Lombardi et al. (2013) demonstrated that mid-
dle-school students could be taught to critically examine
evidence and decided whether that evidence supported the
scientific perspective of human-induced climate change or
a skeptic model. Using a technique developed by Chinn
and colleagues called the Model-Evidence-Link Diagram
(Chinn & Buckland, 2012), students were able to engage in
the epistemic practice of model evaluation. This led to
greater conceptual change as well as a shift in their percep-
tions about the plausibility of humans’ role in climate
change. Lombardi and Sinatra (2012) previously demon-
strated that plausibility is linked to acceptance of human-
induced climate change. Moreover, in Lombardi et al.
(2013), the shifts in knowledge and plausibility perceptions
persisted at a 6-month delayed posttest. Chinn, Duschl,
Golan Duncan, Buckland, and Pluta (2008) previously dem-
onstrated that the epistemic practice of model evaluation
produces changes in how students view knowledge, show-
ing further promise that the “hat trick” of change is possible
to achieve through carefully crafted instruction.
Promoting epistemic change may seem daunting, yet
studies have shown that even short-term interventions can
be effective. Kienhues and colleagues have shown that epi-
stemic change can be fostered by exposure to controversial
science-based knowledge claims. For example, in one study
(Kienhues et al., 2008) participants who read a short text
outlining the uncertainties and difficulties of DNA finger-
printing, which highlighted how knowledge in genetics
develops over time, shifted toward a belief in the complex-
ity and variability of knowledge in genetics. In another
study (Kienhues et al., 2011) participants searched the
Internet for cholesterol information to support a fictitious
friend’s decision making about a medical treatment. The
preselected websites included either conflicting or consis-
tent claims on the causes and treatment of high cholesterol.
Results revealed that different kinds of information evoked
qualitatively different beliefs. For example, the conflict
group was less likely than the consistent group to believe
that it was possible to find one best solution to the medical
problem.
DISCUSSION
Research on epistemic cognition, motivated reasoning, and
conceptual change can help those interested in understand-
ing obstacles for public understanding of science. We have
argued in this article that misunderstanding of science
can be at least partly traced to how individuals approach
scientific topics, their understanding of knowledge itself,
their motivations for holding a particular view, or their
motivations to resist change. These factors hinder rational
weighing of evidence and the reflective consideration of
alternative explanations—and thereby also hinder change
of preexisting ideas.
Alternatively, such weighing of evidence and consider-
ation of different kinds of information when seeking
 ADDRESSING CHALLENGES TO PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF SCIENCE
answers to science-related everyday questions can be seen
as part of an advanced public understanding of science. As
science has become ever more complex, the public will
never have an in-depth factual understanding of the
scientific issues confronting society. However, we would
caution against adopting the “deficit model” of science lit-
eracy (see Sinatra & Danielson, 2014). According to this
view, if the pubic were only better informed, acceptance of
scientific ideas would surely follow (e.g., Durant, Evans, &
Geoffrey, 1992).
Critics of the deficit model argue that the relation
between knowledge and scientific literacy is quite complex
(Nisbet & Scheufele, 2009) and that “feeding” the public
with more knowledge does not necessarily increase their
scientific literacy (Allum, Sturgis, Tabourazi, & Brunton-
Smith, 2008). As we have argued in this article, it is impor-
tant to take into account people’s attitudes, values, and
beliefs about the nature of science, the nature of knowledge,
Downloaded by [Dr Gale Sinatra] at 07:09 20 May 2014
and the topic itself to enrich our appreciation of the public’s
understanding of science.
At a minimum, the public should be enabled to make
thoughtful decisions that are informed by science. They
should have the skills necessary to apply scientific evidence
to science-related issues that affect their lives. Ryder
(2001) called this a “functional scientific literacy,” which is
“science knowledge needed by individuals to enable them
to function effectively in specific settings” (p. 3).
We have further posited that some beliefs regarding the
nature of knowledge and knowing may serve as obstacles
for the public to deeply engage with science. Depending on
the beliefs individuals hold about knowledge and knowing,
there might be motivational barriers to participatory citizen
science understanding and to developing a critical attitude
toward socio-scientific issues. Nielsen (2012) pointed out
that socio-scientific issues often include decisions not only
on what is true but also on what to do. Often these objec-
tives are uncoupled in scientific thought, as one is a scien-
tific issue but the other is a social, political, or policy
matter, but these goals may be intertwined in the eyes of
the public. That is, if we admit that humans are contributing
to climate change, perhaps overly restrictive public policies
would necessarily follow.
Ideally, the public should understand both the benefits
and the limitations of scientific information and appreciate
the contributions of science to our modern way of life.
Quite often scientific information is only one source of
explanation in a potpourri of competing information,
including highly biased, pseudo-scientific information or
even intentional misinformation. Individuals tend to selec-
tively choose like-minded sources in the media and on the
Internet, or they may misinterpret information in a way
that fits their preferred ideas (Kahan et al., 2011). It is
quite easy, especially due to new media, to find sources
that support one’s view, even those with counterfactual
information (Lewandowsky et al., 2012), and possible to
13
restrict sources to only those that align with existing
beliefs.
We have argued that educational psychology can con-
tribute to understanding the challenges facing public scien-
tific literacy, but we also believe it can contribute to
building a path toward solutions as well. A start would be
to further promote critical thinking and reasoning skills in
elementary and secondary science education, as empha-
sized by academic standards (e.g., the NGSS in the United
States or the KMK standards in Germany, as previously
mentioned). Several strategies that support the development
of scientific literacy skills in school by teaching thinking
and reasoning have been shown to be promising. A few
examples among many include critical questions (Nuss-
baum & Edwards, 2011), discussion of socio-scientific
issues (Nielson, 2012), model-based reasoning (Chinn &
Samarapungavan, 2001), and promoting plausibility reap-
praisals that lead to conceptual change (Lombardi et al.,
2013).
Beyond these formal education reforms and interven-
tions, additional science learning for children and adults
takes place in informal science learning environments such
as museums (Diamond, Evans, & Spiegel, 2012). These
have begun to promote not only appreciation of science but
also appreciation of publically perceived controversial
topics such as human evolution (Diamond et al., 2012).
The public gets much of its information about science
from media outlets including print, television, and the Inter-
net. Journalists could help by resisting the temptation to
present “both sides” of every scientific issue with equal
weight, giving the impression that an issue is more divided
among experts than it really is. Sensationalism attracts
viewers and readers but gives the impression of controversy
when it is often unwarranted. Helping the public understand
uncertainty would be a laudable goal. When an individual
hears from her doctor that a treatment for her illness has an
80% likelihood of being effective, that treatment may
sound promising enough to warrant action. Yet the same
individual may feel that an 80% likelihood that the climate
will be significantly warmer by the end of the decade is too
uncertain to warrant action.
It would also be helpful for educators and those commu-
nicating science to the public to appreciate the challenges
we have described. The awareness of these pitfalls
allows the educator or communicator to address them
directly. Instructional and communication strategies that
begin by acknowledging typical misconceptions and
explaining why they are not aligned with scientific under-
standing have been shown to be effective (Sinatra &
Broughton, 2011).
The contributions of epistemic cognition, motivated rea-
soning, and conceptual change to the promotion of public
understanding of science have yet to be determined. How-
ever, we believe efforts in research, formal and informal
education, and communications would benefit from a
 14 SINATRA, KIENHUES, HOFER
consideration of these constructs. As we wrestle with the
socio-scientific challenges of our time, the stakes are high.
We believe it is worth pursuing the potential of these con-
structs for whatever benefit they might confer upon the pub-
lic understanding of science.
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