The Cambridge History of Africa, Volume 8 PDF

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY
OF A F R I C A
General Editors: J. D . F A G E a n d ROLAND OLIVER
Volume 8
from c. 1940 to c. 1975
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

THE CAMBRIDGE
H I S T O R Y OF
AFRICA
Volume 8
from c. 1940 to c. 1975
edited by
MICHAEL CROWDER
I CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE
The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge C B 2 2RU, U K

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http://www. cambridge.org
© Cambridge University Press 1 9 8 4
This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception

and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without
the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 1 9 8 4
Reprinted 1 9 8 8 , 1 9 9 ; , 1 9 9 9 , 2 0 0 0 , 2003
Printed and bound in the United Kingdom

at the University Press, Cambridge
Library of Congress catalogue card number: 76—2261
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

The Cambridge history of Africa
Vol. 8: From c. 1 9 4 0 to c. 1 9 7 ;
1. Africa — History
I. Crowder, Michael
960 DT20
ISBN 0 ;2i 2 2 4 0 9 8 (v. 8)
UP

CONTENTS
List of figures page x
Preface xiii
Introduction i
b y M I C H A E L C R O W D E R , Professor of History,
University of Botswana
The Second World War: prelude to decolonisation

in Africa 8
by M I C H A E L CROWDER
T h e course o f the w a r o n A f r i c a n soil 15
T h e impact o f the Second W o r l d W a r o n the
colonial powers 20
T h e impact o f the Second W o r l d W a r o n
Africans 29
Colonial reforms 40
Conclusion 47
Decolonisation and the problems of independence 5 2

b y t h e l a t e B I L L Y J . DUDLEY, formerly Department
of Political Science, University of Ibadan
Paths to independence 54
T h e constitutional inheritance 64
The bureaucracy and the e c o n o m y 70
Social mobilisation 75
T h e military a n d militarism 87
Political leadership and political succession 93
Pan-Africanism since 1 9 4 0 95
b y I A N D U F F I E L D , Department of History,
University of Edinburgh
The 1945 P a n - A f r i c a n C o n g r e s s 101

CONTENTS
T h e African diaspora and post-194 5

Pan-Africanism 104
T h e road to the Organisation o f African Unity 109
Nationalism, regionalism and African unity 117
Pan-Africanism and the armed liberation
struggles 126
P a n - A f r i c a n i s m a n d w o r l d affairs 131
Pan-Africanism and culture 13 8
l z
4 Social and cultural change 4
b y J. D . Y . P E E L , Professor of Sociology, University
of Liverpool
Patterns o f migration 145
The growth o f towns 15 o
C h a n g i n g bases o f identity 15 3
Class formation 162
State a n d society 184
Cultural change 187
5 T h e economic evolution o f developing Africa 192

b y A D E B A Y O A D E D E J I , United Nations
Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary,
Economic Commission for Africa
T h e colonial e c o n o m y o n the e v e o f the Second
World War 193
T h e performance o f the African e c o n o m y ,
6
1940-75 19
Structural and sectoral changes 205
T h e search for e c o n o m i c integration 2 31
Africa and the international e c o n o m y 238
Conclusion 248
6 Southern Africa 251

b y F R A N C I S W I L S O N , Professor of Economics,
University of Cape Town
Industrial revolution in South Africa, 1 9 3 6 - 7 6 260
Politics 1936-60 277
South Africa's neighbours 294
Maintaining the white republic, 1 9 6 1 - 7 6 301
T h e struggle for liberation, 1 9 6 1 - 7 7 310
Conclusion 328
vi

CONTENTS
7 English-speaking West Africa 3 31

by D A V I D WILLIAMS
T h e impact o f the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r 3 33
8
Decolonisation 33
T h e problems o f independence 355
Social, cultural and educational
1
developments 37
R e g i o n a l relations 375
Economics 377
Conclusion 3 81
8 East and Central Africa 383

b y C H E R R Y G E R T Z E L , School of Social Sciences,
The Flinders University of South Australia
Political and constitutional d e v e l o p m e n t 385
Economic development 416
Social change 431
Education 444
Inter-state and external relations 451
8
9 T h e Horn of Africa 45
by C H R I S T O P H E R C L A P H A M , Department of
Politics, University of Lancaster
8
T h e setting 45
T h e restored Ethiopian empire, 1 9 4 1 - 5 2 461
T h e peripheral administrations 464
P o l i t i c i s a t i o n a n d its o u t c o m e 467
Political decay and revolution 473
Regional and international relationships 480
Social and e c o n o m i c change 484
Urbanisation and education 487
Agriculture 496
Conclusion 5 00
10 Egypt, Libya and the Sudan 502

by H A N S - H E I N O K O P I E T Z ,
and PAMELA A N N SMITH
Decolonisation and independence 504
International relations 546
Social and cultural change 55
vii

CONTENTS
Economic development 55 5
Conclusion 5 61
11 T h e Maghrib 5 64
b y C L E M E N T H E N R Y M O O R E , Visiting Professor,
American University of Beirut
The struggle for independence 5 66
8 2
The independent regimes 5
Strategies o f d e v e l o p m e n t 5 94
F o r e i g n affairs 604
12 French-speaking tropical Africa 611

by R U T H SCHACHTER MORGENTHAU,
Department of Political Science, Brandeis University
and L U C Y C R E E V E Y B E H R M A N , University of
Pennsylvania
Formal political decolonisation 615
Political parties a n d leaders, 1944-60 625
T h e difficulties o f n a t i o n - b u i l d i n g , 1 9 6 0 - 7 5 636
Social, e c o n o m i c and cultural change 649
13 Madagascar 674
b y B O N A R A. G o w
Political and constitutional history:
pre-independence 674
Political and constitutional history:
post-independence 680
Social and cultural change 685
Educational development 689
14 Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi 698

b y M . C R A W F O R D Y O U N G , Department of Political
Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison
T h e rise o f n a t i o n a l i s m 707
I n d e p e n d e n c e a n d crisis in Z a i r e 717
Internationalisation o f the * C o n g o crisis' 722
The N e w Regime, 1965-75 731
R w a n d a : consolidation o f the H u t u regime 734
viii

CONTENTS
Burundi: from monarchy to Tutsi republicanism,

1962-75 73 5
Economic change 739
Social and cultural c h a n g e 743
Educational development 749
15 Portuguese-speaking Africa 755

by B A S I L DAVIDSON
Colonial continuity and expansion, 1945-60 758
T h e rise o f n a t i o n a l i s m 764
D e v e l o p m e n t s in colonial policy, 1 9 6 1 - 7 5 772
T h e f i g h t f o r i n d e p e n d e n c e , 1961—75 780
T h e politics o f liberation: theory and practice 798
Appendix: E q u a t o r i a l G u i n e a , c. 1 9 4 0 t o 1 9 7 5 806
Bibliographical essays 811
Bibliography 905
Index 963
ix

FIGURES
1 Africa, 1940 page 3

2 Africa, 1975 6
3 Africa, 1946 19
4 Africa: the path to independence, 1 9 5 6 - 6 6 55
5 Major vegetation zones 194
6 Primary commodities - export prices indices 202
7 D e v e l o p i n g Africa: structure o f gross domestic
product, 1960-75 206
8 Staple and cash crops 210
9 Cash crops 211
10 F a c t o r y w o r k e r s as a p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n 2 1 7
11 T r a n s p o r t 222
12 R e g i o n a l a n d s u b - r e g i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s f o r c o
operation and integration 234
13 E x p o r t s a n d i m p o r t s i n d e v e l o p i n g A f r i c a , 1 9 6 0 - 7 5 239
1 4 B a l a n c e o f p a y m e n t s d e f i c i t s in d e v e l o p i n g A f r i c a ,
1960-75 242
15 T h e Republic o f South Africa, Swaziland and L e s o t h o 254
16 Namibia and B o t s w a n a 256
17 Ghana 342
18 Nigeria, 1964 347
19 Sierra L e o n e and Liberia 3 51
20 N i g e r i a : t h e 12 s t a t e s 363
21 The Gambia 368
22 Uganda, K e n y a and Tanzania 384
23 Rhodesia, Z a m b i a and M a l a w i 388
24 E t h i o p i a , S o m a l i a and the F r e n c h T e r r i t o r y o f the
A f a r s a n d Issas 459
25 Egypt 505
26 T h e Sudan 521
27 Libya 535
28 T h e M a g h r i b c. 1 9 7 5 565

FIGURES
29 F r a n c o p h o n e tropical A f r i c a : the w e s t e r n states 612

30 F r a n c o p h o n e t r o p i c a l A f r i c a : t h e e a s t e r n states 613
31 Madagascar 676
32 Zaire, R w a n d a and Burundi 699
33 A n g o l a : the risings o f 1961 771
34 G u i n e a - B i s s a u : l a u n c h i n g the w a r o f liberation. 780
35 N o r t h e r n M o z a m b i q u e after S e p t e m b e r 1 9 6 4 781
36 G u i n e a - B i s s a u : g e n e r a l p o s i t i o n in late 1968 a n d after 787
37 M o z a m b i q u e after l a t e 1 9 7 3 791
38 A n g o l a in 1 9 7 0 a n d after 792
xi

PREFACE
In the English-speaking w o r l d , the C a m b r i d g e histories h a v e

since the b e g i n n i n g o f the c e n t u r y set the pattern for m u l t i - v o l u m e
w o r k s o f history, w i t h chapters written b y experts o n a particular
t o p i c , a n d unified b y the g u i d i n g h a n d o f v o l u m e editors o f senior
s t a n d i n g . The Cambridge Modern History, p l a n n e d b y L o r d A c t o n ,
appeared in sixteen v o l u m e s b e t w e e n 1902 a n d 1 9 1 2 . It w a s
f o l l o w e d b y The Cambridge Ancient History, The Cambridge Medieval
History, The Cambridge History of English Literature, a n d C a m b r i d g e
Histories o f India, o f Poland, and o f the British E m p i r e . T h e
o r i g i n a l Modern History h a s n o w b e e n r e p l a c e d b y The New
Cambridge Modern History i n f o u r t e e n v o l u m e s , a n d The Cambridge
Economic History of Europe is n o w c o m p l e t e . O t h e r C a m b r i d g e
Histories recently undertaken include a history o f Islam, o f A r a b i c
l i t e r a t u r e , o f t h e B i b l e t r e a t e d as a c e n t r a l d o c u m e n t o f a n d
influence o n W e s t e r n civilisation, and o f Iran, C h i n a and Latin
America.
It w a s d u r i n g t h e l a t e r 1 9 5 0 s t h a t t h e S y n d i c s o f t h e C a m b r i d g e
U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s first b e g a n t o e x p l o r e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f e m b a r k i n g
on a C a m b r i d g e History o f Africa. B u t they were then advised
that the time w a s n o t y e t ripe. T h e serious appraisal o f the past
o f Africa b y historians and archaeologists had hardly been
u n d e r t a k e n b e f o r e 1 9 4 8 , t h e y e a r w h e n u n i v e r s i t i e s first b e g a n t o
appear in increasing n u m b e r s in the vast reach o f the African
continent south o f the Sahara and n o r t h o f the L i m p o p o , and the
t i m e t o o w h e n u n i v e r s i t i e s o u t s i d e A f r i c a first b e g a n t o t a k e s o m e
n o t i c e o f its h i s t o r y . I t w a s i m p r e s s e d u p o n t h e S y n d i c s t h a t t h e
most urgent need o f such a y o u n g , b u t also very rapidly a d v a n c i n g
branch o f historical studies, w a s a journal o f international
standing t h r o u g h w h i c h the results o f o n g o i n g research m i g h t b e
disseminated. In i960, therefore, the C a m b r i d g e University Press
l a u n c h e d The Journal of African History, w h i c h g r a d u a l l y d e m o n
strated the a m o u n t o f w o r k b e i n g undertaken t o establish the past
xiii

PREFACE
o f A f r i c a as a n i n t e g r a t e d w h o l e r a t h e r t h a n - as it h a d u s u a l l y
b e e n v i e w e d b e f o r e - as t h e s t o r y o f a s e r i e s o f i n c u r s i o n s i n t o
the continent b y p e o p l e s c o m i n g f r o m outside, f r o m the M e d i
terranean basin, the N e a r East o r western E u r o p e . T h i s m o v e m e n t
will o f course c o n t i n u e a n d d e v e l o p further, b u t the increasing
facilities a v a i l a b l e f o r i t s p u b l i c a t i o n s o o n b e g a n t o d e m o n s t r a t e
a n e e d t o a s s e s s b o t h w h a t h a d b e e n d o n e , a n d w h a t still n e e d e d
to b e d o n e , in the light o f s o m e general historical perspective for
the continent.
T h e S y n d i c s therefore returned t o their original c h a r g e , a n d in
1 9 6 6 t h e f o u n d i n g e d i t o r s o f The Journal of African History
accepted a commission to b e c o m e the general editors o f a
Cambridge History of Africa. T h e y f o u n d it a d a u n t i n g t a s k t o d r a w
up a plan for a co-operative w o r k c o v e r i n g a history w h i c h w a s
in a c t i v e p r o c e s s o f e x p l o r a t i o n b y s c h o l a r s o f m a n y n a t i o n s ,
s c a t t e r e d o v e r a fair p a r t o f t h e g l o b e , a n d o f m a n y d i s c i p l i n e s -
linguists, anthropologists, geographers and botanists, for example,
as w e l l as h i s t o r i a n s a n d a r c h a e o l o g i s t s .
It w a s t h o u g h t t h a t t h e g r e a t e s t p r o b l e m s w e r e l i k e l y t o a r i s e
w i t h the earliest a n d latest p e r i o d s : the earliest, b e c a u s e s o m u c h
w o u l d d e p e n d o n the results o f l o n g - t e r m a r c h a e o l o g i c a l investi
g a t i o n , a n d t h e latest, b e c a u s e o f the rapid c h a n g e s in historical
p e r s p e c t i v e that w e r e o c c u r r i n g as a c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h e e n d i n g
o f c o l o n i a l rule in Africa. T h e r e f o r e w h e n , in 1967, the general
editors presented their s c h e m e t o the Press a n d notes w e r e
prepared for contributors, only four v o l u m e s - c o v e r i n g the
p e r i o d s 500 B.C. t o A . D . 1 0 5 0 , A . D . 1 0 5 0 t o 1 6 0 0 , 1600—1790, a n d
1 7 9 0 - 1 8 70 - h a d b e e n p l a n n e d i n a n y d e t a i l , a n d t h e s e w e r e
p u b l i s h e d as v o l u m e s 2 - 5 o f t h e History b e t w e e n 1 9 7 5 a n d 1 9 7 8 .
S o far as t h e p r e h i s t o r i c p e r i o d w a s c o n c e r n e d , t h e g e n e r a l
editors w e r e clear f r o m the outset that the p r o p e r course w a s t o
e n t r u s t t h e p l a n n i n g as w e l l as t h e a c t u a l e d i t i n g o f w h a t w a s
necessary entirely t o a scholar w h o w a s fully e x p e r i e n c e d in the
archaeology o f the African continent. In d u e course, in 1982,
V o l u m e 1, ' F r o m t h e e a r l i e s t t i m e s t o c. 500 B . C . a p p e a r e d u n d e r
t h e d i s t i n g u i s h e d e d i t o r s h i p o f P r o f e s s o r J. D e s m o n d C l a r k . A s
f o r t h e c o l o n i a l p e r i o d , it w a s e v i d e n t b y t h e e a r l y 1 9 7 0 s t h a t t h i s
w a s b e i n g r a p i d l y b r o u g h t t o i t s c l o s e , s o t h a t it b e c a m e p o s s i b l e
t o p l a n t o c o m p l e t e t h e History i n t h r e e f u r t h e r v o l u m e s . T h e first,
V o l u m e 6, is d e s i g n e d t o c o v e r t h e E u r o p e a n p a r t i t i o n o f t h e
xiv

PREFACE
continent, and the setting up o f the colonial structures b e t w e e n

c. 1 8 7 0 a n d c. 1 9 0 5 ; t h e s e c o n d , V o l u m e 7, is d e v o t e d t o t h e
' c l a s s i c a l ' c o l o n i a l p e r i o d r u n n i n g f r o m c. 1905 t o c. 1 9 4 0 ; w h i l e
t h e f o c u s o f t h e t h i r d , V o l u m e 8, is o n t h e p e r i o d o f r a p i d c h a n g e
w h i c h led f r o m a b o u t the time o f the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r t o the
e n d i n g o f f o r m a l c o n t r o l f r o m E u r o p e w i t h t h e d r a m a t i c final
c o l l a p s e o f t h e P o r t u g u e s e e m p i r e in 1 9 7 5 .
W h e n they started their w o r k , the g e n e r a l editors q u i c k l y c a m e
to the c o n c l u s i o n that the m o s t practical plan for c o m p l e t i n g the
History w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e p e r i o d o f t i m e w a s l i k e l y t o b e t h e
simplest and most straightforward. E a c h v o l u m e w a s therefore
entrusted to a v o l u m e editor w h o , in addition t o h a v i n g m a d e a
substantial c o n t r i b u t i o n to the u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the p e r i o d in
question, w a s s o m e o n e w i t h w h o m the g e n e r a l editors w e r e in
close t o u c h . W i t h i n a v o l u m e , the aim w a s to k e e p the n u m b e r
o f contributors to a m i n i m u m . E a c h o f t h e m w a s asked to essay
a b r o a d s u r v e y o f a particular area o r t h e m e w i t h w h i c h h e w a s
familiar for the w h o l e o f the p e r i o d c o v e r e d b y the v o l u m e . In
this s u r v e y , h i s p u r p o s e s h o u l d b e t o t a k e a c c o u n t n o t o n l y o f all
r e l e v a n t r e s e a r c h d o n e , o r still i n p r o g r e s s , b u t a l s o o f t h e g a p s
in k n o w l e d g e . T h e s e h e s h o u l d t r y t o fill b y n e w t h i n k i n g o f h i s
o w n , w h e t h e r based o n n e w w o r k o n the available sources o r o n
interpolations from c o n g r u e n t research.
It s h o u l d b e r e m e m b e r e d t h a t t h i s b a s i c p l a n w a s d e v i s e d
n e a r l y t w e n t y y e a r s a g o , w h e n little o r n o r e s e a r c h h a d b e e n d o n e
on many important topics, and before many o f today's y o u n g e r
s c h o l a r s - n o t least t h o s e w h o n o w fill p o s t s i n t h e d e p a r t m e n t s
o f history and a r c h a e o l o g y in the universities a n d research
institutes in A f r i c a itself - h a d m a d e their o w n d e e p p e n e t r a t i o n s
into s u c h areas o f i g n o r a n c e . T w o t h i n g s f o l l o w f r o m this. I f the
general editors had d r a w n u p their plan in the 1970s rather than
the 1960s, the shape m i g h t w e l l h a v e b e e n v e r y different, p e r h a p s
with a larger n u m b e r o f m o r e specialised, shorter chapters, each
centred o n a smaller area, p e r i o d o r t h e m e , t o the u n d e r s t a n d i n g
o f w h i c h the c o n t r i b u t o r w o u l d h a v e m a d e his o w n i n d i v i d u a l
c o n t r i b u t i o n . T o s o m e e x t e n t , i n d e e d , it h a s b e e n p o s s i b l e t o
adjust t h e s h a p e o f t h e last t h r e e v o l u m e s i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n .
S e c o n d l y , the sheer v o l u m e o f n e w research that has b e e n
published since m a n y contributors accepted their c o m m i s s i o n s
has o f t e n l e d t h e m t o u n d e r t a k e v e r y s u b s t a n t i a l r e v i s i o n s i n t h e i r
xv

PREFACE
w o r k as it p r o g r e s s e d f r o m d r a f t t o d r a f t , t h u s p r o t r a c t i n g t h e
length o f time originally e n v i s a g e d for the preparation o f these
volumes.
A t the time w h e n the plan for V o l u m e 8 w a s settled, 1975
s e e m e d an ideal c l o s i n g date. F o r the reason w h i c h has already
b e e n m e n t i o n e d , it still is a v e r y s e n s i b l e d a t e . B u t h i s t o r y d o e s
n o t s t o p at t h e p o i n t s w h e r e its r e c o r d e r s a n d i n t e r p r e t e r s c h o o s e
to d r a w their lines and, in the n o t i n c o n s i d e r a b l e space o f time
in w h i c h V o l u m e 8 w a s b e i n g w r i t t e n a n d p u t t o g e t h e r , it w a s
inevitable that a n u m b e r o f events s h o u l d o c c u r w h i c h m i g h t be
t h o u g h t w o r t h y o f m e n t i o n . S o m e o f t h e s e h a v e fitted n i c e l y i n t o
the w a y s o m e c o n t r i b u t o r s c h o s e to organise their chapters ; s o m e
h a v e not. Inevitably, therefore, the c o n c l u d i n g line o f the v o l u m e
as a w h o l e h a s b e c o m e s o m e w h a t r a g g e d . S e c o n d l y , n o t all
historians are w i l l i n g t o w r i t e s o c l o s e t o the c h r o n o l o g i c a l
f r o n t i e r o f t h e i r d i s c i p l i n e as t h i s v o l u m e a i m s t o g o . Its e d i t o r
has therefore perforce s o m e t i m e s had to seek c o n t r i b u t i o n s from
s c h o l a r s w h o s e d i s c i p l i n e is less h i s t o r y t h a n p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e o r
e c o n o m i c s . T h e discerning reader will therefore recognise s o m e
differences o f a c a d e m i c a p p r o a c h b e t w e e n chapters.
H o w e v e r , histories are m e a n t to b e read, a n d n o t t o b e
c o m m e n t e d o n and analysed b y their general editors, and w e
therefore present t o the reader this c o n c l u d i n g v o l u m e o f o u r
enterprise.
March 1984 J. D. F A G E
ROLAND OLIVER
M a n y p e o p l e h a v e assisted the E d i t o r in the p r o d u c t i o n o f this

volume. He would particularly like to express his debt to
Professor Lalage Bown, Professor Robert Gavin, Dr Lome
Larson, Professor R o b i n H o r t o n , and D r Philip Shea.
xvi

INTRODUCTION
W h e t h e r the Second W o r l d W a r marked a decisive stage in the

colonial history o f Africa, unleashing forces that, w i t h hindsight,
w e c a n see m a d e political d e c o l o n i s a t i o n b y e v e n the m o s t
r e l u c t a n t o f E u r o p e a n p o w e r s i n e v i t a b l e , o r w h e t h e r it m e r e l y
hastened a process that w a s already, if n o t v e r y o b v i o u s l y , u n d e r
w a y , w i l l l o n g r e m a i n a m a t t e r f o r d e b a t e . T h e r e is m u c h t o b e
said f o r b o t h v i e w s . W h a t is c l e a r is t h a t n e a r l y a l l w r i t e r s o n t h e
c o l o n i a l p e r i o d o f A f r i c a ' s p a s t a c c e p t , o r a t least p a y l i p s e r v i c e
to, the v i e w that for w h a t e v e r reason the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r
represented a watershed in the history o f the continent. Y e t
c u r i o u s l y f e w o f t h e m g i v e its c o u r s e o r i m p a c t detailed attention.
It is as t h o u g h it w e r e a n i n t e r v a l b e t w e e n t h e t w o a c t s o f a p l a y
in w h i c h t h e a u d i e n c e is a s k e d t o a c c e p t t h a t t h e r e h a s b e e n a
p a s s a g e o f t i m e b u t is g i v e n o n l y t h e b a r e s t o u t l i n e o f w h a t h a s
happened meanwhile.
T h e r e are m a n y serious studies of, o n the o n e h a n d , the years
1 9 1 9 - 1 9 3 9 - the p e r i o d o f classic colonial r u l e - a n d , o n the
other, the years immediately f o l l o w i n g the w a r - the period o f
' d e c o l o n i s a t i o n ' o r ' t h e transfer o f p o w e r ' . F e w historians h a v e
interested t h e m s e l v e s in b o t h p e r i o d s , a n d the latter p e r i o d has
m o s t l y b e e n left t o t h e a t t e n t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s . C o n v e r s e l y ,
few political scientists h a v e paid m u c h attention t o the years
before 1945. T h e Second W o r l d W a r seems t o represent a
b o u n d a r y b e t w e e n w h a t is r e g a r d e d as t h e p r o p e r t e r r i t o r y o f t h e
h i s t o r i a n a n d w h a t is t h e p r o v i n c e o f t h e p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t o r
j o u r n a l i s t . M o s t h i s t o r i a n s a p p a r e n t l y feel r e l u c t a n t t o b r i n g t h e
tools o f their trade t o bear o n a period in w h i c h the chief actors
are still p r a c t i s i n g t h e i r p r o f e s s i o n , a n d f o r w h i c h t h e a r c h i v a l
e v i d e n c e h a s , f o r t h e g r e a t e r p a r t o f it, n o t y e t b e e n r e l e a s e d . T h e y
prefer t o let political scientists h a z a r d j u d g e m e n t s w h i c h t h e y fear
w i l l fail t h e test o f t i m e .
S i n c e The Cambridge History of Africa sets o u t t o b e a n e n d u r i n g

INTRODUCTION
historical survey, there m i g h t , therefore, seem to be a case for

a c c e p t i n g t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r as a t e r m i n a l e v e n t f o r t h e
e n t e r p r i s e . A t least f o r m a n y o f t h e c o u n t r i e s t h a t o n c e r u l e d
A f r i c a , t h e a r c h i v e s are o p e n f o r m o s t o f t h e p e r i o d t h a t p r e c e d e d
t h a t w a r , t h o u g h s o m e still m a i n t a i n t h e 50-year r u l e . A s a r e s u l t
it w i l l o n l y b e in 1 9 9 0 t h a t w e s h a l l l e a r n t h e i n n e r m o s t s e c r e t s
o f s o m e o f the c o l o n i s e r s for the year 1940, the date w i t h w h i c h
this p r e s e n t v o l u m e b e g i n s .
Inevitably a v o l u m e that takes the history o f Africa u p to 1 9 7 5 ,
a n d t h e c h a p t e r s o f w h i c h w e r e in s o m e c a s e s w r i t t e n as e a r l y as
1977 by those martyrs o f collective enterprises - the p r o m p t
deliverers - d o e s n o t h a v e the a d v a n t a g e o f p e r s p e c t i v e that e v e n
t h e p r e c e d i n g v o l u m e , c o v e r i n g t h e c o l o n i a l p e r i o d f r o m 1905 till
1940, can h a v e . M u c h o f the e v i d e n c e m u s t o f necessity be
s e c o n d a r y o r , w h e r e it is p r i m a r y , t h e r e s u l t o f t h e d i r e c t
experience o f the contributor, using evidence assimilated from day
to day in n e w s p a p e r s , c o n v e r s a t i o n o r i n t e r v i e w s .
A m o r e cautious scheme for a history o f Africa w o u l d , then,
h a v e h a d its last v o l u m e c o n c l u d e w i t h t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r .
B u t that w o u l d h a v e been to leave the story w i t h o u t an e n d i n g .
T h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r m a y h a v e b e e n a w a t e r s h e d in A f r i c a n
h i s t o r y , b u t it w a s m o r e in t h e n a t u r e o f a t u r n i n g p o i n t w i t h i n
a p e r i o d than the e n d i n g o f o n e o r the b e g i n n i n g o f another.
W h e t h e r t h e w a r is s e e n as h a v i n g u n l e a s h e d n e w f o r c e s o r m e r e l y
4 1
as h a v i n g s t i m u l a t e d a n d g i v e n s c o p e t o f o r c e s a l r e a d y at p l a y ' ,
it d i d c h a n g e t h e s i t u a t i o n s o r a d i c a l l y i n A f r i c a t h a t t h e
c o n c l u s i o n o f the c h a n g e has to be seen if the significance o f the
w a r is t o b e u n d e r s t o o d . I n d e e d , o n e o f t h e G e n e r a l E d i t o r s o f
The Cambridge History of Africa o n c e c r i t i c i s e d t h e w r i t e r f o r
t e r m i n a t i n g h i s West Africa under Colonial Rule i n 1 9 4 5 , ' t h u s
2
e x c l u d i n g the m o s t d e t e r m i n i n g part o f the colonial p e r i o d \ T h a t
w a s o f c o u r s e the d i s m a n t l i n g o f the E u r o p e a n e m p i r e s in the
g r e a t e r p a r t o f N o r t h a n d W e s t A f r i c a b y i 9 6 0 , a n d t h e rest o f t h e
continent by 1975.
In 1940 the v a s t majority o f the inhabitants o f the c o n t i n e n t
w e r e under one f o r m or another o f E u r o p e a n colonial rule. O f
the three countries that w e r e n o m i n a l l y i n d e p e n d e n t , L i b e r i a w a s
enfeoffed to the F i r e s t o n e R u b b e r C o m p a n y o f the U n i t e d States,
E g y p t w a s s e v e r e l y l i m i t e d in t h e e x e r c i s e o f h e r s o v e r e i g n t y b y
1 2
See Chapter 8. Roland Oliver in The Observer, n August 1968.

INTRODUCTION
SPANISH MOROCCO^
^FRENCHWEST AFRICA; „J A N G L O -
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French mandate
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i Africa, 1940.
the terms o f the A n g l o - E g y p t i a n T r e a t y o f 1936, w h i l e indepen

dence in the U n i o n o f S o u t h Africa w a s meaningful o n l y for the
white minority w h i c h h a d already embarked o n a p r o g r a m m e o f
stripping the non-white majority o f the f e w political a n d social
r i g h t s it d i d p o s s e s s . I n d e e d , w h i l e m o s t o t h e r b l a c k A f r i c a n s
d u r i n g o u r period w e r e t o i m p r o v e their political position, those

INTRODUCTION
o f S o u t h A f r i c a w e r e t o suffer a c o n c o m i t a n t d e t e r i o r a t i o n in
theirs.
O n the e v e o f the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r f e w , if any, E u r o p e a n s
or Africans e n v i s a g e d that w i t h i n t w o decades well o v e r half o f
t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f t h e c o n t i n e n t w o u l d b e free f r o m c o l o n i a l
tutelage. D e s p i t e the d e v o l u t i o n o f p o w e r in the major A s i a n
d e p e n d e n c i e s , t h e B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t d i d n o t y e t t h i n k it n e c e s s a r y
to a p p l y that e x p e r i e n c e t o A f r i c a . B y 1940 C e y l o n h a d for l o n g
had internal s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t , w h i l e in India the British had
already d e v o l v e d a great deal o f the business o f g o v e r n m e n t o n
I n d i a n s , r e t a i n i n g e x c l u s i v e c o n t r o l o n l y o v e r e x t e r n a l affairs a n d
defence. A l t h o u g h the British L a b o u r Party had independence for
I n d i a o n its p r o g r a m m e , as far as t h e A f r i c a n c o l o n i e s w e r e
c o n c e r n e d it c o n s i d e r e d s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t , l e t a l o n e i n d e p e n d e n c e ,
a remote prospect. M a l c o l m M a c D o n a l d , L a b o u r Colonial Sec
r e t a r y in t h e B r i t i s h N a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t , p u t t h e B r i t i s h v i e w o n
political d e v e l o p m e n t in the A f r i c a n c o l o n i e s t o the H o u s e o f
C o m m o n s o n 7 D e c e m b e r 1938: 'It may take generations, or e v e n
centuries, for the p e o p l e s in s o m e parts o f the c o l o n i a l e m p i r e
t o a c h i e v e s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t . B u t it is a m a j o r p a r t o f o u r p o l i c y ,
e v e n a m o n g the m o s t b a c k w a r d peoples o f Africa, to teach t h e m
1
a l w a y s t o b e a b l e t o s t a n d a little m o r e o n t h e i r o w n f e e t . ' T h e
Popular Front g o v e r n m e n t o f France had been n o more daring
in its t h i n k i n g a b o u t p o l i t i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t i n A f r i c a , a n d t h e f e w
r e f o r m s it h a d b e e n a b l e t o i n t r o d u c e w e r e b a s i c a l l y a s s i m i l a t i o n i s t
in i n t e n t , w h i l e t h e B e l g i a n s , S p a n i s h , P o r t u g u e s e a n d I t a l i a n s d i d
n o t g i v e the subject a passing t h o u g h t .
Far from decolonisation b e i n g a theme o f these times, a n e w
i m p e r i a l i s m w a s i n t h e E u r o p e a n air. I t a l y h a d j u s t i n v a d e d
E t h i o p i a a n d i n c o r p o r a t e d it i n t o h e r E a s t A f r i c a n e m p i r e . T h e
L e a g u e o f N a t i o n s , w h i c h had earlier v o t e d e c o n o m i c sanctions
a g a i n s t I t a l y i n t h e h o p e o f h a l t i n g h e r i n v a s i o n , o n c e it w a s
successful w i t h d r e w t h e m , t u r n i n g a d e a f if e m b a r r a s s e d ear t o
the personal appeal by E m p e r o r Haile Selassie for i n t e r v e n t i o n
o n h i s c o u n t r y ' s b e h a l f . G e r m a n y , still s m a r t i n g u n d e r t h e
humiliation o f the T r e a t y o f Versailles w h i c h had stripped her o f
her colonial empire, thrilled to Hitler's d e m a n d s that the c o u n t r y
r e g a i n its ' r i g h t f u l p l a c e i n t h e t r o p i c a l s u n ' . E v e n in S p a i n t h e r e
1
Hansard^ 7 December 1938.

INTRODUCTION
w e r e expansionists w h o d r e a m e d d u r i n g the w a r o f creating an

1
e m p i r e taken from N i g e r i a and F r e n c h E q u a t o r i a l A f r i c a .
N o t only was imperialism very m u c h alive, but few Europeans
questioned their right to p o s s e s s i o n o f c o l o n i e s . C o n v e r s e l y , the
majority o f Africans had c o m e to accept the E u r o p e a n presence,
if o n l y passively. N o t a f e w o f the educated élite shared the v i e w
o f Isaac D e l a n o w h o w r o t e in 1 9 3 7 : ' T h e p e o p l e o f N i g e r i a are
very p r o u d o f the British E m p i r e to w h i c h they b e l o n g , and o f
British statesmanship and equity. T h e y realise that they c a n n o t
safely b e c o m e i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e B r i t i s h G o v e r n m e n t as t h i n g s
2
are t o d a y i n t h e w o r l d . ' S o m e o f t h e w e s t e r n - e d u c a t e d m i n o r i t y
had, h o w e v e r , b e g u n to articulate q u e s t i o n s c o u c h e d in terms o f
western political t h o u g h t a b o u t the presence o f the E u r o p e a n s and
their right to g o v e r n c o l o n i a l p e o p l e s in an autocratic fashion.
T h u s for L a m i n e G u è y e , w h o f o u n d e d the Parti Socialiste
S é n é g a l a i s i n 1 9 3 5 , it w a s i r o n i c t h a t t h e s a m e c o l o n i a l p o w e r
w h i c h i m p o s e d t h e corvée o n its A f r i c a n s u b j e c t s p l a c e d i n t h e
h a n d s o f t h e i r c h i l d r e n at s c h o o l b o o k s p r o c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e
' c o l o n i e s w e r e an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f t h e v e r y R e p u b l i c w h o s e
founders had d i s c o v e r e d and t a u g h t that " m e n are b o r n and
r e m a i n f r e e " a n d w h i c h h a d as its m o t t o " L i b e r t y - E q u a l i t y -
3
F r a t e r n i t y " \ W h i l e the majority o f the e d u c a t e d élite limited
their d e m a n d s to s o m e f o r m o f participation in the institutions
o f g o v e r n m e n t i m p o s e d o n t h e m b y their colonial masters, w i t h
the v a r i o u s y o u t h m o v e m e n t s in W e s t A f r i c a d e m a n d i n g that this
participation be g r a n t e d m o r e s p e e d i l y , a m i n o r i t y in F r e n c h
N o r t h Africa w a s b e g i n n i n g to m a k e o v e r t d e m a n d s for an early
and c o m p l e t e i n d e p e n d e n c e that w a s n o t tied to s o m e f o r m o f
constitutional association w i t h F r a n c e . E v e n s o , in the year before
the o u t b r e a k o f the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r the E u r o p e a n imperial
p o w e r s had g o o d reason to be c o m p l a c e n t a b o u t their l o n g - t e r m
p o s i t i o n in A f r i c a . Y e t w i t h i n t w o years o f the o p e n i n g o f
h o s t i l i t i e s i n E u r o p e E t h i o p i a h a d r e g a i n e d its s o v e r e i g n t y , a n d
a d e c a d e later L i b y a b e c a m e i n d e p e n d e n t . W i t h i n a n o t h e r 2 5 years
t h e last m a j o r E u r o p e a n c o l o n y i n A f r i c a , A n g o l a , h a d g a i n e d its
independence o n 11 N o v e m b e r 1 9 7 5 , and the dismantling o f the
1
René Pélissier, 'Equatorial Guinea: recent history', in Africa: South of the Sahara,
1977-78 ( L o n d o n , 1977), 301.
2
I. O . Delano, The soul of Nigeria ( L o n d o n , 1937), 8.
3
Lamine G u è y e , Itinéraire africaine (Paris, 1966), 79.

INTRODUCTION
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AFARS & ISSAS
MALI NIGER
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A TANZANIA^
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Mauritius Û
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illegal South African rule
I Illegal independence from
Britain declared by white
minority government in 1965
Partitioned between Morocco
2000 km
and Mauritania, Nov. 1975
10*00 miles
2 Africa, 1975.

INTRODUCTION
E u r o p e a n e m p i r e s in A f r i c a w a s c o m p l e t e e x c e p t for a f e w e x o t i c
enclaves and offshore islands. T h e r e w e r e , o f course, three major
t e r r i t o r i e s i n w h i c h A f r i c a n s w e r e still s u b j e c t t o c o n t r o l b y p e o p l e
o f E u r o p e a n origin but w h i c h n o l o n g e r formed part o f any
E u r o p e a n i m p e r i u m . T h e w h i t e m i n o r i t y in the R e p u b l i c o f S o u t h
A f r i c a h a d g a i n e d v i r t u a l i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m B r i t a i n as l o n g a g o
as 1 9 1 0 . T h e f o r m e r G e r m a n c o l o n y o f S o u t h W e s t A f r i c a h a d
b e e n m a n d a t e d t o S o u t h A f r i c a after t h e F i r s t W o r l d W a r . I n
R h o d e s i a the w h i t e minority had unilaterally and effectively taken
its i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m B r i t a i n i n 1965 s o as t o a v o i d a n y q u e s t i o n
o f effective A f r i c a n p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the political p r o c e s s o f their
c o u n t r y , let a l o n e s u b j e c t i o n t o A f r i c a n m a j o r i t y r u l e , w h i c h w a s
a prerequisite o f the legal g r a n t i n g o f i n d e p e n d e n c e b y the m o t h e r
country.
T h e political, social and e c o n o m i c c o n s e q u e n c e s o f this rapid
collapse o f the E u r o p e a n c o l o n i a l e m p i r e s in A f r i c a b e t w e e n 1940
a n d 1 9 7 5 f o r m t h e c e n t r a l t h e m e o f t h i s v o l u m e . T h e first c h a p t e r
will seek to assess the role o f the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r in that
collapse.

C H A P T E R 1
THE S E C O N D W O R L D WAR: PRELUDE

T O D E C O L O N I S A T I O N IN AFRICA
B y 1 9 3 9 t h e E u r o p e a n c o l o n i a l p o w e r s w e r e as firmly i n c o n t r o l
o f t h e i r A f r i c a n t e r r i t o r i e s as t h e y e v e r w o u l d b e . D u r i n g t h e
p r e c e d i n g ten years there had been f e w major challenges to their
authority. Africans had c o m e to accept the n e w political order and
to o b e y the rules laid d o w n b y the c o l o n i a l administration. T h e
lesson had been learned that, a l t h o u g h the colonial administration
w a s t h i n o n t h e g r o u n d , i n t h e last r e s o r t it h a d o v e r w h e l m i n g
resources o f p o w e r . A t t e m p t s to take a d v a n t a g e o f the w e a k n e s s
o f s o m e colonial administrations d u r i n g the First W o r l d W a r and
to return to an i n d e p e n d e n c e based o n pre-colonial political
structures, t h o u g h t e m p o r a r i l y successful, had failed. S u c h chal
l e n g e s t o t h e c o l o n i a l a u t h o r i t i e s as d i d t a k e p l a c e d u r i n g t h e 1 9 3 0 s
w e r e m a d e w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k o f the c o l o n i a l state and w e r e
b y and large limited to protest against o b n o x i o u s features o f the
administration; such protest t o o k the f o r m o f riots against
taxation o r strikes to obtain h i g h e r w a g e s or better conditions o f
s e r v i c e in the small c o l o n i a l industrial sector. W i t h the n o t a b l e
exception o f French N o r t h Africa, there w e r e few violent d e m o n
s t r a t i o n s o f a m o d e r n p o l i t i c a l c h a r a c t e r , t h a t i s , a i m e d at
securing greater participation b y Africans, and m o r e specifically
the small e d u c a t e d élite, in the g o v e r n m e n t a l processes o f the
c o l o n i a l state. N e v e r t h e l e s s it w a s c l e a r t h a t i f t h e e d u c a t e d é l i t e
a c c e p t e d t h e s t a t u s q u o it w a s a p a s s i v e n o t a n a c t i v e a c c e p t a n c e :
t h e y h a n k e r e d after a n i n d e p e n d e n c e , b u t , l i k e t h e B r i t i s h , t h e y
s a w it as a g o a l w h o s e r e a l i s a t i o n w a s d i s t a n t . Y e t w h e n t h e y s a w
t h e o n e t r u l y i n d e p e n d e n t s t a t e o f E t h i o p i a fall t o c o l o n i a l i s t
forces in 1936, their reaction w a s o n e o f w i d e - s c a l e protest.
B y 1 9 3 9 t h e i m p o s e d c o l o n i a l states h a d g a i n e d l e g i t i m a c y i n
the eyes o f their inhabitants, particularly a m o n g the e d u c a t e d
elites, w h o n o w identified their political and social a m b i t i o n s w i t h
them. T h i s did not m e a n that they had a b a n d o n e d their pre-colonial
identities ; yet that part o f the legacy o f colonial rule that w a s called

PRELUDE TO DECOLONISATION
less i n t o q u e s t i o n t h a n a n y o t h e r b y t h e n a t i o n a l i s t s w a s t h e
f r a m e w o r k o f states s u p e r i m p o s e d o n t h e p r e - c o l o n i a l p o l i t i e s b y
t h e i n v a d i n g E u r o p e a n p o w e r s at t h e e n d o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h
c e n t u r y . It w a s m o r e t h e c o u n t r y - f o l k , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h o s e w h o s e
lands had b e e n arbitrarily split b y the n e w E u r o p e a n c o l o n i a l
frontiers, w h o tended to operate socially and e v e n politically in
terms o f their pre-colonial structures.
O n t h e e v e o f t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r , t h e n , t h e Pax Europaea
w a s f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d i n A f r i c a . A t o n e l e v e l it w a s a s e e m i n g l y
very tenuous peace, dependent on a handful o f E u r o p e a n admini
strators ruling o v e r vast and p o p u l o u s areas w i t h o n l y a handful
o f A f r i c a n s o l d i e r s o r p a r a - m i l i t a r y p o l i c e at t h e i r d i s p o s a l .
N i g e r i a , f o r e x a m p l e , h a d o n l y s o m e 4000 s o l d i e r s a n d 4000 p o l i c e
in 1 9 3 0 , o f w h o m all b u t a b o u t 75 i n e a c h f o r c e w e r e b l a c k . J u s t
h o w thin o n the g r o u n d the E u r o p e a n administrations w e r e can
b e s e e n f r o m t h e fact t h a t i n N i g e r i a i n t h e l a t e 1 9 3 0 s t h e n u m b e r
o f a d m i n i s t r a t o r s f o r a p o p u l a t i o n e s t i m a t e d at 20 m i l l i o n w a s o n l y
386, a r a t i o o f 1 : 5 4 0 0 0 , a n d t h a t i n c l u d e d t h o s e i n t h e s e c r e t a r i a t .
In the B e l g i a n C o n g o the ratio w a s 1: 34800 and in F r e n c h W e s t
A f r i c a 1 : 2 7 500. It s h o u l d n o t b e f o r g o t t e n , t o o , t h a t i n p a r t s o f
t h e E u r o p e a n c o l o n i a l e m p i r e t h e c o l o n i a l i m p r i n t w a s still v e r y
light. M a n y Africans had never personally seen a w h i t e man, w h i l e
in M o z a m b i q u e p a r t s o f t h e t e r r i t o r y w e r e n o t e v e n a d m i n i s t e r e d
b y the g o v e r n m e n t , b u t b y c o n c e s s i o n c o m p a n i e s .
T h e Pax Europaea e s t a b l i s h e d b y t h e e n d o f t h e 1 9 3 0 s w a s , o f
course, vital to the successful and intensive exploitation o f the
c o l o n i a l estate b y m e t r o p o l i t a n capital. A n d b y the 1930s the
pre-colonial e c o n o m i c structure o f Africa had been remodelled
i n t o a series o f c o l o n i a l e c o n o m i e s w h o s e c o m m o n characteristic,
w h a t e v e r the nationality o f their administration, w a s that they
w e r e p r o d u c e r s o f foodstuffs and raw materials for c o n s u m p t i o n
o r p r o c e s s i n g b y t h e m e t r o p o l i t a n a n d r e l a t e d e c o n o m i e s ; in t u r n
t h e y s e r v e d as m a r k e t s f o r t h e m a n u f a c t u r e d g o o d s o f E u r o p e a n
industry, m a n y o f them, like soap, processed from r a w materials
exported b y these v e r y colonial e c o n o m i e s . T h e infrastructural
pattern o f the A f r i c a n c o l o n i e s reflected clearly this f u n c t i o n .
R a i l w a y s and roads w e r e built primarily to link m i n e s o r areas o f
e x p o r t - c r o p p r o d u c t i o n w i t h the coast; few w e r e built to link o n e
centre o f p r o d u c t i o n o f crops o r g o o d s for internal c o n s u m p t i o n
with another. T h e colonial administrations were handmaidens to

this e x p l o i t a t i o n , differing o n l y in the d e g r e e o f a c t i v e assistance

t h e y g a v e in t e r m s o f t a x a t i o n , f o r c e d l a b o u r o r c o m p u l s o r y c r o p
cultivation, and the extent to w h i c h they tried to protect the
interests o f their c o l o n i a l subjects. W h e r e p r i v a t e capital w a s
u n w i l l i n g t o p r o v i d e t h e i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l s e r v i c e s it s u p p l i e d in
E u r o p e , s u c h as e l e c t r i c a l p o w e r , r a i l w a y s a n d p o r t s , t h e c o l o n i a l
g o v e r n m e n t s raised the necessary funds for their establishment
f r o m the c o l o n i a l b u d g e t either t h r o u g h taxation o r loans. In
short, b y 1939 Africa had been integrated b y c o l o n i a l rule into
the E u r o p e a n capitalistic s y s t e m and in turn had been i m p r e g n a t e d
w i t h the capitalistic structure o f the m e t r o p o l e , and s u c h d e v e l
o p m e n t that t o o k place w a s m a i n l y in t h o s e sectors p r o d u c i n g for
1
the e x p o r t and i m p o r t trade. A n y d e v e l o p m e n t o f the internal
e x c h a n g e e c o n o m y that resulted w a s largely co-incidental.
T h e extent and intensity o f the incorporation o f the African
e c o n o m y into the w o r l d capitalist system b y 1939 varied f r o m
colony to c o l o n y and from region to region within individual
c o l o n i e s . T h i s p r o c e s s h a d b e g u n as e a r l y as t h e e i g h t e e n t h
c e n t u r y , b u t u n t i l t h e E u r o p e a n o c c u p a t i o n it affected p r i n c i p a l l y
t h o s e areas o n the coast w i t h w h i c h trade h a d already b e e n o p e n e d
u p . T h e r e s u l t o f c o l o n i a l o c c u p a t i o n w a s t o i n v o l v e all A f r i c a n s ,
h o w e v e r indirectly, in the w o r l d e c o n o m y . T h e directness o f their
i n v o l v e m e n t w a s , o f course, determined b y the resources o f the
locality they l i v e d in. B y the b e g i n n i n g o f o u r p e r i o d the m o s t in
t e n s i v e l y i n v o l v e d w e r e t h e p r o d u c e r s o f c r o p s s u c h as g r o u n d
n u t s , p a l m - o i l , c o t t o n , c o c o a , cofTee a n d sisal f o r w h i c h t h e r e
was a demand overseas. T h e s e crops had c o m e to be produced
i n t h r e e d i s t i n c t w a y s w h i c h w e r e t o h a v e i m p o r t a n t effects o n t h e
c o u r s e o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f A f r i c a n n a t i o n a l i s m . T h e first,
p r e d o m i n a n t in W e s t A f r i c a , b u t a l s o t o b e f o u n d i n t h e M a g h r i b ,
E g y p t and U g a n d a , w a s t h r o u g h the a g e n c y o f peasant farmers.
T h e s e c o n d , p r e d o m i n a n t in E q u a t o r i a l A f r i c a and in parts o f
Central and southern Africa, w a s t h r o u g h c o m p a n y - o w n e d
plantations using w a g e a n d / o r forced labour. T h e third w a s
t h r o u g h farms run b y w h i t e settlers u s i n g A f r i c a n w a g e - l a b o u r .
Irrespective o f nationality, the character o f individual colonial
administrations w a s deeply influenced b y the m o d e s o f agricultural
p r o d u c t i o n t o b e f o u n d in t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s . T h u s B r i t i s h a d m i n -
1
See the i n t r o d u c t i o n ' to Peter C . W . G u t k i n d and Immanuel Wallerstein (eds.),
The political economy of contemporary Africa (Beverly Hills and L o n d o n , 1976), 1 1 - 1 2 .
IO

i s t r a t i o n in K e n y a w i t h its s e t t l e r - f a r m e r s , differed c o n s i d e r a b l y
f r o m t h a t i n t h e G o l d C o a s t , w i t h its i n d i g e n o u s f a r m e r s . W h e r e
the principal m e a n s o f agricultural p r o d u c t i o n w a s t h r o u g h w h i t e
settler-farmers, their interests w e r e held p a r a m o u n t b y the c o l o n i a l
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s , as i n L i b y a , A l g e r i a a n d S o u t h e r n R h o d e s i a . I n
colonies w h e r e settler-farmers a n d E u r o p e a n - c o n t r o l l e d plan
t a t i o n s w e r e j o i n t l y c o n c e r n e d a s p r o d u c e r s o f e x p o r t c r o p s , as i n
A n g o l a , M o z a m b i q u e a n d the B e l g i a n C o n g o , E u r o p e a n interests
w e r e also held to b e paramount. In colonies w h e r e there w e r e
substantial a n d influential settler g r o u p s w h o w e r e n o t , h o w e v e r ,
s e e n as t h e p r i n c i p a l o r e x c l u s i v e m e a n s o f p r o d u c t i o n o f e x p o r t
c r o p s , A f r i c a n interests w e r e n e v e r entirely s u b o r d i n a t e d t o t h e m .
M o r o c c o , Tunisia, the I v o r y Coast, Northern Rhodesia and K e n y a
fit i n t o this c a t e g o r y . E v e n w i t h r e g a r d t o K e n y a , w h i c h i n t h e
p o p u l a r B r i t i s h i m a g i n a t i o n w a s t h e w h i t e - s e t t l e r c o l o n y par
excellence, as e a r l y as 1 9 2 3 a C o n s e r v a t i v e c o l o n i a l s e c r e t a r y , t h e
D u k e o f D e v o n s h i r e , h a d laid d o w n t h a t :
Primarily Kenya is an African territory, and His Majesty's Government thinks

it necessary definitely to record their considered opinion that the interests of
the African natives must be paramount and that if, and when, those interests
and the interests of the European races should conflict, the former should
p r e v a i l . . . In the administration of Kenya, His Majesty's Government regard
themselves as exercising a trust on behalf of the African population, and they
are unable to delegate or share this trust, the object of which may be defined
1
as the protection and advancement of the native races.
In practice this o f c o u r s e o n l y m e a n t t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e A f r i c a n
p o p u l a t i o n f r o m the m o r e e x t r e m e f o r m s o f racial p r i v i l e g e
exercised b y the E u r o p e a n settlers in A l g e r i a a n d S o u t h e r n
R h o d e s i a , n o t f r o m its o v e r a l l s u b j e c t i o n t o t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e
w o r l d capitalist e c o n o m y . N e v e r t h e l e s s , in T a n g a n y i k a , f o r
e x a m p l e , s e t t l e r s w e r e g i v e n financial s u p p o r t a n d p r e f e r e n t i a l
t r e a t m e n t e v e n w h e r e it w a s c l e a r f r o m t h e s t a t i s t i c s t h a t A f r i c a n
farmers w e r e m o r e p r o d u c t i v e .
W h e r e w h i t e settlers a n d c o n c e s s i o n c o m p a n i e s w e r e insigni
ficant c o m p a r e d w i t h t h e A f r i c a n p e a s a n t f a r m e r a s a m e a n s o f
production o f export crops, the political role o f local E u r o p e a n s
w a s equally limited. It w a s in s u c h c o l o n i e s that d e c o l o n i s a t i o n
o r d i s e n g a g e m e n t w a s m o s t e a s i l y a c h i e v e d , as t h e c a s e s o f t h e
G o l d Coast, Nigeria, Upper Volta or Senegal witness. T h e most
1
Indians in Kenya, C o m m a n d paper N o . 1922 ( L o n d o n , 1923), 9.
11

violent confrontations between Africans and colonial g o v e r n m e n t s

t o o k p l a c e in t h o s e c o l o n i e s w h e r e settler or c o n c e s s i o n - c o m p a n y
i n t e r e s t s w e r e m o s t d e e p l y e n t r e n c h e d , as i n A l g e r i a , S o u t h e r n
Rhodesia or Mozambique.
W h a t e v e r t h e a g e n c y o f p r o d u c t i o n in a c o l o n y - w h i t e s e t t l e r -
farmer, plantation c o m p a n y o r African farmer - those colonial
d e p e n d e n c i e s m o s t i n v o l v e d in the w o r l d capitalist e c o n o m y and
m o s t d i r e c t l y s u b j e c t t o its fluctuations w e r e t h o s e in w h i c h
cultivation o f crops for export had been m o s t intensively
developed.
B y 1 9 3 9 , w h a t e v e r t h e i n t e n s i t y o f its p r o d u c t i o n f o r t h e e x p o r t
market, three distinct zones o f e c o n o m i c activity c o u l d be
1
d i s c e r n e d i n t h e c o n t i n e n t . T h e first, o f c o u r s e , w a s t h a t d e v o t e d
to the p r o d u c t i o n o f c r o p s for e x p o r t b y w h a t e v e r means, w h e t h e r
indigenous farming, forced-labour or wage-labour on European
farms o r concessions. H e r e African labour had been diverted from
p r o d u c t i o n o f f o o d for c o n s u m p t i o n for the h o m e m a r k e t to that
for c o n s u m p t i o n overseas. A s e c o n d z o n e , therefore, had
d e v e l o p e d in w h i c h a principal c o n c e r n w a s p r o d u c t i o n o f f o o d
for c o n s u m p t i o n by the z o n e p r o d u c i n g f o o d for export. T h e third
z o n e , w h i c h in o t h e r circumstances w o u l d h a v e c o n t i n u e d to
concentrate o n agriculture for domestic c o n s u m p t i o n , not h a v i n g
sufficient a g r i c u l t u r a l r e s o u r c e s t o p r o d u c e s u r p l u s f o o d s t u f f s f o r
the e x p o r t or the internal market, had b e c o m e the source o f supply
o f l a b o u r f o r t h e f a r m s o f t h e first t w o z o n e s . S u c h l a b o u r w a s
f o r t h c o m i n g as a r e s u l t o f f o r c e d r e c r u i t m e n t , as in t h e P o r t u g u e s e
c o l o n i e s , the n e e d t o earn a w a g e in o r d e r to p a y taxes, o r t h r o u g h
the desire o f individuals w h o w i s h e d to take a d v a n t a g e o f the
e c o n o m i c opportunities p r o v i d e d b y the colonial e c o n o m y . T h i s
z o n e , o f w h i c h N i g e r and U p p e r V o l t a or, o n the other side o f
the continent, N y a s a l a n d w e r e o b v i o u s e x a m p l e s , w a s also a
principal supplier o f labour for mines, army, roads and railways.
T h u s few Africans escaped the impact o f the colonial e c o n o m y ,
w h o s e m o s t i m p o r t a n t p o l i t i c a l effect o r b y - p r o d u c t w a s t h e
increasing peasantisation and proletarianisation o f the erstwhile
small-scale farmer. T h i s w a s to be o f crucial importance for the
d e v e l o p m e n t o f the nationalist m o v e m e n t s w h i c h secured political
i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m t h e c o l o n i a l r u l e r s . F o r it w a s f r o m a m o n g t h i s
' See Immanuel Wailerstein, 'Three stages of African involvement in the world
e c o n o m y ' , in G u t k i n d and Wailerstein, Political economy, 30-57.
12

class that an N k r u m a h f o u n d his ' v e r a n d a h b o y s ' o r a S a m o r a

M a c h e l the recruits for the armies o f F R E L I M O .
O f e q u a l i m p o r t a n c e , t h o u g h s o m e t i m e s d i s a s t r o u s i n t h e effects
o n the w e l l - b e i n g o f those i n v o l v e d , w e r e the l o n g - t e r m c o n
s e q u e n c e s o f this m a s s i v e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f the e c o n o m i e s o f
Africa into d e p e n d e n t e c o n o m i e s o f the w o r l d capitalist system.
In m a n y cases this t r a n s f o r m a t i o n led t o an increase in p r o d u c t i o n
o f c r o p s for the e x p o r t m a r k e t that w a s d e t r i m e n t a l , especially in
t h e l o n g - t e r m , t o t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f sufficient c r o p s f o r d o m e s t i c
1
c o n s u m p t i o n . A n o t o r i o u s e x a m p l e o f this d e v e l o p m e n t w a s
the G a m b i a , w h e r e a ' h u n g r y s e a s o n ' resulted from o v e r -
concentration o f labour and land o n g r o u n d n u t s , the chief export
c r o p , to the detriment o f rice, the main subsistence c r o p .
A s Vieira da Silva and de M o r a i s h a v e s h o w n for the H u a m b o
D i s t r i c t in A n g o l a , t h e o v e r - c o n c e n t r a t i o n o n e x p o r t c r o p s l e d i n
the l o n g - t e r m to ' a t r o p h y and d e c a y ' in the rural e c o n o m y since
the surplus d e r i v e d f r o m the p r o d u c t i o n o f the cash c r o p , m a i z e ,
w a s n o t r e i n v e s t e d in the local e c o - s y s t e m , w h i l e soils that w e r e
2
allowed shorter and shorter fallows for regeneration deteriorated.
S u c h r u r a l areas b e c a m e less a n d less c a p a b l e o f s u p p o r t i n g a l o c a l
p o p u l a t i o n t h a t w a s i n a n y c a s e i n c r e a s i n g as a r e s u l t o f i m p r o v e d
and m o r e readily available m e d i c a l facilities, and their y o u n g m e n
h a d i n c r e a s i n g l y t o m i g r a t e in s e a r c h o f w o r k . H u a m b o a n d t h e
G a m b i a r e p r e s e n t e x t r e m e e x a m p l e s o f t h e effects o f a c o l o n i a l
e c o n o m i c system w h o s e principal c o n c e r n w a s w i t h m e e t i n g the
demands o f overseas markets for Africa's export crops, and w h i c h
paid little, if any, attention t o p r o b l e m s c o n c e r n e d w i t h the
production, distribution or i m p r o v e m e n t o f subsistence crops.
This concern with cash-crop production was generalised
t h r o u g h o u t colonial Africa and reinforced b y the taxation and
l a b o u r policies o f the colonial administrations, w h i c h c o m p e l l e d
farmers to d e v o t e m o r e and m o r e e n e r g y , land and time to
p r o d u c t i o n o f cash crops. T o g e t h e r these had important social
c o n s e q u e n c e s . T h e y accelerated the g r o w t h o f a plantation
sub-proletariat and w e r e a m a j o r factor in the m a s s i v e m i g r a t i o n
1
See Chapter 5, where it is shown that by 1975 a majority of African countries were
finding it increasingly difficult to feed themselves even though their economies were
still primarily agricultural.
2
Jorge Vieira da Silva and Julio Artur de Morais, * Ecological conditions of social
change in the central highlands of A n g o l a ' , in Franz-Wilhelm Heimer (ed.), Social change
in Angola (Munich, 1973).
13

to the t o w n s that t o o k place d u r i n g the p e r i o d c o v e r e d b y this

v o l u m e and the c o n s e q u e n t d e v e l o p m e n t o f an u r b a n s u b -
p r o l e t a r i a t . T h e y affected t h e r e l a t i v e r o l e s o f m e n a n d w o m e n i n
society: increasingly w o m e n were diverted from income-
p r o d u c i n g agricultural p r o d u c t i o n to p r o d u c t i o n o f crops for
domestic consumption.
If the l o n g - t e r m c o n s e q u e n c e s o f the colonial e c o n o m i c s y s t e m
w e r e the i m p o v e r i s h m e n t o f m a n y rural p o p u l a t i o n s d u r i n g o u r
p e r i o d and the increasing d e p e n d e n c e o f the farmer o n c r o p s
w h o s e p r i c e s w e r e s u b j e c t t o w i d e fluctuations, f o r s o m e s e c t o r s
o f colonial African society alien rule had b r o u g h t p o s i t i v e
benefits, in particular in the e x t e n s i o n o f e d u c a t i o n a n d ancillary
social benefits. F o r w h i l e the m a i n business o f c o l o n i a l rule m a y
h a v e been the e x p l o i t a t i o n o f the resources o f Africa for the benefit
o f the m e t r o p o l i t a n e c o n o m i e s , the colonial administrations in
A f r i c a w e r e c o n c e r n e d , in differing d e g r e e s , to i m p r o v e the lot
o f t h e i r p o p u l a t i o n s . T h e y c e r t a i n l y d i d n o t p e r c e i v e , at t h e t i m e ,
the l o n g - t e r m c o n s e q u e n c e s o f the e c o n o m i c structures that had
d e v e l o p e d b y 1940. I n d e e d increases in e x p o r t e a r n i n g s b y a
c o l o n y s e e m e d t o a u g u r w e l l f o r it, s i n c e t h e d u t i e s i m p o s e d o n
these and the imports they m a d e possible p r o v i d e d the w h e r e
withal to d e v e l o p roads, and build bridges, hospitals and schools.
It w a s t h e s e b e n e f i t s as m u c h as a n y d i s t r e s s c a u s e d b y t h e c o l o n i a l
e c o n o m i c system that w e r e to b r i n g a b o u t the demise o f colonial
rule. W h e r e the early o p p o n e n t s o f c o l o n i a l rule had b e e n those
w h o w i s h e d to regain their pre-colonial independences, the n e w
o p p o n e n t s w e r e those w h o had personally benefited m o s t from
the c o l o n i a l s y s t e m , t h e e d u c a t e d é l i t e . T h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e
pre-colonial polities - the chiefs - had n o w been a b s o r b e d into
the c o l o n i a l h i e r a r c h y as its m o s t l o y a l c o l l a b o r a t o r s . T h e e d u c a t e d
élite, in c h a l l e n g i n g t h e c o l o n i a l g o v e r n m e n t , d i d n o t s e e k a r e t u r n
to the pre-colonial structures o f Africa, but rather s o u g h t a share
in t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f t h e n e w c o l o n y - s t a t e s . B y 1 9 4 0 f e w h a d
g o n e as far as t o d e m a n d c o n t r o l o f t h e administration;
i n d e p e n d e n c e w a s a w o r d n o t o p e n l y b a n d i e d a b o u t e x c e p t in the
M a g h r i b and there o n l y w i t h caution. T h e w e s t e r n - e d u c a t e d élite,
h a v i n g r e a c h e d , a n d in s o m e c a s e s s u r p a s s e d , t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l
attainments o f their colonial administrators o n those administra
t o r s ' o w n t e r m s , b e g a n t o d e m a n d p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e a d m i n i
stration. T h e y w e r e primarily c o n c e r n e d w i t h the b e t t e r m e n t o f

t h e i r p o s i t i o n as a c l a s s , a n d p a i d little a t t e n t i o n t o t h e w e l f a r e
o f the rural masses, t h o u g h they w e r e t o harness the rural
b y - p r o d u c t , t h e u r b a n i m m i g r a n t s , t o g o o d effect i n a g i t a t i o n
against the colonial regime. T h e prevailing attitude o f the
e d u c a t e d é l i t e i n t h e late 1 9 3 0 s is s u m m e d u p b y t h e y o u n g l a w y e r ,
O b a f e m i A w o l o w o , w h o w r o t e in 1946 that ' t h e articulate
m i n o r i t y is d e s t i n e d t o r u l e t h e c o u n t r y . I t is t h e i r h e r i t a g e . I t is
t h e y w h o m u s t b e t r a i n e d i n t h e a r t o f g o v e r n m e n t s o as t o e n a b l e
t h e m t o t a k e o v e r c o m p l e t e c o n t r o l o f t h e affairs o f t h e i r
1
c o u n t r y . ' I t is this a t t i t u d e t h a t e x p l a i n s t h e h o s t i l i t y o f t h e
majority o f t h e e d u c a t e d élite t o t h e role o f t h e chiefs in
g o v e r n m e n t , f o r t h e y s a w t h e m as r i v a l s f o r p o w e r , p a r t i c u l a r l y
in t h o s e British c o l o n i e s , like N i g e r i a , w h e r e t h e s y s t e m o f indirect
r u l e m a d e it e x p l i c i t t h a t d e v o l u t i o n o f c o l o n i a l p o w e r w o u l d b e
to the native authorities rather than t o the e d u c a t e d élite.
Criticisms o f the colonial structure, then, b y 1940 had largely
b e e n l i m i t e d t o p r o t e s t s a g a i n s t its c h a r a c t e r , n o t its e x i s t e n c e .
T h e s e criticisms h a d been fuelled in part b y the depressed level
o f the e c o n o m y and consequent diminution o f colonial services
t h r o u g h o u t the 1930s. A t a time o f rising e x p e c t a t i o n s , based o n
t h e p r o s p e r i t y o f t h e first t w o d e c a d e s o f t h e c e n t u r y w h e n t h e
terms o f trade w e r e in A f r i c a ' s f a v o u r a n d peasant a n d trader h a d
profited, the thirties, in w h i c h the terms o f trade w e r e dramatically
reversed, b r o u g h t disillusion with the positive aspects o f colonial
r u l e . T h i s d i s i l l u s i o n s e t i n b o t h a m o n g f a r m e r s w h o e a r n e d less
a n d less f r o m t h e i r c r o p s a n d a m o n g t h e e d u c a t e d é l i t e w h o f o u n d
fewer o p e n i n g s in the colonial system - w h e t h e r g o v e r n m e n t o r
b u s i n e s s — as d i m i n i s h i n g r e v e n u e s f o r c e d it t o c u t b a c k its
activities.
THE COURSE OF T H E WAR ON A F R I C A N SOIL
T h e extent to w h i c h the Second W o r l d W a r represented a turning

p o i n t in the liberation o f A f r i c a f r o m c o l o n i a l rule, o r m e r e l y acted
as a n a c c e l e r a t o r t o a p r o c e s s t h a t w a s a l r e a d y u n d e r w a y , c a n n o t
be assessed w i t h o u t an appreciation o f the impact o f that w a r o n
t h e A f r i c a n c o n t i n e n t itself.
N o t l o n g after t h e o u t b r e a k o f w a r i n E u r o p e , t h e fighting w a s
e x t e n d e d t o A f r i c a , j u s t as it h a d b e e n i n t h e F i r s t W o r l d W a r .
1
Obafemi A w o l o w o , Path to Nigerian freedom ( L o n d o n , 1947), 63.
15

E v e n b e f o r e t h i s , s o m e 80000 A f r i c a n t r o o p s h a d b e e n s h i p p e d
f r o m F r e n c h A f r i c a t o E u r o p e t o fight a g a i n s t t h e G e r m a n s . O n c e
Italy h a d entered the w a r o n the side o f G e r m a n y in M a y 1940
t h e s e c u r i t y o f t h e S u e z r o u t e t o t h e F a r E a s t w a s p l a c e d in
j e o p a r d y , w i t h I t a l i a n f o r c e s in L i b y a p o s i n g a t h r e a t t o E g y p t ,
a n d t h o s e in t h e H o r n o f A f r i c a t o K e n y a a n d t h e S u d a n . W i t h t h e
fall o f F r a n c e in J u n e 1 9 4 0 t h e m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n i n A f r i c a b e c a m e
e v e n m o r e w o r r y i n g t o t h e B r i t i s h , as t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s o f
French N o r t h and W e s t Africa, Somali Coast and Madagascar
o p t e d f o r t h e V i c h y r e g i m e , w h o s e i n t e n t i o n s as far as p r o
v i d i n g facilities f o r t h e G e r m a n n a v y in its c o a s t a l c o l o n i e s
w e r e n o t at all c l e a r . T h e o n l y c o u t e r v a i l i n g e v e n t s w e r e t h e
decision b y the black G u y a n e s e G o v e r n o r o f C h a d , Felix E b o u e ,
to b a c k G e n e r a l de G a u l l e and the F r e e F r e n c h , and his success
in r a l l y i n g t h e rest o f E q u a t o r i a l A f r i c a a n d C a m e r o u n t o t h e i r
cause w i t h the assistance o f military intervention f r o m Free
F r e n c h f o r c e s b a s e d in N i g e r i a . T h e o u t c o m e w a s t o s e c u r e a n
o v e r l a n d a n d air r o u t e f o r B r i t a i n a n d h e r allies f r o m A c c r a a n d
L a g o s to Sudan and E g y p t by w a y o f Chad. T h i s w a s to p r o v e
v i t a l in t h e e x t e n d e d w a r in t h e L i b y a n d e s e r t . T h e d e s t r u c t i o n
o f t h e F r e n c h fleet o f f t h e c o a s t o f A l g e r i a at M e r s - e l - K e b i r , a n d
t h e s h e l l i n g o f t h e F r e n c h b a t t l e s h i p Richelieu in D a k a r , r e l i e v e d
s o m e o f Britain's anxieties that the G e r m a n s m i g h t use the F r e n c h
fleet a n d i n c r e a s e t h e p r o b l e m s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h h e r
colonies. H o w e v e r , the attempt b y British and Free F r e n c h forces
to take D a k a r in S e p t e m b e r 1940 failed i g n o m i n i o u s l y a n d d i d
m u c h t o r e d u c e d e G a u l l e ' s c u r r e n c y in t h e e y e s o f t h e A l l i e s ,
t h o u g h it d i d n o t , as f e a r e d , l e a d t o D a k a r b e i n g u s e d as a G e r m a n
1
b a s e as c o n t e m p o r a r y p r o p a g a n d a w o u l d h a v e i t . N e v e r t h e l e s s
t h e B r i t i s h in W e s t A f r i c a n e v e r felt s e c u r e o n t h e i r b o r d e r s u n t i l
F r e n c h W e s t A f r i c a d e c l a r e d f o r t h e F r e e F r e n c h in N o v e m b e r
1942.
I n t h e H o r n o f A f r i c a t h e I t a l i a n s justified B r i t a i n ' s fears a n d
i n v a d e d B r i t i s h S o m a l i l a n d in A u g u s t 1 9 4 0 , a n d a l s o t o o k K a s s a l a
in t h e A n g l o - E g y p t i a n S u d a n a n d M o y a l e in K e n y a . D e s p i t e t h e
p a t h e t i c a l l y s m a l l B r i t i s h f o r c e s in t h i s s t r a t e g i c a r e a , t h e I t a l i a n s
w e r e c a u t i o u s in t h e i r i n v a s i o n o f b o t h t h e S u d a n a n d K e n y a a n d
did n o t p r o v e the threat to the security o f these c o l o n i e s that they
1
Michael C r o w d e r , ' V i c h y and Free France in West Africa during the Second World
War', in Colonial West Africa ( L o n d o n , 1978), 274.
16

THE COURSE O F T H EW A RO N A F R I C A N SOIL
m i g h t h a v e b e e n . T h e initial British r e s p o n s e , g i v e n their limited

resources, w a s to order the recapture o f Kassala and t o g i v e
a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e E t h i o p i a n p a t r i o t s w h o w e r e still r e s i s t i n g t h e
recent Italian o c c u p a t i o n . K a s s a l a w a s taken in J a n u a r y 1 9 4 1 , a n d
despite the four-to-one numerical superiority o f the Italian forces
o v e r the British, the latter a d v a n c e d i n t o Italian E a s t A f r i c a a n d
by 17 M a y they had effectively gained control o v e r the H o r n .
A d d i s A b a b a , w h i c h w a s taken in early A p r i l , w a s the scene a
m o n t h l a t e r o f t h e first a c t i n t h e d e c o l o n i s a t i o n o f t h e E u r o p e a n
empires that w a s t o take place o v e r the next 3 5 years. O n 5 M a y ,
1 9 4 1 , H a i l e S e l a s s i e r e t u r n e d t o h i s i m p e r i a l c a p i t a l , e x a c t l y five
y e a r s t o t h e d a y after it h a d b e e n o c c u p i e d b y t h e I t a l i a n s . I t w a s ,
h o w e v e r , n o t uncharacteristic o f the w a y decolonisation unfolded
that the British insisted o n retaining certain c o n t r o l s o v e r his
g o v e r n m e n t , i n p a r t i c u l a r i n t h e O g a d e n r e g i o n . B u t it w a s a l s o
significant that this act o f d e c o l o n i s a t i o n w a s a c h i e v e d w i t h t h e
assistance o f A f r i c a n soldiers f r o m b o t h E a s t a n d W e s t A f r i c a . T h e
participation o f N i g e r i a n soldiers in this c a m p a i g n w a s celebrated
by the Hausa poet Sa'adu Z u n g u r .
The Nigerians cleaved through to the Somali corner without halting.
The Ethiopians drank freely in city, in encampment and in village.
1
Their enemy was knocked out. Ethiopia's troubles were over.
W i t h the e x p u l s i o n o f the Italians f r o m E a s t Africa, the m a i n

theatre o f w a r b e c a m e N o r t h Africa. T h e r e the G e r m a n s a n d
Italians c a m e c l o s e t o o c c u p y i n g E g y p t , a l m o s t r e a c h i n g A l e x a n
d r i a . T h e y w e r e e v e n t u a l l y d r i v e n b a c k after t h e b a t t l e o f E l
A l a m e i n . Thereafter the w a r see-sawed back and forth in L i b y a ,
c a u s i n g i m m e n s e destruction in urban areas. T h e G e r m a n s a n d
I t a l i a n s w e r e n o t finally e x p e l l e d u n t i l after t h e j o i n t A m e r i c a n -
British landings in N o r t h Africa in S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 2 . W h i l e
M o r o c c o and A l g e r i a w e r e q u i c k l y taken f r o m their V i c h y
administrations b y the Allies, Tunisia, w h i c h for a short time w a s
under G e r m a n administration, b e c a m e a battlefield suffering g r e a t
d e v a s t a t i o n i n its c i t i e s a n d t o w n s . T h e last G e r m a n a n d I t a l i a n
forces w e r e d r i v e n o u t o f N o r t h Africa in 1943, a n d the Italian
c o l o n i s t s in L i b y a w e r e i n t e r n e d .
Madagascar was invaded b y British forces and occupied b e t w e e n
M a y and December 1942. T h e whole o f French Africa w a s
1
Sa'adu Z u n g u r , 'Welcome to the soldiers', in Dandatti Abdulkadir, The poetry,
life and opinions of Sa*adu Zungur (Zatiz, 1974), 4 1 .
17

PRELUDE TO D E C O L O N I S A T I O N
e v e n t u a l l y placed u n d e r Free F r e n c h administration, t h o u g h in

N o r t h A f r i c a d e G a u l l e r u l e d v e r y m u c h as a c l i e n t o f t h e
A m e r i c a n s , a point n o t lost o n the nationalists. France w a s g i v e n
the administration o f the Italian Saharan territory o f F e z z a n ,
w h i c h linked her Equatorial and N o r t h African colonies, while
Britain administered the coastal territories o f Tripolitania a n d
Cyrenaica.
In contrast t o the First W o r l d W a r , the S e c o n d d i d n o t lead
to any redrawing o f the m a p o f Africa. N o r did any o f the victors
make long-term colonial acquisitions. H o w e v e r , during the w a r
Britain d i d entertain ambitions w i t h regard t o the Italian c o l o n i e s
w h i c h she had conquered and w h i c h she certainly did n o t want
returned t o Italy o r g i v e n t o a n y p o w e r that m i g h t o n c e again
threaten the security o f her imperial communications. B u t such
ambitions w e r e thwarted b y A m e r i c a n hostility towards any
expansion o f the British empire, o r the granting to her o f any
1
o p e n - e n d e d t r u s t e e s h i p . A s it w a s , E t h i o p i a , as w e h a v e s e e n ,
regained an i n d e p e n d e n c e o n l y recently l o s t ; the Italian c o l o n y
of Eritrea was placed under temporary British administration, and
federated w i t h E t h i o p i a in 1952. S o m a l i a , administered b y the
B r i t i s h f r o m 1 9 4 1 t o 1 9 5 0 , w a s g i v e n b a c k t o t h e I t a l i a n s as a
U n i t e d N a t i o n s T r u s t T e r r i t o r y w i t h a specific o b l i g a t i o n t o
p r e p a r e it f o r i n d e p e n d e n c e w i t h i n a d e c a d e ; t h e L i b y a n p r o v i n c e s
o f Tripolitania and Cyrenaica w e r e administered b y Britain, and
F e z z a n b y F r a n c e until 1951 w h e n , at t h e insistence o f t h e U n i t e d
N a t i o n s , t h e y b e c a m e t o g e t h e r i n d e p e n d e n t as t h e K i n g d o m o f
Libya.
T h e majority o f the African colonies controlled b y Britain and
France d i d n o t , o f course, b e c o m e directly i n v o l v e d in the
hostilities. Y e t t h e y w e r e m u c h m o r e o b v i o u s l y affected b y t h e
course o f the w a r than they had been during the First W o r l d W a r .
A p a r t from the increased sophistication o f the t e c h n o l o g y available
to the combatants, m o r e particularly in the form o f longer-range
s u b m a r i n e s a n d aircraft that m a d e a n y territory potentially v u l
nerable, m a n y cities a n d t o w n s r e m o t e f r o m theatres o f w a r served
as s t a g i n g p o s t s f o r s o l d i e r s a n d s u p p l i e s . I m p r o v e d m e a n s o f
m a s s - c o m m u n i c a t i o n and the progress, albeit s l o w , o f western
education b e t w e e n the w a r s , meant that a m u c h larger s e g m e n t
1
See William R o g e r Louis, Imperialism at bay: rpî-i^^j: the United States and the
decolonisation of the British Empire (Oxford, 1977).
18

THE C O U R S E OF T H E W A R ON A F R I C A N SOIL
Tangier
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S P A N I(International
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3 Africa, 1946.
19

o f the A f r i c a n p o p u l a t i o n w a s a w a r e o f the issues i n v o l v e d . In

a m u c h m o r e real s e n s e t h a n i n t h e F i r s t W o r l d W a r A f r i c a w a s
integrated into the mainstream o f international politics b y the
S e c o n d . T h e F i r s t W o r l d W a r , it is t r u e , w a s as d i s r u p t i v e as t h e
S e c o n d W o r l d W a r i n A f r i c a , i f n o t m o r e s o , a c c o m p a n i e d as it
w a s b y w i d e - s c a l e r e v o l t s , particularly in F r e n c h W e s t A f r i c a , a n d
m i l l e n n i a l m o v e m e n t s s u c h as t h a t o f G a r r i c k B r a i d e i n t h e N i g e r
Delta w h i c h s o u g h t to r e m o v e the colonial p o w e r . B u t these w e r e
directed t o w a r d s a return to the status q u o ante. T h e forces stirred
in A f r i c a b y t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r w e r e a i m e d at s e c u r i n g
c o n t r o l o f the h o u s e s the E u r o p e a n s had built.
THE IMPACT OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR ON
THE C O L O N I A L POWERS
T h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r shattered the colonial calm o f Africa.

W i t h i n a y e a r o f its o u t b r e a k B e l g i u m a n d F r a n c e h a d b e e n o v e r r u n
b y t h e G e r m a n s . S o o n after, I t a l y w a s d i s p o s s e s s e d first o f h e r E a s t
African empire and then o f her N o r t h African c o l o n y o f Libya.
A l t h o u g h B r i t a i n d i d n o t suffer i n v a s i o n a n d t h e h u m i l i a t i o n o f
o c c u p a t i o n b y h e r o p p o n e n t s as d i d F r a n c e , B e l g i u m a n d I t a l y ,
she k n e w the bitter taste o f defeat. L i k e that o f F r a n c e , her Far
Eastern empire w a s seized b y Japan, a ' c o l o u r e d nation', w h o s e
e a r l i e r s u c c e s s e s i n t h e field o f m o d e r n i s a t i o n h a d c o n t e m p t u o u s l y
been attributed to skills o f imitation. F o r France and B e l g i u m ,
c o n t i n u e d e x i s t e n c e as i n d e p e n d e n t e n t i t i e s b r i e f l y r e s i d e d i n t h e i r
o w n d e p e n d e n c i e s : F r e n c h E q u a t o r i a l A f r i c a in the case o f F r a n c e ,
a n d t h e C o n g o in t h e c a s e o f B e l g i u m . P i e r r e R y c k m a n s , G o v e r n o r -
G e n e r a l o f B e l g i u m ' s C o n g o estate, w a s to declare w i t h apparently
n o a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the true i r o n y o f his c o u n t r y ' s situation : ' T h e
B e l g i a n C o n g o , i n t h e p r e s e n t w a r , is t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t a s s e t
o f B e l g i u m . It is e n t i r e l y at t h e s e r v i c e o f t h e A l l i e s , a n d t h r o u g h
t h e m t h e m o t h e r l a n d . I f s h e n e e d s m e n , it w i l l g i v e t h e m ; i f s h e
, f
n e e d s w o r k , it w i l l w o r k f o r h e r . W h i l e F r e n c h m e n w i t h v i s i o n s
o f a F r a n c e o n c e m o r e free a n d i n d e p e n d e n t m a y h a v e b e e n a b l e
t o h o l d t h e i r h e a d s h i g h i n t h e i r E q u a t o r i a l c o l o n i e s , i n t h e rest
o f F r e n c h A f r i c a the A f r i c a n élite w a s t o w i t n e s s the spectacle
o f a d i v i d e d c o l o n i a l class and see the r e c r i m i n a t i o n s and
1
Pierre Ryckmans in June 1940, cited by George Martelli, Leopold to Lumumba: a
history of the Belgian Congo 1877-1960 (London, 1962), 201.
20

THE IMPACT OF THE WAR ON C O L O N I A L POWERS
retributions visited u p o n those w h o had m a d e the mistake o f

b a c k i n g the V i c h y horse t o o o p e n l y . In D a k a r they w e r e to be
told that the venerable Marshal Petain, w h o had led F r a n c e to
ultimate v i c t o r y in the First W o r l d W a r w i t h the m a s s i v e
assistance o f A f r i c a n c o n s c r i p t s , w a s n o w a fallen i d o l , w h i l e
G e n e r a l d e G a u l l e , p r e s e n t e d as t h e i r l i b e r a t o r , h a d t o b e g i v e n
s p e c i a l p r o t e c t i o n o n h i s first v i s i t t o D a k a r i n c a s e r e l a t i v e s o f
those killed d u r i n g his a b o r t i v e raid o f 1940 s h o u l d seek
vengeance.
O f the E u r o p e a n imperial p o w e r s in A f r i c a o n l y S p a i n a n d
P o r t u g a l e m e r g e d from the w a r relatively unscathed, w i t h the
latter g a i n i n g s o m e profit f r o m the b o o m that the w a r g e n e r a t e d
i n t h e d e m a n d f o r t h e p r o d u c t s o f its A f r i c a n c o l o n i e s . T h e o t h e r s ,
w h o s e s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e h a d a l r e a d y r e c e i v e d a b o d y - b l o w as a re
s u l t o f t h e p r o l o n g e d d e p r e s s i o n o f t h e t h i r t i e s , h a d n o w suffered
t h e h u m i l i a t i o n o f d e f e a t , a fact w h i c h t h e y k n e w d i d n o t e s c a p e
t h e i r b e t t e r e d u c a t e d s u b j e c t s . S u b s e q u e n t v i c t o r i e s w e r e n o t suf
ficient t o r e s t o r e r e s p e c t . T h e m y t h o f c o l o n i a l i n v i n c i b i l i t y w a s
d e s t r o y e d , and the self-confidence o f the c o l o n i a l p o w e r s and
administrators w h o sustained this m y t h dissipated. T h e c o l o n i a l
e m p e r o r had n o clothes. T h i s w a s a truth that w a s to be realised
b y t h e c o l o n i s e d A f r i c a n s o n l y d i m l y at first b u t w i t h i n c r e a s i n g
c l a r i t y o v e r t h e n e x t t h i r t y y e a r s . It w a s , h o w e v e r , a t r u t h t h a t
w a s n o t at all a p p a r e n t in t h e c o l o n i e s o f t h o s e t w o p o w e r s t h a t
w e r e n o t directly i n v o l v e d in the w a r : P o r t u g a l and S p a i n . T h e i r
subjects w e r e to remain insulated from the early w i n d s o f c h a n g e
that w e r e b l o w i n g e l s e w h e r e in A f r i c a b y harshly repressive and
economically backward regimes.
T h e dependence o f the belligerent colonial p o w e r s o n their
colonies for s u r v i v a l w a s n o t o n l y p s y c h o l o g i c a l and political, b u t
m i l i t a r y a n d e c o n o m i c , as R y c k m a n s m a d e s o c l e a r . E v e n t h o u g h
Britain retained her territorial integrity, her c o n t i n u e d existence
and her struggle against the G e r m a n s and Japanese w e r e depen
dent in s o m e m e a s u r e o n supplies o f p r o d u c e and t r o o p s f r o m her
A f r i c a n c o l o n i e s . A f t e r t h e fall o f M a l a y a t o t h e J a p a n e s e t h e r a w
materials o f her A f r i c a n colonies b e c a m e e v e n m o r e vital to her
w a r effort. T h i s d e p e n d e n c e o n h e r c o l o n i a l e m p i r e w a s m a d e
q u i t e explicit in the p r o m i s e s she m a d e t o the I n d i a n p e o p l e s o f
i n d e p e n d e n t d o m i n i o n s t a t u s after t h e w a r i n r e t u r n f o r c o o p e r a t i o n
d u r i n g it, a n d in t h e p r o p a g a n d a d e s i g n e d t o c o n v i n c e h e r A f r i c a n
21

c o l o n i a l p o p u l a t i o n s t h a t s u p p o r t d u r i n g t h e w a r w o u l d r e a p its
r e w a r d s i n s o c i a l , e c o n o m i c a n d p o l i t i c a l r e f o r m s after it h a d b e e n
w o n . I n d e e d , as w e s h a l l s e e , s o m e o f t h e s e r e f o r m s w e r e a c t u a l l y
i n i t i a t e d d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e o f t h e w a r itself. F r a n c e a l s o w a s t o
m a k e explicit her sense o f o b l i g a t i o n , o f a debt that h a d t o b e
repaid, t o h e r A f r i c a n c o l o n i e s at t h e B r a z z a v i l l e C o n f e r e n c e o f
1944, w h e r e a b o l d outline for e c o n o m i c , social, legal a n d political
reform w a s approved b y the Free French administration. In the
Belgian C o n g o , t o o , promises o f social and e c o n o m i c reform w e r e
made, t h o u g h political change w a s n o t o n the agenda.
T h e official e n u n c i a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e f u t u r e o f t h e c o l o n i a l
empires in Africa in n o w a y q u e s t i o n e d the basis o f the c o l o n i a l
relationship. W i n s t o n C h u r c h i l l specifically stated that the clause
in t h e A t l a n t i c C h a r t e r , w h i c h h e s i g n e d w i t h P r e s i d e n t R o o s e v e l t ,
a f f i r m i n g * t h e r i g h t o f all p e o p l e t o c h o o s e t h e f o r m o f g o v e r n m e n t
in w h i c h t h e y l i v e ' a n d h o p i n g ' t o see s o v e r e i g n r i g h t s a n d
self-government restored to those w h o have been forcibly deprived
o f t h e m ' , d i d n o t a p p l y t o t h e A f r i c a n c o l o n i e s . H e a l s o m a d e it
q u i t e clear that h e h a d n o t b e c o m e ' the K i n g ' s First M i n i s t e r in
order to preside o v e r the liquidation o f the British E m p i r e ' .
Similarly the F r e e F r e n c h stated c a t e g o r i c a l l y that the future o f
France's A f r i c a n territories w a s n o t t o b e ' s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t ' , b u t
rather greater political freedom within the f r a m e w o r k o f a
' g r e a t e r F r a n c e ' . Indeed the assurance o f the s u r v i v a l o f their
colonial empires in the p o s t - w a r w o r l d formed a b o n d b e t w e e n
1
C h u r c h i l l a n d d e G a u l l e , w h o s a w F r a n c e ' s e m p i r e as the
g u a r a n t e e o f h e r c o n t i n u i n g s t a t u s as a w o r l d p o w e r . T h e r e w a s ,
h o w e v e r , a basic difference b e t w e e n the t w o c o l o n i a l p o w e r s in
that Britain d i d accept that decolonisation o f her e m p i r e w a s
i n e v i t a b l e , e v e n i f this w o u l d take place o n l y in s o m e v e r y distant
f u t u r e as far as h e r A f r i c a n c o l o n i e s w e r e c o n c e r n e d . B r i t a i n a l s o
had w i t h i n t h e w a l l s o f its C o l o n i a l Office a g r o u p o f ' r e f o r m e r s '
w h o w e r e determined t o b r i n g that future nearer.
Nevertheless both within the metropolitan countries themselves
and increasingly in the U n i t e d States o f A m e r i c a , the w h o l e
colonial relationship and the right o f o n e people t o dominate
another e v e n in the short term w a s b e i n g questioned. I n Britain,
the w a r g a v e an e d g e t o those w i t h i n the C o l o n i a l Office w h o
f a v o u r e d r e f o r m a n d w h o , t h o u g h t h e y still b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e
1
Louis, Imperialism at bay 27. y
22

African colonies needed a great deal m o r e social and e c o n o m i c

development before they could be accorded even modest measures
o f s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t , felt t h a t m o r e p o s i t i v e s t e p s s h o u l d b e t a k e n
to prepare t h e m for political responsibility w i t h i n a foreseeable
f u t u r e as d i s t i n c t f r o m o n e t h a t h a d b e e n m e r e l y n e b u l o u s . W i t h i n
t h e g o v e r n m e n t itself, C l e m e n t A t t l e e , C h u r c h i l l ' s d e p u t y a n d t h e
leader o f the L a b o u r Party, p r o t e s t e d against the h o l d i n g o f
c o l o n i e s f o r t h e financial a d v a n t a g e w h i c h ' m a i n l y a c c r u e d t o a
1
c a p i t a l i s t g r o u p ' . T h e W e s t I n d i a n r i o t s o f 19 3 8 h a d s t r e n g t h e n e d
t h e h a n d o f t h o s e w h o a d v o c a t e d r e f o r m in t h e C o l o n i a l O f f i c e
and a former Indian State g o v e r n o r like Hailey had already per
ceived w h a t m a n y o f the m e n o n the spot had n o t yet seen, that
Africa w a s a continent o f ' rapid c h a n g e , and greater c h a n g e s im
p e n d i n g ' . H e a l s o a s k e d t h e q u e s t i o n as t o w h e t h e r t h e c o l o n i a l
authorities c o u l d ' b e sure o f the continuance o f that degree o f
a c q u i e s c e n c e in o u r r u l e w h i c h is a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n o f
2
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o g r e s s ' . I n t h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e c o l u m n s o f The
Times, M a r g e r y P e r h a m r e g u l a r l y e x p r e s s e d t h e g r o w i n g u n e a s e
that t h i n k i n g B r i t o n s c o n c e r n e d w i t h the c o l o n i a l e m p i r e w e r e
b e g i n n i n g t o feel a b o u t t h e i r r e c o r d . T h i s u n e a s e w a s h e i g h t e n e d
b y the o p e n attacks m a d e n o t o n l y o n that r e c o r d b u t o n the v e r y
idea o f e m p i r e b y the A m e r i c a n s , e p i t o m i s e d b y the b r o a d c a s t o f
W e n d e l l W i l k i e o n h i s v i s i t t o L o n d o n in N o v e m b e r 1 9 4 2 w h e n
3
he s p o k e o f ' t h e necessity o f a b o l i s h i n g i m p e r i a l i s m ' . In this he
w a s merely e c h o i n g the v i e w s o f President R o o s e v e l t and i m p o r
tant elements w i t h i n his administration w h o feared that the
greatest d a n g e r to the stability o f the p o s t - w a r w o r l d w o u l d c o m e
f r o m the re-establishment o f a p o w e r f u l British e m p i r e . T h e
B r i t i s h , in t u r n , s u s p e c t e d t h a t t h e m o t i v a t i o n f o r A m e r i c a n
a t t a c k s o n h e r e m p i r e c a m e f r o m a d e s i r e t o s e c u r e freer a c c e s s
to her colonial markets. T h e r e w a s also the a n o m a l y that A m e r i c a
did not consider that her overseas possessions o f H a w a i i , the
Philippines and P u e r t o R i c o constituted an empire.
T h e r e w a s a certain bitterness that s u c h attacks w e r e directed
p r i m a r i l y at t h e B r i t i s h , w h i l e t h e F r e n c h s e e m e d t o e s c a p e
u n s c a t h e d . B u t this w a s n o t i n fact t h e c a s e . I f a n y t h i n g , as W i l l i a m
1
Ibid., 33, citing minutes of ministerial meeting of n September 1942.
2
Introductory chapter to Native administration and political development in British
tropical Africa, confidentially printed, 1942, cited in John D . Hargreaves, The end of
colonial rule in West Africa ( L o n d o n , 1978), 15.
3
Margery Perham, Colonial sequence /930-1949 ( L o n d o n , 1967), 237.
23

R o g e r L o u i s points out, R o o s e v e l t w a s m o r e hostile t o the French

1
as a c o l o n i a l p o w e r t h a n t o t h e B r i t i s h . H e d i d n o t w a n t
I n d o - C h i n a t o b e r e t u r n e d t o t h e F r e n c h after t h e J a p a n e s e h a d
been defeated, s o p o o r a v i e w did he have o f France's colonial
r e c o r d t h e r e . A t t h e v e r y l e a s t h e felt t h a t r e s t o r a t i o n o f I n d o - C h i n a
to French administration should be conditional o n independence
b e i n g m a d e the l o n g - t e r m g o a l o f policy there. A m e r i c a n criticisms
o f French colonialism strengthened the position o f those Free
French politicians and administrators w h o w a n t e d t o see i m
p r o v e m e n t s in their e c o n o m i c a n d social policies in the A f r i c a n
c o l o n i e s , a n d it is s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t t h e p r o m i s e s o f p o l i t i c a l ,
e c o n o m i c a n d social r e f o r m m a d e at t h e B r a z z a v i l l e C o n f e r e n c e
o n the future o f France's A f r i c a n c o l o n i e s w e r e a major factor in
persuading a reluctant R o o s e v e l t t o accept the legitimacy o f
France's position in Indo-China.
I n B r i t a i n t h e official m i n d n e v e r q u i t e g o t o v e r t h e s h o c k o f
t h e r e a l i s a t i o n t h a t t h e fate n o t o n l y o f t h e e m p i r e b u t a l s o o f t h e
m e t r o p o l i s n o w h u n g m i l i t a r i l y a n d financially o n t h e w h i m o f
2
t h e e x - c o l o n i a l a l l y . T h e fear i n W h i t e h a l l w a s t h a t t h e A m e r i c a n s
might make liquidation o f the colonial empire a condition o f
s u p p o r t . A n d w h i l e t h i s fear w a s n o t i n t h e e v e n t r e a l i s e d , t h e
threat w a s always there that anti-colonialism in A m e r i c a m i g h t p u t
pressure o n the colonial p o w e t s t o prepare their subjects for
i n d e p e n d e n c e u n d e r international s u p e r v i s i o n . A n d as R o b i n s o n
p o i n t s o u t , it w a s ' n o a c c i d e n t t h a t f r o m 1 9 4 3 t h e B r i t i s h b e g a n
t o liberalise their arrangements in o r d e r t o appease A m e r i c a n
3
anti-colonialism'. W h i l e in neither France n o r Britain w a s there
any intention o f a b a n d o n i n g their A f r i c a n empires, an i m a g e that
w a s s o c l e a r l y t a r n i s h e d i n t h e e y e s o f A m e r i c a n s as w e l l as o f
d o m e s t i c critics o f e m p i r e w a s g i v e n a polish a n d n e w names a n d
formulae w e r e p r o d u c e d t o emphasise a change in the colonial
r e l a t i o n s h i p . I n t h e c a s e o f B r i t a i n it w a s t h e r e p l a c e m e n t o f t h e
paternalistic c o n c e p t o f ' trusteeship' b y that o f * partnership' a n d
in t h e case o f F r a n c e t h e n o m i n a l transformation o f t h e ' e m p i r e '
i n t o a ' u n i o n ' a n d o f ' c o l o n i e s ' i n t o 'territories d'outre mer\ a n d
'indigenes' i n t o 'autochtones'.
1
Louis, Imperialism at bay, Chapter 2.
2
Ronald Robinson, * Andrew Cohen and the transfer of power in Tropical Africa,
1 9 4 0 - 1 9 5 1 i n W. H. Morris-Jones and Georges Fischer (eds.), Decolonisation and after:
the British and French experience (London, 1980), 53.
3
Ibid., 54.
24

THE IMPACT OF T H E WAR ON C O L O N I A L POWERS
W h i l s t the political relationship w a s in neither case fundamen-

tally altered d u r i n g t h e w a r , political r e f o r m s w e r e initiated that,
as w e s h a l l l a t e r s e e , c a n b e h e l d w i t h t h e a d v a n t a g e o f h i n d s i g h t
to have led inevitably along the path to independence. A n d to
p r o v e t o the A m e r i c a n s in particular that their empire really d i d
have a n e w image, both France and Britain elaborated p r o g r a m m e s
o f social a n d e c o n o m i c reform that m a r k e d a turning p o i n t in the
history o f their colonial rule. F r a n c e i n t r o d u c e d the a m b i t i o u s
F I D E S (Fonds d'Investissement et de D é v e l o p p e m e n t É c o n o -
m i q u e e t S o c i a l ) at B r a z z a v i l l e , e m p h a s i s i n g t h a t t h e ' o b j e c t o f
our colonial policy must be the d e v e l o p m e n t o f the productive
potential o f the o v e r s e a s territories a n d the g r o w t h o f their w e a l t h
s o as t o a s s u r e t h e A f r i c a n s o f a b e t t e r life b y r a i s i n g t h e i r
purchasing p o w e r and i m p r o v i n g standards o f l i v i n g . . . V while
B r i t a i n ' s C o l o n i a l D e v e l o p m e n t a n d W e l f a r e A c t o f 1 9 4 5, r e f l e c t i n g
t h e i n c r e a s e d a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e i d e a s o f J. M . K e y n e s , s e t a s i d e
£ 1 2 0 million for p o s t - w a r d e v e l o p m e n t and welfare in the
colonies o v e r a ten-year period. T h i s greatly increased the £5
million a year set aside b y the 1940 C o l o n i a l D e v e l o p m e n t a n d
W e l f a r e A c t . H e r e is p e r h a p s t h e b e s t i l l u s t r a t i o n o f a s i t u a t i o n
t h a t w a s a c c e l e r a t e d b y t h e w a r r a t h e r t h a n i n i t i a t e d b y it.
A l t h o u g h in 1929 the British g o v e r n m e n t h a d m a d e available
t h r o u g h t h e C o l o n i a l D e v e l o p m e n t A c t u p t o £1 m i l l i o n a y e a r
in t h e f o r m o f l o a n s o r g r a n t s t o t h e w h o l e o f t h e d e p e n d e n t
e m p i r e , this w a s p r i m a r i l y d e s i g n e d t o b o o s t the British e c o n o m y ,
a n d d i d n o t g r e a t l y affect t h e B r i t i s h p o l i c y t h a t t h e c o l o n i e s w e r e
to b e e c o n o m i c a l l y self-supporting. It w a s the 1940 A c t that
m a r k e d t h e real t u r n i n g p o i n t i n t h e e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s h i p
b e t w e e n Britain a n d h e r c o l o n i e s . A n d that A c t o f c o u r s e h a d its
roots in a pre-war situation and w a s b e i n g discussed within the
C o l o n i a l Office before the o u t b r e a k o f w a r . N e v e r t h e l e s s , as
R . D . P e a r c e p o i n t s o u t , it n e e d e d n o t o n l y t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s
o f L o r d M o y n e in his report o n the W e s t Indian disturbances, b u t
' the ideological requirements o f a w a r against N a z i G e r m a n y , t o
2
j o l t t h e T r e a s u r y f r o m its h a b i t u a l p a r s i m o n i o u s h a b i t s ' . A s
M a l c o l m M a c D o n a l d told the cabinet w h e n presenting his pro-
posals for colonial development and welfare: ' A continuation
1
Cited in J. D . Hargreaves (ed.), France and West Africa: an anthology of historical
documents ( L o n d o n , 1969), 239.
2
R. D . Pearce, The turning point in Africa: British colonial policy 19)8-1948 ( L o n d o n ,
1982), 21.
25

o f t h e p r e s e n t state o f affairs w o u l d b e w r o n g o n m e r i t a n d it
p r o v i d e s o u r enemies and critics w i t h an admirable subject for
9 1
propaganda... T h a t this A c t m a r k e d an e n d t o a relationship
b e t w e e n Britain and her colonies that w a s largely an extractive
o n e , a n d o n e in w h i c h colonies h a d t o p a y for t h e m s e l v e s , w a s
m a d e c l e a r i n S i r B e r n a r d B o u r d i l l o n ' s s p e e c h as g o v e r n o r t o t h e
Nigerian Legislative Council w h e n introducing the Colonial
D e v e l o p m e n t a n d Welfare A c t in 1940. H e assured his c o u n c i l
t h a t it w a s ' a d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e u t m o s t i m p o r t a n c e ' , i n d i c a t i n g
that the doctrine o f the self-sufficiency o f i n d i v i d u a l c o l o n i e s w a s
2
now 'dead'. F I D E S o n the other hand w a s m u c h more
specifically a b y - p r o d u c t o f the w a r a n d A m e r i c a n pressures in
p a r t i c u l a r , a n d r e p r e s e n t e d a real point de départ, f o r a l t h o u g h
F r a n c e h a d initiated a p r o g r a m m e o f p u b l i c w o r k s in the c o l o n i e s
in 1 9 3 1 , this w a s d o n e b y m e a n s o f a loan, n o t a grant. T h e
B e l g i a n s , t o o , w e r e affected b y t h i s c o n c e r n t o r e f u r b i s h t h e i m a g e
o f empire, and whilst they had n o intention o f m a k i n g political
c o n c e s s i o n s in their C o n g o , they d i d initiate an a m b i t i o u s d e v e l
opment programme with a strong welfare content.
R u s s i a n c r i t i q u e s o f e m p i r e g a v e t h e c o l o n i a l p o w e r s less
i m m e d i a t e c o n c e r n than those o f their A m e r i c a n allies. B e c a u s e
o f t h e p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m f r o m w h i c h t h e y e m a n a t e d , t h e y w e r e less
m o r a l l y w o u n d i n g , t h o u g h t h e r e w a s t o b e m o r e c o n c e r n as t o
t h e i r p o t e n t i a l p o l i t i c a l effect o n t h e c o l o n i a l s u b j e c t s t h e m s e l v e s .
T h e British had already been n e r v o u s about the C o m m u n i s t
c o n n e x i o n s o f I. T . A . W a l l a c e - J o h n s o n in Sierra L e o n e a n d h a d
placed h i m under restricted residence d u r i n g the w a r . T h o u g h
t h e F r e n c h a l l o w e d groupes d'études communistes t o b e f o r m e d
f r e e l y i n t h e i r t r o p i c a l A f r i c a n e m p i r e i n t h e last y e a r s o f t h e w a r ,
o n c e t h e C o m m u n i s t s h a d left t h e F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t i n M a y
1 9 4 7 , c o n t i n u i n g affiliations b e t w e e n A f r i c a n p o l i t i c i a n s a n d t h e
F r e n c h C o m m u n i s t P a r t y w e r e t h e o c c a s i o n f o r official r e p r e s s i o n
o f these politicians e v e n t h o u g h t h e party w a s as politically
a s s i m i l a t i o n i s t as a n y o t h e r F r e n c h p a r t y .
D u r i n g the w a r there w e r e w i d e s p r e a d calls f o r p l a c i n g the
colonial empires under s o m e form o f international supervision.
T h e s e w e r e stoutly resisted b y b o t h C h u r c h i l l a n d d e G a u l l e . S o m e
A m e r i c a n s w e n t s o f a r as t o s u g g e s t t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f
1
Ibid., 21.
2
Jeremy White, Central administration in Nigeria, 1914-1948 (Dublin and L o n d o n ,
1981), 233.
26

i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r u s t e e s h i p s f o r all t h e c o l o n i a l d e p e n d e n c i e s .
R o o s e v e l t felt t h a t at least t h o s e c o l o n i a l t e r r i t o r i e s l i b e r a t e d b y
A m e r i c a n arms should be placed under trusteeship. T h e r e was
d e b a t e as t o w h e t h e r this t r u s t e e s h i p s h o u l d c o n s i s t o f t h e
supervision o f the administration o f the existing colonial p o w e r
or the establishment o f international administrations o f w h i c h
t h a t in T a n g i e r w a s c i t e d as b e i n g a n o t v e r y h a p p y e x a m p l e . It
w a s n o t o n l y the A m e r i c a n s w h o a d v o c a t e d the e x t e n s i o n o f the
i d e a o f t r u s t e e s h i p t o all c o l o n i a l d e p e n d e n c i e s ; s u p p o r t f o r s u c h
a m o v e came from Australia, N e w Zealand, Russia, and Indian
n a t i o n a l i s t s . A s it w a s t h e s e p l a n s n e v e r c a m e t o f r u i t i o n . T h e
Y a l t a A g r e e m e n t specifically e x c l u d e d such a solution. E v e n
m o v e s to put teeth into the e x i s t i n g mandates w e r e resisted b y
C h u r c h i l l , a n d in p a r t i c u l a r J a n S m u t s , P r i m e M i n i s t e r o f S o u t h
A f r i c a , w h o feared the c o n s e q u e n c e s for his o w n c o u n t r y ' s racial
policies o f close s u p e r v i s i o n o f the S o u t h W e s t African mandate.
N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e n e w U n i t e d N a t i o n s O r g a n i s a t i o n , as s u c c e s s o r
t o t h e L e a g u e o f N a t i o n s , w a s a b l e t o p u t s o m e b i t e i n t o its n e w
system o f trusteeships w h i c h replaced the former mandates.
W h e r e the P e r m a n e n t M a n d a t e s C o m m i s s i o n had had n o right o f
inspection, the n e w T r u s t e e s h i p C o u n c i l had the right to send
out V i s i t i n g M i s s i o n s to the T r u s t Territories. F u r t h e r m o r e ,
inhabitants o f these territories c o u l d appeal to the c o u n c i l o v e r
t h e h e a d s o f t h e c o l o n i a l a d m i n i s t e r i n g a u t h o r i t y . A b o v e a l l , in
r e n e w i n g t h e m a n d a t e as a t r u s t , t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s g a v e t h e
administering p o w e r the specific o b l i g a t i o n o f ' the p r o g r e s s i v e
d e v e l o p m e n t t o w a r d s i n d e p e n d e n c e ' o f its T r u s t T e r r i t o r y . O n l y
S o u t h Africa refused to accept these i n n o v a t i o n s w i t h regard to
its S o u t h W e s t A f r i c a n m a n d a t e .
A s far as t h e c o l o n i a l e m p i r e s t h e m s e l v e s w e r e c o n c e r n e d , t h e
U n i t e d N a t i o n s c h a r t e r n o w h e r e s p e c i f i e d i n d e p e n d e n c e as a g o a l
f o r t h e ' n o n - s e l f - g o v e r n i n g t e r r i t o r i e s ' , as t h e i m p e r i a l d e p e n
dencies w e r e described. Y e t the United N a t i o n s w a s to p r o v i d e a
f o r u m in w h i c h the r e c o r d o f i n d i v i d u a l c o l o n i a l p o w e r s c o u l d
be challenged o r c o n d e m n e d . B u t the sense o f international
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y w i t h w h i c h at l e a s t B r i t a i n , F r a n c e , H o l l a n d a n d
B e l g i u m e m e r g e d after t h e w a r w a s n o t s o m u c h a s t r u c t u r a l as
a m o r a l o n e . W h e r e b e f o r e t h e w a r e m p i r e h a d still b e e n a m a t t e r
f o r p r i d e , n o w it w a s i n c r e a s i n g l y s e e n as a n e m b a r r a s s m e n t ,
s o m e t h i n g w h i c h n e e d e d c o n s t a n t l y t o b e justified.
T h e Second W o r l d War, then, saw a dramatic change not only
*7

in t h e s t a n d i n g o f t h e g r e a t c o l o n i a l p o w e r s in t h e w o r l d b u t a l s o
in t h e i r a t t i t u d e s a b o u t t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s t o w a r d s t h e i r c o l o n i e s .
Britain, France and B e l g i u m ended the w a r w i t h their e c o n o m i e s
o n the v e r g e o f ruin. Britain alone had overseas debts o f o v e r
£3500 million. A l l three w e r e d e p e n d e n t for their p o s t - w a r
rehabilitation o n m a s s i v e aid f r o m A m e r i c a . Britain and F r a n c e
h a d l o s t t h e i r p r e v i o u s p r e - e m i n e n c e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l affairs t o t h e
t w o n e w super-powers, A m e r i c a and Russia, both o f w h i c h , for
different reasons, w e r e hostile to the c o n t i n u e d e x i s t e n c e o f the
E u r o p e a n colonial empires. A n d while France and Britain
c o n t i n u e d t o b e t r e a t e d as w o r l d p o w e r s , t h e y h a d i n r e a l i t y l o s t
the strength to be s o . O f the E u r o p e a n imperial p o w e r s in A f r i c a ,
only Spain and Portugal e m e r g e d relatively unscathed, and
unaffected b y the n e w and hostile international climate w i t h regard
to imperialism.
N o n e o f this, h o w e v e r , w a s immediately apparent. T h e im-
m e d i a t e a f t e r m a t h o f t h e w a r s a w a d e t e r m i n e d effort b y t h e
successful belligerent g o v e r n m e n t s to r e n e w their colonial mis-
s i o n s . T h e y w e r e d e t e r m i n e d t o b e t h e i r o w n t r u s t e e s as t o t h e
future o f their c o l o n i a l e m p i r e s . I n d e e d in the British, F r e n c h a n d
B e l g i a n c o l o n i e s i n A f r i c a t h e r e f o l l o w e d after t h e w a r w h a t m i g h t
b e c a l l e d a s e c o n d c o l o n i s a t i o n o f A f r i c a as t e c h n i c i a n s a n d e x p e r t s
flooded into the colonies to i m p l e m e n t ambitious d e v e l o p m e n t
schemes designed b o t h to i m p r o v e the lot o f the colonial subjects
and to help revitalise the metropolitan e c o n o m i e s . Catherine
C o q u é r y - V i d r o v i t c h has described the p e r i o d f r o m 1946 to 1952
1
as ' t h e g r e a t y e a r s o f F r e n c h c o l o n i a l i m p e r i a l i s m ' . N e v e r t h e l e s s ,
while both Britain and France may have fought the w a r to
p r e s e r v e t h e i r e m p i r e s a n d , at l e a s t at t h e g o v e r n m e n t l e v e l ,
c o n t i n u e d t o h a v e f a i t h i n t h e i m p e r i a l m i s s i o n after t h e w a r , t h o s e
w h o d i d t h e a c t u a l fighting, as A . J. P . T a y l o r h a s w r i t t e n o f t h e
British, ' had simpler aims. T h e y f o u g h t to liberate the peoples o f
E u r o p e from G e r m a n y and those o f the Far East f r o m Japan. T h e
British did not relinquish their E m p i r e b y accident. T h e y ceased
2
t o b e l i e v e i n it. ' A n d t h e p o s t - w a r w o r l d p r o v e d t h i s p o i n t ; o n c e
the will to maintain empire w a s lost, colonial dependencies w e r e
either voluntarily c e d e d to their inhabitants o r the empire
1
Catherine C o q u é r y - V i d r o v i t c h , * La Mise en dépendance de l'Afrique noire : essai
de périodisation, 1 8 8 0 - 1 9 7 0 ' , Cahiers d'études africaines, 1976, 1 6 , 39.
2
Cited in the preface to Louis, Imperialism at bay, x.
28

THE IMPACT OF T H E WAR ON C O L O N I A L POWERS
c o l l a p s e d . T h i s latter w a s w h a t h a p p e n e d i n t h e B e l g i a n C o n g o
and w a s perhaps epitomised in the P o r t u g u e s e African empire.
T h e r e t h e v e r y s o l d i e r s s e n t t o d e f e n d it c e a s e d t o b e l i e v e t h a t it
w a s either w o r t h defending o r e v e n possible t o defend.
After the w a r , then, the question appeared m o r e a n d m o r e t o
be h o w t o extricate oneself from empire w i t h o u t losing the
i n v e s t m e n t o n e h a d m a d e in it, o r else h o w t o t r a n s f o r m that
empire into a political entity that c o u l d b o t h withstand the critics
o f e m p i r e a n d satisfy t h e e r s t w h i l e c o l o n i a l s u b j e c t s t h e m s e l v e s .
T h e British chose the path o f independence within a largely
sentimental C o m m o n w e a l t h , the F r e n c h that o f political transfor
mation o f empire into a s o m e w h a t more structured c o m m u n i t y .
T h e Italians h a d n o c h o i c e in t h e matter w h e n S o m a l i a w a s
returned to them. T h e Belgians s t u b b o r n l y refused t o read the
signs o f the times, w i t h disastrous consequences. Significantly
P o r t u g a l a n d S p a i n , t h e t w o p o w e r s least affected b y t h e w a r , w e r e
as y e t still i n s u l a t e d f r o m t h e s e c u r r e n t s , b o t h p o l i t i c a l p a r i a h s i n
a democratic post-war w o r l d . Y e t in 1952 w h e n P o r t u g a l applied
for m e m b e r s h i p o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , she reconstituted h e r
c o l o n i e s as o v e r s e a s p r o v i n c e s i n o r d e r t h a t t h e y s h o u l d b e
i m m u n i s e d f r o m U N d i s c u s s i o n as b e i n g p r o p e r l y d o m e s t i c
c o n c e r n s . W h e n S p a i n w a s finally a d m i t t e d t o t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s
on 14 D e c e m b e r 1 9 5 5 , in the same year that P o r t u g a l w a s
admitted, she w a s already preparing to divest herself o f the m o s t
important part o f her African empire, Spanish M o r o c c o , w h o s e
independence she recognised the following April.
THE IMPACT OF T H E SECOND WORLD WAR
ON AFRICANS
C o l o n i a l h i s t o r i a n s , as C h e r r y G e r t z e l p o i n t s o u t , l i k e t o s e e t h e
t r a n s f e r o f p o w e r as a p r o c e s s w h e r e b y E u r o p e a n s granted A f r i c a n s
i n d e p e n d e n c e , w h i l e A f r i c a n h i s t o r i a n s s e e it as o n e i n w h i c h t h e
1
n a t i o n a l i s t s took t h e i r f r e e d o m . T h e t r u t h o f t h e m a t t e r i n m o s t
c a s e s lies s o m e w h e r e i n b e t w e e n . I t i s , h o w e v e r , fair t o s a y t h a t
while the Second W o r l d W a r b r o u g h t about demonstrable
c h a n g e s in the attitudes o f the belligerent p o w e r s t o w a r d s the
w a y in w h i c h they administered their A f r i c a n subjects a n d placed
t h e m o n t h e d e f e n s i v e a b o u t e m p i r e , g e n e r a l l y it p r o d u c e d n o
1
See Chapter 7.
29

c o r r e s p o n d i n g o v e r t c h a n g e in t h e attitudes o f t h e c o l o n i a l élites
t o w a r d s their imperial masters.
B y a n d large in Africa, the w a r w a s an occasion for declarations
o f loyalty, c o u p l e d o f course w i t h the h o p e o f r e w a r d in the f o r m
o f a quickening o f the pace o f constitutional reform. Habib
B o u r g u i b a , w h o h a d b e e n i m p r i s o n e d b y t h e F r e n c h in 1938 for
his nationalist activities, w h e n b r o u g h t b a c k t o T u n i s i a b y the
G e r m a n s in the h o p e s o f p l a y i n g off his nationalism against the
A l l i e s , m a d e the f o l l o w i n g appeal in M a y 1943 t o the T u n i s i a n
people :
Today you must close ranks behind F r a n c e . . . Without France there is no hope
of salvation ; it is on her success that the future of our country depends. I am
convinced that the French nation, once freed from the Nazi yoke, will not
forget her true friends, those w h o stood by her in her hour of trial. What
1
matters most now is to win the war.
B u t e v e n w h e r e i n d e p e n d e n c e w a s o n t h e n a t i o n a l i s t a g e n d a as
in F r e n c h N o r t h A f r i c a , d e m a n d s f o r r e f o r m w e r e still a i m e d at
advance within a parliamentary framework to be achieved b y
negotiation rather than confrontation. E l s e w h e r e the achievement
o f r e s p o n s i b l e g o v e r n m e n t a n d i n d e p e n d e n c e w e r e a s y e t still
dimly perceived goals. Indeed the political reforms introduced
d u r i n g a n d i m m e d i a t e l y after t h e w a r b y t h e B r i t i s h a n d F r e n c h
w e r e g e n e r a l l y i n a d v a n c e o f t h o s e as y e t e n v i s a g e d b y t h e c o l o n i a l
é l i t e s as a t t a i n a b l e . B u t n o s o o n e r h a d t h e s e r e f o r m s b e e n
presented than they w e r e declared inadequate. Colonial g o v e r n
ments either h a d t o respond w i t h further concessions that hastened
the p a c e o f constitutional a d v a n c e b e y o n d that p l a n n e d for, o r
resort t o repression. T h e y usually o n l y t o o k the latter c o u r s e
w h e r e s u c h c o n c e s s i o n s a p p e a r e d t o jeopardise settler interests.
T h e solution to the c o n u n d r u m o f whether the imperial p o w e r s
g a v e A f r i c a n s i n d e p e n d e n c e o r w h e t h e r A f r i c a n s t o o k it l i e s ,
p e r h a p s , h e r e i n t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r . T h e r e is a c a s e t o b e m a d e
that, u p until the c o n c l u s i o n o f that w a r , Britain a n d France
(except in her N o r t h African territories) w e r e m a k i n g the r u n n i n g
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y a n d t h a t t h e i r c o n c e s s i o n s h a d till t h a t t i m e b e e n
sufficient t o a s s u a g e t h e a s y e t l i m i t e d d e m a n d s o f t h e c o l o n i a l
é l i t e s . T h e r e a f t e r it w a s i n c r e a s i n g l y t h e n a t i o n a l i s t s w h o m a d e t h e
running, forcing the hands o f the colonial g o v e r n m e n t s to
1
Cited in Henri Grimai, Decolonisation: the British, French, Dutch and Belgian empires,
ryry-rpéj, trans. Stephen de V o s (London, 1977), 1 1 7 .
30

THE IMPACT OF THE WAR ON AFRICANS
r e s p o n d w i t h c o n c e s s i o n o r r e p r e s s i o n . T h e l a t t e r , as it t u r n e d o u t ,
in i t s e l f m e r e l y s t r e n g t h e n e d t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n w i t h w h i c h t h e s e
nationalists and their supporters pressed their d e m a n d s .
T h e w a r m a y b e s a i d t o h a v e m a t u r e d n a t i o n a l i s m . It e x p o s e d
its p i o n e e r s t o a r a n g e o f i n f l u e n c e s m u c h b r o a d e r t h a n t h o s e t h a t
had been able to penetrate the enclosed colonial w o r l d o f the
1930s. It c r e a t e d n e w s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c c o n d i t i o n s w h i c h t h e
nationalists w e r e able t o e x p l o i t in o r d e r t o p e r s u a d e the c o l o n i a l
g o v e r n m e n t s that they had g r o w i n g s u p p o r t for their cause. In
turn these n e w c o n d i t i o n s p u t pressure o n the nationalists to
radicalise their p r o g r a m m e s and m a k e m o r e u r g e n t their d e m a n d s
for social reform and constitutional a d v a n c e .
T h o s e o n w h o m the w a r had the m o s t direct impact w e r e , o f
course, those enlisted w i t h the armies o f the belligerent p o w e r s .
A s in t h e F i r s t W o r l d W a r , A f r i c a n s o l d i e r s d r a w n f r o m e v e r y
corner o f the c o n t i n e n t administered b y the A l l i e s p l a y e d a vital
r o l e in t h e d e f e a t o f t h e I t a l i a n s a n d G e r m a n s . A s m a n y as 8 0 0 0 0
F r e n c h A f r i c a n s o l d i e r s h a d b e e n fighting o n t h e E u r o p e a n f r o n t
w h e n F r a n c e fell t o t h e G e r m a n s . S o l d i e r s f r o m F r e n c h E q u a t o r i a l
A f r i c a , and later f r o m F r e n c h W e s t A f r i c a and M a d a g a s c a r , w h e n
t h e y r e j o i n e d t h e A l l i e d c a u s e , f o u g h t in t h e N o r t h A f r i c a n
c a m p a i g n s and the M i d d l e E a s t . T h e British recruited h e a v i l y in
all t h e i r A f r i c a n c o l o n i e s , i n c l u d i n g t h e i r m a n d a t e d t e r r i t o r y o f
T a n g a n y i k a , for s e r v i c e in the E a s t A f r i c a n c a m p a i g n . R e c r u i t s
w e r e r e q u i r e d b o t h as s o l d i e r s a n d as m i l i t a r y l a b o u r . A s d e m a n d
for recruits rose, v o l u n t a r y enlistment w a s increasingly replaced
b y s o m e m e a s u r e o f c o n s c r i p t i o n , in F r e n c h , B e l g i a n a n d B r i t i s h
t e r r i t o r i e s . M a n y p o t e n t i a l d r a f t e e s fled r a t h e r t h a n f a c e t h e
r i g o u r s o f military l a b o u r , s o v i v i d w e r e the m e m o r i e s in s o m e
areas o f t h e h a r d s h i p s a n d m o r t a l i t i e s r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h e c o n s c r i p
tions o f the First W o r l d W a r . African troops w e r e also shipped
by the British to India for service in the B u r m a c a m p a i g n , w h e r e
t h e y w e r e u s e d b o t h as i n f a n t r y a n d c a r r i e r s , a n d p l a y e d a
c o n s p i c u o u s p a r t in t h e d e f e a t o f t h e J a p a n e s e . I n a l l , a r o u n d a
million troops and carriers, i n c l u d i n g s o m e n o n - w h i t e n o n -
c o m b a t a n t s f r o m S o u t h Africa, w e r e used in the w a r ; a l l o w i n g
f o r c a s u a l t i e s this m e a n t t h a t a h u g e n u m b e r o f y o u n g m e n
returned to their h o m e s w i t h v e r y m u c h w i d e n e d h o r i z o n s , h a v i n g
in m a n y c a s e s l e a r n t t r a d e s a n d o t h e r s k i l l s , i n p a r t i c u l a r h o w t o
read and w r i t e . T h e y returned w i t h h e i g h t e n e d e x p e c t a t i o n s , and
3i

it is s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t t h e A c c r a r i o t s o f 1 9 4 8 t h a t l e d i n e x o r a b l y t o
the i n d e p e n d e n c e o f G h a n a w e r e triggered b y an e x - s e r v i c e m a n ' s
demonstration against living conditions. T h e r e have been many
testimonies t o the educative impact o f the w a r o n African soldiers,
forced f r o m their villages b y o n e f o r m o f c o m p u l s i o n o r another -
few w e r e true volunteers e v e n in those British territories w h e r e
allegedly all r e c r u i t m e n t w a s o n a v o l u n t e e r basis.
J o y c e Cary, w h o had o b s e r v e d the impact o f the First W o r l d
W a r o n remote Nigerian B o r g u , also w r o t e about the impact o f
the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r o n A f r i c a n t r o o p s :
But this war, far more than the last, must change Africa. T h e natives w h o now
again come together belong to a new age and generation. Many more have
the beginnings of education; nearly all have heard of cooperate and political
action. Although as soldiers they may stand aside from revolutionary move
ments, they are making comparisons between wages, conditions and hopes. T h e
Cape half-caste driver meets the G o l d Coast farmer with free cooperatives and
his independent status in a country without a colour-bar; the Nigerian Moslem
sees, through the eyes of an Indian hillman, the fraternity of Islam; the C o n g o
mechanic describes to some East Coast pagan the garden village built for him
by the paternal despots of the 'Union Miniere B e l g i q u e V
T h e i r v i e w o f the colonial relationship w a s also altered b y their

experiences in the w a r . A s N d a b a n i n g i Sithole w r o t e :
World War I I . . . has had a great deal to do with the awakening of the peoples
of Africa. During the war the African came in contact with practically all the
peoples of the earth. He met them on a life and death struggle basis. He saw
the so-called civilised and peaceful and orderly white people mercilessly
butchering one another just as his so-called savage ancestors had done in tribal
wars. He saw no difference between the primitive and civilised man. In short,
he saw through European pretensions that only Africans were savages. This
2
had a revolutionising psychological impact on the African.
T h e full i m p a c t o f t h e r e t u r n o f t h e e x - s e r v i c e m e n o n t h e
nationalist m o v e m e n t in Africa has y e t t o b e assessed. T h o u g h
comparatively f e w t o o k leading roles in the formation o f political
parties, a n d w e r e in the case o f F r e n c h - s p e a k i n g Africa t o p r o v e
a c o n s e r v a t i v e f o r c e p o l i t i c a l l y i n t h e late 1 9 5 0 s , t h e y d i d f u e l t h e
social ferment in the urban centres, in w h i c h m a n y o f t h e m settled
in preference t o r e t u r n i n g t o their villages. T h e s e u r b a n centres
w e r e t o p r o v e t h e m o s t fertile r e c r u i t i n g g r o u n d f o r m a s s parties.
W h e r e the colonial response t o nationalist demands w a s repression,
1
Joyce Cary, The case for African freedom and other writings ( L o n d o n , 1944), 1 5 2 - 3 .
2
Ndabaningi Sithole, African nationalism ( L o n d o n , 1959), 19.
32

a n d t h e r e a c t i o n w a s a r m e d u p r i s i n g , it is n o t c l e a r h o w far
k n o w l e d g e o f m o d e r n w e a p o n s acquired d u r i n g the w a r w a s a
significant factor. Perhaps the m o s t i m p o r t a n t result o f the
w a r for these soldiers and carriers w a s the b r o a d e n i n g o f their
e x p e r i e n c e , p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r t h o s e w h o h a d s e r v e d in E u r o p e a n d
t h e F a r E a s t . N o t o n l y w e r e t h e y t o l d t h a t t h e y w e r e fighting t o
p r e s e r v e f r e e d o m a n d d e m o c r a c y , b u t in I n d i a t h e y w i t n e s s e d
f e l l o w c o l o n i a l subjects p r o t e s t i n g against Britain's o w n restric
tions o n their political freedom. M a n y soldiers received rudimen
tary literary o r technical e d u c a t i o n and a significant factor in the
p o s t - w a r e n t h u s i a s m for e d u c a t i o n , particularly in areas that h a d
h i t h e r t o b e e n i n d i f f e r e n t t o it, w a s t h e r e t u r n o f s o l d i e r s w h o s e
e x p e r i e n c e s in t h e w o r l d o u t s i d e t h e i r v i l l a g e s h a d t a u g h t t h e m
its v a l u e .
A f r i c a c o n t r i b u t e d m a n p o w e r f o r t h e A l l i e d w a r effort n o t o n l y
in the f o r m o f soldiers a n d military l a b o u r , b u t t h r o u g h the
i n v o l v e m e n t o f m i l l i o n s o f m e n a n d w o m e n in the increased
p r o d u c t i o n o f those c r o p s w h i c h w e r e n e e d e d t o feed the t r o o p s
as w e l l as c i v i l i a n s i n E u r o p e . O n c e t h e J a p a n e s e h a d o v e r r u n t h e
British and D u t c h c o l o n i e s in S o u t h E a s t A s i a , A f r i c a b e c a m e the
o n l y s o u r c e o f palm-oil for the A l l i e s , w h i l e her tin, r u b b e r and
sisal c a m e u n d e r i n c r e a s e d d e m a n d . E v e n t h e n e u t r a l P o r t u g u e s e
t e r r i t o r i e s w e r e affected b y t h e b o o m i n d e m a n d f o r sisal. T h i s
d e m a n d for Africa's r a w materials w a s secured not b y higher
p r i c e s , b u t in m a n y c a s e s b y v a r i o u s f o r m s o f c o e r c i o n , i n c l u d i n g
conscription o n to plantations or into the mines. N o m a d s w e r e
f o r c e d t o sell c a t t l e . B u t o f c o u r s e t h e i n c r e a s e d d e m a n d s f o r
agricultural p r o d u c t i o n conflicted w i t h the requirements o f the
army, w h i c h s o u g h t the ablest-bodied y o u n g m e n w h o w o u l d
n o r m a l l y h a v e b e e n i n v o l v e d in a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n . C o e r c i o n
o f l a b o u r w a s j u s t i f i e d , w h e r e it w a s felt n e c e s s a r y t o d o s o , i n
t h e n a m e o f A f r i c a ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e fight f o r f r e e d o m .
A n o t h e r equally i m p o r t a n t f o r m o f ' c o e r c i o n ' w a s inflation.
S e v e r e r e s t r i c t i o n s o n i m p o r t a n t g o o d s l e d t o s t e e p rises i n t h e i r
prices, w h i l e prices paid to farmers for agricultural exports w e r e
controlled. T h e result w a s that m e t r o p o l i t a n c o m p a n i e s and their
local agents acquired cash crops cheaply and sold imported g o o d s
at h i g h p r i c e s , w h i l e t h e f a r m e r h a d t o p r o d u c e m o r e i f h e w e r e
t o b e able t o p u r c h a s e t h e m . I r o n i c a l l y the V i c h y r e g i m e in W e s t
Africa, unable to e x p o r t because o f the A l l i e d n a v a l b l o c k a d e , w a s
33

m u c h m o r e b e n i g n f r o m the p o i n t o f v i e w o f the A f r i c a n peasant

t h a n its F r e e F r e n c h s u c c e s s o r , w h i c h w a s d e t e r m i n e d t o s e c u r e
a F r e n c h s t a k e in v i c t o r y b y c o n t r i b u t i o n s f r o m its A f r i c a n
territories, and did n o t hesitate to force peasants to p r o d u c e the
c r o p s the A l l i e s n e e d e d .
O n c e the Far Eastern colonies had been lost to the Allies, Africa
became o f increased strategic and e c o n o m i c importance.
F r e e t o w n , w i t h its d e e p - w a t e r p o r t , a n d later D a k a r , M o n r o v i a ,
A c c r a , L a g o s , Port Harcourt and inland t o w n s like K a n o and Fort
L a m y p r o v i d e d s t a g i n g posts to the S u d a n and E g y p t for the
c a m p a i g n s in N o r t h Africa. L a t e r the c a m p a i g n in the F a r E a s t
i n v o l v e d c o n s i d e r a b l e d e v e l o p m e n t s t o t h e p o r t s o f D a r es S a l a a m
a n d M o m b a s a , a n d D i e g o S u a r e z after t h e V i c h y r e g i m e i n
Madagascar had been o v e r t h r o w n . T h e s e ports and other points
s t r a t e g i c t o the A l l i e d w a r effort g r e w at a r a p i d r a t e w i t h l a r g e -
scale i m m i g r a t i o n f r o m t h e c o u n t r y s i d e . T h e p o p u l a t i o n o f
L e o p o l d v i l l e , for instance, increased f r o m 40000 inhabitants in
1 9 3 9 t o 1 1 0 0 0 0 i n 1 9 4 5 . W o r k e r s r e q u i r e d in a i r p o r t a n d d o c k
c o n s t r u c t i o n , a n d in t h e f a c t o r i e s t h a t p r o c e s s e d g o o d s t h a t c o u l d
not be obtained f r o m E u r o p e because o f the submarine w a r , often
l i v e d in i n t o l e r a b l e c o n d i t i o n s i n b i d o n v i l l e s f r o m C a s a b l a n c a t o
L a g o s . In N o r t h Africa these c o n d i t i o n s w e r e exacerbated b y
d i s a s t r o u s h a r v e s t s f r o m 1 9 4 2 t o 1 9 4 5 . T h e last w a s o n e - t h i r d o r
less t h a n t h e p r e - w a r h a r v e s t . T h a t y e a r M o r o c c o l o s t h a l f its s h e e p
and Algeria almost three-quarters. T h e increasing proletarianism
a n d p e a s a n t i s a t i o n t h a t a c c o m p a n i e d t h e w a r effort, a n d in
p a r t i c u l a r t h e o f t e n a p p a l l i n g c o n d i t i o n s in t h e c i t i e s , c r e a t e d a n
unprecedented s o c i o - e c o n o m i c situation ripe for nationalists to
exploit.
A l t h o u g h t h e w a r b r o u g h t w i t h it h e i g h t e n e d e c o n o m i c a c t i v i t y ,
f r o m s o m e p e r s p e c t i v e s t h e c o l o n i a l e c o n o m y u n d e r w e n t little
c h a n g e . T e r m s o f trade, effectively, remained u n f a v o u r a b l e to the
A f r i c a n p r o d u c e r . I n s o m e p a r t s o f A f r i c a t h e effects o f t h e
r e c e s s i o n o f t h e 1930s w e r e i n t e n s i f i e d b y t h e i m p e d i m e n t s t o
i m p o r t i n g a n d e x p o r t i n g o c c a s i o n e d b y t h e w a r at sea. A n d w h e r e
d e m a n d f o r A f r i c a n p r o d u c e r o s e it w a s n o t r e f l e c t e d i n rises in
price. Prices w e r e strictly c o n t r o l l e d b y the colonial g o v e r n m e n t s
w h o retained the difference b e t w e e n the price paid to the
p r o d u c e r s a n d t h a t o b t a i n e d o n t h e w o r l d m a r k e t a n d u s e d it t o
d e v e l o p r e s e r v e s t h a t h e l p e d t o f i n a n c e t h e w a r effort. T h i s w a s
34

t o set a n i m p o r t a n t p r e c e d e n t f o r p o s t - w a r g o v e r n m e n t s , b o t h
colonial and independent, w h i c h c o n t i n u e d to c o n t r o l the prices
paid to farmers for their p r o d u c e , usually to the latter's disad
v a n t a g e . T h e r e s e r v e s t h a t w e r e b u i l t u p i m m e d i a t e l y after t h e w a r
w e r e used for d e v e l o p m e n t projects, m a n y o f t h e m not o f
i m m e d i a t e benefit to farmers, and h e n c e f o r t h the latter carried an
u n d u e share o f the tax b u r d e n in their c o u n t r i e s .
In B e l g i a n and F r e n c h Africa m u c h o f the peasants' p r o d u c e
w a s requisitioned. T h e o b n o x i o u s forms o f the p r e - w a r colonial
e c o n o m y w e r e intensified. F o r c e d l a b o u r and c o m p u l s o r y c r o p
c u l t i v a t i o n , all i m p o s e d i n t h e n a m e o f t h e w a r effort, m e a n t t h a t
m a n y A f r i c a n p r o d u c e r s earned less t h a n e v e r for their l a b o u r .
Furthermore the cost o f imported g o o d s rose higher and higher
as a r e s u l t o f s h o r t a g e s . W h e r e p r i c e s f o r p r i m a r y p r o d u c t s a n d
w a g e s did increase they o n l y s e r v e d t o reinforce an inflationary
situation because o f these shortages. In o n e respect, h o w e v e r ,
s i g n i f i c a n t p e r m a n e n t c h a n g e s d i d t a k e p l a c e in t h e c o l o n i a l
e c o n o m y . B e f o r e the w a r the p r o c e s s i n g o f r a w materials - mineral
a n d a g r i c u l t u r a l - w a s c a r r i e d o u t a l m o s t e x c l u s i v e l y in E u r o p e .
D u r i n g the w a r a substantial n u m b e r o f factories w a s established
in t h e m a j o r A f r i c a n c i t i e s t o p r o c e s s l o c a l l y p r o d u c e d m a t e r i a l s
t h a t h i t h e r t o h a d b e e n i m p o r t e d i n t h e i r finished s t a t e f r o m
E u r o p e . T h e s e factories m a r k e d the b e g i n n i n g o f the industri
a l i s a t i o n t h a t n a t i o n a l i s t s after t h e w a r b e c a m e s o a n x i o u s t o
d e v e l o p as a w a y o f l e s s e n i n g d e p e n d e n c e o n t h e m e t r o p o l i t a n
c o u n t r i e s . I n t u r n this i n d u s t r i a l d e v e l o p m e n t l e d t o t h e f o r m a t i o n
in m a n y A f r i c a n c i t i e s o f a s i g n i f i c a n t w a g e - l a b o u r c l a s s w h i c h
w a s t o p r o v i d e an i m p o r t a n t r e c r u i t i n g g r o u n d f o r t h e r i s i n g
nationalist parties.
T h e e x p a n s i o n o f the colonial e c o n o m i e s d u r i n g the w a r and
the enlistment o f m a n y E u r o p e a n s o f w a r - s e r v i c e a g e into the
a r m e d forces led to an u n p r e c e d e n t e d e x p a n s i o n o f business
o p p o r t u n i t i e s for A f r i c a n s b o t h o n their o w n a c c o u n t and in the
e m p l o y o f t h e e x p a t r i a t e c o m p a n i e s . T h e s e nouveaux bourgeois w e r e
to join forces w i t h the nationalists and to p r o v i d e the finances
n e e d e d f o r s u s t a i n i n g t h e p o l i t i c a l m o v e m e n t s t h a t e x p a n d e d in
the w a k e o f the political r e f o r m s m a d e b y the F r e n c h and the
B r i t i s h at t h e e n d o f t h e w a r .
T h e aspirations o f the A f r i c a n political elites w e r e h e i g h t e n e d
b y t h e w a r , b u t in s u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a at least t h e s e w e r e still
35

limited to reform o f the colonial political process and an increase

in t h e l e v e l o f t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n it. T h e r e w e r e f e w d e m a n d s
f o r i n d e p e n d e n c e m a d e b y A f r i c a n p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s as a r e s u l t o f
the defensive position belligerent colonial p o w e r s n o w f o u n d
t h e m s e l v e s in. A s S y l v i a L e i t h - R o s s , w h o w a s s e n t o u t t o N i g e r i a
d u r i n g t h e w a r as a n i n t e l l i g e n c e o f f i c e r , o b s e r v e d : ' T h e r e w e r e
n o l o u d protestations o f loyalty to the British but equally n o
1
flagrant advantage w a s taken o f o u r p l i g h t . ' In s o m e colonies
A f r i c a n s a c t u a l l y m a d e financial c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o f u n d - r a i s i n g
s c h e m e s d e s i g n e d t o assist t h e A l l i e d w a r effort. I n N o r t h A f r i c a
the situation w a s m o r e delicate for the c o l o n i a l p o w e r s . T h e
nationalist cause, fuelled b y P a n - A r a b i s m , w a s m u c h m o r e ad-
v a n c e d t h a n in s u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a and h a d already resulted in
v i o l e n c e in all t h r e e F r e n c h t e r r i t o r i e s . I n d e p e n d e n c e as a g o a l ,
a l b e i t still a l o n g - t e r m o n e , w a s a l r e a d y o n t h e n a t i o n a l i s t a g e n d a .
A l t h o u g h t h e initial r e a c t i o n o f t h e é l i t e s i n F r e n c h N o r t h A f r i c a
t o t h e fall o f F r a n c e h a d b e e n o n e o f s h o c k , a n d a l t h o u g h t h e V i c h y
regime had been well received because o f the prestige o f Marshal
P é t a i n , r a t i o n i n g a n d rises in p r i c e s i n c r e a s e d d i s c o n t e n t w i t h t h e
French authorities. T o the p r o p a g a n d a o f P a n - A r a b i s m w a s added
t h a t o f G e r m a n y . T h e D e s t o u r P a r t y in T u n i s i a , as w e l l as t h e
c o u n t r y ' s n e w B e y , M o n c e f , flirted w i t h t h e G e r m a n s . I n n o m i n a l l y
i n d e p e n d e n t E g y p t a n u m b e r o f politicians s u p p o r t e d the A x i s
p o w e r s as a m e a n s o f c o u n t e r i n g B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l a n d m i l i t a r y
c o n t r o l . O n c e the F r e e F r e n c h h a d t a k e n o v e r c o n t r o l in T u n i s i a
as a r e s u l t o f t h e A l l i e d l a n d i n g s i n N o r t h A f r i c a , M o n c e f B e y w a s
4
d e p o s e d . B u t as J e a n G a n i a g e h a s o b s e r v e d , p l u s q u e ses r e l a t i o n s
a v e c l ' A l l e m a g n e , M o n c e f a v a i t p a y é d e sa d e s t i t u t i o n ses m a n i -
2
f e s t a t i o n s d ' i n d é p e n d e n c e à l ' é g a r d d e la F r a n c e ' . I n M o r o c c o
S u l t a n M o h a m m e d b e n Y o u s s e f m e t w i t h P r e s i d e n t R o o s e v e l t as
a f e l l o w h e a d o f s t a t e o n 22 J a n u a r y 1 9 4 3 , a n d t h e t e n o r o f t h e
m e e t i n g w a s s u c h that the sultan f o r e s a w a n e w future for his
c o u n t r y as a r e s u l t o f R o o s e v e l t ' s a n t i - c o l o n i a l a t t i t u d e s . A n e w
party r e g r o u p i n g the hitherto d i v i d e d nationalists and w i t h
discreet s u p p o r t f r o m the palace w a s f o u n d e d under the n a m e
Istiqlal, the party o f i n d e p e n d e n c e . In A l g e r i a in 1943, Ferhat
A b b a s issued the A l g e r i a n Manifesto calling for the creation o f
1
Sylvia Leith-Ross, Stepping-stones: memoirs of colonial Nigeria 1907-1960 ( L o n d o n ,
1983), 110.
2
Jean Ganiage, ' L ' A f r i q u e du nord', in Jean Ganiage, Hubert Deschamps and
e
Odette Guitard, & Afrique au XX siècle (Paris, 1966), 162.
36

an a u t o n o m o u s , d e m o c r a t i c A l g e r i a n s t a t e w h i c h w o u l d h a v e a
f e d e r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h F r a n c e . I n all t h r e e M a g h r i b t e r r i t o r i e s ,
A m e r i c a ' s c h a m p i o n i n g o f the cause o f subject peoples and the
l o s s o f r e s p e c t f o r a fallen a n d d i v i d e d F r a n c e f a n n e d t h e flames
o f discontent w i t h the c o l o n i a l situation.
T h e s e rising d e m a n d s for i n d e p e n d e n c e in the M a g h r i b w e r e
not e c h o e d s o u t h o f the Sahara d u r i n g the w a r . N e v e r t h e l e s s the
w a r p r o v e d an a c c e l e r a t o r in a political situation in w h i c h the
majority o f the e d u c a t e d élite h a d b e c o m e d i s e n c h a n t e d w i t h the
colonial v i s i o n o f an association o f E u r o p e and Africa to their
m u t u a l benefit. T w o d e c a d e s o f e c o n o m i c s t a g n a t i o n , the s l o w
p a c e o f p o l i t i c a l a n d s o c i a l r e f o r m , as w e l l as t h e e x c e s s e s o f t h e
colonial system, had seen to that. A n d n o w the colonial masters
t h e m s e l v e s s e e m e d in t h e i r p r o p a g a n d a t o b e r e i n f o r c i n g t h e
reservations e v e n the m o s t d e v o t e d o f African ' c o l l a b o r a t o r s ' had
a b o u t t h e c o l o n i a l r e c o r d . T h e p r o p a g a n d a n o t o n l y t r i e d t o justify
t h a t r e c o r d , b u t i n s i s t e d t h a t i n r e t u r n f o r collaboration t h a t r e c o r d
w o u l d b e i m p r o v e d o n after t h e w a r . It w a s a l s o d e s i g n e d t o
counter the barrage o f criticism o f the c o l o n i a l r e g i m e s m a d e b y
the N a z i s . In the F r e n c h - c o n t r o l l e d areas, A f r i c a n s w e r e subject
t o t w o r i v a l sets o f p r o p a g a n d a , d i r e c t e d n o t s o m u c h at s e c u r i n g
the loyalty o f the A f r i c a n subjects to F r a n c e b u t p u s h i n g the claims
o f one v i e w o f France against another. F o r the British-controlled
areas, a C o l o n i a l F i l m U n i t w a s established w h o s e p u r p o s e * w a s
t o e x p l a i n t h e w a r t o u n s o p h i s t i c a t e d c o l o n i a l a u d i e n c e s : t o tell
1
t h e m w h y B r i t a i n w a s fighting a n d i n v i t e c o l o n i a l s u p p o r t ' . T h e
w a r t i m e use o f p r o p a g a n d a in b o t h the F r e n c h a n d B r i t i s h
colonies p r o v e d to be a precedent, for thereafter b o t h colonial
p o w e r s c o n t i n u e d to i n f o r m their colonial subjects a b o u t their
policies and plans t h r o u g h the printed w o r d , the radio and cinema.
In the short run, the m o s t significant aspect o f this d e v e l o p m e n t
w a s t h a t A f r i c a n s - at l e a s t t h o s e w h o w e r e e d u c a t e d - w e r e n o w
b e i n g invited n o t f o r c e d o r o r d e r e d , t o c o o p e r a t e w i t h t h e c o l o n i a l
p o w e r s . A n d the r e w a r d w a s to be the g r a n t i n g o f s o m e o f the
requests the political élite h a d b e e n m a k i n g b e f o r e the w a r ,
a p p a r e n t l y in v a i n : g r e a t e r political and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e i n v o l v e
m e n t b y the e d u c a t e d élite in the m a c h i n e r y o f g o v e r n m e n t ; and
1
P e g g y Medina G i l t r o w and D a v i d R. G i l t r o w , * Films of the Colonial Film U n i t ' ,
unpublished paper presented at the conference on ' T h e film as records of empire', 10
April 1981. I am grateful to A n d r e w Roberts for drawing my attention to this.
37

i m p r o v e m e n t o f the social a n d e d u c a t i o n a l facilities a v a i l a b l e t o

t h e c o l o n i a l s u b j e c t s . B r i t a i n w a s a b l e , as a s y m b o l o f g o o d faith,
to m a k e s o m e o f these concessions d u r i n g the c o u r s e o f the w a r
i t s e l f : t h u s in t h e G o l d C o a s t t h e first a p p o i n t m e n t s i n t h e
t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y o f A f r i c a n s t o t h e field a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n d t h e
first a p p o i n t m e n t s t o t h e e x e c u t i v e c o u n c i l s o f b o t h t h e G o l d
Coast and N i g e r i a w e r e m a d e in 1 9 4 2 - 3 . T h e w a r t i m e British
administration o f the W e s t A f r i c a n colonies i n v o l v e d itself in
l a r g e - s c a l e p l a n n i n g f o r e d u c a t i o n a l a n d s o c i a l r e f o r m after t h e
war. A n d if the Free F r e n c h and Belgians, denied access to their
m e t r o p o l e s , w e r e less h a p p i l y p l a c e d t o i n t r o d u c e r e f o r m s d u r i n g
t h e c o u r s e o f t h e w a r , t h e y d i d a t least e l a b o r a t e p l a n s f o r r e f o r m .
T h e F r e e F r e n c h d i d s o at t h e B r a z z a v i l l e C o n f e r e n c e i n 1 9 4 4 .
Pierre R y c k m a n s , w h o had attended the Brazzaville Conference,
in h i s v a l e d i c t o r y s p e e c h as t h e g o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l w h o h a d a d m i n
istered the B e l g i a n C o n g o d u r i n g the w a r , e n v i s a g e d a c h a n g e
in t h e c o l o n i a l p o l i c y o f h i s c o u n t r y t h a t w o u l d i n v o l v e b r o a d
e c o n o m i c and social reform and a controlled participation b y the
élite in t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s .
T h e p o l i t i c a l é l i t e , t h e n , f o r t h e first t i m e f o u n d its c o l o n i a l
masters t r y i n g t o justify their rule t o t h e m . F u r t h e r m o r e , they
w e r e m a d e a w a r e that b o t h A m e r i c a and Russia w e r e d e e p l y critical
o f the E u r o p e a n colonial empires a n d their record. T h e y w e r e thus
o p e r a t i n g in a n e w i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e i n w h i c h t h e i r
o w n criticisms o f colonialism w e r e b e c o m i n g c o m m o n currency
a n d in w h i c h t h e i r a s p i r a t i o n s s e e m e d t o b e l e g i t i m i s e d b y t h e
Atlantic Charter, whatever reservations Churchill m a y have had.
T h e declaration about self-determination in that charter w a s to
be an inspiration t o educated Africans f r o m M o r o c c o t o
Madagascar.
B u t s u p p o r t for A f r i c a n ideas o f political a n d social reform
leading one day to self-government and independence came not
only from the anti-colonial p o w e r s like A m e r i c a and Russia, b u t
from within the colonial p o w e r s themselves. In Britain, the
L a b o u r Party, most explicitly t h r o u g h the Fabian Colonial
B u r e a u , m a d e c l e a r its h o s t i l i t y t o t h e l o n g - t e r m c o n t i n u a t i o n o f
empire, and African nationalists c o u l d c o u n t o n increasing
support for their ideas from the L a b o u r m e m b e r s o f the w a r t i m e
British g o v e r n m e n t . L i k e w i s e within the Free French g o v e r n m e n t ,
t h e C o m m u n i s t s w e r e a m a j o r f o r c e a n d groupes d'études
communistes w e r e e s t a b l i s h e d i n a n u m b e r o f A f r i c a n c o l o n i a l
38

t o w n s . T h e y w e r e to h a v e a formative influence o n the d e v e l o p -

m e n t after t h e w a r o f F r e n c h - s p e a k i n g B l a c k A f r i c a ' s l a r g e s t
radical party, the R a s s e m b l e m e n t D é m o c r a t i q u e A f r i c a i n . H e r e
it m u s t b e s a i d t h a t t h e C o m m u n i s t s d i d n o t f a v o u r i n d e p e n d e n c e
as a g o a l f o r t h e i r A f r i c a n c o l o n i e s , b u t r a t h e r a s s o c i a t i o n o f t h e
enfranchised A f r i c a n w o r k i n g classes w i t h the international class
struggle. N o r did the Socialists, w h o a d v o c a t e d reform o f the
colonial system, e n v i s a g e a future for the colonies independent
o f a constitutional relationship w i t h France.
T h e w a r b r o u g h t E u r o p e a n s a n d A m e r i c a n s o u t to A f r i c a in
g r e a t e r n u m b e r s t h a n e v e r b e f o r e . W h a t is m o r e , m a n y o f t h e m
c a m e f r o m v e r y different s o c i a l b a c k g r o u n d s f r o m t h o s e w i t h
w h o m A f r i c a n s h a d h i t h e r t o g e n e r a l l y c o m e in c o n t a c t . T h e
exigencies o f w a r , particularly the need to p r o v i s i o n the supply
routes to the M i d d l e East and Far Eastern c a m p a i g n s , resulted
in t h e s t a t i o n i n g in m a j o r A f r i c a n c i t i e s o f l a r g e n u m b e r s o f w h i t e
s o l d i e r s a n d t r a d e s m e n , m a n y o f w h o m w e r e m u c h less w e l l
e d u c a t e d than the m e m b e r s o f the g r o w i n g A f r i c a n m i d d l e class
o f l a w y e r s , d o c t o r s , teachers and clerical officers. M o r e i m p o r t a n t
still, t h e s e w h i t e s d i d n o t i d e n t i f y w i t h c o l o n i a l a u t h o r i t i e s b u t s a w
t h e m as p a r t o f a c l a s s s t r u c t u r e a g a i n s t w h i c h t h e y v o t e d
o v e r w h e l m i n g l y in t h e p o s t - w a r e l e c t i o n s in b o t h B r i t a i n a n d
France.
T h e m y t h o f w h i t e superiority, o f the separation o f A f r i c a n s
a n d E u r o p e a n s e i t h e r i n f o r m a l l y , as i n t h e c a s e o f t h e B r i t i s h W e s t
African and F r e n c h colonies, or by formal rules a p p r o x i m a t i n g
t o a c o l o u r b a r as in t h e R h o d e s i a s a n d K e n y a , w e r e b r o k e n d o w n
by these temporary immigrants. W h i l e African soldiers w h o had
s e r v e d in F r a n c e d u r i n g t h e F i r s t W o r l d W a r h a d , as a r e s u l t o f
c o m i n g into contact w i t h the local p o p u l a t i o n , ' q u i c k l y c o m e to
1
h a v e d o u b t s a b o u t the superiority o f the c o l o n i s e r ' , and w h i l e
in E a s t A f r i c a A f r i c a n t r o o p s w h o h a d f o u g h t a l o n g s i d e w h i t e
soldiers had e x p e r i e n c e d similar d o u b t s , this reaction w a s m u c h
m o r e w i d e l y spread d u r i n g the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r because o f the
sheer n u m b e r s o f w o r k i n g - c l a s s w h i t e s w h o passed t h r o u g h the
colonies. T h e educated Africans, particularly those w h o had never
travelled a b r o a d , g a i n e d a v e r y different p e r c e p t i o n o f their
E u r o p e a n r u l e r s as a r e s u l t o f t h i s w a r t i m e c o n t a c t .
Perhaps n o o n e p e r c e i v e d the i m p a c t o f the w a r o n the A f r i c a n s '
1
Paul Catrice, 'L'emploi des troupes indigènes et leur séjour en France', Études:
revue Catholique d'intérêt général, 20 N o v e m b e r 1931, 401.
39

v i e w o f t h e E u r o p e a n s o a c u t e l y as S y l v i a L e i t h - R o s s , h e r s e l f v e r y
m u c h a m e m b e r o f the colonial class, w h o had first arrived in
N i g e r i a in 1 9 0 7 . I t is w o r t h q u o t i n g her o w n observations in
extenso:
Till then, and in spite of the 1914 war which had never really come very close
to Nigeria, the mass of the people still thought of the white race as one, united
by colour, education, religion... They thought of the white men as being
' brothers \ with all the implications connoted in the African mind by that term,
bound to assist each other and having the same aims and interests. All these
white men were rich, and had come into the world with ready-made knowledge
and skills. Therefore, for the time being, they dominated the A f r i c a n . . .
Every time we indicted Germany or Vichy France, we indicted ourselves
as well. Except for the travelled or highly educated few, Europeans had been
a mass conception for so long that whatever cruelty or treachery or injustice
we attributed to our enemies was seen as a possible attribute of ourselves...
Further, outside and apart from our own propaganda directed against a
section of fellow-Europeans, another and even more radical change, noted by
few, was taking place in the black-white attitude of the masses. Perhaps for
the first time, except in individual cases, an element of contempt had crept into
their minds: these 'civilised' white men could nevertheless kill each other in
great numbers, their rich towns could be destroyed, their expensive homes
burnt down, they could be tortured and starved, they could cringe and beg
for help and for money. And, a curious sidelight emerging from conversations
with observant Africans who had been in contact with our troops or sailors,
for the first time in their lives these Africans had met a number of Europeans
less educated than themselves... They were careful to show no disdain, only sheer
amazement that they should have been mistaken. Y o u could not help feeling
that this discovery was perhaps the final insidious blow which shattered the
1
crumbling edifice of white superiority.
COLONIAL REFORMS
T h e c o l o n i a l r e f o r m s initiated b y F r a n c e and B r i t a i n are crucial

to an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the unforeseen speed with which the
transfer o f p o w e r t o o k p l a c e in A f r i c a f o l l o w i n g the w a r . These
reforms, which as w e have seen were conceived l a r g e l y as a
response to the c h a n g e d political climate b r o u g h t a b o u t b y the
w a r , w e r e in t u r n t o e v o k e a r e s p o n s e b y the A f r i c a n p o l i t i c a l class
that w a s n o t o n e o f g r a t i t u d e for c o n c e s s i o n s - w h i c h in fact often
surpassed their current expectations - but w a s rather a d e m a n d
for yet larger and speedier concessions. It w a s as t h o u g h the
1
Leith-Ross, Stepping-stones, 1 1 6 - 1 7 .
40

COLONIAL REFORMS
reforms themselves c h a n g e d the political e n g i n e into a n e w gear

t h a t w a s t o d r i v e it i n e x o r a b l y t o w a r d s i n d e p e n d e n c e , h o w e v e r
hard the c o l o n i a l rulers tried t o a p p l y the b r a k e s , w h e t h e r for fear
o f the c o n s e q u e n c e s o f t o o rapid a transition o r to protect w h i t e
m i n o r i t y i n t e r e s t s . It is t h e j o u r n e y s m a d e b y t h i s m a c h i n e ,
t r a v e l l i n g v e r y different r o a d s i n different p a r t s o f A f r i c a , t h a t
f o r m t h e c e n t r a l t h e m e o f t h e c h a p t e r s o f t h i s v o l u m e . Suffice it
t o o u t l i n e h e r e t h e r e f o r m s t h a t w e r e i n t r o d u c e d as a r e s u l t o f t h e
w a r , for they can b e p i c k e d u p in detail o n later p a g e s , w h e r e their
c o n s e q u e n c e s a n d t h e r e s p o n s e s t o t h e m are e x a m i n e d b y r e g i o n a l
specialists.
N o t all t h e c o l o n i a l p o w e r s r e s p o n d e d in k i n d . S p a i n a n d
P o r t u g a l , n e v e r directly i n v o l v e d in the w a r , m a d e n o m o d i f i c a
tions to their c o l o n i a l p o l i c y . T h e B e l g i a n s initiated i m p o r t a n t
social and e c o n o m i c reforms designed to ameliorate the standard
o f l i v i n g o f t h e i r C o n g o l e s e s u b j e c t s , b e l i e v i n g t h a t a full b e l l y
w a s the best antidote to nationalism. S o m e attempt w a s m a d e to
find a p l a c e i n t h e C o n g o ' s c o l o n i a l h i e r a r c h y f o r t h e m i n u s c u l e
e d u c a t e d é l i t e , b u t p l a n s f o r e v e n t u a l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n at t h e
g r a s s - r o o t s l e v e l w e r e y e a r s in p r e p a r a t i o n . T h e B e l g i a n s w e r e i n
n o m o o d for eventual d i s b a n d m e n t o f their rich A f r i c a n empire,
a n d i m m e d i a t e l y after t h e w a r t h e r e w a s n o t h o u g h t o f i n d e p e n
d e n c e f o r t h e i r C o n g o e v e n i n t h e far d i s t a n t f u t u r e . I d e a l l y t h e y
w o u l d h a v e liked the w i t h d r a w a l o f the mandate o v e r R u a n d a -
U r u n d i a n d its i n c o r p o r a t i o n in t h e C o n g o as a s e v e n t h p r o v i n c e .
T h e y particularly resented the specific o b l i g a t i o n entailed in their
subsequent U N Trusteeship to p r o m o t e self-government and
e v e n t u a l i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d in fact d i d little, a b o u t it.
T h e F r e n c h a n d t h e B r i t i s h w e r e still as m u c h in t h e b u s i n e s s
o f A f r i c a n e m p i r e as t h e B e l g i a n s . T h e F r e n c h m a d e it q u i t e c l e a r
t h a t t h e p o l i t i c a l r e f o r m s t h e y i n i t i a t e d at B r a z z a v i l l e i n n o w a y
i n v o l v e d e v e n t u a l self-government — a n d t h e y d i d i n d e e d u s e t h e
E n g l i s h expression for w a n t o f an appropriate F r e n c h o n e . Rather,
t h e i n c r e a s e d p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s a c c o r d e d t h e A f r i c a n s , as a r e s u l t o f
the B r a z z a v i l l e C o n f e r e n c e and the deliberations o f the t w o
constituent assemblies, w e r e to be held w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k o f
an indissoluble and indivisible u n i o n o f F r a n c e and her o v e r s e a s
territories. T h u s w h i l e de G a u l l e and the F r e e F r e n c h leaders
a c c e p t e d t h a t it w a s n e c e s s a r y t o i n i t i a t e c o l o n i a l r e f o r m s at
Brazzaville - and de G a u l l e h i m s e l f w a s v e r y c o n s c i o u s o f the debt
41

he o w e d Africans for their s u p p o r t d u r i n g the w a r - the main

aim o f the conference w a s to make secure the links between the
colonies and the metropolis. T h r o u g h a strengthened empire the
grandeur o f France w o u l d b e re-established. A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t
of, a n d c o n c e s s i o n s t o , l o c a l p o l i t i c a l i d e n t i t y w e r e s t r i c t l y w i t h i n
the f r a m e w o r k o f a G r e a t e r France. A c c o r d i n g l y the e x t e n s i o n o f
citizenship to a limited n u m b e r o f A l g e r i a n M u s l i m s w i t h o u t
c o m p r o m i s i n g t h e i r p e r s o n a l s t a t u s as far as t h e i r r e l i g i o n a n d
private l a w were concerned and the provision for representation
o f the colonies in the National A s s e m b l y w e r e designed t o bind
the colonies m o r e closely t o France.
T h e r e f o r m s o f t h e least p a l a t a b l e a s p e c t s o f F r e n c h c o l o n i a l
policy - the suppression o f forced labour, the abolition o f the
indigenat o r s u m m a r y a d m i n i s t r a t i v e j u s t i c e , t h e c h a n g e i n s t a t u s
f r o m sujet t o citqyen, t h e l e g a l i s a t i o n o f t r a d e u n i o n s , w e r e
intended t o g i v e t h e c o l o n i a l inhabitants r e n e w e d faith in the
French mission. These reforms, t h o u g h an immediate by-product
o f the war, had been mooted by the Popular Front government,
w h i c h h a d permitted the formation o f trade unions a n d profes
sional associations b y those w i t h primary education in 1937. E v e n
the e x t e n s i o n o f citizenship t o A l g e r i a n M u s l i m s a l o n g t h e lines
o f t h e Ordonnance o f 7 M a r c h 1 9 4 4 h a d b e e n p r o p o s e d b u t r e j e c t e d
during the g o v e r n m e n t o f the Popular Front. B u t although
B r a z z a v i l l e w a s n o t as i n n o v a t o r y as it h a s s o m e t i m e s b e e n
c h a r a c t e r i s e d , it d i d i n i t i a t e a m a j o r i f u n i n t e n d e d c h a n g e i n
France's relationship w i t h her colonies. A s D . Bruce Marshall has
emphasised:
In the end, the reforms of Brazzaville did indeed contribute both to the desire
for independence within the colonies and to the creation of a political system
that tended to legitimise the pursuit of that aim. Y e t nothing could have been
further from the intentions of those responsible for Free French policy,
1
especially Charles de Gaulle.
A l t h o u g h self-government w a s a stock phrase in the British

colonial vocabulary, and indeed had been accorded to India and
C e y l o n , t h e r e w a s still n o i n t e n t i o n i n 1 9 4 6 , w h e n t h e B u r n s
c o n s t i t u t i o n w a s i n t r o d u c e d i n t h e G o l d C o a s t , o f g r a n t i n g it t o
that o r a n y o t h e r A f r i c a n c o l o n y e x c e p t in t h e distant future. T h e
1
D . Bruce Marshall, 'Free France in Africa: Gaullism and colonialism', in Prosser
Gifford and William Roger Louis (eds.), France and Britain in Africa: imperial rivalry and
colonial rule ( N e w Haven and L o n d o n , 1971), 748.
42

COLONIAL REFORMS
one country for w h i c h the British g o v e r n m e n t appeared t o

perceive independence o n the visible horizon w a s the Sudan,
w h i c h in itself w a s a special t y p e o f c o l o n y administered b y Britain
as a c o n d o m i n i u m w i t h E g y p t . P r e s s u r e s b y n a t i o n a l i s t s w h o
desired independence a n d those w h o s a w their c o u n t r y ' s future
in an i n d e p e n d e n t u n i o n w i t h E g y p t h a d l e d t h e B r i t i s h C o -
4
D o m i n u s t o d e c l a r e i n A p r i l 1 9 4 6 t h a t i t w a s a i m i n g a t a free a n d
i n d e p e n d e n t S u d a n w h i c h w i l l b e a b l e as s o o n as i n d e p e n d e n c e
is a c h i e v e d t o d e f i n e f o r i t s e l f its r e l a t i o n s w i t h G r e a t B r i t a i n a n d
1
Egypt'.
T h e S u d a n m a y n o t h a v e b e e n s o e x c e p t i o n a l as it s e e m s . F o r
in the C o l o n i a l Office, a c c o r d i n g t o R o n a l d R o b i n s o n , the
thinking in 1947 w a s that w i t h i n a generation m o s t o f the major
British African colonies w o u l d b e c o m e self-governing within the
2
C o m m o n w e a l t h . B u t public pronouncements indicated a m u c h
l o n g e r t i m e t a b l e . T h e E l l i o t C o m m i s s i o n , w h i c h in 1945 r e c o m
m e n d e d the establishment o f university colleges in the G o l d C o a s t
a n d N i g e r i a , h a d s e e n t h e m as t r a i n i n g g r o u n d s f o r a n i n
d e p e n d e n c e t h a t m i g h t b e fifty o r m o r e y e a r s a w a y . B e f o r e 1 9 4 7
f e w c o l o n i a l a d m i n i s t r a t o r s i n t h e field e n v i s a g e d r e f o r m s as
leading t o a n y t h i n g m o r e than increased representation. B u t in
t h a t y e a r , w i t h I n d i a n i n d e p e n d e n c e , t h e i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f self-
g o v e r n m e n t for the A f r i c a n territories b e c a m e evident.
O n l y for Italy, t o w h o m the administration o f h e r c o l o n y o f
S o m a l i a w a s restored as a U n i t e d N a t i o n s T r u s t e e s h i p , w a s in
d e p e n d e n c e an o b j e c t i v e w i t h a specific t e r m f o r its a c c o m p l i s h
ment. T h e U N , in a g r e e i n g in 1950 that Italy s h o u l d c o n t i n u e
to administer Somalia, did s o o n the condition that she prepare
it f o r i n d e p e n d e n c e w i t h i n t e n y e a r s . T h u s a c o l o n i a l p o w e r , f o r
t h e first t i m e , h a d t o w o r k t o w a r d s a fixed d a t e f o r t h e
i n d e p e n d e n c e o f o n e o f its c o l o n i e s . T h e case o f L i b y a w a s
s o m e w h a t d i f f e r e n t . I t a c h i e v e d i n d e p e n d e n c e o n 24 D e c e m b e r
1 9 5 1 , w i t h o u t b e i n g f o r m a l l y r e s t o r e d t o I t a l y o r a c c e p t e d as t h e
d o m a i n o f the British o r F r e n c h w h o w e r e a d m i n i s t e r i n g it,
b e c a u s e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l w r a n g l i n g o v e r its f u t u r e .
In taking o v e r the M a n d a t e s o f t h e L e a g u e o f N a t i o n s as
1
P. M . Holt and M . W . D a l y , The history of the Sudan, from the coming of Islam to the
present day, 3rd ed. ( L o n d o n , 1979), 1 5 1 .
1
Ronald Robinson, ' C o n c l u s i o n i n A . H . M . K i r k - G r e e n e (ed.), Africa in the
colonial period: the transfer of power: the colonial administrator in the age of decolonisation
( O x f o r d , 1979), 179.
43

T r u s t e e s h i p s the U n i t e d N a t i o n s i n t r o d u c e d an i m p o r t a n t e x
traneous element into the political calculations o f those colonial
p o w e r s administering t h e m in Africa. T h e s e p o w e r s - Britain,
France and B e l g i u m - w e r e subject to inspection and criticism o f
their administration o f these trusts and w e r e o b l i g a t e d to d e v e l o p
t h e m t o w a r d s s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t t h o u g h n o t after a n y s p e c i f i c
l e n g t h o f t i m e as i n t h e c a s e o f S o m a l i a . T h e y w e r e t h u s t o b e
held internationally a c c o u n t a b l e for their s t e w a r d s h i p in w a y s they
had not been under the L e a g u e o f N a t i o n s M a n d a t e s , and colonial
g r i e v a n c e s c o u l d in the case o f these T r u s t e e s h i p s b e b r o u g h t
before the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , an organisation b y and large hostile
to colonialism. O n l y S o u t h Africa refused to a c k n o w l e d g e the U N
as s u c c e s s o r t o t h e L e a g u e o f N a t i o n s as far as its a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
of South West Africa was concerned.
In retrospect, the political advances m a d e b y the F r e n c h and
B r i t i s h c o l o n i e s at t h e e n d o f t h e w a r , t h o u g h p e r c e i v e d as
g e n e r o u s by the d o n o r s , w e r e considered paltry b y the recipients,
a n d o f c o u r s e s e e m s o n o w . T h e y d i d , h o w e v e r , r e p r e s e n t t h e first
hesitant steps in w h a t w a s to p r o v e a v e r y rapid d e c o l o n i s a t i o n
o f the A f r i c a n c o n t i n e n t . In the case o f the F r e n c h , initial
decolonisation w a s to be not w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k o f eventual
i n d e p e n d e n c e ; r a t h e r it c o n s i s t e d o f t h e g r e a t e r p a r t i c i p a t i o n b y
w h a t w e r e n o w s t y l e d ' o v e r s e a s t e r r i t o r i e s ' in t h e F r e n c h p o l i t i c a l
process. In the case o f the British c o l o n i e s , the a i m w a s to prepare
their inhabitants b y g r a d u a l stages for an e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g m e a s u r e
o f participation in their o w n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n until they c o u l d be
g r a n t e d i n t e r n a l s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t as a p r e l u d e t o i n d e p e n d e n c e
w i t h i n the British C o m m o n w e a l t h .
I n 1 9 4 6 t h e G o l d C o a s t , c o n s i d e r e d at t h a t t i m e t o b e t h e m o s t
politically a d v a n c e d o f Britain's A f r i c a n territories, g a i n e d an
e l e c t e d A f r i c a n m a j o r i t y in its L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l - t h e first s u c h
i n c o l o n i a l A f r i c a . B u t o n l y five o f t h e e i g h t e e n m e m b e r s w e r e
d i r e c t l y e l e c t e d b y t h e p e o p l e , t h e rest b e i n g e l e c t e d b y c h i e f s .
In N i g e r i a , reflecting the colonial administration's c o n t i n u i n g
c o m m i t m e n t to indirect rule, the n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n i n t r o d u c e d in
1 9 4 6 p r o v i d e d f o r a m a j o r i t y o f A f r i c a n u n o f f i c i a l m e m b e r s , all
but four o f w h o m w e r e n o m i n a t e d from the N a t i v e A u t h o r i t i e s .
O n l y intervention o f the colonial secretary had forced Sir A r t h u r
R i c h a r d s , t h e G o v e r n o r , t o retain t h e t h r e e e l e c t e d m e m b e r s f r o m
L a g o s and the o n e f r o m Calabar p r o v i d e d for in the 1922
44

COLONIAL REFORMS
c o n s t i t u t i o n . I n K e n y a , t h e first A f r i c a n m e m b e r o f t h e L e g i s l a t i v e
C o u n c i l w a s o n l y a p p o i n t e d in 1 9 4 4 . I n T a n g a n y i k a , t h e first
African m e m b e r w a s n o t a p p o i n t e d until 1948. T h e C o l o n i a l
O f f i c e m a y h a v e h a d as its g o a l in 1 9 4 7 t h e p r e p a r a t i o n o f its m a j o r
African colonies w i t h i n a generation for s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t based
o n t h e e d u c a t e d A f r i c a n é l i t e , o n c e it h a d b e e n s u f f i c i e n t l y
c o n v i n c e d t h a t this é l i t e h a d g r a s s - r o o t s s u p p o r t ; b u t t h i s w a s
n o t m a n i f e s t i n its first e x p e r i m e n t s i n d e v o l u t i o n o f p o w e r w h e r e
the traditional élite w a s p r e d o m i n a n t in the legislatures o f N i g e r i a
and the G o l d Coast.
A s w e h a v e s e e n , p o l i t i c a l a d v a n c e s in t h e F r e n c h B l a c k A f r i c a n
t e r r i t o r i e s w e r e d i r e c t e d at c l o s e r p o l i t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n w i t h F r a n c e .
B u t e v e n h e r e , t h o u g h all A f r i c a n s w e r e n o w g r a n t e d c i t i z e n s h i p ,
their actual status w a s that o f s e c o n d - and e v e n third-class citizens.
T h e m a j o r i t y still d i d n o t h a v e t h e v o t e , a n d o f t h o s e t h a t d i d ,
a majority had to v o t e o n a separate roll from that for the
E u r o p e a n s resident in the c o l o n i e s , w i t h the result that their v o t e s
w e r e e f f e c t i v e l y w o r t h m u c h less t h a n t h o s e o f E u r o p e a n s .
F u r t h e r m o r e , their n e w territorial assemblies w e r e o n l y a d v i s o r y .
T h e s e provisions also applied to M a d a g a s c a r w h o s e deputies
to the S e c o n d C o n s t i t u e n t A s s e m b l y had unsuccessfully d e m a n d e d
independence. T h e case o f F r a n c e ' s N o r t h A f r i c a n territories w a s
different f r o m t h a t o f h e r B l a c k A f r i c a n t e r r i t o r i e s . A l g e r i a w a s
t r e a t e d as a n i n t e g r a l p a r t o f F r a n c e , w h i l e M o r o c c o a n d T u n i s i a
w e r e p r o t e c t o r a t e s w h e r e t h e s u l t a n a n d b e y w e r e at least n o m i
nally s o v e r e i g n . In Tunisia, because o f the activities o f M o n c e f
B e y d u r i n g t h e w a r , t h e F r e n c h in fact i m p o s e d f u r t h e r c o n
trol o v e r the b e y ' s administration, t h o u g h the T u n i s i a n s w e r e
g i v e n s o m e i n c r e a s e s in e l e c t o r a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . D e m a n d s f o r
i n d e p e n d e n c e m a d e in M o r o c c o w e r e c o u n t e r e d n o t w i t h liber
alisation o f the political r e g i m e , b u t w i t h m o d e s t e c o n o m i c
r e f o r m s . I n A l g e r i a all M u s l i m s b e c a m e n o m i n a l l y c i t i z e n s b u t ,
as i n B l a c k A f r i c a , n o t all o f t h e m h a d t h e v o t e , s o t h a t t h e m a j o r i t y
r e m a i n e d s e c o n d - c l a s s F r e n c h m e n in this N o r t h A f r i c a n ' F r a n c e ' .
T h e failure to c o n c e d e a n y t h i n g b u t the m o s t m o d e s t o f political
reforms in N o r t h A f r i c a n territories w a s to be grist to the mill
o f t h e n a t i o n a l i s t c a u s e i n M o r o c c o a n d T u n i s i a , a n d t o e n d all
h o p e that A l g e r i a c o u l d e v e r really be assimilated into France.
I f a n y p a t t e r n e m e r g e s i n t h e s e first t e n t a t i v e s t e p s t o w a r d s
p o l i t i c a l d e c o l o n i s a t i o n , it is t h a t t h e y w e r e m o r e a d v e n t u r o u s i n
45

those F r e n c h a n d British c o l o n i e s w h e r e settler interests w e r e n o t

dominant. W h e r e they were dominant, both countries had to
confront a g r o w i n g white nationalism, w h i c h w a s vociferously
o p p o s e d to political concessions to the African majorities.
M u c h m o r e important than these measures o f political liberal
i s a t i o n i n t r o d u c e d d u r i n g a n d i m m e d i a t e l y after t h e w a r w e r e t h e
broad e c o n o m i c and social reforms made b y the British, French
a n d B e l g i a n s . W h i l e s o m e r e f o r m s w e r e a l t r u i s t i c , m a n y w e r e as
m u c h d e s i g n e d t o assist i n t h e r e h a b i l i t a t i o n o f t h e m o t h e r l a n d
as w i t h t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e c o l o n i e s t h e m s e l v e s . T h e B e l g i a n s
actually p r o m u l g a t e d a ten-year plan that c o v e r e d b o t h the
m o t h e r l a n d a n d h e r A f r i c a n estate, w h i l e a m b i t i o u s s c h e m e s like
the T a n g a n y i k a g r o u n d n u t s c h e m e and the G a m b i a e g g project
w e r e as m u c h d e s i g n e d t o a l l e v i a t e t h e e c o n o m i c s i t u a t i o n in
B r i t a i n as t o p r o m o t e real d e v e l o p m e n t i n A f r i c a . I n d e e d d u r i n g
the p o s t w a r b o o m in agricultural prices, the surpluses earned b y
the c o l o n i e s w e r e held in m e t r o p o l i t a n b a n k s a n d thus h e l p e d
finance t h e r e c o v e r y o f t h e m o t h e r l a n d s as t h e y h a d h e l p e d finance
t h e w a r itself. T h e B e l g i a n s w e r e q u i t e e x p l i c i t a b o u t t h e C o n g o ' s
role in assisting the m o t h e r l a n d ' s p o s t - w a r r e c o v e r y .
T h u s the essential colonial e c o n o m i c relationship w a s n o t
c h a n g e d ; b u t as far as t h e F r e n c h , B r i t i s h a n d B e l g i a n t e r r i t o r i e s
w e r e c o n c e r n e d t h e r e w e r e i m p o r t a n t m o d i f i c a t i o n s t o it. I n t h e
first p l a c e all t h r e e p o w e r s i m m e d i a t e l y after t h e w a r i n t r o d u c e d
the idea o f p l a n n i n g the e c o n o m i e s o f their c o l o n i e s . M o n e y w a s
to be spent n o t only o n aspects o f the e c o n o m y immediately
b e n e f i c i a l t o t h e i m p o r t — e x p o r t t r a d e , s u c h as n e w r o a d s a n d
r a i l w a y s , b u t o n s o c i a l w e l f a r e a n d e d u c a t i o n as w e l l . T h e c o n c e p t
o f t h e s t a t e ' s r o l e as a g e n t f o r t h e p r o m o t i o n o f t h e w e l f a r e o f
its i n h a b i t a n t s w a s i n t r o d u c e d t o t h e c o l o n i e s w i t h i n c r e a s e d
e d u c a t i o n a l a n d m e d i c a l s e r v i c e s as a m a j o r f e a t u r e o f t h e B r i t i s h ,
French and Belgian d e v e l o p m e n t plans. T h e concept o f e c o n o m i c
d e v e l o p m e n t w a s s o n e w t h a t C a p t a i n J. R . M a c k i e , t h e D i r e c t o r
o f A g r i c u l t u r e , w a s later t o c o m m e n t that Sir B e r n a r d B o u r d i l l o n ' s
statement o n g o v e r n m e n t policy for e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t in
N i g e r i a f o l l o w i n g the passing o f the 1940 C o l o n i a l D e v e l o p m e n t
a n d W e l f a r e A c t w a s t h e first t h a t h a d * e v e r b e e n m a d e p u b l i c l y '
in t h e c o u n t r y , a n d t h a t i n a l m o s t t w e n t y y e a r s o f s e r v i c e i n
N i g e r i a he had * n e v e r seen such a statement o f p o l i c y e v e n in
1
official p a p e r s ' .
1
White, Central administration in Nigeria, 234.
46

COLONIAL REFORMS
T h e Colonial D e v e l o p m e n t and Welfare A c t can o f course be

s e e n as a s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d m e a s u r e , f o r it h a d b e e n b o r n o u t o f t h e
belated realisation, b r o u g h t a b o u t b y the C a r i b b e a n riots o f 1938,
t h a t c o l o n i a l n e g l e c t l e d t o c o l o n i a l d i s a s t e r . F u r t h e r m o r e , it c a m e
to be p e r c e i v e d that e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t schemes would
b e n e f i t t h e m e t r o p o l e as m u c h as t h e c o l o n i e s i n v o l v e d , f o r t h e y
increased the surplus that c o u l d b e extracted from the colonial
e c o n o m i e s and w o u l d also enlarge the market for manufactured
e x p o r t s . B u t it w o u l d b e c a v a l i e r t o d e n y t h a t t h e l a r g e - s c a l e s o c i a l
welfare schemes introduced b y France under F I D E S , for instance,
w e r e n o t in part an a t t e m p t t o repay a d e b t that, j u d g i n g f r o m
t h e r e c o r d a n d t h e p u b l i c p r o n o u n c e m e n t s o f h e r officials a n d
m i n i s t e r s , F r a n c e s i n c e r e l y felt s h e o w e d h e r c o l o n i a l s u b j e c t s f o r
their w a r t i m e support. F u r t h e r m o r e , m a n y o f the administrators
a p p o i n t e d t o t h e c o l o n i a l s e r v i c e s o f F r a n c e a n d B r i t a i n after t h e
w a r w e r e n o t i m b u e d w i t h the innate sense o f superiority o f their
pre-war colleagues, and espoused radical v i e w s a b o u t the colonial
relationship. T h e r e w a s a g r o w i n g sense o f accountability t o the
a d m i n i s t e r e d as w e l l as a n i n c r e a s i n g q u e s t i o n i n g o f t h e m o r a l i t y
o f the colonial relationship. A n d e v e n if independence w a s a
distant g o a l for the British, a n d w a s e x c l u d e d b y the F r e n c h in
favour o f greater eventual participation b y Africans in the politics
o f a greater France, the c o n s e n s u s w a s that the foundations for
this i n c r e a s e d i n v o l v e m e n t o f A f r i c a n s i n t h e g o v e r n m e n t a n d
administration o f their countries h a d t o b e firmly s u n k in an
improved educational, social, medical and economic infra
structure.
CONCLUSION
T h e w a r , as W a l t e r R o d n e y p u t it, ' c a l l e d f o r t h n e w r e s p o n s e s
from every section o f the African population, from resident
minorities, from colonial regimes and from the metropolitan
1
capitalist class w h i c h h a d a stake in A f r i c a ' . F o r all these reasons,
the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r w a s a t u r n i n g point, if n o t a w a t e r s h e d ,
in A f r i c a ' s c o l o n i a l h i s t o r y .
In the t w e n t y years that f o l l o w e d the p r o m u l g a t i o n o f the
political reforms promised b y Britain and France during the
S e c o n d W o r l d W a r , the great majority o f African colonial subjects
g a i n e d their political f r e e d o m a n d the British, F r e n c h a n d Italian
1
Walter Rodney, World War II and the Tanânian economy, Cornell African Studies
Centre M o n o g r a p h no. 3, 1976, 1.
47

P R E L U D E TO DECOLONISATION
colonial empires effectively ceased to exist. T h e Spanish, w h o had

the smallest e m p i r e in A f r i c a , r e v e r s e d their p r e v i o u s p o l i c y o f
i n t e g r a t i o n a n d a s s i m i l a t i o n w h e n , in 1 9 6 2 , t h e y b e g a n t h e
political decolonisation o f F e r n a n d o P o and R i o M u n i w h i c h
t o g e t h e r b e c a m e i n d e p e n d e n t as E q u a t o r i a l G u i n e a i n 1 9 6 8 . T h e
future o f the Spanish Sahara w a s m o r e p r o b l e m a t i c , b e i n g m o r e
t h a n h a l f t h e s i z e o f S p a i n itself, b u t w i t h a p o p u l a t i o n a c c o r d i n g
to the i960 census o f o n l y 2 3 7 9 3 . In 1 9 7 5 , under pressure from
K i n g H a s s a n o f M o r o c c o , S p a i n a g r e e d t o d i v i d e it b e t w e e n h i s
country and Mauritania. O n l y the P o r t u g u e s e held steadfastly to
their d e t e r m i n a t i o n to i n c o r p o r a t e their A f r i c a n d e p e n d e n c i e s in
a perpetual u n i o n w i t h the m o t h e r country. Significantly their t w o
major c o l o n i e s , A n g o l a and M o z a m b i q u e , w e r e b o t h settler
colonies, for o n the path to independence the greatest v i o l e n c e
w a s e x p e r i e n c e d in t h o s e t e r r i t o r i e s w h e r e w h i t e - m i n o r i t y i n t e r e s t s
o p p o s e d concessions to the d e m a n d s o f A f r i c a n nationalists, and
w h e r e the m e t r o p o l i t a n g o v e r n m e n t either s u p p o r t e d these settler
interests, or delayed or modified the c o n c e s s i o n s they w e r e
p r e p a r e d to m a k e to A f r i c a n nationalists in non-settler territories
in t h e h o p e s o f r e c o n c i l i n g t h e t w o n a t i o n a l i s m s . Y e t e v e n in
S o u t h e r n R h o d e s i a , w h e r e the w h i t e nationalists, w h o had already
had legal s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t since 1923, w e r e able to declare their
o w n u n r e c o g n i s e d i n d e p e n d e n c e in 1 9 6 5 , the A f r i c a n nationalists
w e r e e v e n t u a l l y t o t r i u m p h i n 1980 as t h e y h a d in t h e f o r m e r
P o r t u g u e s e territories. W e m a y pause, then, to ask w h y the
E u r o p e a n e m p i r e s in A f r i c a c o l l a p s e d so q u i c k l y a n d g e n e r a l l y so
e a s i l y in t h e q u a r t e r c e n t u r y after t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r , a n d t o
p o n d e r h o w far t h e w a r w a s t h e d o m i n a n t f a c t o r in this c o l l a p s e .
W e h a v e a r g u e d that the w a r created a n e w international climate
in w h i c h t h e l e a d i n g c o l o n i a l p o w e r s w e r e p u t o n t h e d e f e n s i v e
a n d in w h i c h t h e y felt o b l i g e d t o i n t r o d u c e p o l i t i c a l as w e l l as
social and e c o n o m i c reforms, h o w e v e r tentative these m a y n o w
appear to have been. Therefore, African nationalists, w h o had had
l i m i t e d g o a l s b e f o r e t h e w a r , a n d h a d b e e n u n s u c c e s s f u l in g a i n i n g
any major c o n c e s s i o n s f r o m the c o l o n i a l g o v e r n m e n t s , f o u n d
t h e m s e l v e s o p e r a t i n g in a n e w p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e . T h e i r i d e a s a n d
a s p i r a t i o n s n o w f o u n d s u p p o r t n o t o n l y in p o l i t i c a l c i r c l e s w i t h i n
t h e r e l e v a n t m e t r o p o l i s b u t in s i g n i f i c a n t s e c t i o n s o f t h e i n t e r
n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y . W h a t is m o r e , t h e w a r h a d s o c h a n g e d t h e
e c o n o m i c s i t u a t i o n in m a n y o f t h e i r c o u n t r i e s , i n p a r t i c u l a r b y
48

CONCLUSION
s w e l l i n g the n u m b e r o f i m m i g r a n t s to the t o w n s , that the

nationalists n o w had larger constituencies to call u p o n . A n d b y
c o n c e d i n g reforms w h i c h i n v o l v e d the establishment and signi
ficant e x t e n s i o n o f t h e f r a n c h i s e t o A f r i c a n s , e i t h e r t h r o u g h d i r e c t
or indirect elections, the colonial g o v e r n m e n t s w e r e also,
consciously or u n c o n s c i o u s l y , a c c e p t i n g that they were
responsible to their c o l o n i a l subjects. T h e l o g i c o f g r a n t i n g
suffrage t o A f r i c a n s , h o w e v e r l i m i t e d a n d n o m a t t e r w h a t t h e
c r i t e r i a m i g h t b e , w a s t h a t it m u s t l a t e r b e e x t e n d e d . F o r e i t h e r
m o r e p e o p l e b e c a m e qualified under the terms o f the existing
f r a n c h i s e , o r e l s e A f r i c a n n a t i o n a l i s t s p r o t e s t e d t h a t it w a s
arbitrarily restrictive and that a F r a n c e and Britain w h i c h held that
universal suffrage w a s f u n d a m e n t a l t o g o o d g o v e r n m e n t c o u l d
n o t j u s t i f y l i m i t i n g it i n t h e i r A f r i c a n c o l o n i e s . W h e r e l i m i t a t i o n s
o n the suffrage w e r e d e s i g n e d t o p r o t e c t the interests o f a w h i t e
minority, they easily b e c a m e an issue that nationalists c o u l d use
to rouse popular protest.
O f c o u r s e u n t i l i 9 6 0 it w a s o n l y B r i t a i n a n d F r a n c e t h a t m a d e
such concessions and then o n l y w h e n w h i t e - m i n o r i t y interests did
not h a v e to be protected. A n d e v e n there they w e r e c a u g h t in the
dilemma, w h e n e n g a g i n g in the defence o f w h i t e - m i n o r i t y interests
as i n K e n y a o r A l g e r i a , t h a t t h e i r p r a c t i c e w a s n o t c o n s i s t e n t . B u t
w h a t o f the colonial p o w e r s like P o r t u g a l and Spain w h i c h w e r e
n o t d i r e c t l y affected b y t h e w a r , w h o s e c o l o n i a l e c o n o m i e s
stagnated by c o m p a r i s o n w i t h those o f the F r e n c h and British
t e r r i t o r i e s ? H e r e t h e e x a m p l e s set b y t h e F r e n c h a n d B r i t i s h i n
decolonising m a d e their o w n determination to h o l d o n to their
colonies i n v i d i o u s . H o w e v e r m u c h they desired to retain c o n t r o l
o f them, h o w e v e r hard they tried to isolate t h e m f r o m the w i n d s
o f c h a n g e t a k i n g place in o t h e r parts o f the continent, they w e r e
ultimately unable, in an a g e o f mass c o m m u n i c a t i o n , t o insulate
their A f r i c a n subjects f r o m the ideas for i n d e p e n d e n c e that g a i n e d
c u r r e n c y after t h e w a r . E v e n i n F r e n c h B l a c k A f r i c a , w h e r e f o r
a t i m e it s e e m e d A f r i c a n s w o u l d s e t t l e f o r a p o l i t i c a l f r e e d o m
w i t h i n a F r a n c o - A f r i c a n C o m m u n i t y a n d e s c h e w i n d e p e n d e n c e as
such, the e x a m p l e o f G h a n a and the special status o f T o g o and
C a m e r o u n w h i c h , as T r u s t T e r r i t o r i e s , d i d n o t fit i n t o t h e
grandiose plans for a F r a n c o - A f r i c a n C o m m u n i t y , had m u c h to
d o w i t h the d e c i s i o n b y F r a n c e in i960 t o g r a n t i n d e p e n d e n c e t o
all its B l a c k A f r i c a n t e r r i t o r i e s . T h e c o l l a p s e o f B e l g i a n a u t h o r i t y
49

in t h e C o n g o , w h i l s t in p a r t d u e t o l o s s o f w i l l b y t h e c o l o n i a l
a u t h o r i t i e s , w a s a l s o a r e s u l t o f t h e i n f l u e n c e s o f a n d e x a m p l e s set
b y o t h e r A f r i c a n t e r r i t o r i e s , in p a r t i c u l a r t h e e x a m p l e o f G h a n a
and o f n e i g h b o u r i n g Brazzaville, w h i c h enjoyed a great deal o f
political a u t o n o m y w i t h i n the F r e n c h C o m m u n i t y and w a s o n l y
half-an-hour's ferry ride f r o m L e o p o l d v i l l e . W h e r e before the
S e c o n d W o r l d W a r African leaders c o n t e m p l a t i n g political c o n
c e s s i o n s w e r e o p e r a t i n g in a w o r l d t h a t a c c e p t e d t h e fact o f
c o l o n i a l i s m , after it t h e y w e r e t o p r e s s t h e i r c a s e i n a w o r l d w h e r e
the c o l o n i a l d e p e n d e n c i e s w e r e g a i n i n g i n d e p e n d e n c e by
n e g o t i a t i o n o r v i o l e n c e in s u c c e s s i o n like the p r o v e r b i a l d o m i n o e s .
A n d e v e n w h e r e t h e c o l o n i a l p o w e r s t r i e d t o resist t h e s e i n f l u e n c e s ,
as in V i e t n a m a n d I n d o n e s i a , a n d l a t e r in A l g e r i a , it w a s
d e m o n s t r a t e d that their forces w e r e n o l o n g e r sufficient to
maintain a control that had been apparently so easily retained
before the war. Until then, the colonial p o w e r s had been able to
k e e p c o n t r o l o f their large p o p u l a t i o n s w i t h m i n i m u m force just
b e c a u s e the latter a c c e p t e d the c o l o n i a l p r e s e n c e , e v e n if o n l y
p a s s i v e l y . B u t after t h e w a r , n a t i o n a l i s t s w e r e a b l e t o h a r n e s s n o t
o n l y the frustrations o f the urban masses but also rural discontent
to d e m a n d political c o n c e s s i o n s . W h e r e these w e r e resisted b y the
colonial p o w e r s , nationalists w e r e able to mobilise armed
resistance n o t o n l y in the t o w n s b u t in the c o u n t r y s i d e , w h e r e n o t
e v e n m a s s i v e m i l i t a r y f o r c e as u s e d in A l g e r i a a n d t h e P o r t u g u e s e
c o l o n i e s c o u l d s u b d u e p e o p l e fighting o n t h e i r o w n g r o u n d . T h e
s i t u a t i o n w a s m a d e t h e m o r e difficult f o r t h e i n t r a n s i g e n t c o l o n i a l
p o w e r s once countries like M o r o c c o and Tunisia had gained
i n d e p e n d e n c e and c o u l d s u p p o r t an A l g e r i a n i n d e p e n d e n c e
m o v e m e n t , o r as l a t e r T a n z a n i a c o u l d s u p p o r t M o z a m b i q u e .
T h a t t h e c o l o n i a l e m p i r e s w o u l d b e d i s b a n d e d w i t h i n less t h a n
t w o g e n e r a t i o n s - an e v e n t u a l i t y t h a t s e e m e d s o u n l i k e l y in
1 9 3 9 - is c o m p r e h e n s i b l e in t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r
b o t h as a r e s u l t o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t s i n t h e c o n t i n e n t t h a t it
s p e e d e d u p a n d t h e n e w e c o n o m i c , s o c i a l a n d p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s it
set in m o t i o n . R e t r o s p e c t i v e l y , t o o , w e c a n s e e t h a t t h e g r a d u a l
loss o f will for e m p i r e o n the part o f the colonial p o w e r s w a s
a c c o m p a n i e d b y a r e a l i s a t i o n t h a t A f r i c a n s , in s e e k i n g t h e p o l i t i c a l
k i n g d o m , h a d l o s t s i g h t o f t h e e c o n o m i c k i n g d o m . T h u s it s u i t e d
the colonial p o w e r s , especially w h e r e they w e r e not embarrassed
by, or c o m m i t t e d to, a rival w h i t e nationalism, to c o n c e d e the
50

CONCLUSION
p o l i t i c a l k i n g d o m w h i l s t r e t a i n i n g as m u c h c o n t r o l as p o s s i b l e o f
t h e i r e c o n o m i c e m p i r e . F o r b y a n d l a r g e , o f c o u r s e , it w a s t h e
e d u c a t e d e l i t e t h a t i n h e r i t e d t h e c o l o n i a l k i n g d o m , s o t h a t i n real
t e r m s t h e l o t o f t h e m a j o r i t y o f i n h a b i t a n t s c h a n g e d v e r y little w i t h
the c h a n g e f r o m w h i t e to black c o n t r o l . T h e w o r l d capitalist
system had deeply i m p r e g n a t e d the colonial structures b y the e v e
o f i n d e p e n d e n c e and the elites w h o g a i n e d i n d e p e n d e n c e w e r e
loath to f o r g o the v e r y o b v i o u s personal benefits that these
structures immediately b r o u g h t them. Indeed u p until the end o f
our period very few African countries had s o u g h t alternatives to
the e c o n o m i c structures they had inherited, h o w e v e r m u c h
socialist o r M a r x i s t w i n d o w - d r e s s i n g they m a y h a v e displayed.
T h e drama o f the s t r u g g l e for i n d e p e n d e n c e and the p r o b l e m s o f
t h e i n d e p e n d e n t l e a d e r s after it, as t h e n e x t c h a p t e r s h o w s , is t h a t
the independence the Africans t o o k , and the i n d e p e n d e n c e the
c o l o n i a l i s t s g a v e , w a s i n effect a q u a l i f i e d i n d e p e n d e n c e , f o r t h e
r e a l i t y o f p o w e r , c o n t r o l o f t h e e c o n o m y , w a s still t o b e f o u n d
overseas.
5i

C H A P T E R 2
DECOLONISATION AND THE

PROBLEMS OF I N D E P E N D E N C E
F o r m i l l i o n s o f p e o p l e s in A f r i c a - a n d t h o s e w i t h liberal incli
nations outside Africa - t w o decades o f independence brought
little b u t d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t . F o r the A f r i c a n s , the nationalist agita
tions o f the 1930s d o w n t o the m i d - 1 9 5 0 s p r o m i s e d a n e w era o f
political self-assertion and freedom from foreign imperialist
domination. T h e vision o f what was to c o m e was well put by
K w a m e N k r u m a h o f G h a n a w h e n he said: ' S e e k ye first the
political k i n g d o m and e v e r y t h i n g else shall b e a d d e d u n t o y o u /
I n d e p e n d e n c e w a s t o b e the m i l l e n n i u m w h e n the A f r i c a n , after
decades o f b e i n g e x p l o i t e d and o p p r e s s e d , w a s t o c o m e i n t o his
o w n ' i n h e r i t a n c e ' . T o the liberals o f E u r o p e and N o r t h A m e r i c a ,
the nationalist rhetoric o f f r e e d o m and equality w a s a reassertion
o f t h e i d e a l s t h e y h a d c h e r i s h e d a n d p r o c l a i m e d . B u t after t w o
decades o f i n d e p e n d e n c e these h o p e s and ideals w e r e replaced b y
d e s p a i r as p l u r a l i s t i n s t i t u t i o n s w e r e s u p p l a n t e d b y m i l i t a r y r u l e
in m a n y states a n d the p r o m i s e o f p l e n t y g a v e w a y , i f n o t t o the
increasing i m p o v e r i s h m e n t o f the masses, then m o s t certainly to
r e l a t i v e s t a g n a t i o n . F o r e x a m p l e , it h a s b e e n e s t i m a t e d t h a t t h e
a v e r a g e A f r i c a n s t a t e g r e w l e s s f o o d p e r c a p i t a i n 1 9 6 8 t h a n it h a d
d o n e in 1956, w h i l e the per capita g r o s s d o m e s t i c p r o d u c t at
m a r k e t p r i c e s s t o o d i n 1 9 7 0 at $200, a figure w h i c h h a d c h a n g e d
1
l i t t l e f r o m w h a t it h a d b e e n a d e c a d e e a r l i e r .
2
A t t e m p t s at e x p l a i n i n g t h e ' A f r i c a n p r e d i c a m e n t ' have been
m a n y and v a r i e d b u t p e r h a p s the m o s t p e r c e p t i v e are t h o s e o f the
'structural analysts' o r dependence theorists. A s put by O s v a l d o
S u n k e l , d e p e n d e n c e is t h a t s y s t e m w h i c h l i n k s e x t e r n a l p r e s s u r e s
and constraints, often operating through 'hidden or subtle
financial, economic, technical and cultural' mechanisms, with
1
' W o r l d hunger: causes and remedies', report by the Transnational Institute
(Washington D C , 1974).
2
Stanislao Andreski, The African predicament ( L o n d o n , 1968).
5*

DECOLONISATION AND INDEPENDENCE
i n t e r n a l p r o c e s s e s o f u n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t c h a r a c t e r i s e d b y t h e ' self-
reinforcing accumulations o f p r i v i l e g e ' o n the o n e hand and the
1
existence o f a ' m a r g i n a l class' o n the other. T h o u g h there are
different f o r m u l a t i o n s o f d e p e n d e n c y t h e o r y , c o m m o n t o a l l t h e
t h e o r i s t s is t h e p o s t u l a t i o n o f a p a t t e r n o f u n e q u a l , a s y m m e t r i c
exchange relationships w h i c h consistently and persistently operate
to the a d v a n t a g e o f the o n e partner and to the d i s a d v a n t a g e o f
t h e o t h e r . T h e r e s u l t is t h e e m e r g e n c e w i t h i n t h e international
system o f d o m i n a n t and d e p e n d e n t actors, or, in the l a n g u a g e o f
Galtung, o f a conflict b e t w e e n 'centre' and 'periphery' or
b e t w e e n ' m e t r o p o l i s ' and 'satellite' to use G u n d e r F r a n k ' s and
2
Samir Amin's terminology. T h e net outcome of dependent
relationships 'is e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t for the centre and e c o
n o m i c u n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t for the p e r i p h e r y ; military ascendancy,
highly developed means o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n and cultural expansion
on the one hand, and military inferiority, primitive means of
3
c o m m u n i c a t i o n and cultural e m u l a t i o n o n the o t h e r ' . A s G u s t a v o
L a g o s h a s p u t it, t h e d e p e n d e n t a c t o r suffers f r o m a b s o l u t e atimia
4
or extreme deprivation. W h i l e t h i s b r o a d c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n is n o
d o u b t i l l u m i n a t i n g , it d o e s n o t c o v e r a d e q u a t e l y t h e c o m p l e x i t i e s
and peculiarities o f specific situations w i t h i n the A f r i c a n predica
ment. W e e x a m i n e this predicament first b y l o o k i n g at the
different w a y s i n w h i c h A f r i c a n s t a t e s o b t a i n e d t h e i r i n d e p e n d e n c e
a n d s e c o n d l y b y e x a m i n i n g t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l e g a c y . T h i s is
f o l l o w e d b y a discussion o f s o m e specific p r o b l e m s : those o f the
bureaucracy and the e c o n o m y , the related problem o f social
m o b i l i s a t i o n , t h e m i l i t a r y a n d m i l i t a r i s m a n d , finally, t h e p r o b l e m
o f political leadership and political succession.
T h e c h o i c e o f issues m a y s e e m arbitrary g i v e n the multitude
o f p r o b l e m s c o n f r o n t i n g A f r i c a n states b e f o r e a n d particularly
s i n c e i n d e p e n d e n c e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , it h a s s o m e r a t i o n a l e . B a s i c a l l y ,
w e c o u l d d i c h o t o m i s e t h e set o f p r o b l e m s i n t o t w o s u b - s e t s . T h e
first c o n s i s t s o f i s s u e s i n h e r e n t i n t h e n a t u r e o f A f r i c a n s o c i a l a n d
1
O s v a l d o S u n k e l , ' Big business and " dependencia " F o r e i g n Affairs, 50, April 1972,
519. Q u o t e d in Joseph A . Camilleri, Civilisation in crisis (Cambridge, 1977), 7 1 - 2 .
2
A . G u n d e r Frank, ' L u m p e n bourgeoisie and lumpen development', trans. Marian
D . Berdecio ( N U Monthly R e v i e w Press, 1972); J. G a l t u n g , ' A structural theory o f
imperialism', Journal of Peace Research, 1971, 8, 2; Samir A m i n , Neo-colonialism in West
Africa, trans. Francis M c D o n a g h ( L o n d o n , 1976).
3
Camilleri, Civilisation in crisis, 72.
4
G u s t a v o Lagos, International stratification and underdeveloped countries (North Carolina,
1963).
53

political systems antecedent to the i m p o s i t i o n o f colonial rule, for

e x a m p l e , the h e t e r o g e n e i t y o f these systems, their socio-structural
v a r i e t y a n d t h e p r o b l e m s w h i c h t h e s e in t u r n c r e a t e d f o r s t a t e
f o r m a t i o n . T h e s e c o n d s u b - s e t is c o m p o s e d o f d i f f i c u l t i e s w h i c h
c o u l d b e said t o h a v e arisen f r o m , and b e intimately b o u n d u p
w i t h , the dialectical l o g i c o f the colonial situation and the nature
o f the independence settlement, for e x a m p l e , bureaucratic style
and leadership, and the f r a m e w o r k o f political contestation.
E m p i r i c a l l y , the sub-sets are c l o s e l y interrelated, the o n e i m
p i n g i n g o n and s h a p i n g the other. A n a l y t i c a l l y , h o w e v e r , the
pre-colonial and colonial d i c h o t o m y can be made w i t h a degree
o f v a l i d i t y , and the c h o i c e o f p r o b l e m s has b e e n dictated b y that
dichotomy.
A s outlined a b o v e , the basic p r o b l e m c o n f r o n t i n g the A f r i c a n
states - a n d t h i r d - w o r l d c o u n t r i e s i n g e n e r a l - is t h a t o f p o v e r t y ,
w h i c h i n i t s e l f is t o b e e x p l a i n e d i n t e r m s o f a d e p e n d e n c y
r e l a t i o n s h i p , w h i c h is a f u n c t i o n o f s p e c i f i c s t r u c t u r a l a n d b e
h a v i o u r a l v a r i a b l e s . A f r i c a n s t a t e s , it is c o n t e n d e d , c a n n o t e x p e c t
to escape from the d e g r a d a t i o n o f p o v e r t y unless they break the
d e p e n d e n c y relationship w h i c h binds t h e m to the d e v e l o p e d ,
industrial nations in an e x p l o i t a t i v e n e x u s . A b r e a k w o u l d require
n o t o n l y r a d i c a l c h a n g e s in t h e p o l i t i c a l a n d e c o n o m i c s t r u c t u r e s
o f t h e s e states b u t a l s o a t t i t u d i n a l c h a n g e s o n t h e p a r t o f t h e
élite - the b u r e a u c r a t i c - m a n a g e r i a l a n d political élite, the military
and the intelligentsia.
T h u s , far f r o m b e i n g a r b i t r a r y , t h e r e a r e c o g e n t h i s t o r i c a l a n d
theoretical warrants for the choice o f p r o b l e m s for examination.
O u r analysis f o c u s e s o n the p r o b l e m s that A f r i c a n states h a v e
e x p e r i e n c e d s i n c e g a i n i n g t h e i r i n d e p e n d e n c e ; b u t , as w e h a v e
already s u g g e s t e d , these cannot be u n d e r s t o o d w i t h o u t reference
to the p r o c e s s w h e r e b y this i n d e p e n d e n c e w a s g a i n e d .
PATHS TO INDEPENDENCE
T h e year i960 has been described, n o t w i t h o u t s o m e justification,

as ' t h e y e a r o f A f r i c a ' . S o m e 16 states - C a m e r o u n , t h e C e n t r a l
African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville (now C o n g o ) , C o n g o -
L é o p o l d v i l l e ( n o w Zaire), D a h o m e y ( n o w Benin), G a b o n , the
Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia,
T o g o a n d U p p e r V o l t a - b e c a m e i n d e p e n d e n t , s o v e r e i g n states
54

Eüi] 1 9 6 1 - 6 6
r ~l Not independent in 1966 0 { 2 0 0 0 km
R Ruanda B Burundi ß ' KX)0 miles
4 A f r i c a : the p a t h t o i n d e p e n d e n c e , 1956-66.
in t h a t y e a r . O t h e r states f o l l o w e d i n q u i c k s u c c e s s i o n : S i e r r a
L e o n e a n d T a n g a n y i k a in 1 9 6 1 , B u r u n d i , R w a n d a a n d U g a n d a in
1962, K e n y a in 1963, N y a s a l a n d a n d N o r t h e r n R h o d e s i a in 1964,
t h e G a m b i a i n 1965 a n d B e c h u a n a l a n d a n d B a s u t o l a n d i n 1 9 6 6 .
T h e first c o l o n y t o b e c o m e i n d e p e n d e n t i n A f r i c a w a s L i b e r i a ,
in 1 8 4 7 . I t b e c a m e i n d e p e n d e n t s o o n after it w a s s e t t l e d w i t h s l a v e s
r e p a t r i a t e d f r o m t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . O v e r t h e n e x t 60 y e a r s t h e rest
55

o f the continent w a s o c c u p i e d b y the E u r o p e a n c o l o n i a l p o w e r s

in o n e f o r m o r a n o t h e r a n d o n l y E t h i o p i a r e m a i n e d effectively
i n d e p e n d e n t . A n d e v e n s h e w a s i n v a d e d b y I t a l y i n 1935 a n d
i n c o r p o r a t e d into the Italian E a s t A f r i c a n e m p i r e until her
liberation b y A l l i e d forces in 1941 d u r i n g the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r .
If w e except E g y p t , w h o s e exercise o f sovereignty continued to
be constrained b y the presence o f British troops o n the S u e z Canal
u n t i l 1 9 5 6 , t h e first E u r o p e a n c o l o n y t o g a i n i n d e p e n d e n c e after
1
L i b e r i a w a s L i b y a i n 1 9 5 1 . O v e r t h e n e x t 26 y e a r s i m p e r i a l r u l e
in A f r i c a w a s d i s m a n t l e d , t h e F r e n c h T e r r i t o r y o f t h e A f a r s a n d
I s s a s g a i n i n g i n d e p e n d e n c e as t h e R e p u b l i c o f D j i b o u t i i n 1 9 7 7 .
R h o d e s i a , S o u t h A f r i c a a n d its d e p e n d e n c y , S o u t h W e s t A f r i c a
( N a m i b i a ) , still r e m a i n e d as w h i t e - d o m i n a t e d t e r r i t o r i e s b u t
independent o f imperial control from E u r o p e .
I n d e p e n d e n c e c a m e t o the different A f r i c a n states in a v a r i e t y
o f w a y s , t h e p r o c e s s o f d e c o l o n i s a t i o n d e p e n d i n g , i n t h e m a i n , first
o n the colonising p o w e r , and second o n the nature o f the c o l o n y
itself, in p a r t i c u l a r w h e t h e r o r n o t it h a d a s i z e a b l e w h i t e - s e t t l e r
element. In W e s t Africa — the stretch o f territories e x t e n d i n g f r o m
Senegal to Z a i r e - the c o l o n i s i n g p o w e r s w e r e Britain, France,
B e l g i u m , Spain and Portugal. In n o n e o f these w a s there a
significant white-settler element. W h i l e Britain, B e l g i u m and
S p a i n a d m i n i s t e r e d t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s as s e p a r a t e p o l i t i c a l a n d
administrative units, the F r e n c h territories, other than those under
U n i t e d N a t i o n s T r u s t e e s h i p , w e r e g o v e r n e d as t w o * f e d e r a t i o n s '
o f states, A f r i q u e O c c i d e n t a l e Française ( A O F ) and A f r i q u e
Equatoriale Française ( A E F ) . W h e r e Britain had f o l l o w e d a policy
a i m e d at t h e u l t i m a t e a t t a i n m e n t o f c o m p l e t e i n d e p e n d e n c e b y
each o f her colonies, France, B e l g i u m , P o r t u g a l and Spain had
maintained a s y s t e m o f * D i r e c t R u l e ', the l o n g - t e r m a i m o f w h i c h
was to turn Africans into French, Belgian, Portuguese or Spanish
' c i t i z e n s ' as t h e c a s e m i g h t b e .
F o r the British territories in W e s t A f r i c a and e l s e w h e r e o n the
c o n t i n e n t w h e r e there w e r e n o sizeable settler e l e m e n t s , the
process o f d e c o l o n i s a t i o n b e c a m e a g r a d u a t e d transfer o f p o w e r
to an e m e r g e n t ' m i d d l e class ' o f l a w y e r s , teachers, d o c t o r s and
journalists, w h o spearheaded the v a r i o u s nationalist m o v e m e n t s
w h i c h h a d g r o w n u p in the s e c o n d and third d e c a d e s o f the
1
T h i s does not of course take account of white-settler colonies ; the O r a n g e Free State
gained independence in 1854 and the U n i o n of South Africa in 1910.
56

twentieth century. T h e pattern w a s n o t unlike that w h i c h had

o c c u r r e d earlier in places like India and C e y l o n . First, there w a s
the creation o f legislative institutions w i t h limited p o w e r s , w h i c h
w a s usually a c c o m p a n i e d b y the g r a n t i n g o f a restricted franchise.
T h i s almost invariably e n c o u r a g e d the formation o f political
parties. T h e s e c o n d stage f o l l o w e d w i t h the e x t e n s i o n o f the area
o f discretion a l l o w e d to the legislative assemblies and a b r o a d e n i n g
o f the franchise. T h i s w a s succeeded b y the third stage, the
granting o f internal s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t w h i c h led, often w i t h i n a
y e a r o r t w o , t o t h e final s t a g e o f full i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d s o v e r e i g n
status.
B e c a u s e the British-administered territories in w e s t e r n A f r i c a
w e r e g o v e r n e d as s e p a r a t e e n t i t i e s , t h e p r o c e s s o f t h e t r a n s f e r o f
p o w e r i n v o l v e d m i n i m u m d i s r u p t i o n . A n d h e r e i n lies t h e m a i n
contrast w i t h the F r e n c h territories. France had c o n c e i v e d o f A O F
(French West Africa) and A E F (French Equatorial A f r i c a -
G a b o n , C h a d , t h e C e n t r a l A f r i c a n R e p u b l i c , a n d C o n g o ) as
* federations' to be united w i t h France. F o r F r a n c e , the future o f
h e r A f r i c a n t e r r i t o r i e s w a s n o t t o b e full s o v e r e i g n t y b u t a u t o n o m y
w i t h i n a g r e a t e r F r e n c h U n i o n , o r F r a n c o - A f r i c a n C o m m u n i t y as
it l a t e r c a m e t o b e c a l l e d . N o t u n e x p e c t e d l y , t h i s p o l i c y m e t w i t h
o p p o s i t i o n f r o m t w o m a i n s o u r c e s : first f r o m t h e ' r a d i c a l '
politicians w h o rejected any idea o f a ' q u a l i f i e d ' i n d e p e n d e n c e ;
a n d s e c o n d l y , f r o m ' c o n s e r v a t i v e ' a n d rich states like the I v o r y
C o a s t and G a b o n w h o s e leaders t h o u g h t that they s t o o d to gain
m o r e b y b e i n g d i r e c t l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h F r a n c e t h a n i n d i r e c t l y as
m e m b e r s o f a federation. In A O F , the I v o r y C o a s t had p r o v i d e d
the major part o f the ' s u r p l u s ' w i t h w h i c h the ' f e d e r a t i o n ' w a s
m a i n t a i n e d , w h i l e G a b o n w a s in the s a m e p o s i t i o n w i t h respect
to A E F . T h e radical leaders o f the p o o r e r states w a n t e d i n d e
pendence w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k o f the federations, seeing the
proposal to d e v o l v e political p o w e r o n the constituent territories
r a t h e r t h a n t h e g r o u p as a w h o l e as o n e a i m e d at d e l i b e r a t e
'balkanisation'.
T h e t u r n i n g p o i n t in F r e n c h p o l i c y in b o t h A O F and A E F c a m e
i n 1958 w h e n G e n e r a l C h a r l e s d e G a u l l e b e c a m e P r e s i d e n t o f
F r a n c e . H e offered the c o n s t i t u e n t territories o f b o t h these
f e d e r a t i o n s , as d i s t i n c t f r o m t h e f e d e r a t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s , t h e c h o i c e
of autonomy within a Franco-African C o m m u n i t y or indepen
d e n c e w i t h all its c o n s e q u e n c e s , w h i c h i n effect m e a n t t h e
57

Table 2.1. Economic profile offormer AOF states less

Mauritania c. 1961.
Index of agric. Growth rate

production GDP per
GDP 1961 in Per capita 1960-1 capita
State $ US million GDP 1963 (1954 = 100) 1961-8
Dahomey 160 70 111 1.1

Guinea 190 96 122 2
-7
Ivory Coast 470 188 201 4.8
Mali 250 66 116 i-3
Niger 170 77 148 -1.6
Senegal 5 3° 183 140 -1.4
Upper Volta 180 45 ^3 0.1
Source-. Morrison et a/., Black Africa (New York, 1972), 50-3.
s e v e r a n c e o f all F r e n c h a i d . G u i n e a a l o n e o p t e d f o r t h e s e c o n d
alternative, and F r a n c e p u l l e d o u t , l e a v i n g in her w a k e a near-
collapsing country. G u i n e a ' s fate at first s e r v e d as a terrible
w a r n i n g to those w h o had v o t e d to stay w i t h F r a n c e and c o n t i n u e
to enjoy her considerable aid. A t the same time her i n d e p e n d e n c e ,
and the f o r t h c o m i n g independence o f the F r e n c h UN Trust
T e r r i t o r i e s o f T o g o a n d C a m e r o u n as w e l l as t h a t o f n e i g h b o u r i n g
B r i t i s h states p r o v e d irresistibly attractive a n d e a c h C o m m u n i t y
state n e g o t i a t e d an i n d e p e n d e n c e w i t h F r a n c e that w o u l d e n s u r e
it c o n t i n u e d t o r e c e i v e F r e n c h a i d .
If the m o v e t o w a r d s i n d e p e n d e n c e in the British W e s t A f r i c a n
states, A O F , A E F a n d the British E a s t A f r i c a n states o f U g a n d a
and T a n g a n y i k a had b e e n relatively peaceful, that in the B e l g i a n
t e r r i t o r i e s w a s far f r o m b e i n g s o . I n n e i t h e r its T r u s t T e r r i t o r i e s
o f R w a n d a a n d B u r u n d i , n o r its h u g e C o n g o e s t a t e , d i d B e l g i u m ,
unlike Britain and France, attempt to create any national political
institutions b e f o r e 1 9 5 9 . A n d then, in the B e l g i a n C o n g o , the
p r o p o s e d constitutional reforms a l l o w e d only for direct elections
at t h e l o c a l - g o v e r n m e n t l e v e l , t h o u g h t h e s e h a d b e e n i n t r o d u c e d
in 1 9 5 6 i n b o t h R w a n d a a n d B u r u n d i . W h i l e t h e s e t w o c o u n t r i e s
h a d h a d s o m e e x p o s u r e t o t h e o u t s i d e w o r l d as a r e s u l t o f t h e i r
s t a t u s as U N T r u s t T e r r i t o r i e s , t h e C o n g o w a s f o r all p r a c t i c a l
p u r p o s e s i s o l a t e d f r o m it b y B e l g i u m . W i t h t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f
58

G h a n a in 19 5 7 a n d t h e g r u d g i n g offer b y d e G a u l l e o f i n d e p e n d e n c e
to the f r a n c o p h o n e A f r i c a n states, B e l g i a n administration o f the
C o n g o c a m e to be seriously questioned b y the handful o f A f r i c a n
nationalists, principal a m o n g s t w h o m w a s Patrice L u m u m b a ,
w h o h a d e m e r g e d as p o t e n t i a l p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s . A f e w d a y s
after L u m u m b a r e t u r n e d f r o m t h e P a n - A f r i c a n C o n f e r e n c e h e l d
in A c c r a in D e c e m b e r 1 9 5 8 , r i o t i n g b r o k e o u t in L e o p o l d v i l l e .
T h e Belgian governor-general, w h o had advocated establishing a
parliament for the C o n g o b y the end o f i960 - an indication o f
t h e p o l i t i c a l v a c u u m in t h e c o u n t r y - a n d i n d e p e n d e n c e b y 1963
( a l t e r e d at t h e e n d o f 1 9 5 9 t o i n d e p e n d e n c e i n i 9 6 0 ) , w a s f o r c e d
b y c o n s e r v a t i v e protests to r e s i g n in 1 9 5 9 . T h e r e a f t e r there w a s
e f f e c t i v e l y a v o l t e - f a c e b y t h e B e l g i a n g o v e r n m e n t a n d at t h e
f a m o u s T a b l e R o n d e h e l d i n B e l g i u m i n J a n u a r y i 9 6 0 it w a s
agreed to accede to C o n g o l e s e d e m a n d s for political freedom and
grant i n d e p e n d e n c e w i t h i n six m o n t h s , a l t h o u g h A f r i c a n delegates
h a d t a l k e d in t e r m s o f i n d e p e n d e n c e w i t h i n f o u r y e a r s . I n J u n e
i960, w i t h the political institutions o f s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t barely
established, the B e l g i a n s m o v e d o u t o f the C o n g o , o n l y to return
t e m p o r a r i l y a m o n t h l a t e r t o p r o t e c t B e l g i a n c i v i l i a n s still l i v i n g
there.
T h e t o o - h a s t y w i t h d r a w a l o f B e l g i u m w a s t h e s i g n a l f o r all h e l l
t o b r e a k l o o s e in t h e n e w l y i n d e p e n d e n t c o u n t r y . T h e F o r c e
P u b l i q u e , w h i c h p a s s e d as t h e C o n g o l e s e a r m y , m u t i n i e d a n d
K a t a n g a , the richest r e g i o n o f the C o n g o , seceded under M o i s e
T s h o m b e o n 11 J u l y . I n t h e c a p i t a l , L e o p o l d v i l l e ( n o w K i n s h a s a ) ,
a g a m e o f musical chairs for the leadership b e g a n , w h i l e there w e r e
threats o f further secession.
T h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s , in r e s p o n s e t o a p p e a l s b y t h e P r e s i d e n t ,
J o s e p h K a s a v u b u , and the P r i m e Minister, Patrice L u m u m b a , ' t o
protect the national territory o f the C o n g o against the present
e x t e r n a l a g g r e s s i o n w h i c h is a t h r e a t t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l p e a c e ' , s e n t
a m i s s i o n t o t h e C o n g o o n 1 4 J u l y i 9 6 0 . W i t h its a r r i v a l b e g a n
i n c r e a s e d g r e a t - p o w e r i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h e affairs o f t h e C o n g o , a n
i n v o l v e m e n t w h i c h w a s to lead to the death o f the U N Secretary-
General, D a g H a m m a r s k j o l d , o n 17 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 6 1 . T h e
c o n f u s e d state o f C o n g o l e s e p o l i t i c s is d i s c u s s e d i n d e t a i l in
C h a p t e r 1 4 . H e r e , it is s u f f i c i e n t t o n o t e t h a t t h e U N S e c u r i t y
F o r c e s , w a l k i n g t h e t i g h t - r o p e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s , finally
s u c c e e d e d in e a r l y 1963 in r e u n i t i n g K a t a n g a w i t h t h e r e s t o f t h e
59

DECOLONISATION A N D I N D E P E N D E N C E
c o u n t r y a n d t h e m s e l v e s p u l l i n g o u t o f the C o n g o in 1964. T h u s ,
t h o u g h i n d e p e n d e n c e w a s p r o c l a i m e d in J u n e i960, the s e m b l a n c e
o f a state did n o t b e g i n t o e m e r g e in the C o n g o until f o u r years
later. T h e e x p e r i e n c e o f the C o n g o thus m a r k s an e x t r e m e case
1
o f o n e approach to independence by an African state.
Portugal, unlike Britain, B e l g i u m and France (except with
r e s p e c t t o A l g e r i a ) s a w h e r A f r i c a n t e r r i t o r i e s as a n e x t e n s i o n o f
P o r t u g a l itself. A n g o l a , M o z a m b i q u e , C a p e V e r d e a n d G u i n e a -
Bissau were not just c o l o n i e s , t h e y w e r e part and parcel of
P o r t u g a l , or so they w e r e regarded b y the P o r t u g u e s e g o v e r n m e n t
u n d e r Salazar, w h e t h e r o r n o t they had n e g l i g i b l e settler p o p u
l a t i o n s as i n C a p e V e r d e a n d G u i n e a - B i s s a u , o r l a r g e o n e s as in
the case o f A n g o l a and M o z a m b i q u e . F r o m the P o r t u g u e s e point
o f v i e w there c o u l d be n o question o f independence for these
territories. That would be like talking o f independence for
Portugal, w h i c h w o u l d be meaningless. But Portugal could hardly
e x p e c t t o k e e p its t e r r i t o r i e s i s o l a t e d f r o m t h e p o l i t i c a l c h a n g e s
t a k i n g p l a c e all o v e r A f r i c a . W i t h P o r t u g a l u n w i l l i n g a n d unpre
pared to make any concessions, there w a s but one option open
t o the nationalist leaders - a r m e d s t r u g g l e . B y the sixties, this had
t a k e n t h e f o r m o f o r g a n i s e d g u e r r i l l a w a r f a r e , w h i c h is d i s c u s s e d
in detail in C h a p t e r 1 5 . W i t h i n ten years, the cost o f counter
revolutionary warfare was b e c o m i n g unbearable for Portugal,
w h i c h w a s t h e n s p e n d i n g as m u c h as 4 2 p e r c e n t o f its b u d g e t
o n m a i n t a i n i n g its a r m e d p e r s o n n e l i n t h e s e t e r r i t o r i e s . Portugal
was fighting a l o s i n g b a t t l e a n d in 1 9 7 4 w a s finally d e f e a t e d in
G u i n e a - B i s s a u , M o z a m b i q u e a n d A n g o l a , in m u c h t h e s a m e w a y
t h a t t h e F r e n c h h a d b e e n in I n d o - C h i n a t w o d e c a d e s e a r l i e r .
A n g o l a p r e s e n t e d a different situation f r o m M o z a m b i q u e and
G u i n e a - B i s s a u . F i r s t , it is m o r e r i c h l y e n d o w e d b y n a t u r e , a n d l i k e
the C o n g o w a s therefore e x p e c t e d to attract international interest.
S e c o n d , b e c a u s e o f its h e t e r o g e n e o u s p o p u l a t i o n , it w a s u n a b l e
to p r o d u c e a political leadership acceptable t o all, w i t h the result
that the liberation movement splintered into three warring
factions: the Movimento Popular de Liberta9áo de Angola
( M P L A ) ; the Frente N a c i o n a l de L i b e r t a d o de A n g o l a ( F N L A ) ;
and the U n i á o N a c i o n a l para a Independencia T o t a l de A n g o l a
( U N I T A - initially a b r e a k a w a y f r o m the F N L A ) . T h e s t r u g g l e
1
See the classic study by Crawford Y o u n g , Politics in the Congo (Princeton, 1965).
60

for liberation thus b e c a m e c o m p o u n d e d b y an internal civil w a r

and w a s the signal for external, g r e a t - p o w e r i n v o l v e m e n t , w i t h
the S o v i e t U n i o n , C u b a a n d a n u m b e r o f A f r i c a n states ( N i g e r i a
w a s o n e ) s u p p o r t i n g t h e M P L A ; t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , its A f r i c a n
p r o t e g e , Z a i r e ( w h i c h had ambitions t o w a r d s the oil-rich e n c l a v e
o f Cabinda) and, interestingly, the P e o p l e s ' R e p u b l i c o f C h i n a
s u p p o r t i n g the F N L A ; and U N I T A appealing to S o u t h Africa for
m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t . C u b a n s o l d i e r s , o v e r 4000 o f t h e m , a n d S o v i e t
and Y u g o s l a v w e a p o n s ultimately w o n the day for the M P L A and
A n g o l a b e c a m e a n i n d e p e n d e n t s t a t e in 1 9 7 5 , t h u s e n d i n g 400
years o f colonial rule b y P o r t u g a l in Africa.
In those territories that w e r e politically d o m i n a t e d b y w h i t e
s e t t l e r s , u n l i k e t h e a r e a s d i s c u s s e d s o far, t h e d i a l e c t i c s o f
liberation had i n v o l v e d n o t just the c o l o n i s e r and the c o l o n i s e d
but also the white-settler element. In these territories, therefore,
rather than a binary relationship, w e are c o n f r o n t e d b y a triad.
T h e classic case here w a s A l g e r i a , w h i c h the F r e n c h started
o c c u p y i n g in 1 8 3 4 after it h a d b e e n o c c u p i e d b y a v a r i e t y o f
c o n q u e r i n g rulers in the p r e c e d i n g centuries. T h o u g h largely
M u s l i m A r a b and B e r b e r in p o p u l a t i o n , A l g e r i a rapidly attracted
n o n - M u s l i m E u r o p e a n settlers. W i t h i n a d e c a d e o f F r e n c h c o l
o n i s a t i o n , this e l e m e n t h a d g r o w n t o a b o u t 4 6 0 0 0 . B y 1880 t h e
figure w a s s o m e 2 7 6 0 0 0 , r i s i n g i n 1 9 1 2 t o 7 8 1 0 0 0 a n d t o o v e r a
million b y i960. W i t h the influx o f w h i t e settlers there f o l l o w e d
t h e f o r c e f u l a c q u i s i t i o n o f l a n d a n d b y 1868 t h e n u m b e r s d i s p o s
sessed o f land h a d g r o w n so l a r g e that, in a n a t i o n - w i d e famine
w h i c h b r o k e o u t t h a t y e a r , s o m e 500000 M u s l i m s w e r e f e a r e d t o
h a v e died. B y 1 9 5 5 , A l g e r i a ' s settler element, w h i c h f o r m e d 11
p e r c e n t o f t h e t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n , o w n e d m o r e t h a n 25 p e r c e n t o f
the arable land and earned o v e r 5 o per cent o f the i n c o m e d e r i v e d
f r o m a g r i c u l t u r e a n d s o m e 90 p e r c e n t o f t h a t f r o m e x p o r t s .
T h e F r e n c h , b e c a u s e o f A l g e r i a ' s p r o x i m i t y a n d t h e s i z e o f its
s e t t l e r p o p u l a t i o n , r e g a r d e d it as p a r t o f F r a n c e a n d a d m i n i s t e r e d
it as s u c h . A s in t h e B e l g i a n a n d P o r t u g u e s e t e r r i t o r i e s , l i t t l e i f
any attempt w a s made to e v o l v e or d e v e l o p local political
institutions, w h i l e d e m a n d s for these w e r e met w i t h brutal
r e p r e s s i o n , as i n t h e p r o t e s t m a r c h i n S e t i f i n 1 9 4 5 , a f o r e t a s t e o f
revolt. A l t h o u g h the A l g e r i a n Statute o f 1947 created a local
a s s e m b l y in w h i c h h a l f t h e seats w e r e h e l d b y M u s l i m s , a n d
61

DECOLONISATION AND I N D E P E N D E N C E
p r o v i d e d for M u s l i m representation in the F r e n c h N a t i o n a l

A s s e m b l y , settler interests ensured that nationalists d i d n o t profit
f r o m it (see C h a p t e r n ) . D e m a n d s b y n a t i o n a l i s t s f o r e f f e c t i v e
p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the g o v e r n m e n t o f their c o u n t r y w e r e c o n s i s t e n t l y
b l o c k e d b y the w h i t e - s e t t l e r p o p u l a t i o n a n d w h e n t h e y finally
resorted t o arms to press their case the settlers w e r e b a c k e d b y
the F r e n c h a r m y in A l g e r i a , w h i c h b e c a m e a l a w u n t o itself and
w a s prepared to defy the metropolitan g o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d the
latter a t t e m p t a n y r e f o r m . T h e w e a k n e s s e s and d i v i s i o n s o f the
g o v e r n m e n t s o f the F o u r t h F r e n c h R e p u b l i c did n o t i m p r o v e
m a t t e r s , a n d t h e A l g e r i a n r e b e l l i o n w h e n it b e g a n l e d , i n effect,
t o t h e c o l l a p s e o f t h a t R e p u b l i c . R e b e l l i o n finally b r o k e o u t i n 1 9 5 4
and w a s led b y y o u n g A l g e r i a n M u s l i m s w h o had acquired s o m e
measure o f cosmopolitanism and a k n o w l e d g e o f Marxist
revolutionary techniques. T h e y formed the F r o n t de Liberation
N a t i o n a l e ( F L N ) , w h i c h h a d as its m i l i t a r y a r m t h e A r m e e
Nationale de Liberation. T h e i r rebellion spread rapidly and by
1957 had g r o w n into a full-scale w a r b e t w e e n the A l g e r i a n w h i t e s
and the M u s l i m p o p u l a t i o n . A t t e m p t s b y different p r i m e ministers
o f t h e F o u r t h R e p u b l i c t o find a s o l u t i o n t o t h e A l g e r i a n w a r m e t
w i t h little s u c c e s s . A t t h e e n d o f M a y 1 9 5 8 , t w o w e e k s b e f o r e t h e
r e s i g n a t i o n o f P r e m i e r P i e r r e P f l i m l i n , t h e last P r i m e M i n i s t e r o f
t h e R e p u b l i c , A l g e r i a n s e t t l e r s h a d i n fact r e b e l l e d a g a i n s t P a r i s
and there w a s a plan to take o v e r the Paris g o v e r n m e n t t h r o u g h
a c o u p to be led b y c o m m a n d e r s o f the A l g e r i a n army. T h a t the
c o u p did not materialise can be attributed to G e n e r a l de G a u l l e ,
w h o w a s i n v i t e d to take p o w e r in F r a n c e w h e n the F o u r t h
R e p u b l i c c o l l a p s e d . It w a s h e w h o b y c a r e f u l m a n o e u v r i n g
s u c c e e d e d in i s o l a t i n g the rebel g e n e r a l s a n d b y skilful n e g o t i a t i o n s
b r o u g h t the w a r t o an e n d .
D e G a u l l e ' s first m o v e w a s t o offer A l g e r i a i n 1 9 5 9 a c h o i c e
between independence, integration w i t h France or association
w i t h F r a n c e , w h i c h c h o i c e w a s t o b e m a d e f o u r y e a r s after t h e
e n d o f hostilities. T h i s p r o n o u n c e m e n t precipitated a r e v o l t in
January i960 b y the E u r o p e a n c o m m u n i t y , w h i c h rejected any
t a l k o f i n d e p e n d e n c e . T h e r e v o l t f a i l e d a n d its l e a d e r s w e r e
s u b s e q u e n t l y a r r e s t e d , b u t it w a s t o b e f o l l o w e d b y a n o t h e r i n
A p r i l 1 9 6 1 . O u t o f the collapse o f a third r e v o l t e m e r g e d the
Organisation de T A r m e e Secrete ( O A S ) , w h i c h resorted to
t e r r o r i s m a n d , c r e a t i n g fears o f r e p r i s a l s a m o n g s t t h e E u r o p e a n
62

p o p u l a t i o n , forced an e x o d u s o f the settler c o m m u n i t y f r o m

A l g e r i a . T h e l i q u i d a t i o n o f t h e O A S finally o p e n e d t h e w a y t o
n e g o t i a t i o n s w h i c h l e d in J u l y 1 9 6 2 t o t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f
Algeria.
D i a l e c t i c a l l y , p e r h a p s o n e s h o u l d see t h e d i l e m m a o f w h i t e -
m i n o r i t y r u l e in A f r i c a as a p l a y in t h r e e a c t s , t h e first a c t h a v i n g
b e e n p l a y e d in K e n y a w i t h t h e r e v o l t o f t h e K i k u y u ( t h e M a u - M a u
r e b e l l i o n o f 1 9 5 2 - 6 ) . A s in A l g e r i a , E u r o p e a n - s e t t l e r e x p r o p r i
ation o f g o o d arable land w a s met w i t h m o u n t i n g resentment,
especially b y the dispossessed K i k u y u , a resentment w h i c h led to
t h e f o r m a t i o n o f t h e K e n y a A f r i c a n U n i o n in t h e late f o r t i e s u n d e r
t h e l e a d e r s h i p o f J o m o K e n y a t t a (later t o b e c o m e p r i m e m i n i s t e r
a n d s u b s e q u e n t l y p r e s i d e n t o f i n d e p e n d e n t K e n y a ) . W i t h little
o p p o r t u n i t y o f r e d r e s s , w h a t s t a r t e d as an o r d i n a r y p o l i t i c a l p a r t y
soon g r e w into a revolutionary m o v e m e n t w h i c h w a s f o l l o w e d
b y o p e n r e b e l l i o n a n d t h e p r o c l a m a t i o n o f a state o f e m e r g e n c y
w h i c h lasted until 1956. E v e n then c o u n t r y - w i d e political a c t i v i t y
w a s n o t a l l o w e d u n t i l i 9 6 0 , a r e s t r i c t i o n w h i c h w a s later t o
i n f l u e n c e , in n o s m a l l w a y , t h e p o s t - i n d e p e n d e n c e p a t t e r n o f
p o l i t i c s . I f K e n y a c a n t h e n b e t a k e n as t h e first a c t in t h e d i a l e c t i c s
o f w h i t e - s e t t l e r - A f r i c a n r e l a t i o n s , A l g e r i a m a y b e s e e n as t h e
m i d d l e act, w i t h w h i t e - d o m i n a t e d s o u t h e r n A f r i c a p r o v i d i n g the
last a c t - after w h i c h t h e e p i t a p h f o r w h i t e r u l e i n A f r i c a m a y
perhaps be written. B e f o r e the end o f o u r period, the curtain had
r i s e n o n t h a t last a c t . P a r t o f t h e s c e n a r i o f o r A l g e r i a n i n d e p e n d e n c e
h a d a c l o s e p a r a l l e l in S o u t h e r n R h o d e s i a w h e n in 1965 t h e
w h i t e - m i n o r i t y s e t t l e r g r o u p r e b e l l e d a g a i n s t L o n d o n ' s efforts t o
pressure them to m a k e concessions to African demands for
p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e c o u n t r y ' s g o v e r n m e n t . T h e y p r o c l a i m e d t h e i r
c o u n t r y i n d e p e n d e n t as ' R h o d e s i a ' , a n d t h o u g h t h e i r s t a t e w a s
n e v e r r e c o g n i s e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y t h e y h a d t h e financial a n d m i l i t a r y
r e s o u r c e s t o d e f y L o n d o n f o r 15 y e a r s . I n d e e d it w a s t h e s u c c e s s
o f the A f r i c a n guerrilla w a r against the forces o f the illegal
R h o d e s i a n r e g i m e t h a t finally b r o u g h t it t o t h e c o n f e r e n c e t a b l e
a n d f o r c e d it t o a c c e p t t h e t r a n s f e r o f p o w e r f r o m t h e w h i t e
minority to the black majority under Britain's supervision. B u t
i n 1 9 7 5 , at t h e c l o s e o f o u r p e r i o d , it s e e m e d t h a t L o n d o n w o u l d
n e v e r r e - e s t a b l i s h its a u t h o r i t y a n d t h a t t h e A l g e r i a n t r a g e d y
w o u l d b e r e - e n a c t e d t h e r e . A s it w a s , d e s p i t e m u c h b l o o d s h e d o n
b o t h sides, albeit o n a p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y m u c h smaller scale than
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D E C O L O N I S A T I O N A N D I N D E P E N D E N C E
in A l g e r i a , a n d d e s p i t e t h e e x o d u s o f s o m e s e t t l e r s , t h e white
minority remained in independent Zimbabwe under black-
majority rule w i t h entrenched political rights and a c o n t i n u i n g
e c o n o m i c role.
The process by which independence was won - whether
through the 'peaceful' handing over of power or through
r e v o l u t i o n a r y insurrectionist s t r u g g l e - n o t o n l y p r o f o u n d l y influ
e n c e d p o s t - i n d e p e n d e n c e e v e n t s , it a l s o e n g e n d e r e d s o m e o f t h e
p r o b l e m s w h i c h the i n d e p e n d e n t states w e r e t o c o n f r o n t . T h u s ,
one cannot b e g i n to understand the nature o f ethnic conflicts and
the w a y t h e y influenced the conflict b e t w e e n states o v e r territorial
boundaries, the p r o b l e m o f military intervention and rule, and the
fragility o f political leadership unless o n e fits them into the
c o n t e x t o f t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e s e t t l e m e n t . M u c h o f t h i s is d i s c u s s e d
below.
THE C O N S T I T U T I O N A L I N H E R I T A N C E
1
T h e constitutional inheritance o f independence was not uniform
b u t v a r i e d f r o m o n e state t o the other, the differences b e i n g d u e
to the format o f the decolonisation process, the nature o f the
political leadership to which power was transferred - the
inheritors - and the character of the nationalist movements
( w h i c h in m o s t cases c o n v e r t e d t h e m s e l v e s into political parties)
at t h e t i m e o f i n d e p e n d e n c e . I n t h e m a i n , t h r e e b r o a d t y p e s o f
2
constitutional settlement can be distinguished: states w i t h a
representative-parliamentary inheritance; states with radical-
r e v o l u t i o n a r y r e g i m e s ; a n d states w i t h a c o n s e r v a t i v e - m o n a r c h i c a l
settlement.
The states that e n t e r e d o n i n d e p e n d e n c e w i t h representative
parliamentary institutions w e r e , in the main, those o f a n g l o p h o n e
and francophone East, West and Central Africa. Relative
modernisation — o n e o f the consequences o f colonisation - had
led t o the e m e r g e n c e in these states o f a ' n e w c l a s s ' , an e d u c a t e d
elite w h o , either b e c a u s e they f o u n d t h e m s e l v e s d e n i e d oppor
tunities to w h i c h they t h o u g h t themselves entitled b e c a m e o p p o s e d
to the colonial r e g i m e , o r because o f their e x p o s u r e to n e w ideas
1
O n the notion o f an 'inheritance* see Peter Nettl and R. Robertson, International
systems and the modernisation of societies (London, 1968).
2
T h e categorisation is quite arbitrary. For other categorisations, see, e.g., James S.
Coleman and Carl G . Rosberg (eds.), Political parties and national integration in tropical
Africa (Berkeley, 1964).
64

( m a n y h a d b e e n e d u c a t e d in B r i t a i n , F r a n c e o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s )
r e j e c t e d t h e w h o l e n o t i o n o f c o l o n i a l i s m itself. T h e y w e r e , i n
essence, m a r g i n a l m e n w h o , e m b r a c i n g the n e w , liberal ideas they
had acquired from the v a r i o u s educational institutions they had
attended abroad, had b e c o m e alienated f r o m their o w n society.
S e e i n g t h e m s e l v e s as p r o s p e c t i v e i n h e r i t o r s o f t h e c o l o n i a l m a n t l e ,
w i t h all t h e p o m p a n d p r i v i l e g e t h a t w e n t w i t h it, t h e y s p e a r h e a d e d
the early nationalist m o v e m e n t s and b e c a m e the leaders o f the
parties that e m e r g e d w i t h the g r a d u a l liberalisation o f the c o l o n i a l
regime, the granting o f the franchise and the introduction o f
representative institutions in the d e c a d e f o l l o w i n g the e n d o f the
S e c o n d W o r l d W a r . Generally, their orientation to politics w a s
c o n s e r v a t i v e a n d g r a d u a l i s t , a n o r i e n t a t i o n w h i c h fitted t h e
predisposition o f the colonial administrations.
T w o m o d e l s w e r e in the m a i n transferred. In the f r a n c o p h o n e
territories, the m o d e l w a s , m o r e often than n o t , the presidential
parliamentarianism o f the Fifth F r e n c h R e p u b l i c , w h i l e in the
a n g l o p h o n e states it w a s t h e ' W e s t m i n s t e r m o d e l \ I n n o c a s e w a s
a n y a t t e m p t m a d e at a c h i e v i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a u t o c h t h o n y i n t h e
m a n n e r o f I n d i a . B u t in e v e r y i n s t a n c e , n o s o o n e r h a d i n d e p e n
dence been w o n than constitutional and other changes w e r e
i n t r o d u c e d w h i c h h a d t h e effect o f r a d i c a l l y m o d i f y i n g t h e s p i r i t
if n o t n e c e s s a r i l y t h e f o r m o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n h e r i t a n c e . I n
m o s t cases, the pattern f o l l o w e d p r o v e d t o be quite similar.
First, ruling parties s o u g h t a m o n o p o l y o f political p o w e r b y
e x c l u d i n g or eliminating c o m p e t i n g parties f r o m the political
arena. T h e tactics f o l l o w e d v a r i e d f r o m the g e r r y m a n d e r i n g o f
constituencies and electoral manipulation, and the c o e r c i o n and
sometimes imprisonment o f opposition candidates, to outright
proscription o f o p p o s i t i o n parties. F r o m a multi-party system, the
r e g i m e b e c a m e q u i c k l y c o n v e r t e d i n t o e i t h e r a de jure o r a de facto
s i n g l e p a r t y s t a t e : f o r e x a m p l e , t h e P a r t i D é m o c r a t i q u e d e la C ô t e
d ' I v o i r e , led b y H o u p h o u ë t - B o i g n y , the U n i t e d National
I n d e p e n d e n c e Party o f Z a m b i a , led b y K e n n e t h K a u n d a , o r the
N é o - D e s t o u r o f T u n i s i a led b y H a b i b B o u r g u i b a .
T h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f the single-party state w a s f o l l o w e d b y the
fusion o f the roles o f h e a d o f g o v e r n m e n t a n d h e a d o f state in
the p e r s o n o f the president, w h o w a s then often m a d e * president-
for-life'. T h e legislature b e c a m e increasingly e m a s c u l a t e d as,
u n d e r t h e s i n g l e p a r t y , it w a s s y s t e m a t i c a l l y s u b o r d i n a t e d t o t h e
65

executive while the executive itself was converted into an

i n s t r u m e n t for effecting the w i l l o f the president. O t h e r changes
f o l l o w e d as t h e j u d i c i a r y w a s m a d e t o s e r v e t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e
e x e c u t i v e and the security forces w e r e c o n v e r t e d into para-political
extensions of the ruling party. Frantz Fanon gave a good
description o f this p r o c e s s o f c h a n g e w h e n he w r o t e :
Before independence, the leader generally embodies the aspirations of the

people for independence, political liberty and national dignity. But as soon as
independence is declared, far from embodying in concrete form the needs of
the people in what touches bread, land and the restoration of the country to
the sacred hands of the people, the leader will reveal his inner purpose: to
become the general president of that company of profiteers impatient for their
1
returns which constitutes the national bourgeoisie.
I n d e p e n d e n c e and the paraphernalia o f a constitutional settlement

thus b e c a m e n o m o r e than a restoration o f the m e d i e v a l d i c t u m :
quod principi placuit, legis vigorem habet.
The independent states of Africa with radical-revolutionary

r e g i m e s c a n b e d i v i d e d i n t o t w o s u b - c a t e g o r i e s . I n t h e first w e r e
states s u c h as G h a n a , Guinea, Mali and Tanzania (formerly
T a n g a n y i k a a n d Z a n z i b a r ) w h i c h at t h e t i m e o f i n d e p e n d e n c e had
a political settlement not unlike that o f the 'representative-
parliamentary' regimes. What differentiated them was the
existence of mass populist-oriented political parties and a
leadership e s p o u s i n g socialist or n e o - M a r x i s t i d e o l o g y .
A g o o d e x a m p l e w a s the Parti D é m o c r a t i q u e de G u i n é e ( P D G )
led b y S é k o u T o u r é and built o n the C o n f é d é r a t i o n Générale
du Travail, a federation o f trade unions. A s Ruth Schachter
M o r g e n t h a u n o t e d in h e r c l a s s i c s t u d y Political parties in French-
speaking West Africa, to the leaders o f the P D G ,
party and trade union were one. The trade union experience of many PDG
leaders affected their ideas as well as their style of living, speaking, writing and
acting. Since they held jobs low in the administrative hierarchy, they lived of
necessity close to the people. Many had but irregular incomes; their housing
was bad, few had cars, their clothes were simple. They relied on their colleagues
or relations when in need, and made virtues of the labels pinned on them by
2
their adversaries - * illiterates*, 'vagrants' and * badly dressed'.
!
F r a n t z F a n o n , The wretched of the earth ( N e w Y o r k , 1963), 134.
2
Ruth Schachter Morgenthau, Political parties in French-speaking West Africa
( O x f o r d , 1964), 230.
66

Similarly, in G h a n a m e m b e r s o f K w a m e N k r u m a h ' s C o n v e n t i o n
People's Party were designated 'verandah boys' and 'prison
graduates'.
But t h o u g h radical and r e v o l u t i o n a r y in orientation, the pattern
o f i m m e d i a t e p o s t - i n d e p e n d e n c e political d e v e l o p m e n t in these
s t a t e s d i d n o t differ, in e s s e n t i a l s , f r o m t h a t i n t h e ' r e p r e s e n t a t i v e -
parliamentary' regimes. Representative institutions and the elec
t o r a l p r o c e s s w e r e p r o g r e s s i v e l y u n d e r m i n e d as t h e s u p r e m a c y o f
the party w a s p r o c l a i m e d . In N k r u m a h ' s G h a n a , for e x a m p l e , n o
e l e c t i o n s t o t h e N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y w e r e h e l d after 1958. T h e
a s s e m b l y s i m p l y e x t e n d e d its life b y l e g i s l a t i v e a p p r o v a l o f its
m e m b e r s . T h e pattern w a s similar in G u i n e a and M a l i , w h e r e the
p a r t y C o n g r e s s m e t t o r a t i f y t h e list o f c a n d i d a t e s f o r t h e N a t i o n a l
A s s e m b l y d r a w n u p b y the president and the party e x e c u t i v e .
T a n z a n i a , in this r e s p e c t , p r o v e d t o b e a n e x c e p t i o n . T h o u g h a
de jure o n e - p a r t y state w i t h N y e r e r e , leader o f the T a n g a n y i k a
1
African National U n i o n , as p r e s i d e n t , Tanzania nevertheless
maintained on the mainland the institutions she inherited at
i n d e p e n d e n c e , w i t h s o m e f r e e d o m o f e l e c t o r a l c h o i c e still b e i n g
retained by the electorate. Unlike Ghana, Guinea or Mali,
T a n z a n i a m a d e d e f i n i t e m o v e s t o w a r d s t h e r e a l i s a t i o n o f its i d e a l
o f participatory d e m o c r a c y a n d in that respect w a s p e r h a p s u n i q u e
2
amongst African states.
The second sub-category o f the radical-revolutionary regimes
c o m p r i s e d t h o s e states - A l g e r i a , M o z a m b i q u e , A n g o l a , G u i n e a -
Bissau and the C a p e V e r d e Islands - w h i c h a c h i e v e d i n d e p e n d e n c e
3
not through bargaining but by 'internal w a r ' . T h e s e w e r e states
w h i c h at t h e t i m e o f i n d e p e n d e n c e h a d n o i n h e r i t e d p o l i t i c a l i n
stitutions ( A l g e r i a b e i n g s o m e t h i n g o f an e x c e p t i o n , see a b o v e
4
p p . 6 1 - 2 ) b u t c a m e i n t o e x i s t e n c e as ' g a r r i s o n s t a t e s ' w h e r e the
political rhetoric was that derived from the revolutionary
experience o f guerrilla warfare. T h a t experience was oriented
m a i n l y at w i n n i n g t h e s y m p a t h y a n d g o o d w i l l , o r at t h e w o r s t , t h e
s i m p l e t o l e r a n c e , o f t h e p e a s a n t r y in t h o s e a r e a s w h i c h , b e f o r e i n -
1
The reference here is specifically to Tanganyika. The union of that territory with
Zanzibar is called Tanzania.
2
Socialism and participation, the Election Study Committee, University of Dar es
Salaam (Dar es Salaam, 1974).
3
4
Harry Eckstein (ed.), Internal war: problems and approaches (New York, 1964).
H. D. Lasswell: 'The garrison-state hypotheses today', in Samuel P. Huntington
(ed.), Changing patterns of military politics (New York, 1962).
67

d e p e n d e n c e , w e r e held b y the nationalist guerrilla leaders t h r o u g h

force o f arms. T h o u g h practice varied from o n e place to the other
d e p e n d i n g o n the nature o f the local c o m m u n i t i e s and the state
o f t h e g u e r r i l l a w a r , n e v e r t h e l e s s t h e p r i n c i p a l t h r u s t o f effort w a s
t o w a r d s the formation o f self-administering local c o m m i t t e e s
representing g r o u p s o f small villages, committees w h o s e respon
sibilities w e r e then p r o g r e s s i v e l y w i d e n e d t o c o v e r functions
s u c h as l o c a l j u s t i c e a n d s e c u r i t y , e d u c a t i o n a n d h e a l t h a n d
c o o p e r a t i v e p r o d u c t i o n a n d m a r k e t i n g as t h e l i b e r a t e d a r e a s w e r e
m a d e m o r e secure. F r o m this there d e v e l o p e d the m o d e l w h i c h
t h e i n d e p e n d e n t state e v e n t u a l l y a d o p t e d , a m o d e l b a s e d at e a c h
level o f o r g a n i s a t i o n o n an elected a s s e m b l y o f delegates w h i c h
in t u r n e l e c t e d a n e x e c u t i v e c o m m i t t e e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r p o l i c y
m a k i n g at t h a t l e v e l a n d a c c o u n t a b l e - i n p r i n c i p l e - t o t h e
a s s e m b l y w h i c h e l e c t e d it. G e n e r a l l y , t h e a i m w a s t o m a x i m i s e
p o p u l a r p a r t i c i p a t i o n at e a c h l e v e l o f g o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e
o r g a n i s i n g p r i n c i p l e c o u l d p e r h a p s b e d e s c r i b e d as a f o r m o f
d e m o c r a t i c centralism. T h o u g h this w a s the m o d e l established in
G u i n e a - B i s s a u a n d C a p e V e r d e , i n e s s e n t i a l s it is n o t u n r e p r e s e n
t a t i v e o f w h a t o b t a i n e d in M o z a m b i q u e a n d A n g o l a . It is far f r o m
certain h o w l o n g such a neo-populist, ' n e o - M a r x i s t ' f r a m e w o r k
can persist. A l g e r i a — w h i c h also had a r e v o l u t i o n a r y e x p e r i e n c e
and a colonial b a c k g r o u n d n o t t o o dissimilar f r o m that o f
M o z a m b i q u e - had, under Ben Bella, s o u g h t to experiment w i t h
a s o c i a l i s t f r a m e w o r k s o o n after it b e c a m e i n d e p e n d e n t . B u t
within three years o f independence B e n Bella w a s to be arrested
and imprisoned by the military-backed C o l o n e l B o u m e d i e n n e ,
w h o castigated B e n Bella for calling for ' the w i t h e r i n g a w a y o f
t h e s t a t e ' w h e n t h e state w a s y e t t o b e e s t a b l i s h e d . T w e l v e y e a r s
later, after t h e c o u p t h a t o v e r t h r e w B e n B e l l a i n 1 9 6 5 , A l g e r i a h a d
b e c o m e , like m a n y o f the o t h e r A f r i c a n states, a o n e - m a n
p r e s i d e n t i a l i s t state (see C h a p t e r 1 1 ) .
T h i r d l y , t h e r e w a s a g r o u p o f states w h i c h e m b a r k e d o n i n d e
pendence with a conservative-monarchical settlement, notably
M o r o c c o , Ethiopia and Libya, to w h i c h may be added L e s o t h o
and Swaziland and, for c o n v e n i e n c e , Zaire. (Technically Tunisia
w a s a m o n a r c h y at i n d e p e n d e n c e b u t it w a s p r o c l a i m e d a r e p u b l i c
shortly afterwards.) T h e inclusion o f Zaire may seem o d d , but
t h o u g h , after t h e c h a o s o f 1 9 6 0 - 4 , G e n e r a l M o b u t u ( w h o s u b s e -
68

THE CONSTITUTIONAL I N H E R I T A N C E
q u e n t l y r e n a m e d h i m s e l f M o b u t u S e s e S e k o ) e m e r g e d as P r e s i
dent o f C o n g o - K i n s h a s a (Zaire), the Z a i r e a n r e g i m e b e c a m e
e s s e n t i a l l y m o n a r c h i c a l i n m u c h t h e s a m e s e n s e as M o r o c c o ' s
r e g i m e c o u l d b e s a i d t o b e s o . L e s o t h o at i n d e p e n d e n c e c o u l d b e
d e s c r i b e d as a ' c o n s t i t u t i o n a l m o n a r c h y ' w i t h P a r a m o u n t C h i e f
M o t l o t l e h i M o s h w e s h w e I I as k i n g : f o u r y e a r s after i n d e p e n
dence, C h i e f L e a b u a Jonathan, then prime minister, extra-legally
seized p o w e r and placed the k i n g u n d e r house-arrest.
M o r o c c o , e v e n b e f o r e its o c c u p a t i o n a n d c o l o n i s a t i o n b y
France, w a s a m o n a r c h y u n d e r the rule o f a sultan. U n d e r F r e n c h
r u l e t h e m o n a r c h y w a s p r e s e r v e d a n d at i n d e p e n d e n c e M o r o c c o
remained a monarchy under M o h a m m e d V ben Youssef. In Libya,
t h e S a n u s i E m i r o f C y r e n a i c a e m e r g e d as K i n g M u h a m m e d I d r l s
o f L i b y a w h e n the former Italian p r o v i n c e s o f F e z z a n , Tripolitania
a n d C y r e n a i c a w e r e m e r g e d t o g e t h e r i n 1 9 5 1 t o f o r m t h e n e w state.
B u t after j u s t o v e r a d e c a d e o f i n d e p e n d e n c e , t h e m o n a r c h y i n
L i b y a w a s to be abolished b y the military, led b y C o l o n e l
Q a d h d h a f i (Gadafi). T h e restored m o n a r c h y o f Haile Selassie w a s
o v e r t h r o w n a n d r e p l a c e d b y a r a d i c a l m i l i t a r y r e g i m e at t h e e n d
o f o u r period, b y w h i c h time the c o n s e r v a t i v e - m o n a r c h i c a l r e g i m e
w a s an e x o t i c f o r m o f g o v e r n m e n t o n t h e c o n t i n e n t .
Independence - and the political settlement that c a m e w i t h

it - w a s n o t w i t h o u t its a t t e n d a n t d i f f i c u l t i e s . T h e r e w a s h a r d l y
a state i n A f r i c a i n w h i c h , w i t h i n a d e c a d e o f i n d e p e n d e n c e , t h e r e
w a s n o t a m i l i t a r y c o u p o r a t t e m p t e d c o u p . D a h o m e y (later t h e
R e p u b l i c o f B e n i n ) e x p e r i e n c e d n o less t h a n s e v e n c o u p s w i t h i n
t h e first t e n y e a r s o f its i n d e p e n d e n c e . I n f a c t , s o p r e v a l e n t w e r e
military c o u p s that civil g o v e r n m e n t s b e c a m e the e x c e p t i o n rather
than the rule in the n e w l y i n d e p e n d e n t states. N o t o n l y c o u p s ;
i n d e p e n d e n c e a l s o b r o u g h t w i t h it c i v i l w a r s , as in N i g e r i a , C h a d ,
the S u d a n and the ancient k i n g d o m o f E t h i o p i a . T o civil w a r s must
be added the spate o f inter-state w a r s o v e r disputed b o u n d a r i e s :
between A l g e r i a and M o r o c c o ; K e n y a and Somalia; Somalia
and E t h i o p i a ; the S u d a n and E t h i o p i a ; A l g e r i a and M o r o c c o and
Mauritania o v e r Spanish Sahara; Zaire and A n g o l a o v e r sections
o f A n g o l a ; and to a lesser extent b e t w e e n N i g e r i a and C a m e r o u n .
T h e s i t u a t i o n is i n n o w a y i m p r o v e d w h e n w e a d d i n t e r n a l
c o n f l i c t s o v e r e t h n i c b o u n d a r i e s . O f t h e 43 o r m o r e i n d e p e n d e n t
A f r i c a n states, o n l y S o m a l i a can p e r h a p s c l a i m a h o m o g e n e o u s
69

p o p u l a t i o n . C h a d and the S u d a n w e r e almost f r o m the time o f

their accession to i n d e p e n d e n c e c o n f r o n t e d b y secessionist w a r s
w h i l e N i g e r i a h a d t o fight a b i t t e r c i v i l w a r f o r c l o s e o n t h r e e y e a r s
t o maintain her territorial integrity. W h e n o n e realises that in a
state s u c h as N i g e r i a t h e r e a r e o v e r t w o h u n d r e d e t h n i c g r o u p s ,
s o m e w i t h p o p u l a t i o n s g r e a t e r than t h o s e of, for instance, G a b o n ,
Mauritania, N i g e r and U p p e r V o l t a , then one begins to appreciate
the potential for internal conflict w h i c h the ethnic h e t e r o g e n e i t y
o f A f r i c a n societies p o s e s for the n e w states. T h i s potential w a s
all t h e m o r e real b y r e a s o n o f t h e l o w l e v e l o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n
o f political structures, the parochial nature o f political socialisation
and the ' p r i m i t i v e ' means o f social c o m m u n i c a t i o n and m o b i l i
s a t i o n w h i c h c h a r a c t e r i s e d t h e s e s t a t e s . T h e r e is l i t t l e d o u b t t h e n
that disputes o v e r the borders created b y colonial rule will remain
t o p l a g u e t h e n e w l y i n d e p e n d e n t s t a t e s in t h e y e a r s t o c o m e . B e
t h a t as it m a y , it m i g h t b e as w e l l t o t a k e a c l o s e r l o o k at s o m e
of the other problems that have arisen in the wake of
independence.
THE BUREAUCRACY AND THE ECONOMY
I n all t h e n e w s t a t e s o f A f r i c a , t h e g o v e r n m e n t w a s n o t o n l y t h e
l a r g e s t s i n g l e e m p l o y e r o f l a b o u r , it w a s a l s o t h e ' p r i m e m o v e r '
1
e c o n o m i c a l l y and politically. B e c a u s e the p u b l i c sector w a s so
d o m i n a n t , there can be n o meaningful discussion o f the p r o b l e m s
o f the n e w states that d o e s n o t take i n t o a c c o u n t the p l a c e a n d
r o l e o f t h e b u r e a u c r a c y in t h e m . It h a s in fact b e e n a r g u e d t h a t
it w o u l d b e u n r e a l t o t h i n k o f a n y t y p e o f n a t i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t
in t h e s e states in w h i c h t h e b u r e a u c r a c y , e v e n i f its r o l e w e r e
limited to the p r o v i s i o n o f data, a d v i c e , and m a n a g e m e n t expertise,
2
w a s e x c l u d e d . M o r e o v e r , m o s t o f the i n d e p e n d e n t A f r i c a n states
exhibited a high degree o f ethnic, religious and cultural hetero
g e n e i t y , a n d as t h e h i s t o r i e s o f c o u n t r i e s l i k e J a p a n , after t h e M e i j i
R e s t o r a t i o n , a n d G e r m a n y a n d I t a l y in t h e n i n e t e e n t h century
have s h o w n , a centralised bureaucracy can be o f crucial importance
1
T h e percentages of w a g e and salary earners employed in the public sector in 1965
were: Somalia, 60; Sudan, 5 7; T o g o , 48; Nigeria, 4 1 ; Ghana, 3 5; Senegal, 3 5; Tanzania,
3 2; K e n y a , 29. G o v e r n m e n t spending as a percentage of G N P , 1961, gives the following
figures: Somalia, 19; Sudan, 16; T o g o , 1 3 ; Nigeria, 1 1 ; Ghana, 26; Tanzania, 18; K e n y a ,
17; Senegal, 24. (Source: Morrison et al., Black Africa, tables 7.3 and 9.4.)
2
Joseph La Palombara (ed.), Bureaucracy and political development (Princeton, 1969).
70

BUREAUCRACY AND THE ECONOMY
in t h e f o r m a t i o n o f a national entity out o f a socio-cultural

p l u r a l i t y . B u t t h o u g h s o c e n t r a l , t h e b u r e a u c r a c y in t h e A f r i c a n
states p o s e d a n u m b e r o f p r o b l e m s .
1
W i t h the e x c e p t i o n o f E g y p t , the bureaucracy w a s largely a
new creation for m o s t A f r i c a n states, an artifact o f c o l o n i a l i s m ,
w h i c h g r e w in m o s t c a s e s o u t o f E u r o p e a n m i l i t a r y o c c u p a t i o n ,
a n d m o s t o f its first m e m b e r s , as h a s b e e n p o i n t e d o u t b y o n e
c o m m e n t a t o r , ' w e r e military personnel d r a w n from the colonial
2
regiments and occupation forces'. Because o f the need to
m a i n t a i n o r d e r in t h e c o l o n i s e d t e r r i t o r i e s , t h i s w a s t h e i n i t i a l
orientation o f the civil servants in the n e w states. T h e y w e r e rarely
d e v e l o p m e n t - o r i e n t e d , an a c t i v i t y w h i c h b e f o r e the S e c o n d W o r l d
W a r w a s l a r g e l y left t o m i s s i o n a r i e s , t r a d i n g c o m p a n i e s , a n d , in t h e
white-settled areas, to the i m m i g r a n t E u r o p e a n p o p u l a t i o n . E v e n
w h e n , w i t h increasing modernisation and rapid political c h a n g e ,
p a r t i c u l a r l y after t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r , t h e b u r e a u c r a c y b e c a m e
i n v o l v e d in m o r e c o m p l e x a d m i n i s t r a t i v e tasks, v e r y little w a s
d o n e t o d e v e l o p i n d i g e n o u s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n it at t h e p o l i c y - m a k i n g
l e v e l . I n d e e d , t h e e x p a n s i o n o f t h e c i v i l s e r v i c e s after t h e w a r t o
meet the more c o m p l e x tasks that the bureaucracy had to
c o n f r o n t r e s u l t e d in w h a t h a s b e e n d e s c r i b e d as a s e c o n d c o l o n i a l
invasion.
A s l a t e as 19 5 o i n t h e a n g l o p h o n e a n d f r a n c o p h o n e s t a t e s , w h e r e
m o r e attention w a s g i v e n to the d e v e l o p m e n t o f an i n d i g e n o u s
b u r e a u c r a c y t h a n it w a s in t h e B e l g i a n , P o r t u g u e s e a n d S p a n i s h
territories, the managerial, s u p e r v i s o r y , professional, senior tech
nical and o t h e r u p p e r levels o f the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w e r e l a r g e l y held
by E u r o p e a n s . T h e j o b o f d i s m a n t l i n g this racial structure w a s
h a r d l y b e g u n in W e s t A f r i c a b e f o r e 1 9 4 8 , a n d i n E a s t a n d C e n t r a l
Africa not before 1954 and i960 respectively. A s A . L . A d u noted,
' t h e p a t t e r n b e f o r e t h e c h a n g e [in t h e a n g l o p h o n e states] w a s t h a t
E u r o p e a n s filled all " s e n i o r " s e r v i c e p o s t s , t h a t i s , r e s p o n s i b l e
p o s t s in the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , e x e c u t i v e , p r o f e s s i o n a l a n d technical
g r a d e s . L o c a l p e r s o n n e l w e r e r e c r u i t e d t o fill t h e " j u n i o r " s e r v i c e
p o s t s in t h e j u n i o r e x e c u t i v e , c l e r i c a l , s e m i - s k i l l e d a n d u n s k i l l e d
industrial and manipulative grades.' In East and Central Africa,
he a d d e d , ' the situation w a s further c o m p l i c a t e d b y the i n t e r v e n t i o n
1
M o r roe Berger, Bureaucracy and society in modern Egypt: a study of the higher civil service
(Princeton, 1957).
2
A . L. A d u , The civil service in the Commonwealth of Africa (London, 1969), 17.
71

o f the i m m i g r a n t E u r o p e a n , A s i a n and " c o l o u r e d " c o m m u n i t i e s

who filled intermediate grade positions b e t w e e n the expatriate
E u r o p e a n and the A f r i c a n s . T h e y o c c u p i e d w h a t in W e s t A f r i c a n
t e r m s m a y b e d e s c r i b e d as t h e more junior o f the so-called
" E u r o p e a n " a p p o i n t m e n t s and the m o r e senior o f the A f r i c a n
1
appointments.'
T h e n e e d r a p i d l y t o A f r i c a n i s e t h e b u r e a u c r a c y in t h e A f r i c a n
s t a t e s m e a n t t h a t at i n d e p e n d e n c e m o s t h a d c i v i l s e r v i c e s i n w h i c h
key decision-making posts had been filled either by relatively
inexperienced, though educated, personnel, or by people who
w e r e e x p e r i e n c e d b u t n o t adequately e d u c a t e d . E v e n this g e n e r
alisation has t o b e qualified. In states where one party was
d o m i n a n t b e f o r e i n d e p e n d e n c e , it w a s n o t s o m u c h t h e r e l a t i v e
c o m p e t e n c e o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l as h i s o s t e n s i b l e l o y a l t y t o t h e p a r t y
that b e c a m e the prime consideration in the filling of posts.
Africanisation thus b e c a m e a m e t h o d o f ensuring that k n o w n
party supporters w e r e rewarded, and the n o t i o n o f merit g a v e w a y
to that o f favouritism. T h e p l u m s o f independence w e r e ready for
t h e p i c k i n g b y t h e ' l o y a l ' . I n s t a t e s s u c h as N i g e r i a a n d K e n y a ,
w h e r e ethnic considerations had been a v e r y i m p o r t a n t factor in
t h e s t r u g g l e f o r i n d e p e n d e n c e , it w a s t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s e t h n i c o r i g i n
w h i c h m a t t e r e d as t h e v a r i o u s e t h n i c g r o u p s c o m p e t e d t o r e a p t h e
fruits o f i n d e p e n d e n c e . I n e i t h e r c a s e , t h e e n d r e s u l t w a s t h e s a m e :
efficiency w a s sacrificed t o the d e m a n d s o f political e x p e d i e n c y .
T h e a n g l o p h o n e a n d f r a n c o p h o n e states c o u l d , h o w e v e r , b e
said t o h a v e b e e n r e l a t i v e l y f o r t u n a t e . T h e s i t u a t i o n i n t h e B e l g i a n
c o l o n i e s w a s m o r e d i s m a l , as t a b l e 2.2 s h o w s .
Z a i r e , o n c e m o r e , p r o v i d e s a classic e x a m p l e o f the situation
w i t h respect t o the b u r e a u c r a c y in the B e l g i a n territories. A t the
time o f independence in i 9 6 0 t h e r e w e r e o n l y 30 C o n g o l e s e
( Z a i r e a n s ) w h o h a d u n i v e r s i t y d e g r e e s , w h i l e 350 w e r e e n r o l l e d
in the C o n g o ' s t w o universities. T h e total e n r o l m e n t in s e c o n d a r y
schools w a s 1 3 5 8 3 . T h e result w a s that w h e n i n d e p e n d e n c e c a m e
t h e r e w e r e h a r d l y a n y C o n g o l e s e t o m a n t h e b u r e a u c r a c y (see
t a b l e 2.3).
P r i o r t o 1 9 5 9 , there h a d in fact b e e n t w o c i v i l s e r v i c e s in the
C o n g o : the civil service proper, w h i c h w a s restricted to the
E u r o p e a n p o p u l a t i o n , a n d an auxiliary s e r v i c e in w h i c h A f r i c a n s
w e r e t o be f o u n d . W h e n in 1 9 5 9 , b y the Statut U n i q u e , the
1
Ibid., 21.
72

BUREAUCRACY AND THE ECONOMY
T a b l e 2.2. Secondary school enrolment ipjo and 1966:

selected countries.
Total estimated
population Secondary school enrolment
(1969) in
Country thousands 1950 1966
Kenya 10.9 8000 49223

Nigeria 56.7 21437 202683
Senegal 3.8 2288 *5 574
Central African 1.5 *37 4668
Republic
Zaire 20.6 6
953 52309
Rwanda 3-5 247 2900
Burundi 3-5 350 2932
Source-. Morrison et al., Black Africa, tables5.9, 5.10, and 1.4.
T a b l e 2.3. Composition of the civilservice in the Congo, i960.
Minimum educational
Rank requirement Europeans Africans
i university 106 0
2 university 1004 I
3 university 3 5 32 2
4 2 yrs university - 5 159 800
complete secondary
5-7 four years primary - 0 11000
secondary
Source-. Crawford Young, Politics in the Congo, 402.
bureaucracy was consolidated and seven grades established, only

s o m e 800 C o n g o l e s e w e r e f o u n d s u i t a b l e f o r r e c r u i t m e n t t o t h e
fourth rank, w h i c h had previously been exclusive to Europeans.
T h e r e f o r e , w h e n t h e B e l g i a n s p u l l e d o u t o f t h e C o n g o at
independence, the n e w A f r i c a n leaders found they barely had a
c i v i l s e r v i c e , f o r w i t h o n l y 30 g r a d u a t e s a v a i l a b l e t o fill o v e r 4000
vacated posts, o n e c o u l d hardly talk o f the C o n g o l e s e inheriting
a bureaucracy.
It h a s b e e n s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e b u r e a u c r a c y h a s a c r u c i a l r o l e
73

t o p l a y in t h e p o l i t i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e n e w states in A f r i c a .
B u t this is a r o l e f o r w h i c h t h e c o l o n i a l b u r e a u c r a c y w a s n o t
d e s i g n e d a n d t h e r e f o r e it h a d t o b e c o n s i d e r a b l y a d a p t e d t o m e e t
t h e d e m a n d s o f i n d e p e n d e n t A f r i c a n s t a t e s . Y e t it w a s at t h e t i m e
w h e n n e w orientations had to be f o r m e d for p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g that
the b u r e a u c r a c y h a d t o face t h e d i s l o c a t i o n s c a u s e d b y A f r i c a n i -
sation and restructuring. In m o s t cases, the ' n e w m e n ' had neither
the capabilities n o r the e x p e r i e n c e to c o p e w i t h the tasks they w e r e
c o n f r o n t e d w i t h - f o r e x a m p l e , f o r m u l a t i n g t h e n e w ' five-year
d e v e l o p m e n t plans ' w h i c h became fashionable w i t h independence
- w h i l e i n t e r f e r e n c e in m a t t e r s p e r t a i n i n g t o a p p o i n t m e n t s a n d
p r o m o t i o n s b y the n e w political leaders u n d e r m i n e d w h a t traditions
o f d i s c i p l i n e , i n t e g r i t y a n d i m p a r t i a l i t y h a d e x i s t e d p r e v i o u s l y in
the civil service.
Besides b e i n g ill-equipped for the n e w role e x p e c t e d o f t h e m ,
t h e ' n e w m e n as i n h e r i t o r s o f t h e p o s t s v a c a t e d b y t h e i r e r s t w h i l e
c o l o n i a l m a s t e r s , in m o s t c a s e s a l s o f o u g h t t o r e t a i n a n d t o
p r e s e r v e t h e p r i v i l e g e s a n d p e r q u i s i t e s o f t h e offices t h e y h a d c o m e
t o o c c u p y , a n t i t h e t i c a l as t h e s e o f t e n w e r e t o t h e n e e d s o f t h e n e w l y
i n d e p e n d e n t states. I n s e e k i n g t o m a i n t a i n t h e a u r a o f t h e i r offices,
t h e y s u c c e e d e d o n l y in c u t t i n g t h e m s e l v e s o f f f r o m t h e r e a l i t i e s
o f their societies and in the p r o c e s s b e c a m e , w i t h the political
l e a d e r s , a n e w b r e e d o f p r i v i l e g e d é l i t e , f o r w h o m , as in t h e
c o l o n i a l p e r i o d , all e l s e h a d t o b e s a c r i f i c e d . P o l i c y - m a k i n g , in
t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , c o u l d n o t b u t b e h a p h a z a r d , as t h e p r i o r i t i e s
o f the society w e r e distorted to suit the d e m a n d s o f this élite. T h e
bureaucracy, b y the dialectics o f independence, b e c a m e , like the
c o l o n i a l s y s t e m , a b u r d e n t o t h e n e w states. I n m o s t o f t h e s e , a d
ministrative costs s o o n accounted for m o r e than sixty per cent o f
the r e c u r r e n t b u d g e t . F o r t h e s e ' soft states to use the l a n g u a g e
o f G u n n a r M y r d a l , the distinguished S w e d i s h d e v e l o p m e n t
economist, w i t h party structures w h i c h hardly extended b e y o n d
the main urban centres and barely existent local political structures,
the d i l e m m a s p o s e d b y a politicised bureaucratic s y s t e m l a c k i n g
the necessary techno-managerial skills b e c a m e a l m o s t o v e r w h e l m
ing. T h e situation w a s exacerbated by a w a g e structure and an
educational f r a m e w o r k w h i c h discriminated against the acquisi
tion o f managerial skills and expertise but placed a p r e m i u m o n
9
a literary and ' l i b e r a l education w h i c h w a s barely c o n s o n a n t w i t h
the technocratic requirements o f a d e v e l o p i n g society.
74

SOCIAL MOBILISATION
SOCIAL MOBILISATION
M o s t A f r i c a n states p r o v e d n o t u n m i n d f u l o f the shortcomings

o f their public services and m a n y initiated schemes for retraining
and reorganisation. B u t if the p r o b l e m s p o s e d b y the b u r e a u c r a c y -
lack o f (or inadequate) skills, inexperience, inefficiency - w e r e
p a r t l y s o l v e d b y t h e s e s c h e m e s , it w a s n o t o b v i o u s t h a t those
p o s e d b y the structure o f the society and the e c o n o m y w e r e so
amenable.
O n e o f t h e l e g a c i e s o f c o l o n i a l i s m in t h e i n d e p e n d e n t African
states w a s the s u p e r - i m p o s i t i o n o f a n e w stratificational pattern
o n the traditional social structure. Since independence, not only
d i d this n e w p a t t e r n ( w h i c h o w e d itself m o r e t o western-type
education than to any other single factor) displace and replace the
traditional social structure, b u t the different strata t e n d e d in fact
to rigidify, thereby creating w h a t has b e e n described b y m a n y
o b s e r v e r s as a n ' e l i t e - m a s s ' g a p , o n e o f t h e m a i n s o u r c e s o f
instability in the i n d e p e n d e n t A f r i c a n states.
In traditional s o c i e t y , status w a s defined either in k i n s h i p o r
lineage terms, or by age and sex. W i t h the creation of new
bureaucratic roles w h i c h required a formal education, the colonial
state i n t r o d u c e d a n e w criterion for status differentiation, a n d the
acquisition o f a formal education rapidly b e c a m e the passport to
upward mobility in the emergent stratification system. At
independence, some five different levels o f this stratificational
1
s y s t e m c o u l d be d i s t i n g u i s h e d in the v a r i o u s A f r i c a n states. The
topmost stratum, w h i c h for purposes of convenience may be
designated the ' u p p e r class', and w h i c h w a s c o m p o s e d o f ap
proximately one per cent o f the total population, w a s itself m a d e
up of two segments, the bureaucratic-professional and the
c o m m e r c i a l . T h e former w a s c o m p o s e d o f the u p p e r echelons o f
the bureaucracy (including parastatals), the military, lawyers,
d o c t o r s , m a n a g e r s and u n i v e r s i t y teachers, the e d u c a t e d elite w h o
h a d h a d at l e a s t t h r e e y e a r s o f u n i v e r s i t y e d u c a t i o n ; w h i l e t h e l a t t e r
c o m p r i s e d the large farmers g r o w i n g e x p o r t c r o p s and the b i g
mercantile-contracting class, often linked w i t h foreign financial
interests and the 'political class' with whom they shared a
1
E. De K a d t and G . Williams (eds.), Sociology and development (London, 1974);
R. Sandbrook and R. Cohen (eds.), The development of an African working class (London,
1975); I. G . Shivji, Class struggles in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam, 1975).
75

c o m m o n interest, that o f furthering their e c o n o m i c ends t h r o u g h

t h e m a n i p u l a t i o n a n d c o n t r o l o f t h e m a c h i n e r y o f state.
T h e s e c o n d stratum, w h i c h m i g h t be t e r m e d t h e ' m i d d l e class ',
a l s o f o r m e d t w o s e g m e n t s , t h e first c o n s i s t i n g o f t h e e x e c u t i v e ,
technical and clerical cadres o f the bureaucracy, the junior ranks
o f the military, s c h o o l teachers and the like. T h e s e m a d e u p s o m e
t w o per cent o f the total p o p u l a t i o n , w h i l e the other s e g m e n t ,
c o m p r i s i n g s o m e ten per cent o f the p o p u l a t i o n , c o u l d b e defined
r e s i d u a l l y as t h e petite bourgeoisie, t h o s e w h o w e r e n e i t h e r m e m b e r s
o f the * u p p e r class ', n o r o f the third o r f o u r t h strata - the
' w o r k i n g c l a s s ' (or proletariat) o r the ' p e a s a n t s ' . T h e s e w e r e the
' p e t t y t r a d e r s ' , u s u a l l y s e l f - e m p l o y e d , w i t h little o r n o f o r m a l
e d u c a t i o n a n d o w n i n g v e r y little c a p i t a l .
T h e proletariat w a s made u p o f the skilled, semi-skilled and
u n s k i l l e d l a b o u r e r s , w h o , l i k e t h e petit-bourgeois m e m b e r s o f t h e
m i d d l e class h a d a c q u i r e d little, i f a n y , f o r m a l e d u c a t i o n . T h i s
s t r a t u m a c c o u n t e d f o r b e t w e e n five a n d e i g h t p e r c e n t o f t h e
p o p u l a t i o n , a n d i n states w h e r e u n i o n i s a t i o n w a s p e r m i t t e d , w a s
usually organised into trade unions. T h e fourth stratum, w h i c h
f o r m e d s o m e t h i n g b e t w e e n 70 a n d 80 p e r c e n t o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n ,
consisted o f the peasants, the ' s u b s i s t e n c e f a r m e r s ' , w h o m o r e
often than n o t w e r e illiterate and w e r e usually t o be f o u n d f a r m i n g
land n o t m u c h m o r e than an acre in area.
T o t h e f o r e g o i n g m u s t b e a d d e d a fifth s t r a t u m , t h e e v e r
g r o w i n g class o f u n e m p l o y e d - and p o s s i b l y u n e m p l o y a b l e -
p r i m a r y - s c h o o l leavers and s c h o o l ' d r o p - o u t s ' . T h i s class w a s the
creation largely o f the p o s t - i n d e p e n d e n c e era and a p r o d u c t o f t w o
m a i n f a c t o r s . T h e first w a s t h e e x p l o s i o n i n f o r m a l e d u c a t i o n
w h i c h generally a c c o m p a n i e d the a p p r o a c h to, or the attainment
of, i n d e p e n d e n c e . T h e s e c o n d w a s t h e n a t u r e o f t h e p o s t - c o l o n i a l
' administrative state'. Because o f the need to p r o v i d e the educated
m a n p o w e r required b y n e w l y i n d e p e n d e n t states, m o s t A f r i c a n
states h a d r a p i d l y t o e x p a n d t h e i r e d u c a t i o n a l s y s t e m s . H o w e v e r ,
s i n c e t h e state w a s t h e m a i n e m p l o y e r o f l a b o u r , e i t h e r j o b
opportunities b e c a m e q u i c k l y exhausted or the p r o d u c t s o f the
s c h o o l s b e c a m e f u n c t i o n a l l y o b s o l e s c e n t as t h e d e m a n d f o r l a b o u r
b e c a m e increasingly skill-specific. T h e result w a s the creation o f
a ' reserve a r m y ' - a veritable lumpenproletariat - o f u n e m p l o y e d
a n d u n e m p l o y a b l e y o u t h s w h o t h e n b e g a n t o c o n s t i t u t e a real
76

SOCIAL MOBILISATION
s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l threat t o the stability o f the n e w state. T h i s threat

b e c a m e all t o o real w h e n t h e p r o b l e m o f t h e u n e m p l o y a b l e w a s
c o n s i d e r e d in r e l a t i o n t o t h e p r o b l e m o f u r b a n i s a t i o n . I n t h e p a s t ,
t h e s i z e o f t h e c i t y s e r v e d as a n i n d e x o f ' p r o g r e s s ' a n d
' d e v e l o p m e n t ' , so that b y 1950 the urban p o p u l a t i o n o f the
d e v e l o p e d , rich countries w a s just a b o u t d o u b l e that o f the
t h i r d - w o r l d c o u n t r i e s . B y 1 9 7 5 , h o w e v e r , h a l f o f t h e 15 l a r g e s t
c i t i e s in t h e w o r l d ( m e a s u r e d in p o p u l a t i o n ) w e r e s i t u a t e d i n t h e
p o o r states a n d it h a s b e e n e s t i m a t e d t h a t b y 1 9 9 0 , 60 p e r c e n t
o f the w o r l d ' s u r b a n p o p u l a t i o n w i l l be l i v i n g in the cities o f
A f r i c a , A s i a a n d L a t i n A m e r i c a , a figure w h i c h is e x p e c t e d t o rise
t o 75 p e r c e n t b y t h e e n d o f t h e c e n t u r y . B e t w e e n 1 9 7 0 a n d 1 9 7 5 ,
o f t h e 106 m i l l i o n p e r s o n s e s t i m a t e d t o h a v e m o v e d f r o m t h e r u r a l
i n t o t h e u r b a n a r e a s , s o m e 70 p e r c e n t (73 m i l l i o n ) w e r e i n t h e
nations o f the T h i r d W o r l d and a g o o d p r o p o r t i o n o f these w e r e
s c h o o l leavers m o v i n g i n t o the cities in search o f j o b s .
T a k i n g t h e H o r n o f A f r i c a as a n e x a m p l e o f o n e o f t h e p o o r e s t
regions o f Africa, the p o p u l a t i o n o f A d d i s A b a b a , capital o f
E t h i o p i a , j u m p e d f r o m 560000 in t h e m i d - 1 9 6 0 s t o o v e r a m i l l i o n
in 1 9 7 4 , a g r o w t h rate o f a b o u t 7 p e r c e n t p e r a n n u m . T h e
c o m p a r a b l e figures f o r M o g a d i s h u a n d A s m a r a , c a p i t a l c i t i e s o f
S o m a l i a a n d E r i t r e a r e s p e c t i v e l y , w e r e 1 4 1 000 in 1965 r i s i n g t o
o v e r 250000 in 1 9 7 4 for the f o r m e r a n d 132000 rising t o 296000
f o r t h e l a t t e r i n t h e s a m e t i m e p e r i o d . A n d t h e s e figures n o w h e r e
c o m p a r e t o t h e g r o w t h rates i n t h e c a p i t a l c i t i e s o f s o m e W e s t
A f r i c a n states. F o r e x a m p l e L a g o s , the capital o f N i g e r i a , b e t w e e n
1 9 7 0 a n d 1975 r e c o r d e d a n a n n u a l g r o w t h r a t e o f j u s t a b o u t 1 4
per cent per annum. W h a t w a s particularly striking about urban
g r o w t h i n A f r i c a n states w a s t h a t g r o w t h o c c u r r e d i n s t a t e s w h i c h
w e r e least c a p a b l e o f d e a l i n g w i t h t h e m u l t i t u d e o f p r o b l e m s
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h u r b a n i s a t i o n . F o r t h e A f r i c a n s t a t e s , far f r o m
b e i n g an i n d e x o f ' p r o g r e s s ' , u r b a n i s a t i o n b e g a n t o b e s e e n as a n
index o f decay. T o q u o t e the third report to the C l u b o f R o m e ,
Reshaping the international order,
it is in t h e cities w h e r e the g l a r i n g d i s p a r i t i e s b e t w e e n t h e * h a v e s ' a n d 'have

n o t s ' are m o s t a p p a r e n t . It is a l s o in cities w h e r e p o v e r t y a n d disadvantage
are the m o s t c o n c e n t r a t e d . M i g r a n t s t o the c i t y are n o o r d i n a r y p e o p l e . T h e y
4
h a v e t a k e n the c o u r a g e o u s d e c i s i o n t o d i g u p their rural r o o t s , t o s e e k a new
l i f e ' for t h e m s e l v e s a n d their c h i l d r e n . In c o m i n g t o the c i t y , t h e y b r i n g w i t h
77

t h e m e x p e c t a t i o n s a n d a s p i r a t i o n s . I f cities c a n n o t m e e t t h e s e , if cities can offer

n o a l t e r n a t i v e t o p o v e r t y , it w i l l be in cities t h a t f u t u r e s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s in
n a t i o n a l o r d e r s w i l l b e w r o u g h t . In t h e p a s t m o d e r n i z a t i o n has t e n d e d t o m e a n
1
u r b a n i z a t i o n . In the f u t u r e , it c a n n o t d o so.
T h e pattern o f social stratification d e s c r i b e d a b o v e , as one

m i g h t e x p e c t , is a g e n e r a l i s e d a n d s o m e w h a t p a r a d i g m a t i c m o d e l
w h i c h d o e s n o t p u r p o r t to be a faithful d e s c r i p t i o n o f the c o n c r e t e
s t r a t i f i c a t i o n a l s y s t e m as t h i s e x i s t s i n t h e d i f f e r e n t s t a t e s . For
example, Tunisia developed a much more homogeneous and
coherent bureaucratic-managerial ruling c l a s s , w h i c h in fact
profited proportionately more, compared to other sectors of
society, f r o m the acquisition o f the landed properties p r e v i o u s l y
o w n e d by the small white-settler p o p u l a t io n , than either M o r o c c o
or A l g e r i a . Algeria, o n the other hand, by the agrarian reforms
o f 1 9 7 2 , s u c c e e d e d better than K e n y a in b r e a k i n g u p the e m e r g e n t
c o n n e x i o n s b e t w e e n the l a n d o w n i n g b o u r g e o i s i e and the top
b u r e a u c r a t s c o n t r o l l i n g t h e state a p p a r a t u s . E q u a l l y K e n y a h a d
a m u c h m o r e visible class structure than T a n z a n i a w h i c h , because
o f its p r o c l a i m e d i d e o l o g i c a l s t a n c e a n d its p r e v i o u s h i s t o r y as a
T r u s t T e r r i t o r y , t o g e t h e r w i t h its m u c h s m a l l e r s e t t l e r p r e s e n c e ,
w a s a b l e t o a c h i e v e g r e a t e r s u c c e s s i n its d e t e r m i n e d a t t e m p t s t o
ameliorate class inequalities than o t h e r A f r i c a n states, w i t h the
p o s s i b l e e x c e p t i o n o f states like G u i n e a - B i s s a u , M o z a m b i q u e and
A n g o l a . B u t w h a t e v e r the v a r i a t i o n s , m o s t A f r i c a n states w e r e
increasingly a p p r o x i m a t i n g to the p a r a d i g m g i v e n a b o v e so that
it c a n b e r e g a r d e d as b e i n g n o t u n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f the class
s t r u c t u r e o f t h e A f r i c a n state d u r i n g o u r p e r i o d .
W i t h any e c o n o m y that remains mainly c o m m o d i t y - e x p o r t -
o r i e n t e d l o n g after i n d e p e n d e n c e , a n d w h o s e s u r p l u s e s g o l a r g e l y
i n t o t h e i m p o r t o f c o n s u m e r g o o d s t o satisfy t h e d e m a n d s o f t h e
é l i t e , a n d w i t h e d u c a t i o n as t h e p r i n c i p a l a v e n u e t o u p w a r d s o c i a l
mobility and m o r e and m o r e students c o m p e t i n g for the limited
a c c e s s t o h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n , f e w e r a n d f e w e r m a k e it i n t o t h e r a n k s
o f t h e h i g h l y p r i v i l e g e d u p p e r c l a s s . A s J. D . B a r k a n d i s c o v e r e d
in a s u r v e y o f u n i v e r s i t y s t u d e n t s i n G h a n a , U g a n d a a n d T a n z a n i a ,
states w h i c h w e r e n o t u n t y p i c a l o f m a n y o f t h e independent
A f r i c a n states, * the r e c r u i t m e n t o f u n i v e r s i t y students, a n d h e n c e
t h e t e c h n o c r a t i c u p p e r - m i d d l e c l a s s itself, i s . . . b e c o m i n g m o r e
and more restricted to sons and daughters o f citizens with
1
Jan Tinbergen (co-ordinator), Reshaping the international order (London, 1977), 3 1 - 2 .
78

SOCIAL MOBILISATION
T a b l e 2.4. Degree to which ranks desired are expected to be fulfilled.
Ghana Tanzania Uganda
First Last First Last First Last

job job job job job job
% % %
Expect to obtain 79 58 76 40 66 37
position at desired
rank
Do not expect to 9 22 12 33 15 30
obtain position at
desired rank
Don't know 12 20 12 27 19 33
N= (615) (615) (479) (479) (550) (550)
Source: Barkan, An African dilemma, table 2.9.
relatively h i g h educational b a c k g r o u n d s . Rather than b r i d g e the

elite-mass g a p , students are consequently m o r e likely t o exacerbate
this c l e a v a g e , a n d i n h i b i t t h e p r o c e s s o f v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n i n t h e i r
1
societies/
An obvious outcome o f the elite-mass g a p a n d t h e self-
recruitment o f the educated u p p e r and m i d d l e classes w a s the
a l i e n a t i o n o f t h e i n t e l l i g e n t s i a as e x p e c t a t i o n s l a g g e d b e h i n d t h e
d e s i r e d f u t u r e s . T a b l e 2.4 is s u f f i c i e n t l y i n d i c a t i v e o f t h i s . T h e
educational system implanted by the metropolitan p o w e r s w a s
i n t e n d e d t o s e r v e as a b r i d g e b e t w e e n A f r i c a n t r a d i t i o n a l s o c i e t i e s
and western culture. B u t in b r i d g i n g the g a p between the
'traditional' and the ' m o d e r n ' , the system has n o t only under
mined traditional culture b u t has also created a d i l e m m a for the
i n d e p e n d e n t s t a t e s : t h o u g h p u r p o r t e d l y c h a n g e - i n d u c i n g , it h a s
produced a structure which had become perhaps the most
i m p o r t a n t i m p e d i m e n t t o t h a t c h a n g e w h i c h it s o u g h t t o b r i n g
about.
1
Joel D . Barkan, An African dilemma (Nairobi, 1975), 188. See also D a v i d Court,
' T h e education system as a response to inequality in Tanzania and K e n y a J o u r n a l of
Modem African Studies, 1976, 1 4 , 4; Richard Marvin, ' W h y d o African parents value
schooling?' Journal of Modern African Studies, 1975, 1 3 , 3; Remi P. Clignet and Philip
Foster, The fortunate few (Evanston, 1966); P. Foster, Education and social change in Ghana,
(Chicago, 1965); D a v i d Abernethy, The political dilemma of popular education (Stanford,
1969).
79

T a b l e 2.5. Export and import trade: selected countries.
No. of
Principal commodities
export as % making up % of imports
of total 70 % of composed of
exports, exports, ' machinery
Country 1966-8 1966-8 1962
Cameroun 28 4 16
Congo (Braz.) 48 2 4^
Ethiopia 56 3 38
Guinea 64 2 40
Ivory Coast 35 3 3*
Kenya 26 6 20
Lesotho 60 2 5
Liberia 73 I 55
Malawi 25 4 25
Niger 65 2 9
Sierra Leone 57 2
Tanzania l
9 6 26
Zambia 94 I 30
Source: Morrison et al., Black Africa, tables 13.2, 13.3 and 13.4.
T h e p r o b l e m o f the structure o f the society w a s c o m p o u n d e d

b y the structure o f the e c o n o m i e s o f the A f r i c a n states. T h e
c o l o n i a l a u t h o r i t i e s s a w t h e s e states e s s e n t i a l l y as s o u r c e s o f r a w
materials a n d markets for the p r o d u c t s o f E u r o p e a n industry.
C o m m u n i c a t i o n s a n d other infrastructural d e v e l o p m e n t s w e r e
therefore carried o u t w i t h these t w o aims in v i e w , t o the n e g l e c t
o f almost e v e r y t h i n g else. Africa thus inherited e c o n o m i e s -
enclave e c o n o m i e s - in w h i c h the primary e c o n o m i c activity
consisted in the p r o d u c t i o n o f e x p o r t c o m m o d i t i e s for use in the
factories o f E u r o p e and in the i m p o r t o f manufactures and other
c o n s u m e r g o o d s . A n d since the price o f manufactures rose
quickly relative to agricultural c o m m o d i t i e s , b o t h the balance o f
trade and o f p a y m e n t s m o v e d m o r e in f a v o u r o f E u r o p e than o f
Africa. A structural dependence w a s thus created w h i c h barely
c h a n g e d d u r i n g o u r p e r i o d , as t a b l e s 2.5 a n d 2.6 s h o w .
In these states, w h i c h are typical o f the vast majority o f states
o f i n d e p e n d e n t A f r i c a , the e x p o r t o f just a b o u t t w o c o m m o d i t i e s —
w h i c h r a n g e d f r o m c o t t o n , g u m a r a b i c , c o f f e e , c o c o a a n d sisal t o
80

SOCIAL MOBILISATION
T a b l e 2.6. Direction of trade: selected countries.
Trade with African Trade with former colonial

states, 1968 power
%
% % Export, Total, Total,
Country Import Export 1955 1962 1968
Cameroun 10 9 53 57 46
Congo (Braz.) 6 4 34 51 37
Guinea I 9 63 17
Ivory Coast 10 8 58 54 41
Kenya 11 39 27 30 24
Lesotho 5 5 3 10 5
Liberia 2 2 n/a n/a n/a
Malawi 24 19 60 34 33
Niger 1
5 30 85 54 56
Sierra Leone 3 0 73 46 48
Somalia 11 I 2 38 40
Tanzania 17 18 33 45 23
Source: Morrison et al, Black Africa, tables 13.5 and 13.6, 1 3 . 9 - 1 3 . 1 1 .
copper, iron-ore, g o l d and petroleum - constituted approximately

70 p e r c e n t o f t o t a l t r a d e , w h i l e t h e i m p o r t o f ' m a c h i n e r y w h i c h
i n c l u d e d v e h i c l e s a n d o t h e r m e c h a n i c a l d e v i c e s , c o n s t i t u t e d less
than a third o f total trade.
D e p e n d e n c e w a s n o t just in terms o f the e x p o r t o f c o m m o d i t i e s ,
it w a s a l s o r e f l e c t e d i n t h e p a t t e r n o f t r a d e . C l o s e t o a d e c a d e after
i n d e p e n d e n c e , less t h a n 10 p e r c e n t o f all e x p o r t a n d 1 4 p e r c e n t
o f all i m p o r t t r a d e w a s b e t w e e n A f r i c a n s t a t e s as a g a i n s t 3 3 p e r
cent w i t h the p r e v i o u s c o l o n i a l p o w e r . T r a d e b e t w e e n the A f r i c a n
s t a t e s in 1968 a n d e a s t e r n b l o c c o u n t r i e s r a n g e d b e t w e e n o n e a n d
10 p e r c e n t w i t h o n l y f o u r s t a t e s , G u i n e a , M a l i , t h e S u d a n a n d
E g y p t , h a v i n g a figure o f m o r e t h a n 10 p e r c e n t . T h e m e a n figure
o f t r a d e w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s d u r i n g t h e s a m e p e r i o d w a s 9.28
per cent w i t h o n l y three states, B u r u n d i , L i b e r i a and Ethiopia,
h a v i n g a figure o f j u s t a b o u t a t h i r d . I n f a c t , at t h e t i m e o f t h e
i n d e p e n d e n c e in i 9 6 0 o f m o s t o f the A f r i c a n states (if trade
between South Africa, R h o d e s i a / Z i m b a b w e , Z a m b i a and M a l a w i ,
w h i c h a c c o u n t e d f o r o v e r 40 p e r c e n t o f t o t a l e x p o r t s a n d i m p o r t s ,
is i g n o r e d ) , a b o u t 3 5 p e r c e n t o f t o t a l i n t r a - A f r i c a n i m p o r t s w a s
81

T a b l e 2.7. Percentage industrial composition of GDP

at factor cost, ip6j.
Transport
and
Agri Industrial Con communi
Country culture activity struction cation Trade Other
Kenya 38 '3 2 10 12 25
Morocco 32 22 5 — 22 18
Tanzania 55 7 3 5 13 17
Tunisia 22 18 9 8 M 27
Uganda 59 12 2 3 10 14
Zambia 10 48 7 6 16
Source: UN Yearbook of national account statistics 1966, 6 9 3 - 4 .
a b s o r b e d b y four countries, A l g e r i a , G h a n a , the I v o r y C o a s t and

E g y p t , w h i l e 36 p e r c e n t o f i n t r a - A f r i c a n e x p o r t s w a s p r o v i d e d
b y K e n y a , M o r o c c o , the I v o r y C o a s t and M a l i . M u c h o f this trade
was also limited to a restricted number o f items, with food,
b e v e r a g e s a n d t o b a c c o f o r m i n g a b o u t 59 p e r c e n t o f t h e t o t a l in
v a l u e w i t h c r u d e materials, fuels a n d m a n u f a c t u r e s m a k i n g u p 1 5 ,
1
3 a n d 22 p e r c e n t r e s p e c t i v e l y .
If the c o m p e t i t i v e nature o f A f r i c a n e x p o r t s can be taken to
explain the l o w level o f intra-African trade, the reliance o n a few
e x p o r t c o m m o d i t i e s for f o r e i g n - e x c h a n g e earnings and the h i g h e r
price o f imported manufactures relative to exports together
a c c o u n t e d for the inability o f the A f r i c a n states t o t r a n s f o r m their
economies into more industrially based ones. Table 2.7 is
illustrative o f the industrial c o m p o s i t i o n o f the g r o s s domestic
p r o d u c t o f s o m e selected A f r i c a n states.
E v e n t h o u g h the contribution o f ' industrial a c t i v i t y ' to G D P
has b e e n s l o w l y rising in m o s t A f r i c a n states d u r i n g o u r p e r i o d ,
there w e r e certain peculiar characteristics o f manufacturing w h i c h
s h o u l d b e n o t e d . F o r t h i s p u r p o s e , N i g e r i a c a n b e c o n s i d e r e d as
a c a s e s t u d y . F o r all t h e s e e m i n g l y i m p r e s s i v e g r o w t h r a t e o f
d o m e s t i c m a n u f a c t u r i n g - 14 p e r c e n t b e t w e e n 1958 a n d 1963 a n d
15 p e r c e n t i n 1 9 7 1 / 2 - m u c h o f it r e m a i n e d l a r g e l y c h a r a c t e r i s e d
by l o w - l e v e l t e c h n o l o g y . O n the other hand, the manufacture o f
1
P. R o b s o n and D . A . Lury (eds.), The economies of Africa ( L o n d o n , 1969), 57.
82

SOCIAL MOBILISATION
T a b l e 2.8. Imported raw-material component in Nigerian

manufacturing: selected industries, 1972.
% Raw material
Industry group imported
Dairy products 40.85
Grain-mill products 99-75
Miscellaneous food products 60.35
Animal feeds 35-70
Beer brewing 46.00
Soft drinks 45-55
Made-up textile goods (except 79.65
wearing apparel)
Carpets and rugs 100.00
Paper containers, boxes and board 44-95
Basic industrial chemicals 87.30
Fertilisers and pesticides 43.50
Drugs and medicines 45-45
Other chemical products 61.05
Tyres and tubes 44-75
Pottery products 92.10
Glass products 6535
Concrete products 44-5 5
(other than cement, bricks and tiles)
Source: Federation of Nigeria, third national development plan, ip/j-So, 148.
agricultural and special industrial equipment, h o u s e h o l d electrical

a p p a r a t u s , a n d m a c h i n e r y a n d t r a n s p o r t e q u i p m e n t , w h i c h re
q u i r e d r e l a t i v e l y m o r e s o p h i s t i c a t e d t e c h n o l o g y , w a s a b a r e 2.3 p e r
c e n t in 1 9 7 2 . S e c o n d l y , m u c h m a n u f a c t u r i n g d e p e n d e d v e r y
l a r g e l y o n a h i g h l e v e l o f i m p o r t c o m p o n e n t s , as t a b l e 2.8 s h o w s .
W h a t e v e r the rationale for industrialisation m a y h a v e been - the
creation o f greater self-reliance t h r o u g h the diversification o f the
e c o n o m y ; the generation o f m o r e varied and increasing e m p l o y
ment opportunities to meet the demands o f a rapidly g r o w i n g
p o p u l a t i o n ; or the p r o v i s i o n o f greater welfare t h r o u g h overall
e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t - t h e b a s i c s t r a t e g y i n a l m o s t all t h e s t a t e s
w a s the process o f i n t r o d u c i n g i m p o r t substituting industries and
therefore the c o n s e r v a t i o n o f f o r e i g n - e x c h a n g e earnings for
f u r t h e r i n v e s t m e n t . B u t as t h e N i g e r i a n e x a m p l e s h o w s , a n d it is
n o t a t y p i c a l , t h a t s t r a t e g y t e n d e d t o p r o v e m o r e o r l e s s self-
83

T a b l e 2.9. Percentage expenditure p.m. GNP (at market prices): selected countries.
General Exports Less Net

govt. Imports factor
expenditure Fixed - income
Private on Capital Increase on goods and from
Country Year consumption consumption formation in stocks services abroad
Algeria 1959 60 35 — 26 20 41 —
Cameroun 1963 7* 15 11 — 23 21 —
Chad 1963 84 14 11 1 H 25 —
Congo (Braz.) 1964 67 *3 14 1 — — -5
Ethiopia 1963 82 9 12 — 11 13 —1
Ghana 1965 80 13 16 — 16 24 —-1
Malawi 1963 86 21 14 1 — —21 —2
Morocco 1965 73 14 11 — 20 19 —
Sierra Leone 1964 85 9 13 — 30 34 -5
Sudan 1964 76 12 11 3 16 19 —
Tanzania 1965 72 14 14 — 31 30 —1
Tunisia 1965 7* 17 27 1 20 35 —2
Source: UN Yearbook of national account statistics 1966, 681-2.

SOCIAL MOBILISATION
T a b l e 2. i o .Total long-term and publicly guaranteed external debt:

selected non-petroleum-producing states ($ billion).
Country End 1973 End 1974 End 1975 End 1976
Egypt 1-73 3.89 6.31 7.30

Tanzania 0.46 0.61 0.79 0.96
Zaire 0.89 i.31 1.68 1.90
Zambia 0.57 0.68 0.95 1.20
Source: H. van B. Cleveland and W. H. Bruce Britain, 'Are the LDCs in over
their heads?', International Affairs, July 1977, 734.
defeating. T h e reason for this lay in the m a i n w i t h the g o v e r n m e n t

o f t h e A f r i c a n states. F i r s t , d e s p i t e g r a n d i l o q u e n t five ( o r s i x o r
ten) year d e v e l o p m e n t plans, m u c h o f capital i n v e s t m e n t tended
t o b e left t o t h e s m a l l b a n d o f A f r i c a n e n t r e p r e n e u r s , w i t h f o r e i g n
financial l i n k s , w h o s e m a i n i n t e r e s t w a s t h e p r o f i t a b i l i t y o f t h e i r
investments, w h a t e v e r the c o n s e q u e n c e s for their countries.
S e c o n d l y , because o f their o v e r r i d i n g desire to retain political
p o w e r , g o v e r n m e n t l e a d e r s f o u n d it i n a d v i s a b l e t o t a m p e r w i t h
t h e c o n s u m p t i o n h a b i t s o f t h e é l i t e o n w h o m t h e y r e l i e d for
p o l i t i c a l s u p p o r t . T h e r e s u l t w a s t h e r e f o r e for t h a t é l i t e t o p r e f e r
to maintain their acquired taste for f o r e i g n c o n s u m e r g o o d s rather
t h a n t o s a v e , as t a b l e 2.9 s h o w s .
T h e need to assuage élite c o n s u m p t i o n patterns, c o u p l e d w i t h
the necessity nevertheless to d e v e l o p e c o n o m i c a l l y (and in the case
o f E g y p t , to maintain defence requirements) not surprisingly led
to h e a v y f o r e i g n indebtedness o n the part o f the A f r i c a n states,
w i t h s o m e h a v i n g as h i g h a d e b t t o G D P r a t i o as 0.80. W i t h
f o r e i g n i n d e b t e d n e s s g r o w i n g faster t h a n the rate o f g r o w t h o f
G D P , t h e c a p a c i t y o f t h e s e states t o m e e t t h e i r f o r e i g n o b l i g a t i o n s
became m o r e doubtful. F o r s o m e , unless the i m p r o b a b l e w e r e to
happen, the l o n g - t e r m o u t c o m e s e e m e d not unlikely to be
complete bankruptcy.
T h a t l i k e l i h o o d m i g h t h a v e b e e n o b v i a t e d h a d A f r i c a n states
agreed to cooperate or integrate to form larger units. F o r
w h a t e v e r the difficulties m i g h t b e w i t h r e g a r d t o e c o n o m i c
m o b i l i s a t i o n , t h e s i m p l e fact r e m a i n e d t h a t m o s t o f t h e i n d e p e n
d e n t A f r i c a n states w e r e t o o s m a l l a n d t o o p o o r t o form v i a b l e
e c o n o m i c u n i t s . I n 1 9 6 4 , f o r e x a m p l e , s o m e 24 A f r i c a n s t a t e s h a d
85

p o p u l a t i o n s o f l e s s t h a n five m i l l i o n ( f o u r h a d p o p u l a t i o n s o f l e s s
than a m i l l i o n ) . S e v e n states h a d p o p u l a t i o n s v a r y i n g b e t w e e n 11
and 20 m i l l i o n , w h i l e E t h i o p i a had 22.2 m i l l i o n , E g y p t 28.9
million and Nigeria 56.4 m i l l i o n . O f t h e 42 states listed as
i n d e p e n d e n t in 1 9 7 2 ( e x c l u d i n g E g y p t ) , o n l y 17 h a d a p e r capita
G D P i n e x c e s s o f 200 d o l l a r s a n d o n l y s i x - A l g e r i a , G a b o n , t h e
I v o r y Coast, L i b y a , South Africa and Tunisia —exceeded 400
d o l l a r s . A f r i c a ' s s h a r e o f t h e t o t a l w o r l d real i n c o m e w a s j u s t a b o u t
5 p e r c e n t , w h i l e its i n c o m e f r o m m a n u f a c t u r e s w a s a p p r o x i m a t e l y
2 p e r c e n t . I n t e r m s o f t r a d e in f o o d , t h o u g h b y t h e mid-1930s
Africa w a s e x p o r t i n g a b o u t o n e million tons o f cereals per a n n u m ,
b y 1 9 7 5 s h e w a s i m p o r t i n g 10 m i l l i o n t o n s p e r a n n u m . F o r m o s t ,
t h e n , t h e o n l y h o p e o f f u t u r e p r o g r e s s s e e m e d t o lie i n s o m e f o r m
o f e c o n o m i c union or the other. A s Peter R o b s o n rightly noted :
ultimately the character and pace of economic development in Africa may be

considerably influenced for the better by the consolidation and development
of economic integration arrangements. But although the long-term objectives
of most African States can best be served by economic co-operation, short-term
interests often lead to independent action. The future of economic co-operation
1
in Africa will depend on which of these considerations becomes dominant.
G i v e n the c o m p e t i t i v e nature o f African e c o n o m i e s , the legacy
o f their colonial past and the character o f their political leadership,
2
o n e c o u l d not be sanguine about the prospects for integration.
T h e evidence o f t w o decades o f independence showed that
African leaders w e r e m o r e influenced b y short-term considerations
than b y l o n g - t e r m interests. F e w , if any, o f the actual attempts
at c o o p e r a t i o n a n d i n t e g r a t i o n - i n c l u d i n g t h e m o s t promising
East African E c o n o m i c C o m m u n i t y — s u r v i v e d the first twenty
years o f independence while many others remained either as
p r o p o s a l s o r as u n i o n s o n p a p e r o n l y . I n t h e l a s t a n a l y s i s , i f t h e r e
c o u l d b e said t o b e a p r o b l e m o f independence, it w a s that
independence gave to most o f the A f r i c a n states a cover of
spurious sovereignty w i t h political p o w e r h a v i n g been transferred
to a political leadership w h o s e sole aim - and achievement - w a s
to have retained that power by preserving the myth of
3
sovereignty.
1
Peter Robson, Economic integration in Africa ( L o n d o n , 1968), 21.
2
See e.g. Hannu N u r m i , 'Public g o o d s and the analytic theory of the state', in
P. Birnbaum, J. Lively and G . Parry (eds.), Democracy, consensus and social contract
( L o n d o n and Beverly Hills, 1978).
3
Arthur H a z l e w o o d (ed.), African integration and disintegration ( O x f o r d , 1967).
86

THE MILITARY AND MILITARISM
Independence not only brought to the fore the problem of

e c o n o m i c dependency, but also that o f the military, a p r o b l e m that
1
t u r n e d i n t o a s p e c t r e h a u n t i n g all t h e A f r i c a n s t a t e s . H a v i n g an
a r m e d f o r c e w a s as m u c h p a r t o f t h e a c c o u t r e m e n t s o f s o v e r e i g n t y
as h a v i n g a n a t i o n a l flag o r a n a t i o n a l a n t h e m . B u t t h o u g h it c o u l d
hardly b e a r g u e d that m o s t o f these states faced a n y serious
external threat to their sovereignty, they certainly w e r e not
hesitant a b o u t maintaining large military establishments - large,
that is, relative to their resources and security needs, b o t h external
and internal. In fact, b u t for the p r o b l e m o f internal security, f e w
o f these states c o u l d b e said t o h a v e r e q u i r e d the size o f a r m e d
personnel they established. ( T h e colonial authorities, because they
had to maintain their presence b y a r m e d force, had o f necessity
to create a military establishment requisite for that purpose
t h o u g h for the m o s t part their armies w e r e v e r y small.) T h u s ,
w h i l e the A f r i c a n states c a m e t o i n d e p e n d e n c e w i t h q u i t e small
armies, there can b e n o e s c a p i n g the fact that w i t h i n d e p e n d e n c e
the rate o f increase in the size o f the a r m e d forces w a s q u i t e
p h e n o m e n a l . A n d w i t h the g r o w t h in size, there w a s a m o r e o r
less c o r r e s p o n d i n g i n c r e a s e i n ' d e f e n c e ' e x p e n d i t u r e ( t a b l e 2 . 1 1 ) .
S i g n i f i c a n t as t h e i n c r e a s e s m a y h a v e b e e n , t h e full i m p o r t o f
d e f e n c e s p e n d i n g is p e r h a p s o n l y p r o p e r l y a p p r e c i a t e d w h e n it is
c o m p a r e d w i t h s p e n d i n g in o t h e r sectors, for e x a m p l e , o n welfare
services. T h e ratio o f expenditure o n defence to that o n welfare
in the A f r i c a n states w h e n c o m p a r e d w i t h the ratio in s o m e o f
t h e d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s o r e v e n o t h e r t h i r d - w o r l d s t a t e s s u c h as
V e n e z u e l a , s u g g e s t s that the c h o i c e o f priorities in the A f r i c a n
states w a s m i s p l a c e d (tables 2 . 1 2 a n d 2.13).
T h e p r o b l e m p o s e d b y the military in the n e w states o f A f r i c a
w a s , h o w e v e r , n o t just o n e o f n u m b e r s and costs, i m p o r t a n t as
these m a y h a v e b e e n for the d e v e l o p m e n t o f these states. T h e r e
w e r e also the related issues o f d e p e n d e n c y and instability. A f r i c a n
armies, like their counterparts t h r o u g h o u t the w o r l d , w e r e in a
narrow professional sense, 'modernity'-oriented. Being thus
oriented, they w e r e c o n c e r n e d a b o u t the state o f their h a r d w a r e ,
which tended to become outdated with rapid technological
1
T h e literature on the military is quite extensive. There is a g o o d bibliography in
Claude E . Welch J nr. and Arthur K . Smith, Military role and rule (Belmont, C a l . , 1974).
87

Table 2.11. Manpower and cost of African armies: selected

countries.
Defence
budget as
Total % of % change
man govt. in Level of
power in % expendi defence Africani-
hundreds, change, ture, budget, sation,
Country 1967 1963-7 1967 1963-7 1965*
Nigeria 500 479 9.9 128 4

Zaire 354 10 14.5 118 3
Ethiopia 350 14 17.0 45 5
Sudan 185 54 17-7 67 5
Ghana 160 83 7*4 33 5
Somalia 95 85 18.1 33 5
Uganda 60 182 10.2 400 I
Senegal 55 103 11.6 107 4
Guinea 50 -4 8.1 87 j
Tanzania 50 11 3.8 150 I
Kenya 48 71 6.9 100 2
Ivory Coast 45 4 6.9 44 2
Liberia 41 10 6.7 28 5
Cameroun 35 21 19.5 35 I
Mali 35 6 21.2 17 4
Zambia 30 -6 5-7 110 I
Rwanda *5 153 9-7 182 I
Sierra Leone l
9 I 4.9 33 2
C o n g o (Braz.) 18 143 8.9 80 2
Dahomey 18 64 12.0 M 2
(Bénin)
Togo M 569 135 350 2
Upper V o l t a M 43 14.1 0 4
Niger 13 0 10.8 71 3
Burundi 10 U 6.9 -13 4
Mauritania 10 90 17.9 IO 2
Chad 9 "7 135 33 2
Malawi 9 -44 33 33 I
Gabon 8 30 7.6 41 3
Central African 6 11 7-9 83 2
Rep.
Botswana 0 0 0.0 0 0
Gambia 0 0 0.0 0 0
Lesotho 0 0 0.0 0 0
1
o = no army before independence; 1 = officer corps entirely foreign before
independence; 2 = no indigenous officer corps before independence - mixed
after independence with near-complete indigenisation at 1965; 3 = no in
digenous officer corps before independence - total Africanisation thereafter;
4 = indigenous officers before independence; 5 = never a colonial territory,
or indigenous officer corps at all levels by or shortly after independence.
Source: Morrison et al. Black Africa, 116, 119, 120.

t
88

T a b l e 2 . 1 2 . Comparative expenditure: selected countries 1972.
General economic Public expenditures Manpower

GNP Armed
Pop. $US Military Education Health forces Teachers Doctors
1000 million $US million % million % million 1000 1000 1000
% % % % % %
3of 4 of 5 of 6 of 7 of 8 of
Country I 2 3 2 4 2 5 2 6 I 7 I 8 I
Nigeria 69 500 10585 566 5-35 204 1.92 30 0.28 274 0.39 119 0.02 3-1 0.004
Kenya 12070 1964 *5 1.27 86 4.38 31 1-57 7 0.58 56 0.50 1.6 0.013
Ivory Coast 4530 i 832 22 1.20 126 6.88 7 0.38 4 0.09 0.03 0.3 0.006
Ghana 9700 *57* 34 1.32 97 3-77 27 1.05 9l 0.02 61 0.06 0.8 0.008
Algeria 15270 6250 108 1.72 57« 9- 52
97 1-55 60 0.39 60 0.40 2.0 0.013
Zaire 22860 2378 100 4.20 132 5-55 18 0.75 50 0.22 88 0.38 0.9 0.040
Tanzania 14000 1522 37 2.43 55 3.61 23 1.51 11 0.08 24 0.17 0.6 0.043
USA 208 840 1168100 77638 6.64 65652 5.62 35441 3-03 2322 1.12 2308 1.10 320.9 0.150
UK 56790 154308 8186 5.30 8962 5.80 8641 5.60 372 0.07 530 0.90 73.6 0.130
Venezuela 10970 14097 270 1.91 663 4.70 310 2.20 34 0.31 71 0.65 10.9 0.010
Source: Ruth Leger Sivard: World military and social expenditures (Virginia, 1974).

Table 2.i}. $ US Social and military indicators: per capita ranking, 1972 (rank in brackets).
Education Health Military expenditure

Public Public
expendi expendi Infant Expendi
GNP per ture per % ture Mortality ture Expenditure Pop. per
Country capita per capita illiteracy per capita per 1000 per capita per soldier soldier
Algeria 409 (4) 38 (2) 75(i3) 6 (6) 86 (7.5) 7 (9-5) 1 800(22) 260 (5)
Botswana 119(18) 10(11) 67 (7) 4 (9-5) 175(38)
Burundi 66(41) 2(37) 9°(2 5) 1(30) 161(32) 1(26.5) 1500(25) 1700(31)
Cameroun «3(i7) I
9( 3-5) 2
9°( 5) 2(22) no (9) 4(17) 6000 (3) 1520(29)
Central African 152(25) 5(21.2) 92(26) 2(22) 163(35) 4(17) 6000 ($) 1650(30)
Rep.
Chad 82(36) 2(37) 94(28) i(3o) 155(29) 4(i7) 4667 (7) 1260(23)
Congo 355 (8) 22 (5) 80(17) 5 (8) 148(24) 10 (4.5) 5 000 (6) 490(11)
Dahomey (Bénin) 104(31.5) 5(21.2) 80(17) 2(22) 150(26.5) 2(23) 2500(17) 1440(28)
Eq. Guinea 264(14) 3(32) 80(17) 3(14) 140(21.5) 3(19) 1000(29.5) 290 (6.5)
Ethiopia 78(37) 2(37) 93(27) i(30) 162(33.5) 2(23) 1067(28) 580(14)
Gabon 916 (2) 19 (7) 70 (9) 12 (2.5) 184(41) 10 (4.5) 5000 (6) 500(12)
Gambia 141(27) 5(21.2) 90(25) 3(H) 146(23)
Ghana 265(13) 10(11) 75(i3) 3(i4) 64 (3.5) 4(17) 1790(23) 510(13)
Guinea 105(30) 5(21.2) 9°(2 5) 1(30)
1
5 5(29) 4(17) 2500(17) 680(17)
Ivory Coast 404 (6) 28 (4) 80(17) i(3o) 138(20) 4(13) 5 500 (4) 1130(21)
Kenya 163(21.5) 7(i6) 75(i3) 3(i4) 55 ( 0 2(23) 3 57i(io) 1720(32)
Lesotho 100(34) 4(28.5) 4i (2) 1(30) I37(i8)
Liberia 222(16) 6(19) 85(19) 3(14) I37(i8) 2(23) 1000(29.5) 400 (8)

Libya 1982 (1) 101 (1) 73(io) 53 ( I ) 130(14) 48 (l) 4OOO (9) 80 (1)
Malagasy Rep. 149(26) 5(21.2) 61 (5) 3(i4) 55 (I) 2(23) 3 0OO(l4) 1780(33)
Malawi 99(35) 3(32) 78(H) 1(30) 119(12) 2 000(2l) 4670(36)
Mali 67(40) 3(32) 2
9°( 5) i(3o) 168(36.5) 2(23) 2 000(2l) 1320(25.5)
Mauritania 174(20) 6(19) 95(3o) 1(30) I37(i8) 8 (7-5) 5 000 (6) 620(15)
Mauritius 320(10) 10(11) 38 (1) 8 (4) 64 (3-5) 1(26.5) —— — —
Morocco 276(11) 14 (8) 80(17) 3(i4) 149(25) 9 («) 2556(16) 290 (6.5)
Niger 103(33) ^(37) 95(3o) 1(30) 140(21.5) 1(26.5) 2000(21) 2100(35)
Nigeria 152(24) 3(32) 75(13) — — 58 (2) 8 (7-5) 2066(18) 250 (4)
Rhodesia 346 (9) 8(15) 7503) 5 (8) 86 (7-5) 5(i3) 6000 (3) 1140(22)
Rwanda 64(42) 2(37) 2
9°( 5) 1(30) I33(i5) 1(26.5) 833(32) 650(16)
Senegal 252(15) 1(38.5) 2
9°( 5) 3(i4) 67 (5) 5(13) 3 333(i2) 690(18)
Sierra Leone 183(19) 6(19) 2
9°( 5) 2(22) 136(16) 1(26.5) I 700(24) 1320(25.5)
Somalia 7i(38) 1(38.5) 95(3o) i(3o) 154(27) 4(17) 943(3 0 210 (2)
South Africa 850 (3) 2(37) 60 (4) 4(95) 179(35) 19 (2) 25 529 (1) 1350(27)
Sudan 125(28) 6(19) 90(25) 2(22) 121(13) 7 (9-5) 3139O3) 460 (9.5)
Swaziland 267(12) » (9) 64 (6) 5 (8) 168(36.5)
Tanzania 109(29) 4(28.5) 85(19) 2(22) 162(33.5) 3(19) 3382(11) 1270(24)
Togo 160(23) 5(21.2) 85(19) 1(30) 155(29) 2(23) 4400 (8) 2090(34)
Tunisia 405 (5) 30 (3) 68 (8) 7 (5) 78 (6) 6(11) I 258(26) 220 (3)
Uganda 163(21.5) 903-5) 75(13) 2(22) 113(10) 3(19) 2769(15) 800(20)
Upper Volta 69(38) 2(37) 95(30 i(30) 181(40) 1(26.5) 2 5 00(00) 2800(00)
Zaire 104(31.5) 6(19) 87(20) i(3o) 115(11) 4(17) 2004(19) 460 (9.5)
Zambia 359 (7) 21 (6) 59 (3) 12 (2.5) i59(3i) 17 (3) 1250(27) 740(19)
Source: Sivard, World military and social expenditures, Rank ordering recomputed.

change. W e a p o n s systems therefore had to be changed frequently,

as t h e t e c h n o l o g y o f w a r c h a n g e d . B u t s i n c e m o s t A f r i c a n
countries (with the e x c e p t i o n o f S o u t h Africa) had neither the
t e c h n o l o g i c a l skills n o r the resource base to maintain a m o d e r n
a r m a m e n t s i n d u s t r y , it f o l l o w e d t h a t all m i l i t a r y h a r d w a r e h a d t o
be imported from the arms merchants and manufacturers o f
E u r o p e , the U n i t e d States and the eastern-bloc countries. T h e
need to ensure a regular s u p p l y o f arms, b o t h in terms o f n e w
acquisitions and the replacement and servicing o f existing
w e a p o n s , not infrequently led to a d e p e n d e n c y relation w h i c h w a s
f u r t h e r e n h a n c e d a n d c o n s o l i d a t e d t h r o u g h s u c h d e v i c e s as t h e
g i v i n g o f m i l i t a r y a i d , as t h e h i s t o r y o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ' m i l i t a r y
aid t o E t h i o p i a and the S o v i e t U n i o n ' s s u p p l y o f arms t o E g y p t
( u p till a b o u t 1 9 7 3 - 4 i n b o t h c a s e s ) s o c l e a r l y d e m o n s t r a t e d .
D e p e n d e n c y and aid w e r e n o t i n f r e q u e n t l y a c c o m p a n i e d b y the
intrusion o f g r e a t - p o w e r rivalry into the domestic politics o f the
A f r i c a n states, i n t r o d u c i n g t h e r e b y further e l e m e n t s o f instability.
A s examples o f this, o n e c o u l d cite S o v i e t - A m e r i c a n rivalry o v e r
C u b a n i n t e r v e n t i o n in the A n g o l a n w a r o f l i b e r a t i o n ; the
intervention in Z a i r e b y France, the U n i t e d States, B e l g i u m and
W e s t e r n G e r m a n y , t h r o u g h the surrogate p r o v i d e d b y M o r o c c o ,
w h e n Cuban-trained Z a i r e a n mercenaries i n v a d e d the Shaba
(former K a t a n g a ) p r o v i n c e ; S o v i e t - A m e r i c a n rivalry in the
S o m a l i a - E t h i o p i a c o n f l i c t s ; F r a n c o - S o v i e t rivalry in the Sahara,
w i t h F r a n c e b a c k i n g M o r o c c o and Mauritania, and the S o v i e t
U n i o n s u p p o r t i n g the Polisario, the nationalist m o v e m e n t fighting
for the i n d e p e n d e n c e o f the former Spanish Sahara - also sup
ported b y A l g e r i a . Finally there w a s the special case o f S o u t h Africa,
w h e r e the struggle for African majority rule seemed a possible
trigger for a third W o r l d W a r in w h i c h the drama o f g r e a t - p o w e r
rivalry w o u l d be played o u t b e t w e e n the w e s t and the eastern-bloc
countries.
A t t e m p t s at e s c a p i n g f r o m d e p e n d e n c y t h r o u g h t h e d i v e r s i f i
cation o f supply sources w e r e not very successful during the
p e r i o d c o v e r e d b y this v o l u m e . N o t o n l y did they p r o v e costly and
lead to inefficiency, b u t s u c h attempts w e r e c o u n t e r e d b y the
w i t h h o l d i n g o f s u p p l i e s a n d r e p l a c e m e n t s , s o t h a t , far f r o m e n d i n g
d e p e n d e n c y , diversification o n l y s u c c e e d e d in replacing de
p e n d e n c y o n o n e o r a limited n u m b e r o f supply sources b y that
o n o t h e r s . T o t h i s fact m u s t b e a d d e d t h e g r o w t h o f a m i l i t a r i s t i c
92

spirit fostered t h r o u g h the a c q u i s i t i o n , f r o m b o t h the w e s t e r n a n d

communist blocs, o f arms. M o s t African armies, o w i n g to lack
o f technological skills, a relatively l o w level o f education, inex
perience d e r i v i n g f r o m the escalation in n u m b e r s and the s o m e
times over-rapid indigenisation of the officer corps, were
incapable o f u s i n g the sophisticated p r o d u c t s o f the modern
armaments industry. M u c h o f the hardware therefore turned o u t
not u n e x p e c t e d l y to be the r e d u n d a n t o r discarded items of
E u r o p e a n armies, those already rendered obsolete t h r o u g h tech
n o l o g i c a l c h a n g e . T h u s A f r i c a n states b e c a m e the d u m p i n g g r o u n d
f o r s u c h h a r d w a r e (as i n d e e d t h e y h a d b e e n in p r e - c o l o n i a l t i m e s ) ,
a d u m p i n g w h i c h t e n d e d t o f o s t e r a n e w m i l i t a r i s m , as s e e n i n
the increasing incidence o f border wars, military c o u p s and
v a r i o u s o t h e r acts o f a g g r e s s i o n o n the c i v i l i a n p o p u l a t i o n s o f
t h e s e states. T h e ' s o v e r e i g n t y o f t h e p e o p l e ' p r o c l a i m e d w i t h t h e
declaration o f i n d e p e n d e n c e b e c a m e , for m a n y an A f r i c a n state,
nothing m o r e than tutelage under the military. Independence
itself b e c a m e a p a r a d o x .
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND POLITICAL SUCCESSION
T h e global changes w h i c h f o l l o w e d the end o f the S e c o n d W o r l d

W a r m a d e i n d e p e n d e n c e for the v a r i o u s A f r i c a n states i n e v i t a b l e .
It m i g h t b e a r g u e d , h o w e v e r , t h a t t h o u g h i n d e p e n d e n c e was
i n e v i t a b l e , these states w e r e little p r e p a r e d to cope with the
n u m e r o u s p r o b l e m s w h i c h w e n t w i t h the g r a n t i n g o f a s o v e r e i g n
1
status. B u t s u c h an a r g u m e n t c o u l d b e m i s l e a d i n g , b e c a u s e o f the
a m b i g u i t y i n h e r e n t in t h e n o t i o n o f ' p r e p a r e d n e s s ' . O n t h e o t h e r
hand, the a r g u m e n t a b o u t lack o f preparedness c o u l d be taken to
m e a n that the c o l o n i a l authorities, b y their v a r i o u s p o l i c i e s , failed
t o c r e a t e in t h e t e r r i t o r i e s t h e y g o v e r n e d t h e c o n d i t i o n s n e c e s s a r y
f o r t h e a s s u m p t i o n o f s o v e r e i g n t y . I t is n o t e x a c t l y c l e a r h o w t h e
' necessary c o n d i t i o n s ' c o u l d be specified, but that interpretation
h a s n o t b e e n w i t h o u t its p r o t a g o n i s t s a m o n g s t A f r i c a n n a t i o n a l i s t
l e a d e r s , m a n y o f w h o m in f a c t u s e d it t o h a s t e n t h e p r o c e s s o f ,
and justify the d e m a n d for, i n d e p e n d e n c e .
On the other hand the a r g u m e n t a b o u t lack o f preparedness
1
B. B. Shaffer, ' T h e concept of preparation - some questions about the transfer of
systems of g o v e r n m e n t ' , World Politics, 1965, 1 8 ; Ali Mazrui, ' E d m u n d Burke and
reflections on the revolution in the C o n g o ' , in Ali Mazrui, On heroes and Vhuru-worship:
essays on independent Africa (London, 1967), 3 - 1 8 .
93

c o u l d be taken to m e a n that the African p e o p l e s w e r e themselves

u n p r e p a r e d for i n d e p e n d e n c e , i m p l y i n g that they w e r e , in s o m e
sense, incapable o f s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t . O n e o f the g r o u n d s used to
justify the o r i g i n a l c o l o n i s a t i o n o f A f r i c a b y the E u r o p e a n s w a s
that A f r i c a n s w e r e n o t capable o f g o v e r n i n g t h e m s e l v e s , a n o t i o n
that nationalist leaders quite p r o p e r l y rejected. F o r t h e m the right
to self-government also included the right to self-misgovernment.
B u t as t h e A f r i c a n s t a t e s c o n t i n u e d t o g r a p p l e w i t h t h e p r o b l e m s
o f independence, the question o f preparedness, irrelevant t h o u g h
it m a y n o w s e e m t o b e , c o n t i n u e d t o b e r a i s e d . A f r i c a ' s c o l o n i a l
heritage and the d e p e n d e n c y w h i c h f o l l o w e d f r o m that heritage
has led to p r o b l e m s that m u s t be o v e r c o m e ; the c o n c e p t o f
' preparedness' m a y t h r o w light o n these p r o b l e m s , but apart from
its i n t e r e s t t o h i s t o r i a n s , it c a n o n l y u s e f u l l y b e e m p l o y e d as a
c h a l l e n g e t o A f r i c a n states t o t a k e d e c i s i o n s b a s e d o n a rational
assessment o f possible solutions.
94

C H A P T E R 3
PAN-AFRICANISM SINCE 1940
In 1940, P a n - A f r i c a n i s m s e e m e d t o b e in a state o f d e c a y , y e t w a s
germinating n e w g r o w t h . O n e generation o f leaders and
organisations was fading. T h e r e had been n o Pan-African
C o n g r e s s since the unimpressive N e w Y o r k C o n g r e s s in 1927.
T h e organiser o f the four c o n g r e s s e s b e t w e e n 1 9 1 9 and 1927,
W . E . B . D u B o i s , l a t e r a c c l a i m e d as t h e ' F a t h e r o f P a n -
A f r i c a n i s m ' , a p p e a r e d t o l o o k b a c k o n t h e m as a c o m p l e t e d
e p i s o d e . H i s s e m i - a u t o b i o g r a p h i c a l b o o k , Dusk of dawn, p u b l i s h e d
in 1 9 4 0 , s h o w e d m i n i m a l i n t e r e s t i n P a n - A f r i c a n i s m . H o w e v e r ,
D u B o i s ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n t o P a n - A f r i c a n i s m w a s n o t o n l y as t h e
o r g a n i s e r a n d i n s p i r e r o f o c c a s i o n a l c o n g r e s s e s , b u t a l s o as a n
intellectual, m a k i n g k n o w n the contribution o f black p e o p l e in
b o t h A f r i c a and the A f r i c a n diaspora to h u m a n i t y . In this respect,
h e w a s still f r u i t f u l l y a c t i v e . H i s Black folk then and now, p u b l i s h e d
in 1 9 3 9 , w a s a l i v e l y a n d p e n e t r a t i n g c o l l e c t i o n o f e s s a y s o n
African and diaspora history and culture from ancient to m o d e r n
t i m e s . It c o n t i n u e d a g e n r e h e h a d p i o n e e r e d as far b a c k as 1 9 1 5 ,
w i t h h i s b o o k The Negro, a n d w h i c h h e w a s t o r e t u r n t o i n 1 9 4 7
w i t h The world and Africa. I n t h e s e w o r k s h e s h o w e d h i m s e l f
capable o f stimulating the intelligent general reader o n vast,
l i t t l e - k n o w n themes. In spirit, these b o o k s w e r e p r o f o u n d l y i f n o t
e x p l i c i t l y P a n - A f r i c a n . T h e y d e a l t w i t h A f r i c a as a w h o l e , d e f e n d e d
t h e c r e a t i v i t y a n d v a l i d i t y o f A f r i c a n c u l t u r e t h r o u g h t h e a g e s (as
h a d t h e g r e a t n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y p r o t o - P a n - A f r i c a n i s t s , s u c h as
E . W . B l y d e n ) , a n d t r e a t e d t h e h i s t o r y o f t h e d i a s p o r a as a v i t a l
part o f the history o f Africa and Africans.
In the o p e n i n g m o n t h s o f 1940, his g r e a t rival in f a m e - o r
n o t o r i e t y - as a P a n - A f r i c a n i s t , M a r c u s G a r v e y , w a s d y i n g i n
L o n d o n . His Universal N e g r o Improvement Association ( U N I A ) ,
t h e o n l y m a s s - s u p p o r t e d o r g a n i s a t i o n till t h e n i n t h e h i s t o r y o f
Pan-Africanism, had l o n g since divided into mutually hostile
fragments. His r e m a i n i n g s u p p o r t e r s w e r e chiefly in distant N o r t h
95

PAN-AFRICANISM SINCE I94O
A m e r i c a and the W e s t Indies. H i s spirits w e r e s i n k i n g ; he w a s
p o v e r t y stricken; and t h o u g h respected b y the y o u n g e r generation
o f active Pan-Africanists in Britain, had held h i m s e l f a l o o f f r o m
them. His magazine The Black Man, to w h i c h , largely, he devoted
h i s last y e a r s , a p p e a r e d at i n c r e a s i n g l y i r r e g u l a r i n t e r v a l s , a n d h a d
p e t e r e d o u t i n J u n e 1939. D e s p i t e h i s p u g n a c i o u s a t t a c k s o n o t h e r
black leaders, the obituaries on his death contained some
remarkably g e n e r o u s tributes, w h i c h recognised the uniqueness
o f his career and a c h i e v e m e n t s . T h e o r g a n o f the L e a g u e o f
C o l o u r e d P e o p l e s , an essentially moderate o r e v e n c o n s e r v a t i v e
g r o u p b a s e d i n B r i t a i n , d e s c r i b e d h i m as ' o n e o f t h e g r e a t e s t m e n
o u r g r o u p h a s s o far t h r o w n u p ' a n d r e c o g n i s e d t h a t ' n o o t h e r
m a n o p e r a t i n g o u t s i d e A f r i c a h a s s o far b e e n a b l e t o u n i t e o u r
1
people in such large numbers for any object whatsoever'.
A n o t h e r o f the older generation o f Pan-African leaders, D u s e
M o h a m e d A l i , w h o had been one o f G a r v e y ' s early mentors, but
w h o later had d i s a g r e e d w i t h h i m , and had b r o k e n w i t h the
Universal N e g r o Improvement A s s o c i a t i o n in 1922, c a m e to
m u c h the same c o n c l u s i o n :
Perhaps no African, living or dead, had made such an impression on the world
at large and quickened the desire for racial self-reliance and self-dependence
in the breasts of Africans the world over, than the dead leader... It is to be
deeply regretted that his dream of a permanent home for the peoples of African
origin was not destined to be realised, but the fact remains that he altered the
economic and political consciousness of the African the world over... He has
unquestionably altered their outlook as no previous leader seemed capable of
2
accomplishing.
A l i w a s a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e figure i n a t h i r d m a i n s t r a n d o f t h e
P a n - A f r i c a n M o v e m e n t in the p e r i o d 1918-39. T h i s w a s w h a t
m i g h t be called C o m m e r c i a l P a n - A f r i c a n i s m - the belief that
large-scale c o m m e r c i a l enterprise b y p e o p l e f r o m Africa and the
diaspora c o u l d prise resources from the hands o f w h i t e imperialists,
enrich the black race, and t h r o u g h the p o w e r o f w e a l t h w i n
f r e e d o m . B u t b y 1940, A l i h a d c e a s e d t o b e a n a c t i v e C o m m e r c i a l
P a n - A f r i c a n i s t , a n d h a d s e t t l e d d o w n i n h i s last y e a r s as t h e
p r o p r i e t o r a n d e d i t o r o f The Comet, & l o c a l l y i n f l u e n t i a l m a g a z i n e
in L a g o s . T o a rising g e n e r a t i o n o f N i g e r i a n s , he w a s a respected
but rather r e m o t e o l d m a n , w i t h a m y s t e r i o u s and e x c i t i n g past.
L i k e G a r v e y , h e w a s m u c h less fiery i n h i s l a t e r y e a r s , e s p e c i a l l y
1
News Letter, July 1940, xo, 64. z
The Comet, 17 August 1940, 4.
96

o v e r the evils o f British imperialism. A m a n a b o v e local party

divisions, he chaired the inaugural m e e t i n g o f the N a t i o n a l
C o u n c i l for N i g e r i a and the C a m e r o o n s ( N C N C ) in L a g o s in 1944,
a l m o s t h i s last p u b l i c a c t b e f o r e h i s d e a t h i n 1 9 4 5 . H i s m a i n r i v a l
as a C o m m e r c i a l P a n - A f r i c a n i s t , t h e s p e c t a c u l a r Ghanaian,
W . T e t e - A n s a , w a s still a t t e m p t i n g t o c a r r y t h r o u g h h i s l a t e s t
g r a n d i o s e c o m m e r c i a l s c h e m e s in 1940, b u t w i t h the o u t b r e a k o f
w a r the m o m e n t for such enterprises had passed. I n d e e d , e v e n
from the early 1930s, the y o u n g e r successors o f A l i and T e t e -
A n s a , W e s t Africans like E k e t I n y a n g U d o h , w h o had learned
m u c h f r o m t h e m , w e r e m u c h m o r e c o m m e r c i a l nationalists t h a n
Pan-Africanists.
Simultaneous w i t h these declining careers and m o v e m e n t s ,
there w a s from the mid-1930s a t o u g h , resourceful and radical n e w
g e n e r a t i o n o f P a n - A f r i c a n i s t s , s o m e M a r x i s t , s u c h as t h e
Trinidadians G e o r g e P a d m o r e and C . L . R. James and the Sierra
L e o n e a n I. T . A . W a l l a c e - J o h n s o n , o t h e r s l i k e t h e K e n y a n J o m o
K e n y a t t a and the G u y a n a n Ras M a k o n n e n d e t e r m i n e d l y anti-
imperialist. W h a t b o u n d t h e m t o g e t h e r i d e o l o g i c a l l y w a s anti-
imperialism, and the c o n v i c t i o n that i m p e r i a l i s m had a racial
m o d e - t h a t it w a s t h e e x p l o i t a t i o n o f b l a c k m e n b y w h i t e , a n d
that the o n l y w a y o u t , for the b l a c k w o r l d , w a s t h r o u g h racial
solidarity and activism. T h i s consensus enabled the anti-Marxist
M a k o n n e n , for example, to w o r k h a r m o n i o u s l y w i t h the Marxist
Padmore. W h a t activated their radicalism, m o r e than anything
else, w a s the I t a l o - E t h i o p i a n crisis, and the c y n i c a l a b a n d o n m e n t
o f Ethiopia b y the leaders o f the L e a g u e o f N a t i o n s , Britain and
France. S o m e , notably P a d m o r e w i t h his experience o f the
C o m i n t e r n and Profintern, w e r e also c o n v i n c e d that, w i t h equal
c y n i c i s m , t h e U S S R m e r e l y r e g a r d e d b l a c k m o v e m e n t s as ' r e -
v o l u t i o n a r y e x p e n d a b l e s ' , and had jettisoned support for the
b l a c k w o r l d in t h e i n t e r e s t s o f P o p u l a r F r o n t p o l i c i e s . I t s h o u l d b e
n o t e d t h a t t h e first i n s t i t u t i o n a l e x p r e s s i o n o f t h i s g r o u p , t h e
I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f r i c a n F r i e n d s o f A b y s s i n i a ( I A F A ) , i n 1935 h a d
c l o s e c o n t a c t s w i t h t h e P a r i s - b a s e d Ligue de la Défense de la Race
Nègre, at o n e t i m e c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e F r e n c h C o m m u n i s t
Party, and suppressed b y the P o p u l a r F r o n t g o v e r n m e n t in 1937.
O n e other factor b o n d i n g the radicals t o g e t h e r w a s that despite
diverse origins, they w e r e g e o g r a p h i c a l l y concentrated b y their
r e s i d e n c e i n B r i t a i n , w h i c h t h e y felt ' t o b e at t h e c e n t r e o f g r a v i t y
97

1
as far as A f r i c a w a s c o n c e r n e d ' . Sceptical about British free
speech, they nevertheless r e c o g n i s e d its u t i l i t y f o r t h e i r own
purposes; although determined to be neither smothered nor
c o n t r o l l e d , they appreciated the practical aid o f British s y m p a t h
isers. D i s p e r s e d a r o u n d B r i t a i n b y the blitz ( M a k o n n e n ' s restau
r a n t s in M a n c h e s t e r t h e n b e c o m i n g a n i m p o r t a n t l o c a l e o f t h e
m o v e m e n t ) , t h e y r e m a i n e d in c l o s e t o u c h w i t h e a c h o t h e r . M o r e
than any other group, they were responsible for the Fifth
P a n - A f r i c a n C o n g r e s s in M a n c h e s t e r in 1945.
What saved them from b e i n g merely a small Pan-African
discussion g r o u p o f the sort that had l o n g flourished in Britain
w a s their ability to reach and penetrate other black circles. O n e
o f these w a s W A S U , the W e s t A f r i c a n Students U n i o n , w h o s e
dominant figure, Ladipo Solanke, had long b e l i e v e d in the
c o n c e p t o f a U n i t e d W e s t A f r i c a , a n d w h o s e hostel in L o n d o n w a s
a r e n d e z v o u s for W e s t African students and visitors, and other
Africans, W e s t Indians, black A m e r i c a n s and white sympathisers.
T h r o u g h friendly and informal contacts w i t h W A S U , the radicals
w e r e able to spread their influence. A British-based organisation
w i t h w h i c h they had m o r e e q u i v o c a l relations w a s the moderate
L e a g u e o f C o l o u r e d Peoples ( L C P ) , led b y the Jamaican, Dr
M . A . M o o d y . M a k o n n e n r e g a r d e d his g r o u p ' s relationship w i t h
2
t h e L C P as b e i n g ' o n e of convenience'. H o w e v e r , in 1939,
collaboration b e t w e e n the L C P moderates and the radicals w a s
increasing, particularly in p l a n n i n g a W o r l d C o n f e r e n c e to be h e l d
in L o n d o n in 1940, w h i c h w a s to deal c o m p r e h e n s i v e l y with
questions c o n c e r n i n g Africa and the diaspora. T h e radicals w e r e
anxious that their organisation, the International A f r i c a n S e r v i c e
B u r e a u ( I A S B ) , w h i c h h a d r e p l a c e d t h e I A F A in 1 9 3 7 , w o u l d n o t
be s w a m p e d b y the L C P , w h i c h had taken the initiative. W a r put
paid to the conference, and the fragile c o o p e r a t i o n between
radicals and moderates. The former denounced the war as
i m p e r i a l i s t , a n d r e f u s e d t o s u p p o r t t h e B r i t i s h w a r effort. M o o d y ,
w h i l e c o n t i n u i n g t o w o r k f o r b l a c k p o l i t i c a l a n d c i v i l r i g h t s , felt
t h a t in t h a t c r i s i s it w a s n e c e s s a r y t o r a l l y b e h i n d t h e U n i o n J a c k .
In c o n s e q u e n c e , b y 1945 t h e i n t e n s e r a d i c a l i s i n g effect o f t h e
S e c o n d W o r l d W a r m a d e h i m seem irrelevant, w h i l e the radicals
w e r e in a c c o r d w i t h the m o o d o f the times. D e s p i t e wartime
1
Ras Makonnen, Pan-Africanism from within (Nairobi, 1973), 152—3.
2
Makonnen, Pan-Africanism, 127.
98

dislocation, the radicals, notably P a d m o r e and M a k o n n e n , re

mained organisationally effective. In 1944 they w e r e able to create
t h e P a n - A f r i c a n F e d e r a t i o n ( P A F ) as a n u m b r e l l a f o r a n u m b e r
of smaller organisations.
I f B r i t a i n w a s t h e f o c u s o f P a n - A f r i c a n a c t i v i t y u p t o 1 9 4 5 , it
w o u l d n e v e r t h e l e s s b e m i s l e a d i n g t o a t t r i b u t e all i n i t i a t i v e b e t w e e n
1935 a n d 1945 t o B r i t i s h - b a s e d g r o u p s a n d l e a d e r s . A l l o v e r t h e
b l a c k w o r l d , b u t m o s t n o t a b l y in W e s t A f r i c a and in the U n i t e d
States, p e o p l e w e r e aroused b y the I t a l o - E t h i o p i a n crisis. T h u s ,
a l t h o u g h o n l y a h a n d f u l o f b l a c k A m e r i c a n s - s u c h as t h e a v i a t o r s
John C Robinson and Hubert Fauntleroy Julian - actually
s e r v e d in t h e Ethiopian forces, nevertheless many thousands
expressed the w i s h to d o so but w e r e p r e v e n t e d by circumstances.
The m o s t i m p o r t a n t o f these w a s the U S State D e p a r t m e n t ' s ban
o n A m e r i c a n citizens enlisting in E t h i o p i a n forces. T h e b l a c k
A m e r i c a n press d e v o t e d e n o r m o u s attention to the w a r , and to
the appeals o f v a r i o u s aid c o m m i t t e e s . M a n y b l a c k A m e r i c a n
organisations s o u g h t to aid E t h i o p i a ; such, for e x a m p l e , w a s the
Pan-African Reconstruction Association, founded by Samuel
D a n i e l s in Harlem in 1934. T h e s e press campaigns and aid
o r g a n i s a t i o n s w e r e p a r a l l e l e d i n W e s t A f r i c a . T h e effect o n b o t h
the y o u n g e r and older generations o f W e s t Africans w a s often to
m a k e t h e m a w a r e i n a w a y t h a t w a s , at l e a s t i m p l i c i t l y , P a n -
African. A s A n t h o n y E n a h o r o put it:
Our favourite newspaper, The Comet, was a weekly publication by [Duse

Mohamed Ali]... From it I followed the fortunes of the Italo-Abyssinian War,
about which Father and my teachers appeared considerably agitated. Fellow-
feeling with other Africans was a newly awakened sentiment, much
disappointment was felt about England's failure to go to the aid of the
1
Ethiopians, and collections were taken for a 'Help Abyssinia Fund'.
In o t h e r w a y s , the W e s t A f r i c a n P a n - A f r i c a n response in the
1 9 3 0 s w a s less c l e a r . T h i s w a s t h e p e r i o d o f t h e d e c l i n e o f t h e
N a t i o n a l C o n g r e s s o f B r i t i s h W e s t A f r i c a a n d the rise o f territori
ally based political parties. O n the o t h e r h a n d W a l l a c e - J o h n s o n ' s
W e s t A f r i c a n Y o u t h L e a g u e had a P a n - A f r i c a n o u t l o o k , and tried
t o e m b r a c e F r e n c h a n d P o r t u g u e s e as w e l l as B r i t i s h W e s t A f r i c a
i n t h e y e a r s after 1 9 3 5 . H i s d e t e n t i o n o n S h e r b r o I s l a n d f o r m o s t
of the p e r i o d o f the Second W o r l d W a r ended the League's
e f f e c t i v e life. T h e m o s t s p e c t a c u l a r o f t h e n e w g e n e r a t i o n o f W e s t
1
Anthony Enahoro, Fugitive offender (London, 1965), 45.
99

African political leaders, N n a m d i A z i k i w e , proclaimed Pan-

A f r i c a n i d e a s i n h i s n e w s p a p e r s , t h e African Morning Post i n A c c r a ,
a n d f r o m 1 9 3 8 t h e West African Pilot i n L a g o s ; a n d i n h i s b o o k
Renascent Africa ( 1 9 3 7 ) . H e h a d a w i d e i n f l u e n c e o v e r t h e y o u n g e r
generation.
A z i k i w e provided a model and personal encouragement to
y o u n g W e s t Africans to g o to the U n i t e d States for their
u n i v e r s i t y e d u c a t i o n , m o s t n o t a b l y in the case o f K w a m e
N k r u m a h , w h o i n 1935 w e n t t o s t u d y at L i n c o l n U n i v e r s i t y ,
A z i k i w e ' s o l d s c h o o l . In the 1930s and 1940s, several score W e s t
A f r i c a n s t u d e n t s s t u d i e d at L i n c o l n , n o t t o m e n t i o n n u m b e r s o f
o t h e r A f r i c a n s w h o s t u d i e d at o t h e r A m e r i c a n u n i v e r s i t i e s , b l a c k
and w h i t e . D u r i n g the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r such students had
opportunities to interact w i t h a r e v i v i n g black A m e r i c a n interest
in A f r i c a , a n d t o assess t h e i r o w n p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n i n a c o u n t r y
w h i c h , i f an ally o f w a r t i m e Britain, w a s hostile t o British i m
perialism. A m o n g t h e m s e l v e s , they f o r m e d an A f r i c a n Students
A s s o c i a t i o n ( A S A ) , first m o o t e d as a n i d e a at L i n c o l n i n 1 9 3 9 ,
w h i c h h e l d its first g e n e r a l m e e t i n g i n H a r l e m in 1 9 4 1 .
A l t h o u g h its m e m b e r s w e r e n o t m a n y , t h e y c o n t a i n e d m e n w h o
w e r e l a t e r t o m a k e t h e i r m a r k i n W e s t A f r i c a , s u c h as K . O .
Mbadiwe, A. A . N. Orizu, Mbonu Ojike, K . A . B . Jones-
Q u a r t e y , a n d , o f c o u r s e , N k r u m a h . It n o w a p p e a r s t h a t N k r u m a h
later e x a g g e r a t e d h i s r o l e i n t h e A S A , e l e v a t i n g h i m s e l f r e t r o
s p e c t i v e l y t o t h e p o s i t i o n o f its first p r e s i d e n t , a n d c l a i m i n g t h a t h e
c o n t i n u e d as p r e s i d e n t u n t i l h e w e n t t o B r i t a i n i n 1 9 4 5 . S o far as
is k n o w n h e w a s t h e second p r e s i d e n t , a n d o n l y h e l d this p o s t
d u r i n g 1 9 4 2 - 3 . N e v e r t h e l e s s , b e c a u s e t h e A S A affiliated i t s e l f t o
W A S U i n B r i t a i n , o n r e a c h i n g L o n d o n i n 1945 it w a s n o t difficult
f o r N k r u m a h , still a r a t h e r o b s c u r e p e r s o n , t o m a k e h i m s e l f
k n o w n to the t o p leadership o f P a n - A f r i c a n i s m in Britain.
A d d i t i o n a l l y , he had a letter o f r e c o m m e n d a t i o n to P a d m o r e f r o m
C L . R. James. But N k r u m a h does seem to have played a part
in radicalising the C o u n c i l o n A f r i c a n Affairs, a b l a c k A m e r i c a n
organisation w h i c h had been founded by Paul R o b e s o n and M a x
Y e r g a n . H e p l a y e d a p r o m i n e n t p a r t i n its C o n f e r e n c e o n A f r i c a ,
h e l d in N e w Y o r k i n 1 9 4 4 , w h i c h i n t u r n r e f l e c t e d t h e g r o w i n g
interest o f politically c o n s c i o u s b l a c k A m e r i c a n s in the A f r i c a n
continent.
100

THE I945 PAN-AFRICAN CONGRESS
T h e 1945 P a n - A f r i c a n C o n g r e s s w a s t h e c u l m i n a t i o n o f t h e n e w
g r o w t h s in t h e m o v e m e n t , b u t a l s o o f a m u c h l o n g e r p r o c e s s ,
s t r e t c h i n g b a c k to the e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , in w h i c h P a n - A f r i c a n
c o n s c i o u s n e s s h a d b e e n g e r m i n a t i n g , especially in the d i a s p o r a ,
a l t h o u g h also in A f r i c a . A f t e r 1 9 4 5 , P a n - A f r i c a n i s m w a s to
t r a n s f e r its g e o g r a p h i c a l c e n t r e , p o l i t i c a l p r i o r i t i e s , a n d l e a d e r s h i p ,
at l o n g last, t o t h e A f r i c a n c o n t i n e n t itself, a n d t h e d i a s p o r a w a s
to b e c o m e peripheral in e v e r y sense. N e v e r t h e l e s s , despite the
reiteration, especially b y N k r u m a h , that the M a n c h e s t e r C o n g r e s s
w a s t h e first t o b e d o m i n a t e d b y A f r i c a n s a n d A f r i c a n i s s u e s , it
w a s v e r y m u c h t h e c r e a t i o n o f d i a s p o r a l e a d e r s . It s o h a p p e n e d t h a t
b y 1944, D u B o i s had r e v i v e d his a c t i v e interest in P a n - A f r i c a n i s m
and w a s planning another c o n g r e s s . T h u s b y early 1945, b o t h
D u B o i s and the radical P a n - A f r i c a n i s t s in Britain w e r e , u n k n o w n
to each other, planning a Fifth C o n g r e s s . T h i s confusion was
partly because D u B o i s ' s contacts in Britain w e r e w i t h W A S U and
the L C P , w h o s e leader, M o o d y , had b e e n c o n t e m p l a t i n g s o m e sort
o f Pan-African conference since 1943, rather than the I A S B and
t h e P A F . H e h o p e d , as h e h a d i n 1 9 1 9 , t o p e r s u a d e t h e N a t i o n a l
A s s o c i a t i o n for the A d v a n c e m e n t o f C o l o r e d P e o p l e ( N A A C P )
officially t o s u p p o r t a n d finance h i s c o n g r e s s , w h i c h h e w i s h e d t o
t a k e p l a c e in A f r i c a . W h e n h e b e c a m e a w a r e o f t h e p l a n s b e i n g
m a d e i n d e p e n d e n t l y i n B r i t a i n , at first h e r e a c t e d i c i l y . T w o
factors, h o w e v e r , p r e v e n t e d a disastrous split. A s in the p e r i o d
b e t w e e n 1 9 1 9 a n d 1 9 2 7 , t h e N A A C P u l t i m a t e l y w i t h h e l d official
b a c k i n g a n d finance, w h i c h r e d u c e d h i s p o w e r t o d o m i n a t e
e v e n t s o r g o his o w n w a y . M o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , w i t h masterly skill,
P a d m o r e s o o t h e d D u B o i s ' s susceptibilities, r e c o g n i s i n g his v a l u e
as t h e e m b o d i m e n t o f t h e m o v e m e n t ' s h i s t o r i c a l c o n t i n u i t y a n d
thus secured his c o o p e r a t i o n . T h e c o n g r e s s that e m e r g e d reflected
P a d m o r e ' s radical ideas rather than D u B o i s ' s m o r e cautious ones.
E x p l o i t i n g contacts w i t h colonial trades-union leaders, and the
m e e t i n g o f the W o r l d T r a d e s U n i o n C o n g r e s s in Paris in early
O c t o b e r 1945, P a d m o r e w a s able to ensure that Manchester w a s
not merely a meeting o f eminent black intellectuals and
professional m e n . A n d , in a n o t h e r adroit piece o f political
management, not only was D u B o i s present, but also four delegates
from the U N I A o f Jamaica, thus s y m b o l i c a l l y r e c o n c i l i n g the
101

deepest antagonism within the m o v e m e n t . Neither did the pres

ence o f these U N I A delegates deter A m y A s h w o o d G a r v e y ,
Garvey's first wife, from attending, although the U N I A of
Jamaica w a s headed b y his second wife, A m y Jaques G a r v e y . T h e
n o t a b l e a b s e n c e s f r o m t h e 1945 C o n g r e s s w e r e M o o d y a n d t h e
LCP moderates, and any representative o f francophone Pan-
A f r i c a n i s m . I t h a s b e e n a r g u e d t h a t p o l i t i c a l effort i n F r e n c h B l a c k
A f r i c a , after t h e 1 9 4 4 B r a z z a v i l l e C o n f e r e n c e , w a s d i r e c t e d ( o r
misdirected) into the limited o p e n i n g s that b e c a m e available in
1
m e t r o p o l i t a n F r e n c h p o l i t i c s . I n p e r s o n a l t e r m s , s o o n after t h e
M a n c h e s t e r C o n g r e s s , N k r u m a h and K e n y a t t a returned t o their
o w n countries to take u p the struggle for local independence. In
sharp contrast, Leopold Senghor w a s acting as an official
philological adviser o n the language o f the constitution o f the
F r e n c h F o u r t h R e p u b l i c . It c o u l d b e said that the a b s e n c e o f
f r a n c o p h o n e d e l e g a t e s i n 1945 p r e s a g e d o n e o f t h e d i v i s i o n s i n
i n d e p e n d e n t A f r i c a f r o m t h e late 1 9 5 0 s , t h a t b e t w e e n f r a n c o p h o n e
and a n g l o p h o n e Africa.
T h e C o n g r e s s d i d n o t seize the w o r l d ' s headlines, y e t un
doubtedly it w a s a n e v e n t o f great importance. Nkrumah,
r e m i n i s c i n g in 1 9 6 3 , asserted that ' w e w e n t f r o m Manchester
2
k n o w i n g d e f i n i t e l y w h e r e w e w e r e g o i n g ' . A s w e l l as s u r v e y i n g
the situation in v a r i o u s parts o f A f r i c a a n d the diaspora, the
C o n g r e s s issued t w o general statements, ' T h e C h a l l e n g e to the
Colonial P o w e r s ' , and a 'Declaration to the Colonial W o r k e r s ,
F a r m e r s a n d Intellectuals'. T h e s e c o n t a i n e d the essence o f its
message. B o t h used Marxist-flavoured language - the ' Declara
tion ' ended w i t h the phrase ' Colonial and Subject Peoples o f the
W o r l d U n i t e ! ' - w i t h o u t b e i n g in reality M a r x i s t statements. T h e
' Challenge' demanded independence f o r ' Black Africa' (although
the c o n g r e s s h a d c o n c e r n e d itself w i t h N o r t h A f r i c a t o o ) , c o n
demned ' t h e m o n o p o l y o f capital', and envisaged the use o f
f o r c e t o w i n f r e e d o m ' a s a last r e s o r t ' , t h o u g h n o t as i n e v i t a b l e .
B u t w h a t w a s perhaps the m o s t characteristic a n d significant call
o f t h e M a n c h e s t e r C o n g r e s s w a s f o r c o l o n i a l f r e e d o m , ' t h e first
step towards and necessary prerequisite to complete social,
3
e c o n o m i c a n d p o l i t i c a l e m a n c i p a t i o n ' . H e r e w a s t h e first p r i o r i t y
1
Imanuel Geiss, The Pan-African movement ( L o n d o n , 1974), 396-7.
2
G e o r g e Padmore (ed.), The history of the Pan-African Congress (2nd edition with new
material, L o n d o n , 1963), v.
3
Padmore, Pan-African Congress, 5-7.
102

for the m o v e m e n t - national i n d e p e n d e n c e , a g o a l that h a d n o t

clearly e m e r g e d f r o m the earlier c o n g r e s s e s . T h e q u e s t i o n o f w h a t
f o r m P a n - A f r i c a n i s m m i g h t e v e n t u a l l y t a k e after t h e a c h i e v e m e n t
o f national i n d e p e n d e n c e w a s n o t c o n s i d e r e d . A f t e r all, despite
t h e o p t i m i s m o f t h e m o m e n t , it is u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e d e l e g a t e s
f o r e s a w n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e as n o t m u c h m o r e t h a n a d e c a d e
a w a y for s o m e A f r i c a n colonies. T h e issue o f the relationship
between national independence and supra-national Pan-Africa
n i s m w a s n e c e s s a r i l y e v e n m o r e r e m o t e , a l t h o u g h , i n e v i t a b l y , it
w a s t o a r i s e i n a n a c u t e f o r m a l m o s t as s o o n as t h e r e w a s a
sufficient n u c l e u s o f i n d e p e n d e n t A f r i c a n states i n e x i s t e n c e .
N k r u m a h had been the author o f the ' D e c l a r a t i o n to the
C o l o n i a l W o r k e r s , Farmers and Intellectuals' o f the c o n g r e s s . In
t h e i n t e r v a l b e t w e e n O c t o b e r 1945 a n d h i s r e t u r n t o t h e G o l d
C o a s t i n D e c e m b e r 1 9 4 7 at t h e r e q u e s t o f t h e l e a d e r s o f t h e U n i t e d
G o l d C o a s t C o n v e n t i o n ( U G C C ) , n o o n e w a s m o r e a c t i v e in
i m p l e m e n t i n g its d e c i s i o n s . H e c r e a t e d , t o g e t h e r w i t h W a l l a c e -
J o h n s o n and others, the W e s t A f r i c a n N a t i o n a l Secretariat
( W A N S ) , a small élite g r o u p o f radically inclined W e s t A f r i c a n s
in B r i t a i n . T h e t a c t i c t h e y a d v o c a t e d w a s m o b i l i s a t i o n o f t h e
masses (unlike the c o n s e r v a t i v e traditions o f the U G C C leaders),
and their o b j e c t i v e w a s an i n d e p e n d e n t U n i t e d W e s t Africa,
an o l d W e s t A f r i c a n d r e a m , w h i c h can b e traced b a c k t o
the nineteenth-century p r o t o - P a n - A f r i c a n i s t J a m e s A f r i c a n u s
H o r t o n . N k r u m a h a n d t h e W A N S w e r e n o t satisfied w i t h t h e
l i m i t e d c o n c e p t o f a U n i t e d British W e s t A f r i c a , b u t l i k e t h e W e s t
African Y o u t h League, wanted to include French and Portuguese
c o l o n i e s t o o . T o this e n d , g o o d relations w e r e established n o t o n l y
w i t h B r i t i s h W e s t A f r i c a n p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , s u c h as t h e N C N C , b u t
also w i t h the only g e n u i n e l y trans-territorial W e s t A f r i c a n political
party o f the day, the R a s s e m b l e m e n t D é m o c r a t i q u e A f r i c a i n
( R D A ) , w h o s e leaders, m e m b e r s o f the F r e n c h N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y ,
N k r u m a h m e t in P a r i s in 1 9 4 7 . B u t h i s r e t u r n t o A f r i c a in 1 9 4 7 ,
a y e a r after K e n y a t t a h a d r e t u r n e d t o K e n y a , m a r k e d t h e
b e g i n n i n g o f the e n d o f the p e r i o d in w h i c h Britain w a s the m o s t
important geographical centre o f Pan-African activity. F o r a time
W A S U c o n t i n u e d t o afford a n u m b r e l l a u n d e r w h i c h P a n -
Africanists could operate. In 1947-8, M a k o n n e n (with help from
British sympathisers and other Pan-Africanist radicals) p r o d u c e d
a n d e d i t e d t h e j o u r n a l Pan-Africa, p e r h a p s t h e last i n t h e l i n e o f
103

influential P a n - A f r i c a n journals p r o d u c e d in Britain, w h i c h

s t r e t c h e d b a c k v i a D u s e M o h a m e d A l i ' s African Times and Orient
Review ( 1 9 1 2 - 1 8 ) t o S. J. C e l e s t i n e E d w a r d s ' s Fraternity ( 1 8 9 2 - 4 ) .
But b y the early 1950s, e v e n those Pan-Africanists w h o remained
in B r i t a i n s e e m , u n d e r s t a n d a b l y , t o h a v e b e e n s w e p t a l o n g b y
h e a d y e v e n t s in A f r i c a , especially in the G o l d C o a s t ; P a n -
A f r i c a n i s m w a s n o t r e n o u n c e d b u t w a s s u b s u m e d in the national
i n d e p e n d e n c e s t r u g g l e s . T h u s P a d m o r e p u b l i s h e d h i s b o o k The
Gold Coast revolution. The struggle of an African people from slavery
to freedom i n 1 9 5 3 . B u t t h i s w a s , after a l l , q u i t e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e
s p i r i t o f M a n c h e s t e r 1 9 4 5 , a s p i r i t w h i c h as t h e 1 9 5 0 s a d v a n c e d
must have seemed m o r e and m o r e prescient.
THE A F R I C A N DIASPORA AND POST-1945
PAN-AFRICANISM
O n e o f t h e m o s t p o i g n a n t c o n s e q u e n c e s o f t h e p o s t - 1 9 4 5 shift i n
Pan-Africanism w a s the increasing marginality o f the diaspora. T o
b e g i n w i t h , in the early and m i d - 1 9 5 0 s , b l a c k A m e r i c a n s and
British W e s t Indians, the t w o diaspora c o m m u n i t i e s w h o had
historically b e e n o f m o s t i m p o r t a n c e in the m o v e m e n t , h a d o t h e r
and urgent preoccupations. In the U n i t e d States, the older
generation o f black American Pan-Africanists, notably D u B o i s
and R o b e s o n , w e r e sometimes victims o f M c C a r t h y i s m . T h e i r
M a r x i s t s y m p a t h i e s m a d e this inevitable. W h e n the A m e r i c a n
Civil R i g h t s m o v e m e n t b e g a n to get u n d e r w a y , w i t h the historic
c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h G o v e r n o r F a u b u s in L i t t l e R o c k , A r k a n s a s ,
i n 195 3, it w a s t h e F r e d e r i c k D o u g l a s s t r a d i t i o n i n b l a c k A m e r i c a n
radicalism that w a s u p p e r m o s t , d e m a n d i n g the rights o f blacks
as A m e r i c a n c i t i z e n s . A s t h e C i v i l R i g h t s m o v e m e n t b e g a n t o
cohere and gather strength under the leadership o f Martin L u t h e r
K i n g this, rather than a P a n - A f r i c a n perspective, remained
u p p e r m o s t until perhaps the m i d - 1 9 6 0 s . A f t e r all, K i n g ' s m o s t
openly a c k n o w l e d g e d political debt to any n o n - A m e r i c a n w a s not
to the n e w leaders o f i n d e p e n d e n t A f r i c a , b u t to G a n d h i . A p a r t
from those w h o f o l l o w e d h i m , perhaps the m o s t d y n a m i c m o v e
m e n t a m o n g black A m e r i c a n s , the N a t i o n o f Islam, p r o c l a i m e d
a n A r a b i a n r a t h e r t h a n an A f r i c a n o r i g i n f o r b l a c k p e o p l e .
M e a n w h i l e , in the British W e s t Indies, the 1950s w e r e years o f
struggles and negotiations for independence from Britain - and
104

POST-1945 PAN-AFRICANISM
struggles within and a m o n g the W e s t Indian colonies b e t w e e n

federalists a n d anti-federalists. T h e latter, w h o s e u n i v e r s a l t r i u m p h
b e g a n w i t h the o p t i n g o f Jamaica for separate i n d e p e n d e n c e , w e r e
hardly likely to s u b s u m e their h a r d - w o n local i n d e p e n d e n c e in a
w i d e r P a n - A f r i c a n identity. B y the 1960s, P a n - A f r i c a n i s m in the
W e s t Indies b e c a m e an i d e o l o g y o f dissident intellectuals, rather
than o f g o v e r n m e n t s - a l t h o u g h partial e x c e p t i o n s w o u l d b e the
interest s h o w n b y F o r b e s B u r n h a m ' s g o v e r n m e n t in G u y a n a in
the 1970s, and Jamaica f o l l o w i n g the return to p o w e r o f M i c h a e l
M a n l e y and his P e o p l e ' s N a t i o n a l Party in 1 9 7 5 .
In Jamaica, A m y Jaques G a r v e y , M a r c u s G a r v e y ' s w i d o w ,
w o r k e d ceaselessly to keep her husband's m e m o r y and ideas alive
a n d , as s c h o l a r l y i n t e r e s t i n G a r v e y b e g a n t o g r o w i n t h e m i d - 1 9 5 o s ,
p r o v i d e d i n v a l u a b l e h e l p t o m a n y scholars. It w o u l d n o t b e an
e x a g g e r a t i o n t o say that her part in the history o f P a n - A f r i c a n i s m
w a s i n itself, f o r t h e s e r e a s o n s , a m a j o r o n e ; s h e l i v e d t o s e e G a r v e y
a c k n o w l e d g e d as a h e r o a g a i n b y b l a c k l e a d e r s i n b o t h A f r i c a a n d
the diaspora.
A f r i c a in g e n e r a l , a n d P a n - A f r i c a n i s m in particular, c o n t i n u e d
t o b e o f i m p o r t a n c e t o t h e d i a s p o r a after t h e late 1 9 4 0 s . T h e a d v e n t
o f i n d e p e n d e n t b l a c k A f r i c a n states, b e g i n n i n g w i t h G h a n a in
1957, and r e a c h i n g a c l i m a x in the h e a d y year o f i960, caused an
i m m e n s e stirring o f interest and pride t h r o u g h o u t the diaspora,
and an u n d e r s t a n d a b l e w i s h t o relate to and e m u l a t e this m o v e
m e n t . O n t h e l e v e l o f b l a c k p o p u l a r c u l t u r e , this f o u n d e x p r e s s i o n
in the w e a r i n g o f * A f r o ' hairstyles and ' d a s h i k i s ' , the g i v i n g o f
African names to children, and e v e n a v o g u e for attending
b e g i n n e r s ' classes in S w a h i l i .
T h e y o u n g e r generation o f black political leaders, especially in
the U n i t e d States, w h o e m e r g e d f r o m the C i v i l R i g h t s m o v e m e n t ,
a l m o s t i n v a r i a b l y e m p h a s i s e d t h e A f r i c a n h e r i t a g e as p a r t o f t h e i r
p r o g r a m m e o f Black Nationalism. Indeed, b o r r o w i n g a leaf from
the African nationalist leaders, or for that matter f r o m the
Manchester C o n g r e s s , there w e r e demands for national indepen
dence for black A m e r i c a n s . T h u s the p r o g r a m m e o f the B l a c k
P a n t h e r P a r t y i n 1 9 6 6 i n c l u d e d as t h e p a r t y ' s ' m a j o r p o l i t i c a l
o b j e c t i v e ' , a call for ' a U n i t e d N a t i o n s - s u p e r v i s e d plebiscite t o
b e h e l d t h r o u g h o u t t h e b l a c k c o l o n y (i.e. b l a c k A m e r i c a n s ) i n
w h i c h only black colonial subjects will be a l l o w e d to participate,
f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f d e t e r m i n i n g t h e w i l l o f b l a c k p e o p l e as t o t h e i r
105

1
national destiny'. W i t h i n the B l a c k Panthers, b y 1968, there w a s
a split b e t w e e n those w h o stressed political b l a c k nationalism, and
a w i n g led b y S t o k e l y C a r m i c h a e l that put a s t r o n g emphasis o n
cultural nationalism. Carmichael's stance became increasingly
detached from diaspora black nationalism and increasingly African
inclined, until he d e c i d e d to join the o v e r t h r o w n N k r u m a h in exile
in G u i n e a . O t h e r b l a c k nationalists o f the s a m e g e n e r a t i o n b e c a m e
explicitly P a n - A f r i c a n in o u t l o o k , w i t h o u t l e a v i n g the United
States. T h u s the writer I m a m u B a r a k a (the f o r m e r L e R o i Jones),
created the C o n g r e s s o f African Peoples, w h i c h held a m e e t i n g
in A t l a n t a , G e o r g i a in 1970, a t t e n d e d m a i n l y b y d e l e g a t e s f r o m
affiliated b l a c k A m e r i c a n o r g a n i s a t i o n s , b u t a l s o s o m e A f r i c a n s ,
s u c h as t h e G u i n e a n A m b a s s a d o r t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , a n d a
representative o f H o l d e n Roberto's A n g o l a n National Liberation
Front. Baraka regarded this g a t h e r i n g as ' o n e in a g r o w i n g
historical tradition o f international gatherings o f P a n - A f r i c a n s ' .
Those present were an amazingly heterogeneous collection,
representing w h a t e v e n he admitted w e r e ' s e e m i n g l y antithetical
2
approaches to national and international African l i b e r a t i o n ' . In
his o w n address, he called for a W o r l d A f r i c a n Political P a r t y :
' A P o l i t i c a l P a r t y t h a t w i l l f u n c t i o n i n S o u t h A f r i c a l i k e it w i l l
f u n c t i o n in C h i c a g o , w h e r e y o u k n o w t h a t i f y o u a r e i n S u r i n a m
o r Jamaica, o r N e w Y o r k City this W o r l d A f r i c a n Party will be
functioning to get p o w e r , to bring about self-determination for
3
Black people.'
A n o t h e r s t r a n d o f d i a s p o r a life w i t h a c o n t i n u i n g i n t e r e s t in
Africa and Pan-Africanism w a s the intellectual w o r l d . T h e black
A m e r i c a n c o n t r i b u t i o n to the early g r o w t h o f A f r i c a n studies w a s
p i o n e e r i n g a n d s e m i n a l . E v e n if, in t h e m a s s i v e e x p a n s i o n o f
African studies f r o m the 1950s, the distinctively black A m e r i c a n
(or, o n e m i g h t add, W e s t Indian contribution) n o l o n g e r played
quite such a central role, black A m e r i c a n universities and scholars
p l a y e d a k e y part in initiating that e x p a n s i o n . C o n t i n u i n g interest
a m o n g the b l a c k A m e r i c a n intelligentsia in A f r i c a n c u l t u r e w a s
signalled by the creation o f the A m e r i c a n S o c i e t y o f A f r i c a n
Culture (AMSAC) in 1956, w h i c h restricted membership to
p e r s o n s o f A f r i c a n d e s c e n t . A l t h o u g h its s t a n d i n g w a s s e r i o u s l y
1
Bobby Seale, Sei%e the time. The story of the Black Panther Party (London, 1970), 89.
2
Imamu Amiri Baraka (ed.) African Congress: a documentary of thefirstmodern Pan-African
y
Congress ( N e w Y o r k , 1972), vii, viii.

3
Baraka, African Congress, 94.
106

POST-1945 PAN-AFRICANISM
tarnished b y the subsequent revelation o f secret Central Intelli

g e n c e A g e n c y c o n n e x i o n s , it w o u l d b e u n w i s e t o d i s m i s s t h i s b o d y ,
a n d its m e m b e r s , as n o t h i n g b u t p u p p e t s o f c o v e r t A m e r i c a n
g o v e r n m e n t p o l i c y . Its t h i r d a n n u a l c o n f e r e n c e , i n P h i l a d e l p h i a
in i 9 6 0 , d e v o t e d i t s e l f t o t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f ' A f r i c a n U n i t i e s a n d
P a n - A f r i c a n i s m ' , a n d c a n b e r e g a r d e d as a n e v e n t i n t h e h i s t o r y
o f the m o v e m e n t . S o m e o f those present had s t r o n g links w i t h
the P a n - A f r i c a n past, n o t a b l y R a y f o r d W , L o g a n , w h o had p l a y e d
a n i m p o r t a n t p a r t i n t h e e r a o f P a n - A f r i c a n c o n g r e s s e s after t h e
First W o r l d W a r ; Jean P r i c e - M a r s , Haitian diplomat, p h i l o s o p h e r
o f négritude, a n d P r e s i d e n t o f t h e Société Africaine de Culture i n P a r i s ;
a n d Jaja W a c h u k u , w h o h a d b e e n at t h e 1945 P a n - A f r i c a n
C o n g r e s s , and w h o w a s in i960 f o r e i g n minister o f N i g e r i a .
O n e o f the oldest dreams in the diaspora, that o f the ' r e t u r n
o f exiles ' to A f r i c a , f o u n d e x p r e s s i o n in the era o f i n d e p e n d e n t
A f r i c a n states, n o t in m a s s m i g r a t i o n s , b u t in the t r a v e l o f m a n y
black A m e r i c a n and W e s t Indian individuals to Africa. S o m e w e n t
as v i s i t o r s ; s o m e t o w o r k t h e r e ; a n d y e t o t h e r s t o m a k e A f r i c a
t h e i r h o m e . O f t h i s last g r o u p , t h r e e o f t h e m o s t s i g n i f i c a n t l e a d e r s
o f P a n - A f r i c a n i s m in 1945, D u B o i s , P a d m o r e and M a k o n n e n ,
w e r e all t o s e t t l e i n G h a n a , t h e b r i g h t ' B l a c k S t a r ' o f t h e 1 9 5 0 s .
F o r D u B o i s , his d e c i s i o n t o settle in G h a n a , w h e r e he w a s t o die
in 1 9 6 3 , w a s b o t h a s y m b o l i c a l a n d a real r e n u n c i a t i o n o f t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d its d o m i n a n t w h i t e c u l t u r e . H e a n d h i s w i f e
s p e n t t h e c l o s e o f h i s life w o r k i n g o n t h e Encyclopaedia Africana,
a p r o j e c t w h i c h h a d official G h a n a i a n g o v e r n m e n t b a c k i n g , a n d
w h o s e first v o l u m e a p p e a r e d i n 1 9 7 8 . I n s o m e w a y s , P a d m o r e ' s
c a s e is e v e n m o r e i n t e r e s t i n g , f o r i n 1 9 5 8 N k r u m a h i n v i t e d h i m
t o c o m e t o G h a n a as h i s a d v i s e r o n A f r i c a n affairs. T h u s , i n a b r i e f
final e p i s o d e i n h i s life, P a d m o r e h a d t h e p r o s p e c t o f w i e l d i n g
p o w e r . I r o n i c a l l y , t h e last y e a r s i n L o n d o n w e r e i n f a c t m o r e
f r u i t f u l , as d u r i n g t h a t t i m e h e p r o d u c e d a s t e a d y s e r i e s o f m a j o r
w o r k s , c u l m i n a t i n g i n h i s Pan-Africanism or Communism? ( 1 9 5 6 ) ,
w h i c h as w e l l as i n s i s t i n g o n t h e n e e d f o r A f r i c a t o b e free f r o m
both western colonialism and subordination to M o s c o w ' s
i n t e r e s t s , a l s o h a d e n c a p s u l a t e d w i t h i n it a m a j o r s u r v e y o f t h e
r o o t s a n d h i s t o r y o f P a n - A f r i c a n i s m . T h e r e c a n b e little d o u b t t h a t
h e i n t e n d e d t h i s as a m o r e o r less ' o f f i c i a l ' h i s t o r y o f P a n -
A f r i c a n i s m ; it s t r e s s e d D u B o i s ' s a l l e g e d r o l e as ' f a t h e r ' o f t h e
m o v e m e n t , ignored or underplayed contrary aspects o f Pan-
107

A f r i c a n i s m ' s h i s t o r y , r e c o n c i l e d G a r v e y i s m w i t h the rest o f the

m o v e m e n t , and glorified N k r u m a h ' s policies in the G o l d C o a s t
as t h e s u p r e m e e m b o d i m e n t o f P a n - A f r i c a n i s m i n a c t i o n . Y e t i n
G h a n a , he disliked the toadies and opportunists w h o surrounded
N k r u m a h , a n d t h e y in t u r n w e r e d e t e r m i n e d t o k e e p h i m isolated
f r o m effective p o w e r . H e h e l p e d o r g a n i s e the 1958 A l l - A f r i c a n
P e o p l e s ' C o n f e r e n c e , and w a s p u t in c h a r g e o f a specially created
B u r e a u o f A f r i c a n Affairs; b u t the latter w a s m e r e l y a c o n s o l a t i o n
prize for his e x c l u s i o n f r o m the cabinet. B y July 1959 his health
w a s failing, a n d in S e p t e m b e r 1959 he returned to L o n d o n for
medical treatment, o n l y to die there.
T h i s m i s e r a b l e c l o s e t o P a d m o r e ' s life i l l u s t r a t e s t h e d a r k e r s i d e
o f the position in m o d e r n independent Africa of committed
Pan-Africanists from the diaspora. T h e most perceptive com
m e n t a t o r o n t h i s is P a d m o r e ' s o l d f r i e n d M a k o n n e n , w h o g a v e
N k r u m a h loyalty t o the end o f his r e g i m e , suffering imprisonment
f o r t h i s after h i s o v e r t h r o w i n 1 9 6 6 . B u t h i s l o y a l t y w a s n o t o n e
o f u n c r i t i c a l a d u l a t i o n . T h u s , h e f o u n d t h a t after P a d m o r e ' s d e a t h ,
e v e n the B u r e a u o f African Affairs w a s effectively controlled b y
G h a n a i a n s , w i t h n o n - G h a n a i a n s b e i n g t r e a t e d as ' o u t s i d e r s ' , a n d
the B u r e a u ceasing to be a ' truly P a n - A f r i c a n i n s t r u m e n t o f p o l i c y
1
making'. Worse still, he found the generality of Ghanaian
politicians, a n d for that m a t t e r t h o s e in K e n y a w h e r e he has l i v e d
since his release f r o m p r i s o n in G h a n a , to be hostile to N e w W o r l d
b l a c k s . O f c o u r s e , n o t all d i a s p o r a v i s i t o r s r e a c h e d s u c h g l o o m y
c o n c l u s i o n s ; it is c l e a r t h a t M a l c o l m X f o u n d h i s b r i e f v i s i t t o W e s t
A f r i c a in 1964 an exhilarating experience, l e a d i n g h i m t o p r o c l a i m
that ' P h i l o s o p h i c a l l y and culturally w e A f r o - A m e r i c a n s need to
" r e t u r n " to A f r i c a - a n d to d e v e l o p a w o r k i n g unity in the
2
framework of Pan-Africanism.'
A s a p h e n o m e n o n , the return o f significant n u m b e r s o f black
i n d i v i d u a l s f r o m t h e N e w W o r l d t o A f r i c a i n m o d e r n t i m e s still
r e m a i n s t o b e e x p l o r e d f u l l y . I t is c l e a r t h a t at t i m e s , although
never holding p o w e r , such people have been able to m a k e an
important contribution. Thus, the Martiniquan psychiatrist,
Frantz F a n o n , b e c a m e o n e o f the m o s t i m p o r t a n t theorists of
r e v o l u t i o n in A f r i c a in the 1960s, and a trenchant critic o f those
A f r i c a n r u l e r s w h o m h e r e g a r d e d as a c c o m p l i c e s o f c o n t i n u i n g
1
Makonnen. Pan-Africanism, 209.
2
M a l c o l m X , The autobiography of Malcolm X ( L o n d o n , 1976), 465-6.
108

POST-1945 P A N - A F R I C A N I S M
imperialist control, roles w h i c h w e r e taken o n b y the G u y a n e s e

scholar W a l t e r R o d n e y in the 1970s. P e r h a p s the m o s t spectacular
' r e t u r n t o A f r i c a ' o f m o d e r n t i m e s i n its i m p a c t o n m a s s c o n
sciousness w a s that o f the black A m e r i c a n writer A l e x Hailey. His
q u e s t for his f a m i l y ' s o r i g i n s in the G a m b i a led t o the p u b l i c a t i o n
o f his sensationally successful n o v e l Roots in 1 9 7 6 , w h i c h w a s
f o l l o w e d u p b y serialisation o n television. T h e television v e r s i o n
of Roots seized the attention o f not only black, but also white,
A m e r i c a n s , and signified the pride o f the former and acceptance
b y the latter o f the v a l u e o f an A f r i c a n origin. In the aftermath,
there w a s a b o o m in b l a c k A m e r i c a n t o u r i s m t o the reputed
v i l l a g e o f A l e x H a i l e y ' s ancestors in the G a m b i a .
T H E R O A D TO T H E O R G A N I S A T I O N OF A F R I C A N U N I T Y
U n d o u b t e d l y the m o s t v i s i b l e aspect o f P a n - A f r i c a n i s m after the

1950s w a s t h e a t t e m p t t o c r e a t e a n a l l - A f r i c a n s u p r a - n a t i o n a l
i n s t i t u t i o n w i t h t h e s u p p o r t o f all i n d e p e n d e n t A f r i c a n s t a t e s . I n
a superficial sense, therefore, the creation o f the O r g a n i s a t i o n o f
A f r i c a n U n i t y ( O A U ) in 1963 w a s the a p o t h e o s i s o f this p h a s e o f
P a n - A f r i c a n i s m . T h i s p e r i o d is a b o v e all a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e c a r e e r
o f N k r u m a h as l e a d e r o f G h a n a ( a l t h o u g h t h e r e w e r e v e r y f e w
o f h i s c o n t e m p o r a r i e s as r u l e r s o f A f r i c a w h o d i d n o t p a y at l e a s t
occasional lip-service to a v a g u e Pan-African ideal). E v e n before
G h a n a b e c a m e i n d e p e n d e n t , h e m a d e s o m e efforts t o a d v a n c e t h e
c a u s e o f s u p r a - n a t i o n a l P a n - A f r i c a n i s m . H o w e v e r , it is w o r t h
recalling that before 1963, ' K w a m e N k r u m a h ' s v o i c e and actions
did not c o m e out decidedly for a U n i o n g o v e r n m e n t for the w h o l e
1
o f A f r i c a ' . F o r s o m e time his W A N S d r e a m o f a W e s t A f r i c a n
Socialist R e p u b l i c w a s his i m m e d i a t e aspiration, a l t h o u g h he
intended t o h o l d a P a n - A f r i c a n C o n g r e s s in the G o l d C o a s t in 1 9 5 4
t o c o n s i d e r t h e affairs o f t h e e n t i r e c o n t i n e n t . T h i s w a s p r e v e n t e d ,
h o w e v e r , b y a political crisis w i t h i n his c o u n t r y . O n l y f r o m 1957
w a s h e free t o a t t e m p t t h e c o n c r e t e r e a l i s a t i o n o f h i s P a n - A f r i c a n
dream. A t the v e r y celebrations for G h a n a i a n i n d e p e n d e n c e in
19 5 7, h e b r o a c h e d , t o v i s i t i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f o t h e r i n d e p e n d e n t
African countries, the idea o f h o l d i n g a C o n f e r e n c e o f I n d e p e n d e n t
African States.
1
S. K . B . A s a n t e , ' K w a m e N k r u m a h and Pan-Africanism: the early phase,
1 9 4 5 - 1 9 6 1 ' , Universitas, 1973, 3, 1, 45.
109

T h i s c o n f e r e n c e , h e l d in A c c r a in A p r i l 1958, w a s a t t e n d e d b y
heads o f state o r the f o r e i g n ministers o f L i b y a , E t h i o p i a , the S u d a n ,
T u n i s i a , M o r o c c o , E g y p t a n d L i b e r i a , as w e l l as t h e h o s t c o u n t r y .
It b e g a n t h e p r o c e s s l e a d i n g t o t h e O A U i n 1 9 6 3 . I t p r o d u c e d l i t t l e
m o r e than a b r o a d but v a g u e consensus o n foreign p o l i c y - that
A f r i c a n states s h o u l d b e n o n - a l i g n e d i n w o r l d p o w e r b l o c k s a n d
should stick t o g e t h e r - but generated e n o u g h impetus to ensure
further efforts. It also generated feelings o f elation, among
p a r t i c i p a n t s a n d m o r e w i d e l y in A f r i c a , t h a t i n d e p e n d e n t A f r i c a n
countries w e r e n o w m e e t i n g together to discuss the great questions
o f Africa and the w o r l d . T h e identity o f the participants also
e n s u r e d t h a t in t h i s n e w p h a s e o f P a n - A f r i c a n i s m t h e m o v e m e n t
would be continental, including the lighter-skinned, mainly
A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g p e o p l e s o f N o r t h A f r i c a , r a t h e r t h a n - as s o m e
o f t h e l e a d e r s o f t h e p r e v i o u s p h a s e , s u c h as M a k o n n e n , w o u l d
h a v e w i s h e d - a P a n - N e g r o m o v e m e n t . A s u c c e s s w i t h i n its o w n
limitations, the conference fell short o f the commitment to
African independence and African unity that Nkrumah (or
P a d m o r e ) h a d in m i n d - u n l i k e t h e s e c o n d A c c r a C o n f e r e n c e o f
1958, the All-African P e o p l e s ' C o n f e r e n c e in December. As
V . B . T h o m p s o n had stated, this c o n f e r e n c e w a s a ' reaffirmation'*
o f t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e 1945 M a n c h e s t e r P a n - A f r i c a n C o n g r e s s ,
for it c a l l e d f o r a c o o r d i n a t e d ' f i n a l a s s a u l t o n c o l o n i a l i s m a n d
i m p e r i a l i s m in A f r i c a ' , i f n e c e s s a r y u s i n g v i o l e n c e i n r e p l y to
colonialist v i o l e n c e . B u t w h e r e the A l l - A f r i c a n P e o p l e s ' C o n f e r
e n c e far t r a n s c e n d e d e i t h e r 1945 o r t h e first A c c r a C o n f e r e n c e w a s
in its d e c i s i o n t o ' w o r k f o r t h e u l t i m a t e a c h i e v e m e n t o f a U n i o n
2
or C o m m o n w e a l t h o f African States'. A m b i g u o u s t h o u g h this
p h r a s e is ( f o r t h e r e is a w o r l d o f d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e i m p l i e d
m o d e l s o f the A m e r i c a n U n i o n and the British C o m m o n w e a l t h ) ,
it u n a v o i d a b l y r a i s e d t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f i n d i v i d u a l
African sovereignty to overall African unity. T h e c o m p o s i t i o n o f
t h e c o n f e r e n c e a l s o r a i s e d t h o r n y p r o b l e m s , as m a n y d e l e g a t e s
c a m e f r o m c o u n t r i e s still u n d e r c o l o n i a l o r m i n o r i t y r u l e , and
represented national and liberation m o v e m e n t s rather than estab
lished g o v e r n m e n t s . T h e clear implication w a s that Nkrumah
was p u t t i n g h i m s e l f f o r w a r d as t h e l e a d e r o f A f r i c a n freedom
1
V . B . T h o m p s o n , Africa and unity: the evolution of Pan-Africanism ( L o n d o n , 1969),
M3-
2
K w a m e N k r u m a h , / speak offreedom. A statement of African ideology ( L o n d o n , 1961),
174-5.
IIO

T H E ROAD TO THE OAU
e v e r y w h e r e , a role that w a s for o b v i o u s reasons not v e r y

a c c e p t a b l e t o m a n y o f h i s f e l l o w h e a d s o f state.
In the years l e a d i n g u p t o 1963, a parallel series o f c o n f e r e n c e s
took place: subsequent All-African Peoples' Conferences were
held in T u n i s in i 9 6 0 a n d C a i r o in 1 9 6 1 , w h i l e further C o n f e r e n c e s
o f A f r i c a n S t a t e s w e r e h e l d at A d d i s A b a b a i n J u n e i 9 6 0 a n d
L e o p o l d v i l l e ( n o w K i n s h a s a ) in A u g u s t i960. A l t h o u g h the A d d i s
A b a b a C o n f e r e n c e accepted the A l g e r i a n p r o v i s i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t ,
as w e l l as all i n d e p e n d e n t A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t s ( e x c e p t i n g , o f
c o u r s e , S o u t h A f r i c a ) as full m e m b e r s , a n d a d m i t t e d o b s e r v e r s
from v a r i o u s other territories, nevertheless the T u n i s and C a i r o
C o n f e r e n c e s set the p a c e in i n c r e a s i n g c o m m i t m e n t t o v i o l e n t
struggle against colonialism. Pan-Africanism came, once again, to
have moderate and militant w i n g s , expressing themselves t h r o u g h
separate o r g a n i s a t i o n s . N a t u r a l l y , t h o s e states that h o s t e d a n d
supported the ' P e o p l e s ' c o n f e r e n c e s ' , especially G h a n a and
E g y p t , w e r e regarded w i t h increasing suspicion b y the remainder.
T h u s , w h e n i n c r e a s i n g n u m b e r s o f A f r i c a n states w e r e b e
c o m i n g independent, the Pan-African m o v e m e n t , w h i c h had
c o m m i t t e d itself t o national i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d h a d , in 1 9 5 7 ,
g l i m p s e d e x c i t i n g further d e v e l o p m e n t s , had split. N o t o n l y w a s
there a split b e t w e e n m o d e r a t e s and militants, b u t also, t o s o m e
extent, b e t w e e n f r a n c o p h o n e and o t h e r states. T h i s d i v i s i o n w a s
not, o f c o u r s e , linguistic in essence, but a c o n s e q u e n c e o f the
course o f politics within F r e n c h W e s t and Equatorial Africa since
1946, a n d the w a y in w h i c h m o s t o f the c o l o n i e s in t h o s e
federations came to independence. In 1958, cutting short argu
m e n t s a m o n g A f r i c a n p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s as t o w h e t h e r a f e d e r a l - t y p e
or a c o m m o n w e a l t h - t y p e relationship w i t h France w o u l d be
desirable, de G a u l l e offered t h e m the brutal c h o i c e o f either
c o m p l e t e s e c e s s i o n , w i t h t h e i m m e d i a t e c e s s a t i o n o f all b e n e f i t s ,
aid and links w i t h F r a n c e ; o r c o n t i n u i n g association w i t h the
o p t i o n o f f u t u r e full i n d e p e n d e n c e . O n l y G u i n e a , u n d e r S e k o u
T o u r e , c h o s e i m m e d i a t e i n d e p e n d e n c e . B u t b y i960, the c i r c u m
stances under w h i c h the remaining colonies c o u l d b e c o m e inde
p e n d e n t h a d b e e n m a d e less h a r s h , as t h e y w e r e t h e n p e r m i t t e d
t o d o s o a n d y e t r e t a i n all t h e i m m e d i a t e a d v a n t a g e s o f c o n t i n u i n g
e c o n o m i c links w i t h France, F r e n c h technical and military aid, and
firm F r e n c h i n t e r n a l a n d e x t e r n a l s u p p o r t f o r t h e i r g o v e r n m e n t s .
B u t these terms w e r e applied to individual colonies, rather than
111

to the t w o great federations o f F r e n c h W e s t and F r e n c h E q u a t o r i a l

A f r i c a , w h i c h m i g h t h a v e p r o v i d e d the bases for v i a b l e states.
M a n y o f the n e w states w e r e either, l i k e C h a d , e n o r m o u s in area,
but m i n u s c u l e in p o p u l a t i o n and r e s o u r c e s ; o r rich in resources,
b u t m i n u s c u l e in p o p u l a t i o n a n d the skills n e c e s s a r y t o d e v e l o p
their resources, like G a b o n . E v e n the c o m p a r a t i v e l y d e v e l o p e d
I v o r y C o a s t , under the leadership o f President H o u p h o u e t - B o i g n y
( w h o s e r a d i c a l p a s t w a s l o n g b e h i n d h i m ) , f o u n d it a d v a n t a g e o u s
t o r e t a i n t h e c l o s e s t l i n k s w i t h F r a n c e after i n d e p e n d e n c e . I t is
small w o n d e r that the result o f this p r o c e s s w a s the e m e r g e n c e o f
a b l o c o f c o n s e r v a t i v e states, l o o k i n g t o F r a n c e t o maintain b o t h
their internal and external security, t o p r o v i d e capital and expertise
for d e v e l o p m e n t , t o p r o v i d e a m a r k e t for their agricultural and
mineral produce, and to supply them w i t h manufactured g o o d s .
V i a this b l o c , de G a u l l e ' s p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h k e e p i n g ' A n g l o -
S a x o n ' influence o u t o f the E u r o p e a n C o m m o n M a r k e t w a s
imported into Africa, and t o o k the f o r m o f suspicion o f initiatives
b y a n g l o p h o n e s t a t e s . T h e b l o c s i g n a l l e d its e x i s t e n c e b y h o l d i n g
a m a j o r c o n f e r e n c e at B r a z z a v i l l e i n i 9 6 0 , a n d b e c a m e k n o w n as
the U n i o n A f r i c a i n e et M a l g a c h e ( U A M ) o r m o r e c o m m o n l y the
Brazzaville g r o u p . O f the former constituent colonies o f F r e n c h
West and Equatorial Africa, only G u i n e a and Mali w e r e outside
this g r o u p , a n d e n t h u s i a s t i c a b o u t P a n - A f r i c a n i s m .
F r o m the Pan-African point o f v i e w , therefore, i960 w a s the
w o r s t time for the C o n g o tragedy to h a v e o c c u r r e d ; n o t h i n g c o u l d
have served better to e x p o s e the divisions w i t h i n the m o v e m e n t .
T o l e a d e r s l i k e S e k o u T o u r e a n d N k r u m a h , it r e a l i s e d t h e i r w o r s t
fears a b o u t t h e d a n g e r o u s w e a k n e s s o f a d i v i d e d A f r i c a i n t h e f a c e
o f m a l i g n outside intervention. A s Patrice L u m u m b a , the
Congolese Prime Minister, was a committed Pan-Africanist w h o
h a d b e e n m u c h i n f l u e n c e d b y h i s a t t e n d a n c e at t h e 1 9 5 8 A l l - A f r i c a n
P e o p l e s ' C o n f e r e n c e , N k r u m a h a n d S e k o u T o u r e i n p a r t i c u l a r felt
p e r s o n a l l o y a l t i e s t o h i s g o v e r n m e n t w h i c h a n y w a y , w h a t e v e r its
defects, s h o w e d an unflinching d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o reject o u t s i d e
c o n t r o l a n d i n t e r f e r e n c e , e s p e c i a l l y f r o m t h e B e l g i a n s . W h a t is
more, L u m u m b a l o o k e d to the Pan-African m o v e m e n t to buttress
h i m i n his c o u n t r y ' s h o u r o f n e e d , a n d e v e n c a l l e d a C o n f e r e n c e
o f I n d e p e n d e n t A f r i c a n States in L e o p o l d v i l l e in A u g u s t i960,
w h i c h , h o w e v e r , o n l y revealed their w e a k n e s s and division. A l l
e x c e p t G u i n e a affirmed w h o l e h e a r t e d s u p p o r t for the U n i t e d
N a t i o n s ' a c t i o n s i n t h e C o n g o , a n d i n s i s t e d (in t h e n a m e o f
112

T H E ROAD TO T H E OAU
k e e p i n g t h e C o l d W a r o u t o f A f r i c a ) t h a t all a i d t o t h e C o n g o l e s e
g o v e r n m e n t should be channelled via the U N . O n l y G u i n e a w a s
w i l l i n g to b a c k L u m u m b a ' s w i s h t o rid h i m s e l f and his c o u n t r y
o f the U N , and to o v e r t h r o w M o i s e T s h o m b e ' s secession in
K a t a n g a p r o v i n c e ( n o w S h a b a ) b y f o r c e . I n t h e a f t e r m a t h , a n d as
events unfolded, w i t h the o v e r t h r o w o f L u m u m b a and the
entrenchment o f the K a t a n g a regime, m o r e divisions e m e r g e d .
Thus, Nkrumah's adherence to w o r k i n g under United Nations
auspices had the deeply ironic result that G h a n a i a n t r o o p s in the
C o n g o w e r e used to further the o v e r t h r o w o f L u m u m b a , w h o s e
g o v e r n m e n t he w i s h e d to preserve. A t the same time G u i n e a alone
i n s i s t e d t h a t its C o n g o c o n t i n g e n t s h o u l d n o t b e u n d e r U n i t e d
N a t i o n s c o m m a n d , d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t at t h e o u t b r e a k o f t h e c r i s i s
N k r u m a h had s p o k e n o f the n e e d for an A f r i c a n H i g h C o m m a n d
to deal w i t h the situation. A s for the B r a z z a v i l l e g r o u p , t o g e t h e r
with Liberia and Tunisia, they supported L u m u m b a ' s enemies,
K a s a v u b u and T s h o m b e .
It is a t r i b u t e t o t h e v i t a l i t y o f t h e P a n - A f r i c a n i d e a t h a t t h e
m o v e m e n t s u r v i v e d the C o n g o crisis, and w a s able to r e s o l v e
s o m e o f its d i f f e r e n c e s a n d p u t a s i d e o t h e r s i n t h e c r e a t i o n o f t h e
O A U i n 1 9 6 3 . T e r r i b l e t h o u g h it w a s f o r t h e p e o p l e o f t h e c o u n t r y
t h a t b e c a m e Z a i r e , t h e c r i s i s w a s p r o b a b l y , in t h e l o n g r u n , a l m o s t
an asset t o P a n - A f r i c a n i s m . T o b e g i n w i t h , t h e d i m e n s i o n s o f t h e
tragedy, the clear i n v o l v e m e n t o f the m o s t sinister outside forces
s u c h as w h i t e m e r c e n a r i e s a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l c a p i t a l , t h e i m m e n s e
publicity generated b y events, and the personalisation o f the issues
in t h e c a r e e r , o v e r t h r o w a n d d e a t h o f L u m u m b a , c r e a t e d t h e i r
o w n p r e s s u r e s f o r A f r i c a n u n i t y . It is h a r d t o b e s u r e w h a t p a r t
p o p u l a r f e e l i n g p l a y e d in all t h i s b u t , t o g i v e w h a t m a y b e a
s i g n i f i c a n t e x a m p l e , i n a c o u n t r y far f r o m t h e C o n g o ( a l b e i t o n e
w h i c h had supplied a c o n t i n g e n t o f troops for the U N force), in
t h e e a r l y 1960s o n e o f t h e m o s t c o m m o n n a m e s f o r h u m b l e b a r s
catering to the A d d i s A b a b a p o p u l a c e w a s ' P a t r i c e L u m u m b a
1
B a r ' . T h e third A l l - A f r i c a n P e o p l e s ' C o n f e r e n c e in C a i r o in
M a r c h 1961 p r o c l a i m e d L u m u m b a , w h o had been m u r d e r e d o n l y
4
t w o m o n t h s b e f o r e , as t h e h e r o o f A f r i c a ' - t h o u g h w i t h i n t h e
c o n f e r e n c e , t h e g o v e r n m e n t s r e p r e s e n t e d w e r e far m o r e c a u t i o u s
than the liberation m o v e m e n t s .
Despite these pressures, 1961 w a s a dismal year for Pan-
1
P e r s o n a l r e m i n i s c e n c e o f I. D u f f i e l d , w h o l i v e d in A d d i s A b a b a f r o m J a n u a r y 1962
t o J u l y 1964.
"3

Africanism, for not o n l y did the divisions b e t w e e n independent

A f r i c a n states s e e m t o b e f o r m a l i s i n g t h e m s e l v e s , w i t h the
e m e r g e n c e o f the Casablanca and M o n r o v i a g r o u p i n g s , but also
further deep divisions o v e r major issues w e r e b e c o m i n g apparent.
T h e C a s a b l a n c a C o n f e r e n c e , called in J a n u a r y o v e r the C o n g o
q u e s t i o n , w a s a t t e n d e d b y the N o r t h A f r i c a n states e x c e p t T u n i s i a ,
but including representatives o f the A l g e r i a n provisional g o v e r n
m e n t , plus G h a n a , G u i n e a and M a l i . E x c e p t for L i b y a , this w a s
a g r o u p i n g o f t h e m o r e r a d i c a l A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t s . P a r t l y in
r e a c t i o n t o t h i s g r o u p , a n d r e f l e c t i n g s u s p i c i o n at t h e p r e d i l e c t i o n
o f t h e r a d i c a l s ( e s p e c i a l l y G h a n a ) t o i n t e r f e r e in t h e affairs o f t h e i r
n e i g h b o u r s , as w e l l as d i s a g r e e m e n t s o v e r C o n g o p o l i c y , t h e
M o n r o v i a C o n f e r e n c e w a s h e l d in M a y 1 9 6 1 . T h e c o r e o f the
M o n r o v i a g r o u p w e r e the U A M countries, but Ethiopia, Liberia,
L i b y a , N i g e r i a , Sierra L e o n e , Somalia, T o g o and T u n i s i a also t o o k
part. W i t h the e x c e p t i o n o f L i b y a , the Casablanca p o w e r s
b o y c o t t e d M o n r o v i a . T o the M o n r o v i a p o w e r s , A f r i c a n unity w a s
t o b e u n d e r s t o o d as i n n o w a y i n f r i n g i n g o n t h e s o v e r e i g n
i n d e p e n d e n c e o f A f r i c a n states. G i v e n the p r o - F r e n c h character
o f t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e m , it is n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h e y a v o i d e d a n y
stance o n the A l g e r i a n question that w o u l d h a v e estranged France.
A t the s e c o n d m e e t i n g o f the g r o u p in L a g o s in J a n u a r y 1962,
the breach w i t h the Casablanca p o w e r s seemed to w i d e n . F o r t u
nately for P a n - A f r i c a n i s m this b r e a c h w a s n e v e r total. T u n i s i a ' s
determination that F r a n c e s h o u l d e v a c u a t e the Bizerta naval base
w o n her support from b o t h g r o u p s . T h e re-emergence o f a united
g o v e r n m e n t in t h e C o n g o , a c c e p t a b l e t o b o t h , r e m o v e d a m a j o r
cause o f dissension. Increasingly, p o w e r s o n b o t h sides, notably
G u i n e a from the Casablanca g r o u p and E t h i o p i a f r o m the
M o n r o v i a g r o u p , began actively to seek reconciliation and l o o k
f o r a r e a s o f c o o p e r a t i o n . G e s t u r e s w e r e m a d e , s u c h as t h e
cancelling o f the 1962 A l l - A f r i c a n P e o p l e s ' C o n f e r e n c e , o b n o x i o u s
t o t h e M o n r o v i a g r o u p as l i k e l y t o p r o m o t e i n t e r f e r e n c e i n t h e i r
i n t e r n a l affairs. A l g e r i a n i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d t h e o v e r t h r o w b y t h e
U N o f the K a t a n g e s e r e g i m e r e m o v e d major s t u m b l i n g b l o c k s .
B y t h e b e g i n n i n g o f 1 9 6 3 , a m e e t i n g o f all i n d e p e n d e n t A f r i c a n
states w a s p o s s i b l e , w i t h e v e r y c h a n c e o f t h e c r e a t i o n o f a u n i f i e d
P a n - A f r i c a n s t a t e o r g a n i s a t i o n as a r e s u l t .
I n t h i s s e n s e , t h e m e e t i n g in A d d i s A b a b a i n M a y 1963 t h a t
created the O A U w a s n o surprise, a l t h o u g h the a t m o s p h e r e in
114

T H E ROAD TO T H E OAU
A d d i s A b a b a w a s c e r t a i n l y e u p h o r i c , a n d e v e n a little u n r e a l , t h e
city's streets h a v i n g b e e n w h i t e w a s h e d , and the destitute, b e g g a r s
and other u n w a n t e d persons w h o normally inhabited t h e m h a v i n g
been r e m o v e d . D e s p i t e the a t m o s p h e r e o f g o o d w i l l , there w a s a
genuine political duel at Addis Ababa between those who
b e l i e v e d all A f r i c a ' s o t h e r p r o b l e m s c o u l d o n l y b e s o l v e d w i t h i n
the framework o f political union, and those who wanted a
consultative b o d y o f A f r i c a n states, w h i c h w o u l d e n d e a v o u r t o
promote African consensus certainly, but which would also
guarantee unequivocally individual independence. N k r u m a h was
the great p r o p o n e n t o f p o l i t i c a l u n i o n , b u t h e h a d little s u p p o r t ,
e v e n f r o m the o t h e r radical states. O n l y U g a n d a totally s u p p o r t e d
his call f o r a U n i o n G o v e r n m e n t o f A f r i c a . G i v e n the over
w h e l m i n g m a j o r i t y o f c o u n t r i e s e i t h e r in f a v o u r o f , o r w i l l i n g t o
acquiesce in, the o p p o s i t e c o n c e p t , and the skilful w a y in w h i c h
the host c o u n t r y had prepared for the c o n f e r e n c e and e m p h a s i s e d
the need b o t h for u n a n i m i t y and ' a n o r g a n i s a t i o n w h i c h will
1
facilitate a c c e p t a b l e s o l u t i o n s t o d i s p u t e s a m o n g A f r i c a n s ' (a
manifest necessity), N k r u m a h c o u l d o n l y m a k e the best o f the
situation by c o n c e d i n g w i t h reasonably g o o d grace. S o f r o m the
outset, unity o f the O A U w a s to be like that o f the U N , a gesture
t o w a r d s idealistic aspirations, b u t in reality d e p e n d i n g o n the
c o n s e n s u s o f its m e m b e r s . O n l y s o v e r e i g n A f r i c a n s t a t e s w e r e t o
be members - a total defeat for the Pan-Africanism of the
All-African P e o p l e s ' Conferences. Article III o f the O A U Charter,
a d o p t e d at A d d i s A b a b a , is i n m a n y w a y s t h e k e y t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g
t h e O A U ' s e s s e n t i a l n a t u r e . It a f f i r m s :
( 1 ) t h e s o v e r e i g n e q u a l i t y o f all m e m b e r s t a t e s ;
(2) n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e i n t h e i n t e r n a l affairs o f s t a t e s ;
(3) r e s p e c t f o r t h e s o v e r e i g n t y a n d t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y o f e a c h
s t a t e a n d f o r its i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t t o i n d e p e n d e n t e x i s t e n c e ;
(4) p e a c e f u l s e t t l e m e n t o f d i s p u t e s b y n e g o t i a t i o n , mediation,
conciliation or arbitration;
(5) u n r e s e r v e d c o n d e m n a t i o n , i n all its f o r m s , o f p o l i t i c a l a s s a s
s i n a t i o n as w e l l as o f s u b v e r s i v e a c t i v i t i e s o n t h e p a r t o f
n e i g h b o u r i n g states o r a n y o t h e r state;
(6) a b s o l u t e d e d i c a t i o n t o t h e t o t a l i n d e p e n d e n c e o f t h e A f r i c a n
t e r r i t o r i e s w h i c h a r e still d e p e n d e n t ;
1
Welcoming speech by Haile Selassie, in Z. C e r v e n k a , The Organisation of African
(2nd edition, London, 1969), 8.
Unity and its Charter
115

( 7 ) a f f i r m a t i o n o f a p o l i c y o n n o n - a l i g n m e n t w i t h r e g a r d t o all
1
blocs.
T h e c o n c l u s i o n , l a r g e l y b o r n e o u t b y s u b s e q u e n t e v e n t s , is t h a t
the O A U w a s essentially an o r g a n i s a t i o n to defend the territorial
and political status quo in independent Africa, a thing of
governments and rulers rather than of peoples, though not
n e c e s s a r i l y i m m u n e t o p o p u l a r p r e s s u r e s . T h e i s s u e o n w h i c h its
m e m b e r s f o u n d it e a s i e s t t o a g r e e — a n d h e r e w a s a r e a l c o n t i n u i t y
from 1 9 4 5 - w a s t h a t o f s u p p o r t f o r d e c o l o n i s a t i o n . W i t h i n its
own ranks, despite the creation o f O A U bodies to consider
p o l i c i e s o n s u c h m a t t e r s as h e a l t h , e d u c a t i o n , e c o n o m i c c o o p e r
ation, and even defence, individual sovereignty was to be supreme.
It is n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t its h i g h e s t g o v e r n i n g b o d y w a s t o b e t h e
annual A s s e m b l y o f H e a d s o f State and G o v e r n m e n t .
W i t h i n these limits, the O A U p r o v e d to be b y n o means
i n e f f e c t i v e . F o r s o m e y e a r s it h a d a g o o d r e c o r d i n c o n t a i n i n g , i f
n o t s o l v i n g , disputes b e t w e e n m e m b e r states, a l t h o u g h this w a s
m o r e u s u a l l y a c h i e v e d b y ad hoc a r b i t r a t i o n than t h r o u g h the
C o m m i s s i o n o f A r b i t r a t i o n a n d C o n c i l i a t i o n established in 1964.
T h i s k i n d o f arbitration w a s o f m o s t use in p r e s e r v i n g the status
q u o , w h e n it c a m e t o t e r r i t o r i a l o r b o u n d a r y d i s p u t e s . T h u s , t h e
q u e s t i o n o f S o m a l i a ' s claims to large areas o f E t h i o p i a n and
K e n y a n territory w a s deferred by O A U foreign ministers' medi
a t i o n i n 1 9 6 4 a n d 1 9 7 3 . A s e a r l y as O c t o b e r 1 9 6 3 , H a i l e S e l a s s i e
and M o d i b o K e i t a o f M a l i w e r e able t o m e d i a t e in the M o r o c c a n -
A l g e r i a n b o r d e r clash o f that year. T h e O A U w a s also often
successful in r e c o n c i l i n g states that h a d fallen o u t o n v a r i o u s o t h e r
g r o u n d s ; thus in 1970 Haile Selassie reconciled N i g e r i a w i t h
Z a m b i a , t h e I v o r y C o a s t a n d T a n z a n i a , all o f w h i c h h a d s u p p o r t e d
t h e B i a f r a n r i g h t t o s e c e s s i o n . B u t it c o u l d b e s a i d t h a t b y t h e
m i d - 1 9 7 0 s , w i t h escalation in the n u m b e r and intensity o f disputes
w i t h i n and b e t w e e n m e m b e r states, and the t e n d e n c y o f m a n y
A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t s t o seek s u p p o r t in s u c h disputes f r o m o n e
o r other o f the g r e a t - p o w e r b l o c s , the O A U w a s facing a crisis.
F u r t h e r m o r e , i n t i m e at l e a s t s o m e P a n - A f r i c a n i s t s h a d c o m e t o
r e g a r d t h e O A U w i t h s u s p i c i o n as n o m o r e t h a n t h e g u a r d i a n o f
v e s t e d i n t e r e s t s . S o m e o f t h e s e s u s p i c i o n s w e r e v o i c e d at t h e S i x t h
P a n - A f r i c a n C o n g r e s s , h e l d i n D a r es S a l a a m , T a n z a n i a , i n J u n e
1
'Article III, Charter o f the Organisation o f African Unity*, Cervenka, The
Organisation of African Unity and its Charter, A p p e n d i x A , 232-3.
n6

THE R O A D T O T H E O A U
1974, and f o l l o w i n g c o n s c i o u s l y in the traditions o f the A l l - A f r i c a n

Peoples' Conferences. There was strong representation from
national and liberation movements in c o l o n i a l territories and
South Africa, and from the diaspora. Julius Nyerere in his
opening address paid tribute to the Pan-African Conference o f
1900, t h e C o n g r e s s e s o f 1900 t o 1 9 4 5 , a n d t h e e a r l y l e a d e r s o f t h e
m o v e m e n t u p t o 1 9 4 5 , as w e l l as t o N k r u m a h ( w h o h a d d i e d i n
1972 in exile). The conference w a s implicitly critical o f the
1
OAU. H o w e v e r , the c o n t r i b u t i o n o f Walter R o d n e y to the
c o n g r e s s w e n t far b e y o n d i m p l i e d c r i t i c i s m , a n d c o n s t i t u t e s p r o b
ably the m o s t fundamental and hostile criticism o f O A U Pan-
Africanism made by any committed Pan-Africanist. F o r him, * T h e
existing African régimes h a v e helped create the illusion that the
OAU represents the concrétisation o f A f r i c a n U n i t y . T h e O A U
is t h e p r i n c i p a l i n s t r u m e n t w h i c h l e g i t i m i s e s t h e f o r t y - o d d m i n i -
states v i s i t e d u p o n u s b y c o l o n i a l i s m . ' I n d e e d , b e y o n d r e g u l a t i n g
' a f e w internal conflicts b e t w e e n the petty bourgeoisie from
different p a r t s o f t h e c o n t i n e n t ' , its f u n c t i o n s w e r e a l s o a t t a c k e d
by R o d n e y as m a i n t a i n i n g the separation o f African peoples
w i t h i n existing territorial b o u n d a r i e s , and stifling criticism o f any
4
exploitative, oppressive and autocratic African state... even
w h e n the m o s t e l e m e n t a r y civil a n d h u m a n rights are trampled
2
on'.
N A T I O N A L I S M , R E G I O N A L I S M A N D A F R I C A N U N I T Y
T o understand the e m e r g e n c e o f this k i n d o f radical disillusion

w i t h t h e ' o f f i c i a l ' P a n - A f r i c a n i s m o f t h e O A U , it is first o f all
n e c e s s a r y t o e x p l o r e a little further s o m e o f the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s a n d
tensions engendered by a Pan-Africanism dominated b y indepen
dent states, and a t t e m p t i n g to exalt national independence and
A f r i c a n u n i t y s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . T o b e fair t o a n u m b e r o f l e a d i n g
P a n - A f r i c a n i s t s o f the late 1950s a n d early 1960s, this w a s n o t an
u n p e r c e i v e d p r o b l e m . N k r u m a h ' s e v e n t u a l b e l i e f in an A f r i c a n
Union Government has already been mentioned. Nyerere of
T a n z a n i a referred to the tension b e t w e e n national s o v e r e i g n t y and
3
P a n - A f r i c a n i s m as ' t h e d i l e m m a o f t h e P a n - A f r i c a n i s t ' . F o r s o m e
1
Resolutions and selected speeches from the Sixth Pan African Congress ( D a r e s S a l a a m ,
2
i9lty>
3
3~4- Resolutions and selected speeches, 26-67.
Julius K .Nyerere, ' T h e dilemma o f the P a n - A f r i c a n i s t i n Nyerere, Freedom and
socialism ( D a r e s S a l a a m , 1968), 2 0 7 - 1 7 .
" 7

P A N - A F R I C A N I S M S I N C E I94O
y e a r s t h e r e w e r e efforts t o a p p r o a c h a n a l l - A f r i c a n s u p r a -
nationalism via an intermediate stage o f regional unions. T h e
p i o n e e r in this a p p r o a c h w a s , o f c o u r s e N k r u m a h . P r o v i s i o n w a s
m a d e in the c o n s t i t u t i o n o f G h a n a for m e r g i n g w i t h o t h e r
i n d e p e n d e n t A f r i c a n states, a l t h o u g h N k r u m a h also d e m o l i s h e d
the c o m m o n services G h a n a had shared w i t h o t h e r British W e s t
A f r i c a n t e r r i t o r i e s i n t h e c o l o n i a l e r a . W h e n F r a n c e c u t o f f all a i d
t o G u i n e a i n O c t o b e r 1 9 5 8 , h o w e v e r , G h a n a at o n c e o f f e r e d
practical aid in the f o r m o f a £ 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 loan, a n d w i t h i n a m o n t h
the t w o states had d e c l a r e d the e x i s t e n c e o f a G h a n a - G u i n e a
u n i o n , that w a s t o b e the b e g i n n i n g o f a U n i o n o f W e s t A f r i c a n
S t a t e s ; i n i 9 6 0 , M a l i j o i n e d t h e u n i o n , f o l l o w i n g its s e v e r a n c e o f
ties w i t h S e n e g a l . B u t t h i s u n i o n , w h i c h t o o k t h e t i t l e o f U n i o n
o f A f r i c a n States ( U A S ) n e v e r had m u c h substance in reality, and
w i t h the c r e a t i o n o f the O A U in 1963 f o u n d l i q u i d a t i n g itself in
the name o f w i d e r A f r i c a n unity a painless process. T h e same
c a n n o t be said for the U A M , w h i c h also d i s s o l v e d itself in
r e s p o n s e t o O A U p r e s s u r e , b u t w a s r e b o r n i n 1965 as t h e O r
ganisation C o m m u n e A f r i c a i n e et M a l g a c h e ( O C A M ) , the I v o r y
C o a s t p l a y i n g a l e a d i n g r o l e as m i d w i f e t o t h i s r e b i r t h . I n
particular, O C A M reflected c o n t i n u i n g resentment among
G h a n a ' s f r a n c o p h o n e n e i g h b o u r s at s u c h m a n i f e s t a t i o n s as ' t r a i n
i n g c a m p s ' in G h a n a for political dissidents f r o m o t h e r A f r i c a n
c o u n t r i e s . L i k e w i s e , r e s e n t m e n t w a s felt at t h e O A U f o r n o t
p r e v e n t i n g this, n o t s u r p r i s i n g l y in v i e w o f the fact that the
O C A M states h a d t h o u g h t that the O A U charter g a v e cast-iron
guarantees against such actions.
N a t u r a l l y , the o v e r t h r o w o f N k r u m a h in 1966, f o l l o w e d b y that
o f M o d i b o K e i t a in M a l i in 1968, l e a v i n g G u i n e a for s o m e time
as t h e s o l e r a d i c a l W e s t A f r i c a n s t a t e , r e m o v e d s o m e o f t h e s e
tensions. Nevertheless, w h e n the impetus t o w a r d s W e s t African
regionalism re-emerged o n the e c o n o m i c level, practical advance
w a s l o n g d e l a y e d b y f r a n c o p h o n e s u s p i c i o n s . A s e a r l y as 1 9 6 7
discussions w e r e held in A c c r a u n d e r the auspices o f a U n i t e d
Nations b o d y , the E c o n o m i c C o m m i s s i o n for Africa ( E C A ) , o n
the desirability o f a W e s t African E c o n o m i c C o m m u n i t y , a l o n g
the lines o f the E u r o p e a n E c o n o m i c C o m m u n i t y ( E E C ) . T h i s w a s
v i e w e d w i t h d i s p l e a s u r e b y F r a n c e as y e t a n o t h e r p l a n f o r ' A n g l o -
S a x o n ' e c o n o m i c domination, a v i e w readily c o m m u n i c a t e d
to her friends in A f r i c a , n o t a b l y the I v o r y C o a s t . I n d e e d , a p u r e l y
118

N A T I O N A L I S M , R E G I O N A L I S M A N D U N I T Y
f r a n c o p h o n e W e s t A f r i c a n e c o n o m i c c o m m u n i t y w a s c r e a t e d in
1970, w h i c h n o t surprisingly l o o k e d to F r a n c e and to the E E C ,
rather than to a n g l o p h o n e neighbours. T h i s dismal situation
b e g a n to i m p r o v e w i t h N i g e r i a n initiatives t o w a r d s the creation
of a comprehensive West African economic community. Under
the stimulus o f the oil b o o m , N i g e r i a rapidly a c h i e v e d a r e m a r k a b l e
recovery from the destructive civil w a r o f 1 9 6 7 - 7 0 , and b y the
m i d - 1 9 7 0 s w a s c l e a r l y t h e e c o n o m i c g i a n t o f W e s t A f r i c a , as w e l l
as h a v i n g a p o p u l a t i o n l a r g e a n d e n e r g e t i c e n o u g h t o p l a y , i n
relation to her n e i g h b o u r s , a leading role. In 1 9 7 3 , the N i g e r i a n
balance o f payments w e n t into substantial surplus, while the
i n t e r n a t i o n a l o i l c r i s i s o f t h a t y e a r p u t all h e r n o n - o i l p r o d u c i n g
n e i g h b o u r s in a w e a k e r p o s i t i o n . S k i l f u l l y u t i l i s i n g t h i s s i t u a t i o n ,
and using T o g o to s o u n d out and soften up the francophone
p o w e r s , N i g e r i a b e g a n t o steer W e s t A f r i c a t o w a r d s the creation
o f the E c o n o m i c C o m m u n i t y o f W e s t A f r i c a n States. Events
within E u r o p e helped, notably the accession o f Britain to the
E E C . I n c r e a s i n g (if n o t total) A f r i c a n unity w a s s h o w n in the
negotiations leading to the L o m é C o n v e n t i o n o f 1974, w h i c h
regulated the relations o f A f r i c a n , C a r i b b e a n and Pacific nations
w i t h the E E C . F i n a l l y , E C O W A S c a m e i n t o e x i s t e n c e in L a g o s
in M a y 1 9 7 5 , t h e f o u n d e r m e m b e r s b e i n g M a u r i t a n i a , S e n e g a l ,
the G a m b i a , G u i n e a - B i s s a u , G u i n e a , Sierra L e o n e , L i b e r i a , the
Ivory Coast, Mali, Upper Volta, Ghana, T o g o , D a h o m e y (now
Bénin), Niger and N i g e r i a - an exciting occasion, despite a
salutary w a r n i n g o n the e v e o f the L a g o s C o n f e r e n c e b y the
Nigerian Federal Commissioner for Economic Development,
A d e b a y o A d e d e j i , t h a t ' i t w i l l t a k e at least five y e a r s t o d e v e l o p
1
a West African E c o n o m i c C o m m u n i t y ' . E C O W A S w a s in s o m e
w a y s c l e a r l y m o d e l l e d o n t h e E E C ; it p r o v i d e d f o r t h e g r a d u a l
diminution o f customs duties and trade restrictions between
m e m b e r s , the creation o f c o m m o n c u s t o m s and c o m m e r c i a l p o l i c y
towards third-party countries, and the creation of common
E C O W A S citizenship, w h i c h w o u l d confer freedom o f m o v e m e n t ,
w o r k and residence w i t h i n the c o m m u n i t y .
T h e last w a s o f d i r e c t i m p o r t a n c e t o l a r g e n u m b e r s o f o r d i n a r y
W e s t A f r i c a n s , as m i g r a n t t r a d e r s a n d m i g r a n t l a b o u r e r s m o v i n g
across international frontiers are an i m p o r t a n t feature o f m a n y
West African economies, yet such migrants had come under
1
West Africa, 19 May 1975, 558.
119

P A N - A F R I C A N I S M S I N C E 1940
unpleasant pressures. E a r l y in 1970, D r B u s i a ' s g o v e r n m e n t in

G h a n a s h o c k e d A f r i c a a n d t h e w o r l d b y its s u d d e n e x p u l s i o n o f
large n u m b e r s o f foreign Africans, mainly traders; b y the end o f
January 1970, G h a n a herself admitted ' repatriation' (or expulsion
as m a n y s a w it) o f 1 7 0 0 0 0 A f r i c a n f o r e i g n e r s . N o r w a s t h i s u n i q u e ,
as t h e s a m e p e r i o d a l s o s a w m a s s e x p u l s i o n s f r o m I v o r y C o a s t .
This kind o f action - and there were examples elsewhere in
Africa - contributed in n o small a m o u n t to radical disillusion.
R o d n e y u s e d it as a s t i c k w i t h w h i c h t o b e a t A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t s :
Pan-Africanism has been so flouted by the present governments that the

concept of 'African' is dead for all practical purposes such as travel and
employment. The ' Africanisation * that was aimed against the European
colonial administrator soon gave way to restrictive employment and immi
gration practices by Ivory Coast, Ghana (under Busia), Zaire, Tanzania, Uganda,
Zambia and others - aimed against ... all Africans who were guilty of
1
believing that Africa was for the Africans.
G i v e n the s e n s i t i v i t y o f the issues i n v o l v e d in free m o v e m e n t o f
labour, and the resentments that c o u l d be caused a m o n g indigenes
at t h e p r e s e n c e o f l a r g e n u m b e r s o f e i t h e r s u c c e s s f u l or u n s u c c e s s f u l
f o r e i g n e r s , it is n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t b y t h e A p r i l 1 9 7 8 m e e t i n g o f
ECOWAS h e a d s o f s t a t e i n L a g o s , free m o v e m e n t o f labour
remained a matter for anxious discussion. The intermediate
regional stage o f Pan-Africanism represented by E C O W A S was
still b y 1 9 7 8 a n u n p r o v e n v e n t u r e (as A d e d e j i w i s e l y p r e d i c t e d ) .
The h o p e that N i g e r i a n oil m o n e y c o u l d finance West African
e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t in a m o r e appropriate w a y , and o n m o r e
easy terms, than traditional external aid f r o m the developed
nations or the W o r l d B a n k , e v a p o r a t e d w i t h the lapse o f the
N i g e r i a n e c o n o m y i n t o serious b a l a n c e - o f - p a y m e n t s difficulties.
T h u s , W e s t A f r i c a n regional unity, despite b e i n g an aspiration
dating b a c k to the time o f James Africanus H o r t o n , and despite
v a r i o u s a t t e m p t s o v e r t h e t w e n t y y e a r s f r o m 195 8 t o 1 9 7 8 t o b r i n g
it i n t o e x i s t e n c e i n s o m e f o r m o r o t h e r , p r o d u c e d a h a r v e s t m a i n l y
o f frustrated h o p e s . A p a r t f r o m the o b v i o u s practical p r o b l e m s ,
it is a l s o n e c e s s a r y t o t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t t h e f a c t t h a t as w e l l as b e i n g
t h e r e g i o n o f A f r i c a w i t h t h e m o s t p e r s i s t e n t efforts t o c r e a t e a
w i d e r r e g i o n a l u n i t y , it h a s a l s o b e e n t h e h o m e o f i n v e t e r a t e a n d ef
fective o p p o n e n t s o f r e g i o n a l unity. In this n e g a t i v e sense, the k e y
state w a s certainly the I v o r y C o a s t , and the k e y leader H o u p h o u e t -
1
Resolutions and selected speeches, 15,
I20

B o i g n y . In 1 9 5 7 - 8 he w a s the m o s t important leader, w i t h i n the

old R a s s e m b l e m e n t D é m o c r a t i q u e Africain, o f the successful
o p p o s i t i o n to the idea o f a united F r e n c h W e s t African indepen
dence. T h e subsequent w a t e r e d - d o w n plan for a Federation o f
M a l i , t o c o m p r i s e S o u d a n (as t h e f u t u r e R e p u b l i c o f M a l i w a s still
c a l l e d i n 195 8 - 9 ) , S e n e g a l , U p p e r V o l t a a n d D a h o m e y , w a s
further w e a k e n e d b y the I v o r y C o a s t p e r s u a d i n g U p p e r V o l t a
and D a h o m e y to w i t h d r a w . O n l y a r u m p federation o f the t w o
r e m a i n i n g s t a t e s c a m e b r i e f l y i n t o e x i s t e n c e as a n i n d e p e n d e n t
state in i 9 6 0 . W i t h i n t h a t f e d e r a t i o n , S o u d a n , u n d e r M o d i b o
K e i t a , w a s e n t h u s i a s t i c f o r f e d e r a l u n i o n as a b a s i s f o r c r e a t i n g
a t r a n s f o r m e d s o c i e t y , w h i c h w a s s o little t o t h e t a s t e o f L e o p o l d
S e n g h o r o f S e n e g a l t h a t h e w i t h d r e w h i s c o u n t r y after o n l y t w o
months. T h e only wider grouping o f former French West African
territories that m a n a g e d t o establish itself securely in this era o f
transfer o f p o w e r w a s the C o n s e i l de P E n t e n t e , f o r m e d in M a y
1959. B u t this w a s a creation d o m i n a t e d b y the I v o r y C o a s t (also
comprising D a h o m e y , U p p e r V o l t a , and N i g e r ) , and very m u c h
the ancestor o f the U A M and O C A M . A f r i c a n unity w a s certainly
n e v e r o n e o f its o b j e c t i v e s , b u t r a t h e r a d e d i c a t i o n t o p r e s e r v i n g
the s o v e r e i g n t y o f i n d i v i d u a l states e v e n i f b y m e a n s o f a l o o s e
e c o n o m i c or political association.
In o t h e r parts o f A f r i c a the r e g i o n a l idea h a d e v e n less s u c c e s s .
T h e r e w e r e h o p e s i n E g y p t i n t h e y e a r s i m m e d i a t e l y after t h e
E g y p t i a n r e v o l u t i o n o f 1 9 5 2 t h a t t h e S u d a n m i g h t b e a t last
reunited w i t h E g y p t , and s u p p o r t for this w a s c a n v a s s e d ener
getically in the S u d a n u n d e r the aegis o f the U n i t y o f the N i l e V a l l e y
M o v e m e n t , w h i c h w a s , h o w e v e r , perhaps more o f a pressure
g r o u p w i t h a slogan than a genuine popular m o v e m e n t a m o n g
the S u d a n e s e . S u d a n e s e a c h i e v e m e n t o f i n d e p e n d e n c e in 1956
killed this * m o v e m e n t \ In F r e n c h - r u l e d N o r t h A f r i c a the idea o f
t h e u n i t y o f t h e M a g h r i b ( w h i c h as a g e o g r a p h i c a l c o n c e p t a l s o
includes L i b y a ) w a s m o r e than counterbalanced b y the v e r y
different n a t u r e a n d o u t c o m e o f t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e s t r u g g l e s i n
A l g e r i a , M o r o c c o and Tunisia. Thereafter, the main impetus for
w i d e r u n i o n s in N o r t h A f r i c a c a m e f r o m L i b y a , w h o s e a b o r t i v e
unions w i t h E g y p t and T u n i s i a underlined the lack o f success o f
N o r t h A f r i c a n regionalism. T h e s e disunities in N o r t h A f r i c a w e r e
further d e m o n s t r a t e d b y the acute confrontation between
M o r o c c o and Mauritania o n the o n e hand, and the Polisario F r o n t ,
121

A l g e r i a and L i b y a o n the other, o v e r the future o f the former

Spanish Sahara, partitioned b e t w e e n M o r o c c o and Mauritania by
agreement w i t h Spain, but w i t h o u t c o n s u l t i n g the wishes o f the
S a h r a o u i s , in 1 9 7 5 .
R e g i o n a l i s m in E a s t a n d C e n t r a l A f r i c a w a s p r o d u c t i v e m a i n l y
o f disillusion. O n e p r o b l e m faced b y Pan- Africanists w h o f a v o u r e d
r e g i o n a l i s m in this p a r t o f A f r i c a w a s the fact that historically
federalism w a s associated w i t h settler pressures t o m a x i m i s e their
degree o f local control. T h i s w a s clearly so m u c h the case w i t h
the Central A f r i c a n federation o f S o u t h e r n Rhodesia, Northern
R h o d e s i a a n d N y a s a l a n d , (officially k n o w n as t h e F e d e r a t i o n o f
R h o d e s i a a n d N y a s a l a n d ) , created in 1953 a g a i n s t the w i s h e s o f
v i r t u a l l y all a r t i c u l a t e A f r i c a n o p i n i o n , t h a t A f r i c a n n a t i o n a l i s t s
in t h o s e t e r r i t o r i e s i n e v i t a b l y o p t e d f o r s e p a r a t e i n d e p e n d e n c e . I n
the four British East African territories of Kenya, Uganda,
T a n g a n y i k a and Z a n z i b a r , settler pressures for federation had n o t
succeeded, but there w a s a legacy f r o m the c o l o n i a l era o f c o m m o n
s e r v i c e s i n m a t t e r s s u c h as t r a n s p o r t , c u r r e n c y , a n d customs.
Furthermore, o n t h e p e r s o n a l l e v e l , i n t h e late 1 9 5 0 s a n d e a r l y
1960s, there w a s p e r h a p s n o part o f Africa where a greater
p r o p o r t i o n o f senior African political leaders regarded themselves
as P a n - A f r i c a n i s t s . T o n a m e o n l y s o m e o f t h e m o r e obvious
e x a m p l e s , as w e l l as N y e r e r e , t h e r e w a s M i l t o n O b o t e o f U g a n d a ;
Jomo K e n y a t t a ; T o m M b o y a o f K e n y a w h o had chaired the
1958 A c c r a A l l - A f r i c a n P e o p l e s ' C o n f e r e n c e ; O s c a r K a m b o n a ,
independent T a n g a n y i k a ' s first f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r ; and Oginga
Odinga, K e n y a ' s first vice-president. In other words, Pan-
A f r i c a n i s m w a s v e r y m u c h in v o g u e in the n e w r u l i n g circles o f
U g a n d a , T a n g a n y i k a a n d K e n y a as t h e y c a m e t o independence.
B y c o m p a r i s o n , f r o m the three territories c o m p r i s i n g the Federa
tion o f Rhodesia and Nyasaland, only one major figure commit
ted to P a n - A f r i c a n i s m e m e r g e d in a p o s i t i o n o f p o w e r , K e n n e t h
K a u n d a o f Z a m b i a , the former N o r t h e r n Rhodesia. T h e East
African Pan-Africanists w e r e aware o f the dangers facing small
w e a k states in the m o d e r n w o r l d . F o r a n u m b e r o f years t h e r e w e r e
hopes that these c o u l d be a v o i d e d b y the creation o f an East
A f r i c a n federation, w h i c h w o u l d b e large e n o u g h in area, p o p u
lation and resources not to be the cat's-paw o f outside p o w e r s ,
a n d t o t a c k l e its i n t e r n a l s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c t a s k s .
W i t h E a s t A f r i c a n r e g i o n a l i s m , as w i t h P a n - A f r i c a n i s m as a
122

w h o l e , o n e o f the central p r o b l e m s w a s that political forces had

d e v e l o p e d within individual colonial units, dedicated primarily to
national independence, and w i t h the possibilities o f conflict
b e t w e e n this a i m a n d the w i d e r r e g i o n a l ideal n o t c o n f r o n t e d until
t o o late. N o t till 1 9 5 8 w a s t h e r e a s e r i o u s a t t e m p t t o c r e a t e a
P a n - E a s t A f r i c a n p o l i t i c a l p a r t y , w h i c h w o u l d u n i f y all e x i s t i n g
parties. T h e initiative w a s largely N y e r e r e ' s , and the o u t c o m e w a s
disappointing. Instead o f creating the unified E a s t A f r i c a n party
that N y e r e r e had h o p e d for, the 1958 M w a n z a C o n f e r e n c e created
the P a n - A f r i c a n F r e e d o m M o v e m e n t o f East and Central Africa
( P A F M E C A ) . T h i s w a s n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n a n omnium gatherum o f
existing East and Central A f r i c a n parties, w i t h the object o f
f u r t h e r i n g national r a t h e r t h a n regional i n d e p e n d e n c e , a n d w i t h all
e f f e c t i v e a u t h o r i t y r e m a i n i n g w i t h its c o n s t i t u e n t o r g a n i s a t i o n s .
F u r t h e r m o r e , the U g a n d a n s participated in the M w a n z a C o n f e r
e n c e at o n l y a m i n o r a n d n o n - c o m m i t t a l l e v e l , w h i l e t h e p r e s e n c e
o f Central A f r i c a n delegates m a d e P A F M E C A an ill-assorted b o d y
for furthering East A f r i c a n unity. In the years that f o l l o w e d ,
P A F M E C A b e c a m e a n e v e r m o r e diffuse b o d y , as its c o n f e r e n c e s
( m o r e o r less its o n l y a c t i v i t y ) w e r e a t t e n d e d b y d e l e g a t e s f r o m
a g r o w i n g r a n g e o f c o u n t r i e s and m o v e m e n t s . A c c o r d i n g l y , in
1961 it c h a n g e d its n a m e t o t h e P a n - A f r i c a n F r e e d o m M o v e m e n t
o f E a s t , C e n t r a l and S o u t h e r n A f r i c a ( P A F M E C S A ) . Its g r o w t h
w a s s h o w n b y t h e fact t h a t its 1 9 6 2 m e e t i n g w a s h e l d i n A d d i s
A b a b a , chaired b y K e n n e t h K a u n d a , w i t h representation from 14
c o u n t r i e s w i t h 100 m i l l i o n i n h a b i t a n t s ; its w e a k n e s s b y t h e f a c t
t h a t it w a s a l w a y s c h r o n i c a l l y u n d e r - f i n a n c e d a n d i n d e b t , w i t h
m a n y o f its c o n s t i t u e n t g o v e r n m e n t s a n d p a r t i e s f a i l i n g t o p a y
their dues.
T h e m o s t spectacular initiative t o w a r d s r e g i o n a l unity in E a s t
A f r i c a c a m e in J u n e i 9 6 0 , t h r o u g h J u l i u s N y e r e r e o f f e r i n g t o d e l a y
T a n g a n y i k a n i n d e p e n d e n c e u n t i l s u c h t i m e as all t h r e e m a j o r E a s t
A f r i c a n t e r r i t o r i e s c o u l d b e c o m e j o i n t l y i n d e p e n d e n t as a f e d e r a l
u n i t . T h e first a n d o n l y c o n c r e t e a c h i e v e m e n t i n t h e a f t e r m a t h o f
this initiative w a s the r e p l a c e m e n t o f the o l d c o l o n i a l a r r a n g e m e n t s
for East A f r i c a n c o m m o n services b y the East A f r i c a n C o m m o n
Services O r g a n i s a t i o n ( E A C S O ) in 1 9 6 1 . H o w e v e r , E A C S O w a s
very m u c h controlled o n a tripartite basis, w i t h each o f the three
constituent nations h a v i n g the right o f v e t o . V e r y s o o n
d i s a g r e e m e n t s e m e r g e d a m o n g its m e m b e r s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , it w a s
123

for s o m e years, despite o c c a s i o n a l friction, to be the best e x a m p l e

o f r e g i o n a l e c o n o m i c c o o p e r a t i o n in the c o n t i n e n t . T h e h i g h p o i n t
o f e x p e c t a t i o n o f an E a s t A f r i c a n federation c a m e in J u n e 1 9 6 3 ,
w h e n O b o t e , N y e r e r e and K e n y a t t a declared their intention to
federate that year - a l t h o u g h , significantly, K e n y a n i n d e p e n d e n c e
was not to be delayed until federation w a s arranged. T h e period
o f a c c o r d b e t w e e n the three leaders w a s brief; the K e n y a n s and
U g a n d a n s w e r e m o r e p r e - o c c u p i e d w i t h i n t e r n a l affairs. O b o t e ,
w h o h a d t a k e n a r a d i c a l P a n - A f r i c a n i s t s t a n c e at t h e A d d i s A b a b a
H e a d s o f S t a t e C o n f e r e n c e in M a y , b e g a n t o feel t h a t E a s t A f r i c a n
federation w a s antithetical to continental unity. F r o m the sidelines,
Kwame Nkrumah made known his v i e w that the proposed
federation w a s n o t in a c c o r d w i t h the O A U spirit, and a p u b l i c
c o n t r o v e r s y resulted b e t w e e n h i m s e l f and N y e r e r e o n the issue.
T h e G h a n a i a n s u s e d t h e i r i n f l u e n c e t o stir u p f e e l i n g a g a i n s t t h e
f e d e r a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y in U g a n d a . T h e failure t o federate in 1963
s o o n soured relations b e t w e e n T a n g a n y i k a and her n e i g h b o u r s ,
a n d m a d e for i n c r e a s i n g friction in the r u n n i n g o f E A C S O . B y
the m i d - 1 9 6 0 s the feelings o f N y e r e r e , w h o h a d in 1964 u n i t e d
Tanganyika with Zanzibar to form Tanzania, were s h o w n by
increasingly bitter c o m m e n t s on the failure to achieve East
A f r i c a n federation, and the difficulties e m e r g i n g w i t h i n E A C S O ,
in p a r t i c u l a r the wish o f Tanzania not to have her nascent
1
manufacturing sector flooded by imports from K e n y a .
N o t o n l y w a s r e g i o n a l i s m , at b e s t , a v e r y l i m i t e d s u c c e s s , b u t
a l s o t h e P a n - A f r i c a n m o v e m e n t w a s u n a b l e t o p r e v e n t , in the
period after i960, two other kinds o f challenge - separatist
m o v e m e n t s w i t h i n e x i s t i n g states, and irredentist m o v e m e n t s b y
national minorities w i s h i n g t o join their kin in adjacent states. T h e
H o r n o f Africa exhibited b o t h tendencies. O n the o n e hand, the
Pan-Somali sentiments of all Somalia's governments since
independence generated claims for a G r e a t e r Somalia, to include
the O g a d e n r e g i o n o f E t h i o p i a , the N o r t h - E a s t F r o n t i e r area o f
K e n y a , and D j i b o u t i (the f o r m e r F r e n c h territory o f the A f a r s and
Issas). T h e O g a d e n claim w a s p r o m o t e d the m o s t relentlessly, and
b y t h e m i d - 1 9 7 0 s O A U a t t e m p t s at m e d i a t i o n h a d f a l l e n d o w n ,
a n d a m a j o r i n s u r r e c t i o n w a s t a k i n g place in the O g a d e n , w i t h
s y m p a t h y and s u p p o r t f r o m S o m a l i a , escalating into full-scale w a r
in 1 9 7 8 . C l e a r l y , in c i r c u m s t a n c e s l i k e these, c o m m i t m e n t s t o the
1
N y e r e r e , ' P r o b l e m s o f E a s t A f r i c a n c o - o p e r a t i o n i n Freedom and socialism, 64-5.
124

territorial integrity o f m e m b e r states o n the o n e h a n d , a n d to the

right o f national self-determination o n the other, b e c a m e m u t u a l l y
c o n t r a d i c t o r y . In a c o n t i n e n t in w h i c h f e w states lack e t h n i c
m i n o r i t i e s , it is n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h e O A U , w h i l e w i s h i n g a
peaceful resolution o f this conflict, f o u n d E t h i o p i a n territorial
i n t e g r i t y o f m o r e i m p o r t a n c e t h a n O g a d e n S o m a l i self-
d e t e r m i n a t i o n . N o r d i d t h e O A U find i t s e l f a b l e t o r e s o l v e t h e
p r o b l e m o f the Eritrean secessionist m o v e m e n t , fighting for
i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m E t h i o p i a e v e r since in 1962 H a i l e Selassie's
g o v e r n m e n t first a b o l i s h e d t h e f e d e r a t e d s t a t u s E r i t r e a h a d
enjoyed since 1952. Irredentism struck the p a c e m a k e r o f Pan-
A f r i c a n i s m , N k r u m a h ' s G h a n a , at t h e v e r y m o m e n t o f i n d e p e n
dence. M a n y E w e s inside G h a n a w i s h e d to be united w i t h their
f e l l o w E w e s in n e i g h b o u r i n g T o g o . T h e incipient E w e r e v o l t o n
the e v e o f i n d e p e n d e n c e had to be suppressed b y the use o f t r o o p s .
T h e still p a r t i a l l y o b s c u r e e v e n t s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e i n v a s i o n o f
S h a b a p r o v i n c e o f Z a i r e (the f o r m e r K a t a n g a ) in 1 9 7 7 a n d 1978
by dissident elements based in A n g o l a , seems to h a v e b e e n partly
based on ethnic tensions. E x a m p l e s could be proliferated o f ethnic
secessionism and irredentism, but u n d o u b t e d l y the m o s t serious
crisis o f t h i s s o r t , t o d a t e , f o r t h e P a n - A f r i c a n m o v e m e n t -
e x c e p t i n g t h e as y e t u n r e s o l v e d m u l t i p l e p r o b l e m s i n t h e H o r n
o f Africa - w a s that created b y the N i g e r i a n civil w a r o f 1 9 6 7 - 7 0 .
T h e N i g e r i a n c i v i l w a r w a s a n e a r d i s a s t e r f o r t h e O A U , as n o t
o n l y d i d it p r o v i d e t h e s p e c t a c l e o f its i m p o t e n c e t o p r e v e n t
f o r e i g n i n t e r f e r e n c e i n t h e A f r i c a n c o n t i n e n t , b u t it a l s o s p l i t its
m e m b e r s . A m i n o r i t y o f f o u r m e m b e r states r e c o g n i s e d B i a f r a n
i n d e p e n d e n c e in 1968, in the n a m e o f the r i g h t o f the I b o p e o p l e
t o s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . It w a s a n i l l - a s s o r t e d g r o u p i n g - i t s e l f a
c o m m e n t o n the c o m p l e x i t i e s o f the Biafran e p i s o d e - c o n s i s t i n g
o f Z a m b i a a n d T a n z a n i a , u s u a l l y r e g a r d e d as r a d i c a l P a n - A f r i c a n
countries, and the l u k e w a r m enthusiasts for P a n - A f r i c a n i s m ,
G a b o n and the I v o r y C o a s t . T h e N i g e r i a n federal g o v e r n m e n t
eventually received important supplies o f arms not only from
E g y p t , but also from Britain, the S o v i e t U n i o n and C z e c h o s l o
vakia. O n the other hand the Biafrans, n o d o u b t equally feeling that
necessity m a k e s strange b e d - f e l l o w s , received support from
Portugal, France and, according to rumour, South Africa. B e t w e e n
1967 and 1969, there w a s a series o f attempts b y the O A U t o b r i n g
a b o u t peace, but the Biafrans w e r e suspicious o f a b o d y that for
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the m o s t part regarded the territorial i n t e g r i t y o f its e x i s t i n g

m e m b e r s as m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n m i n o r i t y self-determination;
w h i l e the federal g o v e r n m e n t w a s understandably a n x i o u s not to
a l l o w t h e O A U ' s e f f o r t s t o t a k e t h e f o r m o f m e d i a t i o n , let a l o n e
arbitration. T h e final c o l l a p s e o f B i a f r a in J a n u a r y 1970 was
g r e e t e d w i t h r e l i e f b y a l m o s t all O A U m e m b e r s , a n d w a s a v i c t o r y
f o r t h e p r i n c i p l e o f t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y - b u t it w a s a v i c t o r y w o n
b y the N i g e r i a n g o v e r n m e n t , not b y the O A U .
P A N - A F R I C A N I S M A N D T H E A R M E D L I B E R A T I O N
S T R U G G L E S
I f the issues o f r e g i o n a l i s m , secessionism and irredentism split or

at l e a s t p a r a l y s e d a n d t o s o m e e x t e n t d i s c r e d i t e d P a n - A f r i c a n i s m
in the t w e n t y years f r o m 1958, s u p p o r t for national i n d e p e n d e n c e
from colonial and white minority regimes w a s something everyone
c o u l d a g r e e o n i n p r i n c i p l e . H o w e v e r , as w e h a v e s e e n , t h e i s s u e
o f support for and recognition o f the provisional g o v e r n m e n t o f
Algeria, during the period w h e n A l g e r i a n independence w a s yet
b e i n g contested, d i v i d e d the n e w l y independent A f r i c a n states.
T h u s e v e n national liberation c o u l d be a d i v i s i v e issue. N o r w a s
this the o n l y p r o b l e m faced b y t h o s e e n g a g e d in a r m e d liberation
s t r u g g l e s at t h a t t i m e , i n t r y i n g t o e n g a g e t h e a t t e n t i o n o f t h o s e
w h o had recently benefited from peaceful transfer o f p o w e r . In
a revealing anecdote, A m f l c a r Cabral, leader o f the revolutionary
liberation s t r u g g l e in P o r t u g u e s e G u i n e a until his m u r d e r b y a
P o r t u g u e s e a g e n t in 1 9 7 3 , r e m a r k e d on:
An incident during the second All-African Peoples' Conference in Tunis during
i 9 6 0 , where we had some difficulty in being heard. One African delegate to
whom we tried to explain our situation replied in all sympathy: 'Oh, its
different for you. No problem there - you're doing all right with the Portu
1
guese.' At least it helped us to see that we could count only on ourselves.
A t least in C a b r a P s c o u n t r y there w a s o n l y o n e m o v e m e n t , the
Partido A f r i c a n o da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde
( P A I G C ) , f o r t h e official P a n - A f r i c a n m o v e m e n t t o r e c o g n i s e . I n
other places, notably A n g o l a and Rhodesia, the spectacle o f rival
liberation movements complicated the whole problem of
recognition and aid. The creation o f the OAU's Liberation
1
A m f l c a r C a b r a l , f o r e w o r d t o B a s i l D a v i d s o n , The liberation of Guine: aspects of an
African revolution ( L o n d o n , 1969), 9 - 1 0 .
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T H E A R M E D L I B E R A T I O N S T R U G G L E S
C o m m i t t e e i n 1963 s i g n i f i e d a s e r i o u s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o e n s u r e t h a t
it w o u l d n e v e r h e n c e f o r t h b e b l a n d l y a s s u m e d t h a t a n y o f t h o s e
still u n d e r c o l o n i a l a n d m i n o r i t y r u l e w e r e ' d o i n g all r i g h t ' , as
w e l l as t o t r y t o r e c o n c i l e d i v i d e d l i b e r a t i o n m o v e m e n t s , o r at l e a s t
to decide w h i c h o f such m o v e m e n t s o u g h t to be supported. Based
s i n c e i n c e p t i o n in D a r es S a l a a m , t h o u g h w i t h r e g i o n a l b u r e a u x
in L u s a k a a n d (till 1 9 7 4 ) i n C o n a k r y , t h e L i b e r a t i o n C o m m i t t e e
h a d its o w n b u r e a u c r a c y a n d - t h o u g h quite inadequately till
1 9 7 4 - its o w n f u n d s . E x e c u t i v e s e c r e t a r i e s w e r e T a n z a n i a n , b u t
its m e m b e r s h i p , d r a w n f r o m O A U m e m b e r s t a t e s , fluctuated, and
at t i m e s was fiercely contested. Its actions, necessarily often
confidential or e v e n secretive, s o o n aroused the suspicions o f
m o r e c a u t i o u s O A U m e m b e r s , a n d as a c o n s e q u e n c e its a u t o n o m y
w a s r e s t r i c t e d a n d all O A U s t a t e s g i v e n o b s e r v e r s t a t u s i n its
d e l i b e r a t i o n s in 1 9 6 6 .
I f this r e d u c e d o p p o s i t i o n w i t h i n t h e O A U , it c a n n o t b e s a i d
to have increased the Liberation C o m m i t t e e ' s ability to give
effective aid, w h i c h r e m a i n e d , in the v i e w o f s o m e , for s o m e years
an o b j e c t i v e r a t h e r t h a n a r e a l i t y . I n 1 9 6 6 C a b r a l w a s ' c o n v i n c e d
that A f r i c a can and s h o u l d d o m o r e for o u r s t r u g g l e ' , w h i l s t Basil
D a v i d s o n , historian for the world-at-large o f the independence
s t r u g g l e s in P o r t u g u e s e A f r i c a , o b s e r v e d t h a t i n 1 9 6 8 t h e L i b e r -
a t i o n C o m m i t t e e ' m o v e d c l o s e r t o at l e a s t a r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e
need for m o r e effective s u p p o r t . . . o n e m i g h t think, n o t before
1
time'. B u t it w a s i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e h a r d c h o i c e s d e m a n d e d by
the liberation s t r u g g l e in A n g o l a that the L i b e r a t i o n C o m m i t t e e
stumbled most. There, Holden Roberto's Frente Nacional de
L i b e r t a d o d e A n g o l a ( F N L A ) w a s officially r e c o g n i s e d i n 1 9 6 3 ,
rather than the M o v i m e n t o P o p u l a r de Liberta£áo de Angola
( M P L A ) , partly b e c a u s e the M P L A ' s initial r e v o l t , in L u a n d a in
1961, had been a disaster. A l s o , H o l d e n R o b e r t o w a s t h e n better
k n o w n t o t h e l e a d e r s o f i n d e p e n d e n t A f r i c a , h a v i n g b e e n at t h e
1958 All-African Peoples' Conference and having thereafter
established his i m a g e . R e c o g n i t i o n o f the F N L A w a s w i t h d r a w n
as its f o r t u n e s w a n e d i n 1 9 6 4 , a n d as it w a s i d e n t i f i e d as m o r e o f
a n e t h n i c K o n g o t h a n a P a n - A n g o l a n m o v e m e n t , w h i l e official
approval w a s n o w g i v e n to the M P L A . H o w e v e r , in 1972 the
FNLA w a s r e c o g n i s e d again, this time a l o n g s i d e the MPLA.
R o b e r t o ' s kinship to President M o b u t u Sese S e k o o f Z a i r e , and
1
D a v i d s o n , The liberation of Guiñé 141.
y
127

Zairean determination to further the F N L A ' s fortunes at the

e x p e n s e o f t h e M P L A , i n f l u e n c e d t h i s c o n f u s e d p o l i c y as m u c h
as a n y t h i n g , a l t h o u g h t h e r e w e r e c o n t i n u i n g a t t e m p t s t o r e c o n c i l e
t h e t w o m o v e m e n t s . T h e n , at t h e m o m e n t o f i n d e p e n d e n c e for
Angola, the Liberation Committee also recognised the third
Angolan movement, Jonas S a v i m b i ' s U n i á o N a c i o n a l para a
I n d e p e n d e n c i a T o t a l d e A n g o l a ( U N I T A ) , as a c l i m a x t o O A U
efforts t h r o u g h 1974 to persuade the three m o v e m e n t s to n e g o
tiate j o i n t l y w i t h the defeated P o r t u g u e s e . T h e r e s o l u t i o n o f the
r e s u l t i n g s t r u g g l e f o r p o w e r after i n d e p e n d e n c e o w e d n o t h i n g t o
the O A U , and e v e r y t h i n g to the M P L A ' s military v i c t o r y (aided
by C u b a n troops and Russian logistical support), o v e r the forces
o f U N I T A (backed b y S o u t h African intervention) and the F N L A
(backed b y Z a i r e and e m p l o y i n g w e s t e r n freelance mercenaries).
T h i s A n g o l a n situation displayed the Liberation C o m m i t t e e ,
a n d t h e O A U at l a r g e , i n a s i t u a t i o n o f g r e a t d i s a d v a n t a g e , w h i c h
w a s to s o m e extent redressed b y the record elsewhere. Eduardo
M o n d l a n e , leader o f the Frente de L i b e r t a d o de Mozambique
( F R E L I M O ) , w r o t e , n o t l o n g b e f o r e his assassination in 1969, o f
the O A U ' s ' i m p o r t a n t w o r k ' t o w a r d s a c h i e v i n g unity w i t h i n the
liberation m o v e m e n t s (although stating, * m o r e w o r k needs to be
d o n e a l o n g these lines'), and helping ' t o g e t recognition and
1
establish contacts w i t h other parts o f A f r i c a ' .
In N a m i b i a ( S o u t h W e s t Africa), the Liberation Committee
consistently b a c k e d the S o u t h W e s t Africa P e o p l e ' s O r g a n i s a t i o n
( S W A P O ) . F r o m its i n c e p t i o n i n 1 9 6 3 , t h e O A U m a d e a r o o t -
and-branch c o n d e m n a t i o n o f the apartheid r e g i m e in S o u t h Africa
a n d N a m i b i a , a n d c a l l e d f o r b o t h its m e m b e r s a n d all U n i t e d
N a t i o n s m e m b e r s to sever diplomatic relations w i t h , close their
ports and airports to, and i m p o s e a trade and arms e m b a r g o on,
S o u t h A f r i c a . F r o m 1 9 6 3 , t h e O A U m a d e it its b u s i n e s s t o m a k e
life as d i f f i c u l t as p o s s i b l e f o r S o u t h A f r i c a at t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s ,
a n d in 1 9 7 4 a l m o s t s u c c e e d e d in s e c u r i n g S o u t h A f r i c a ' s e x p u l s i o n ,
a m o v e t h w a r t e d b y B r i t i s h , F r e n c h a n d A m e r i c a n v e t o e s in the
S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l . L i k e w i s e , in 1963 the O A U called u p o n Britain
not to transfer p o w e r in R h o d e s i a ; w h e n Ian Smith's illegal
Unilateral D e c l a r a t i o n o f I n d e p e n d e n c e ( U D I ) c a m e in 1965, the
OAU a l m o s t at o n c e c a l l e d o n B r i t a i n t o s m a s h t h e rebellion
1
E d u a r d o M o n d l a n e , The struggle for Mozambique ( L o n d o n , 1969), 2 1 2 - 1 3 .
128

T H E A R M E D L I B E R A T I O N S T R U G G L E S
i m m e d i a t e l y o r f a c e t h e b r e a k i n g o f f o f d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s b y all
O A U members.
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e s e p o l i c i e s p r o v e d far
m o r e difficult t h a n their p r o m u l g a t i o n , n o t o n l y b e c a u s e the w o r l d
at l a r g e , a n d e s p e c i a l l y t h e w e s t e r n w o r l d , c o n t i n u e d t o t r a d e w i t h
a n d sell a r m s t o S o u t h A f r i c a , a n d c o v e r t l y t o s u p p o r t R h o d e s i a
t h r o u g h sanctions-breaking companies, but also because o f di
vided reactions and policies a m o n g O A U m e m b e r s themselves. In
the case o f s o m e , there w e r e r e c o g n i s e d t o be e x t e n u a t i n g
c i r c u m s t a n c e s ; t h u s Z a m b i a ' s g e o g r a p h i c a l p o s i t i o n m a d e it
impossible for her to o b s e r v e sanctions w i t h o u t causing her o w n
e c o n o m i c collapse, and B o t s w a n a , L e s o t h o and Swaziland were
e v e n less able t o b r e a k w i t h S o u t h A f r i c a . B u t the i m p o s i t i o n o f
t h e v a r i o u s r e s t r i c t i o n s o n S o u t h A f r i c a ' s air a n d sea t r a n s p o r t ,
and o n trade w i t h S o u t h A f r i c a , w e r e i m p o s e d p i e c e m e a l and in
s o m e c a s e s t a r d i l y o r n o t at all. T h e l e a d i n d e f y i n g O A U p o l i c y
was taken by President Hastings K a m u z u Banda o f M a l a w i , w h o
i n 1 9 6 7 w e n t s o far as t o e s t a b l i s h d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h S o u t h
Africa, a m o v e not universally unpopular with other O A U
m e m b e r s , especially the I v o r y C o a s t and a n u m b e r o f the other
O C A M p o w e r s , and G h a n a , then reacting strongly against the
Pan-African militancy o f the o v e r t h r o w n N k r u m a h g o v e r n m e n t .
I n 1 9 7 0 , H o u p h o u e t - B o i g n y t o o k t h i s l i n e t o its l o g i c a l c o n c l u s i o n
by advocating a policy o f ' dialogue' with South Africa, arguing
that the o p e n i n g o f diplomatic and trade relations w o u l d lead to
a softening and peaceful r e s o l u t i o n o f racial o p p r e s s i o n w i t h i n
S o u t h A f r i c a . T h i s w a s s t r o n g l y r e j e c t e d b y t h e O A U at its 1 9 7 1
S u m m i t in A d d i s A b a b a , b u t G a b o n , L e s o t h o , the M a l a g a s y
R e p u b l i c , M a l a w i and Mauritius supported the I v o r y C o a s t , w h i l e
D a h o m e y , N i g e r , T o g o and U p p e r V o l t a abstained. In the
aftermath, M a l a w i continued to h a v e o p e n relations w i t h S o u t h
A f r i c a , P r e s i d e n t B a n d a m a k i n g a n official v i s i t t h e r e i n A u g u s t
1 9 7 1 , and the I v o r y C o a s t d e v e l o p e d informal contacts u p to the
h i g h e s t levels. T h e O A U h a d , h o w e v e r , s o m e successes in the
b a t t l e a g a i n s t S o u t h A f r i c a , t h e m o s t n o t a b l e b e i n g its t o t a l l y
successful policy o f African and international non-recognition o f
t h e T r a n s k e i B a n t u s t a n o n its b e i n g g r a n t e d s o - c a l l e d i n d e p e n
d e n c e b y S o u t h A f r i c a in 1 9 7 6 , a n d o f o t h e r B a n t u s t a n s s u b s e
q u e n t l y declared ' i n d e p e n d e n t ' b y the R e p u b l i c .
A s for the R h o d e s i a n question, by 1966 the O A U had already
129

b e e n r e l u c t a n t l y f o r c e d t o r e c o g n i s e t h e i m p r a c t i c a b i l i t y o f its
original reaction to Smith's U D I , and to accept the British and
United Nations policy o f sanctions, although without conviction.
F u r t h e r m o r e , the L i b e r a t i o n C o m m i t t e e w a s faced w i t h the split
i n t h e A f r i c a n n a t i o n a l i s t s ' o p p o s i t i o n t o U D I , at t h a t t i m e
b e t w e e n the Z i m b a b w e A f r i c a n N a t i o n a l U n i o n ( Z A N U ) and the
Z i m b a b w e African People's Union ( Z A P U ) . Such divisions
c o n t i n u e d t o b e d e v i l the liberation s t r u g g l e in R h o d e s i a , a l t h o u g h
in 1975 the L i b e r a t i o n C o m m i t t e e w a s able t o r e c o m m e n d
substantial assistance to the liberation m o v e m e n t , unified in 1974,
under the aegis o f the African National C o u n c i l . O n the other
h a n d , it c o u l d n o t p r e v e n t s a n c t i o n s - b r e a k i n g , n o r t h e r a p i d
b r e a k d o w n o f the A f r i c a n N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l ' s precarious unity.
A f t e r 1 9 7 6 it s u p p o r t e d t h e P a t r i o t i c F r o n t ( r e f l e c t i n g t h e i n c r e a s e d
influence in the L i b e r a t i o n C o m m i t t e e o f P r e s i d e n t S a m o r a
M a c h e l o f M o z a m b i q u e , w h o backed R o b e r t M u g a b e ' s faction).
T h i s t u r n o f O A U p o l i c y in relation t o R h o d e s i a represented a
m o v i n g a w a y f r o m the p o l i c y o f ' d e t e n t e ' . T h e thesis b e h i n d
detente w a s that in a situation deteriorating for S o u t h Africa, w i t h
the collapse o f the P o r t u g u e s e in M o z a m b i q u e and A n g o l a , and
the potentially e x p o s e d p o s i t i o n o f h a v i n g to s h o r e - u p the
w e a k e n i n g S m i t h r e g i m e in R h o d e s i a , r e a l i s m w o u l d p r e v a i l in
the V o r s t e r g o v e r n m e n t , w h i c h m i g h t be persuaded to put
pressure o n Ian S m i t h to c o n c e d e an acceptable settlement. S o u t h
A f r i c a n s e l f - i n t e r e s t , t h e r e f o r e , w a s t o b e p u t at t h e d i s p o s a l o f
Z i m b a b w e ' s l i b e r a t i o n . T h e m a i n a r c h i t e c t s a n d e x p o n e n t s o f this
p o l i c y w e r e T a n z a n i a , B o t s w a n a , M o z a m b i q u e a n d Z a m b i a . It w a s
n o t t o t a l l y w i t h o u t s u c c e s s , as S o u t h A f r i c a n p r e s s u r e w a s w i d e l y
b e l i e v e d t o h a v e b e e n a factor in Ian S m i t h ' s a p p a r e n t a c c e p t a n c e
in S e p t e m b e r 1 9 7 6 o f the principle o f majority rule. H o w e v e r , this
w a s s e e n b y t h e d e t e n t e l e a d e r s a n d t h e P a t r i o t i c F r o n t as l i t t l e
m o r e than another w h i t e R h o d e s i a n exercise in p l a y i n g for time
a n d d i v i d i n g its i n t e r n a l a n d e x t e r n a l o p p o n e n t s , o f m a k i n g
apparent c o n c e s s i o n s w h i l e retaining the reality o f p o w e r in w h i t e
hands.
I n g e n e r a l it w o u l d b e t r u e t o s a y t h a t f r o m t h e R a b a t S u m m i t
o f 1972, the O A U policy declarations o n liberation b e c a m e m o r e
militant, e v e n e x t e n d i n g to the d e c i s i o n in principle that the armies
o f African countries o u g h t to be c o m m i t t e d to the armed struggle
against colonial and w h i t e minority rule. Far f r o m b e i n g w e l c o m e
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THE A R M E D L I B E R A T I O N S T R U G G L E S
to either the O A U ' s radical critics, o r to those leading liberation

m o v e m e n t s i n t h e field, t h i s w a s u n i v e r s a l l y r e j e c t e d as u n d e s i r a b l e .
P r o b a b l y the most scornful comments were those of Walter
Rodney in the paper he prepared for the Sixth Pan-African
C o n g r e s s in 1 9 7 4 :
The record to date exposes the gap between theory and practice on the part
of OAU members as far as monetary support to the OAU Liberation
Committee is concerned. Recently, the rhetoric has become seemingly more
fiery... Take for instance the demagogic appeal that African governments
should send armies to the combat zone. Such suggestion is completely out of
touch with the concept of a people's war and out of sympathy with the process
1
through which a people prepare themselves for self-liberation.
I f R o d n e y w e r e t o b e d i s m i s s e d as a n a r m c h a i r c r i t i c , t h e n t h e
c o n t i n u i n g self-reliance in p u r e l y military m a t t e r s o f the l i b e r a t i o n
m o v e m e n t s i n t h e final p h a s e o f t h e w a r s a g a i n s t P o r t u g a l w a s
e v e n m o r e eloquent. T h e liberation m o v e m e n t s w e l c o m e d aid,
but did n o t need or w e l c o m e crusading A f r i c a n armies, w i t h their
implications o f outside leadership and c o n t r o l o f the liberation
process.
P A N - A F R I C A N I S M A N D W O R L D A F F A I R S
P a n - A f r i c a n i s m after t h e a d v e n t o f t h e e r a o f i n d e p e n d e n t A f r i c a n
states b e c a m e p r i m a r i l y t h e c o n c e r n o f A f r i c a ' s l e a d e r s , m o v e
m e n t s , p e o p l e s a n d g o v e r n m e n t s , y e t it c a n n o t b e understood,
before o r since 1958, e x c e p t in the c o n t e x t o f certain global
t h e m e s . P r o t o - P a n - A f r i c a n i s m h a d its r o o t s i n v a s t e v e n t s : t h e
transfer o f A f r i c a n slave l a b o u r o n a colossal scale across the
Atlantic from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, to w o r k
the plantations, mines and industries o f the N e w W o r l d ; the
penetration o f i n c r e a s i n g areas o f A f r i c a b y E u r o p e a n c o m m e r c e
in t h e e r a o f * l e g i t i m a t e ' t r a d e t h a t o v e r l a p p e d a n d s u c c e e d e d t h e
Atlantic slave trade; the E u r o p e a n partition o f A f r i c a ; and the
transfers o f p o w e r and liberation s t r u g g l e s since the late 1940s.
B y i n v o l v e m e n t in these e v e n t s , A f r i c a w a s t a k i n g part in an e v e n
vaster and w o r l d - w i d e historical process. In a few centuries, a
small g r o u p o f E u r o p e a n states had risen t o w o r l d - w i d e d o m i
nance, and created a plethora o f doctrines, from crude racial
9 9
superiority to paternalistic trusteeship for ' child r a c e s or a ' d u t y
1
Resolutions and selected speeches, 3 1 - 3 .
•31

P A N - A F R I C A N I S M S I N C E I940
to d e v e l o p the w o r l d in the n a m e o f ' p r o g r e s s ' , in o r d e r to justify

their h e g e m o n y . P a n - A f r i c a n i s m w a s o n l y o n e o f a n u m b e r o f
m o v e m e n t s in the * d o m i n a t e d ' w o r l d t o c h a l l e n g e that h e g e m o n y ,
i d e o l o g i c a l l y a n d i n p r a c t i c e , a n d t a k e a d v a n t a g e o f its i n t e r n a l
contradictions and weaknesses. T h i s w a s well u n d e r s t o o d b y the
p i o n e e r P a n - A f r i c a n i s t s o f the earlier t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , who
often anticipated the post-1945 spirit o f A f r o - A s i a n unity. T h u s ,
i n h i s h e y d a y after t h e F i r s t W o r l d W a r , M a r c u s G a r v e y s u p p o r t e d
G a n d h i and the Indian N a t i o n a l C o n g r e s s . D u s e M o h a m e d A l i
was almost as m u c h an activist for Pan-Islamism, Egyptian
nationalism, and Indian and other A s i a n n a t i o n a l i s m s , as for
P a n - A f r i c a n i s m . H e o f t e n s p o k e , as d i d W . E . B . D u B o i s , o f ' t h e
darker races', w h o had the same p r o b l e m s , enemies and tasks.
I n d e p e n d e n c e at its h e a d y o n s e t c r e a t e d t h e i l l u s i o n t h a t A f r i c a
easily and s o o n c o u l d b e freed f r o m external influences. The
African states were to be non-aligned, plans for their joint
e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t proliferated. A l l o u t s i d e states a c c e p t i n g
t h e s e t h i n g s w i t h g o o d w i l l w e r e t o b e r e g a r d e d as f r i e n d s . O t h e r
realities h a v e d i s p e r s e d t h e s e e p h e m e r a l d r e a m s .
In the e c o n o m i c sphere, modern, independent Africa still
produced agricultural and mineral c o m m o d i t i e s for w o r l d mar
kets, w i t h o u t m u c h control o v e r the terms o f trade, and was
heavily dependent o n foreign capital and expertise (often f r o m the
old colonial p o w e r s ) to p r o d u c e and market them. In the starkest
cases, this m a d e for vitiated i n d e p e n d e n c e . Z a m b i a ' s e c o n o m y w a s
almost totally dependent o n the w o r l d price o f copper, for w h i c h
the market w a s almost w h o l l y outside A f r i c a ; Mauritania was
e v e n m o r e bereft o f resources o t h e r than her F r e n c h - d e v e l o p e d
mines w h i c h p r o d u c e d totally for export outside Africa; e v e n
r e v o l u t i o n a r y A n g o l a r e t a i n e d , as o f 1978, t h e s e r v i c e s o f G u l f O i l
to d e v e l o p off-shore oil, despite the use o f A m e r i c a n w a r materials
b y the P o r t u g u e s e d u r i n g the i n d e p e n d e n c e s t r u g g l e , and w i d e l y
alleged U S Central Intelligence A g e n c y support for the M P L A ' s
e n e m i e s in t h e c i v i l w a r s f o l l o w i n g i n d e p e n d e n c e . A f r i c a n r o a d a n d
rail s y s t e m s still m o s t l y f o l l o w e d c o l o n i a l p a t t e r n s , c o n n e c t i n g a n
e c o n o m i c hinterland w i t h the nearest port, f r o m w h i c h the hin
terland's primary c o m m o d i t i e s c o u l d be shipped to the a d v a n c e d
i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s . A f r i c a still c o n t a i n e d a h i g h p r o p o r t i o n o f
t h e w o r l d ' s p o o r e s t c o u n t r i e s , t h e o n l y c l e a r e x c e p t i o n t o all t h i s
b e i n g t h e R e p u b l i c o f S o u t h A f r i c a , still t h e e c o n o m i c , i f n o
132

l o n g e r the political, m e t r o p o l i s o f s o u t h e r n Africa. T h i s w a s best

illustrated not so m u c h b y the total d e p e n d e n c e o n selling cheap
l a b o u r t o S o u t h A f r i c a o f a c o u n t r y l i k e L e s o t h o , s m a l l , p o o r in
r e s o u r c e s , a n d s u r r o u n d e d b y S o u t h A f r i c a n t e r r i t o r y , as b y t h e
continued e c o n o m i c relations w i t h S o u t h Africa o f independent
and Marxist M o z a m b i q u e .
B r i e f l y after 1 9 7 3 it s e e m e d at l e a s t t h a t A f r i c a n s t a t e s w i t h
substantial oil resources c o u l d be e x e m p t f r o m p o v e r t y and
d e p e n d e n c y , a n d finance w i d e s p r e a d d e v e l o p m e n t f o r t h e m s e l v e s
a n d a l s o f o r less f o r t u n a t e n e i g h b o u r s . T h e s u c c e s s o f t h e
O r g a n i s a t i o n o f P e t r o l e u m E x p o r t i n g C o u n t r i e s ( O P E C ) in v a s t l y
i m p r o v i n g its m e m b e r s ' t e r m s o f t r a d e c r e a t e d h o p e s t h a t p r o
ducers o f other primary commodities might d o likewise. Such
hopes were largely disappointed; improvements w e r e invariably
temporary and caused by factors b e y o n d African control. T h u s ,
A f r i c a n coffee p r o d u c e r s , s u c h as I v o r y C o a s t , E t h i o p i a , K e n y a
and U g a n d a , benefited f r o m the s u d d e n steep rise in w o r l d coffee
p r i c e s in t h e m i d - 1 9 7 0 s , b u t t h i s w a s c a u s e d b y f r o s t i n B r a z i l , t h e
w o r l d ' s leading producer, rather than any coordinated African
action. S u b s e q u e n t l y , coffee p r o d u c e r s w e r e u n a b l e t o m a i n t a i n
a p r i c e p l a t e a u . A s f o r t h e O P E C ' s ' s u c c e s s ' o v e r o i l p r i c e s , it l e d
to serious p r o b l e m s for A f r i c a . M o s t A f r i c a n states h a d n o oil o f
t h e i r o w n , y e t w e r e p e c u l i a r l y d e p e n d e n t o n it f o r e n e r g y - as
m u c h as 9 5 p e r c e n t i n t h e c a s e o f T a n z a n i a , a b y n o m e a n s i s o l a t e d
e x a m p l e . T h e a d v a n c e d industrial c o u n t r i e s w e r e in fact m u c h
better able to substitute o t h e r fuels, o r in the case o f Britain and
N o r w a y , d o m e s t i c a l l y p r o d u c e d o i l as w e l l . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d ,
their e c o n o m i e s stagnated f r o m 1 9 7 3 , and b y 1978 the i m m e d i a t e
m a r k e t f o r o i l h a d b e c o m e d e p r e s s e d , a n d its real p r i c e h a d b e e n
d r o p p i n g for s o m e time, despite the likelihood o f future oil-
shortages. T h e m o r e p r o d i g a l O P E C countries, w h e t h e r in o r o u t
o f Africa - Nigeria and Iran c o m e to mind - found themselves
facing not abundance but debt, w i t h m u c h diminished prospects
o f aiding (and influencing) others. M e a n w h i l e , the industrial
countries passed o n to A f r i c a n customers for their manufactures
t h e i n c r e a s e d c o s t s in o i l .
These intrusive processes, functions o f the w o r l d and n o t the
African economy, inevitably were a profound political challenge
t o P a n - A f r i c a n i s m , w i t h its optimistic doctrine that together
A f r i c a n s c o u l d s o l v e all t h e i r p r o b l e m s . E v e n before the creation
133

o f the O A U , N k r u m a h attacked the d o m i n a t i o n and manipulation

o f A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s b y o u t s i d e c a p i t a l as ' n e o - c o l o n i a l i s m ' , a n d
preached e c o n o m i c integration, even if political integration w a s
h i s first p r i o r i t y . Y e t u n d e r h i s g u i d a n c e t h e G h a n a i a n e c o n o m y
w a s n o t i n t e g r a t e d e v e n w i t h t h o s e o f its n e i g h b o u r s . Internally
N k r u m a h ' s G h a n a had ' socialist talk w i t h o u t socialist p l a n n i n g .
1
The worst of both worlds'. L i k e w i s e , o n c e the h o p e o f East
African unity faded, Nyerere's Tanzania turned to a policy o f
national e c o n o m i c and social transformation. Tanzania's biggest
regional e c o n o m i c project, the TanZam railway, linking the
Z a m b i a n C o p p e r b e l t w i t h D a r es Salaam, w a s c o n s t r u c t e d with
Chinese capital, technical expertise, capital g o o d s and e v e n skilled
labour, and by 1978 needed Chinese aid to restore efficient
o p e r a t i o n . A s f o r t h e O A U , its E c o n o m i c a n d S o c i a l C o m m i s s i o n
( E S C ) f r o m i n c e p t i o n p l a n n e d s u c h t h i n g s as a c o m m o n e x t e r n a l
tariff, inter-African transport systems, increased inter-African
t r a d e , a n d b e t t e r t e r m s o f t r a d e ; a l l , in 1 9 7 8 , still u n r e a l i s e d , w i t h
minor exceptions. A l t h o u g h largely dependent for expertise o n
the pre-existing United N a t i o n s a g e n c y , the E c o n o m i c C o m m i s
sion for Africa ( E C A ) , the E S C increasingly disliked the ECA's
s t a n c e o f b e i n g ' a b o v e ' p o l i t i c s . I t s first m a j o r v i c t o r y - a p a p e r
victory - was U N acceptance in 1969 that the ECA should,
broadly, cooperate with the O A U . In the 1970s the OAU
enthusiastically f o l l o w e d the U N ' s call (1974) for a ' N e w Inter
national E c o n o m i c O r d e r ' t o benefit the d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s . Its
m a i n a c t i o n in that d i r e c t i o n w a s the 1975 L o m é C o n v e n t i o n .
T h o u g h o b t a i n i n g better terms for A f r i c a f r o m the E E C , this
hardly transformed the nature o f A f r i c a n e c o n o m i c relations.
Subsequently, the O A U endorsed the creation o f E C O W A S , and
called for similar organisations to be created in other regions o f
A f r i c a . N o n e o f t h i s , e v e n at its m o s t u s e f u l , a m o u n t e d t o the
e c o n o m i c unity that Pan-Africanism in t h e o r y stood for. In
practice, national interests remained u p p e r m o s t . In reality, m o s t
of Africa remained p o o r or very poor.
T h e original Pan-Africanist g o a l o f political n o n - i n v o l v e m e n t
w i t h e x t e r n a l p o w e r b l o c s p r o v e d as e l u s i v e as e c o n o m i c u n i t y .
I n d e e d i n s o f a r as c o m m i t m e n t t o A f r o - A s i a n u n i t y as a b r o a d
concept was concerned, outside i n v o l v e m e n t w a s i n fact en
thusiastically a c c e p t e d . T h e 1955 B a n d u n g C o n f e r e n c e , t h o u g h
1
M a k o n n e n , Pan-Africanism, 246.
154

dominated by already independent Asian powers, was also

attended b y African nationalists, and had s o m e influence o n the
s u b s e q u e n t d e v e l o p m e n t o f P a n - A f r i c a n i s m . It l o o k e d t o the U N
to safeguard universal h u m a n rights, and especially rights of
national self-determination. P a n - A f r i c a n i s m in the era o f inde
p e n d e n t s t a t e s w a s t o d o t h e s a m e . W i t h t h e rise i n t h e n u m b e r o f
A f r i c a n m e m b e r s it b e c a m e a f o r m i d a b l e f o r c e i n t h e U N . B u t t h e
l i m i t s o n t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f * w o r l d o p i n i o n ' as e x p r e s s e d i n U N
G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y majorities w e r e the limits o f w h a t Africa c o u l d
a c h i e v e b y s u c h means. A s for the principle that A f r i c a n states
s h o u l d be ' n o n - a l i g n e d ' , this hardly s u r v i v e d . In the Africa o f
1 9 7 8 , it w a s e a s y t o m a k e lists o f p o w e r s t h a t w e r e v e r y c l o s e t o
either the S o v i e t o r the w e s t e r n b l o c s , e v e n if n o t part o f their
formal systems o f alliances. N o o n e d o u b t e d that K e n y a , the I v o r y
Coast, Liberia, Zaire, C h a d , the Central African empire, G a b o n ,
M o r o c c o and U p p e r V o l t a , to name some o b v i o u s examples, w e r e ,
w i t h variations, close to the western w o r l d . E v e n E g y p t under
Nasir, o n e o f the m o s t formidable o p p o n e n t s o f s u c h i n v o l v e
m e n t , s u b s e q u e n t l y i n c l i n e d in m a n y w a y s t o the w e s t . E q u a l l y ,
no one doubted the w a r m t h o f relations b e t w e e n the S o v i e t
Union, Cuba and the German Democratic Republic (East
G e r m a n y ) , and Ethiopia, M o z a m b i q u e , A n g o l a , Guinea-Bissau,
Benin, the C a p e V e r d e Islands, the C o n g o R e p u b l i c , and the
Malagasy R e p u b l i c . In the former Portuguese colonies, this
closeness w a s a natural o u t g r o w t h o f the substantial military and
other aid g i v e n t h e m d u r i n g their i n d e p e n d e n c e s t r u g g l e s b y the
S o v i e t b l o c ; in the case o f A n g o l a , C u b a n a n d S o v i e t aid w a s
vital d u r i n g the post-independence civil w a r . In Ethiopia, Russian
logistic and material support and military advice, b a c k e d by
troops from Cuba and Marxist South Y e m e n , enabled the
Ethiopian government to win back control o f the disputed
O g a d e n a n d h o l d o n t o the E r i t r e a n p o r t o f M a s s a w a in 1 9 7 8 . In
t h e s p h e r e o f c o n t i n u i n g l i b e r a t i o n s t r u g g l e s , it w a s c l e a r t h a t t h e
Patriotic Front and SWAPO w e r e also receiving substantial
S o v i e t - b l o c as w e l l as A f r i c a n a i d . ( T h e e x a m p l e o f A l b a n i a is a n
e x e m p l a r y c a u t i o n against s u p p o s i n g that small states are i n v a r i
ably dominated b y p o w e r f u l friends a n d allies.) Furthermore,
A f r i c a n states w i t h s t r o n g w e s t e r n o r eastern c o n n e x i o n s w o u l d
vehemently deny membership o f , still l e s s s u b o r d i n a t i o n to,
f o r e i g n b l o c s . G o o d relations b e t w e e n A f r i c a n states w e r e n o t
*35

a l w a y s i m p a i r e d b y t h e i r d i f f e r i n g n o n - A f r i c a n c o n n e x i o n s , as w a s
s h o w n b y E t h i o p i a and K e n y a . C o n n e x i o n s w i t h the same
e x t e r n a l f r i e n d s m i g h t n o t e n s u r e g o o d r e l a t i o n s , as w a s s h o w n
b y the case o f Somalia and E t h i o p i a . F o r m e r l y close to the S o v i e t
U n i o n , Somalia was estranged by Soviet and C u b a n support for
Ethiopia.
R e v e a l i n g l y , b y t h e 1 9 7 0 s A f r i c a n states w e r e i n c r e a s i n g l y
l o o k i n g to outside p o w e r s for s u p p o r t in b o t h internal and
e x t e r n a l d i s p u t e s , as w a s s h o w n b y t h e p r e s e n c e o f f o r e i g n t r o o p s
in i n c r e a s i n g n u m b e r s o f A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s . T h e C u b a n s w e r e
present in substantial strength in A n g o l a and E t h i o p i a , a n d
present in smaller n u m b e r s in s e v e r a l o t h e r c o u n t r i e s , n o t a b l y
M o z a m b i q u e . F o r m a n y years France g a v e military support to
C h a d i n its l o n g w a r w i t h its n o r t h e r n d i s s i d e n t s , a n d b y 1 9 7 8 t h e r e
w a s d i s q u i e t e v e n w i t h i n F r a n c e i t s e l f at t h e d e p l o y m e n t o f F r e n c h
forces there, and in the w a r against Polisario in Sahara and
M a u r i t a n i a . F r e n c h f o r c e s r e m a i n e d i n D j i b o u t i after its i n d e p e n
dence. M o s t c o n t r o v e r s i a l o f all, F r e n c h t r o o p s i n t e r v e n e d ,
t o g e t h e r w i t h the B e l g i a n s and w i t h U S logistic s u p p o r t , in the
t r o u b l e s o f S h a b a p r o v i n c e i n Z a i r e i n J u n e 1 9 7 8 . O n c e a g a i n , as
in 1 9 6 0 - 2 and the ' S t a n l e y v i l l e D r o p ' o f 1964 w h e n B e l g i a n ,
A m e r i c a n and British military intervention t o o k place, Zaire
p o s e d the acutest, m o s t c o m p l i c a t e d p r o b l e m s for P a n - A f r i c a n i s m .
In b o t h 1964 and 1978 the foreign military intervention w a s
p r e s e n t e d as a h u m a n i t a r i a n r e s c u e o p e r a t i o n t o s a v e w h i t e
r e s i d e n t s f r o m b a r b a r o u s m a s s a c r e s , t h o u g h t h e far m o r e e x t e n s i v e
m a s s a c r e s o f A f r i c a n s w e r e m o r e o r less i g n o r e d , e x c e p t t o
provide a propaganda picture o f alleged African savagery. Shaba
w a s i n v a d e d i n 1 9 7 8 , as it h a d b e e n i n 1 9 7 7 , b y i n s u r g e n t s b a s e d
in A n g o l a ( a l t h o u g h the A n g o l a n authorities d e n i e d c o m p l i c i t y ) ,
s o m e o f w h o m w e r e former m e m b e r s o f the K a t a n g e s e g e n d a r m
erie, the military a r m o f K a t a n g e s e secession in the early 1960s.
F o r its p a r t , t h e Z a i r e a n g o v e r n m e n t h a d e n c o u r a g e d t h e M P L A ' s
internal enemies, n o t a b l y the F N L A , w h i c h had m o u n t e d raids
into A n g o l a from Zairean territory. T h e Zairean g o v e r n m e n t w a s
r e v e a l e d b y t h e S h a b a i n t e r v e n t i o n as s o w e a k a n d u n p o p u l a r t h a t
it h a d t o r e l y o n f o r e i g n e r s , i n c l u d i n g B e l g i a n s , t o m a i n t a i n its
existence, a n d in the aftermath h a d to a c c e p t increased w e s t e r n
c o n t r o l o v e r Z a i r e ' s finances a n d e c o n o m y as t h e p r i c e o f
136

c o n t i n u i n g s u p p o r t . C h i n a a l s o r u s h e d t o offer Z a i r e m i l i t a r y a i d ,
alleging that the episode w a s a S o v i e t - C u b a n plot. N o t h i n g c o u l d
h a v e m o r e d i s c r e d i t e d t h e O A U , g i v e n its c e n t r a l f u n c t i o n o f
p r e s e r v i n g the i n v i o l a b i l i t y o f m e m b e r states, and r e s o l v i n g
disputes b e t w e e n them. C h i n e s e i n v o l v e m e n t reflected increasing
C h i n e s e d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o p e r s u a d e as m a n y A f r i c a n s t a t e s as
p o s s i b l e to see the S o v i e t U n i o n , C u b a and their A f r i c a n friends
as t h e g r e a t e s t t h r e a t t o t h e c o n t i n e n t ' s p e a c e a n d s e c u r i t y . I n t h e
i m m e d i a t e a f t e r m a t h o f t h e 1 9 7 8 S h a b a c r i s i s , t h e r e w a s at l e a s t
o n e i m p r o v e m e n t in the situation, w i t h A n g o l a a n d Z a i r e
agreeing to prevent violations o f each other's territory b y resident
exiles.
O n o n e o f the other great international issues o f m o d e r n times,
the conflict b e t w e e n the Israeli state and the Palestinians, A f r i c a
m o v e d o v e r t h e t w e n t y y e a r s after 1 9 5 8 f r o m d i v i s i o n t o w i d e
agreement. President Nasir o f E g y p t b e g a n the process o f
p e r s u a d i n g t h e m a j o r i t y o f A f r i c a n states t o s u p p o r t t h e A r a b
p o w e r s o v e r the Palestine q u e s t i o n , u s i n g his influence w i t h i n the
Casablanca g r o u p and the O A U , and u n d o i n g the close relations
that an intelligently administered aid p r o g r a m m e had secured for
I s r a e l w i t h m a n y A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s , i n c l u d i n g G h a n a . A s late as
1967, the O A U refused t o declare that Israel w a s an a g g r e s s o r in
the S i x - D a y w a r against E g y p t . In the late 1960s a n d early 1970s
this attitude c h a n g e d , w i t h c o n t i n u i n g Israeli o c c u p a t i o n o f
E g y p t i a n territory, and a g r o w i n g feeling that the p l i g h t o f the
Palestinians w a s a n a l o g o u s to that o f Africans under colonial o r
w h i t e m i n o r i t y rule. A m i n o r i t y o f A f r i c a n countries c o n t i n u e d
t o resist t h e t r e n d t o w a r d s t h e a n t i - Z i o n i s t c a m p , p r o m i n e n t
a m o n g t h e s e b e i n g t h e I v o r y C o a s t a n d M a l a w i . B u t in 1 9 7 3 , all
O A U members except M a l a w i , Botswana, L e s o t h o and Swaziland
s e v e r e d relations w i t h Israel. T h e e c o n o m i c p r o b l e m that c o n
f r o n t e d m a n y A f r i c a n s t a t e s after t h e o i l c r i s i s o f 1 9 7 3 , a n d
d i s c o n t e n t at t h e l e v e l o f A r a b e c o n o m i c a i d f o r A f r i c a as a w h o l e
(as o p p o s e d t o M u s l i m A f r i c a ) , l e d t o s o m e f e e l i n g t h a t A f r o -
A r a b cooperation brought Africa only problems. Meanwhile,
M i d d l e E a s t e r n o i l c o n t i n u e d t o find its w a y t o R h o d e s i a a n d
S o u t h Africa. In 1976, h o w e v e r , a n u m b e r o f e v e n t s rallied
A f r i c a n support for the Palestinians. T h e s e included i m p r o v e d
d i p l o m a t i c relations b e t w e e n Israel and S o u t h Africa, the s u p p l y
137

o f Israeli w a r planes to S o u t h A f r i c a , and the Israeli c o m m a n d o

raid o n E n t e b b e a i r p o r t i n U g a n d a t o r e l e a s e J e w i s h h o s t a g e s
held there. T h o u g h m a n y A f r i c a n leaders l o o k e d a s k a n c e at Idi
A m i n ' s g o v e r n m e n t in U g a n d a , s u c h u n i n v i t e d f o r e i g n armed
i n t e r v e n t i o n in Africa w a s a h i g h l y sensitive issue and totally
unacceptable. A t the same time, the supply o f A r a b funds to Africa
was increasing, and in January 1 9 7 7 at t h e C a i r o Afro-Arab
Summit vast n e w sums were pledged.
P A N - A F R I C A N I S M A N D C U L T U R E
F r o m the d a y s o f p r o t o - P a n - A f r i c a n i s m in the nineteenth c e n t u r y ,

a desire to defend and reassert the v a l i d i t y o f A f r i c a n c u l t u r e w a s
a p r e o c c u p a t i o n o f m a n y w i t h i n the P a n - A f r i c a n m o v e m e n t . A s
w a s s t a t e d at t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h i s c h a p t e r , s u c h m a t t e r s c o n t i n u e d
as a n i m p o r t a n t P a n - A f r i c a n i s t c o n c e r n , n o t a b l y e x e m p l i f i e d i n
t h e w o r k o f W . E . B . D u B o i s , in t h e l a t e 1 9 3 0 s t o m i d - 1 9 4 0 s .
V a l u a b l e t h o u g h s u c h e f f o r t s w e r e as a c o u n t e r - a t t a c k a g a i n s t t h e
generally d e r o g a t o r y o p i n i o n o f the then d o m i n a n t w h i t e w o r l d
a b o u t A f r i c a n culture and the A f r i c a n past, they nevertheless
p r o v i d e d w h a t w a s in s o m e w a y s a c o n f u s e d a n d difficult l e g a c y
for P a n - A f r i c a n i s m in the m i d - and l a t e - t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . To
begin with, such thinking had c o m e from men w h o , h o w e v e r
m u c h they desired to present a sympathetic interpretation of
African culture, w e r e nevertheless the p r o d u c t s o f E u r o p e a n o r
N o r t h A m e r i c a n education. T h e r e w a s n o t h i n g specifically A f r i c a n
a b o u t t h e w a y s in w h i c h t h e y a t t e m p t e d t h e i r t a s k , w h i c h i n d e e d
o n l y t o o s e l f - e v i d e n t l y , as w a s b o u n d t o b e t h e c a s e , w e r e b a s e d
o n the intellectual and cultural traditions o f the w h i t e w o r l d .
S e c o n d l y , their a p p r o a c h to the A f r i c a n past - and here the w o r k
o f D u B o i s must particularly be born in m i n d - t e n d e d to be
romantic, triumphalist, and d e v o i d o f any serious attempt to
identify conflict and o p p r e s s i o n w i t h i n A f r i c a n societies. D u B o i s ' s
readers w e r e presented w i t h a g l o r i o u s past o f great k i n g s and
k i n g d o m s , d i s r u p t e d b y the s l a v e trade and i m p e r i a l i s m . A t least
one modern historian o f Pan-Africanism, Imanuel Geiss, has
r e j e c t e d t h i s l e g a c y as r o m a n t i c in a p e j o r a t i v e s e n s e , r e a c t i o n a r y ,
and incapable o f p r o v i d i n g present-day Pan-Africanism w i t h the
1
basis for a c o h e r e n t and effective m o d e r n i s i n g i d e o l o g y . T h i r d l y ,
1
Geiss, The Pan-African movement, 114 and 197.
138

Pan-Africanism had a legacy, reaching b a c k to the nineteenth

c e n t u r y , a n d a b o v e all i d e n t i f i e d w i t h t h e t h o u g h t o f E . W . B l y d e n ,
o f assuming the existence o f a generalised African culture based
o n r a c i a l i d e n t i t y ; B l y d e n h i m s e l f is c r e d i t e d w i t h h a v i n g o r i g i
n a t e d t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e ' A f r i c a n p e r s o n a l i t y \ U s e f u l as s u c h i d e a s
w e r e i n m a k i n g it m o r e p o s s i b l e f o r p e o p l e s o f A f r i c a n d e s c e n t
in t h e d i a s p o r a t o i d e n t i f y w i t h A f r i c a , a n d f o r A f r i c a n s w i t h i n
Africa to identify w i t h fellow-Africans from other parts o f the
continent, they i g n o r e d the diversity o f African cultures, and e v e n
the ethnic diversity o f Africa, a continent w h i c h contains millions
o f i n d i g e n o u s p e o p l e w h o are n o t b l a c k .
E a s i l y t h e m o s t d e t e r m i n e d effort t o r e p r o d u c e a n i d e o l o g y a n d
art w h i c h w o u l d b e d e t e r m i n e d l y a u t h e n t i c , w h i c h w o u l d e x a l t
a n d g l o r i f y A f r i c a n c u l t u r e a n d m o d e s o f t h o u g h t as o p p o s e d t o
E u r o p e a n , o r i g i n a t e d in the w o r l d o f b l a c k s t u d e n t s in Paris in
the 1930s. T h i s w a s the b e g i n n i n g o f the c o n c e p t o f négritude,
o r i g i n a l l y a s e a r c h f o r i d e n t i t y b y i n d i v i d u a l s w h o felt a l i e n a t e d
f r o m b o t h t h e i r e t h n i c r o o t s a n d f r o m F r e n c h s o c i e t y . Its m o s t
i m p o r t a n t leaders w e r e the M a r t i n i q u a n p o e t , A i m é Césaire, the
French G u y a n e s e p o e t L é o n D a m a s , and the Senegalese L e o p o l d
S é d a r S e n g h o r w h o , y e a r s l a t e r , as P r e s i d e n t o f S e n e g a l , w a s a b l e
to g i v e p o w e r f u l patronage to the m o v e m e n t , a l t h o u g h he w a s
eventually t o seem t o lose interest in it. U n d e r the aegis o f
négritude, w h i c h in the p o s t - w a r era a c q u i r e d a political d i m e n s i o n
w i t h claims t o b e an i d e o l o g y o f liberation, a w h o l e s c h o o l o f
francophone writers from both Africa and the New World
emerged, as d i d the h i g h l y influential Paris-based magazine
Présence Africaine. Y e t it w o u l d b e b r o a d l y t r u e t o s a y t h a t négritude
remained a force restricted to francophone black intellectuals
( t o g e t h e r w i t h s o m e w h i t e a d m i r e r s s u c h as J e a n - P a u l S a r t r e ) , a n d
i n c r e a s i n g l y u n d e r attack n o t o n l y f r o m b l a c k intellectuals in
non-francophone Africa, but even from some francophones
t h e m s e l v e s . T h u s as e a r l y as 1 9 5 2 , t h e M a r t i n i q u a n F r a n t z F a n o n
r e m a r k e d t h a t ' t h e m a n w h o a d o r e s t h e N e g r o is as s i c k a s t h e
man w h o abominates him a n d d e s c r i b e d t h e e d u c a t e d N e g r o as
1
the ' s l a v e o f the spontaneous and c o s m i c N e g r o m y t h ' . Twelve
years later, in an ironic a n d p e r c e p t i v e critique o f the relationship
o f the F r e n c h W e s t Indian élite t o Africa o n the o n e h a n d and
1
F r a n t z F a n o n , Black skin, white masks, tr. C h a r l e s M a r k m a n n ( L o n d o n , 1970),
12. O r i g i n a l l y p u b l i s h e d a s Peau noire, masques blancs ( P a r i s , 1952).
49

to the F r e n c h o n the other, F a n o n stated that ' t h e W e s t Indian,
after t h e g r e a t w h i t e e r r o r , is n o w l i v i n g i n t h e g r e a t black
mirage V
The m a i n lines o f attack against négritude w e r e t h a t it r o m a n
t i c i s e d A f r i c a n c u l t u r e a n d s o c i e t y , a n d t h a t it w a s m e a n i n g f u l o n l y
t o a s m a l l é l i t e o f i n t e l l e c t u a l s w h o h a d l o s t t o u c h , at l e a s t i n p a r t ,
w i t h the African masses to w h o m such doctrines w e r e o f n o
c o n c e r n , as t h e y h a d n e v e r b e e n a s s i m i l a t e d t o a n y d e g r e e t o
European culture. Such w a s the trend o f argument against
négritude o f the South African, Ezekiel Mphahlele, w h o made a
t r e n c h a n t a t t a c k a g a i n s t t h e m o v e m e n t at t h e D a k a r C o n f e r e n c e
on Black Literature o f 1963, w h i c h h a d b e e n sponsored by
S e n g h o r h i m s e l f . I n d e e d , r a t h e r a s t h e P a n - A f r i c a n i s t s o f t h e 1945
congress put the question of national independence first,
M p h a h l e l e asserted that national culture m u s t c o m e first. For
M p h a h l e l e , ' i n a g r e a t e r A f r i c a , w e m a y a r r i v e at a p o i n t w h e r e
Pan-African goals d o determine certain national objectives, b u t
cultures c a n o n l y contribute t o P a n - A f r i c a n ideals f r o m a position
2
of national s t r e n g t h ' . A n o t h e r eminent anglophone writer, the
Nigerian W o l e Soyinka, had, h o w e v e r , c h a n g e d his attitude to
négritude b y the mid-1970s. A s h e p u t it i n 1976, ' f r o m a
w e l l - p u b l i c i s e d p o s i t i o n as a n a n t i - N e g r i t u d i n i s t . . . it h a s b e e n
w i t h an increasing sense o f alarm a n d e v e n betrayal that w e h a v e
watched our position distorted and exploited to embrace a
" s o p h i s t i c a t e d " s c h o o l o f t h o u g h t w h i c h . . . repudiates the exist
3
ence o f an African w o r l d ! '
W h i l e these debates raged, cultural Pan-Africanism, like poli
tical P a n - A f r i c a n i s m , d e v e l o p e d an institutional e x i s t e n c e in t h e
w o r l d o f i n d e p e n d e n t A f r i c a n states. M e n t i o n has b e e n m a d e o f
t h e D a k a r C o n f e r e n c e o n B l a c k L i t e r a t u r e i n 1963. B y t h e 1970s,
this k i n d o f e v e n t w a s b e c o m i n g a r e g u l a r feature o f w h a t m i g h t
b e c a l l e d official o r s e m i - o f f i c i a l c u l t u r e i n A f r i c a , w i t h s u c h e v e n t s
as t h e B l a c k A r t s F e s t i v a l i n D a k a r i n 1966, a n d i n L a g o s i n 1977.
C u l t u r a l p r o b l e m s w e r e a l s o d i s c u s s e d at t h e U N E S C O C o n f e r
ence o n the Influence o f C o l o n i a l i s m o n A f r i c a n Cultures in
Dar e s S a l a a m i n 1972, a n d t h e S i x t h P a n - A f r i c a n C o n g r e s s i n
Dar e s S a l a a m i n 1974. T h e r e r e m a i n e d , h o w e v e r , s e r i o u s p r o -
1
F r a n t z F a n o n , Toward the African revolution, tr. H a a k o n C h e v a l i e r ( L o n d o n , 1968),
37.
2
E z e k i e l M p h a h l e l e , The African image. 2nd r e v i s e d e d . ( L o n d o n , 1974), 92.
3
W o l e S o y i n k a , Myth, literature and the African world ( C a m b r i d g e , 1976), i x - x .
140

b l e m s ; A f r i c a n w r i t e r s still, for the m o s t part, w r o t e in E u r o p e a n

l a n g u a g e s , w i t h a readership i n e v i t a b l y restricted to A f r i c a n s fully
l i t e r a t e in t h o s e l a n g u a g e s o r t o i n t e r e s t e d w h i t e f o r e i g n e r s . T h e i r
works were usually published by European or American
p u b l i s h i n g houses, o r their A f r i c a n subsidiaries. A t the same time,
t h e c o n t i n e n t w a s b e i n g i n c r e a s i n g l y p e n e t r a t e d , e v e n at t h e l e v e l
o f the masses, b y f o r e i g n culture, spread t h r o u g h the m e d i a o f
the c i n e m a , television and radio, despite s p o r a d i c attempts t o use
all t h e s e m e d i a t o d e v e l o p a n a u t h e n t i c m o d e r n A f r i c a n p o p u l a r
culture.
In the v i e w o f o n e o f the m o s t perceptive leaders o f the
r e v o l u t i o n a r y liberation struggles o f the 1960s a n d 1970s, the
p r o b l e m o f culture in m o d e r n A f r i c a w a s in a sense n o p r o b l e m
at a l l . T o A m f l c a r C a b r a l , t h i s a t t e m p t t o ' r e t u r n t o t h e s o u r c e s '
was n o more than ' a means to attempt temporary advantages, a
conscious or unconscious f o r m o f political o p p o r t u n i s m ' o n the
part o f the A f r i c a n l o w e r - m i d d l e classes under c o l o n i a l i s m , unless
it i n v o l v e d ' a g e n u i n e c o m m i t m e n t t o t h e fight f o r i n d e p e n d e n c e
and a total, definitive identification w i t h the aspirations o f the
masses, w h o contest not merely the foreigners' culture, but
1
foreign rule a l t o g e t h e r ' . C a b r a l w a s c o n v i n c e d - and this w a s
certainly true o f his native c o u n t r y - that the A f r i c a n masses had
(with few exceptions) n e v e r lost their culture and traditions; and
t h r o u g h the liberation m o v e m e n t s they w o u l d universally gain the
power not o f restoring it o r preserving it, but o f using it
c r e a t i v e l y - in his o w n often repeated phrase, o f ' m a k i n g h i s t o r y \
T h i s p r o c e s s , q u i t e different f r o m the search for a c u l t u r a l identity
usually associated w i t h the cultural aspects o f Pan-Africanism, w a s
o n e w h o s e o u t c o m e r e m a i n e d as y e t undetermined.
1
A m i l c a r C a b r a l , ' T h e r o l e o f c u l t u r e i n t h e l i b e r a t i o n s t r u g g l e ' , in Guinea-Bissau:
toward final victory. Selected speeches and documents from PAIGC ( R i c h m o n d , B r i t i s h
C o l u m b i a , 1974), 42.
141

C H A P T E R 4
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CHANGE
T h e history o f m o s t A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s since 1940 seems t o r e v o l v e

around a single e v e n t : their g a i n i n g o f political i n d e p e n d e n c e . B u t
this c l i m a x o f n a t i o n a l i s m m u s t b e set w i t h i n t h o s e s o c i a l a n d
c u l t u r a l c h a n g e s o f w h i c h it w a s s o m u c h t h e p r o d u c t a n d w h i c h
w e r e , i n t h e m a i n , c o n f i r m e d i n t h e i r c o u r s e f o r at least a d e c a d e
or t w o thereafter. T h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r b o o s t e d a w h o l e v a r i e t y
o f social c h a n g e s : the intensification o f cash-crop p r o d u c t i o n , the
a c c e l e r a t i o n o f m i g r a t i o n o f all k i n d s a n d t h e r a p i d g r o w t h o f
cities, the diversification o f the o c c u p a t i o n a l structure and,
e v e n t u a l l y , t h e m o v e m e n t o f A f r i c a n s i n t o its u p p e r e c h e l o n s , a n d
t h e e x p a n s i o n o f m o d e r n e d u c a t i o n at all l e v e l s . A l l t h e s e i m p l i e d
c h a n g e s in areas m o r e i m m e d i a t e l y c o n s t i t u t i v e o f ' s o c i e t y ' ,
n a m e l y in h o w p e o p l e i d e n t i f i e d t h e m s e l v e s a n d in t h e i r p a t t e r n s
o f social cooperation and conflict. N o w the c o n c e p t o f 'social
c h a n g e ' is m o r e t h a n a m e r e u m b r e l l a f o r s e v e r a l p a r a l l e l ,
p r o b a b l y s o m e h o w - r e l a t e d c h a n g e s in d i v e r s e a s p e c t s o f s o c i a l
l i f e ; it d e n o t e s t h e s y s t e m a t i c t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f a p a r t i c u l a r
s o c i e t y . B u t at w h a t l e v e l d o w e set ' s o c i e t y ' ? T h e d i f f i c u l t y w a s
t h a t , t h o u g h t h e p r i m e s o u r c e o f t h e s e c h a n g e s d i d n o t lie w i t h i n
t h e m , it w a s still m u c h e a s i e r , as late as t h e 1 9 4 0 s , t o s p e a k o f l o c a l
s o c i a l s y s t e m s l i k e t h o s e o f A s a n t e o r t h e L u o as b e i n g societies
than w h o l e colonies like the G o l d C o a s t or K e n y a . T h u s the p i o n
e e r i n g s t u d y , G . a n d M . W i l s o n ' s The analysis of social change ( 1 9 4 5 ) ,
t o o k as its u n i t s o f a n a l y s i s t h e s e s m a l l - s c a l e s o c i e t i e s , e v e n t h o u g h
the features o f c h a n g e w h i c h they described resulted f r o m the
progressive incorporation o f these societies into w i d e r units, o f
w h i c h the c o l o n i a l social s y s t e m w a s the m o s t i m p o r t a n t . T h o u g h
m a n y o f the elements o f the future national societies w e r e already
t h e n p r e s e n t , t h e i r full e m e r g e n c e , r a t h e r t h a n t h e i r t r a n s f o r m
a t i o n , w a s t o b e the m a j o r a s p e c t o f s o c i a l c h a n g e i n t h e d e c a d e s
t h a t f o l l o w e d . T h i s c h a p t e r , t h e n , is a s o c i o l o g i c a l c o m m e n t a r y
o n o n e main aspiration o f the nationalist m o v e m e n t : the creation
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S O C I A L A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G E
o f national societies within the boundaries o f the colonial

states.
W e , like the nationalists, m u s t b e g i n f r o m w h a t c o l o n i a l i s m
c r e a t e d . C o l o n i a l i s m p r o d u c e d , b e s i d e s t h e g e n e r a l ' i n c r e a s e in
social s c a l e ' , the implications o f w h i c h for social relations the
W i l s o n s analysed so clearly, a distinctive k i n d o f societal inte
g r a t i o n . T h i s h a d t w o a s p e c t s , w h i c h w i l l b e c o n s i d e r e d i n t u r n at
length b e l o w : a certain ' h o r i z o n t a l ' integration o f the various
r e g i o n s , natural and e t h n o l o g i c a l , w i t h i n the state's b o u n d a r i e s ;
a n d a ' v e r t i c a l ' i n t e g r a t i o n o f e m e r g e n t s o c i a l s t r a t a in a s o c i a l
s y s t e m c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e state. T h e s e t w o d i m e n s i o n s w e r e
linked, h o w e v e r , since there tended to e m e r g e a certain hierarchy
o f r e g i o n s o r c o m m u n i t i e s , and the c o m p o s i t i o n o f the social strata
was not random with respect to regional or ethnic origin.
A n A f r i c a n c o l o n y ' s d e v e l o p m e n t w a s a b o v e all a n a s p e c t o f
its r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e m e t r o p o l i t a n p o w e r . C o m m u n i c a t i o n s w e r e
an e x c e l l e n t i n d i c a t o r o f t h e p a t t e r n o f ' h o r i z o n t a l ' i n t e g r a t i o n :
all t a r r e d r o a d s , s o t o s p e a k , l e d t o t h e c a p i t a l , o r at least t o a n o t h e r
entrepot, a channel for material or s y m b o l i c i n t e r c h a n g e w i t h the
m e t r o p o l i s . Different parts o f the r e g i o n a l and ethnic m o s a i c
v a r i e d in t h e e x t e n t o f t h e i r i n v o l v e m e n t w i t h this c e n t r e ,
d e p e n d i n g o n w h a t t h e y c o u l d offer t o t h e o u t s i d e w o r l d , f o r
e x a m p l e c a s h c r o p s , o r w e r e i n t e r e s t e d in r e c e i v i n g f r o m it, f o r
example education. T h e primary integration, then, w a s that w h i c h
d e v e l o p e d b e t w e e n the regions and the centre, rather than that
d i r e c t l y b e t w e e n t h e r e g i o n s . T h e c a p i t a l , as ' c e n t r e ' , w a s n o t t h e
c e n t r e o f a p r e f o r m e d s y s t e m o f j o i n t r e l a t i o n s , b u t i m p o s e d as
t h e n o d e t h r o u g h w h i c h all r e g i o n s s e v e r a l l y r e l a t e d t o t h e
outside. T o the extent that direct inter-regional relations d e v e l
o p e d , they w e r e , apart from s o m e continuation o f pre-colonial
f o r m s , a n effect o f o n e r e g i o n ' s m o r e d i r e c t r e l a t i o n w i t h t h e
c e n t r e , as w i t h t h e r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n c a s h - c r o p p i n g areas a n d t h e
r e m o t e r areas w h i c h p r o v i d e d m u c h o f t h e i r l a b o u r . O t h e r w i s e ,
it w a s p r e c i s e l y at t h e o u t w a r d - f a c i n g c a p i t a l , a n d at o t h e r n e w
centres established by colonialism, w h e r e s o m e overall integration
o f the r e g i o n s and their p o p u l a t i o n s b e g a n to take place.
T h e colonial period also introduced altogether n e w kinds o f
social relations, especially those b e t w e e n e m p l o y e r and w a g e - or
s a l a r y - e a r n e r . A n d it t r a n s f o r m e d , w h e r e it d i d n o t i n t r o d u c e ,
r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n officials a n d s u b j e c t s . H e n c e d e v e l o p e d t h e
*43

b e g i n n i n g s o f a n a t i o n a l s y s t e m o f s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n . It d o e s n o t
necessarily f o l l o w that, because a certain k i n d o f relationship, s u c h
as t h a t e n t a i l e d i n w a g e - l a b o u r , w a s i n t r o d u c e d w i t h c o l o n i a l i s m ,
w e are at o n c e d e a l i n g w i t h a s e g m e n t o f a n a t i o n a l l y i n t e g r a t e d
system. B e c a u s e o f the m o d e o f regional integration that w e h a v e
already o u t l i n e d , a particular s e g m e n t m a y b e fairly u n i n t e g r a t e d
in a n y s y s t e m o f s u c h r e l a t i o n s g o i n g o u t s i d e t h e l o c a l i t y a n d e v e n
fairly //^differentiated f r o m q u i t e different k i n d s o f p u r e l y l o c a l
relations, for example those b e t w e e n m e m b e r s of two ethnic
g r o u p s , o r at t h e l e v e l o f l o c a l p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s , b e t w e e n c h i e f a n d
client. T h u s class analysis, w h i l e an indispensable t o o l in e x a m i n i n g
the e m e r g e n t social structures, m u s t b e c o m b i n e d w i t h a lively
appreciation o f t w o features h i g h l y distinctive o f m o s t o f sub-
Saharan A f r i c a : the e n o r m o u s regional variety o f class situations,
u n d e r p i n n e d b y cultural d i v e r s i t y ; a n d the crucial role o f the state,
w h i c h t o a great extent f o r m e d , rather than reflected, the s y s t e m
o f stratification. T h e m o s t unified social strata w e r e those located
in t h e n a t i o n a l c e n t r e s , t h e c i t i e s , a n d e s p e c i a l l y t h o s e directly
e m p l o y e d b y t h e s t a t e itself. T h e ' p r i m a c y o f p o l i t i e s ' , o n w h i c h
1
several social scientists h a v e r e m a r k e d , is t h u s a n effect o f t h e
loose, or rather distinctive, m o d e o f societal integration be
q u e a t h e d b y c o l o n i a l i s m . N k r u m a h ' s i n j u n c t i o n ' S e e k y e first t h e
political k i n g d o m ' s h o w s that nationalist politicians appreciated
it w e l l .
B e c a u s e A f r i c a is s o d i v e r s e a n d d o e s n o t f o r m a s i n g l e s o c i a l
system, this a c c o u n t concentrates o n the social p r o c e s s e s typical
o f the ' n o r m a l ' A f r i c a n c o u n t r y : an e x - c o l o n y o f W e s t , E a s t o r
C e n t r a l A f r i c a w h i c h g a i n e d its i n d e p e n d e n c e in the 1950s o r
1960s. The countries o f southern Africa, and especially the
Republic of South Africa, while sharing many cultural and
local-level characteristics w i t h those further n o r t h , differ, not
merely because o f the l o n g - c o n t i n u e d presence and p o w e r o f
whites and the existence o f significant interstitial mestigo or
c o l o u r e d p o p u l a t i o n s , b u t because their class systems w e r e so
m u c h m o r e dominated by w a g e - l a b o u r and locally based capital.
B u t t o s e e S o u t h A f r i c a , f o r e x a m p l e , as e c o n o m i c a l l y ' a d v a n c e d '
o r as p o l i t i c a l l y ' b a c k w a r d ' c o m p a r e d w i t h a ' n o r m a l ' African
country - despite the attraction w h i c h such c o n c e p t i o n s h a v e for
political actors - w o u l d be to i m p o s e an unjustified unilinear
1
H . S p i r o ( e d . ) , The primacy of politics ( N e w Y o r k , 1966).
144

p a t t e r n o n a h i s t o r i c a l c o u r s e w h i c h is l i k e l y t o b e as d i s t i n c t i v e
in t h e f u t u r e as i n t h e p a s t . E t h i o p i a a n d t h e A r a b c o u n t r i e s o f
N o r t h Africa present a m u c h greater p r o b l e m , since they cannot
b e p r e s e n t e d as v a r i a n t s o f t h e s u b - S a h a r a n m o d e l . T o t h e e x t e n t
that their national societies w e r e f o r m e d in a colonial m o u l d , there
are s i m i l a r i t i e s . T h u s b e c a u s e o f a m a s s i v e s e t t l e r p r e s e n c e a n d
e x t e n s i v e l a n d e x p r o p r i a t i o n f r o m t h e i n d i g e n o u s p o p u l a t i o n , it
is h e l p f u l t o d r a w p a r a l l e l s b e t w e e n A l g e r i a ' s e x p e r i e n c e o f r u r a l l y
based national insurrection w i t h similar m o v e m e n t s in A n g o l a
a n d M o z a m b i q u e . E t h i o p i a , o f c o u r s e , h a s as its c o r e a n a n c i e n t
c o l o n i s i n g , r a t h e r t h a n c o l o n i s e d , n a t i o n , a n d it h a s b e e n t h e
r e s p o n s e s o f its p e r i p h e r y , r a t h e r t h a n t h e f o r m o f its c e n t r e , w h i c h
a p p r o a c h the m o d e l . B u t in o t h e r respects, the social a n d cultural
f o r m s o f t h e N o r t h A f r i c a n s o c i e t i e s are s o m u c h t h e i r o w n t h a t
t h e i r p r i n c i p a l u s e w i l l b e as a f o i l t o h i g h l i g h t t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c
experiences o f the b u l k o f A f r i c a t o the s o u t h .
P A T T E R N S OF M I G R A T I O N
B y 1940 t h e p a t t e r n s o f h u m a n m i g r a t i o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f t h e
colonial period w e r e well established. Despite s o m e continuities
w i t h pre-colonial m o v e m e n t s and s o m e o r i g i n in i n d i g e n o u s
p r o c e s s e s , s u c h as n o m a d s é d e n t a r i s a t i o n , t h e y w e r e d o m i n a t e d
b y t h e w a y s in w h i c h different r e g i o n s o f A f r i c a h a d c o m e t o b e
related t o the w o r l d e c o n o m y . T h r e e b r o a d patterns o f m o v e m e n t
m a y b e d i s c e r n e d : (i) t o a r e a s o f c a s h - c r o p o r e x p o r t - o r i e n t e d
a g r i c u l t u r e , (ii) t o a r e a s o f e m p l o y m e n t i n m i n e s o r i n d u s t r y ,
(iii) t o g e n e r a l , h e t e r o g e n e o u s e m p l o y m e n t i n c i t i e s .
In W e s t Africa any rural-to-urban m o v e m e n t w a s eclipsed b y
t h e v a s t flow o f s e a s o n a l , u n s k i l l e d a g r i c u l t u r a l l a b o u r f r o m t h e
p o o r e r r u r a l areas o f t h e i n t e r i o r s a v a n n a t o t h e a r e a s w h e r e
cash crops w e r e g r o w n b y A f r i c a n farmers. T h e r e w e r e also
m o v e m e n t s , c o n t i n u i n g f r o m the early colonial p e r i o d o r e v e n
before, o f agricultural c o l o n i s a t i o n f r o m areas o f real land
s h o r t a g e i n t o a r e a s o f l a n d a b u n d a n c e , s u c h as t h e C r o s s R i v e r
area, the N i g e r i a n M i d d l e Belt a n d the n o r t h e r n I v o r y C o a s t .
E x c e p t for N i g e r i a , the m o v e m e n t s in W e s t A f r i c a t e n d e d t o b e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l in s c o p e , t h e w h o l e a r e a p r e s e n t i n g t h e a s p e c t o f a
sub-continental labour-market.
O u t s i d e W e s t A f r i c a , s o m e t h i n g l i k e this p a t t e r n e v o l v e d w i t h
145

the attraction o f m i g r a n t s f r o m a w i d e area, b u t especially f r o m

R w a n d a and B u r u n d i , t o the coffee a n d c o t t o n farms o f U g a n d a .
E l s e w h e r e plantations and E u r o p e a n farms d r e w o n local labour,
m u c h o f it n o n - s e a s o n a l . B u t t h e m a j o r flows within southern
A f r i c a - f r o m rural areas g e n e r a l l y t o the C o p p e r b e l t , the R a n d
and other mining centres, and the ports and cities o f South
A f r i c a - w e r e rather different in character. T h e r e w e r e here no
continuities with pre-colonial movements; there were much
h i g h e r l e v e l s o f i n v o l v e m e n t in m i g r a t i o n than in W e s t Africa
g e n e r a l l y ; and m e n w e r e absent f r o m their rural h o m e s for m u c h
longer, w i t h periods o f 1 0 - 1 5 years b e i n g c o m m o n .
B o t h r a t e s a n d i n c i d e n c e s o f m i g r a t i o n a r e s e e n as effects o f t h e
relative opportunities that h o m e or rural circumstances and
p o t e n t i a l t a r g e t - a r e a s offer p o t e n t i a l m i g r a n t s , e n d o w e d i n p a r
ticular w a y s . F r o m the late 1940s, e x c e p t for P o r t u g a l ' s c o l o n i e s
w h e r e it l a s t e d u n t i l 1 9 6 2 , d i r e c t p o l i t i c a l c o m p u l s i o n t o l a b o u r ,
s u c h as e x i s t e d e a r l i e r , w a s a b s e n t ; a n d e v e n w h e r e m i g r a t i o n w a s
initially compelled by the imposition of taxes, it was now
u n d e r t a k e n in o r d e r t o satisfy a v a r i e t y o f w a n t s and n e e d s w h i c h
h a d b e c o m e ' i n d i g e n o u s ' t o s o c i a l life in t h e r u r a l a r e a s : c a s h t o
p r o v i d e s c h o o l fees, c o n s u m e r g o o d s , s u p p l e m e n t s t o traditional
d i e t s , c u s t o m a r y o b l i g a t i o n s l i k e b r i d e w e a l t h o r i n s t a l l a t i o n fees
f o r c h i e f l y office w h i c h h a d b e c o m e m o n e t i s e d o r i n f l a t e d o r b o t h .
C l y d e M i t c h e l l has s h o w n clearly h o w gross rates o f migration
f r o m different areas o f R h o d e s i a w e r e a f u n c t i o n o f levels o f
' agro-ecological disadvantage', there being m o r e migration from
areas w i t h p o o r soils, f e w e r E u r o p e a n farms, a n d w a g e s that w e r e
1
l o w e r than the national a v e r a g e . I f an area d e v e l o p e d a significant
export product, migration flows might be reversed. Purely
' c u l t u r a l ' m o t i v e s , s u c h as t h e d e s i r e f o r ' b r i g h t c i t y l i g h t s ' , s e e m
quite subordinate to ' e c o n o m i c ' ones.
The incidence o f migration, however, was more dependent on
a variety o f social and cultural factors. A c t u a l land shortage, the
c l a s s i c ' p u s h ' factor responsible for the e x o d u s o f the p o o r e s t rural
c l a s s e s in N o r t h A f r i c a as w e l l as in A s i a a n d L a t i n A m e r i c a ,
r e m a i n e d u n c o m m o n i n s u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a ; t h o u g h it d e v e l o p e d
w h e r e significant land-alienation h a d o c c u r r e d , for e x a m p l e in
K e n y a and S o u t h A f r i c a , and b y the early 1950s w a s responsible
1
J. C . M i t c h e l l , ' F a c t o r s in r u r a l m a l e a b s e n t e e i s m i n R h o d e s i a ' , in D . J . P a r k i n ,
Town and country in Central and Eastern Africa ( L o n d o n , 1975), 9 3 - 1 1 2 .
146

P A T T E R N S OF M I G R A T I O N
for s o m e s e a s o n a l m i g r a t i o n , m u c h o f it fairly l o c a l , f r o m the

close-settled z o n e s o f n o r t h e r n N i g e r i a . It also l a r g e l y a c c o u n t e d
for t h e l a r g e s t e x t r a - c o n t i n e n t a l m i g r a t i o n flow, b e g i n n i n g in t h e
First W o r l d W a r , o f A l g e r i a n s to metropolitan France, w h e r e they
n u m b e r e d o v e r half a million b y 1950. Usually the incidence o f
m i g r a t i o n w a s h i g h e r a m o n g the better e d u c a t e d and the skilled,
since the r e w a r d s o f urban e m p l o y m e n t tended t o be significantly
h i g h e r for t h e m . W h e r e w h o l e areas o r p o p u l a t i o n s w e r e m a r k e d
by relatively h i g h l e v e l s o f s u c h attributes, rates o f m i g r a t i o n
m i g h t b e affected t o o , a n d c o m p l e x p a t t e r n s o f p o p u l a t i o n - s h i f t
m i g h t r e s u l t . T h u s m a n y c a s h - c r o p p i n g a r e a s s u c h as southern
Ghana, w h e r e earlier p r o s p e r i t y had encouraged educational
d e v e l o p m e n t , s h o w e d b o t h h i g h levels o f o u t - m i g r a t i o n (to urban
e m p l o y m e n t ) and high levels o f in-migration o f strangers from
l e s s - f a v o u r e d a r e a s as l a b o u r e r s o r t e n a n t f a r m e r s .
The migratory flow w a s also d e p e n d e n t o n the costs o f the
migrants' absence from their h o m e c o m m u n i t i e s not rising t o o
1
high. T h e l o w w a g e levels o f unskilled l a b o u r and the disincen
tives to permanent settlement w h i c h m a n y migrants encountered,
especially in their definition as 'strangers', or the absence,
w h e t h e r deliberate o r u n p l a n n e d , o f h o u s i n g facilities for their
families, s u g g e s t that the subsistence sector c o n t i n u e d t o function.
How c o u l d this be, g r a n t e d the a b s e n c e o f s o m a n y y o u n g m a l e s ?
In b r o a d areas o f W e s t A f r i c a the d o v e t a i l i n g o f the p e r i o d s o f
peak l a b o u r d e m a n d in subsistence and in c a s h - c r o p f a r m i n g areas
permitted the m i g r a n t to m o v e seasonally b a c k and forth, so that
t h e l o c a l s u b s i s t e n c e e c o n o m i e s w e r e m a i n t a i n e d at a m i n i m u m
level, t h o u g h they w e r e n o t d e v e l o p e d . In southern Africa such
f a c t o r s as t h e p r e v a l e n c e o f f e m a l e a g r i c u l t u r a l l a b o u r s y s t e m s , t h e
mobilisation o f kin g r o u p s to carry out periodic male tasks such
as b u s h - c l e a r i n g , a n d t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f c o n v e n i e n t n e w c r o p s
like cassava, contributed to a situation w h e r e p r o p o r t i o n s o f adult
m a l e s a b s e n t at a n y o n e t i m e w e r e c o m m o n l y as h i g h as 50 p e r
cent and in s o m e societies in M a l a w i e v e n r e a c h e d 70 p e r cent.
But n o static e q u i l i b r i u m b e t w e e n the s u b s i s t e n c e a n d the
w a g e - e a r n i n g sectors w a s e v e r attained. T h e increased world
demand for b o t h minerals and tropical agricultural products
1
T h e r e is m u c h d i s a g r e e m e n t o n t h e c o s t s o f m i g r a t i o n t o t h e l a b o u r e x p o r t i n g a r e a .
F o r t h e ' o p t i m i s t i c * v i e w , E . J. B e r g , ' T h e e c o n o m i c s o f t h e m i g r a n t l a b o r s y s t e m ' ,
in H . K u p e r ( e d . ) , Urbanisation and migration in West Africa ( B e r k e l e y , 1965); a n d
o p p o s e d , S . A m i n ( e d . ) , Modern migrations in Western Africa ( L o n d o n , 1974).
*47

T a b l e 4 . 1 . Estimated population of selected African cities

1940s—1960s (population in thousands).
1940s 1950s 1960s
Cairo 1947 2091 i960 3349 1966 4220

Algiers 1948 473 1954 57o 1966 943
Dakar 1943 1955 300 1968 600
Kumasi 1948 78 [i960 218] 1966 301
Kano [i93i 89] 1952 130 1963 2
95
Lagos h93i I 2
7] 1952 267 1963 665
Addis Ababa 1948 402 1958 400 1968 620
Nairobi 1948 119 1957 222 1969 478
Dar es Salaam 1948 69 1952 99 1967 273
Kinshasa 1940 49 1950 191 1966 508
Salisbury 1940 67 1958 233 1968 380
Johannesburg [1936 519] 1951 919 i960 ii53
Source: W. A. Hance, Population, migration and urbanisation in Africa.
induced b y the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r , and the h i g h c o m m o d i t y

p r i c e s s u s t a i n e d f o r s e v e r a l y e a r s t h e r e a f t e r , at o n c e s t i m u l a t e d
greater e m p l o y m e n t in c o m m e r c e and transport and yielded
surpluses that c o u l d b e d e v o t e d t o educational a n d administrative
expansion. I n terms o f the relative o p p o r t u n i t i e s they offered, the
s t a g n a n t s u b s i s t e n c e e c o n o m i e s t e n d e d t o fall e v e n f u r t h e r b e h i n d
t h e c a s h - c r o p a r e a s ; a n d b o t h fell b e h i n d t h e c i t i e s , w h e r e t h e n e w
e m p l o y m e n t o p p o r t u n i t i e s w e r e c o n c e n t r a t e d . T h e years after
1945 s a w a d r a m a t i c i n c r e a s e i n r u r a l - u r b a n m i g r a t i o n a n d i n t h e
r a t e o f u r b a n g r o w t h (cf. T a b l e s 4 . 1 , 4 . 2 ) . F r o m t h e m i d - 1 9 4 0 s ,
mining centres, like those o n the Copperbelt, w h i c h had b e g u n
as l a b o u r c a m p s a n d w h e r e s e t t l e m e n t h a d b e e n r i g i d l y c o n t r o l l e d
by the authorities t o p r e v e n t a stable urban p o p u l a t i o n , b e g a n to
assume m o r e the character o f t o w n s , w i t h n e w o p p o r t u n i t i e s in
the informal sector. T h e g r o w i n g t o w n s w e r e equally magnets for
the educated and the unskilled, labourers and petty traders. W h e r e
m a n u f a c t u r i n g i n d u s t r y w a s set u p , this w a s also in o r near the
existing urban centres; both because o f the same locational
a d v a n t a g e s that h a d earlier m a d e t h e m centres o f the i m p o r t - e x p o r t
trade and because the d o m e s t i c markets for their manufactures
w e r e concentrated there a m o n g the urban wage-earners and the
national elites. T h u s urban g r o w t h since 1950 w a s particularly
concentrated in the national capitals.
148

P A T T E R N S O F M I G R A T I O N
T a b l e 4.2. Total population of selected African countries living in cities

of (/) 20000 inhabitants and (ii) 100000 inhabitants, as proportion of
total population.
(i) (Ü)
c. 1950 c. i960 c. 1950 c. i960
Egypt 1947- -66 28.9 38.2 20.0 29.6

Algeria 1948- -60 14.1 21.6 6.6 16.4
Senegal 1956- -61 19.0 22.5 9.9 12.6
Ghana 1948- -60 5.0 12.3 3-3 9-5
Nigeria 1952- -63 11.4 14.0 4.1 8.7
Kenya 1948- -62 3.8 5-9 2.2 5-2
Zaire 1957-"9 7-1 9.1 3-5 5-9
South Africa 1951- 60 30.8 35.1 23.1 26.5
Source-. U N Economie Commission for Africa, in Economie survey of Africa,

1967.
A n e w feature o f t h e e x p a n s i o n in the 1960s a n d 1970s w a s that

m i g r a n t s w e r e less e x c l u s i v e l y a d u l t m a l e s i n s e a r c h o f w o r k .
Women joining their husbands or migrating o n their o w n
account, and children seeking secondary education, accounted for
a b i g g e r share o f r u r a l - u r b a n migratory flows than earlier, a n d
the a g e a n d sex profiles o f u r b a n p o p u l a t i o n s c a m e t o d i v e r g e less
1
from the national norms. Significant urban unemployment
appeared in the 1960s, a r e m i n d e r that urban j o b o p p o r t u n i t i e s
d e p e n d e d in the main o n surpluses g e n e r a t e d in t h e rural sector,
w h i c h w a s d e p r e s s e d in m a n y c o u n t r i e s . I n the late 1970s this l e d
s o m e A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t s s u c h as G h a n a a n d U g a n d a t o e x p e l
aliens, thus r e d u c i n g the international character o f earlier m i
gration flows. A l t h o u g h m i g r a t i o n m i g h t c o n t i n u e f o r as l o n g as
m i g r a n t s c o u l d still r e a s o n a b l y e x p e c t , after a p e r i o d o f u n e m
p l o y m e n t , to obtain a superior situation than w a s available in the
c o u n t r y s i d e , it b e g a n t o b e e v i d e n t t h a t , w i t h o u t a n e w r e s o u r c e
like N i g e r i a ' s o i l , the rates o f u r b a n g r o w t h seen in the t w o
d e c a d e s after t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r c o u l d n o t b e s u s t a i n e d f o r
ever.
1
T h i s is e s p e c i a l l y w e l l d o c u m e n t e d in J. C . C a l d w e l l ' s a n a l y s i s o f t h e i960 G h a n a
C e n s u s , African rural-urban migration ( C a n b e r r a , 1969).
149

T H E G R O W T H OF T O W N S
T h e cities o f s u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a t e n d e d to c o n t a i n to a m u c h
greater extent than those o f other regions o f the T h i r d W o r l d ,
including N o r t h Africa, a population that continued to m o v e
b e t w e e n t o w n and c o u n t r y despite the sharp c l e a v a g e in terms o f
e c o n o m i c function, distribution o f resources and formal institu
t i o n s , b e t w e e n t h e s e t w o s p h e r e s . M i g r a n t s t o all T h i r d W o r l d
cities b r i n g rural attitudes, and retain for a w h i l e k i n s h i p links w i t h
their o r i g i n s , but rarely h a v e these links and identities c o n t i n u e d
as v i t a l l y as t h e y d i d i n A f r i c a . T h e m i g r a n t s ' r e t e n t i o n o f r u r a l
land rights contributed v e r y greatly to this; but so did the role
o f rurally based identities in adaptation to the d e m a n d s o f t o w n
life. T h i s w a s n o less t r u e o f t h e m o s t c a p i t a l i s t c i t i e s - t h o s e o f
s o u t h e r n A f r i c a w i t h l a r g e p r o l e t a r i a t s - s i n c e official p o l i c y f o r
l o n g s o u g h t to p r e v e n t the consolidation o f a stable urban
p o p u l a t i o n . S o m e t o w n s in S o u t h A f r i c a s a w f o u r o r f i v e
g e n e r a t i o n s that had r e t u r n e d t o the rural areas after the p e r i o d
o f their labour - a circulation w h i c h tended ultimately to be
b r o u g h t t o a n e n d b y r u r a l o v e r - p o p u l a t i o n as w e l l as u r b a n
l a b o u r - d e m a n d . B u t e v e r y w h e r e s o m e o f the migrants stayed, so
t h a t a s o l e l y u r b a n p o p u l a t i o n g r e w , m a k i n g it s e e m l i k e l y t h a t
h i g h rates o f i m m i g r a t i o n w o u l d a l s o d e c l i n e a n d u l t i m a t e l y c r e a t e
a p e r m a n e n t and firm d i v i s i o n b e t w e e n t o w n s p e o p l e and the rural
p o p u l a t i o n s , w i t h all t h a t t h i s m u s t i m p l y f o r t h e c h a r a c t e r o f
national social structure.
T h e character o f a colonial city w a s d e r i v e d from the operation
o f f o u r m a j o r f a c t o r s : its p r e d o m i n a n t f u n c t i o n , its o c c u p a t i o n a l
s t r u c t u r e , its p h y s i c a l o r g a n i s a t i o n a n d its e t h n i c c o m p o s i t i o n .
T h e s e factors w e r e not independent o f o n e another, since function
has clear i m p l i c a t i o n s for o c c u p a t i o n a l structure, m i n i n g and p o r t
t o w n s h a v i n g m u c h larger true proletariats; while administrative
centres have considerably higher proportions o f b o t h wealthier,
e d u c a t e d strata and w o r k e r s in the i n f o r m a l sector. P h y s i c a l
p l a n n i n g w a s better realised in t h e n e w t o w n s established for a
precise function in the c o l o n i a l s y s t e m , w h e r e there w a s n o
i n d i g e n o u s city o f traders o r craftsmen, for e x a m p l e N a i r o b i ,
w h i c h w a s an administrative and railway centre, o r P o r t H a r c o u r t ,
w h i c h w a s a p o r t a n d r a i l w a y t e r m i n u s , a n d a b o v e all i n t h e m i n i n g
t o w n s o f the C o p p e r b e l t . Paradoxically, African urban studies
150

THE G R O W T H O F T O W N S
t o o k t h e i r rise f r o m t o w n s - L u a n s h y a i n Z a m b i a b e i n g a c l a s s i c
case - w h i c h , b e i n g in their clear p h y s i c a l r e c o g n i t i o n o f social-
c l a s s b o u n d a r i e s a l m o s t m o d e l s o f t h e c o l o n i a l s y s t e m itself, w e r e
1
u n u s u a l in the 1950s a n d b e c a m e m o r e s o later. H e r e the t o w n
comprised three principal functional, physical and social-
structural elements: the M i n e T o w n s h i p , o w n e d and organised
b y t h e c o m p a n y f o r its e m p l o y e e s ; t h e G o v e r n m e n t T o w n s h i p ,
w i t h an o c c u p a t i o n a l l y h e t e r o g e n e o u s p o p u l a t i o n ; and E u r o p e a n
residential areas housing those Europeans in supervisory or
white-collar occupations.
Elsewhere, and especially w h e r e there w a s an indigenous
l a n d o w n i n g c o m m u n i t y , h o u s i n g w a s less a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y c o n
trolled and there w a s less residential s e g r e g a t i o n b y o c c u p a t i o n .
Instead, indigenous landlords and enterprising i m m i g r a n t s , w h e r e
it w a s p o s s i b l e f o r t h e m t o b u y l a n d , b u i l t h o u s e s f o r t h e m s e l v e s
o r t o let, s o m e t i m e s within the framework of a municipally
p l a n n e d l a y o u t , s o m e t i m e s , as i n t h e o u t e r s u b u r b s o f L a g o s o r
parts o f M e n g o - K a m p a l a , subject to the minimum of such
control. S o m e s u c h city-areas recalled in their class h e t e r o g e n e i t y —
the rich and p o w e r f u l l i v i n g c h e e k - b y - j o w l w i t h those o f the
l o w e s t status - the social character o f pre-colonial cities. B u t there
also d e v e l o p e d , especially f r o m the 1960s and outside urban
administrative boundaries, shanty t o w n s w h i c h w e r e m o r e h o m o
geneous in class terms, housing the lowest urban class of
unskilled, casual and u n d e r - e m p l o y e d w o r k e r s . T h e 1960s t e n d e d
to b r i n g a c o n v e r g e n c e o f these t w o polar types o f city. A f r i c a n
governments were unwilling or unable to control urban settlement
in t h e c o l o n i a l w a y s o t h a t t h e ' i n f o r m a l ' s e c t o r o f c i t i e s t e n d e d
to g r o w w i t h continuing in-migration. B u t , o n the other hand,
as t h e A f r i c a n e l i t e s r e p l a c e d e x p a t r i a t e s i n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e posts
and o c c u p i e d the former European residential preserves, resi
d e n t i a l s e g r e g a t i o n b y c l a s s c o n t i n u e d . I n d e e d , it w a s e x t e n d e d ,
with the establishment of new housing estates for different
income levels.
E t h n i c c o m p o s i t i o n affected u r b a n social structure in s e v e r a l
w a y s . S o m e cities clearly possessed a ' h o s t ' ethnic g r o u p , w h i c h
was either the g r o u p that * o w n e d the land * o r a g r o u p w h o s e local
preponderance was due to w e i g h t o f numbers, education or
1
A . L . E p s t e i n , Politics in an urban African community (Manchester, 1958); G .
B a l a n d i e r , Sociologie des Braâvilles noires ( P a r i s , 1955).
151

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL C H A N G E
political p o w e r in the national arena. T h e s e c o n d i t i o n s c o i n c i d e d

i n t h e c a s e s o f t h e K o n g o i n K i n s h a s a , t h e Y o r u b a in L a g o s o r
the G a n d a in K a m p a l a . B u t e l s e w h e r e , the L e b u , for instance, did
not d o m i n a t e their native D a k a r n o r the G a A c c r a , w h i l e P o r t
H a r c o u r t , situated outside the h o m e l a n d s o f any major ethnic
g r o u p , w a s successively d o m i n a t e d b y the O w e r r i I b o (from the
l a t e 1 9 4 0 s t o 1 9 6 7 ) a n d t h e r e a f t e r , as t h e c a p i t a l o f t h e R i v e r s S t a t e
of Nigeria, by the Ijo. Ethnically homogeneous neighbour
h o o d s o r q u a r t e r s w e r e h a r d l y t o b e f o u n d in C e n t r a l o r s o u t h e r n
African cities and w e r e n o t the rule e l s e w h e r e . T h e y w e r e m o r e
a feature o f the o l d e r W e s t A f r i c a n cities (e.g. the V a i , K r u , Bassa
q u a r t e r s o f M o n r o v i a ) , a n d a t t a i n e d t h e s h a r p e s t d e f i n i t i o n in t h e
H a u s a - s p e a k i n g settlements o f M u s l i m n o r t h e r n e r s in southern
Ghana {%pngo) or Western Nigeria {sabo). Even when developed
in recent d e c a d e s (like S a b o in I b a d a n ) , t h e y d r e w o n p r e - c o l o n i a l
c u l t u r a l m o d e l s as w e l l as m o d e r n a d v a n t a g e s . B u t e l s e w h e r e , a n d
w i t h t h e p a r t i a l e x c e p t i o n o f t h e ' o l d t o w n s ' o f i n d i g e n e s , w e find
only a tendency t o w a r d s the g e o g r a p h i c a l concentration o f fellow
t r i b e s m e n . It w a s e n c o u r a g e d , t o s o m e e x t e n t , b y c h a i n - m i g r a t i o n ,
as n e w arrivals sought out compatriots or kinsmen already
e s t a b l i s h e d i n t o w n . O t h e r w i s e it t e n d e d t o b e a f u n c t i o n o f t h e
income and educational levels, the status and occupational
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e m e m b e r s o f p a r t i c u l a r e t h n i c g r o u p s . It w a s
most marked where they were occupationally h o m o g e n e o u s and
o f l o w status. H e n c e the c o n c e n t r a t i o n s o f H a y a w o m e n , m a n y
o f w h o m were prostitutes, or R w a n d a men, w h o were unskilled
labourers, in 'urban villages' in parts of Kampala. Similar
h o u s i n g e s t a t e s , s u c h as S u r u l e r e i n L a g o s o r N a g u r u i n K a m p a l a ,
attracted disproportionate n u m b e r s o f I b o and L u o respectively,
since b o t h g r o u p s included m a n y y o u n g , m o d e r a t e l y educated or
s k i l l e d p e o p l e , w h o as i m m i g r a n t s w e r e free f r o m m a n y o f t h e
i n v o l v e m e n t s o f t h e l o c a l l y d o m i n a n t Y o r u b a a n d G a n d a in t h e
o l d e r parts o f the t o w n . B u t e v e n these ' c o n c e n t r a t i o n s ' w e r e in
ethnically m i x e d areas.
The classic studies o f the Copperbelt towns in the 1950s
demonstrated the e x i s t e n c e o f fairly unified u r b a n social-status
s y s t e m s , in w h i c h ethnic g r o u p s w e r e r a n k e d in t e r m s o f ad
1
v a n c e m e n t in w e a l t h , e d u c a t i o n a n d p o w e r i n t h e m o d e r n s e c t o r .
1
S e e e s p e c i a l l y J. C . M i t c h e l l a n d A . L . E p s t e i n , ' O c c u p a t i o n a l p r e s t i g e a n d s o c i a l
s t a t u s a m o n g u r b a n A f r i c a n s in N o r t h e r n R h o d e s i a ' , Africa, 1959, 29, 22-39.
152

T H E G R O W T H O F T O W N S
T h e r e w a s a l i m i t e d d i v e r g e n c e f r o m this r u l e o n l y i n t h o s e W e s t
A f r i c a n cities like F r e e t o w n o r I b a d a n w h i c h had m i x e d M u s l i m -
Christian populations and where some Muslim groups,
c o n s i d e r a b l y less a d v a n c e d i n m o d e r n e d u c a t i o n a n d its r e w a r d s ,
continued to stress alternative status values associated with
Islamic learning. B e c a u s e the specific p r o b l e m s and o p p o r t u n i t i e s
o f u r b a n life - r e s i d e n c e i n a s l u m - a r e a , e m p l o y m e n t i n a s i m i l a r
m a r k e t s i t u a t i o n , c o m m o n n e e d f o r r e c r e a t i o n — s e v e r a l l y affected
many hitherto unrelated individuals, the Gesellschaft o r voluntary
association existing for a specific e n d w a s e v e r y w h e r e a charac
teristic u r b a n institution. T r a d e u n i o n s and m o r e i n f o r m a l o r g a n
isations based o n the w o r k situation w e r e v i g o r o u s w i t h i n their
particular spheres o f relevance. T h e friendship g r o u p s existing o n
t h e b a s i s o f l o c a l n e i g h b o u r h o o d , s u c h as h a v e b e e n a n a l y s e d i n
1
d e t a i l in K i s a n g a n i ( S t a n l e y v i l l e ) b y P o n s , played an i m p o r t a n t
r o l e in e n a b l i n g m i g r a n t s t o a d a p t t o a v e r y h e t e r o g e n e o u s a n d
transient e n v i r o n m e n t ; b u t b e c a u s e o f this v e r y c i r c u m s t a n c e , the
neighbourhood or quartier, e x c e p t in the case o f well-established
cities w i t h stable p o p u l a t i o n s , t e n d e d n o t to be the basis o f
enduring c o m m i t m e n t s and thus o f long-term social mobilisation.
M a n y social a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s h a v e used the c o n c e p t o f network t o
c h a r a c t e r i s e u r b a n s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . E a c h i n d i v i d u a l s t a n d s at t h e
centre o f a w e b o f possible links (with, for instance, kinsmen,
affines, neighbours, fellow tribesmen, age mates, fellow em
ployees, fellow church-members, business contacts) and seeks to
2
a c t i v a t e t h o s e p a r t i c u l a r ties w h i c h a r e s i g n i f i c a n t . B u t a m o n g
t h e m , e t h n i c i t y h a s a s p e c i a l i m p o r t a n c e . T o u n d e r s t a n d it, w e
must m o v e o u t from the city to the w i d e r society w i t h i n w h i c h
it is set.
C H A N G I N G BASES OF I D E N T I T Y
T h e s e p o p u l a t i o n m o v e m e n t s , i n v o l v i n g a great increase in b o t h
the scale o f social relations and the a m o u n t o f interaction w i t h i n
s o c i a l l y h e t e r o g e n e o u s e n v i r o n m e n t s , h a d g r e a t effects o n s o c i a l
identity and hence o n emergent patterns o f conflict and c o o p e r
ation. T w o such bases w e r e especially significant: ethnicity and
r e l i g i o n . T h e s e d i d n o t h a v e a n y fixed r e l a t i o n t o t h a t o t h e r m a j o r
1
V . P o n s , Stanleyville: an African urban community under Belgian administration (London,
1969), e s p . 1 2 7 - 2 1 2 .
2
E s p e c i a l l y t h o s e o f the ' M a n c h e s t e r ' s c h o o l w h o h a v e w o r k e d in C e n t r a l A f r i c a ;
see the e s s a y s in J. C . M i t c h e l l ( e d . ) , Social networks in urban situations ( M a n c h e s t e r , 1969).
153

s o u r c e o f identity - social rank o r class - b u t m i g h t sustain o r

w e a k e n it i n v a r i o u s w a y s . I t is t h e ' w o r l d r e l i g i o n s ' - I s l a m a n d
Christianity - that are relevant here since, unlike Africa's
' traditional' religions - those practised uniquely b y the members
o f particular small-scale societies — they confer an identity w h i c h
is d i s t i n c t f r o m e t h n i c o r c o m m u n a l i d e n t i t y a s s u c h , e v e n w h e n
it is c l o s e l y l i n k e d w i t h it. M o r e o v e r , i t is t h e v e r y c o s m o p o l i t a n i s m
o f the w o r l d religions w h i c h made them a social i d i o m w h i c h w a s
relevant in the n o v e l and heterogeneous situations o f urban and
1
national arenas. E t h n i c i t y , b y contrast, s e e m s t o relate m u c h m o r e
to the local and traditional, h a v i n g a base in the m a n y ' tribes' o r
'ethnic groups' which comprise most African nations. As
descriptive terms, and n o t v e r y precise ones, these variously
designate linguistic o r cultural blocs, traditional polities o r g r o u p s
o f p e o p l e s linked b y s o m e k e y identity-conferring social institu
t i o n , s u c h as a n a g e - g r a d e s y s t e m o r i n i t i a t i o n r i t e s . B u t h e r e t h e
i s s u e is n o t h o w f a r t h e m e m b e r s o f p a r t i c u l a r e t h n i c groups
retained c u s t o m a r y usages, b u t rather h o w identities based o n
some such usages and symbols became important in novel
c o n t e x t s . F o r t h e r e is n o g i v e n fixity i n t h e b o u n d a r i e s , n e c e s s i t y
in t h e c o n t e n t , o r u n i f o r m i t y in t h e significance o f particular e t h n i c
g r o u p labels.
Ethnicity
Ethnicity c a m e t o exist in t w o principal m o d e s : w h e r e individuals
interacted in urban o r rural situations w h i c h d r e w p e o p l e t o g e t h e r
f r o m different e t h n i c o r i g i n s ; a n d w h e r e c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t - g r o u p s ,
associated w i t h particular areas o f o r i g i n , c o m p e t e d t o secure
rewards for their m e m b e r s from the higher-order units w i t h i n
w h i c h t h e y c o e x i s t e d - t h e s t a t e a n d i t s s u b d i v i s i o n s . T h e ties
w h i c h initially l i n k e d k i n s m e n o r f e l l o w villagers in t o w n , a n d the
g r e a t e r ease w i t h w h i c h c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d h e n c e n e w ties c o u l d
be established b e t w e e n those o f similar l a n g u a g e a n d c u s t o m s , led
to the d e v e l o p m e n t in t o w n s o f n e w , broader stereotypes, w h i c h
s h a p e d h o w p e o p l e t h o u g h t o f t h e m s e l v e s as w e l l as o f others.
T h e y also p r o v i d e d them with a c o g n i t i v e tool for organising
social interaction in a n o n y m o u s , multi-ethnic contexts. It w a s n o t
1
F o r a c o n v i n c i n g t h e o r y relating r e l i g i o u s c o n v e r s i o n t o t h e increase in t h e scale
o f s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s s e e R . H o r t o n , ' A f r i c a n c o n v e r s i o n ' , Africa, 1 9 7 1 , 4 1 , 85-108
a n d ' O n t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f c o n v e r s i o n ' , Africa, 1975, 4 5 , 2 1 9 - 3 5 , 373-99.

C H A N G I N G BASES O F I D E N T I T Y
always m u c h m o r e than this. T h o u g h 'tribal e l d e r s ' m i g h t a p p l y

particularistic norms w i t h i n , say, the d o m e s t i c sphere, or the
n e t w o r k o f ' h o m e - b o y s ' m i g h t be i m p o r t a n t for m u t u a l aid and
comfort, c o m m e r c i a l and industrial relations w e r e d o m i n a t e d b y
n o n - e t h n i c i d e n t i t i e s , s u c h as t h o s e d e r i v e d f r o m occupational
r a n k o r c o n t r o l o f r e s o u r c e s in t h e m a r k e t s i t u a t i o n . T h e e t h n i c
divisions a m o n g Africans were quite overshadowed by their
c o m m o n s u b o r d i n a t i o n , i n all s p h e r e s , t o E u r o p e a n s , as in t h e
Copperbelt towns o f the 1950s, or urban South Africa and
R h o d e s i a l o n g after. N o r d i d e t h n i c i t y a l w a y s d o m i n a t e social
r e l a t i o n s in m u l t i - e t h n i c r u r a l s i t u a t i o n s . I t s l a c k o f s a l i e n c y , f o r
e x a m p l e in c e r t a i n a r e a s o f e a s t e r n a n d c e n t r a l U g a n d a , w h e r e g o o d
land-population ratios attracted immigrants from many ethnic
g r o u p s , seems to h a v e been d u e b o t h to the desire o f established
or potential big-men to attract followers and labourers of
w h a t e v e r o r i g i n , a n d t o t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f l o c a l r e s i d e n c e as a b a s i s
o f i d e n t i t y . I n t h e s e c o n t e x t s e t h n i c i t y h a d its s i g n i f i c a n c e , b u t it
w a s h i g h l y s i t u a t i o n a l : it w a s o n e o f t h e ties a n i n d i v i d u a l m i g h t
activate in his s u p p o r t b u t n o t necessarily an o v e r r i d i n g o n e , a n d
always one that had to be i n v o k e d discreetly, if vital non-ethnic
r e l a t i o n s h i p s w e r e n o t t o suffer.
Y e t e l s e w h e r e ethnicity d i d b u l k large in interaction between
m e m b e r s o f d i f f e r e n t g r o u p s - e s p e c i a l l y w h e r e it c o r r e s p o n d e d
w i t h e c o n o m i c f u n c t i o n o r residence, this t y p i c a l l y b e i n g l i n k e d
w i t h i n t e r - r e g i o n a l p a t t e r n s o f t r a d e , as is c o m m o n i n W e s t A f r i c a .
Thus ethnic identity, underscored in the 1950s b y a greater
e m p h a s i s o n r e l i g i o u s d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s , has p l a y e d a b i g p a r t in the
i n t e r a c t i o n o f H a u s a , as k o l a - o r c a t t l e - t r a d e r s , w i t h t h e p e o p l e s
o f the forest z o n e . H e r e ethnicity acted to i m p r o v e the b a r g a i n i n g
position o f a g r o u p by excluding cultural outsiders and disciplining
insiders. Rural parallels m i g h t exist w h e r e i m m i g r a n t s f o u n d a
1
distinct e c o l o g i c a l niche, as U r h o b o p a l m - w i n e t a p p e r s d i d i n
parts o f Y o r u b a l a n d , or w h e r e they p r o v i d e d w a g e - l a b o u r o n
cash-crop farms, the o w n e r s o f w h i c h w i s h e d to e x c l u d e t h e m ,
as ' s t r a n g e r s ' , f r o m full p r o p r i e t a r y rights.
1
O n t h e n o t i o n o f ' e c o l o g i c a l n i c h e ' , s e e F . B a r t h , Ethnic groups and boundaries: the
social organisation of culture difference ( B e r g e n - O s l o , 1969). T h i s h a s d e e p h i s t o r i c a l r o o t s
in W e s t A f r i c a , as w i t n e s s r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n M a n d i n k a dyula a n d A k a n , o r F u l b e
p a s t o r a l i s t s a n d s e m i - s e r v i l e M a n d i n k a c u l t i v a t o r s i n F u t a J a l o n ; f o r m o d e r n effects o f
the latter see W . D e r m a n , Serfs, peasants and socialists: a former serf village in the Republic
of Guinea ( B e r k e l e y , 1973).
155

B u t t h e e t h n i c i t y florescent in P o r t H a r c o u r t a n d m a n y o t h e r
s i m i l a r t o w n s in o t h e r p a r t s o f A f r i c a , in t h e late 1 9 5 0 s a n d 1 9 6 0 s ,
tells a n o t h e r s t o r y . It w a s n o t b a s e d o n t h e e c o n o m i c s p e c i a l i s a t i o n
o r residential s e g r e g a t i o n o f ethnic g r o u p s , but o n their general
c o m p e t i t i o n for jobs, contracts and licences, indeed, access to any
r e s o u r c e s d i s t r i b u t e d b y l o c a l o r n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t . T h u s in
Port H a r c o u r t the ethnically m i x e d n e i g h b o u r h o o d s played hardly
a n y r o l e in p o l i t i c a l m o b i l i s a t i o n , t h i s b e i n g d o m i n a t e d b y e t h n i c
interest-groups. T h i s w a s a p h e n o m e n o n not merely o f certain
k i n d s o f c i t i e s b u t o f a c e r t a i n e p o c h in A f r i c a ' s h i s t o r i c a l
e v o l u t i o n , w h e n , f r o m t h e late 1 9 4 0 s a n d e a r l y 1 9 5 0 s , t h e
nationalist m o v e m e n t s b e g a n to mobilise popular political forces
a n d t o t a k e c o n t r o l o f s t a t e p o w e r . T h i s is t h e s e c o n d m o d e o f
e t h n i c i t y : a n i n t e r a c t i o n , n o t o f i n d i v i d u a l s in m u l t i - e t h n i c
c o n t e x t s , b u t o f o r g a n i s e d e t h n i c - g r o u p i n t e r e s t s r o o t e d in t h e i r
h o m e areas. T h e major articulating role, before the creation o f
political parties, w a s p l a y e d b y formal and informal tribal associ
ations that c o m b i n e d m u t u a l aid for i n d i v i d u a l f e l l o w t r i b e s m e n
in t o w n s w i t h a g e n e r a l r o l e o f ' c o n s c i o u s n e s s - r a i s i n g ' a n d
l o b b y i n g in t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e h o m e a r e a . T h i s d u a l r o l e
p r e s u p p o s e s b o t h the retention b y t o w n - d w e l l e r s o f a source o f
s e c u r i t y in t h e i r r u r a l s t a t u s e s a n d t h e s t a t e ' s s e r v i n g as d i s t r i b u t o r
o f jobs and contracts to urban individuals, and o f public amenities
and d e v e l o p m e n t g r a n t s in the rural areas. T h e s e f u n c t i o n s g r e w
m a r k e d l y after 1 9 4 5 , a n d s o d i d t h e i r p o l i t i c i s a t i o n , b o t h b e f o r e
a n d after n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e . T h u s w e h a v e t h e p a r a d o x t h a t
' t r i b a l i s m ' ( t o u s e a t e r m o f w i d e p a r l a n c e in a n g l o p h o n e A f r i c a )
w a s b o t h a p r o d u c t o f nationalism and a threat to national
i n t e g r a t i o n ; a n d w h i l e it m i g h t c a l l o n t r a d i t i o n a l s y m b o l s o f
e t h n i c i d e n t i t y , it w a s a r t i c u l a t e d b y t h e e d u c a t e d a n d t h o s e in
urban e m p l o y m e n t , acting b o t h for t h e m s e l v e s and their regions
of origin.
T h e earliest f o r m a t i o n o f these ethnic g r o u p s usually p r e c e d e d
t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f ' t r i b a l i s m ' . I n s o m e c a s e s , s u c h as t h o s e o f
the A s a n t e , the G a n d a and the L o z i , a clear p r e - c o l o n i a l political
and cultural identity w a s consolidated, w i t h distinct privileges to
b e d e f e n d e d , in t h e c o l o n i a l o r d e r . O t h e r g r o u p s t e n d e d t o
o r g a n i s e i n i m i t a t i o n o f o r in r e a c t i o n t o t h e m , e s p e c i a l l y w h e r e
t h e y h a d suffered s o m e f o r m o f ' s u b - i m p e r i a l i s m ' , as d i d t h e T i v
and o t h e r peoples o f central N i g e r i a against the Hausa, o r the G i s u
156

and other peoples o f eastern U g a n d a against the G a n d a . In other

cases, for e x a m p l e the Y o r u b a , I b o and E w e , the identity w a s
fostered b y the a d o p t i o n b y the Christian missions o f a standard
l a n g u a g e f o r m that w a s used in c h u r c h e s and s c h o o l s , thus
b e c o m i n g a m a j o r s o u r c e o f f e l l o w - f e e l i n g a m o n g an e d u c a t e d
élite. C u l t u r a l associations, s o m e t i m e s w i t h w e l f a r e functions t o o ,
tended to be f o u n d e d in the 1930s and 1940s.
B y t h e 1 9 5 0 s e t h n i c g r o u p f o r m a t i o n w a s s h a p e d as m u c h b y
t h e p r e s s u r e s o f t h e n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l e n v i r o n m e n t as b y p r i o r
patterns o f association or cultural identity. Entirely n e w ethnic
g r o u p s e m e r g e d , like the L u h y a o r K a l e n j i n o f w e s t e r n K e n y a ,
from t w o congeries o f adjacent peoples, respectively B a n t u -
speaking and Nilotic-speaking. T h e exact boundaries o f identity
w e r e shaped by considerations o f strategy w i t h i n the appropriate
a r e n a : w i t h i n N i g e r i a as a w h o l e t h e r e l e v a n t i d e n t i t y w a s I b o ,
w i t h i n P o r t H a r c o u r t it w a s O n i t s h a o r O w e r r i , w i t h i n O w e r r i
it w a s M b a i s e o r . . . T h e s e i d e n t i t i e s , in t h e m i d d l e r a n g e s , d e r i v e d
f r o m t h e colonial a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d i v i s i o n s o f N i g e r i a , j u s t a s , after
i n d e p e n d e n c e , n a t i o n a l i t y , f o r e x a m p l e as K e n y a n s in U g a n d a o r
as M a l a w i a n s in Z a m b i a , c a m e t o s e r v e , in c o n t e x t , as a k i n d o f
'tribe'. T h e principles o f alliance-formation, tending towards a
b a l a n c e o f r o u g h l y e q u i v a l e n t o p p o n e n t s at e a c h l e v e l o f t h e
h i e r a r c h y , s h o w e d f o r m a l s i m i l a r i t i e s t o t h o s e o p e r a t i v e in s e g
m e n t a r y l i n e a g e s o c i e t i e s . It is t h u s p e r h a p s n o t a c c i d e n t a l t h a t s o m e
t r a d i t i o n a l l y s e g m e n t a r y p e o p l e s , s u c h as t h e I b o a n d L u o , w e r e
a m o n g t h e m o s t s u c c e s s f u l in a d a p t i n g t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s t o t h e
o r g a n i s a t i o n o f tribal u n i o n s t h r o u g h o u t their c o u n t r i e s . A n d in
the c a s e o f S o m a l i a , p e r h a p s t h e m o s t c u l t u r a l l y h o m o g e n e o u s o f
all A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s , t h e t r a d i t i o n a l s e g m e n t a r y c l a n s o r ' l i n e a g e
c o n f e d e r a t i o n s ' t h e m s e l v e s t o o k o n n e w r o l e s as i n t e r e s t - g r o u p s
r e l e v a n t in p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t a n d t h e s t a t e ' s d i s t r i b u t i o n o f r e w a r d .
S o ethnicity, sustained b y the political e n v i r o n m e n t o f the state,
c a m e t o b e an i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t in t h e n a t i o n a l c u l t u r e s o f m a n y
African countries, acting back on patterns o f individual association
and action. T h u s , second-generation M o s s i migrants to G h a n a
w e r e f o u n d in t h e e a r l y 1 9 7 0 s t o h a v e d e v e l o p e d s o c i a l i d e n t i t y
as M o s s i w i t h i n G h a n a , e v e n t h o u g h t h e y h a d l o s t t h e i r c u l t u r a l
d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s as M o s s i as w e l l as, v e r y p o s s i b l y , t h e i r a b i l i t y t o
re-enter rural M o s s i society. A s a m e a n s o f g a i n i n g political and
e c o n o m i c p o w e r , they had to 'find w a y s o f asserting their identity
M7

in a s o c i e t y w h e r e e v e r y o n e , G h a n a i a n o r n o n - G h a n a i a n , h a s a n
1
e t h n i c as w e l l as a n a t i o n a l identity'.
Yet i f it is i m p o s s i b l e to dismiss ethnicity as mere false
consciousness, an aberration from true consciousness o f nation or
c l a s s , e q u a l l y it c a n n o t b e r e g a r d e d as a n i n e l u c t a b l e a n d eternal
effect o f t h e c o l o n i a l i m p o s i t i o n o f states o n e t h n i c m o s a i c s . T h a t
is p r o v e d b y its r e l a t i v e u n i m p o r t a n c e in s o m e countries and
contexts. T h r e e general conditions h a v e been stressed: the ' d i s
t r i b u t i v e s t a t e ' ; t h e s p e c i f i c ties b e t w e e n u r b a n a n d r u r a l areas;
and the historical legacy o f traditional cultures and identities.
N o r t h A f r i c a p r o v i d e s a n i n s t r u c t i v e c o n t r a s t t o t h e s i t u a t i o n in
m o s t o f sub-Saharan Africa. D e s p i t e the existence o f areas like the
K a b y l e r e g i o n o f A l g e r i a w h i c h w e r e distinct b o t h in l a n g u a g e
and colonial experience, o r o f c o m m u n i t i e s like the M z a b i t e s , w h o
preserved a special religious and occupational character,
' t r i b a l i s m ' , as t h a t is u n d e r s t o o d s o u t h o f t h e S a h a r a , w a s l a r g e l y
absent. Cultural heterogeneity w a s indeed declining, w i t h the
steady A r a b i s a t i o n o f Berbers and the attenuation o f the o l d urban
ethnic or religious minorities, J e w s and others, once organised
in milets u n d e r the O t t o m a n u m b r e l l a ; b u t this w a s less significant
than a d i v i d e o f rural and urban p o p u l a t i o n s m u c h sharper than
that f o u n d s o u t h o f the Sahara, w h i c h restrained the g r o w t h o f
a joint interest, ethnic in i d i o m , o f t o w n s m e n and rural regions.
I n t h e M a g h r i b t h e p r o b l e m w a s m o r e o n e , as G e e r t z p o i n t s o u t
for M o r o c c o , o f social particularism than o f cultural hetero
2
geneity; and its model was the ancient antithesis between
makîn (urban order) and sibd (tribal dissidence) that had been
analysed centuries before by Ibn K h a l d u n .
Generally, any cultural legacy seems to have been permissive
a n d s u p p o r t i v e , r a t h e r t h a n d e c i s i v e , as far as t h e p r e s e n c e or
absence o f ethnic consciousness w a s concerned. T h u s Tanzania,
c e l e b r a t e d as a c o u n t r y free o f t r i b a l i s m , e n j o y e d t h e a b s e n c e o f
g r o s s initial cultural d i v i s i o n s a n d o f d o m i n a n t e t h n i c groups.
Furthermore it n o t o n l y h a d i n S w a h i l i a s u p r a - t r i b a l mode of
communication, but a ruling party, the Tanganyika African
National Union, that was seriously committed to regionally
1
E n i d S c h i l d k r o u t , ' E t h n i c i t y and generational differences a m o n g urban i m m i g r a n t s
in G h a n a ' , in A . C o h e n ( e d . ) , Urban ethnicity ( L o n d o n , 1974), 124; o n t h e w i d e r c o n t e x t
J. R o u c h , Migrations au Ghana ( P a r i s , 1956).
2
C . G e e r t z , The interpretation of culture ( N e w Y o r k , 1973), 246-9.
158

C H A N G I N G BASES O F I D E N T I T Y
disinterested policies. Nevertheless T A N U seemed o n l y to h a v e

r e s t r a i n e d e t h n i c i t y r a t h e r t h a n t o h a v e n u l l i f i e d it.
If the ' d i s t r i b u t i v e state * w a s a necessary c o n d i t i o n for * tribal
i s m ' , it w a s far f r o m b e i n g a s u f f i c i e n t o n e , s i n c e t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n
o f jobs m i g h t g o b y other channels, for instance ethnically m i x e d
factions o r religious interest-groups, w h i l e liquid resources m i g h t
b e d i v i d e d b y c l a s s e x c l u s i v e l y . T h u s in S e n e g a l t h e r e w e r e ' c l a n
polities', the ' c l a n s ' b e i n g shifting factions led b y m e m b e r s o f the
political élite, but recruited t h r o u g h a variety o f allegiances, o f
which the home-base w a s only one and religious fellowship
another. T h i s national political style g r e w from the urban politics
o f the quatre communes before 1940 and recalls other locales o f
f a c t i o n a l p o l i t i c s s u c h as t h e m i c r o - p o l i t i c s o f t r a d e u n i o n s as
reported f r o m U g a n d a , o r the s m a l l - t o w n politics o f K i t a in M a l i
in t h e 1 9 6 0 s , w h e r e n o s i n g l e c a t e g o r y o f i d e n t i t y d o m i n a t e d . I f
it w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y t y p i c a l o f p a r t s o f t h e W e s t A f r i c a n s a v a n n a
zone, there w e r e g o o d reasons for it: the universalist, homo
g e n i s i n g i d e o l o g y o f I s l a m s u p p o r t e d it, b u t m o r e p o t e n t w a s t h e
fact t h a t t h e s e w e r e a r e a s , S e n e g a l e s p e c i a l l y , w h i c h h a d e x p e r i
enced during the previous century a fair 'scrambling' of
populations, with extensive m o v e m e n t s o f piecemeal agricultural
colonisation and the l o o s e n i n g o f c u s t o m a r y tenures. T h e r e w a s
t h u s less b a s i s f o r t h e a l i g n m e n t o f r u r a l - r e g i o n a l a n d u r b a n - e t h n i c
interest w h i c h so u n d e r p i n n e d the p o w e r o f ethnicity e l s e w h e r e .
Religion
R e l i g i o n m a y either be aligned w i t h other identities o r cross-cut
and s u b d i v i d e them. T h e i m p o s i t i o n o f colonial rule accelerated
1
the spread o f b o t h Christianity and Islam. Islam's advance, with
s o m e e x c e p t i o n s , s u c h as p a r t s o f t h e W e s t A f r i c a n f o r e s t b e l t o r
i n w a r d f r o m the S w a h i l i coast, w a s a c h i e v e d t h r o u g h a d e e p e r
social penetration w i t h i n a r e a s w h e r e it h a d a l r e a d y e x i s t e d , i n
some cases for centuries, as a religious idiom restricted to
particular status g r o u p s — traders, m e m b e r s o f royal c o u r t s , or
r e l i g i o - m e d i c a l s p e c i a l i s t s . F o r C h r i s t i a n i t y , it w a s m u c h m o r e a
g e o g r a p h i c a l a d v a n c e i n t o f r e s h a r e a s f r o m its e a r l i e s t b a s e s a l o n g
1
T h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n c o l o n i s a t i o n a n d c o n v e r s i o n w a s far f r o m a s t r a i g h t
f o r w a r d o n e . F o r a c o m p a r a t i v e s t u d y , J. D . Y . P e e l , ' C o n v e r s i o n a n d t r a d i t i o n i n t w o
A f r i c a n s o c i e t i e s : I j e b u a n d B u g a n d a ' , Past and Present, 1977, 77, 108-41.
*59

the coasts and in a handful o f interior k i n g d o m s like B u g a n d a ,

Merina, Lozi, and Kgatla, where prescient local rulers had
s p o n s o r e d it. B u t l a t e r , it t o o s p r e a d t h r o u g h t h e s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e
to categories initially unattracted b y it. M o s t n a t i o n s included
p e o p l e s at d i f f e r e n t s t a g e s o f i n f l u e n c e b y t h e w o r l d r e l i g i o n s a n d ,
except for peoples w h o w e r e solidly M u s l i m or Christian well
b e f o r e t h e c o l o n i a l i s t p e r i o d , l i k e t h e K a n u r i o r t h e A m h a r a , it
w a s the p e o p l e s m o s t i n v o l v e d in the c o l o n i a l o r d e r w h o s h o w e d
the greatest penetration b y the w o r l d religions.
A fair r e l i g i o u s v a r i e t y c a m e t o e x i s t i n m o s t A f r i c a n l o c a l i t i e s :
in M u s l i m areas often s e v e r a l c o m p e t i n g b r o t h e r h o o d s [tariqa, p i .
turuq), in mixed or exclusively Christian areas, usually the
historically dominant missions — Catholic and one or m o r e forms
o f P r o t e s t a n t i s m - as w e l l as a v a r i e t y o f i n d e p e n d e n t churches.
T h e r e is s o m e e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e v a r i o u s c o n f e s s i o n s m i g h t a p p e a l
to distinct status constituencies and t o g e t h e r f o r m a differentiated
system o f religious provision. But attempts to interpret that
v a r i e t y o f r e l i g i o u s e x p r e s s i o n p r i m a r i l y in t e r m s o f its c o r r e
s p o n d e n c e , o r ' e l e c t i v e affinity', to the r a n k e d statuses o r class
p o s i t i o n s o f a d h e r e n t s , o n a n a n a l o g y w i t h t h e r e l i g i o u s stratifi
cation of Europe, are often misleading. Where social status
differences came to exist between the members of different
churches (or m o r e importantly, b e t w e e n M u s l i m s and Christians),
they w e r e m o s t often the consequences o f a v a r i e t y o f different, often
a c c i d e n t a l , attributes o f the r e l i g i o n s : the fact that t h e y c a m e early
o r late t o an a r e a ; h a d a c o r e o f m e m b e r s f r o m p a r t i c u l a r parts
of the country; or possessed historical advantages such as
C h r i s t i a n i t y ' s s c h o o l s , I s l a m ' s r o l e as a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l trading
n e t w o r k in certain areas, o r the ' e s t a b l i s h m e n t ' status a c c o r d e d
C a t h o l i c i s m in the B e l g i a n C o n g o o r I s l a m in N o r t h e r n N i g e r i a .
T h e c a s e is e a s i e s t t o m a k e f o r s o m e o f t h e i n d e p e n d e n t , l o c a l l y
d e v e l o p e d c h u r c h e s - Z i o n i s t s in S o u t h A f r i c a , A l a d u r a in W e s t
Africa - w h i c h typically enjoyed a l o w e r standing and some o f
1
w h i c h w e r e at t i m e s a v e h i c l e f o r e x p r e s s i n g c l a s s d i s c o n t e n t . But
they frequently also attracted elite m e m b e r s and sympathisers,
especially since i n d e p e n d e n c e ; and their main religious aim w a s
to relate Christianity t o s u c h i n d i g e n o u s r e l i g i o u s c o n c e r n s as
1
F o r s t a t e m e n t s o f t h i s v i e w a n d c a s e s t u d i e s , R . K a u f m a n , Millenarisme et acculturation
( B r u s s e l s , 1964), a n d P a r t I I I , ' R e l i g i o u s e x p r e s s i o n s o f d i s c o n t e n t ' , o f R . I. R o t b e r g
a n d A . A . M a z r u i ( e d s . ) , Protest and power in Black Africa ( N e w Y o r k , 1970).
160

healing and divination. T h e trend o f the p e r i o d w a s rather for the

various religious g r o u p s to c o m e to resemble one another more
in t h e i r m e m b e r s h i p , j u s t as t h e r e w a s a t e n d e n c y t o offset t h e c l a s h
o f s p e c i f i c d o c t r i n e s a n d p r a c t i c e s w i t h t h e a t t i t u d e t h a t all w e r e
concerned w i t h the same general morality and the same G o d .
Since the general level o f personal religious o b s e r v a n c e c o n
tinued so h i g h in A f r i c a , o n e m i g h t ask w h y r e l i g i o n w a s m u c h
less i m p o r t a n t as t h e b a s i s o f l e g i t i m a t i o n t h a n it h a s b e e n
e l s e w h e r e , f o r e x a m p l e in E u r o p e ; o r w h y r e l i g i o n , w i t h s o m e
s i g n i f i c a n t e x c e p t i o n s , w a s r e l a t i v e l y u n i m p o r t a n t as a g e n e r a l a x i s
o f s o c i a l c o n f l i c t . T h e m a i n a n s w e r t o t h e first q u e s t i o n is
straightforward: there w a s t o o m u c h religious variety to permit
r e l i g i o u s l e g i t i m a t i o n e x c e p t in the m o s t v a g u e terms. Signifi
c a n t l y , w h i l e I s l a m w a s s o u s e d in t h e A r a b c o u n t r i e s o f N o r t h
Africa, especially L i b y a , M o r o c c o and to a smaller extent A l g e r i a ,
similar attempts to use I s l a m in the o l d N o r t h e r n R e g i o n o f
N i g e r i a o r C h r i s t i a n i t y in E t h i o p i a w e r e , b e c a u s e o f a c t u a l
religious variety, probably counter-productive. T h e widespread
Islam o f countries like Senegal, Mali or Somalia, w h i l e linked to
valued national traditions, contributed to a c o m m o n social idiom,
for instance the S w a h i l i i d i o m o f T a n z a n i a , rather than furnishing
an e x p l i c i t i d e o l o g y o f l e g i t i m a t i o n .
T h e a n s w e r t o t h e s e c o n d q u e s t i o n is m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d . T h e
churches, and to a lesser extent Islam, o r M u s l i m b r o t h e r h o o d s ,
were organised and c o m p e t i n g corporate interest-groups, some
t i m e s in b i t t e r r i v a l r y f o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s u p p o r t . C h u r c h s c h o o l s
w e r e o f t e n a s o u r c e o f p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t , as i n E a s t e r n N i g e r i a in
t h e late 1 9 5 0 s , t h o u g h i n c r e a s e d g o v e r n m e n t c o n t r o l o f s c h o o l s
since independence tended to r e m o v e that important source o f
c h u r c h politics. B u t b e y o n d this, w h y w e r e c h u r c h e s n o t m o r e
i m p o r t a n t as ' c o m m u n a l ' i n t e r e s t - g r o u p s , a c t i n g o n b e h a l f o f
t h e i r m e m b e r s ' , r a t h e r t h a n j u s t t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n a l , i n t e r e s t s ? It
is w o r t h r e c a l l i n g t h e c a s e o f S e n e g a l , w h e r e r e l i g i o u s a l l e g i a n c e ,
s p e c i f i c a l l y t o t h e M u s l i m b r o t h e r h o o d s , f u n c t i o n e d in a w a y
a n a l o g o u s t o e t h n i c i t y , as a c o n s t i t u e n t o f p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t - g r o u p s .
U g a n d a w a s m o r e e x c e p t i o n a l , b u t its v e r y d i v e r g e n c e h i g h l i g h t s
t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f r e l i g i o n ' s s m a l l p o l i t i c a l w e i g h t e l s e w h e r e . Its
pattern w a s an e x t e n s i o n o f that w h i c h d e v e l o p e d d e c a d e s earlier
i n t h e B u g a n d a k i n g d o m , its c o r e r e g i o n , w h e r e t w o c o n d i t i o n s
o b t a i n e d : first, w i t h i n t h e t r a d i t i o n a l o r d e r , l o c a l ties w e r e
161

e c l i p s e d i n i m p o r t a n c e b y v e r t i c a l ties o f c l i e n t a g e f o c u s s e d o n t h e
court, chieftaincy tending to be d i v o r c e d from lineage or regional
bases; secondly, c o n v e r s i o n w a s led b y rising m e m b e r s o f the
p o l i t i c a l élite a n d r e s u l t e d i n t h e f o r m a t i o n o f t h r e e c o n f e s s i o n a l
interest-groups - A n g l i c a n s , Catholics and Muslims. Religion and
r e g i o n a l o r i g i n cross-cut, a n d in the relative u n i m p o r t a n c e o f
r e g i o n , r e l i g i o n w a s a b l e t o e m e r g e , at least f o r a t i m e , as t h e
dominant criterion o f political allegiance.
B u t m o s t l y , w h e r e r e l i g i o n a n d e t h n i c i t y c r o s s - c u t , it w a s t h e
l a t t e r w h i c h p r e d o m i n a t e d as a s o u r c e o f i d e n t i t y w i t h i n t h e
nation, since a c o m m o n g e o g r a p h i c a l base w a s so fundamental to
the definition o f g r o u p interests. W h e r e a particular f o r m o f
religion w a s s t r o n g l y associated w i t h o n e ethnic g r o u p to the
e x c l u s i o n o f o t h e r s , it o f t e n s e r v e d as an i d i o m f o r , o r a n
o r g a n i s a t i o n a l a i d t o , a n e t h n i c o r r e g i o n a l i n t e r e s t - g r o u p , as t h e
Tijàniyya order did for the Hausa o f Ibadan against their Y o r u b a
hosts, or the K i m b a n g u i s t c h u r c h , linked w i t h the A B A K O party,
for K o n g o interests w i t h i n Z a i r e .
B e c a u s e , in t h e m a i n , m o s t e x p r e s s i o n s o f t h e w o r l d r e l i g i o n s
tended to be unidentified w i t h the main interest-groups, w h e t h e r
e t h n i c o r c l a s s , t h e y w e r e a v a i l a b l e i n a diffuse f o r m as a m e d i a t i n g
e l e m e n t , relatively neutral g r o u n d , in social and political conflict.
Religious institutions w e r e therefore generally accorded respect
b y t h e p o l i t i c a l é l i t e , p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e y d i d n o t a p p e a r as a r i v a l
f o c u s o f a u t h o r i t y t o t h e state. I f t h e y d i d , l i k e A l i c e L e n s h i n a ' s
L u m p a c h u r c h i n N o r t h e r n Z a m b i a i n t h e late 1 9 6 0 s o r t h e R o m a n
C a t h o l i c c h u r c h i n s e v e r a l c o u n t r i e s ( f o r i n s t a n c e , Z a i r e in t h e
1960s, A n g o l a in the 1970s) since i n d e p e n d e n c e , they m i g h t e x p e c t
t o find t h e p o w e r o f t h e s t a t e m o b i l i s e d a g a i n s t t h e m .
C L A S S F O R M A T I O N
W e turn n o w to that other, ' v e r t i c a l ' , d i m e n s i o n o f social

structure, the c o n s e q u e n c e o f the social d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r and the
h i e r a r c h y o f p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l t h a t is s o a m b i g u o u s l y c o o r d i n a t e d
w i t h the system o f regional and cultural divisions. G r e a t t h o u g h
t h e effects o f c o l o n i a l r u l e h a d b e e n o n t h e s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s o f A r a b
N o r t h A f r i c a , w e c a n still a p p r o a c h t h e m as t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s o f
pre-existing systems o f relations b e t w e e n social categories:
peasants, pastoralists and n o m a d s , l a n d o w n e r s , urban ' b o u r g e o i s '
162

CLASS F O R M A T I O N
g r o u p s l i k e m e r c h a n t s , officials o r I s l a m i c i n t e l l i g e n t s i a ('ulamd'),
and lower-class traders, craftsmen, labourers and the urban p o o r .
T o these h a v e been a d d e d a m o d e r n - e d u c a t e d stratum, t e n d i n g
to be d r a w n f r o m the o l d ' b o u r g e o i s i e ' , w h i c h has taken o v e r the
main part o f r u n n i n g state and military institutions; and an
industrial proletariat, especially in E g y p t and in a city like
Casablanca. A l g e r i a , because o f the h e a v y presence o f the F r e n c h
settlers o v e r m a n y d e c a d e s , has c o m e nearest to a complete
r e w o r k i n g o f its p r e - c o l o n i a l s o c i a l s y s t e m , w h i l e M o r o c c o , b r i e f l y
and l i g h t l y c o l o n i s e d , has the least. B u t the national societies o f
sub-Saharan Africa w e r e made, rather than remade. S u c h carry
o v e r as t h e r e h a d b e e n f r o m p r e - c o l o n i a l s y s t e m s o f i n d i g e n o u s
stratification, o u t s i d e v e r y local spheres, w a s m o s t m a r k e d in the
case o f a few v e r y c o h e r e n t polities, n o t a b l y the emirates of
Northern Nigeria and Buganda, which managed to reach a
9
p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n as t h e ' c o r e o f a c o l o n y ; b u t b e y o n d t h a t , t h e
continuity was m o r e a matter o f attitudes to rank and inequality
(a n o t o r i o u s l y e l u s i v e f a c t o r ) o r o f s u c h s p e c i f i c p o l i t i c a l r o l e s as
that o f chief, w h i c h m i g h t radically c h a n g e their c o n t e n t s . T h e
alleged classlessness o f m u c h o f pre-colonial Africa, w h i l e relating
in m a n y c a s e s t o s o m e r e a l d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n A f r i c a n and
1
E u r o p e a n o r A s i a n s o c i e t i e s , w a s r e l e v a n t as a n i d e o l o g y o r a n
aspiration, not as an explanation of what developed with
nationalism.
T o the extent that class expresses o c c u p a t i o n , g r o s s e m p l o y m e n t
statistics g i v e s o m e i m p r e s s i o n o f the g r e a t r e g i o n a l v a r i a t i o n in
t h e s i z e o f p a r t i c u l a r c l a s s c a t e g o r i e s , as t h e y h a d c o m e t o e x i s t
a r o u n d i 9 6 0 , a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y o f t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h , as m e a s u r e d
by wage employment, especially outside agriculture, African
populations had then m o v e d from l i v i n g in c o m m u n i t i e s of
p r e d o m i n a n t l y s u b s i s t e n c e c u l t i v a t o r s (cf. t a b l e 4 . 3 ) . T h e figures
d o n o t s u g g e s t a n y s i n g l e p a t h o f c h a n g e , in w h i c h t h i s s i n g l e
indicator, the e m p l o y m e n t pattern, systematically correlates w i t h
other aspects o f social change. W e s t and Central Africa had
r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e r t o t a l l a b o u r f o r c e s , n o d o u b t as a r e s u l t o f t h e
g r e a t e r e c o n o m i c r o l e o f w o m e n . S o u t h e r n A f r i c a , a n d a b o v e all
1
L . A . Falters, Inequality: social stratification reconsidered ( C h i c a g o , 1973) is a v a l u a b l e
d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t r a d i t i o n a l a n d m o d e r n s t r a t i f i c a t i o n , b o t h in
B u g a n d a and generally. See t o o , M . G . S m i t h , 'Pre-industrial stratification s y s t e m s ' ,
in M . J. S m e l s e r a n d S. M . L i p s e t ( e d s . ) , Social structure and mobility in economic development
( C h i c a g o a n d L o n d o n , 1966).
163

T a b l e 4.3. Employment in Africa, by region, i960.
North East Central South West

Labour force as % of 34.6 36.5 42.1 35.5 45.8
total population
Wage-earners as % of 33-* 15.4 15.2 63.3 6.1
labour force
Agricultural wage-earners 12.8 5.3 3.6 13.3 0.09
as % of labour force
Non-agricultural wage- 20.4 IO.I 11.6 50.0 5-2
earners as % of labour
force
Non-wage-earners, as % 66.8 84.6 84.8 36.7 93-9
of labour force
K. C. Doctor and H. Gallis, 'Size and characteristics of wage em
Source:
ployment in Africa', International labour review, 1966, 93, 166-7.
the R e p u b l i c o f S o u t h Africa, had easily the m o s t w a g e - e a r n e r s ,

p r e d o m i n a n t l y in n o n - a g r i c u l t u r a l j o b s , b e i n g f o l l o w e d here b y
North Africa. Within N o r t h Africa, Egypt, populous, highly
urbanised and partially industrialised, contributed m o r e than the
o t h e r s t o t h i s p i c t u r e . O u t s i d e t h e s e a r e a s , M o z a m b i q u e w i t h 30.5
p e r c e n t , a n d A n g o l a w i t h 27 p e r c e n t h a d t h e h i g h e s t p r o p o r t i o n s
of wage-earners. East and Central Africa had c o m p a r a b l e profiles
t h r o u g h o u t , w i t h l e v e l s o f w a g e - e a r n i n g , b o t h in a g r i c u l t u r e and
o u t s i d e it, w e l l b e l o w N o r t h a n d S o u t h , b u t s i g n i f i c a n t l y a b o v e
W e s t Africa. W e s t Africa, with few plantations and overall l o w i s h
l e v e l s o f f a c t o r y o r m i n i n g e m p l o y m e n t , s h o w e d i t s e l f as the
s t r o n g h o l d o f the peasant farmer and the petty entrepreneur.
Peasantisation?
Discussion o v e r the past t w o decades o f the changing class
character o f the A f r i c a n rural p o p u l a t i o n has largely b e e n c o n
cerned with whether it is t o b e c o n s i d e r e d as c o m p o s e d of
1
'peasants'. Such a claim goes beyond the unexceptionable
1
D i s c u s s i o n t o o k t h i s t u r n in t h e 1960s, t h o u g h t h e t e r m pay san i n t h e F r e n c h
literature, used earlier, n e v e r b e c a m e the f o c u s o f debate a b o u t the character o f rural
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n in q u i t e t h e s a m e w a y as it d i d i n t h e E n g l i s h . S e e L . A . F a l l e r s , ' A r e
A f r i c a n c u l t i v a t o r s t o b e c a l l e d " p e a s a n t s " ? ' , Current Anthropology, 1961, 2, 1 0 8 - 1 0 ;
R. S t a v e n h a g e n , Social classes in agrarian societies ( G a r d e n C i t y , 1975), 6 4 - 7 1 , 1 1 9 - 6 2 o n
164

CLASS FORMATION
assertion that the v a s t m a j o r i t y o f a g r i c u l t u r a l enterprises in A f r i c a

d u r i n g o u r period - e x c e p t for large capitalist estates, whether
p r i v a t e l y o r state o w n e d - t e n d e d t o c o i n c i d e w i t h d o m e s t i c units,
s o t h a t t h e d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r w a s still l a r g e l y e x p r e s s e d t h r o u g h
the kinship structure. It i n s i s t s o n t h e i m p o r t a n t consequence
that m o s t s u c h p r o d u c i n g units w e r e , to an e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g extent,
politically and economically subordinated to non-producers, and,
d r a w i n g an a n a l o g y w i t h the large agrarian societies o f Eurasia
(as such c a t e g o r i e s as 'middle peasants' and even 'kulaks'
1
declare), implies that certain definite relations and actions w o u l d
e m e r g e . T h e c e n t r a l i s s u e s t o b e c o n s i d e r e d a r e , first, w h a t k i n d
o f differentiation w a s o c c u r r i n g w i t h i n rural c o m m u n i t i e s and,
secondly, the nature o f the links b e t w e e n the rural c o m m u n i t i e s
and external or higher-order institutions.
I n m o s t a r e a s o f A f r i c a at t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e c o l o n i a l p e r i o d
l a n d w a s p l e n t i f u l in r e l a t i o n t o p o p u l a t i o n n e e d s , s o c o n t r o l o f
it as a s c a r c e r e s o u r c e w a s n o t t h e b a s i s o f s o c i a l h i e r a r c h y . S i n c e
p r o d u c t i o n w a s geared to the h o u s e h o l d ' s c o n s u m p t i o n needs, the
a m o u n t o f land required and w o r k e d tended to v a r y w i t h the size
o f this unit, a n d family-failure, rather than l a n d - s h o r t a g e , w a s the
s o u r c e o f e c o n o m i c difficulty. C h i e f s and lineage-heads were
' o w n e r s ' o f the land o n l y in that they held the right to allocate
land to actual o r potential m e m b e r s o f their c o m m u n i t i e s ; but,
with a few conspicuous exceptions like Ethiopia, R w a n d a , B u
rundi o r s o m e societies in the w e s t e r n S u d a n , t h e y d i d n o t m a k e
heavy levies o n agricultural production or maintain a radically
different l i f e - s t y l e . T h e a u t h o r i t y o f c h i e f s , as o f h o u s e h o l d or
lineage heads, required a h i g h degree o f redistribution o f w h a t
resources c a m e their w a y . A s there w a s n o landlessness, there w a s
no wage-labour.
S o m e t h i n g like these c o n d i t i o n s p r e v a i l e d in a g o o d m a n y areas
o f A f r i c a as late as t h e 1 9 5 0 s , t h o u g h it h a d b e g u n t o p a s s o u t
t h e A g n i o f I v o r y C o a s t ; K . P o s t , ' P e a s a n t i s a t i o n a n d r u r a l p o l i t i c a l m o v e m e n t s in
W e s t e r n A f r i c a ' , Archives Européennes de Sociologie, 1972, 1 3 , 223-54.
1
F o r ' m i d d l e p e a s a n t s ' (this b e i n g an a l l u s i o n t o the g r o u p w h o s e s u p p o r t w a s
c l a i m e d critical for M a o in C h i n a ) , G . W i l l i a m s , ' P o l i t i c a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s a m o n g the
I b a d a n p o o r ' , in E . d e K a d t a n d G . W i l l i a m s ( e d s . ) , Sociology and development ( L o n d o n ,
1974), 1 3 0 - 1 . ' K u l a k s ' w a s u s e d b y G . A r r i g h i a n d J . S . S a u l , ' S o c i a l i s m a n d
d e v e l o p m e n t in t r o p i c a l A f r i c a ' , Journal of Modern African Studies, 1968, 6 , 1 4 1 - 6 9 , a n d
s i n c e t h e n v e r y g e n e r a l l y b y M a r x i s t w r i t e r s o n E a s t A f r i c a , s u c h as M . M a m d a n i ,
Politics and class formation in Uganda ( L o n d o n , 1976), w h o m a k e s t h e s u r p r i s i n g c l a i m
t h a t it ' i s t h e p o p u l a r u s a g e in E a s t A f r i c a ' ( p . 10).
165

o f e x i s t e n c e as e a r l y as t h e 1900s in t h o s e p a r t s o f W e s t A f r i c a
w h e r e c a s h - c r o p f a r m i n g first d e v e l o p e d o n a l a r g e s c a l e . C a s h - c r o p
f a r m i n g , a n d t h e l a n d s h o r t a g e o f t e n l i n k e d w i t h it, s t i m u l a t e d t w o
kinds o f differentiation w i t h i n local c o m m u n i t i e s : b e t w e e n farmer-
employers and wage-labourers, and b e t w e e n richer and poorer
f a r m e r s . S t u d i e s in Z a m b i a a n d K e n y a h a v e s h o w n h o w e n t e r
prising cash farmers b r o k e w i t h m a n y o f the c o m m u n a l norms,
w h i c h enjoined redistribution and so restrained e c o n o m i c polar
1
isation, and discerned parallels w i t h E u r o p e ' s ' P r o t e s t a n t E t h i c ' .
L a n d titles g e n e r a l l y b e c a m e m o r e i n d i v i d u a l i s e d , a n d labour
s y s t e m s less d e p e n d e n t o n c o r p o r a t e k i n g r o u p i n g s . S t u d i e s o v e r
a w i d e area h a v e c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e a d v a n c e m e n t o f s u c c e s s f u l
farmers tended to be consolidated b y the local intervention o f the
state, w h o s e e x t e n s i o n s e r v i c e s , l o a n s c h e m e s a n d s o o n b e n e f i t e d
them rather than the p o o r e r farmers. B u t despite these tendencies,
a m a r k e d rural polarisation w a s s l o w to e m e r g e . T h i s w o u l d be
a process sustained o v e r several generations and few adequate
historical studies have been done. Polly Hill, h o w e v e r , has
d o c u m e n t e d , in a H a u s a v i l l a g e e x h i b i t i n g l a n d s c a r c i t y , c o m
m e r c i a l a g r i c u l t u r e a n d a m a r k e t in l a n d , w h a t h a s e l s e w h e r e b e e n
c a l l e d ' c y c l i c a l m o b i l i t y ' - t h e rise a n d fall o f f a r m i n g f a m i l i e s , as
l a r g e r l a n d h o l d i n g s w e r e b r o k e n u p (a p r o c e s s g r e a t l y a s s i s t e d in
Africa b y the p o l y g y n y o f the w e a l t h i e r farmers), w h i l e p o o r e r
farmers either dropped out o f the rural c o m m u n i t y or built
2
themselves up. E v e n in B u g a n d a , w h e r e s o m e t h i n g l i k e a l a n d e d
g e n t r y w a s m a n u f a c t u r e d u n d e r t h e 1900 A g r e e m e n t , t h e s o - c a l l e d
mailo estates had been largely b r o k e n u p b y the 1950s, and, w h i l e
t h e r e w a s c o n s i d e r a b l e i n e q u a l i t y in l a n d h o l d i n g , t h e r e w a s a
s p e c t r u m f r o m l a r g e t o s m a l l o w n e r s , as w e l l as a c o m p l e x o f o t h e r
k i n d s o f ties l i n k i n g t h e m . I n m a n y a r e a s o f W e s t A f r i c a , w h e r e
cash-crop farmers e m p l o y e d strangers as w a g e - l a b o u r e r s , the
migrants often w e n t o n t o a c q u i r e l a n d , e i t h e r as t e n a n t s or
unconditionally, to produce cash crops themselves. In most
1
N . L o n g , Social change and the individual ( M a n c h e s t e r , 1968) o n t h e r o l e o f J e h o v a h ' s
W i t n e s s e s a m o n g t h e Z a m b i a n L a l a in l e g i t i m i s i n g a b r e a k w i t h t r a d i t i o n a l u s e s o f
l a b o u r , o r D . J. P a r k i n , Palms, wine and witnesses ( L o n d o n , 1972) o n h o w s u c c e s s f u l
G i r i a m a c o p r a - p r o d u c e r s in K e n y a u s e I s l a m i c c o n v e r s i o n t o d i s t a n c e t h e m s e l v e s f r o m
their fellows.
2
P o l l y H i l l , Rural Hausa: a village and a setting ( C a m b r i d g e , 1972), e s p e c i a l l y c h a p t e r s
1 0 - 1 3 . S i m i l a r p r o c e s s e s w e r e n o t e d in late n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y R u s s i a , w h o s e k u l a k s
w e r e less l i k e E n g l i s h y e o m e n o f a n e a r l i e r p e r i o d t h a n h a s b e e n a s s u m e d ; cf. T . S h a n i n ,
The awkward class ( O x f o r d , 1972).
166

A f r i c a n rural areas b y t h e 1970s, then, w h e r e there h a d n o t b e e n

l a r g e - s c a l e e x p r o p r i a t i o n o f l a n d f r o m A f r i c a n s as a r e s u l t o f
c o l o n i a l p o l i c y , w e find a n o v e r l a p p i n g a n d s h i f t i n g o f e c o n o m i c
statuses: small farmers employing occasional migrant labour,
migrants establishing quite large enterprises, individuals m o v i n g
t h r o u g h different e c o n o m i c statuses.
S o despite incipient class differences, a fundamental common
ality o f c o n d i t i o n s f o r a l l ' p e a s a n t s ' e n d u r e d . In the bid for
amenities s u c h as a tarred r o a d o r a d a m f r o m t h e state, t h e m o r e
prosperous farmers inevitably provided, through cooperative
movements o r political parties o r local g o v e r n m e n t , general
leadership o f their c o m m u n i t i e s . T h a t leadership tended t o b e
linked w i t h s o m e c o n f o r m i t y t o traditional n o r m s o f redistri
b u t i o n , s e c u r e d p e r h a p s b y e x t e n s i v e k i n s h i p a n d affinal t i e s . I t w a s
ironic that T a n z a n i a ' s r u l i n g party, o n e o f w h o s e roots lay in t h e
c o o p e r a t i v e societies o f the agriculturally a d v a n c e d area near L a k e
V i c t o r i a , s h o u l d c o m m i t itself, i n t h e n a m e o f o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e
polarisation o f ' k u l a k s ' a n d p o o r peasants, to policies w h i c h
i g n o r e d this p a t t e r n i n g o f local interest vis-a-vis t h e s t a t e . Its ujamaa
p o l i c i e s a p p e a l e d less t o t h e p o o r e r p e a s a n t s a g a i n s t t h e r i c h e r t h a n
t o t h e p o o r e r r e g i o n s - t h o s e less a d v a n c e d i n c a s h - c r o p p i n g — as
against the richer o n e s like the C h a g a o r the S u k u m a . It w a s
misleading, particularly granted marked regional unevenness in
d e v e l o p m e n t , t o identify these rural g r a d a t i o n s as t h e g e r m s o f
1
national social classes.
The w i d e r national environment o f the rural community,
though it p r o v i d e d s o m e s u p p o r t to the larger-scale peasant
p r o d u c e r s , also d i s c o u r a g e d the e m e r g e n c e o f a landed u p p e r class
in o t h e r w a y s . I n g e n e r a l , s o p o o r w e r e t h e r e w a r d s o f f a r m i n g
relative t o s o m e other o c c u p a t i o n s that p r o s p e r o u s farmers w e r e
soon likely to divert much investment outside agriculture,
b r a n c h i n g into transport o r c o m m e r c e and educating their children
for bureaucratic e m p l o y m e n t . I n s u m , they o r their children,
1
T h e e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e ujamaa p o l i c y is c o n t e n t i o u s , s i n c e m u c h i d e o l o g y h a s b e e n
i n v e s t e d in it, b u t see D . F e l d m a n , ' T h e e c o n o m i c s o f i d e o l o g y : s o m e p r o b l e m s o f
a c h i e v i n g r u r a l s o c i a l i s m i n T a n z a n i a ' , i n C . T . L e y s ( e d . ) , Politics and change in developing
countries ( C a m b r i d g e , 1969), 8 5 - 1 1 1 ; L . C l i f f e , ' T h e p o l i c y o f Ujamaa Vijijini a n d t h e c l a s s
s t r u g g l e i n T a n z a n i a ' , i n L . Cliffe a n d J. S . S a u l ( e d s . ) , Socialism in Tanzania ( N a i r o b i ,
l z v
97 )> ° l - 1» 1 9 5 - 2 1 1 a n d , a m o s t u s e f u l c o m p a r i s o n w i t h r u r a l p o l i c y i n N i g e r i a i n
the l i g h t o f theories o f t h e peasantry, G . W i l l i a m s , ' T a k i n g t h e part o f p e a s a n t s ' , in
P . C . W . G u t k i n d a n d I. W a l l e r s t e i n ( e d s . ) , The political economy of Africa ( N e w Y o r k ,
167

w i t h o u t a b a n d o n i n g l a n d - r i g h t s o r s o c i a l ties w i t h t h e c o u n t r y s i d e
( w h i c h m i g h t be politically valuable), aspired to join an essentially
u r b a n élite, n o t e v e n d e p e n d e n t o n rural rents. T h e m a i n , and
perhaps significant e x c e p t i o n to the d i v o r c e o f the national urban
élite f r o m s i g n i f i c a n t d i r e c t i n v o l v e m e n t i n a g r i c u l t u r e o c c u r r e d
i n G h a n a , K e n y a a n d s o m e o t h e r c o u n t r i e s in t h e late 1960s a n d
early 1970s, w h e r e , w i t h f o o d shortages, inflation and c o n s e q u e n t
h i g h p r i c e s , s o m e m e m b e r s o f t h e é l i t e b e g a n t o m o v e i n t o fairly
large-scale capitalist farming o f f o o d c r o p s , intended for urban
c o n s u m p t i o n , using their influence to acquire surplus land and
g e t t i n g financial s u p p o r t f r o m s t a t e i n s t i t u t i o n s . F o r t h o u g h
n a t i o n a l i s m d e r i v e d its m a i n r u r a l s u p p o r t i n c a s h - c r o p a r e a s , a n d
its l e a d e r s w e r e o f t e n d r a w n f r o m t h e f a m i l i e s o f p r o s p e r o u s
p e a s a n t f a r m e r s ( s o t h a t a n affinity o f t h e r u r a l p e t t y c o m m o d i t y
p r o d u c e r a n d t h e n a t i o n a l i s t state s e e m e d l i k e l y ) , a n d t h o u g h m o s t
states c o n t i n u e d t o b e d i s p o s e d t o offer s o m e , r e l a t i v e , r e w a r d t o
the larger peasant farmers (if o n l y to secure the c o m p l i a n c e o f m e n
w h o represented the o r g a n i s e d local interests o f peasants
g e n e r a l l y ) , t h e n a t i o n a l i s t state w a s n o t t h e state of t h i s r u r a l
stratum. T h e g a p b e t w e e n the farmers and the non-agricultural
sectors o f society remained crucial.
T h e p e a s a n t m o v e m e n t s o f t h e 1960s m u s t b e set i n a l o n g
tradition o f rural unrest, w h o s e a m b i g u o u s and protean character
h a s m a d e it difficult t o i n t e r p r e t . T h e r e h a d b e e n w i d e s p r e a d
o p p o s i t i o n , o f n o particular class character, to the i m p o s i t i o n o f
c o l o n i a l rule - the chiefs' loss o f w i d e discretionary p o w e r s ,
f o r c e d l a b o u r , l e v y i n g o f t a x - o f w h i c h t h e last r e m a i n e d a k e y
f e a t u r e o f n e a r l y all s u b s e q u e n t p e a s a n t o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e state,
w h e t h e r c o l o n i a l o r national. In the 1910s and 1920s these t h e m e s
continued, often to blend w i t h w h a t w e r e essentially m o v e m e n t s
o f c u l t u r a l r e i n t e g r a t i o n after t h e first s h o c k s o f c o l o n i a l s o c i a l
change. T h e i r concerns had often been religious and included
witch-finding, faith-healing and suchlike, but had sometimes
assumed a m o r e political tone if they w e r e subject to harsh
r e p r e s s i o n . T h e 1 9 3 0 s a n d 1940s h a d s e e n w i d e s p r e a d r e s i s t a n c e
t o t a x , w h e n i n c o m e l e v e l s fell d u r i n g t h e d e p r e s s i o n , as w e l l as
t o t h e c o l o n i a l r e g u l a t i o n o f a g r i c u l t u r e in t h e f o r m o f c o m p u l s o r y
c r o p - p l a n t i n g , a n d s a n i t a r y o r i n o c u l a t i o n m e a s u r e s . It h a d a l s o
seen the establishment b y farmers o f c o o p e r a t i v e s to reduce their
d e p e n d e n c e o n m i d d l e m e n in m a r k e t i n g . T h e l a t e r c o l o n i a l states
168

had tried unsuccessfully to depoliticise c o o p e r a t i v e societies, and

a l s o t r a d e u n i o n s , w h i c h p l a y e d , at l e a s t i n f o r m a l l y , a s i g n i f i c a n t
r o l e in n a t i o n a l i s t m o b i l i s a t i o n f r o m t h e l a t e 1 9 4 0 s . T h i s f a c i l i t a t e d
t h e i r v i r t u a l a p p r o p r i a t i o n b y t h e g o v e r n i n g p a r t i e s as a n i n s t r u
m e n t to c o n t r o l the rural p o p u l a t i o n . A further d e v i c e for the
e x p l o i t a t i o n o f f a r m e r s , s o c o n v e n i e n t t h a t it h a s b e e n a d o p t e d
v e r y w i d e l y in s u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a , w a s the m a r k e t i n g b o a r d , b y
w h i c h t h e s t a t e , t h r o u g h m o n o p s o n i s t fixing o f p r o d u c e r p r i c e s ,
c o u l d t a x p e a s a n t f a r m e r s at w i l l . T h e r e w e r e s e v e r a l r e a s o n s w h y
this e x p l o i t a t i o n i n i t i a l l y m e t w i t h s o little p r o t e s t : it w a s a
w e l l - c o n c e a l e d f o r m o f i m p o s t c o m p a r e d w i t h r e n t s o r t a x e s ; it
w a s i n t r o d u c e d at a t i m e w h e n , o w i n g t o t h e h i g h l e v e l o f w o r l d
p r o d u c e r prices, sustained f r o m the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r into the
late 1 9 5 0 s , m o s t f a r m e r s w e r e a b s o l u t e l y b e t t e r o f f t h a n t h e y h a d
e v e r been. A p r o p o r t i o n o f w h a t w a s taken w a s redistributed in
the f o r m o f c o m m u n a l welfare g o o d s v a l u e d b y the farmers, and
a b o v e all i n t h e f o r m o f i n c r e a s e d e d u c a t i o n a l s e r v i c e s . A n d t h e r e
w a s a diffuse s p i n - o f f f r o m t h e s p e n d i n g o f t h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s
and the n o n - a g r i c u l t u r a l sector.
B u t t h e 1960s s a w a r e v i v a l o f a g r a r i a n d i s c o n t e n t , e s p e c i a l l y
in s o m e o f the earliest and w e a l t h i e s t c a s h - c r o p g r o w i n g areas like
the Y o r u b a c o c o a areas and the g r o u n d n u t r e g i o n o f S e n e g a l .
W o r l d p r i c e s h a d s l u m p e d , a n d it w a s difficult f o r t h e g o v e r n m e n t s
to reduce the bureaucracies they had e x p a n d e d w i t h the m a r k e t i n g -
b o a r d s ' r e s e r v e s . T h e s i t u a t i o n in N i g e r i a w a s a g g r a v a t e d b y t h e
financial s t r a i n o f its c i v i l w a r . T h e S e n e g a l e s e p e a s a n t s r e s p o n d e d
by shifting back to subsistence crops, thus r e d u c i n g the p r o p o r t i o n
o f their o u t p u t w h i c h c o u l d be taxed, and c a u s i n g a major crisis
in t h e n a t i o n a l e c o n o m y . T h e Y o r u b a p e a s a n t s , r e l u c t a n t t o
a b a n d o n the l o n g - t e r m i n v e s t m e n t w h i c h c o c o a trees represent,
b a c k e d u p their d e m a n d s for r e d u c e d taxes and better p r o d u c e r
p r i c e s w i t h a t t a c k s o n g o v e r n m e n t offices a n d a v i r t u a l t a k e - o v e r
o f the c o u n t r y s i d e r o u n d Ibadan. S u c h responses m i g h t be
c o m p a r e d t o t h e r e s i s t a n c e o f s o m e r u r a l a r e a s t o t h e ujamaa
p r o g r a m m e in T a n z a n i a in t h e e a r l y 1 9 7 0 s , l e a d i n g t o v i o l e n c e
b o t h b y a n d a g a i n s t t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f a ' s o c i a l i s t ' state. It is
very doubtful whether such actions should be taken to indicate
the d e v e l o p m e n t o f a w i d e s p r e a d and solidary ' p e a s a n t ' class
c o n s c i o u s n e s s , o v e r r i d i n g o t h e r i d e n t i t i e s , o r t h a t p e a s a n t s as s u c h
w e r e in t h e p r o c e s s o f b e c o m i n g a d i s t i n c t p o l i t i c a l f o r c e , r a t h e r
169

than m e r e l y the s o u r c e o f sporadic pressures o n the political elite.

F o r the relations o f the f a r m i n g p o p u l a t i o n w i t h the rest o f s o c i e t y
w e r e t o o c o m p l e x and ambivalent. T h e urban sector and the
a g e n c i e s o f t h e state m i g h t rest o n r e s o u r c e s e x t r a c t e d f r o m
farmers, but they p r o v i d e d crucial general conditions for the
existence and d e v e l o p m e n t o f the rural c a s h - e c o n o m y t o w h i c h
the farmers w e r e c o m m i t t e d . A t a m o r e c o n c r e t e and individual
l e v e l , b e c a u s e o f t h e ties w h i c h l i n k e d f a r m e r s a n d t h e i r k i n s f o l k
i n t o w n s , f a r m e r s l o o k e d t o t h e u r b a n s e c t o r as o n e p o s s i b l e s o u r c e
o f support. Because agrarian conditions tended to be regionally
fairly s p e c i f i c , t h e d e m a n d s o f f a r m e r s b l u r r e d i n t o t h e d e m a n d s
o f r e g i o n s and ethnic g r o u p s ; a n d , in g e n e r a l , t h e y d e p e n d e d o n
ethnic politicians or urban political b r o k e r s to negotiate their
interests.
The entrepreneurial hierarchy

W i t h the w i d e s p r e a d d e v e l o p m e n t o f small-scale export-oriented
a g r i c u l t u r e , a n e x t e n s i v e t r a d i n g h i e r a r c h y d e v e l o p e d . It h a d t w o
sides, b u y i n g agricultural p r o d u c e and selling manufactured
g o o d s , w h i c h , b y t h e 1920s a n d 1 9 3 0 s , b o t h t e n d e d t o b e
d o m i n a t e d b y the same large E u r o p e a n enterprises. In W e s t
Africa, w h e r e cash-cropping w a s m o s t a d v a n c e d , and rural
i n c o m e s h i g h e s t , t h e h i e r a r c h y t y p i c a l l y h a d s e v e r a l t i e r s : (i) l o c a l
h e a d office, c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e a c t u a l i m p o r t a n d e x p o r t o f g o o d s ;
(ii) b r a n c h e s at k e y l o c a l c e n t r e s f o r c o l l e c t i o n a n d d i s t r i b u t i o n ,
r u n b y E u r o p e a n s w h o m a d e a r r a n g e m e n t s w i t h (iii) l o c a l a g e n t s ,
usually m e n o f s o m e standing, to w h o m they advanced cash to
buy p r o d u c e and g o o d s to sell; and (iv) smaller m e n , w i t h o u t
substantial capital or property, w h o actually contacted the farmers
or h a w k e d r o u n d the villages. In those areas, especially o f East,
Central and southern Africa, w h e r e rural c a s h - i n c o m e s w e r e m o s t l y
derived from urban remittances, trading was m o r e focussed
o n t h e s m a l l s t o r e t h a t , a l o n g w i t h t h e boma a n d l a t e r t h e
dispensary, b e c a m e the focal p o i n t o f an area o f dispersed
settlement. T h e p r o d u c e - c o l l e c t i o n side o f the t r a d i n g hierarchy
in W e s t A f r i c a m e a n t t h a t t h e b u y i n g a g e n t s a n d t h e s o - c a l l e d
' m i d d l e m e n ' t e n d e d t o b e n a t i v e s , t h a t is, m e n w i t h l o c a l
c o n n e x i o n s . B u t o t h e r w i s e traders w e r e often strangers; partly,
n o d o u b t , b e c a u s e t h e h i e r a r c h y w a s set u p f r o m o u t s i d e a n d h a d
penetrated into the rural localities, and partly because there w e r e
170

CLASS FORMATION
operational advantages in being culturally distinctive and free

from local communal pressures. Some African peoples became
k n o w n as traders, like the K w a h u in G h a n a o r the Ijebu in
Nigeria. M o r e c o n s p i c u o u s w e r e the Syrians (Lebanese) in W e s t
Africa and Indians in East Africa. T h e Indians were found at every
level from substantial shopkeepers in the large cities to tiny
up-country storekeepers; the Syrians were more to be found in
the middle-to-high levels o f the hierarchy b u y i n g p r o d u c e and
selling cloth. In A n g o l a , this kind o f role w a s often taken up by
1
small Portuguese traders, often recent immigrants.
F r o m the late 1930s this hierarchy began to change its character.
T h e development o f m o t o r transport and better roads enabled
some local b u y i n g agents to branch out into transport. T h e war
caused a reorganisation o f the marketing arrangements, and the
large expatriate concerns tended to w i t h d r a w from the middle
levels o f the produce-buying hierarchy, leaving them to African
or Asian enterprises. In the late 1940s rising entrepreneurs were
an important base o f the nationalist m o v e m e n t , t h r o u g h w h i c h
they made accusations against b o t h the colonial state and expatriate
firms and banks for limiting their opportunities, especially by
credit restrictions and oligopolistic agreements at higher levels.
T h e same period in East Africa saw the emergence o f a really
significant African g r o u p o f small traders and transporters, w h o s e
antipathy to the Asians became an enduring strand o f nationalism.
T h e nationalist success in the 1950s initially meant a definite
improvement in the environment for traders: rapid urban g r o w t h
which expanded their potential markets; loans made available for
transport and other d e v e l o p m e n t s , provided from agricultural
surpluses; and in East Africa, administrative measures against
Asians. T h e arena for entrepreneurs at all levels shifted m u c h more
towards the middling and large t o w n s .
T h e larger commercial magnates stood at the apex o f a pyramid
o f wealth and status w h i c h ran d o w n , w i t h many gradations, to
the urban p o o r ; labourers, drivers, small traders and petty
c o m m o d i t y producers o f all kinds. M a n y traditional crafts were
undermined by imported manufactures and changed needs, but
the cities p r o v i d e d large markets for n e w , m o r e informally
.' D. L. Wheeler and R. Pelissier, Angola (London, 1971), 64, 14) emphasise that 'the
ordinary Portuguese inhabitant of Angola was not a farmer or industrialist, but a petty
trader, a strtaiujo (storekeeper), whose ambitions were limited to owning a laberna or
store'.
«7I

o r g a n i s e d c r a f t s , s u c h as t h o s e c o n c e r n e d w i t h s u p p l y i n g p r e p a r e d
food and clothing, servicing vehicles, constructing a n d maintain
i n g buildings, furniture a n d other appliances. H e r e there w e r e
n o f o r m a l e d u c a t i o n a l b a r r i e r s t o e n t r y , a n d little initial c a p i t a l w a s
needed. T h e master m i g h t have apprentices, and also e m p l o y s o m e
extra labour, in a situation o f intense c o m p e t i t i o n a n d small profit
margins. S u c h w e r e the capital, technical a n d m a n a g e m e n t
obstacles t o e x p a n d i n g a single enterprise's scale o f p r o d u c t i o n
b e y o n d a certain point, that successful petty c o m m o d i t y p r o d u c e r s
a s p i r e d i n s t e a d t o m o v e u p t h e distributive h i e r a r c h y , t o b e c o m e
traders in their o w n supplies, a n d then t o b r a n c h o u t into
transport, building contracting, and distribution o f consumption
g o o d s like beer o r tinned foods. C o m m e r c i a l success w a s largely
a m a t t e r , at t h e u p p e r e n d , o f s e c u r i n g m o n o p o l i s t i c a d v a n t a g e
o v e r competitors t h r o u g h contacts w i t h expatriate suppliers and
g o v e r n m e n t officials, a n d a l s o , at t h e l o w e r e n d , o f m a n a g i n g
relations w i t h a range o f occasional o r full-time e m p l o y e e s ,
sub-contractors, apprentices, personal clients, junior partners and
tenants. T h i s h a d implications f o r the pattern o f class relations
w i t h i n the informal urban sector. D e s p i t e the various w a y s in
w h i c h t h e b i g e n t r e p r e n e u r m i g h t b e said t o e x p l o i t h i s s u b o r
dinates, his continued operation d i d ultimately d e p e n d o n his
m a i n t a i n i n g h i s n e t w o r k o f s u b o r d i n a t e s a n d his w i d e r r e p u t a t i o n .
C o n s e q u e n t l y h e h a d t o d i s p l a y p e r s o n a l g e n e r o s i t y , offer h e l p a n d
l o a n s t o i n d i v i d u a l s a n d c o m m u n a l l e a d e r s h i p , e s p e c i a l l y vis-à-vis
the agencies o f g o v e r n m e n t . T h e c o m m e r c i a l m a g n a t e , rather than
the manufacturer o r the bureaucrat, needed a n d w a s able t o
sustain in t o w n s o m e t h i n g o f the o p e n - h a n d e d ethic o f traditional
chiefship. Despite his wealth, he w a s likely t o be a m a n o f h u m b l e
o r i g i n s a n d s m a l l e d u c a t i o n w h o s e r v e d as a r o l e - e x e m p l a r , a
paradigm o f success, to the youthful urban poor. A paradoxical
d e v e l o p m e n t in S o u t h Africa in t h e 1950s w a s h o w s u c h entre
preneurs tended to displace the o l d educated leadership o f the
A f r i c a n u r b a n c o m m u n i t y , s u c h as t h e t e a c h e r s o r c l e r g y , s i n c e
t h e s e latter w e r e c o m p r o m i s e d b y b e i n g m a d e e l e m e n t s i n t h e
regime's system o f control.
T h i s a c c o u n t o f the social structure o f the informal urban sector
h a s , it is t r u e , l a r g e l y b e e n d e r i v e d f r o m t h e i n s t a n c e o f N i g e r i a ,
w h o s e s i z e a n d w e a l t h as a n a t i o n a l e c o n o m y c r e a t e d , f r o m t h e
1950s a n d e s p e c i a l l y after 1 9 7 0 , a p a r t i c u l a r l y c o m p l e x e n t r e p r e -
172

neurial hierarchy. S o m e t h i n g similar also e m e r g e d in o t h e r

c o u n t r i e s , s u c h as K e n y a o r t h e I v o r y C o a s t , w h i c h w e r e r e l a t i v e l y
rich and espoused a 'capitalist' or ' m i x e d ' e c o n o m i c policy.
P o v e r t y , p e r h a p s m o r e t h a n p r o f e s s e d ' s o c i a l i s m ' , l i m i t e d its
d e v e l o p m e n t i n s u c h c o u n t r i e s as T a n z a n i a o r M a l i . T h e n a t i o n a l i s t
e p o c h b o t h g a v e s c o p e to this i n d i g e n o u s c o m m e r c i a l class a n d
set b o u n d s t o it. A w h e e l c a m e full c i r c l e : t h e e n t r e p r e n e u r s ,
h a v i n g s u p p o r t e d the nationalist m o v e m e n t to c h a l l e n g e the
c o l o n i a l state and the expatriate trading c o m p a n i e s , a g a i n f o u n d
t h e m s e l v e s s u b o r d i n a t e d t o the state, n o w A f r i c a n i s e d , and t o the
expatriate enterprises.
E x c e p t f o r t h e s m a l l e s t a n d p o o r e s t c o u n t r i e s , after t h e 1 9 4 0 s
internal markets came to be able to support s o m e local m a n u
facturing industries, and policies o f i m p o r t substitution w e r e
w i d e l y adopted. T h e s e w e r e neither basic n o r h e a v y industries but
were concerned with light manufacturing and assembling, and
depended to a great extent o n foreign capital and the c o n t i n u e d
importation o f parts or semi-raw materials. F e w locals possessed
the capital o r the skills t o d e v e l o p s u c h industries. L o c a l entre
p r e n e u r s a d a p t e d t o t h i s as d i s t r i b u t o r s o f t h e i r p r o d u c t s o r as
small-scale p r o d u c e r s o f cheap c o n s u m p t i o n g o o d s for their
w o r k e r s a n d t h e rest o f t h e u r b a n p o p u l a t i o n . A s t o i n d i g e n o u s
s o c i a l c l a s s e s , t h e t o p s a l a r i e d s t a t e officials far e c l i p s e d l o c a l
entrepreneurs. Nigeria, almost alone, provided a number o f
c o n s p i c u o u s exceptions. In the nationalist ruling parties o f
socialist countries like M a l i and T a n z a n i a , traders, despite their
e a r l y s u p p o r t f o r t h e n a t i o n a l i s t c a u s e , c o n s i s t e n t l y l o s t , in
ideological and factional struggle, to bureaucrats and party
officials. E v e n i n c o u n t r i e s w h i c h e n d o r s e d ' c a p i t a l i s m ' i n s o m e
f o r m , t h e j o b - s e c u r i t y , h i g h s a l a r i e s a n d a b o v e all s t a t e a u t h o r i t y
w h i c h officials p o s s e s s e d , e n d o w e d t h e m w i t h u n c h a l l e n g e d
1
a d v a n t a g e s . T h e y allocated the resources o f the state and they
w e r e the g a t e w a y t h r o u g h w h i c h expatriate enterprise had to enter
t h e A f r i c a n c o u n t r y . H i g h p u b l i c office b e c a m e a b a s e f r o m w h i c h
1
O n the cultural h e g e m o n y o f the bureaucrat o v e r the entrepreneur, P. Marris and
A . S o m e r s e t , African businessmen ( L o n d o n , 1971), 224-6, s p e a k o f t h e e n t r e p r e n e u r ' s
' d r i v i n g a m b i t i o n t o realise t h r o u g h his o w n enterprise an a c h i e v e m e n t that w i l l
c o m m a n d t h e s a m e r e s p e c t as t h e o c c u p a t i o n s o f t h e h i g h e s t s t a t u s . . . t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
a n d p o l i t i c a l e l i t e f r o m w h i c h h e is e x c l u d e d . H e t h e r e f o r e e m p h a s i s e s t h o s e p u r p o s e s
w h i c h business shares w i t h g o v e r n m e n t . . . for h i m e n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p expresses the spirit
o f African socialism*.
«73

they c o u l d c u t into capitalist enterprises, b u y i n g s t o c k a n d

acquiring directorships. T h u s developed a 'national bourgeoisie',
r e c r u i t e d f r o m s e n i o r state officials, t h e A f r i c a n m a n a g e r s o f
w h o l l y o r p a r t l y f o r e i g n - o w n e d e n t e r p r i s e s , as w e l l as t h e v e r y
élite o f t h e m i n u t e l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i n d i g e n o u s e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l
hierarchy.
Workers and unions
In contrast w i t h the v a r i e g a t e d mass o f p e o p l e e m p l o y e d o r

semi-employed in the informal sector stood those in regular w a g e
or salaried e m p l o y m e n t . A v e r y h i g h p r o p o r t i o n o f these, e x c e p t
for the m i n i n g a n d m o s t h i g h l y industrial e c o n o m i e s , w e r e
e m p l o y e e s o f the g o v e r n m e n t o r public corporations. O f these the
unionised w o r k e r s - those w h o most resembled the proletariat o f
a m o d e r n industrial country - maintained an ambivalent b u t
important relationship to the urban poor.
A certain F a n o n e s q u e tradition, m o s t c o n v i n c i n g l y represented
by A r r i g h i , w i t h primary reference to Central a n d southern
Africa, held that these w o r k e r s constituted an 'aristocracy o f
1
l a b o u r ' , a p r i v i l e g e d g r o u p set against the rural a n d urban p o o r .
It a r g u e d t h a t t h e y e n j o y e d h i g h e r a n d s e c u r e r i n c o m e s t h a n o t h e r
w o r k e r s ; that their v e r y existence d e p e n d e d o n the particular
forms o f exploitation o f the rural p o p u l a t i o n ; that their strategic
i m p o r t a n c e w i t h i n t h e o r g a n s o f t h e state e n a b l e d t h e m t o m a k e
effective d e m a n d s o n the national p r o d u c t ; a n d that in c o n s e q u e n c e
o f these interests they identified u p w a r d s w i t h those h i g h e r in the
o c c u p a t i o n a l h i e r a r c h y a n d e v e n t h e p o l i t i c a l é l i t e . B u t n o t all s u c h
c l a i m s w e r e justified. A b o v e all t h e e v i d e n c e o n w a g e - e a r n e r s '
l i v i n g s t a n d a r d s is n o t e n t i r e l y c l e a r . S o m e s t u d i e s h a v e s u g g e s t e d
that, despite h i g h e r w a g e levels, h i g h e r urban l i v i n g costs a n d the
pressure o f greater numbers o f dependants o n wage-earners meant
2
that they h a d n o t b e e n significantly a d v a n t a g e d ; o n the other
h a n d , t h e v e r y fact o f u r b a n m i g r a t i o n a n d t h e r e p o r t e d a p p e a l
1
G . A r r i g h i , 'International corporations, labor aristocracies and e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p
m e n t in t r o p i c a l A f r i c a ' , in G . A r r i g h i a n d J. S . S a u l , Essays on the political economy
of Africa ( N e w Y o r k a n d L o n d o n , 1973); s e e t o o , r e s p o n d i n g t o m u c h c r i t i c i s m o f t h e
t h e s i s , m o s t l y f r o m t h e left, J. S . S a u l , ' T h e " l a b o u r a r i s t o c r a c y " t h e s i s r e c o n s i d e r e d ' ,
in R. S a n d b r o o k a n d R. C o h e n ( e d s . ) , The development of an African working class ( L o n d o n ,
1975).
2
C f . G . P f e f f e r m a n , Industrial labour in Senegal ( N e w Y o r k , 1968), d i s c u s s e d in
R. C o h e n , Labour and politics in Nigeria ipjj-ip/i ( L o n d o n , 1974), 1 8 7 - 9 1 .
174

1
o f factory and other w a g e e m p l o y m e n t seemed to indicate that
m o s t wage-earners w e r e better situated than the mass o f the rural
and urban population.
B u t e v e n i f t h e s e a d v a n t a g e s w e r e s e c u r e d i n p a r t at t h e e x p e n s e
o f t h e r u r a l o r u r b a n p o o r , it d o e s n o t f o l l o w t h a t t h e i r
identification and action necessarily lay w i t h the h i g h e r social
classes. T h e distinction b e t w e e n w a g e - e a r n e r s and peasants o r
t h o s e i n t h e i n f o r m a l u r b a n s e c t o r is e a s i e r t o m a k e a n a l y t i c a l l y
than concretely. T h r o u g h o u t the p e r i o d , w a g e - e a r n e r s remained
c l o s e l y l i n k e d b y ties o f k i n s h i p a n d r e s i d e n c e w i t h m e m b e r s o f
these o t h e r g r o u p s ; h o u s e h o l d s and w i d e r c o r p o r a t e kin g r o u p s
frequently d e r i v e d i n c o m e f r o m several class s o u r c e s ; w a g e -
earners m o v e d in and o u t o f o t h e r class situations, and frequently
h o p e d to use their s a v i n g s to enable t h e m to b e c o m e c a s h - c r o p
f a r m e r s o r e n t r e p r e n e u r s . I n t h e t o w n s all t h e n o n - é l i t e g r o u p s -
a n d t h i s i n c l u d e d m a n y w h i t e - c o l l a r w a g e - e a r n e r s , s u c h as m i n o r
c l e r k s o r t e a c h e r s as w e l l as t h e g r e a t b u l k o f t h e e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l
hierarchy - shared m a n y o f the same v e x a t i o n s : price inflation,
w r e t c h e d l i v i n g conditions and p o o r public amenities. D e s p i t e the
w a g e - e a r n e r s ' e c o n o m i s t i c pursuit o f d e m a n d s against their
e m p l o y e r s , w h e r e parallels w i t h the b e h a v i o u r o f E u r o p e a n
w o r k e r s w e r e close, a distinctive and enduring 'proletarian'
identity w a s s l o w to e m e r g e ; and, outside the industrial situation,
m e r g e d in a diffuse p o p u l a r c o n s c i o u s n e s s , o f t h e m a s s o f o r d i n a r y
p e o p l e in t h e t o w n s a g a i n s t t h e p o l i t i c a l é l i t e . H e r e , as i n t h e
nationalist m o b i l i s a t i o n against c o l o n i a l rule in the late 1940s,
unionised w o r k e r s had a special role to play.
U n i o n i s e d w o r k e r s w e r e the m o s t organised s e g m e n t o f a
w o r k - f o r c e t h a t , d e s p i t e t h e h o m o g e n e i t y o f its b a s i c c i r c u m
s t a n c e s , w a s still v e r y f r a g m e n t e d . T o t h e p r e v a i l i n g c u l t u r e o f
individualised, clientelist class-relations, they b r o u g h t f r o m their
particular w o r k situation a conception o f confrontation together
w i t h t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s t o e x p r e s s it. M o r e o v e r , b e c a u s e t h e g o v e r n
m e n t w a s the principal e m p l o y e r and m a n y o f the m o s t firmly
established unions represented public-sector w o r k e r s (railway,
post and telegraph o r electricity w o r k e r s , teachers, l o w e r salaried
staffs), t h e p u r s u i t o f m e m b e r s ' n a r r o w e r o c c u p a t i o n a l d e m a n d s
1
Cf. M a r g a r e t Peil, ' A s p i r a t i o n s and social structure: a W e s t African e x a m p l e ' ,
Africa, 1968, 38, 7 1 8 .
175

against an e m p l o y e r c o u l d w e l l b r o a d e n into a c h a l l e n g e to the

g o v e r n m e n t and b e c o m e a vehicle for expressing the g r i e v a n c e s
o f the larger mass o f the non-unionised urban p o p u l a t i o n against
t h e i r r u l e r s . T h i s w a s first e v i d e n t i n late c o l o n i a l A f r i c a , w h e r e
t h e e m p l o y e r s , w h e t h e r i n t h e p r i v a t e o r p u b l i c s e c t o r w e r e , in
a d d i t i o n , i d e n t i f i e d w i t h t h e E u r o p e a n c o l o n i a l p o w e r . I n t h e late
1940s a n d e a r l y 1 9 5 0 s t h e s e v e r a l d e m a n d s o f w o r k e r s i n u n i o n s ,
a n d o f c a s h - c r o p f a r m e r s a n d e n t r e p r e n e u r s , all ran p a r a l l e l in t h e
n a t i o n a l i s t m o v e m e n t . I n s o m e c a s e s , s u c h as G u i n e a , t h e u n i o n s
w e r e the p r i n c i p a l n a t i o n a l i s t b a s e , o r , as i n K e n y a , a v e r y m a j o r
c o m p o n e n t ; in o t h e r s , s u c h as N i g e r i a , w h e r e u n i o n s w e r e
f r a g m e n t e d in d i v e r s e w a y s , n o clear relationship d e v e l o p e d
b e y o n d a g e n e r a l c o n t r i b u t i o n t o n a t i o n a l i s t a w a r e n e s s ; in o t h e r s
a g a i n , s u c h as G h a n a o r Z a m b i a , a n e a r l i e r c l o s e l i n k b e t w e e n t h e
u n i o n s and the nationalist party b e c a m e attenuated, as, w i t h the
a p p r o a c h o f i n d e p e n d e n c e , an i n d i g e n o u s é l i t e b e g a n t o t a k e h o l d
o f t h e r e i n s o f state a n d its c o n c e r n s d i v e r g e d f r o m t h o s e o f t h e
unionised w o r k e r s . After independence, the a m b i g u o u s place
o f u n i o n s a n d t h e i r m e m b e r s in t h e s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e — w h i c h
nationalism seemed for a while to have resolved - tended to
r e - e m e r g e . T h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e 1 9 6 4 g e n e r a l s t r i k e in
Nigeria, for example, w e r e m a r k e d l y like those o f 1945. W o r k e r s ,
and especially those in k e y o r strategic sectors, like m i n e r s o r p o r t
and electricity w o r k e r s , did h a v e s o m e p o w e r to p u s h their o w n
p a r t i c u l a r d e m a n d s , at t h e e x p e n s e o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s o w n
intentions, w h e t h e r these stressed the p r i v i l e g e s o f the élite o r a
m o r e w i d e l y redistributive p r o g r a m m e . In s o m e countries, such
as Benin - t h e f o r m e r D a h o m e y - w h e r e t h e y c o n t r o l l e d t h e
c o m m e r c i a l centre o f C o t o n o u , the unions played an effective role
in n a t i o n a l p o w e r p o l i t i c s . B u t u n i o n l e a d e r s , t h a t is t h e l e a d e r s
o f national labour congresses rather than local shop-floor militants,
c o u l d b e c o o p t e d b y the political élite and the u n i o n s used m o r e
as i n s t r u m e n t s o f c o n t r o l b y t h e g o v e r n m e n t , e s p e c i a l l y w h e r e ,
as in T a n z a n i a , o n l y o n e c e n t r a l l y o r g a n i s e d u n i o n w a s p e r m i t t e d ;
and this frequently led to the disaffection o f o r d i n a r y m e m b e r s
from u n i o n leaders. W h a t e v e r e c o n o m i c advantages unions m i g h t
s e c u r e f o r t h e i r m e m b e r s , t h e y d i d n o t g o n e a r l y far e n o u g h f o r
the mass o f w a g e - e a r n e r s to be c o - o p t e d to the élite; and w o r k e r s '
organisations, if they were permitted reasonable freedom o f
action, w e r e likely to conjoin the pursuit o f their m e m b e r s '
particular d e m a n d s w i t h the intermittent critique o f g o v e r n m e n t
176

p o l i c i e s in t h e n a m e o f t h e ' c o m m o n m a n \ T h e i r s t a n c e w a s m o r e
a reaction to the e v o l u t i o n o f urban c o n d i t i o n s than the active
presentation o f a lower-class alternative to prevailing regimes.
A f r i c a n e c o n o m i e s w e r e still t o o u n d e v e l o p e d , t h e w a g e - l a b o u r
f o r c e s t o o s m a l l in m o s t c a s e s , f o r t h i s t o b e p o s s i b l e . C o n v e r s e l y ,
as t h e d i s t u r b a n c e s at S o w e t o a n d e l s e w h e r e in t h e m i d - 1 9 7 0 s
suggested, S o u t h Africa remained the o n e c o u n t r y w h e r e , o w i n g
t o its o c c u p a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e a n d t h e v i r t u a l e x c l u s i o n o f A f r i c a n s
from the ranks o f capitalists, a social r e v o l u t i o n based o n the mass
o f w a g e - e a r n e r s w a s at all l i k e l y . H e r e , u n l i k e t h e c o u n t r i e s t o t h e
north, mass African nationalism had n o choice but to be, w h a t e v e r
its l e a d e r s h i p , o v e r w h e l m i n g l y a m o v e m e n t r o o t e d a m o n g u r b a n
wage-earners.
The bureaucratic hierarchy
T h e b u r e a u c r a c y d i d n o t f o r m a c l a s s o r a n o c c u p a t i o n as s u c h ,
b u t an a v e n u e o f a s c e n t , p a r a l l e l t o t h a t o f t r a d e , b u t n o w g r e a t l y
o v e r s h a d o w i n g it. T h e e d u c a t i o n a l s y s t e m w a s c r u c i a l h e r e , f o r
t w o r e a s o n s . F i r s t , b e c a u s e t h e c o l o n i a l state, w h o s e e x p a t r i a t e
officials h a d n o i n d e p e n d e n t s t a n d i n g w i t h i n l o c a l s o c i e t y , p r e
ceded and d o m i n a t e d the e m e r g e n t national society, the ability to
a s s u m e b u r e a u c r a t i c office, a n d h e n c e e d u c a t i o n , w a s c r u c i a l f o r
A f r i c a n s t o a t t a i n p o w e r . S e c o n d l y , in t h e a b s e n c e o f f o r m e d
national social classes or status g r o u p s that w e r e in a p o s i t i o n t o
m o n o p o l i s e it, m o d e r n e d u c a t i o n w a s f o r i n d i v i d u a l s , o v e r a
generation o r m o r e , the g a t e w a y to social p o w e r rather than the
fruit o f it. T h e f e w c a s e s w h e r e e d u c a t i o n w a s p r o v i d e d f o r
r e c r u i t s s e l e c t e d o n o t h e r p r i n c i p l e s , s u c h as m e m b e r s h i p o f a
t r a d i t i o n a l r u l i n g e s t a t e , as i n N o r t h e r n N i g e r i a , o n l y s e r v e t o
u n d e r l i n e this g e n e r a l r u l e f o r t h e c o l o n i a l p e r i o d .
E x c e p t for those, m o s t l y Islamic, areas w h e r e c o l o n i a l g o v e r n
m e n t s d e l i b e r a t e l y set o u t t o p r o v i d e s o m e s e c u l a r e d u c a t i o n ,
western education w a s for l o n g o v e r w h e l m i n g l y linked w i t h the
missions. A t the b e g i n n i n g , the incidence o f education a m o n g
A f r i c a n s w a s l a r g e l y a n effect o f t h e v a g a r i e s o f m i s s i o n a r y
presence and success — hence the early a d v a n c e m e n t o f s o m e
coastal peoples like the Fante o r those m o s t receptive to the
G o s p e l , like the T o n g a o f M a l a w i o r the G a n d a . E d u c a t e d
A f r i c a n s in t h e late n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y o c c u p i e d a d i s t i n c t n i c h e ,
as p o l i t i c a l a n d e c o n o m i c g o - b e t w e e n s , b u t e d u c a t i o n d i d n o t
confer a general social p o w e r . Indeed, for a generation f r o m the
l
77

1890s, e d u c a t e d A f r i c a n s , e s p e c i a l l y i n W e s t A f r i c a a n d in A n g o l a ,
suffered a s e t b a c k , s e e i n g t h e m s e l v e s d i s p l a c e d e i t h e r b y E u r o p e a n
officials o r b y i n d i g e n o u s r u l e r s . A g e n e r a l a p p r e c i a t i o n o f t h e
v a l u e o f e d u c a t i o n , at least a m o n g t h e y o u n g , a n d a c o n s e q u e n t
a t t r a c t i o n t o t h e c h u r c h e s t h a t p r o v i d e d it, b e g a n t o d e v e l o p w i t h
the penetration o f the c o l o n i a l administration and the c o m m e r c i a l
e c o n o m y . T h e r e a f t e r , a n d m o s t p a r t i c u l a r l y d u r i n g t h e 1920s
w h e n both Britain and France p r o d u c e d key statements on
c o l o n i a l e d u c a t i o n p o l i c y , it d e v e l o p e d a m o n g t h e w e a l t h i e r
cash-cropping peoples.
E d u c a t i o n w a s needed to p r o v i d e b o t h g o v e r n m e n t and the
c o m m e r c i a l c o m p a n i e s w i t h clerks, so mission s c h o o l s , b e i n g the
most ready means to p r o d u c e them, were therefore subsidised by
the c o l o n i a l g o v e r n m e n t s and g r e a t l y e x p a n d e d . In the s t r a t u m
o f educated y o u n g m e n , c o n s c i o u s bearers o f n e w values, the
social impact o f teachers w a s especially i m p o r t a n t , since they w e r e
m o s t w i d e l y spread a m o n g the rural population. T h e y tended to
be a m o n g s t the m o s t p o o r l y remunerated o f their stratum but,
since teacher-training w a s the m o s t c o m m o n f o r m o f post-primary
education, their profession w a s often a g a t e w a y to the m o r e
l u c r a t i v e p o s t s in g o v e r n m e n t o r c o m m e r c i a l s e r v i c e . T h e i r
discontent w a s c o m p o u n d e d b y their e x c l u s i o n , until the 1940s,
f r o m the local political structure, e x c e p t in informal capacities, and
there was often a divide, b o t h cultural and generational, b e t w e e n
the ' o l d é l i t e ' , represented by chiefs w h o held local political
authority, and the alternative status-hierarchy o f the educated
y o u n g . I n F r e n c h c o l o n i e s at t h i s t i m e , t h e e d u c a t e d t e n d e d t o b e
f e w e r a n d t h e y w e r e e n c o u r a g e d m u c h m o r e t h a n in t h e B r i t i s h
colonies to identify t h e m s e l v e s w i t h the colonial administrative
hierarchy, from w h i c h they w e r e not entirely excluded and w h i c h
reached m u c h further d o w n , often displacing local chiefs f r o m
l e v e l s at w h i c h t h e y w e r e a c t i v e i n , s a y , N i g e r i a . I n t h e B e l g i a n
C o n g o t h e évolués w e r e c o n t a i n e d f o r m u c h l o n g e r , u n t i l t h e
mid-1950s, w h e n their n u m b e r s b e g a n to m o u n t rapidly.
T h e Second W o r l d W a r created a m u c h tighter vertical
integration o f the c o l o n i a l societies : a h i g h e r level o f i n t e r c h a n g e
b e t w e e n l o c a l c o m m u n i t i e s a n d t h e state a n d , in c o n s e q u e n c e , a
greater rivalry b e t w e e n t h e m for access to the resources o f the
state. T h i s m e a n t b o t h t h a t l o c a l c o m m u n i t i e s c a m e t o d e p e n d o n
their e d u c a t e d sons, rather than o n their m o r e locally oriented
178

c h i e f s , as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s b e f o r e t h e w i d e r e n v i r o n m e n t o f t h e
c o l o n i a l state ; a n d t h a t t h e e d u c a t e d c a m e t o d e m a n d a l a r g e r p l a c e
in t h e c o n t r o l o f t h a t state. T h u s it w a s t h a t t h e l o c a l rise o f t h e
e d u c a t e d l e d d i r e c t l y t o t h e i r a s s u m p t i o n o f t h e k e y r o l e in t h e
m o v e m e n t for national independence. Since nationalism e v e r y
w h e r e c o m p r i s e d a coalition o f particular e m e r g e n t class interests,
the e x a c t p l a c e w i t h i n it o f t h e e d u c a t e d v a r i e d c o n s i d e r a b l y . It
w a s n o t u s u a l l y as c l e a r - c u t as in T a n z a n i a , w h e r e T A N U g r e w
from the T a n g a n y i k a African A s s o c i a t i o n , consisting o f clerks and
teachers, or Z a i r e , w h e r e the parties g r e w f r o m associations o f
évolués. I n t h e G o l d C o a s t , o l d e r p r o f e s s i o n a l s , e s p e c i a l l y l a w y e r s ,
joined w i t h chiefs ( m a n y o f w h o m w e r e e d u c a t e d ) in the U n i t e d
G o l d C o a s t C o n v e n t i o n , w h i l e a y o u n g e r a n d g e n e r a l l y less
w e l l - e d u c a t e d g r o u p f o r m e d the c o r e o f a m o r e p o p u l i s t party
in t h e C o n v e n t i o n P e o p l e s P a r t y ; t e a c h e r s a n d e x - t e a c h e r s d o m i
n a t e d the N i g e r i a n A c t i o n G r o u p , a n d s o o n . T h e e d u c a t e d m a d e
a d e c i s i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n t o n a t i o n a l i s m in their articulation o f a
p r o g r a m m e ; a n d t h e y w e r e a l s o its m o s t d e f i n i t e b e n e f i c i a r i e s , i n
that, w h a t e v e r the g e n e r a l c o n s e q u e n c e s o f s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t for
peasants, traders or w o r k e r s , they w o u l d inherit the h i g h e r
political and administrative posts vacated b y expatriates and c o u l d
create m o r e posts o f the same kind.
T h e Africanisation o f the bureaucracy w a s thus a foremost
c o m p o n e n t o f d e c o l o n i s a t i o n as w e l l as n a t i o n a l i s t a d v a n c e ; a n d
s i n c e it m e a n t t h e a s s u m p t i o n b y A f r i c a n s o f t h e h i g h e s t p o s t s ,
f o r m e r l y o c c u p i e d o n l y b y E u r o p e a n s , it r e q u i r e d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t
o f s e c o n d a r y a n d t e r t i a r y e d u c a t i o n . N e w u n i v e r s i t i e s w e r e set u p
in E a s t a n d W e s t A f r i c a s h o r t l y after t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r , a n d
secondary-school expansion o c c u r r e d steadily t h r o u g h the post
w a r period. E v e n so, the process w a s v e r y u n e v e n , the lead b e i n g
taken by those parts o f the E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g countries o f W e s t
A f r i c a w h i c h , in a d d i t i o n t o b e i n g w e a l t h i e r , h a d t h e l o n g e s t
t r a d i t i o n s o f s e c o n d a r y e d u c a t i o n . S o w h i l e T a n z a n i a , o n its
i n d e p e n d e n c e , h a d less t h a n 100 g r a d u a t e s , N i g e r i a at t h e s a m e
time must have had several thousands, t h o u g h these w e r e most
unevenly distributed w i t h i n the country, and G h a n a , relative to
its p o p u l a t i o n , c o u n t e d e v e n m o r e . T h e p r o c e s s o f A f r i c a n i s a t i o n
b e g a n late a n d w e n t v e r y fast. I n t h e s i x y e a r s after i n d e p e n d e n c e ,
f o r e x a m p l e , t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f N i g e r i a n s i n t h e i r c o u n t r y ' s officer
c o r p s r o s e f r o m 18 p e r c e n t t o n e a r l y 100 p e r c e n t . W i t h f e w
x
79

T a b l e 4.4. Educational expansion in selected African countries,

c. 19 jo to c. 1970; percentage of age-cohort enrolled in education
institutions at appropriate level.
Primary, 6—11 Secondary, 12-18 Tertiary, 19-24

1950 i960 1970 1950 i960 1970 1950 i960 1970
Egypt 26 40 69 7 21 33 n/a 4.86 7.92

Algeria 28 75 5 8 11 n/a n/a 1.70
Senegal 7 17 43 I 4 10 n/a 0.50 1.46
Ghana *9 40 61 I 3 9 n/a 0.24 0.83
Nigeria 16 37 34 I 3 4 n/a n/a 0.30
Kenya 26 49 64 2 4 9 n/a n/a 0.79
Tanzania 10 l
9 35 I 2 3 n/a n/a 0.17
Zaire 33 43 88 I 3 9 n/a n/a 0.65
Source: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbooks, 1963, 1964, 1975. Thefiguresare

subject to numerous notes and reservations expressed in this source.
e x c e p t i o n s in F r e n c h Africa, A f r i c a n s o n l y rose t o b e ministers

o r t o p c i v i l s e r v a n t s i n t h e m i d - 1 9 5 0 s o r e v e n later. R e g u l a r s e n i o r
technical and professional posts w e r e Africanised m o r e slowly,
a n d E u r o p e a n s c o n t i n u e d t o b e e n g a g e d o n a c o n t r a c t b a s i s as t h e
demand for such posts expanded. A s Africans came in, they took
o v e r e x i s t i n g salary levels, as w e l l as a l l o w a n c e s a n d perquisites,
and thus vastly o u t s t r i p p e d their non-elite c o m p a t r i o t s in i n c o m e
levels. A consequence o f these signal rewards w a s that the general
d e m a n d f o r e d u c a t i o n w a s g r e a t l y increased. T h e richest areas -
G h a n a and N i g e r i a ' s W e s t e r n R e g i o n — used their c o c o a r e v e n u e s
t o p r o v i d e free p r i m a r y e d u c a t i o n f o r a l l a n d t h i s m a j o r s o c i a l
policy fuelled further d e m a n d for secondary education since the
numbers o f primary leavers soon outstripped the supply o f jobs.
C o u n t r i e s l i k e K e n y a , w i t h its H a r a m b e e s c h o o l s o f t h e 1 9 6 0 s
f o l l o w e d fast b e h i n d t h e l e a d e r s ; a n d e v e n T a n z a n i a , d e s p i t e t h e
d e l i b e r a t e a t t e m p t t o r e d u c e t h e financial p r i v i l e g e s o f g o v e r n m e n t
office after t h e A r u s h a D e c l a r a t i o n i n 1 9 6 7 , s h o w e d s o m e t h i n g o f
t h e s a m e i n f l a t i o n a r y t r e n d (cf. t a b l e 4.4). A t t h e s a m e t i m e t h e
pressure for jobs from the m o d e s t l y educated tended to lead, in
m o s t countries, t o sharp increases in the n u m b e r o f g o v e r n m e n t
p e r s o n n e l i n t h e y e a r s after i n d e p e n d e n c e .
T h e s o c i a l p r e - e m i n e n c e o f t h o s e at t h e a p e x o f t h i s h i e r a r c h y
180

had t w o c o m p l e m e n t a r y aspects: political, t h r o u g h the h o l d i n g

o f g o v e r n m e n t a l p o w e r , a n d c u l t u r a l , t h r o u g h t h e i r ' m o d e r n i t y '.
O f c o u r s e there w e r e v a r i a t i o n s , in time and place, in the precise
c o m p o s i t i o n o f the élite. T h e civilian r e g i m e s w h i c h a s s u m e d
p o w e r at i n d e p e n d e n c e w e r e p e r h a p s m o r e h e t e r o g e n e o u s i n
m e m b e r s h i p t h a n t h o s e w h i c h d e v e l o p e d l a t e r , i n c l u d i n g , as t h e y
did, party-bosses or c o m m u n a l c h a m p i o n s w h o rose t h r o u g h
trade, a u g m e n t e d b y political influence, rather than t h r o u g h the
bureaucracy. In some countries religious leaders, like the heads
o f M u s l i m b r o t h e r h o o d s , o r t r a d i t i o n a l r u l e r s o f little w e s t e r n
education, m i g h t be o f national importance, t h o u g h the general
stance o f the nationalist élites w a s against t h e m - chieftaincy
a b o l i s h e d in G u i n e a a n d T a n z a n i a , t h e U g a n d a n k i n g d o m s
d i s s o l v e d ; t h e g o v e r n m e n t in Z a m b i a m o v i n g a g a i n s t b o t h
p r o m i n e n t chiefs and religious leaders. B u t political leaders w e r e
o v e r w h e l m i n g l y men o f some education, usually former clerks or
teachers; and senior civil servants w e r e m o r e so. T h o u g h the élites
at i n d e p e n d e n c e t h u s h a d t h e s e s e v e r a l p o i n t s o f e n t r y , t h e y
b e c a m e m o r e h o m o g e n e o u s t h e r e a f t e r a n d t h e i r s p e c i f i c a l l y bureau
cratic c o m p o n e n t s t r o n g e r . I n d e p e n d e n t t r a d e r s w h o c a m e t o
t h e p o l i t i c a l élite t h r o u g h p a r t y p o l i t i c s t e n d e d t o b e e c l i p s e d b y
bureaucrats w h o branched into trade o r property o r b y the
African managers o f expatriate enterprises, m e n m o r e like bureau
crats than traders. T h e m o s t s t r i k i n g n e w p r e s e n c e w a s that o f
the military, but soldiers w e r e bureaucrats o f a kind, and, u n d e r
the g l o s s o f the military ethos, shared the predilections o f the
educated generally. Military regimes either c o - o p t e d academics,
l a w y e r s a n d c i v i l s e r v a n t s o n t o d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g b o d i e s as i n
N i g e r i a o r , as w a s m o r e t h e c a s e i n G h a n a , t e n d e d t o a p p r o p r i a t e
administrative functions t h e m s e l v e s , thereby e x c i t i n g inter
professional enmity. T h e r e w a s thus a general tendency for
different s e c t i o n s o f t h e é l i t e t o m o v e i n t o e a c h o t h e r ' s s p h e r e s
and to a d o p t c o m m o n attitudes and life-styles. T h e t o u c h s t o n e
w a s c o n t r o l o f t h e r e s o u r c e s o f t h e state, t h r o u g h p o l i t i c a l office
o r e m p l o y m e n t in p u b l i c i n s t i t u t i o n s . E d u c a t i o n p r o v i d e d t h e
p r i n c i p a l m o d e o f a c c e s s a n d , t h o u g h t a k e n as a b a d g e o f
e l i g i b i l i t y , w a s i t s e l f v a l i d a t e d b y t h e fruits w h i c h it c o n f e r r e d .
A l t h o u g h t h o s e at t h e t o p o f t h e b u r e a u c r a t i c h i e r a r c h y w e r e
s o d i s t a n c e d f r o m t h e rest o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n , t h e r e still r e m a i n e d ,
as t h e w i d e s p r e a d d e s i g n a t i o n ' é l i t e ' i m p l i e s , a m a r k e d r e l u c t a n c e
181

t o s e e t h e m as f o r m i n g a d o m i n a n t s o c i a l c l a s s , t h a t is as a s t r a t u m
w h o s e attributes necessarily create an antagonistic relationship
w i t h l o w e r strata. R a t h e r , t h e i r d i s t i n c t i v e a t t r i b u t e s w e r e c o n
c e i v e d as b e i n g e s s e n t i a l l y c u l t u r a l , a n d t h i s e n a b l e d t h e m t o b e at
once b o t h an example o f w h a t the non-élite m i g h t b e c o m e and
l e a d e r s o f t h e w h o l e s o c i e t y in its a t t e m p t t o a c h i e v e a b e t t e r life.
T h e intense pride s h o w n b y m e m b e r s o f the élite in the a p
p u r t e n a n c e s o f t h e i r s t a t u s is a t o k e n t h a t , far f r o m b e i n g m e m b e r s
o f an u p p e r class w i t h s o m e g e n e a l o g i c a l d e p t h a n d an established
c l a s s c u l t u r e , t h e y w e r e still, as m a n y p o l i t i c i a n s ' a u t o b i o g r a p h i e s
d e t a i l , s o c i a l l y n o t far r e m o v e d f r o m t h e r u r a l a n d u r b a n p o o r .
W h i l e they w e r e not usually the children o f subsistence farmers,
still less o f u n s k i l l e d l a b o u r e r s , b u t r a t h e r o f c l e r k s , c a t e c h i s t s ,
teachers, traders o r c a s h - c r o p farmers, their grandparents w e r e
typically p o o r , rural a n d illiterate; a n d g r a n t e d the extent o f
African k i n g r o u p s , their w i d e r range o f relations usually c o v e r e d
a considerable social spectrum. T h e i r o w n social ascent usually
m e a n t n o t j u s t g r e a t p e r s o n a l effort a n d o f t e n p a r e n t a l s a c r i f i c e ,
but often contributions and support from other m e m b e r s o f the
kin g r o u p , to w h o m they w e r e thus obligated. T h e y remained
linked t o their o r i g i n s in a variety o f w a y s : b y m a i n t a i n i n g o r
' training ' p o o r e r kinsfolk in their houses a n d b y s e n d i n g m o n e y
h o m e ; b y participating in family o r c o m m u n i t y associations; b y
c h a m p i o n i n g in urban a n d political arenas the interests o f their
regions and communities o f origin ; and by patronising individual
co-originaires. T h e r e w e r e , o f c o u r s e , l i m i t s as t o h o w far this
redistribution o r c o m m u n a l responsibility w e n t and there w e r e n o
d o u b t many individuals w h o defaulted o r performed only a
s h a d o w o f w h a t w e r e felt as t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s ; b u t t o t h e e x t e n t
that élite m e m b e r s w e r e thus r e s p o n s i v e t o the d e m a n d s o f their
k i n a n d t h e i r c o m m u n i t i e s , it w a s n o t j u s t f r o m a p e r s o n a l r e s i d u e
o f traditional n o r m s b u t because this base o f s u p p o r t c o n t i n u e d
to b e o f value t o them. O n l y thus c o u l d they b e sure o f
m a i n t a i n i n g title t o l i n e a g e l a n d ( a n i n t e r e s t w h i c h w a s p e r h a p s
c o m i n g t o s e e m o f g r e a t e r m o m e n t i n t h e 1 9 7 0 s t h a n it w a s i n
t h e 19 5 o s ) , a n d o n l y t h u s c o u l d t h e y h o p e t o a c h i e v e p o l i t i c a l office
in elected r e g i m e s . T h e fact that a m a n w a s a ' l e a d e r o f t h o u g h t '
or a recognised c o m m u n a l leader m i g h t significantly advance his
chances e v e n within a bureaucratic hierarchy w h e r e there w a s
182

c o n c e r n , in t h e n a m e o f ' n a t i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n ' , t o b a l a n c e c o m
munal representation.
Y e t u n d o u b t e d l y there w e r e strong tendencies for these links
to b e c o m e attenuated, and for the interests and experiences o f the
élite a n d t h e n o n - é l i t e t o d i v e r g e . C r u c i a l t o t h i s w e r e t h e
c o m b i n e d effects of, first, a s l o w i n g d o w n in t h e r a t e o f g r o w t h
o f élite p o s t s after t h e b o o m c a u s e d b y b e l a t e d c o l o n i a l A f r i c a n i s -
ation and subsequent administrative expansion and, s e c o n d l y , the
elite's a b i l i t y t o e n s u r e t h a t its o f f s p r i n g g o t t h e l i o n ' s s h a r e o f
fresh o r v a c a n t élite p o s t s i n f u t u r e . T h e latter d e r i v e d f r o m t h e
elite's d o m i n a t i o n o f t h e g a t e w a y t o élite s t a t u s : t h e e d u c a t i o n a l
s y s t e m . It w a s a l r e a d y s h o w n in t h e e a r l y 1 9 6 0 s , n o t o n l y t h a t
children o f professional parents had m u c h better chances o f
c o m p l e t i n g secondary education than children o f farmers or, e v e n
m o r e so, o f unskilled w o r k e r s , but also that the chances o f u p w a r d
mobility t h r o u g h education could vary widely. T h e y w e r e , for
e x a m p l e , s i g n i f i c a n t l y l o w e r in G h a n a t h a n in n e i g h b o u r i n g I v o r y
C o a s t - an effect o f G h a n a ' s t h e n b e i n g m o r e ' d e v e l o p e d ' i n b o t h
the size o f its élite a n d in t h e m a t u r i t y o f its s e c o n d a r y - e d u c a t i o n
s y s t e m . E d u c a t i o n w a s d e m a n d e d b y t h e n o n - é l i t e as t h e m a i n k e y
t o u p w a r d m o b i l i t y a n d its free p r o v i s i o n at p r i m a r y l e v e l ,
a c h i e v e d in a f e w c o u n t r i e s , s e e m e d t o p r e s e r v e t h e o r i g i n a l
e q u a l i t y o f o p p o r t u n i t y . B u t s i n c e p o s t s w e r e l i m i t e d in r e l a t i o n
to the n u m b e r s o f p r i m a r y certificate holders, the critical level o f
s e l e c t i o n s h i f t e d h i g h e r . It w a s at t h e l e v e l o f s e c o n d a r y e d u c a t i o n
t h a t t h e real c o n s t r i c t i o n o f o p p o r t u n i t y o c c u r r e d a n d h e r e t h e
élite w a s a b l e t o p r o v i d e t h e c o n d i t i o n s - financial, c u l t u r a l a n d
w h a t e v e r else - f o r t h e s c h o l a s t i c s u c c e s s o f its c h i l d r e n . T h e r e are
n o r e a s o n s t o s u p p o s e t h a t t h e s e b a s i c m e c h a n i s m s w e r e in a n y
w a y affected b y a p a r t i c u l a r c o u n t r y ' s p r o f e s s i o n o f ' s o c i a l i s m '
o r b y s u c h a p o l i c y as t h a t o f T a n z a n i a a t t e m p t i n g t o l i m i t t h e
e c o n o m i c r e w a r d s o f its é l i t e .
S o in all c o u n t r i e s t h e élite t e n d e d t o a c q u i r e a d i s t i n c t i v e
class-culture, shifting from b e i n g an a g g r e g a t e o f individuals f r o m
d i v e r s e c o m m u n i t i e s w h o h a d a c q u i r e d e d u c a t i o n a n d office, t o
b e i n g a fairly b o u n d e d s o c i a l s t r a t u m . I n c r e a s i n g l y its m e m b e r s ,
in a d d i t i o n t o t h e i r w e a l t h a n d p o w e r , h a d a d i s t i n c t l i f e - s t y l e ,
married a m o n g themselves, recruited from within their ranks and
consolidated their order b y material and cultural inheritance. A
I8J

n e w social class w a s in f o r m a t i o n . A t t i t u d e s t o this p r o c e s s o f

t h o s e o u t s i d e the ranks o f the élite w e r e d e e p l y a m b i v a l e n t . W i t h i n
a f e w years o f independence there w a s expressed, particularly
a m o n g the youthful urban p o o r , sharp criticism o f the rich and
p o w e r f u l a n d o f t h e state p o l i c i e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e m ; b u t t h e r e
w a s also m u c h acceptance o f hierarchy p r o v i d e d that the superior
s h o w e d p a t r o n a g e t o c o m m u n i t y a n d i n d i v i d u a l c l i e n t s . B u t it
m a y b e v e r y m i s l e a d i n g t o i n t e r p r e t t h e s e d i v e r g e n t a t t i t u d e s as
definite e v i d e n c e o f a trend f r o m a clientelist t o an antagonistic
p a t t e r n o f c l a s s r e l a t i o n s . C l a s s a c t i o n (as i n s t r i k e s ) w a s far f r o m
b e i n g a f r e s h d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e p o s t - i n d e p e n d e n c e p e r i o d ; it
c o u l d co-exist o r alternate w i t h clientelist responses b y the
non-élite. T h e system o f regional integration, with a hierarchy o f
c o m m u n i t i e s o r regions oriented to i m p r o v e d access to the
national centre, entailed the dependence o f communities o n
educated-bureaucratic patrons. It w a s thus that the p r i v i l e g e s o f
the élite, despite the class a n t a g o n i s m w h i c h they stimulated, w e r e
also c o m b i n e d w i t h a pattern o f conflict w h i c h c u t across the axis
o f class.
S T A T E A N D S O C I E T Y
I n a n y s o c i e t y t h e d e s i g n a t i o n g i v e n t o t h o s e w h o h o l d p o w e r is
usually symptomatic, b u t in sub-Saharan Africa the sheer variety
o f t e r m s u s e d — é l i t e , p o l i t i c a l c l a s s o r classe dirigeante, n a t i o n a l i s t
b o u r g e o i s i e o r e v e n petite bourgeoisie o r n e w m i d d l e c l a s s - s u g g e s t
t h e u n c e r t a i n t i e s . B u t o f t h e s e t e r m s , ' p o l i t i c a l c l a s s ' is p e r h a p s
t h e m o s t h e l p f u l s i n c e it p o i n t s t o t h e fact t h a t s o c i a l p o w e r w a s
o v e r w h e l m i n g l y t h e p r o d u c t o f p o l i t i c a l o r state b u r e a u c r a t i c
office r a t h e r t h a n o f a n y m a t e r i a l r e s o u r c e h e l d i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f
it. C a p i t a l a n d l a n d w e r e t o o e x i g u o u s , u n c o n c e n t r a t e d o r
localised - o r else in the hands o f f o r e i g n a g e n t s - for their
p o s s e s s o r s t o b e nationally p o w e r f u l b e c a u s e o f t h e m ; o r t h o s e w h o
held such resources w i t h i n local arenas w e r e t o o culturally
h e t e r o g e n e o u s , t o o m u c h their possessors o n purely local terms,
or t o o d e v o i d o f the m o d e r n cultural resources necessary for
o p e r a t i o n as a t r u l y n a t i o n a l c l a s s . S o u t h A f r i c a a n d E t h i o p i a , at
least until its social r e v o l u t i o n in t h e m i d - 1 9 7 0 s , w e r e e x c e p t i o n s ,
in t h a t t h e y were t h u s c o n t r o l l e d b y s u c h a p r o p e r t y - o w n i n g c l a s s .
T h e p o s i t i o n i n A r a b states w a s h i s t o r i c a l l y m o r e a m b i g u o u s .
W h i l e , traditionally, there w a s n o private property in land and the
184

ruling elites w e r e a political class o f external p r o v e n a n c e

( M a m l u k , T u r k , Berber), the nineteenth century did tend t o see
the establishment o f a l a n d h o l d i n g aristocracy o f p o w e r f u l fam
ilies. B u t c o l o n i a l i s m u n d e r m i n e d o r d e s t r o y e d o u t r i g h t t h i s
s o c i a l s t r a t u m , a n d s o c i a l d o m i n a n c e t e n d e d t o p a s s t o a n e w classe
dirigeante, t h e h o l d e r s o f p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y a n d b u r e a u c r a t i c office,
as i n s u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a .
T h e p o w e r o f the political class d i d n o t just h a v e t h e n e g a t i v e
c o n d i t i o n t h a t n o o t h e r c o h e r e n t s o c i a l c l a s s e s e x i s t e d at t h e
n a t i o n a l l e v e l . I t i n v o l v e d m o r e t h a n its m e m b e r s ' e d u c a t i o n a n d
technical o r administrative skills, important t h o u g h these m i g h t
be for the ascent o f individuals; for these only conferred p o w e r
because o f the structural importance, e v e n the ' o v e r d e v e l o p
1
m e n t ' , o f t h e state as t h e l i n k b e t w e e n t h e n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y a n d
the outside w o r l d . F o r these external c o n n e x i o n s , mediated
t h r o u g h t h e . state, w e r e i n d i v e r s e w a y s a p r i m e s o u r c e o f t h e
n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y ' s i n t e g r a t i o n - a n d t h a t n o t o n l y , as M a r x i s t
' u n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t ' theory implies, for those societies closely
i n v o l v e d in trading links w i t h the capitalist w e s t . L o c a l c o m
munities d e p e n d e d o n external markets for their cash c r o p s , a n d the
state i n t e r v e n e d t o c o n t r o l t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p ; e x t e r n a l a l l i a n c e s ,
m o r e a v a i l a b l e t o states t h a n t o f o r c e s o f i n s u r r e c t i o n , y i e l d e d t h e
means o f c o e r c i v e c o n t r o l w h e n political classes w e r e u n a b l e
o t h e r w i s e t o d o m i n a t e their societies. O i l , for a f e w states, w a s
a r e s o u r c e w h i c h fell d i r e c t l y t o t h e p o l i t i c a l c l a s s w i t h n o f u r t h e r
i n t e r v e n t i o n in s o c i e t y . T h e s t r u c t u r a l g r o u n d s f o r t h e h e g e m o n y
o f t h e p o l i t i c a l c l a s s w e r e , aufond, t h e s a m e f o r A l g e r i a a n d K e n y a ,
Liberia and Angola.
B u t i n t e r n a l f e a t u r e s o f s o c i e t y d o s e e m t o h a v e h a d s o m e effect
o n h o w the political classes influenced the course o f social c h a n g e .
F i r s t , a l t h o u g h t h e p o l i t i c a l c l a s s a s s u c h l a c k e d its o w n c o n s t i t u
e n c y i n s o c i e t y , it f o u n d t h e t a s k o f g o v e r n i n g m u c h e a s i e r w h e n
1
T h i s is t h e f o r m u l a t i o n o f C o l i n L e y s , ' T h e " o v e r d e v e l o p e d " p o s t - c o l o n i a l s t a t e :
a r e - e v a l u a t i o n ' , Review of African Political Economy, 1976, 5, 39-48, w h o t h u s c o n f r o n t s
i n a n i d i o m o f t h e left t h e s a m e s e t o f p r o b l e m s t h a t o t h e r s c h o l a r s d e n o t e b y e x p r e s s i o n s
l i k e ' t h e p r i m a c y o f p o l i t i e s ' . S e e t o o J. S. S a u l , ' T h e s t a t e i n p o s t - c o l o n i a l s o c i e t i e s -
T a n z a n i a ' , The Socialist Register ( L o n d o n , 1974) a n d ' T h e u n s t e a d y s t a t e : U g a n d a , O b o t e
a n d G e n e r a l A m i n ' , Review of African Political Economy, 1976, 5, 1 2 - 3 8 . S a u l ' s c o n c e p t
o f a ' p e t i t - b o u r g e o i s s t a t e ' c o n f u s e s , s i n c e it i s n e v e r q u i t e c l e a r w h e t h e r t h i s s t a t e is
considered ' p e t i t - b o u r g e o i s ' because o f the political class's origins a n d / o r internal
c o n n e x i o n s , o r b e c a u s e it is ' p e t t y ' i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e real, o v e r s e a s b o u r g e o i s ( o w n e r s
o f m u l t i - n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n s e t c . ) i n w h o s e real i n t e r e s t s it is s a i d t o b e g o v e r n i n g .
185

it e s t a b l i s h e d a l l i a n c e s w i t h p a r t i c u l a r f o r m e d i n t e r e s t - g r o u p s ,
s o m e o f w h i c h w e r e m o r e capable o f f o r c i n g their attentions o n
t h e state t h a n o t h e r s . T h e s e m i g h t b e e t h n i c g r o u p s , p o s s e s s e d o f
s t r a t e g i c r e s o u r c e s s u c h as e d u c a t i o n a l a d v a n c e m e n t , w h i c h i n
t u r n w a s l i k e l y t o b e a n effect o f e a r l i e r p r o m i n e n c e i n c a s h
c r o p p i n g ; o r o c c u p a t i o n a l o r class categories. A n i n d i g e n o u s
b o u r g e o i s i e , f o r e x a m p l e , m i g h t b e closely allied w i t h t h e political
c l a s s , as i n N i g e r i a , o r o p p o s e d b y it, as i n T a n z a n i a ; a m a j o r e t h n i c
g r o u p , l i k e t h e L u o o f K e n y a , m i g h t at o n e t i m e b e o n g o o d t e r m s
w i t h t h e p o l i t i c a l c l a s s , at a n o t h e r t i m e e s t r a n g e d f r o m it. I t is
difficult t o g e n e r a l i s e a c r o s s A f r i c a a b o u t t h e g e n e r a l t e n d e n c y o f
these alliances since they arose o u t o f conjunctures that w e r e
h i g h l y s p e c i f i c as t o b o t h t i m e a n d p l a c e . B u t s u c h a l l i a n c e s h a d
t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r i m p a r t i n g a l o n g - t e r m effect o n t h e p a t t e r n o f
s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n , as t h e p o l i t i c a l c l a s s b e c a m e p r o g r e s s i v e l y
c o m m i t t e d t o a particular pattern o f ethnic a n d class s u p p o r t , a n d
less a n d less a b l e t o t a k e a p u r e l y u n c o m m i t t e d a n d p r a g m a t i c
attitude t o possible alliances.
S e c o n d l y , t h e p o l i t i c a l c l a s s m i g h t b e i n c l i n e d , b e c a u s e o f its
o w n social c o m p o s i t i o n , t o m o v e in particular directions. T o
s u g g e s t t h i s is t o g o b a c k s o m e w h a t o n t h e e a r l i e r p o i n t t h a t o n e
e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e o f a political c l a s s is p r e c i s e l y t h a t its c h a r a c t e r
d e r i v e s f r o m t h e s t r u c t u r a l p o s i t i o n its m e m b e r s h a v e c o m e t o
o c c u p y , rather than f r o m their social o r i g i n s . T h e ' p l a s t i c i t y ' o f
élites in sub-Saharan A f r i c a m a y n o d o u b t b e partly attributed t o
their h e t e r o g e n e o u s o r i g i n s . B u t the v e r y i n c o n c l u s i v e n e s s o f the
debate about E g y p t ' s so-called ' n e w middle class', w h o s e
m e m b e r s ' social o r i g i n s clearly lay in t h e ' rural m i d d l e class a n d
its u r b a n o f f s h o o t s ' , i n d i c a t e s h o w r e f r a c t e d t h e l i n k s b e t w e e n
s o c i a l c l a s s o r i g i n s a n d p o t e n t i a l f o r a c t i o n at t h e l e v e l o f t h e state
c o u l d b e . B u t i f the interests generated b y its m e m b e r s ' particular
c l a s s o r i g i n w e r e l i k e l y , b e c a u s e l o c a l , t o b e fairly i r r e l e v a n t t o
the directions o f the political class's p o l i c y , the cultural values that
d e r i v e d f r o m this o r i g i n c o u l d p l a y a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e at t h e
9
n a t i o n a l l e v e l . T h u s t h e * petit bourgeois b a c k g r o u n d o f t h e c o r e
o f t h e A l g e r i a n p o l i t i c a l c l a s s w a s r e l e v a n t t o s u b s e q u e n t state
9
p o l i c y less b e c a u s e o f t h e d i r e c t o p e r a t i o n o f a 'petit bourgeois c l a s s
interest than because that w a s t h e milieu o f t h e religio-social
reformist m o v e m e n t inspired b y B e n Badis, w h o s e i d e o l o g y nicely
s u s t a i n e d I s l a m i c n a t i o n a l i s m , as w e l l as t h e l e g i t i m a t i o n o f t h e
186

urban political centre against the h e t e r o d o x y and dissidence o f the

hinterlands and the social h e g e m o n y o f m o d e r n i s i n g functionaries.
It is p e r h a p s less l i k e l y t h a t s u c h s o c i a l l y s p e c i f i c e x i s t i n g c u l t u r a l
traditions s h o u l d b e as distinctly relevant t o the d i r e c t i o n o f a
political class's initiatives in B l a c k A f r i c a as in A r a b A f r i c a , w h e r e
cultural idioms w e r e m o r e widespread. B u t the insistency o f
c u l t u r a l d e b a t e in B l a c k A f r i c a - w h e t h e r i n n o v e l s a n d p l a y s , i n
academic historiography o r the pursuits o f Institutes o f African
S t u d i e s - c l e a r l y testifies t o t h e s e n s e a m o n g t h e e d u c a t e d e l i t e ,
f r o m w h i c h t h e p o l i t i c a l c l a s s is l a r g e l y r e c r u i t e d , a n d w i t h w h o m
it m o s t n e e d s t o e s t a b l i s h r e l a t i o n s , t h a t c u l t u r e is h i g h l y r e l e v a n t
to the question: w h a t kind o f society d o w e w a n t t o create?
C U L T U R A L C H A N G E
I n this a n a l y s i s o f s o c i a l c h a n g e , o n e c o m m o n l y h e l d v i e w h a s b e e n
d e l i b e r a t e l y a v o i d e d : t h a t its e s s e n c e h a s b e e n t h e t r a n s m u t a t i o n
of'traditional' societies into ' m o d e r n ' ones t h r o u g h the ever w i d e r
adoption o f m o d e r n cultural values, propagated a m o n g their
1
co-nationals b y a m o d e r n i s i n g elite. S o m e t h i n g like this has
certainly been an i m p o r t a n t element in the self-representation o f
A f r i c a n elites. B u t there are t o o m a n y a m b i g u i t i e s a n d difficulties
f o r this a c c o u n t t o b e a d e q u a t e a s a n e x p l a n a t i o n o f s o c i a l
actuality. M a n y o f the values alleged t o b e m o d e r n m a y also b e
t r a d i t i o n a l a n d ' t r a d i t i o n a l ' b e h a v i o u r m a y p r o c e e d less f r o m
traditional values than from rationally p e r c e i v e d a d v a n t a g e s in the
c o n t e m p o r a r y situation; the m o s t ' m o d e r n ' m a y retain p o w e r f u l
traditional attachments, a n d the ' t r a d i t i o n a l ' m a y s o m e t i m e s b e
harnessed f o r ' m o d e r n ' e n d s ; m u c h o f the empirical variation that
w e h a v e to describe, for e x a m p l e in national policies r e g a r d i n g
development strategy or wealth distribution o r constitutional
f o r m , w o u l d s e e m t o fall r i g h t o u t s i d e a n y ' t r a d i t i o n - m o d e r n i t y '
c o n t i n u u m . T h e t h e o r y t e n d s t o lift c u l t u r e f r o m i t s c o n t e x t s a n d
1
D . E . A p t e r has perhaps b e e n the m o s t influential p r o p o n e n t o f s u c h a p e r s p e c t i v e ,
b o t h in h i s m o n o g r a p h s o n G h a n a a n d U g a n d a a n d , m o r e g e n e r a l l y , in The politics of
modernisation ( C h i c a g o , 1965). S e e , t o o , D . N . L e v i n e , Wax and gold: tradition and
innovation in Ethiopian culture ( C h i c a g o , 1965), w h i c h p r e s e n t s a s u b t l e d e s c r i p t i v e
a c c o u n t , using the ' t r a d i t i o n - m o d e r n i t y ' f r a m e w o r k , o f the personal d i l e m m a s o f social
c h a n g e . R . A . L e V i n e , Dreams and deeds: achievement motivation in Nigeria ( C h i c a g o , 1966)
seeks stimuli t o m o d e r n i s a t i o n in e l e m e n t s o f traditional cultures, b u t his characterisation
o f the ' m o d e r n ' s e e m s u n d u l y l i m i t e d ; cf. c r i t i q u e o f S. R . B a r r e t t , ' M o d e l c o n s t r u c t i o n
a n d m o d e r n i s a t i o n in N i g e r i a ' , Sociological Review, 1969, 1 7 , 2 5 1 - 6 6 .
187

t r e a t s it as q u i t e a u t o n o m o u s , w h e r e a s in fact t h e a d o p t i o n o f
' t r a d i t i o n a l ' o r ' m o d e r n ' s y m b o l s is m o r e o f t e n a f u n c t i o n o f
context, rather than o f individual predispositions. F o r Africa
exhibits a hierarchy o f social levels o r contexts, from the local or
r e g i o n a l in w h i c h a p a r t i c u l a r t r a d i t i o n a l i d i o m w i l l t e n d t o
p r e d o m i n a t e , t o t h e n a t i o n a l w h e r e , as a r u l e , n o s u c h i d i o m w i l l
be able t o p r e v a i l and w h e r e , in a d d i t i o n , social f u n c t i o n s w i t h
n o local o r traditional a n a l o g u e are p e r f o r m e d . A g e n e r a l increase
o f ' m o d e r n i t y ' in c u l t u r e w a s t h u s l a r g e l y a n effect o f t h e g r e a t e r
d o m i n a t i o n o f all s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s b y its s o u r c e , t h e n a t i o n a l s p h e r e .
Y e t t r a d i t i o n is n o t w h o l l y a b a n d o n e d e v e n b y t h o s e w h o s e l i v e s
are m o s t l y p a s s e d i n t h i s s p h e r e , f o r it r e m a i n s a c r u c i a l s o u r c e
o f personal identity; and because o f the patterns o f integration
w i t h i n t h e n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y , it r e t a i n s i m p o r t a n c e as o n e p r i n c i p a l
i d i o m o f v e r t i c a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e élite a n d t h e i r r u r a l
dependants.
T h e e d u c a t e d é l i t e is m u c h m o r e i n t e n s e l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h
c u l t u r e - t h a t is w i t h t h e f o r g i n g o f a c o n s i s t e n t c u l t u r a l s y n t h e s i s
r e l e v a n t t o all l e v e l s a n d r e g i o n s o f t h e n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y - t h a n
t h o s e o r d i n a r y p e o p l e w h o m o v e to and fro b e t w e e n social
c o n t e x t s creating their o w n personal balances, w h e t h e r unified o r
compartmentalised, b e t w e e n the various cultural options o p e n to
t h e m . S o c i e t a l p r o b l e m s w e r e e c h o e d in t h e d i l e m m a s o f t h e i r
personal experience. W h a t balance w a s to be struck b e t w e e n local
values, those associated w i t h family and c o m m u n i t y o f origin, and
the m o r e universal and c o s m o p o l i t a n ones o f formal education,
w o r k - p l a c e and the national political arena? H o w w a s the
educated African to square those aspects o f ' E u r o p e a n ' culture
w h i c h d e p r e c i a t e d A f r i c a a n d l e g i t i m i s e d its s u b o r d i n a t i o n , w i t h
t h o s e w h i c h h a d m a d e h i m w h a t h e w a s , as an e d u c a t e d m a n , a n d
u n d e r l a y his c l a i m t o l e a d e r s h i p r o l e s w i t h i n h i s o w n e m e r g e n t
national society? T h e s e personal and cultural questions became
m u c h m o r e political in i m p o r t w h e n the nationalist m o v e m e n t
c a m e t o m a t u r i t y i n t h e late 1940s a n d t h e e d u c a t e d b e g a n t o m o v e
i n t o p o s i t i o n s o f p o l i t i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Négritude, t h e s o m e w h a t
d e l a y e d r e s p o n s e in F r e n c h A f r i c a to s o m e o f these issues, w a s
from the b e g i n n i n g a synthesis o f the n a r r o w l y ' c u l t u r a l ' w i t h
n a t i o n a l i s t p o l i t i c s . S i n c e t h e c o l o n i a l state w a s n o w t a k e n as
g i v e n , the task w a s to define a level o f national culture against
b o t h the micro-loyalties o f the tribe and the c o s m o p o l i t a n culture
188

o f the c o l o n i a l p o w e r s . T h e p o s i t i o n o f the élite w a s intensely

e q u i v o c a l ; f o r as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e state, m e d i a t o r s b e t w e e n
it a n d t h e o u t s i d e w o r l d , t h e y w e r e s i n c e r e l y c o m m i t t e d t o its
i n t e g r i t y , b u t as c o m m u n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t h e y w e r e a l s o s u s c e p
tible to centrifugal o r ' t r i b a l i s t ' attachments. O n e acute cultural
p r o b l e m w a s that the s y m b o l s o f A f r i c a n n e s s w h i c h c o u l d be m o s t
r e a d i l y set a g a i n s t c o l o n i a l c u l t u r e w e r e a l s o in t h e m a i n i d e n t i f i e d
w i t h p a r t i c u l a r e t h n i c s u b - g r o u p s . N o w h e r e is this m o r e e v i d e n t
than w i t h that classic s y m b o l o f n a t i o n h o o d , a c o m m o n and
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g l a n g u a g e , for in s u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a linguistically
h o m o g e n e o u s states a n d s u p r a - e t h n i c l a n g u a g e s s u c h as S w a h i l i
are s o f e w .
Y e t u n d o u b t e d l y t h e d e c a d e s after t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r d i d
see a definite e n l a r g e m e n t o f t h e c o m m o n c u l t u r a l s t o c k w i t h i n
the national societies. L i n g u a francas c o n t i n u e d to e x t e n d their
r a n g e . E v e n e t h n i c i t y f o s t e r e d a n d b e t o k e n e d it - d e s p i t e its
t e n d e n c y t o h e i g h t e n some c u l t u r a l d i f f e r e n c e s as d i a c r i t i c a l e t h n i c
s y m b o l s - s i n c e it w a s e s s e n t i a l l y a c o m p e t i t i o n b e t w e e n e t h n i c
categories b r o u g h t together under c o m m o n conditions for
c o m m o n ends. A n d ethnic g r o u p s learnt f r o m o n e another. T h e
great spread o f primary education generalised many concerns and
experiences, and the c o n t i n u e d e x p a n s i o n o f the w o r l d religions
i n d i c a t e d a p r o g r e s s i v e d e c l i n e in t h e s u f f i c i e n c y o f p r e d o m i n a n t l y
l o c a l r e l i g i o u s s y m b o l s . It is s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t t h e m o s t t e n a c i o u s
elements o f ' t r a d i t i o n a l ' religion, the m o s t likely to s u r v i v e
migration to t o w n s , w e r e those that t o u c h e d a c o m m o n b e d r o c k
o f African traditional religions: the individual's c o n c e r n for
divinatory and m a g i c o - m e d i c a l assistance. T h e independent
churches and n e w religious m o v e m e n t s , w h i c h continued to
e x p a n d w e l l after t h e v a r i o u s d i v e r s e c r i s e s t h a t b e g o t t h e m h a d
subsided, w e r e h i g h l y s y m p t o m a t i c o f the dual aspect o f general
cultural c h a n g e . O n the o n e hand they represented an indigenis-
ation o f missionary religion, a c l o s i n g o f the cultural g a p b e t w e e n
t h e o l o g i e s o f élite and external o r i g i n and the r e l i g i o u s c o n c e r n s
o f o r d i n a r y p e o p l e , an ecclesiastical forerunner t o the m o v e m e n t
a m o n g educationalists for a m o r e truly vernacular c u r r i c u l u m . O n
the other, n o d o u b t because they b r o u g h t t o g e t h e r a universal
idiom with attention to widespread popular concerns, they
s h o w e d a r e m a r k a b l e a b i l i t y t o a t t r a c t m e m b e r s f r o m different
ethnic g r o u p s and to spread from one ethnic g r o u p to another.
189

It is n o a c c i d e n t t h a t t h e 1 9 5 0 s b r o u g h t s u c h a n e f f l o r e s c e n c e o f
t h e n o v e l - t h a t c u l t u r a l f o r m w h i c h is s o m u c h ' a b o u t ' m o d e r n
social c h a n g e , b o t h a mirror a n d a g u i d e - a n d that the novelists
were so d r a w n to themes o f culture contact: I b o b o y meets
Y o r u b a girl, o r t h e difficulties o f m e e t i n g t h e e x p e c t a t i o n s o f o n e ' s
k i n s f o l k as w e l l as t h o s e o f t h e c i v i l s e r v i c e . S o y i n k a ' s first n o v e l ,
a b o u t a g r o u p o f intellectuals' responses t o their society and t o
their social relations in a n d outside a university, w a s m o s t aptly
n a m e d The interpreters. A n d it is p e r h a p s a l s o i n d i c a t i v e o f a real
socio-cultural a d v a n c e that b y the 1970s m a n y o f the m o s t serious
novelists - Soyinka, A c h e b e , N g u g i - had m o v e d o n to themes
less p u r e l y ' c u l t u r a l ' a n d m o r e p o l i t i c a l , less t o d o w i t h t h e
relations b e t w e e n Africans a n d ' E u r o p e a n ' culture, and m o r e to
d o w i t h those b e t w e e n t h e n e w political class a n d the mass o f the
1
population.
' C u l t u r a l r e v i v a l ' , w i t h its e c h o e s o f négritude, b e c a m e a r a l l y i n g
c r y i n t h e 1960s a n d 1 9 7 0 s , c u l m i n a t i n g i n t h e S e c o n d W o r l d B l a c k
and African Festival o f A r t s and Culture held in L a g o s in 1977.
D e s p i t e its o v e r t s t a n c e , t h i s w a s h i g h l y a m b i v a l e n t t o w a r d t h e
t r a d i t i o n s it c e l e b r a t e d ; a n d n e c e s s a r i l y s o , s i n c e t h e n a t i o n a l élite
w h o s e p r o j e c t it w a s h a d as a c o n d i t i o n o f its o w n e x i s t e n c e t h e
p r o g r e s s i v e destruction o f those social contexts that h a d p r o d u c e d
it. C o n d u c t e d u n d e r t h e s p o n s o r s h i p o f t h e state, it t e n d e d
t o w a r d s t w o m a j o r effects. F i r s t , it d e l o c a l i s e d t r a d i t i o n a l c u l t u r a l
forms, w r e s t i n g t h e m from their p r o p e r contexts o f use, subjecting
them to the requirements o f appeal to m u c h wider g r o u p s , turning
them into ' folklore ' and g i v i n g t h e m a m o r e national character.
Secondly, b y thus appropriating forms w h o s e m o s t authentic
b e a r e r s w e r e still m e m b e r s o f s m a l l r u r a l c o m m u n i t i e s a n d e v e n
m a k i n g itself necessary t o their s u r v i v a l , t h e élite l e g i t i m i s e d itself
in t h e eyes o f those w h o w e r e largely d e p r i v e d o f those ' m o d e r n '
c u l t u r a l a n d p o l i t i c a l r e s o u r c e s w h i c h g a v e a c c e s s t o state p o w e r .
C u l t u r e thus assisted a national integration against the incipient
d i v i s i o n s o f c l a s s a s w e l l as t h o s e o f e t h n i c i t y .
T h e r e remains o n e important source o f the emergent national
culture that w a s neither universal n o r purely ethnic o r local in
provenance: the ideas o f the nationalist leadership a b o u t w h a t
kind o f national society they wished to have. T h e general form
1
E . g . C . A c h e b e , A man of the people ( L o n d o n , 1966); W . S o y i n k a , Season of anomy
( L o n d o n , 1973); N g u g i w a T h i o n g o , Petals of blood ( L o n d o n , 1977).
190

o f t h e ' c u l t u r a l p r o b l e m \ as s k e t c h e d a b o v e , w a s c o m m o n t o m o s t
countries o f sub-Saharan A f r i c a ; the origins and constitution o f
their elite g r o u p s w e r e b a s i c a l l y s i m i l a r ; t h e y f a c e d t h e s a m e
international e n v i r o n m e n t and, w i t h few e x c e p t i o n s , c o n f r o n t e d
s i m i l a r o b s t a c l e s t o t h e d e v e l o p m e n t w h i c h t h e y all d e s i r e d . It m a y
be asked here w h y the political cultures and d e v e l o p m e n t
ideologies o f S e n e g a l and G u i n e a , G h a n a and the I v o r y C o a s t ,
U g a n d a , K e n y a and T a n z a n i a w e r e so diverse. T h i s diversity
c o u l d n o t h a v e b e e n p r e d i c t e d in 1 9 5 0 . A n d it is n o t v e r y
e n l i g h t e n i n g in s e e k i n g a n e x p l a n a t i o n m e r e l y t o r e f e r in g e n e r a l
t e r m s t o t h e d i v e r s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s in w h i c h p a r t i c u l a r c o u n t r i e s
w o n their i n d e p e n d e n c e and the equally diverse political c o n
junctures w h i c h d e v e l o p e d since. B u t the v e r y variety o f responses
s u g g e s t s that w e m a y h a v e a n o t a b l e case o f the relative a u t o n o m y
o f i d e a s b e f o r e w h i c h t h e d e t e r m i n i s m o f s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e falters.
W h a t r e m a i n s t o b e s e e n is w h e t h e r this c u l t u r a l a u t o n o m y w i l l
be matched b y any l o n g - t e r m cultural influence o n social
s t r u c t u r e s ; o r w h e t h e r it w i l l t u r n o u t t o b e fairly e p i p h e n o m e n a l ,
w h i l e the intransigent w e i g h t o f external c i r c u m s t a n c e s forces
1
A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s a n d p e o p l e s t o a d v a n c e in c o n f o r m i t y t o i t .
1
In p r e p a r i n g this c h a p t e r , I r e c e i v e d v a l u a b l e h e l p f r o m P r o f e s s o r E r n e s t G e l l n e r ,
w h o g a v e a d v i c e o n N o r t h A f r i c a , a n d f r o m D i A . J. P e a c e , w h o c o m m e n t e d o n a n
earlier draft.
191

C H A P T E R 5
THE ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF

DEVELOPING AFRICA
T h e t r e a t m e n t o f A f r i c a as a n e c o n o m i c e n t i t y n e e d s t o b e
a p p r o a c h e d w i t h c a u t i o n , f o r it is a c o n t i n e n t o f g r e a t n a t u r a l
diversity. O v e r and a b o v e this the differing political, social and
e c o n o m i c policies i m p o s e d o n the continent b y the colonial
p o w e r s left i n d e p e n d e n t A f r i c a w i t h a p o o r l y i n t e g r a t e d e c o n o m y .
Intra-African trade w a s n e g l i g i b l e ; there w a s n o continental
transport and c o m m u n i c a t i o n s s y s t e m ; and the various indepen
d e n t A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s b e l o n g e d t o different m o n e t a r y z o n e s , e a c h
m o n e t a r y area b e i n g l i n k e d w i t h o n e o r the o t h e r o f the f o r m e r
m e t r o p o l i t a n p o w e r s . It i s , t h e r e f o r e , m o r e a c c u r a t e t o t a l k a b o u t
t h e e v o l u t i o n o f t h e A f r i c a n e c o n o m i e s r a t h e r t h a n o f the A f r i c a n
e c o n o m y ; and necessary to trace h o w each has e v o l v e d d u r i n g the
p e r i o d o f 35 y e a r s c o v e r e d b y t h i s v o l u m e . S u c h a n a p p r o a c h ,
h o w e v e r , w o u l d d o less t h a n full j u s t i c e t o t h e e c o n o m i c h i s t o r y
o f A f r i c a for in spite o f the differences in the p a t t e r n s o f
d e v e l o p m e n t o f the various countries, certain overall themes and
features are discernible. It w i l l b e o u r a i m t o h i g h l i g h t these w h i l e
e m p h a s i s i n g , as m a y b e a p p r o p r i a t e , t h e u n i q u e n e s s o f e a c h
e c o n o m y . S o u t h A f r i c a , b e i n g a d e v e l o p e d e c o n o m y , at l e a s t as
far as its d o m i n a n t w h i t e c o m m u n i t y w a s c o n c e r n e d , is n o t
considered here except for c o m p a r a t i v e p u r p o s e s ; n o r for that
m a t t e r , u n l e s s e x p r e s s l y s t a t e d , is R h o d e s i a , d u e t o l a c k o f d a t a ,
particularly d u r i n g the period o f the unilateral declaration o f
independence.
W i t h o u t d o u b t t h i s p e r i o d is o n e o f t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t i n
A f r i c a ' s p o l i t i c a l as w e l l as its e c o n o m i c h i s t o r y . B u t w h i l e b y t h e
e n d o f o u r p e r i o d o n l y in f o u r c o u n t r i e s - the F r e n c h S o m a l i C o a s t
(Djibouti), Rhodesia ( Z i m b a b w e ) , South West Africa (Namibia)
and S o u t h A f r i c a itself - had political p o w e r n o t yet been trans
ferred to A f r i c a n s , in the e c o n o m i c sphere, b y c o n t r a s t , the
r e a w a k e n i n g p r o c e s s w a s still at t h e s t a g e o f a s s e r t i o n o f r i g h t s
192

T H E E C O N O M I C E V O L U T I O N
and o f a re-assessment o f the relevance o f the e c o n o m i c p h i l o s o p h y ,

strategy and policy inherited from the colonial p o w e r s . B y 1975
n o fundamental c h a n g e h a d taken place in the e c o n o m i e s w h i c h
i n d e p e n d e n t A f r i c a inherited. I n fact, in s o m e areas there h a d b e e n
real s e t b a c k s .
T H E C O L O N I A L E C O N O M Y O N T H E E V E O F
T H E S E C O N D W O R L D W A R
T h e foundations o f the national e c o n o m i e s inherited b y the n e w l y

i n d e p e n d e n t g o v e r n m e n t s w e r e l a i d d o w n i n t h e first t w o d e c a d e s
o f the t w e n t i e t h century a n d elaborated in the s u c c e e d i n g t w o
decades b e t w e e n the First W o r l d W a r and the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r ,
w h i c h m a r k s t h e b e g i n n i n g o f o u r p e r i o d . B y 1 9 1 4 , as J. F o r b e s
M u n r o h a s p u t it, t h e r e h a d b e e n ' a fairly d r a m a t i c s t r e n g t h e n i n g
o f Africa's connections under the international e c o n o m y , and
p o s s i b l y t h e final, c o n c l u s i v e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f its e c o n o m i e s
into peripheries o f the industrialised capitalist centre o f w o r l d
1
e x c h a n g e ' . V e r y few Africans n o w remained untouched by the
demands o f externally oriented production, o r b y a colonial
p h i l o s o p h y t h a t s a w t h e c o l o n i e s p r i m a r i l y as a s o u r c e o f r a w
m a t e r i a l s f o r t h e m e t r o p o l i t a n e c o n o m i e s a n d as a m a r k e t f o r
imported manufactured g o o d s .
T a x a t i o n w a s the principal l e v e r that b r o u g h t additional l a b o u r
and p r o d u c e o n t o the m a r k e t ; railroads p r o v i d e d a n e w transport
infrastructure t h r o u g h w h i c h increased quantities o f i m p o r t e d
g o o d s c o u l d b e c h e a p l y shifted into the interior a n d n e w areas
o p e n e d for export p r o d u c t i o n . B y 1940 a particular pattern o f
d e p e n d e n c y h a d d e v e l o p e d in m o s t c o l o n i e s , a n d in s o m e cases
o n a r e g i o n a l b a s i s : at t h e c e n t r e o f t h e c o l o n i a l e c o n o m i c s y s t e m
w a s the e x p o r t e n c l a v e ; o n the periphery w e r e those areas that
provided migrant labour for the export enclave. V e r y few
A f r i c a n s c o u l d n o w c l a i m that they o p e r a t e d in a traditional
' subsistence' e c o n o m y that w a s u n t o u c h e d b y the d e m a n d s o f the
i n t e r n a t i o n a l e c o n o m y . F u r t h e r m o r e , as a r e s u l t o f t h e d i f f e r i n g
tariffs, c u r r e n c i e s , l e g a l s y s t e m s , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p o l i c i e s a n d
l a n g u a g e s , as w e l l as t h e d i r e c t i o n o f r a i l w a y e x p a n s i o n , v e r t i c a l
links were forged between the metropolitan countries and colonies
1
J. F o r b e s M u n r o , Africa and the international economy 1800-1960 ( L o n d o n , 1976), 86.
*93

Major vegetation zones.

that d i s c o u r a g e d b o t h the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f pre-existing, and the
development of new, regional patterns of trade and
communication.
W i t h i n the export-led e c o n o m y , E u r o p e a n concerns generally
controlled the c o m m a n d i n g heights o f c o m m e r c e and p r o d u c t i o n ,
w i t h t h e L e b a n e s e in W e s t A f r i c a a n d A s i a n s i n E a s t A f r i c a
o c c u p y i n g intermediate roles, and A f r i c a n s restricted for the m o s t
194

T H E C O L O N I A L E C O N O M Y
p a r t t o t h e least l u c r a t i v e e c o n o m i c l e v e l s . T h i s h i e r a r c h i c a l
pattern, h o w e v e r , had important regional variations. In W e s t
A f r i c a t h e r e w e r e f e w r a d i c a l a l t e r a t i o n s in an e c o n o m i c s y s t e m
that had l o n g - s t a n d i n g external contacts and w h e r e A f r i c a n
p a r t i c i p a t i o n in p r o d u c t i o n a n d c o m m e r c e r e m a i n e d v e r y s t r o n g .
I n r e g i o n s w h e r e m i n i n g , as in S o u t h A f r i c a , o r E u r o p e a n - d i r e c t e d
a g r i c u l t u r e , as in A l g e r i a , K e n y a a n d R h o d e s i a , e x e r t e d a d o m i n a n t
i n f l u e n c e , t h e n t h e p r i m a r y A f r i c a n r o l e w a s i n c r e a s i n g l y s e e n as
that o f p r o v i d i n g c h e a p l a b o u r . B e t w e e n the e x t r e m e s represented
by these paradigms there w a s a variety o f o p p o r t u n i t y for African
participation.
I n at least t w o i m p o r t a n t r e s p e c t s e c o n o m i c s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y w a s
b e i n g e r o d e d . F i r s t , r a i l r o a d e x p a n s i o n m a d e it p o s s i b l e t o
distribute cheaply large quantities o f imported g o o d s ; indigenous
industries - particularly t h o s e i n v o l v e d in the m a n u f a c t u r e o f
i r o n , salt a n d c l o t h — c o l l a p s e d o r w e r e s e v e r e l y r e s t r i c t e d in t h e
face o f this i n f l u x . S e c o n d , t h e q u a n t i t y a n d v a r i e t y o f f o o d
p r o d u c t i o n w a s a d v e r s e l y affected b y t h e r e - a l l o c a t i o n o f l a n d a n d
labour towards export production. This process was more gradual
t h a n t h e c o l l a p s e o f l o c a l craft i n d u s t r i e s . I n t h e l o n g t e r m it w a s
t o h a v e m a r k e d r e g i o n a l effects o n n u t r i t i o n , s o i l c o n s e r v a t i o n a n d
r e s i s t a n c e t o d r o u g h t as w e l l as i n i t i a t i n g a g r o w i n g d e p e n d e n c e
on i m p o r t e d foodstuffs.
T h e inter-war period, with a few brief exceptions, w a s a time
o f i n s t a b i l i t y a n d d e p r e s s i o n in t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l e c o n o m y t h a t h a d
a p r o f o u n d i n f l u e n c e o n t h e e c o n o m y o f A f r i c a at t h e b e g i n n i n g
o f o u r period. B e t w e e n 1929 and 1932 the v a l u e o f A f r i c a ' s
c o m m e r c e h a d fallen b y a p p r o x i m a t e l y 42 p e r c e n t a n d o n l y
r e c o v e r e d s l o w l y o v e r t h e n e x t e i g h t y e a r s . I n d e e d b y 1938 m a n y
c o u n t r i e s w e r e still at l o w e r l e v e l s o f r e t u r n f r o m t r a d e t h a n t h e y
h a d b e e n in 1 9 2 9 . I n m a n y c o l o n i e s g o v e r n m e n t d i r e c t i o n o f t h e
e c o n o m y ( p a r t i c u l a r l y in m a r k e t i n g ) i n c r e a s e d e n o r m o u s l y d u r i n g
t h e 1 9 3 0 s in o r d e r t o e n s u r e t h a t p r o d u c t i o n w a s m a i n t a i n e d , a n d
e v e n increased, in the face o f falling c o m m o d i t y prices and
w a g e - r a t e s . S m a l l e r firms a n d t r a d e r s w e r e f o r c e d o u t o f b u s i n e s s
w h i l e a restricted n u m b e r o f large mercantile concerns reacted to
insecurity by amalgamation, price-fixing and market-sharing
thereby establishing a l o n g - t e r m oligopolistic influence o n the
c o l o n i a l e c o n o m i e s t h a t w a s t o c o n t i n u e i n m a n y c a s e s l o n g after
independence. T h e white-settler communities, notoriously
*95

inefficient a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c e r s , w e r e s h e l t e r e d f r o m d i s a s t e r b y
preferential access to markets, credit, and g o v e r n m e n t services.
B y 1940 African peasants and petty traders w e r e h a v i n g to p a y
a v e r y h e a v y price - in absolute a n d relative terms - for their
colonial subjugation and incorporation into the international
economy.
T H E P E R F O R M A N C E O F T H E A F R I C A N E C O N O M Y ,
1940-75
B y 1 9 4 0 , t h e n , t h e c o l o n i a l e c o n o m i e s o f A f r i c a h a d b e c o m e firmly
established. T h e colonial pattern o f production, concentrating o n
primary products for export and importing most o f the manu
factured g o o d s required, had b e c o m e the established doctrine.
B e c a u s e o f this e x t e r n a l o r i e n t a t i o n , t h e p r e - c o l o n i a l A f r i c a n
economies were distorted almost b e y o n d recognition. T h e y had
lost their a u t o n o m y , a n d A f r i c a ' s * m a i n function w a s t o p r o d u c e
for the w o r l d m a r k e t u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s w h i c h , because they i m p o v
e r i s h e d it, d e p r i v e d [it] o f a n y p r o s p e c t s o f r a d i c a l m o d e r n i s a t i o n .
T h i s " t r a d i t i o n a l " society w a s n o t , therefore, in transition t o
" m o d e r n i t y " ; as a d e p e n d e n t s o c i e t y it w a s c o m p l e t e , p e r i p h e r a l ,
1
a n d h e n c e at a d e a d e n d . '
F o l l o w i n g the lean years o f the depression, the w a r itself
b r o u g h t partial relief t o the A f r i c a n e c o n o m i e s . A l t h o u g h the
demand for Africa's primary products increased substantially,
p a r t i c u l a r l y after t h e l o s s o f S o u t h E a s t A s i a t o J a p a n i n 1 9 4 2 ,
t h e r e w a s n o c o r r e s p o n d i n g u p w a r d shift in p r i c e s b e c a u s e
A f r i c a ' s external c o m m e r c e w a s subjected t o a series o f w a r t i m e
m a r k e t i n g c o n t r o l s b y t h e c o l o n i a l p o w e r s . I n d e e d , it w a s n o t u n t i l
t h e last t w o y e a r s o f t h e w a r t h a t s i g n i f i c a n t l y h i g h e r p r i c e s w e r e
paid for African primary produce. T h u s for most o f the w a r years
A f r i c a n p r o d u c e r s suffered s u b s t a n t i a l l o s s e s i n t h e i r real i n c o m e s .
F o r w h i l e their earnings f r o m their agricultural p r o d u c t s w e r e
stabilised, the prices o f i m p o r t e d c o m m o d i t i e s , if they w e r e
a v a i l a b l e at a l l , r o s e . A n d i n o r d e r t o s u s t a i n , a n d p o s s i b l y
increase, p r o d u c t i o n t o meet w a r t i m e d e m a n d s , colonial admin
istrations a d o p t e d c o e r c i v e measures. W h a t e v e r tactics w e r e
a d o p t e d , t h e n e t e c o n o m i c effect o f t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n o f t h e c o l o n i a l
1
S a m i r A m i n , ' U n d e r - d e v e l o p m e n t a n d d e p e n d e n c e in B l a c k A f r i c a - o r i g i n s a n d
c o n t e m p o r a r y f o r m s ' , Journal of Modern African Studies, 1972, 1 0 , 4, 520.
196

T H E A F R I C A N E C O N O M Y
p o w e r s in the m a r k e t i n g o f agricultural c o m m o d i t i e s w a s to
d e p r i v e African countries o f the o p p o r t u n i t y presented b y the w a r
to accelerate the pace o f their d e v e l o p m e n t . T h e years b e t w e e n
1945 a n d 1 9 4 9 s a w n o s u b s t a n t i a l i m p r o v e m e n t f r o m w a r t i m e
conditions. T h e r e continued to be trade controls, shortages o f
g o o d s and h i g h prices o n imports. T h e post-war expectations o f
the A f r i c a n p o p u l a t i o n w e r e n o t m e t and this resulted in
widespread labour, and to a certain extent agrarian, unrest.
S o m e o f the agrarian d i s c o n t e n t w a s d i r e c t e d at the o p e r a t i o n s
o f the p r o d u c e m a r k e t i n g b o a r d s , direct descendants o f the
e c o n o m i c control boards established d u r i n g the w a r . O r i g i n a l l y
c o n c e i v e d as i n s t r u m e n t s o f l o n g - t e r m p r i c e s t a b i l i s a t i o n , t h e
m o n o p o l y p o s i t i o n o f the b o a r d s w a s used increasingly to extract
resources from the agrarian sector w h i c h w e r e then diverted to
o t h e r d e v e l o p m e n t sectors o r , particularly in this p e r i o d , w h e t h e r
expressly or not, to bolster the currency reserves o f the m e t r o
politan countries. M a r k e t i n g boards continued to be prime
instruments o f g o v e r n m e n t e c o n o m i c control t h r o u g h o u t our
period, e v e n t h o u g h their impact o n agricultural p r o d u c t i o n
remained controversial.
W h a t then w a s the e c o n o m i c situation in A f r i c a b y 1950 - the
b e g i n n i n g o f the pre-independence decade - and w h a t c h a n g e s
t o o k place d u r i n g that d e c a d e ? B e c a u s e o f the lack o f reliable and
c o m p r e h e n s i v e d a t a , it is o f c o u r s e e a s i e r t o p o s e t h a n t o a n s w e r
this q u e s t i o n . A n d w h a t e v e r d a t a are a v a i l a b l e , h o w e v e r f r a g
m e n t a r y , g e n e r a l l y relate t o i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t r i e s . Q u a n t i t a t i v e
d a t a r e l a t i n g t o t h e c o n t i n e n t as a w h o l e w e r e , i n t h e 1 9 5 0 s ,
unavailable. In fact, for this d e c a d e , indicators o f total e c o n o m i c
a c t i v i t y , s u c h as d o m e s t i c p r o d u c t a n d n a t i o n a l i n c o m e , a r e
a v a i l a b l e f o r o n l y 21 c o u n t r i e s a n d in s e v e r a l o f t h e s e c o u n t r i e s
the data are available for o n e year o n l y . E x t r e m e c a u t i o n ,
therefore, needs to b e e x e r c i s e d in a t t e m p t i n g t o d r a w v a l i d
c o n c l u s i o n s f r o m t h e d a t a , p a r t i c u l a r l y as t h e i r a c c u r a c y v a r i e s
considerably from c o u n t r y to country, r a n g i n g f r o m the h i g h l y
p r o b a b l e t o the m e r e l y conjectural.
B u t in s p i t e o f this l i m i t a t i o n , it is still p o s s i b l e t o i d e n t i f y , e v e n
i f o n l y in b r o a d o u t l i n e , t h e m a i n f e a t u r e s o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t i n
the e c o n o m i e s o f Africa b e t w e e n 1950 and i960. D e v e l o p m e n t s
in A f r i c a s i m p l y e c h o e d d e v e l o p m e n t s i n t h e i n d u s t r i a l i s e d m a r k e t
e c o n o m i e s , particularly those o f the colonial p o w e r s . W h e r e a s the
J
97

immediate p o s t - w a r years saw the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f w a r t i m e

r e s t r i c t i o n s in w a r - d e v a s t a t e d E u r o p e a n d l a b o u r a n d a g r a r i a n
u n r e s t in an e x p e c t a n t , d e m o b i l i s i n g A f r i c a , w i t h t h e p r o g r e s s i v e
r e m o v a l o f w a r t i m e c o n t r o l s after 1948 a n d t h e r e s u r g e n c e in t h e
international e c o n o m y , the w o r l d d e m a n d for A f r i c a n p r o d u c e
expanded very rapidly. T h e reconstruction and re-equipment o f
the w e s t e r n industrial e c o n o m i e s t h r o u g h M a r s h a l l A i d and the
s u b s e q u e n t g r a d u a l r e m o v a l o f all f o r m s o f r e s t r i c t i o n a n d
c o n t r o l , a n d t h e g r o w t h in real i n c o m e s in t h e s e c o u n t r i e s , l e d
i n e v i t a b l y t o a c o m m o d i t i e s b o o m in A f r i c a , p a r t i c u l a r l y in A f r i c a
s o u t h o f the Sahara. T h i s b o o m w a s intensified b y the o u t b r e a k
o f t h e K o r e a n w a r in 1 9 5 0 w h e n t h e i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s s t o c k p i l e d
c o m m o d i t i e s . A l l t h e s e d e v e l o p m e n t s r e s u l t e d in t h e p r i c e s f o r
A f r i c a ' s p r o d u c e r i s i n g t o u n p r e c e d e n t e d h e i g h t s . F o r t h e first
time since the First W o r l d W a r , the barter terms o f trade m o v e d
s t r o n g l y in f a v o u r o f t h e A f r i c a e c o n o m i e s .
T h i s b o o m had a considerable i m p a c t o n the p r o d u c t i o n o f
e x p o r t c o m m o d i t i e s in A f r i c a , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e a n n u a l c r o p s . T h u s
in W e s t A f r i c a , g r o u n d n u t p r o d u c t i o n d o u b l e d b e t w e e n 1 9 4 7 a n d
1 9 5 7 ; c o t t o n p r o d u c t i o n m o r e t h a n t r e b l e d ; coffee i n c r e a s e d b y
o n e - a n d - a - h a l f t i m e s ; a n d c o c o a , w h i c h t a k e s b e t w e e n five a n d
s e v e n y e a r s after p l a n t i n g t o y i e l d , i n c r e a s e d b y 24 p e r c e n t d u r i n g
t h i s t e n - y e a r p e r i o d . T e a p r o d u c t i o n d o u b l e d in s o u t h e r n A f r i c a ,
w h i l e s u g a r p r o d u c t i o n i n c r e a s e d b y 8 9 . 7 4 a n d 42 p e r c e n t
in s o u t h e r n a n d e a s t e r n a n d c e n t r a l A f r i c a r e s p e c t i v e l y . C o t t o n
e n j o y e d c o m p a r a b l e i n c r e a s e s in t h e t h r e e s u b - r e g i o n s w h i l e coffee
p r o d u c t i o n i n c r e a s e d b y 1 6 6 p e r c e n t in E a s t A f r i c a a n d b y 83 p e r
c e n t in C e n t r a l A f r i c a .
In t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f m i n e r a l s , s i m i l a r s p e c t a c u l a r i n c r e a s e s
w e r e a c h i e v e d , as t a b l e 5.1 c l e a r l y s h o w s . I n 1 9 3 8 , A f r i c a
a c c o u n t e d f o r 97 p e r c e n t o f t h e w o r l d o u t p u t o f d i a m o n d s ; 95
p e r c e n t o f c o b a l t ; 46 p e r c e n t o f g o l d ; 40 p e r c e n t o f c h r o m e ;
35 p e r c e n t o f m a n g a n e s e ; a n d 21 p e r c e n t o f c o p p e r . I n o t h e r
m i n e r a l s , t h e p o s i t i o n o f A f r i c a w a s less p r o n o u n c e d - 12 p e r c e n t
o f t o t a l tin p r o d u c t i o n ; 6 p e r c e n t o f i r o n o r e ; a n d 2 p e r c e n t o f
a n t h r a c i t e a n d b i t u m i n o u s c o a l . B y 1 9 5 0 A f r i c a a c c o u n t e d f o r 52
p e r c e n t o f w o r l d o u t p u t o f c h r o m i t e a n d m a n g a n e s e ; 22 p e r c e n t
o f c o p p e r ; 56 p e r c e n t o f g o l d a n d 13 p e r c e n t o f tin c o n c e n t r a t e s .
A l t h o u g h the o u t p u t o f d i a m o n d s , r o c k p h o s p h a t e s , cobalt, silver
a n d a s b e s t o s e x p a n d e d in a b s o l u t e t e r m s , t h e A f r i c a n s h a r e i n t h e
198

T a b l e 5 . 1 . Indices of output of principal minerals

(1948-jo, average = 100).
Level of production
1937-8 1955-7
Mineral production average average
Copper 9 1
M5
Manganese 68 136
Iron ore 96 188
Lead 56 213
Zinc 31 224
Tin 9 1 112
Bauxite 404
Chromite 54 145
Cobalt 55 196
Asbestos 2
9 164
Calcium phosphate 7* 167
Gold 132 120
Source: United Nations economic survey of Africa since 19jo, table 2-1.
w o r l d p r o d u c t i o n o f these minerals declined d u r i n g the pre-

i n d e p e n d e n c e d e c a d e o f the 1950s. A f r i c a ' s share in w o r l d o u t p u t
increased in respect o f c o p p e r , g o l d , tin concentrates, tungsten and
z i n c , a n d it r e m a i n e d c o n s t a n t in t h e c a s e o f i r o n o r e , d i a m o n d s ,
and lead.
T h u s in the 1950s m o s t A f r i c a n e c o n o m i e s w e r e able t o attain
h i g h rates o f e c o n o m i c e x p a n s i o n , p r o p e l l e d as t h e y w e r e b y t h e
c o m m o d i t i e s b o o m o f the p o s t - w a r period. T h e r e w e r e also
i n f l o w s o f p r i v a t e c a p i t a l . T a b l e 5.2 s h o w s t h e c h a n g e s b e t w e e n
1950 a n d 1957 in g r o s s national p r o d u c t s a n d g r o s s capital
f o r m a t i o n in A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s , s e l e c t e d f r o m t h e v a r i o u s s u b -
r e g i o n s o f the c o n t i n e n t that e n j o y e d an a v e r a g e g r o w t h rate o f
7.74 per cent per a n n u m d u r i n g the eight-year period c o v e r e d .
T h e i r g r o s s capital f o r m a t i o n a v e r a g e d 10.41 p e r cent p e r a n n u m
during the same period. A s w e h a v e already pointed o u t , a l t h o u g h
c o m p r e h e n s i v e national i n c o m e data are n o t available for m o s t
A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s f o r this p e r i o d , t h e g e n e r a l p i c t u r e is r e a s o n a b l y
c l e a r : g r o s s n a t i o n a l p r o d u c t g r e w o n t h e w h o l e at t h e rate o f
a b o u t 5 - 7 p e r c e n t p e r a n n u m i n real t e r m s .
But the colonial structure o f the African e c o n o m i e s remained
199

Table 5.2. Selected African countries; percentage changes in gross national product
and gross capital formation, 19 jo—7.
Gross national product Gross capital formation
Average Annual Average Annual

Total yearly rate of Total yearly rate of
Country Period increase increase growth increase increase growth
Belgian Congo 1950-7 78.7 11.2 8.64 145-4 20.8 13.68
Morocco 1951-6 49-5 9.9 8.38
— — —
Nigeria 1950-6 39.8 6.6 5-74 H4.i b
19.0 15
i3-53 b
Rhodesia and Nyasaland 1950-7 138.5 19.8 13.2 130.4b i8.6 b

I2.6 7
b
(Federation of)
Union of South Africa 1950-7 84.5 12.1 9.14 94-4 13-5 9-97
Gold Coast 1950-7 48.6 6.9 5.82 32.6 4-7 4.11
Mauritius 1950-7 57.6 8.2 6.72 40.0 5-7 4.92
0
Kenya 1950-7 107.4 15-5 10.98
— — —
Tanganyika^ 1954-7 16.9 5.6 5.33 8.0 2.4
—
Uganda b
1950-7 70.2 10.0 7.90
Uganda 1950—6 63.5 10.6 8.53
—
121.2 b —
29.2 b —
i .i5 b
4
Egypt (UAR) 1950-6 16.3 2.7 2.56

—
Source: United Nations economic survey of Africa since ipjo.
a
Cumulative rate
b
Not including capital formation in peasant agriculture
c
Net domestic product
d
Gross domestic product

u n c h a n g e d ; i f a n y t h i n g , it b e c a m e c o n s o l i d a t e d . T h e r a p i d g r o w t h
in t h e A f r i c a n e c o n o m y h a d d e r i v e d f r o m t h e b o o m in t h e
industrialised m a r k e t e c o n o m i e s . T h e peripheral nature o f the
African e c o n o m i e s remained and their e c o n o m i c d e p e n d e n c e
i n t e n s i f i e d . It w a s a l s o d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d t h a t t h e c o l o n i a l p o w e r s
a b a n d o n e d t h e p o l i c y o f financial s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y f o r c o l o n i e s a n d
adopted instead the p o l i c y o f responsible colonialism under w h i c h
they p r o v i d e d the c o l o n i e s w i t h d e v e l o p m e n t funds. T h e a d o p
tion o f the n e w policy w a s n o d o u b t b o r n o u t o f a mixture o f
motives and intentions - a genuine humanitarian concern about
p o v e r t y in Africa, a sense o f m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n for Africa's w a r t i m e
assistance, and a v e r y large m e a s u r e o f e n l i g h t e n e d self-interest.
T h i s w a s the rationale o f the British C o l o n i a l D e v e l o p m e n t and
W e l f a r e A c t o f 1945 a n d t h e F r e n c h F o n d s d ' I n v e s t i s s e m e n t e t d e
1
D é v e l o p p e m e n t É c o n o m i q u e et S o c i a l ( F I D E S ) o f 1 9 4 6 . T h e s e
colonial aid p r o g r a m m e s p r o v i d e d ready m a r k e t s for m e t r o p o l i t a n
g o o d s as w e l l as finance f o r d e v e l o p m e n t i n t h e c o l o n i e s . M o r e
importantly, they enabled the colonial p o w e r s to achieve a greater
measure o f control o v e r , and ability to coordinate and influence,
the i n v e s t m e n t policies o f the c o l o n i e s . F r a n c e w e n t e v e n further
t h a n t h e o t h e r s . B e c a u s e o f its p o l i c y o f a s s i m i l a t i n g t h e c o l o n i e s
t o m e t r o p o l i t a n F r a n c e , as e v i n c e d in t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e n e w
F r e n c h U n i o n o f 1 9 4 6 , its a i d w a s l i n k e d t o a p u b l i c i n v e s t m e n t
p r o g r a m m e d e s i g n e d f o r t h e m o d e r n i s a t i o n o f F r a n c e itself.
In c o n c l u d i n g this r e v i e w o f d e v e l o p m e n t d u r i n g this d e c a d e ,
it m u s t b e a d d e d t h a t t h e flow o f financial r e s o u r c e s f r o m t h e
metropolitan countries, particularly Britain and France, and to a
l e s s e r e x t e n t B e l g i u m , t o t h e c o l o n i e s w a s u n s u r p a s s e d . It w o u l d
h e l p t o p u t t h i s d e v e l o p m e n t in p r o p e r h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e i f
it is p o i n t e d o u t t h a t m o r e r e s o u r c e s w e r e t r a n s f e r r e d i n t h e d e c a d e
1 9 4 6 t o 1 9 5 6 t h a n d u r i n g t h e e n t i r e p e r i o d f r o m 1903 t o 1 9 4 6 .
F o r e x a m p l e , b e t w e e n 1952 and 1957 F r a n c e i n v e s t e d 579 billion
F r e n c h francs o f p u b l i c funds in the c o l o n i e s . W e shall c o m e b a c k
t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f aid l a t e r . B u t suffice it t o a d d t h a t n e i t h e r
P o r t u g a l n o r Spain p r o v i d e d any substantial v o l u m e o f aid t o their
African colonies.
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e b o o m in t h e d e m a n d f o r t r o p i c a l p r i m a r y
p r o d u c t s d i d n o t last l o n g . T o w a r d s t h e e n d o f t h e d e c a d e , t h e r e
w a s a fall in t h e i r p r i c e s d u e t o a w o r l d - w i d e e c o n o m i c d e p r e s s i o n .
1
F o r a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f p r e v i o u s D e v e l o p m e n t A c t s s e e C h a p t e r 1.
20I

1 1 1 1 1 » 1 1 —
1955 1956 1957 1956 1959 I960 1961 1962

YEAR
6 Primary commodities: export prices indices (1958 = 100)

(United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Sept. 1963).
T h e r e w a s c o n s e q u e n t l y a c o n s i d e r a b l e r e d u c t i o n i n t h e rate o f
e c o n o m i c g r o w t h o f the A f r i c a n e c o n o m i e s b y the b e g i n n i n g o f
t h e 1960s. T h u s n o t o n l y d i d t h e A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s , m o s t o f w h i c h
h a d b e c o m e i n d e p e n d e n t b y t h e first h a l f o f t h e 1 9 6 0 s , a c h i e v e
i n d e p e n d e n c e w i t h the c o l o n i a l structure o f their e c o n o m y intact,
b u t t h e y a l s o suffered t h e m i s f o r t u n e o f t a k i n g o v e r at a t i m e w h e n
e c o n o m i c p e r f o r m a n c e fell b e l o w t h a t o f t h e 1 9 5 0 s . T o i l l u s t r a t e
t h i s , fig. 6 s h o w s t h e m a g n i t u d e o f t h e r e v e r s e s suffered b y
c o m m o d i t i e s ' export prices. C o n s e q u e n t l y , the g o v e r n m e n t s o f
t h e n e w l y i n d e p e n d e n t A f r i c a n states ( a n d 1 7 o f t h e m b e c a m e
i n d e p e n d e n t in i 9 6 0 a l o n e ) w e r e f a c e d w i t h s e r i o u s e c o n o m i c a n d
financial p r o b l e m s s o o n after t h e i r a s s u m p t i o n o f p o w e r . T h e n e w
leadership o f these countries inherited not only u n d e r d e v e l o p e d
e c o n o m i e s w i t h their colonial patterns o f p r o d u c t i o n and w i t h the
vast majority o f their p e o p l e ill-fed, ill-clad, ill-housed and
202

illiterate, b u t they also faced the i m m e d i a t e p r o b l e m s o f a s l u m p

in t h e p r i c e s o f t h e c o m m o d i t i e s w h i c h w e r e t h e i r m a i n s o u r c e
o f i n c o m e . P u b l i c r e c u r r e n t as w e l l as d e v e l o p m e n t e x p e n d i t u r e
rapidly diminished. B u t the confidence and o p t i m i s m generated
by the c r u m b l i n g o f c o l o n i a l i s m u n d e r the tidal w a v e o f national
ism w a s e n o u g h to sustain the n e w leadership, w h i c h had
p r o m i s e d i m p r o v e d e c o n o m i c and social c o n d i t i o n s for their
people and had thereby engineered a revolution o f rising expec
tations a m o n g them.
D e v e l o p m e n t planning w a s a d o p t e d b y the African g o v e r n
m e n t s as t h e i n s t r u m e n t n o t o n l y f o r a r r e s t i n g t h e a d v e r s e t r e n d in
the terms o f trade but also for accelerating the rate o f g r o w t h and
the pace o f social and e c o n o m i c transformation and thus satisfying
this r e v o l u t i o n o f r i s i n g e x p e c t a t i o n s . O v e r a n d a b o v e t h e i r
experience o f post-war colonial d e v e l o p m e n t planning - itself
based o n the experience o f w a r t i m e p l a n n i n g - the rapid trans
formation o f the centrally planned socialist e c o n o m i e s , particularly
that o f t h e U S S R , i n f l u e n c e d t h e n e w l y i n d e p e n d e n t c o u n t r i e s in
their reliance o n centralised e c o n o m i c p l a n n i n g rather than o n the
operation o f a free-market e c o n o m y . T h e almost universal
a c c e p t a n c e o f p l a n n i n g as a n efficient t o o l f o r p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n
w i t h regard to rapid e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t w a s also inspired by
the e x a m p l e o f t h e s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s . E v e n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ,
w h i c h for years had a b h o r r e d p l a n n i n g , w a s b y i960 actively
e n c o u r a g i n g aid-seeking countries to formulate national d e v e l o p
m e n t plans. B u t the greatest single factor w h i c h s t r e n g t h e n e d the
case for p l a n n i n g w a s the d e s i g n a t i o n o f the 1960s b y the G e n e r a l
A s s e m b l y o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s as t h a t o r g a n i s a t i o n ' s F i r s t
Development Decade.
T h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s set d o w n g u i d e l i n e s a n d o b j e c t i v e s f o r
accelerating p r o g r e s s t o w a r d s the self-sustaining e c o n o m i c
g r o w t h o f i n d i v i d u a l n a t i o n s a n d t h e i r s o c i a l a d v a n c e m e n t s o as
t o a t t a i n in e a c h d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r y a s u b s t a n t i a l i n c r e a s e in t h e
rate o f g r o w t h . T o w a r d s t h i s e n d , it s p e c i f i e d t h a t e a c h c o u n t r y
set its o w n t a r g e t , t a k i n g a n a n n u a l rate o f i n c r e a s e o f 5 p e r c e n t
in t h e g r o s s d o m e s t i c p r o d u c t ( G D P ) as t h e m i n i m u m g r o w t h r a t e
t o b e a c h i e v e d at t h e e n d o f t h e d e c a d e . A n d t h i s g r o w t h o b j e c t i v e
was to be achieved preferably t h r o u g h c o m p r e h e n s i v e planning.
T h e a c h i e v e m e n t o f t h e t a r g e t rate o f g r o w t h w o u l d , it w a s
t h o u g h t , b e a c c o m p a n i e d b y a n i m p r o v e m e n t in t h e e c o n o m i c
203

c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e p o o r e r s e c t i o n s o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n . It w a s a l s o
t h o u g h t that there w o u l d be substantial social p r o g r e s s t h r o u g h
the elimination o f illiteracy, h u n g e r and disease, t h r o u g h i m
p r o v e m e n t in e d u c a t i o n a n d t h r o u g h a m o r e e g a l i t a r i a n d i s t r i
bution o f income.
T h e 1 9 7 0 s w e r e s i m i l a r l y p r o c l a i m e d as t h e S e c o n d U n i t e d
N a t i o n s D e v e l o p m e n t D e c a d e . T h e strategy for that decade called
f o r a n a v e r a g e rate o f g r o w t h o f G D P at c o n s t a n t p r i c e s o f at least
6 p e r c e n t p e r a n n u m . T o a c h i e v e s u c h an o v e r a l l g r o w t h rate,
a n a n n u a l rate o f e x p a n s i o n o f 4 p e r c e n t in a g r i c u l t u r a l o u t p u t
a n d o f 8 p e r c e n t in m a n u f a c t u r i n g p r o d u c t i o n w a s n e c e s s a r y . T h e
s t r a t e g y a l s o c a l l e d f o r h a l f a p e r c e n t a g e p o i n t rise a n n u a l l y in t h e
ratio o f g r o s s d o m e s t i c s a v i n g to the g r o s s p r o d u c t , so that the
r a t i o w o u l d rise t o a r o u n d 20 p e r c e n t b y t h e y e a r 1 9 8 0 ; a n d a
rise o f n o t m o r e t h a n 7 p e r c e n t in i m p o r t s , o r a b o u t o n e
p e r c e n t a g e p o i n t h i g h e r t h a n t h e t a r g e t set f o r G D P g r o w t h rate.
E v e n if African g o v e r n m e n t s w e r e otherwise inclined, there
w e r e f o r c e s i m p e l l i n g t h e m t o p l a y a d i r e c t a n d p e r v a s i v e r o l e in
t h e d e v e l o p m e n t p r o c e s s . It w a s a b a s i c a s s u m p t i o n o f t h e U N
First and S e c o n d D e v e l o p m e n t D e c a d e s that d e v e l o p i n g countries
w o u l d a c h i e v e the stated o b j e c t i v e s t h r o u g h c o m p r e h e n s i v e
planning. Bilateral d o n o r agencies, particularly from industrialised
m a r k e t e c o n o m i e s , t o g e t h e r w i t h s u c h m u l t i l a t e r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s as
the International B a n k for R e c o n s t r u c t i o n and D e v e l o p m e n t (the
W o r l d B a n k ) and the U N D e v e l o p m e n t P r o g r a m m e , attached a
great deal o f i m p o r t a n c e to p l a n n i n g and the preparation o f
n a t i o n a l p l a n s as a p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r p r o v i d i n g i n v e s t m e n t finance,
grants and technical assistance in the p r e p a r a t i o n o f s u c h plans.
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , instead o f d e v e l o p m e n t p l a n n i n g b e c o m i n g the
i n s t r u m e n t f o r e n g i n e e r i n g s o c i o - e c o n o m i c c h a n g e in A f r i c a , a
w i d e n i n g g u l f s o o n b e g a n to e m e r g e b e t w e e n planning and plan
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . In an increasing n u m b e r o f c o u n t r i e s , the
d e v e l o p m e n t p l a n s o o n b e c a m e , l i k e t h e n a t i o n a l flag a n d t h e
national anthem, a s y m b o l o f sovereignty. M o r e often than not
it w a s u n f o r t u n a t e l y r e s p e c t e d m o r e in t h e b r e a c h t h a n in t h e
p e r f o r m a n c e . In any case, the policies and p r o g r a m m e s c o n t a i n e d
in s u c h p l a n s t e n d e d , w i t h v e r y f e w e x c e p t i o n s , t o p e r p e t u a t e t h e
c o l o n i a l p a t t e r n o f p r o d u c t i o n o f t h e A f r i c a n e c o n o m i e s . It is n o t
surprising therefore that Africa's overall e c o n o m i c p e r f o r m a n c e
b e t w e e n i960 and 1975 w a s p o o r .
204

As w e h a v e already stated, the boom in t h e d e m a n d for

c o m m o d i t i e s had been replaced b y a mild depression t o w a r d s the
end o f the 1950s. T h u s b e t w e e n 1958 a n d 1964 the total G D P o f
A f r i c a i n c r e a s e d b y o n l y 27 p e r c e n t o r at a b o u t 4.2 p e r c e n t
a n n u a l l y at c o m p o u n d rate. T h e r e w a s a s l i g h t i m p r o v e m e n t o n
this p e r f o r m a n c e d u r i n g t h e rest o f t h e 1 9 6 0 s . F o r t h e w h o l e o f
the U N First D e v e l o p m e n t D e c a d e , A f r i c a a c h i e v e d an a v e r a g e
g r o w t h rate o f 5.0 p e r c e n t in real t e r m s . A n d d u r i n g t h e first h a l f
o f t h e S e c o n d D e v e l o p m e n t D e c a d e t h e p e r f o r m a n c e w a s 4.5 p e r
c e n t p e r a n n u m . I n all d u r i n g t h e 1 5 - y e a r p e r i o d , 1 9 6 0 - 7 5 , t h e
o v e r a l l A f r i c a n p e r f o r m a n c e o f 4.9 p e r c e n t fell b e l o w t h e t a r g e t s
o f the First and S e c o n d D e v e l o p m e n t D e c a d e s . T h e year 1975 w a s
a particularly bad one for Africa mainly because o f the w o r l d
r e c e s s i o n a n d real g r o w t h in G D P fell t o 2 p e r c e n t , a n d t h e r e a f t e r
w a s to b e c o m e n e g a t i v e in n o t a f e w c o u n t r i e s . A s a p e r i p h e r y
o f t h e p e r i p h e r y , . t h e A f r i c a n e c o n o m i e s suffered considerably
from the inflationary pressures w h i c h g r i p p e d the industrialised
m a r k e t e c o n o m i e s in t h e latter p a r t o f t h e 1 9 6 0 s a n d t h e first h a l f
o f the 1970s. Inflation c o u p l e d w i t h recession led to an e v e n
s h a r p e r fall in t h e v a l u e s o f e x p o r t c o m m o d i t i e s , t h u s s e r i o u s l y
affecting g o v e r n m e n t r e v e n u e f r o m e x p o r t s . T h e A f r i c a n g o v e r n
ments also had n o c h o i c e but to s u c c u m b to the d e m a n d for w a g e
and salary increases and, in s o m e cases, t o the pressure t o subsidise
essential consumer g o o d s , thus accentuating the inflationary
p r o c e s s . B e c a u s e o f t h e c o n s e q u e n t i a l i n c r e a s e s in g o v e r n m e n t
e x p e n d i t u r e , m o s t g o v e r n m e n t s had t o resort t o deficit financing.
T h e s e g o v e r n m e n t s also p e r f o r c e h a d to pile u p external d e b t s in
order to pay for their i m p o r t s , w h i c h increased f r o m an estimated
t o t a l o f $ U S 5 b i l l i o n in 1 9 6 5 ^ 0 a b o u t $ U S 2 2 b i l l i o n in 1 9 7 3 a n d
$ U S 30 b i l l i o n i n 1 9 7 5 . T h i s r e s u l t e d in a g r o w i n g d e m a n d f o r t h e
rescheduling o f external debts. M e a n w h i l e , there w a s an increasing
a c c u m u l a t i o n o f a r r e a r s in i n t e r n a t i o n a l p a y m e n t s , a n d a g r o w i n g
number o f countries became threatened w i t h acute balance-
o f - p a y m e n t s difficulties d u e in part to h e a v y d e b t liabilities.
S T R U C T U R A L A N D S E C T O R A L C H A N G E S
It h a s o f t e n b e e n s a i d t h a t d u r i n g this p e r i o d d e v e l o p i n g A f r i c a
w a s r u n n i n g v e r y hard to remain in the same place. T h i s statement
is b o r n e o u t b y t h e fact t h a t it w a s t h e w o r l d ' s l e a s t d e v e l o p e d
205

Agriculture,Forestry, Hunting
Commerce
J and Fishing
Transport and Communication

Mining and Quarrying
Public Administration and Defence

Manufacturing and Electricity
Other Services
Construction
7 Developing Africa: structure of gross domestic product, 1960-75 (in

million US$ at 1970 rate of exchange) (compiled from EC A computer
national accounts print-outs, March 1977).
r e g i o n , h a v i n g 18 o f the 25 least d e v e l o p e d a m o n g d e v e l o p i n g
c o u n t r i e s a n d 27 o f t h e w o r l d ' s m o s t s e r i o u s l y affected c o u n t r i e s
w h i l e i n c l u d i n g 14 l a n d - l o c k e d c o u n t r i e s . I n e x a m i n i n g t h e s t r u c
t u r e o f d e v e l o p i n g A f r i c a , w e shall p e r f o r c e h a v e t o c o n c e n t r a t e
o n the p o s t - i n d e p e n d e n c e period for w h i c h data o n national
206

T a b l e 5.3. Developing Africa: expenditure on gross domestic product, 1960-jj
(in million % US at 1970 rate of exchange).
Percentage distribution
Expenditure i960 1965 1970 1975 i960 1965 1970 1975
Total GDP at 1970 market 35436.9 44510.6 5 8 064.3 71934.4 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
prices
Private consumption 26336.3 30807.8 20
379 -7 47070.1 74.3 2 69.21 65.31 65.43
Government consumption 4703.9 6213.8 9465-7 14 267.1 13.27 13.96 16.30 19.83
Fixed capital formation 5705.3 7074.6 9 664.1 18748.3 16.10 15.89 16.64 26.06
Increase in stocks 145-4 512.6 732.2 687.2 0.41 1.15 1.27 0.96
Exports of goods and services 8 794.7 11468.6 15050.7 16357.9 24.82 25-77 25.92 22.74
Less imports of goods and 10248.7 11566.8 14769.1 25 196.2 28.92 25.98 2
5-44 35.02
services
Source-. ECA national accounts computer print-outs, March 1977.

a c c o u n t s are a v a i l a b l e . T h e d a t a in fig. 7 s h o w t h a t t h e e c o n o m i c
structure o f African countries u n d e r w e n t significant changes
d u r i n g this p e r i o d . In p a r t i c u l a r , t h e s h a r e o f a g r i c u l t u r e in t h e
G D P d e c l i n e d f r o m 4 1 . 3 p e r c e n t i n i 9 6 0 t o 30.3 p e r c e n t in 1 9 7 5 .
T h e s h a r e o f m i n i n g i n c r e a s e d f r o m 4.4 p e r c e n t t o 7.3 p e r c e n t ,
a n d t h e s h a r e o f m a n u f a c t u r i n g a n d e l e c t r i c i t y i n c r e a s e d f r o m 10.0
p e r c e n t t o 12 p e r c e n t . T h e s h a r e o f c o n s t r u c t i o n a l s o i n c r e a s e d
from 5 per cent to 8 per c e n t ; w h i l e the share o f public ad
m i n i s t r a t i o n a n d d e f e n c e i n c r e a s e d f r o m 8 t o 12 p e r c e n t .
T r a n s p o r t a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s d i d n o t c h a n g e its r e l a t i v e s h a r e
significantly. D e s p i t e these c h a n g e s , agriculture remained the
d o m i n a n t s e c t o r in m o s t d e v e l o p i n g A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s .
T h e e c o n o m i c structure o v e r the period 1960-75 can also be
e x a m i n e d b y c o n s i d e r i n g the e v o l u t i o n o f the main c o m p o n e n t s
o f e x p e n d i t u r e o n t h e g r o s s d o m e s t i c p r o d u c t (i.e. p r i v a t e
c o n s u m p t i o n , g o v e r n m e n t c o n s u m p t i o n , capital formation, ex
ports o f g o o d s and services and imports o f g o o d s and services).
T h e impression c o n v e y e d b y the available information o n private
c o n s u m p t i o n in d e v e l o p i n g A f r i c a (see t a b l e 5.3) is t h a t p r i v a t e
consumption absorbed a higher proportion o f available resources
in d e v e l o p i n g A f r i c a t h a n it d i d in o t h e r T h i r d W o r l d c o u n t r i e s .
In i960, private c o n s u m p t i o n a c c o u n t e d for 74 per cent o f G D P
in real t e r m s , w h i l e in 1 9 7 5 it a c c o u n t e d f o r 65 p e r c e n t . T h e
s i t u a t i o n is e v e n c l e a r e r w h e n w e c o n s i d e r i n f o r m a t i o n o n
i n d i v i d u a l A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s . F o r i n s t a n c e , in i 9 6 0 , p r i v a t e
c o n s u m p t i o n a c c o u n t e d f o r m o r e t h a n 50 p e r c e n t in 4 4 o f 48
d e v e l o p i n g A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s . T h e e x c e p t i o n s w e r e G a b o n (45 p e r
c e n t ) a n d N o r t h e r n R h o d e s i a (48 p e r c e n t ) . I n t w o c o u n t r i e s ,
h o w e v e r , private c o n s u m p t i o n exceeded G D P b y a significant
m a r g i n - L i b y a (105 p e r c e n t ) a n d B a s u t o l a n d ( 1 0 8 p e r c e n t ) . I n
1 9 7 5 , p r i v a t e c o n s u m p t i o n as a p e r c e n t a g e o f G D P w a s little
c h a n g e d f r o m t h e i 9 6 0 l e v e l s , a c c o u n t i n g f o r m o r e t h a n 50 p e r
c e n t in 42 o f t h e 48 c o u n t r i e s . L i b y a d i d , h o w e v e r , a c h i e v e a
s u b s t a n t i a l c h a n g e in r e d u c i n g t h e s h a r e f r o m 105 p e r c e n t in i 9 6 0
t o 48 p e r c e n t in 1 9 7 5 , t h a n k s t o o i l p r o d u c t i o n .
A s is i n d i c a t e d in t a b l e 5.3, t h e s h a r e o f g o v e r n m e n t c o n s u m p
t i o n in t o t a l G D P at 1 9 7 0 c o n s t a n t m a r k e t p r i c e s in d e v e l o p i n g
A f r i c a i n c r e a s e d f r o m 13 p e r c e n t in i 9 6 0 t o 20 p e r c e n t in 1 9 7 5 .
It is i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e t h a t , in 3 1 o f t h e 48 c o u n t r i e s , t h e s h a r e
o f g o v e r n m e n t c o n s u m p t i o n in G D P i n c r e a s e d s u b s t a n t i a l l y in
208

real t e r m s f r o m i 9 6 0 t o 1 9 7 5 . T h e s h a r e d e c r e a s e d i n 1 2 c o u n t r i e s
and remained constant in 5 others.
A s r e g a r d s g r o s s fixed c a p i t a l f o r m a t i o n as a p e r c e n t a g e o f g r o s s
d o m e s t i c p r o d u c t at c o n s t a n t 1 9 7 0 p r i c e s , t a b l e 5.3 i n d i c a t e s a n
i n c r e a s e f r o m 1 6 p e r c e n t i n i 9 6 0 t o 26 p e r c e n t i n 1 9 7 5 . F r o m
t h e d a t a o n t h e i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t r i e s , it a p p e a r s t h a t t h e r e w a s a
rising trend in the share o f the d o m e s t i c p r o d u c t used for capital
f o r m a t i o n i n all d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s e x c e p t A n g o l a , t h e C o n g o ,
Ethiopia, the G a m b i a , G h a n a , K e n y a , Libya, N i g e r and Uganda.
E x p o r t s a n d imports o f g o o d s a n d services are c o n s i d e r e d in
detail in t h e section d e a l i n g w i t h A f r i c a a n d the international
e c o n o m y . B u t it is i m p o r t a n t t o p o i n t o u t h e r e t h a t t h e s h a r e o f
total exports o f g o o d s a n d services in G D P in d e v e l o p i n g Africa
d e c r e a s e d f r o m 25 p e r c e n t i n i 9 6 0 t o 23 p e r c e n t i n 1 9 7 5 , w h i l e
the share o f i m p o r t s o f g o o d s a n d services in G D P increased f r o m
29 p e r c e n t i n i 9 6 0 t o 35 p e r c e n t i n 1 9 7 5 .
The agricultural sector
T h o u g h there h a v e been significant c h a n g e s in the structure o f

the A f r i c a n e c o n o m y , they h a v e n o t b e e n fundamental. A f r i c a
t o d a y still h a s pro tanto a n a g r i c u l t u r a l e c o n o m y . T h e fall i n t h e
relative contribution o f agriculture t o the G D P has been d u e n o t
s o m u c h t o i n c r e a s e d p r o d u c t i v i t y i n t h e o t h e r s e c t o r s as it h a s
been to the very l o w productivity in agriculture and t o p o o r
weather conditions. U n d e r the U N First and S e c o n d D e v e l o p m e n t
D e c a d e s , a t a r g e t rate o f g r o w t h o f 4 p e r c e n t p e r a n n u m w a s
a s s u m e d f o r a g r i c u l t u r e . P r o d u c t i o n fell c o n s i s t e n t l y v e r y m u c h
b e l o w this t a r g e t , a v e r a g i n g 2.5 p e r c e n t p e r a n n u m . T h e
w o r s e n i n g d r o u g h t c o n d i t i o n s in the S u d a n o - S a h e l i a n r e g i o n ,
particularly d u r i n g the 1 9 7 1 - 4 period, c o n t r i b u t e d in n o small
m e a s u r e t o this d i s a p p o i n t i n g p e r f o r m a n c e o f t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l
sector.
T h e p a t t e r n o f a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n r e m a i n e d , f o r all p r a c t i c a l
purposes, unchanged. C r o p p r o d u c t i o n remained basically divided
into production for export and production for domestic con
s u m p t i o n . I n s u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a , s u b s i s t e n c e f a r m i n g still c o
existed w i t h commercial o r m o d e r n farming. Indeed, agricultural
o r g a n i s a t i o n i n m o s t A f r i c a n states w a s a m i x t u r e o f t h e t w o .
T r a d i t i o n a l a g r i c u l t u r e w a s still c h i e f l y o r g a n i s e d w i t h t h e
209

ISt*,fk3 Citrus fruits

(c) (d)
8 Staple and cash crops: main areas,
(a) Staple crops: cassava and wheat,
(b) Staple crops: millets, sorghum and yams,
(c) Staple and cash crops: maize, oil palm and dates,
(d) Staple and cash crops: groundnuts, citrus, bananas and ensete.
(Source: Cambridge Encyclopaedia of Africa.)
210

(a) lb)
9 Cash crops: main areas.

(a) Rubber, tobacco, cotton and cloves.
(b) Coffee, tea, cocoa, sugar and grapes.
r e s o u r c e s o f a n d f o r t h e s u b s i s t e n c e o f t h e r u r a l c o m m u n i t i e s ; it
w a s the b a s i s f o r a w a y o f life a n d an e c o n o m y in w h i c h d i s p o s a l
o f p r o d u c e b y sale w a s i n c i d e n t a l , d e p e n d i n g o n a v a i l a b i l i t y o f
marketable surpluses. M o d e r n agriculture, by contrast, w a s carried
o n as a c o m m e r c i a l u n d e r t a k i n g e n t i r e l y w i t h i n t h e m o n e y e c o n
o m y , a n d its m e t h o d s a n d o b j e c t s w e r e t h e r e f o r e different f r o m
those o f traditional agriculture. Traditional agriculture w a s heavily
p r e d o m i n a n t in W e s t , C e n t r a l a n d E a s t A f r i c a . I n N o r t h A f r i c a ,
farming had b e c o m e p r e d o m i n a n t l y c o m m e r c i a l . Until recently,
subsistence p r o d u c t i o n a c c o u n t e d for b e t w e e n t w o - t h i r d s and
t h r e e - q u a r t e r s o f t h e v a l u e s o f t o t a l p r o d u c t i o n in t r o p i c a l A f r i c a .
H o w e v e r , w i t h the increasing c o m m e r c i a l i s a t i o n o f farming, the
relative share o f subsistence p r o d u c t i o n diminished progressively.
W e have already noted that, o n the w h o l e , agriculture w a s the
lagging sector responsible for d a m p e n i n g substantially the overall
g r o w t h o f G D P . W e must h o w e v e r g o b e y o n d the overall picture,
s o m b r e as t h a t i s , t o t h e main c o m p o n e n t s o f the agricultural
21 I

T a b l e 5.4. Indices of the volume of agricultural production in Africa

(19/2/j = 100).
x 6
1948/9 1953/4 1958/9 !9<W3 9 5/6
All agricultural 88 103 120 128 132

products
Food products 88 103 118 125 128
Non-food products 87 103 133 145 49
Livestock products 9 2 103 114 119 121
Per capita production

All agricultural 97 100 103 105 102
products
Food products 97 100 IOI 103 98
Non-food products. 95 100 114 119 122
Source: EC A, A survey of economic conditions in Africa.
s e c t o r . T a b l e 5.4 s h o w s t h a t w h e r e a s all a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t s r o s e
b y 44 p o i n t s b e t w e e n 1948 a n d 1 9 6 6 ( a v e r a g i n g 2.44 p e r cent
annual increase), f o o d a n d l i v e s t o c k p r o d u c t s increased b y 40 a n d
19 p e r c e n t r e s p e c t i v e l y ( a v e r a g i n g t o g e t h e r 1.6 p e r c e n t ) . O n t h e
other hand, non-food products increased b y 72 per cent during
t h e s a m e p e r i o d ( a v e r a g i n g 4.0 p e r c e n t p e r a n n u m ) . O n a p e r
capita basis, the position did n o t i m p r o v e v e r y m u c h ; i f a n y t h i n g
it s t a g n a t e d f o r all a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t s a n d s h o w e d a m a r k e d
t e n d e n c y t o d e t e r i o r a t e as far as f o o d p r o d u c t i o n w a s c o n c e r n e d .
T h i s is n o t s u r p r i s i n g , s i n c e a n n u a l p o p u l a t i o n i n c r e a s e a v e r a g e d
2.2 p e r c e n t d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d .
T h e situation deteriorated considerably b e t w e e n 1966 and 1 9 7 5 .
Climatic conditions were particularly unfavourable from 1 9 7 1 / 2
to 1974 in the Sudano-Sahelian z o n e and in other parts o f Africa.
H o w e v e r , these w e r e n o t the sole factors a c c o u n t i n g for the p o o r
p e r f o r m a n c e in the agricultural sector. W e a k administrative
capacity a n d inadequate infrastructural support for agriculture,
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n s u c h fields as m a r k e t i n g , c r e d i t , t r a n s p o r t , a n d
extension services w e r e also responsible. T h e producer-pricing
p o l i c i e s a l s o h a d a m a r k e d d i s i n c e n t i v e effect. T h e l a r g e - s c a l e
r u r a l - u r b a n m i g r a t i o n affected a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n s i n c e t h e
s h o r t a g e o f f a r m - h a n d s w h i c h r e s u l t e d f r o m it d i d n o t i n i t s e l f l e n d
to the revolutionising o f agricultural techniques and technologies.
212

A l t h o u g h m u c h m e c h a n i s a t i o n h a d t a k e n p l a c e , t h i s w a s still
rather marginal. A n d w h i l e the resources allocated for agricultural
d e v e l o p m e n t in A f r i c a i n c r e a s e d s u b s t a n t i a l l y o v e r t h e y e a r s , t h e y
w e r e still far f r o m b e i n g a d e q u a t e . A s u p e r v i s e d a g r i c u l t u r a l c r e d i t
s y s t e m w a s still a t h i n g o f t h e f u t u r e .
T h e f o o d s i t u a t i o n d e t e r i o r a t e d fast i n t h e face o f r i s i n g
p o p u l a t i o n a n d rapid urbanisation. T h e annual rate o f increase in
f o o d p r o d u c t i o n f r o m 1 9 7 0 t o 1 9 7 6 w a s 1.5 p e r c e n t , c o m p a r e d
w i t h t h e a n n u a l rate o f i n c r e a s e i n w o r l d p r o d u c t i o n o f 2.4 p e r
cent d u r i n g the same period. It also c o m p a r e d u n f a v o u r a b l y w i t h
rates a c h i e v e d b y o t h e r d e v e l o p i n g r e g i o n s . C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e g a p
in n u t r i t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s a n d p e r c a p u t d i e t a r y e n e r g y s u p p l i e s
w a s w i d e r in Africa than in a n y o t h e r d e v e l o p i n g r e g i o n . O n
a v e r a g e , p e o p l e i n A f r i c a r e c e i v e d o n l y 90 p e r c e n t o f t h e i r
nutritional requirements per day. T h i s contrasted w i t h m a n y Latin
A m e r i c a n countries, w h e r e per caput dietary energy supplies w e r e
as h i g h as 1 0 7 p e r c e n t o f n u t r i t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s . O n e o f
Africa's most serious p r o b l e m s remained a shortage o f basic
foodstuffs: d u e to harvesting techniques and p o o r and inadequate
s t o r a g e f a c i l i t i e s , A f r i c a still l o s t b e t w e e n o n e - q u a r t e r a n d t w o -
fifths o f its f o o d p r o d u c t i o n a n n u a l l y .
The mining sector
Unlike agriculture, the mining industry achieved considerable

progress during the period under review. W e have already
referred t o the spectacular increase in mineral p r o d u c t i o n in the
p r e - i n d e p e n d e n c e d e c a d e o f t h e 1 9 5 0 s . T a b l e 5.1 i l l u s t r a t e s t h e s e
increases. D u r i n g the p e r i o d f r o m i 9 6 0 t o 1 9 7 5 , these g r o w t h rates
w e r e n o t only sustained but substantially i m p r o v e d u p o n . A s w e
h a v e a l r e a d y s h o w n i n f i g . 7, m i n i n g a n d q u a r r y i n g i n c r e a s e d t h e i r
e r c e n t
c o n t r i b u t i o n t o G D P f r o m 4.38 p e r c e n t i n i 9 6 0 t o 1 1 . 3 3 P
in 1 9 7 0 , t h o u g h t h i s d r o p p e d t o 7.25 p e r c e n t i n 1 9 7 5 d u e m a i n l y
to the w o r l d - w i d e depression b e g i n n i n g in that year. O n e o f the
m o s t r e m a r k a b l e d e v e l o p m e n t s d u r i n g this p e r i o d w a s t h e entry
o f four countries into the rank o f major oil-exporters: Algeria,
G a b o n , Libya and Nigeria. In i960, Africa produced only o n e per
c e n t o f t h e w o r l d o u t p u t o f c r u d e p e t r o l e u m ; b y 1 9 7 5 it p r o d u c e d
11 p e r c e n t .
O n e o f the features o f m i n i n g resources d e v e l o p m e n t in Africa
213

w a s its u n e v e n d i s t r i b u t i o n as b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t r i e s a n d
as b e t w e e n t h e v a r i o u s s u b - r e g i o n s i n t o w h i c h t h e c o n t i n e n t c a n
be d i v i d e d . W e h a v e already listed the major p r o d u c e r s o f c r u d e
p e t r o l e u m . W e m u s t a d d t o this list c o u n t r i e s s u c h as E g y p t ,
Tunisia, C o n g o and A n g o l a , w h i c h t h o u g h not major oil-
exporters, were nevertheless producers. T h e t w o major producers
o f n a t u r a l g a s w e r e A l g e r i a a n d N i g e r i a , w h i l e (if w e e x c e p t S o u t h
Africa) M o r o c c o and R h o d e s i a w e r e the major p r o d u c e r s o f coal.
I r o n o r e w a s p r o d u c e d m a i n l y in A l g e r i a , G u i n e a , L i b e r i a ,
Mauritania, Sierra L e o n e and S w a z i l a n d , w h i l e Z a i r e and Z a m b i a
w e r e the main p r o d u c e r s o f c o p p e r . N i g e r i a , R w a n d a and Zaire
w e r e t h e m a i n p r o d u c e r s o f tin c o n c e n t r a t e ; G h a n a , G u i n e a a n d
Sierra L e o n e w e r e the main b a u x i t e - p r o d u c i n g c o u n t r i e s ;
M o r o c c o , T u n i s i a and Z a m b i a p r o d u c e d lead o r e ; M o r o c c o , Z a i r e
and Z a m b i a , zinc o r e ; w h i l e phosphate rock came primarily from
M o r o c c o and Tunisia. Z a i r e w a s the largest p r o d u c e r o f d i a m o n d s
in d e v e l o p i n g A f r i c a , f o l l o w e d b y G h a n a a n d S i e r r a L e o n e . A n d
the g o l d - p r o d u c i n g c o u n t r i e s w e r e G h a n a and Z a i r e , a l t h o u g h
s m a l l q u a n t i t i e s w e r e p r o d u c e d in E t h i o p i a , G a b o n a n d Z a m b i a .
A s c a n b e s e e n f r o m t a b l e 5.5, m i n i n g a n d q u a r r y i n g e x p a n d e d
m o s t r a p i d l y in N o r t h a n d W e s t A f r i c a d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d i 9 6 0
t o 1 9 7 0 . B e t w e e n i 9 6 0 a n d 1 9 6 5 , m i n i n g d e v e l o p m e n t w a s at its
p e a k , g r o w i n g at a n a n n u a l a v e r a g e r a t e o f 38.5 a n d 2 1 . 7 p e r c e n t
in N o r t h a n d W e s t A f r i c a r e s p e c t i v e l y . T h e s l o w - d o w n in t h e
g r o w t h o f this s e c t o r b e t w e e n 1965 a n d 1 9 7 5 a n d m o r e p a r t i c u l a r l y
d u r i n g t h e last f i v e y e a r s w a s d u e t o a v a r i e t y o f f a c t o r s , i n c l u d i n g
l a c k o f c a p i t a l a n d k n o w - h o w as f o r e i g n c a p i t a l i s t s b e c a m e m o r e
a n d m o r e c a u t i o u s a b o u t i n v e s t i n g in A f r i c a in v i e w o f t h e
g r o w i n g e c o n o m i c n a t i o n a l i s m , w h i c h w a s m a n i f e s t i n g i t s e l f in
the v a r i o u s indigenisation policies and p r o g r a m m e s b e i n g p u r s u e d
b y an increasing n u m b e r o f A f r i c a n countries. In s o m e o f these
there w a s o u t r i g h t nationalisation. T h e r e w a s also the p r o b l e m
o f d e p l e t i o n o f r e s e r v e s in a n u m b e r o f c o u n t r i e s w h i l e in a f e w
t h e r e w a s a p o l i c y o f c o n s e r v a t i o n . T h e s l o w - d o w n in t h e a n n u a l
rate o f g r o w t h i n o u t p u t o f m a n y m i n e r a l s w a s d u e t o t h e r i s i n g
unit cost o f p r o d u c t i o n .
T h e 1960s w i t n e s s e d t h e b e g i n n i n g o f a s u b s t a n t i a l e x p a n s i o n
o f mineral processing industries. T h i s encompassed petroleum
r e f i n i n g ; c e m e n t p r o d u c t i o n ; fertiliser p r o d u c t i o n ; t h e s m e l t i n g
214

T a b l e 5.5. Structure and growth of mining and quarrying in developing Africa by sub-region 1960-jj.
Contribution of mining to GDP at Annual rate of growth of mining

1970 factor cost (per cent) (per cent)
juu-icgiuu
i960 1965 1970 1975 1960-5 1965-70 1970-5 1960-75
North Africa 3-i 10.5 18.1 8.0 38.5 18.4 -9.6 15.8
West Africa 5-2 7.7 9.0 21.7 16.8 9.1 15.9
Central Africa 4.6 3-7 6.6 7-9 — 2.1 18.3 12.1 9-4
Eastern Africa 7.8 6.0 6.2 1.9 -0.8 8.6 —16.9 -3.0
Total 4-4 7-5 11.3 7-3 17.0 14.8 -4.3 9.2
Source: Compiled from ECA national accounts computer print-outs, March 1977.

o f tin, lead and a l u m i n i u m ; a n d the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f steel plants

in a n u m b e r o f countries.
The industrial sector
W h i l e traditional handicrafts and artisan-type industries w e r e

d e e p l y i n g r a i n e d in the h i s t o r y o f N o r t h A f r i c a a n d a n u m b e r o f
sub-Saharan countries, the d e v e l o p m e n t o f factory p r o d u c t i o n
w a s a f a i r l y r e c e n t p h e n o m e n o n , h a v i n g its o r i g i n s in t h e 1920s
a n d 1 9 3 0 s . T h i s is t r u e e v e n o f t h e R e p u b l i c o f S o u t h A f r i c a , w h e r e
m a n u f a c t u r i n g i n d u s t r i e s g r e w at a m u c h h i g h e r r a t e t h a n in a n y
o t h e r A f r i c a n c o u n t r y . T h e d e l a y e d entry o f A f r i c a into in
dustrialisation resulted from the reluctance o f colonial p o w e r s
t o e n c o u r a g e it i n t h e i r c o l o n i e s l e s t it c o m p e t e w i t h m e t r o p o l i t a n
industry.
D u r i n g the w a r years, there w a s an inevitable interruption o f
supplies from the industrialised countries. T h i s e n c o u r a g e d the
m a n u f a c t u r e o f c o n s u m e r g o o d s in the c o l o n i e s . T h e scarcity o f
s h i p p i n g space d u r i n g the w a r also e n c o u r a g e d the p r o c e s s i n g o f
b u l k y r a w materials. A n d for strategic reasons, the metropolitan
countries established branches o f s o m e industries in the c o l o n i e s
a n d t h u s g a v e f u r t h e r i m p e t u s t o m a n u f a c t u r i n g . B u t it w a s n o t
u n t i l after t h e w a r , a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y d u r i n g t h e p r e - i n d e p e n d e n c e
d e c a d e o f t h e 1 9 5 0 s a n d t h e first p o s t - i n d e p e n d e n c e d e c a d e , t h a t
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n w a s p u r s u e d v i g o r o u s l y a n d in a p e r s i s t e n t
m a n n e r b y the g o v e r n m e n t s o f the e m e r g i n g African nations. B y
i 9 6 0 , t h e s h a r e o f m a n u f a c t u r i n g in t h e t o t a l G D P o f d e v e l o p i n g
Africa had risen to 1 0 . 1 7 per cent. Industrial g r o w t h d u r i n g the
p e r i o d 1 9 6 0 - 7 5 a v e r a g e d 6.4 p e r c e n t . T h i s rate w h i l e h i g h e r t h a n
t h e r a t e o f g r o w t h o f t h e e c o n o m y as a w h o l e , a n d h i g h e r a l s o
t h a n t h e rates a c h i e v e d in s u c h s e c t o r s as a g r i c u l t u r e , e l e c t r i c i t y
a n d t r a n s p o r t , w a s m u c h l o w e r t h a n t h e rates r e c o r d e d b y m i n i n g
a n d c o n s t r u c t i o n . B y 1 9 7 5 , i n d u s t r y c o n t r i b u t e d a l m o s t 12 p e r
cent o f the total G D P . T h e v a l u e a d d e d by m a n u f a c t u r i n g
i n c r e a s e d f r o m J U S 3.13 b i l l i o n in 1960 t o $ U S 7.09 b i l l i o n in 1975
as t a b l e 5.6 s h o w s . B u t c o m p a r e d w i t h t h e o t h e r r e g i o n s o f t h e
w o r l d , industrial d e v e l o p m e n t l a g g e d b e h i n d ; Africa w a s only
a b l e t o i n c r e a s e its s h a r e o f w o r l d m a n u f a c t u r i n g o u t p u t f r o m 0.5
p e r c e n t i n i 9 6 0 t o 0.6 p e r c e n t i n 1 9 7 5 .
W h a t w e r e t h e m a i n f e a t u r e s o f t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g s e c t o r in
216

S3*
FTUNISIA
•ALGERIA
WESTERN/
SAHARA/ LIBYA
/MAURITANIA
MALI
NIGER
CHAD SUDAN
TI/ NIGERIA
GUINEA-1 * I VORYJ ETHIOPIA
BISSAU . 7COASTJ
EQUATORIAL-
GUINEA ZAIRE
RWANDA/*
BURUNDI t
s TANZANIA/*
ANGOLA
Factory workers per 1 0 0 0

total population
l_ ~\ Data not available

BOTSWANA
[ : X 3 Less than 1 per 1 0 0 0
: : :
L .1125 per 1000

[ D 2 . 5 — 5 per 1 0 0 0 SWAZILAND
fgSS 5—10 per 1000 -LESOTHO
WÊÊ10—25 per 1000
• H More than 25 per 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 km
l o b o miles
Factory workers as a proportion ot the total population.

A f r i c a d u r i n g this p e r i o d ? First, there w a s the c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f
industry in certain s u b - r e g i o n s and in certain c o u n t r i e s . T h e s e
w e r e c o u n t r i e s w h i c h had a h e a d start in industrialisation (like
E g y p t ) o r had a h i g h e c o n o m i c potential o r mineral w e a l t h (for
example, N i g e r i a and Algeria). Indeed, these three countries —
E g y p t , Nigeria and Algeria - accounted for 4 1 . 7 per cent o f
217

T a b l e 5.6. Some economic indicators of manufacturing industry in

developing Africa by sub-region, 1960-7j.
Value
Value added by
added by manufac
manufac turing
turing as Percentage
(millions percentage of Percentage
of JUS) of total population of GDP
i960
North Africa 1690.5 54.0 25.9 37.1
West Africa 512.5 16.4 32.1 28.5
Central Africa 450.8 14.4 14.3 14.2
Eastern Africa 476.3 15.2 27.7 20.2
Total 3130.1 100.0 100.0 100.1
1975
North Africa 3535.5 49.8 26.0 42.0
West Africa 1494.8 21.1 31.9 28.6
Central Africa 609.8 8.6 14.5 10.6
Eastern Africa 14533 20.5 27.6 18.8
Total 7093.4 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source-. Compiled from EC A national accounts computer print-outs, March

1977.
d e v e l o p i n g A f r i c a ' s t o t a l i n d u s t r i a l o u t p u t i n 1 9 7 5 . A n d a s is
s h o w n in table 5.7, these three c o u n t r i e s t o g e t h e r w i t h s e v e n
others — M o r o c c o , Zaire, K e n y a , the Ivory Coast, G h a n a , Z a m b i a
and T u n i s i a in that o r d e r — a c c o u n t e d f o r three-quarters o f total
A f r i c a n m a n u f a c t u r i n g o u t p u t . T h e r e m a i n i n g 38 c o u n t r i e s c o n t r i
b u t e d b a r e l y 27 p e r c e n t o f t h e t o t a l . A m o n g t h e s e , 24 c o u n t r i e s -
half the total n u m b e r o f i n d e p e n d e n t A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s in 1 9 7 5 ,
c o m p o s e d e s s e n t i a l l y o f t h e least d e v e l o p e d , l a n d - l o c k e d o r i s l a n d
c o u n t r i e s - c o n t r i b u t e d less t h a n 1 0 p e r c e n t . T h i s i m b a l a n c e i n
t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f i n d u s t r i a l d e v e l o p m e n t is o f c o u r s e r e f l e c t e d
sub-regionally. N o r t h Africa, w i t h a quarter o f Africa's total
p o p u l a t i o n a n d 3 7 . 1 p e r c e n t o f its G D P , a c c o u n t e d f o r 54 p e r
c e n t o f its i n d u s t r i a l o u t p u t i n i 9 6 0 a n d f o r 49.8 p e r c e n t i n 1 9 7 5 .
218

T a b l e 5.7. Manufacturing value added (at factor cost in 1970

constant prices) in million %US.
i960 1975
Percentage Percentage
of total of total
African African
Country Amount output Amount output
Egypt 857 31.2 1180 16.8
Nigeria 184 6.7 1013 14.4

Algeria 210 7.6 738 10.5
Morocco 2
35 8.5 512 7-3
Zaire 246 8.9 509 7-3
Kenya 61 2.2 285 4.1
Ivory Coast 46 i-7 23 1
3-3
Ghana 61 2.2 222 3- 2
Zambia 9 2 1.1 I99 2.8

c\
Tunisia 100 I92 2

-7
Total 2029 73-7 5081 72.4
Source: EC A Secretariat estimates, March 1977.
O n the other hand, W e s t Africa w i t h almost a third o f d e v e l o p i n g

Africa's population and G D P accounted for only 16.4 and 21.1
p e r c e n t o f its i n d u s t r i a l o u t p u t i n i 9 6 0 a n d 1975 r e s p e c t i v e l y . T h e
relative shares o f Central a n d eastern Africa w e r e e v e n smaller,
if w e e x c e p t R h o d e s i a ( Z i m b a b w e ) , w h i c h w a s o f c o u r s e still
under w h i t e minority rule.
T h e second characteristic o f African manufacturing o u t p u t w a s
its d o m i n a t i o n b y l i g h t i n d u s t r y , a l t h o u g h h e a v y i n d u s t r i e s
i n c r e a s e d t h e i r r e l a t i v e s h a r e s i g n i f i c a n t l y after i 9 6 0 . T h u s ,
w h e r e a s in i 9 6 0 t h e p e r c e n t a g e s o f m a n u f a c t u r i n g v a l u e a d d e d b y
l i g h t a n d h e a v y i n d u s t r i e s w e r e 7 7 . 5 a n d 22.5 r e s p e c t i v e l y , t h e
c o r r e s p o n d i n g figures i n 1975 w e r e 60.2 a n d 39.8. W i t h i n t h e l i g h t
industries g r o u p , food b e v e r a g e s and t o b a c c o , textiles a n d c l o t h i n g
p r e d o m i n a t e d a n d j o i n t l y a c c o u n t e d f o r 6 6 . 7 a n d 49.8 p e r c e n t o f
total i n d u s t r i a l o u t p u t in i 9 6 0 a n d 1975 r e s p e c t i v e l y . T h e c h e m i c a l
and petro-chemical industry and basic metal industry represented
o n l y 12.3 p e r c e n t in i 9 6 0 a n d 2 1 . 6 p e r c e n t in 1 9 7 5 . A f r i c a ' s s h a r e
in t h e w o r l d o u t p u t o f m e t a l s a n d e n g i n e e r i n g p r o d u c t s r e m a i n e d
219

u n c h a n g e d f r o m 1955 t o 1 9 7 5 at 0.2 p e r c e n t . O f all d e v e l o p i n g

r e g i o n s , Africa had the l o w e s t ratio o f e n g i n e e r i n g p r o d u c t i o n to
e n g i n e e r i n g i m p o r t s . T h e significance o f this n e e d s to be
underlined. E n g i n e e r i n g industries not only p r o v i d e the means
o f p r o d u c t i o n f o r t h e m s e l v e s b u t a l s o f o r v i r t u a l l y all o t h e r
s e c t o r s . T h e y s e r v e n o t o n l y as c a r r i e r s o f t e c h n o l o g y b u t a l s o as
the m e d i u m o f t e c h n o l o g i c a l i n v e n t i o n and i n n o v a t i o n . T h e y
contribute, possibly m o r e than any other sector, to fostering
labour, technical and m a n a g e m e n t skills.
T h e third feature o f industrialisation in A f r i c a w a s that the
industrial sector w a s c o m p o s e d o f a heterogeneous collection o f
industrial products, m a n y o f w h i c h w e r e o f marginal significance
for the achievement o f self-sustaining g r o w t h . Industrialisation,
rather t h a n c o n s t i t u t i n g an e n g i n e for g r o w t h in A f r i c a , t e n d e d
to accentuate the dualistic nature o f the African e c o n o m y . African
g o v e r n m e n t s had been led to believe that, t h r o u g h g e n e r o u s
p r o v i s i o n s o f fiscal a n d o t h e r i n c e n t i v e s c o m b i n e d w i t h h i g h
protective duties, a d y n a m i c and self-sustaining industrial sector
w o u l d e m e r g e . T h e y therefore p u r s u e d an import-substituting
industrialisation policy w h i c h m o r e often than not depended o n
f o r e i g n c a p i t a l , t e c h n o l o g y a n d s k i l l w i t h little o r n o b a c k w a r d
and f o r w a r d linkages w i t h the agricultural and m i n i n g sectors,
w h i c h w e r e the b a c k b o n e o f the e c o n o m y . C o n s e q u e n t l y , the
h e t e r o g e n e o u s i n d u s t r i a l p r o j e c t s w h i c h w e r e set u p c a m e t o
constitute islands o f s y m b o l i c m o d e r n i t y s u r r o u n d e d b y vast
oceans o f p o v e r t y and traditional agricultural sectors. Fortunately
b y t h e e n d o f o u r p e r i o d it w a s b e g i n n i n g t o b e r e c o g n i s e d , i f o n l y
s l o w l y , t h a t i n d u s t r y h a d an i n n e r s t r u c t u r a l l o g i c a n d t h a t
l i n k a g e s w i t h i n t h e i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r w e r e as i m p o r t a n t t o its
v i t a l i t y as l i n k a g e s b e t w e e n it a n d t h e o t h e r s e c t o r s . A n i n c r e a s i n g
n u m b e r o f g o v e r n m e n t s had c o m e to perceive that the importance
o f a s e c t o r d e p e n d s n o t s o m u c h o n its s i z e as o n its g r o w t h -
p r o m o t i n g impact on other sectors.
T h e f o u r t h c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f e a t u r e o f i n d u s t r i a l d e v e l o p m e n t in
the years 1960-75 w a s that these industries d e v e l o p e d o n a
national scale. T h e r e w e r e virtually n o joint projects d e s i g n e d and
i m p l e m e n t e d o n the r e g i o n a l scale. A s a result, m o s t o f the units
set u p s e r v e d t h e l o c a l m a r k e t a n d t h e r e f o r e h a d t o o p e r a t e i n
h a r m o n y w i t h t h e s i z e o f t h a t m a r k e t , a n d e x p e r i e n c e its h a z a r d s
a n d fluctuations, w i t h o u t b e i n g a b l e t o b e n e f i t f r o m t h e e c o n o m i e s
220

o f scale w h i c h characterise the p r o d u c t i o n o f the industrialised

countries. T h e result w a s that a large n u m b e r o f industrial projects
e x p e r i e n c e d difficulties, l e a d i n g in m o s t cases t o p r o h i b i t i v e
production costs a n d / o r to p o o r uncompetitive quality with
similar i m p o r t e d p r o d u c t s .
Industrialisation in Africa p r o v e d a d i s a p p o i n t m e n t in spite o f
its r e l a t i v e l y h i g h rates o f g r o w t h s i n c e i n d e p e n d e n c e . It d i d n o t
bring about any reduction in the dependence o f African countries
o n f o r e i g n c o u n t r i e s . O n t h e c o n t r a r y — it c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e
establishment o f an industrial structure o v e r l y d e p e n d e n t o n
i m p o r t e d materials. M o r e o v e r , this p o l i c y d i d n o t e n c o u r a g e
national savings n o r p r o m p t African entrepreneurs to enter the
circuit o f industrial i n v e s t m e n t since incentives p r o v i d e d w e r e
principally for the benefit o f the f o r e i g n investor. T h e industri
a l i s a t i o n p u r s u e d f o r m o s t o f this p e r i o d w a s n o t p a r t o f a n o v e r a l l
multi-sectoral strategy. It w a s n o t linked t o agricultural a n d rural
development, the main sector e m p l o y i n g the largest section o f the
p o p u l a t i o n a n d , as a r e s u l t , it d i d n o t c o n t r i b u t e t o r e d u c i n g t h e
dualistic imbalances w h i c h characterised the A f r i c a n e c o n o m y .
Because the industrial projects w e r e concentrated in the t o w n s ,
industrialisation accelerated the process o f urbanisation t o the
detriment o f the rural sector a n d agricultural d e v e l o p m e n t . S o m e
c h a n g e i n p o l i c y h a d t a k e n p l a c e i n t h e e a r l y 1 9 7 0 s , w h e n a n effort
was made b y s o m e countries t o establish industrial projects o n a
scale l a r g e r t h a n t h e l o c a l m a r k e t a n d o r i e n t e d t o w a r d s e x p o r t .
T h i s w a s the case w i t h the liquid o r g a s e o u s h y d r o c a r b o n
industries; the agro-allied industries (textiles, leather, sugar, meat
and oilseed p r o c e s s i n g ) ; the construction industry; the ferrous
and non-ferrous metals industry; and the w o o d industry (pulp and
p a p e r ) . N e v e r t h e l e s s A f r i c a w a s b y t h e e n d o f 1 9 7 5 still p r i m a r i l y
e x p o r t i n g its r a w m a t e r i a l s a n d i m p o r t i n g m o s t o f its r e q u i r e m e n t s
of manufactured g o o d s .
Economic infrastructure
N o c o u n t r y c a n d e v e l o p p r o p e r l y w i t h o u t a n a d e q u a t e infra-
s t r u c t u r a l s u p p o r t . Y e t a t i n d e p e n d e n c e all A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s w e r e
v e r y short o f social o v e r h e a d capital. T h e e c o n o m i c and social
infrastructures w h i c h they inherited w e r e designed for a colonial
type o f administration w h i c h was concerned with the maintenance
221

Algiers
Tangier Tunis
Tripoli
Rabat« Alexandria
Bechar^ Touggourt
) Marrakesh ¿ Cairo j
Aswan
Zouerate Wadi Haifa

Port Sudan
i Nouadhibou
Timbuktu ¿.Gao
kAnsongo Khartoum
St Louis g
l^âga-'ANiarriev Nguru
Dakar f dougou Djoubiti
Maiduguri Nyala •
Bamako
Banjul I Roseires
• (Addis Ababa
Conakry 1
Ngaoundere Gambeila
Wau
Freetown \
Juba
P^ Port Bangui /
DOuala o Mogadishu
O Harcourt
Libreville* vii
Kisangani
1
Ubundu" ] [M^nza j
Brazza-
ville j Ileto Kind^^^Kigoma ' Mombasa
Tabora/
Pointe-Noire nKinSfiasa
K a l e m i e
\ Dar es Salaam
Matadi
Luanda Malanje
«s
Lobito Lubumbashi
^ Mozambique
Moçamedes i Lusaka
Tamatave
Maramba
Antananarivo
Bulawayo^
Beira
Walvis Bay I
Pretoria /
Hotazel • Maputo
Luderitz
Durban
1
Port Elizabeth
Cape Town J Port London
II Transport. (Source: Cambridge Encylopaedia of Africa.)
o f law and order and the p r o m o t i o n o f exports and imports. In

the c i r c u m s t a n c e s , therefore, the n e w l y - i n d e p e n d e n t c o u n t r i e s
had n o alternative but to g i v e priority attention to the d e v e l o p m e n t
o f their infrastructures. W e shall presently c o n c e r n o u r s e l v e s w i t h
transport and c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ; the social services will be
c o n s i d e r e d later.
T h e total l e n g t h (route k i l o m e t r e s ) o f A f r i c a n r a i l w a y s , e x c l u d -
222

T a b l e 5.8. Transport and other economic indicators: percentage

distribution of world totals, 1961.
Europe
South (excl. North
Africa America USSR) America
Population 8.5 4.9 14.0 8.9
Area 22.5 13.2 3-7 18.0
Air transport capacity 2.0 5.0 23.0 62.0
Air traffic 2
-3 5.3 24.0 60.0
Rail freight traffic 1.8 1.0 11.0 29.0
Commercial vehicles 2.9 4.8 24.0 55-o
Energy consumption 1.6 2.2 27.0 38.0
Gross domestic product 3-3 4-7 28.0 51.0
('958)
Source UN statistical yearbook.
i n g t h o s e i n S o u t h A f r i c a , is a b o u t 50000 k m . I f S o u t h A f r i c a n
r a i l w a y s a r e i n c l u d e d , it c o m e s t o a b o u t 7 3 0 0 0 k m . I n r e l a t i o n t o
the s i z e o f t h e c o n t i n e n t t h e s e a r e v e r y l o w figures. I n d e e d , t h e
g e n e r a l i m p r e s s i o n o f A f r i c a ' s r a i l w a y n e t w o r k is o n e o f e m p t i n e s s .
In a d d i t i o n , t h e r a i l w a y s h a d different t e c h n i c a l c h a r a c t e r s , s u c h
as g a u g e s , c o u p l i n g s , b r a k e s y s t e m s a n d buffers a n d t h e y w e r e
unconnected w i t h o n e another. In Africa south o f the Sahara, 76
p e r c e n t o f t h e c. 6 0 0 0 0 k m o f r a i l r o a d s w e r e 3 ' 6 " g a u g e w h i l e
a b o u t 20 p e r c e n t w e r e o f i m g a u g e . I n N o r t h A f r i c a , o n t h e
o t h e r h a n d , o v e r t h r e e - q u a r t e r s o f t h e 13 000 k m o f r a i l r o a d s w e r e
4 ' 8" ( o r s t a n d a r d ) g a u g e , a b o u t 1 6 p e r c e n t w e r e i m g a u g e , w h i l e
8 p e r c e n t w e r e 1.05 5 m g a u g e (this b e i n g t h e 1 3 2 0 k m o f l i n e i n
the R e p u b l i c o f A l g e r i a ) .
Because o f the fragmentary c o m p o s i t i o n o f m u c h o f the r a i l w a y
s y s t e m , r o a d t r a n s p o r t w a s o f s p e c i a l i m p o r t a n c e , p a r t i c u l a r l y as
the s c o p e o f inland w a t e r w a y s w a s restricted t o the c o m p a r a t i v e l y
f e w areas w h i c h h a v e r i v e r s a n d l a k e s n a v i g a b l e t o a n y t h i n g l a r g e r
than a canoe. F u r t h e r m o r e , f e w o f the n a v i g a b l e rivers are
navigable t h r o u g h o u t the year. In 1 9 6 3 , d e v e l o p i n g Africa,
excluding A n g o l a and M o z a m b i q u e , h a d a total mileage o f
9 4 6 2 9 1 k m o f r o a d s , less t h a n 10 p e r c e n t o f w h i c h w e r e p a v e d .
2
T h e d e n s i t y o f t h i s n e t w o r k a v e r a g e d 7.3 k m p e r 100 k m w h i c h ,
e v e n after d u e a c c o u n t h a s b e e n t a k e n o f t h e g r e a t e x p a n s e o f l a n d
o c c u p i e d b y d e s e r t s a n d t h e r e f o r e s p a r s e l y p o p u l a t e d , w a s still
223

v e r y l o w . W h i l e , as i n t h e c a s e o f t h e r a i l w a y s , t h e r e h a d b e e n n o
attempt during the colonial period to build an all-African road
system, unlike railroads there w a s n o total isolation. T h e r e w e r e
h i g h w a y links b e t w e e n n e i g h b o u r i n g countries. B u t these w e r e
r e a l l y ad hoc c o n n e x i o n s r a t h e r t h a n l i n k s i n a p l a n n e d s y s t e m o f
regional or even sub-regional road networks. T h u s road systems
w e r e essentially national a n d local in character.
T a b l e 5.8 s h o w s h o w r e l a t i v e l y u n d e v e l o p e d A f r i c a ' s t r a n s p o r t
s y s t e m w a s at t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e 1 9 6 0 s . I t s s h a r e o f w o r l d t o t a l s
in a i r t r a n s p o r t c a p a c i t y , a i r traffic, rail f r e i g h t traffic, a n d
c o m m e r c i a l v e h i c l e s w a s d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y s m a l l e r t h a n its s h a r e
o f w o r l d p o p u l a t i o n a n d l a n d a r e a w h i l e its s h a r e o f t h e w o r l d
transport system, using the a b o v e indices, w a s m u c h smaller than
its s h a r e o f w o r l d i n c o m e . T h i s w a s a l s o t r u e o f its s h a r e o f e n e r g y
consumption.
The social sector
W e cannot e n d o u r analysis o f structural and sectoral c h a n g e s and

trends without t o u c h i n g u p o n the all-important social sector -
health, education, h o u s i n g , water supplies - w h i c h in turn touches
directly o n the well-being o f the citizens. A l t h o u g h for t o o l o n g
economists have been concerned with such quantitative
p a r a m e t e r s as G N P , i n c o m e , s a v i n g s , c a p i t a l f o r m a t i o n a n d p e r
c a p i t a i n c o m e as t h e i n d i c e s f o r m e a s u r i n g e c o n o m i c p r o g r e s s ,
t h e r e is a g r o w i n g f e e l i n g t h a t t h e s e a r e far f r o m b e i n g a d e q u a t e
in s a t i s f a c t o r i l y m e a s u r i n g t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h t h e h u m a n n e e d s
o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l s a r e b e i n g m e t , p a r t i c u l a r l y as t h e r e is n o
a u t o m a t i c p o l i c y r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n a n y p a r t i c u l a r l e v e l o r rate
o f g r o w t h o f t h e G N P a n d i m p r o v e m e n t i n s u c h i n d i c a t o r s as life
e x p e c t a n c y , death rates, infant m o r t a l i t y , literacy, h o u s i n g o r
water supplies. T h e r e has, therefore, recently been a search for
a n e w kind o f index, a Physical Quality o f Life Index.
It is o f c o u r s e n o t d i f f i c u l t t o u n d e r s t a n d o r e v e n a p p r e c i a t e w h y
e c o n o m i s t s h a v e f a v o u r e d the easily quantifiable parameters in
their m e a s u r e m e n t o f p r o g r e s s . Social p h e n o m e n a are n o t easily
quantifiable a n d w h i l e social c h a n g e s m a y b e a d o p t e d as p o l i c y
measures, the actual m o v e m e n t in the direction required m a y n o t
b e e a s i l y m e a s u r a b l e e x c e p t after a p e r i o d o f s e v e r a l y e a r s .
M o r e o v e r , social conditions varied greatly from country to
224

c o u n t r y a n d as a r e s u l t a n y g e n e r a l i s a t i o n w o u l d in all p r o b a b i l i t y
b e a r b i t r a r y a n d p e r h a p s m i s l e a d i n g . T h e f o l l o w i n g a n a l y s i s is
therefore limited to o b s e r v a b l e trends in social c o n d i t i o n s .
African countries m a d e great advances d u r i n g the years b e t w e e n
i 9 6 0 a n d 1975 i n t h e s o c i a l s e c t o r s i n r e l a t i o n t o w h a t h a d b e e n
a c h i e v e d in t h e c o l o n i a l p e r i o d . A t t h e t i m e o f i n d e p e n d e n c e m o s t
o f them had n o m o r e than v e r y rudimentary social services. N o
country had well-established educational systems, health services
or h o u s i n g p r o g r a m m e s . Indeed, m a n y countries had o n l y a
handful o f university graduates and only a few thousand h i g h -
s c h o o l g r a d u a t e s . P i p e - b o r n e w a t e r w a s a rarity and hospitals
a n d h e a l t h c e n t r e s w e r e f e w a n d far b e t w e e n . E v e n t h e s c h o o l s
w h i c h w e r e established b y the colonial administrations, o r m o r e
usually b y the Christian missionaries, w e r e d e s i g n e d to p r o d u c e
c l e r k s w h o w e r e v e r s e d in t h e t h r e e R s - a r i t h m e t i c , w r i t i n g
a n d r e l i g i o u s k n o w l e d g e . T h u s b y i 9 6 0 , c o u n t r i e s s u c h as t h e
Gambia, A n g o l a , Mali, Upper Volta, Mauritania, Somalia, N i g e r
a n d E t h i o p i a - all o f w h i c h are t o d a y c l a s s i f i e d as t h e m o s t
s e r i o u s l y affected b y p o v e r t y a n d t h e least d e v e l o p e d a m o n g t h e
d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s - h a d less t h a n 10 p e r c e n t o f t h e i r
e l e m e n t a r y s c h o o l - a g e p o p u l a t i o n e n r o l l e d in s c h o o l s a n d less
than 5 per cent o f their s e c o n d a r y s c h o o l - a g e p o p u l a t i o n attending
s c h o o l . I n d e e d , b y i 9 6 0 as m a n y as 27 A f r i c a n states h a d less t h a n
a third o f their p r i m a r y s c h o o l - a g e p o p u l a t i o n enrolled, and
a l m o s t all A f r i c a n s t a t e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h o s e s o u t h o f t h e S a h a r a ,
h a d less t h a n 8 p e r c e n t o f t h e i r s e c o n d a r y s c h o o l - a g e p o p u l a t i o n
enrolled. In 1 9 6 0 - 1 , the p r o p o r t i o n o f the p o p u l a t i o n b e t w e e n the
a g e s o f 5 a n d 19 t h a t w a s r e c e i v i n g f o r m a l e d u c a t i o n i n A f r i c a
as a w h o l e w a s o n l y 16 p e r c e n t , c o m p a r e d w i t h 4 4 p e r c e n t i n
S o u t h E a s t A s i a , 50 p e r c e n t i n L a t i n A m e r i c a a n d 7 6 p e r c e n t
in t h e S c a n d i n a v i a n c o u n t r i e s . N o c o m p r e h e n s i v e d a t a are
available w i t h respect to the other services w i t h i n the social sector,
b u t t h e s i t u a t i o n in t h e s e w a s h a r d l y b e t t e r . F o r e x a m p l e , a
C o l o n i a l O f f i c e - s p o n s o r e d e c o n o m i c s u r v e y o f N i g e r i a in 1 9 5 1
h a d this t o r e p o r t o n h e a l t h s e r v i c e s :
Economic development is severely handicapped by the many health needs and

problems of Nigeria. Outbreaks of relapsing and cerebro-spinal fevers are a
serious problem in many of the Northern Provinces, and no province is entirely
free from smallpox... Guinea worm infection prevails in many parts of the
225

North, and the incidence of yaws is widely spread throughout Southern

1
Nigeria... Malaria is widespread...
T h u s , in evaluating performance during the period under
r e v i e w , it is i m p o r t a n t a l w a y s t o b e a r i n m i n d t h e d e p t h s f r o m
w h i c h all A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s h a d t o e m e r g e i n t h e s o c i a l s e c t o r . A n d
unfortunately, their task w a s n o t m a d e easy b y rapid increases in
p o p u l a t i o n . T h e e s t i m a t e d p o p u l a t i o n o f t h e c o n t i n e n t i n 1965 w a s
a b o u t 220 m i l l i o n , o r 8 p e r c e n t o f t h e w o r l d ' s t o t a l . B y 1 9 7 5 it
had increased t o a b o u t 402 m i l l i o n , w h i c h represented a b o u t 10.1
per cent o f the w o r l d p o p u l a t i o n in that year. T h i s represented
an a n n u a l rate o f i n c r e a s e o f b e t w e e n 2.7 a n d 3.0 p e r c e n t , w h i c h
w a s t e n d i n g t o rise. T h e r e is a l s o t h e fact t h a t A f r i c a h a d t h e
y o u n g e s t a g e structure o f any continent: o v e r two-fifths o f the
population w e r e b e l o w the a g e o f 15. T h u s , a l t h o u g h there w a s
p h e n o m e n a l progress in absolute terms, relative t o the needs o f
the rapidly increasing p o p u l a t i o n the a c h i e v e m e n t s w e r e m o d e s t
and in s o m e countries e v e n n e g a t i v e .
I n t h e field o f e d u c a t i o n , p r i m a r y - s c h o o l e n r o l m e n t s d o u b l e d
b e t w e e n 1 9 5 0 a n d 1 9 6 4 f o r A f r i c a as a w h o l e ; t h e y i n c r e a s e d
fivefold after 1 9 5 7 a n d f o u r f o l d after 1 9 5 9 . B y 1 9 6 3 , t h e n u m b e r
o f s e c o n d a r y - s c h o o l p u p i l s h a d i n c r e a s e d b y 2000 p e r c e n t o v e r
1 9 5 0 ; 700 p e r c e n t o v e r 1 9 5 7 ; a n d 500 p e r c e n t o v e r 1 9 5 9 . Y e t
b e c a u s e o f t h e h i g h p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h rates a n d t h e a g e - s t r u c t u r e ,
Africa w a s destined to continue for a l o n g time t o shoulder an
unequalled enrolment burden.
A l t h o u g h m a r k e d i m p r o v e m e n t s in health c o n d i t i o n s w e r e
a c h i e v e d b e t w e e n i 9 6 0 a n d 1 9 7 5 , h e a l t h s t a n d a r d s w e r e still v e r y
l o w . T h e a v e r a g e d e a t h rate r e m a i n e d h i g h at a b o u t 21 p e r 1000
a n d b y t h e e n d o f t h e p e r i o d f o r m o s t c o u n t r i e s t h e a v e r a g e life
e x p e c t a n c y w a s still u n d e r 50 y e a r s . T h e p r i m a r y c a u s e s o f
morbidity and mortality w e r e malnutrition, insanitary health en
v i r o n m e n t s , l o w health education and v e c t o r - b o r n e disease. A
l o n g l e e w a y still h a d t o b e m a d e u p b y all states t o i n c r e a s e t h e s i z e
o f their medical a n d para-medical personnel. A l t h o u g h in m o s t
c a s e s t h e s i t u a t i o n g r e a t l y i m p r o v e d after t h e p r e - i n d e p e n d e n c e
d e c a d e - t h e i m p r o v e m e n t r a n g e d f r o m 2 p e r c e n t t o 30 p e r c e n t
o v e r t h e figures f o r 1 9 5 8 t o i 9 6 0 - d e v e l o p m e n t s i n d i f f e r e n t
A f r i c a n states w e r e u n e v e n . B e s i d e s , t h e s i t u a t i o n w o r s e n e d i n a
1
C o l o n i a l O f f i c e , An economic survey of the colonial territories, i?jr Vol. III. The West
African territories (London, H M S O , 1952).
226

n u m b e r o f states, f o r e x a m p l e U g a n d a a n d E t h i o p i a , d u e t o a
brain-drain caused by political upheavals.
O n e o f the characteristic features o f the African e c o n o m y
d u r i n g this p e r i o d w a s t h e r a p i d r a t e o f u r b a n i s a t i o n (see C h a p t e r
4). T r a d i t i o n a l l y , A f r i c a n s w e r e c o u n t r y d w e l l e r s . E v e n a r o u n d
i 9 6 0 , o n l y 7 - 8 p e r c e n t o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n w e r e l i v i n g in t o w n s
o f 100000 i n h a b i t a n t s a n d u p w a r d s . T h e p r o p o r t i o n o f u r b a n
population h o w e v e r varied from one sub-region to another, with
N o r t h Africa being, by a v e r y w i d e margin, the m o s t urbanised,
a n d E a s t a n d s o u t h e r n A f r i c a t h e least. A f t e r i 9 6 0 t h e a n n u a l rates
of g r o w t h o f urban population were consistently very m u c h
h i g h e r t h a n the a n n u a l rates o f g r o w t h o f t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n , a n d
r a n g e d f r o m an a v e r a g e o f 4.2 p e r c e n t t o 15.5 p e r c e n t . B y
1 9 7 5 , f r o m 20 t o 25 p e r c e n t o f t h e p e o p l e w e r e l i v i n g i n u r b a n
areas. It m u s t b e a d d e d , h o w e v e r , t h a t A f r i c a r e m a i n e d t h e least
u r b a n i s e d o f all t h e c o n t i n e n t s .
Rapid urbanisation put very severe pressures on such social
s e r v i c e s as h o u s i n g , h e a l t h a n d w a t e r s u p p l y . H o u s i n g c o n d i t i o n s
s e e m t o h a v e s t a g n a t e d , i f n o t d e t e r i o r a t e d , d u r i n g this p e r i o d .
F o r t h e w h o l e c o n t i n e n t t h e r a t e o f i n c r e a s e in h o u s i n g w a s
a p p r o x i m a t e l y 3 u n i t s p e r 1000 p e o p l e a n n u a l l y w h i l e b a s i c n e e d s
w e r e e s t i m a t e d at 10 t o 13 u n i t s p e r 1000. T h e s t e e p l y r i s i n g c o s t s
o f b u i l d i n g materials a g g r a v a t e d the situation. In o r d e r to
ameliorate the acute h o u s i n g s h o r t a g e , g o v e r n m e n t s b e g a n to
assume direct responsibility for p r o v i d i n g h o u s i n g , particularly
low-cost housing, and g i v i n g incentives to private developers.
A l t h o u g h e x i s t i n g d a t a are s k e t c h y , t h e r e is e n o u g h e v i d e n c e
to s h o w that the p r o b l e m s o f o p e n u n e m p l o y m e n t , u n d e r e m
p l o y m e n t and mass p o v e r t y assumed increasingly serious pro
portions. A c c o r d i n g to a recent International L a b o u r Office
e s t i m a t e , u n e m p l o y m e n t a n d u n d e r e m p l o y m e n t affected o n t h e
a v e r a g e 7.1 a n d 3 7 . 9 p e r c e n t o f t h e t o t a l l a b o u r f o r c e r e s p e c t i v e l y ;
t h a t is t o s a y , 45 p e r c e n t o f t h e l a b o u r f o r c e w a s e i t h e r o p e n l y
unemployed or disguisedly unemployed. Little w o n d e r Africa
r e m a i n e d p o o r . F o r i f w e w e r e t o a d d t o t h i s figure t h e 4 4 p e r
c e n t o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n b e l o w t h e a g e o f 15 a n d t h e r e f o r e
e c o n o m i c a l l y d e p e n d e n t , a l m o s t 240 m i l l i o n o u t o f A f r i c a ' s t o t a l
p o p u l a t i o n o f 402 m i l l i o n in 1 9 7 5 w e r e c o n t r i b u t i n g little o r
n o t h i n g to the G D P . A l t h o u g h a n u m b e r o f countries did e m b a r k
o n e m p l o y m e n t - c r e a t i o n p r o g r a m m e s , o n accelerated rural
227

d e v e l o p m e n t , and o n the restriction o f migration o f people

w i t h o u t jobs from rural t o urban areas, these p r o v e d n o m o r e than
palliatives.
I n c o m e d i s t r i b u t i o n is c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o t h e p r o b l e m s o f
unemployment and underemployment. Empirical evidence o n
i n c o m e d i s t r i b u t i o n , s c a n t y as it i s , s h o w s t h a t i n e q u a l i t i e s
w o r s e n e d and w e r e n o t significantly softened b y social services
a n d w e l f a r e b e n e f i t s . T h e d i s a d v a n t a g e d h a d v e r y little o p p o r
tunity for u p w a r d e c o n o m i c o r social m o b i l i t y o w i n g t o lack o f
employment and inadequate educational opportunities. A c c o r d i n g
1
t o a r e c e n t s t u d y b y A d e l m a n a n d M o r r i s , t h e p o o r e s t 40 p e r c e n t
o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n r e c e i v e d o n a v e r a g e b e t w e e n 1965 a n d 1 9 7 1
a b o u t 9 t o 17 p e r cent o f the national i n c o m e , w h i l e the richest
20 p e r c e n t a b s o r b e d b e t w e e n 50 a n d 7 0 p e r c e n t . Still m o r e
striking, the richest 5 p e r cent o f the p o p u l a t i o n h a d b e t w e e n 17
a n d 34 p e r c e n t o f t h e i n c o m e . T h e i m p l i c a t i o n o f t h e s e e s t i m a t e s
is v e r y s e r i o u s i n t e r m s o f s o c i a l j u s t i c e ( s e e C h a p t e r 6 ) . W i t h p e r
c a p i t a i n c o m e b e i n g as l o w as it w a s in m o s t A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s ,
a n d w i t h t h e r i c h e s t 20 p e r c e n t o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n h a v i n g b e t w e e n
50 a n d 7 0 p e r c e n t o f t h e t o t a l n a t i o n a l i n c o m e , it w o u l d s e e m t h a t
a b o u t 80 p e r c e n t o f A f r i c a ' s t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n w e r e a r o u n d o r
b e l o w the p o v e r t y line; m u c h o f this p o v e r t y w a s t o b e f o u n d in
t h e r u r a l areas w h e r e m o s t p e o p l e still l i v e d .
Sub-regional trends
T o c o n c l u d e this r e v i e w o f structural a n d sectoral c h a n g e s let us

e x a m i n e v e r y briefly a n y discernible s u b - r e g i o n a l trends. T h e
a v e r a g e a n n u a l g r o w t h rate o f 4.9 f o r t h e y e a r s 1 9 6 0 - 7 5 c o n c e a l e d
l a r g e d i f f e r e n c e s a m o n g t h e different s u b - r e g i o n s a n d g r o u p s o f
countries. T h e usual classification o f Africa b y r e g i o n d o e s n o t
t h r o w e n o u g h light o n t o the increasing e c o n o m i c disparity a m o n g
2
African countries. In a recent assessment o f trends and p r o s p e c t s
u n d e r t a k e n b y the E c o n o m i c C o m m i s s i o n for A f r i c a at t h e
r e q u e s t o f t h e U N G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y , as p a r t o f t h e s t u d y o f
l o n g - t e r m trends in t h e e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t o f the r e g i o n s o f
1
I. A d e l m a n a n d C . T . M o r r i s , Economic growth and social equity in developing countries
( S t a n f o r d , 1973), 1 4 1 - 8 5 .
2
Preliminary assessment of long-term development trends and prospects in developing Africa,
p u b l i s h e d b y t h e U N E c o n o m i c a n d S o c i a l C o u n c i l as d o c u m e n t E / 5 9 3 7 / A d d . 3 o f 29
M a r c h 1977, 7.
228

t h e w o r l d , A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s w e r e c l a s s i f i e d i n t o five e c o n o m i c a l l y
m o r e m e a n i n g f u l c a t e g o r i e s . T h e r e w a s , first, t h e g r o u p o f m a j o r
oil-exporters - A l g e r i a , G a b o n , the L i b y a n A r a b R e p u b l i c and
N i g e r i a . T h e n o n - o i l - e x p o r t i n g c o u n t r i e s w e r e classified into four
g r o u p s o n the basis o f per capita i n c o m e : $US300-400;
$ U S 2 0 o ~ 3 o o ; $ U S 100-200; and b e l o w $ U S i o o . O f the 41
n o n - o i l - e x p o r t i n g c o u n t r i e s o n w h i c h d a t a w e r e a v a i l a b l e , five
countries - C o n g o , the I v o r y C o a s t , S â o T o m é and Principe,
T u n i s i a a n d Z a m b i a - b e l o n g e d t o t h e first p e r c a p i t a i n c o m e
c a t e g o r y ( $ U S 3 0 0 - 4 0 0 ) ; 11 c o u n t r i e s - C a p e V e r d e , E g y p t , E q u a
torial G u i n e a , G h a n a , G u i n e a - B i s s a u , Libéria, Mauritius, M o r
o c c o , M o z a m b i q u e , Senegal and S w a z i l a n d - b e l o n g e d to the
s e c o n d c a t e g o r y ( $ U S 200—300) ; a n o t h e r 1 1 c o u n t r i e s - B o t s w a n a ,
the Central African R e p u b l i c , the G a m b i a , K e n y a , M a d a g a s c a r ,
Mauritania, Sierra L e o n e , S u d a n , T o g o , U g a n d a and the U n i t e d
R e p u b l i c o f C a m e r o o n - b e l o n g e d to the $ U S 100-200 i n c o m e -
r a n g e g r o u p . T h e last g r o u p , w i t h p e r c a p i t a i n c o m e s o f b e l o w
$ U S i o o , consisted o f 14 countries: Bénin, B u r u n d i , C h a d , Ethi
opia, Guinea, Lesotho, M a l a w i , Mali, N i g e r , R w a n d a , Somalia,
the U n i t e d R e p u b l i c o f T a n z a n i a , U p p e r V o l t a and Z a i r e . T h e
v a r y i n g p e r f o r m a n c e o f t h e s e five g r o u p s o f c o u n t r i e s is m o s t
r e v e a l i n g (see t a b l e 5.9).
W h e r e a s t h e f o u r m a j o r o i l - e x p o r t i n g c o u n t r i e s a n d t h e five
c o u n t r i e s in t h e $ U S 3 0 0 - 4 0 0 g r o u p a c h i e v e d a v e r a g e g r o w t h
rates o f 6.9 a n d 5.8 p e r c e n t p e r a n n u m r e s p e c t i v e l y b e t w e e n i 9 6 0
a n d 1 9 7 5 , t h e 14 c o u n t r i e s w h o s e p e r c a p i t a i n c o m e w a s b e l o w
$ U S 100 a c h i e v e d o n l y 2.6 p e r c e n t g r o w t h p e r a n n u m . W h e n d u e
a c c o u n t is t a k e n o f p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h in t h e s e c o u n t r i e s , this
l a t t e r g r o u p a c h i e v e d no growth at all o n a p e r c a p i t a b a s i s d u r i n g
t h e 1 5 - y e a r p e r i o d ; it is c l e a r t h a t t h e i r e c o n o m i e s w e r e d e c l i n i n g .
T h e 22 c o u n t r i e s in t h e p e r c a p i t a i n c o m e r a n g e s o f $ U S 100 t o
$ U S 300 a c h i e v e d a v e r a g e g r o w t h o f 4.1 p e r c e n t p e r a n n u m , w i t h
a 1.4 p e r c e n t p e r a n n u m i n c r e a s e in p e r c a p i t a i n c o m e .
T a b l e 5.9 p r o v i d e s d a t a o n t h e r a t e o f g r o w t h o f t h e 45
d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s , first b y g e o g r a p h i c a l s u b - r e g i o n a n d ,
s e c o n d l y , u n d e r the e c o n o m i c a l l y m o r e m e a n i n g f u l classifications.
T h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f t h e different s e c t o r s o f e a c h g r o u p o f
c o u n t r i e s is s h o w n at t a b l e 5 . 1 0 . T h e five n o n - o i l - e x p o r t i n g
countries p r o v e d t h r o u g h their p e r f o r m a n c e that A f r i c a n countries
did not h a v e to wait for the d i s c o v e r y o f crude p e t r o l e u m before
229

T a b l e 5.9. Growth of real GDP in developing Africa, 1970

{percentage per annum).
1960-70 1970-5 1960-75
North Africa 5.6 6.1 5.8

West Africa 4.8 4-2 4-5
Central Africa (excluding S. Rhodesia) 2.9 3-1
00
East Africa 1.9 4.5
Total 4-5 4.9
Major oil-exporting countries (4) 6.9 7.0 6.9
Non-oil-exporting countries (41) 4.9 3.6 4.0

GDP less than $100 per capita 2-5 2.8 2.6
GDP $ 1 0 0 to under $200 per capita 4-3 3.8 4.1
GDP $200 to under $300 per capita 3-5 5.0 4.1
GDP $300 to $400 per capita 6.5 4.3 5.8
Source: Estimates from the Economic Commission for Africa.
T a b l e 5 . 1 0 . Average growth rates by economic sector by groups of

countries 1960-7 j (percentage per year).
Total Agri Manufac- All

GDP culture turing industry Services
Major oil-exporting 6.9 2.0 12.1 13-7 5-7
countries
Non-oil-exporting 4.0 2.4 5-3 5.4 4.6
countries
GDP less than 2.6 0.4 4-7 4.1 4.2
$100 per capita
GDP $100 to under 4.1 2-7 6.6 5-5 5-7
$200 per capita
GDP $200 to under 4.1 3- 2 4.2 6.1 3.8
$300 per capita
GDP $300 to under 5.8 4.0 9-7 4.8 7-3
$400 per capita
Total 4.9 2.3 6.4 7-6 4.8
Source: Estimates from the Economic Commission for Africa.
230

d e v e l o p m e n t c o u l d g e t u n d e r w a y . F o r t h e r e g i o n as a w h o l e , t h e
c u m u l a t i v e effect o f this i n c r e a s i n g d i s p a r i t y in e c o n o m i c
p e r f o r m a n c e a m o n g t h e d i f f e r e n t g r o u p s o f c o u n t r i e s is t h a t a
small n u m b e r o f countries w o u l d b e c o m e increasingly e c o n o m i
c a l l y d o m i n a n t in A f r i c a . W e h a v e a l r e a d y r e f e r r e d t o t h e
g r o w i n g d o m i n a n c e o f t e n c o u n t r i e s in t h e i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r . T h e s e
countries, a c c o r d i n g to table 5.10, a c c o u n t e d for 72.4 per cent o f
Africa's total industrial o u t p u t . In 1 9 7 5 , the four major oil-
e x p o r t e r s a c c o u n t e d f o r 34.5 p e r c e n t o f d e v e l o p i n g A f r i c a ' s
G D P ; t h e five n o n - o i l - e x p o r t i n g c o u n t r i e s in t h e p e r c a p i t a i n c o m e
r a n g e o f $ U S 3 0 0 - 4 0 0 a c c o u n t e d f o r 8.6 p e r c e n t ; t h e 1 1 c o u n t r i e s
w i t h i n the i n c o m e range o f $ U S 200-300 per capita a c c o u n t e d for
30.2 p e r c e n t ; t h e o t h e r 11 c o u n t r i e s w i t h i n t h e p e r c a p i t a i n c o m e
range o f $ U S 100-200 a c c o u n t e d for 13.6 per c e n t ; and the 14
c o u n t r i e s w h o s e p e r c a p i t a i n c o m e w a s b e l o w $ U S 100 a c c o u n t e d
for 13.1 per cent. T h u s nine countries shared b e t w e e n t h e m 43.1
p e r c e n t o f A f r i c a ' s G D P in 1 9 7 5 w h i l e 25 c o u n t r i e s h a d o n l y 26.7
per cent.
T H E S E A R C H FOR E C O N O M I C I N T E G R A T I O N
A s w e have already emphasised, a principal legacy o f colonialism

in A f r i c a w a s its c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f t h e c o n t i n e n t i n t o a n u m b e r o f
politically distinct entities w i t h o u t regard to history and culture
or political and e c o n o m i c viability. T h e colonial p o w e r s c o n
centrated o n f o r g i n g vertical e c o n o m i c links b e t w e e n their m e t r o -
poles and their dependencies rather than horizontal links a m o n g
t h e c o l o n i e s . T h e y c o n s i s t e n t l y d i s c o u r a g e d t h e l a t t e r u n l e s s it
s e r v e d an imperial p u r p o s e . Y e t p a r a d o x i c a l l y the genesis o f
e c o n o m i c i n t e g r a t i o n is t o b e f o u n d in t h e p o l i c i e s o f t h e c o l o n i a l
powers.
I n E a s t A f r i c a , K e n y a a n d U g a n d a f o r m e d a c u s t o m s u n i o n as
far b a c k as 1 9 1 7 a n d t h e s e t w o w e r e j o i n e d b y T a n g a n y i k a t e n
y e a r s later. A l t h o u g h t h i s w a s d e s i g n e d t o p r o t e c t a n d f u r t h e r t h e
i n t e r e s t s o f t h e w h i t e s e t t l e r s in K e n y a , it w a s a l s o i n t e n d e d t o
g i v e t h e t h r e e t e r r i t o r i e s t h e b e n e f i t o f e c o n o m i e s o f s c a l e in t h e
p r o v i s i o n , i m p r o v e m e n t and administration o f infrastructural
facilities s u c h as r a i l w a y s , r o a d s , p o r t s , a n d p o s t s a n d t e l e c o m
m u n i c a t i o n s . I n 1 9 4 7 this c o m m o n - m a r k e t a r r a n g e m e n t w a s d e
v e l o p e d into an institution for the administration o f these
231

i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l facilities - t h e E a s t A f r i c a H i g h C o m m i s s i o n . A s
the three c o u n t r i e s a p p r o a c h e d i n d e p e n d e n c e , this a r r a n g e m e n t
e n c o u n t e r e d g r o w i n g difficulties. W i t h the i n d e p e n d e n c e o f
T a n g a n y i k a in 1 9 6 1 , the E a s t A f r i c a n H i g h C o m m i s s i o n w a s
replaced b y the East African C o m m o n Services O r g a n i s a t i o n
( E A C S O ) . T h i s w a s in turn replaced b y the East A f r i c a n
C o m m u n i t y ( E A C ) w i t h w h i c h w e s h a l l d e a l later.
T h e establishment o f the Federation o f R h o d e s i a and N y a s a l a n d
in 1953 h a d similar o b j e c t i v e s t o the E a s t A f r i c a n H i g h
C o m m i s s i o n - the protection o f the e c o n o m i c a l l y d o m i n a n t
g r o u p , the w h i t e settlers. T h e o n l y difference b e t w e e n the E a s t
A f r i c a n and the Central A f r i c a n a p p r o a c h e s w a s that in the case
o f t h e latter t h e B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l p o w e r w a s p e r s u a d e d b y t h e
settlers that those interests w e r e better s e r v e d n o t m e r e l y t h r o u g h
the e c o n o m i c integration o f the three but also t h r o u g h their
political integration. T h i s g a v e the w h i t e settlers o f the t w o
R h o d e s i a s the possibility o f establishing e c o n o m i c and political
h e g e m o n y o v e r the three countries. B e c a u s e o f A f r i c a n o p p o s i t i o n ,
t h e f e d e r a t i o n h a d a v e r y s h o r t e x i s t e n c e a n d fell a p a r t i n 1 9 6 4 .
T h e c o m m o n s e r v i c e s w e r e s p l i t u p i n 1 9 6 3 , t e n y e a r s after t h e y
had been established.
T h e British d e p e n d e n c e s in W e s t A f r i c a w e r e n o t c o n t i g u o u s ;
they w e r e separated from o n e another by F r e n c h colonies and
L i b e r i a . T h e r e w e r e n o settler interests t o p r o t e c t and therefore
n o c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n t o set u p a c o m m o n m a r k e t o r c u s t o m s
u n i o n , o r e v e n a c o m m o n services a r r a n g e m e n t . H o w e v e r , in
order to minimise the cost o f administration, these countries had
certain services in c o m m o n , for e x a m p l e a c o m m o n c u r r e n c y and
a c o m m o n income-tax policy, c o m m o n research institutions and
e v e n a c o m m o n s c h o o l examination institution - the W e s t A f r i c a n
E x a m i n a t i o n s C o u n c i l . T h e British H i g h C o m m i s s i o n territories
o f Bechuanaland (Botswana), Swaziland and Basutoland (Lesotho)
w e r e j o i n e d w i t h S o u t h A f r i c a , b y w h i c h t h e last w a s s u r r o u n d e d ,
in a c u s t o m s r e g i m e i n 1 9 1 0 w i t h c o m m o n e x t e r n a l tariffs a g a i n s t
t h i r d c o u n t r i e s a n d w i t h free m o v e m e n t o f l a b o u r , c a p i t a l ,
currency and g o o d s .
T h e F r e n c h o r g a n i s e d their tropical A f r i c a n c o l o n i e s into t w o
administrative areas, F r e n c h W e s t Africa and F r e n c h E q u a t o r i a l
A f r i c a , as a m e a n s o f e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e m o s t e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l . E a c h
o f these a d m i n i s t r a t i v e areas w a s a k i n d o f federation w i t h
232

appropriate federal institutions, a monetary system and a c o m m o n

policy in trade. E a c h federation had p o w e r s o f taxation and all
French financial assistance was channelled t h r o u g h it. T h e
currencies o f the t w o federations w e r e freely transferable a m o n g
the constituent colonies o f the other federation w i t h a par value
being maintained with the metropolitan franc T h e y were also
transferable to the Trusteeship Territories o f C a m e r o u n and
T o g o , as well as Madagascar and French Somaliland. T h e s e
arrangements did not survive independence because France chose
to grant independence not to each federation but to the constituent
colonies.
T h e Belgians united their Trust Territory o f Ruanda-Urundi
with the Belgian C o n g o not only for the purposes o f administrative
convenience but also as a de facto c o m m o n market. T h e r e was free
m o v e m e n t o f capital and labour and currency. W i t h the approach
o f independence the Ruanda-Urundi U n i o n split into t w o separate
independent states, R w a n d a and Burundi, and entered on a
separate economic existence from the independent C o n g o (Zaire).
A l t h o u g h virtually all the e c o n o m i c g r o u p i n g s w h i c h were set
up during the colonial period failed to survive colonialism, during
this period the nationalists from all parts o f Africa had advocated
African integration and unity as the only means o f bringing about
self-rule and self-determination. T h e Fifth Pan-African Congress
held in Manchester in 1 9 4 5 , for instance, recommended inter alia
the establishment o f a West African e c o n o m i c union as a means
o f combating the exploitation o f the e c o n o m i c resources o f the
West African territories and for ensuring the participation o f the
indigenous people in the industrial development o f W e s t Africa.
T h e Bandung Declaration o f 1955 also urged e c o n o m i c cooper
ation a m o n g the African countries.
In 195 8, a year after the G o l d Coast had achieved independence
as Ghana, the first conference o f the leaders o f political parties
in Africa was held in Accra. T h i s conference decided to establish
a permanent organization, the All-African Peoples' Conference,
a m o n g w h o s e objectives was the p r o m o t i o n o f intra-African trade
through the removal o f customs and other trade restrictions, the
conclusion o f multilateral payments agreements designed to
facilitate intra-African trade, the formation o f an African Trans
port C o m p a n y for land, sea and air transportation; the setting up
o f an African C o m m o n M a r k e t ; the creation o f an African
2
33

234

THE SEARCH FOR E C O N O M I C INTEGRATION
Investment B a n k ; and, the setting up o f an African Institute for

Research and Training w h o s e primary task w o u l d be to p r o m o t e
the development o f joint projects.
In 1960, the conference held its second meeting in T u n i s where
the recommendations o f the first conference were endorsed. T h i s
was followed a year later by a third meeting held in Cairo. In the
post-independence period, many meetings were held o n the issue
o f economic cooperation and development. T h e United Nations
E c o n o m i c Commission for Africa, w h i c h was established in 1958,
made determined efforts to foster e c o n o m i c cooperation a m o n g
African states. F r o m the beginning o f the 1970s, particularly since
the United Nations General A s s e m b l y passed the resolution in
December 1972 calling for the d e v e l o p i n g nations themselves to
take concrete action to promote technical cooperation, a series o f
sub-regional, regional and inter-regional meetings was held o n the
subject o f cooperation, each meeting ending w i t h a declaration
a n d / o r a programme o f action.
It would be tedious to list all the declarations and pronounce
ments on the intention to cooperate. O n e thing that was clear
was that the African states and, before independence, the national
ists, were not wanting in the right intentions. Y e t , not only
did they fail to build on the foundations laid by the colonial
powers, whatever the m o t i v e s o f the latter, but they failed to
achieve any significant b r e a k t h r o u g h after independence.
Key to fig. 1 1
ADB The African Development Bank

BEAC Bank of Central African States
BOAD West African Development Bank
CEAO West African Economic Community
CPCM Maghrib Permanent Consultative Committee
EAC East African Community
EADB East African Development Bank
ECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
ECEAO Central Bank of West African States
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
ENTENTE Council of the Entente States
OMVS Organisation for the Development of the Senegal River
UDEAC Central African Customs and Economic Union
UEAC Union of Central African States
UMOA West African Monetary Union
WACH West African Clearing House
2
35

THE ECONOMIC EVOLUTION
J u d g i n g from the number o f e c o n o m i c g r o u p i n g s w h i c h have

been established since i960 (see fig. 12) o n e w o u l d be tempted
to think that there had indeed been a breakthrough in economic
cooperation and integration. A c c o r d i n g to an E C A directory o f
inter-governmental cooperation organisations in Africa, there
were, in 1975, 6 e c o n o m i c communities, 20 inter-governmental
multi-sectoral e c o n o m i c organisations and about 100 single-sector
multi-national organisations meant to p r o m o t e technical and
e c o n o m i c cooperation in the continent. A l l these organisations
had a chequered history; s o m e w e r e virtually moribund while
others were n o more than paper tigers. A few were earnestly trying
t o b e c o m e effectively operational.
W h y were the efforts at fostering e c o n o m i c cooperation in
Africa not successful? T o answer this question satisfactorily w e
w o u l d have to examine fully and in detail each economic
g r o u p i n g . A l l w e can d o here is highlight some o f the major
problems and issues i n v o l v e d .
T h e constraints facing e c o n o m i c cooperation in Africa were
either internally generated or externally induced. T h e major
internally-generated constraints included, first, the difficulty o f
agreeing o n a formula for sharing the benefits and cost o f
e c o n o m i c c o o p e r a t i o n ; secondly, the over-sensitivity concerning
national s o v e r e i g n t y ; thirdly, the inadequacy o f infrastructure and
the absence o f an appropriate institutional framework to promote
e c o n o m i c c o o p e r a t i o n ; fourthly, differences in political i d e o l o g y ;
and, finally, ambivalence in attitudes towards economic c o
operation.
A series o f under-capacities - inadequate physical infrastructure
and lack o f enabling institutional facilities - constituted the prin
cipal hurdles to effective regional cooperation. T h e real constraints
w e r e generated by the limited range o f modern transport and
communication links a m o n g m e m b e r states. In the colonial period
there w a s , o f course, n o intra-African clearing house arrangement
nor a c o m m o n currency and payments arrangement to facilitate
commercial transactions, let alone the multi-national development
institutions w i t h the capacity for project identification, prepara
tion, investment p r o m o t i o n and consultancy services in industrial
and commercial ventures. T h e s e capacities are, h o w e v e r , the real
nuts and bolts in the vehicle o f multi-national economic
cooperation, w i t h o u t w h i c h the latent p o w e r in the engine will
236

not lead to forward movement. I n this connexion, the Economic

Commission for Africa tried to develop, in cooperation w i t h
African governments, physical infrastructural capacities on a
continent-wide basis. Accordingly, plans were initiated for the
development of a network of five trans-African highways: trans-
Saharan roads from Algiers to Gao and A r l i t and to Lagos; a
trans-African highway from Dakar to Ndjamena; a coastal
highway from Lagos to Nouakchott; and a trans-East African
highway from Cairo to Gaborone. The Commission, in collabo
ration with the International Telecommunication Union and the
O A U , established in 1963 the Pan-African Telecommunication
Union (Panaftel) whose task was to develop a Pan-African
telecommunications network.
I n the years after independence, strong differences in political
ideologies with consequential differences in economic organis
ation and policy appeared among different African countries. For
example, the failure of the East African Community was due in
part to the fact that Tanzania had a socialist ideology while Kenya
followed the capitalist pattern. Furthermore, by and large the
multi-national corporations had little sympathy w i t h the aspir
ations for economic progress of African countries, but were only
interested in protecting and extending the markets which they had
dominated during the colonial era and maximising and repatriating
profits for their metropolitan shareholders.
Finally, there was the constraint imposed by the failure of
political initiatives and declared collective goodwill to be marked
by concomitant practical action. I n most African states there did
not exist institutional arrangements and administrative machinery
adequately equipped to translate collective declarations and poli
tical goodwill into operational development programmes and
projects. More serious was the tendency for actions at national
levels to be completely at variance w i t h declarations in inter
national forums and for some high-ranking public officials to
allow themselves to be used as pawns on the chessboard o f
international power politics, thus delaying the economic progress
of their own people.
O f course it can be argued that this dichotomy between
internally generated and externally induced constraints is unre
alistic, in that extra-African factors played direct and indirect roles
in influencing the intensity, extent and direction of the operation
*37

o f internally generated constraints, at individual country level.

But Africa was still powerfully oriented to the outside w o r l d . A n d
even more striking, it was still conditioned by strong attach
ment to pre-independence political, economic, social and cultural
relations. T h i s orientation and this attachment inhibited the
development o f concepts, policies and instruments essential for
engineering the kind o f domestic socio-economic change on
w h i c h self-sustaining g r o w t h and self-reliance could be based and
on w h i c h effective regional and sub-regional cooperation could
be built. It was difficult, if not impossible, to achieve a significant
measure o f self-reliance, national and collective, while g o v e r n
ments ran externally oriented and excessively open economies.
A F R I C A A N D T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L E C O N O M Y
E c o n o m i c development was conceived in colonial Africa in terms

o f production for export and in terms o f investment, technology
and skilled personnel c o m i n g from overseas. Africa's dependence
on the international e c o n o m y , particularly that o f the metropolitan
countries, was almost complete. Indeed, the prevailing conven
tional w i s d o m during the colonial period supported this v i e w . It
linked the rate and direction o f colonial socio-economic change
with production for export and w i t h the importation o f skills,
technology and capital g o o d s and services and modern consumer
g o o d s . T h u s , foreign trade was regarded as the prime engine o f
g r o w t h and development in the d e v e l o p i n g countries.
Foreign trade remained critically important to independent
African g o v e r n m e n t s , if they w e r e ever to be in a position to
maintain public services and attempt to fulfil their pre-
independence promises. Y e t in i960, w h e n so many African
countries became independent, the values o f Africa's imports and
exports as percentages o f w o r l d imports and exports were only
6 and 5.1 per cent respectively. E x c l u d i n g S o u t h Africa, the
figures were 4.8 and 4.1 per cent.
D u r i n g the period 1960-75, Africa experienced phenomenal
increases in its external trade. A s is s h o w n in fig. 13, the value
o f exports increased from $ U S 4 9 z o million in i960 to $ U S 3 3 o i 2
million in 1975 - an increase by 6.7 times. Imports also increased
5.7 times in value during the period. In terms o f v o l u m e , the
exports o f d e v e l o p i n g Africa increased annually at the average rate
238

KEY
Non-oil Exporting Countries
/ / / / / / M a i a oil Exporting Countries
1 1
20.000-
I960 1965 1970 1975

YEAR
13 Exports and imports by groups of countries in developing Africa

(excluding Angola and Rhodesia), 1960-75 (in million % US) (United
Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, various issues to Sept. 1976;
IMF, International Financial Statistics^ Dec. 1976).
o f 4.5 per cent whereas the imports increased at the rate o f 6.2
per cent during the same period. It will be recalled that during
this period G D P increased o n average at 4.9 per cent per annum,
In other w o r d s , the g r o w t h rate o f imports w a s about o m
percentage point higher than the g r o w t h rate o f G D P . In annual
values, as indicated in fig. 13, the non-oil-exporting countries
achieved average cumulative increases o f 8.3 per cent and 10.8 per
cent for exports and imports respectively with the result that a
very large trade g a p developed for this g r o u p o f countries o v e r
the period. Their deficit o n external trade rose from J U S 0 . 2
billion in i960 to $US6-3 billion in 1975. T h e major oil exporters
turned their deficit o f $US 1.1 billion in i960 into a trade surplus
o f J U S 3.8 billion in 1975.
Table 5.11 provides details o f the g r o w t h rates o f exports and
imports by g i v i n g the annual averages for each five-year period
239

TABLE Average annual growth rates of export and import

5 . 1 1 .
volume, by groups of non-oil-exporting countries,

1960-7j (percentage).
1960-5 1965-70 1970-5 1960-75
Exports
GDP less than $100 — 2.1 8.0 -6.0 — 0.1
per capita
GDP $100 to under $200 6.8 4.1 -1.8 2.9
per capita
GDP $200 to under $300 2.6 2.6 4.3 3.2
per capita
GDP $300 to under $400 8.0 8.6 -0.3 5.3
Imports
GDP less than $100 4-5 8.2 -1.4 3.8
per capita
GDP J 1 0 0 to under $200 6.3 5.6 0.8 42
per capita
GDP $200 to under $300 5-5 1-3 SM 5-4
per capita
GDP $300 to under $400
00
7.0 4.4 5-7

per capita
Sources'.Estimates from the Economic Commission for Africa, based on data

in the United Nations Monthly bulletin of statistics and International Monetary
Fund, Internationalfinancialstatistics, various issues.
SINCE I 9 6 0 . T H ETABLE S H O W S THAT T H EANNUAL G R O W T H RATES O F
EXPORTS A N D IMPORTS F R O M I 9 6 0 T O 1 9 7 5I N C R E A S E D ASP E R CAPITA
G D P INCREASED, A N D THAT T H EG R O W T H RATE O FI M P O R T S W A S HIGHER
FOR E A C H G R O U P O FCOUNTRIES THAN F O RE X P O R T S . A TT H EL O W E S T LEVEL
(I.E. I N T H E 1 4C O U N T R I E S W I T H P E R CAPITA G D P UNDER $ U S I O O I N
1 9 7 0 ) , T H EG A P B E T W E E N T H EA N N U A L A V E R A G E G R O W T H RATES O F E X P O R T S
A N D IMPORTS W A S PARTICULARLY M A R K E D . EXPORTS FAILED T O INCREASE
I N V O L U M E FORTHIS G R O U P O FCOUNTRIES D U R I N G T H EP E R I O D WHEREAS
IMPORTS ROSE B Y3 . 8 P E RCENT P E RA N N U M . I TSHOULD B E NOTED THAT
THIS G R O U P O FC O U N T R I E S INCLUDED M O S T O FT H E COUNTRIES O F AFRICA
HARDEST H I TB YD R O U G H T I N T H E YEARS 1 9 7 3 A N D1 9 7 4 , A N D THAT B Y
1975 RECOVERY O FAGRICULTURAL A N D LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION W A S FAR
F R O M B E I N G COMPLETE. FINALLY, T H E EXPORT PERFORMANCE O F ALL
G R O U P S O FC O U N T R I E S , E X C E P T T H O S E W I T H P E R C A P I T A G D PO F$ U S 2 0 0
2 4 0

Table 5.12. Imports and exports by provenance or destination

1960-7j {percentages).
Provenance Imports Exports

destination i960 1965 1970 1975 i960 1965 1970 1975
Developed 82 85 81 85 84 89 88 84
market
economies
Developing 11 8 10 10 5 5 10
market
economies
Centrally 7 7 6 6 6 6 7 6
planned
economies
World 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: UN, Monthly bulletin of statistics, IMF Directory of Trade.
to $US 300, was particularly disappointing during the first half o f

the 1970s.
T h e direction o f Africa's trade did n o t u n d e r g o any significant
change after i960 as table 5.12 clearly s h o w s . T h e principal
trading partners o f the region w e r e countries w i t h d e v e l o p e d
market economies. Chief a m o n g these w e r e the members o f the
European E c o n o m i c C o m m u n i t y ( E E C ) w h i c h accounted for
approximately 57 per cent o f the trade o f the region o v e r the
period, i.e. 5 5 per cent o f imports and 5 8 per cent o f exports.
H o w e v e r , it should be observed that there w a s a steady relative
decline in trade with E E C countries, particularly as regards
export, in favour o f the United States, the Latin-American Free
Trade Association countries and Japan.
W i t h regard to the patterns o f trade some significant structural
changes t o o k place in exports particularly during the last ten years
( 1 9 6 5 - 7 5 ) . T h e most significant change w a s the rapid increase in
the relative importance o f exports o f mineral fuels, lubricants and
related materials and, to a lesser extent, o f imports o f machinery
and transport equipment. T h e former increased from 19 per cent
o f total exports in 1965 t o 55 per cent in 1975, while the latter
increased from 31 per cent o f total imports in 1966 to 39 per cent
241

YEAR
I960 »65 1970 1975
US S M
ü
-2000
-4000
-6000
NON-OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES
-8000 MAJOR OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES
14 Balance of payments deficits on goods and services by groups of

countries in developing Africa, 1960-75 (in million % US). Note that the
data for i960 are much more unreliable than those for later years.
(Estimates from the ECA.)
in 1 9 7 5 . O n . t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e s h a r e o f e x t e r n a l t r a d e a t t r i b u t e d
to food, drink and t o b a c c o , and to exports b o t h o f manufactured
g o o d s and inedible r a w materials, apart f r o m fuels, declined
c o n s i d e r a b l y o v e r t h e p e r i o d . T h e n e t r e s u l t o f all t h e s e c h a n g e s
w a s that mineral fuel, lubricants and related materials b e c a m e the
m o s t i m p o r t a n t g r o u p o f e x p o r t s in place o f o t h e r c r u d e inedible
materials. T h e s e d e c l i n e d in i m p o r t a n c e t o a l e v e l b e l o w that o f
f o o d s t u f f s , w h i c h c o n t i n u e d t o a c c o u n t f o r t h e s e c o n d p l a c e in t h e
share o f total e x p o r t s . M a c h i n e r y and transport e q u i p m e n t
continued t h r o u g h o u t the period to be the m o s t important g r o u p
o f imports, f o l l o w e d b y manufactured g o o d s . O n the w h o l e there
w a s n o significant c h a n g e in the p a t t e r n o f i m p o r t s d u r i n g the
period under review.
L e t us n o w c o m p l e t e o u r r e v i e w o f A f r i c a and the international
e c o n o m y b y l o o k i n g at t h e b a l a n c e - o f - p a y m e n t s s i t u a t i o n f r o m
i 9 6 0 t o 1 9 7 5 . A s s h o w n in fig. 1 4 , t h e o v e r a l l d e f i c i t f o r g o o d s
a n d s e r v i c e s r o s e f r o m $ U S i 9 7 o m i l l i o n in i 9 6 0 t o $ 1 1 8 9 5 3 2
m i l l i o n in 1 9 7 5 . W h i l e t h e r e w a s little c h a n g e in t h e d e f i c i t o f t h e
242

A F R I C A A N DT H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L E C O N O M Y
Table 5 . 1 3 . Net transfers and net capital in-flows for oil-exporting

and non-oil-exporting African countries (1960-7;).
i960 1965 1970 1975

(in million JUS)
(a) Net transfers
Non-oil-exporting 135 224 735 2780
countries
Major oil-exporters 210 191 252 69
Total 345 4M 987 2849
(b) Net capital in-flows

Non-oil-exporting 680 824 957 4477
countries
Major oil-exporters 850 300 417 483
Total 1530 1124 1374 4960
Source-. ECA Secretariat estimates, March 1977.
oil-exporting countries - it increased from $ U S i 4 o o million in

i 9 6 0 to $ U S i 8 6 2 million in 1975 - the deficits o f the non-oil-
exporting countries increased from a mere $US 5 70 million in i 9 6 0
to $1187670 million in 1 9 7 5 . I n fact, for the poorest among this
group o f countries, the deficit rose from virtually nothing in i 9 6 0
to$US 1560 million in 1 9 7 5 . Although the level o f deficit on goods
and services account increased in the non-oil-exporting countries
between i 9 6 0 and 1 9 7 0 , there was a very small limited rise in the
size o f the deficit between 1 9 7 0 and 1 9 7 5 .
These deficits were covered by increasing in-flows o f public
transfers and capital, some rise in net receipts o f private transfers
and a running down o f net foreign reserves. For example, the
reserves of the non-oil-exporters fell by JUS 4 1 0 million i n 1 9 7 5 ,
while those o f the major oil-exporters fell by JUS 1 3 1 0 million in
the same year. The increase in the in-flows o f net transfers and
the level o f the net capital in-flows since i 9 6 0 were as shown in
table 5 . 1 3 . Thus, the sharply-increased flows o f resources into
African countries, particularly during the 1970s, helped to contain
the balance-of-payments problems. But it also increased their debt
burdens to virtually unbearable proportions.
We must now turn to the role o f foreign aid and investment
in Africa's development. We have already noted the paucity o f
243

aid during the colonial period since the colonies were, in general,
required to pay for themselves up until the Second World War.
And private foreign investment was limited to mine development,
plantations, and in some colonies, railways. The Second World
War brought a fundamental change in the flow of aid and foreign
investment. The establishment of the World Bank gave a fillip to
this trend.
True enough, it was the urgency of reconstruction and reha
bilitation in Europe after that war that pointed to the need for
increased assistance to the developing countries. When the charter
of the World Bank was drafted in 1944, it was in the hope that
the Bank would be 'the principal instrument for restoring the
war-torn nations of the world to economic life'. In 1 9 4 6 - 7 , the
Bank's annual report confirmed that the most pressing calls upon
the Bank were ' for purposes of reconstructing the war-damaged
nations of Europe'. The same report, however, forecast that it
would not be very long before the financing of development
projects in the developing countries would tend to become the
primary concern of the Bank. By June 1 9 5 2 , the Bank had granted
a total of JUS 1382 million as loans. Africa received only 9 per
cent ($US 12 5 million). Out of this, $US 5 8 million was for electric
power generation in Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South
Africa, $US 20 million for the expansion of transportation facilities
in the Union of South Africa - a total of 62 per cent - and $ U S 4 o
million or another 32 per cent for development programmes in
the Belgian Congo. These three countries thus had nearly 95 per
cent of total World Bank loans to the Africa region. By June
1958, the region received nearly 13 per cent of the total loans
(JUS 4 7 9 million). As much as 91 per cent of the loans to the
African region were for electric power and transportation facilities.
The Union of South Africa and the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland again had the lion's share of the loans - about 63 per
cent - while the Belgian Congo had 1 7 per cent. By 1966, total
World Bank loans and International Development Association
(IDA) credits to Africa (excluding the Union of South Africa) had
reached $US 1224 million; I D A credits being $US 145 million.
By 1 9 7 0 , World Bank loans had increased by $US 693 million and
I D A credits by $US 403 million.
Official assistance, both financial and technical, also increased.
Other developed countries besides the colonial powers began to
244

give assistance to the developing countries. With the achievement

of independence by the African territories, colonial funds gave
way to bilateral assistance. At the end of 1 9 6 1 , the Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) was organised by the aid-giving
countries as a forum for consultation. The members of the
committee soon provided most of the financial and technical
assistance to the developing countries. By 1970, both the bilateral
and the multilateral assistance to the continent (excluding the
Union of South Africa) had expanded considerably.
From the data given in the 1976 Review of development co-operation
(OECD), total resource flows from the D A C countries and
multilateral agencies increased from JUS 3446 million in 1 9 7 1 to
JUS 5160 million in 1 9 7 4 and JUS 8 1 1 1 million in 1 9 7 5 . Total
private flows, therefore, increased from JUS 5 80 million in 1972
to JUS 7 9 0 million in 1 9 7 4 and JUS 2680 million in 1 9 7 5 .
Resources were also made available by both the socialist and
the O P E C countries. The annual commitment of bilateral devel
opment assistance from Centrally Planned Economies varied
between JUS 200 million and JUS 400 million in the 1 9 6 0 - 1 period,
except in 1964 when it jumped to JUS 870 million and 1962, 1966
and 1969 when it was less than JUS 60 million. It is estimated that
the commitment in 1 9 7 2 - 4 was about JUS 500 million a year. The
financial assistance received from the O P E C countries became
substantial after 1 9 7 3 . It is estimated to have been JUS 5 87 million
in 1 9 7 3 , JUS 2 1 6 7 million in 1 9 7 4 and JUS 2666 million in 1 9 7 5 ,
a total of JUS $420 million. But it did not offset oil price rises,
and not all countries benefited from it.
Africa received much foreign assistance, both financial and
technical. As shown in table 5.14, the external public debt of the
developing countries of Africa south of the Sahara increased
three-and-a-half times between 1967 and 1974. Even though
suppliers' credit only doubled, private bank credit increased
tremendously, especially after 1973 when official bilateral debt
more than tripled and multilateral debt increased five-fold. As a
result of the rapid increase of private resource flows in 1 9 7 5 , the
D A C countries were able to achieve the target of 1.0 per cent of
their G N P for total resource flows. Considering that most rapid
increases took place after 1970, and that the greatest increase was
in private resource flows, the debt service payments rose sharply
and would thereafter continue to rise. Debt service payments
*45

Table 5 . 1 4 . External public debt classified by type of creditor, Africa south of the Sahara, 1967—74:
amount in $US million {percentage in brackets).
Official Private
Suppliers'
Total Bilateral Multilateral credit Banks Others
1967 4629(100) 2261(48.8) 770(16.6) 737(i5-9) 45(3-0 716(15.5)
1968 5331(100) 2549(47.8) 939(17.6) 869(16.3) 206(3.9) 768(14.4)
1969 5884(100) 2789(47.4) 1241(21.1) 800(13.6) 245(4-0 808(13.7)
1970 7327(100) 3666(50.0) 1628(22.2) 937(i3-0 292(4.0) 783(10.7)
1971 8345(100) 4304(51.6) 1929(23.1) 1118(13.4) 6
3 4(4.4) 631(7.6)
1972 9555(100) 4763(49.8) 2406(25.1) 1173(12.3) 638(6.7) 575(6.o)
1973 12582(100) 5923(47.1) 3295(26.2) 1327(10.5) 1653(13.1) 384(3.0
1974 15957(100) 7349(46.1) 4019(25.2) 1599(10.0) 2640(16.5) 350(2.2)
Source-. World Bank: Annual report, 1976.

increased four-fold between 1967 and 1973 with a great jump

between 1972 and 1 9 7 3 , and these were only amortisation and
interest payments.
Figures for total capital out-flow, including repatriation of
profits and income, tell a different story. The out-flow of financial
resources in the form of private transfers and payment for services
for non-oil-producing developing African countries was sub
stantially greater than capital in-flow in 1969, 1970 and 1973 while
in 1971 and 1972 the out-flow and in-flow were about equal. The
conclusion which emerges from this is very disturbing though not
surprising. Aid to Africa was becoming increasingly more
apparent than real. Looked at broadly, capital investment was
coming to mean a recycling and extension of financial claims by
foreign creditors on African resources without any net transfer
of real value into Africa taking place. This was the cause of the
growing demand for rescheduling of debt payments which
reached a pitch at the Fourth Conference of the UN Conference
on Trade and Development held in Nairobi in 1 9 7 6 . And that is
why the action taken in 1 9 7 7 by the Swedish and Canadian
governments in writing off the debts owed to them by the most
seriously affected states was welcomed. But these were mere
palliatives. They did not solve the basic problems facing the
African countries. In addition, much of the foreign aid was tied,
with the donors stipulating that it must be used to purchase goods
and services from their own countries. This could preclude the
recipient countries from purchasing from low-cost suppliers and
from developing economic relations that were in their best
national interest. In particular, it tended to discourage economic
and trade links with neighbouring countries and thereby hampered
measures aimed at economic cooperation as well as links with the
other developing regions where more suitable technology was
available. Foreign loans thus had a substantial cost; the cost
relating to repayment or amortisation and interest payment, the
cost relating to foreign exchange for the service payment, as well
as the cost arising from the restrictions placed on the ways in
which aid could be used. Many countries were forced to borrow
in order to be able to meet these increasing costs; so the loans
and the repayments increased in a spiral.
247

C O N C L U S I O N
We observed that the governments of the newly independent

states were all determined to play a direct and pervasive role in
the development process, and that through the United Nations
the international community encouraged massive government
involvement in development through the adoption of compre
hensive planning. But in spite of all efforts by governments to
accelerate the rate of progress, analysis of the economic evolution
of Africa since 1940 has shown that no fundamental changes took
place after independence. Indeed, the revolution of rising
expectations which manifested itself among the masses at
independence was overtaken by rising frustrations which were
surfacing all over the continent, and which were potentially
disturbing to political and social peace. There was no gainsaying
the fact that Africa was facing an economic crisis of great portent
which was rapidly assuming alarming proportions.
Why did government involvement in the development effort
generally yield such disappointing results? Why did development
planning fail to bring about the same fundamental and rapid
transformation which it achieved in some centrally planned
socialist economies? The answers to these questions are to be
found partly in the planning techniques inherited from the
industrialised market economies; partly in African policy-makers'
perception of economic policy and the process of engineering
socio-economic change; and partly also in the international
community's conventional wisdom about the process of economic
development, as was reflected in the objectives and targets set
down for the First and Second U N Development Decades.
Early development planning, in the late 1 9 5 0 s and early 1 9 6 0 s ,
was limited to plans for government capital expenditure, or
project-oriented plans, prepared within a framework of stated
objectives which were in most cases limited to the provision of
infrastructure, to capital investment in social services and to the
expansion of agricultural production for export. A varying degree
of comprehensive planning was later adopted by a growing
number of countries. By 1968, upwards of 30 African countries
had adopted development planning. O f 25 of these countries
whose plans have been analysed, 9 countries had project plans,
13 countries made use of national accounts data and included
248

C O N C L U S I O N
sectoral analysis within a macroframework, while three countries

made use of formal models. Planning was already becoming
increasingly elaborate.
The hopes entertained in these plans were not realised.
Very few countries were able to achieve more than 70 per cent
of the objectives set out in their development plans. Even fewer
achieved a growth rate higher than the 5 per cent per annum set
as a target for the First Development Decade. Nor, from the
experience of those countries for which the appropriate data were
available, could it be concluded that growth depended solely or
mechanically on capital investment.
Apart from the fact that there was no unified approach to
development, success was retarded by the inherited theories of
development and economic growth which provided the intellec
tual basis from which African technocrats and policy-makers
derived public policies. These theories, or at least some of them,
linked the rate and direction of internal socio-economic change
with export markets and with imports of skills, technology and
capital goods and services and modern consumer products. Hence
discussions centred on trade gaps, with insufficient attention to
natural resources availability, local entrepreneurship, skilled
manpower and technology and the domestic market. Most
governments, in seeking to put these theories into practice and
to accelerate economic development and diversify their economies,
reinforced the existing pattern of production, exportation, and the
import of factor inputs from abroad.
By continuing to produce what the international system wanted
and not what they themselves needed, the dependence of African
countries on the international community was increased and their
capacity for self-reliance was reduced. Instability in export
volumes, prices and export proceeds became a regular feature of
the mono-cultural economies of most states. Unfortunately,
African policy-makers thought that the solution to their excessive
dependence - for such things as employment, foreign-exchange
earnings, government revenue - on one or two export crops, was
to pursue a policy of diversifying the production of agricultural
export commodities. In a few years, this policy resulted in a
greater number of agricultural export commodities in surplus
supply in the 'world' market - the industrialised countries. This
led to greater instability which was in turn worsened by inflation
249

and periodic recessions in the industrialised countries, and rising

payments to factor incomes abroad.
Multi-national arrangements for commodity management and
price stabilisation were then sought as solutions to the growing
price instability and worsening terms of trade for primary
commodities. Experience, however, quickly revealed the limita
tions of this policy; first, because of the high cost involved;
second, because many products concerned were susceptible to
quality deterioration; third, because non-members (and even
members) driven by necessity undermined the pricing formula by
increasing production and selling below the price floor agreed upon
by participants; and, finally, because of the intransigence of the
industrialised countries which put one obstacle after another in
the way of the successful conclusion of commodity agreements
and, where such agreements were concluded, of their effective
operation.
After more than two to three decades of negotiation between
producers and consumers, agreements had been concluded on
only six commodities - coffee, tin, cocoa, olive oil, sugar and
wheat — and these were operated with varying degrees of success.
This lack of success did not persuade developing countries to
undertake an agonising reappraisal of their development strategies
with a view to making a break from the past.
It would be wrong to conclude that because of this rather
sombre picture, African governments failed altogether in their
efforts to accelerate the development process. True enough, many
of them made avoidable mistakes, most of them tended to behave
as if the economic well-being of their people would be much
advanced by symbolic modernisation, because of their politically
motivated desire for convincing people that something was in fact
being done. But the real cause of the disappointing results was
that these governments and their advisers were ignorant of the
dynamics of development in their own societies and simply
extrapolated the experiences of other societies to their own.
Besides, they failed to ask the fundamental question: development
for what and for whom? They pursued the line of least resistance
by continuing with inherited policies based on inherited theories.
250

CHAPTER 6
SOUTHERN AFRICA
In southern Africa, as in Ireland, history is formidably active in

politics. What people believe about their past has been both a
consequence and a cause of conflict, and also a source of political
energy. People are not chess pieces. Their next move depends not
only on where they are in relation to others but also on how they
got there, and on how they think they got there. N o matter how
loaded it may be, the historical luggage which people carry in their
heads, and in their school textbooks, is an important fact.
Such luggage is generally of three types. One is the moving
symbol with which men seek * to rally support for themselves or
, 1
some cause, or to maintain a distinction . Secondly there is the
searing event which has happened recently enough for many
people to have experienced it themselves, or to have grown up
in homes where parents or grandparents were still affected by its
having happened to them. Thirdly there is the political myth
whose supposed happening is used to justify certain political
beliefs or actions. All three types of luggage are carried about
everywhere but their weight, both relative and absolute, varies
in different societies at different times. In southern Africa in the
1930s there was an abundance of such luggage although not
everybody carried the same pieces.
For blacks the most important historic event was the loss of
M o s t o f the facts and ideas contained in this chapter have been acquired over the
years from my family, friends and colleagues. A few o f the debts owed to the writing
and conversation of others are acknowledged in footnotes and the bibliographical essay.
I learned much from the opportunity o f testing out ideas with colleagues at seminars
in Cape T o w n , Stellenbosch and at the School o f International Studies, Jawaharlal
Nehru University. N e w Delhi. It was my g o o d fortune that, during the writing o f this
chapter, another member of the family was preparing for publication the autobiography
of Z . K . Matthews. T w o fellow South Africans o f my o w n generation, whose incisive
criticism during the writing o f this chapter I should particularly like to acknowledge,
are Neville Alexander and the late Steve Biko. M a n y other friends were also generous
with their time and their insights.
1
Monica W i l s o n , * Changing lines o f cleavage \ in Meyer Fortes and Sheila Patterson
(eds.), Studies in African social anthropology ( L o n d o n , 1975), 51.
251

S O U T H E R N A F R I C A
land to white conquerors. The hundred-year war in the eastern

Cape, in Natal and elsewhere, culminating in the Land Act of 1 9 1 3
which prohibited Africans from buying land outside the residual
reserves was a bitter memory. So too for Herero and others in
Namibia was the history of German annexation in 1884 and the
subsequent thirty years of brutal conquest. Swazi remembered the
signing away of their land to white settlers. In Lesotho the loss
of the fertile Caledon plains to the burghers of the Orange Free
State was tempered by the impregnability of Moshweshwe's
mountain fortress. The skill of the old warrior-king retained
honour, but not enough land, for his people.
Paradoxically it was this century of black defeat and dispos
session which was also to be seen by South Africa's white rulers
as their own dark vale. Smuts himself shifted from his early views
but his people did not move with him. Dunbar Moodie has
1
shown how the hundred years from 1815 to 1 9 1 4 became for the
purified Afrikaner nationalists of the 1 9 3 0 s the sacred century.
The Great Trek, the battle of Blood River, the concentration
camps of the Anglo-Boer war, the humiliating poverty which
uprooted them from the land, and Lord Milner's anglicisation
policy were seen as a period of redemptive suffering at the hands
of twin foes: the imperialist British with their capitalist tentacles,
and the black * heathens' in whose midst the chosen people had
been set down and from whom G o d was miraculously rescuing
them.
For another group of South Africans the important luggage
consisted of the agonies of indenture in the latter half of the
nineteenth century when their grandfathers had been shipped to
Natal to work in the sugar plantations of the English-speaking
settlers. But there was also some less burdensome history: the epic
period - between 1893 and his departure from South Africa in
1 9 1 4 - w h e n the young Mohandas Gandhi forged his powerful
tool of 'Satyagraha' and created a living tradition that became a
source of inspiration not only to thousands of South Africans (see
below) but also to countless Indians as they followed the Mahatma
from the banks of the Sarbarnati to independence in 1946. For
English-speaking South Africans, the British heritage of imperial
power, wealth and culture bred a confidence which many others
found patronising.
1
T . D u n b a r M o o d i e , The rise of Afrikanerdom ( B e r k e l e y , 1975).
252

Particular events gave rise to quite different memories. The

First World War, for example, was remembered by the Coloured
community for Square Hill and other battles in Palestine where
members of the Cape Corps distinguished themselves, and by
English-speaking South Africans for the nightmare battle of
Delville Wood in the Somme mud. For nationalist Afrikaners, the
war was remembered chiefly for the execution of Jopie Fourie
whose blood was seen to be precious seed of the new nation.
Africans were left with the loss of over 600 men in the sinking
of the Mendi, a realisation that few had recognised their offering,
and S. E. K. Mqhayi's haunting poetry. Many who held one of
these memories dear had never heard of the others; and there were
those who were indifferent to all four. So it was with all luggage.
Few pieces were important to everybody and there were some in
Southern Africa who travelled light. But the burdens which people
bore and the different contents of their luggage were to play a
significant role in the history of the period.
For the purpose of this volume, southern Africa has been defined
as the region comprising the five countries of South Africa,
Lesotho (Basutoland), Namibia (South West Africa), Botswana
(Bechuanaland), and Swaziland. Such a definition makes sense for
a constitutional historian but less so for an anthropologist or
economist. The straight line separating Namibia from Angola
tends to obscure the fact that people on either side of the boundary
share common languages and customs. More restricting still is a
definition which excludes Mozambique, whose southern parts are
bound to South Africa by language, trade, and a long history of
oscillating migration to the gold mines. No definition would
eliminate such difficulties, but one should be conscious of the
subtle bias which it introduces.
It is helpful to begin by examining the major divisions which
separated people within the region. First, national boundaries:
table 6. i shows the size, both by population and area, of the five
countries. Variations in the distribution of population were due
primarily to the pattern of rainfall, but also to conquest, land
legislation, the distribution of minerals, and the process of
urbanisation. At the beginning of the Second World War, South
Africa was an independent state whilst South West Africa,
although a Mandated Territory, was ruled virtually as a fifth
253

15 T h e Republic of South Africa, Swaziland and Lesotho.

Table 6.1. Southern Africa: area and population (in thousands)

1936-74; percentages in brackets.
Population
density
Population 1974
Area persons/
Country 1936 1974 (sq. km) sq. km
South Africa 9590 24940 (88.7) 1222 (45.8) 20.4
Lesotho 562 1191 (4.2) 30 39-7
Namibia 318 860 (3.1) 823 (30.9) 1.0
Botswana 266 654 (2.3) 575 (21.6) 1.1
Swaziland 157 478 (1.7) 17 (0.6) 28.1
Total 10893 28 123 (100) 2667 (100) 10.5
Sources: World Bank atlas (Washington, 1976); Union Office of Census and
Statistics, Official year book of the Union of South Africa and of Basutoland,
Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland, 1941 (Pretoria, 1937), 988; Philip, The
international atlas (London, 1969).
province. Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland were all

administered as separate United Kingdom dependencies by the
British High Commissioner in Pretoria, but shared common
currency, membership of the customs union, and much else with
South Africa. Passports were not required by anybody crossing
from one country to another. However, in subsequent decades
these boundaries became increasingly important.
In societies where pigmentation is considered important, there
is more to colour than meets the eye and even South Africa has
been unable to produce an infallible definition of 'race' for
purposes of population classification. Despite fuzziness at the
edges, colour-caste divisions (and the ancestry they implied) were
important primarily in terms of the distribution of power as
reflected in long-entrenched racist legislation, such as the Mines
and Works Act ( 1 9 1 1 ) , the Land Act ( 1 9 1 3 ) and the Urban Areas
Act ( 1 9 2 3 ) but also in terms of peoples' perceptions of each other
even within communities that were themselves subject to
1
discrimination.
1
S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , Z . K . M a t t h e w s , Freedom for my people ( L o n d o n , 1980); R i c h a r d
R i v e , Selected writings ( J o h a n n e s b u r g , 1977), 2 9 - 3 7 ; M a r t i n E . W e s t , Divided community
( C a p e T o w n , 1971).
255

JTsumeb /^.-LfrV* Okavango V RHODESIA
^7-? ~-y"-; Swamp \^ (Zimbabwe)
»Grootfontein r
)tjiwarongo
VR I C A Ora pa
KA LIA H ARI
— .1
r
Windhoek! 'DÉSE R T
Swakopmu Gobabis I
BOTSWANA
WalvisE
(BECHUANALAND)
(NAM r I A) Molepolole
[ Mariental Gaborone,
k Kanye«
AT L ANT I C \ -Lobatse
/~'-\ i r
! »
LKeetmanshoop R E P U B LIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

OCEAN i ^
——— Principal roads • Railways
500 km
9 •
"SUOmiles
16 Namibia and Botswana.

Table 6.2. Colour-castes in Southern Africa, 19)6; number of

persons {thousands), percentages in brackets.
Country African White Coloured Asian Total

South Africa 6597(69) 2004(21) 770(8) 220(2) 9590(100)
Basutoland 5 5 9(99) i(—) i(—) 0.3 562(100)
S W Africa 288^90) 31(10) a
— 318(100)
Bechuanaland 260(98) 2(1) 4(1) — 266(100)
Swaziland 15 3(9 8) 3(2) i(—) — 157(100)
b
Total 7857(70 2041(19) 775(7) 220(2) 10893(100)
Notes:
a
For South West Africa, * Native and Coloured' were enumerated together.
b
Figures do not add up due to rounding.
Sources: Union Office of Census and Statistics, Official year book, 19 41, 988.
Table 6.3. Home languages in South Africa, 1946; number of

persons {thousands), percentages in brackets.
a a b b 0
Nguni Sotho Afrikaans English Other
Africans 4772 2216 — — 844
White — — 1375 949 49
Coloured — — 831 90 8
Asian — — 7 12 266
d
Total 4772(42) 22x6(19) 2212(19) io
5*(9) 1168(10)
Notes:
a
Languages are grouped according to mutual intelligibility. Nguni includes
Ndebele, Swazi, Xhosa and Zulu. Sotho includes South Sotho, North Sotho
(Pedi), and Tswana.
b
Statistics for Afrikaans (and English) include one-half of those who speak
the two official languages equally at home.
c
Including Tsonga, Venda, Tamil, Hindi, Gujerati, German, Portuguese,
Yiddish and a number of others.
d
Figures do not add up due to rounding.
Source: Bureau of Census and Statistics, Union statistics for fifty years (Pretoria,
i960), A. 1 8 - 1 9 .
257

Table 6.4. Urbanisation in South Africa, 1904-2000 (percentages).
2000
1904 1936 1970 (projected)
African IO.I 17.3 33.0 32 min./47 max.
White 52.7 65.2 86.7 (90)
Coloured 50.5 53-9 74.3
Asian 36.6 6.3 86.2 (90
Total 23.4 31.4 47.8 47 min./5 8 max.
Sources'. RSA Department of Statistics, South African statistics, 1974 (Pretoria,

1974), 1.12. Charles Simkins, Four essays on the past, present and possible future
of the distribution of the black population of South Africa (Cape Town, 1983),
143 ff.
A striking feature of southern Africa is the diversity of language.

Some people, particularly Africans growing up in the urban
crucibles, were fluent in several tongues but there were many,
notably urban whites and rural blacks, for whom language
was an impenetrable barrier. Second-language statistics are not
available, but it seems that a higher proportion of Africans learnt
Afrikaans or English in order to understand their employers than
whites learnt Nguni or Sotho, despite the fact that the latter were
the mother tongues of more people than spoke either of the official
languages. The political importance of language as a frontier
along which battles raged made itself explicitly felt in the
Afrikaans language movement, which was a major source of
energy for Afrikaner nationalism in its drive to power. It was not
until 1 9 7 6 , and the revolt of the Soweto schoolchildren against
the forcible imposition of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction,
that language moved to the centre of the black political stage.
More than most countries, South Africa's urban-rural cleavage
was blurred by the fact that a large proportion of workers moved
to town as oscillating migrants who, though they might spend
the best part of their working lives down a mine or in a factory,
were not allowed to bring their wives or children with them, but
returned regularly to their rural homes. Nevertheless the
distinction between town and country is fundamental.
The figures of table 6.4 mask two important dimensions of the
cleavage: one is the fact that by the 1930s most English-speaking
258

whites had long since become urbanised whilst for many Afrik
aners and blacks the towns were still new and bewildering places;
the other is that the rural areas themselves were divided into the
white-owned capitalist farms on which, in South Africa, more
than one-third of the black population lived and the 'reserves'
from which most of the South African migrant workers came.
Another boundary was the great gulf between rich and poor.
Class divisions based on access to and ownership of land, of jobs
and of capital in the form of livestock, mineral rights, business
investments, and education were deeply embedded in the society
of southern Africa. Although there were numbers of poor whites,
and although some blacks were relatively well-to-do, the primary
class division followed the colour line. In South Africa, ownership
of private farm land was restricted almost entirely to whites by
conquest as consolidated in the Land Act of 1 9 1 3 whilst within
the black reserves, which, after 1936, formed approximately 13
per cent of the country, the density of population on arable land
was such that the level of income that could be derived from
agriculture was far lower. In mining and manufacturing the
better-paid jobs were effectively barred to Africans (and, in lesser
measure, to Coloured persons and Indians) by direct legislative
barriers and by the less visible but more pervasive obstacles of
white conventions and the lack of opportunities for education and
training. It is estimated that in 1936 the ratios of average white
incomes per head to those of Africans, Coloureds, and Asians were
1 2 : 1 , 7 : 1 , and 5 : 1 respectively (see table 6.6). Rough though
these figures are, they serve to illustrate clearly the enormous
economic gap between black and white in South Africa.
This list of cleavages tells nothing of the tensions that existed
between Afrikaners of the Cape and of the Transvaal; between
Mfengu and Xhosa in the eastern Cape; between Christian
denominations in various dorps; between ' borners' and migrants
in the townships. Nor does it say anything about the important
changes taking place in the relations between generations and
between sexes. All these and more were there. But we have
focussed on the boundaries of nation, 'colour', language, urban
isation and class because their interaction was a central feature
of the history of the period. The divisions did not always overlap.
Only two-thirds of those whose mother tongue was Afrikaans were
white; those who spoke Swazi did not all live in Swaziland; not
2
59

Table 6.5. Employment in South Africa by selected sectors 1936-76.
All employees Blacks only
1936 1956 1976 1936 1956 1976
A. Numbers employed (thousands)

Manufacturing 200 611 1273 a
121 45* 997
Mines and quarries 429 554 671 384 488 606
Construction 33 in 447 22 87 386
SAR and H 104 222 256 45 114 143
1
Agriculture * na 843 (7i6) c
na 73* (602)
B. Index of employment (1936 = 100)

Manufacturing 100 306 637 100 37* 821
Mines and quarries 100 129 156 100 i*7 158
Construction 100 337 1360 100 403 1796
SAR and H 100 214 *47 100 *53 316
Notes:
a
Reclassification in 1970 makes this figure not strictly comparable with
previous years.
b
Number of regular employees living on white, Coloured and Asian farms.
Seasonal and occasional workers and domestic servants excluded.
c
Thefigureis for 1975.
Source: South African statistics, 1978, 7.4 fF.
all the rich were white, nor was all the proletariat black. Yet part
of the uniqueness of southern Africa is the extent to which the
boundaries have been made to reinforce each other. Indeed, by
the 1 9 7 0 s , the attempt to impose national boundaries to correlate
with skin, language, and class differences was the central issue of
South African politics.
I N D U S T R I A L R E V O L U T I O N IN S O U T H A F R I C A , 1936-76
The first three years of the 1 9 3 0 s had been disastrous. But by the
end of 1932 General Hertzog had abandoned the gold standard
and by the summer of 1 9 3 3 / 4 rain had fallen and President
Roosevelt had devalued the dollar. The price of gold rose 4 7 per
cent without causing inflation and the country was set for four
decades of almost uninterrupted growth, its gross national
260

I N D U S T R I A L R E V O L U T I O N IN S O U T H A F R I C A
product increasing at an average annual rate of approximately 5

per cent. Employment increased rapidly.
Between 1932 and 1939 total employment in the mining
industry rose by over 5 o per cent as 15 7 000 new jobs were created.
With the outbreak of war prospecting and development ceased,
but in 1946 the richest gold ore ever found in South Africa was
struck at Geduld in the Orange Free State and then, in 1949,
Britain devalued sterling, thus raising the price of gold by 44 per
cent. Between 1951 and 1969 the country's output almost trebled
from 11.5 to 31.3 million fine ounces whilst employment on the
gold mines rose to a peak of nearly 450000 in 1961. Between 1968
and December 1974 the price of gold, moving slowly at first,
1
suddenly rocketed from $35 to $197 per fine ounce. This
spectacular change was accompanied by a marked increase in the
rate of inflation which dampened, but did not eliminate, prospects
of further expansions. But in breaking loose from its moorings
which had held it stable for so long, the gold price was now
subject to sudden fluctuations for the first time since the early
1920s. Increased exploitation of other minerals, notably platinum,
offset the decrease in employment in the gold mines after 1961.
Diamonds remained important as a source of both employment
and foreign exchange. And coal, after the oil price rise in 1973,
emerged as increasingly significant from both economic and
strategic perspectives.
Stimulated by the growth of gold and the impact of war,
industrialisation of the economy went on apace. Employment in
manufacturing and construction between 1933 and 1939 had
practically doubled and, during the war years, whilst construction
declined temporarily, manufacturing increased by nearly 100000
(42 per cent) to 327000 persons in 1944. Only a fraction,
approximately one in eight, of these wartime jobs went to whites,
as many who would otherwise have claimed preference had been
drawn into the armed forces. In the post-war years, rapid
expansion continued until the onset of depression in the mid-1970s,
by which time employment in manufacturing and construction
together was greater than the total number of regular jobs in
mining and agriculture combined. One of thè most striking
1
In the six years from 1970 to 1975 the annual average price received by the gold
mines more than quadrupled from R26 to R i 12 per ounce fine.
261

features of the period was the increasing role of the state as

employer, producer and investor in the South African economy.
The first steel, produced by the government-owned iron and steel
corporation (Iscor), was tapped in Pretoria in 1934. By 1 9 6 1
output had risen to 2.4 million tons and by 1 9 7 6 to over 5 million
tons, which was 7 7 per cent of the country's total production of
steel. In the civil service, including the railways and the post office,
but excluding Iscor and other industrial corporations, employment
in 1976 was 1.2 million, which was approximately one-quarter of
1
all jobs outside agriculture and domestic service. It is estimated
that nearly one-third (30 per cent) of economically active whites
were by 1 9 7 7 employed in the public and semi-public sector. State
involvement is also measured by the share of government
investment, which increased as a proportion of gross domestic
fixed investment from 35 per cent during 1950 to 53 per cent in
2
1976.
On the farms too the period was one of expansion. Over the
decade 1 9 4 6 / 9 to 1 9 5 6 / 9 the output of wool increased by 40 per
cent, maize by over 50 per cent and wheat by over 60 per cent,
whilst fruit and sugar doubled. Total employment of both casual
and regular workers increased steadily until the end of the 1 9 6 0 s
after which it started to fall. This was a turning point. Behind it
lay changing techniques of production, the use of machinery and
chemical weedkillers, which reduced demand for labour. The
absolute number of whites on the land had been falling since the
mid-1930s but it was not until the end of the 1 9 6 0 s that total farm
3
employment, including that of Africans, began to decline.
South African population in the generation before 1936 grew by

approximately 2.1 per cent per annum but grew somewhat faster
thereafter. Population growth varied considerably between the
different countries. Over the period 1 9 6 0 - 7 4 , for example, the
average annual percentage rates were: Botswana 1.9, Lesotho 2.2,
4
South Africa 2.7, Swaziland 3.0 and Namibia 3 . I . The evidence
suggests that, as elsewhere, growth was due primarily to falling
1
H e r i b e r t A d a m a n d H e r m a n n G i l i o m e e , Ethnic power mobilised: can South Africa
change? ( N e w H a v e n , 1979), 165.
2
D i c k C l a r k , US corporate interests in South Africa ( R e p o r t t o t h e C o m m i t t e e o n
F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s , U n i t e d S t a t e s S e n a t e , W a s h i n g t o n , 1978), 25.
3
F . W i l s o n , A . K o o y , D . H e n d r i e ( e d s . ) , Farm labour in South Africa ( C a p e T o w n ,
»977). 4 World Bank atlas, 1976.
262

death rates. Development of transport and the capacity to shift

food in response to shortages contributed to this change, as did
the work of churches in establishing and running medical services
in many of the more densely populated rural areas of the country.
The interaction between socio-economic factors and population
growth is little understood, but in southern Africa population
growth may prove the most significant change in the twentieth
1
century. Projections in the 1 9 7 0 s estimated that between 1 9 7 0 and
2020 total population in South Africa might more than treble from
22 million to 7 9 million, with Africans quadrupling from 15.5
million to over 60 million and whites increasing in absolute
numbers from 3.8 million to 7 million - but falling as a proportion
of the total population from 17 to 9 per cent.
The expansion in mining and manufacturing output combined
with the changing techniques of production in the capitalist
agricultural sector and the rapid growth of population overall led
to a rapid process of urbanisation as people poured off the land
to take up jobs in town. The focus of much of the movement was
the southern Transvaal, together with the five harbour towns
from Cape Town to Maputo (Lourenô Marques) that served it.
People came to the densely populated shanty-towns whose infinite
capacity to absorb newcomers was a measure of human ingenuity
and resilience under most trying conditions. Black Fordsburg,
White Fordsburg, Sophiatown and Vrededorp were all polyglot
2
ports of entry into the brash world of Johannesburg. But not
everybody came this way. Many men came alone to live in the
vast labour compounds. Although their stay was temporary, in
the sense that contracts varied from a few months to two years,
it was for many the beginning of long-term commitment to urban
employment.
In absolute terms the population of the Witwatersrand, Pretoria
and Vereeniging increased from 1.2 million to 3.7 million between
1936 and 1970 whilst the urban population of the country as a
whole grew from 3.0 million to 10.4 million. Peoples' responses,
both as individuals and as groups, to the changes taking place,
were shaped in no small measure by the distribution of political
1 c
J. L . S a d i e , T h e d e m o g r a p h i c f o r c e s in S o u t h A f r i c a * , Transactions of the Royal
Society of South Africa, 1978, 4 3 , 1, 21.
2
T h e r e is a w e a l t h o f l i t e r a t u r e , m u c h o f it b a n n e d in S o u t h A f r i c a , d e s c r i b i n g t h e
b l a c k e x p e r i e n c e . S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , P e t e r A b r a h a m s , Tell freedom ( L o n d o n , 1954).
E z e k i e l M p h a h l e l e , Down Second Avenue ( L o n d o n , 1959).
263

Table 6.6. Income distribution by colour-caste in South Africa

i936-t97<>/i.
A. Income shares
1936 1970/71
Net Private consumption
national income expenditure
% % % %
Income base Population Income Population Income
African 68.8 19.7 70.0 19.1
White 20.9 74-5 17.8 73-7
Coloured 8.0 4.1 9-4 5-2
Asian 2.3 1.7 2.9 2.1
B. Income per head ratios
1936 1970/71
White: African 12.4: i 15.2:1

White: Coloured 6.9: i 7.5:1
White: Asian 4.7:1 5.7:1
White: African-Asian-Coloured 11 : i 12.9: i
Source: S. F. Archer, South African Outlook, December 1978. Peter Randall (ed.),
Power, privilege and poverty (Report of the Spro-cas Economics Commission,
Johannesburg, 1972), 116, Appendix C.
power and by the similarities and differences facing various groups

as they moved to the cities. By the 1 9 3 0 s most English-speaking
whites had long been urbanised and already occupied the com
manding heights of the economy. Coming to the cities, poor
whites, mainly Afrikaans-speaking, found themselves competing
for scarce jobs with others whom, by virtue of conquest and
skin-colour, they had always treated as inferior. For these others
urbanisation was likewise a new experience born of rural im
poverishment. But they found themselves struggling at the
bottom of a pyramid whose base was well below the poverty
datum line and which presented many barriers to prevent black
people from rising.
264

Differences in access to jobs and to ownership of the means of

production naturally implied differences in income (table 6.6).
Throughout the period whites, who formed approximately one-
fifth of the population, enjoyed some three-quarters of the total
income; Africans, on the other hand, formed over two-thirds of
the population and received approximately one-fifth of the
national income. By international standards distribution of
income in South Africa was particularly skewed. It has been
estimated that the richest 20 per cent of the population earned
approximately 75 per cent of total income in 1970. Comparative
figures, though not all for the same year, of the share of income
earned by the richest quintile in Brazil, India and the United States
1
are 62, 52 and 39 per cent respectively.
More detailed figures of salaries and wages paid in particular
sectors enable us to obtain a slightly fuller picture of the impact
of the industrial revolution on both relative and absolute living
standards (table 6 . 7 ) . The real earnings of black gold-mine
workers in 1 9 7 1 were estimated to be no higher and possibly
slightly lower than they had been two generations previously in
1 9 1 1 . The sharp change over the next five years was due to an
extraordinary combination of independent yet mutually re
inforcing events, including the increase in the price of gold,
widespread industrial strikes centred in Durban in the summer of
1 9 7 3 - 4 , the decision by President Banda early in April 1 9 7 4 to
halt all South African recruiting in Malawi, and, later in the
month, the collapse of the Portuguese empire. Despite the
increase, wages on the mines (even after allowing for payments
in kind) remained below the average earnings of black workers
in the manufacturing sector where, largely because they did not
have the access to labour from beyond the boundaries of South
Africa, employers had long paid higher black wages.
In agriculture generalisations are more misleading, for there
were wide variations across the country. But everywhere the gap
in living standards between white farmers and their labourers was
large and may well have increased over time. In some parts of the
country farm wages increased, especially during the 1 9 7 0 s
although, even allowing for wages in kind, they remained well
below what were paid in other sectors. In subsistence agriculture,
1
S o u r c e : S. F . A r c h e r , ' T h e w i n t e r o f o u r d i s c o n t e n t : issues a n d policies o f i n c o m e
d i s t r i b u t i o n i n S o u t h A f r i c a ' , South African Outlook* D e c e m b e r 1978.
265

Table 6.7. Earnings in selected sectors 1936-76.

A. Gold mines 19)6-76
Index of real
Earnings (R/annum) Earnings Earnings earnings
ratio difference (1936 = 100)
Date White (W) Black (B) W:B W - B White Black
1936 786 68 11.5: i 718 100 IOO
1956 2046 132 15.5: i 1914 119 89

1971 4633 221 21.0: i 4412 *79 99
1976 8843 1103 8.0: i 7740 207 301
B. Various Sectors, 1976
Earnings (R/monthly)
Ratio
White Asian Coloured African Average W:Af
Mining* 713 275 186 88 151 8.1:1
Construction 557 2
97 217 112 187 5.0:1
Manufacturing 571 184 154 125 230 4.6: i
Retail trade 255 154 110 82 154 3.1:1
SAR and H 545 198 119 109 303 5.0:1
Banks 509 258 190 164 448 3.1:1
Central govt. 427 330 189 130 265 3.3:1
Local 540 174 161 98 218 5.5:1
Authorities
Universities 597 272 182 122 427 4.9:1
b
Average 489 *97 157 106 220 4.6: i
0
Agriculture (330) (90 (35) (18) (*7) (17.9:1)
Notes:
a
Including quarries.
b
Including most sectors except agriculture, domestic service and
self-employment.
c
Figures for agriculture are less reliable and those cited are for the previous
year (1975) and refer only to regular farm employees, thus excluding most
farmers and all casual labourers. Nevertheless, they are instructive.
Sources: (A) Francis Wilson, Labour in the South African gold mines 1911-1969
(Cambridge, 1972), 46; Chamber of Mines of South Africa, Annual reports
(Johannesburg); South African statistics, 1978, 7.6 ff.
(B) S. F. Archer, App. C in Peter Randall (ed.), Power, privilege and poverty
(Report of Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid Society, Johannesburg,
1972), 116.
266

I N D U S T R I A L R E V O L U T I O N IN SOUTH AFRICA
the evidence points to a steady decrease in output per capita and

hence for many, w i t h o u t adequate remittances from migrants,
1
increasing p o v e r t y .
E c o n o m i c cleavages existed also within racial g r o u p s , as may
be seen for example in the figures for income distribution a m o n g s t
2
white South African taxpayers in 1 9 7 6 . A few whites (0.8 p e r
cent) had z e r o income o r less, whilst nearly half (49 per cent)
earned up to R5000 per annum. M o r e than a third (37 per cent)
earned between R5000 and R10000, whilst a further 173000
whites (12 per cent) earned b e t w e e n R10000 and R30000 w i t h the
remaining 8000 (0.6 per cent) earning m o r e than R30000. F o r
blacks n o general figures are available, b u t a glimpse o f the Ciskei
3
at the grass roots in the 1960s is n o t atypical. O n e third (33 p e r
cent) o f the 2082 households s u r v e y e d had n o arable land at all.
M o r e than a quarter (28 per cent) had b e t w e e n 1 and 5 acres. A n
other third (35 per cent) had b e t w e e n 6 and 10 acres whilst 3 per
cent o f the households had between 11 and 30 acres o f arable land.
T w o further points are w o r t h noting. T h e r e w a s a substantial
shift, not unconnected w i t h the rise o f the National Party after
the Second W o r l d W a r , in the ethnic distribution o f wealth within
the white community. T h e g r o w t h o f b i g Afrikaner-led business
was a particularly striking feature o f the period. Per capita income
o f Afrikaners in 1946 w a s estimated t o b e less than half (47 per
cent) that o f English-speaking whites. B y 1976 the p r o p o r t i o n had
4
risen to 72 per c e n t . M o r e significantly, despite the w i d e i n c o m e
gap between white and black, and despite g r i n d i n g p o v e r t y ,
particularly in rural areas, o n e consequence o f e c o n o m i c g r o w t h
was a substantial increase in black b u y i n g p o w e r . B y 1975 the total
consumer market represented by blacks living in Johannesburg
alone, for example, w a s estimated t o be R638 million, approxi
s
mately equal to the entire defence b u d g e t for that y e a r .
1
Fot evidence of the decline in output in the reserves see J. B. Knight and G . Lenta,
'Has capitalism underdeveloped the labour reserves of South Africa?', Oxford Bulletin
of Economies and Statistics, August 1980, 42, 3, and F. Wilson, GoU mints, 189.
* House of Assembly debates {Hansard, Cape Town, 1977, i j ) , col. 949. House of
Assembly debates {Hansard, Cape Town, 1977, 16), col. 1113.
5
P. J. de Vos tt al., A socio-economic and educational survey of the Bantu residing in the
Victoria East, Middledrift and Zwelitsha areas of the Ciskei (Fort Hare, 1970).
4
Derived from Adam and Giliomee, Ethnic power, 174. The figures must be used
with some care for other evidence {ibid., 134) suggests that in 1936 the proportion was
61 per cent which implies a surprisingly large widening of the income gap between
Afrikaners and other whites during the war years.
1
M. Loubser, Market potentials of consumer goods and services for non-white population
groups in the main urban areas in the Republic of South Africa in if/; (Bureau of Market
Research, Pretoria, 1977).
267

As far as the infrastructure of the region is concerned, most of

the important railways (see figs. 15, 16) in southern Africa were
built in the half century between the mineral discoveries and the
outbreak of the First World War; nevertheless in later years the
state invested heavily in railway development. Between 1948 and
1972 the proportion of total track electrified rose from 4 to 21
per cent. During the early 1 9 7 0 s two new harbours were built at
Richards Bay and Saldanha Bay and rail track was laid linking
them, respectively, to the Witwatersrand and the iron-ore deposits
of the northern Cape.
There was a great improvement in roads not least for defence
purposes. Meandering gravel roads were resurveyed, and tarred
highways laid down which connected the towns and also made
farmers less isolated than they had been. The motorways driven
through the hearts of the major cities during the 60s and 70s so
transformed some of them that visitors and ex-prisoners, having
been away for ten years, found themselves lost. Airports were
built to serve the major industrial areas and the number of internal
passengers (including some within the neighbouring countries)
carried by South African Airways grew at an annual rate of 12
per cent from 115 000 in 1948 to 2.5 million in 1 9 7 6 .
The number of telephones grew at 7 per cent per year between
1936 and 1976 from 142 thousand to 2.1 million, but few of these
went to black homes. During the same period the number of
licensed radios grew slightly faster from 1 3 9 thousand to 2.5
million, thus reducing the average number of people per radio
from 69 to 1 1 . Television was not introduced until 1 9 7 6 but by
mid-1977 some 6 7 0 0 0 0 sets had been sold. The impact of these
changes is difficult to assess but the spread of transistors, not least
into the isolated homesteads of farm labourers, made many people
aware of events outside their local area. A t the same time skilful
use by the state of its broadcasting monopoly did much, through
heavy censorship, to influence white attitudes.
Considerable expansion took place in school-buildings and
equipment, not only of material investment, but also of the less
tangible but no less important investment in * human c a p i t a l t h u s
contributing to the rise in literacy which some perceptive
observers regard as one of the most significant changes to have
268

Table 6.8. Hospital beds 19)6-62.
Population per bed

White Black Total
1936 207:1 521:1 395:1
1962 144:1 204:1 189:1
Sources'. Union statistics for fifty years, A-3 and D-3; Statistical year book 1966, A-i 1
and D-3.
1
taken place during the period. One consequence of this is the fact
that between 1962 and 1 9 7 7 the proportion of daily newspaper
readers who were black rose from 33 to 45 per cent. A t the same
time the pattern of educational spending served - like so much
of South Africa's public expenditure - to reinforce the existing
maldistribution of wealth and opportunity. In i 9 6 0 only 2 per cent
of white South Africans over the age of 19 had no education at
all compared with 65 per cent of Africans. At the other end of
the scale, where 2 3 per cent of whites over the age of 14 had passed
standard 1 0 (i.e. 12 years of schooling) only 0.2 per cent of
Africans had so so. O f those at school in 1 9 7 4 - 5 it is estimated
that per capita expenditure on African pupils was less than
one-eighth the expenditure on all other pupils.
The picture for health was much the same. There was con
siderable expansion of the segregated medical services but this
expansion was biased in favour of those who were urban, wealthy
and white (table 6.8). Similarly whilst the population: doctor ratio
between 1 9 3 6 and 1 9 7 0 fell from approximately 3 4 0 0 : 1 to 2 0 0 0 : 1
we find that, in 1 9 7 5 , two-thirds (65.5 per cent) of all doctors
practised in the three metropolitan areas of the Witwatersrand,
Cape Town and Durban, whereas only 5.5 per cent of all doctors
practised in the rural areas where over half the population lived.
In general, despite superb medical care in some areas, health
services were not able to deal effectively with the existing pattern
of disease, including widespread malnutrition amongst blacks.
1
B e t w e e n 1948 a n d 1970 t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f A f r i c a n s a g e d 10 a n d o l d e r w h o c o u l d
r e a d a n d w r i t e i n c r e a s e d f r o m j u s t o v e r o n e - q u a r t e r (28 p e r c e n t ) t o a little u n d e r o n e - h a l f
(48-9 p e r c e n t ) . Union statistics for fifty years, A - 2 2 ; South African statistics, 1978, 1 , 35.
269

Electricity, most of which was generated relatively cheaply

from the coal of the southern Transvaal and Natal, was spread
throughout the country by the network of Escom power-lines
whose total area of supply rose from 20000 sq. miles in 1 9 3 6 to
1 3 9 0 0 0 sq. miles in 195 8, thus bringing power to many towns and
farms which previously had either generated their own or had
none. Total production of electricity in the country grew at 7.7
per cent per annum from 3.8 thousand million K w H in 1935 to
80 thousand million K w H in 1 9 7 6 . 1
During the 1 9 6 0 s , the Orange River drainage scheme with its

great dams and its irrigation tunnels through the mountains was
built with little public debate as to its effectiveness compared with
other alternatives. On the western side of the Drakensberg there
was much land but few people, whereas on the eastern escarpment
imaginative irrigation and hydroelectric schemes on the various
rivers that flowed through the Transkei to the sea could have
revolutionised the farming potential in a densely populated rural
area where people were desperately short of food. Other important
decisions shaped by political considerations were South Africa's
decision not to purchase water from Lesotho - thus spiking the
Malibamatso scheme (see below) - but rather to pump water from
the Tugela up the western escarpment to the Vaal from whence
it was drawn to the Witwatersrand.
Possibly even more significant in the long run than the giant
schemes were the multitude of small dams built on farms and in
the reserves. This investment did something to offset the appalling
loss of top soil as bad farming combined with heavy rain caused
much of the country's most precious asset to be washed into the
sea every year. Much soil was also taken by wind blowing over
treeless miles of plough land, causing dust storms which reminded
observers of the American dust-bowl. The speed with which the
desert was encroaching from the south-west was an ominous sign
of irreversible damage due to the loss of what economists,
knowing only Europe, once called the ' indestructible powers of
the soil'.
South Africa's infrastructure was not built in isolation. Roads,

railways, air-routes, power lines and radio waves served not only
to bind the countries of southern Africa more closely together
1
Including net purchases outside the country. South African statistics, 1978, 1 4 , 3.
270

but also to link the region to the rest of the continent and the
world. The Cabora Bassa Dam, built with limited interference
from F R E L I M O guerrillas in Mozambique on the lower reaches
of the Zambesi, was joined to the Escom network and started
to supply electricity in 1 9 7 7 . South Africa took care to ensure
1
that she did not import too high a proportion of her total needs.
Moreover, the grid was designed in such a way that electricity
from Cabora Bassa for Maputo itself had to pass through a
transformer built on South African soil, near Pretoria. Across the
sub-continent the other Portuguese-South African hydroelectric
brainchild was designed to take water and power from the Kunene
2
River to the new mines of the dry Namibian hinterland. But
construction was interrupted during the mid-1970s by the es
calating war. Another link, this time spurred on by war, was the
railway line built by the Rhodesian government in 1 9 7 4 from
Rutanga to Beit Bridge in order to connect directly with South
Africa. The decline of passenger ships and the rise of jets shifted
the gateway of southern Africa from Cape Town to Johannesburg
and marked also a sharp increase in the number of international
overseas travellers from under 9000 in 1 9 4 8 to nearly 4 0 0 0 0 0 in
1 9 7 6 . Radio programmes were beamed both ways across the
Limpopo. The BBC, the Voice of America and, during the 1 9 7 0 s ,
Lusaka's Freedom Radio and the A N C ' s broadcasts from Maputo
were all listened to in the Republic, as was the SABC elsewhere
in Africa.
Stronger even than the infrastructural links were the inter
national flows of labour which bound the region together into a
single economy. A s the mines expanded in the late nineteenth
century the demand for labour grew voraciously and men were
recruited from throughout the sub-continent and elsewhere.
Thirteen years after the Witwatersrand gold discoveries, there
were 1 0 0 0 0 0 black miners at work in the area, large numbers of
them drawn from outside South Africa. In 1896, for example,
nearly two-thirds (60 per cent) of the black mineworkers came
from Mozambique. In 1 9 0 6 there were 80000 men recruited from
1
K e i t h M i d d l e m a s , Cabora Bassa: engineering and politics in Southern Africa ( L o n d o n ,
1975), 212, 233.
2
Renfrew Christie, ' T h e political e c o n o m y o f the K u n e n e R i v e r hydroelectric
s c h e m e s ' ( M A t h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y o f C a p e T o w n , 1975). F o r a s u r v e y o f t h e m a j o r d a m s
in A f r i c a s o u t h o f t h e e q u a t o r a n d o f t h e i r i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n s s e e H e n r y O l i v i e r , Great
dams in Southern Africa ( C a p e T o w n , c. 1978).
271

Table 6.9. Geographic origin of labour employed by the Chamber of

Mines (in thousands); percentages in brackets.
Area 1936 1973 1976

Transvaal 22.2 (7.o) 10.8 (2.6) 26.2 (7-5)
Natal/Zululand 15-5 (4.9) 4-2 (1.0) 11.8 (3-3)
Cape Province 124.6 (39-* ) 63.6 CM-0 104.8 (29.0)
OFS 3-5 (1.1) 7.6 (1.8) 15.6 (4-3)
Lesotho 46.0 (14.5) 87.2 (20.7) 96.4 (26.7)
Swaziland 7.0 (2.2) 4-5 (1.1) 8.6 (»•4)
Botswana 7-2 (M) 16.8 (4.0) '5-5 (4-3)
Mozambique 88.4 (27.8) 99-4 (23.6) 48.6 (13.4)
Africa N of 3-4 (1.1) 128.0 (30.3) (9-4)
lat 2 2 S
0
Total 317.7 (100) 422.2 (100) 361.3 (100)
Source: Mine Labour Organisations (Wenela) Ltd., Annual Reports

(Johannesburg).
Northern China and housed in compounds. Although the Chinese

were repatriated within five years, the compounds were kept and
expanded. By 1 9 3 6 there were 3 1 8 0 0 0 men housed on a single
basis, working in the gold and coal mines of the Transvaal. Nearly
two-fifths (39 per cent) of these men came from the Transkei and
Ciskei; more than one-quarter (28 per cent) from Mozambique;
15 per cent from Lesotho and the rest from elsewhere (table 6.9).
Between 1 9 3 6 and 1 9 7 3 the proportion (and after 1 9 6 1 the
absolute number) of black South Africans at work on the mines
fell whilst those from elsewhere, notably tropical Africa north of
0
latitude 2 2 S, rose steadily to a point when, in 1 9 7 3 , the
proportion of non-South African blacks working on the mines
had risen to over 80 per cent. Due to the combination of events
already mentioned, important changes, including a marked in
crease in the real earnings of black miners, took place over the next
four years. These combined with the sharp decline in the number
of construction and manufacturing jobs meant that by 1976 the
proportion of South Africans at work on the mines had more than
doubled from 20 to 4 4 per cent. And the sources of labour from
outside changed as well: Rhodesia became a significant supplier
following the cut-off of all Malawians in 1 9 7 4 , whilst from
272

Mozambique the number of mineworkers fell (due primarily to

pressure from South Africa) from an all-time peak of 1 2 0 0 0 0 men
in 1 9 7 4 to 3 5 0 0 0 men in 1 9 7 7 .
An important consequence of the long-term oscillating mi
gration was the increased dependence of the rural communities
upon the industrial core whose growth was made possible by the
work of migrants. As economies develop, urban areas themselves
become generators of income and employment through a twin
process of both private and social capital accumulation and
localised expansion of markets. The urban bias in the location of
capital accumulation is likely to be even more pronounced where
migrants cross national frontiers, because those who control the
economy of the labour-receiving country are subject to few
political pressures to use tax revenue collected in the wealthy core
to finance roads, power stations, schools, or health services
beyond the boundary. Thus, for example, Lesotho, which before
1 9 1 4 was a net exporter of food and whose sons participated as
diamond diggers, gold-miners, farm-workers, and schoolteachers
in South Africa's century of economic growth, found itself after
independence ( 1 9 6 6 ) in a situation where less than one-tenth of
its labour force was in paid employment inside the country, and
nearly half outside. There was no prospect of providing jobs either
for those working outside or for the growing population inside,
and the people had no right of access to, nor voice affecting
decisions concerning, the employment-generating capital which
they had helped to form. O f course, oscillating migration em
bedded in a political-economic structure for a century or more is
not the only cause of a country's chronic poverty but no analysis
of southern Africa during the twentieth century can overlook the
extent to which economic development in South Africa served to
bias the whole process of capital accumulation against those rural
areas, both inside and outside South Africa's boundaries, whence
the flow of labour came, thus giving a geographic dimension to
1
the distribution of wealth and poverty within the region.
We turn now to the other links which helped shape South
Africa's industrial revolution: the international flows of capital
investment. From the opening up of the gold mines in 1887 until
1932, more than four-fifths (81 per cent) of the £ 1 4 8 million
1
F r a n c i s W i l s o n , ' I n t e r n a t i o n a l m i g r a t i o n i n S o u t h e r n A f r i c a \ International Migration
Review, 1976, 10, 4.
275

invested in the Rand came from outside Africa, mainly from

1
Britain. A generation later, in i960, it was estimated that of the
R940 million spent by the gold-mining industry on capital
development since the Second World War approximately three-
quarters (74 per cent) was new money from the public, of which
half came from overseas, particularly from Britain and the United
States. The remaining quarter (R240 million) came primarily from
within the mining houses, whose internal resources had
mushroomed after the opening of the O F S gold-fields. Over the
years 1954-67 the investment income of the Anglo American
Corporation alone more than quintupled from R5.2 million to
R28.6 million. Not all organisations or individuals were so lucky.
During 1935-63 the average rate of return from investment in the
gold mines was 4.3 per cent compared with 7 per cent for United
Kingdom equities. But the rewards of backing the right horse
were such that the mines seldom had difficulty in raising their
capital requirements.
Foreign investors did not confine themselves to the gold mines.
Industrial companies in Britain, Germany, France, Switzerland,
the United States and later Japan, found South Africa, with its
strong infrastructure, cheap coal, cheap labour, and growing
demand for both consumption and capital goods, to be a highly
profitable area. However, apart from mining, much of South
Africa's capital requirements were generated within the country.
In the three decades before i960, less than 15 per cent of total
capital investment in a cross-section of manufacturing industries
was derived from foreign sources, and almost two-thirds of that
came from the sterling area, primarily the United Kingdom.
Between i960 and 1972 total foreign investment in South Africa
rose from R3.0 billion to R7.8 billion, during which period the
share coming from Western Europe (excluding the U K ) rose from
14 to 25 per cent. But British investment, in some 600 companies,
remained the largest proportion. Although foreign investment as
a whole was relatively low (being less than 12 per cent of total
investment in the thirty years after the Second World War)
nevertheless it was widely seen as a vital component of the
1
S . H e r b e r t F r a n k e l , Capital investment in Africa ( L o n d o n , 1938), 89. Note: t h e s e
figures e x c l u d e r e i n v e s t m e n t a p p r o p r i a t e d f r o m p r o f i t s . S . H e r b e r t F r a n k e l , Investment
and the return to equity capital in the South African gold mining industry 1887-1961 ( O x f o r d ,
1967), 8; a n d W i l s o n , Gold mines, 25.
*74

1
economy. As well as providing resources for growth, foreign
investment often brought with it the technology and know-how
used, not always appropriately, in new capital-intensive productive
processes.
In addition to investments there were also loans, including the
controversial revolving fund of $40 million guaranteed by a
consortium of American banks in i960 shortly after Sharpeville
(see below) when the flight of capital threatened to bankrupt the
South African economy. But the investors soon recovered from
their fright and, despite new restrictions on the withdrawal of
capital, returned more strongly than ever. Moreover, in the
mid-1970s, the government and its parastatal arms such as Iscor,
Escom, Sasol and Armscor sought to expand a number of
security-related infrastructure projects rapidly in order to increase
the country's self-sufficiency.
South Africa resorted to heavy borrowing abroad, particularly
after the price of gold fell in 1975. This need for loans was
reinforced by the virtual drying up of foreign private investment
following the Soweto crisis of 1976, which came as the country
was sliding into its second great depression. Before this South
Africa had begun to export capital to such distant fields as
Mauritania, Peru, Canada, Australia and Western Europe. Be
2
tween i960 and 1972 South African investments abroad rose from
R0.9 billion to R3.1 billion. The share of these funds that were
invested in the sterling area fell from 60 to 42 per cent whilst the
share in the rest of Western Europe rose from 5 to 20 per cent.
Closer to home, where her businessmen had long been active,
South Africa's investments, both private and public, were sub
stantial. It has been estimated that in the mid-1960s approximately
40 per cent of total investment in the sub-continent (including also
Zambia, Malawi, Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique) was South
3
African. By 1976 nearly one-third (30 per cent) of South Africa's
total foreign investment of R5.0 billion was in Africa.
1
A . J. N o r v a l , A quarter of a century of industrial progress in South Africa ( C a p e T o w n ,
1962), 57; A u b r e y D i c k m a n , ' I n v e s t m e n t - t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r e c o n o m i c g r o w t h a n d
l i v i n g s t a n d a r d s ' , Optima, 1977, 2 7 , 1 ; C l a r k , US corporate interests, 47. F o r a d i f f e r e n t
v i e w see Brian K a h n and Brian K a n t o r , ' D o e s S o u t h Africa need foreign capital?'
( u n p u b l i s h e d , U n i v e r s i t y o f C a p e T o w n , 1977).
2
South African statistics, 1974, 2 3 , 3. I n v e s t m e n t s a b r o a d a r e d e f i n e d a s ' L i a b i l i t i e s
towards South Africa o f foreign enterprise " c o n t r o l l e d " from S o u t h Africa*.
3
R u t h F i r s t , J o n a t h a n S t e e l e , C h r i s t a b e l G u r n e y , The South African connection
( L o n d o n , 1972), 263. South African statistics, 1978, 2 3 , 3.
275

SOUTHERN A F R I C A
Table 6 . 1 0 . Southern Africa's foreign trade by continent and country,

I9J7-76-
Exports (%) Imports (%)
1957 1976 1957 1976
Africa 19.2 10.8 6.8 5-2

United Kingdom 27.5 23-5 32.6 17.6
German Federal 5.0 8.5 8.1 18.0
Republic
Other Europe 20.6 21.2 13.6 19.0
USA 6.3 9-7 19.6 21.6
Other North America I 1.6 3-2 4.4 1.6
South America J 2.6 0.7
Japan 2.3 12.6 3'* 10.2
Other Asia 2.8 6.1 11.2 4.0
Oceania 1.1 1.1 0.6 1.6
(incl. Australia)
Unspecified i}.6 0.7 — 0.4
Total % 100 100 100 100
Total (R million) (801) (4194) (1098) (5859)
Source: Statistical year book 1966, Q . 12-13; South African statistics, 1 9 7 6 , 1 6 , 1 8 - 1 9 .
The involvement of South African mining houses in Zambia,

of manufacturing companies in Rhodesia, and of the government
itself in providing a soft loan to finance the building of Malawi's
new capital in Lilongwe, and of helping Mozambique to keep the
railways and harbours running after the Portuguese had with
drawn, all served to tie these countries more closely to the south.
Elsewhere in the region, the South Africans were busy investing
their capital and their expertise, particularly in minerals. Despite
Botswana's active, and not unsuccessful, efforts to attract investors
from further afield, South Africa remained dominant. For Nami
bia, still under South African control in the late 1 9 7 0 s , investors
from all over the western world were jockeying for new mineral
concessions which they hoped might prove as profitable as the
coastal diamonds or the Rössing uranium deposits.
The invisible web spun by the capital investors and money-
2 7 6

I N D U S T R I A L R E V O L U T I O N I N S O U T H A F R I C A
lenders was strengthened by the lines of trade which formed a

similar pattern. South Africa, indeed, had a particularly open
economy with trade in 1 9 7 6 accounting for one-third of gross
domestic product.
During the period for which statistics are available, a number
of interesting changes took place, including the rise of Japan as
a major trading partner. At the same time the share of South
Africa's imports provided by the German Federal Republic
increased markedly whilst Britain's share declined sharply. N o less
striking than these changes was South Africa's failure to expand
trade with the rest of Africa which was seen to be her natural
market, particularly after Britain's entry into the European
Economic Community in 1973 and the subsequent raising of
tariffs. Behind the South African foreign policy of dialogue and
detente in the early 1 9 7 0 s lay the attempt not only to obtain
African support (or neutrality at least) in voting at the United
Nations but also to break the African boycott against South
African goods and to penetrate the markets beyond Zambia.
Apart from economic gains to South Africa from the investment
funds, and the technology and expertise that came with them,
there were distinct political advantages to the Pretoria government
of the flows, both in and out, of investments and trade. For
although these increased South Africa's vulnerability to sanctions,
particularly in the 1 9 7 0 s after Nigeria had begun to overshadow
South Africa in importance as a trading partner with the west,
nevertheless they served to dampen pressures which, in Britain
and the Federal Republic of Germany particularly, could have
caused considerable economic loss through reduction of the rich
incoming flow of dividends and of employment in sectors
exporting to South Africa.
It is against this background of urbanisation, capital accumu
lation, and the centripetal forces of industrialisation that we turn
now to an examination of the political drama as it unfolded over
the period.
P O L I T I C S 1936-60
The emergence of the All Africa Convention on 16 December

1935 was as much a triumph as had been the founding conference
in 1 9 1 2 of the African National Congress. Arising in response to
the white government's proposal to prevent all Africans, who
277

might in future qualify, from becoming ordinary voters in the

Cape Province, where some n o o o Africans were already on
the common roll, the A A C brought under its umbrella a wide
spectrum of organisations dedicated to fighting the ' Native Bills'
(see below). Under the chairmanship of Professor D. D . T. Jabavu
and with Dr A. B. Xuma as Secretary, the Convention achieved
an astonishing coalition - ranging from elderly, conservative
rural African chiefs to young * Coloured' Trotskyists from the
western Cape.
However, the unity forged in the crisis did not last. Once the
bills became law a new strategy had to be evolved. Members of
the A A C debated the issue. Should they use the very institutions
created by the Act in order to fight it? Or should they, as was being
increasingly urged by I. B. Tabata, Goolam Gool and others, have
nothing to do with such dummy bodies? T w o organisations
grew as the Convention collapsed in the early 1 9 4 0 s . One was
the A N C which slowly re-gathered strength and, after Dr Xuma
was elected president in 1 9 4 1 , began once again to make its
presence felt. The other was the Non-European Unity Movement
forged in 1943 out of a conference of delegates from the A A C ,
and the National Anti-CAD, a body established to fight the
Smuts's government's intention to introduce a special' Coloured
Affairs' department.
Meanwhile the process of clarifying goals continued. From its
foundation in 1 9 1 2 the A N C had been clear as to where it stood;
participation by all - albeit with a qualified franchise - in the
political life of the common society to which everybody belonged
irrespective of race, colour, or creed. This too was the basic belief
of the Convention. As time went on, it became necessary to define
the goals of the common society more clearly. The adoption by
the Allied powers in 1941 of the Atlantic Charter suggested that
even in South Africa there was hope. In 1943 the A N C published
a manifesto on African claims and the Unity Movement announced
its Ten-point programme. Common to these policy statements and
the speeches which supported them was the premise that South
Africa belonged to all who lived there. The fact that whites were
included as equals - but not as masters - was continually
reiterated.
The Freedom Charter adopted in 1955 by a 'Congress of the
People' drawn from all race groups in the country and reflecting
278

P O L I T I C S
a broad spectrum of opinion, particularly in the African and

Indian congresses, was a consensus document that could be
supported both by those whose ultimate goal was a socialist
society and those who were neither Marxist nor believed that the
entire economy should be run by the state. All were agreed,
however, that certain key industries, notably mining, should be
1
nationalised.
But not everybody who believed in a common society neces
sarily wished to alter the structure of ownership. Both in the
Liberal and the Progressive Parties the emphasis was on the
abolition of discriminatory legislation and the reorganisation of
state expenditure to ensure equal education, better housing and
welfare services. White radicals tended to move either into the
Communist Party (until it was banned in 1950) or, later, into the
Congress of Democrats until it too was proscribed in 1 9 6 2 .
Despite vehement disagreement on many basic issues, there was
a fundamental belief across the whole spectrum ranging from
Moses Kotane, General Secretary of the Communist Party, to
Helen Suzman of the Progressive Party that the country belonged
to all those who lived in it, and that all South Africans had the
right to equal opportunities irrespective of race or colour. But
those who held power stood on the other side of this great divide.
What was to be done?
' W h o will deny/ said Chief Luthuli in 1952 'that thirty years
of my life have been spent knocking in vain, patiently, moder
ately and modestly at a closed and barred door? The past thirty
years have seen the greatest number of laws restricting our rights
and progress until today we have reached the stage where we
2
have almost no rights at all.' His life and sense of frustra
tion epitomised that of scores of leaders who for two generations
and more had sought, via deputation and reasoned argument
with cabinet ministers and government commissions, to persuade
those in power to alter their policies. In 1936 the All Africa
Convention sent a delegation to see the prime minister about his
proposed Native Bills. In 1 9 4 7 , when Smuts summoned leaders
to talk about the collapse of the Natives' Representative Council,
they went. In 1959 a deputation from Fort Hare University
1
F o r t h e full t e x t s e e T h o m a s K a r i s a n d G w e n d o l e n M. C a r t e r ( e d s . ) , From protest
to challenge: a documentary history of African politics in South Africa 1882-1964, V o l . i n ,
2
205. C i t e d i n Sechaha, J u n e 1969.
279

College, threatened with government control and ethnic segreg

ation, appealed in vain to be heard at the bar of the house. The
attempt to reason continued although, as time went on, belief in
its ultimate efficacy was confined more and more to whites.
Not everybody, however, was content with knocking. Amongst
the delegates to the founding conference of the A A C was
Clements Kadalie, whose Industrial and Commercial Union,
1
known amongst Africans as ' I C U Mlungu', had mushroomed
during the 1 9 2 0 s to a peak membership of 1 0 0 0 0 0 - sufficient to
give both employers and government considerable food for
thought. However by the mid-1930s, due to mismanagement,
increasing state pressure and political disagreements, the move
ment had failed. But the need for an organisation to represent
workers was greater than ever before. In 1941 the Transvaal
African Congress called a conference which founded the African
Mine Workers' Union. The government responded the next year
by passing War Measure 145 which made all strikes by black
workers illegal in all circumstances. In 1943, following a demand
by the A M W U for higher wages, the government appointed a
commission to investigate. In 1946, when average earnings for the
mineworkers were no higher than they had been for the previous
ten years, indeed for a generation, the A M W U , led by J. B. Marks,
having attempted for months to negotiate, could get no response
from the Chamber of Mines. So the A M W U finally called a strike.
At its peak in mid-August 1 9 4 6 , some 7 4 0 0 0 men, approximately
one-quarter of the total employed by the gold mines, downed
tools and paralysed eight mines; five others were partially affected.
The police were called out to force the men back to work at
bayonet point if necessary. The Chamber of Mines issued a
statement saying that * the introduction of trade unionism among
tribal Natives at their present stage of development would lead
to abuses and irresponsible action*. Leaders of the strike were
tried and the union was crushed. Five years later, after the price
of gold had risen 4 4 per cent, the average real earnings of white
mineworkers was 14 per cent higher than it had been at the time
of the black strike. The real earnings of black miners were 3 per
cent lower.
Other unions too were having a difficult time. From 1 9 3 5 ,
when he was appointed secretary of the African Laundry Workers'
1
'I see you white man'.
280

P O L I T I C S
Union until he was interned in 1940, Max Gordon organised half

a dozen unions for African workers in various industries in the
southern Transvaal. He was a Trotskyist but held loosely to the
finer points of doctrine with which members of the left so
belaboured each other. His aim was to build a solid organisation
without splitting hairs. Naboth Mokgatle draws a vivid picture
of the trials and tribulations faced by union organisers at this
1
time, but under skilful and courageous hands the trade unions
continued to grow despite constant police harassment. By 1947
it was estimated that there were almost a hundred African unions
which, in Smuts's words, were 'unrecognised, unauthorised, but
2
in existence'. Like its political counterparts, the trade-union
movement in South Africa was deeply divided between those for
whom it was a movement to include all those struggling against
poverty and exploitation, and those who saw it as an instrument
of exclusion to benefit some, primarily white workers, at the ex
pense of others, primarily black. In the Garment Workers' Union
in the 1930s, most of the factory workers were young Afrikaans-
speaking women recently come from the farms who were
struggling to keep themselves and their families afloat. The union,
led by Solly Sachs, fought strongly on their behalf and conditions
improved greatly. In the war years, as the economy went on
expanding, more and more people were drawn into the Wit-
watersrand factories. But when some Coloured women were
hired, there were complaints to the union which stated that the
new workers should stay. Union members who continued to
object were expelled which meant, due to the closed shop
agreement, that they lost their jobs. Afrikaans churchmen and
politicians rushed to the rescue and formed the Blankewerkers-
beskermingsbond (White Workers' Protection Society). During
the 1950s, the new government cracked down on the labour
movement (see below) and by i960 membership of trade unions
that were solidly on the side of the lowest paid workers was but
a fraction of the total number employed.
In his presidential address to the A A C in 1936, Professor
Jabavu who, like so many others, was influenced by events in
India, where Gandhi was mobilising millions to boycott both
British cloth and certain institutions, considered seriously 'a
1
N a b o t h M o k g a t l e , The autobiography of an unknown South African ( B e r k e l e y , 1971).
2
K a r i s a n d C a r t e r ( e d s . ) , From protest to challenge, v o l . 11, 239.
28l

complete boycott of all the new Acts'. However, he rejected it

1
because 'a perfect organisation where there are no blacklegs' did
not exist. Yet the possibility of boycott remained. I. B. Tabata,
whose analysis of boycott as a weapon in the struggle was to exert
a profound influence, challenged those who maintained that,
despised as they were, such bodies as the Natives' Representative
2
Council and the Transkei Bunga had to be used. He argued that
non-collaboration would at least ensure that people did not help
maintain the political instruments of their own oppression.
Nevertheless there were many in the A N C , both on the left and
the right, who thought they should give the institutions a try. But
in 1946 members of the Natives' Representative Council, after 10
years of talking without the government paying any attention,
could finally bear it no longer. Government refusal to allow the
N R C - which happened to meet in Pretoria as the mine strike was
beginning - to play any role in the matter was the last straw.
Members of the N R C had, as Paul Mosaka put it, been playing
with a * toy telephone', and they would play no more. The council
resolved to adjourn until further notice. T w o months later they
met again to hear Jan Hofmeyr, as Acting Prime Minister, accuse
them of wanting to rush things. Z . K . Matthews, as chairman of
the council's African caucus, delivered the measured reply and the
council resolved to adjourn sine die.
This move was widely supported and the A N C resolved that
further elections for the council should be boycotted. In the face
of hardening white attitudes, as evidenced both by the crushing
of the mine strike in 1946 and the victory of the National Party
at the polls in 1 9 4 8 , the A N C became considerably more
aggressive. In 1949, urged on by its increasingly influential Youth
League (which had been founded in 1944 with Anton Lembede
as first president), the A N C adopted a militant Programme of
Action which set the stage for the next decade of persistent
Congress attempts to change the policies of the government by
means of mass action.
In 1955 the A N C sought to resist the introduction of Bantu
Education by boycotting all the schools. Although the campaign
was ill-prepared and received little support, it was the forerunner
1
D . D . T . J a b a v u , All African Convention Presidential Address 19)6 ( L o v e d a l e , 1936),
10.
2
L a t e r p u b l i s h e d : I . B . T a b a t a , The boycott as a weapon of struggle ( L o n d o n , i960).
282

P O L I T I C S
of a much tougher and more effective campaign, led by the school

pupils themselves, 20 years later. More successful was the superbly
organised bus boycott in 1957 when, by walking up to 20 miles
a day for ten weeks or more, thousands of African commuters on
the Witwatersrand from Alexandra, Sophiatown, and elsewhere,
forced the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce and subsequently
the government itself to find ways other than raising fares to
finance the increasing cost of transport.
A three-month potato boycott, organised in 1959 to draw
attention to the system of farm gaols and the oppressive labour
conditions found on farms in the potato-growing area of the
eastern Transvaal around Bethal, made some impact, but the farm
gaols were not abolished. It was not until later, when the boycott
weapon was aimed from overseas, that it began, particularly in
the field of sport, to make a visible difference to government
policy.
Meanwhile another weapon was tried. In 1 9 4 6 Smuts was
pushed by his predominantly English-speaking Natal supporters
to enact legislation to restrict Indian ownership to areas where
they already owned land. Gandhi telegraphed his protest and India
vigorously denounced South Africa at the opening session of the
United Nations. Within the country itself the Indian community
rallied behind, the S A Indian Congress which, under the leadership
of Dr Naicker, launched a passive resistance campaign. T w o
thousand people were sent to gaol but the campaign had little
effect. In 1949 communal riots between Indians and Africans tore
Durban apart in an episode which highlighted cleavages within
the black community and demonstrated the difficulties of united
resistance. Nevertheless Indian and African leaders were able
subsequently to get together and plan a massive defiance campaign
against unjust laws. Timed to coincide with the whites' tercen
tenary celebrations of the landing of Jan van Riebeeck, the
campaign was launched on 26 June 1952 when resisters set out
deliberately to break one of six laws relating to control of
movement or to railway and post office segregation. During the
four months (July to October) a total of 8000 volunteers, no less
than two-thirds of them in the eastern Cape, went forward to be
arrested. The government response was to pass legislation
permitting the whipping of all those convicted of breaking a law
for the purpose of demonstrating against it.
283

But the attempt to persuade those in power to mend their ways

by means of Satyagraha actions was not finished. Seven years later
another peaceful campaign, focussing once again on the hated pass
laws, was mounted. Some jockeying for position between the A N C
and the Pan-African Congress which, led by Robert Sobukwe, had
recently broken away from the older body, prevented the campaign
being properly co-ordinated, but this rapidly became a secondary
consideration when on 21 March i 9 6 0 a large crowd of people
responding to the P A C call gathered round the Sharpeville police
station to hand in their passes and was shot at by police. Sixty-nine
people lost their lives in an event which echoed round the world.
A week later, nearly a thousand miles away, 30000 Africans
marched unarmed into Cape Town to demonstrate against the
pass laws. A state of emergency was declared and the two African
congress organisations were banned. An era had ended.
For white South Africans the second half of the 1 9 3 0 s was a honey
moon period. United behind the old warriors, Generals Hertzog
and Smuts, the vast majority of Afrikaans- and English-speaking
whites put aside the quarrels of the past and, basking in the glow
of fusion, saw even the nightmare of white poverty begin to
recede. But the price of unity was to be high. In 1936, having
waited ten years for the two-thirds majority he needed, Hertzog
was able to manoeuvre Smuts into supporting legislation to
remove African voters from the common roll which had been open
to those in the Cape Province with certain qualifications since 1853
and which had been entrenched, at the insistence of Cape
delegates, in the South Africa Act, 1909. In place of the common
franchise a Natives' Representative Council with advisory but no
executive power was established and provision was made for those
removed from the common voters' roll to elect three white
representatives to the House of Assembly and two (also white)
to the Cape Provincial Council. Another provision allowed
Africans throughout the Union to elect four whites as additional
members of the Senate. At the same time Hertzog was able to tidy
some of the loose ends left in the Land Act of 1 9 1 3 by finalising
(at approximately 13 per cent of the total) the amount of land
which was to be reserved for Africans. Smuts saw global dangers
more clearly than those within his own country, thus, whilst he
was not prepared to sacrifice white unity for the sake of black
284

P O L I T I C S
South Africans, he was nevertheless willing to break it in order

to take sides against Nazi Germany. When, on the outbreak of
war in September 1939, Hertzog proposed that South Africa
remain neutral Smuts argued that her interests as a small nation
decreed that she should stand by her friends and go to war. The
cabinet was evenly split but Smuts won the parliamentary vote
with a majority of eleven. Hertzog crossed the floor to join
D. F. Malan's ' purified' Nationalist Party, which had been in the
wilderness since it opposed fusion of the (Afrikaner) Nationalist
Party, led by Hertzog, and the (largely anglophone) United Party,
led by Smuts, in 1933. South Africa, like Britain and her sister
Dominions, entered the w a r ' dangerously unprepared V although
she too mobilised rapidly and sent troops first to East Africa
where, with Indians, West Africans and others, they defeated the
Italians and liberated Ethiopia. From there the South African
army moved to North Africa where 1 1 0 0 0 South Africans were
captured at Tobruk. Those not captured went on, after fighting
at El Alamein, to Italy and the heart of Europe. Some 2 3 1 0 0 0 men
were enlisted. More than one-third ( 3 7 per cent) of these were
African or Coloured and were sent to war with spears but no
2
guns. Smuts himself played a key role in the war both as
Commander-in-Chief of the South African armed forces and as
a global strategist in close touch with Churchill and the British
generals.
Another aspect of the war was its impact on the soldiers, both
black and white, who went north to fight against Nazi racism and
Italian Fascism. For blacks the experience of travelling outside the
confines of a segregated society was profoundly liberating whilst
for many whites the goals of the war as well as meeting all sorts
and conditions of men and learning of a world far richer in culture
than anything they had ever dreamed of made the social structures
back home seem mean and petty. Smuts responded to these
impulses when invasion threatened and, after remarking in 1942
that 'segregation had fallen on evil days', gave notice that if the
Japanese landed he would arm blacks. But, as one of the most
1
N e i l O r p e n , South African forces, World War II ( C a p e T o w n , 1968), v o l . 11, 338.
2
F o r an illustration o f the a m b i g u o u s n a t u r e o f c h a n g e in S o u t h A f r i c a c o n t r a s t the
p h o t o g r a p h o f black t r o o p s d o i n g parade drill w i t h spears d u r i n g the S e c o n d W o r l d
W a r i n O r p e n , South African forces, v o l . 1, w i t h t h a t o f t h e h e a v i l y a r m e d b l a c k r i o t
p o l i c e m e n in J o h a n n e s b u r g in 1976 i n P e t e r M a g u b a n e , Magubane's South Africa
( L o n d o n , 1978), 104.
285

English of Smuts's supporters confided to his diary, * Anything

like a wholesale grant of the vote to our natives is utterly out of
the question now and will remain utterly out of the question as
l
long as anyone living can now foresee. ' As the threat of invasion
receded and an election loomed, the hopes of trade-union rep
resentation, relaxation of the pass laws, and guns for black soldiers
faded, and the 1943 election, though buoyed up on the tide of
victory against Fascism in North Africa, was fought on the clear
understanding that, at home, the black man should stay in his
place.
Yet Smuts was still willing to negotiate and, who knows, with
his willingness to laat maar loop (let things develop) he would later
perhaps have seen the writing on the wall and moved to
accommodate black aspirations. But Smuts was an old man.
Moreover, despite all his knowledge and the breadth of his
interests, despite the charisma which Hancock describes so
2
vividly, the harsh fact remains that Smuts was one of the chief
architects of the South Africa Act, he had been second-in-
command of the government which passed the Land Act in 1913
and was also the man without whose support Hertzog would
never have been able in 1936 to remove Africans from the Cape
common roll. He believed in evolution but did not discern the
culs-de-sac of history. Perhaps he stretched as far as they would
go the thongs which bound representatives of the white electorate.
But at the end of his days, in the crisis of the African mineworkers'
strike and the collapse of the Natives' Representative Council he,
like Hofmeyr, failed to respond adequately to the hands that were
being held out to him from across the widening chasm that
divided South Africa. For the majority of his fellow countrymen
Smuts was spokesman for the ' haves'; ruler of a country designed
'for whites only'; a man unable to see Africans as equals. He left
no legacy on which those struggling for a common society could
build. More immediately, however, the most damaging attack on
Smuts came from the apostles of greater exclusiveness. In the
post-war election of 1948 the United Party was defeated. The
National Party, supported almost entirely by Afrikaans-speaking
white voters, was returned to power.
1
B . K . L o n g , In S/nuts's camp ( L o n d o n , 1945), 106.
2
W . K . H a n c o c k , Smuts ( C a m b r i d g e , 1962, 1968), 2 v o l s .
286

P O L I T I C S
In 1938 the liturgical celebration of the centenary of the Great

Trek, with ox-waggons pulling slowly through the towns and
dorps of South Africa to a great climax in Pretoria, was instru
mental in diffusing an Afrikaans-speaking whites-only group
consciousness, and in building up a reservoir of feeling which
'purified nationalists' were to harness effectively in their drive for
power. Despite this, and despite the coming together of Hertzog
and Malan in the opening days of the war, it was not all plain
sailing. Many of Malan's followers were not happy either with the
choice of leader of the new, Herenigde Nationale (United National)
Party, nor with Hertzog's insistence on soft-pedalling the policy
of making South Africa a Republic outside the Commonwealth.
A palace revolt was organised and the old general resigned.
Much more serious to the National Party, however, was the rise
of the Ossewa Brand wag (OB). Founded in the euphoria of the
centenary trek, it was a para-military organisation aimed at
rallying young Afrikaaners to the republican cause. Starting as a
cultural movement, it became increasingly committed to armed
subversion and was soon carving out a space for itself in the
political arena. Malan, in what he later described as one of the three
most difficult decisions of his life, decided to attack the O B head
1
on. Helped by the turn of the tide in Europe, Malan was able
to defeat the rival organisation whose Nazi philosophy he
declared was a foreign import. In 1948, the National Party refused
to have anything to do with the O B and in the election the young
B. J. Vorster had to stand as a member of the Afrikaner Party
because Malan disapproved of his O B activities. He lost by two
votes, but by the election of 1953 the O B was dead, and the lost
sheep were back in the fold, with men like Vorster on their way
to the top of the party.
The power house which transformed Afrikaners from what
92
they were before the First World War into the * organisation-men
they became after the Second was not, however, the National
Party as such. The Broederbond (League of Brothers), founded
1
T h e t w o other decisions w e r e whether or not to leave the C h u r c h ministry and
whether or not to follow H e r t z o g into 'fusion*.
2
F. V a n Z y l Slabbert, ' A f r i k a n e r nationalism, white politics and political change
in S o u t h A f r i c a \ i n L e o n a r d T h o m p s o n a n d Jeffrey B u t l e r ( e d s . ) , Change in contemporary
South Africa ( B e r k e l e y , 1975), 3 - 1 8 .
287

in 1 9 1 9 by Henning Klopper, went underground in 1922 where,

save for those few occasions when it has emerged, blinking like
a mole, in the harsh light of Sunday journalism, it remained until
the late 1 9 7 0 s . Hertzog was vehemently opposed to such a secret
1
organisation, but from the time of his withdrawal from politics

in 1940 until the assassination of Dr Verwoerd in 1966 and indeed
right through the Vorster era, the evidence suggests that the
Broederbond, whose leadership was drawn primarily from pro
fessional, political, religious and intellectual leaders, played a
key role, especially in the Transvaal, in organising the Afrikaner
nationalists' achievement and consolidation of power.
In 1944 the Federasie vir Afrikaanse Kultuur, an offshoot of
the Broederbond, acted as host at a conference at which the new
vision o f ' Christian National' policy was put before the public.
With the backing of the three Church denominations to which
most white Afrikaans-speaking South Africans belonged, the
programme stated explicitly that the first duty of a 'nation'
(white-skinned and Afrikaans-tongued) was to save its own life,
and laid the foundations of an ideology which was to serve the
National Party for the next generation.
In the field of economics a number of young intellectuals,
Albert Hertzog, Piet Meyer and others, after returning from study
in Western Europe, established the Nasionale Raad van Trustees
(National Council of Trustees) in 1936 in order to form trade
unions with the specific objective of rescuing Afrikaans workers
from the hold of class solidarity and of directing them along the
paths of Afrikaner consciousness. In 19 34 the Spoorbond (Railway
Union) for white railway workers had been established by the
Broederbond and, after a long battle, the Mine Workers' Union
2
was taken over in 1 9 4 8 . The threat of Coloured women in the
Garment Workers' Union on the Witwatersrand led to the
launching of the Blankewerkersbeskermingsbond to protect
white workers from contamination b y ' untouchables' of a different
hue.
Across the class divide there was also need for organisation.
The Reddingsdaadbond (RDB) (Rescue Action Society), formed
1
J. H . P . S e r f o n t e i n , Brotherhood of power ( L o n d o n , 1979); I v o r W i l k i n s a n d H a n s
S t r y d o m , The Broederbond ( N e w Y o r k , 1979); C h a r l e s B l o o m b e r g , The Broederbond and
Christian nationalism in South Africa, u n p u b l i s h e d (1972).
2
D a n O ' M e a r a , ' T h e " C h r i s t i a n N a t i o n a l " assault o n w h i t e trade u n i o n s in S o u t h
A f r i c a ' , African Affairs, 1978, 7 7 , 306.
288

P O L I T I C S
in the wake of the 1938 centenary celebrations, was designed to

help Afrikaners develop some muscle within the English-
dominated capitalist world. Nico Diedrichs, who with Geoff
Cronje and others was one of the apostles of the new
1
'nationalism', resigned his professorship in the Orange Free
State to become full-time director of the R D B which collected
funds (albeit not very successfully). The R D B enabled some small
businesses to get off the ground and, more important, provided
early support for the new investment house Federale Volks-
beleggings (Federal People's Investments). Influential though
these organisations were, it was not until the National Party had
won the 1948 election that they had the opportunity of putting
into practice the policies that had been so long in gestation.
The first actions of the new government were focussed on

intensifying colour-caste cleavages where they were least visible.
In 1949 marriage between 'European and non-European' was
made illegal whilst, a year later, the illegality of sexual intercourse
between whites and Africans was extended also against' Coloured'
and 'Asians' as well by an amendment to the 1927 Immorality
Act. The Population Registration Act of 1950, hideously cruel in
its effects, was used primarily to separate ' white' from ' Coloured'
even within the same families. Attempts to justify these 'race'
divisions on pseudo-scientific grounds drew heavily on Nazi
thinking, but in remoter parts of the Karoo such refinements
were dispensed with when, so the story goes, farm-labourer
descendants of centuries of Bantu-Khoi interaction were lined up
on local railway platforms before an official who glanced at each
9 9 9 9 9 9
face pronouncing 'Jj s n Hotnot or 'Jy s n Kaffir , as he thought
the case might be. The Group Areas Act ( 1 9 5 0 ) excluded black
neighbours and entrepreneurs from preferred districts, thus
extending urban segregation which had first been directed pri
marily against Africans, many of whom had been penned into
'locations' since before the First World War. The shabby pro
cedures, 1 9 5 1 - 6 , to remove the franchise from Coloured voters in
the Cape, reversed Hertzog's 1926 proposal that it be extended
to the Coloured people in other provinces. T w o reasons for
rejecting the bruin Afrikaners were the National Party's fear of
1
N. Diedrichs, Nasionalisme as Lewensbeskoutng en sy Verhouding tot internationalisme
(Bloemfontein, 1936).
289

losing its precarious hold on power due to the Coloured vote in

a number of marginal Cape seats and, secondly, the increasing
emphasis on racial purity which the young intellectuals brought
back from Germany in the 1 9 3 0 s . The new Afrikaner nationalists
used the fences of language and colour-caste both to give
consciousness and cohesiveness to a group which was sufficiently
numerous to win all elections confined only to whites, and also
to foster division amongst everybody else.
A significant shift in the state's response to urbanisation came
in 1948. The Smuts government had supported a proposal that
the massive wartime movements of Africans to the manufactur
ing centres be accepted as inevitable. But the nationalists,
harking back to policy enunciated in 1922 by a Transvaal local
government commission that ' the native' should only enter the
cities in order 'to minister to the needs of the white man and
should depart therefrom when he ceases so to minister V proposed
a policy which not only made it more difficult for blacks to settle
in town, but which also laid the foundations for extending the
migrant labour system from the mining industry to the rest of the
urban economy. The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act ( 1 9 5 1 )
prohibited squatting without permission, but did empower local
authorities to proclaim emergency camps. The Native Abolition
of Passes and Coordination of Documents Act ( 1 9 5 2 ) streamlined
the system of geographic control and introduced a single reference
book, the dompas, which had to be carried at all times by all
2
Africans of 18 years or older. The Native Laws Amendment Act
( 1 9 5 2 ) laid down the terms (birth in a town, or ten years
continuous work with one employer, or 15 years continuous
employment in the same town) under which a person might
acquire rights to remain permanently in a particular town and, if
a man, to bring in his wife and children to live with him. For those
who did not yet fulfil these requirements family housing was not
to be made available. Those wishing to seek work in town were
allowed to come for 72 hours after which time, if they were not
registered in employment they had to leave. Labour bureaux were
established in 1951 to facilitate the co-ordination of labour flow,
not least to agriculture. The dompas, containing information
1
T r a n s v a a l P r o v i n c e , Report of the Local Government Commission ( S t a l l a r d ) ( T P i ,
P r e t o r i a , 1922), p a r a 267.
2 4
T h e o r i g i n o f t h e w o r d is o b s c u r e . P o s s i b l y it is d e r i v e d f r o m w h e r e is y o u r d a m n
pass?'.
290

POLITICS
about an individual's place of residence, employment status and

tax payments, had to be produced upon demand by any policeman.
During the 1 9 5 0 s the average annual number of convictions for
contraventions of the pass laws was double that during the 1 9 4 0 s
(see table 6 . 1 2 ) . Behind these statistics lay the indignities of
arrogant arrest, and a development about which Africans felt
particularly bitter: the extension of pass laws to women. Forty
years previously a passive resistance campaign in the Orange Free
State had successfully warded off a similar attempt, but now,
despite massive protest culminating in a march of 1 0 0 0 0 women
led by Lilian Ngoyi to Pretoria in 1 9 5 6 , the government extended
the laws until by 1959 passes had to be carried by all African
women. Such power led to abuse. For example a white policeman
arrested a teenage girl for a pass offence.
After locking her in a police van he drove her to a remote place... He told
her to get undressed. She told the court she had submitted because she was
terrified. She did not voice any refusal but did everything he told her to do...
The court accepted that she had not agreed to have intercourse. In view of
the fact, however, that she silently submitted without being forced to, 'the
policeman could have taken it as consent'. Therefore he would not be
1
convicted of rape.
He was, however, sentenced to two years imprisonment under the

Immorality Act!
There were further controls on occupational mobility. The law
bolstering the well-established conventional colour bar in
secondary industry was used to ensure that the colour—caste
pecking order was not upset by blacks giving orders to whites,
and also as part of the white social system to reserve jobs in times
of economic downturn. But the amendment to the Industrial
Conciliation Act ( 1 9 5 6 ) , though drafted by men with memories
of the depression, was passed long after the problem of poor
whites had disappeared and the evidence suggests that, as the
economy continued to expand, legal barriers to black advancement
in manufacturing, as opposed to mining, were less significant than
other obstacles such as white social custom, trade-union pressure,
and the consequences of the education structure.
Political control was also increased. Legislation such as War
Measure 145 of 1943 was already on the books to prevent African
1
Cape Times, 8 August 1972.
291

workers from striking, and trade-union organisers had long been

harassed by the state. But the real pressure on leadership did not
come until 1950 with the Suppression of Communism Act and
its subsequent amendments, which gave the state power to ban
any individual who, in the opinion of the minister, w a s ' furthering
the aims of communism'. Apart from the useful political mileage
which could be gained both locally and internationally from such
legislation at the height of McCarthyism and the Cold War, it
provided the state with an instrument with which it was able, at
the stroke of a pen, to turn an indispensable trade-union organiser,
political leader, or creative writer into an impotent non-person.
He became a social leper who was confined to a magisterial area,
prohibited from addressing or attending any gatherings, from
meeting more than one other person at a time, from visiting any
factory, university or school premises, from writing or publishing
anything and from being quoted either orally or in print for
periods (which could be renewed) of between three and five years.
Amongst the 1300 people banned over the years 1 9 5 0 - 7 7 were
some who were Communists and many, Roman Catholic priests,
1
Quaker pacifists, and others, who were not. The Act was an
effective instrument of control. But it also, as we shall see, clogged
the cybernetic channels by which a society grows in self-awareness
and understanding.
No less far-reaching however than the banning of books and
writers were the consequences of the Bantu Education Act ( 1 9 5 3 ) ,
which transferred control of African schools from churches and
provincial authorities to the Department of Native Affairs (later
Bantu Administration, later Plural Relations, later Co-operation
and Development). There were essentially three components in
the new thinking. One was the desire to have a syllabus more
related to those jobs in the economy which government would
permit blacks to take up. Another consideration was that the
syllabus should be moulded by what the white rulers considered
to be good for 'Bantu'. There was no question of blacks
participating in debate about reform of education for the whole
country. Effectively they were told that as blacks they had no right
to train for more skilled jobs in the urban economy as there was
* no place for [them] in the European community above the level
1
S e a n M o r o n e y a n d L i n d a E n s o r , The silenced: bannings in South Africa (Johannesburg,
*979)-
292

P O L I T I C S
1
of certain forms of labour'. Thirdly, the government sought also
to destroy the influence of men and women whom it considered
to be insidiously influencing Africans to hold ideas above their
station as 'black Englishmen'. There is a sense in which the
destruction of so much of what the missionaries had laboured for
more than a century to build was a judgement on the arrogance
of British imperial power, and the wounds it had inflicted on an
earlier generation of Afrikaners, who found themselves often
looked down upon by their wealthier, more self-assured, English-
speaking neighbours. But the action, such as the dispersal of old
school libraries and the destruction of all that for which proud
institutions such as Lovedale, Adams College and Fort Hare
stood, was wanton and deeply wounding. The legislation to
segregate university education and to create ethnic institutions
under state control was aimed, said a government spokesman, ' t o
produce native leaders who will accept and propagate Apartheid \
Nor was it only Africans who were casualties of the philosophy
of Christian National Education. South Africans of Indian descent
were segregated into Indian schools whilst 'Coloured' children
had to go to schools taken over by the Coloured Affairs
Department. Amongst whites too a policy of ethnic segregation
was used to isolate Afrikaans-speaking children from others and
to foster a narrow group identity so that the educational system
entrenched group differences.
Other fundamental legislation during the 1 9 5 0 s laid the
foundations for the policy that was to emerge during the follow
ing decades of separating from South Africa a number of pol
itically independent archipelagos. In his meeting with some
members of the Natives' Representative Council in 1 9 4 7 , Smuts
had spelt out his ideas for future policy. These were to give the
N R C executive powers - roughly equal to those of a provincial
council - to run those rural areas set aside as 'Native Reserves'.
The Bantu Authorities Act of 1953 executed this policy but with
one crucial difference. Where Smuts had intended to place all the
reserves under one black authority Verwoerd divided them
according to language sub-groupings, with Nguni-speakers being
split into four and Sotho-speakers into three. Six years later,
during which time Ghana had become independent under
Nkrumah whilst Verwoerd had become prime minister of South
1
Pelzer A. N. (ed.), Verwoerd speaks: speeches 1948-1966 (Johannesburg, 1966).
293

Africa, the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Bill was

introduced, thus opening the way, though not yet explicitly, to
Bantustan independence within the Verwoerdian vision of a
commonwealth of nations in southern Africa. The full implica
tions of this policy as it evolved are analysed later.
As the 1 9 5 0 s drew to a close those who led white South Africa
along the path of exclusion could feel well pleased with themselves
as they looked back over the tracks of the previous quarter
century. The economy was booming; investors, both local and
foreign, were satisfied. Politically, not only was the policy of
exclusion becoming clearer and, in the eyes of its supporters, more
moral, but the time was ripe for the National Party's crowning
achievement, the establishment of a white Republic. But this
confidence was severely jolted in i 9 6 0 by a series of events
including the * Winds of Change' speech in Cape Town by Harold
Macmillan, the Sharpeville tragedy, an assassination attempt
which severely wounded the South African prime minister, a
massive flight of capital, and the banning of the two major
organisations representing African political aspirations. With
Verwoerd's steely resolve and the breaking of a pledge to the
leaders of the black protesters who marched on Cape Town, the
government regained its nerve and pushed on with the referendum
in which, by a narrow majority, whites voted for a Republic. In
1961 South Africa finally severed its long constitutional link with
the British Crown and, even more telling as a measure of its
increasing isolation in the world, withdrew from the Common
wealth in which, during previous decades, it had been so
important a member.
S O U T H A F R I C A ' S N E I G H B O U R S
Bechuanaland
Ever since the South Africa Act ( 1 9 0 9 ) , which made special
provision for the later incorporation of the three High Commis
sion territories, the Pretoria government had made periodic
requests that this be done; but African opposition was firmly
articulated by Tshekedi Khama, second son of Khama the Great,
1
who had been installed as Regent of the Ngwato people of the
1
T s h e k e d i w a s R e g e n t w h i l s t his n e p h e w , S e r e t s e , w a s still t o o y o u n g t o b e C h i e f .
S e r e t s e ' s f a t h e r S e k g o m a II ( C h i e f K h a m a ' s e l d e s t s o n ) d i e d after a b r i e f r u l e w h e n
Seretse w a s a child o f four.
294

Bechuanaland Protectorate in 1 9 2 6 . In 1 9 3 6 H e r t z o g tried again

to incorporate the territories but Britain refused. O n the outbreak
o f war T s h e k e d i and other chiefs offered Britain their resources
and, after visiting Pretoria to examine conditions o f Africans in
the Union Defence Force, refused Smuts's suggestion that they
encourage their men to join it. Instead a special corps o f men from
the territories w a s created and performed distinguished service
around the Mediterranean. But again in 1 9 4 9 the issue was raised
w h e n the y o u n g Seretse K h a m a returned h o m e w i t h his E n g l i s h
bride. White South Africa, w h i c h had just made ' mixed ' marriages
illegal, was outraged and Malan announced that he w o u l d shortly
be m a k i n g a formal demand for the territories. Britain's response
was to resist incorporation but to announce that recognition o f
Seretse as chief w o u l d be withheld for five years during w h i c h
time he must live outside the Protectorate. A t the same time
T s h e k e d i K h a m a , w h o had done his best t o stop Seretse's
marriage to an u n k n o w n outsider, was banished from the N g w a t o
1
reserve, ' w h i l e the chieftainship is in suspense'. T h e matter was
not finally resolved until 1 9 5 6 w h e n , having renounced all claims
to the chieftainship, the t w o men returned as private citizens t o
Serowe.
By this time, after years o f parsimony, funds had been made
available for the Protectorate. In 1955 a white paper was issued
outlining a five-year development p r o g r a m m e concentrating o n
water, roads, education, social services, and soil conservation. In
1958 negotiations began for mining in N g w a t o country. In the
same year the Joint A d v i s o r y C o u n c i l , representing both blacks
and whites, called for the establishment o f a Legislative C o u n c i l .
By the year o f T s h e k e d i ' s death in 1 9 5 9 , his nephew, for w h o m
he had so l o n g held the N g w a t o land in trust as R e g e n t , was o n
his w a y t o b e c o m i n g first president o f an independent Botswana.
South West Africa J Namibia

By the end o f the 1930s, South W e s t Africa had been g o v e r n e d
for almost t w o decades by South Africa under mandate from the
L e a g u e o f Nations. In practice this meant that the territory w a s
ruled under the same laws as applied t o the Cape P r o v i n c e and
was subjected to decisions w h i c h reflected primarily the interests
o f whites w h o , in South W e s t Africa, formed less than 1 0 per cent
1
M a r y B e n s o n , Tshekedi Khama ( L o n d o n , i960), 198.
295

Table 6 . 1 1 . Land utilisation in South West Africa, 1936.
Million
ha Percentage
Farm land (3905 white-owned farms) 30.6 44-3

Desert (Namib) 12.0 17.4
Native reserves 9.9 M.3
Game reserves 9.6 13.9
Reserved for extension of native 6.5 9.4
reserves
Urban areas 0.4 0.6
Total 69.0 100.0
Source: Official year book 19ft* 1137.
o f the population. T h e structure o f political p o w e r was reflected

most clearly in the pattern o f land utilisation: nearly three-quarters
( 7 1 per cent) o f the land, excluding the N a m i b Desert itself, was
allocated either as white farm land or as game reserves (table 6 . 1 1 ) .
T h e African population was heterogeneous, consisting o f
O v a m b o , Damara, Herero, K a v a n g o and other g r o u p s w h o s e
language differences were further accentuated by the g o v e r n m e n t ' s
policy o f setting up more than 20 separate rural reserves. O n e aim
o f this policy was stated as being to create ' a potential labour-
1
recruiting field for the future'. A t this stage the main employers
o f labour, apart from the white farmers, were the railways, a few
mines (including diamond mines) and fishing companies. T h e
e c o n o m y o f South W e s t Africa g r e w very rapidly, particularly in
the mining sector in the decade 1 9 4 6 - 5 6 . But the fact that national
income as a proportion o f gross domestic product fell from 92
to 60 per cent in the same period is a measure o f the extent to
w h i c h much o f the increased wealth was taken out o f the country
in the form o f dividend and other payments to foreign, especially
South African, investors and property owners. B y i 9 6 0 mining
accounted for 34 per cent and agriculture for 15 per cent o f G D P
and the country's major exports were diamonds, copper, karakul
pelts and cattle. T h e manufacturing sector, based largely on the
canning o f pilchards in W a l v i s Bay, was small and the e c o n o m y
1
Officialyear book 19}?, 115 5.
296

remained primarily rural with more than three-quarters o f the

population l i v i n g on the land.
L i k e South Africa, South West Africa developed with an
oscillating migrant labour system at the heart o f the e c o n o m y , but
most migrants w e r e d r a w n from within the country, particularly
from the northern, O v a m b o and K a v a n g o , areas. S o m e w o r k e r s
came from A n g o l a . Between 1938 and i960—1 the annual number
o f w o r k e r s recruited by the monopsonistic South W e s t African
N a t i v e L a b o u r Association ( S W A N L A ) rose from a little under
1 0 0 0 0 to 25 000, o f w h o m one-third were e m p l o y e d by farmers,
one-third by industry and g o v e r n m e n t , one-quarter ( 2 7 per cent)
by the mines and the rest in fishing and other activities.
Important political changes were also taking place. H a v i n g
l o n g considered the territory as effectively annexed to South
Africa, Smuts applied to the new United Nations in 1 9 4 6 for its
formal incorporation. T h e Herero, led by Chief Hosea K u t a k o ,
rejected the referendum by w h i c h South Africa hoped to w i n
African approval for the m o v e . T h e Paramount Chief, Frederick
Maharero, lived in the Bechuanaland Protectorate w i t h 1 4 0 0 0 o f
his people w h o had fled from v o n T r o t h a ' s massacres in 1904 and
he appealed to the N g w a t o Regent for help. T s h e k e d i K h a m a
responded immediately by cabling the United Nations to refuse
South Africa's request. S o o n afterwards, h a v i n g found him l i v i n g
in a tent in a squatter camp outside Johannesburg, T s h e k e d i
K h a m a commissioned the R e v d Michael Scott to plead the South
West African cause at the United Nations on behalf o f Chief
Kutako.
In 1 9 4 9 , the National Party g o v e r n m e n t , seeking simultaneously
to strengthen the South W e s t connexion and its precarious
majority, decreed that white Suid-westers should elect six repres
entatives to the Cape T o w n parliament. South Africa's v i e w that
the mandate had lapsed w i t h the collapse o f the L e a g u e o f Nations
was submitted by the U N General A s s e m b l y to the International
C o u r t o f Justice w h i c h ruled that the mandate was still in force.
South Africa h o w e v e r ignored the implications o f this judgement
and continued to g o v e r n the territory. Indeed it was the further
extension o f apartheid, with the forcible removal o f blacks from
the ' O l d L o c a t i o n ' in the centre o f W i n d h o e k to a new ethnically
divided non-freehold township o f Katatura some miles outside,
that led to confrontation on the night o f 10 D e c e m b e r (the
297

a n n i v e r s a r y o f t h e U N D e c l a r a t i o n o f H u m a n R i g h t s ) in 1 9 5 9
w h e n p o l i c e fired o n u n a r m e d d e m o n s t r a t o r s , k i l l i n g 11 a n d
w o u n d i n g 54. T h i s e v e n t , w h i c h p r e c e d e d t h e S h a r p e v i l l e m a s s a c r e
b y t h r e e m o n t h s , w a s n o less f a r - r e a c h i n g in its c o n s e q u e n c e s . It
led to the transformation o f the O v a m b o l a n d P e o p l e ' s O r g a n i s a
t i o n , f o u n d e d in 1 9 5 7 b y T o i v o H e r m a n ja T o i v o t o fight t h e
migrant labour system, into the S o u t h W e s t Africa People's
Organisation ( S W A P O ) w h i c h had a broad national base and
w h i c h w a s dedicated to e n d i n g S o u t h Africa's colonisation o f the
c o u n t r y . S a m N u j o m a , w h o w a s t o b e c o m e first p r e s i d e n t o f
S W A P O , w a s banished to O v a m b o l a n d f o l l o w i n g the W i n d h o e k
s h o o t i n g s . S o o n a f t e r w a r d s h e left t h e c o u n t r y a n d in D a r e s
S a l a a m set u p t h e h e a d q u a r t e r s o f S W A P O in e x i l e . M e a n w h i l e ,
inside the c o u n t r y , the internal w i n g o f the organisation, w h i c h
w a s never banned a l t h o u g h leaders w e r e often harassed, quietly
w e n t o n w i t h the w o r k o f political mobilisation.
Swaziland
F o r m o r e than sixty years, o r t w o generations, the k i n g d o m

o f S w a z i l a n d w a s d o m i n a t e d b y K i n g S o b h u z a II w h o w a s
i n s t a l l e d as ingwenyama in 1 9 2 1 . A t t h e t i m e o f t h e 1 9 3 6 c e n s u s ,
t h e t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n w a s 1 5 7 0 0 0 , o f w h o m 98 p e r c e n t w e r e
A f r i c a n , a l m o s t all S w a z i - s p e a k i n g . L e s s t h a n 3000 w e r e w h i t e ,
b u t w h i t e s , s o m e o f t h e m d o m i c i l e d in S o u t h A f r i c a , o w n e d n e a r l y
half the land. A sense o f h a v i n g been r o b b e d b y the L a n d Partition
P r o c l a m a t i o n o f 1907, together w i t h a steady curtailment o f
traditional p o w e r , created a deep sense o f distrust o f the colonial
g o v e r n m e n t b y the S w a z i p e o p l e and led the k i n g , an inherently
c o n s e r v a t i v e m a n , i n t o m u t e d b u t real c o n f l i c t w i t h B r i t a i n o n
these issues. N e v e r t h e l e s s S o b h u z a f o u n d S o u t h A f r i c a n policies
e v e n m o r e d i s t a s t e f u l , p a r t i c u l a r l y after t h e p r o m u l g a t i o n in 1 9 2 6
o f H e r t z o g ' s N a t i v e B i l l s , a n d h e c a m e d o w n s o l i d l y a g a i n s t all
attempts to incorporate Swaziland into the U n i o n . B u t e c o n o m i c
ties w e r e s t r o n g a n d S o u t h A f r i c a c o n t i n u e d t o e x e r t its p o w e r
o v e r the tiny k i n g d o m . B e f o r e the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r m o r e than
two-thirds o f w a g e - p a y i n g jobs held by S w a z i w e r e outside the
c o u n t r y , l a r g e l y in t h e m i n e s o f t h e W i t w a t e r s r a n d . A s t i m e w e n t
on, h o w e v e r , relatively m o r e jobs w e r e generated within
S w a z i l a n d . T h e H a v e l o c k asbestos m i n e , o p e n e d in 1937, b e c a m e
298

a major employer, whilst after the Second W o r l d W a r the

afforestation p r o g r a m m e , and the development o f sugar planting
(particularly after malaria had been brought under control) led t o
considerable expansion o f the e c o n o m y , so that by i960 11 300
Swazi were employed within Swaziland, o u t n u m b e r i n g the 7500
recruited during the year t o the South African g o l d and platinum
mines. Important t h o u g h they were, the earnings o f migrants
formed a less substantial proportion o f Swaziland's income than
was the case in either Bechuanaland o r Basutoland. A l t h o u g h
nearly every Swazi adult male w o r k e d at some stage o n the
Witwatersrand, the people o f Swaziland remained o v e r w h e l m
ingly rural in their o u t l o o k . E v e r y year the people gathered for the
great first-fruits ceremony o f the Ncwala and the country,
untroubled by constitutional crises or rivals to the k i n g , retained
its cohesiveness for longer than most other areas. B u t the
conservatism o f the k i n g and his elderly councillors created
strains in the years after the Second W o r l d W a r , w h e n y o u n g e r
more educated men and w o m e n s o u g h t to modernise the social
structure and to create a more democratically g o v e r n e d society.
Basutoland
Entirely surrounded by South Africa, the small mountain k i n g d o m

ruled, under Britain, b y M o s h w e s h w e ' s heirs had almost nothing
which it could sell to the outside w o r l d except labour. In years
g o n e by the S o t h o had adapted quickly and efficiently to the
opportunities presented by the o p e n i n g u p o f the markets around
the diamond and g o l d mines. E v e n after the fertile plains along
the west bank o f the Caledon R i v e r had been lost to the
conquering white settlers in the O r a n g e Free State they had g r o w n
and exported large surpluses o f grain. H o w e v e r , b y the end o f
the First W o r l d W a r , as a result o f population pressure c o m b i n e d
with the destructive effects o f the widespread migrant labour
system, Basutoland produced only just e n o u g h for its people to
eat. T h i s state o f affairs continued until the great d r o u g h t at the
beginning o f the 1930s, after w h i c h time the country became a
steadily increasing net importer o f grain. O v e r the 25 years from
1936 to 1961, the number o f men engaged for w o r k o n the mines
from Basutoland and the O r a n g e Free State rose b y two-thirds
from 46000 t o 69000. O v e r the same period the n u m b e r o f paid
299

SOUTHERN AFRICA
jobs within Basutoland remained a fraction o f those held in South

Africa.
Despite the internal p o v e r t y and lack o f e m p l o y m e n t oppor
tunities, Basutoland had a well-established infrastructure o f edu
cation and one o f the highest literacy rates in Africa. In 1945 the
R o m a n Catholic Pius X I I C o l l e g e was established where students
could take degrees o f the University o f South Africa as could
blacks in the U n i o n . In politics t o o there w a s a great deal o f
activity. In 1952 the Basutoland C o n g r e s s Party, closely modelled
on South Africa's A N C , was founded by Ntsu M o k h e h l e . A n d
in 1958 C h i e f Leabua Jonathan, later to be first prime minister
o f the independent L e s o t h o , established the Basutoland National
Party w i t h support from the s o m e w h a t surprising combination
o f R o m a n Catholics and the g o v e r n m e n t o f South Africa. It was
supported also by the queen regent in her attempts to retain
p o w e r after the y o u n g k i n g came o f age. Utterly dependent
t h o u g h it w a s o n the S o u t h African e c o n o m y , Basutoland by the
end o f the 1950s w a s being g r o o m e d , like Bechuanaland and
Swaziland, for political independence.
South Africa was loath to accept this fact. J. G . Strijdom, w h o
succeeded Malan as prime minister in 1954, was so anxious to
achieve incorporation that he, the arch-republican, was willing to
postpone a Republic if that w o u l d reduce opposition to transfer
o f the H i g h C o m m i s s i o n territories. But he died in 1958 without
achieving either o f his t w o goals. Paradoxically, it w a s the very
failure o f S o u t h Africa to achieve incorporation that enabled
Strijdom's successor, V e r w o e r d , to play his master-stroke. Re
cognising that South Africa w o u l d have to live with the three
territories as politically independent neighbours, V e r w o e r d
turned this defeat into the springboard o f a n e w strategy. G i v e n
that the three areas w e r e dependent both for jobs and g o o d s o n
a n e i g h b o u r i n g country w h o s e e c o n o m i c and military strength
relative to theirs w a s o v e r w h e l m i n g , there was n o w a y in w h i c h
their political independence could pose an effective threat to white
control in S o u t h Africa itself. Indeed as V e r w o e r d saw, there were
positive advantages in not incorporating the H i g h C o m m i s s i o n
territories. For, as citizens o f independent countries, the people
living there w o u l d exert far less pressure to change South African
society than if they were constitutionally part o f it. M o r e o v e r
South Africa w o u l d have international law and practice behind
300

her in preventing them, as foreigners, from playing any role in

her internal affairs. S o despite one last appeal for incorporation
in 1 9 6 3 , South Africa b e g a n to m o v e t o w a r d s a policy not o n l y
o f w e l c o m i n g the territories' c o m i n g independence but also o f
carving out and granting political independence to those parts o f
South Africa w h i c h , historically, had b e c o m e labour reserves. T h e
boundaries o f the nation state w e r e to be used to reinforce the
barriers o f language, c o l o u r and urbanisation. Blacks w e r e to be
further excluded by declaring them foreigners. W i t h o u t w a v e r i n g
from the g o a l o f maintaining c o n t r o l o f the c o r e o f the e c o n o m y ,
white South Africa's strategy gradually c h a n g e d d u r i n g the 1 9 5 0 s
1
and early 1 9 6 0 s from incorporation to a policy o f dispossession.
M A I N T A I N I N G T H E W H I T E R E P U B L I C , I961-76
There were t w o sides to the coin w i t h w h i c h the S o u t h African

government s o u g h t to buy prosperity and security inside the
laager o f an all-white Republic. O n e was the migrant labour
system, the other was the Bantustan policy. B o t h had deep historic
roots. O n e was modelled almost entirely o n the pattern w h i c h the
gold-mining industry had e v o l v e d for itself o v e r t w o generations
before 1 9 4 8 . T h e other g r e w o u t o f the nineteenth-century
policies o f Sir T h e o p h i l u s Shepstone and the L a n d A c t o f 1 9 1 3 .
T h e Natives (Urban Areas) A c t , as amended in 1 9 5 2 , had made
the permanent urbanisation o f black w o r k e r s and their families
more difficult but not impossible. H o w e v e r , g o v e r n m e n t policy
was aimed not only at s l o w i n g d o w n b u t also at halting and
ultimately at reversing the flow o f black people t o the cities. In
1968 labour regulations were p r o m u l g a t e d w h i c h prohibited n e w
workers from c o m i n g from the rural areas unless they had entered
into a contract w h i c h had t o be r e n e w e d annually back in the
reserves. T h i s break effectively nullified section i o ( i ) ( b ) o f the
Natives (Urban Areas) A c t w h i c h had made it possible for
w o r k e r s to acquire residence rights for themselves and their
families in t o w n . T h e consequences o f this policy b e c a m e m o s t
clearly visible in the western C a p e w h e r e , in 1 9 6 6 , employers w e r e
instructed that henceforth they must reduce the n u m b e r o f
Africans o n their payrolls by 5 per cent per annum. A n immediate
1
For further analysis see SAIRR, Towards economic and politicaljustice in South Africa
(Johannesburg, 1980).
301

SOUTHERN AFRICA
consequence was the w i n d i n g d o w n o f the local authorities'

housing programmes to the point where, for some years after
1972, not one house was built for occupation by an African family.
M e a n w h i l e another g o a l o f g o v e r n m e n t policy, the foster
ing o f e c o n o m i c g r o w t h , was assiduously pursued. Thousands
o f jobs were created during these b o o m years as new d o c k s ,
roads, and buildings were constructed. Cape T o w n itself could
not p r o v i d e e n o u g h labour so, naturally, more workers were
pulled off the land. But the Africans w h o were drawn in were not
supposed to be there. E m p l o y e r s were permitted to erect only
' t e m p o r a r y ' accommodation, w h i c h they did in the form o f damp,
w i n d y , cold barns unfit for human occupation. T h e occupants
referred to them a s ' stables'. But the demand for labour continued
to expand, not least in state sectors such as the railways and
harbours, where between 1968 and 1974 the number o f African
w o r k e r s more than quadrupled from 1400 to o v e r 6000 men. By
1977, despite recession in the building industry where large
numbers o f migrants had been employed, the number o f contract
w o r k e r s in C a p e T o w n w a s approximately d o u b l e w h a t it had
been in 1968. S o m e w h a t more solid structures were built to house
w o r k e r s as time w e n t o n but, like the ' t e m p o r a r y ' barns (still
being used a decade later), they were designed for men only,
without their families. T h u s by 1976 the male:female ratio o f
Africans in C a p e T o w n w a s , according to official statistics, almost
3 : 1 . In L a n g a , a township where the heaviest concentration o f
migrants was housed, the proportion o f men to w o m e n was o v e r
1 2 : 1 . T h e shortage o f normal family housing both for the natural
population g r o w t h o f the 10000 African families w h o had
acquired residence rights in C a p e T o w n during earlier years, and
also for more recent migrants from the country, was such that
many people had n o alternative but to build corrugated iron
shanties for themselves w h e r e v e r they could find some unused
g r o u n d near the city. Concentrations o f African squatter c o m
munities m u s h r o o m e d , particularly after 1975, w h e n the scattered
dwellings w e r e b r o u g h t together in t w o major areas. O n e o f these,
M o d d e r d a m - W e k g e n o t - U n i b e l , where 25000 people lived, was
destroyed by the g o v e r n m e n t ' s bulldozers o v e r six months
beginning in the cold w e t winter o f 1977. T h e other, Crossroads,
was continually threatened w i t h demolition t h o u g h later, after a
unique combination o f grass-roots resistance and international
302

M A I N T A I N I N G T H E W H I T E R E P U B L I C
pressure, reprieved. D e s p i t e e v i d e n c e o f viable, well-organised

c o m m u n i t i e s , a n d d e s p i t e t h e fact t h a t , at U n i b e l , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e
a v e r a g e h o u s e h o l d h e a d h a d b e e n in C a p e T o w n f o r o v e r 1 1 y e a r s
a n d his s p o u s e f o r m o r e t h a n five y e a r s , official p o l i c y w a s c l e a r .
W i t h the special e x c e p t i o n o f C r o s s r o a d s residents, w i v e s and
c h i l d r e n i l l e g a l l y in C a p e T o w n m u s t r e t u r n t o t h e ' h o m e l a n d s '.
M e n w i t h jobs had to g o back to the labour c o m p o u n d s ; those
w h o h a d l o s t t h e i r j o b s in t h e r e c e s s i o n o r w h o w o r k e d i n t h e
informal sector w e r e required to leave the city and return to the
reserves w h e r e there w a s virtually n o prospect o f w o r k . A b o v e
all, r e s t r i c t i o n s w e r e t i g h t e n e d t o m a k e it m o r e d i f f i c u l t f o r p e o p l e
in t h e r u r a l areas t o m o v e i n t o t h e c i t y , e i t h e r t o l o o k f o r w o r k
or to join their h u s b a n d s and fathers.
N o t o n l y in C a p e T o w n b u t e v e n m o r e s o i n t h e i n d u s t r i a l
c o n c e n t r a t i o n in t h e s o u t h e r n T r a n s v a a l as w e l l as i n D u r b a n , P o r t
E l i z a b e t h and other t o w n s , the d e c a d e b e g i n n i n g in the m i d - 1 9 6 0 s
w i t n e s s e d an u n p r e c e d e n t e d e x p a n s i o n o f single-sex barracks i n t o
w h i c h the w o r k e r s o f the c o u n t r y ' s e c o n o m i c miracle w e r e
d i r e c t e d as t h e m i g r a n t l a b o u r s y s t e m b e c a m e y e t m o r e firmly
e m b e d d e d as t h e c e n t r e - p i e c e o f a p a r t h e i d ' s p o l i t i c a l e c o n o m y .
P r e c i s e figures are difficult t o o b t a i n , b u t it w o u l d s e e m t h a t b y
t h e m i d - 1 9 7 0 s at l e a s t h a l f t h e b l a c k m e n l e g a l l y at w o r k i n t h e
u r b a n areas o f S o u t h A f r i c a w e r e h o u s e d o n a s i n g l e basis in
a c c o m m o d a t i o n m u c h o f w h i c h had been built within the past
decade.
B u t increasingly force had to be used to maintain the system.
T h e n u m b e r o f c a s e s s e n t f o r trial u n d e r t h e p a s s l a w s r o s e t o a p e a k
o f 6 7 0 300 in 1 9 6 8 . D e s p i t e t h e s u b s e q u e n t d o w n t u r n , t h e a v e r a g e
a n n u a l n u m b e r o f p r o s e c u t i o n s in t h e first h a l f o f t h e 1 9 7 0 s w a s
still e q u i v a l e n t t o m o r e t h a n o n e e v e r y m i n u t e o f t h e d a y a n d n i g h t
t h r o u g h o u t t h e y e a r . D u r i n g t h e t h i r t y y e a r s after t h e S e c o n d
W o r l d W a r , the total n u m b e r o f p r o s e c u t i o n s w a s m o r e than 1 1 . 7
m i l l i o n (table 6.12). D e s p i t e this m a s s i v e p o l i c e net, m a n y p e o p l e
m a n a g e d t o l i v e in t h e c i t i e s i l l e g a l l y , e i t h e r p a y i n g a fine o r
b r i b i n g the p o l i c e w h e n e v e r t h e y w e r e c a u g h t . O t h e r s l i v e d in the
v a s t shanty areas that m u s h r o o m e d in t h o s e f r a g m e n t s o f B a n -
tustans w i t h i n c o m m u t i n g r a n g e o f cities (often i n v o l v i n g l o n g
distances and arduous hours o f daily travel) but w h e r e urban
restrictions against h o u s i n g and families did n o t apply. In C a p e
T o w n , o v e r 1000 k i l o m e t r e s f r o m t h e n e a r e s t ' h o m e l a n d ' , t h e
303

T a b l e 6 . 1 2 . Pass Law prosecutions, 1921-7j.
Annual average
number of
contraventions
(in thousands)
1921-9 54.7
1930-9 110.8
1940-9 157.7
1950-9 318.7
1960-9 469.1
I970-5 541.5
Note: Until (and including) 1962 figures are for convictions, which are slightly
lower than prosecutions.
Source: Union statistics for fifty years, F.4; Annual reports of the Commissioner of
the South African police (Pretoria).
inexorable logic o f the policy led to the destruction o f hundreds

o f h o m e s b y b u l l d o z e r s . B y u s i n g p e o p l e as w o r k e r s , a r g u e d D r
V e r w o e r d , o n e did n o t thereby integrate them into one's society
any m o r e than o n e integrated the o x , the ass, and the tractor
w h i c h w e r e also instruments o f one's e c o n o m i c activity.
Parallel w i t h the expansion o f the m i g r a n t labour system w e n t
the u n f o l d i n g o f the Bantustan p o l i c y , that is, o f constituting the
Bantu homelands into self-governing o r even nominally 'inde
p e n d e n t ' territories. T h e P r o m o t i o n o f Bantu S e l f - G o v e r n m e n t
A c t (1959) w a s f o l l o w e d b y the establishment in 1963 o f the
T r a n s k e i L e g i s l a t i v e A s s e m b l y . T h i s r e p l a c e d t h e o l d Bunga,
w h i c h , w i t h a majority o f elected v o t i n g members, had for so l o n g
been the forum for Transkei political debate. T h e T L A had
r o u g h l y t h e s a m e a u t h o r i t y as a p r o v i n c i a l c o u n c i l , w i t h e x e c u t i v e
p o w e r o v e r s u c h m a t t e r s as r o a d s , e d u c a t i o n , a n d a g r i c u l t u r e , b u t
u n l i k e t h e Bunga t h e A s s e m b l y c a n n e v e r b e said t o h a v e b e e n
properly representative. N o t only w e r e elected m e m b e r s in a
m i n o r i t y u n t i l 1 9 7 6 b u t it w a s b o r n , a n d l i v e d its w h o l e life, u n d e r
the s h a d o w o f P r o c l a m a t i o n 4 0 0 . T h e s e e m e r g e n c y r e g u l a t i o n s
ensured that n o political gathering c o u l d take place w i t h o u t the
express permission o f a magistrate, and also e m p o w e r e d the
p o l i c e t o d e t a i n w i t h o u t trial. T h e c h i e f m i n i s t e r o f t h e T r a n s k e i
t h r o u g h o u t this p e r i o d w a s C h i e f K a i s e r M a t a n z i m a , m a n y o f
304

w h o s e political o p p o n e n t s w e r e arbitrarily arrested, notably o n

t h e e v e o f a v i t a l p r e - i n d e p e n d e n c e e l e c t i o n . I n at least o n e c a s e
the o r d e r t o detain s o m e b o d y for o b s t r u c t i n g t h e cause o f justice
was signed before the police even asked h i m any questions.
Side b y side w i t h the political d e v e l o p m e n t s , w h e r e b y ten
different ' h o m e l a n d s ' w e r e h e r d e d a l o n g t h e p a t h t o w a r d s c o n
s t i t u t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e , w e r e t h e s t e p s a i m e d first o f a l l at
reducing the m o v e m e n t o f Africans to the major cities, a n d
s e c o n d l y , at s t i m u l a t i n g s o m e e c o n o m i c g r o w t h w i t h i n t h e
e m b r y o states. I n its w h i t e p a p e r o n t h e r e p o r t o f t h e T o m l i n s o n
C o m m i s s i o n , w h i c h had been established to w o r k o u t the B a n -
tustan blueprint, the g o v e r n m e n t rejected the possibility o f
w h i t e - c o n t r o l l e d capital b e i n g invested w i t h i n the ' h o m e l a n d s ' .
T h e r e e m e r g e d instead the p o l i c y o f b o r d e r industries w h e r e b y ,
through the carrot o f tax railway-rating and other concessions,
and the stick o f the Physical P l a n n i n g A c t (1967) w h i c h e m p o w e r e d
the M i n i s t e r o f P l a n n i n g t o p r o h i b i t an increase in t h e n u m b e r
o f African e m p l o y e e s in a n y particular factory, steps w e r e taken
to direct industrial e x p a n s i o n o u t o f the existing urban areas t o
various decentralised g r o w t h points, m a n y o f t h e m situated o n
the b o r d e r s o f the reserves. T h e e v i d e n c e s u g g e s t s that t h e p o l i c y
o f industrial decentralisation w a s n o t particularly successful in
s t i m u l a t i n g e i t h e r b o r d e r i n d u s t r i e s o r , after t h e p r o h i b i t i o n o n
w h i t e capital in b l a c k areas h a d b e e n d r o p p e d , r e g i o n a l e c o n o m i c
g r o w t h within the homelands. Indeed more jobs seem to have
been destroyed b y the application o f the p l a n n i n g legislation than
1
w e r e created in the d e s i g n a t e d g r o w t h p o i n t s .
T h e t r u t h w a s t h a t t h o s e areas d e s i g n a t e d as B a n t u s t a n s h a d
l o n g since b e c o m e labour reserves o n the periphery of, b u t w i t h
s t r o n g s y m b i o t i c ties t o , t h e c e n t r a l c o r e o f t h e S o u t h A f r i c a n
e c o n o m y . T h u s in the Transkei, for example, the n u m b e r o f
m i g r a n t s in the five years prior t o i n d e p e n d e n c e d o u b l e d f r o m
191 600 i n 1 9 7 1 t o 3 7 7 8 0 0 i n 1 9 7 6 . B y t h i s t i m e n o less t h a n s i x
out o f every seven Transkeians earning a cash income were d o i n g
so in j o b s outside t h e territory, n o t a b l y o n t h e W i t w a t e r s r a n d a n d
i n t h e w e s t e r n C a p e . F u r t h e r m o r e , a t least h a l f t h e A f r i c a n
p o p u l a t i o n o f the R e p u b l i c d i d n o t h a v e e v e n that t e n u o u s link
w i t h the Bantustans. B y the 1970s the p r o p o r t i o n s o f A f r i c a n s
1
K e i t h Gottschalk, 'Industrial decentralisation: j o b s a n d w a g e s ' , South African
Labour Bulletin, 1977, 3, 5.
3°5

l i v i n g p e r m a n e n t l y o n t h e w h i t e - o w n e d f a r m s a n d in t h e t o w n s
w e r e o f the order o f one-quarter and one-third respectively. T h o s e
l i v i n g o n f a r m s w e r e in a p a r t i c u l a r l y difficult s i t u a t i o n , f o r t h e
combination o f population g r o w t h with changing techniques o f
agricultural p r o d u c t i o n w a s p u s h i n g p e o p l e off the land. M o v i n g
directly to t o w n w a s illegal, so m a n y families w e n t to the densely
p o p u l a t e d rural g h e t t o e s w h i c h m u s h r o o m e d in the ' h o m e l a n d s ' .
T h e r e w i v e s a n d c h i l d r e n h a d t o b e left w h i l s t t h e m e n w e n t o f f
t o t o w n as m i g r a n t w o r k e r s .
N o t e v e r y b o d y m o v e d s i m p l y b e c a u s e o f t h e d e c l i n e in a g r i
c u l t u r a l e m p l o y m e n t (see t a b l e 6 . 5 ) . It is e s t i m a t e d t h a t b e t w e e n
i960 and 1970 approximately half a million p e o p l e w e r e either
e n d o r s e d o u t o f t o w n s o r c o m p e l l e d t o m o v e f r o m r u r a l areas
(called ' b l a c k s p o t s ' ) w h e r e the presence o f Africans w a s c o n
sidered undesirable b y politicians and civil servants w i s h i n g to
' c o n s o l i d a t e the h o m e l a n d s ' . A n o t h e r million o r m o r e w e r e
m o v e d o f f w h i t e - o w n e d f a r m s w h e r e t h e y l i v e d as t e n a n t s o f o n e
s o r t o r a n o t h e r p a y i n g t h e i r r e n t e i t h e r i n c a s h o r , f r e q u e n t l y , in
labour. T h e s e r e m o v a l s created m u c h hardship and bitterness,
particularly a m o n g s t those w h o w e r e m o v e d to densely populated
rural resettlement areas w h e r e there w a s n o agricultural land and
w h e r e people w e r e miles from any e m p l o y m e n t opportunities.
A f r i c a n s , w h e t h e r t h e y l i v e d in the o l d r e s e r v e s o r n o t , w e r e
declared to be citizens o f o n e o f the ' h o m e l a n d s ' . T h i s meant that
as e a c h B a n t u s t a n b e c a m e i n d e p e n d e n t , s t a r t i n g w i t h t h e T r a n s k e i
in 1 9 7 6 , l a r g e n u m b e r s o f b l a c k s w e r e f o r m a l l y d e p r i v e d o f t h e i r
S o u t h A f r i c a n c i t i z e n s h i p . T h e l o g i c a l e n d o f t h e p o l i c y , as
g o v e r n m e n t s p o k e s m e n p r o c l a i m e d in the m i d - 1 9 7 0 s , w a s a
R e p u b l i c o f S o u t h A f r i c a i n w h i c h all A f r i c a n i n h a b i t a n t s h a d
been transformed into foreigners.
It is p o s s i b l e t o i n t e r p r e t t h e p o l i c y o f a p a r t h e i d n o t s o m u c h
as o n e w h i c h d i v i d e s b l a c k f r o m w h i t e , o r e v e n b l a c k f r o m
b l a c k , a l t h o u g h it d o e s b o t h t h e s e t h i n g s in full m e a s u r e , b u t
as o n e w h i c h d i v i d e s t h e b l a c k m a n i n h a l f : h e is a l a b o u r u n i t
for the benefit a n d c o m f o r t o f w h i t e p e o p l e in t o w n s and o n farms,
and a h u m a n b e i n g w i t h his civic and political rights and, for
m a n y , e v e n his family rights restricted to the rural B a n t u s t a n s .
B e h i n d all t h e r h e t o r i c o f a c o n s t e l l a t i o n o f s t a t e s , a c o m m o n w e a l t h
o f n a t i o n s i n s o u t h e r n A f r i c a , e a c h w i t h its o w n ' h o m e l a n d ' , l a y
the harsh reality o f a single e c o n o m y built o n the a s s u m p t i o n that
f o u r - f i f t h s o f t h o s e w h o w o r k e d in a n d d r e w t h e i r s u s t e n a n c e f r o m
306

it w e r e n o m o r e t h a n l a b o u r u n i t s a n d h a d n o r i g h t t o b e t h e r e
in a n y o t h e r c a p a c i t y . S u c h w a s t h e f u n d a m e n t a l flaw i n t h e g r a n d
design o f apartheid a n d such w a s the basic reason for black
r e s i s t a n c e t o it.
Despite a p r o u d tradition o f judicial independence against arbi

t r a r y state p o w e r , t h e l a w i n S o u t h A f r i c a h a d , as h a s b e e n
c o n v i n c i n g l y a r g u e d , a l s o l o n g s e r v e d as a n i n s t r u m e n t o f p o l i t i c a l
1
d o m i n a t i o n . Pass laws, for e x a m p l e , d i d n o t apply t o w h i t e s , b u t
f o r A f r i c a n s t h e y w e r e a c a u s e o f p o l i c e h a r a s s m e n t a n d , as h a s
been s h o w n , arrests o n a m a s s i v e scale. O n e significant d e v e l o p
ment w a s that the l a w b e c a m e increasingly d e t e r m i n e d b y
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e fiat. N o w h e r e w a s this m o r e e v i d e n t t h a n i n
legislation regarding w h e r e Africans m i g h t w o r k and w h a t jobs
2
they might perform. Proclamations and departmental circulars,
w h i c h had never been debated in parliament, acquired the force
of law. This g r o w t h o f executive p o w e r , w h i c h bypassed both
parliament and the courts and w a s n o t matched b y a n y significant
a t t e m p t s t o i m p o s e e f f e c t i v e c h e c k s a g a i n s t its a b u s e , s p r a n g n o t
only from determination t o redesign the society in a c c o r d a n c e
with ideological blueprints b u t also from the necessity o f dealing
with increasing resistance t o the policies b e i n g i m p o s e d o n blacks
by means o f the state's l e g a l - a d m i n i s t r a t i v e m a c h i n e r y .
S o m e t i m e s executive action w a s aimed against leaders a n d
organisers, s o m e t i m e s against writers a n d their ideas, thus re
d u c i n g t h e flow o f i n f o r m a t i o n a n d i d e a s . B l a c k s d i d n o t n e e d
P e t e r A b r a h a m s , A l e x la G u m a , E z e k i e l M p h a h l e l e , o r t h e y o u n g
p o e t s o f t h e 1 9 7 0 s t o tell t h e m w h a t life w a s l i k e i n t h e t o w n s h i p s ,
a l t h o u g h they d i d need t h e m for their o w n self-awareness a n d
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e p a s t . B u t w h i t e s d i d n o t k n o w e v e n t h e facts
and became increasingly ignorant o f w h a t w a s h a p p e n i n g in their
o w n country. Indeed, n o t o n l y readers o f b o o k s b u t television
v i e w e r s in L o n d o n o r N e w Y o r k o f t e n s a w a n d h e a r d m o r e o f
life w i t h i n S o w e t o o r L a n g a t h a n d i d w h i t e s l i v i n g n e x t d o o r i n
Johannesburg o r Cape T o w n . A n d so, o v e r the years, the white
electorate w a s led into an intellectual darkness that w a s t o leave
it g r a s p i n g f o r a r e a l i t y it c o u l d n o t s e e .
T h e d e n i a l o f habeas corpus i n s e v e r a l different Acts passed
1
A l b i e S a c h s , Justice in South Africa ( B e r k e l e y , 1973).
2
G . M . B u d l e n d e r , ' A d m i n i s t r a t i v e r u l e o f A f r i c a n w o r k e r s * , Kesponsa Meridiana,
1975, 3>
307

b e t w e e n 1963 a n d 1 9 7 6 e m p o w e r e d t h e p o l i c e t o d e t a i n p e o p l e
w i t h o u t being o b l i g e d to bring them before any court, or to grant
t h e m access to a l a w y e r , or e v e n to inform their families w h e r e
they w e r e . P e o p l e vanished from a n y t h i n g b e t w e e n a few days to
p e r i o d s o f o v e r a y e a r w i t h o u t a n y c h a r g e h a v i n g b e e n laid a g a i n s t
them. Often, t h o u g h not always, detention w a s used to extract
information. Disturbing reports, some g i v e n on oath, began to
e m e r g e a s s e r t i n g t h e w i d e s p r e a d u s e o f t o r t u r e in N a m i b i a as w e l l
1
as in S o u t h A f r i c a . I n 1963 M r L . N g u d l e d i e d after h a v i n g b e e n
detained under the General Laws Amendment Act. He was
alleged t o h a v e h a n g e d himself. F r o m this time until the death
in S e p t e m b e r 1 9 7 7 o f S t e v e B i k o , first p r e s i d e n t o f t h e South
African Students' O r g a n i s a t i o n and honorary president o f the
B l a c k P e o p l e ' s C o n v e n t i o n , at l e a s t 4 1 p e o p l e , d e t a i n e d w i t h o u t
any c h a r g e s h a v i n g b e e n b r o u g h t against t h e m , died in the h a n d s
o f the police.
B u t s o m e political o p p o n e n t s w e r e c h a r g e d and the courts w e r e
required to pronounce judgement on activities which in
d e m o c r a t i c societies w e r e part o f the n o r m a l process o f public
debate. In a p r e - d a w n r a i d in D e c e m b e r 1956, 156 respected
citizens w e r e arrested and c h a r g e d w i t h h i g h treason. T h e n u b o f
t h e s t a t e ' s c a s e w a s t h e F r e e d o m C h a r t e r , a d o c u m e n t in w h i c h
the A f r i c a n N a t i o n a l C o n g r e s s and others had s o u g h t to spell o u t
t h e i r p o l i t i c a l g o a l s a l o n g t h e l i n e s o f s o c i a l d e m o c r a t i c p a r t i e s in
t h e w e s t e r n w o r l d . T h e trial d r a g g e d o n f o r o v e r f o u r y e a r s u n t i l
the remaining defendants w e r e f o u n d not guilty and acquitted. B y
this t i m e h o w e v e r the A N C itself had b e e n b a n n e d a n d many
o f the t r e a s o n trialists w e r e s o o n t o find themselves similarly
attacked by decrees against w h i c h there w a s n o appeal to any
j u d g e . In 1967 the T e r r o r i s m A c t defined terrorism (retrospec
t i v e l y t o 1 9 6 2 ) s o w i d e l y t h a t , as t h e D e a n o f L a w at t h e U n i v e r s i t y
o f N a t a l p u t it, n o b o d y in S o u t h A f r i c a c o u l d e x i s t w i t h o u t d o i n g
s o m e t h i n g w h i c h , in t e r m s o f t h e A c t , c o u l d b e c o n s t r u e d as
2
terrorism. O n e o f t h e m o s t p u b l i c i s e d o f t h e m a n y trials t h a t t o o k
p l a c e in t e r m s o f t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n w a s t h a t o f n i n e y o u n g ' b l a c k
1
S A I n s t i t u t e o f R a c e R e l a t i o n s , Detention without trial in South Africa 1976-1977
( J o h a n n e s b u r g , 1977); T h e C h r i s t i a n I n s t i t u t e o f S o u t h e r n A f r i c a , Torture in South
Africa? ( C a p e T o w n , n . d . ) ; H . H u n k e a n d J. E l l i s , Torture: a cancer in our society
( W i n d h o e k , 1978); U n i t e d N a t i o n s , * M a l t r e a t m e n t a n d t o r t u r e o f p r i s o n e r s in S o u t h
A f r i c a ' , Report of the Special Committee on Apartheid ( N e w Y o r k , 1973).
2
A . S . M a t t h e w s , Law, order and liberty in South Africa ( C a p e T o w n , 1971).
308

c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' l e a d e r s w h o s e trial in P r e t o r i a f r o m 1 9 7 4 t o 1 9 7 6
o n a n u m b e r o f a l l - e m b r a c i n g c h a r g e s c u l m i n a t e d in t h e i r b e i n g
found guilty and sentenced to b e t w e e n 5 and 6 years imprisonment
on R o b b e n Island, w h e r e m a n y o f the older generation o f political
leaders w e r e already incarcerated.
A n o t h e r m e a s u r e o f s o c i a l s t r e s s , a l b e i t less d i r e c t l y p o l i t i c a l in
1
nature, w a s the astonishing n u m b e r o f murders, w h i c h rose f r o m
a n a v e r a g e o f s e v e n p e r d a y in i 9 6 0 t o t w e n t y p e r d a y in 1 9 7 7 .
O v e r this s a m e p e r i o d o f time well o v e r 1200 p e r s o n s were
e x e c u t e d , g i v i n g S o u t h A f r i c a t h e u n e n v i a b l e r e p u t a t i o n in t h e late
1960s o f b e i n g r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a l m o s t h a l f o f t h e l e g a l e x e c u t i o n s
2
in t h e w o r l d . A y e t m o r e s t r i k i n g m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f t h e rise o f
v i o l e n c e in t h e r e g i o n w a s t h e r a p i d i n c r e a s e in S o u t h Africa's
m i l i t a r y b u d g e t in r e s p o n s e t o t h e r i n g o f fire t h a t b e g a n t o s p r e a d
round h e r b o r d e r s in t h e m i d - 1 9 6 0 s as t h e v a r i o u s liberation
movements from Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia,
and from S o u t h Africa itself e m b a r k e d u p o n military, guerrilla,
campaigns.
T h e i n c r e a s e in r e s o u r c e s d e v o t e d t o d e f e n c e e n a b l e d South
Africa to build up considerable military strength capable of
dealing with any armies south o f the Sahara that w e r e not
reinforced b y military aid f r o m o u t s i d e the c o n t i n e n t . In t e r m s
o f m a n p o w e r the a r m e d forces w e r e e x p a n d e d b y means o f w h i t e
c o n s c r i p t i o n , f r o m j u s t u n d e r 1 0 0 0 0 m e n in 1 9 6 1 t o 1 1 0 0 0 0 m e n
in 1 9 7 4 . I n l i n e w i t h i t s i n c r e a s i n g i m p o r t a n c e , the p e r i o d of
citizen-force training g r e w f r o m three m o n t h s in 1961 t o an initial
p e r i o d o f t w o years p l u s c o n t i n u o u s training o f 19 d a y s a year for
ten years. In addition to the citizen and p e r m a n e n t forces there
w a s also the police, i n c l u d i n g the security police. T h e B u r e a u for
State Security was established in 1969 to co-ordinate and
c o m p l e m e n t police security and military intelligence. S u p p o r t i n g
all t h e s e w a s a h o m e - g u a r d o f 7 5 0 0 0 c o m m a n d o s o r g a n i s e d to
defend their residential and industrial areas in case o f civil
disorder.
T h e hardware necessary to equip these forces w a s acquired n o
less r a p i d l y . D e s p i t e a 1963 U n i t e d N a t i o n s r e s o l u t i o n c a l l i n g f o r
an a r m s e m b a r g o a g a i n s t S o u t h A f r i c a , t h e R e p u b l i c w a s a b l e , b y
1
B u t s e e F r a n t z F a n o n , The wretched of the earth ( N e w Y o r k , 1963) f o r i n s i g h t i n t o
the link b e t w e e n violence and a colonialist political structure.
2
J o h n D u g a r d , Human rights and the South African legal order ( P r i n c e t o n , 1978), 126.
309

shifting orders from Britain to France and elsewhere, o v e r the next

decade, to import a n d / o r to build up her o w n capacity to p r o d u c e
(often under licence) a w i d e range o f military e q u i p m e n t i n c l u d i n g
aircraft such as I m p a l a (the Italian Aermacchi MB326) and
M i r a g e s ( F r e n c h ) ; helicopters ( F r e n c h ) ; missiles, especially the
C a c t u s / C r o t a l e anti-aircraft system ( S A / F r e n c h ) ; radar defence
systems ( U K and West G e r m a n y ) ; herbicides, including t w o types
u s e d f o r m i l i t a r y p u r p o s e s i n V i e t n a m ( U S A ) ; as w e l l as a v a r i e t y
1
o f o t h e r e q u i p m e n t f r o m P o r t u g a l , Spain, Israel, and R u s s i a . By
the m i d - 1 9 7 0 s a b o u t a t h o u s a n d contractors and sub-contractors
w e r e a c t i v e l y e n g a g e d in the l o c a l a r m s industry a n d the c o u n t r y
was p r a c t i c a l l y s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t in t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f r o c k e t s , ar
m o u r e d cars, a m m u n i t i o n , b o m b s (including napalm), firearms
a n d m i n e s . R e s e r v e s o f o i l , e s t i m a t e d t o b e s u f f i c i e n t f o r five y e a r s ,
h a d b e e n b u i l t u p . I n 1 9 7 7 it w a s w i d e l y r e p o r t e d , t h o u g h firmly
denied b y the g o v e r n m e n t , that S o u t h Africa w a s b u i l d i n g a
n u c l e a r t e s t i n g site in t h e K a l a h a r i D e s e r t . I n s h o r t , b y t h e t i m e
o f the m a n d a t o r y arms e m b a r g o i m p o s e d b y the U n i t e d N a t i o n s
i n N o v e m b e r 1 9 7 7 , S o u t h A f r i c a w a s far m o r e p r e p a r e d f o r w a r
than she had b e e n in S e p t e m b e r 1 9 3 9 . Politically h o w e v e r , despite
t h e e x t e n t o f h e l p f r o m t h e w e s t i n p r o v i d i n g a r m s , s h e w a s far
m o r e isolated.
THE S T R U G G L E F O R L I B E R A T I O N , 1961-77
R e s i s t a n c e in S o u t h A f r i c a after i 9 6 0 w a s i n e x t r i c a b l y l i n k e d w i t h
t h e w i d e r e v e n t s o f d e c o l o n i s a t i o n as t h e y u n f o l d e d f r o m G h a n a ' s
i n d e p e n d e n c e in 1957 t o the c o l l a p s e o f the P o r t u g u e s e empire
in t h e m i d - 1 9 7 0 s . B u t t h e S o u t h A f r i c a n s t r u g g l e w a s n o t t h e s a m e
as t h a t i n c o u n t r i e s s e e k i n g t o f r e e t h e m s e l v e s f r o m c o n t r o l b y
a d i s t a n t m e t r o p o l i t a n p o w e r . It w a s a n a l t o g e t h e r t o u g h e r , m o r e
p r o l o n g e d , a n d m o r e d i f f i c u l t b a t t l e b e t w e e n p e o p l e all o f w h o m
w e r e firmly r o o t e d in a c o u n t r y w h o s e r u l e r s h a d at t h e i r d i s p o s a l
the t e c h n o l o g y and organisation w h i c h m a k e s m o d e r n authori
tarianism possible. S u c h a situation led to the e v o l u t i o n o f a
n u m b e r o f different, and s o m e t i m e s c o m p e t i n g , strategies.
1
A n t h o n y S a m p s o n , The arms bazaar ( S e v e n o a k s , 1978), 1 6 7 - 8 ; S i g n e L a n d g r e n -
B a c k s t r o m , Southern Africa: the escalation of a conflict ( S t o c k h o l m I n t e r n a t i o n a l P e a c e
R e s e a r c h I n s t i t u t e , S t o c k h o l m , 1976).
310

T H E S T R U G G L E FOR L I B E R A T I O N
D u r i n g 1 9 6 1 , w i t h i n a y e a r after t h e t w o A f r i c a n C o n g r e s s e s h a d
b e e n b a n n e d , n o less t h a n f o u r d i f f e r e n t u n d e r g r o u n d r e s i s t a n c e
g r o u p s e m e r g e d . U m k h o n t o w e S i z w e (Spear o f the N a t i o n ) led
by N e l s o n Mandela, w h o had been T r a n s v a a l leader o f the A N C ,
was formed w i t h the aim o f b r i n g i n g a b o u t political c h a n g e b y
means o f selective s a b o t a g e against specific installations and
buildings. Similarly P o q o ( A l o n e ) w h i c h had tenuous links w i t h
1
the P A C , the Y u i C h u i C h a n C l u b ( w h i c h g r e w into the N a t i o n a l
Liberation Front), c o m p o s e d mainly o f y o u n g black intellectuals
w h o had b r o k e n a w a y from the U n i t y m o v e m e n t , and the African
Resistance M o v e m e n t made up largely o f y o u n g whites, began to
plan and, in s o m e cases t o e x e c u t e , militant f o r m s o f resistance.
B e t w e e n D e c e m b e r 1961 and the end o f 1964 there w e r e m o r e than
200 a c t s o f s a b o t a g e o r a t t e m p t e d s a b o t a g e p r i m a r i l y a g a i n s t s t a t e
property, i n c l u d i n g police stations and railway lines. B u t the
s e c u r i t y p o l i c e w e r e w e l l o r g a n i s e d , a n d v i r t u a l l y all u n d e r g r o u n d
activity d u r i n g this p e r i o d s e e m s t o h a v e b e e n u n e a r t h e d a n d
c r u s h e d i n a s e r i e s o f a r r e s t s a n d trials i n c l u d i n g t h a t o f t h e
U m k h o n t o h i g h c o m m a n d captured o n a farm, Rivonia, outside
J o h a n n e s b u r g in 1963. T h e m a j o r i t y o f t h o s e jailed o r h a n g e d for
their u n d e r g r o u n d political activities w e r e o f c o u r s e b l a c k , b u t
resistance w a s b y n o m e a n s confined to any o n e g r o u p . N g u n i
lawyers; Afrikaans poets; Sotho journalists; English-speaking
h o u s e w i v e s ; Marxists and Christians; Muslims and J e w s ; milkmen
a n d e n g i n e e r s ; all m a n n e r o f S o u t h A f r i c a n s a n d N a m i b i a n s
became c a u g h t up in d a n g e r o u s u n d e r g r o u n d w o r k .
Others w e n t into exile and from there began military training.
I n A u g u s t 1 9 6 6 t h e first m a j o r a r m e d c o n f l i c t s o u t h o f t h e
Z a m b e z i since the w a r s o f dispossession had e n d e d t w o gener
ations previously t o o k place w h e n S W A P O guerrillas clashed w i t h
S o u t h A f r i c a n forces in n o r t h e r n N a m i b i a . E x a c t l y a y e a r later a
combined A N C / Z A P U ( Z i m b a b w e African People's Union) force
f o u g h t R h o d e s i a n t r o o p s in a series o f e n g a g e m e n t s in the W a n k i e
area. T h e i n s u r g e n t s w e r e d e f e a t e d a n d t h e A N C / Z A P U a l l i a n c e
w a s heavily criticised by b o t h Z A N U ( Z i m b a b w e African National
U n i o n ) a n d t h e P A C o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t it w o u l d d r a w S o u t h
1
N a m e d after t h e h e a d o f C h i n a ' s t r a d e - u n i o n o r g a n i s a t i o n , w h o l e d t h e P e k i n g
d e l e g a t i o n t o t h e A f r o - A s i a n S o l i d a r i t y C o n f e r e n c e h e l d i n T a n g a n y i k a , F e b r u a r y 1963.
311

A f r i c a n t r o o p s i n t o R h o d e s i a a n d t h a t it w a s b a d g u e r r i l l a t a c t i c s
t o t r y a n d g o b b l e u p a r e g u l a r a r m y . I n t h e e v e n t t h e f a i l u r e , after
t w o m o r e s i m i l a r a t t e m p t s e a r l y i n 1968 a n d 1970, to infiltrate
S o u t h Africa via R h o d e s i a caused the A N C to turn to other
m e t h o d s until the v i c t o r y o f F R E L I M O in M o z a m b i q u e o p e n e d
a shorter o v e r l a n d r o u t e v i a S w a z i l a n d into S o u t h Africa. B y 1978
it w a s e s t i m a t e d that s o m e 4000 b l a c k South Africans were
1
u n d e r g o i n g military training outside the c o u n t r y .
C l o s e l y allied w i t h the resort to arms and the escalating guerrilla
w a r w a s active international d i p l o m a c y . T h e A N C and the P A C
e s t a b l i s h e d offices i n d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s i n c l u d i n g Z a m b i a , T a n
zania, A l g e r i a , India, G r e a t Britain and the U S A and, later in
A n g o l a and M o z a m b i q u e . D i p l o m a t i c links were also established
w i t h other countries including Russia, China, and Nigeria, while
the A N C in particular m a d e sure that there w a s a r e g u l a r S o u t h
A f r i c a n a n t i - a p a r t h e i d p r e s e n c e at t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s a n d m e e t
i n g s o f the O A U . A l l this did m u c h to m o b i l i s e w o r l d o p i n i o n
against apartheid. In Africa the commitment to end white
m i n o r i t y rule in the s o u t h w a s spelt o u t clearly in the Lusaka
M a n i f e s t o ( 1 9 6 9 ) w h i c h , w h i l s t u n c o m p r o m i s i n g i n its a t t a c k o n
racism, nevertheless laid the basis for p o s s i b l e future n e g o t i a t i o n .
Another important point o f pressure w a s the c a m p a i g n or
ganised, largely f r o m outside the c o u n t r y , b y the S o u t h A f r i c a n
Non-Racial O l y m p i c Committee (Sanroc) to boycott segregated
sports teams representing the country abroad. A l l players and
administrators w e r e a n x i o u s to g e t back into the international
arena but there w a s s o m e division b e t w e e n those w h o believed
they should push ahead with integrating previously all-white
c l u b s a n d l e a g u e s w h i l s t l e a v i n g t h e res't o f t h e s o c i e t y t o c a t c h
u p i n its o w n t i m e , a n d t h o s e w h o , a r g u i n g t h a t * Y o u c a n n o t p l a y
normal s p o r t in a n a b n o r m a l society', w a n t e d the b o y c o t t to
remain until apartheid had been dismantled.
A m o n g s t those w h o believed that violent r e v o l u t i o n w a s not
possible g i v e n the military strength and determination o f whites
w e r e s o m e w h o a r g u e d t h a t it w a s n e c e s s a r y t o m a k e u s e o f s u c h
p l a t f o r m s as w e r e a v a i l a b l e w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f a p a r t h e i d i n
order to w o r k to c h a n g e that structure. Thus, Chief Gatsha
Buthelezi, a former m e m b e r o f the A N C y o u t h league, used the
p r o t e c t i o n a f f o r d e d b y h i s p o s i t i o n as c h i e f e x e c u t i v e c o u n c i l l o r
1
Financial Mail, n A u g u s t 1978.
312

T H E S T R U G G L E F O R L I B E R A T I O N
o f the K w a z u l u L e g i s l a t i v e A u t h o r i t y t o speak o u t o n political

i s s u e s in t h e late 1960s as n o b l a c k p o l i t i c i a n h a d d o n e s i n c e t h e
b a n n i n g o f the A f r i c a n C o n g r e s s e s . F u r t h e r m o r e , he built u p an
organised and independent political base w h i c h extended b e y o n d
t h e b o u n d a r i e s o f K w a z u l u . H e s o u g h t t o shift t h e f o c u s o f a c t i o n
a w a y from the Bantustan structure to a b r o a d e r cultural
movement, Inkhatha, which though Zulu-dominated was not, he
insisted, an ethnic o r g a n i s a t i o n . In 1 9 7 7 the minister o f p o l i c e
w a r n e d t h a t h e w o u l d t a k e s t e p s t o b a n I n k h a t h a i f it o p e n e d
its d o o r s t o n o n - Z u l u m e m b e r s , b u t B u t h e l e z i r e f u s e d t o c o m
ply. N e v e r t h e l e s s the c h i e f w a s w i d e l y criticised, particularly b y
y o u n g e r blacks w h o a r g u e d that his strategy s e r v e d m o r e t o
legitimise the policy o f apartheid than to p r o v i d e a fulcrum o n
w h i c h t o l e v e r t h e g o v e r n m e n t a w a y f r o m its c h o s e n p a t h . M a n y
feared the g r o w t h o f an e x c l u s i v e and d e s t r u c t i v e Z u l u
n a t i o n a l i s m . B u t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f I n k h a t h a e m e r g i n g as a
p o w e r f u l vehicle o f black resistance remained.
A similar strategy, t h o u g h l a c k i n g B u t h e l e z i ' s political skill,
w a s f o l l o w e d b y t h e L a b o u r P a r t y f o u n d e d in 1 9 6 6 t o fight f o r
t h o s e seats o n t h e C o l o u r e d P e r s o n s R e p r e s e n t a t i v e C o u n c i l (set
u p b y the g o v e r n m e n t to replace direct representation in
parliament) w h i c h w e r e n o t n o m i n a t e d b y the state president. T h i s
s t r a t e g y , r e j e c t e d 20 y e a r s p r e v i o u s l y b y A f r i c a n s w h e n t h e y
w i t h d r e w f r o m the N a t i v e R e p r e s e n t a t i v e C o u n c i l , w a s v e
h e m e n t l y o p p o s e d , particularly in the w e s t e r n C a p e , w h e r e the
p o l i t i c a l d e s c e n d a n t s o f t h e U n i t y m o v e m e n t still h a d c o n s i d e r a b l e
i n f l u e n c e . F o l l o w i n g T a b a t a a n d o t h e r s , t h e y m a i n t a i n e d t h a t all
institutions created b y the g o v e r n m e n t w e r e essentially established
t o s i d e - t r a c k p e o p l e f r o m t h e real a r e n a w h e r e t h e s t r u g g l e f o r
p o w e r h a d t o b e w a g e d . W h e n , in 1 9 7 6 , t h e g o v e r n m e n t r e j e c t e d
t h e m a j o r findings o f t h e T h e r o n C o m m i s s i o n , i n c l u d i n g o n e t o
t h e effect t h a t ' C o l o u r e d ' p e o p l e s h o u l d o b t a i n d i r e c t p o l i t i c a l
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in t h e c e n t r a l p a r l i a m e n t , t h e s t a n d i n g o f t h e C R C
fell t o a n a l l - t i m e l o w .
A f t e r the S u p p r e s s i o n o f C o m m u n i s m A c t had been used to
m o w d o w n w h o l e ranks o f trade-union leadership by the simple
p r o c e s s o f b a n n i n g t h e m , the l a b o u r m o v e m e n t w a s fairly q u i e t
for m o s t o f the 1960s. B u t early in 1973 a w a v e o f strikes w e l l e d
u p in D u r b a n a n d s w e p t t h r o u g h t h e c o u n t r y p u s h i n g u p w a g e s
in an u n p r e c e d e n t e d b o u t o f e m p l o y e r s e l f - e x a m i n a t i o n . T h e n , i n

S e p t e m b e r 1 9 7 3 , b e g a n t h e first o f t h e m a j o r c o m p o u n d con
frontations that w e r e to r o c k the m i n i n g industry. In the four years
u p t o S e p t e m b e r 1 9 7 7 s o m e 200 m e n w e r e k i l l e d a n d o v e r 1300
i n j u r e d i n a p p r o x i m a t e l y 78 d i f f e r e n t i n c i d e n t s c a u s e d in m i n e s
around the country b y a variety o f factors including wage
grievances, inadequate structure of communication, and the
1
migrant labour system. T h e r e had l o n g been instances o f such
disturbances but what was new w a s the frequency and the
intensity o f the confrontations w h i c h i n v o l v e d large n u m b e r s o f
miners.
D u r i n g this p e r i o d s o m e e m p l o y e r s , i n c l u d i n g major mining
m a g n a t e s led b y H a r r y O p p e n h e i m e r , indicated a w i l l i n g n e s s ,
w h i c h h a d n o t existed in p r e v i o u s l a b o u r crises, to c o n s i d e r the
prospect o f unionisation o f their black w o r k e r s . T h e g o v e r n m e n t
t o o felt c o m p e l l e d t o m o v e a n d , i n 1 9 7 3 , l e g i s l a t i o n w a s p a s s e d
to m a k e s o m e p r o v i s i o n for c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n w o r k e r s and
e m p l o y e r s . H o w e v e r , the liaison c o m m i t t e e s w h i c h the state
p r o m o t e d w e r e m u c h criticised by trade unionists o n the g r o u n d
that b y putting w o r k e r s and m a n a g e m e n t o n the same c o m m i t t e e
effective p o w e r w a s left i n t h e hands o f employers. Works
committees to w h i c h only w o r k e r s were elected made some form
o f b a r g a i n i n g possible, but they w e r e so constituted that w o r k e r s
w e r e k e p t in isolation f r o m the w i d e r t r a d e - u n i o n m o v e m e n t . N o
p r o v i s i o n w a s m a d e for full-time u n i o n organisers to participate
in o r g u i d e the w o r k e r s ' n e g o t i a t i o n s . D e s p i t e the u n w i l l i n g n e s s
o f the state t o c o n c e d e m u c h in the w a y o f e n a b l i n g trade
unionism to flourish, and despite the c o n t i n u e d harassment,
sometimes e v e n to death, o f those assisting w o r k e r s to organise,
t h e l a b o u r m o v e m e n t c o n t i n u e d t o g r o w d u r i n g t h e first h a l f o f
the 1970s. Its p o t e n t i a l p o w e r r e m a i n e d .
N o less c h a l l e n g i n g w a s the t h i n k i n g o f a y o u n g e r g e n e r a t i o n
o f b l a c k intellectuals w h o b e g a n t o e m e r g e in the s e c o n d half o f
the 1960s w i t h a p h i l o s o p h y o f b l a c k c o n s c i o u s n e s s , w h i c h a r g u e d
the need to enhance black self-awareness b y means o f w i t h d r a w a l
into e x c l u s i v e black organisations, o f w h i c h the S o u t h African
S t u d e n t s ' O r g a n i s a t i o n ( S A S O ) , f o u n d e d in 1969, w a s the m o s t
important. T h i s m o v e m e n t w a s undertaken w i t h i n the c o n t e x t o f
a s s e r t i n g t h e i n c l u s i v e u n i t y o f t h e c o u n t r y as e m p h a s i s e d in t h e
1
D u d l e y Horner and Alide K o o y , 'Conflict on South African mines 1972-1979*
( S a l d r u w o r k i n g p a p e r 29, C a p e T o w n , 1980).
314

movement's slogan ' O n e Azania. O n e N a t i o n ' - Azania being the

name b y w h i c h they wanted a black-dominated South Africa to
b e k n o w n . T h e m o v e m e n t l e a r n t a g o o d d e a l - as t h e i r f a t h e r s a n d
grandfathers h a d d o n e before t h e m - f r o m blacks in the U n i t e d
S t a t e s . N o r w a s it o n l y A m e r i c a n w r i t i n g , b y M a l c o l m X a n d
others that w a s i m p o r t a n t ; the w o r k o f Frantz F a n o n , for e x
ample, t h o u g h also banned, w a s obtained a n d avidly read.
F o r s o m e y e a r s S A S O , d e s p i t e its m i l i t a n t c r i t i c i s m o f t h e S o u t h
African system, w a s g i v e n a surprising amount o f rope by the
g o v e r n m e n t w h i c h , misunderstanding the sharp attack o n the role
p l a y e d b y w h i t e l i b e r a l s , s e e m e d t o h o p e t h a t at t h e b o t t o m o f
black consciousness lay an acceptance o f the w h o l e p h i l o s o p h y o f
eiesoortige ontwikkeling ( o n e ' s o w n s o r t o f d e v e l o p m e n t ) o n w h i c h
white control w a s based. T h e h o p e p r o v e d vain and b y 1973 the
g o v e r n m e n t h a d s t a r t e d t o b a n its l e a d e r s , o n e o f w h o m , A b r a h a m
T i r o , w a s the f o l l o w i n g year killed in s u s p i c i o u s c i r c u m s t a n c e s
by a parcel b o m b that reached h i m in B o t s w a n a w h e r e h e w a s
co-ordinating black student activities in southern Africa. Later
in t h e s a m e y e a r , f o l l o w i n g a r a l l y t o c e l e b r a t e F R E L I M O ' s
v i c t o r y i n M o z a m b i q u e , m u c h o f t h e b l a c k s t u d e n t l e a d e r s h i p still
left i n s i d e t h e c o u n t r y w a s s w e p t u p i n t o g a o l .
C o i n c i d i n g w i t h , a n d t o s o m e e x t e n t a n e x p r e s s i o n o f , t h e rise
o f b l a c k c o n s c i o u s n e s s w a s a f r e s h b u r s t o f w r i t i n g as p e o p l e f o u n d
w a y s o f expressing their feelings p u b l i c l y inside the c o u n t r y . B u t
e v e n p o e t r y , o b l i q u e t h o u g h its shafts o f t e n w e r e , w a s n o t w i t h o u t
its d a n g e r s a n d a n u m b e r o f p o e t s a n d p l a y - w r i t e r s w e r e b a n n e d .
It is a g a i n s t this b a c k g r o u n d t h a t t h e e r u p t i o n o f e v e n t s w h i c h
surprised seasoned observers o f the S o u t h African scene, black
and white alike, can best b e understood. T h e march o n 16 June
1976 o f s c h o o l c h i l d r e n in S o w e t o , s o p r o v o c a t i v e l y handled b y
the p o l i c e , s p a r k e d off a w a v e o f protest, i n c l u d i n g b u r n i n g o f
b u i l d i n g s , t h r o u g h o u t t h e c o u n t r y . A l t o g e t h e r a b o u t 700 p e o p l e ,
a large proportion o f them teenagers, w e r e killed, most o f them
1
s h o t b y p o l i c e . O v e r 6000 p e r s o n s w e r e a r r e s t e d a n d p r o s e c u t e d .
T h e g o v e r n m e n t w a s n o t unduly stretched b y the revolt, for the
army, while o n standby, n e v e r had t o be called in, b u t the episode
m a r k e d the b e g i n n i n g o f an a l t o g e t h e r n e w m o o d o f fearless
self-assurance in a g e n e r a t i o n w h i c h h a d b e e n raised w i t h i n the
f r a m e w o r k o f ' B a n t u ' and ' C o l o u r e d ' education, y e t had rejected
1
J o h n K a n e - B e r m a n , Soweto ( J o h a n n e s b u r g , 1978).
34

it t o t a l l y . T h e b o y c o t t o f s c h o o l s w h i c h t h e A N C h a d t r i e d a n d
f a i l e d t o a c h i e v e at t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f B a n t u E d u c a t i o n in 1 9 5 3
spread like a bushfire and continued to rage fiercely. By August
1 9 7 7 in S o w e t o , n o t o n l y h a d t h e p u p i l s s u c c e s s f u l l y o r g a n i s e d
a t o t a l b o y c o t t o f all s e c o n d a r y s c h o o l s b u t t h e y h a d c a u s e d t h e
m a s s r e s i g n a t i o n , in t h e m i d s t o f a d e e p e c o n o m i c r e c e s s i o n , o f
m o r e than half their teachers. Similarly m e m b e r s o f the S o w e t o
Urban Bantu Council were forced to resign. Although the
scholars had w o n the battle against c o m p u l s o r y A f r i k a a n s , the
g o v e r n m e n t had b y n o means yet lost the w a r o v e r educational
reform. In 1978 pupils w e r e d i v i d e d and s o m e children returned
to school. T h e teachers w h o remained continued to struggle w i t h
a heavy-handed bureaucracy w h o s e lip-service to change was
unmatched by action.
A n o t h e r f o r m o f resistance w a s perhaps the m o s t effective o f
all. S i m p l y b y d i s o b e y i n g certain legislation and i g n o r i n g its
p r o h i b i t i o n s p e o p l e f o r c e d the g o v e r n m e n t c o n t i n u a l l y t o face
n e w r e a l i t i e s t h a t fell o u t s i d e its p l a n . T h e m o s t n o t a b l e f o r m o f
this ' i n f o r m a l ' resistance w a s that against the pass l a w s , o n e a i m
o f w h i c h w a s t o p r e v e n t p e o p l e s e t t l i n g in t o w n . P r e c i s e figures
are i m p o s s i b l e t o o b t a i n b u t in C a p e T o w n , for e x a m p l e , the actual
A f r i c a n p o p u l a t i o n w a s t h o u g h t t o b e p e r h a p s as m u c h as 80 p e r
c e n t a b o v e t h e official figure. A n d in S o w e t o , w h e r e the 1970
c e n s u s c o u n t e d 6 0 0 0 0 0 p e o p l e , it w a s w i d e l y b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e r e
w e r e m o r e than a million. B u t e v e n a m o n g s t those w h o s e presence
was illegal w e r e m a n y w h o had forced their presence to be
r e c o g n i s e d and accepted. T h u s the squatter c o m m u n i t i e s l i v i n g
a r o u n d J o h a n n e s b u r g after t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r , l e d b y m e n
like James S o f a s o n k e M p a n z a , c o m p e l l e d reluctant local auth
orities to grant them effective rights t o h o u s i n g in t o w n . A
g e n e r a t i o n later A f r i c a n squatters w e r e still d o g g e d l y b a t t l i n g
a g a i n s t e v i c t i o n b u t , as i n C a p e T o w n d u r i n g t h e m i d 1970s,
m e e t i n g w i t h the increasing force o f g o v e r n m e n t bulldozers and
b a t o n s . N o r w a s it o n l y in u r b a n a r e a s t h a t g o v e r n m e n t m e t w i t h
s t r o n g o p p o s i t i o n . T h e r e a c t i o n o f A f r i c a n w o m e n in the r e m o t e
w e s t e r n T r a n s v a a l t o t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f p a s s e s in 1 9 5 7 a n d t h e
peasants' revolt in Pondoland during i960 were but two
manifestations o f determined resistance w h i c h w e r e crushed by
1
superior might.
1
C h a r l e s H o o p e r , Brief authority ( L o n d o n , i960); G o v a n M b e k i , South Africa: the
peasants' revolt ( H a r m o n d s w o r t h , 1964).
316

T h o s e w h o struggled for liberation did not confine themselves

to resistance. T h e r e w a s also a l o n g tradition o f affirmative action
b u i l d i n g u p s e l f - h e l p c o m m u n i t y p r o j e c t s s u c h as t h e Z e n z e l e
m o v e m e n t , w h i c h b e g a n t o g r o w in t h e 1 9 3 0 s a n d l a t e r affiliated
to the I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o u n t r y W o m e n o f the W o r l d . A n d o n e o f
t h e i m m e d i a t e fruits o f t h e b l a c k - c o n s c i o u s n e s s m o v e m e n t w e r e
the c o m m u n i t y projects s u c h as t h e Z a n e m p i l o C l i n i c in the
e a s t e r n C a p e a n d a c o o p e r a t i v e c l o t h i n g f a c t o r y in C a p e T o w n .
B u t t h e s e l a t t e r t w o w e r e r e g a r d e d as s u b v e r s i v e a n d t h e y w e r e
b a n n e d b y t h e state.
The line d i v i d i n g the politics o f exclusion from those of
inclusion w h i c h has b e e n traced t h r o u g h the history o f this p e r i o d
ran a l s o t h r o u g h t h e C h u r c h . T h i s b e c a m e m o s t c l e a r l y a p p a r e n t
f o l l o w i n g a c o n f e r e n c e c o n v e n e d at C o t t e s l o e in J o h a n n e s b u r g b y
t h e W o r l d C o u n c i l o f C h u r c h e s at t h e t i m e o f t h e S h a r p e v i l l e c r i s i s
in i 9 6 0 . T h e C o t t e s l o e s t a t e m e n t by c h u r c h leaders, including
those o f the D u t c h R e f o r m e d C h u r c h , w a s repudiated b y V e r -
w o e r d a n d s u b s e q u e n t l y b y all t h e A f r i k a a n s - s p e a k i n g c h u r c h e s .
B u t the split did n o t f o l l o w precise d e n o m i n a t i o n a l o r l a n g u a g e
lines. S o m e o f the s t r o n g e s t o p p o s i t i o n to the t h e o r y and practice
of apartheid came from within the three Dutch Reformed
churches, eleven o f w h o s e theologians had published a sharp
attack o n race discrimination shortly before the C o t t e s l o e C o n
f e r e n c e in J o h a n n e s b u r g . A n d , f r o m t h e t i m e o f its e s t a b l i s h m e n t
in 1963 u n t i l it w a s b a n n e d in 1 9 7 7 , t h e C h r i s t i a n I n s t i t u t e l e d b y
the R e v d B e y e r s N a u d e , a f o r m e r m o d e r a t o r o f the southern
T r a n s v a a l s y n o d o f the D u t c h R e f o r m e d C h u r c h , played a major
r o l e in s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e o p p o s i t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l C h r i s t i a n s a n d
of some denominations to the i d e o l o g y o f apartheid. No less
i m p o r t a n t w a s t h e w o r k o f t h e C h r i s t i a n I n s t i t u t e in f o r g i n g l i n k s
b e t w e e n the established churches and the rapidly g r o w i n g A f r i c a n
Independent C h u r c h e s w h i c h rejected w h i t e leadership, and w h i c h
p r o v i d e d an a p p r o p r i a t e structure for n u r t u r i n g social security
and c o h e s i v e n e s s in the turbulent process of economic and
1
cultural transition.
Besides the churches, universities and the press were also
embroiled in the political arena. Legislation passed in 1959
authorising the g o v e r n m e n t to i m p o s e restrictions o n universities
based o n c o l o u r w a s v i g o r o u s l y o p p o s e d , particularly by the
1
J. P . K i e r n a n , ' P o o r a n d P u r i t a n : a n a t t e m p t t o v i e w Z i o n i s m as a c o l l e c t i v e
r e s p o n s e t o u r b a n p o v e r t y ' , African Studies, 1977, 36, 1.
317

E n g l i s h - m e d i u m universities w h o s e students were actively organ

i s e d , t h r o u g h t h e N a t i o n a l U n i o n o f S o u t h A f r i c a n S t u d e n t s , in
their o p p o s i t i o n to apartheid. A l o n g tradition o f press f r e e d o m
in t h e c o u n t r y h e l p e d t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e h a n d o f e d i t o r s w h o s e
newspapers came under increasingly frequent attack. B u t there
w a s m u c h t h e n e w s p a p e r s d i d n o t p r i n t f o r fear o f state r e p r i s a l s .
M o r e o v e r , for the majority o f papers, n e w s w a s generally seen to
be that w h i c h interested w h i t e readers. N e v e r t h e l e s s the role o f
s e v e r a l n e w s p a p e r s in f a c i n g b o t h g o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e g e n e r a l
public w i t h uncomfortable truths and w i t h trenchant criticism was
an i m p o r t a n t , a l t h o u g h b y i t s e l f i n a d e q u a t e , c h e c k o n t h e
i n c r e a s i n g l y a r b i t r a r y p o w e r o f t h e state.
B y t h e m i d - 1 9 7 0 s r e s i s t a n c e i n S o u t h A f r i c a w a s stiffened b y
the astonishing fearlessness o f children g o i n g o u t against bullets
a r m e d o n l y w i t h dustbin lids and stones. A t the same time a
process o f clarifying targets c o u l d be traced by y o u n g blacks, one
o f w h o m p o i n t e d o u t t h a t , ' I n i 9 6 0 s o m e 30000 A f r i c a n s m a r c h e d
p e a c e f u l l y i n t o t h e c e n t r e o f C a p e T o w n ; in 1 9 7 6 t h e i r c h i l d r e n
b u r n t l i q u o r o u t l e t s , a n d s c h o o l s in t h e b l a c k t o w n s h i p s ; n e x t t i m e
it w i l l b e w h i t e h o u s e s . ' T h i s n e w c o u r a g e w a s n o t u n c o n n e c t e d
w i t h t h e v i c t o r y o f F R E L I M O in M o z a m b i q u e a n d t h e g u e r r i l l a
s t r u g g l e s in R h o d e s i a a n d N a m i b i a w h i c h h a d a n i m p o r t a n t
p s y c h o l o g i c a l i m p a c t o n all S o u t h A f r i c a n s . O v e r t h e t h r e e y e a r s
f r o m t h e c o u p in L i s b o n in A p r i l 1 9 7 4 t h r o u g h t h e i n v a s i o n o f
A n g o l a in 1 9 7 5 , a n d t h e u p r i s i n g in S o w e t o , L a n g a a n d e l s e w h e r e
in 1 9 7 6 t o t h e k i l l i n g o f S t e v e B i k o in 1 9 7 7 , S o u t h A f r i c a c r o s s e d
a w a t e r s h e d . I n t h e face o f m o u n t i n g w o r l d p r e s s u r e t h e
g o v e r n m e n t e m b a r k e d on a limited p r o g r a m m e o f selective
d e s e g r e g a t i o n . B u t it s h o w e d n o s i g n s o f y i e l d i n g o n t h e f u n d a
mental structure o f apartheid w h i c h w a s designed to exclude black
S o u t h A f r i c a n s f r o m effective political p o w e r . N o t e v e n the
c o u r a g e o f the y o u n g c o u l d yet guarantee that sort o f c h a n g e from
within.
E l s e w h e r e in s o u t h e r n A f r i c a , h o w e v e r , t h e t w o d e c a d e s f o l l o w
i n g G h a n a ' s i n d e p e n d e n c e in 1 9 5 7 w e r e y e a r s o f c o n s i d e r a b l e
p o l i t i c a l c h a n g e as t h e p r o c e s s o f d e c o l o n i s a t i o n p e r m e a t e d t h e
continent. F o r the three countries o f B o t s w a n a , L e s o t h o and
S w a z i l a n d the l o n g s t r u g g l e against political i n c o r p o r a t i o n had
a l m o s t been w o n b y i960. In 1962 P r i m e M i n i s t e r V e r w o e r d
318

a c k n o w l e d g e d publicly that S o u t h Africa accepted the possibility

o f i n d e p e n d e n c e , a l t h o u g h h e still h o p e d t h a t t h e t h r e e t e r r i t o r i e s
m i g h t y e t see t h e b e n e f i t s o f b e c o m i n g p a r t o f t h e S o u t h A f r i c a n
C o m m o n w e a l t h o f N a t i o n s . T h e first o f t h e pre-independence
e l e c t i o n s t o o k p l a c e i n 1 9 6 4 in S w a z i l a n d w h e r e , a y e a r p r e v i o u s l y ,
w i d e s p r e a d s t r i k e s h a d c a u s e d B r i t a i n t o air-lift t r o o p s i n t o t h e
country. A n u m b e r o f political organisations e m e r g e d w i t h broad
agreement on three basic d e m a n d s : that the king become a
constitutional m o n a r c h ; that i n d e p e n d e n c e be granted immedi
a t e l y ; a n d t h a t all r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b e a b o l i s h e d . T h e k i n g
a c c e p t e d the i m p l i c i t c h a l l e n g e and f o r m e d his o w n I m b o k o d v o
1
movement to contest the elections w h i c h he w o n w i t h o u t a single
o p p o s i t i o n c a n d i d a t e r e t a i n i n g h i s d e p o s i t , let a l o n e w i n n i n g a
seat. T h e e l e c t i o n h a d t a k e n p l a c e u n d e r a c o n s t i t u t i o n which
g u a r a n t e e d a n e q u a l s h a r e o f seats t o t h e w h i t e c o m m u n i t y , t o t h e
S w a z i h i e r a r c h y , a n d t o v o t e r s o n t h e n a t i o n a l r o l l . B u t as s o o n
as it h a d w o n t h e e l e c t i o n s t h e I m b o k o d v o d i s f r a n c h i s e d all w h i t e
S o u t h A f r i c a n s in S w a z i l a n d , c h a l l e n g e d t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n as b e i n g
racist, and d e m a n d e d i m m e d i a t e i n d e p e n d e n c e . B y F e b r u a r y 1967
a n e w constitution acceptable b o t h to the I m b o k o d v o (to w h i c h
m a n y o f the y o u n g radicals had flocked after 1 9 6 4 ) a n d t o B r i t a i n
h a d b e e n d r a f t e d . T h e c o u n t r y g a i n e d its i n d e p e n d e n c e in 1 9 6 8 ,
t w o y e a r s after B o t s w a n a a n d L e s o t h o .
T h e p r o b l e m s o f d e v i s i n g suitable institutions which would
c o n t a i n different interest g r o u p s a n d m a k e o r d e r l y c h a n g e p o s s i b l e
w e r e formidable. F o r S w a z i l a n d , particularly, the duality b e t w e e n
l o y a l t y t o t h e k i n g in w h o m w a s v e s t e d all t h e a u t h o r i t y o f t h e
n a t i o n , a n d t h e e m e r g e n c e o f a n e w set o f l o y a l t i e s t o l a w a n d t o
the c o u n t r y , w a s a source o f increasing tension. T h e k i n g ' s p o w e r
w a s b e i n g encroached u p o n and increasingly challenged b y the
younger more educated people w h o were m o v i n g into adminis
trative and other jobs w i t h i n the g o v e r n m e n t and the private
sector o f the e c o n o m y . In A p r i l 1973 the k i n g issued an order
in c o u n c i l w h i c h s u s p e n d e d t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n , d e c l a r e d a s t a t e o f
e m e r g e n c y , v e s t e d all p o w e r i n h i m s e l f , a n d e n a b l e d h i m t o d e t a i n
p e r s o n s f o r 60 d a y s at a t i m e , w i t h o u t trial. T h e l e a d e r o f t h e
o p p o s i t i o n , D r A . P. Z w a n e , President o f the N g w a n e N a t i o n a l
1
T h e full name, Imbokodvo kmalabala, means literally, 'the grinding-stone-that-
brings-together-many-colours'. Hilda Kuper, Sobhuâ II, Ngwenyama and King of
Swaziland (London, 1978), 250.
319

Liberation Congress, was subsequently detained four times. B y

1 9 7 7 t h e k i n g w a s still firmly i n c o n t r o l . H o w e v e r , t h e r e w e r e
i n c r e a s i n g s i g n s , s u c h as t h e t e a c h e r d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n o f m i d - 1 9 7 6 ,
that the c l e a v a g e b e t w e e n the c o n s e r v a t i v e , traditional hierarchy
g o v e r n i n g t h r o u g h the S w a z i N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l and the m o r e
educated, urbanised people was deepening dangerously although
t h e k i n g , a g e d n e a r l y 80, w i t h h i s i m m e n s e a u t h o r i t y , w a s a b l e
to c o m m a n d a certain consensus.
In L e s o t h o C h i e f Jonathan w o n the pre-independence elections
i n 1965 w i t h a m i n o r i t y v o t e . H e h a d t o face a n i m m e d i a t e
challenge f r o m the y o u n g k i n g w h o , t h o u g h n o t p o s s e s s i n g the
s a m e w e i g h t o f a u t h o r i t y as K i n g S o b h u z a , w a s n o n e t h e less
d e t e r m i n e d to retain s o m e i n d e p e n d e n c e for the civil service and
t h e p o l i c e w h e n i n d e p e n d e n c e c a m e . H o w e v e r , in a n h i s t o r i c
decision the police o b e y e d C h i e f Jonathan's orders to p r e v e n t
p e o p l e g a t h e r i n g at a Pitso c a l l e d b y t h e k i n g , w h o s e p o w e r w a s
thereby effectively curtailed a l t h o u g h he remained titular head o f
t h e n a t i o n . I n 1 9 7 0 C h i e f J o n a t h a n w a s d e f e a t e d at t h e p o l l s b y
the C o n g r e s s Party but, refusing to c o n c e d e defeat, he seized
p o w e r illegally in a c o u p . A c o u n t e r - c o u p failed in 1 9 7 4 . T h e
leader o f the C o n g r e s s Party, N t s u M o k h e h l e , escaped to B o t s w a n a
but m a n y political opponents w e r e beaten up or killed whilst
others w e r e found guilty o f h i g h treason and gaoled for s o m e
years.
F o r B o t s w a n a t h e first d e c a d e o f p o l i t i c a l i n d e p e n d e n c e w a s
m u c h s m o o t h e r . F u s i n g in his p e r s o n b o t h the traditional a n d the
m o d e r n , Sir Seretse K h a m a , the rightful heir o f the N g w a t o
chieftainship, and the m a n w h o h a d risked his p o s i t i o n and earned
the d i s a p p r o v a l o f b o t h the c o l o n i a l p o w e r and the b i g n e i g h b o u r
b y m a r r y i n g the wife o f his c h o i c e , w a s able to w i n and maintain
the s u p p o r t o f the vast majority o f his p e o p l e w i t h o u t b e i n g so
t h r e a t e n e d t h a t h e felt it n e c e s s a r y e i t h e r t o b a n o t h e r p o l i t i c a l
parties o r t o i m p r i s o n his o p p o n e n t s .
B u t B o t s w a n a had other troubles w h i c h , by the mid-1970s, w e r e
b e c o m i n g i n c r e a s i n g l y a c u t e . S i t u a t e d at t h e c e n t r e o f s o u t h e r n
Africa, she shared l o n g borders w i t h the three white-ruled
c o u n t r i e s w h e r e the s t r u g g l e for liberation w a s b e c o m i n g in
c r e a s i n g l y b i t t e r a n d v i o l e n t . F o r B o t s w a n a t h i s m e a n t first t h e
p r o b l e m o f r e f u g e e s as p e o p l e s t r e a m e d a c r o s s at d i f f e r e n t t i m e s
from S o w e t o , from O v a m b o l a n d , and from the south-western
320

districts o f R h o d e s i a . T h e r e w a s pressure t o o f r o m the guerrilla

m o v e m e n t s to a l l o w the passage o f a r m s and m e n , b u t o n this
B o t s w a n a , l i k e L e s o t h o a n d S w a z i l a n d , h a d t o t a k e a firm s t a n d .
Moral support was possible but more active involvement was
suicidal. B o t s w a n a w a s not able to a v o i d b e i n g burnt by the w a r
w h i c h raged particularly o n the R h o d e s i a n border, w h e r e Smith's
t r o o p s , a l l e g e d l y in h o t p u r s u i t , e n t e r e d B o t s w a n a s e v e r a l t i m e s
and killed a n u m b e r o f civilians. A l t h o u g h there w a s w a r b o t h
i n N a m i b i a a n d in R h o d e s i a t h e r e s e e m e d t o b e s o m e h o p e i n t h e
m i d - 1 9 7 0 s that the conflict w o u l d be r e s o l v e d w i t h o u t further
u n d u e d a m a g e to B o t s w a n a . H o w e v e r , the l o n g - t e r m v i e w to the
s o u t h w a s far less p r o m i s i n g . T h e r e t h e m i l i t a r y s t r u g g l e s e e m e d
o n l y j u s t b e g i n n i n g a n d t h e p r o s p e c t f o r B o t s w a n a o f finding i t s e l f
in t h e n o - m a n ' s l a n d b e t w e e n g u e r r i l l a b a s e s a n d t h e S o u t h
A f r i c a n a r m y w a s far f r o m r e a s s u r i n g . S w a z i l a n d t o o w a s c a u g h t
in a similar p o s i t i o n : w e d g e d b e t w e e n M a p u t o a n d the W i t -
w a t e r s r a n d , it w a s w e l l s i t u a t e d f o r g u n - r u n n i n g a n d t h e t r a n s i t
o f guerrillas.
L e s o t h o ' s m a i n p r o b l e m s c e n t r e d a r o u n d its e c o n o m i c b o n d a g e
t o S o u t h A f r i c a . T h e c o u n t r y h a d l o n g f u n c t i o n e d as a l a b o u r
r e s e r v e little different f r o m t h e T r a n s k e i o r t h e C i s k e i . T h e
difficulties i n v o l v e d in r e d u c i n g its e c o n o m i c d e p e n d e n c e o n
South Africa by creating e m p l o y m e n t opportunities and produc
i n g g o o d s w i t h i n its o w n b o r d e r s w e r e i m m e n s e . A g r i c u l t u r a l
potential o n the m o u n t a i n o u s , o v e r p o p u l a t e d land w a s l o w . A p a r t
f r o m a r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l p i p e o f d i a m o n d s , p r o s p e c t i n g y i e l d e d little
in t h e w a y o f m i n e r a l s . D e v e l o p m e n t o f m a n u f a c t u r i n g w a s
constrained b y the smallness o f the internal market, effectively
r e d u c e d still f u r t h e r b y r e a d y a c c e s s t o t h e s h o p s a n d g o o d s o f
the R e p u b l i c . A n y h o p e s o f selling p r o d u c t s w i t h i n the w i d e r
m a r k e t o f t h e c u s t o m s u n i o n w e r e d a s h e d b y P r e t o r i a ' s a c t i o n in
preventing investors from establishing either a motor-assembly
p l a n t o r a fertiliser f a c t o r y . D e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e M a l i b a m a t s o
w a t e r project w a s d e p e n d e n t u p o n an a g r e e m e n t w i t h S o u t h
Africa to b u y the water, w h i c h for s o m e years she declined to d o .
O n e r e m a i n i n g possibility w a s tourism. T h e chief attraction to the
w h i t e S o u t h A f r i c a n s w h o flocked a c r o s s w e r e t h e g a m b l i n g
casinos and soft-porn m o v i e s rather than the spectacular m o u n t a i n
scenery.
T h e r e n e g o t i a t i o n in 1 9 6 9 o f t h e c u s t o m s a g r e e m e n t a n d t h e
321

s h a r p rise i n e a r n i n g s o f g o l d - m i n e r s i m p r o v e d L e s o t h o ' s c u r r e n t
a c c o u n t , s o t h a t b y 1 9 7 3 - 4 it w a s n o l o n g e r d e p e n d e n t u p o n a
grant-in-aid f r o m the British g o v e r n m e n t in o r d e r to balance the
b u d g e t . N e v e r t h e l e s s the l o n g - t e r m prospects for L e s o t h o ' s
e c o n o m y w e r e , i f a n y t h i n g , w o r s e at t h e e n d o f its first d e c a d e
o f i n d e p e n d e n c e t h a n t h e y w e r e at t h e b e g i n n i n g , f o r d u r i n g this
p e r i o d the rate o f g r o w t h o f internal e m p l o y m e n t w a s w e l l b e l o w
the rate o f natural p o p u l a t i o n increase, and the e m e r g i n g spectre
o f u n e m p l o y m e n t h a u n t i n g S o u t h A f r i c a itself w a s an o m i n o u s
sign to the p e o p l e o f L e s o t h o , w h o f o u n d t h e m s e l v e s increasingly
b e h i n d b l a c k S o u t h A f r i c a n s in the q u e u e for j o b s . W h i l e the
South African mines w e r e unlikely to dispense altogether w i t h
w o r k e r s f r o m L e s o t h o , t h e r e s e e m e d little l i k e l i h o o d t h a t d e m a n d
f o r t h e m w o u l d i n c r e a s e s u b s t a n t i a l l y in t h e f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e o r
that S o t h o w o r k e r s w o u l d be d r a w n into the agricultural sector,
w h e r e o v e r a l l e m p l o y m e n t w a s o n the decline, o r into manufac
turing w h i c h had never e m p l o y e d many foreign black w o r k e r s .
O n e c o n s e q u e n c e to L e s o t h o (and the other l a b o u r - s u p p l y i n g
c o u n t r i e s in the r e g i o n ) o f the i n c r e a s i n g i m p o r t a n c e o f the
n a t i o n a l b o u n d a r y w a s t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h it f a c i l i t a t e d S o u t h
Africa's p o l i c y o f containing u n e m p l o y m e n t b y the simple ex
p e d i e n t o f e x p o r t i n g it.
I n c o n t r a s t t o L e s o t h o w a s S w a z i l a n d w h e r e , as w e h a v e s e e n ,
t h e e c o n o m y w a s g r o w i n g r a p i d l y . B y t h e 1960s t h e p i n e
p l a n t a t i o n s w e r e a m o n g t h e l a r g e s t in t h e w o r l d a n d w e r e
p r o d u c i n g b o t h timber and paper in substantial quantities. T h e
e x p l o i t a t i o n o f i r o n - o r e p r o v i d e d e m p l o y m e n t , as w e l l as i n d u c i n g
t h e b u i l d i n g o f a r a i l w a y , o p e n e d in 1 9 6 4 , w h i c h l i n k e d t h e
c o u n t r y b o t h to M a p u t o and to the W i t w a t e r s r a n d . D e s p i t e these
d e v e l o p m e n t s Swaziland also continued to send migrants to w o r k
in S o u t h A f r i c a .
B o t s w a n a ' s e c o n o m y s h o w e d t h e m o s t i m p r o v e m e n t i n t h e first
decade o f independence. F r o m the mid-1960s there w a s a g o o d
d e a l o f p r o s p e c t i n g a n d s o m e n o t a b l e finds. T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t
o f t h e s e w e r e t h e t w o d i a m o n d p i p e s at O r a p a a n d J w a n e n g a n d
t h e c o p p e r - n i c k e l d e p o s i t s at S e l i b e - P i k w e . T h e t i m i n g o f t h e s e
d i s c o v e r i e s w a s i m p o r t a n t f o r , a l t h o u g h in t h e e a r l y n e g o t i a t i o n s
the B o t s w a n a g o v e r n m e n t l a c k e d the necessary e x p e r i e n c e to
b a r g a i n a d e q u a t e l y o v e r t h e t e r m s o f t h e c o n c e s s i o n s , it w a s l a t e r
a b l e t o r e n e g o t i a t e t h e s e a n d e n s u r e t h a t o v e r 50 p e r c e n t o f t h e
322

p r o f i t s w e r e p a i d b a c k , r a t h e r t h a n b e i n g s i p h o n e d o f f a b r o a d , as
had happened in t h e neighbouring countries of Zambia and
1
N a m i b i a . D u r i n g the ten years f r o m 1966 t o 1975 the a n n u a l rate
o f g r o w t h o f G N P a v e r a g e d 5.1 p e r c e n t , a n d a l t h o u g h t e c h n i c a l
difficulties at S e l i b e - P i k w e , c o m b i n e d w i t h a s h a r p fall in t h e p r i c e
o f c o p p e r after 1 9 7 4 , d e f e r r e d s o m e o f t h e h o p e i n v e s t e d in t h e
mineral b o o m , the prospects for further substantial d e v e l o p m e n t s
in t h a t s e c t o r w e r e g o o d . T w o i m p o r t a n t p r o b l e m s n e v e r t h e l e s s
accompanied this growth. One w a s that the major share of
i n v e s t m e n t in t h i s s e c t o r w a s S o u t h A f r i c a n ; t h e o t h e r w a s t h e
l a r g e a m o u n t o f c a p i t a l r e q u i r e d t o c r e a t e o n e j o b in a c o u n t r y
suffering severely f r o m underemployment.
G r o w t h in t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r , as in m i n i n g , w a s a c c o m
panied b y serious difficulties. O n e w a s the u n c e r t a i n t y o f e x p o r t s
following Britain's entrance into the Common Market with
c o n c e s s i o n s a g a i n s t t h e n e w h i g h tariffs h a v i n g t o b e b a r g a i n e d
f o r o n e y e a r at a t i m e . L e s s v i s i b l e b u t n o less i m p o r t a n t was
irreversible ecological d a m a g e caused by extending g r a z i n g into
unsuitable areas. T h i r d w e r e the l o n g e r t e r m s o c i o - e c o n o m i c
implications o f the apparently i n c r e a s i n g s k e w n e s s o f rural i n c o m e
distribution, as t h e w e a l t h y t o w n s m e n e m p l o y e d in t h e civil
s e r v i c e a n d e l s e w h e r e i n v e s t e d in c a t t l e , w h i l e c o u n t r y m e n w i t h
n o stock w e r e thus effectively disinherited o f the land to w h i c h ,
2
theoretically, they had a c c e s s . N o r w a s the g a p confined t o the
agricultural sector. In the civil service b y the m i d - 1 9 7 0 s the ratio
o f salaries for super-scale p o s t s w a s o f the o r d e r o f 1 0 : 1 c o m p a r e d
w i t h a r a t i o o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y 5 : 1 in m o s t d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s .
T h u s , e v e n w i t h i n s o h o m o g e n e o u s a c o u n t r y as B o t s w a n a , t h e
cleavage b e t w e e n rich and p o o r w a s deep.
In Namibia the first lustrum o f the 1960s w a s relatively
u n e v e n t f u l . A t t e n t i o n w a s f o c u s s e d o n p r o c e e d i n g s at T h e H a g u e
w h e r e orders had been s o u g h t against S o u t h Africa for violation
o f the m a n d a t e . In 1966 the International C o u r t o f Justice refused
t o p r o n o u n c e o n t h e m a t t e r s b e f o r e it o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t t h e
applicant states, L i b e r i a and Ethiopia, had n o legal standing
before the court. F o l l o w i n g this a number of far-reaching
decisions were made by interested parties. SWAPO issued a
1
I am indebted to Charles Harvey for this point.
2
Norman Reynolds, 'Rural development in Botswana' (Saldru w o r k i n g paper 13,
Cape T o w n , 1977); Botswana, Ministry of Finance and D e v e l o p m e n t Planning, Central
Statistics Office, The rural income distribution survey in Botswana 1974/ / (Gaborone, 1976).
323

s t a t e m e n t f r o m D a r es S a l a a m t h a t t h e r e w a s n o w n o a l t e r n a t i v e
b u t ' t o rise in a r m s a n d b r i n g a b o u t o u r o w n l i b e r a t i o n ' . In
August 1966 the first clashes b e t w e e n S W A P O guerrillas and
S o u t h A f r i c a n s e c u r i t y f o r c e s o c c u r r e d in n o r t h e r n N a m i b i a . T w o
months later the United Nations General Assembly resolved
formally to terminate the mandate and to put N a m i b i a under the
direct responsibility o f the U N . S o u t h Africa r e s p o n d e d differ
ently. C l a i m i n g incorrectly that the court's technical finding was
a r u l i n g in h e r f a v o u r , t h e S o u t h A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t i g n o r e d t h e
U n i t e d N a t i o n s and p r o c e e d e d virtually to c o m p l e t e the incor
p o r a t i o n o f t h e t e r r i t o r y a n d t o m o u l d it m o r e f u l l y i n t o its o w n
image.
I n 1968 l e g i s l a t i o n w a s p a s s e d e n a b l i n g t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of
Bantustans carefully m o d e l l e d o n S o u t h Africa's o w n e m e r g i n g
1
system. T h e f o l l o w i n g year the S o u t h W e s t A f r i c a Affairs A c t
e m p o w e r e d the R e p u b l i c to transfer the majority o f fiscal and
o t h e r p o w e r s still r e s i d i n g in t h e W i n d h o e k L e g i s l a t i v e A s s e m b l y
to Pretoria. Statistics t o o b e c a m e increasingly fused w i t h S o u t h
A f r i c a ' s s o t h a t a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e d i r e c t i o n in w h i c h n e t p a y m e n t s
b e t w e e n the t w o countries w e r e flowing became virtually im
p o s s i b l e . E a r l y in 1 9 6 8 t h e T e r r o r i s m A c t o f 1 9 6 7 w a s i n v o k e d f o r
t h e first t i m e t o c h a r g e 37 N a m i b i a n s f o r a c t s c o m m i t t e d before
t h e l a w w a s p a s s e d . T h e m e n w e r e b r o u g h t f r o m N a m i b i a t o trial
in Pretoria, where most were sentenced to long terms of
i m p r i s o n m e n t . T h e i r l e a d e r , T o i v o H e r m a n ja T o i v o , in a m o v i n g
s t a t e m e n t f r o m t h e d o c k , firmly r e j e c t e d S o u t h A f r i c a ' s r i g h t t o
rule N a m i b i a . T h i s v i e w w a s implicitly u p h e l d b y the International
C o u r t o f J u s t i c e i n J u n e 1 9 7 1 w h e n it r u l e d t h a t , in t e r m s o f t h e
UN r e v o c a t i o n o f the mandate in 1966, the c o n t i n u e d presence
of South Africa in N a m i b i a w a s illegal. T h e South African
g o v e r n m e n t rejected the j u d g e m e n t . A f e w d a y s later the two
boards o f w h a t w e r e s o o n to join into the E v a n g e l i c a l L u t h e r a n
C h u r c h and w h i c h represented the majority o f i n d i g e n o u s N a m i b
ians m e t t o discuss the crisis a n d an O p e n L e t t e r , s i g n e d b y the
t w o chairmen, B i s h o p A u l a and Pastor G o w a s e b , w a s sent to the
prime minister outlining the extent to w h i c h S o u t h African policy
infringed the D e c l a r a t i o n o f H u m a n R i g h t s , asserting that their
c o u n t r y s h o u l d b e r e g a r d e d as a s i n g l e u n i t , a n d r e q u e s t i n g the
1
S o u t h W e s t A f r i c a , Report of the Commission of Enquiry into South West African
Affairs, 1962-196) ( O d e n d a a l R e p o r t , 1964).
324

g o v e r n m e n t t o e n a b l e it t o m o v e p e a c e f u l l y t o i n d e p e n d e n c e .
T h e s e p o i n t s w e r e spelt o u t m o r e fully t o M r V o r s t e r b y the t w o
c h u r c h leaders w h e n they m e t h i m s u b s e q u e n t l y in W i n d h o e k .
T h e f o l l o w i n g m o n t h the C o m m i s s i o n e r - G e n e r a l for O v a m b o -
land, replying to increasing criticism o f the contract-labour
s y s t e m , s t a t e d t h a t it c o u l d n o t b e r e g a r d e d as a f o r m o f s l a v e r y
because m e n reported voluntarily for recruitment. T h i s p r o v e d
t o b e t h e last s t r a w a n d , in a w e l l o r g a n i s e d m o v e , t h e N a m i b i a n s
s t r u c k . S t a r t i n g i n W i n d h o e k o n 13 D e c e m b e r 1 9 7 1 w o r k e r s
paralysed m a n y parts o f the e c o n o m y b y d o w n i n g tools in protest
against the labour system. W i t h i n a w e e k m o r e than 1 1 0 0 0
w o r k e r s h a d c o m e o u t a n d b y m i d - J a n u a r y at l e a s t 2 1 0 0 0 p e o p l e
h a d , it is e s t i m a t e d , b e e n i n v o l v e d i n s o m e f o r m o f p r o t e s t i n 23
p l a c e s , i n c l u d i n g 1 1 m i n e s . O v e r 13 000 w o r k e r s w e r e t r a n s p o r t e d
b y the g o v e r n m e n t and others w i t h d r e w themselves to O v a m b o -
land w h e r e their presence s e r v e d t o b r o a d e n the base o f resistance
b y i n c l u d i n g p e a s a n t o p p o s i t i o n . O v e r 100 k m o f b o r d e r f e n c e ,
for e x a m p l e , w e r e d e s t r o y e d in o n e n i g h t . T h e p o l i c e a n d a r m y
m o v e d in a n d e a r l y i n F e b r u a r y e m e r g e n c y r e g u l a t i o n s s i m i l a r t o
those in the T r a n s k e i w e r e p r o c l a i m e d , furnishing authorities w i t h
w i d e p o w e r s to prevent meetings and to detain people w i t h o u t
trial. S t e p s w e r e a l s o t a k e n t o a l t e r t h e f o r m o f t h e r e c r u i t i n g
c
system; S W A N L A was abolished and replaced with h o m e l a n d '
labour bureaux; greater flexibility in the c h o i c e o f j o b w a s
introduced. B u t the essential features o f the m i g r a n t l a b o u r
system, w h i c h p r e v e n t e d a m a n f r o m l i v i n g w i t h his w i f e and his
children w i t h i n c o m m u t i n g distance o f his place o f w o r k , remained
intact. B y the e n d o f F e b r u a r y 1972 this r o u n d o f internal
resistance w a s b r o k e n .
D e s p i t e w o r l d pressure, S W A P O raids, and the practical
logistics o f creating a multitude o f minute independent financial
and administrative structures, the systematic application o f the
policy m i g h t h a v e g o n e o n for m a n y years had not the A p r i l 1974
c o u p in L i s b o n radically t r a n s f o r m e d the scene. T h e p r o t e c t i v e
A n g o l a n buffer a l o n g t h e n o r t h e r n N a m i b i a n b o r d e r w a s s w e p t
a w a y . G o n e for the m o m e n t w a s the p r o s p e c t o f p a r t i t i o n i n g
N a m i b i a and c a r v i n g o u t a n e w O v a m b o state s t r a d d l i n g the
K u n e n e and s u p p l y i n g water, electricity and labour to the white-
controlled e c o n o m y further south. A n e w plan had to be m a d e .
I n J u n e 1 9 7 4 t h e S o u t h A f r i c a n p r i m e m i n i s t e r s t a t e d t h a t it w a s
3*5

u p to the p e o p l e o f S o u t h W e s t Africa to decide their future. A f t e r

a year o f negotiations led b y the local leader o f the N a t i o n a l Party,
a c o n f e r e n c e m e t i n t h e W i n d h o e k T u r n h a l l e ( G y m n a s i u m ) at t h e
beginning o f September 1975. T h e delegates represented ethnic
g r o u p s ( w i t h w h i t e s as o n e g r o u p ) a n d t h u s S W A P O , as a n a t i o n a l
party, w a s e x c l u d e d . N e v e r t h e l e s s the declaration o f intent, issued
b y t h e T u r n h a l l e C o n f e r e n c e , t o m o v e t o w a r d s i n d e p e n d e n c e as
a s i n g l e state w i t h the p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f all g r o u p s in a new
g o v e r n m e n t w a s a significant c h a n g e f r o m the d i r e c t i o n in w h i c h
Pretoria had previously been pressing.
M e a n w h i l e the S o u t h A f r i c a n D e f e n c e F o r c e w h i c h , since the
early skirmishes w i t h S W A P O , had built a substantial military
b a s e at G r o o t f o n t e i n a n d o c c u p i e d m u c h o f t h e a r e a s o u t h o f t h e
b o r d e r , w a s o r d e r e d in J u l y 1 9 7 5 t o e n t e r A n g o l a . S o u t h A f r i c a ' s
reasons included a desire to protect the K u n e n e s c h e m e w h i c h w a s
still b e i n g b u i l t , a n d t h e h o p e o f s t r e n g t h e n i n g a n t i - M P L A f o r c e s
in t h e c i v i l w a r t h e n r a g i n g . I n m i d - O c t o b e r a S o u t h A f r i c a n a r m y
c o l u m n m a r c h e d rapidly n o r t h t o w a r d s L u a n d a . B u t a m o n t h later
the picture had c h a n g e d radically. S o v i e t arms, i n c l u d i n g the
' Stalin o r g a n s ' w h i c h halted H o l d e n R o b e r t o ' s F N L A a r m y o n
the outskirts o f the capital o n the e v e o f i n d e p e n d e n c e , and
C u b a n troops w e r e p o u r i n g into A n g o l a . B y m i d - N o v e m b e r the
S o u t h A f r i c a n s w e r e s t u c k at N o v o R e d o n d o w i t h n o p r o s p e c t
o f further a d v a n c e w i t h o u t fearful escalation o f a w a r that w a s
rapidly b e c o m i n g a nightmare to Pretoria strategists. B u t w o r s e
was to c o m e : t o w a r d s the end o f the m o n t h t w o S o u t h A f r i c a n
s o l d i e r s , c a p t u r e d in A n g o l a , w e r e d i s p l a y e d t o t h e w o r l d ' s p r e s s
in L a g o s a n d , t h e n e x t d a y , N i g e r i a , w h i c h in J u n e h a d been
b a c k i n g U N I T A , a n n o u n c e d t h a t it w o u l d r e c o g n i s e t h e M P L A
g o v e r n m e n t , citing the U N I T A and F N L A acceptance o f S o u t h
A f r i c a n s u p p o r t as a m a j o r f a c t o r i n t h e d e c i s i o n . B y J a n u a r y 1 9 7 6
S o u t h Africa had n o o p t i o n but to cut her losses and w i t h d r a w ,
having achieved nothing but the increase, if not the original
1
intervention, o f C u b a n t r o o p s in A f r i c a .
In the same m o n t h the Security C o u n c i l resolved u n a n i m o u s l y
that S o u t h A f r i c a w i t h d r a w her illegal administration in N a m i b i a
a n d c a l l e d f o r free e l e c t i o n s u n d e r U N c o n t r o l . I n A u g u s t 1 9 7 6
the T u r n h a l l e C o n f e r e n c e a g r e e d o n e v e n t u a l i n d e p e n d e n c e and
1
T h i s p o i n t is u n c l e a r . F o r a n a t t e m p t t o sift t h e e v i d e n c e s e e J o h n s o n , How long
will South Africa survive?, 137-54.
326

T a b l e 6 . 1 3 . Employment in Namibia, 197J.
Percentage
Percentage whites as
proportion proportion
of labour of total
Sector Total force in sector
Agriculture
Subsistence/communal 90000 30.5 0
commercial / capitalist 52 800 17.9
Government and other services 28 300 9.6 51

Mining and quarrying 17500 5-9 9
Manufacturing, electricity 13 200 4.5 35
and water
Construction 12 500 4.2 23
Self-employed in 11000 3-7 0
subsistence areas
Commerce and finance 10400 3-5 39
Transport and communication 9300 3-1 l
9
Domestic service 8000 2.7 0
Fishing 7500 M 7
Defence/resistance/refugees 6000 2.0
Unemployed and unspecified 29000 9.8 0
Total labour force 295 500 100 13
Source: Wolfgang Thomas, Economic development in Namibia (Mainz, 1978).
the S o u t h A f r i c a n p r i m e minister accepted the decision, thus

formally marking the end o f S o u t h Africa's l o n g attempt to
incorporate the mandated territory. B u t w h e n colonialism ends
neo-colonialism tends t o begin, and the prospect o f cutting formal
political links b y n o means implied that S o u t h Africa r e n o u n c e d
all i n t e r e s t i n t h e s h a p e o f t h e e m e r g i n g g o v e r n m e n t . I n o r d e r t o
understand the constraints within w h i c h N a m i b i a n politics w o u l d
s u b s e q u e n t l y b e p l a y e d o u t it is h e l p f u l t o g l a n c e at t h e s t r u c t u r e
o f t h e e c o n o m y - a n d its l i n k s w i t h S o u t h A f r i c a - a t t h i s t i m e
(table 6.13). I n terms o f c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o the g r o s s d o m e s t i c
p r o d u c t o f t h e c o u n t r y it is e s t i m a t e d t h a t t h e p r o p o r t i o n s i n 1 9 7 5
w e r e : m i n i n g 27 p e r c e n t ; m a n u f a c t u r i n g a n d c o n s t r u c t i o n 1 7 p e r
c e n t ; agriculture 16 p e r cent a n d the tertiary sector, i n c l u d i n g
g o v e r n m e n t s e r v i c e s , 40 p e r cent. F r o m m i n i n g , w h i c h w a s the
3*7

m a j o r s o u r c e o f t a x r e v e n u e , e s t i m a t e d g r o s s e a r n i n g s in 1 9 7 3
c o m p r i s e d 61 p e r c e n t f r o m d i a m o n d s ; 18 p e r c e n t f r o m c o p p e r ;
9 p e r c e n t f r o m z i n c ; a n d 8 p e r c e n t f r o m l e a d . B u t , after s o m e
R 200 m i l l i o n i n v e s t m e n t b y B r i t i s h a n d S o u t h A f r i c a n c o m p a n i e s ,
u r a n i u m p r o d u c t i o n s t a r t e d in 1 9 7 6 , a n d w a s e x p e c t e d t o b e m u c h
t h e l a r g e s t s o u r c e o f e x p o r t e a r n i n g s b y t h e e a r l y 1980s d e s p i t e
t h e fact t h a t t h e R ó s s i n g m i n e w a s t i e d b y l o n g - t e r m d e l i v e r y
c o n t r a c t s t o t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m at a l o w p r i c e .
A measure o f N a m i b i a ' s e c o n o m i c subservience m a y be seen
in t h e fact t h a t , o f t h e c o m p a n i e s w h i c h b e t w e e n t h e m c o n t r o l l e d
t h e 20 m a j o r m i n e s in t h e c o u n t r y , 12 w e r e p r i m a r i l y S o u t h
A f r i c a n , w h i l e five w e r e A m e r i c a n , f o u r w e r e B r i t i s h , o n e w a s
C a n a d i a n , a n d t h e rest o f d i v e r s e o w n e r s h i p . N o r w a s it o n l y i n
m i n i n g that S o u t h African interest w a s p a r a m o u n t . In the
capitalist farming sector, w h i c h p r o d u c e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y nine-
tenths o f agricultural o u t p u t , a substantial p o r t i o n o f the land w a s
o w n e d b y S o u t h African individuals and c o m p a n i e s , w h i l e the
p r o c e s s i n g o f m e a t ( a n d fish) a n d t h e m a r k e t i n g o f a g r i c u l t u r a l
e x p o r t s w e r e l a r g e l y in S o u t h A f r i c a n h a n d s . A n d t h e g o v e r n m e n t
sector, including railways and other communications, w a s , o f
c o u r s e , an extension o f S o u t h A f r i c a ' s o w n . T h u s the t w o
c o u n t r i e s w e r e b o u n d t i g h t l y t o g e t h e r a l t h o u g h , as h a s b e e n
a r g u e d a b o v e , the absence o f large-scale oscillating m i g r a t i o n to
S o u t h A f r i c a o v e r a l o n g p e r i o d o f t i m e left N a m i b i a w i t h o n e
important degree o f freedom not inherited b y M o z a m b i q u e ,
L e s o t h o , Botswana, or Swaziland w h e n they became independent.
N e v e r t h e l e s s o f all t h e c o u n t r i e s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e R e p u b l i c it w a s
in N a m i b i a t h a t S o u t h A f r i c a ' s v e s t e d i n t e r e s t s w e r e g r e a t e s t a n d
w h e r e , in t h e p e r i o d o f t r a n s i t i o n t o i n d e p e n d e n c e , s h e s o u g h t t o
retain the greatest influence.
C O N C L U S I O N
T h i s chapter has focussed primarily o n political and e c o n o m i c

issues. Y e t p e o p l e also w r o t e p o e t r y , c o m p o s e d and p l a y e d music,
danced, peered through microscopes, painted, designed bridges,
built d a m s , healed the sick, and w e r e creative in a m y r i a d w a y s .
T h e r e w a s indeed an e x u b e r a n t vitality, a sense o f e n e r g y , w h i c h
ran t h r o u g h t h e s o c i e t y a n d f o u n d e x p r e s s i o n in m a n y f o r m s
r a n g i n g f r o m t h e l y r i c s o f K i n g K o n g t o t h e p o e t r y o f t h e sestigers;
from the plays o f A t h o l F u g a r d to the jazz o f D o l l a r B r a n d . T h e r e
328

C O N C L U S I O N
w a s m u c h o f beauty and truth that g r e w o n the dung-heap o f

S o u t h Africa's social system.
B u t o n e final q u e s t i o n r e m a i n s . W a s S o u t h A f r i c a i n t h i s p e r i o d
b e s t s e e n as a n a b e r r a t i o n i n t h e w o r l d o f c i v i l i s e d p e o p l e ; a n
o u t c a s t f r o m s o c i e t y ? O r w a s it b e s t u n d e r s t o o d as a m i c r o c o s m
o f t h e w o r l d at l a r g e ? T h e r e w a s m u c h t h a t w a s u n c o m f o r t a b l y
familiar a b o u t S o u t h Africa. A m e r i c a n visitors f o u n d s t r o n g
similarities t o the pattern o f s e g r e g a t i o n that existed in the D e e p
S o u t h as r e c e n t l y as t h e m i d - 1 9 6 0 s . E u r o p e a n s s a w a s p e c t s o f t h e
m i g r a n t l a b o u r system reflected in their o w n treatment o f
Gastarbeiter. T h e j u x t a p o s i t i o n o f c o m f o r t a b l e w e a l t h b e s i d e
grinding poverty, w h i c h appalled visitors from Western E u r o p e
o r N o r t h A m e r i c a , w a s familiar t o those w h o l i v e d in N e w D e l h i
or R i o de Janeiro. T h e tensions springing from ethnic and cultural
d i f f e r e n c e s w e r e n o m o r e difficult t h a n i n M a l a y s i a o r t h e S u d a n .
N o r w a s t h e i m m e n s e p o w e r o f t h e state w i t h its f o r c i b l e
interference w i t h personal freedom s o m e t h i n g w i t h w h i c h
Chileans, C a m b o d i a n s , o r inhabitants o f the G u l a g A r c h i p e l a g o
w e r e unfamiliar. M a n y o f the divisions and tensions w h i c h
wracked South Africa during the twentieth century were to be
found in other parts o f the w o r l d : b l a c k / w h i t e ; r i c h / p o o r ;
migrant/non-rriigrant; citizen/non-citizen; c o r e / p e r i p h e r y ; capi
talist w e s t / T h i r d W o r l d ; state p o w e r / i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m . A n d
within the wider southern African region the relationship b e t w e e n
a m a g n e t i c e c o n o m y w h o s e fields o f f o r c e e x t e n d e d o v e r a n a r e a
w h i c h i n c l u d e d o t h e r n a t i o n a l states w a s i t s e l f a n e x a m p l e o f t h e
o n e - w a y filter f u n c t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l b o u n d a r i e s i n a w o r l d o f
uneven development. Indeed, with increasing awareness o f the
m u t u a l i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e o f all c o u n t r i e s i n t h e ' g l o b a l v i l l a g e ' ,
t h e r e w a s a p r o f o u n d s e n s e i n w h i c h t h e p r o b l e m s - as d i s t i n c t
f r o m t h e s o l u t i o n s - f a c i n g s o u t h e r n A f r i c a d u r i n g this p e r i o d o f
its h i s t o r y s h o u l d b e s e e n n o t o n l y as t h o s e o f a b a c k w a r d a r e a
still t r a p p e d i n t h e p a s t b u t a l s o , p a r a d o x i c a l l y , as i s s u e s w h i c h
w o u l d i n c r e a s i n g l y c h a l l e n g e the w h o l e w o r l d in t h e future. A n d
it w a s t h e a t t e m p t t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e s e g l o b a l i s s u e s i n t h e i r
particular S o u t h A f r i c a n c o n t e x t that g a v e a sense o f u r g e n c y t o
the debate a m o n g s t historians, e c o n o m i s t s a n d others in the 1970s
as t h e y g r a p p l e d w i t h s u c h q u e s t i o n s as t h e n a t u r e o f t h e
relationship b e t w e e n class a n d race o r b e t w e e n d e v e l o p m e n t a n d
u n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t in a capitalist society.
Y e t there w a s m u c h that w a s u n i q u e a b o u t S o u t h Africa. N o
329

o t h e r c o u n t r y , after t h e d e f e a t o f t h e T h i r d R e i c h , b u i l t r a c e i n t o
its l e g a l s t r u c t u r e s o t h a t w h o m a p e r s o n m i g h t m a r r y , w h e r e a
p e r s o n m i g h t l i v e , b e e d u c a t e d o r s w i m in the sea, w h e t h e r a
person m i g h t v o t e , or h o w a person m i g h t w o r k , w e r e critically
affected b y a n c e s t r y a n d s k i n c o l o u r . N o o t h e r c o u n t r y i n t h e
w o r l d h a d b u i l t its p o l i t i c a l e c o n o m y e x p l i c i t l y o n a s y s t e m o f
o s c i l l a t i n g m i g r a t i o n w h i c h t r e a t e d its w o r k e r s n o t as p e r s o n s b u t
as l a b o u r u n i t s , a n d w h i c h m a d e it a c r i m e f o r w o m e n t o l i v e w i t h
their h u s b a n d s . N o o t h e r c o u n t r y in the w o r l d used the l a w quite
so systematically to control the lives o f those w h o lived w i t h i n
it. I n n o o t h e r s o c i e t y d i d s o m a n y p e o p l e feel s o d e m e a n e d b y
the structures o f racism.
M o r e and m o r e , in the years after the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r , S o u t h
Africa b e c a m e the ' b e l o v e d outcast ' ; an extreme manifestation o f
all t h a t o t h e r s o c i e t i e s f e a r e d a n d r e j e c t e d a b o u t t h e m s e l v e s . A
B r i t i s h t e l e v i s i o n film o f t h e N a z i c o n c e n t r a t i o n c a m p s s h o c k e d
t h o s e w h o s a w it n o t l e a s t b e c a u s e o f t h e w a y i n w h i c h , i n t h e
1
hands o f a S o u t h African script writer, it s h o w e d h o w o r d i n a r y
m e n and w o m e n c o u l d b e c o m e c a u g h t u p in the perpetration o f
a b a r b a r i s m that w a s b e y o n d belief. Similarly in S o u t h A f r i c a the
very normality o f people seemed to blind them to the evil
c o n s e q u e n c e s o f structures t h e y h a d built u p in p u r s u i t o f a g o a l
w h i c h placed self-preservation, g r o u p security and prosperity
before love o f neighbour.
T h e t r o u b l e d sub-continent in the m i d - 1 9 7 0 s s e e m e d to be
m o v i n g i n e x o r a b l y t o w a r d s m a s s i v e c o n f l i c t as t h o s e e x c l u d e d ,
not only from political p o w e r but increasingly from citizenship
itself, s o u g h t m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t t o h e l p t h e m b r e a k l o o s e f r o m t h e
oppression w h i c h gripped them. South Africa, proclaimed one o f
its g e n e r a l s i n 1 9 7 7 , w a s at w a r . B u t t h e firing line did n o t lie,
as t h e g e n e r a l s t h o u g h t , a l o n g t h e n a t i o n a l b o u n d a r i e s o f t h e
r e g i o n . T h e truth w a s e v e n m o r e painful than that. A s Saint-
2
E x u p é r y h a s p o i n t e d o u t i n a d i f f e r e n t c o n t e x t , t h e firing l i n e w a s
i n v i s i b l e : it p a s s e d t h r o u g h t h e h e a r t s o f t h e p e o p l e . F o r it w a s
civil war.
1
C h a r l e s B l o o m b e r g in t h e T h a m e s T e l e v i s i o n s e r i e s , The world at war, p r o d u c e d
by J e r e m y Isaacs.
2
A n t o i n e d e S a i n t - E x u p é r y , Wind, sand and stars ( H a r m o n d s w o r t h , 1966), 145.
33°

CHAPTER 7
ENGLISH-SPEAKING WEST AFRICA
Can the English-speaking countries o f W e s t Africa - Nigeria,

Ghana, Sierra L e o n e , Liberia and the G a m b i a - be considered as
a separate g r o u p ? A p a r t from Sierra L e o n e and Liberia they are
not contiguous and might seem t o have little in c o m m o n other
than their imported official l a n g u a g e ; e v e n this has very different
status a m o n g different g r o u p s in each country. F o r the Creoles
o f Sierra L e o n e and Liberians o f A m e r i c a n descent it is their native
language; for the Hausa-speaking peoples o f Northern N i g e r i a it
takes second place to their o w n language, reduced to writing l o n g
before the advent o f the British.
T h e impact o f colonial rule by Britain on its West African
colonies was uneven. F o r some g r o u p s , in particular the coastal
communities under British rule for o v e r a century, it deeply
affected their culture and g a v e them strong links w i t h others
similarly affected elsewhere in W e s t Africa. E v e n for A m e r i c o -
Liberians that British connexion was important because o f their
religious and educational links with F r e e t o w n . T h e real founder
o f Nigerian political journalism in the 1890s, for instance, was
John Payne Jackson, an A m e r i c o - L i b e r i a n . T h e n u m b e r affected
by such links, h o w e v e r , was tiny. A n d in all five countries there
have been ' t w o n a t i o n s ' : small coastal communities with l o n g
connexions with Britain or, in the case o f Liberia, A m e r i c a , and
much larger communities w h i c h came under British rule only at
the turn o f the century.
Politically the d e v e l o p m e n t o f the territories after independence
showed marked divergencies. T h e G a m b i a remained a multi-party
democracy. G h a n a experienced one-party civilian dictatorship,
multi-party democracy, ' d o m i n a n t p a r t y ' rule, and military
government. Sierra L e o n e had multi-party, and t w o versions o f
one-party, rule, as well as a military regime. Nigeria experienced
a period o f turbulent multi-party g o v e r n m e n t , f o l l o w e d b y 13
years o f military rule, and then an American-type presidential
government. Liberia m o v e d from personal, if benign, autocracy
53i

E N G L I S H - S P E A K I N G W E S T A F R I C A
to a liberal f o r m o f one-party rule, and then to military rule. T h e r e

w a s n o u n a n i m i t y in f o r e i g n p o l i c y , and there w a s s o m e t i m e s d e e p
e n m i t y b e t w e e n t h e s e c o u n t r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y in N k r u m a h ' s d a y .
T h e interterritorial organisations for currency, research, airways
and parallel functions o n c e established for the four British
colonies w e r e dismantled, w i t h the e x c e p t i o n o f the W e s t African
E x a m i n a t i o n s C o u n c i l , w h i c h L i b e r i a joined in 1969.
T r a d e b e t w e e n t h e c o u n t r i e s c o n t i n u e d t o b e as i n s i g n i f i c a n t
as it h a d b e e n i n t h e c o l o n i a l e r a . T h e g r e a t B r i t i s h firms, s u c h
as t h e U n i t e d A f r i c a C o m p a n y o r P a t e r s o n Z o c h o n i s , w h i c h w e r e
h o u s e h o l d n a m e s i n all o f t h e m , i n c l u d i n g L i b e r i a , l o s t t h e i r
c o m m e r c i a l d o m i n a n c e . A f t e r i n d e p e n d e n c e , m o v e m e n t o f staff
b y t h e s e firms b e t w e e n t h e t e r r i t o r i e s c e a s e d , a l t h o u g h m o v e
m e n t o f individual citizens, including traders, continued o n a
c o n s i d e r a b l e scale.
Y e t , a p a r t f r o m h i s t o r i c a l c o n v e n i e n c e , t h e r e is still r e a s o n t o
treat t h e s e c o u n t r i e s as a g r o u p . I n a s e n s e t h e m e r g i n g o f t h e * t w o
n a t i o n s ' in each c o u n t r y m e a n t the m o v e m e n t inland f r o m the
c o a s t o f m a n y o f t h e e x t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e s w h i c h t h e five c o u n t r i e s
shared. T h e national legal systems had a c o m m o n o r i g i n and theor
etical attachment t o the rule o f l a w c o n t i n u e d t o be s t r o n g . T h e i r
universities had strong links. T h e i r administrative, police and
military practices remained similar. A sense o f a shared political
p a s t p e r s i s t e d . N a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s b e g a n s o o n e r in t h e a n g l o p h o n e
than in the f r a n c o p h o n e c o u n t r i e s and there w e r e a l w a y s s t r o n g
links b e t w e e n the politicians o f the British colonies. D r A z i k i w e ,
f o r e x a m p l e , first m a d e h i s n a m e i n t h e G o l d C o a s t . T h e r e l i n g e r e d
in a n g l o p h o n e c o u n t r i e s the v i e w n o t o n l y that s o m e f r a n c o p h o n e
countries w e r e n o t really i n d e p e n d e n t o f F r a n c e but that their
leaders did n o t w a n t t h e m to be. T h e i m p o r t a n c e o f this political
d i v i s i o n d i m i n i s h e d r a p i d l y b u t it s u r v i v e d i n t o t h e late 1 9 7 0 s .
A l t h o u g h t h e C o m m o n w e a l t h c o n n e x i o n h a d less a n d less t o
d o w i t h p o l i t i c s , it r e m a i n e d i m p o r t a n t in t h e fields o f e d u c a t i o n
a n d t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e . It b r o u g h t t o g e t h e r c o u n t l e s s W e s t
A f r i c a n s in o r g a n i s a t i o n s o f m a n y k i n d s , s o m e n o n - g o v e r n m e n t a l .
A b o v e all t h e E n g l i s h l a n g u a g e itself, still little c h a l l e n g e d as t h e
language o f g o v e r n m e n t , law, higher education and b i g business,
w a s n o t o n l y r e g a r d e d as a u n i f y i n g f o r c e i n s i d e e a c h c o u n t r y b u t
f a c i l i t a t e d c o o p e r a t i o n a m o n g a n g l o p h o n e A f r i c a n s . It l i n k e d
2
33

them to a cultural system t o w h i c h they themselves w e r e m a k i n g

a significant contribution.
A l l t h i s m a y b e said t o h a v e affected o n l y t h e é l i t e s a n d t o b e
a dwindling imperial legacy. T o the politicians it certainly
m a t t e r e d less t h a n w i d e r A f r i c a n l i n k s a n d in n o w a y w e a k e n e d
these. B u t for an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the recent history o f these
countries a k n o w l e d g e o f the a n g l o p h o n e links remains necessary,
e v e n i f L i b e r i a is a s p e c i a l c a s e .
THE I M P A C T O F T H E S E C O N D W O R L D W A R
No l e a d i n g n a t i o n a l i s t in E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g W e s t A f r i c a c l a i m e d
that the 1939-45 w a r significantly c h a n g e d his political o u t l o o k ,
though many testified t o t h e effect on them o f Mussolini's
invasion o f Ethiopia in 1 9 3 5 . I n h i s a u t o b i o g r a p h y , Kw'ame
N k r u m a h hardly mentions the 1939-45 war, during most o f w h i c h
h e w a s i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , w h i l e C h i e f A w o l o w o , w h o w a s in
L o n d o n in t h e w a r y e a r s , g i v e s it o n l y p a s s i n g m e n t i o n i n h i s
1
p o l i t i c a l m a n i f e s t o , Path to Nigerian freedom, p u b l i s h e d i n 1 9 4 7 .
A l t h o u g h D r N n a m d i A z i k i w e constantly stressed the need for
Britain t o declare w a r aims for the future o f the c o l o n i e s a n d later
deplored Britain's lack o f gratitude to her colonial subjects w h o
had helped her w i n the w a r , his o w n political p h i l o s o p h y h a d b e e n
f o r m e d l o n g b e f o r e , as h i s Renascent Africa, p u b l i s h e d in 1 9 3 7 ,
2
shows. T h e same w a s true o f the Sierra L e o n e a n nationalist
l e a d e r , I. T . A . W a l l a c e - J o h n s o n , w h o s e p r e v i o u s r a d i c a l i s m a n d
trade-union activity s o alarmed the Sierra L e o n e g o v e r n m e n t that
he w a s interned for m u c h o f the w a r .
Is it t h e n m i s t a k e n t o s e e t h e 1 9 3 9 - 4 5 w a r as a w a t e r s h e d i n
t h e h i s t o r y o f W e s t A f r i c a n n a t i o n a l i s m ? T h e a n s w e r is t h a t t h e
war did n o t create, b u t stimulated and g a v e scope to, forces
a l r e a d y at p l a y . S u p e r f i c i a l l y , h o w e v e r , p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i n B r i t i s h
W e s t A f r i c a o n t h e e v e o f t h e w a r w a s still c o n c e r n e d w i t h ' t h e
3
i d e a l s o f e a r l y V i c t o r i a n r a d i c a l i s m ' as L o r d H a i l e y p u t i t . Thus
the N i g e r i a n Y o u t h M o v e m e n t , w h o s e leaders w e r e n o t v e r y
y o u n g , d e m a n d e d r e f o r m b u t n o t s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t at its c o n f e r -
1
O b a f e m i A w o l o w o , Path to Nigerian freedom ( L o n d o n , 1947), 2 7 - 8 , 36.
2
N n a m d i A z i k i w e , Renascent Africa ( A c c r a , 1937, r e p r . L o n d o n , 1968).
3
Journal of the Royal African Society, A p r i l 1937, 36, 140-1.
333

e n c e i n L a g o s i n 1 9 4 0 . I n t h e G o l d C o a s t , p o l i t i c s w a s as m u c h
c o n c e r n e d w i t h r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n c h i e f s a n d c o m m o n e r s as
b e t w e e n the country and the colonial p o w e r . T h e o n l y funda
mental critiques o f the colonial system in pre-war British W e s t
Africa had c o m e f r o m A z i k i w e a n d W a l l a c e - J o h n s o n jointly in
t h e G o l d C o a s t , a n d s e p a r a t e l y in t h e i r o w n c o u n t r i e s . B u t as Y a w
T w u m a s i a n d others h a v e s h o w n , the urban and rural discontent
o n w h i c h A z i k i w e a n d , after t h e i r r e t u r n , b o t h A w o l o w o a n d
N k r u m a h w e r e a b l e t o d r a w in f o r m i n g p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s w i t h m a s s
b a c k i n g and d e m a n d i n g s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t h a d their roots in p r e - w a r
c o n d i t i o n s , w h i c h w e r e exacerbated b y w a r t i m e inflation a n d
1
r e s t r i c t i o n s . T h i s d i s c o n t e n t h a d b e e n m a n i f e s t e d in t h e G o l d
C o a s t c o c o a h o l d - u p o f 1938 against the ' p o o l ' c o n t r o l l e d b y
e x p a t r i a t e firms. T h e s i m i l a r h o l d - u p i n W e s t e r n N i g e r i a w a s less
effective.
O n t h e e v e o f t h e w a r A f r i c a n s in all f o u r B r i t i s h W e s t A f r i c a n
territories w e r e a l o n g w a y from the s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t d e m a n d e d
by Wallace-Johnson and A z i k i w e . In Nigeria the northern prov
inces did n o t e v e n c o m e within the c o m p e t e n c e o f the Legislative
C o u n c i l . N o N i g e r i a n sat o n t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l . T h e L e g i s
l a t i v e C o u n c i l h a d a m a j o r i t y o f officials, a n d o f t h e A f r i c a n
m e m b e r s o n l y four w e r e elected, and then o n a restricted
franchise. O n l y four N i g e r i a n s o c c u p i e d senior posts in the
administrative service, t h o u g h others held senior a p p o i n t m e n t s in
the judicial a n d medical services. In the G o l d C o a s t there w e r e o n l y
three elected m e m b e r s o f the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l , w h i c h c o u l d n o t
legislate for A s a n t e and the N o r t h e r n Territories n o r for British
T o g o l a n d , w h i c h , a l t h o u g h it w a s u n d e r L e a g u e o f N a t i o n s
2
m a n d a t e , w a s a d m i n i s t e r e d as p a r t o f t h e G o l d C o a s t . I n S i e r r a
L e o n e , t o o , there w e r e only three elected African m e m b e r s o f the
L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l , w h i c h h a d a n official m a j o r i t y . N o A f r i c a n s
sat o n t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l . I n t h e G a m b i a p o l i t i c s w e r e
c o n f i n e d t o B a t h u r s t ( B a n j u l ) m u n i c i p a l offices.
I n all f o u r c o l o n i e s t h e o u t b r e a k o f w a r p r o d u c e d p r o t e s t a t i o n s
o f loyalty from many quarters. T h o u s a n d s volunteered for the
f o r c e s . M o n e y w a s r a i s e d f o r w a r c h a r i t i e s , p r a y e r s w e r e offered
for an A l l i e d v i c t o r y . E d u c a t e d W e s t A f r i c a n s realised w h a t a N a z i
1
S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , G . O . O l u s a n y a , The Second World War and politics in Nigeria
19)9-19J3 ( L o n d o n , 1973), 63-6.
2
T h e G o v e r n o r o f the G o l d Coast did, h o w e v e r , c o m m o n l y apply laws passed b y
the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l t o the w h o l e c o u n t r y .
334

THE S E C O N D W O R L D W A R
t r i u m p h m i g h t m e a n for t h e m . O n l y in N i g e r i a , a n d there, until

t h e N C N C w a s f o u n d e d , l a r g e l y t h r o u g h The West African Pilot,
w e r e the British constantly and sometimes bitterly reminded that
Africans, t o o , expected s o m e political rewards for their w a r
s e r v i c e s . The West African Pilot w e l c o m e d t h e A t l a n t i c C h a r t e r i n
1941, a n d attacked C h u r c h i l l for his e x c l u s i o n o f the c o l o n i e s from
its a m b i t .
A few concessions were, however, made to African demands
for a greater share in their g o v e r n m e n t . I n 1942 t w o A f r i c a n
members were appointed to the G o l d Coast E x e c u t i v e Council,
o n e o f t h e m a chief, N a n a Sir O f o r i A t t a , t h u s c o n t i n u i n g British
policy, strongly criticised b y the intelligentsia, o f placing h e a v y
r e l i a n c e o n t h e c h i e f s as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e p e o p l e . I n 1943 t w o
Nigerians were nominated to the Nigerian E x e c u t i v e Council. In
1943 S i e r r a L e o n e a n s w e r e a l s o a p p o i n t e d t o t h a t c o u n t r y ' s
Executive Council. T h e appointment o f t w o G o l d Coasters,
A . L . A d u a n d K . A . B u s i a , as d i s t r i c t c o m m i s s i o n e r s i n 1 9 4 2 w a s
h a i l e d as a m a j o r b r e a k t h r o u g h . G o l d C o a s t e r s h a d h e l d s u c h
p o s t s i n t h e 1 8 9 0 s ; b u t s i n c e 1 9 0 0 field a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n a l l f o u r
colonies had been the exclusive preserve o f the British.
These modest constitutional advances t o o k place against a
b a c k g r o u n d o f rapid e c o n o m i c a n d social c h a n g e . D u r i n g the w a r
the British W e s t A f r i c a n c o l o n i e s b e c a m e m o r e c l o s e l y integrated
w i t h the British e c o n o m y than e v e r before. F r o m 1942 a senior
British cabinet minister w a s based in A c c r a t o co-ordinate the
c o l o n i e s ' w a r effort. F o r t h e first t i m e t h e c o l o n i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s
seriously c o n c e r n e d t h e m s e l v e s w i t h m a x i m i s i n g p r o d u c t i o n in all
fields. F o r e x a m p l e , 1 8 0 0 0 l a b o u r e r s w e r e f o r c e d t o w o r k i n t h e
m i n e s i n N i g e r i a , a n official m a r k e t i n g - b o a r d s y s t e m f o r e x p o r t
crops w a s established, and production drives w e r e launched. A s
Peter B a u e r puts it: 'leaflets w e r e d r o p p e d f r o m aeroplanes t o
explain t o w o m e n and children c r a c k i n g p a l m kernels in the
r e m o t e A f r i c a n b u s h o r g r o w i n g g r o u n d n u t s in the arid semi-
desert s o u t h o f the Sahara, that their p r o d u c e w a s u r g e n t l y
1
required in the w a r for f r e e d o m ' .
State intervention, h o w e v e r , strengthened the position o f
e x p a t r i a t e firms, s i n c e it w a s e a s i e r t o o p e r a t e c o n t r o l s t h r o u g h
t h e m than t h r o u g h the rising class o f A f r i c a n entrepreneurs a n d
s m a l l t r a d e r s , w h o w e r e t h u s a l i e n a t e d a n d b e c a m e after t h e w a r
a main source o f nationalist support. T h e controls placed b y the
1
P . T . B a u e r , West African trade ( L o n d o n , 1954), 252.
335

colonial g o v e r n m e n t s on prices paid to primary producers, the

rapid inflation arising f r o m s h o r t a g e s o f i m p o r t s and the increase
in t h e n u m b e r o f p e o p l e flocking into the t o w n s s e e k i n g w o r k
in t h e n e w i n d u s t r i e s a n d c o n s t r u c t i o n p r o j e c t s r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h e
war effort added fuel to the nationalist fire. There was a
multiplication o f trade u n i o n s w h i c h w e r e to p r o v e in b o t h the
G o l d C o a s t and N i g e r i a i m p o r t a n t supporters o f the nationalist
cause. In 1945, before the w a r ' s end, N i g e r i a experienced a 44-day
general strike against the cost o f l i v i n g .
T h e w a r a l s o e n c o u r a g e d l o c a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y n o t o n l y in f o o d
but in s u c h i t e m s as f u r n i t u r e a n d soap - the possibilities o f
p r o d u c i n g t h e s e l o c a l l y i m p r e s s e d n a t i o n a l i s t s . It a l s o m e a n t a
c o n s t r u c t i o n b o o m in s o m e a r e a s , a n d s i g n i f i c a n t improvements
i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , n o t a b l y a i r f i e l d s , b u i l t a n d e x p a n d e d i n all
f o u r c o l o n i e s , a n d in L i b e r i a , as R A F a n d A m e r i c a n s t a g i n g p o s t s
( t h e p r e s e n c e o f s o m e 5000 w e l l - p a i d U S s o l d i e r s , m a n y b l a c k , in
L i b e r i a is s a i d t o h a v e h a d a ' m a r k e d i m p a c t ' o n ' t r i b a l ' p e o p l e ,
1
still s e c o n d - c l a s s c i t i z e n s t h e r e ) . F o r t h e first t i m e t h e Sierra
L e o n e C o l o n y w a s connected w i t h the Protectorate by a m o t o r a b l e
road.
Parallel w i t h the cautious constitutional a d v a n c e s , the British
g o v e r n m e n t also i n t r o d u c e d the 1940 U K C o l o n i a l D e v e l o p m e n t
and Welfare A c t expressing the c o n c e p t , h o w e v e r feebly, o f the
duty of colonial powers to promote economic and social
d e v e l o p m e n t in t h e i r c o l o n i e s . A l t h o u g h it o w e d its o r i g i n p a r t l y
t o c o n c e r n a b o u t c o n d i t i o n s in t h e C a r i b b e a n , its i n t r o d u c t i o n a l s o
o w e d m u c h t o w a r t i m e s e n t i m e n t , a n d it i n s i s t e d o n trade-union
f r e e d o m i n affected c o l o n i e s .
A major c o n t r i b u t i o n o f the British W e s t A f r i c a n c o l o n i e s to
t h e w a r effort w a s t h e p r o v i s i o n o f t r o o p s a n d c a r r i e r s . A t t h e
war's end W e s t African forces numbered some 150000-the
majority o f w h o m had volunteered for service and were not
conscripted - against 8000 at its b e g i n n i n g . T h e y h a d fought
E u r o p e a n s a n d h e l p e d t o l i q u i d a t e a c o l o n i a l e m p i r e in E t h i o p i a ,
fighting beside white South Africans. O v e r half w e n t to India and
distinguished t h e m s e l v e s a g a i n s t t h e J a p a n e s e in B u r m a ; they
served as P i o n e e r s in the Middle East. A few, most Sierra
L e o n e a n s , o b t a i n e d c o m m i s s i o n s in the R o y a l A i r F o r c e , b u t w i t h
o n e o r t w o e x c e p t i o n s all W e s t A f r i c a n s o l d i e r s , m o s t i l l i t e r a t e ,
1
J. G . L i e b e n o w , Liberia: the evolution of privilege ( I t h a c a , 1969), 7 7 - 8 .
356

T H E S E C O N D W O R L D W A R
w e r e c o m m a n d e d b y British officers. D e s p i t e the fact that A f r i c a n

rates o f p a y w e r e m u c h l o w e r than t h o s e o f the B r i t i s h , they
b r o u g h t cash to s o m e subsistence e c o n o m y areas and compared
f a v o u r a b l y w i t h civilian rates. A r m y technical training also offered
n e w o p p o r t u n i t i e s . T h e contrast b e t w e e n p a y and p r o s p e c t s in the
a r m y a n d c i v i l i a n life l e d e x - s e r v i c e m e n t o l o o k f o r r e d r e s s t o t h e
post-war politicians, most notably in the G o l d Coast, which
contributed proportionately far more to the forces than did
N i g e r i a . B u t w h i l e in the G o l d C o a s t e x - s e r v i c e m e n w e r e p r o m i
n e n t i n t h e 1948 A c c r a d i s t u r b a n c e s , i n N i g e r i a t h e m a j o r i t y c a m e
f r o m the n o r t h and those in the s o u t h dissipated their influence
in s p l i n t e r organisations.
Few ex-servicemen became political leaders - M o k w u g o
O k o y e , l e a d e r o f N i g e r i a ' s Z i k i s t m o v e m e n t , is o n e e x c e p t i o n -
a n d t h e first g e n e r a t i o n o f a n g l o p h o n e A f r i c a n m i n i s t e r s were
n o t a b l y i g n o r a n t o f m i l i t a r y m a t t e r s . N o r is it p o s s i b l e a c c u r a t e l y
t o assess the political influence o f their service overseas on
ex-soldiers. F r o m limited personal experience o f serving with
W e s t A f r i c a n s in E t h i o p i a , I could not g o as far as Gabriel
Olusanya, w h o declared, ' soldiers w h o w e n t to w a r came back
1
as n e w m e n w i t h n e w i d e a s ' . W a r was primarily a matter o f
s u r v i v a l ; r e l a t i v e l y f e w s o l d i e r s f r o m a n y n a t i o n c a n h a v e s e e n it
as a n i n t e l l e c t u a l l y l i b e r a t i n g e x p e r i e n c e o f p e r m a n e n t v a l u e . Y e t
a w i d e r e x p e r i e n c e and p e r s p e c t i v e had b e e n g a i n e d , and i f this
s e e m e d r a t h e r u n d r a m a t i c at a n i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l , c o l l e c t i v e l y it
contributed to a critical e v a l u a t i o n o f the post-war colonial
situation.
T h e c i v i l i a n s , t o o , w e r e n o less c o n s c i o u s o f t h e d i s a s t e r s to
British arms than w e r e the soldiers. B u t there w a s n o land fighting
in W e s t A f r i c a although after their success in the Ethiopian
campaign o f 1 9 4 0 - 1 , W e s t African units temporarily returned
h o m e to guard against possible attacks from the V i c h y - c o n t r o l l e d
F r e n c h c o l o n i e s . Y e t t h e d o u b l y artificial d i v i s i o n b e t w e e n the
francophone and a n g l o p h o n e countries resulting from the adher
ence to V i c h y o f the F r e n c h c o l o n i a l authorities - in m a n y cases,
p u t t i n g p e o p l e o f the s a m e ethnic g r o u p o n different sides in
a world conflict - must have bewildered and angered many
Africans, including some technically ' V i c h y ' subjects serving
in the British forces.
1
Olusanya, The Second World War, 97.
337

O n e g r o u p o f W e s t Africans was politically active throughout

t h e w a r : t h e s t u d e n t s a b r o a d , o f w h o m b y 1945 t h e r e w e r e s o m e
1 5 0 in B r i t a i n a n d s o m e 30 in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . T h e W e s t A f r i c a n
S t u d e n t s U n i o n ( W A S U ) in L o n d o n c o n s t a n t l y r a i s e d A f r i c a n
problems, including the need for substantial constitutional
change, w i t h British ministers and M P s . T h e corresponding b o d y
in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , i n c l u d e d m a n y , p a r t i c u l a r l y I b o s , w h o w e r e
t o b e c o m e n a t i o n a l i s t l e a d e r s . B u t in t h e i r c a s e it w a s c o n t a c t w i t h
new concepts and systems rather than the war itself w h i c h
p r o b a b l y had the greater influence.
D E C O L O N I S A T I O N
E v e n after t h e w a r f e w i n W e s t m i n s t e r o r W h i t e h a l l c o u l d f o r e s e e
i n d e p e n d e n c e , e v e n f o r W e s t A f r i c a n c o l o n i e s , w i t h i n 20 y e a r s .
But some L a b o u r M P s could reconcile democracy and adult
s u f f r a g e at h o m e w i t h c o l o n i a l r u l e a b r o a d , o n l y b e c a u s e t h a t r u l e
w a s s e e n as a t e m p o r a r y t r u s t e e s h i p . It is a L a b o u r P a r t y m y t h ,
h o w e v e r , that the A f r i c a n colonies reached i n d e p e n d e n c e under
Labour rule. O n l y the Gambia became independent under a
L a b o u r g o v e r n m e n t , a n d it w a s t h e C o n s e r v a t i v e I a n M a c L e o d
w h o s h o w e d the greatest enthusiasm for A f r i c a n s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t .
T h e H i g h T o r y Oliver Lyttelton not only found himself urging
an apparently c o m p l a c e n t K w a m e N k r u m a h to speed u p prep
arations for independence, but also established a close personal
r a p p o r t w i t h N i g e r i a n p o l i t i c i a n s at t h e c o n f e r e n c e s t h a t p a v e d
t h e w a y f o r N i g e r i a n i n d e p e n d e n c e . Y e t , as A . P . T h o r n t o n put
it,
on both sides of the House of Commons more attitudes were being struck than
principles expressed. Radicals read up on what radicals had been wont to say
about the British Empire and said it again... but, remembering their
responsibilities, said it in muted tones. Tories continued to strike the imperial
1
note every so often, but more in nostalgia than from conviction.
T h e c h a n g e in w o r l d forces and Britain's w e a k n e s s h a d t a k e n the
s t e a m o u t o f B r i t i s h i m p e r i a l i s m b y 1 9 4 5 . A d o o r w a s ajar i n W e s t
A f r i c a w h i c h n e e d e d o n l y firm p u s h i n g t o o p e n . In n o case w a s
independence i n C o m m o n w e a l t h W e s t A f r i c a a c h i e v e d as the
result o f violent struggle, even if the deaths following the
e x - s e r v i c e m e n ' s d e m o n s t r a t i o n in A c c r a in 1 9 4 8 a n d t h e s h o o t i n g
1
A . P . T h o r n t o n , The imperial idea and its enemies ( L o n d o n , 1975), 332.
338

o f 29 m i n e r s b y t h e p o l i c e d u r i n g d i s t u r b a n c e s i n E a s t e r n N i g e r i a
in 1949 e n c o u r a g e d political m i l i t a n c y , c o n t r i b u t e d to nationalist
resentment, and p r o v i d e d p o w e r f u l m y t h s .
It w a s p e r s o n a l e q u a l i t y a n d p a r t i c i p a t i o n in g o v e r n m e n t
s e r v i c e , in c o m m e r c e , a n d in e d u c a t i o n w h i c h W e s t A f r i c a n
n a t i o n a l i s t s h a d first d e m a n d e d , a l o n g w i t h t h e r e d r e s s o f s p e c i f i c
g r i e v a n c e s . S u c h e q u a l i t y , it b e c a m e c l e a r t o e d u c a t e d A f r i c a n s ,
w a s a l w a y s uncertain under colonial rule. S o the d e m a n d for
s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t - a m o r e a c c u r a t e t e r m t h a n i n d e p e n d e n c e at this
s t a g e - g r e w in t h e m i d - 1 9 4 0 s , at least i n t h e G o l d C o a s t a n d
Nigeria. E v e n those w h o c o n c e d e d that the British had n o t been
o p p r e s s i v e felt t h a t r u l e b y w h i t e m e n w a s h u m i l i a t i n g , a n d t h a t
E u r o p e a n s c o u l d n e v e r prefer A f r i c a n o v e r imperial interests. T h e
i m p e t u s for W e s t A f r i c a n i n d e p e n d e n c e w a s , in this w o r t h y sense,
racial. T h e n a t i o n a l i s t s , u n l i k e t h o s e o f E u r o p e o r m u c h o f A s i a ,
c o u l d n o t s e e k t o r e c r e a t e a P o l a n d o r a B u r m a , o r in g e n e r a l
appeal to past polities. T h e y d e m a n d e d , instead, the right to rule
t h e m s e l v e s i n t h e artificial u n i t s i n t o w h i c h E u r o p e h a d p u t t h e m .
T h e y n o longer s o u g h t independence for ancient K a n o or A s a n t e ,
or e v e n for the Y o r u b a o r the W o l o f o r any o f the W e s t A f r i c a n
peoples n u m e r o u s e n o u g h to deserve the n a m e o f nation.
A l t h o u g h the d e m a n d for s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t b e c a m e increasingly
v o c i f e r o u s a n d i n t h e e n d , i r r e s i s t i b l e , i n all c a s e s i n B r i t i s h W e s t
Africa independence f o l l o w e d p r o l o n g e d negotiations and careful,
t h o u g h always inadequate, preparation. T h e r e were no European
settlers a n d t h e r e w e r e n o s t r a t e g i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t o e n c o u r a g e
British resistance to the d e m a n d , w h i c h , h o w e v e r , w a s n e v e r
u n i v e r s a l a n d w a s o p p o s e d b y i n f l u e n t i a l l o c a l g r o u p s in all f o u r
countries except, until the e v e o f i n d e p e n d e n c e , the G o l d C o a s t .
In the G a m b i a , earlier c o n s i d e r e d e v e n b y G a m b i a n politicians t o
be t o o small to b e self-sufficient, there w a s n o d e m a n d for
i n d e p e n d e n c e until the early 1960s. T h e N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l o f the
C o l o n y o f Sierra L e o n e o p p o s e d e v e n the representation o f the
Protectorate, the greater part o f the c o u n t r y , in the legislature,
w h i l e the Sierra L e o n e P e o p l e ' s Party, w h i c h w a s to take Sierra
L e o r i e t o i n d e p e n d e n c e i n 1 9 6 1 , a r o s e in t h e P r o t e c t o r a t e l a r g e l y
as a r e a c t i o n t o t h i s c o n t e m p t u o u s C r e o l e a t t i t u d e . I n N i g e r i a t h e
N o r t h e r n P e o p l e ' s C o n g r e s s ( N P C ) , w h i c h in 1950 b e c a m e a
political alliance b e t w e e n traditional forces and the majority o f
t h e , still v e r y f e w , w e s t e r n - e d u c a t e d p e o p l e i n t h e N o r t h e r n
339

Region, was concerned not with independence but with protecting

n o r t h e r n i n t e r e s t s f r o m t h e p o l i t i c a l p r e s u m p t i o n s , as t h e N P C
leaders saw them, o f southern politicians.
T h e nationalist leaders w h o s l o w l y m o v e d to d e m a n d -
' r e q u e s t ' is a b e t t e r w o r d i n m o s t c a s e s - i n d e p e n d e n c e w e r e i n
n o case either p r o m p t e d b y outside forces or intent o n internal
social r e v o l u t i o n . Indeed the c o n v e r s i o n o f the N P C to the cause
o f i n d e p e n d e n c e w a s s e e n b y s o m e as r e f l e c t i n g t h e v i e w s o f t h o s e
t r a d i t i o n a l f o r c e s w h i c h t h o u g h t t h a t B r i t i s h officials w e r e n o w
c o m m i t t e d to policies w h i c h c o u l d only erode traditional p o w e r .
T h e y felt t h e y s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e s u p p o r t a n i n d e p e n d e n c e u n d e r
w h i c h a party o f w h i c h they c o u l d a p p r o v e w o u l d h o l d the reins.
T h e parties w h i c h t o o k the G a m b i a , Sierra L e o n e and N i g e r i a
t o i n d e p e n d e n c e w e r e all c o a l i t i o n s , e m b r a c i n g a v a r i e t y o f
v i e w p o i n t s . B u t the d o m i n a n t elements w e r e moderate, and
sometimes conservative, closely connected w i t h b o u r g e o i s fam
ilies, o r w i t h chiefly h o u s e s . W i t h the e x c e p t i o n o f S i a k a S t e v e n s
in Sierra L e o n e n o n e o f the leaders had a base a m o n g the s l o w l y
g r o w i n g trade unions. T h e y s o u g h t a transfer o f political p o w e r ,
not the transformation o f society. T o the extent that e c o n o m i c
p o w e r h a d n o t b e e n m o d i f i e d b y i n s t i t u t i o n s s u c h as t h e m a r k e t i n g
b o a r d s set u p b y t h e c o l o n i a l g o v e r n m e n t , t h e y w e r e c o n t e n t , at
first at l e a s t , t o a l l o w it t o r e m a i n u n d i s t u r b e d i n t h e h a n d s o f
overseas companies and market forces, while seeking greater
opportunities for local businessmen.
T h e G o l d C o a s t w a s g e n e r a l l y t h o u g h t , at l e a s t b y w e s t e r n
o b s e r v e r s , t o b e different. B u t the R u s s i a n s , b e f o r e adjusting their
sights to suit their international interests, originally, and f r o m their
p o i n t o f v i e w r i g h t l y , r e f e r r e d t o a n d r e j e c t e d all t h e W e s t A f r i c a n
l e a d e r s as ' b o u r g e o i s - n a t i o n a l i s t s ' ; a n d at first t h e y i n c l u d e d
K w a m e N k r u m a h in this d e s p i s e d c a t e g o r y . F o r e v e n his C o n
v e n t i o n P e o p l e ' s P a r t y ( C P P ) , as its 1 9 5 1 e l e c t i o n m a n i f e s t o
s h o w e d i n its s e c t i o n o n h i r e - p u r c h a s e , c o u l d b e m o r e c o n c e r n e d
w i t h protecting traders than their customers and w a s c o n c e r n e d
with consumers and with expanding African entrepreneurship
rather than w i t h the rights o f w o r k e r s and peasants.
A l t h o u g h r e f l e c t i n g real p o p u l a r f e e l i n g , r i g h t e o u s r e s e n t m e n t
o v e r racialism, and a c o n v i c t i o n that o n l y Africans c o u l d m a k e
just decisions a b o u t the use o f A f r i c a n resources, the parties to
w h i c h B r i t a i n ' s i m p e r i a l p o w e r w a s transferred w e r e parties in
340

w h o s e d e l i b e r a t i o n s t h e r i c h a n d i n f l u e n t i a l - a n d , it m u s t b e
e m p h a s i s e d , the e d u c a t e d - p r e d o m i n a t e d a n d w h i c h w e r e in
g e n e r a l financially s u p p o r t e d b y i n d i g e n o u s c o m m e r c i a l i n t e r e s t s
rather than b y the p e o p l e ' s p e n n i e s . In this, if n o t a l w a y s in their
a p p r o a c h t o e x t e r n a l affairs o r t o t h e p l a c e o f f o r e i g n e n t e r p r i s e
in t h e i r e c o n o m i e s , t h e r e w a s a s i g n i f i c a n t s i m i l a r i t y b e t w e e n t h e
G a m b i a ' s P e o p l e ' s C o n g r e s s Party ( P C P ) , the Sierra L e o n e
People's Party ( S L P P ) , and Nigeria's National Council o f Nigeria
a n d t h e C a m e r o o n s (later t h e N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l o f N i g e r i a n
Citizens, N C N C ) , the A c t i o n G r o u p , and the N o r t h e r n P e o p l e ' s
Congress ( N P C ) . N o r were there signs, outside Nigeria's N o r t h e r n
R e g i o n , o f radical o p p o s i t i o n to these t r i u m p h a n t organisations,
all o f w h i c h first c a m e t o p o w e r t h r o u g h e l e c t i o n s - e v e n i f
s o m e t i m e s restricted o r indirect - c o n d u c t e d b y British officers.
6
The Gold Coast i94 ~J7
I n 1 9 4 6 , t h e G o l d C o a s t w a s still c o n s i d e r e d B r i t a i n ' s ' m o d e l

c o l o n y ' in A f r i c a . T h e n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n , i n t r o d u c e d b y the
G o v e r n o r , Sir A l a n B u r n s , p r o v i d e d for an A f r i c a n majority,
largely indirectly elected, in the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l . T h e chiefs,
t h o u g h o f t e n i n s e r i o u s c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e i r p e o p l e s , w e r e still s e e n
b y t h e B r i t i s h as t h e p e o p l e ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a n d as p o w e r f u l
p a r t n e r s o f t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . T h e g r e a t e s t o f t h e m t h e asante-
hene o f A s a n t e , c a m e t o A c c r a t o s h o w h i s s u p p o r t f o r t h e n e w
c o n s t i t u t i o n . B r i t i s h officers still i n i t i a t e d p o l i c y ; b u t a h e a d t h e r e
seemed to stretch a peaceful road to a distant independence -
p e r h a p s i n 15 y e a r s ' t i m e . T h i s w a s a s o r t o f d a t e t h e L a b o u r
C o l o n i a l Secretary, A r t h u r C r e e c h - J o n e s , o r an influential C o l o n i a l
1
Office civil s e r v a n t like A n d r e w C o h e n h a d in m i n d . I m p r o v i n g
infrastructure and a b o o m i n g r e v e n u e s u g g e s t e d that o n c e post
w a r shortages w e r e o v e r c o m e , the c o l o n y , the richest in Africa,
w o u l d e a s i l y s t a n d o n its o w n feet. I t w a s c o c o a , o f w h i c h t h e G o l d
C o a s t w a s the w o r l d ' s leading p r o d u c e r and w h o s e w o r l d price
w a s b o o m i n g , that w a s the basis o f prosperity, and w h i c h , in the
s o u t h , had p r o d u c e d n o t o n l y a class o f t h r i v i n g farmers, b u t
n u m e r o u s merchants and the means for education.
National unity, h o w e v e r , w a s tenuous e v e n t h o u g h the
population w a s m o r e h o m o g e n e o u s than that o f m o s t A f r i c a n
1
S e e R . D . P e a r c e , The turning point in Africa ( L o n d o n , 1982), 166.
341


colonies. Southern politics had scarcely penetrated into A s a n t e ,

w h i c h the n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n had b r o u g h t u n d e r the c o m p e t e n c e
o f t h e L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l ; far less t h e N o r t h e r n T e r r i t o r i e s ,
w h i c h remained under direct c o n t r o l o f the g o v e r n o r until 1 9 5 1 .
A n d A f r i c a n i s a t i o n o f t h e s e n i o r p o s t s in t h e c i v i l s e r v i c e s ,
p a r t i c u l a r l y in t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s e r v i c e , w a s v e r y s l o w ; a m o n g
heads o f ministries and c h i e f r e g i o n a l officers there w a s n o t a
s i n g l e A f r i c a n as late as 1 9 5 4 .
T w e n t y m o n t h s after t h e i n a u g u r a t i o n o f t h e B u r n s c o n s t i t u
t i o n , r i o t s in m a n y p a r t s o f t h e c o u n t r y , i n w h i c h t h e r e w e r e 29
deaths, shattered the illusion o f peaceful c h a n g e . T h e elementary-
s c h o o l l e a v e r s , t h e m a i n s t a y o f t h e a g i t a t i o n a g a i n s t c h i e f s at
p o p u l a r level, transferred their a n t a g o n i s m s to the central
g o v e r n m e n t i t s e l f a n d t o t h e b i g f o r e i g n firms, a n d j o i n e d w i t h
ex-servicemen and other discontented g r o u p s .
In the p r e v i o u s year the U n i t e d G o l d C o a s t C o n v e n t i o n
( U G C C ) - the ' C o n v e n t i o n ' — had been founded, largely b y suc
c e s s f u l p r o f e s s i o n a l m e n a n d m e r c h a n t s in t h e c o a s t a l t o w n s , p a r t l y
to express dissatisfaction w i t h the p o w e r f u l p o s i t i o n o f chiefs in
t h e L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l , p a r t l y t o p r e p a r e t h e c o u n t r y as a w h o l e
f o r s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t - t h e first t i m e t h i s o b j e c t i v e h a d s e r i o u s l y
been discussed. A l t h o u g h U G C C leaders w e r e briefly detained
f o r t h e i r a l l e g e d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e 1948 d i s t u r b a n c e s , m o s t
o f t h e m w e r e as s u r p r i s e d b y t h e s e d i s t u r b a n c e s as w e r e t h e
B r i t i s h officials. W h i l e t h e i r d e t e n t i o n at first g a v e t h e m n a t i o n a l
popularity, the disturbances released forces they c o u l d not contain,
in A s a n t e as m u c h as in t h e C o l o n y . O n e U G C C l e a d e r , h o w e v e r ,
a s s e s s e d t h e p o s i t i o n a c c u r a t e l y . K w a m e N k r u m a h , after t e n y e a r s
in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d a p e r i o d i n v o l v e d i n P a n - A f r i c a n p o l i t i c s
in B r i t a i n , h a d b e e n i n v i t e d i n 1 9 4 7 t o r e t u r n t o b e c o m e f u l l - t i m e
s e c r e t a r y o f t h e U G C C . F r o m t h e s t a r t it w a s c l e a r t h a t h e w a s
o f a different s t a m p f r o m t h e U G C C l e a d e r s , w h o w e r e r e a d y t o
u s e t h e d i s t u r b a n c e s as e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e i r d e m a n d t o t h e
Colonial Office for s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t , but w h o n e v e r d o u b t e d that
t h e g o v e r n m e n t w a s d e s t i n e d t o fall i n t o t h e h a n d s o f p e o p l e l i k e
t h e m s e l v e s . N k r u m a h , a l t h o u g h he w a s later t o b e c o m e a dictator,
at this t i m e a n d f o r m a n y y e a r s u n d e r s t o o d a n d c o u l d c o n t r o l t h e
m a s s e s . H e b e l i e v e d t h a t o n e m a n ' s — o r w o m a n ' s — v o t e w a s as
g o o d a n d as v a l u a b l e as a n o t h e r ' s a n d h e w a s a l w a y s a c c e s s i b l e
to any citizen - t o o accessible for the g o o d o f his g o v e r n m e n t
343

w h e n he came to p o w e r . H e also understood, together with men

w h o later b e c a m e his lieutenants, the i m p o r t a n c e o f detailed
organisation o f political support, including that o f newspapers.
H e split w i t h the C o n v e n t i o n t o f o r m his o w n C o n v e n t i o n
P e o p l e ' s Party ( C P P ) in J u n e 1949. In the meantime, o n the
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n o f a C o l o n i a l Office c o m m i s s i o n into the dis
turbances, an all-African c o m m i t t e e under M r Justice C o u s s e y had
d r a w n u p a n e w constitution, w h i c h p r o v i d e d for a majority o f
African elected Ministers and an elected National A s s e m b l y . T h e
C P P at o n c e a d o p t e d the s l o g a n ' S e l f - G o v e r n m e n t N o w ' ; a n d
a l t h o u g h its l e a d e r s ' a p p r o a c h w a s u n c e r t a i n , t h e p a r t y i n t h e e n d
r e j e c t e d t h e p r o p o s e d n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n , w h i c h still f o u n d a p l a c e
f o r B r i t i s h officials i n t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l . A t t h e e n d o f 1 9 4 9
the C P P threatened t o take ' P o s i t i v e A c t i o n ' to o b l i g e the British
g o v e r n m e n t t o s u m m o n a c o n s t i t u e n t a s s e m b l y , a l t h o u g h it w a s
clear that in the g e n e r a l election t o b e held in 1951 u n d e r the
Coussey constitution the party could w i n p o w e r and largely
a c h i e v e its o b j e c t i v e s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y . I n J a n u a r y 1 9 5 0 ' P o s i t i v e
A c t i o n ' , in a half-hearted fashion, w a s declared, largely because
the T U C proclaimed a general strike for industrial reasons. T h i s
time the G o l d C o a s t g o v e r n m e n t did not lose control and
N k r u m a h and other C P P leaders w e r e charged o n various counts
and g i v e n g a o l sentences.
W h i l e N k r u m a h w a s in g a o l the success o f his p a r t y ' s attention
t o o r g a n i s a t i o n a n d t h e d e m o r a l i s a t i o n o f t h e U G C C a n d its
supporters w e r e s h o w n b y the C C P ' s o v e r w h e l m i n g v i c t o r y in the
A c c r a municipal elections o f 1950, a v i c t o r y w h i c h led to U G C C
w a r n i n g s a b o u t red r e v o l u t i o n . T h e G o v e r n o r , Sir Charles
A r d e n - C l a r k e , and the C o l o n i a l Office, h o w e v e r , w e r e sure that
the C P P w o u l d w i n the 1951 general election and that N k r u m a h
w o u l d h a v e to be released from g a o l to lead a C P P g o v e r n m e n t .
A f t e r the party's o v e r w h e l m i n g v i c t o r y in 1951 (on a relatively
small turn-out f o l l o w i n g l o w registration) he w a s released to
b e c o m e L e a d e r o f G o v e r n m e n t B u s i n e s s in a cabinet o v e r w h i c h
the g o v e r n o r presided.
It w a s t o b e a n o t h e r s i x y e a r s b e f o r e t h e G o l d C o a s t b e c a m e
independent. B u t there c o u l d n o w be n o g o i n g b a c k w i t h o u t the
use o f a r m e d force. T h e delay w a s d u e partly to the C P P ' S
i n c r e a s i n g e m p h a s i s o n its a m b i t i o u s s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c r e f o r m s .
B y 1957 the n u m b e r o f pupils in primary and m i d d l e s c h o o l s , for
344

e x a m p l e , had m o r e than d o u b l e d and those in technical and

secondary schools had quadrupled, while there had been great
i m p r o v e m e n t in c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g t h e b e g i n n i n g o f
T e m a H a r b o u r . T h e p a r t y ' s realistic a p p r o a c h in s o m e areas o f
administration w a s s h o w n b y the g o v e r n m e n t ' s resumption o f
c o m p u l s o r y c u t t i n g - o u t o f t r e e s as t h e o n l y m e a n s o f c o n t r o l l i n g
s w o l l e n - s h o o t disease in c o c o a , a p o l i c y m u c h resented b y farmers
and w h i c h the party itself had attacked in the 1951 election
c a m p a i g n . It can b e a r g u e d , i n d e e d , that the C P P ' s greatest
contribution to Ghana's progress was made before independence.
A f t e r i n d e p e n d e n c e i n c r e a s i n g e c o n o m i c difficulties ( t h e r e h a d
b e e n n o real e c o n o m i c c h a n g e ) , a g r o w i n g o b s e s s i o n w i t h e x t e r n a l
affairs, t h e l o s s o f i d e a l i s m as t h e g o v e r n m e n t b e c a m e e n t i r e l y
authoritarian, and a w i d e n i n g g a p b e t w e e n profession and reality
prevented the a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o f social reform.
M o r e s e r i o u s as a n o b s t a c l e t o t h e e a r l y a c h i e v e m e n t o f
i n d e p e n d e n c e , h o w e v e r , w a s t h e rise o f t h e N a t i o n a l L i b e r a t i o n
M o v e m e n t ( N L M ) after t h e 1 9 5 4 e l e c t i o n , w h i c h t h e C P P a g a i n
w o n h a n d s o m e l y a l t h o u g h at t h e c o s t o f i n t e r n a l d i v i s i o n i n t h e
p a r t y . T h e e l e c t i o n s a w t h e rise o f i n d e p e n d e n t s a n d l o c a l g r o u p s ,
and the N L M , based in A s a n t e , d r e w t o g e t h e r C P P rebels, local
leaders and chiefs in a m o v e m e n t , often v i o l e n t and p o w e r f u l
e n o u g h to delay the negotiations w i t h L o n d o n for self-government
w h i c h w e r e expected to f o l l o w the election. M a n y chiefs had
o p p o s e d t h e C P P , a n d n o w t h e y felt t h a t t h e y c o u l d o p e n l y
s u p p o r t - o r in t h e c a s e o f t h e asantehene, l e a d - a c r u s a d e a g a i n s t
independence under the party.
In A s a n t e , t o o , particular bitterness w a s caused, o r w a s
f o s t e r e d , b y t h e N L M , o v e r t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s fixing f o r f o u r y e a r s
o f t h e p r i c e t o b e p a i d t o f a r m e r s f o r t h e i r c o c o a at a l e v e l l e s s
than a third o f ruling w o r l d prices. T h e m o v e w a s intended partly
t o c o m b a t i n f l a t i o n , p a r t l y t o raise d e v e l o p m e n t f u n d s f r o m t h e
difference b e t w e e n the w o r l d price and the local price. H a l f the
c o u n t r y ' s c o c o a w a s g r o w n in A s a n t e , a n d n o t o n l y f a r m e r s b u t
c o c o a traders, merchants, and e v e n landlords o f b o o m i n g K u m a s i ,
r e s e n t e d this g o v e r n m e n t r e s t r i c t i o n o n t h e flow o f m o n e y t o
A s a n t e , w h i c h for s o m e N L M leaders represented a h e a v y
personal loss o f i n c o m e .
S o p o w e r f u l d i d t h e m o v e m e n t s e e m t h a t t o test C P P s t r e n g t h
the British d e m a n d e d a further election, w h i c h w a s held in 1956,
345

b e f o r e final n e g o t i a t i o n s . T h e e l e c t i o n s h o w e d t h a t t h e C P P h a d
o v e r w h e l m i n g s t r e n g t h in the c o l o n y , and in T r a n s - V o l t a T o g o ,
w i t h m i n o r i t y b u t still s i g n i f i c a n t s u p p o r t i n A s a n t e a n d t h e n o r t h .
B u t o n l y 57 p e r c e n t o f t h e v o t e r s o u t o f a 50 p e r c e n t t u r n - o u t
s u p p o r t e d t h e C P P , r e p r e s e n t i n g p e r h a p s 30 p e r c e n t o f t h e a d u l t
p o p u l a t i o n . It w a s t h e s m a l l s i z e o f t h i s t o t a l v o t e , r a t h e r t h a n its
d i s t r i b u t i o n , w h i c h d i d n o t reflect an i n s u p e r a b l e n o r t h - s o u t h or
any other kind o f territorial o r tribal d i v i s i o n , that mattered for
the future. For this was not the b a s i s f o r d e c l a r i n g , as Dr
N k r u m a h w a s later t o d o , a o n e - p a r t y state; and G h a n a w a s n o t
a g a i n t o e x p e r i e n c e a free a n d fair e l e c t i o n u n t i l 1 9 6 9 .
Nigeria 194J-60
P o l i t i c s i n N i g e r i a c a m e t o life i n 1945 w i t h t h e p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h e
p r o p o s a l s f o r t h e R i c h a r d s C o n s t i t u t i o n , n a m e d after t h e then
governor. While bringing Northern Nigeria into the central
s y s t e m a n d e x t e n d i n g N i g e r i a n representation in the L e g i s l a t i v e
and E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l s , this established three regions with
representative bodies o f their o w n . T h e proposals, h o w e v e r , w e r e
strongly criticised b y nationalists, partly because the consti
tution had been i m p o s e d w i t h o u t consultation, partly because the
elections w e r e to be ' i n d i r e c t ' . F u r t h e r m o r e , w h e n the Richards
C o n s t i t u t i o n w a s d e b a t e d in the H o u s e o f C o m m o n s in 1 9 4 5 , a
mere 29 m i n u t e s w e r e d e v o t e d t o it, w h i c h d i s g u s t e d many
Nigerians.
B e f o r e 1948, politics in N i g e r i a w e r e m o r e turbulent than those
in G h a n a . T h e N C N C - the N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l o f N i g e r i a and the
C a m e r o o n s , so-called because a part o f C a m e r o u n under UN
Trusteeship was administered w i t h Nigeria - was a mass m o v e
m e n t , i f o n l y in l i m i t e d parts o f the c o u n t r y , o f the k i n d w h i c h
the C P P w a s to surpass. N n a m d i A z i k i w e ( Z i k ) w a s a p o p u l a r
leader, and an orator - if n o t o r g a n i s e r - w h o m N k r u m a h m i g h t
e n v y . B u t in contrast to the G o l d C o a s t a n o t h e r force w a s w a i t
i n g in the n o r t h w h i c h w a s t o d o m i n a t e politics until the soldiers
t o o k o v e r in 1966. T h i s w a s the N o r t h e r n People's Congress
( N P C ) , less a political p a r t y t h a n the e x p r e s s i o n o f an e n t r e n c h e d
social a n d political s y s t e m . T h e N C N C had, in fact, m a d e political
allies i n t h e t h e n N o r t h e r n P r o v i n c e s b e f o r e t h e N P C , w h i c h w a s
formally inaugurated in 1 9 4 9 as a c u l t u r a l organisation, had
appeared o n the scene. B u t because o f the threatening influence
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18 Nigeria, 1964.
o f the N o r t h e r n E l e m e n t s P r o g r e s s i v e U n i o n ( N E P U ) , an ally o f
the N C N C , l e a d i n g n o r t h e r n e r s t u r n e d the N P C i n t o an open
p o l i t i c a l b o d y in 1 9 5 0 .
In t h e m e a n t i m e t h e B r i t i s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , l a r g e l y u n d e r the
influence o f its C h i e f Secretary, Sir Hugh Foot, later Lord
C a r a d o n , had decided that the N i g e r i a n g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d n o t be
9
* o v e r t a k e n b y e v e n t s as t h e G o l d C o a s t g o v e r n m e n t h a d b e e n in
1
1 9 4 8 . S o it p r o p o s e d t h a t a r e v i e w o f t h e R i c h a r d s C o n s t i t u t i o n ,
t h e a b r u p t i n t r o d u c t i o n o f w h i c h , as w e l l as its p r o v i s i o n s , h a d
excited nationalist antipathy, s h o u l d be u n d e r t a k e n b y a series o f
local c o n f e r e n c e s c u l m i n a t i n g in a national o n e . T h e g o v e r n m e n t
had also made important proposals to a d v a n c e Africanisation o f
the senior civil s e r v i c e w h i c h , t o g e t h e r w i t h the constitutional
consultations, helped to d a m p e n the N C N C s fire.
F o r t h e first t i m e t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n s u l t a t i o n s r e a l l y b r o u g h t
the N o r t h e r n P r o v i n c e s into N i g e r i a n national politics, if o n l y for
l e a d i n g n o r t h e r n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t o p r o t e c t w h a t t h e y s a w as t h e i r
1
H u g h F o o t , A start in freedom ( L o n d o n , 1964), 103-6.
347

interests against s o u t h e r n influences. B u t this p a r t i c i p a t i o n also

p r o v o k e d northerners t o question their o w n emirate system. T h e
N P C became a party in time for the elections to the Northern
H o u s e o f A s s e m b l y under the constitution resulting from the
n a t i o n - w i d e d i s c u s s i o n s ; i t s l e a d e r w a s t h e sardauna o f S o k o t o ,
scion o f the great h o u s e o f U s u m a n d a n F o d i o a n d a talented
administrator. In these discussions northern s p o k e s m e n had
successfully insisted that representation in the p r o p o s e d national
H o u s e o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s s h o u l d reflect p o p u l a t i o n , w h i c h m e a n t
t h a t o n t h e b a s i s o f t h e l a t e s t c e n s u s figures t h e n o r t h w o u l d h a v e
1
half the seats. It also meant that the northern leaders, confident
in the c o n s e r v a t i s m o f their o w n p e o p l e , w e r e relying o n t h e m
to o u t - v o t e the radicals.
T h e n e w constitution also p r o v i d e d for a central council o f
ministers w i t h a Nigerian majority, a m o n g w h o m the N o r t h e r n
R e g i o n w o u l d have one-third o f those elected, and regional
councils o f ministers for the W e s t e r n , Eastern, and N o r t h e r n
P r o v i n c e s , n o w designated regions. A m o n g those elected in 1952
to the four legislatures w e r e few w h o c o u l d b e called radicals. T h e
administration's determination n o t to be taken unawares seemed
t o h a v e b e e n successful, a n d t h e s u b s e q u e n t l o n g series o f
conferences w h i c h negotiated Nigerian independence were marked
m o r e b y disputes a m o n g the N i g e r i a n s than disputes b e t w e e n
t h e m and the C o l o n i a l Office.
A s w e l l as t h e N P C , t h e elections p r o d u c e d a n o t h e r n e w force
replacing the moribund Nigerian Y o u t h M o v e m e n t . T h i s was the
Action G r o u p under Chief Obafemi A w o l o w o . A l t h o u g h he
p r o d u c e d d e t a i l e d p r o g r a m m e s f o r it b e f o r e t h e e l e c t i o n , C h i e f
A w o l o w o later f o r m e d t h e party o u t o f those w h o h a d w o n
election to the Western H o u s e o f Assembly. A w o l o w o became
leader o f the n e w Western R e g i o n g o v e r n m e n t .
T h e first c o n s t i t u t i o n t o p r o v i d e f o r t h e a p p o i n t m e n t o f
N i g e r i a n ministers f o u n d n o n e o f the leaders o f the main parties
i n office a t t h e c e n t r e . S o t h e s e n i o r N P C f e d e r a l m i n i s t e r a n d l a t e r
2
Prime Minister, Alhaji Sir A b u b a k a r T a f a w a B a l e w a , respected
1
T h e last c e n s u s h a d b e e n t a k e n i n 1931, a n d g a v e t h e N o r t h e r n R e g i o n 11.4 m i l l i o n
a g a i n s t 8.6 m i l l i o n f o r t h e r e s t o f t h e c o u n t r y . T h e 1953 c e n s u s g a v e t h e N o r t h e r n
R e g i o n 16.8 m i l l i o n a g a i n s t 13.6 m i l l i o n f o r t h e rest o f t h e c o u n t r y , e x c l u d i n g S o u t h e r n
Cameroons.
2
A b u b a k a r T a f a w a B a l e w a w a s appointed t o the n e w l y created post o f prime
m i n i s t e r o f t h e F e d e r a t i o n i n 1957 a n d w a s k n i g h t e d i n i960. B e f o r e b e c o m i n g p r i m e
minister h e l e d t h e N P C in t h e H o u s e o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s as federal minister o f
transport. H e w a s o f relatively h u m b l e origin.
348

m o r e f o r his integrity a n d his intelligence than f o r his d e c i s i v e n e s s ,

a l w a y s s e e m e d t o b e inhibited b y t h e fact that his N P C party
l e a d e r , t h e sardauna, o c c u p i e d t h e n o m i n a l l y i n f e r i o r p o s t o f
premier o f the N o r t h e r n R e g i o n .
T h e a p p a r e n t u n i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e c e n t r a l a n d - after t h e 1 9 5 3
constitution conference - the federal, g o v e r n m e n t in relation t o
the regions w a s the main feature o f N i g e r i a n politics u p t o
independence. B u t the s e c o n d m o s t i m p o r t a n t feature h a d already
become prominent; the demand for division o f the country into
smaller regions, called 'states'. S u c h demands w e r e e n c o u r a g e d
b y the g r a n t i n g o f r e g i o n a l status t o t h e tiny S o u t h C a m e r o o n s
T r u s t e e s h i p i n 1 9 5 3 . A b o v e all it w a s m a i n t a i n e d i n t h e s o u t h
t h a t t h e a l l o c a t i o n o f h a l f t h e seats i n t h e f e d e r a l H o u s e o f
Representatives to the Northern R e g i o n meant permanent
d o m i n a t i o n o f federal p o w e r b y the N P C , w h i c h w o u l d a l w a y s
be assured o f a great majority o f these n o r t h e r n seats. A l t h o u g h
v o t i n g f o r t h e m w a s o n t h e f a c e o f it d e m o c r a t i c , s o u t h e r n
r e s e n t m e n t r e f l e c t e d t h e v i e w t h a t t h e N P C , b e c a u s e o f its
a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h t r a d i t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y t o w h i c h n o r t h e r n e r s still
d e f e r r e d , w o u l d a l w a y s find w a y s o f m a i n t a i n i n g its r e g i o n a l
majority. I n practice t h e N P C ruled centrally w i t h allies, n o r m a l l y
the N C N C , b u t s o m e t i m e s i n c l u d i n g t h e A c t i o n G r o u p .
' T r i b a l i s m ' , it is s a i d , h a s d o m i n a t e d N i g e r i a n p o l i t i c s . B u t
s o m e o f the bitterest political disputes h a v e been w i t h i n ethnically
related c o m m u n i t i e s , s o m e o f w h i c h in N i g e r i a n u m b e r m a n y
millions o f people. T h i s w a s particularly true a m o n g the Y o r u b a ;
b u t t h e 1953 crisis i n E a s t e r n N i g e r i a w a s t h e r e s u l t o f a d i s p u t e
between A z i k i w e and s o m e I b o ministers, while the K a n o - b a s e d
a n d H a u s a / F u l a n i - l e d N E P U o p p o s e d its o w n N o r t h e r n R e g i o n a l
g o v e r n m e n t . Y e t t r i b a l i s m b e c a m e m o r e , n o t l e s s , i m p o r t a n t as
N i g e r i a n politics d e v e l o p e d . B y the time o f independence, in i960,
it w a s f e a r e d , r i g h t l y as it t u r n e d o u t , t h a t a c o u n t r y w h i c h h a d
c o m e t o i n d e p e n d e n c e as a r e s u l t o f c o m p r o m i s e s u n d e r B r i t i s h
a u s p i c e s m i g h t n o t i n d e f i n i t e l y p u r s u e t h e s e c o m p r o m i s e s after
independence.
It w a s A l h a j i S i r A b u b a k a r T a f a w a B a l e w a w h o a p p e a r e d t o
m a n y t o b e the guarantee that N i g e r i a w o u l d n o t split apart. F o r
a l t h o u g h , as w e h a v e s a i d , h e w a s r e g a r d e d i n t h e n o r t h p r i m a r i l y
as a l i e u t e n a n t o f t h e sardauna h e w a s still w i d e l y r e s p e c t e d i n
y
the south a n d b e y o n d N i g e r i a . H e w a s criticised b y s o m e N i g e r i a n

M P s f o r b e i n g t o o p r o - w e s t e r n i n e x t e r n a l affairs a n d i n p a r t i c u l a r
349

f o r h a v i n g m a d e at i n d e p e n d e n c e a l i m i t e d d e f e n c e a g r e e m e n t
w i t h B r i t a i n . Y e t i m m e d i a t e l y after i n d e p e n d e n c e h e t o o k a firm
line at t h e U N a b o u t t h e C o n g o , d e m a n d i n g t h e e x c l u s i o n o f t h e
g r e a t p o w e r s f r o m t h e c o u n t r y ' s affairs, w h i l e h i s g o v e r n m e n t
s o o n after b r o k e d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h F r a n c e b e c a u s e o f h e r
a t o m i c tests in t h e S a h a r a .
I n d e p e n d e n c e w a s , in t h e e n d , n o t t h e r e s u l t o f a m a s s
m o v e m e n t , but o f peaceful negotiation w i t h the British. N i g e r i a ' s
p o s t - i n d e p e n d e n c e p a r t i e s m a y h a v e suffered in t h e i r o w n e s t i
m a t i o n , and that o f m a n y others, f r o m this lack o f militancy. B u t
at i n d e p e n d e n c e , e v e n i f t h e elite w h o h a d i n h e r i t e d B r i t i s h p o w e r
w e r e intent o n retaining their position, N i g e r i a n politicians appear
t o h a v e b e e n d e t e r m i n e d t o l i v e d o w n t h e d i v i s i o n s in t h e i r
country between north and south, M u s l i m and Christian, Y o r u b a
a n d I b o , o l d a n d y o u n g , e d u c a t e d a n d u n e d u c a t e d . Y e t it p r o v e d
i m p o s s i b l e , w i t h o u t further and b l o o d y conflict, to erase f r o m
Black Africa's b i g g e s t and m o s t c o m p l e x c o u n t r y the legacy o f
its artificial c r e a t i o n .
Sierra Leone 19J1-61
A s late as 1 9 5 1 S i e r r a L e o n e ' s L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l still h a d a

m a j o r i t y o f B r i t i s h officials. Y e t t h e l o n g - e s t a b l i s h e d F r e e t o w n
schools and F o u r a h B a y C o l l e g e had p r o d u c e d the m o s t h i g h l y
e d u c a t e d g r o u p in B l a c k A f r i c a . W h a t c a u s e d t h i s p o l i t i c a l
underdevelopment ?
S i e r r a L e o n e d e m o n s t r a t e d i n its m o s t a c u t e f o r m t h e ' t w o
nations' character o f many African countries. T h e Creoles o f
F r e e t o w n and the tiny ' C o l o n y ' area w e r e descendants o f captives
rescued from slave ships b y the R o y a l N a v y , or repatriated from
L o n d o n and the A m e r i c a s . E n g l i s h w a s their l a n g u a g e , they t o o k
E n g l i s h names, w e r e m o s t l y k e e n Christians, and had lost their
e t h n i c affiliations. T h e y w e r e B r i t i s h c i t i z e n s a n d p r o u d o f it. B y
contrast, in the P r o t e c t o r a t e , w h i c h formally b e c a m e part o f Sierra
L e o n e o n l y i n 1 8 9 6 , w e r e p e o p l e s w h o s e affinities l a y w i t h
n e i g h b o u r i n g G u i n e a and Liberia, the largest g r o u p s b e i n g the
M e n d e o f the s o u t h and the T e m n e o f the n o r t h and west.
T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n i n o p e r a t i o n i n 1 9 5 1 g a v e five l e g i s l a t i v e
c o u n c i l seats t o t h e C o l o n y a n d t h r e e t o t h e m u c h b i g g e r P r o
t e c t o r a t e , n o w k n o w n as ' t h e P r o v i n c e s ' . B u t t h e r e w a s C r e o l e
350

19 Sierra Leone and Liberia.
o p p o s i t i o n to any increase in Protectorate representation, o n the

g r o u n d that British ' p r o t e c t e d p e r s o n s ' , particularly illiterate
chiefs, c o u l d not legislate for British subjects. T h i s delayed until
1951 the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f a c o n s t i t u t i o n p r o v i d i n g for an elected
Legislative Council most o f w h o s e members w o u l d come from
the P r o t e c t o r a t e ; and, in the E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l , for a m a j o r i t y o f
unofficial m e m b e r s w h o w o u l d b e c o m e ministers. C r e o l e intran
sigence had s o m e justification in v i e w o f the political d o m i n a t i o n
o f t h e P r o t e c t o r a t e b y c h i e f s . It w a s s u p p o r t e d b y S i e r r a L e o n e ' s
m o s t f a m o u s r a d i c a l , I. T . A . W a l l a c e - J o h n s o n , a C r e o l e w h o
frightened s o m e o f his o w n p e o p l e b e c a u s e o f his M o s c o w l i n k s .
H i s W e s t A f r i c a n Y o u t h L e a g u e , established in 1938, w a s Sierra
L e o n e ' s first n a t i o n a l i s t g r o u p a n d w a s s u p p r e s s e d d u r i n g t h e w a r .
B y 1951 W a l l a c e - J o h n s o n w a s in harness w i t h the m o s t
35i

intransigent C r e o l e politician, D r B a n k o l e - B r i g h t , in the N a t i o n a l

C o u n c i l o f the C o l o n y o f Sierra L e o n e .
Protectorate leaders, t o o , had prepared for the 1951 election,
and from then o n Sierra L e o n e politics w e r e the politics o f the
Protectorate. A l t h o u g h a vestigial Creole protest continued, some
C r e o l e politicians f o u n d an i m p o r t a n t place in P r o t e c t o r a t e - b a s e d
p a r t i e s , w h i l e C r e o l e s c o n t i n u e d t o h o l d a s i g n i f i c a n t p l a c e in t h e
public services and the professions.
U n t i l i n d e p e n d e n c e in 1 9 6 1 , a n d until his d e a t h in 1964, the
d o m i n a n t figure i n S i e r r a L e o n e p o l i t i c s w a s D r M i l t o n M a r g a i .
H i s career illustrates the e v o l u t i o n o f the c o u n t r y ' s politics. S o n
o f a M e n d e trader, h e w a s b o r n in 1896 just b e f o r e the B r i t i s h
P r o t e c t o r a t e w a s e s t a b l i s h e d a n d w a s t h e first P r o t e c t o r a t e p e r s o n
t o t a k e a d e g r e e at F o u r a h B a y C o l l e g e , a n d t h e first t o b e c o m e
a physician. H e w a s a founder o f the Protectorate E d u c a t i o n a l
P r o g r e s s i v e U n i o n , w h i c h g a v e birth to the Sierra L e o n e P e o p l e ' s
Party ( S L P P ) . T h e party s t o o d o n the platform ' O n e C o u n t r y ,
O n e P e o p l e ' , a n d it i n c l u d e d C r e o l e s a m o n g its o f f i c e r s . Its
s t r e n g t h l a y i n its a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h ' b i g m e n ' , p a r t i c u l a r l y a m o n g
t h e M e n d e . D r M a r g a i , after a n e a s y e l e c t i o n v i c t o r y , b e c a m e
L e a d e r o f G o v e r n m e n t B u s i n e s s in the n e w E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l ,
w h i c h included a cross-section o f the c o m m u n i t y : a M u s l i m
C r e o l e , D r M a r g a i ' s h a l f - b r o t h e r A l b e r t M a r g a i , t h e first P r o
tectorate l a w y e r and destined to b e c o m e prime minister, and M r
Siaka Stevens, the leading trade unionist and destined to b e c o m e
president.
W i t h o u t r e p r e s s i o n , S i r M i l t o n , as h e b e c a m e , a c h i e v e d a n
e x t r a o r d i n a r y p e r s o n a l a s c e n d a n c y . H e u s e d t h e c h i e f s as a g e n t s .
H e c o n c i l i a t e d t h e C r e o l e s a n d a p p e a l e d t o all t r i b a l g r o u p s . H i s
a g e stifled c r i t i c i s m b y y o u n g e r p o l i t i c i a n s o f h i s c o n s e r v a t i s m .
Indifferent to c e r e m o n y and t o theory, he w a s a l w a y s ready to deal
w i t h t r o u b l e s personally. T o illiterate p e o p l e , ' P a ' s e e m e d t o be
infinitely w i s e , and t o e d u c a t e d y o u n g s t e r s t o be infinitely w i l y .
W h e n s u c h a c o n s e r v a t i v e m a n a s k e d f o r i n d e p e n d e n c e , as h e d i d
in i960, the C o l o n i a l Office c o u l d o n l y a g r e e .
H i s t e r m o f office, h o w e v e r , i n s p i t e o f t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f
stability, w a s troubled. A colonial mineral e c o n o m y w i t h a
stagnant agriculture, Sierra L e o n e had the special p r o b l e m o f the
illicit d i g g i n g a n d s m u g g l i n g o f d i a m o n d s . T h i s l e d t o l a w l e s s n e s s
and corruption, and g a v e s o m e Lebanese traders, a l w a y s relatively
35*

m o r e i m p o r t a n t in Sierra L e o n e than in a n y o t h e r A f r i c a n c o u n t r y ,
an unhealthy p o w e r . V i o l e n t strikes for h i g h e r w a g e s in F r e e t o w n
in 1955 w e r e d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t t h e m i n i s t e r s , as t h e n e w a u t h o r i t y ,
as m u c h as a g a i n s t e m p l o y e r s ; a n d t h e r e w a s a s e r i o u s u p r i s i n g
in t h e n o r t h t h e f o l l o w i n g y e a r a g a i n s t w i d e s p r e a d m a l p r a c t i c e s
b y chiefs. A f t e r the independence agreement, Stevens w e n t into
o p p o s i t i o n a n d at t h e t i m e o f i n d e p e n d e n c e i n 1 9 6 1 h e a n d s o m e
o f his f o l l o w e r s w e r e u n d e r d e t e n t i o n . It w a s . already clear that
n o t e v e n P r o t e c t o r a t e u n i t y c o u l d last. L a t e r , h o w e v e r , p e o p l e
c a m e t o l o o k b a c k o n t h e a g e o f ' P a ' M a r g a i as a g o l d e n o n e .
The Gambia iyji-6j
F o r the G a m b i a , e v e n the nationalist politicians s o u g h t s o m e

f u t u r e o t h e r t h a n i n d e p e n d e n c e u n t i l a r o u n d i 9 6 0 . It w a s felt t h a t
t h e c o u n t r y , w i t h a p o p u l a t i o n o f o n l y 300000, w a s t o o s m a l l , p o o r
a n d v u l n e r a b l e t o s t a n d o n its o w n . T h e M u s l i m C o n g r e s s o f
Alhaji I b r a i m a h G a r b a - J a h u m p a , for instance, in 1 9 5 7 - 8 w a s
asking for a permanent association w i t h Britain. T h i s , o n T r e a s u r y
p r o m p t i n g , Britain rejected. B y i960 the G a m b i a had b e c o m e an
e m b a r r a s s m e n t t o W h i t e h a l l , f o r it w a s c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e c o u n t r y
m i g h t n o t fit t h e ' s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t w i t h i n t h e C o m m o n w e a l t h '
r u b r i c . It w a s h o p e d t h a t its l e a d e r s c o u l d s e c u r e s o m e a r r a n g e m e n t
w i t h i n d e p e n d e n t S e n e g a l w h i c h w o u l d a v o i d it h a v i n g t o t a k e
1
c o m p l e t e i n d e p e n d e n c e o n its o w n . S u c h a l i n k , h o w e v e r , w a s
rejected for several reasons. It w a s feared that the partnership
w o u l d b e v e r y u n e q u a l ; t h e t w o h a d different l e g a l a n d a d m i n
i s t r a t i v e s y s t e m s , different official l a n g u a g e s . M a n y G a m b i a n s
w o r k i n g in S e n e g a l p r o f i t e d f r o m t h e a r t i f i c i a l l y h i g h v a l u e o f t h e
A f r i c a n f r a n c . A l l f e a r e d t h a t c l o s e r a s s o c i a t i o n w o u l d raise
G a m b i a n prices. S o m e , t o o , feared the end o f their p r o s p e r o u s
s m u g g l i n g trade. A n o t h e r influence w a s that o f the chiefs, w h o
c o u l d see t h a t t h e i r c o u n t e r p a r t s i n S e n e g a l w e r e l a r g e l y
powerless.
A l t h o u g h there had been G a m b i a n m e m b e r s o f the Legislative
C o u n c i l s i n c e 1 8 8 8 , t h e first p o l i t i c a l p a r t y , t h e D e m o c r a t i c P a r t y ,
1
I n fact t h e ' C o n f e d e r a t i o n ' e s t a b l i s h e d b y t h e G a m b i a a n d S e n e g a l in 1981, f o l
l o w i n g t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n o f S e n e g a l e s e t r o o p s t o s u p p r e s s a n a t t e m p t e d c o u p in t h e
G a m b i a , v i r t u a l l y a c h i e v e d t h i s . A m o n e t a r y u n i o n w a s t o b e e s t a b l i s h e d a n d w h i l e it
w a s a g r e e d t h a t e a c h c o u n t r y c o u l d m a i n t a i n its s o v e r e i g n t y , t h e G a m b i a w a s c l e a r l y
t h e j u n i o r p a r t n e r in t h e C o n f e d e r a t i o n .
353

w a s not formed until 1 9 5 1 , and w a s virtually confined to the

capital. T h e same year saw the establishment o f the M u s l i m
C o n g r e s s . In 1954 Pierre Sarr N ' J i e , a Bathurst l a w y e r o f W o l o f
d e s c e n t , f o r m e d t h e U n i t e d P a r t y w i t h a W o l o f b a s e . It w o n
c o n t r o l o f the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l u n d e r a n e w constitution w h i c h
p r o v i d e d for an elected majority w i t h a f o r m o f ministerial
government.
T h e m o s t s i g n i f i c a n t c h a n g e c a m e in 1 9 5 9 , w h e n t h e P r o t e c t
orate People's Society, a charitable organisation, w a s transformed
i n t o t h e P r o t e c t o r a t e (later P e o p l e ' s ) P r o g r e s s i v e P a r t y t o fight t h e
i960 election, in w h i c h there w a s direct v o t i n g t h r o u g h o u t the
country. T h e P P P w o n a clear Protectorate majority but o n l y a
m i n o r i t y o f all e l e c t e d s e a t s . T h e c h i e f s w e l c o m e d t h e P P P
c a u t i o u s l y b u t its s u p p o r t at first c a m e f r o m M a n d i n k a m e n i n t h e
capital w h e r e senior j o b s w e r e in the h a n d s either o f the British,
or o f the local Creoles o r urban W o l o f . T h e M a n d i n k a n u m b e r e d
a b o u t half the p o p u l a t i o n and w e r e e v e n l y distributed t h r o u g h o u t
t h e c o u n t r y . M a n y M a n d i n k a felt n e g l e c t e d a n d c o n c l u d e d t h a t
B a t h u r s t a n d t h e C o l o n y w e r e f a v o u r e d at t h e e x p e n s e o f t h e
P r o t e c t o r a t e , p a r t i c u l a r l y in e d u c a t i o n .
T o lead the n e w party there appeared a m a n w h o w a s to
dominate G a m b i a n politics for m a n y years. D a u d a Jawara w a s
b o r n i n 1 9 2 4 , s o n o f a p r o s p e r o u s f a r m e r . H e w a s e d u c a t e d at
A c h i m o t a C o l l e g e i n t h e G o l d C o a s t , s u b s e q u e n t l y q u a l i f y i n g as
a v e t e r i n a r y s u r g e o n in G l a s g o w . H e w a s principal v e t e r i n a r y
officer, b u t a b a n d o n e d this c a r e e r f o r a n u n c e r t a i n p o l i t i c a l f u t u r e .
In the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l , a majority s u p p o r t e d the a p p o i n t m e n t
o f P i e r r e N ' J i e as c h i e f m i n i s t e r — G a m b i a n s n o w f o r t h e first t i m e
h a d real e x e c u t i v e a u t h o r i t y . B u t i n e l e c t i o n s i n 1 9 6 2 J a w a r a w o n
by a substantial margin, and b e c a m e prime minister. H e reverted
t o t h e I s l a m i c faith in 1965 a n d w a s k n i g h t e d i n 1 9 6 6 , t h u s
c o m b i n i n g t h e h e r i t a g e o f t w o w o r l d s . T h e r e a f t e r t h e U P a n d its
leader w e n t into decline. A f t e r an amicably negotiated indepen
d e n c e in 1 9 6 5 , p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t m o v e d t o d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n t h e
ruling P P P .
Liberia 1944—64
W h i l e British W e s t Africa was m o v i n g towards independence,

Liberia started a process o f internal d e c o l o n i s a t i o n . W h e n W i l l i a m
T u b m a n b e c a m e president, in 1944, representation in the legis-
354

lature w a s confined to the coastal c o u n t i e s w h e r e the descendants

o f Americo-Liberians and other immigrants tended to dominate
affairs, w h i l e t h e h i n t e r l a n d m a j o r i t y w a s still r u l e d i n c o l o n i a l
fashion w i t h district c o m m i s s i o n e r s s u p e r v i s i n g chiefs. S o m e
hinterland peoples had been assimilated into A m e r i c o - L i b e r i a n
s o c i e t y a n d i n t o g o v e r n m e n t s e r v i c e . B u t it w a s t h e * u n i f i c a t i o n
p o l i c y ' o f President T u b m a n , w h o had an i m p e c c a b l e A m e r i c o -
Liberian b a c k g r o u n d , w h i c h b e g a n to erode the division o f
Liberia into t w o separate c o m m u n i t i e s . In 1944 representation in
the H o u s e o f Representatives w a s e x t e n d e d to the hinterland,
w h i l e in 1 9 6 4 t h e S e n a t e w a s o p e n e d t o n e w h i n t e r l a n d c o u n t i e s
and the ' c o l o n i a l ' administration w a s e n d e d . President T u b m a n
a l s o s t r o v e t o a p p o i n t p e o p l e o f ' t r i b a l ' (as t h e y w e r e k n o w n i n
l o c a l p a r l a n c e ) b a c k g r o u n d t o s e n i o r p o s i t i o n s a n d h e w a s t h e first
president to travel regularly in the interior.
S i n c e a n y real p o l i t i c a l c o n t e s t still t o o k p l a c e w i t h i n t h e
long-established T r u e W h i g ( ' W i t h H o p e in G o d ' ) Party - the
o n l y o n e t h e n t o l e r a t e d , a n d u n d e r t h e firm c o n t r o l o f c o a s t a l
l e a d e r s h i p - t h i s p o l i t i c a l c h a n g e at first w a s u n r e m a r k a b l e . T h e
old political and social distinction b e t w e e n A m e r i c o - L i b e r i a n s
a n d i n d i g e n e s , h o w e v e r , p r o v e d i n c r e a s i n g l y difficult t o m a i n t a i n ,
e v e n i f t h e d e v e l o p i n g e c o n o m i c c l a s s d i v i s i o n t e n d e d still t o
c o r r e s p o n d to the old o n e . T h e citadels o f the presidency and the
v i c e - p r e s i d e n c y , as w e l l as l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e p o w e r f u l M a s o n i c
o r d e r , p e r h a p s a l o n e r e m a i n e d firmly i n A m e r i c o - L i b e r i a n h a n d s .
President T u b m a n also b r o u g h t L i b e r i a fully into continental
African politics, in w h i c h he p l a y e d the role o f elder statesman,
p a r t i c u l a r l y d u r i n g t h e N i g e r i a n c i v i l w a r w h e n h e firmly s u p
p o r t e d the federal cause. H i s ' o p e n - d o o r ' e c o n o m i c p o l i c y , w h i l e
c r i t i c i s e d b y s o m e as t o o g e n e r o u s t o f o r e i g n c o n c e s s i o n a i r e s ,
ensured that Liberia n o l o n g e r relied e c o n o m i c a l l y o n the U n i t e d
States. T h e e c o n o m y , h o w e v e r , remained heavily d e p e n d e n t o n
an e x p o r t t r a d e b a s e d o n m i n i n g a n d p r i m a r y p r o d u c t i o n .
T H E P R O B L E M S OF I N D E P E N D E N C E
F e w W e s t Africans expected independence itself to s o l v e political,

e c o n o m i c and social p r o b l e m s - e x c e p t p e r h a p s , in the early d a y s ,
t h o s e C P P s u p p o r t e r s w h o e c h o e d D r N k r u m a h : ' S e e k y e first
t h e p o l i t i c a l k i n g d o m a n d all t h i n g s w i l l b e a d d e d u n t o i t . '
355

Independence, instead, emphasised existing p r o b l e m s and b r o u g h t

f o r w a r d n e w o n e s , in particular the fragile sense o f national
c o n s c i o u s n e s s and the c o n s e q u e n t m a n i p u l a t i o n o f ethnic senti
m e n t b y p o l i t i c i a n s a n d o t h e r s ; c o r r u p t i o n at all l e v e l s ; w e a k n e s s
o f the p u b l i c s e r v i c e s and lack o f r e s o u r c e s in face o f the
aspirations o f the n e w g o v e r n m e n t s ; the n e r v o u s n e s s o f ruling
g r o u p s w h o lacked the confidence o f an established social order.
T h e r e w e r e t h e difficulties o f a d j u s t i n g i m p o r t e d , t h o u g h n o t
i m p o s e d , institutions t o l o c a l c o n d i t i o n s resulting in the estab
lishment o f one-party o r military rule; the excessive rewards o f
political p o w e r , the fragility o f independence w h e n the e c o n o m i e s
d e p e n d e d s o h e a v i l y b o t h o n t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f f o r e i g n firms
internally and o n w o r l d market forces; and the incipient conflict
b e t w e e n rich and p o o r , t o w n and country, educated and unedu
cated. T h e s e d i v i s i o n s n o w displaced the o l d differences b e t w e e n
c h i e f s a n d c o m m o n e r s , o r b e t w e e n c o a s t a l a n d i n l a n d p e o p l e s , as
w e l l as b e t w e e n c o l o n i a l i s t s a n d c o l o n i a l s .
T h e w e a k n e s s o f n a t i o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s in A f r i c a is e a s i l y
e x a g g e r a t e d . Y e t i n all W e s t A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s p o l i t i c i a n s w e r e
a l w a y s in d a n g e r o f y i e l d i n g t o the t e m p t a t i o n t o m a k e tribal o r
p a r t i c u l a r i s t a p p e a l s . Y e t t h e N i g e r i a n c i v i l w a r a n d its a f t e r m a t h
s t r e n g t h e n e d n a t i o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s . L a r g e - s c a l e c o r r u p t i o n i n all
a n g l o p h o n e W e s t A f r i c a n states e x c e p t t h e G a m b i a h a s b e e n w e l l
d o c u m e n t e d (it s h o u l d b e n o t e d t h a t t h i s d o c u m e n t a t i o n is t h e
w o r k o f the g o v e r n m e n t s themselves). W i t h the exception o f the
G a m b i a all a n g l o p h o n e states i n W e s t A f r i c a d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d
e x p e r i e n c e d military o r o n e - p a r t y r e g i m e s , s h o w i n g the difficulty
o f transplanting the W e s t m i n s t e r and the W h i t e h a l l systems. B u t
n o w o r k a b l e i n d i g e n o u s alternative w a s d e v i s e d , e v e n if the
A m e r i c a n rather than the British system w a s ultimately preferred.
P r o t a g o n i s t s o f t h e o n e - p a r t y s y s t e m c l a i m e d it as a t r u l y
African concept relying not o n the continuous interplay o f
o p p o s i n g g r o u p s b u t o n an alleged search for c o m p r o m i s e . T h e y
d i d n o t e x p l a i n h o w a m e t h o d f o r c o n d u c t i n g affairs i n a s m a l l
c h i e f d o m w a s a p p r o p r i a t e f o r a l a r g e m o d e r n state. C l e a r l y ,
h o w e v e r , the Westminster * winner-take-all' principle m i g h t o n l y
p r o d u c e bitter, and possibly violent, o p p o s i t i o n since the rewards
o f political p o w e r w e r e so great. W e s t Africa witnessed victorious
p a r t i e s i n n o m i n a l l y m u l t i - p a r t y s y s t e m s - i n S i e r r a L e o n e as w e l l
as in N i g e r i a ' s r e g i o n s - b e h a v i n g as d o m i n a n t o n e - p a r t y r e g i m e s
356

a n d i n t r u d i n g p a r t y a n t i p a t h i e s i n t o d a i l y life, i n t o t h e a w a r d o f
scholarships, into appointments and e v e n into the l o w e r courts.
B e h i n d all m i l i t a r y c o u p s i n W e s t A f r i c a t h e r e l a y a r m y
g r i e v a n c e s as w e l l as h o s t i l i t y t o c i v i l i a n g o v e r n m e n t s a r i s i n g f r o m
other causes. F o r e x a m p l e , in G h a n a C o l o n e l A c h e a m p o n g w a s
said t o h a v e o v e r t h r o w n D r B u s i a i n 1 9 7 2 b e c a u s e h e a n d o t h e r
officers w e r e i n c e n s e d b y t h a t g o v e r n m e n t ' s w i t h d r a w a l o f a r m y
p r i v i l e g e s . N e v e r t h e l e s s a r m y rule in a n g l o p h o n e W e s t A f r i c a in
general w a s not oppressive and the courts, civil services and
n e w s p a p e r s p r o v e d to h a v e b e e n in n o m o r e d a n g e r f r o m soldiers
t h a n f r o m c i v i l i a n s . M i l i t a r y r u l e , h o w e v e r , as s h o w n b y t h e s e r i e s
o f c o u p s and a t t e m p t e d c o u p s in G h a n a and N i g e r i a and the
forcible o v e r t h r o w o f the one-year-old F r e e t o w n military r e g i m e
b y p r i v a t e soldiers in 1968, w a s n o m o r e stable t h a n o n e - p a r t y rule.
In spite o f ritual d e n u n c i a t i o n o f f o r e i g n c o m m e r c i a l enterprises
b y p o l i t i c i a n s , a n g l o p h o n e W e s t A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t s all s o u g h t
to e n c o u r a g e f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t , t h o u g h often in practice dis
c o u r a g i n g it. E v e n D r N k r u m a h h a d n o a n t i p a t h y t o f o r e i g n
private enterprise. It w a s G h a n a i a n p r i v a t e enterprise that he
stifled, s e e i n g its d e v e l o p m e n t as a t h r e a t t o h i s t h e o r i e s as m u c h
as t o h i s r e g i m e . A l l t h e s e c o u n t r i e s , h o w e v e r , felt t h e m s e l v e s t o
b e at t h e m e r c y o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l m a r k e t s i n c e , i n s p i t e o f O P E C
and other p r o d u c e r s ' organisations, d e m a n d and prices for their
e x p o r t s d e p e n d e d o n e c o n o m i c decisions in the industrialised
countries.
In W e s t Africa, e v e n a m o n g the N o r t h e r n N i g e r i a n aristocracy,
b i r t h c o n f e r r e d f e w p r i v i l e g e s after i n d e p e n d e n c e . B u t i n r e l a t i o n
t o t h e m a j o r i t y - p a r t i c u l a r l y f a r m e r s - all officials, p r o f e s s i o n a l
p e o p l e and e v e n industrial w o r k e r s seemed p r i v i l e g e d . State
b o d i e s in b e w i l d e r i n g n u m b e r s h a d l i t t l e t o d o w i t h s o c i a l i s m b u t
instead p r o d u c e d a kind o f state-supported, if insecure, b o u r g e
o i s i e . E d u c a t i o n , at l e a s t o f t h e h i g h e r k i n d s , still m a r k e d p e o p l e
o u t , and in N i g e r i a d e m a n d s for the c r e a t i o n o f n e w states t e n d e d
t o c o m e f r o m g r o u p s f e e l i n g at a d i s a d v a n t a g e c o m p a r e d w i t h
m o r e h i g h l y e d u c a t e d p e o p l e in t h e e x i s t i n g s t a t e s . M i l i t a r y r u l e
in N i g e r i a and G h a n a c o n c e a l e d social tensions. W h e n they
e m e r g e d , h o w e v e r , t h e y w e r e still m o r e l i k e l y t o b e b a s e d o n a g e
o r ethnic g r o u p than o n social class.
357

Independent Ghana
G h a n a entered independence w i t h immense international g o o d
w i l l , w i t h D r N k r u m a h as p r i m e m i n i s t e r . H e h a d w o n a d e c i s i v e
e l e c t i o n v i c t o r y , b u t w i t h t h e v o t e s p r o b a b l y o f o n l y 30 p e r c e n t
o f t h e a d u l t p o p u l a t i o n . O p p o s i t i o n M P s n u m b e r e d 43 a g a i n s t t h e
C P P ' s 5 7; s o , in s p i t e o f t h e v i o l e n c e o f t h e p e r i o d w h e n t h e N L M
w a s c a m p a i g n i n g a g a i n s t t h e C P P , it s e e m e d p o s s i b l e t h a t a
multi-party parliamentary system could survive.
T h e r e w e r e , h o w e v e r , o m i n o u s signs. D u r i n g the independence
c e l e b r a t i o n s , a v i o l e n t u p r i s i n g t o o k p l a c e in T r a n s v o l t a T o g o l a n d ,
the former T r u s t T e r r i t o r y o f S o u t h e r n T o g o l a n d , integrated w i t h
G h a n a after a U N - c o n d u c t e d p l e b i s c i t e w h o s e r e s u l t s w e r e
c h a l l e n g e d b y s o m e s o u t h e r n T o g o l e a d e r s . T h e last e x e c u t i v e a c t
o f S i r C h a r l e s A r d e n - C l a r k e as g o v e r n o r w a s t o s e n d t h e G h a n a
a r m y in t o q u e l l t h e d i s t u r b a n c e s . T h e s u b s e q u e n t a c q u i t t a l o n a
technicality o f t w o o p p o s i t i o n leaders a c c u s e d o f c o m p l i c i t y in the
v i o l e n c e l e d C P P l e a d e r s t o q u e s t i o n t h e efficacy o f c o n v e n t i o n a l
legal machinery. A c c r a itself also experienced disturbances caused
by a n e w m o v e m e n t a m o n g the area's G a p e o p l e .
T h e g o v e r n m e n t t o o k a s e r i e s o f m e a s u r e s w h i c h it d e c l a r e d
n e c e s s a r y b e c a u s e o f its o p p o n e n t s ' v i o l e n c e . T h e s e i n c l u d e d
r e m o v a l o f chiefs w h o had supported the o p p o s i t i o n , and they
c u l m i n a t e d in t h e P r e v e n t i v e D e t e n t i o n A c t , p a s s e d i n J u l y 1 9 5 8 ,
after t h e a l l e g e d d i s c o v e r y o f a p l o t l e d b y a n o p p o s i t i o n M P .
P e o p l e c o u l d n o w b e d e t a i n e d f o r p e r i o d s o f five y e a r s w i t h o u t
a p p e a l . T h e a c t w a s u s e d first a g a i n s t 38 l e a d i n g m e m b e r s o f t h e
opposition and then against opposition within the ruling party
itself.
T h e f u s i o n o f state a n d p a r t y p o w e r n o w b e g a n , w i t h t h e
a p p o i n t m e n t o f C P P m e m b e r s as r e g i o n a l a n d d i s t r i c t c o m m i s
s i o n e r s in p l a c e o f c i v i l s e r v a n t s . A C P P o r g a n i s a t i o n w a s g i v e n
m o n o p o l y representation o f farmers, w h i l e the T U C c a m e u n d e r
party control and independent cooperatives w e r e crushed. M P s
started to leave the o p p o s i t i o n , w h i c h w a s n o w o r g a n i s e d into the
United Party under D r Busia, and w a s beginning to lose local
elections. B y i960 the n u m b e r o f o p p o s i t i o n M P s had been h a l v e d .
In that year D r N k r u m a h w a s elected e x e c u t i v e president w i t h
o v e r w h e l m i n g p o w e r s , b u t still b y o n l y a m i n o r i t y o f t h e
35»

r e g i s t e r e d e l e c t o r s . H e h a d e a r l i e r r e f e r r e d t o t h e C P P as c o n t a i n i n g
1
'the vast majority o f o u r c o u n t r y ' .
T h e C P P , once a genuinely popular movement, declined,
increasingly reflecting the ideas o f o n e m a n and the functionaries
flourishing in his s h a d o w . I n 1 9 6 1 a s e r i o u s s t r i k e o f r a i l w a y m e n
protesting against prices w a s summarily ended. B u t the strikers
a n d o t h e r s c o u l d see h o w f u n c t i o n a r i e s w e r e e n r i c h i n g t h e m s e l v e s ;
a n d in h i s f a m o u s ' D a w n B r o a d c a s t ' o f 1 9 6 1 N k r u m a h h i m s e l f
a c c u s e d t h e p a r t y ' s o l d g u a r d o f a b u s i n g t h e i r offices. T h e i r p l a c e s
were then taken by p e o p l e w h o o w e d their positions entirely to
the president, and w h o e c h o e d his theories. A n u m b e r o f the o l d
g u a r d returned w h e n s o m e o f the n e w m e n w e r e accused o f
c o m p l i c i t y in a t t e m p t s t o a s s a s s i n a t e N k r u m a h .
In a plebiscite held in 1964 t o c o n f i r m m e a s u r e s to g i v e the
president greater control o v e r the judiciary and to turn G h a n a
officially i n t o a o n e - p a r t y s t a t e , 9 3 p e r c e n t o f t h e e l e c t o r a t e w e r e
said t o h a v e v o t e d f o r t h e p r e s i d e n t ' s m e a s u r e s . O n l y f o r c e c o u l d
n o w r e m o v e h i m , a n d after m a n y r u m o u r s t h e a r m y , l e d b y
C o l o n e l K o t o k a , finally m o v e d , o n 24 F e b r u a r y 1 9 6 6 , w h i l e t h e
president w a s a b r o a d in C h i n a .
W h y did K o t o k a u n d e r t a k e this risky v e n t u r e ? M a n y had said
t h a t i f t h e p r e s i d e n t left G h a n a h e w o u l d n e v e r r e t u r n ; f o r t h e
g o v e r n m e n t ' s s t a n d i n g h a d s u n k s o l o w t h a t it c o u l d n o t s u r v i v e
his a b s e n c e . K o t o k a h a d p e r s o n a l g r i e v a n c e s a b o u t promotion
a n d p o s t i n g a n d s h a r e d t h e a r m y ' s r e s e n t m e n t t h a t it w a s b e i n g
reduced to an ill-equipped g e n d a r m e r i e , w h i l e the Presidential
G u a r d w a s p a m p e r e d . B u t h e a l s o felt a s h a m e d o f h i s g o v e r n m e n t ,
and was confident that public o p i n i o n would support him.
D i s g u s t w i t h N k r u m a h ' s r e g i m e w a s n o t the result so m u c h o f
its a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m o r c o r r u p t i o n , o r o f h i s e x t r a v a g a n t p o l i t i c a l
a i m s , as o f its i n c o m p e t e n c e a n d p r o f l i g a c y . F o r D r N k r u m a h a n d
his c o l l e a g u e s t h e a n s w e r t o a n e c o n o m i c p r o b l e m w a s y e t a n o t h e r
c o s t l y b o a r d o r c o r p o r a t i o n , w i t h a n e w office b l o c k , o v e r s t a f f e d
b y p a r t y s u p p o r t e r s , a n d w i t h its o w n fleet o f c a r s .
At independence Ghana had foreign reserves w o r t h £190
million, adequate infrastructure, and a n efficient government
machine. When Nkrumah was overthrown the country was
l i t e r a l l y b a n k r u p t , w i t h e x t e r n a l d e b t s - s o m e , it is t r u e , i n f l a t e d
1
D e n n i s A u s t i n , Politics in Ghana 1946-60 ( O x f o r d , 1964), 180.
359

b y foreign c o m p a n i e s - o f s o m e £ 2 5 0 m i l l i o n . L o c a l f o o d w a s
prohibitively expensive and there w a s a chronic shortage o f
c o n s u m e r g o o d s t u r n i n g the m a r k e t w o m e n , for l o n g p o w e r f u l
s u p p o r t e r s , a g a i n s t t h e p r e s i d e n t . F r o n t i e r s w i t h all G h a n a ' s
n e i g h b o u r s w e r e c l o s e d , w h i l e t h e p r i s o n s w e r e full. T h e w o r l d
c o c o a p r i c e h a d d r o p p e d t o its l o w e s t p o s t - w a r p o i n t , a n d t h e
effects w e r e c o m p o u n d e d b y G h a n a ' s m a r k e t i n g o p e r a t i o n s .
C o c o a b a r t e r d e a l s w i t h C o m m u n i s t c o u n t r i e s i n fact p r o b a b l y
strengthened the w o r l d market price; but G h a n a received from
the C o m m u n i s t countries o n l y sub-standard or inappropriate
goods.
N k r u m a h w a n t e d a planned, socialist, independent and n o n -
a l i g n e d e c o n o m y ; b u t i n p r a c t i c e t h e r e w a s little real p l a n n i n g .
I m p o r t controls, necessary to p r o v i d e foreign e x c h a n g e for n e w
industrial equipment, made operation o f existing factories im
possible. T h e r e w a s little s o c i a l i s m either, and n o equality b e t w e e n
p a r t y f u n c t i o n a r i e s a n d t h e m a s s o f p e o p l e . T h e r e w e r e state
enterprises in p l e n t y , b u t these s e r v e d bureaucrats, o r a f a v o u r e d
constituency, and the majority o f t h e m lost m o n e y heavily. In spite
o f s t u p e n d o u s waste, h o w e v e r , the N k r u m a h r e g i m e had m u c h
t o s h o w . O n e o f D r N k r u m a h ' s last p u b l i c a c t s w a s t o i n a u g u r a t e
the £ i 2 o - m i l l i o n V o l t a hydroelectricity scheme, w i t h w h i c h w a s
associated the £50 million V a l c o aluminium smelter, the b i g g e s t
non-oil private project in W e s t Africa.
T h e n e w military regime w a s w e l c o m e d w i t h enthusiasm and
f o u n d a c i v i l s e r v i c e e a g e r t o h e l p it. F o r t h e p r e s s i n g e c o n o m i c
p r o b l e m s it f a c e d t h e r e m e d i e s w e r e m o s t l y c l e a r ; t h e d i f f i c u l t y
w a s to apply them. Creditor countries, for example, concerned
w i t h setting precedents, w e r e u n r e a d y t o g o the w h o l e w a y in
rescheduling the N k r u m a h debts, but speedy shipment o f U S
surplus f o o d and r a w materials helped to p e g the cost o f living.
T h e r e g i m e c u t d o w n s p e n d i n g , b u t it h a d t o b e c a r e f u l n o t t o
inflate u n e m p l o y m e n t . T h e r e g i m e a l s o t u r n e d t o t h e W o r l d B a n k
a n d t h e I M F , w h o s e a d v i c e N k r u m a h h a d i g n o r e d , as w e l l as t o
the U N . T h e frontiers w e r e o p e n e d to f o o d i m p o r t s , and w e s t e r n
g o v e r n m e n t s p r o v i d e d credit. O n e controversial m o v e w a s the
offer t o p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n s o m e s t a t e e n t e r p r i s e s .
T h e object w a s to encourage Ghana's businessmen, w h o had been
suppressed by D r N k r u m a h .
T h e military g o v e r n m e n t dismissed party functionaries and
360

abolished various ideological bodies. B u t without creating unem

p l o y m e n t it c o u l d n o t a b o l i s h t h e W o r k e r s ' B r i g a d e , w h i c h h a d
o r i g i n a l l y b e e n f o u n d e d i n 1 9 5 7 as t h e B u i l d e r s ' B r i g a d e t o
' p r o v i d e a useful o c c u p a t i o n for the u n e m p l o y e d w h o are unable
to secure either a formal apprenticeship o r steady e m p l o y m e n t ;
t o afford t h e y o u t h o f t h e c o u n t r y a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o g i v e p a t r i o t i c
s e r v i c e i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e c o u n t r y , a n d t o assist i n t h e
e x e c u t i o n o f d e v e l o p m e n t projects, especially in rural areas'.
F r e q u e n t l y , h o w e v e r , it h a d a c t e d as a b o d y o f s t o r m - t r o o p e r s .
T h e r e g i m e w a s l u c k y t h a t its a d v e n t c o i n c i d e d w i t h a w o r l d c o c o a
m a r k e t r e c o v e r y . B u t D r N k r u m a h ' s p o l i c i e s i n h i s last y e a r s s e e m
almost consciously to h a v e been designed to reduce the e c o n o m y
t o b a n k r u p t c y . A n o t h e r r e g i m e c o u l d n o t fail t o i m p r o v e t h i n g s
e v e n i f - o r p e r h a p s p a r t i c u l a r l y i f - it d i d n o t h i n g .
A p a r t from arresting, b u t n o t really reversing, e c o n o m i c
decline, the military r e g i m e ' s greatest a c h i e v e m e n t w a s t o restore
d e m o c r a t i c civilian rule to G h a n a in an election in 1969, w h i c h
w a s a m o d e l o f fairness. U n h a p p i l y the t w o m a i n parties, the
Progress Party (PP) and the N a t i o n a l A l l i a n c e o f Liberals ( N A L ) -
a l t h o u g h issuing sober election manifestos - b a c k e d their national
d e m a n d s w i t h particularist tribal appeals in the s o u t h e r n r e g i o n s .
In the northern regions the national parties strongly c h a m p i o n e d
d i f f e r i n g s i d e s i n l o c a l d i s p u t e s , s u c h as s u c c e s s i o n t o t h e Y e n d i
1
chieftancy.
U n d e r D r B u s i a , an a d m i n i s t r a t o r and intellectual t u r n e d
politician, the P P f o r m e d a g o v e r n m e n t w h o s e record, in v i e w
o f t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l c a l i b r e o f its m e m b e r s , w a s d i s a p p o i n t i n g . I t s
attempt, for e x a m p l e , t o reduce u n e m p l o y m e n t in G h a n a b y
e x p e l l i n g n o n - G h a n a i a n s w a s n o t o n l y h a r s h , as t h o u s a n d s o f
t h o s e affected h a d l i v e d i n G h a n a f o r m a n y y e a r s , b u t s e r i o u s l y
d i s r u p t e d c o m m e r c e . I n t h e e n d , h o w e v e r , it w a s t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y
o f controlling s m u g g l i n g - together w i t h the G h a n a i a n predilec
tion for i m p o r t e d g o o d s - and the w e a k , if politically dispassi
onate, w o r l d cocoa market w h i c h caused D r Busia, under I M F
p r o m p t i n g , to d e v a l u e G h a n a ' s c u r r e n c y b y 44 per cent in 1 9 7 2 .
O n c e m o r e the a r m y m o v e d . B u t this time C o l o n e l A c h e a m p o n g
c o u l d n o t use the justification used b y C o l o n e l K o t o k a , since there
1
T h i s w a s o n e o f t h e m a j o r c h i e f t a n c i e s in n o r t h e r n G h a n a . T h e d e a t h o f t h e c h i e f
left a v a c a n c y w h i c h c o u l d b e filled b y a n y o f a n u m b e r o f c a n d i d a t e s f r o m r u l i n g h o u s e s .
P P backed one candidate and N A L another.
561

w a s n o d o u b t t h a t D r B u s i a w o u l d h a v e f a c e d i n d u e c o u r s e a free
a n d fair e l e c t i o n . A c h e a m p o n g ' s o n l y j u s t i f i c a t i o n m i g h t h a v e
b e e n that the e c o n o m i c p e r f o r m a n c e o f his r e g i m e w a s greatly
s u p e r i o r t o D r B u s i a ' s . Y e t o v e r s i x y e a r s later, after A c h e a m p o n g ' s
o v e r t h r o w , h i s s u c c e s s o r s h a d t o d e v a l u e b y o v e r 100 p e r c e n t .
S o , in spite o f s o m e earlier successes in c a m p a i g n s t o g r o w m o r e
f o o d and industrial r a w materials, the failure and the c o r r u p t i o n
o f the A c h e a m p o n g r e g i m e s h o w e d that military g o v e r n m e n t had
offered little t o G h a n a .
Independent Nigeria
J u s t as G h a n a ' s i n d e p e n d e n c e c e l e b r a t i o n s t h r e e y e a r s e a r l i e r h a d
b e e n m a r r e d b y a p o p u l a r u p r i s i n g in T r a n s v o l t a - T o g o , s o , b u t
t o far less p u b l i c i t y , N i g e r i a ' s c e l e b r a t i o n s i n O c t o b e r i 9 6 0 w e r e
a c c o m p a n i e d b y widespread disburbances a m o n g the T i v o f the
then N o r t h e r n R e g i o n . T h e T i v had local g r i e v a n c e s w h i c h their
l e a d e r s felt c o u l d b e m e t o n l y b y t h e c r e a t i o n o f a * M i d d l e B e l t '
state o u t o f t h e n o n - M u s l i m a r e a s o f t h e N o r t h e r n R e g i o n . T h e
d e m a n d f o r n e w states t o s e p a r a t e m i n o r i t i e s f r o m t h e e t h n i c
majorities o f the three main r e g i o n s w a s an i m p o r t a n t feature o f
p r e - i n d e p e n d e n c e p o l i t i c s . I n d e p e n d e n c e s h a r p e n e d it, a n d it s o o n
b e c a m e c l e a r t h a t t h e findings o f a C o l o n i a l O f f i c e c o m m i s s i o n ,
w h i c h had reported just before i n d e p e n d e n c e , that the creation
o f n e w states w a s u n d e s i r a b l e a n d w o u l d n o t c a l m t h e m i n o r i t i e s '
fears, w e r e m i s t a k e n . I n a n y c a s e , b e c a u s e in e a c h r e g i o n t h e
largest ethnic g r o u p tended to d o m i n a t e the ruling party, the
d e m a n d f o r n e w states b e c a m e a m a j o r c a u s e o f p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y ,
a n d e a c h o f t h e t h r e e m a i n p a r t i e s e x p l o i t e d it t o t h e d i s a d v a n t a g e
o f the others.
O n l y in t h e M i d - W e s t a r e a o f t h e W e s t e r n R e g i o n , h o w e v e r ,
w a s it f o u n d p o l i t i c a l l y p o s s i b l e , i n 1 9 6 3 , t o s e p a r a t e a m i n o r i t y
area f r o m a r e g i o n a n d c r e a t e a n e w r e g i o n . It w a s n o t u n t i l 1 9 6 7 ,
o n the e v e o f the civil w a r , that G e n e r a l G o w o n d i v i d e d N i g e r i a
i n t o 12 s t a t e s , i n c l u d i n g t h r e e i n t h e E a s t e r n R e g i o n , t w o o f w h i c h
w e r e d e s i g n e d to detach the minorities there f r o m the d o m i n a n t
I b o s w h o w e r e t h e m a i n s t a y o f t h e r e b e l l i o n (fig. 20). T h e r e a f t e r
in 1 9 7 6 c a m e t h e d i v i s i o n o f t h e rest o f N i g e r i a i n t o 1 9 s t a t e s , b u t
e v e n t h a t left s o m e s i g n i f i c a n t e t h n i c g r o u p s d i s s a t i s f i e d .
362

20 Nigeria: the 12 states.
S o l o n g as t h e N o r t h e r n R e g i o n c o m m a n d e d h a l f t h e seats i n
the federal H o u s e o f Representatives and c o n t a i n e d w e l l o v e r half
t h e c o u n t r y ' s a r e a , t h e N i g e r i a n f e d e r a t i o n w a s at b e s t u n s t a b l e ,
at w o r s t u n w o r k a b l e . S o u t h e r n fears o f p e r p e t u a l n o r t h e r n
d o m i n a t i o n w e r e m a t c h e d b y the determination o f n o r t h e r n
leaders n o t to a l l o w the d i v i s i o n o f their r e g i o n u n d e r any
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . A n d a l t h o u g h t h e N C N C f o u n d it c o n v e n i e n t f o r
m o s t o f the p r e - 1 9 6 6 p e r i o d to join the N P C in the federal
g o v e r n m e n t o f Sir A b u b a k a r T a f a w a B a l e w a — D r A z i k i w e
b e c a m e ' c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ' g o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l in i960, then presi
dent — the prospect o f permanent ' northern d o m i n a t i o n ' d r o v e
s o m e s o u t h e r n l e a d e r s t o d e s p e r a t e a c t s , s u c h as a d v o c a c y o f
secession f r o m the federation. In this sense, failure t o m e e t the
d e m a n d f o r t h e s u b - d i v i s i o n o f t h e r e g i o n s , a l t h o u g h it w a s a
self-interested d e m a n d , threatened the s u r v i v a l o f the federation
as a w h o l e .
363

It w a s t h e u s e o f t h e a r m y t o d e a l w i t h t h e v i o l e n t o p p o s i t i o n
o f A c t i o n G r o u p supporters against the r i g g e d elections w h i c h
the N P C - s u p p o r t e d g o v e r n m e n t o f the W e s t e r n R e g i o n w o n in
1965, and the virtual b r e a k d o w n o f l a w and o r d e r in the r e g i o n ,
w h i c h l e d d i r e c t l y t o t h e m i l i t a r y t a k e - o v e r i n J a n u a r y 1 9 6 6 . It
w a s b e l i e v e d in parts o f the N o r t h e r n R e g i o n that the military
g o v e r n m e n t h a d n o t o n l y b e e n i n s t a l l e d as p a r t o f a n ' I b o p l o t ' ,
b u t w o u l d p l a c e I b o officials i n c h a r g e o f t h e r e g i o n . T h i s l e d t o
t h e later m u r d e r o f I b o s a n d s u b s e q u e n t l y , i n 1 9 6 7 , t o t h e c i v i l
war.
T h e w a r w a s n e v e r , as it w a s o f t e n r e p r e s e n t e d , a c o n f l i c t
b e t w e e n I b o and Hausa. T h e majority o f the federal infantry
c a m e f r o m t h e n o n - M u s l i m areas o f t h e f o r m e r N o r t h e r n R e g i o n ,
and the Y o r u b a s played a leading political role in the military
g o v e r n m e n t o f General G o w o n , himself a Christian from a
n o n - H a u s a ethnic g r o u p in the n o r t h . N o r w a s the civil w a r
' s e n s e l e s s ' . It w a s s e e n o n o n e s i d e as a c r u s a d e t o p r e s e r v e
n a t i o n a l u n i t y , a n d o n t h e o t h e r as t h e o n l y h o p e f o r p h y s i c a l
s e c u r i t y . It w a s , h o w e v e r , v e r y m u c h t h e r e s u l t o f m i s c a l c u l a t i o n
o n the part o f C o l o n e l O j u k w u , military g o v e r n o r o f the Eastern
R e g i o n , w h o w a s c o n v i n c e d that he c o u l d w i n his s t r u g g l e w i t h
L a g o s to secure virtual a u t o n o m y for his Eastern R e g i o n o n l y if
the dispute w e r e ' internationalised'. T h a t m e a n t secession, despite
G o w o n ' s declaration that he w o u l d maintain N i g e r i a ' s unity b y
a r m e d f o r c e . I n E n u g u , it w a s c a l c u l a t e d t h a t ' p r o g r e s s i v e '
g o v e r n m e n t s , w h i c h c o u l d n e v e r declare support for the eastern
cause w h i l e the r e g i o n w a s part o f N i g e r i a , w o u l d r e c o g n i s e an
eastern secessionist g o v e r n m e n t in preference to the L a g o s
g o v e r n m e n t , d o m i n a t e d b y the ' f e u d a l i s t s ' o f the N o r t h e r n
R e g i o n . T h i s calculation p r o v e d quite w r o n g since s o m e radical
A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t s - s u c h as t h o s e o f G u i n e a a n d A l g e r i a -
w e r e a m o n g the strongest supporters o f the federal cause, w h i l e
t h e A f r i c a n states s u p p o r t i n g t h e r e b e l l i o n i n c l u d e d , as w e l l as
Tanzania and Z a m b i a , the I v o r y C o a s t and G a b o n . A n d while
O j u k w u and his advisers had n o s y m p a t h y w i t h C o m m u n i s m , they
c o u l d not h a v e expected that S o v i e t arms - paid for b y the federal
g o v e r n m e n t - w o u l d p l a y a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e in t h e i r d e f e a t . I f t h e
rebel leaders miscalculated the international repercussions o f the
s e c e s s i o n t h e y w e r e s i m i l a r l y at f a u l t i n t h e i r d o m e s t i c c a l c u l a t i o n s ,
seeing G e n e r a l G o w o n and the federal military c o m m a n d e r s ,
364

T H E P R O B L E M S O F I N D E P E N D E N C E
q u i t e w r o n g l y , as i n c o m p e t e n t n o r t h e r n e r s w h o c o u l d n o t b e
effective in t h e a b s e n c e o f E a s t e r n R e g i o n officers.
Success in the civil w a r i m m e n s e l y increased the self-confidence
o f federal civil servants a n d military c o m m a n d e r s . T h e sacrifices
necessary for victory w e r e v e r y u n e v e n l y shared b u t the v i c t o r y
itself i m m e n s e l y strengthened national c o n s c i o u s n e s s , particularly
as it w a s w i d e l y b e l i e v e d t h a t o u t s i d e s u p p o r t f o r t h e r e b e l l i o n
w a s based o n a desire t o see s u c h a p o w e r f u l c o u n t r y as N i g e r i a
disappear. T h e defeated, f o r their part, c o n s c i o u s that they h a d
c o n d u c t e d a b r a v e fight a g a i n s t o d d s a n d h a d d i s p l a y e d g r e a t
talent, w e r e ready o n c e m o r e t o take their place in the federation -
a l t h o u g h a m o n g t h e m , t o o , t h e sacrifices h a d b e e n m o s t u n e v e n l y
shared.
A f t e r i n d e p e n d e n c e g e n u i n e s o u t h e r n fears o f * n o r t h e r n d o m i
n a t i o n ' c o u l d n o t b e s u b s t a n t i a t e d ; n o r t h e r n fears o f s o u t h e r n
intentions were equally v a g u e . But there w a s o n e subject o n w h i c h
northerners and southerners n o t directly charged w i t h the c o n d u c t
o f g o v e r n m e n t c o u l d a g r e e . A t i n d e p e n d e n c e in i 9 6 0 all federal
civil service heads o f ministries and e v e n the Secretary t o the
Prime Minister were British. ' Africanisation' for a time was n o w
as c o n t r o v e r s i a l a n i s s u e as h a d b e e n i n d e p e n d e n c e itself. T h e
a l l e g e d l y d e t a i l e d p r e p a r a t i o n f o r t h e t r a n s f e r o f p o w e r w a s as
d e f i c i e n t i n t h i s as i n t h e m a t t e r o f n e w s t a t e s , b u t w a s e v e n m o r e
unimaginative.
Y e t , as i n o t h e r C o m m o n w e a l t h c o u n t r i e s , A f r i c a n c i v i l s e r v a n t s
soon took o v e r the senior administrative posts and they did a
m a g n i f i c e n t j o b u n d e r m o u n t i n g difficulties. I. F . N i c o l s o n , h o w
e v e r , m a i n t a i n e d t h a t , after t h e p o l i t i c i a n s h a d w e a k e n e d t h e i r
morale, 'confidence, leadership, decision a n d initiative w e r e
steadily drained' o u t o f these administrators. T h e training g i v e n
to y o u n g a r m y officers, h o w e v e r , w a s e x p r e s s l y d e s i g n e d t o b r i n g
out ' t h o s e qualities o f leadership, confidence, initiative, and
p r o m p t d e c i s i o n w h i c h w e r e b e i n g lost in t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
1
s e r v i c e ' . T h i s j u d g e m e n t p r o v e d t r u e o f t h e first m i l i t a r y
g o v e r n o r s in N i g e r i a a n d w a s p r o v e d t o b e true o f those a p
p o i n t e d after G e n e r a l G o w o n w a s p e a c e f u l l y r e m o v e d i n 1 9 7 5
b y s e n i o r officers i m p a t i e n t w i t h h i s p r o c r a s t i n a t i o n a n d ineffec
t i v e n e s s . T h e n e w m i l i t a r y g o v e r n m e n t ( h e a d e d first b y G e n e r a l
M u r t a l a M o h a m m e d a n d , after h i s m u r d e r i n a n a b o r t i v e c o u p i n
1
I. F . N i c o l s o n , The administration of Nigeria, 1900 to i960 ( L o n d o n , 1970), 300.
365

1976, b y General Obasanjo) embarked o n a p r o g r a m m e for a

return to civilian rule in 1979 w h i c h was remarkable for its
thoroughness and for the meticulousness o f its execution in a
country where public utilities and g o v e r n m e n t services were
notorious for their unreliability. T h i s was facilitated by revenues
from Nigeria's extensive oil-fields.
O i l started to make a substantial contribution to federal
revenue in 1970, and in 1979 accounted for some 80 per cent o f
it. T h i s g a v e immense n e w financial p o w e r to the federal
g o v e r n m e n t . T h e breakup o f the regions into m u c h smaller states
greatly increased this federal strength, and, together with the
advent o f military rule, w i t h o u t w h i c h the breakup might never
have happened, it was the most significant political development
in post-independence Nigeria.
Independent Sierra Leone

After the death o f Sir M i l t o n Margai in 1964 t w o men dominated
Sierra L e o n e politics - his brother, Sir Albert Margai, and M r
Siaka Stevens, earlier b o t h senior lieutenants o f Sir Milton. Both
had left the S L P P before independence but Sir A l b e r t returned
to the party to succeed Sir M i l t o n as prime minister.
Stevens formed his A l l People's C o n g r e s s in i960, a radical,
democratic party, tied neither to the chiefs nor to the rich and
influential. In foreign affairs it adopted a more radical stance than
the S L P P . F e w o f its leaders w o u l d have been eligible at that time
to b e c o m e paramount chiefs; none then had a university degree.
E x c e p t for Stevens, the A P C leaders w e r e also y o u n g e r than the
S L P P leaders; and the party was later to adopt a s o m e w h a t v a g u e
socialist ideology. T o many in Sierra L e o n e , h o w e v e r , the
outstanding feature o f the new party was that its leaders were from
the Northern P r o v i n c e , while those o f the S L P P came from the
south.
In the 1962 election, in w h i c h his A P C w o n 16 out o f the 62
seats, Stevens found some southern support. He was n o w leader
o f an effective opposition, and Sir M i l t o n included him in Sierra
L e o n e ' s U N delegation. Stevens also became M a y o r o f F r e e t o w n
w h e n his party w o n the city council elections in 1964. By 1967
his party had made such progress that, despite flagrant abuses in
the general election o f that year b y the S L P P , the results were so
366

THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE
close that the governor-general felt able to appoint Stevens, not

Sir Albert Margai, as prime minister, as b e i n g the man most likely
to command a majority. T h e force c o m m a n d e r , Brigadier Lansana,
intervened on the g r o u n d s that in these circumstances party
conflict could produce disorder, and declared martial law to
prevent Stevens taking o v e r . Stevens and his lieutenants w e r e
confined by the army in State H o u s e w h e r e they had g o n e to be
s w o r n in by the governor-general. T h e brigadier was then o v e r
thrown by his military colleagues, w h o established a military
g o v e r n m e n t , and Stevens was briefly detained. T h e r e f o l l o w e d for
him exile in L o n d o n and in G u i n e a . In A p r i l 1968, after a
counter-coup organised by private soldiers had o v e r t h r o w n the
military regime - the first time in history that privates achieved
such a feat - he was invited to return to take his rightful place
as prime minister. In this counter-coup all s e r v i n g army and police
officers were arrested and imprisoned b y their m e n ; but a
surprising degree o f army and police discipline s u r v i v e d . It was
almost a year before all army and police officers, except some w h o
were to face court charges, had been released.
A s prime minister, Stevens handled this crisis w i t h diplomacy
and courage. But scarcely less melodramatic w e r e the events in
1971, w h i c h led to the rapid changes w h i c h made h i m first
constitutional president and then executive president, f o l l o w i n g
the attempt o n his life in an abortive c o u p led b y the then force
commander, Brigadier Bangura. T r o o p s from G u i n e a w e r e
brought in to act as his b o d y g u a r d . T h e i r presence w a s widely
resented, but he stoutly insisted o n h a v i n g them until 1973. His
A P C subsequently w o n t w o general elections, b y means little
different from those unsuccessfully e m p l o y e d b y the S L P P and
widely criticised; and after t o y i n g w i t h the idea o f a ' n o - p a r t y '
state, President Stevens, o v e r r i d i n g all o p p o s i t i o n , finally estab
lished by law a one-party state in the country w h e r e democratic
notions first gained currency in W e s t Africa.
Independent Gambia
After taking the G a m b i a harmoniously t o independence in 1965,
Sir D a u d a Jawara's People's Progressive Party ( P P P ) n e v e r
seemed in danger o f losing p o w e r , although always h o l d i n g free
and fair elections at the prescribed intervals. In 1965 voters
367

21 T h e Gambia.
rejected the proposal to turn the G a m b i a into a Republic. Sir

D a u d a waited five years to resubmit the p r o p o s a l ; it was accepted,
and in 1970 he became executive president. His g o v e r n m e n t
slowly i m p r o v e d the e c o n o m i c and financial situation despite the
fact that the G a m b i a was one o f the victims o f the Sahel d r o u g h t
and remained principally dependent o n groundnuts, an increase
in w h o s e production the g o v e r n m e n t has successfully fostered.
W h i l e the P P P reached p o w e r as a Mandinka-based party, and
was accused o f advancing Mandinka (as opposed to Protectorate)
interests, Sir D a u d a b r o u g h t non-Mandinka into his cabinets and
at times they w e r e in a majority. Sometimes against the protests
o f his y o u n g e r lieutenants, he placed confidence in non-Mandinka,
o r e v e n British, senior civil servants; and there were still so few
Mandinka at the t o p in the public services ten years after
independence that some M a n d i n k a w e r e demanding a quota
system o f civil-service appointments. H e also resisted party
demands that the appointments o f the five civil service c o m -
368

T H E P R O B L E M S O F I N D E P E N D E N C E
m i s s i o n e r s ' u p r i v e r ' , w h o f o r m a n y p e o p l e still represented

'the g o v e r n m e n t ' , should b e c o m e political.
T h e trade-union m o v e m e n t remained w e a k and divided. But
if the small scale o f c o r r u p t i o n and the v i r t u a l a b s e n c e o f
g o v e r n m e n t e x t r a v a g a n c e limited the political targets available to
the u n e m p l o y e d y o u n g , in the capital area they b e g a n t o f o r m a
potential o p p o s i t i o n to the g o v e r n m e n t that w a s m o r e m e n a c i n g
than the existing parties.
T h e G a m b i a w a s the clearest e x a m p l e o f the d i v i s i o n w h i c h has
continued b e t w e e n the a n g l o p h o n e and francophone countries o f
W e s t A f r i c a after i n d e p e n d e n c e . A l l its p e o p l e s , e x c e p t t h e s m a l l
C r e o l e c o m m u n i t y o f the Banjul area, w e r e k i n s m e n o f ethnic
g r o u p s in s u r r o u n d i n g S e n e g a l , and there w a s c o m p l e t e f r e e d o m
o f m o v e m e n t b e t w e e n t h e t w o c o u n t r i e s . B u t , as w e h a v e s e e n ,
there w a s n e v e r any e n t h u s i a s m in the G a m b i a for any k i n d o f
merger with Senegal, although a 'special relationship' was
1
e s t a b l i s h e d t h r o u g h j o i n t i n s t i t u t i o n s after i n d e p e n d e n c e . I n a n y
c a s e , as a m e m b e r o f E C O W A S a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l g r o u p i n g s , as
a s i g n a t o r y o f t h e L o m é C o n v e n t i o n c o v e r i n g all A f r i c a n s t a t e s ,
a n d as r e c i p i e n t o f a i d f r o m a r a n g e o f A r a b , C o m m u n i s t a n d
western countries, the G a m b i a seemed neither isolated n o r v u l
n e r a b l e , e v e n t h o u g h it h a d n o a r m y , b u t h a d m a d e a s e c u r i t y
a g r e e m e n t w i t h S e n e g a l in 1965.
T h e r e w e r e e v e n smaller a n d less p r o s p e r o u s m e m b e r s o f the
O A U t h a n t h e G a m b i a , a n d its p r e s i d e n t h a d t h e s t a t u s o f a s e n i o r
statesman in A f r i c a . H e w a s , h o w e v e r , criticised inside his o w n
p a r t y f o r l e a n i n g t o w a r d s ' t h e W e s t ' a n d w a s o n e o f t h e last
African leaders to a b a n d o n r e c o g n i t i o n o f T a i w a n . T h e president's
s u c c e s s f u l efforts t o n e u t r a l i s e t h e U n i t e d P a r t y a n d o t h e r p a r t i e s
a n d t o a p p e a l t o all s e c t i o n s o f t h e c o u n t r y as a n a t i o n a l figure
w e a k e n e d his appeal t o s o m e o f his o w n M a n d i n k a . B u t he
s u r v i v e d o p p o s i t i o n to h i m s e l f and to his policies inside the P P P .
R e l a x e d and paternal, he s e e m e d likely t o c o n t i n u e t o s u r v i v e in
a state w h i c h , a l t h o u g h d e m o c r a t i c , o f f e r e d little b a s i s f o r a
successful o p p o s i t i o n party.
1
Austin, Politics in Ghana.
369

Liberia 1966-76
I n t h e y e a r s after its n e i g h b o u r , S i e r r a L e o n e , b e c a m e i n d e p e n d e n t ,
t h e L i b e r i a n h i n t e r l a n d w a s f i n a l l y , i f still t o s o m e d e g r e e o n l y
formally, integrated into the national political system. In 1 9 7 1 ,
w h e n P r e s i d e n t T u b m a n d i e d in office, W i l l i a m T o l b e r t , l o n g
his v i c e - p r e s i d e n t , s u c c e e d e d s m o o t h l y t o the p r e s i d e n c y . H e
dismantled swollen, and sometimes rival, security forces, ruled
w i t h o u t r e p r e s s i o n , a n d i n s t i t u t e d a less f o r m a l t y p e o f r u l e . A f t e r
b e i n g e l e c t e d p r e s i d e n t u n a n i m o u s l y i n 1 9 7 5 h e set a t e r m t o h i s
p e r i o d o f office, i n c o n t r a s t t o t h e r e g u l a r e x t e n s i o n s a r r a n g e d f o r
h i s p r e d e c e s s o r , w h o h a d r u l e d f o r n e a r l y 30 y e a r s .
T o l b e r t entered continental politics w i t h even more enthusiasm
than did T u b m a n and m a d e sure that Liberia played a m o r e
p r o m i n e n t r o l e in O A U i n i t i a t i v e s . L i b e r i a h a d a l s o at last
e x c h a n g e d a m b a s s a d o r s w i t h the S o v i e t U n i o n - an e x c h a n g e
T u b m a n r e s i s t e d , a l t h o u g h h e h a d a g r e e d t o it i n p r i n c i p l e as e a r l y
as 1 9 5 6 w h e n t h e S o v i e t U n i o n s o u g h t a d i p l o m a t i c p o s t in W e s t
A f r i c a a n d L i b e r i a , as t h e s o l e i n d e p e n d e n t s t a t e , w a s t h e o n l y o n e
t h e n a v a i l a b l e . P r e s i d e n t T o l b e r t v i s i t e d P e k i n g after s e v e r i n g
relations w i t h T a i w a n . In 1 9 7 3 , w i t h President S t e v e n s o f Sierra
L e o n e , he f o r m e d the M a n o R i v e r U n i o n u n d e r w h i c h a c u s t o m s '
union and other forms o f e c o n o m i c cooperation w e r e to be
e s t a b l i s h e d . S o at last S i e r r a L e o n e , w h e r e P r o t e c t o r a t e l e a d e r s h a d
o n c e s e e n L i b e r i a as r e p r e s e n t i n g p o l i t i c a l l y s i m i l a r f o r c e s t o t h o s e
w i t h w h o m they themselves w e r e c o m p e t i n g for p o w e r , forged
c l o s e official l i n k s w i t h its n e i g h b o u r .
T h e r e remained a potential conflict o v e r the issue o f the h o l d i n g
o f ' t r i b a l ' land b y Liberian planters f r o m the coast and b y
foreigners. B u t politically the 'settler-tribesman' issue, already
w a n i n g , appeared to be g i v i n g w a y t o a w i d e r o n e that c o u l d excite
real f e e l i n g . A l t h o u g h t h e y w e r e l o s i n g t h e i r p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n ,
particularly w i t h regard to taxation, the international m i n i n g and
p l a n t a t i o n e n t e r p r i s e s , w h i c h l o o m e d s o l a r g e in t h e e c o n o m y ,
together w i t h the Liberians w h o , w h a t e v e r their o r i g i n , w e r e their
p a r t n e r s a n d a g e n t s , w e r e e x p o s e d as p o t e n t i a l p o l i t i c a l t a r g e t s .
B u t a l t h o u g h the benefits o f e c o n o m i c g r o w t h w e r e so u n e v e n l y
d i s t r i b u t e d , L i b e r i a still a p p e a r e d t o e n j o y o n e o f t h e m o s t s t a b l e
r e g i m e s in t h e r e g i o n . U n d e r n e a t h , h o w e v e r , o t h e r f o r c e s w e r e
stirring. M o r e p e o p l e from the hinterland w e r e g a i n i n g access to
37o

education, and thus w e r e able to c o m p e t e for p o w e r , and the

g e n e r a l w o r l d r e c e s s i o n b e g a n t o affect t h e e c o n o m y s o t h a t
serious f o o d shortages and h i g h prices w e r e to lead to discontent
and rioting.
SOCIAL, C U L T U R A L A N D E D U C A T I O N A L D E V E L O P M E N T S
F o r all a n g l o p h o n e W e s t A f r i c a n s t a t e s , t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t s o c i a l
d e v e l o p m e n t i n t h e y e a r s s i n c e 1945 w a s t h e r a p i d s p r e a d o f
e d u c a t i o n . I t w a s i m p o r t a n t f o r t h r e e r e a s o n s . S o l o n g as m o s t
o f their citizens r e m a i n e d illiterate these c o u n t r i e s c o u l d n o t b e
truly independent, since they w o u l d continue to require foreigners
f o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a n d t e c h n i c a l p o s t s as w e l l as f o r t e a c h i n g . S o
l o n g as e d u c a t i o n , at a n y l e v e l , r e m a i n e d t h e p r i v i l e g e o f t h e f e w ,
9
t h e ' t y r a n n y o f t h e c l e r k s w o u l d flourish a n d d e v o t i o n t o p a p e r
qualifications w o u l d distort j u d g e m e n t s a b o u t individual merit.
A b o v e all, p e r h a p s , t h e d i v i s i o n i n t o ' t w o n a t i o n s ' i n all t h e s e
states - b e t w e e n t h e r e l a t i v e l y w e l l e d u c a t e d c o a s t a l t o w n s a n d t h e
hinterland - w o u l d continue to i m p e d e national integration and
p r o d u c e bitter political divisions. T h e further a r g u m e n t that a
h i g h l e v e l o f l i t e r a c y is e s s e n t i a l f o r d e m o c r a c y d i d n o t w i n
u n i v e r s a l a c c e p t a n c e . B u t , i n t h i s b e l i e f , all W e s t A f r i c a n l e a d e r s
attached great importance to the spread o f education.
T h e e d u c a t i o n a l d i v i s i o n c o u l d be seen m o s t sharply in Sierra
L e o n e and L i b e r i a , w h e r e in e a c h case small c o m m u n i t i e s - the
Creoles and the A m e r i c o - L i b e r i a n s - w e r e h i g h l y educated while
t h e m a s s o f i n t e r i o r p e o p l e h a d little o r n o e d u c a t i o n . B u t t h e
political c o n s e q u e n c e s in these cases, and in the a l m o s t similar
o n e in the G a m b i a , w e r e softened b e c a u s e the h i g h l y e d u c a t e d
c o m m u n i t i e s w e r e so few in n u m b e r that they clearly c o u l d n o t
indefinitely d o m i n a t e their countries politically.
I n G h a n a , e n r o l m e n t i n p r i m a r y s c h o o l s r o s e f r o m 80000 i n
1946 to 255000 in 1 9 5 1 , t o 465000 in 1 9 5 7 , a n d t o 1 365000 in
1 9 7 2 . B u t t h e s e i m p r e s s i v e figures c o n c e a l e d a fall i n s t a n d a r d s ,
t h e i m b a l a n c e - w h i c h all t h e c o u n t r i e s e x p e r i e n c e d - b e t w e e n t h e
n u m b e r o f b o y s and o f girls in s c h o o l s , and an imbalance also
b e t w e e n the southern and the t w o n o r t h e r n r e g i o n s w h i c h had
significant political i m p o r t a n c e . T h e really serious d i v i s i o n , h o w
e v e r , w a s in N i g e r i a , w h e r e i n t h e e a r l y 1 9 6 0 s o n l y a b o u t five p e r
cent o f c h i l d r e n o f s c h o o l a g e attended classes in substantial areas
37i

o f t h e f o r m e r N o r t h e r n R e g i o n as a g a i n s t a l m o s t 100 p e r c e n t i n
certain districts o f the three southern r e g i o n s .
T h e d i v i s i o n o f N i g e r i a i n t o states e m p h a s i s e d these differences,
s i n c e t h e m o r e s o u t h e r l y o f t h e states c a r v e d o u t o f t h e f o r m e r
N o r t h e r n R e g i o n c o u l d t h e m s e l v e s be seen to h a v e a h i g h e r
literacy and s c h o o l attendance rate than the m o r e n o r t h e r l y states.
I n s i d e t h e n e w s t a t e s - s o m e i n t h e s o u t h as w e l l as i n t h e
north - educational imbalance, w h i c h previously had not seemed
i m p o r t a n t , a l s o b e c a m e s i g n i f i c a n t . F o r it l e d t o r e s e n t m e n t f r o m
t h e less w e l l e d u c a t e d o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h e b e t t e r e d u c a t e d
w o u l d m o n o p o l i s e g o v e r n m e n t j o b s . I t w a s a l s o felt t h a t b e t t e r
e d u c a t e d areas w o u l d attract m o r e s u p p o r t f r o m the federal
government.
T h e great e x p a n s i o n o f p r i m a r y e d u c a t i o n raised serious social
p r o b l e m s . I n t h e first p l a c e a h i g h p r o p o r t i o n o f c h i l d r e n left
s c h o o l p r e m a t u r e l y ( s o m e t i m e s at t h e i r p a r e n t s ' i n s i s t e n c e ) ,
h a v i n g g a i n e d limited literacy b u t a c o n v i c t i o n that this w a s
e n o u g h to w i n a j o b outside agriculture. O f the children w h o
finished t h e e l e m e n t a r y c o u r s e o n l y a s m a l l p r o p o r t i o n c o u l d g o
o n t o f u r t h e r t r a i n i n g , t h e rest b e c o m i n g t h e s c h o o l - l e a v e r s w h o s e
i n a b i l i t y t o find j o b s a n d w h o s e d i s i n c l i n a t i o n t o f a r m p a r t l y
accounted b o t h for increasing urban u n e m p l o y m e n t and crime
and for the stagnation o r decline o f agriculture. U n e m p l o y m e n t
of secondary-school leavers and o f graduates had not yet b e c o m e
an o v e r w h e l m i n g p r o b l e m b u t t h e y c o u l d n o l o n g e r , e x c e p t in the
m o s t b a c k w a r d areas, suit t h e m s e l v e s entirely in the m a t t e r o f
e m p l o y m e n t . In spite o f considerable a d v a n c e s , s e c o n d a r y and
technical education l a g g e d behind the expansion o f primary
education, partly because o f lack o f funds and partly because o f
shortage o f teachers. M a n y secondary schools, h o w e v e r , establ
ished and maintained h i g h standards. I f the elementary s c h o o l s
p r o v i d e d t h e t r o o p s f o r t h e n a t i o n a l i s t m o v e m e n t , it w a s t h e
secondary s c h o o l s , e v e n m o r e than the universities, w h i c h p r o
v i d e d the officers.
In 1942 there w a s n o a n g l o p h o n e university in W e s t Africa,
although students o f F o u r a h B a y College could be awarded
D u r h a m d e g r e e s in a limited r a n g e o f subjects a n d the C o l l e g e
a t t r a c t e d s t u d e n t s f r o m e l s e w h e r e i n W e s t A f r i c a , s u c h as D r
R o b e r t G a r d i n e r from the G o l d Coast and Professor K e n n e t h
D i k e f r o m N i g e r i a . A c h i m o t a C o l l e g e in the G o l d C o a s t also
372

SOCIAL, C U L T U R A L A N D E D U C A T I O N A L D E V E L O P M E N T S
offered a d e g r e e c o u r s e i n e n g i n e e r i n g f o r t h e L o n d o n B . S c , w h i l e
in N i g e r i a , Y a b a H i g h e r C o l l e g e o f f e r e d p r o f e s s i o n a l t r a i n i n g b u t
n o t d e g r e e s , an inferior status w h i c h in t h e 1930s a n d 1940s d i d
m o r e than any other single factor t o arouse nationalist feeling
a m o n g the Nigerian intelligentsia. B y 1972 N i g e r i a h a d six
universities w i t h seven m o r e in the offing; G h a n a , three; Liberia
one w i t h , in addition, the degree-granting C u t t i n g t o n C o l l e g e ;
and Sierra L e o n e w i t h o n e c a m p u s in the capital, the l o n g -
e s t a b l i s h e d F o u r a h B a y C o l l e g e , a n d o n e c a m p u s u p - c o u n t r y at
N j a l a . A n d t h e r e w e r e still t h o u s a n d s o f a n g l o p h o n e W e s t A f r i c a n
students overseas.
B e c a u s e at first t h e y felt t h e m s e l v e s t o b e - a n d w e r e c o n s t a n t l y
told that they w e r e - p r i v i l e g e d , university students, a l t h o u g h
intensely political, s e l d o m indulged, e v e n against the colonial
authorities, in the activities w h i c h h a v e c o m e t o b e associated w i t h
student politics elsewhere. U n d e r the military regimes, h o w e v e r ,
students t o o k o v e r the opposition role vacated b y politicians and
frequently clashed w i t h the authorities, often violently.
T h e g r e a t e x p a n s i o n o f e d u c a t i o n w a s a c c o m p a n i e d b y efforts
to maintain h i g h standards; and while the universities w e r e
a c c u s e d o f b e i n g elitist o r , b e c a u s e o f t h e i r c o n t i n u e d r e c r u i t m e n t
o f e x p a t r i a t e staff a n d c l o s e c o n n e x i o n s w i t h E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g
universities overseas, ' n e o - c o l o n i a l ' , they helped in the g r o w t h
o f an impressive b o d y o f W e s t African scholars and in the
i n c l i n a t i o n o f c u r r i c u l a , a t all l e v e l s , t o w a r d s a n A f r i c a n c o n t e n t ,
particularly in history.
T h e scholarly interest w h i c h for s o m e years h a d b e e n taken in
their o w n history b y W e s t Africans w a s m a t c h e d b y a n e w interest
in A f r i c a n art. B u t w h i l e there w e r e i m p o r t a n t A f r i c a n historians
o f t h e i r r a c e a n d c o u n t r i e s e v e n i n t h e last c e n t u r y , f o r a l o n g t i m e ,
influenced m o r e b y missionaries than b y those E u r o p e a n s w h o
had l o n g seen the w o r t h o f A f r i c a n w o r k , Africans w i t h w e s t e r n
e d u c a t i o n rejected A f r i c a n art a n d e v e n crafts. P e o p l e like t h e
archaeologist, D r E k p o E y o o f Nigeria, o r Professors Asihene and
N k e t i a o f G h a n a , h o w e v e r , w r o t e expertly o f their countries'
1
traditional art. Artists like B e n E n w o n w u a n d V i n c e n t K o f i d r e w
o n t h i s art f o r i n s p i r a t i o n f o r t h e i r o w n i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y e s t e e m e d
1
E k p o E y o , Two thousand years of Nigeria art ( L a g o s , 1977); J. W . K w a b e n a N k e t i a ,
Folk songs of Ghana ( O x f o r d , 1963); E . V . A s i h e n e , Introduction to the traditional art of
western Africa ( L o n d o n , 1972).
373

work. Archaeological finds, too, notably those at N o k a n d

I g b o - U k w u in N i g e r i a , s h o w e d that sophisticated w o r k o f h i g h
quality w a s p r o d u c e d in a r e m o t e past in areas w h i c h until recently
had been assumed to ' h a v e n o history*. T h e r e also arose a lively
interest a m o n g educated a n g l o p h o n e W e s t Africans in traditional
medicine.
E n g l i s h c o n t i n u e d t o b e u s e d as t h e l a n g u a g e o f i n s t r u c t i o n i n
p o s t - p r i m a r y a n d o f t e n i n p r i m a r y e d u c a t i o n , as i t c o n t i n u e d t o
be the language o f politics, administration and large-scale
c o m m e r c e , o n l y s h a r i n g this role w i t h H a u s a in parts o f N i g e r i a ' s
n o r t h e r n s t a t e s . W i d e s p r e a d m o r t i f i c a t i o n at s u c h u s e o f a n a l i e n
language did n o t p r o d u c e , and seemed unlikely t o p r o d u c e , an
a l t e r n a t i v e , as n o s i n g l e l o c a l l a n g u a g e w a s g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t a b l e
in a n y c o u n t r y . S o m a n y W e s t A f r i c a n s , particularly n o v e l i s t s in
N i g e r i a , s h o w e d a m a s t e r y o f E n g l i s h t h a t i n a s e n s e it w a s n o
l o n g e r a n a l i e n l a n g u a g e . S u c h w r i t e r s as L e n r i e P e t e r s o f t h e
G a m b i a , E l d r e d Jones o f Sierra L e o n e , A y i K w e i A r m a h o f
G h a n a o r C h i n u a A c h e b e o f Nigeria, p r o d u c e d a distinct and
significant branch o f E n g l i s h literature; w h i l e N i g e r i a n writers
s u c h as T u t u o l a a n d O k a r a a d a p t e d E n g l i s h t o f o r m a l i t e r a t u r e
1
w h i c h can be called ' W e s t A f r i c a n ' .
With the return, b y n o means complete, o f cultural self-
confidence, traditional dress also returned to favour. W e s t African
w o m e n c o m b i n e d traditional cloth and patterns to m a k e attractive
fashions in a m o d e r n style. W e s t African cuisine w a s also
b e c o m i n g fashionable. W o m e n , i n c l u d i n g those in M u s l i m areas,
w e r e n e v e r as m a l t r e a t e d i n W e s t A f r i c a as t h e y still w e r e i n s o m e
parts o f the w o r l d ; they gradually acquired the franchise to match
their equality before the l a w . F e w b e c a m e political leaders, b u t
there w e r e n o w w o m e n judges and senior doctors, writers,
scholars, civil-service heads o f ministries, and ambassadors; and,
as t h e r e h a d l o n g b e e n , e n o r m o u s l y s u c c e s s f u l b u s i n e s s w o m e n
and market traders.
T h e position o f chiefs belongs to a discussion o f politics. A s
t h e y l o s t p o l i t i c a l p o w e r a n d i n f l u e n c e , s o t h e y c a m e i n r u r a l as
w e l l as m o s t u r b a n a r e a s t o b e r e g a r d e d b y t h e i r p e o p l e as t h e
e m b o d i m e n t o f their c o m m u n i t y , irrespective o f their personal
q u a l i t i e s . F e w p e o p l e i n a n g l o p h o n e W e s t A f r i c a felt n o a l l e g i a n c e
1
S e e A m o s T u t u o l a , Feather woman of the jungle ( L o n d o n , 1962) a n d G a b r i e l O k a r a ,
The fisherman*s invocation ( L o n d o n , 1978).
374

S O C I A L , C U L T U R A L A N D E D U C A T I O N A L D E V E L O P M E N T S
to a chief o f some kind, and social discipline w a s best maintained

w h e r e traditional influences w e r e strongest. L i b e r a t i o n f r o m
tradition, h o w e v e r , w a s n o t directly related to crime - m u c h o f
it i n u r b a n a r e a s t h e w o r k o f o r g a n i s e d , r u t h l e s s g a n g s ; b u t e v e n
radical y o u n g p e o p l e b e g a n t o w o n d e r w h e t h e r the retreat f r o m
chiefly a u t h o r i t y h a d n o t g o n e t o o far.
A m o n g the g r o w i n g n u m b e r o f M u s l i m s in W e s t A f r i c a , the
world-wide trend towards greater o r t h o d o x y became evident,
t h o u g h often accompanied b y s e e m i n g political radicalism.
A m o n g Christians, d i v i s i o n s w e r e sharper than in E u r o p e , w h i l e
there w a s an intensified search for A f r i c a n f o r m s o f the religion.
B u t a d h e r e n t s o f all r e l i g i o n s d e p l o r e d t h e fall i n m o r a l s t a n d a r d s
and h o p e d , n o d o u b t unrealistically, that religion c o u l d reverse
it.
A n g l o p h o n e W e s t A f r i c a r e m a i n e d socially a n d c u l t u r a l l y in
t r a n s i t i o n f r o m c o l o n i a l s t a t u s t o full i n d e p e n d e n c e . B u t t h e
t r a n s i t i o n d i d n o t p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y i n j u r e its m a i n a g e n t s . T h e y a n d
the p e o p l e they represented s h o w e d a remarkable capacity for
remaining their o w n selves w h i l e a b s o r b i n g c h a n g e .
R E G I O N A L R E L A T I O N S
It is difficult t o r e c a p t u r e t h e e x c i t e m e n t w i t h w h i c h G h a n a ' s
independence w a s greeted t h r o u g h o u t Africa and the w o r l d .
A l t h o u g h an irresistible m o v e m e n t t o w a r d s independence
t h r o u g h o u t t h e c o n t i n e n t w a s n e a r , it d i d n o t l o o k l i k e t h a t t h e n .
T h e d a t e o f N i g e r i a ' s i n d e p e n d e n c e s e e m e d far a w a y ; f o r t h e
G a m b i a a n d f r a n c o p h o n e c o u n t r i e s i n d e p e n d e n c e w a s still s c a r c e l y
d i s c u s s e d ; w h i l e i n o t h e r A f r i c a n c o l o n i e s it w a s n o t y e t e v e n o n
the agenda. S o o n e result o f G h a n a ' s pioneer status w a s the
importance N k r u m a h and his colleagues attached t o the independ
e n c e o f o t h e r A f r i c a n states, a n d a b e l i e f in the c a p a c i t y o f their
s m a l l s t a t e t o e x e r c i s e a n i n f l u e n c e w h i c h w a s b e y o n d its c a p a c i t y .
F r o m his g o v e r n m e n t ' s w h i t e paper o n the i960 R e p u b l i c a n
C o n s t i t u t i o n it w a s c l e a r t h a t N k r u m a h t h o u g h t t h a t G h a n a ' s t a s k
n o w l a y i n e x t e r n a l affairs. L a t e r it w a s s u g g e s t e d t h a t , b e c a u s e
a w h o l e series o f A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s b e c a m e i n d e p e n d e n t w i t h o u t
G h a n a ' s direct assistance, he did n o t recognise their liberation;
a n d r e s e r v e d t h e r i g h t , as h e h a d as e a r l y as t h e first A l l - A f r i c a n
P e o p l e s ' C o n f e r e n c e i n 195 8 ( w h i c h w a s n o t a t t e n d e d b y t h e r u l i n g
375

parties o f N i g e r i a , Sierra L e o n e o r m o s t francophone countries)

to nominate the authentic liberation m o v e m e n t in a n y country.
O f Nkrumah's devotion to African unity and belief in the
necessity and feasibility o f an A f r i c a n continental government
t h e r e is n o d o u b t . A n d b y t h e t i m e h e w a s o v e r t h r o w n a l l A f r i c a n
leaders, h o w e v e r conservative o r self-centred, w e r e o b l i g e d to p a y
at l e a s t l i p - s e r v i c e t o A f r i c a n u n i t y o f a k i n d . I t is o n e o f A f r i c a ' s
tragedies, h o w e v e r , that the means he used t o a d v a n c e his ideal
o f U n i o n G o v e r n m e n t a n d t o o p p o s e a n y t h i n g s h o r t o f it i n c l u d e d
v i r u l e n t n e w s p a p e r c a m p a i g n s a g a i n s t A f r i c a n leaders w h o differed
from his v i e w s , diplomatic bad manners, harbouring dissidents
and e v e n training t h e m in G h a n a for s u b v e r t i n g independent
A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t s o f w h i c h h e d i s a p p r o v e d . T h i s all seriously
divided the continent, interfered w i t h the establishment o f the
O r g a n i s a t i o n o f African U n i t y a n d in the e n d virtually isolated
Ghana.
G h a n a ' s relations w i t h N i g e r i a w e r e often seriously strained.
B u t w h a t in his study o f the t w o countries' relations D r Olajide
A l u k o called ' t h e traditional jealousy, suspicion, c o m p e t i t i o n and
1
differences b e t w e e n G h a n a a n d N i g e r i a ' were not ended by
N k r u m a h ' s o v e r t h r o w . D u r i n g t h e first G h a n a m i l i t a r y r e g i m e
(1966-9), it is t r u e , relations became cordial. T h e Nigerian
military g o v e r n m e n t at o n c e r e c o g n i s e d G e n e r a l A n k r a h ' s n e w
regime. G o w o n readily accepted A n k r a h ' s invitation to meet
C o l o n e l O j u k w u at A b u r i , in G h a n a , in J a n u a r y 1967. D u r i n g the
N i g e r i a n civil w a r , h o w e v e r , relations b e t w e e n A c c r a and the
N i g e r i a n federal g o v e r n m e n t deteriorated. G h a n a i a n n e w s p a p e r s
s y m p a t h i s e d w i t h t h e s e c e s s i o n i s t s , a n d A n k r a h at t i m e s s h o w e d
impatience w i t h the Nigerian leadership. Ghana's change to
civilian rule in 1969 actually w o r s e n e d matters. T h e n e w G h a n a
g o v e r n m e n t s e n t w h a t w a s c o n s i d e r e d i n L a g o s as a n i m p e r t i n e n t
offer t o m e d i a t e i n t h e c i v i l w a r ; l a t e r , as p a r t o f i t s ' i n d i g e n i s a t i o n '
p o l i c y , it e x p e l l e d t h o u s a n d s o f N i g e r i a n s l o n g r e s i d e n t i n G h a n a .
Nkrumah's relations with Sierra Leone were also poor,
particularly, before independence, w i t h Sir M i l t o n M a r g a i , w h o s e
suspicion o f N k r u m a h w a s m a t c h e d b y that o f President T u b m a n
o f Liberia. Sierra L e o n e ' s relations w i t h N i g e r i a also b e c a m e frigid
towards the end o f the civil w a r because o f the o p e n sympathy
for the rebels expressed b y s p o k e s m e n o f Sierra L e o n e , w h i c h
1
O l a j i d e A l u k o , Ghana and Nigeria 1917-70 ( L o n d o n , 1976), 261.
376

R E G I O N A L R E L A T I O N S
s e e m e d i n d a n g e r o f r e c o g n i s i n g t h e s e c e s s i o n i s t r e g i m e j u s t as
it c o l l a p s e d . P r e s i d e n t T u b m a n ' s s u p p o r t o f t h e f e d e r a l c a u s e ,
h o w e v e r , w a s m u c h appreciated in L a g o s .
F o r N i g e r i a n d i p l o m a c y in A f r i c a , the civil w a r w a s an acid test,
successfully passed. N i g e r i a w a s t o b e c o m e the Black African
c o u n t r y w h i c h A m e r i c a n s , in particular, a l w a y s consulted a b o u t
affairs i n t h e c o n t i n e n t . A n d its o i l w a s a l s o t o m a k e it a s i g n i f i c a n t
f a c t o r i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l affairs.
N o a n g l o p h o n e W e s t Africa c o u n t r y , except G h a n a briefly
under N k r u m a h , w a s influenced b y the S o v i e t U n i o n o r C h i n a in
its i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . A l l t o v a r y i n g d e g r e e s s o u g h t t h a t
' n e u t r a l i s m ' o r ' n o n - a l i g n m e n t ' , w h i c h it is s o difficult t o d e f i n e .
B u t if d u r i n g the N k r u m a h years G h a n a s o u g h t an influence
b e y o n d her capacity, N i g e r i a in the early years o f independence
sometimes a v o i d e d exercising the influence w h i c h w a s hers. A f t e r
1970 Nigeria, militarily the m o s t p o w e r f u l c o u n t r y in Black
Africa, w h i c h had been o b l i g e d to defer to G h a n a o n p r o b l e m s
raised b y the f o r m e r B e l g i a n C o n g o , the m o s t i m p o r t a n t inter
national issue for B l a c k A f r i c a until 1967, d i d n o t brashly assert
t h e i n f l u e n c e w h i c h h e r i m p o r t a n c e j u s t i f i e d . O n t h e c o n t r a r y , as
in the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f E C O W A S , she a l l o w e d a n d e n c o u r a g e d
s m a l l e r c o u n t r i e s t o t a k e full p a r t i n , a n d t a k e c r e d i t f o r , its
organisation.
E C O N O M I C S
D u r i n g t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r , as w e h a v e n o t e d , t h e e c o n o m i e s
o f British W e s t Africa were m o r e closely integrated w i t h the
British e c o n o m y than ever before. A recent b d o k has claimed that
t h e w a r y e a r s r e p r e s e n t e d ' t h e h e y d a y o f t h e e m p i r e . . . at last t h e
imperialism against w h i c h the critics o f e m p i r e h a d railed s o l o n g
1
actually existed'. Before the w a r and particularly during the years
o f the great depression, colonial g o v e r n m e n t s had primarily been
concerned with administration and the maintenance o f the
c o n d i t i o n s f o r t r a d e a n d m i n i n g w h i c h t h e i r officials s a w c h i e f l y
as t h e m e a n s f o r r a i s i n g t h e t a x e s n e c e s s a r y t o s u p p o r t t h e i r
colonial g o v e r n m e n t . Y e t the degree to w h i c h the colonial
e c o n o m i e s s t a g n a t e d i n t h e y e a r s b e f o r e 1 9 3 9 is e a s i l y e x a g g e r a t e d ,
as is t h e i n d i f f e r e n c e o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t s t o e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t
and the lack o f enterprise s h o w n b y Africans.
1
Pearce, Turning point in Africa, 220.
377

By 1939 the economies were largely monetised and currency

notes w e r e w i d e l y used. R a i l w a y s , roads a n d ports facilitated
m o v e m e n t o f g o o d s and people, a n d the initiative o f hundreds
o f t h o u s a n d s o f small farmers a n d traders (these latter b o t h b u y i n g
crops and p r o v i d i n g farmers w i t h 'incentive g o o d s ' ) had made
the c o l o n i e s major exporters o f agricultural p r o d u c e . T h e i m p o r t
and e x p o r t trade, m i n i n g a n d timber extraction, w e r e d o m i n a t e d
b y e x p a t r i a t e firms. B u t w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f t h e L e v a n t i n e
t r a d e r s i n S i e r r a L e o n e a n d L i b e r i a , i n t e r i o r retail t r a d e w a s
l a r g e l y i n A f r i c a n h a n d s , as w a s l o n g - d i s t a n c e t r a d e i n , f o r
e x a m p l e , k o l a n u t s , c a t t l e a n d d r i e d fish. A g r i c u l t u r e w a s a l m o s t
e n t i r e l y t h e affair o f s m a l l f a r m e r s .
T h e real c h a n g e i n t r o d u c e d b y t h e w a r w a s t h e e n l a r g e m e n t o f
state c o n t r o l o v e r t h e c o l o n i a l e c o n o m i e s , a c o n t r o l w h i c h h a s
since been extended. It included e x c h a n g e and price controls,
import licensing a n d restrictions o n entry in various c o m m e r c i a l
activities. T h e major change, h o w e v e r , and o n e w h i c h m a n y
e c o n o m i s t s n o w s e e as h a v i n g h a r m e d t h e i n t e r e s t s o f A f r i c a n
p r o d u c e r s , w a s t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t , i n all f o u r B r i t i s h c o l o n i e s , o f
statutory marketing boards w h i c h w e r e g i v e n a m o n o p o l y o f the
p u r c h a s e , e x p o r t a n d sales a b r o a d o f t h e m a j o r e x p o r t c r o p s ,
including cocoa, groundnuts, cotton and palm produce. T h e
m a r k e t i n g b o a r d s u s e d l o c a l firms a s ' l i c e n s e d b u y i n g a g e n t s ' , a n
a r r a n g e m e n t w h i c h t e n d e d t o f a v o u r e x p a t r i a t e firms. A f t e r t h e
war the marketing boards were made permanent, o n the ground
that o n l y thus c o u l d prices paid t o farmers b e ' stabilised' - a
c o n c e p t n e v e r properly defined.
In practice, b y w i t h h o l d i n g part o f the crops' export earnings
in g o o d years t o create stabilisation funds f o r b a d y e a r s , t h e
marketing boards accumulated funds w h i c h w e r e s e l d o m dis
bursed t o farmers b u t w e r e ultimately plundered b y independent
g o v e r n m e n t s . In addition, for years before independence, the
investment o f these funds in L o n d o n bolstered sterling; a n d s o
l o n g a s B r i t a i n ' s M i n i s t r y o f F o o d b o u g h t t h e i r c r o p s it p a i d l e s s
than the w o r l d price to the marketing boards. A t a time w h e n
there w a s talk o f a ' r e v o l u t i o n ' in Britain's relations w i t h h e r
colonies under a L a b o u r g o v e r n m e n t , there w a s ' a n enforced
transfer o f resources f r o m the c o l o n i e s t o the m e t r o p o l i t a n
1
c o u n t r y s u c h as h a d n e v e r o c c u r r e d i n British A f r i c a b e f o r e t h e n ' .
1
P . T . B a u e r , Equality, the Third World and economic delusion ( L o n d o n , 1981), 183.
378

E C O N O M I C S
In addition to r e c e i v i n g l o w prices from the m a r k e t i n g b o a r d s ,

f a r m e r s w e r e o f t e n p a i d in ' c h i t s ' o r o t h e r w i s e d e f r a u d e d . T h e
s t a g n a t i o n o r fall i n p r o d u c t i o n o f m a n y m a r k e t i n g - b o a r d c r o p s ,
or the large-scale s m u g g l i n g o f t h e m into f r a n c o p h o n e countries
a n d L i b e r i a , it is n o w h e l d , w a s t h e r e s u l t o f t h e m a r k e t i n g b o a r d s '
p r a c t i c e s . N i g e r i a , after t h e c i v i l w a r , i n t r o d u c e d g e n u i n e s u b s i d i e s
for m a r k e t i n g - b o a r d c r o p s and considerable f r e e d o m for their
m a r k e t i n g - b u t it w a s t o o l a t e .
W h a t e v e r the c o n s e q u e n c e s for e x p o r t c r o p s o f the establish
m e n t o f the m a r k e t i n g b o a r d s , local f o o d p r o d u c t i o n - in w h i c h
u n t i l r e c e n t l y g o v e r n m e n t s t o o k little i n t e r e s t — a l s o s t a g n a t e d .
T h i s meant b o t h h i g h e r prices - a major factor in the inflation
w h i c h p a r t i c u l a r l y affected G h a n a a n d N i g e r i a - a n d a h e a v y d r a i n
o n foreign e x c h a n g e , particularly for the purchase o f rice.
Disillusionment w i t h public enterprises resulted from the
d e p l o r a b l e r e c o r d o f their inefficiency a n d c o r r u p t i o n in a n g l o
p h o n e W e s t Africa. B u t g o v e r n m e n t s , except in Liberia, remained
the chief agents o f industrial d e v e l o p m e n t , and e x p a n d e d their
participation into petroleum production and refining, tourism,
i m p o r t o f c o n s u m e r g o o d s , n e w s p a p e r s and p u b l i s h i n g , steel
production, mining, plantations, contracting, banking, insurance
a n d o t h e r fields. S h o r t a g e o f m a n a g e r i a l e x p e r i e n c e w a s p a r t l y m e t
by e n g a g i n g foreigners or accepting foreign technical partners;
but many g o v e r n m e n t or s e m i - g o v e r n m e n t enterprises seemed
destined to be loss-makers.
E x c e p t i n N k r u m a h ' s c a s e it w a s n o t d e v o t i o n t o s o c i a l i s t
doctrines w h i c h m o v e d g o v e r n m e n t s into these activities, but a
desire to ensure that c o n t r o l o f t h e m d i d n o t r e m a i n in the h a n d s
o f n o n - c i t i z e n s . T h u s t o different d e g r e e s a n d i n different w a y s
all g o v e r n m e n t s , i n c l u d i n g L i b e r i a , r e q u i r e d t h a t t h e r e b e i n
d i g e n o u s participation - w h e t h e r p r i v a t e o r p u b l i c - in existing
f o r e i g n e n t e r p r i s e s . I n t h e c a s e o f N i g e r i a , it w a s r e q u i r e d t h a t
a majority o f the s h a r e h o l d i n g s h o u l d b e i n d i g e n o u s . In nearly
all c a s e s t h e s e f o r e i g n e n t e r p r i s e s w e r e c o m p e n s a t e d f o r t h e
e n f o r c e d c h a n g e s in the structure o f their o w n e r s h i p .
T h e r e remained, h o w e v e r , a v i g o r o u s local private sector in
trade and distribution, w o r k s h o p s , contracting and b u i l d i n g , and
road transport. Criticism o f direct large-scale farming b y
g o v e r n m e n t agencies g r e w o n the g r o u n d s that g o v e r n m e n t
w o u l d b e better e m p l o y e d in assisting, b y p r o v i s i o n o f r o a d s a n d
379

s t o r a g e , t h e m i l l i o n s o f s m a l l f a r m e r s w h o still c o n s t i t u t e d t h e
majority o f the w o r k - f o r c e , and w h o s e o u t p u t had to be greatly
raised if a g r o w i n g p o p u l a t i o n w a s to b e p r o p e r l y n o u r i s h e d .
W i t h the exception o f N i g e r i a ( w h i c h did not a l w a y s escape,
a n d e a r n e d a r e p u t a t i o n as a v e r y s l o w p a y e r o v e r s e a s ) , i n d e p e n d e n t
African countries faced balance-of-payment p r o b l e m s and s o u g h t
I M F help. Liberia c o n t i n u e d to use the U S dollar, w h e r e a s the
four former British colonies, w h i c h once used a c o m m o n currency
c l o s e l y l i n k e d t o s t e r l i n g , e a c h e s t a b l i s h e d its o w n c u r r e n c y .
N o t h i n g better illustrates G h a n a ' s e c o n o m i c t r a g e d y , t o w h i c h
reference has been m a d e , than the worthlessness o f her cedi o v e r
m u c h o f the period. T h i s led to vast s m u g g l i n g o f c o c o a into
n e i g h b o u r i n g countries, and the s m u g g l i n g into G h a n a o f g o o d s
b o u g h t w i t h the francs the c o c o a earned.
S m u g g l i n g b e c a m e o n e o f the m o s t i m p o r t a n t c o m m e r c i a l
activities in a n g l o p h o n e c o u n t r i e s . W h e t h e r E C O W A S , b y har
m o n i s i n g p r o d u c e p r i c e s a n d tariff l e v e l s i n t h e a r e a a n d b y e n s u r i n g
m o r e realistic e x c h a n g e r a t e s , c o u l d d i m i n i s h it s e e m e d u n c e r t a i n .
B u t the drain o f d i a m o n d s from Sierra L e o n e into Liberia, for
example, and the ruin o f s o m e o f N i g e r i a ' s industries b y s m u g g l e d
imports, w e r e n o t marginal b u t w e r e central features o f the t w o
e c o n o m i e s . E C O W A S , it w a s h o p e d , w o u l d a l s o f a c i l i t a t e t h e
d e v e l o p m e n t o f industries, for m a n y o f w h i c h N i g e r i a alone
offered a n a d e q u a t e d o m e s t i c m a r k e t , i n a n i n c r e a s i n g v a r i e t y ,
ranging from car assembly to glass manufacturing and tyre
production.
Y e t e v e n in N i g e r i a the structure o f the e c o n o m y did n o t
f u n d a m e n t a l l y c h a n g e after 1939. T h e oil industry w a s a n ' e n c l a v e '
industry, e m p l o y i n g relatively few N i g e r i a n s ; and although
N i g e r i a n entrepreneurs m a d e m u c h m o n e y in s e r v i c i n g the
i n d u s t r y , o r t h r o u g h f o r e i g n c o m p a n i e s s e r v i c i n g it, v e r y f e w
participated in p r o d u c t i o n , in w h i c h the state c o r p o r a t i o n w a s the
p r e d o m i n a n t partner o f the foreign oil c o m p a n i e s . N e v e r t h e l e s s
the oil b o o m p r o d u c e d in N i g e r i a a c o n s i d e r a b l e class o f v e r y rich
N i g e r i a n s , w h o b e c a m e i m p o r t a n t in the L o n d o n p r o p e r t y
market. Social m o b i l i t y remained the great protection against
social r e v o l u t i o n .
' S e e k y e first t h e p o l i t i c a l k i n g d o m , a n d all t h i n g s w i l l b e a d d e d
u n t o it,' K w a m e N k r u m a h had assured his f o l l o w e r s . T h a t
p r o p h e c y w a s still t o b e j u s t i f i e d .
380

C O N C L U S I O N
C O N C L U S I O N
Because o f N i g e r i a ' s i m m e n s e p o p u l a t i o n , the p e o p l e o f a n g l o

p h o n e W e s t A f r i c a n states o u t n u m b e r t h o s e o f all t h e rest o f B l a c k
Africa. A f t e r i n d e p e n d e n c e , in spite o f the v i o l e n t disruptions
w h i c h all e x p e r i e n c e d , t h e y r e p r e s e n t e d a r e l a t i v e l y h i g h d e g r e e
o f stability and order, internally and a m o n g t h e m s e l v e s . C o r
ruption w a s widespread and privilege w a s rife; nevertheless,
d e m o c r a c y , if variously defined, w a s a general g o a l . O n e - p a r t y
f a s h i o n s d i d n o t b e c o m e r o o t e d , a n d after l o n g e x p e r i e n c e o f
military rule Ghanaians and N i g e r i a n s returned to the uncertainties
o f civilian g o v e r n m e n t and multi-party politics. S o m e W e s t
A f r i c a n states, i n c l u d i n g these, m a y h a v e entered i n t o a r e g u l a r
a l t e r n a t i o n b e t w e e n m i l i t a r y a n d c i v i l i a n r u l e ; b u t i n all a n g l o
p h o n e states w h i c h e x p e r i e n c e d m i l i t a r y r u l e , t h e c i v i l i a n s c l e a r l y
s h o w e d t h e i r d i s l i k e o f it.
W h e r e a m a n c a m e f r o m , in m a n y matters, remained m o r e
important than w h o he w a s or w h a t he could d o . T h e r e w a s n o
l o n g e r , h o w e v e r , e v e n in the N i g e r i a n emirates o r in L i b e r i a , any
insuperable barrier to talent rising to the t o p . A c o m b i n a t i o n o f
social m o b i l i t y and access to land for almost e v e r y b o d y s e e m e d
likely to a v o i d the social tensions o f m a n y other parts o f the w o r l d ,
p r o v i d e d that g o v e r n m e n t s s h o w e d elementary c o m p e t e n c e in
their e c o n o m i c m a n a g e m e n t .
Class divisions w e r e appearing, based o n acquired — rather than
inherited - w e a l t h and o n p r i v i l e g e d access t o state funds a n d
facilities. W i t h t h e p a s s i n g o f t h e a n t i - c o l o n i a l s t r u g g l e , t h e
domestic social system w a s subjected to increasing scrutiny b y
y o u n g p e o p l e . T h e y c o u l d n o l o n g e r believe that their c o u n t r i e s '
ills w e r e a ' l e g a c y o f c o l o n i a l i s m ' , a c o l o n i a l i s m w h i c h w a s
b e g i n n i n g t o b e s e e n as a n e p i s o d e , h o w e v e r s i g n i f i c a n t , i n a
h i s t o r y w h i c h in m a n y a r e a s it s c a r c e l y i n t e r r u p t e d . N o r , w h i l e
bitterly d e n o u n c i n g r a c i s m in S o u t h A f r i c a , d i d they attach t o
external political factors the sinister p o w e r a s c r i b e d t o t h e m in
s o m e other parts o f the T h i r d W o r l d . T h e y joined, h o w e v e r , the
T h i r d W o r l d c a m p a i g n against the rich countries.
A n g l o p h o n e W e s t A f r i c a n l e a d e r s t h e m s e l v e s w e r e m o s t l y free
o f the d o u b l e - t h i n k i n g w h i c h a l l o w e d leaders o f countries w h i c h
had o n c e been u n d e r c o l o n i a l rule licence to i n d u l g e in c o r r u p t i o n ,
tyranny and profligacy o n the g r o u n d that they c o u l d n o t b e
3 8i

b l a m e d for deficiencies in b e h a v i o u r w h i c h s h o u l d be attributed

to the colonial past - a sort o f i n n o c e n c e b y association. Real
i n d e p e n d e n c e c o m e s w h e n citizens h o l d their leaders, n o t their
history, responsible for their condition. A n g l o p h o n e W e s t
Africans b e g a n to display that independence remarkably s o o n
after t h e c o l o n i a l r u l e r s h a d d e p a r t e d .
382

C H A P T E R 8
EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA
I n t h e 1940s it w a s t h e r a c i a l c o m p o s i t i o n o f t h e E a s t a n d C e n t r a l
A f r i c a n societies that presented the critical obstacle to A f r i c a n
a d v a n c e . A l t h o u g h there w a s in 1940 a distinction in the British
m i n d b e t w e e n the ' c o l o n i e s o f settlement', K e n y a , N o r t h e r n and
Southern Rhodesia, o n the one hand, and the ' c o l o n i e s o f
administration', U g a n d a , T a n g a n y i k a and Nyasaland, o n the
other, the settler presence d o m i n a t e d the r e g i o n in s u c h a m a n n e r
as t o p r e c l u d e t h e e a s y a d o p t i o n o f t h e ' W e s t A f r i c a n ' s o l u t i o n
in the face o f the d e m a n d for A f r i c a n i n d e p e n d e n c e . P o w e r w a s
nevertheless transferred to African n o t E u r o p e a n hands, and b y
1 9 6 4 all t h e s e t e r r i t o r i e s s a v e S o u t h e r n R h o d e s i a w e r e i n d e p e n d e n t
A f r i c a n states. A y e a r later, the settler r e b e l l i o n in S o u t h e r n
R h o d e s i a dispelled any r e m a i n i n g illusions o f Britain's effective
control o v e r that territory.
Independence, therefore, represented a fundamental landmark
i n this p e r i o d , o p e n i n g u p n e w a r e n a s f o r A f r i c a n p a r t i c i p a t i o n
and r e m o v i n g significant political, a l t h o u g h n o t e c o n o m i c , c o n
s t r a i n t s . T h e c r u c i a l effect, f o r t h e first p o s t - c o l o n i a l d e c a d e at l e a s t ,
w a s u p o n the internal balance o f p o w e r o n c e the c o l o n i a l arbiter
had w i t h d r a w n . T h e independence settlement conferred control
o f the institutions o f state u p o n the d o m i n a n t nationalist leader
s h i p , b u t it d i d n o t n e c e s s a r i l y e n s u r e its c o n t i n u e d a u t h o r i t y .
Its l e g i t i m a c y d e p e n d e d u p o n a c o m p l e x i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l b a l
ance so that those w h o inherited the colonial mantle had b o t h
t o n u r t u r e t h a t l e g i t i m a c y a n d t o b u i l d t h e n e w s t a t e . T h e first
decade o f independence w a s therefore concerned primarily w i t h
t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p o w e r in t h e p o s t - c o l o n i a l s t a t e , a l t h o u g h t h e
nature o f the conflict w a s frequently o b s c u r e d b y the rhetoric o f
development.
W h i l e e c o n o m i c s m i g h t necessarily take s e c o n d place to the
imperatives o f politics, a significant acceleration o f e c o n o m i c
g r o w t h o c c u r r e d i n t h e 1 9 6 0 s , as w e l l as a n e x t e n s i o n o f t h e s o c i a l
383

E A S T A N D C E N T R A L A F R I C A

EAST A N D C E N T R A L A F R I C A
infrastructure. Political independence did not, h o w e v e r , in the

first i n s t a n c e c h a n g e t h e p a t t e r n o r t h e d i r e c t i o n o f e c o n o m i c
d e v e l o p m e n t . T h e r e w a s a remarkable continuity in inherited
i n s t i t u t i o n s , in c o n t i n u e d e c o n o m i c d e p e n d e n c e , a n d i n t h e
inability to eliminate not o n l y p o v e r t y but also the inequality that
had been part o f colonial society. T h e distribution o f resources
r e m a i n e d at b e s t u n e v e n , a n d at t h e w o r s t g r o s s l y s o . T h e
difficulties o f d e v e l o p m e n t w e r e , m o r e o v e r , c o m p o u n d e d b y t h e
clear indications that the inherited m o d e l required serious
alteration if self-sustaining g r o w t h w a s to b e c o m e the n o r m .
A s t h e s e states e n t e r e d t h e i r s e c o n d d e c a d e o f i n d e p e n d e n c e
they d r e w increasingly apart in their d e v e l o p m e n t strategies. T h a t
g r o w i n g d i v e r g e n c e r e f l e c t e d , at l e a s t i n p a r t , t h e i r d i f f e r e n t
colonial legacies. W h i l e they shared the experience o f political
d o m i n a t i o n , the i m p a c t o f c o l o n i a l rule had varied f r o m o n e state
to the next. T h e process o f c h a n g e and o f capitalist d e v e l o p m e n t
had bitten deeper into s o m e societies than others; they had
a d a p t e d i n different w a y s . N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e i r c o m m o n c o l o n i a l
origin, the e c o n o m i c foundations o n w h i c h the leaders w o u l d
b u i l d the p o s t - c o l o n i a l state w e r e t h e r e f o r e in e a c h case different.
T w o c r i t i c a l v a r i a b l e s m u s t b e k e p t i n m i n d as w e s e e k t o i d e n t i f y
the major d e v e l o p m e n t s in this r e g i o n o v e r these years. O n the
one hand the particular s o c i o - e c o n o m i c forces b o r n o u t o f
colonial c h a n g e and especially the extent to w h i c h capitalism had
b e c o m e r o o t e d in i n d i g e n o u s s o c i e t y ; o n the o t h e r the n a t u r e o f
t h e l e a d e r s h i p t h a t e m e r g e d t o a s s u m e p o w e r at i n d e p e n d e n c e .
W i t h these v a r i a b l e s in m i n d , w e t u r n t o the p o l i t i c a l a n d
constitutional changes that occurred.
P O L I T I C A L A N D C O N S T I T U T I O N A L D E V E L O P M E N T
A n y consideration o f political and constitutional development

must c o m m e n c e w i t h the change from colonial to sovereign
status, and the process o f d e c o l o n i s a t i o n f r o m 1940 to 1964. In
1940 the E u r o p e a n and A s i a n i m m i g r a n t c o m m u n i t i e s , especially
the w h i t e minorities in K e n y a and R h o d e s i a , w e r e e c o n o m i c a l l y
and politically d o m i n a n t , and until i960 they b e l i e v e d they w o u l d
inherit p o w e r . W h i l e British post-war colonial policy generally
r e c o g n i s e d t h e f o r c e s o f n a t i o n a l i s m i n t h e w o r l d at l a r g e , t h e
p r e s e n c e o f w h i t e s e t t l e r s f o r w h o m A f r i c a w a s h o m e m a d e it t h e
385

m o r e difficult f o r B r i t a i n t o a c c e p t A f r i c a n m a j o r i t y r u l e as t h e
necessary corollary for that region. Britain w a s therefore reluctant
to c o m m i t itself to any p o l i c y o n the t i m i n g and direction o f
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e . U g a n d a ' s f u t u r e as a n A f r i c a n s t a t e w a s
a c k n o w l e d g e d f r o m t h e o u t s e t a n d T a n g a n y i k a ' s s t a t u s as a T r u s t
T e r r i t o r y e x p l i c i t l y r e c o g n i s e d A f r i c a n m a j o r i t y r u l e as t h e
u l t i m a t e g o a l . E l s e w h e r e t h e f u t u r e w a s less c l e a r , a n d t h e
o u t c o m e i n S o u t h e r n R h o d e s i a , w h e r e i n 1965 t h e w h i t e m i n o r i t y
illegally seized p o w e r , emphasises the radical nature o f the
changes that o c c u r r e d elsewhere b e t w e e n i960 and 1964. In those
y e a r s , after a d e c a d e o f p r e v a r i c a t i o n , B r i t a i n t r a n s f e r r e d p o w e r
to A f r i c a n majorities and established six i n d e p e n d e n t B l a c k
A f r i c a n s t a t e s : T a n g a n y i k a i n 1 9 6 1 , U g a n d a in 1 9 6 2 , K e n y a i n
1 9 6 3 , M a l a w i ( N y a s a l a n d ) in 1 9 6 4 , Z a m b i a ( N o r t h e r n R h o d e s i a )
i n 1 9 6 4 , a n d Z a n z i b a r , w h i c h later j o i n e d w i t h T a n g a n y i k a t o f o r m
T a n z a n i a , in 1963. T h e distinctive features o f that d e c o l o n i s a t i o n ,
t h e r e f o r e , w e r e t h e s h a r p a c c e l e r a t i o n o f p a c e at t h e e n d o f t h e
1950s, and the transfer o f p o w e r f r o m w h i t e t o black.
I n t h e final a n a l y s i s d e c o l o n i s a t i o n w a s a s y n t h e s i s o f i m p e r i a l
d e s i g n a n d n a t i o n a l i s t p r e s s u r e . O n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e c h a n g e s in
British policy w e r e undoubtedly influenced by international
d e v e l o p m e n t s , a n d S u e z , C y p r u s a n d M a l a y a m u s t all h a v e p l a y e d
t h e i r p a r t . F u r t h e r m o r e t h e s e w e r e still t h e y e a r s o f t h e C o l d W a r ;
and w h i l e the British cautioned themselves not to confuse
nationalism with C o m m u n i s m , Prime Minister Macmillan had
p o i n t e d o u t , as h e p u s h e d B r i t a i n t o w a r d s E u r o p e , t h a t t h e g r e a t
issue in the c h a n g i n g international scene w a s w h e t h e r A s i a and
A f r i c a w o u l d s w i n g t o t h e east o r t o t h e w e s t . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d ,
the radical c h a n g e s f o r e s h a d o w e d b y the acceptance o f majority
r u l e f o r K e n y a at t h e L a n c a s t e r H o u s e C o n f e r e n c e i n i 9 6 0 w e r e
m a d e in response to a g r o w i n g A f r i c a n political c o n s c i o u s n e s s .
O f a w h o l e series o f e v e n t s w e can h i g h l i g h t o n l y the m o s t
p o r t e n t o u s . I t w a s t h e o u t b r e a k o f u r b a n a n d r u r a l v i o l e n c e in
K e n y a k n o w n as M a u M a u , w h i c h r e s u l t e d i n t h e d e c l a r a t i o n o f
t h e s t a t e o f e m e r g e n c y i n 1 9 5 2 , t h a t l e d finally t o t h e B r i t i s h
a c c e p t a n c e o f m a j o r i t y r u l e . I n U g a n d a it w a s t h e G a n d a r e s p o n s e
to G o v e r n o r Cohen's ill-conceived deportation o f K a b a k a Mutesa
in 1 9 5 3 t h a t c e m e n t e d t h e ties o f G a n d a n a t i o n a l i s m a n d i n 1 9 5 9
stimulated the national m o v e m e n t that forced the British to
r e t r e a t f r o m t h e i r c o m m i t m e n t t o a u n i t a r y state. I t w a s t h e
386

e m e r g e n c y in N y a s a l a n d i n 1 9 5 9 t h a t f o r c e d a c h a n g e o f t h o u g h t
a b o u t the future o f the Central A f r i c a n Federation. B u t b e y o n d
t h o s e c r i s e s it w a s t h e g r o u n d s w e l l o f r e s e n t m e n t o f o r d i n a r y
h u m a n b e i n g s against the conditions o f colonialism that ultimately
created a situation w h e r e the c o l o n i a l rulers c o u l d n o l o n g e r rule
w i t h o u t the excessive use o f force.
Here w e must enter a caveat. First, the political role o f the
i m m i g r a n t c o m m u n i t i e s , especially the E u r o p e a n s , must not be
d i s c o u n t e d . T h e m o s t bitter conflicts that o c c u r r e d in these years
did so where a white-settler c o m m u n i t y had been dominant.
S e c o n d , account must also be taken o f the implications for policy
o f the e x p a n s i o n a b r o a d o f c o r p o r a t e capital in the p o s t - w a r years.
M e t r o p o l i t a n e c o n o m i c interests and corporate p o w e r had a
c r i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e u p o n t h e final s e t t l e m e n t r e a c h e d i n K e n y a i f n o t
elsewhere. N e v e r t h e l e s s , w h i l e decolonisation in each territory
o w e d m o r e o r less t o t h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e c o l o n i a l i s t s ' a d a p t a t i o n ,
a fact m a d e c l e a r b y R h o d e s i a ' s U n i l a t e r a l D e c l a r a t i o n o f I n d e
p e n d e n c e , it w a s t h e u p s u r g e o f A f r i c a n p o l i t i c s i n t h e 1 9 5 0 s t h a t
made that adaptation necessary. I f the point w a s reached w h e r e
t h e c o s t o f d i r e c t r u l e w a s t o o g r e a t , it w a s b e c a u s e o f t h i s n e w
African c h a l l e n g e ; and if the British o b j e c t i v e w a s to retain the
e c o n o m i c advantages o f colonial relationships w i t h o u t the direct
c o s t , this r e q u i r e d c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h a n e w A f r i c a n élite. T h e
essential i n g r e d i e n t in d e c o l o n i s a t i o n therefore, a n d that w h i c h
g a v e e a c h n e w s t a t e its d i s t i n c t i v e c h a r a c t e r , w a s t h e f o r c e o f
nationalism, and the character and identity o f the A f r i c a n leader
s h i p t h a t r o d e t o p o w e r o n its b a c k .
A l t h o u g h A f r i c a n n a t i o n a l i s m is s a i d t o h a v e c o m e ' l a t e r ' t o
E a s t a n d C e n t r a l A f r i c a t h a n t o W e s t A f r i c a , its r o o t s lie d e e p i n
the past. T h e r e w a s a l o n g r e c o r d o f protest and petition d a t i n g
b a c k t o the 1920s in K e n y a a n d S o u t h e r n R h o d e s i a , a n d in Z a m b i a
t h e o r i g i n s o f n a t i o n a l i s m a r e t o b e f o u n d i n t h e first m i n e r s '
s t r i k e s o n t h e C o p p e r b e l t i n 1935 a n d 1 9 4 0 . W h a t c h a n g e d w a s
first t h e f o c u s , w h i c h i n t h e 1 9 4 0 s b e c a m e n a t i o n a l r a t h e r t h a n
l o c a l . T h e n , i n t h e 1 9 5 0 s , a s e c o n d c h a n g e o c c u r r e d as A f r i c a n
politics b e c a m e mass politics, and urban and rural dwellers united
in a c o m m o n s u p p o r t f o r a n e w g e n e r a t i o n o f n a t i o n a l i s t
p o l i t i c i a n s w h o s e o b j e c t i v e w a s p o w e r at t h e n a t i o n a l l e v e l .
T h e British had assumed they had almost indefinite time in
w h i c h t o a c h i e v e s o c i a l d e v e l o p m e n t as t h e p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r
387

23 Rhodesia. Zambia and Malawi.
p o l i t i c a l c h a n g e . T h e L a b o u r P a r t y ' s 1943 s t a t e m e n t o n p o s t - w a i
a i m s f o r t h e c o l o n i e s c l e a r l y s a w t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s as l o n g t e r m .
T h e m o r e significant assumption, h o w e v e r , for the E a s t and
Central African scene c o n c e r n e d the pattern o f institutional
c h a n g e . Official t h i n k i n g , u n d e r the influence o f p o s t - w a r c o l o n i a l
experience in A s i a , accepted the need to a c c o m m o d a t e nationalism,
and a major reassessment o f constitutional and political policies
m a d e in the C o l o n i a l Office b e t w e e n 1946 and 1949 a c k n o w l e d g e d
the n e e d t o p r o m o t e A f r i c a n a d v a n c e m e n t in the civil s e r v i c e and
in political representation. T h a t strategy, h o w e v e r , w a s s t r o n g l y
388

resisted b y the East A f r i c a n g o v e r n o r s , w h o s e n o t i o n s o f political

1
development were n o t those o f the Secretary o f State. T h e
colonial debate within East and Central Africa w a s about direct
E u r o p e a n enterprise as t h e basis f o r d e v e l o p m e n t , w h i c h a s s u m e d
a continuing E u r o p e a n political presence. T h e sabotage o f a
p r o p o s a l i n 1945 f o r e q u a l u n o f f i c i a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e t h r e e
races in a n e w East A f r i c a n L e g i s l a t i v e A s s e m b l y w a s a reflection
o f settler influence. T h e clearest d e m o n s t r a t i o n , h o w e v e r , o f
s e t t l e r p o w e r a n d o f t h e c h a r a c t e r o f official t h i n k i n g w a s t h e
decision b y the n e w C o n s e r v a t i v e g o v e r n m e n t t o p r o c e e d in 1953
w i t h the Central African federation, notwithstanding the almost
unanimous opposition from the region's African inhabitants.
Justified in terms o f its e c o n o m i c potential, criticised as a n
abdication b y Britain o f her responsibility for the African people,
t h i s Mast a t t e m p t at I m p e r i a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n ' d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t
B r i t a i n still s a w t h e E u r o p e a n s a s t h e m o s t s u i t a b l e a g e n t s f o r
2
development.
9
S e e i n g t h e E u r o p e a n settlers as t h e ' m o s t reliable c o l l a b o r a t o r s
but unable t o ignore either A s i a n minority o r African mass,
Britain attempted t o identify political a d v a n c e w i t h multiracialism.
T h u s although Africans were appointed to theLegislative Council
in K e n y a i n 1 9 4 4 , T a n g a n y i k a a n d U g a n d a i n 1 9 4 5 , N o r t h e r n
R h o d e s i a i n 1948 a n d N y a s a l a n d i n 1 9 4 9 , e a c h n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n
' i n v o l v e d a b a l a n c i n g o f t h e racial c o m p o s i t i o n o f t h e unofficial
side o f t h e legislature', t o p r o v i d e representation f o r E u r o p e a n ,
A s i a n a n d African. T h i s w a s critical f o r the d e v e l o p m e n t o f
A f r i c a n political c o n s c i o u s n e s s , since multiracialism failed t o w i n
African support. Africans rejected a partnership m a d e infamous
b y Sir G o d f r e y H u g g i n s ' unfortunate reference t o t h e partnership
o f rider a n d horse, a n d discredited m o r e b y the federation than
by any other event. O v e r the length and breadth o f East and
Central Africa, Africans feared the extension o f E u r o p e a n d o m i
nation. I n T a n g a n y i k a in 1947 the c o n t r o v e r s y sparked off b y
Britain's proposals f o r interterritorial c o o p e r a t i o n stimulated
political feeling, a n d A f r i c a n resentment against colonial rule
began to channel into the T a n g a n y i k a African Association. In
1
C. Pratt, The critical phase in Tanzania, 1941-1968: Nyerere and the emergence of a
socialist strategy (Cambridge, 1976), 14IT; Ronald Robinson, 'Andrew Cohen and the
transfer of power in tropical Africa 1940-1957', in W. H. Morris-Jones and Georges
Fischer (eds.), Decolonisation and after: the British and French experience (London, 1980).
2
See Robinson, 'Andrew Cohen and the transfer of power*.
389

U g a n d a in 1950 a y o u n g G a n d a leader pointed o u t that the

p r o p o s e d p o l i c y o f f e d e r a t i o n f u r t h e r s o u t h w a s * m a k i n g it v e r y
difficult f o r A f r i c a n s w h o w o u l d l i k e t o s u p p o r t B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n
E a s t A f r i c a ' . It w a s this ' c o m m o n c o l o u r p l a t f o r m e m a n a t i n g
from Southern Africa that w a s disturbing the minds o f Africans
1
in E a s t A f r i c a t o d a y ' . a n d in 1 9 5 7 the T a n g a n y i k a A f r i c a n
U n i o n ( T A N U ) c o n s o l i d a t e d its g r o w i n g m a s s b a s e s p e c i f i c a l l y
as a r e s u l t o f o p p o s i t i o n t o m u l t i r a c i a l i s m w h i c h b e c a m e ' the i s s u e
2
in T a n g a n y i k a in 1 9 5 7 - 5 8 ' . A t t h e s a m e t i m e in N o r t h e r n
Rhodesia, politicians disagreed o n the m o s t appropriate strategy
to a d o p t against b o t h that federation a n d c o n t i n u e d racial
domination. T h e m o r e militant elements founded the United
National Independence Party ( U N I P ) , w h i c h quickly became the
dominant political force in the country.
Race and inequality were undoubtedly k e y stimuli to the
g r o w t h o f A f r i c a n nationalism. I f the central issue w a s E u r o p e a n
political influence, there w a s also the crucial issue o f A s i a n
d o m i n a n c e i n c o m m e r c e a n d i n d u s t r y . T h e p r o b l e m o f r a c e , it is
t r u e , p r e s e n t e d i t s e l f i n a different g u i s e i n Z a n z i b a r , w h e r e t h e
key issue w a s the d o m i n a n c e o f the A r a b minority o n an island
w h o s e inhabitants w e r e o v e r w h e l m i n g l y African. Nevertheless o n
t h a t i s l a n d , as e l s e w h e r e , t h e 1 9 5 0 s s a w t h e u p s u r g e o f A f r i c a n
grass-roots political activity, w h i c h c h a l l e n g e d racial d o m i n a t i o n
and demanded p o w e r for the majority.
T h e aspirations that nationalism reflected w e r e w i d e s p r e a d ,
uniting Africans across colonial boundaries. F o r example, the
Nyasaland African C o n g r e s s , formed in 1944, and operating in
Southern Rhodesia t h r o u g h the 117000 N y a s a migrant labourers
in t h a t c o l o n y , g a v e a n e a r l y i m p e t u s t o S o u t h e r n R h o d e s i a n
nationalist action and organisation. In 1 9 5 6 , the N y a s a l a n d
A f r i c a n C o n g r e s s w a s in turn p r o m p t e d t o d e m a n d an A f r i c a n
majority in the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l b y recent d e v e l o p m e n t s n o t
only in W e s t Africa b u t also in U g a n d a . T h e w a v e o f industrial
u n r e s t i n E a s t A f r i c a ' s p o r t s at t h e e n d o f t h e w a r w a s i n f l u e n c e d
b y n e w s o f the strike in D u r b a n , a n d in E a s t A f r i c a n e w s travelled
easily a n d rapidly a l o n g the r a i l w a y m o r e than o n c e t o influence
events in another territory.
1
E . M . K . M u l i r a , Troubled Uganda, q u o t e d i n D . A . L o w , The mind of Buganda
( L o n d o n , 1971), 154.
2
P r a t t , The critical phase in Tanzania, 3 5; J o h n Iliffe, A modern history of Tanganyika
( C a m b r i d g e , 1979).
390

T h e r e a l test o f n a t i o n a l i s m w a s , h o w e v e r , t h e c r e a t i o n o f
state-wide political organisations w i t h mass support. W i t h hind
sight w e n o w appreciate the limitations o f the political parties that
e m e r g e d in the 1 9 5 0 s ; b u t this s h o u l d n o t lead us t o u n d e r e s t i m a t e
their significance, in the c o n t e x t o f their time, o r the f u n d a m e n t a l
nature o f the c h a n g e s that their a d v e n t presaged. T h r e e b r o a d
p a t t e r n s o f c h a n g e e m e r g e d . T h e first w a s t h e r i s e o f u r b a n a n d
proletarian discontent. T h e s e c o n d w a s the g r o w t h o f rural
g r i e v a n c e . T h e third w a s the fusion o f rural and urban protest into
a national m o v e m e n t by a n e w nationalist leadership that
a r t i c u l a t e d its o w n d e m a n d s f o r p o l i t i c a l p o w e r i n t h e s e n t i m e n t s
o f the a g g r i e v e d multitude. T h e desires and the discontents o f the
locality w e r e translated into the i d i o m o f national i n d e p e n d e n c e .
W e can d o n o better than q u o t e the explanation g i v e n b y
Tanzania's President, Julius N y e r e r e , o f the g r o w t h o f nationalism
t o i d e n t i f y t h e h e a r t o f t h e p r o c e s s . ' N a t i o n a l f r e e d o m — uhuru —
w a s a n u n c o m p l i c a t e d p r i n c i p l e , a n d it n e e d e d n o j u s t i f i c a t i o n t o
t h e a u d i e n c e s o f t h e first f e w T A N U s p e a k e r s . A l l t h a t w a s
r e q u i r e d w a s a n e x p l a n a t i o n o f its r e l e v a n c e t o t h e i r l i v e s , a n d
s o m e r e a s o n a b l e a s s u r a n c e t h a t it c o u l d b e o b t a i n e d t h r o u g h t h e
1
methods proposed by T A N U . '
T h e u n e v e n incidence o f industrial and urban protest reflected
t h e u n e v e n i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n a n d u r b a n g r o w t h o v e r t h e r e g i o n as
a w h o l e ; b u t in e a c h c a s e it w a s a p r o t e s t a g a i n s t s o c i a l a n d
e c o n o m i c inequality and the deplorable c o n d i t i o n s in w h i c h the
bulk o f the w o r k - f o r c e lived and w o r k e d . T h u s the p o s t - w a r years
o p e n e d w i t h a succession o f strikes in M o m b a s a , D a r es S a l a a m
and Z a n z i b a r ; and a railway strike that i n v o l v e d b o t h R h o d e s i a s .
T h e late 1 9 4 0 s s a w a w a v e o f s t r i k e s i n S o u t h e r n R h o d e s i a t h a t
made those years ' a period o f African unrest o f unprecedented
intensity and scale'. G o d f r e y H u g g i n s , then prime minister o f
R h o d e s i a , c o m m e n t e d : ' W e are w i t n e s s i n g t h e e m e r g e n c e o f a
2
p r o l e t a r i a t a n d i n t h i s c o u n t r y it h a p p e n s t o b e b l a c k . ' W h e t h e r
o r n o t it w a s a p r o l e t a r i a t , t h e w a g e - l a b o u r f o r c e i n S a l i s b u r y ( t h e
m o d e r n H a r a r e ) , as i n t h e o t h e r u r b a n a n d i n d u s t r i a l c e n t r e s ,
challenged colonial rule (but not necessarily the capitalist system)
t o d e m a n d t h e i m p r o v e m e n t o f t h e i r w a y o f life, a n d t o w i n s t e a d y
increases in urban w a g e s o v e r the 1950s.
1
J u l i u s N y e r e r e , Freedom and unity ( L o n d o n , 1968), 1.
2
L . G a n n a n d M . G e l f a n d , Huggins of Rhodesia ( L o n d o n , 1964), 201.
1
39

T h e p o w e r o f urban labour was most dramatically demonstrated

o n the N o r t h e r n R h o d e s i a n C o p p e r b e l t , w h e r e sustained militant
action o n the part o f A f r i c a n miners t h r o u g h the 1950s ultimately
w r e s t e d the d o m i n a n t position f r o m the w h i t e union. T h e i r v i c t o r y
w a s finally s i g n i f i e d b y t h e d i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e E u r o p e a n M i n e -
w o r k e r s U n i o n in 1964. T h e r o l l i n g strikes o f 1 9 5 6 , w h i c h p r o
v o k e d the N o r t h e r n R h o d e s i a n g o v e r n m e n t t o declare a state o f
e m e r g e n c y , indicated the organisational ability o f the miners
t h a t h a d first b e e n d e m o n s t r a t e d i n 1 9 3 5 . T h e b a s i s f o r t r a d e
u n i o n i s m lay in this early and s p o n t a n e o u s r e s p o n s e o f A f r i c a n
l a b o u r t o relative d e p r i v a t i o n a n d racial a n d e c o n o m i c in
equality. T h e Northern Rhodesian copper-miners and the
M o m b a s a d o c k e r s s h o w e d that illiterate w o r k e r s c o u l d c o m b i n e
w i t h s o m e d e g r e e o f success in defence o f their interests and,
i n t h e N o r t h e r n R h o d e s i a n c a s e at l e a s t , i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n a r i s i n g
o u t o f e c o n o m i c conditions essentially preceded political agitation
d i r e c t e d at i n d e p e n d e n c e .
T h e trade-union m o v e m e n t that d e v e l o p e d in the 1950s o w e d
a g o o d deal to the influence o f British labour policy, to the support
o f the British and international trade-union m o v e m e n t s , and also
to c h a n g i n g e m p l o y e r attitudes t o w a r d s organised labour. B e y o n d
this, h o w e v e r , there w a s the direct stimulus o f the nationalist
struggle, and the g r o w i n g African assertiveness that characterised
the p e r i o d f r o m 1 9 5 5 . U n i o n o r g a n i s a t i o n offered a v e h i c l e for the
articulation o f labour discontent but w a s also part o f the drive
t o w a r d s i n d e p e n d e n c e ; a n d t h e p o l i t i c a l e n v i r o n m e n t o f t h e late
1 9 5 0 s c a n n o t b e i g n o r e d as a n i m p o r t a n t s t i m u l u s t o t r a d e - u n i o n
activity in these latter years. N o r s h o u l d w e i g n o r e the i m p a c t
o f the c h a n g i n g e c o n o m i c situation and the resulting u n e m p l o y
ment.
T h e a c h i e v e m e n t s o f l a b o u r are difficult t o m e a s u r e . A t
i n d e p e n d e n c e there w a s a small l a b o u r m o v e m e n t in e a c h territory.
M e m b e r s h i p c o v e r e d o n l y a small percentage o f the w a g e - l a b o u r
force, a l t h o u g h this m i g h t reflect g o v e r n m e n t a l constraints rather
than u n i o n inaction. T h u s S o u t h e r n Rhodesia, w i t h the largest
w a g e - l a b o u r f o r c e i n c o l o n i a l A f r i c a i n t h e late 1 9 5 0 s , h a d t h e
smallest trade-union m o v e m e n t . N o r t h e r n Rhodesia, w h e r e u n i o n
m e m b e r s h i p w a s j u s t u n d e r 40 p e r c e n t o f t h e w a g e - l a b o u r f o r c e ,
p r o b a b l y had the largest union membership. W h a t distinguished
N o r t h e r n Rhodesia's labour m o v e m e n t , h o w e v e r , w a s the African
392

Mineworkers' Union, of which a Labour Department official

c o m m e n t e d in the late 1950s that ' o v e r the past m a n y y e a r s t h e
idea has g r o w n u p a m o n g s t the A f r i c a n s that o n c e they enter the
C o p p e r b e l t area the p e o p l e t h e y m u s t o b e y in all t h i n g s are the
A M W U l e a d e r s . . .'.* T h e c o i n c i d e n c e in N o r t h e r n R h o d e s i a o f a
highly organised, centralised industry, w i t h a concentrated w o r k
force, a h i g h l y c h a r g e d racial situation a n d p o w e r f u l leadership
in the p e r s o n s o f L a w r e n c e K a t i l u n g u a n d , later, J o h n C h i s a t a ,
contributed to the emergence of a powerful union, whose
trade-union tradition w e n t b e y o n d any other in the region. In
Kenya a similar combination of a growing work-force in
c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f racial inequality also stimulated the g r o w t h o f
a v i g o r o u s labour m o v e m e n t , and t h r e w u p an outstanding y o u n g
l a b o u r leader in T o m M b o y a . T h e M a u M a u e m e r g e n c y , and
s u b s e q u e n t l y u n i o n i n v o l v e m e n t in the c o u n t r y ' s factional politics
nevertheless precluded the d e v e l o p m e n t o f a u t o n o m o u s unions.
The politics o f nationalist protest required also the mass
s u p p o r t o f the rural majorities. N a t i o n a l i s m reflected the g r o w i n g
r u r a l r e s e n t m e n t at t h e i n c r e a s i n g i n t r u s i o n o f c o l o n i a l g o v e r n
ment into people's daily lives, w h i c h w a s a consequence o f post-war
policies for e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t and agricultural i m p r o v e m e n t .
'Purposive government action, in e c o n o m i c , educational and
agrarian spheres, b r o u g h t individual Africans, n o w m o r e peasants
than tribesmen, into m u c h closer and m o r e irritating contact w i t h
2
the colonial r e g i m e . ' T h e consequence, without exception, was
an increased political c o n s c i o u s n e s s r o o t e d in anti-colonial senti
m e n t at t h e g r a s s - r o o t s l e v e l . T h u s , w h i l e G e o r g e N y a n d o r o , o n e
o f the founders o f the Southern R h o d e s i a n National C o n g r e s s ,
said o f the N a t i v e L a n d H u s b a n d r y A c t t h a t it w a s ' t h e best
3
recruiter C o n g r e s s ever h a d ' , Oginga Odinga, one of Kenya's
major politicians, c o n c l u d e d that in K e n y a 'resistance t o g o v e r n
m e n t soil conservation measures and land consolidation g a v e the
4
mass b a c k i n g to the political m o v e m e n t . . . ' . The growth of
nationalism in N o r t h e r n R h o d e s i a , d o m i n a t e d as it w a s b y t h e
1
R i c h a r d J a c o b s , The relationship between African trade unions and political organisations
in Northern Rhodesia/Zambia, 1949-61 ( G e n e v a , 1971), 21, q u o t i n g t h e N o r t h e r n
Rhodesian government.
2
J o h n L o n s d a l e , ' S o m e o r i g i n s o f n a t i o n a l i s m i n E a s t A f r i c a * , Journal of African
History, 1968, 9, 1, 141.
3
Q u o t e d in L . W . B o w m a n , Politics in Rhodesia: white power in an African state
( C a m b r i d g e , M a s s . , 1973), 49.
4
Not jet uhuru ( L o n d o n , 1967), 107.
393

u r b a n , industrial C o p p e r b e l t , w a s just as d e e p l y r o o t e d in t h e
anti-colonial grievances o f the villages, and the strength o f rural
protest contributed a great deal t o the ultimate success o f the
nationalist m o v e m e n t . T h e D e v l i n R e p o r t ' s terse analysis o f t h e
roots o f unrest in Nyasaland s u m m e d u p the circumstances o f
r u r a l p r o t e s t o v e r t h e r e g i o n as a w h o l e .
About ten years ago the Government enacted legislation under which rules
were made to prevent soil erosion. [These rules] mean a good deal of labour,
just before the rains come and when the ground is dry and hard... There are
also veterinary rules...
Breaches of these rules lead to fines and in extreme cases imprisonment. They
are very unpopular... Their object is little understood... The enforcement
of these rules led to disputes and to a great deal of bitter feeling during the
1
period we had under review...
W h i l e the general g r o u n d s w e l l o f peasant discontent gathered
m o m e n t u m from opposition to enforced agricultural improve
ment, the m o s t intense rural nationalism w a s b o r n o u t o f
attachment t o the land. Africans universally feared the loss o f their
land to E u r o p e a n s . E v e n in U g a n d a , w h e r e there w a s minimal
alienation o f land to non-Africans, the U g a n d a g o v e r n m e n t ' s
attempt in 1956 to introduce land reforms w h i c h p r o v i d e d for
individual tenure p r o v o k e d a sharp opposition o v e r almost the
w h o l e c o u n t r y . It w a s h o w e v e r i n t h o s e t e r r i t o r i e s w h e r e l a n d h a d
been alienated t o E u r o p e a n s that the m o s t bitter resentment w a s
bred. In N y a s a l a n d the A b r a h a m s R e p o r t in 1946 identified the
strength o f opposition t o E u r o p e a n planters, and the unrest o f
the 1950s o w e d a great deal t o the bitterness created b y the
h a r d s h i p s o f thangatay t h e A f r i c a n t e n a n t s y s t e m . I n S o u t h e r n
Rhodesia, African action o v e r land w a s checked o n l y b y the m o r e
repressive g o v e r n m e n t a l controls that existed in that territory. I n
K e n y a , w h e r e land h a d been the central political issue since the
1 9 2 0 s , it w a s t h e i m p a c t o f l a n d a l i e n a t i o n u p o n t h e K i k u y u , t h e
Africans most seriously disadvantaged b y E u r o p e a n settlement
( a l t h o u g h n o t those w h o lost the largest a m o u n t o f land), that set
in t r a i n t h e p r o t e s t t h a t e r u p t e d finally i n 1 9 5 2 i n t o t h e v i o l e n c e
o f M a u M a u resistance a n d the state o f e m e r g e n c y that lasted s e v e n
years and d u r i n g w h i c h there w e r e in excess o f ten thousand
African casualties.
1
Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry ( t h e D e v l i n R e p o r t ) , C m n d 814
( L o n d o n , 1959), 19. C o m p a r e r e s i s t a n c e t o t h e c u t t i n g - o u t o f c o c o a t r e e s i n t h e G o l d
C o a s t , C h a p t e r 7.
394

T h e t h i r d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c p a t t e r n t h a t w e c a n i d e n t i f y is t h e
e m e r g e n c e o f a n e w s t y l e o f l e a d e r s h i p . T h e first s t a g e b e g a n s o o n
after t h e w a r w h e n t h e e a r l i e r l e a d e r s h i p o f i l l i t e r a t e w o r k e r s w a s
replaced b y that o f y o u n g e r , m o r e educated m e n , like y o u n g
C h e g e K i b a c h i a in M o m b a s a , o r L a w r e n c e K a t i l u n g u o n t h e
C o p p e r b e l t . T h o s e men, the clerks and the hospital orderlies,
r e p l a c e d t h e c h i e f s as l e a d e r s in t h e u r b a n s i t u a t i o n . A s i m i l a r
p r o c e s s o f c h a n g e o c c u r r e d in the rural areas, a l t h o u g h o v e r a
l o n g e r period o f time, w h e r e b y the chiefs lost the role o f
c o m m u n i c a t o r s to a newer, y o u n g e r generation o f leaders: the
s c h o o l teachers, the clerks and the traders w h o w e r e outside the
chiefly and the N a t i v e A u t h o r i t y structure.
T h e s e c o n d s t a g e i n t h i s e v o l u t i o n o c c u r r e d i n t h e 1 9 5 0 s , a little
later in s o m e c o l o n i e s t h a n in o t h e r s , w i t h the a p p e a r a n c e o f a n e w
type o f politician, the nationalist, w i t h a s t r o n g , m o r e specific
a n t i - c o l o n i a l c o m m i t m e n t . Y o u n g , m a n y still i n t h e i r t w e n t i e s ,
they w e r e generally m o r e e d u c a t e d than the earlier leaders. S o m e ,
b u t b y n o m e a n s all, had b e e n a b r o a d for part o f their e d u c a t i o n
( w h i c h m e a n t in m a n y cases an e x p e r i e n c e o f S o u t h A f r i c a ) . T h e r e
w e r e exceptions, but the majority o f these n e w leaders w e r e the
second generation o f the e m e r g e n t elite: teachers, c o o p e r a t i v e
officials, t r a d e u n i o n i s t s , c l e r k s , a n d a f e w o f t h e m p r o f e s s i o n a l
men. T h e s e w e r e the m e n w h o built the political parties; w h o
started and edited the party n e w s p a p e r s ; and w h o m o u l d e d rural
and urban discontent into a coherent national protest w h i c h
p r o v i d e d t h e m w i t h an institutional base f r o m w h i c h , w i t h
apparently complete self-confidence, they demanded p o w e r .
T h e nationalists e n c o u n t e r e d a g o o d deal o f o p p o s i t i o n in the
1950s f r o m c o l o n i a l g o v e r n m e n t s w h i c h s o u g h t t o direct political
activity into a pattern o f their o w n m a k i n g , w i t h a d e g r e e o f
coercion that w a s for the m o s t part absent from the W e s t African
s c e n e . I n K e n y a t h e e m e r g e n c y l e d t o t h e p r o h i b i t i o n o f all
political organisations and the complete cessation o f normal
p o l i t i c a l life f o r A f r i c a n s u n t i l 1 9 5 6 , w h e n t h e f o r m a t i o n o f
p o l i t i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n s w a s p e r m i t t e d at t h e d i s t r i c t l e v e l . C o u n t r y
w i d e political activity w a s n o t again permitted until i960, and that
restriction, c o m b i n e d w i t h the e x c l u s i o n o f the great majority o f
the K i k u y u f r o m politics for the s e v e n years o f the e m e r g e n c y ,
had long-lasting c o n s e q u e n c e s for the g r o w t h o f the parties. In
Central Africa the nationalists universally encountered v i g o r o u s
395

official h o s t i l i t y t h r o u g h o u t t h e 1 9 5 0 s , c u l m i n a t i n g i n t h e 1 9 5 9
state o f e m e r g e n c y w h e n t h e A f r i c a n p a r t i e s w e r e b a n n e d a n d t h e
l e a d e r s d e t a i n e d i n all t h r e e t e r r i t o r i e s . I n T a n g a n y i k a t h e fledgling
party established in 1954, the T a n g a n y i k a African National U n i o n
( T A N U ) , suffered e a r l y d i f f i c u l t i e s i n a n u m b e r o f d i s t r i c t s ; a n d
in Z a n z i b a r n e i t h e r A r a b n o r A f r i c a n n a t i o n a l i s t s w e n t u n s c a t h e d .
W i t h the c h a n g e in British p o l i c y b y i960 c a m e a c h a n g e in
attitudes t o w a r d s nationalist leaders, demonstrated dramatically
b y the s u d d e n release o f N y a s a l a n d ' s nationalist leader, D r B a n d a ,
early in i 9 6 0 , a p p a r e n t l y at t h e behest o f the Secretary o f State.
It w o u l d b e a n o t h e r year b e f o r e J o m o K e n y a t t a ' s release, b u t f r o m
that date the colonial g o v e r n m e n t s w e r e forced t o f o l l o w w h e r e
t h e C o l o n i a l O f f i c e l e d , s i n c e as t h e W i l d R e p o r t h a d p o i n t e d o u t
apropos o f Uganda:
If the aim, namely to establish a National Assembly on the House of Commons

model, is accepted, then it follows that well-organised political parties
commanding the confidence of the majority of the electorate are an essential
part of the system... therefore our recommendations should be designed to
encourage the development of political parties capable of operating the
1
parliamentary system...
C o l o n i a l policy decreed a n d the nationalists accepted that
electoral s u p p o r t w a s a necessary prerequisite for t h e transfer o f
p o w e r . Hence the African people across the region w e n t to the
p o l l s in a rapid s u c c e s s i o n o f 1 7 different e l e c t i o n s , s o m e o f t h e m
c a r r i e d t h r o u g h w i t h a p p a r e n t h a s t e , t h e last i n e a c h c a s e o n t h e
basis o f universal franchise, t o d e t e r m i n e the leaders w h o w o u l d
a s s u m e office. T h e first d i r e c t e l e c t i o n s w e r e h e l d i n K e n y a i n 1 9 5 7 ,
t h e last i n N y a s a l a n d i n 1 9 6 4 . T h e i m p e r a t i v e s o f t h e e l e c t o r a l
process produced the modern mass m o v e m e n t s w h i c h transformed
political o r g a n i s a t i o n at t h e territorial level. W i t h t h e crucial
e x c e p t i o n o f S o u t h e r n R h o d e s i a , w h e r e settler c o n t r o l d e s t r o y e d
African politics in 1962, the African political parties held the
centre o f the stage for those seven years o f electoral politics.
T A N U led the w a y ; b u t in e a c h state b y 1964 the nationalists h a d
established, w i t h v a r y i n g degrees o f success, a n e w institutional
framework for populist politics.
T h e p a r t i e s t h a t e m e r g e d c o u l d all t r a c e t h e i r o r i g i n s b a c k t o
the earlier p e r i o d o f political activity. U N I P f o r m e d in N o r t h e r n
1
U g a n d a P r o t e c t o r a t e , Report of the Constitutional Committee 1919 ( E n t e b b e , 1959),
33-
396

R h o d e s i a in i960, and the M a l a w i C o n g r e s s Party ( M C P ) estab

lished a year earlier, b o t h s u c c e e d e d the earlier c o n g r e s s - s t y l e
m o v e m e n t s established in the 1940s in r e s p o n s e t o the threat o f
federation. B o t h quickly built up massive support, although
U N I P w a s unable to eliminate the old African N a t i o n a l C o n g r e s s
( A N C ) , w h i c h c o n t i n u e d as a s m a l l b u t v i g o r o u s o p p o s i t i o n p a r t y
until the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the o n e - p a r t y state in 1 9 7 2 . I n K e n y a the
dominant K e n y a African National U n i o n ( K A N U ) , traced its
o r i g i n s b a c k to the K i k u y u Central A s s o c i a t i o n f o r m e d in the
1920s, b u t was more immediately a confederation o f district
a s s o c i a t i o n s set u p s i n c e 1 9 5 6 .
A t the same time these parties w e r e a n e w p h e n o m e n o n : in
terms o f their o b j e c t i v e s ; their electoral f u n c t i o n s ; and their
characteristic association o f a n e w nationalist leadership w i t h the
discontented rural and urban mass. T h e i r m e t h o d s w e r e also n e w .
T h e y used the techniques and s y m b o l s o f the mass party and they
e m p h a s i s e d r e c r u i t m e n t at t h e g r a s s r o o t s a n d i n t h e r u r a l a r e a s .
M o s t o f t h e m p e r f o r m e d c o n s i d e r a b l e feats i n m o b i l i s i n g l a r g e
r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n s first t o r e g i s t e r a n d t h e n t o v o t e . I n N y a s a l a n d ,
f o r e x a m p l e , t h e r e g i s t r a t i o n o f n o t far s h o r t o f t w o m i l l i o n v o t e r s ,
in less t h a n a w e e k , b e f o r e t h e 1 9 6 4 e l e c t i o n s , w a s a t r i u m p h f o r
t h e M C P o r g a n i s a t i o n . A n d e v e r y w h e r e t h e y m a r s h a l l e d at t h e
polls a m a s s i v e , l a r g e l y illiterate electorate, w h o m a d e their m a r k s
f o r i n d e p e n d e n c e . N o r s h o u l d it b e a s s u m e d t h a t i l l i t e r a t e v o t e r s
w e r e n e c e s s a r i l y u n a w a r e o f w h a t w a s at s t a k e . I n U g a n d a , a
significant d r o p in the p o l l in B u n y o r o b e t w e e n the first and
s e c o n d g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s in 1 9 6 1 a n d 1 9 6 2 , u n d o u b t e d l y r e f l e c t e d
g r a s s - r o o t s r e s e n t m e n t at t h e u n r e s o l v e d L o s t C o u n t i e s i s s u e .
The political parties therefore performed a major role in
mobilising popular anti-colonial protest through the electoral
machine. Y e t notwithstanding their exhilarating electoral vic
tories, the parties that t o o k p o w e r shared o n e critical w e a k n e s s that
w o u l d h a v e significant i m p l i c a t i o n s for the p o s t - c o l o n i a l state.
A l t h o u g h m a n y o f the y o u n g nationalists demonstrated consid
erable organisational skill, the parties they created w e r e o r g a n i
sationally w e a k . T h e i r m o s t serious w e a k n e s s w a s perhaps their
inability to c o n t r o l local-level activists in a situation w h e r e a g o o d
deal o f nationalist a c t i v i t y o c c u r r e d at t h e l o c a l l e v e l . W h i l e
K e n y a ' s K A N U presented the m o s t extreme p r o b l e m s o f local
a u t o n o m y , in fact all t h e p a r t i e s , w i t h t h e p o s s i b l e e x c e p t i o n o f
397

the M C P , w e r e characteristically m o r e decentralised in practice

than their constitutions a l l o w e d .
T h e s e w e a k n e s s e s d e r i v e d in part f r o m the limitations o f
resources available. T h e y also reflected the pluralistic character o f
the parties, w h i c h s o u g h t to mobilise a w i d e range o f societal and
e c o n o m i c interests w i t h i n the o n e m o v e m e n t . T w o particular
internal p r o b l e m s need to be b o r n e in m i n d . W h e r e o r g a n i s e d
l a b o u r w a s a s i g n i f i c a n t e l e m e n t i n s o c i e t y , d i f f e r i n g v i e w s as t o
the p r o p e r relationship b e t w e e n party and trade u n i o n created a
potential source o f conflict w i t h i n the nationalist leadership.
A l t h o u g h g o v e r n m e n t s s o u g h t w i t h o u t exception to isolate the
unions from politics, the political c o n s e q u e n c e s o f industrial
action c o u l d not be a v o i d e d . Party politicians and radical y o u n g
t r a d e - u n i o n l e a d e r s s a w i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n as a l e g i t i m a t e w e a p o n
in the nationalist s t r u g g l e , a l t h o u g h there w e r e in fact f e w
politically m o t i v a t e d strikes a c r o s s the r e g i o n in these years.
L a b o u r ' s role in the nationalist s t r u g g l e , h o w e v e r , notwithstand
i n g the close relationship b e t w e e n party and union leaders,
p r o d u c e d a potential rival to and thus a potential division within
the party.
S e c o n d , t h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f different e t h n i c a n d r e g i o n a l
interests w i t h i n the same party w a s also a potential s o u r c e o f
c o n f l i c t . It w a s t h i s a s s o c i a t i o n o f r e g i o n a l i n t e r e s t s , a n d t h e r e f o r e
o f a n u m b e r o f p o w e r f u l national leaders exploiting regional
grievances within the same party, that w a s o n e underlying cause
o f the inability o f the centre to c o n t r o l the p e r i p h e r y in b o t h
K A N U in K e n y a a n d U N I P in N o r t h e r n R h o d e s i a .
S u c h differences c o u l d n o t a l w a y s be c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n the o n e
p a r t y . W h e r e m o r e t h a n o n e p a r t y e m e r g e d , it r e f l e c t e d t h e d e p t h
o f cleavages w i t h i n society that w o u l d not be subordinated to the
n a t i o n a l i s t o b j e c t i v e , b u t w e r e i n fact e x a c e r b a t e d b y t h e
d e c o l o n i s a t i o n process. T h u s the success o f the single party in
T a n g a n y i k a a n d in N y a s a l a n d w a s n o t least a reflection o f the
a b s e n c e o f d e e p - r o o t e d d i v i s i o n s in t h o s e societies. I n K e n y a , b y
c o n t r a s t , t h e r e w e r e i n t e n s e fears a m o n g t h e s o - c a l l e d m i n o r i t y
t r i b e s o f t h e i r p o s s i b l e s u b j e c t i o n , i n t h e i n d e p e n d e n t s t a t e , at t h e
hands o f the e c o n o m i c a l l y and politically d o m i n a n t K i k u y u and
L u o p e o p l e s . R e f l e c t e d a b o v e all i n t h e c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n K a l e n j i n
and K i k u y u o v e r access to the settlers' land in the Rift V a l l e y ,
this l e d t o t h e f o r m a t i o n i n i 9 6 0 o f a s e c o n d p a r t y , t h e K e n y a
398

African Democratic Union ( K A D U ) to challenge K A N U ' s drive

f o r p o w e r , a n d t o b e c o m e , u n t i l s h o r t l y after i n d e p e n d e n c e , t h e
parliamentary opposition. In K e n y a also intra-party tensions
reflected the conflict b e t w e e n landed a n d landless in K i k u y u
society. I n U g a n d a , the central political issue o f B u g a n d a ' s
d o m i n a n c e , allied t o the d e e p - r o o t e d religious rivalry, resulted in
the g r o w t h o f a h i g h l y c o m p e t i t i v e t w o - p a r t y system.
It is i m p o r t a n t t o b e a r i n m i n d t h e r o l e o f v i o l e n c e i n t h e
decolonisation process. Radicalism in those years related t o means
rather than ends, a n d militancy a n d m o d e r a t i o n referred t o the
use o f force. Militant politics g r e w o u t o f the juxtaposition o f
A f r i c a n d e p r i v a t i o n a n d E u r o p e a n p r i v i l e g e . H e n c e it w a s i n t h e
K e n y a n Highlands and o n the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt,
t h e t w o a r e a s w h e r e c o l o n i a l i s m b i t d e e p e s t i n t o A f r i c a n life, t h a t
African resentment against the indignities o f colonialism p r o d u c e d
the earliest a n d t h e m o s t v i o l e n t protest. T h e s e w e r e n o t ,
h o w e v e r , t h e o n l y areas o f v i o l e n t protest. Industrial unrest w a s
a w i d e s p r e a d theme d u r i n g these years a n d rural p o p u l i s m carried
w i t h it u n d e r t o n e s o f v i o l e n c e . W e m a y r e c a l l t h e s u c c e s s i v e c r i s e s
o f 1945, 1949 a n d 1959 in B u g a n d a , all o f w h i c h w e r e m a r k e d b y
demonstrations against the B u g a n d a g o v e r n m e n t and colonial
rule. U N I P militancy p r o v o k e d serious rural v i o l e n c e in N o r t h e r n
R h o d e s i a in e a c h s u c c e s s i v e year b e t w e e n 1958 a n d 1 9 6 4 .
O n c e t h e British c h a n g e d their p o l i c y a n d b e c a m e a n x i o u s , as
they d i d from i960, t o ' g u i d e the energies o f the nationalists into
constructive channels and t o secure their c o o p e r a t i o n in a
1
p r o g r a m m e o f steady b u t n o t h e a d l o n g political a d v a n c e ' , force
w a s n o l o n g e r necessary. T h e nationalist leaders w h o c a m e t o
p o w e r a t i n d e p e n d e n c e d i d s o as a r e s u l t o f a b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s
that p r o c e e d e d t h r o u g h constitutional channels. A l l o f t h e m used
the constitutional process t o a d v a n c e w h a t they s a w t o b e their
c o u n t r y ' s a n d their o w n interests. B u t w h e r e there w e r e rival
elements within the nationalist m o v e m e n t , the bargaining process
w a s n o t simply b e t w e e n colonial rulers a n d nationalists, b u t
b e t w e e n t h o s e r i v a l i n t e r e s t s as w e l l . T h e i n d e p e n d e n c e a r r a n g e
m e n t s reflected t h o s e c l e a v a g e s in society, as f o r e x a m p l e in
K e n y a ' s majimbo ( r e g i o n a l i s m ) a n d U g a n d a ' s f e d e r a l i s m , b u t t h e y
did n o t necessarily o v e r c o m e them. Nationalist leaders in their
d e m a n d for immediate independence m a d e their bargains w i t h the
1
S i r A n d r e w C o h e n , British policy in changing Africa ( L o n d o n , 1959), 61.
399

c o l o n i a l p o w e r i n t h e full k n o w l e d g e t h a t s o m e o f t h e p r o v i s i o n s
m i g h t p r o v e temporary, b u t o n the assumption that they them
selves w o u l d determine a n y future alteration in the internal
distribution o f p o w e r . Before w e consider that n e w phase,
h o w e v e r , w e m u s t b r i e f l y c o n s i d e r S o u t h e r n R h o d e s i a , w h e r e it
w a s w h i t e , n o t black, nationalism that triumphed.
T h e m o s t o b v i o u s difference b e t w e e n the settler c o m m u n i t i e s
in S o u t h e r n R h o d e s i a a n d t h e o t h e r t e r r i t o r i e s , e s p e c i a l l y K e n y a ,
lay in t h e greater political a u t o n o m y t h e w h i t e R h o d e s i a n s h a d
enjoyed since they w e r e granted 'responsible g o v e r n m e n t ' (in
t e r n a l s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t ) i n 19 2 3. T h e e x p l a n a t i o n f o r U D I t h e r e f o r e
lay t o s o m e extent in t h e e v e n t s b e f o r e 1940, w h e n t h e S o u t h e r n
Rhodesians had quietly d e v e l o p e d * a b o d y o f laws that n o t o n l y
protected w h i t e interests b u t generally inhibited A f r i c a n s f r o m
1
d e v e l o p i n g their skills a n d d e m o n s t r a t i n g their c a p a b i l i t i e s ' a n d
in the p r o c e s s established a firm institutional basis f o r racial
segregation and white e c o n o m i c and political control. W e need,
h o w e v e r , t o l o o k further, for w h i l e the K e n y a n settlers d i d n o t
h a v e c o n t r o l o f the c o l o n y ' s g o v e r n m e n t in 1940 they w e r e then
j u s t a s f i r m l y e n t r e n c h e d as t h e i r R h o d e s i a n c o u n t e r p a r t s . O f
greater importance w a s the character o f the white Rhodesian
c o m m u n i t y itself. I n t h e first p l a c e it w a s m u c h l a r g e r t h a n t h a t
o f K e n y a o r Northern Rhodesia: 5 per cent o f the population
i n s t e a d o f 1 p e r c e n t . S e c o n d , it i n c l u d e d a n e c o n o m i c a l l y
p r i v i l e g e d w h i t e urban artisan class w h i c h w a s m o r e p e r m a n e n t l y
rooted in the country than w e r e N o r t h e r n Rhodesia's miners, and
w h i c h enjoyed a greater political p o w e r derived from the country's
greater political a u t o n o m y . T h a t urban w a g e - l a b o u r force
d e p e n d e d m o r e o v e r f o r its p r i v i l e g e d s t a t u s o n t h e r a c i a l
segregation a n d the subordination o f the African majority that
w e r e t h e c o r n e r s t o n e s o f t h e c o u n t r y ' s w a y o f life. T h i r d , t h e w h i t e
farming c o m m u n i t y and the agricultural sector w e r e economically
m o r e significant than w a s the case in K e n y a . S o u t h e r n R h o d e s i a ' s
7000 w h i t e f a r m e r s o w n e d 4 9 p e r c e n t o f t h e c o u n t r y ' s l a n d ,
e m p l o y e d 42 p e r cent o f the l a b o u r force, a n d w e r e politically
much more firmly entrenched than the g r o w i n g business
c o m m u n i t y - either the local o r the international corporate in
terests. T h u s w h i l e the business c o m m u n i t y m i g h t h a v e f a v o u r e d
a m o r e liberal c o n c l u s i o n t o d e c o l o n i s a t i o n , a n d the British m i g h t
1
R o b e r t G o o d , UDI: the international politics of the Rhodesian rebellion ( L o n d o n , 1973).
400

(as H u g g i n s b e l i e v e d ) h a v e w i s h e d t o g i v e w a y t o b l a c k
n a t i o n a l i s m as q u i c k l y as p o s s i b l e i n o r d e r t o sustain their t r a d e
links w i t h A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s , it w a s t h e E u r o p e a n f a r m i n g
c o m m u n i t y that dominated the internal p o w e r system. W h i t e
farmers a n d artisans w e r e politically m o r e p o w e r f u l than w h i t e
b u s i n e s s m e n , a n d it w a s t h e y w h o d e t e r m i n e d t h e r e s p o n s e t o
A f r i c a n nationalism in 1 9 5 9 - 6 0 , w h e n a state o f e m e r g e n c y w a s
followed b y n e w repressive laws. T h e m o s t important factor w a s
u n d o u b t e d l y that the w h i t e Rhodesians controlled their o w n
armed forces w h i c h the K e n y a n whites did not. African militancy
m e t its m a t c h , a n d w e m a y therefore c o n c l u d e that t h e initial
failure o f A f r i c a n nationalism in S o u t h e r n R h o d e s i a w a s t h e result
not o f weaker Africans but o f stronger Europeans.
T w o other factors must also, h o w e v e r , b e taken into account.
I f the nationalist m o v e m e n t in Southern R h o d e s i a d e v e l o p e d
a l o n g lines similar t o t h o s e in o t h e r states, it carried w i t h i n it t h e
s a m e w e a k n e s s e s , n o t least t h e internal conflict w i t h i n t h e
leadership o v e r tactics a n d strategy, a n d those internal d i v i s i o n s
had serious consequences for the o u t c o m e o f the African struggle,
b o t h b e f o r e a n d after U D I . I t m i g h t a l s o b e a r g u e d t h a t t h e
nationalists failed t o identify t h e real n a t u r e o f t h e s t r u g g l e i n
S o u t h e r n R h o d e s i a , m i s j u d g i n g b o t h t h e p o t e n t i a l for a l i b e r a l
solution from within Rhodesia and the possibility o f British
intervention f r o m outside. J u s t as Britain h a d n e v e r exercised h e r
right o f surveillance o v e r Rhodesian legislation o n behalf o f the
black population in the 42 years o f responsible g o v e r n m e n t , s o
in 1965 s h e failed t o h o n o u r h e r c o l o n i a l o b l i g a t i o n s . W h e r e a s
t r o o p s h a d b e e n flown i n t o K e n y a i n 1 9 5 2 t o q u e l l t h e M a u M a u
u p r i s i n g a m o n g t h e K i k u y u , n o force w a s u s e d a g a i n s t R h o d e s i a ' s
w h i t e s e t t l e r s i n 1 9 6 5 . W h i l e t h e u n d e r l y i n g r e a s o n s for t h e B r i t i s h
a b d i c a t i o n o f responsibility at this p o i n t remain a m a t t e r o f
debate, w e must agree that, w h i l e the arguments for and against
the use o f force w e r e i m p r e s s i v e , the fact that force w a s n o t
used
suggests that the issues at stake - reversing U D I and assuring ultimate majority
rule in Rhodesia with all it entailed for the evolution of affairs in Southern
Africa and Britain's position in Black Africa, the Commonwealth and the
U N - were not worth the economic cost and the political risk involved in
1
applying force. There was here a question of values and l e a d e r s h i p . . .
" Good, UDI, 65.

401

It w a s t h e o v e r r i d i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f B r i t a i n ' s d o m e s t i c p o l i c y
that led t o Britain's R h o d e s i a n failure.
Post-colonial change
T h e politics o f independence quickly focussed u p o n the allocation
o f scarce resources in a situation w h e r e the state w a s a c k n o w l e d g e d
as a d i r e c t a g e n t o f d e v e l o p m e n t , a n d g o v e r n m e n t m a n a g e m e n t
o f the e c o n o m y w a s a long-established tradition. T h e r e w a s a
strong continuity between colonial and post-colonial political
p o s t u r e s , and the m o s t p o w e r f u l forces w i t h i n the n e w state had
been b o r n during the nationalist struggle w h e n colonial
d e v e l o p m e n t policy had created n e w urban w o r k e r s , n e w
p r o g r e s s i v e farmers and a n e w African administrative class. T h e r e
w a s a significant inequality o f i n c o m e n o t o n l y b e t w e e n the races,
but also b e t w e e n the small minority o f African society w h i c h had
f o u n d e d u c a t i o n and e m p l o y m e n t in the m o d e r n sector and the
majority w h i c h had not. Colonial policy had also contributed to
acute regional imbalances in e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t , w h e r e
r e g i o n s c o i n c i d e d t o a greater o r lesser extent w i t h ethnic
groupings. Hence although T a n g a n y i k a and Nyasaland were
r e l a t i v e l y free o f e t h n i c c o n f l i c t , e l s e w h e r e e t h n i c a n d / o r r e g i o n a l
inequality w a s a significant basis for political c l e a v a g e . In the
i n d e p e n d e n t s t a t e , t h e i s s u e s at t h e h e a r t o f t h e p o l i t i c a l d e b a t e
therefore remained the same. In Z a m b i a the transition to inde
p e n d e n c e o c c u r r e d against a b a c k g r o u n d o f industrial unrest that
r e a c h e d its c l i m a x i n 1 9 6 6 w h e n t h e m i n e r s d e m o n s t r a t e d t h e i r
continuing p o w e r b y taking the C o p p e r b e l t o u t o n strike and w o n
a 22 p e r c e n t w a g e i n c r e a s e w h i c h w o u l d e x a c e r b a t e t h e u r b a n -
rural g a p . In K e n y a the K i k u y u h u n g e r for land, w h i l e temporarily
assuaged b y the land settlement w h i c h restored the w h i t e highlands
to African o w n e r s h i p , nonetheless remained the dominant political
issue.
T h e r e were, h o w e v e r , t w o additional constraints, w h i c h w o u l d
i n d u e c o u r s e h a v e s e r i o u s p o l i t i c a l c o n s e q u e n c e s : first t h e r e w a s
the b u r d e n o f e c o n o m i c d e p e n d e n c e that meant that expatriate
capital w a s an a d d i t i o n a l influence u p o n the state. ( A l l these states
w e r e dependent o n external capital for d e v e l o p m e n t . ) S e c o n d there
w a s the conflict, already to s o m e extent apparent, b e t w e e n the
needs o f the mass a n d the aspirations o f the élite. W h i l e there w a s
402

at t h e g r a s s r o o t s a h e a l t h y r e a l i s m as t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s t h a t
independence w o u l d bring, there w e r e also the aspirations for a
b e t t e r life, a n d i n p a r t i c u l a r f o r e d u c a t i o n a n d e m p l o y m e n t , t h a t
n o g o v e r n m e n t c o u l d satisfy i n t h e s h o r t t e r m . A t t h e s a m e t i m e
there w e r e intense desires a m o n g the élite for the material
standards o f the expatriate society that they n o w replaced, but
w h i c h n o g o v e r n m e n t c o u l d s u s t a i n e x c e p t at t h e e x p e n s e o f t h e
mass.
A r e m a r k a b l e n u m b e r o f i s s u e s w a s left u n r e s o l v e d b y t h e
independence settlements. In U g a n d a the 60-year-old conflict
b e t w e e n B u g a n d a a n d B u n y o r o o v e r t h e L o s t C o u n t i e s w a s left
to b e d e c i d e d later b y r e f e r e n d u m , a n d the m o r e recent b u t e q u a l l y
divisive R w e n z u r u r u secessionist m o v e m e n t w a s h o l d i n g d o w n
a significant part o f U g a n d a ' s a r m e d forces in the w e s t e r n
k i n g d o m o f T o r o . K e n y a faced the Somali-oriented secessionist
m o v e m e n t in her N o r t h - E a s t e r n P r o v i n c e , a n d a potential dis
ruption to security b y those o f the K i k u y u M a u M a u f r e e d o m
fighters w h o r e m a i n e d i n t h e f o r e s t s . Z a m b i a ' s s e c u r i t y s i t u a t i o n
as t h e f r o n t - l i n e state i n s o u t h e r n A f r i c a w a s c r i t i c a l l y affected b y
R h o d e s i a ' s i l l e g a l d e c l a r a t i o n o f i n d e p e n d e n c e a y e a r after h e r
o w n , at a t i m e w h e n t h e c o u n t r y h a d s c a r c e l y o v e r c o m e t h e
bitterness generated b y the L u m p a c h u r c h u p r i s i n g in N o r t h e r n
P r o v i n c e a n d w h e n L o z i s e p a r a t i s t f e e l i n g s still m a d e B a r o t s e l a n d
a difficult a r e a . I n Z a n z i b a r t h e r e v o l u t i o n t h a t s w e p t t h e A r a b
m i n o r i t y f r o m p o w e r i n J a n u a r y 1 9 6 4 n o m o r e t h a n a m o n t h after
that state's i n d e p e n d e n c e d e m o n s t r a t e d the failure o f c o n s t i t u
tional a r r a n g e m e n t s t o o v e r c o m e racial fears. T h e i n d e p e n d e n c e
constitution had p r o v i d e d for majority rule. N e v e r t h e l e s s ,
c o m m o n - r o l l elections based o n a universal adult franchise and
s i n g l e - m e m b e r c o n s t i t u e n c i e s left t h e A r a b o l i g a r c h y i n p o w e r .
T h a t g o v e r n m e n t ' s repressive measures t o w a r d s the A f r o - S h i r a z i
Party ( A S P ) opposition, w h o s e support derived f r o m the African
majority c o m m u n i t y , pushed Zanzibar towards a m o r e authori
tarian state. A n t i - g o v e r n m e n t e l e m e n t s d r e w t o g e t h e r b e h i n d t h e
U m m a ( ' t h e m a s s e s ' ) P a r t y , f o r m e d i n J u l y 1963 b y A b d u l
R a h m a n M o h a m m e d (Babu). W h i l s t the catalyst for the r e v o l u t i o n
w a s p r o v i d e d b y a n o u t s i d e r , it w a s U m m a , w i t h t h e r a d i c a l
e l e m e n t s o f A S P , w h i c h a s s u m e d c o n t r o l a m o n t h later, a n d three
m o n t h s later j o i n e d T a n g a n y i k a t o f o r m the n e w R e p u b l i c o f
T a n z a n i a . M a l a w i suffered a m a j o r c a b i n e t c r i s i s s o o n after
403

i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d s u b s e q u e n t l y a n a b o r t i v e i n v a s i o n w h i c h , i f it
failed in the face o f m a s s i v e s u p p o r t for D r B a n d a , n o n e t h e l e s s
demonstrated the absence o f consensus within the n e w g o v e r n
m e n t . B u t it w a s i n E a s t A f r i c a t h a t t h e l i m i t a t i o n s o f p o w e r w e r e
m o s t clearly d e m o n s t r a t e d in 1964 b y the a r m y m u t i n i e s that
o c c u r r e d f o l l o w i n g the Z a n z i b a r c o u p in swift s u c c e s s i o n in e a c h
state, a n d w h i c h w e r e c o n t a i n e d o n l y w i t h the assistance o f the
former colonial power.
T h e v e r y i n t e g r i t y o f t h e s t a t e w a s t h e r e f o r e at r i s k , a n d n o
g o v e r n m e n t c o u l d claim effectively to c o m m a n d the use o f force.
T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t characteristic o f the n e w states w a s their
f r a g i l i t y . I t is n o t t h e r e f o r e s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h e p r i m e c o n c e r n o f
the n e w leaders w a s in each case t o strengthen their c o n t r o l and
t o c e n t r a l i s e p o w e r . T h e y r e j e c t e d s e c e s s i o n as a l e g i t i m a t e
solution to internal conflict, and reasserted the b o u n d a r i e s in
herited w i t h the c o l o n i a l state. W h e r e there h a d b e e n a federal
d e v o l u t i o n o f p o w e r it w a s r e v o k e d , a l t h o u g h K e n y a ' s r e g i o n a l
s t r u c t u r e {majimbd) w a s m o r e e a s i l y a b o l i s h e d i n D e c e m b e r 1 9 6 4
t h a n U g a n d a ' s q u a s i - f e d e r a l i s m , w h i c h w a s d i s s o l v e d o n l y after
a violent confrontation b e t w e e n O b o t e ' s central g o v e r n m e n t and
B u g a n d a i n M a y 1 9 6 6 . W i t h o u t e x c e p t i o n , h o w e v e r , t h e y set o u t
to adapt the inherited structures t h r o u g h w h i c h they n o w exerted
their p o w e r . T h e transfer o f p o w e r had generally b e e n o n the basis
o f the W e s t m i n s t e r m o d e l , and the independence constitutions
characteristically h a d p r o v i d e d the n e w states w i t h the institutions
o f representative parliamentary g o v e r n m e n t , the u n d e r l y i n g as
sumptions o f w h i c h were those o f a multi-party democracy. W h i l e
the political pattern w a s g e n e r a l l y that o f the d o m i n a n t p a r t y state,
four o f the n e w states, U g a n d a , K e n y a , Z a m b i a a n d Z a n z i b a r , had
an opposition party recognised under the c o n v e n t i o n s o f
p a r l i a m e n t a r y g o v e r n m e n t . Y e t w i t h i n t h e first d e c a d e o f
i n d e p e n d e n c e e a c h state a d o p t e d a single-party s y s t e m , in w h i c h
the dominant institution w a s a p o w e r f u l presidential executive.
A s a result the 1960s m a r k e d i m p o r t a n t phases in institutional
c h a n g e , and in state-building, in w h i c h the d o m i n a n t trend w a s
a w a y f r o m the multi-party d e m o c r a c y e n v i s a g e d in the indepen
dence settlements t o w a r d s an authoritarian rule and the c o n c e n
tration o f p o w e r at the c e n t r e .
T h e clearest d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f this concentration o f p o w e r in
the central executive w a s the p r o g r e s s i v e decline o f the represen-
404

t a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s o f state. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e n o t i o n o f
parliamentary s o v e r e i g n t y , the right o f elected assemblies to
c o n t r o l the e x e c u t i v e w a s n o t a c c e p t e d , and each legislature in t u r n
w a s r e d u c e d t o a m i n o r role in the p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m . T h e K e n y a n
legislature w a s in the 1960s s o m e t h i n g o f an e x c e p t i o n , a n d
articulate and frequently c o u r a g e o u s M P s ensured a vital public
f o r u m for political debate that contributed a g o o d deal to the
openness o f the K e n y a n system. B y 1970, h o w e v e r , presidential
mediation between parliamentarians and g o v e r n m e n t had g i v e n
w a y t o a m o r e c o e r c i v e c o n t r o l , d e m o n s t r a t e d finally i n 1 9 7 5 b y
the arrest o f t w o M P s w i t h i n the precincts o f parliament and their
s u b s e q u e n t d e t e n t i o n . I n U g a n d a a v i a b l e t w o - p a r t y s y s t e m at t h e
outset ensured a v i g o r o u s parliamentary debate, but the decision
o f the parliamentary leader o f the o p p o s i t i o n D e m o c r a t i c Party
t o join the r u l i n g U g a n d a P e o p l e s ' C o n g r e s s ( U P C ) in 1964
m a r k e d the decline n o t o n l y o f the t w o - p a r t y system b u t also o f
t h e a u t h o r i t y o f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e itself. T h e c o n s t i t u e n t a s s e m b l y
that debated the n e w republican c o n s t i t u t i o n in 1967 m i g h t h a v e
indicated a hankering for tolerance and discussion, but the
N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y had s o m e time earlier lost any g e n u i n e p o w e r .
In T a n z a n i a the h o p e s for a m o r e v i g o r o u s parliamentary assembly
w i t h i n t h e o n e - p a r t y s t a t e f a i l e d t o m a t e r i a l i s e , a n d i n M a l a w i it
w a s at n o t i m e c o n t e m p l a t e d . I n Z a m b i a , w h e n t h e M P s a t t e m p t e d
to establish for themselves a m o r e p o s i t i v e role in the one-party
assembly o f 1974, they encountered the same party and presidential
s u s p i c i o n a n d o p p o s i t i o n as t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r s .
T h e concentration o f p o w e r resulted also in the p r o g r e s s i v e
emasculation i f n o t abolition o f elected local g o v e r n m e n t insti
tutions. T h e colonial attempt to build local g o v e r n m e n t s o n the
British m o d e l had had limited success in E a s t and Central Africa.
W h i l e the urban and E u r o p e a n - d o m i n a t e d local authorities in
K e n y a and Z a m b i a had enjoyed significant p o w e r , o n l y in U g a n d a
and K e n y a had African local authorities assumed an important
governmental role, w h i c h they had performed w i t h s o m e degree
o f c o m p e t e n c e a n d s u c c e s s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , at i n d e p e n d e n c e all
states w e r e c o m m i t t e d t o a s y s t e m o f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e l o c a l g o v e r n
m e n t responsible, in v a r y i n g degrees, for important functions
o f g o v e r n m e n t at t h e d i s t r i c t l e v e l . A f t e r i n d e p e n d e n c e , w h i l e t h e
u r b a n authorities g r e w in p o w e r , reflecting n o t least the u r b a n
g r o w t h that each state e x p e r i e n c e d to a greater o r lesser d e g r e e ,
405

the rural authorities w e r e p r o g r e s s i v e l y shorn o f their responsi

bilities and their functions transferred t o central g o v e r n m e n t - or,
as in T a n z a n i a , t o d i s t r i c t d e v e l o p m e n t c o u n c i l s w h i c h , i f t h e y
preserved the element o f local representation, ensured ultimate
government/party control.
W h e r e traditional rulers had retained any significant constitu
t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y , as i n t h e c a s e o f B u g a n d a a n d B a r o t s e l a n d , t h i s
w a s in d u e c o u r s e s u b o r d i n a t e d to the central a u t h o r i t y and
ultimately abolished, a l t h o u g h the procedure f o l l o w e d p r o v e d
different in e a c h case. E v e r y w h e r e there w a s a m o v e a w a y f r o m
the formal use o f traditional authority. A l t h o u g h tradition w a s b y
n o m e a n s dead the d a y o f the chief had generally passed b y 1 9 7 5 .
It w a s t r u e t h a t i n M a l a w i t h e p o s i t i o n o f c h i e f w a s t o s o m e e x t e n t
r e s t o r e d after i n d e p e n d e n c e , a n d t r a d i t i o n a l c o u r t s i n 1 9 6 7 w e r e
g i v e n increased jurisdiction, including the right to pass death
sentences. N e v e r t h e l e s s n o chief w a s permitted to build an
independent p o w e r base f r o m w h i c h to criticise g o v e r n m e n t or
party and President B a n d a w a s quite willing to depose chiefs
u n p o p u l a r w i t h his administration. S o the p a r a m o u n t chief o f the
N g o n i o f Central P r o v i n c e w a s d e p o s e d for his a n t i - g o v e r n m e n t
a c t i v i t i e s i n 1 9 6 7 , as h e h a d b e e n s u s p e n d e d 1 4 y e a r s e a r l i e r b y
the c o l o n i a l r e g i m e for his o p p o s i t i o n t o a g r i c u l t u r a l rules.
T h e e x t e n s i o n o f e x e c u t i v e p o w e r also resulted in the s u b o r
dination o f the labour m o v e m e n t and o f interest g r o u p s - like
c o o p e r a t i v e s - in g e n e r a l t o g o v e r n m e n t and t o the party. T a n
zania in 1964 led the w a y w i t h the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the N a t i o n a l
U n i o n o f T a n g a n y i k a W o r k e r s . T h e pattern o f a g o v e r n m e n t -
controlled central organisation o f unions, and industrial legis
lation that virtually prohibited strike action, w a s subsequently
i n t r o d u c e d in e a c h state, a l t h o u g h in Z a m b i a g o v e r n m e n t c o n
trol had u p to 1975 s t o p p e d short o f the s a m e radical restructur
i n g o f t h e l a b o u r m o v e m e n t as o c c u r r e d i n E a s t A f r i c a .
T h e centralisation o f p o w e r in the e x e c u t i v e resulted in the
increased p o w e r and authority o f the central bureaucracy, w h i c h
i n e a c h s t a t e w a s b y 1 9 7 5 v a s t l y i n c r e a s e d i n s i z e a n d staffed
predominantly by African nationals rather than expatriates. T h e i r
p o w e r w a s n o d o u b t m o s t apparent in K e n y a , w h e r e the president
h a d d e l i b e r a t e l y c h o s e n t o u s e t h e p r o v i n c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n as h i s
m a j o r a g e n t o f c o n t r o l as w e l l as d e v e l o p m e n t ; b u t a s i m i l a r
406

e x t e n s i o n o f b u r e a u c r a t i c p o w e r o c c u r r e d e l s e w h e r e as e a c h s t a t e
reinstated a paternalist and authoritarian bureaucratic m a c h i n e .
T h i s characteristic centralisation o f c o n t r o l w a s in part a
genuine attempt to grapple w i t h the p r o b l e m s o f d e v e l o p m e n t .
T h e curtailment o f local g o v e r n m e n t and trade-union a u t o n o m y
w a s justified in t e r m s o f the n e e d t o c u r b the c o n s u m p t i o n i s t
t e n d e n c y o f t h e i r m e m b e r s . It a l s o , h o w e v e r , i n d i c a t e d t h e
unwillingness o f g o v e r n m e n t s o r individual rulers to share p o w e r .
T h u s n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g P r e s i d e n t K a u n d a ' s a t t e m p t i n Z a m b i a in
1968 t o i n t r o d u c e ' d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n i n c e n t r a l i s m ' , it w a s o n l y i n
T a n z a n i a in 1972 that a g e n u i n e decentralisation o f g o v e r n m e n t a l
authority had been attempted.
T h e authoritarian character o f the p o s t - c o l o n i a l state w a s
p e r h a p s m o s t o b v i o u s l y d e m o n s t r a t e d b y the refusal t o tolerate
o p p o s i t i o n e x c e p t o n t e r m s l a i d d o w n b y t h e r u l i n g p a r t y itself.
Y e t a l t h o u g h e a c h state i n t r o d u c e d and u s e d a w i d e v a r i e t y o f
constitutional and political measures, including Preventive D e
tention A c t s , to control political opposition, they built v e r y
different k i n d s o f p a r t i e s a n d p a r t y s y s t e m s . T h u s , w h i l e t h e m a j o r
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n n o v a t i o n after i n d e p e n d e n c e w a s t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n
o f t h e o n e - p a r t y s t a t e , it w a s h e r e t h a t t h e g r e a t e s t v a r i a t i o n s
o c c u r r e d b o t h in the o r i g i n s o f the s i n g l e - p a r t y s y s t e m a n d in the
c h a r a c t e r o f t h e p a r t y itself. I n e a c h c a s e t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e
o n e - p a r t y state w a s b a s e d o n t h e a r g u m e n t t h a t c o m p e t i t i v e p a r t y
politics w e r e w a s t e f u l , d i v i s i v e a n d i n a p p r o p r i a t e in the
circumstances o f the independent but u n d e r d e v e l o p e d and
( s u p p o s e d l y ) classless state. Y e t the r e s u l t i n g s i n g l e - p a r t y s y s t e m
v a r i e d a g r e a t d e a l , a n d e a c h i n d e p e n d e n t s t a t e a c q u i r e d its o w n
distinctive character.
I n T a n z a n i a t h e a b s e n c e at i n d e p e n d e n c e o f a n y o p p o s i t i o n t o
T A N U p a v e d the w a y for the easy transition t o the o n e - p a r t y state.
T h e c r i t i c a l e v e n t s l e a d i n g t o its c r e a t i o n w e r e t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n
o f the R e p u b l i c in 1962, the O n e - P a r t y C o m m i s s i o n in 1964, and
the establishment o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o n e - p a r t y state in 1 9 6 5 .
T h e A r u s h a Declaration o f 1967 articulated Tanzania's objective
o f a socialist and self-reliant society and the strategy t o a c h i e v e
it, c e n t r a l t o w h i c h w a s t h e p u b l i c o w n e r s h i p o f t h e m a j o r m e a n s
o f p r o d u c t i o n . T h e Mwongo^p o r G u i d e l i n e s , i s s u e d i n 1 9 7 1 ,
stressed the i m p o r t a n c e o f w o r k e r participation and refined the
407

notions o f leadership. T h e U n i o n b e t w e e n T a n g a n y i k a and

Z a n z i b a r h a d e n l a r g e d the state in 1964, b u t the f o u n d a t i o n s o f
the system lay in T A N U and in the A r u s h a Declaration.
T h e T a n z a n i a n p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m i n t h e m i d - 1 9 7 0 s w a s still
basically authoritarian. Political activity outside the party w a s
firmly r e j e c t e d a n d , a s o n e p e r c e p t i v e a n d s y m p a t h e t i c w r i t e r
observed, ' W h a t e v e r the longer term democratic potential for the
n e w structures w h i c h [had been created], their immediate
consequences have been to consolidate p o w e r in the hands o f the
present leaders, t o silence their critics a n d t o lessen the a u t o n o m y
1
o f previously independent institutions.' Presidential p o w e r had
b e e n d e m o n s t r a t e d b y s u c h d e c i s i o n s as t h e u n i o n w i t h Z a n z i b a r ,
m a d e b y N y e r e r e w i t h o u t reference t o either cabinet o r National
Assembly, and the bureaucracy w a s (notwithstanding party
rhetoric to the contrary) the dominant agent o f development. A t
the same time T a n z a n i a ' s socialist strategy a n d the institutional
c h a n g e s after 1965 i n d i c a t e d t h e d e s i r e o n t h e p a r t o f s o m e a t l e a s t
o f the leadership t o establish democratic controls o v e r b o t h
national élite a n d m i d d l e - l e v e l p a r t y activists.
T h e procedures adopted for the introduction o f the one-party
state in T a n z a n i a ensured a significant e l e m e n t o f p o p u l a r par
ticipation in that process. T h r e e general elections s h o w e d that the
electoral process a n d c a m p a i g n rules p r o v i d e d a basis for g e n u i n e
g r a s s - r o o t s e l e c t o r a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , a n d t h e first g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n
in t h e o n e - p a r t y state in 1965 w a s a m i l e s t o n e in A f r i c a n political
history. A l t h o u g h t h e A r u s h a D e c l a r a t i o n i m p o s e d s o m e restric
tions o n recruitment, T A N U remained in 1975 a mass party. T h e
Leadership C o d e introduced under the A r u s h a Declaration in
1967 w a s a genuine attempt t o prevent social and e c o n o m i c
i n e q u a l i t y , a n d w h i l e t h e s m a l l é l i t e h a d n o t b e e n e l i m i n a t e d it h a d
been controlled. B u t the m o s t significant c h a n g e s for the g r o w t h
o f t h e d e m o c r a t i c s t a t e h a d b e e n w i t h i n T A N U itself, w h i c h h a d
d e v e l o p e d an important element o f internal party d e m o c r a c y that
w a s absent in other ruling parties. F o l l o w i n g the extension in 1968
and 1969 o f the parliamentary electoral system t o the party, a w i d e
r a n g e o f p o s t s i n T A N U w e r e s u b s e q u e n t l y filled b y a n e l e c t i o n
process that followed closely the process for national parliamen
tary elections. T h u s , w h i l e the p r e v a i l i n g characteristic o f t h e
T a n z a n i a n political system w a s in 1975 the p o w e r o f T A N U , there
1
Pratt, The critical phase in Tanzania, 193-4.
408

had been a significant d e v e l o p m e n t o f internal d e m o c r a c y w i t h i n

the party.
T a n z a n i a ' s p o s t - c o l o n i a l state o b v i o u s l y o w e d a g o o d deal t o
President N y e r e r e ' s leadership and t o his m o r a l c o m m i t m e n t t o
the principles o f the d e m o c r a t i c state. B u t the T a n z a n i a n s y s t e m
in 1975 h a d a l s o g r o w n o u t o f T a n z a n i a n s o c i e t y , a n d r e f l e c t e d
p o p u l a r a t t i t u d e s a b o u t p a r t y a n d s o c i e t y o f a still p r e d o m i n a n t l y
egalitarian peasant society. If the A r u s h a Declaration w a s N y
erere's reaction to the early ' scramble o f party m e m b e r s for status,
i n c o m e a n d p e r s o n a l p o w e r ' , it n e v e r t h e l e s s s t r u c k a d e e p l y
r e s p o n s i v e c h o r d i n a n A f r i c a n s o c i e t y i n w h i c h t h e r e w a s as y e t
n o s i g n i f i c a n t é l i t e a n d f e w v e s t e d i n t e r e s t s . I n t h i s r e s p e c t it is
i m p o r t a n t t o b e a r in m i n d t h e m u c h l o w e r l e v e l o f p e n e t r a t i o n
o f f o r e i g n capital in T a n z a n i a c o m p a r e d w i t h K e n y a a n d Z a m b i a
a n d t h e m u c h m o r e diffuse i m p a c t o f w h i t e s e t t l e m e n t a n d o f
c o l o n i a l i s m itself. T h u s s u c h s t a b i l i t y as t h e T a n z a n i a n s y s t e m h a d
a c h i e v e d b y the m i d - 1 9 7 0 s w a s the result n o t s i m p l y o f the
centralisation o f p o w e r and authority, but o f a significant c o n
sensus about the c o u n t r y ' s f o r m o f g o v e r n a n c e a m o n g a p o p u l a t i o n
in w h i c h t h e r e w e r e still f e w d e e p e c o n o m i c o r s o c i a l c l e a v a g e s .
M a l a w i w o n independence w i t h a single party that e n j o y e d
o v e r w h e l m i n g mass support under President Banda's leadership,
so that the m o v e t o a legal o n e - p a r t y state in 1966 also f o l l o w e d
naturally u p o n earlier political d e v e l o p m e n t s . T h e e m e r g e n t party
s y s t e m differed a g r e a t d e a l h o w e v e r f r o m T a n z a n i a ' s , f o r i n
M a l a w i political structures and associated values c o n t i n u e d to
ensure that instructions s h o u l d be carried d o w n w a r d s . B a n d a ' s
d o m i n a n c e w a s based b o t h o n his massive support, particularly
a m o n g the m o r e traditional elements o f rural society, and also
h i s i n t i m a t e i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h p a r t y n e t w o r k s . H e b e c a m e life
p r e s i d e n t in J u l y 1 9 7 1 , f o l l o w i n g a c a l l f r o m t h e p a r t y t h a t t h e
c o n s t i t u t i o n be a m e n d e d for this p u r p o s e , thus c o n s o l i d a t i n g his
c o n t r o l o f all s i g n i f i c a n t p o w e r . W h i l e t h e M C P , l i k e T A N U , h a d
its little office in e v e r y t o w n , a n d t h e p a r t y ' s t e n t a c l e s s t r e t c h e d
far a n d w i d e , t h e p a r t y r e m a i n e d s u b s e r v i e n t t o its life p r e s i d e n t
in the critical functions o f p o l i c y - m a k i n g and the c h o i c e b o t h o f
parliamentary representative and o f m e m b e r s o f the party
hierarchy. W h i l e the party o r g a n s , and especially the M a l a w i
Y o u n g P i o n e e r s , p r o v i d e d a n i m p o r t a n t i n t e g r a t i n g f o r c e t o offset
potentially disruptive parochial loyalties, the party d e p e n d e n c e o n
409

the centre remained a d o m i n a n t characteristic o f the system w h i c h

inhibited any g e n u i n e decentralisation. W h i l e the influence o f the
l e a d e r s h i p w a s as i m p o r t a n t as i n T a n z a n i a , P r e s i d e n t B a n d a ' s
i d e a s a n d a t t i t u d e s w e r e v e r y different f r o m t h o s e o f P r e s i d e n t
N y e r e r e . E q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t , the cabinet crisis o f 1964, w h e n the
y o u n g politicians w h o had earlier built D r B a n d a u p into a m o r e
t h a n l i f e - s i z e figure, t h e n c h a l l e n g e d h i m u n s u c c e s s f u l l y f o r
c o n t r o l , m a d e h i m w a r y o f any c o l l e a g u e s and assistants. T h u s
M a l a w i ' s o n e - p a r t y state w a s a centralised a u t o c r a c y , in w h i c h D r
B a n d a sustained the nation's unity w i t h his appeal t o the p o p u l a c e
for personal support.
T h e e v o l u t i o n o f the one-party system w a s a g o o d deal m o r e
t u r b u l e n t i n K e n y a , Z a m b i a a n d U g a n d a , i n all o f w h i c h c o n
stitutional a m e n d m e n t w a s used to eliminate political o p p o s i t i o n in
a n i n c r e a s i n g l y c o e r c i v e s t a t e . K e n y a ' s first e x p e r i m e n t as a de facto
one-party state f o l l o w e d the v o l u n t a r y d i s s o l u t i o n o f K A D U in
1964, o n the occasion o f the establishment o f the R e p u b l i c and
t h e a b a n d o n m e n t o f t h e q u a s i - f e d e r a l d e v o l u t i o n o f p o w e r . It
lasted h o w e v e r o n l y until 1966 b y w h i c h time the e n l a r g e d K A N U
c o u l d n o l o n g e r c o n t a i n its d i v e r g e n t e l e m e n t s a n d t h e f o r m e r
Vice-President, O g i n g a O d i n g a , w i t h d r e w w i t h a significant
radical m i n o r i t y to f o r m a n e w o p p o s i t i o n , the K e n y a P e o p l e ' s
U n i o n ( K P U ) . T h e K P U w a s i t s e l f b a n n e d i n 1 9 6 9 , after a p e r i o d
o f g r o w i n g p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e , at w h i c h p o i n t K e n y a b e c a m e o n c e
m o r e a de facto o n e - p a r t y state.
Until 1969 the m o d e o f K e n y a n politics w a s essentially that o f
a factional system focussed u p o n the presidency, and based o n
principles o f patronage and clientage w h i c h required national
l e a d e r s t o s u s t a i n a l o c a l b a s e i f t h e y w i s h e d t o r e t a i n p o w e r at
the centre. T h e party w a s , under those circumstances, essentially
a machine to control and distribute patronage and, w h e n necessary,
to m o b i l i s e electoral s u p p o r t , rather than an institution to
organise development or to ensure popular democratic control o f
t h e l e a d e r s h i p . P a r a d o x i c a l l y t h a t f a c t i o n a l i s m , w i t h its o r g a n i s e d
n e t w o r k o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n s b e t w e e n centre and locality, resulted
in a h i g h l y participant political s y s t e m . L o c a l political pressures
w e r e exercised t h r o u g h g o v e r n m e n t ' r i g h t u p to the President',
a n d o f t e n t h r o u g h K A N U w h i c h , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g its m o r i b u n d
s t a t e at t h e n a t i o n a l l e v e l , at t h e l o c a l l e v e l w a s a c t i v e l y a s s o c i a t e d
w i t h local interests. T h e grass roots c o n s e q u e n t l y remained
highly politicised. T h e system, h o w e v e r , placed great pressure o n
410

resources, and resulted in a s y m b i o s i s b e t w e e n b u s i n e s s a n d

politics that p r o v i d e d the f o u n d a t i o n s for the d e p e n d e n t state.
A t independence, uneven d e v e l o p m e n t reinforced the inherited
ethnic c l e a v a g e s in society to m a k e ethnic rivalry a central issue
o f politics, in a situation w h e r e ' t r i b a l i s m ' m e a n t essentially
K i k u y u dominance. Ethnic loyalty w a s also h o w e v e r exploited to
d e f u s e e c o n o m i c d i s c o n t e n t , m o s t n o t a b l y i n a little g e n e r a l
election in 1966, a strategy that p r o g r e s s i v e l y w e a k e n e d K e n y a t t a ' s
p o s i t i o n as a s y m b o l o f K e n y a n i n t e g r a t i o n . T h e a s s a s s i n a t i o n i n
1969 o f T o m M b o y a , K e n y a ' s m o s t c o n t r o v e r s i a l and p r o b a b l y
m o s t gifted political leader, led to a m o r e intense polarisation o f
ethnic forces, and t o the d e s t r u c t i o n o f the K P U . It also resulted
in the greater political d o m i n a n c e o f the K i k u y u . B y 1975 the L u o
had been relegated to the periphery o f the K e n y a n political system
w h i c h w a s n o w d e t e r m i n e d less b y e t h n i c t h a n b y e c o n o m i c
inequality. M b o y a ' s assassination therefore also m a r k e d a distinc
t i v e c h a n g e in the b a l a n c e o f p o w e r in K e n y a a n d a n e w p h a s e
in politics. A t that p o i n t , the rules o f the political g a m e c h a n g e d .
A l t h o u g h t w o r e m a r k a b l y o p e n elections w e r e held in 1969 and
1974, b o t h o f w h i c h resulted in significant c h a n g e s in p a r l i a m e n
tary m e m b e r s h i p , K e n y a n p o l i t i c s h a d m o v e d m u c h m o r e t o
palace clique and a w a y from party, parliament o r faction. A s
K e n y a t t a gathered p o w e r into the presidency, so the presidency
b e c a m e the p r i m e r e s o u r c e in a political conflict that i n c r e a s i n g l y
d e m o n s t r a t e d the n e w class c l e a v a g e s in s o c i e t y . T h e assassination
in 1 9 7 5 o f J. M . K a r i u k i , a v i g o r o u s K i k u y u p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r w h o
had openly challenged K e n y a ' s increasing e c o n o m i c inequality
and the self-aggrandisement o f the small central K i k u y u elite,
s u g g e s t e d the b e g i n n i n g o f a further polarisation o f forces o n
e c o n o m i c rather than ethnic lines. W h e r e a s M b o y a ' s death had
united the K i k u y u in c o m m o n defence against the L u o , K a r i u k i ' s
death d i v i d e d t h e m , a n d this time t h e y c o u l d n o t b e h e l d t o g e t h e r
by ethnic loyalty. T h u s 1975 m a r k e d a qualitative c h a n g e in the
politics o f a post-colonial K e n y a .
In Z a m b i a , U N I P ' s d o m i n a n t position w a s apparent f r o m the
outset and President K a u n d a had o n many occasions expressed
his c o n f i d e n c e that the p e o p l e o f Z a m b i a w o u l d v o t e the o n e - p a r t y
state i n t o e x i s t e n c e . N e v e r t h e l e s s i n 1968 t h e first g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n
disappointed h i m , particularly in B a r o t s e l a n d , w h e r e the L o z i ,
a g g r i e v e d at c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t n e g l e c t , d e m o n s t r a b l y w i t h d r e w
their support from the ruling party. M o r e serious w a s the
411

intra-party conflict w h i c h b e t w e e n 1967 and 1971 pulled U N I P

apart. In a manner reminiscent o f K e n y a , former V i c e - P r e s i d e n t
K a p w e p w e i n 1 9 7 1 left t h e p a r t y t o f o r m a n e w o p p o s i t i o n , t h e
United P r o g r e s s i v e Party ( U P P ) w h i c h represented the radical
p o p u l i s t strain o f U N I P ' s early d a y s . A s in K e n y a the n e w
o p p o s i t i o n w a s short-lived. F o l l o w i n g a p e r i o d o f v i o l e n t inter-
party conflict, President K a u n d a in F e b r u a r y 1 9 7 2 b a n n e d the
p a r t y , d e t a i n e d its l e a d e r s , a n d a n n o u n c e d t h e d e c i s i o n t o i n t r o d u c e
a o n e - p a r t y state. T h e o n e - p a r t y c o n s t i t u t i o n w a s p a s s e d in J u l y
1 9 7 3 , a n d t h e first g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n u n d e r t h e n e w s y s t e m f o l l o w e d
i n D e c e m b e r o f t h a t y e a r . T h e l o w p o l l , a v e r a g i n g 39 p e r c e n t ,
and the m a r k e d absence o f p o p u l a r enthusiasm, s u g g e s t e d that
t h e r e w a s i n fact o n l y a m o d e s t s u p p o r t f o r t h e p a r t y w i t h i n t h e
o n e - p a r t y state.
T h e similarities b e t w e e n the K e n y a n and the Z a m b i a n exper
ience are t o o i m p o r t a n t t o b e i g n o r e d . B o t h K e n y a a n d Z a m b i a
b e c a m e i n d e p e n d e n t as t w o - p a r t y s t a t e s , i n w h i c h a d o m i n a n t
ruling party faced a small but v i g o r o u s o p p o s i t i o n that represented
essentially regional but also m i n o r i t y interests. In b o t h , the
dominant party p r o v e d unable to a c c o m m o d a t e the deeply
e n t r e n c h e d v e s t e d i n t e r e s t s i n s o c i e t y , a n d b o t h u s e d e x e c u t i v e fiat
t o c o n t r o l a n d finally e l i m i n a t e p o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t i o n . T h e o n e - p a r t y
state w a s therefore in b o t h cases i m p o s e d u p o n societies charac
terised b y d e e p c l e a v a g e s that had p r o d u c e d a s t r o n g l y factional
system o f politics. U n d e r those circumstances the party w a s unable
t o a c t as a n a g e n t o f i n t e g r a t i o n , r e m a i n i n g i n s t e a d a ' m a c h i n e - l i k e
o r g a n i s a t i o n ' d e p e n d i n g o n material rewards rather than o n
1
political principle to maintain or extend political support. T h e
e x e c u t i v e a s s u m e d a s t r o n g e r a u t h o r i t a r i a n c o n t r o l , w h i l e it
remained responsive to the pressures o f factional n e t w o r k s and
personal alliances that h a d b e e n created in the c o l o n i a l years.
U g a n d a ' s post-colonial experience demonstrated the funda
m e n t a l p r o b l e m o f the n e w state. W h i l e the centralisation o f p o w e r
w a s an essential e l e m e n t in state f o r m a t i o n , the c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f
p o w e r at t h e c e n t r e c a r r i e d w i t h it t h e d a n g e r o f i s o l a t i o n , a n d
the loss o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n centre and locality. T h i s w a s
d e m o n s t r a t e d first b y B u g a n d a , w h i c h r e m a i n e d t h e c e n t r a l
political issue that faced the i n d e p e n d e n t g o v e r n m e n t . M i l t o n
1
H e n r y B i e n e n , ' P o l i t i c a l parties a n d p o l i t i c a l m a c h i n e s in A f r i c a ' , in M i c h a e l
L o f c h i e ( e d . ) , The state of the nations ( B e r k e l e y , 1971).
412

O b o t e , t h e n p r e s i d e n t o f t h e U P C a n d i n d e p e n d e n t U g a n d a ' s first
p r i m e minister, had w o n i n d e p e n d e n c e o n the basis o f an electoral
alliance w i t h B u g a n d a , and a quasi-federal constitution that
c h a l l e n g e d his o w n p r e d i l e c t i o n for a p o w e r f u l unitary g o v e r n
ment. H e had not, h o w e v e r , resolved the u n d e r l y i n g conflict
b e t w e e n B u g a n d a and the rest o f the c o u n t r y o v e r w h o s h o u l d
rule. N o r w a s he able to establish any g e n u i n e links b e t w e e n the
central g o v e r n m e n t and the G a n d a p o p u l a c e , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g
t h e e l e c t i o n o f t h e kabaka i n 1 9 6 3 as U g a n d a ' s first p r e s i d e n t . T h e
L o s t C o u n t i e s r e f e r e n d u m in 1964 m i g h t h a v e d e m o n s t r a t e d
c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t p o w e r , b u t it b r o k e s u c h f r a g i l e s u p p o r t as
existed in B u g a n d a for h e r a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h the U P C . T h e crucial
p r o b l e m for U g a n d a h o w e v e r w a s that o n c e B u g a n d a a c k n o w l
e d g e d her stake in the n e w state, and the n e e d t o influence e v e n t s
from within, the l o g i c o f n u m b e r s g a v e her the crucial p i v o t a l
p o s i t i o n i n t h e s t a t e , b o t h i n its p a r t y a n d its g o v e r n m e n t a l s y s t e m .
B e t w e e n 1963 a n d 1 9 6 6 w h a t w a s at s t a k e w a s less B u g a n d a ' s
f u t u r e t h a n t h a t o f t h e n o n - G a n d a r u l i n g p a r t y , a n d its l e a d e r ,
O b o t e . B u g a n d a r e m a i n e d t h e m o s t s a l i e n t f a c t o r in U g a n d a
p o l i t i c s n o t s i m p l y b e c a u s e it r e f u s e d t o a c c e p t a d i s p e n s a t i o n o f
p o w e r t h a t c h a l l e n g e d its p a s t d o m i n a n c e , b u t b e c a u s e w i t h i n a
d e m o c r a t i c s y s t e m it e n j o y e d a v e r y r e a l c h a n c e o f w i n n i n g
control. N o one had ever g o v e r n e d U g a n d a without Buganda's
s u p p o r t , s o that w h e n in 1966 O b o t e defeated B u g a n d a he d i d s o
only b y using armed force. T h e army thus b e c a m e the crucial
e l e m e n t i n t h e p o l i t i c a l b a l a n c e , its n e w s i g n i f i c a n c e s y m b o l i s e d
b y t h e m a m m o t h a r m y p a r a d e at t h e 1 9 6 6 i n d e p e n d e n c e
celebrations.
B u g a n d a w a s not the only p r o b l e m . T h e early g r o w t h o f
A f r i c a n l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t at d i s t r i c t l e v e l , w h i c h h a d m a d e t h e
district a significant political arena, c o m b i n e d w i t h the l o n g - h e l d
desires o f those districts to catch u p w i t h B u g a n d a , had resulted
i n a s t r o n g l o c a l p o l i t i c a l f o c u s at t h e e x p e n s e o f t h e c e n t r e . T h e r e
w a s m o r e o v e r a c o i n c i d e n c e b e t w e e n district and ethnic identity
w h i c h further s t r e n g t h e n e d l o c a l ties. U g a n d a h a d h a d p e r h a p s
the m o s t decentralised colonial administrative system in East and
Central Africa; and her independence settlement had further
enhanced district a u t o n o m y and g i v e n districts political resources
not usually enjoyed b y local authorities. T h e a u t o n o m y o f the
d i s t r i c t as a p o l i t i c a l b a s e h a d a l s o h a d a n i m p o r t a n t i n f l u e n c e b o t h
4M

o n the d e v e l o p m e n t o f the parties and o n the limited c o n t r o l o f

t h e p a r t y c e n t r e o v e r its b r a n c h e s . T h u s t h e c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t
had found itself unable to control district authorities e v e n w h e r e
they w e r e o f the same party.
I n t h e e a r l y y e a r s after i n d e p e n d e n c e , O b o t e a c h i e v e d a g o o d
deal o f c o n t r o l b y m e d i a t i o n b e t w e e n district a n d centre. I n his
search for a g r e a t e r centralisation o f p o w e r h o w e v e r , his n e w
L o c a l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n A c t o f 1967 d e s t r o y e d n o t o n l y the former
regional administration, but also the n e t w o r k o f links and c h e c k s
and balances that had in the past knit locality and centre together.
T h e c h a n g e contributed a great deal to the circumstances o f the
c o u p in 1 9 7 1 w h e n the a r m y c o m m a n d e r , G e n e r a l A m i n , a s s u m e d
p o w e r . W h i l e the immediate cause o f the c o u p w a s m o s t probably
A m i n ' s fears f o r h i s o w n p e r s o n a l s u r v i v a l , t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t
m a d e it p o s s i b l e r e l a t e d t o t h e e r o s i o n o f O b o t e ' s e a r l i e r d i s t r i c t -
l e v e l s u p p o r t . A l t h o u g h A m i n ' s r e g i m e s u b s e q u e n t l y e m e r g e d as
an aberrant e v e n o f military rule, his a t t e m p t in 1973 t o break
d o w n the existing districts into smaller administrative units
s u g g e s t e d that he w a s n o t u n a w a r e o f the p r o b l e m s o f local
control.
W h i l e the search for m o r e appropriate institutions had indeed
l e d t o a g r e a t a s s e r t i o n o f c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y , it h a d t h e r e f o r e at t h e
s a m e t i m e led the n e w A f r i c a n states a l o n g v e r y different paths.
E a c h o f t h e m h a d i n t h e first d e c a d e o f i n d e p e n d e n c e a s s u m e d a
v e r y different character a n d b y 1975 the r e g i o n e n c o m p a s s e d a
r a n g e o f v a s t l y different e x p e r i m e n t s a n d a c h i e v e m e n t s . T a n z a n i a ' s
socialist e x p e r i m e n t contrasted w i t h U g a n d a ' s tragic decline
under an anarchic military oligarchy. W h i l e K e n y a and M a l a w i
w e r e the m o s t clearly capitalist, K e n y a ' s m e r i t o c r a c y had until
1975 s h o w n a c a p a c i t y t o i n c o r p o r a t e disparate e l e m e n t s o f s o c i e t y
in a w a y that M a l a w i h a d n o t . It w a s m o r e difficult t o identify
a clear pattern u n d e r l y i n g Z a m b i a ' s s o m e t i m e s b e w i l d e r i n g suc
cession o f changes, and Zanzibar continued, notwithstanding
u n i o n w i t h t h e m a i n l a n d , t o h o l d h e r s e l f a l o o f as s h e c o n t i n u e d
h e r r e v o l u t i o n a r y e x p e r i m e n t . N e v e r t h e l e s s it w a s c l e a r b y 1 9 7 5
that, despite the c o m m o n p r o b l e m s o f u n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t they
s h a r e d , e a c h s t a t e w a s m o v i n g a l o n g a d i f f e r e n t p a t h i n its s e a r c h
for d e v e l o p m e n t .
A f t e r its u n i l a t e r a l d e c l a r a t i o n o f i n d e p e n d e n c e i n 1965 t h e
w h i t e m i n o r i t y r e m a i n e d firmly i n c o n t r o l i n R h o d e s i a a l t h o u g h
414

isolated and under increasing external pressure. T h e ruling

R h o d e s i a n F r o n t , u n d e r its P r i m e M i n i s t e r I a n S m i t h , r e m a i n e d
u n i t e d in t h e f a c e o f t r a d e s a n c t i o n s i m p o s e d f r o m w i t h o u t (see
C h a p t e r 3), a n d t h e g o v e r n m e n t s h i e l d e d t h e w h i t e p o p u l a t i o n
f r o m t h e i r h a r m f u l effects. T h e r e w a s at t h e s a m e t i m e a
perceptible trend t o increased w h i t e c o n t r o l a n d fresh discrimi
natory legislation. In M a r c h 1970 Rhodesia became a R e p u b l i c w i t h
a c o n s t i t u t i o n t h a t c e n t r e d all p o l i t i c a l p o w e r i n a l o w e r H o u s e
o f A s s e m b l y i n w h i c h A f r i c a n s h a d o n l y 1 6 o f 66 s e a t s . A f r i c a n
representation w a s linked to contributions to total income-tax
p a y m e n t s w h i c h ensured that parity w a s i m p o s s i b l e in the
foreseeable future. A n e w L a n d T e n u r e A c t in 1969 p e r m a n e n t l y
d i v i d e d t h e l a n d i n t o t w o e q u a l p o r t i o n s , 45 m i l l i o n a c r e s f o r five
m i l l i o n A f r i c a n s a n d 45 m i l l i o n a c r e s f o r f e w e r t h a n 2 5 0 0 0 0
E u r o p e a n s , and introduced a rigid formula that precluded any
future significant transfer o f E u r o p e a n lands to A f r i c a n use o r
ownership. R e v e n u e allocations to social services for Africans
were decreased. T h e majority o f African nationalist leaders w e r e
in d e t e n t i o n , r e s t r i c t i o n o r e x i l e , a n d s e c u r i t y l e g i s l a t i o n e n s u r e d
c o n t r o l o f a n y dissident political a c t i v i t y . A f r i c a n politicians in
e x i l e , t h e m s e l v e s still d i v i d e d , w e r e u n a b l e t o t u r n e i t h e r o f t h e i r
national organisations, the Z i m b a b w e A f r i c a n P e o p l e ' s U n i o n
( Z A P U ) o r the Z i m b a b w e A f r i c a n N a t i o n a l U n i o n ( Z A N U ) into
an effective liberation m o v e m e n t o r t o establish a joint military
c o m m a n d , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the p r o d d i n g s f r o m the O r g a n i s a t i o n
o f A f r i c a n U n i t y ' s L i b e r a t i o n C o m m i t t e e in D a r es S a l a a m .
A l t h o u g h t h e first r e p o r t e d g u e r r i l l a a t t a c k t o o k p l a c e i n A p r i l
1966, A f r i c a n guerrilla action had b e e n n o m o r e successful than
British negotiations up to 1 9 7 1 .
B e g i n n i n g in 1 9 7 2 , h o w e v e r , c e r t a i n c r i t i c a l c h a n g e s o c c u r r e d
w h i c h d i r e c t l y affected t h e i n t e r n a l s i t u a t i o n i n R h o d e s i a a n d l e d ,
by 1975, to a fundamental w e a k e n i n g o f the R h o d e s i a n r e g i m e .
First, A f r i c a n s in R h o d e s i a o v e r w h e l m i n g l y rejected p r o p o s a l s for
a constitutional settlement agreed b e t w e e n the British and
R h o d e s i a n g o v e r n m e n t s in 1 9 7 1 , w h e n t h e y w e r e g i v e n the
o p p o r t u n i t y to v o i c e their o p i n i o n to the Pearce C o m m i s s i o n that
v i s i t e d t h e c o u n t r y at t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e y e a r . T h i s m a d e a
constitutional settlement unlikely in the near future. S e c o n d , the
A f r i c a n N a t i o n a l C o n g r e s s ( A N C ) f o r m e d in R h o d e s i a in
D e c e m b e r 1971 under the leadership o f B i s h o p A b e l M u z o r e w a
415

to o p p o s e the settlement, n o w p r o v i d e d an o r g a n w i t h i n the

c o u n t r y t o articulate A f r i c a n o p i n i o n . It therefore s t o o d as the
o n l y effective o p p o s i t i o n w i t h i n the c o u n t r y . A s the e c o n o m i c
situation b e c a m e m o r e difficult d u r i n g 1 9 7 2 - 3 , s o a d i a l o g u e
b e t w e e n the R h o d e s i a n F r o n t and A N C s l o w l y t o o k shape, in
w h i c h the latter d e m a n d e d substantial c h a n g e s t o the 1 9 7 1
p r o p o s a l s as a b a s i s f o r a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s e t t l e m e n t . T h i r d , a n e w
p h a s e b e g a n in the a r m e d s t r u g g l e , as Z A N U , in particular, t o o k
the lead o n the north-eastern frontier, and inside the c o u n t r y the
rural p o p u l a t i o n n o w p r o v e d m u c h m o r e w i l l i n g t o g i v e support.
T h e Rhodesian response w a s to extend military service obligations
and to institute collective p u n i s h m e n t s o n villages b e l i e v e d to
h a v e h a r b o u r e d guerrillas. Finally, the m o s t critical c h a n g e w a s
the consequence o f the P o r t u g u e s e c o u p in 1974, and the
subsequent decision to grant independence to the P o r t u g u e s e
A f r i c a n territories. T h i s f u n d a m e n t a l l y c h a n g e d the situation in
southern Africa, and led directly t o the attempts initiated w i t h i n
t h e r e g i o n b y t h e e n d o f t h a t y e a r t o find a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
s e t t l e m e n t . I t l e d at t h e e n d o f 1 9 7 4 t o t h e d r a m a t i c c h a n g e s
c l i m a x e d in the m e e t i n g in L u s a k a , u n d e r the g u i d a n c e o f the
l e a d e r s o f t h e F r o n t L i n e s t a t e s , o f all t h e R h o d e s i a n n a t i o n a l i s t
leaders, released b y S m i t h f r o m detention t o seek the b e g i n n i n g s
at l e a s t o f a s e t t l e m e n t , n e g o t i a t e d n o t b y B r i t a i n a n d S m i t h , b u t
b y S o u t h A f r i c a a n d K a u n d a as t h e n e w b r o k e r s . I t w a s n o t ,
h o w e v e r , u n t i l 1 9 8 0 , five y e a r s a f t e r t h e e n d o f o u r p e r i o d , a n d
after a bitter g u e r r i l l a w a r , that R h o d e s i a w a s c o n v e r t e d i n t o an
A f r i c a n - r u l e d s t a t e as Z i m b a b w e .
E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T
There was a remarkable continuity o f economic policy between

c o l o n i a l a n d p o s t - c o l o n i a l states, s o that i n d e p e n d e n c e w a s less
t h e w a t e r s h e d f o r e c o n o m i c t h a n it w a s f o r p o l i t i c a l c h a n g e . T h e
30 y e a r s a f t e r t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r a r e p e r h a p s b e t t e r v i e w e d
in terms o f three short, successive phases in e c o n o m i c c h a n g e ,
each m e r g i n g into the other, each revealing m o r e clearly than
before the fundamental constraints u p o n d e v e l o p m e n t .
T h e first p h a s e e m b r a c e d t h e y e a r s f r o m t h e e n d o f t h e S e c o n d
W o r l d W a r to the mid-1950s, during w h i c h time the colonial
e c o n o m i c policies and practices that w o u l d h a v e such long-term
416

influence u p o n the r e g i o n w e r e laid d o w n . T h e C o l o n i a l D e v e l

o p m e n t a n d W e l f a r e A c t o f 1940 h a d g i v e n n o t i c e o f B r i t a i n ' s
commitment to a more positive programme o f economic devel
o p m e n t , and from the end o f the w a r she e m b a r k e d u p o n v i g o r o u s
state a c t i o n t o p r o m o t e c o l o n i a l w e l f a r e a n d e c o n o m i c i m p r o v e
ment. M u c h m o r e significant w a s the c o m m o d i t y b o o m and the
i n c r e a s e d p r i c e s f o r m a n y c a s h c r o p s t h a t o c c u r r e d b e t w e e n 1949
a n d 1953, a n d w h i c h p r o d u c e d a s i g n i f i c a n t c h a n g e i n t h e t e r m s
o f trade. E v e n if Britain's objective w a s metropolitan reconstruc
t i o n as m u c h as c o l o n i a l p r o g r e s s , t h e y e a r s a f t e r 1945 w e r e
u n d o u b t e d l y y e a r s o f l o c a l e x p a n s i o n . A w o r d o f c a u t i o n is
necessary here: for m a n y Africans the benefits o f the w o r l d
c o m m o d i t y b o o m w e r e not o b v i o u s . T h e legacies o f w a r -
inflation, u r b a n c r o w d i n g , shortages o f c o n s u m e r g o o d s , agricul
t u r a l r e s t r i c t i o n s — p e r s i s t e d i n t o t h e e a r l y 1950s a n d p r o v i d e d t h e
resentment that w a s channelled into the organisation o f trade
unions, cooperative societies, and nationalist m o v e m e n t s .
T h e s e c o n d p h a s e , w h i c h c o v e r e d t h e d e c a d e f r o m 1955, w a s
also characterised b y g r o w t h , but o f a m o r e erratic kind, so that
e c o n o m i c p r o g r e s s w a s a g o o d deal less stable. C o m m o d i t y prices
v a r i e d a g o o d d e a l , after a s h a r p fall f r o m t h e b o o m y e a r s , a n d
that fluctuation, a l o n g w i t h the v a g a r i e s o f rainfall a n d the
uncertainties o f political c h a n g e , p r o d u c e d a m o r e s o m b r e m o o d
o f financial s t r i n g e n c y at i n d e p e n d e n c e . U n e m p l o y m e n t b e c a m e
a s i g n i f i c a n t i s s u e . N e v e r t h e l e s s b y a n y g e n e r a l l y u s e d c r i t e r i a , all
t h e s e states h a d a c h i e v e d s u b s t a n t i a l g r o w t h s i n c e 1945. N e w
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e s h a d b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d a c r o s s t h e r e g i o n as a w h o l e .
T h e O w e n Falls D a m in U g a n d a a n d the K a r i b a D a m o n the
borders o f Rhodesia and Z a m b i a had o p e n e d u p n e w possibilities
for d e v e l o p m e n t . E a c h n e w state inherited a b u d g e t a g o o d deal
l a r g e r t h a n its c o l o n i a l p r e d e c e s s o r h a d e n j o y e d 15 y e a r s e a r l i e r ,
a n d t h e y e a r s i m m e d i a t e l y after i n d e p e n d e n c e w e r e y e a r s o f
continuing g r o w t h and the expansion o f social services.
A s t h e 1960s g a v e w a y t o t h e 1970s, h o w e v e r , u n e m p l o y m e n t
and a s l a c k e n i n g rate o f g r o w t h e m p h a s i s e d the limitations o f
earlier a c h i e v e m e n t s . H e n c e a n e w phase b e g a n , characterised b y
a n i n c r e a s i n g c o n c e r n at t h e p r o b l e m s o f g r o w t h w i t h o u t
c o r r e s p o n d i n g d e v e l o p m e n t . T w o e v e n t s i n 1967 h i g h l i g h t e d t h e
c h a n g i n g situation. First, T o m M b o y a , then K e n y a ' s Minister for
E c o n o m i c P l a n n i n g and D e v e l o p m e n t , u r g e d u p o n the E c o n o m i c
4i7

C o m m i s s i o n for Africa the necessity o f a Marshall Plan for A f r i c a ;

a n d i f t h e r e w a s a l r e a d y s t r o n g d i s a g r e e m e n t as t o t h e r o l e o f
foreign capital in the d e v e l o p m e n t p r o c e s s , there w a s n o dis
a g r e e m e n t as t o h i s d i a g n o s i s o f A f r i c a ' s i l l s : u n e m p l o y m e n t , l o w
productivity, inequality, export-oriented economies, dependence
u p o n w o r l d m a r k e t s a n d fluctuating p r i c e s , i n s u f f i c i e n t c a p i t a l a n d
inadequate resources o f skilled m a n p o w e r . S e c o n d , the A r u s h a
D e c l a r a t i o n g a v e n o t i c e o f a radical c h a n g e o f strategy in T a n z a n i a
to socialism and self-reliance and thus p r o v i d e d the starting p o i n t
for a n e w d e b a t e a b o u t the n a t u r e o f d e v e l o p m e n t in A f r i c a .
The colonialyears: the search for increased productivity

W i t h these c h a n g e s in m i n d , w e m a y turn to the c o l o n i a l years
w h e n the d o m i n a n t t h e m e o f p o s t - w a r p o l i c y w a s increased
productivity. T h i s required the transformation o f the African
subsistence e c o n o m y and the extension o f cash-crop agriculture;
and if the emphasis w a s u p o n cash crops for e x p o r t there w a s also
a c o n c e r n for self-sufficiency in f o o d . Increased p r o d u c t i v i t y w a s
also believed to require the application o f E u r o p e a n capital and
e x p e r t i s e , a n d E u r o p e a n s w e r e a c c o r d e d a c r i t i c a l r o l e as a g e n t s
o f d e v e l o p m e n t , w h e t h e r in the g u i s e o f a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , settlers,
planters or investors.
Certain assumptions underlying the general c o m m i t m e n t to
e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t n e e d t o b e b o r n e in m i n d , for t h e y
u n d e r l i n e t h e n a t u r e o f t h e s t r a t e g i e s a d o p t e d . T h e first c o n c e r n e d
the obstacles to be o v e r c o m e . W h i l e nationalist leaders a s s u m e d
that their countries' b a c k w a r d n e s s w a s the direct p r o d u c t o f
c o l o n i a l e x p l o i t a t i o n , c o l o n i a l officials at h o m e a n d a b r o a d s a w
it as r o o t e d i n t h e A f r i c a n c o n d i t i o n . D e v e l o p m e n t s t r a t e g i e s w e r e
based o n the a s s u m p t i o n that w e s t e r n skills and technical
k n o w l e d g e w o u l d gradually be transferred to the i n d i g e n o u s
p e o p l e s . W h e r e a s this e n c o u r a g e d the C o l o n i a l Office t o s u p p o r t
a p o s i t i v e e x p a n s i o n o f s o c i a l r e s e a r c h , it a l s o p r o d u c e d a m u c h
m o r e d i r e c t i n t r u s i o n o f c o l o n i a l officials i n t o A f r i c a n life. I f t h e
main contrast w i t h pre-war days w a s the availability o f funds for
e c o n o m i c development, m u c h greater demands were also made
u p o n t h e A f r i c a n p e o p l e b y g o v e r n m e n t s t h a t set o u t t o t u r n
African cultivators into cash-crop farmers.
T h e s e c o n d assumption c o n c e r n e d capital. T h e need for large-
scale capital i n v e s t m e n t w a s a c c e p t e d , and the s o m e w h a t ill-fated
418

Overseas F o o d C o r p o r a t i o n and the m o r e successful C o m m o n

wealth D e v e l o p m e n t Corporation were both evidence o f the
L a b o u r g o v e r n m e n t ' s faith in t h e p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n as a n
instrument o f development. A t the same time, successive British
g o v e r n m e n t s a c k n o w l e d g e d that m u c h o f the necessary capital
s h o u l d c o m e f r o m p r i v a t e i n v e s t m e n t , a n d that this m u s t p l a y a
major role in the necessary diversification o f the colonial e c o n o
mies. W h i l e there m i g h t be s o m e debate about the m e a n i n g o f
socialism in the colonies, colonial strategy w a s nonetheless seen
to require a m a n a g e d e c o n o m y in w h i c h g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d
c o n t r o l p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e w i t h o u t d i s c o u r a g i n g it. D e v e l o p m e n t
thus assumed the extension o f the capitalist m o d e o f p r o d u c t i o n ,
1
and the encouragement o f the entrepreneur.
W e must also bear in m i n d the extent to w h i c h d e v e l o p m e n t
w a s v i e w e d as a l o c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . W h i l e t h e C o l o n i a l O f f i c e l a i d
d o w n t h e b r o a d l i n e s o f p o l i c y , it a s s u m e d t h a t t h e i n i t i a t i v e a n d
t h e financial r e s p o n s i b i l i t y r e m a i n e d w i t h t h e m a n o n t h e s p o t .
Ultimately, therefore, and notwithstanding n e w c o m m i t m e n t s to
c o l o n i a l a i d , a t e r r i t o r y c o u l d a d v a n c e o n l y a s far as its o w n
r e s o u r c e s ( i n c l u d i n g its a b i l i t y t o a t t r a c t c a p i t a l f r o m a b r o a d )
allowed. T h e strategies a d o p t e d therefore varied a g o o d deal from
o n e territory t o the n e x t , as d i d the level o f a c h i e v e m e n t . S i n c e
the m o s t striking contrasts w e r e b e t w e e n those territories w i t h
s e t t l e r s a n d t h o s e w i t h o u t , it is i m p o r t a n t t o b e a r i n m i n d t h e
relative sizes o f the n o n - A f r i c a n c o m m u n i t i e s across the r e g i o n .
T h e post-war commitment to African economic advancement
i n v o l v e d n o alteration in either the existing pattern o f peasant,
settler a n d plantation e c o n o m y , o r in t h e racial basis o f land
o w n e r s h i p o n w h i c h they w e r e based. In U g a n d a the peasant
r e m a i n e d i n t h e official m i n d t h e p r i m a r y a g e n t o f d e v e l o p m e n t .
T a n z a n i a maintained the s a m e a m b i g u o u s m i x o f peasant, settler
and planter that h a d e v o l v e d before the w a r , a l t h o u g h the
trusteeship system ensured a close w a t c h o n any further alienation
o f land. B u t the d o m i n a n t p o s i t i o n o f w h i t e settlers in K e n y a a n d
the t w o R h o d e s i a s , a n d the British acquiescence in federation,
i n d i c a t e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e a t t a c h e d t o E u r o p e a n s as t h e a g e n t s o f
g r o w t h . Soldier settlements w e r e an important item in p o s t - w a r
1
A n i m p o r t a n t s t u d y i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f c o r p o r a t e c a p i t a l i s m i n K e n y a a n d its
r o l e i n t h e p r o c e s s o f e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t p u b l i s h e d after t h i s c h a p t e r h a d b e e n
c o m p l e t e d is N i c o l a S w a i n s o n , The development of corporate capitalism in Kenya, ipif-ip??
( L o n d o n , 1980).
419

agricultural b u d g e t s , and the further d e v e l o p m e n t o f large farms

and plantations remained a central feature o f agricultural p o l i c y
i n all t h r e e t e r r i t o r i e s u p t o i 9 6 0 .
E u r o p e a n a g r i c u l t u r e in fact m a d e a significant c o n t r i b u t i o n t o
p r o d u c t i o n in those territories t h r o u g h o u t the 1950s, a l t h o u g h the
p l a n t a t i o n s e c t o r p r o v e d less v u l n e r a b l e in K e n y a t h a n the
settlers' farms t o b o t h e c o n o m i c and political crises. M o r e critical
i n t e r m s o f its i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r l o n g - t e r m d e v e l o p m e n t w a s t h e
privileged position o f the E u r o p e a n farming c o m m u n i t y that
m a d e this success p o s s i b l e . T h e E u r o p e a n m o n o p o l i s t p o s i t i o n in
regard to land, agricultural inputs and the p r o d u c t i o n o f k e y cash
crops i m p o s e d severe limitations u p o n the g r o w t h o f African
a g r i c u l t u r e , as w e l l as u p o n t h e p r o s p e c t s f o r b a l a n c e d r e g i o n a l
g r o w t h . T h e m o s t e x t r e m e f o r m o f settler p r i v i l e g e applied o f
c o u r s e i n S o u t h e r n R h o d e s i a , b u t g e n e r a l l y , i n all t h e t e r r i t o r i e s
i n v o l v e d , it w a s t h e A f r i c a n p e a s a n t f a r m e r w h o p a i d f o r t h e
E u r o p e a n settler farmer's success.
E u r o p e a n agriculture w a s thus a critical constraint u p o n
African agricultural d e v e l o p m e n t in these years. K e n y a n Africans
d e m o n s t r a t e d in d u e c o u r s e , h o w e v e r , that this constraint c o u l d
be o v e r c o m e . M o r e serious w a s the m a n n e r in w h i c h E u r o p e a n
c o n t r o l o v e r l a r g e land areas c o n t r i b u t e d , f r o m the late 1940s, t o
t h e d e t e r i o r a t i o n o f A f r i c a n l a n d s . B y 195 5 t h e E a s t A f r i c a n R o y a l
C o m m i s s i o n , w a r n i n g o f the dangers o f inaction in the face o f
serious pressures u p o n the land, u r g e d the abolition not o n l y o f
racial b u t also o f e t h n i c barriers t o land o w n e r s h i p a n d land u s a g e .
P o l i t i c a l e v e n t s o v e r t o o k its r e p o r t , b u t w h e n t h e w h i t e h i g h l a n d s
w e r e o p e n e d u p t o A f r i c a n o w n e r s h i p in K e n y a , the difficulties
o f m o v e m e n t a c r o s s t r i b a l b o u n d a r i e s r e m a i n e d . W h i l e it w a s
c o m p a r a t i v e l y s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d t o transfer land f r o m w h i t e t o
b l a c k , it w a s m o r e d i f f i c u l t t o o v e r c o m e t h e s e r i o u s r e g i o n a l
imbalance o f development to w h i c h European settlement had
c o n t r i b u t e d s o m u c h . O n e result, b y n o m e a n s the least i m p o r t a n t ,
w a s an enhanced sense o f regional consciousness a m o n g Africans
determined to protect their o w n lands.
A n o t h e r equally important legacy o f the E u r o p e a n sector w a s
its i n f l u e n c e u p o n p r e v a i l i n g i d e a s a b o u t a g r i c u l t u r e itself. I n
Z a m b i a , the c o m m e r c i a l farmers and the federal M i n i s t r y o f
A g r i c u l t u r e (responsible for E u r o p e a n agriculture in Z a m b i a for
the federal d e c a d e ) created a set o f attitudes that ten y e a r s after
420

i n d e p e n d e n c e still l e d officials t o d e f i n e * t r a d i t i o n a l ' a n d * m o d e r n '

farming in terms o f the patterns o f usage that h a d b e e n laid d o w n
for the E u r o p e a n sector. M u c h m o r e w i d e l y debated w a s K e n y a ' s
belief in the importance o f large-scale farming. T h e so-called
' m y t h o f the large-scale f a r m s ' b o t h o b s c u r e d t h e settler d e p e n
dence u p o n m o n o p o l y a n d f o r m s o f state assistance, a n d sustained
the large-scale farms w h o s e e c o n o m i c size h a d b e e n questioned
s i n c e t h e T r o u p R e p o r t o f 195 3. W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e t r a n s f e r i n t a c t
o f large-scale farms t o individual African o w n e r s w a s the k e y t o
the i n d e p e n d e n c e settlement, large-scale f a r m i n g remained as a
critical a n d h i g h l y controversial c o m p o n e n t o f i n d e p e n d e n t
1
K e n y a ' s agricultural strategy.
T h e transformation o f the African subsistence e c o n o m y a n d the
development o f modern African agriculture were ultimately
h o w e v e r the m o r e significant thrusts o f the colonial period. I f the
objective w a s the increased p r o d u c t i o n o f export crops, there w a s
a l s o a s e n s e o f u r g e n c y t o t a k e a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e effects o f
inadequate husbandry a n d soil erosion. T h i s p r o d u c e d the c o m
pulsory conservation measures in b o t h agricultural and pastoral
areas that w e r e t o p r o v i d e a p o w e r f u l issue f o r nationalist
politicians. T h e r e w a s in addition, h o w e v e r , a p o s i t i v e emphasis
u p o n t h e e x p a n s i o n o f a g r i c u l t u r e itself. T h e c o n f e r e n c e o n
A f r i c a n land tenure in E a s t a n d C e n t r a l A f r i c a held at A r u s h a in
1956 h i g h l i g h t e d the basic assumption that increased p r o d u c t i v i t y
o f the land w o u l d follow land reform a n d the introduction o f
individual land tenure. T h e strategies adopted for i m p r o v e d
agriculture generally assumed the advantages o f individual o w n e r
ship, b u t in fact there w a s little u n i f o r m i t y o f p o l i c y , a n d o n l y
K e n y a set o u t w i t h r e m a r k a b l e c o n v i c t i o n a n d a g o o d deal o f
c o m p u l s i o n t o i m p l e m e n t it.
T h e agents o f change were the agricultural and the c o m m u n i t y
d e v e l o p m e n t officers, a l t h o u g h t h e p r o v i n c i a l administration in
each country generally assumed that the responsibility ultimately
r e s t e d w i t h itself. T h e s t r a t e g i e s i n v o l v e d a v a r i e t y o f i n c e n t i v e s
as w e l l a s t e c h n i c a l a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e s d i r e c t e d a t t u r n i n g t h e
1
C o l i n L e y s , i n Underdevelopment in Kenya: the political economy of mo-colonialism
( L o n d o n , 1974), 3 7 - 9 , a r g u e d t h a t t h e e c o n o m i c s e t t l e m e n t i n 1963 w h i c h p r o v i d e d
a protected position for foreign capital in independent K e n y a w a s possible largely
because o f a g r e e m e n t b y the British t o transfer the former E u r o p e a n lands t o African
o w n e r s h i p o n the terms the African leadership wanted, and w h i c h ensured that m i x e d
farms w e r e available t o African o w n e r s o n easy terms.
421

cultivator into a cash-crop farmer. I m p r o v e d farming schemes had

a place in e v e r y territorial b u d g e t , and there w e r e s o m e notable
showcase experiments. T h e Sukumaland ten-year d e v e l o p m e n t
p r o g r a m m e in w e s t e r n T a n z a n i a , t h e first o f its t y p e a n d s c a l e i n
p o s t - w a r t r o p i c a l A f r i c a , s p e n t a p p r o x i m a t e l y £2 m i l l i o n in a
coordinated p r o g r a m m e to maximise agricultural and veterinary
d e v e l o p m e n t t h r o u g h careful land usage, livestock c o n t r o l and
i m p r o v e d a g r i c u l t u r a l m e t h o d s . It e n g a g e d N a t i v e A u t h o r i t y as
w e l l as p r o v i n c i a l a n d d e p a r t m e n t a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n a j o i n t
effort. I n T a n z a n i a , m o r e o v e r , t h e C h a g a f a r m e r s o n M t K i l i
manjaro had l o n g since d e m o n s t r a t e d their ability to g r o w coffee,
so that b y 1961 the greater part o f the c o u n t r y ' s coffee c r o p w a s
p r o d u c e d b y 1 2 0 0 0 0 coffee f a r m e r s t y p i c a l l y o n less t h a n a n a c r e
each.
U g a n d a s t o o d o u t as t h e c l a s s i c p e a s a n t e c o n o m y , s u s t a i n e d b y
p e a s a n t - g r o w n coffee a n d c o t t o n . I n 1 9 4 6 , t h e W o r t h i n g t o n P l a n ,
in a n effort at l o n g - t e r m a n d c o m p r e h e n s i v e p l a n n i n g , a i m e d at
a v i g o r o u s e x p a n s i o n o f African cash-crop p r o d u c t i o n for the
export market b o t h o f existing and also o f n e w crops. U g a n d a ' s
coffee a n d c o t t o n f a r m e r s r e s p o n d e d i n t h e late 1940s t o t h e
d r a m a t i c rise i n c o m m o d i t y p r i c e s , as t h e p h e n o m e n a l e x p a n s i o n
d e m o n s t r a t e d . C o t t o n p r o d u c t i o n increased f r o m 264000 bales in
1945 t o 3 7 8 6 0 0 in 1 9 5 2 , a n d coffee f r o m 20000 t o 3 7 0 0 0 t o n s . T h e
v a l u e o f t h e t w o c a s h c r o p s r o s e f r o m £ 9 93 8 000 t o £ 4 7 7 0 4 0 0 0 .
U g a n d a ' s p h e n o m e n a l g r o w t h b e t w e e n 1945 a n d 1955 w a s
u n a m b i g u o u s l y based u p o n African peasant initiative and
production.
Y e t it w a s i n K e n y a , i n t h e 1 9 5 0 s , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g s e t t l e r
p r i v i l e g e s , t h a t A f r i c a n a g r i c u l t u r e a c h i e v e d its m o s t s i g n i f i c a n t
a d v a n c e s in terms n o t o n l y o f increased p r o d u c t i o n b u t also o f
i m p r o v e d agricultural practice. T h e gross value o f produce
m a r k e t e d b y A f r i c a n farmers rose f r o m £3.2 million in 1951 to
£ 1 1 . 6 million in 1963. W h e r e a s f e w Africans had d e r i v e d an
i n c o m e f r o m tea, r i c e , coffee o r p y r e t h r u m i n 1 9 5 0 , i n 1 9 6 2 m o r e
t h a n £4 m i l l i o n w e n t t o A f r i c a n s g r o w i n g t h e s e c r o p s . T h e
K i p s i g i s set t h i s p r o c e s s i n m o t i o n , h a v i n g b y 1 9 5 3 o n t h e i r o w n
v o l i t i o n c o n s o l i d a t e d their beautiful hills and b e g u n t o g r o w
p y r e t h r u m ; b u t t h e K i k u y u s w i f t l y o v e r t o o k t h e m a n d it w a s t h e
imperatives o f the e m e r g e n c y and the enforced agricultural
c h a n g e in C e n t r a l P r o v i n c e u n d e r the S w y n n e r t o n P l a n that
p r o d u c e d the m o s t fundamental change.
422

S w y n n e r t o n set o u t in 1953 t o accelerate A f r i c a n agricultural

d e v e l o p m e n t o n existing a c r e a g e s b y a c o n c e n t r a t e d p r o g r a m m e
o f land reform a n d i m p r o v e d (and enforced) agricultural practice,
and in the p r o c e s s t o p r o d u c e an A f r i c a n m i d d l e class. C o n s o l i
dation, registration and individual land tenure, and the expansion
o f research, extension services and marketing, w e r e part o f a
c o h e r e n t p r o g r a m m e o f e c o n o m i c r e f o r m d e s i g n e d n o t l e a s t as a n
e c o n o m i c a n s w e r t o the political pressures that p r o d u c e d the
e m e r g e n c y . T h e relationship b e t w e e n land tenure a n d increased
agricultural production w a s b y n o means p r o v e n and w o u l d be
a source o f debate for m a n y years. B u t the S w y n n e r t o n Plan w a s
a l a n d m a r k in African agricultural d e v e l o p m e n t , w h i c h e p i t o m i s e d
the o b j e c t i v e s o f agricultural p o l i c y o v e r the r e g i o n as a w h o l e :
the d e v e l o p m e n t o f A f r i c a n c a s h - c r o p agriculture o n t h e basis o f
the individual peasant farmer integrated into the m a r k e t e c o n o m y .
W h e t h e r the p r o g r a m m e w a s designed for ' p r o g r e s s i v e ' o r
' i m p r o v e d ' o r ' b e t t e r ' farmers, its o b j e c t i v e w a s s u m m e d u p f o r
M a l a w i b y the Jack R e p o r t in 1 9 5 8 : ' T h e ultimate a i m in
agriculture should be the evolution o f the farmer w h o o w n s and
M
w o r k s his o w n e c o n o m i c h o l d i n g . . . T h e Kenyans would have
added that he s h o u l d e m p l o y his o w n farm labour.
T h i s strategy p r o d u c e d a great m a n y African peasant farmers
w h o s e level o f p r o d u c t i o n and w h o s e material standard o f living
w a s v i s i b l y b e t t e r t h a n it h a d b e e n i n t h e p a s t . I n K e n y a t h e 1 9 5 0 s
w e r e a p e r i o d o f t r e m e n d o u s d e v e l o p m e n t o f A f r i c a n as w e l l as
E u r o p e a n farming, w h i c h w a s sustained w e l l into the 1960s, o n c e
the initial difficulties o f t h e land-transfer p r o g r a m m e h a d b e e n
o v e r c o m e . Indeed K e n y a ' s stronger agricultural cash e c o n o m y ,
as c o m p a r e d w i t h t h e o t h e r c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n , w a s b a s e d
m o r e o n African potential than E u r o p e a n past achievements.
It is n e v e r t h e l e s s d o u b t f u l w h e t h e r t h i s i m p r e s s i v e a g r i c u l t u r a l
d e v e l o p m e n t c o n s t i t u t e d a r e v o l u t i o n , e v e n i n K e n y a , f o r it
i n v o l v e d o n l y a minority o f the total population. M o r e o v e r ,
a l t h o u g h there h a d b e e n a dramatic e x p a n s i o n o f p r o d u c t i o n , it
had for the m o s t part been the result o f the e x p a n s i o n o f the
acreages under cultivation rather than o f structural o r techno
l o g i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t . O u t s i d e K e n y a it is a l s o d o u b t f u l h o w m u c h
i m p r o v e m e n t o f agricultural practice actually resulted from the
' I m p r o v e d Farmers' schemes. T h e great majority o f Africans in
1
Report on an economic survey of Nyasa/and ipjS-ipjp (Federation o f Rhodesia and
N y a s a l a n d , S a l i s b u r y , 1959), 4 4 .
423

e a c h t e r r i t o r y w e r e still i n t h e e a r l y 1 9 6 0 s s u b s i s t e n c e c u l t i v a t o r s
w h o s e main i m p l e m e n t w a s the h o e . T h e y w e r e in, but o n the
m a r g i n s of, t h e n e w e c o n o m y . M o r e o v e r t h e s t e a d y e x p a n s i o n o f
acreage u n d e r cultivation in the face o f g r o w i n g p o p u l a t i o n s
p o s e d critical, u n r e s o l v e d questions a b o u t the future relationship
o f land and people.
T h i s w a s the m o r e d i s q u i e t i n g in v i e w o f the limited industrial
d e v e l o p m e n t that had occurred o v e r these years. A l t h o u g h the
colonial administrator tended to be suspicious o f c o m m e r c e and
industry, fearing the social consequences for the A f r i c a n p o p u
l a t i o n s , h e a c k n o w l e d g e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n as a
m e a n s t o d e v e l o p m e n t . It w a s a s s u m e d that the i m p e t u s for
c h a n g e m u s t c o m e f r o m outside and that external b o r r o w i n g in
o n e f o r m o r another w a s essential. W i t h o n e e x c e p t i o n , industrial
d e v e l o p m e n t w a s left t o t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r .
T h e exception w a s U g a n d a w h e r e , in the post-war years,
G o v e r n o r Sir J o h n Hall e m b a r k e d u p o n a strategy o f industri
alisation that p r o d u c e d a g r o u p o f large-scale industrial projects
c e n t r e d a r o u n d t h e h y d r o e l e c t r i c i n s t a l l a t i o n at Jinja. T h e O w e n
Falls D a m w a s c o m p l e t e d in 1 9 5 6 , b u t the results o f H a l l ' s
p r o p o s a l s , d e s c r i b e d as o f * a m u c h w i d e r s c o p e t h a n t h e l i m i t e d
p r o g r a m m e s o f g o v e r n m e n t capital s p e n d i n g w h i c h f o r m e d the
1
basis o f m o s t o f the c o l o n i a l d e v e l o p m e n t plans o f the p e r i o d ' ,
w e r e less i m p r e s s i v e t h a n e x p e c t e d . W h i l e the U g a n d a D e v e l o p
m e n t C o r p o r a t i o n , f o r m e d i n 195 2, s t o o d o u t as a u n i q u e e x a m p l e
o f s t a t e p r o m o t i o n o f i n d u s t r i a l d e v e l o p m e n t , it h a d l i m i t e d
s u c c e s s i n a t t r a c t i n g f o r e i g n finance a n d e n t e r p r i s e . U g a n d a d i d
better perhaps in the l o n g run w i t h her o w n A s i a n entrepreneurs.
Indeed, concentration o n an external impetus for industrialis
a t i o n r e f l e c t e d a n official i n d i f f e r e n c e o r h o s t i l i t y t o A s i a n e n t r e
preneurs, the o n l y appreciable local source o f v e n t u r e capital.
Nonetheless, A s i a n expansion into import-substitution industries
p r o c e e d e d apace in the 1950s and 1960s; capital w a s increasingly
raised b y inter-family alliances, often o n an interterritorial basis.
In practice this m e a n t a g r o w i n g penetration o f U g a n d a n and
K e n y a n A s i a n capital into T a n g a n y i k a .
In K e n y a and the Central African federation, h o w e v e r , w h e r e
g o v e r n m e n t s s a w t h e i r r o l e as p r i m a r i l y t h a t o f p r o v i d i n g
1
D . A . L u r y , ' D a y s p r i n g m i s h a n d l e d ? T h e U g a n d a e c o n o m y , 1945-1960', in
D . A . L o w a n d A l i s o n S m i t h ( e d s . ) , History of East Africa, v o l . I l l ( O x f o r d , 1976), 236.
424

e n c o u r a g e m e n t and inducements to private enterprise, significant

industrial e x p a n s i o n t o o k place. I n K e n y a b y 1955 the industrial
contribution to G D P almost equalled that o f commercial agricul-
ture and b y independence she had a nucleus o f small industry and
an established c o m m e r c i a l sector. T h e Central A f r i c a n federation
had also b y 1973 achieved an impressive g r o w t h o f industry,
m a n u f a c t u r i n g o u t p u t h a v i n g risen in v a l u e f r o m £ 2 6 . 9 million
i n 1 9 5 4 t o £ 6 5 . 4 m i l l i o n , a n d its s h a r e o f G D P f r o m 8.1 p e r c e n t
t o 1 1 . 7 p e r cent. B y the early 1960s there w a s a significant
industrial base o n w h i c h future d e v e l o p m e n t c o u l d rest. T h a t base
w a s , h o w e v e r , for the m o s t part located in S o u t h e r n R h o d e s i a .
Z a m b i a ' s considerable e c o n o m i c development o v e r the same
period w a s distinctive, based o n a c o p p e r industry that had g i v e n
h e r o n e o f t h e fastest g r o w i n g e c o n o m i e s i n t h e w o r l d .
K e n y a and Southern Rhodesia enjoyed certain important
a d v a n t a g e s d e r i v e d f r o m their strategic p o s i t i o n , e a c h at the c e n t r e
o f a g r o w i n g e c o n o m i c r e g i o n . T h e i r critical a d v a n t a g e h o w e v e r
w a s their ability to attract capital f r o m abroad. B e t w e e n 1950 and
1958, capital i n v e s t m e n t in K e n y a w a s just o v e r ¿ 3 0 0 million, o f
w h i c h 62 p e r c e n t w a s f r o m t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r . I n t h e f e d e r a t i o n ,
o v e r t h e d e c a d e o f its e x i s t e n c e , o f a t o t a l g r o s s i n v e s t m e n t o f
£1100 million, s o m e £223 million, o r one-fifth, w a s p r o v i d e d
from external sources, the m o s t c o n s p i c u o u s e x a m p l e b e i n g o f
c o u r s e t h e K a r i b a D a m . C a p i t a l e n g i n e e r e d g r o w t h , b u t it d i d s o
i n r e s p o n s e less t o t h e A f r i c a n t h a n t o t h e E u r o p e a n c o m m u n i t i e s
that had created e c o n o m i c enclaves w h i c h p r o v i d e d the stimulus
for that g r o w t h . T h e result w a s n o t o n l y industrial d e v e l o p m e n t ,
b u t a l s o a l a r g e r a n d m o r e firmly r o o t e d f o r e i g n p r i v a t e s e c t o r
a n d m a r k e t e c o n o m y i n t h o s e t e r r i t o r i e s t h a n e l s e w h e r e . It w a s
also grossly lopsided d e v e l o p m e n t . R e g i o n a l distribution w a s
u n e v e n : in the federation b y i960 m a n u f a c t u r i n g a c c o u n t e d for
15.5 p e r c e n t o f G D P i n S o u t h e r n R h o d e s i a , b u t o n l y 8 p e r c e n t
i n N o r t h e r n R h o d e s i a a n d 4.5 p e r c e n t i n N y a s a l a n d . M o r e o v e r ,
t h r o u g h o u t its e x i s t e n c e t h e f e d e r a t i o n w a s d e p e n d e n t on
N o r t h e r n Rhodesia's copper, and the N o r t h e r n Rhodesian g o v e r n -
m e n t c a l c u l a t e d t h a t its n e t l o s s t o t h e f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t w a s £ 9 7
million. A l t h o u g h the c o p p e r industry created a b o o m i n g
e c o n o m y , i n N o r t h e r n R h o d e s i a it w a s o n e c h a r a c t e r i s e d b y a
severe imbalance b e t w e e n a stagnant, neglected rural sector a w a y
f r o m t h e l i n e o f rail a n d a f a s t - g r o w i n g u r b a n s o c i e t y . F i n a l l y , t h e
425

benefits o f industrial d e v e l o p m e n t w e r e u n e v e n l y distributed

b e t w e e n races, f a v o u r i n g primarily the E u r o p e a n c o m m u n i t i e s .
Industrial expansion contributed to the marked expansion o f
e m p l o y m e n t in the years u p t o 1 9 5 5 , s o that each territory
e x p e r i e n c e d a n i n c r e a s e i n its w a g e - l a b o u r f o r c e . A t t h a t p o i n t ,
h o w e v e r , the expansion slowed d o w n , and indeed for a short
p e r i o d s h o w e d a p o s i t i v e d e c l i n e . L a b o u r d e p a r t m e n t s b e g a n after
1 9 5 6 t o r e p o r t i n c r e a s i n g u r b a n u n e m p l o y m e n t , as t h e e x p a n d i n g
e c o n o m i e s d e m o n s t r a t e d their inability t o a b s o r b the g r o w i n g
numbers of men and w o m e n seeking w a g e employment. Hindsight
enables us t o identify the c o m p l e x c o m b i n a t i o n o f factors that
c o n t r i b u t e d t o this critical c h a n g e . C o r p o r a t e capital w a s b o u n d ,
as it e x t e n d e d its a c t i v i t i e s , t o s e e k g r e a t e r e f f i c i e n c y , a n d t h e r e f o r e
the advantages o f a m o r e permanent, skilled labour force. T h e
s t a b i l i s a t i o n o f l a b o u r , i n t h e i n t e r e s t s b o t h o f a m o r e efficient
planned e c o n o m y and better l i v i n g conditions for w o r k e r s , had
b e e n official p o l i c y at least s i n c e t h e 1 9 4 9 C o n f e r e n c e o f E a s t
African L a b o u r Commissioners. W h i l e there w a s a w i d e variation
in territorial r e s p o n s e , m i n i m u m w a g e s l e g i s l a t i o n w a s g r a d u a l l y
i n t r o d u c e d in each state in the 1950s. H i g h e r w a g e s e n c o u r a g e d
e m p l o y e r s t o a n ad hoc i m p o r t a t i o n o f w e s t e r n t e c h n o l o g i e s , a n d
w o r k e r s r e m a i n e d l o n g e r o n the j o b , n o t least in the face o f the
increasing competition for employment.
Neither foreign capital, h o w e v e r , n o r industrial g r o w t h p r o
duced an indigenous capitalism. In East Africa there w e r e
g o v e r n m e n t p r o g r a m m e s t o e n c o u r a g e A f r i c a n trade, a n d in
K e n y a the K i k u y u had both t h r o w n u p a landed gentry and also
already s h o w n their propensity for business a n d c o m m e r c e .
N e v e r t h e l e s s at i n d e p e n d e n c e t h e r e w e r e as y e t f e w e s t a b l i s h e d
1
indigenous capitalists.
1
T h e process o f i n d i g e n o u s capital a c c u m u l a t i o n in colonial K e n y a has received
i n c r e a s i n g a t t e n t i o n in r e c e n t y e a r s . S e e t h e w o r k o f M . C o w e n , e s p e c i a l l y ' C a p i t a l a n d
p e a s a n t h o u s e h o l d s ' ( m i m e o , N a i r o b i , J u l y 1976), a n d ' N o t e s o n c a p i t a l , c l a s s a n d
h o u s e h o l d p r o d u c t i o n ' ( m i m e o , N a i r o b i , n.d.). T w o m o r e recent a n d critical studies
a r e A p o l l o L . N j o n j o , The Africanisation of the ' White Highlands*: a study in agrarian class
struggles in Kenya 1910-1974, P h . D t h e s i s , P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y , 1 9 7 7 , a n d G a v i n
K i t c h i n g , Class and economic change in Kenya: the making of an African petite bourgeoisie
1901-1970. ( N e w H a v e n a n d L o n d o n , 1980).
426

O n c e the political uncertainties that a c c o m p a n i e d the transfer o f

p o w e r had been o v e r c o m e , the e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t that
f o l l o w e d w a s i n t h e first p l a c e e n c o u r a g i n g . I n g e n e r a l , t h e i n i t i a l
post-colonial expansion and the Africanisation p r o g r a m m e s that
a c c e l e r a t e d after i n d e p e n d e n c e d e f u s e d t h e m o s t s e r i o u s t e n s i o n s
arising o u t o f u n e m p l o y m e n t , and there w a s an impressive further
increase in agricultural p r o d u c t i o n . M a l a w i , perhaps the p o o r e s t
c o u n t r y o f all, n o n e t h e l e s s a c h i e v e d a n i m p r e s s i v e 4.2 p e r c e n t r a t e
o f g r o w t h i n t h e 1 9 6 0 s a n d e l i m i n a t e d its b u d g e t a r y d e f i c i t .
K e n y a ' s s m a l l h o l d e r a g r i c u l t u r e d e m o n s t r a t e d t h e ability o f its
peasant farmers to increase their surplus a n d t o contribute t o the
country's average 6 per cent g r o w t h . T h e Million A c r e s Settlement
S c h e m e significantly e n l a r g e d the area o f land available for
l a n d - h u n g r y K i k u y u a n d at t h e s a m e t i m e c o n t r i b u t e d t o a
considerable increase in agricultural surplus. Z a m b i a , c o n f r o n t e d
w i t h t h e c o n s t r a i n t s i m p o s e d b y its l a n d - l o c k e d p o s i t i o n w i t h i n
t h e s o u t h e r n A f r i c a n r e g i o n , a n d t h e i n d i r e c t effects o f t h e s a n c
t i o n s i m p o s e d o n R h o d e s i a after U D I , n e v e r t h e l e s s i n t h e first
f o u r y e a r s o f i n d e p e n d e n c e a c h i e v e d a 13 p e r c e n t r a t e o f g r o w t h
and a remarkable expansion o f social services, particularly
education.
T h a t early g r o w t h , h o w e v e r , obscured the u n d e r l y i n g w e a k
n e s s e s o f e a c h s t a t e , w h i c h e m e r g e d m o r e c l e a r l y as t h e 1 9 6 0 s
progressed. M a l a w i ' s d i l e m m a h i g h l i g h t e d the issues that faced
t h e m all. D r B a n d a ' s e c o n o m i c s t r a t e g y w a s b a s e d o n t h r e e p r i m e
assumptions: the need for large-scale foreign aid and private
investment; the need to maintain the country's links w i t h the
s o u t h ; a n d the p r i m a c y o f agricultural d e v e l o p m e n t o n the lines
laid d o w n i n t h e c o l o n i a l y e a r s , n a m e l y t h e e n c o u r a g e m e n t o f
peasant agriculture. A l t h o u g h that strategy p r o d u c e d an i m
p r e s s i v e g r o w t h r a t e , b y t h e 1 9 7 0 s it h a d f a i l e d t o a c h i e v e a n y
significant c h a n g e in the c o u n t r y ' s basic p o v e r t y . S m a l l h o l d e r
agriculture had contributed significantly to agricultural pro
d u c t i o n , b u t t h e m a j o r i t y o f A f r i c a n s w e r e still c u l t i v a t o r s
c o n s t r a i n e d b y t h e i r l o w l e v e l o f t e c h n o l o g y , a n d it w a s t h e e s t a t e
sector that had enjoyed the strongest g r o w t h based o n b o t h
i m p r o v e d t e c h n o l o g y and increased acreage. T h e inherent w e a k
ness o f the c o u n t r y ' s p o s i t i o n w a s d e m o n s t r a t e d b y the c o n t i n -
427

u i n g e x o d u s o f M a l a w i a n s a b r o a d : w h e r e a s there w e r e 35000
M a l a w i a n s at w o r k o n t h e S o u t h A f r i c a n m i n e s i n 1 9 6 4 , i n 1 9 7 4
there w e r e just u n d e r 100000, w h o s e remittances w e r e the
1
c o u n t r y ' s third largest source o f foreign earnings. M o r e o v e r the
c o u n t r y ' s h e a v y d e p e n d e n c e o n e x t e r n a l financing, w h i l e c o n t r i
b u t i n g t o its g r o w t h , h a d a l s o r e s u l t e d i n its g r o w i n g p r o b l e m
o f external indebtedness.
U g a n d a ' s e a r l y , c a u t i o u s p l a n n i n g as a n i n d e p e n d e n t s t a t e h a d
also emphasised the need for increased foreign aid to finance
d e v e l o p m e n t . A t t e m p t s to redress the inherited e c o n o m i c im
balance b e t w e e n the northern and southern parts o f the c o u n t r y
produced political tensions before they b r o u g h t e c o n o m i c
g r o w t h , b u t t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s s e c o n d five-year d e v e l o p m e n t p l a n ,
for 1 9 6 6 - 7 0 , indicated a major a d v a n c e in e c o n o m i c p l a n n i n g
w h i c h grasped the need for diversification and industrialisation
m u c h as S i r J o h n H a l l h a d d o n e 20 y e a r s b e f o r e . D e s p i t e t h e
e x c e p t i o n a l l y g o o d seasons o f 1968 and 1969 h o w e v e r , a n d a
v a r i e t y o f a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o g r a m m e s , at t h e e n d o f t h e 1 9 6 0 s t h e r e
h a d b e e n little s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e . U g a n d a ' s p e a s a n t s , l i k e t h o s e o f
M a l a w i , w e r e still f o r t h e m o s t p a r t d e p e n d e n t u p o n t h e h o e ; a n d
there w e r e n e w areas o f land s h o r t a g e , and g r o w i n g u n e m p l o y
ment. H i n d s i g h t suggests the extent to w h i c h the Africanisation
p r o g r a m m e a n d t h e f a i l u r e t o effect a w a g e s p o l i c y h a d i n c r e a s e d
the rural-urban g a p in African i n c o m e s , w h i l e the g r o w i n g
d o m i n a n c e o f the military had already distorted expenditure.
President O b o t e ' s ' M o v e to the L e f t ' , h o w e v e r , w h i c h attempted
in 1969 t o m o v e U g a n d a t o a m o r e radical socialist strategy, w a s
h i s r e s p o n s e t o p o l i t i c a l r a t h e r t h a n t o e c o n o m i c p r e s s u r e s , as t h e
r e c u r r i n g t h e m e o f unity in the text m a d e clear. H i s u n d i g e s t e d
plans for nationalisation, w h i l e they w e r e in conflict w i t h his
p r o p o s a l s f o r t h e A f r i c a n i s a t i o n o f t h e r e t a i l t r a d e , d i d little m o r e
than p r o m o t e a d e g r e e o f e c o n o m i c uncertainty that un
d o u b t e d l y contributed to the c o u p .
A l t h o u g h in 1964 the Seers R e p o r t w a s optimistic that Z a m b i a
could use the great wealth inherited w i t h her c o p p e r to o v e r c o m e
her p o v e r t y and her unbalanced d e v e l o p m e n t , ten years later her
e c o n o m y w a s in disarray. W h i l e she c o u l d point to an impressive
e x p a n s i o n o f s o c i a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , t h e r u r a l - u r b a n g a p h a d i n fact
increased, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the priority a c c o r d e d t o rural
1
I n 1974, h o w e v e r , f o l l o w i n g a n air d i s a s t e r i n w h i c h 75 M a l a w i a n s r e t u r n i n g f r o m
w o r k o n t h e m i n e s d i e d , D r B a n d a s u s p e n d e d all m i n e s r e c r u i t m e n t .
428

d e v e l o p m e n t in each successive plan and in President K a u n d a ' s

' H u m a n i s m ' , p r o d u c e d as a g u i d e t o p l a n n i n g i n 1 9 6 7 . M a n y o f
t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s Z a m b i a f a c e d as a l a n d - l o c k e d s t a t e w e r e m a d e
w o r s e b y the consequences o f U D I , but the country's fundamental
w e a k n e s s had b e e n that u p t o 1 9 7 4 she h a d failed t o face u p t o
policy alternatives. W h i l e aware o f her o v e r w h e l m i n g dependence
u p o n copper, o n those occasions w h e n the g o v e r n m e n t had b e g u n
to g r a p p l e w i t h the issue a r e c o v e r y in the price o f c o p p e r had
e n c o u r a g e d her t o delay. E c o n o m i c r e f o r m s in 1968 a n d 1969
p r o v i d e d for greater Z a m b i a n participation in the private sector
and a major extension o f state participation in the e c o n o m y
i n c l u d i n g a 51 p e r c e n t s t a t e i n t e r e s t i n t h e m i n i n g i n d u s t r y . B y
the mid-1970s, h o w e v e r , the n o w o v e r w h e l m i n g d o m i n a n c e o f the
state in the e c o n o m y h a d failed t o a c h i e v e a n y significant
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n o f p r o d u c t i o n . H a v i n g f a i l e d t o s a v e d u r i n g t h e fat
years that f o l l o w e d independence, Z a m b i a f o u n d herself unpre
p a r e d f o r t h e l e a n e r 1 9 7 0 s . M o r e o v e r , h a v i n g set o u t i n 1 9 6 4 w i t h
a p r o u d financial i n d e p e n d e n c e , b y 1 9 7 5 s h e w a s w e i g h e d d o w n
by increasing external indebtedness, itself the p r o d u c t o f the
c h a n g e in the international c o p p e r market.
T h e m o s t significant experience h o w e v e r in these years w a s that
o f K e n y a a n d T a n z a n i a , f o r it w a s i n t h o s e t w o c o u n t r i e s t h a t t h e
fundamental issues o f d e v e l o p m e n t w e r e m o s t clearly o p p o s e d .
K e n y a f r o m t h e o u t s e t m a i n t a i n e d its i n h e r i t e d p o l i c i e s , w i t h t h e i r
e m p h a s i s u p o n p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e a n d f o r e i g n c a p i t a l as t h e
n e c e s s a r y a g e n t s o f g r o w t h . C o n f r o n t e d i n 1965 w i t h o p p o s i t i o n
t o t h a t s t r a t e g y , t h e K A N U g o v e r n m e n t set o u t t h e o b j e c t i v e s
c l e a r l y i n S e s s i o n a l P a p e r n o . 1 0 o n ' A f r i c a n s o c i a l i s m a n d its
application t o p l a n n i n g in K e n y a ' . T h e o b j e c t i v e s w e r e political
equality; social justice; h u m a n dignity including freedom o f
conscience, freedom f r o m w a n t , disease and exploitation; equal
opportunities; and h i g h and g r o w i n g per capita i n c o m e equitably
distributed. T h e strategy w a s based o n certain equally clear
assumptions; that g r o w t h w a s the necessary prerequisite for
d e v e l o p m e n t ; that foreign capital, private and public, w a s essential
for g r o w t h ; and that the objectives o f equity and justice c o u l d
be achieved within a merit-based, achievement-oriented c o m
petitive society w h i c h r e c o g n i s e d and r e w a r d e d i n d i v i d u a l initi
ative. W h i l e d e v e l o p m e n t p r o g r a m m e s maintained from the
outset a s t r o n g bias t o w a r d s rural d e v e l o p m e n t , the central focus
o f K e n y a ' s policies w a s the Africanisation o f the private sector
429

and the d e v e l o p m e n t o f i n d i g e n o u s capitalism. T h e T r a d e

L i c e n s i n g A c t o f 1967, w h i c h p r o v i d e d the basis for an o r d e r l y
transfer o f o w n e r s h i p o f expatriate trade and c o m m e r c e t o A f r i c a n
h a n d s , b e c a m e t h e m o d e l f o r o t h e r A f r i c a n states s e e k i n g t h e s a m e
objective. T h a t strategy produced impressive e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p
m e n t a n d in t h e e a r l y 1 9 7 0 s a g o o d m a n y p e o p l e w e r e d e m o n s t r a b l y
better off than they had b e e n ten years before. Certain w e a k n e s s e s
in t h i s s t r a t e g y h a d a l s o h o w e v e r b e e n d e m o n s t r a t e d . O n t h e o n e
hand the g r o w i n g presence o f c o r p o r a t e capital retarded the
g r o w t h o f i n d i g e n o u s c a p i t a l i s m , a l t h o u g h it d i d n o t r e s o l v e t h e
p r o b l e m s o f g r o w i n g u n e m p l o y m e n t . O n the other hand the
Africanisation o f the private sector contributed to an increased
inequality in A f r i c a n society. In the m i d - 1 9 7 0 s K e n y a appeared
as a c l a s s i c i l l u s t r a t i o n o f g r o w t h w i t h o u t d e v e l o p m e n t , w h i c h
demonstrated the fundamental limitations o f the inherited colonial
economic model.
T a n z a n i a also a c h i e v e d a significant agricultural e x p a n s i o n in
the mid-1960s, but neither that increased p r o d u c t i o n n o r attempts
at ' t r a n s f o r m a t i o n ' h a d r e s u l t e d i n a n y s i g n i f i c a n t s t r u c t u r a l
c h a n g e . T h e First N a t i o n a l D e v e l o p m e n t P l a n failed m o r e o v e r t o
a c h i e v e b o t h its i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n o b j e c t i v e s a n d t h e e x p e c t e d r a p i d
rate o f g r o w t h , n o t least as a r e s u l t o f its d e p e n d e n c e u p o n a l e v e l
o f f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t that failed t o materialise. T h a t failure
p u s h e d T a n z a n i a t o r e v i e w its i n h e r i t e d s t r a t e g i e s , w i t h t h e i r
r e l i a n c e o n c a p i t a l as t h e n e c e s s a r y a g e n t o f d e v e l o p m e n t . T h e
A r u s h a D e c l a r a t i o n o f 1 9 6 7 w a s , h o w e v e r , as m u c h a r e s p o n s e
t o i n e q u a l i t y as t o i n e f f e c t i v e e c o n o m i c p e r f o r m a n c e . R e f l e c t i n g
the T a n z a n i a n leadership's c o n c e r n w i t h the social c o n s e q u e n c e s
o f t h e c a p i t a l i s t m o d e l , it l e d t o a r a d i c a l c h a n g e o f s t r a t e g y b a s e d
o n f i v e p r i n c i p l e s a r t i c u l a t e d as t h e f o u n d a t i o n f o r f u t u r e p l a n n i n g :
public control o f the e c o n o m y ; d e v e l o p m e n t t h r o u g h self-reliance;
rural d e v e l o p m e n t ; social equality; and rural socialism. T h e
S e c o n d D e v e l o p m e n t Plan o f 1 9 6 6 - 7 0 therefore m a r k e d a radical
c h a n g e o f p r i o r i t i e s t o r u r a l d e v e l o p m e n t o n t h e b a s i s o f ujamaa,
or socialist agriculture. In the early 1970s, the c o m b i n a t i o n o f
d r o u g h t , structural c h a n g e and the w o r l d e n e r g y crisis p r o d u c e d
the c o u n t r y ' s m o s t s e v e r e e c o n o m i c crisis since the 1930s a n d
f o r c e d h e r i n t o a g r e a t e r d e p e n d e n c y . T e n y e a r s after t h e A r u s h a
D e c l a r a t i o n , T a n z a n i a w a s still t h e r e f o r e n e i t h e r s o c i a l i s t n o r
self-reliant, b u t had, despite climatic and international difficulties,
430

taken s o m e i m p o r t a n t steps t o w a r d s her g o a l s . S h e had reduced,

if not eradicated, the inequality that had been a major target o f
the socialist strategy w h i c h b y 1972 President N y e r e r e a r g u e d w a s
t h e r a t i o n a l c h o i c e f o r all A f r i c a n states.
A s t h e first d e c a d e o f i n d e p e n d e n c e d r e w t o a c l o s e , it h a d
b e c o m e i n c r e a s i n g l y difficult f o r t h e p o s t - c o l o n i a l s t a t e t o i g n o r e
t h e l i m i t a t i o n s o f its r e s o u r c e s a n d t h e u n d e r l y i n g w e a k n e s s e s t h a t
earlier g r o w t h m i g h t h a v e o b s c u r e d . G r o w t h h a d failed t o r e s o l v e
t h e p r o b l e m s o f i n c r e a s i n g u n e m p l o y m e n t , as t h e m a s s i v e e x
p a n s i o n o f u r b a n a n d r u r a l p o o r h a d d e m o n s t r a t e d . A c o m p l e x set
o f forces w a s p u s h i n g an increasing n u m b e r o f m e n and w o m e n
t o s e e k w a g e e m p l o y m e n t a n d t h e e a r l i e r m e a s u r e s w e r e s e e n as
short-term palliatives rather than long-term cures. T h e increased
e m p h a s i s u p o n r u r a l d e v e l o p m e n t as a s t r a t e g y t o a b s o r b t h e
r a p i d l y g r o w i n g p o p u l a t i o n b r o u g h t e a c h s t a t e f a c e t o f a c e at t h e
s a m e t i m e w i t h t h e c o n t i n u i n g w e a k n e s s o f its a g r i c u l t u r e .
K e n y a ' s K e r i c h o Conference on Education, E m p l o y m e n t and
R u r a l D e v e l o p m e n t h i g h l i g h t e d as e a r l y as 1 9 6 6 t h e s i z e o f t h e
p r o b l e m and the extent to w h i c h the agricultural r e v o l u t i o n
r e m a i n e d t o b e w o n . N o r h a d ujamaa r e s u l t e d in T a n z a n i a i n a n y
r a p i d s p r e a d o f m o d e r n m e t h o d s o f a g r i c u l t u r e . It w a s n o t o n l y
in K e n y a m o r e o v e r t h a t t h e s i t u a t i o n h a d c h a n g e d f r o m o n e o f
land surplus t o o n e o f land s h o r t a g e . In e a c h state the central issue
o f d e v e l o p m e n t strategy was clear: h o w to mobilise to greater
p r o d u c t i v i t y t h e g r o w i n g A f r i c a n p e a s a n t r y still o n t h e p e r i p h e r y
o f the m o d e r n e c o n o m y . A t the same time, there w a s an increasing
awareness o f the constraints i m p o s e d b y d e p e n d e n c e not o n l y o n
f o r e i g n c a p i t a l , b u t o n t h e c a p i t a l i s t m o d e l itself.
S O C I A L C H A N G E
B o t h t o w n and c o u n t r y experienced p r o f o u n d c h a n g e s o v e r these

y e a r s . I n 1 9 4 0 t h e c o l o n i a l state w a s e s s e n t i a l l y a c a s t e s o c i e t y i n
w h i c h race d e t e r m i n e d b o t h social and e c o n o m i c position.
E u r o p e a n s w e r e d o m i n a n t , w h e t h e r as a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , s e t t l e r s o r
businessmen. T h e g r o w i n g Asian population occupied the middle
r a n k s o f s o c i e t y e x c e p t in S o u t h e r n R h o d e s i a , a n d N o r t h e r n
R h o d e s i a w h e r e t h e y n u m b e r e d o n l y s o m e 2500 i n 1 9 5 0 . W h i l e
they w e r e characteristically the s h o p k e e p e r s , the traders and the
b u s i n e s s m e n , t h e y a l s o filled m a n y o f t h e c l e r i c a l a n d m i d d l e - l e v e l
431

administrative positions in b o t h g o v e r n m e n t and p r i v a t e sector.

T h e r e w a s a small educated A f r i c a n élite, b u t the great mass o f
Africans w h o constituted the broad base o f society w e r e country
dwellers, w h o s e horizons w e r e b o u n d b y homestead and subsist
ence. W h i l e the presence o f g o v e r n m e n t , church and school
ensured that n o rural c o m m u n i t y w a s isolated from the larger
territorial society, the d e g r e e o f interaction varied a great deal.
G o v e r n m e n t d e m a n d e d tax but otherwise did not i m p i n g e heavily
o n p e o p l e ' s l i v e s at t h e l o c a l l e v e l . M i g r a n t l a b o u r , f o r t h e m o s t
p a r t , s u s t a i n e d r a t h e r t h a n d e s t r o y e d t h e s o c i e t y f r o m w h i c h it
c a m e . R u r a l life w a s c h a r a c t e r i s e d b y a c o n s i d e r a b l e a u t o n o m y a n d
integrity, and traditional institutions and reciprocal relations
prevailed for b o t h the returning migrant and those w h o stayed
at h o m e .
B e a r i n g in m i n d their rich diversity, w e m a y identify the broad
p r o c e s s e s o f c h a n g e that e n c o m p a s s e d these states in the years that
f o l l o w e d . T h e m o s t o b v i o u s c h a n g e related t o the racial fabric o f
society w h i c h (except in R h o d e s i a ) w a s u n d e r m i n e d b y the
political transformation that t o o k place. W h i l e independence did
n o t n e c e s s a r i l y b r i n g a n e n d t o e x p a t r i a t e p r i v i l e g e , it d i d r e m o v e
m u c h o f the o l d racial d o m i n a n c e . T h e m o r e fundamental
changes, h o w e v e r , w e r e those that occurred within African
s o c i e t y itself, w h i c h b e c a m e s t e a d i l y m o r e c o m p l e x a n d m o r e
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d as A f r i c a n s a r r o g a t e d t o t h e m s e l v e s t h e o p p o r
t u n i t i e s as w e l l as t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f t h e m o d e r n s t a t e . A n e w
a n d e n l a r g e d é l i t e g r e w s t e a d i l y , i n r e s p o n s e first t o t h e
opportunities o f education and the e x p a n d i n g bureaucracy, and
s e c o n d t o the transfer o f p o w e r . T h e result w a s the g r o w t h o f a
n e w inequality within African society. W h i l e the S e c o n d W o r l d
W a r and the a c h i e v e m e n t o f i n d e p e n d e n c e b o t h in turn accelerated
t h e g r o w t h o f t h a t i n e q u a l i t y , it w a s e s s e n t i a l l y a c u m u l a t i v e
p r o c e s s o f c h a n g e already set in m o t i o n l o n g b e f o r e the p e r i o d
began.
The colonialyears
Perhaps the m o s t important influence in the l o n g run w a s the

expansion o f the cash-crop e c o n o m y , w h i c h substantially increased
rural cash i n c o m e s and p r o d u c e d noticeable i m p r o v e m e n t s in
s t a n d a r d s o f c o n s u m p t i o n for a s i g n i f i c a n t s e c t i o n o f t h e c o m
munity. A cash i n c o m e b e c a m e a necessity, not o n l y for tax, b u t
43*

also for the increasing range o f n e w g o o d s that appeared in the

rural trade centres a n d t h e A s i a n stores. N e w h o u s e s w i t h
sheet-metal roofs became a g o o d deal m o r e c o m m o n , a n d a l o n g
w i t h bicycles and, for a few, the n e w m o t o r cars, contributed t o
the g r o w i n g air o f p r o s p e r i t y o f a g r e a t m a n y v i l l a g e s a n d
h o m e s t e a d s . I n t h e m o r e fertile parts, p a r t i c u l a r l y o f E a s t A f r i c a ,
many villagers became p r o s p e r o u s peasants w h o , until the m i d -
1950s a t l e a s t , e n j o y e d a s u b s t a n t i a l g a i n i n r e a l i n c o m e a s a r e s u l t
o f their cultivation o f cash c r o p s : the G a n d a , the S o g a , t h e
K i k u y u , the C h a g a a n d S u k u m a all e n j o y e d in c o m m o n this n e w
position o f the better-off farmer. T h e r e w e r e also, a l t h o u g h in
m u c h smaller numbers, the larger cash-crop farmers, the bur
g e o n i n g entrepreneurs. T h e p r o s p e r o u s l a n d - o w n i n g class that
h a d g r o w n o n t h e b a s i s o f t h e mailo l a n d s y s t e m i n B u g a n d a h a d
d e v e l o p e d a g o o d deal further b y the time o f independence. I n
K e n y a , w h e r e f r o m the 1940s o n w a r d s chiefs w e r e b u y i n g land,
m a n y o f t h e m e m e r g e d as p r o s p e r o u s farmers. T h e size o f
landholdings varied a great deal, s o that the n e w m o r e substantial
farmers c o u l d b e arranged o n a c o n t i n u u m f r o m p r o s p e r o u s
p e a s a n t s t o s u c c e s s f u l l a r g e - s c a l e f a r m e r s , all o f t h e m s h a r i n g
certain attributes in c o m m o n : they farmed for the market a n d they
e m p l o y e d labour, if o n l y o n a seasonal basis. T h e y w e r e the n e w
a g r i c u l t u r a l e n t r e p r e n e u r s , t h e mulimi simpindi, ' f a r m e r s f o r
p r o f i t ' , as t h e y w e r e k n o w n a m o n g t h e T o n g a o f Z a m b i a ' s
Southern Province. T h e y b o u g h t an increasing range o f imported
g o o d s , they built better h o u s e s , they p a i d s c h o o l fees f o r a n
expanding extended family, and they generally had m o r e r o o m for
m a n o e u v r e as a result o f their greater e c o n o m i c r e s o u r c e s . T h e y
constituted a n e w rural m i d d l e class.
N o t every villager h o w e v e r became a prosperous peasant. T h e
typical villager remained the m a n w i t h an acre o r t w o o n w h i c h ,
with the help o f family labour and the h o e , he p r o d u c e d a small
quantity o f cash c r o p in addition t o his subsistence. H i s cash return
w a s small and his resulting opportunities limited. H e n c e
agricultural d e v e l o p m e n t p r o d u c e d a n e w rural inequality, a n d i f
this w a s less v i s i b l e in s o m e areas t h a n o t h e r s , n o n e t h e l e s s , n o
rural society r e m a i n e d u n c h a n g e d in t h o s e years.
T h e g r o w t h o f cash c r o p s d e p e n d e d u p o n t h e fertility o f t h e
s o i l , t h e r e l i a b i l i t y o f t h e rainfall a n d t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f t r a n s p o r t
and m a r k e t i n g facilities. S o m e c r o p s offered a better return than
433

o t h e r s , s o that t h e m a n w h o s e land w o u l d p r o d u c e coffee o r tea

w a s found t o d o better than the m a n w h o could g r o w only cotton.
M o r e o v e r there w e r e areas o f acute p o p u l a t i o n pressure, w h i c h
presented the ultimate constraint o n d e v e l o p m e n t . T h e benefits
o f e c o n o m i c g r o w t h w e r e therefore unequally enjoyed between
regions, and rural inequality d e v e l o p e d a m a r k e d regional di
m e n s i o n . I n t h e m i d - 1 9 5 0 s , f o r e x a m p l e , at t h e p e a k o f U g a n d a ' s
n e w cash crop prosperity, in w h a t w a s a peasant-oriented e c o n o m y ,
the net annual farm i n c o m e for the peasant farmer v a r i e d f r o m
218 shillings in B u g a n d a t o 1 7 shillings in K i g e z i . M o r e o v e r in
U g a n d a as e l s e w h e r e t h e r e w a s a d r a m a t i c c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n
a g r i c u l t u r a l a n d p a s t o r a l a r e a s , as t h e p a s t o r a l p e o p l e s w e r e
f u r t h e r left b e h i n d , w h i l e t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l r e g i o n s p u s h e d a h e a d .
A n i n c r e a s i n g n u m b e r o f m e n f r o m t h e less f e r t i l e r e g i o n s
m i g r a t e d e l s e w h e r e in search o f e m p l o y m e n t , a n d this in turn h a d
s i g n i f i c a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r r u r a l life. T r a d i t i o n a l a g r i c u l t u r a l
practice w a s modified to take into account the c h a n g e d labour
resources, a n d the m a r k e t b e c a m e a permanent feature o f rural
s o c i e t y as r u r a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y w a s b r o k e n d o w n . W h e n , f o r
e x a m p l e , b y t h e m i d - 1 9 5 0 s , 60 p e r c e n t o f Z a m b i a ' s r u r a l m a l e
taxpayers w e r e absent at a n y o n e time f r o m h o m e , their a b s e n c e
c o u l d n o t fail t o affect a g r i c u l t u r e . N o t all t h o s e s e e k i n g w a g e
e m p l o y m e n t w e r e t h i n k i n g o n l y o f the regular needs o f tax. T h e r e
w e r e g r o w i n g aspirations for i m p r o v e d material standards, and
f o r t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s o f m o d e r n life o f w h i c h p e o p l e w e r e
increasingly a w a r e . T h u s in B u g a n d a in t h e m i d - 1 9 5 0 s w a g e
e m p l o y m e n t for m a n y G a n d a had b e c o m e a perpetual necessity,
b e c a u s e ' c o t t o n a n d coffee h a v e created in B u g a n d a c u s t o m a r y
standards o f consumption w h i c h only a continuous m o n e y income
1
can m a i n t a i n ' . T h e s a m e m i g h t h a v e b e e n said o f t h e C o p p e r b e l t ,
w h o s e g r o w i n g p o p u l a t i o n h a d a d o p t e d t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c life
style o f a c o n s u m e r society.
T h e 1950s w i t n e s s e d an increasing search f o r u r b a n w a g e
e m p l o y m e n t , a n d a p e r c e p t i b l e drift o f A f r i c a n s f r o m c o u n t r y t o
t o w n . M e n travelled l o n g distances, s o m e t i m e s across territorial
b o u n d a r i e s , s o that there w a s in s o m e respects an international
labour force that c o u l d b e found b e t w e e n the S o u t h e r n S u d a n a n d
S o u t h A f r i c a . I n U g a n d a i n 1 9 5 7 39 p e r c e n t o f w a g e l a b o u r i n
1
W a l t e r E l k a n , Migrants and proletarians: urban labour in the economic development of
Uganda ( L o n d o n , 1961), 47.
434

the p r i v a t e s e c t o r w a s f r o m o u t s i d e the c o u n t r y , a n d in S o u t h e r n
R h o d e s i a i n 1 9 5 9 , 50 p e r c e n t o f t h e A f r i c a n l a b o u r f o r c e w a s
foreign. K e n y a n s s o u g h t e l s e w h e r e in E a s t A f r i c a the o p p o r
t u n i t i e s r e f u s e d t h e m at h o m e , a n d M a l a w i a n s h a d a l w a y s b e e n
k n o w n as g r e a t w a n d e r e r s , f o r c e d a b r o a d b y t h e p o v e r t y o f t h e i r
h o m e resources. N e v e r t h e l e s s , the majority o f migrants remained
w i t h i n their o w n c o u n t r y and this internal m i g r a t i o n g a v e e a c h
l a b o u r f o r c e its s p e c i a l c h a r a c t e r . I n U g a n d a it w a s m i g r a n t s f r o m
the p o o r e r n o r t h e r n parts o f the c o u n t r y w h o s o u g h t w o r k in the
southern estates and o n G a n d a farms ; in Z a m b i a m i n e l a b o u r w a s
d o m i n a t e d f r o m the outset b y B e m b a - s p e a k e r s f r o m the n o r t h ,
s o t h a t t h e C o p p e r b e l t c o u l d b e r e f e r r e d t o as a n ' e x t e n s i o n o f
1
B e m b a - s p e a k i n g s o c i e t y ' and the B e m b a w e r e b y the 1950s the
most proletarianised o f Z a m b i a ' s people.
Economic development produced a marked expansion o f w a g e
e m p l o y m e n t in the late 1940s a n d early 1950s, particularly in
Z a m b i a , K e n y a a n d R h o d e s i a . T h e R o y a l C o m m i s s i o n in 1955
reported an ' e x p a n d i n g v o l u m e o f e m p l o y m e n t n o t restricted b y
l a b o u r s h o r t a g e ' in E a s t A f r i c a , and generally n o e v i d e n c e o f
u n e m p l o y m e n t . B y t h a t d a t e e m p l o y m e n t h a d r e a c h e d 5 5 8 000 i n
K e n y a , 610000 in S o u t h e r n R h o d e s i a and 254000 in N o r t h e r n
R h o d e s i a . A l t h o u g h t h i s w a s still a s m a l l p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e t o t a l
A f r i c a n p o p u l a t i o n , n e v e r t h e l e s s it c h a n g e d t h e n a t u r e o f t h e
t o w n s . I n t h e 1940s t h e y h a d b e e n f o r t h e m o s t p a r t f o r e i g n
enclaves w h o s e d o m i n a n t characteristic w a s racial inequality, and
in w h i c h A f r i c a n s f o u g h t a h a r d and c o n t i n u i n g battle against
p o v e r t y and appalling conditions. T h e r e w a s a small African
educated élite: the teachers, clerks and hospital orderlies w h o
o r g a n i s e d the welfare associations and p r o v i d e d links w i t h h o m e ;
but the majority o f Africans w e r e unskilled w o r k e r s . W h i l e m o s t
did n o t stay l o n g , in R h o d e s i a the L a n d A p p o r t i o n m e n t A c t h a d
already g o n e a l o n g w a y to creating a landless African w o r k i n g
class, and in M o m b a s a and Z a n z i b a r there w a s s o m e t h i n g a k i n
to a p e r m a n e n t urban l a b o u r i n g class. N e v e r t h e l e s s w o r k e r s in
due course w e n t h o m e to the rural areas; they w e r e migrants
subject to the l o w w a g e s and appalling conditions w h i c h w e r e the
characteristic lot o f colonial labour.
D u r i n g t h e 1 9 5 0 s t h a t s i t u a t i o n a l t e r e d , as b o t h t h e c h a r a c t e r
o f the t o w n s and the c o n d i t i o n s o f e m p l o y m e n t b e g a n to c h a n g e .
1
George Kay, A social geography of Zambia (London, 1967).
435

W h i l e w o r k e r s still w e n t b a c k w a r d s a n d f o r w a r d s b e t w e e n t o w n
and country there were many m o r e o f them and they stayed
l o n g e r . F r o m the mid-1950s the signs w e r e o f an increasingly
stable labour force and a declining turnover. S l o w l y a casual and
migrant labour force w a s being converted into a c o m m u n i t y o f
workers.
T h r e e critical factors contributed to that c h a n g e . T h e crucial
influence w a s p r o b a b l y the introduction of minimum wages,
w h i c h constituted a fundamental stage in the d e v e l o p m e n t o f a
m o r e stable and skilled l a b o u r force, and in that respect the
w a t e r s h e d w a s perhaps the Carpenter R e p o r t in K e n y a in 1954,
w h i c h p r o p o s e d an urban family w a g e level that did n o t assume
a rural subsidy. E q u a l l y important w a s the c h a n g e in urban
h o u s i n g p o l i c y . A r o u n d 1 9 5 7 , a n d as t h e e m e r g e n c y d r e w t o a
close, the N a i r o b i City C o u n c i l b e g a n t o build family h o u s i n g for
w o r k e r s instead o f the o l d bachelors' quarters. A t the same time
Uganda, stimulated by Governor Sir Andrew Cohen, had
i n t r o d u c e d e x t e n d e d p r o g r a m m e s in urban A f r i c a n h o u s i n g , and
for u r b a n d e v e l o p m e n t in g e n e r a l . N o h o u s i n g p r o g r a m m e c o u l d
h o p e to meet the needs o f the rapidly g r o w i n g urban populations.
I n K a m p a l a a n d J i n j a , f o r e x a m p l e , w h e r e at l e a s t 5 0 0 0 0 w e r e
e m p l o y e d b y t h e late 1 9 5 0 s , t h e r e w e r e f e w e r t h a n 4000 t e n a n t s
on government estates. Y e t , despite the g r o w i n g peri-urban
s q u a t t e r s e t t l e m e n t s , a c h a n g e h a d b e g u n , a n d it b e c a m e p o s s i b l e
f o r u r b a n w o r k e r s t o c o n t e m p l a t e a s t a b l e f a m i l y life i n t o w n .
T h e t h i r d f a c t o r w a s t h e s t e a d y rise i n w a g e s t h a t o c c u r r e d
t h r o u g h the 1950s. T h e c h a n g e w a s perhaps m o s t dramatic o n the
C o p p e r b e l t , w h e r e A f r i c a n real e a r n i n g s r o s e a p p r o x i m a t e l y 300
per cent between 1945 a n d i960; but e v e r y w h e r e the urban
w o r k e r became better paid. T h e labour force also became m o r e
specialised. Increased wages not only persuaded workers to
r e m a i n l o n g e r o n t h e j o b , b u t a l s o p e r s u a d e d e m p l o y e r s t o offer
training and to e n c o u r a g e a skilled labour force. Indeed m u c h o f
the stimulus for c h a n g e b e g a n w i t h the e m p l o y e r s themselves, and
their concern for greater efficiency. Job specialisation and
A f r i c a n i s a t i o n , in spite o f E u r o p e a n o p p o s i t i o n at the outset,
slowly p r o d u c e d a n e w African skilled and semi-skilled labour
force. A n d because the u p w a r d trend o f w a g e s benefited the
skilled rather than the unskilled w o r k e r s , so the urban wage-
436

e a r n i n g p o p u l a t i o n also b e c a m e m o r e differentiated. U r b a n in

e q u a l i t y a d v a n c e d a m o n g A f r i c a n s , at t h e s a m e t i m e as
u n e m p l o y m e n t increased.
T h e colonial order also contributed to the rapid e x p a n s i o n o f
a n e w é l i t e . T h e w o r d is u n s a t i s f a c t o r y , b u t m a y b e u s e d w i t h
caution to identify the g r o w i n g b o d y o f Africans distinguished
b y their better education, their greater w e a l t h , and their position
in a s o c i e t y w h o s e racial b o u n d a r i e s w e r e b e i n g e r o d e d . I n 1946
G o v e r n o r S i r P h i l i p M i t c h e l l a p p o i n t e d s e v e n A f r i c a n s as
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e assistants t o the K e n y a p r o v i n c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
In 1947 the H o l m e s C o m m i s s i o n o n the East African civil services
r e c o m m e n d e d t h a t all p o s t s s h o u l d b e o p e n t o all c a n d i d a t e s
regardless o f race, and the L i d b u r y C o m m i s s i o n in 1954 g r e a t l y
a d v a n c e d the f r a m e w o r k o f A f r i c a n i s a t i o n , n o t the least b y
eliminating m a n y w a g e inequalities based o n racial g r o u n d s . T h e
process w a s s l o w e r in Central A f r i c a , b u t in Z a m b i a and M a l a w i
ultimately the direction w a s the same.
O v e r those years Africans also m o v e d u p w a r d s in the teaching
s e r v i c e , at s e c o n d a r y as w e l l as p r i m a r y l e v e l ; a n d t h e p r i v a t e
sector, m o r e hesitantly in s o m e territories than others, b e g a n
s l o w l y t o s e e k o u t p r o m i s i n g y o u n g A f r i c a n s t o t r a i n as a n e w
executive class. T h e r e w a s also a s l o w l y increasing n u m b e r o f
professionals. A f r i c a n i s a t i o n in fact p r o c e e d e d a g o o d deal m o r e
s l o w l y than the c o m m i t m e n t to political i n d e p e n d e n c e w o u l d
s e e m to require, held u p n o t least b y the early n o t i o n o f
multiracialism. It also p r o c e e d e d a g o o d deal m o r e s l o w l y in
Central A f r i c a than in E a s t A f r i c a . N e v e r t h e l e s s in e a c h state,
there w a s to a greater o r lesser d e g r e e b y the early 1960s a
distinctive A f r i c a n élite w h o w e r e increasingly t a k i n g u p roles
p r e v i o u s l y restricted to the colonial ruling class. T h e i r aspirations
w e r e e n c o u r a g e d b y the t r e m e n d o u s opportunities o p e n e d u p to
t h e m b y decolonisation and the transfer o f p o w e r , and society in
m a n y w a y s e n c o u r a g e d t h e m i n t h e elitist a s s u m p t i o n s o f t h e
c o l o n i a l o r d e r as w e l l as t h e i r a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e y w o u l d t a k e
o v e r c o n t r o l in the i n d e p e n d e n t state.
S o c i e t y , h o w e v e r , r e m a i n e d at i n d e p e n d e n c e r e m a r k a b l y e g a l i
t a r i a n i n t e r m s o f o p p o r t u n i t y , still e s s e n t i a l l y o p e n a n d fluid. I n
East Africa the B a n t u interlacustrine k i n g d o m s and in Central
A f r i c a B a r o t s e l a n d s t o o d o u t as s o c i e t i e s i n w h i c h t h e r e w a s g r e a t
437

inequality and ' t h e language and gestures o f deference were

1
e l a b o r a t e d . . . in a quite fantastic w a y ' . N e v e r t h e l e s s , e v e n in
B u g a n d a , u p w a r d m o b i l i t y w a s a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f e a t u r e o f life.
A l t h o u g h m a n y rural societies m u s t h a v e identified the n e w élite
as d i d t h e L u g b a r a o f n o r t h - w e s t e r n U g a n d a , as ' t h e e d u c a t e d a n d
2
semi-educated proteges o f the g o v e r n m e n t ' , appointment to the
civil service w a s generally considered a highly desirable goal.
A l t h o u g h in every society there w e r e popular perceptions o f social
stratification based u p o n o c c u p a t i o n , A f r i c a n society generally
accorded the educated m a n respect, whether he w a s a village
p r i m a r y - s c h o o l teacher o r the n e w u n i v e r s i t y g r a d u a t e . T h e latter
m o r e o v e r w a s still i n m o s t c a s e s a s m u c h a t h o m e i n t h e v i l l a g e
as t h e f o r m e r . I t w a s f o r t h e m o s t p a r t t h e o l d e r é l i t e , e s p e c i a l l y
the chiefs, w h o m the nationalists h a d discredited. T h e nationalist
ethic a n d e x p a n d i n g opportunities o b s c u r e d the potential conflict
o f interests a n d the d i l e m m a o f inequality posited b y a strategy
o f d e v e l o p m e n t that assumed the capitalist m o d e l a n d emphasised
t h e v i r t u e s o f i n d i v i d u a l effort. T h e e x c e p t i o n s s t o o d o u t c l e a r l y ,
a n d it w a s n o t i n s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t t h e y o c c u r r e d i n t h o s e states w h e r e
t h e m a r k e t e c o n o m y h a d m a d e its d e e p e s t i m p a c t u p o n s o c i e t y .
If capital h a d engineered g r o w t h , g r o w t h h a d engineered c h a n g e ,
s o t h a t it w a s n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t i n K e n y a t h e p r o c e s s o f e c o n o m i c
d e v e l o p m e n t h a d p r o d u c e d n o t o n l y a n A f r i c a n élite b u t also a n
African p r o p e r t y - o w n i n g class, primarily a m o n g the K i k u y u . T h e
e m e r g e n c y h a d d e m o n s t r a t e d the extent t o w h i c h , b y t h e 1950s,
the K i k u y u w e r e divided into landed a n d landless, w i t h a
l a n d - o w n i n g gentry d o m i n a n t w i t h i n that society. I n Z a m b i a the
mines h a d p r o d u c e d a distinctive urban industrial w a g e - e a r n i n g
l a b o u r force w i t h clear p e r c e p t i o n s o f their interests as a w o r k i n g
class; a n d U N I P h a d a distinctive anti-élitist sentiment.
D u r i n g t h e first d e c a d e o f i n d e p e n d e n c e a m o r e c o m p l e x s e t o f
social structures b e g a n t o e m e r g e . T h e objective conditions o f
inequality intensified w h i l e at t h e s a m e t i m e t h e p o p u l a t i o n
became occupationally more diverse and, almost imperceptibly,
1
L l o y d A . F a l l e r s , Inequality: stratification reconsidered ( C h i c a g o , 1973), 4.
2
J. F . M . M i d d l e t o n , ' S o m e effects o f c o l o n i a l r u l e a m o n g t h e L u g b a r a o f U g a n d a * ,
i n V . T u r n e r ( e d . ) , Colonialism in Africa, v o l . m ( S t a n f o r d , 1971), 21.
438

the familial links b e t w e e n richer a n d p o o r e r w e a k e n e d . W h i l e in

t h e g r e a t m a j o r i t y o f c a s e s t h e ties o f t h e e x t e n d e d f a m i l y
prevented any rigid division between upper and l o w e r income
g r o u p s , nevertheless the social and cultural cleavages b e t w e e n
them began to g r o w .
T h e expansion o f the cash-crop e c o n o m y had done most to
h a s t e n i n e q u a l i t y after t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r , a n d p e r h a p s t h e
m o s t s i g n i f i c a n t i n f l u e n c e 20 y e a r s l a t e r w a s t h e a c c e l e r a t i o n o f
A f r i c a n i s a t i o n , first i n g o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e n i n t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r ,
that f o l l o w e d independence. Africanisation a n d the need for
skilled m a n p o w e r m e a n t an e n o r m o u s e x p a n s i o n in t h e élite ; a n d
the retention o f expatriate scales o f r e m u n e r a t i o n p r o d u c e d the
m a n d a r i n class against w h i c h the H o l m e s C o m m i s s i o n h a d
w a r n e d in 1947. T h e upper echelons o f the bureaucracy, a l o n g
w i t h African ministers, the g r o w i n g b o d y o f professionals and
a c a d e m i c s , a n d n o t l e a s t t h e a r m y o f f i c e r s , s w i f t l y e m e r g e d as a
d i s t i n c t i v e , p r i v i l e g e d salariat d i s t i n g u i s h e d b y its w e a l t h , its
s t a t u s a n d t o o o f t e n its elitist a t t i t u d e s . E a c h salariat a c q u i r e d its
o w n d i s t i n c t i v e traits. D r B a n d a ' s c a u t i o u s A f r i c a n i s a t i o n m e a n t
that M a l a w i ' s t o p - l e v e l b u r e a u c r a c y r e m a i n e d small in size, a n d
in T a n z a n i a t h e A r u s h a D e c l a r a t i o n a n d t h e L e a d e r s h i p C o d e
specifically c h a l l e n g e d , a l t h o u g h they d i d n o t eliminate, s u c h an
é l i t e . I n g e n e r a l elites s h o w e d a d i s t i n c t p r e f e r e n c e f o r u r b a n life,
a l t h o u g h for the m o s t part k e e p i n g o n e foot in the c o u n t r y s i d e ,
and in K e n y a especially h a v i n g v e r y d e e p roots in the rural areas.
T h e Africanisation o f the private sector in d u e course reinforced
this c h a n g e . A l t h o u g h large-scale i n d u s t r y r e m a i n e d in expatriate
hands, African trade and c o m m e r c e greatly expanded, and in
K e n y a a n d Z a m b i a a t least t h e r e w a s a l s o a t t h e e n d o f t h e p e r i o d
a distinctive g r o u p o f n e w entrepreneurs and businessmen w i t h
1
deep interests in capitalist d e v e l o p m e n t .
T o f o c u s e x c l u s i v e l y o n t h e s e u p p e r l e v e l s o f s o c i e t y is h o w e v e r
to obscure the changes occurring elsewhere. W h e t h e r w e identify
them b y e m p l o y m e n t , b y w a g e levels o r b y material standards o f
l i v i n g , it is c l e a r t h a t t h e m i d d l e l e v e l s o f s o c i e t y w e r e b e c o m i n g
1
In addition t o w o r k o n i n d i g e n o u s capital a c c u m u l a t i o n cited a b o v e , see also f o r
the o n g o i n g debate o n the e m e r g e n c e a n d nature o f i n d i g e n o u s capitalism in K e n y a
L e y s , Underdevelopment in Kenya; L e y s , ' C a p i t a l a c c u m u l a t i o n , c l a s s f o r m a t i o n a n d
d e p e n d e n c y : t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e K e n y a n c a s e ' , Socialist Register, 1978; S w a i n s o n ,
Corporate capitalism; a n d Review of African Political Economy, 1980, n o . 17. D e b a t e o n
' D e p e n d e n c y ' i n K e n y a , p u b l i s h e d after t h i s c h a p t e r h a d b e e n c o m p l e t e d .
439

a g o o d deal m o r e differentiated. A w h o l e r a n g e o f n e w o c c u p a t i o n s
w a s o p e n i n g u p to Africans, especially to the increasing ranks o f
educated, so that society b e c a m e functionally a g o o d deal m o r e
diverse. T h e industrial and c o m m e r c i a l labour force, the w o r k e r s ,
w e r e a l s o b e c o m i n g m o r e d i v e r s i f i e d , as t h e y a l s o a c q u i r e d a m o r e
clearly defined status. W a g e increases, n e w p e n s i o n s c h e m e s and
e x t e n d e d w e l f a r e s e r v i c e s all c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e i m p r o v e d
conditions o f the urban w o r k i n g class, w h i c h became a g o o d deal
m o r e s t a b l e a n d c o m m i t t e d t o w a g e e m p l o y m e n t . I n Z a m b i a it
b e c a m e m u c h easier t o retire o n the C o p p e r b e l t , and b y 1975 a
g r o w i n g n u m b e r o f miners w e r e d o i n g so. Presence in t o w n did
n o t necessarily m e a n an e n d t o rural ties, especially in E a s t A f r i c a .
In K e n y a the a i m o f a l m o s t e v e r y u r b a n w o r k e r , w h a t e v e r his
e c o n o m i c s t a t u s , w a s t o b u i l d a h o u s e o n a p i e c e o f l a n d at h o m e ,
a n d the u r b a n family in m o s t cases h a d a s e c o n d h o u s e h o l d in the
rural area.
Increased internal m i g r a t i o n s w e l l e d the u r b a n p o p u l a t i o n s in
the i n d e p e n d e n t state. T h e p o p u l a t i o n o f the C o p p e r b e l t h a d
passed a million by 1974, but every urban centre had expanded
as t h e g r o w t h o f s p r a w l i n g s h a n t y t o w n s a n d t h e i n f o r m a l s e c t o r
demonstrated. There was a g r o w i n g army o f unemployed w o r k -
seekers w h o m the e c o n o m y c o u l d not p r o v i d e w i t h jobs, especially
the g r o w i n g band o f school-leavers. T h e r e w a s also a v i g o r o u s and
e x p a n d i n g informal sector. B y the 1970s the d o m i n a n t feature o f
u r b a n life h a d , h o w e v e r , b e c o m e t h e v i s i b l e i n e q u a l i t y o f A f r i c a n
society. T h e rapid increase in A f r i c a n e a r n i n g s after i n d e p e n d e n c e
n a r r o w e d the g a p b e t w e e n African and non-African, but w i d e n e d
the differences a m o n g A f r i c a n s t h e m s e l v e s . T h e c o l o n i a l l e g a c y
o f s e g r e g a t e d residential areas c o n t r i b u t e d significantly t o the
d e v e l o p m e n t o f d i s t i n c t i v e s o c i a l s t r a t a w h i c h u r b a n life a n d w a g e
e m p l o y m e n t i n v a r i a b l y foster. T h e refinement in r a n k i n g o f
o c c u p a t i o n a l c a t e g o r y c o n t r i b u t e d a l s o t o t h e p r o c e s s o f differ
entiation. B y 1970 U g a n d a h a d altered her c o s t o f l i v i n g statistics
t o take a c c o u n t o f h i g h , m i d d l e a n d l o w i n c o m e g r o u p s in u r b a n
society, a n d in K e n y a the T h i r d D e v e l o p m e n t Plan a c k n o w l e d g e d
that in a society w h e r e individual merit m u s t be r e w a r d e d ,
e c o n o m i c g r o w t h c o u l d not yet lead to equality. B u t w h a t w a s
m o s t noticeable w a s the g r o w t h o f a great b o d y o f w o r k i n g p o o r ,
m a n y o f t h e m e m p l o y e d in the i n f o r m a l sector, r e c e i v i n g less than
440

half the w a g e s o f the modern sector, and living in squatter

housing.
W i t h o u t e x c e p t i o n , t h e w a g e increases o f t h e 1960s benefited
urban rather than rural w a g e - e a r n e r s . A t the same time the
e c o n o m i c situation o f rural d w e l l e r s varied a g o o d deal b o t h
within and b e t w e e n countries in the region. A t o n e e x t r e m e
Z a m b i a ' s rural inhabitants w e r e absolutely w o r s e off in 1975 than
they h a d b e e n in 1964, a n d that c o u n t r y ' s dramatic u r b a n g r o w t h
w a s itself a reflection o f rural decline. A t the o t h e r e x t r e m e ,
K e n y a ' s 225000 smallholders secured an impressive share o f
their c o u n t r y ' s d e v e l o p m e n t , a n d t h e cash inflow t o s m a l l h o l d e r
f a r m i n g h a d i n c r e a s e d f r o m £10 t o £ 3 0 m i l l i o n b e t w e e n i 9 6 0 a n d
1968. T h e vitality o f K e n y a ' s rural e c o n o m y w a s demonstrated
n o t o n l y b y i n c r e a s e d a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n b u t a l s o b y a self-
h e l p p r o g r a m m e w h i c h , w h a t e v e r i t s w e a k n e s s e s , c o n t r i b u t e d £4
million t o d e v e l o p m e n t in the 1960s. A t the same time, h o w e v e r ,
that e x p a n s i o n sustained the existing rural inequality, a n d , in m o s t
cases, existing regional disparities. M o r e o v e r K e n y a ' s land-
transfer p r o g r a m m e p r o d u c e d a n e w l e v e l o f rural i n e q u a l i t y w i t h
the e m e r g e n c e o f A f r i c a n large-scale farmers w h o w e r e also
something o f a landed oligarchy, and t o w h o m the continuation
o f the large-scale farm strategy g a v e a disproportionately large
share o f d e v e l o p m e n t resources. T h e 1 9 6 7 L a n d C o n t r o l A c t
offered t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r t h e a c c u m u l a t i o n o f l a n d i n U g a n d a ,
although the demise o f B u g a n d a ' s political p o w e r in 1966
s u g g e s t e d that a n y n e w l a n d e d o l i g a r c h y that e m e r g e d as a result
w o u l d h a v e a different r e g i o n a l a n d p o l i t i c a l b a s e . I n B u g a n d a
itself t h e trend h a d b e e n in fact t o w a r d s t h e s u b d i v i s i o n o f t h e
o l d mailo e s t a t e s .
L a r g e - s c a l e l a n d o w n e r s s u c h a s K e n y a ' s w e r e still h o w e v e r t h e
exception rather than the rule. W h a t w a s a g o o d deal m o r e
significant w a s the c h a n g i n g pattern o f l a n d o w n e r s h i p at t h e l o w e r
levels o f rural society, especially in t h o s e areas o f acute p o p u l a t i o n
pressure and land shortage. Tanzania w a s here the exception, since
h e r ujamaa p r o g r a m m e w a s a d e l i b e r a t e a t t e m p t t o r e t u r n t o a
c o m m u n a l l a n d o w n e r s h i p , a l t h o u g h s h e d i d n o t i n fact seek t o
d i s t u r b h e r C h a g a coffee f a r m e r s f r o m t h e i r l a n d h o l d i n g s . I n
M a l a w i also the dominant pattern remained that o f a large n u m b e r
o f v e r y small p l o t holders. E l s e w h e r e , h o w e v e r , it w a s p o s s i b l e
441

to identify the d e v e l o p m e n t o f a n e w m a r k e t in land. In K e n y a

the land-reform p r o g r a m m e significantly altered the pattern o f
land d i s t r i b u t i o n in the peasant sector, l a r g e l y t o the d i s a d v a n t a g e
o f the p o o r e s t levels o f rural society. In a c o u n t r y w h e r e land w a s
n o t o n l y the m a j o r s o u r c e o f security b u t also the base for an
a s p i r i n g e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l c l a s s , salariat a n d w a g e e a r n e r s as w e l l as
w e a l t h y farmers had b e g u n to purchase land in the former
' A f r i c a n a r e a s '. A l t h o u g h it w o u l d b e s o m e t i m e b e f o r e t r a d i t i o n a l
rights w o u l d disappear, and a l t h o u g h there w e r e significant
r e g i o n a l differences, n e v e r t h e l e s s a f u n d a m e n t a l c h a n g e in land-
o w n e r s h i p had b e g u n . A n d while for the time being the process
o f s u b d i v i s i o n and the further distribution o f e x p a t r i a t e - o w n e d
land c o u l d absorb the e x p a n d i n g population, the inexorable
a d v a n c e o f p o p u l a t i o n i n t h e 1 9 6 0 s a n d 1 9 7 0 s r e s u l t e d in t h e
c o n t i n u o u s e x p a n s i o n o f the rural p o o r . T h e s e w e r e the great mass
o f A f r i c a n s , n o t necessarily landless, b u t w i t h t o o little land a n d
t o o little e d u c a t i o n t o a c q u i r e the s u r p l u s o r the skills t o s u p p l y
t h e i r b a s i c n e e d s . I f K e n y a ' s r u r a l p o o r w e r e t h e b e s t k n o w n , it
w a s M a l a w i t h a t p r e s e n t e d t h e p r o b l e m in its s t a r k e s t f o r m .
M a l a w i ' s s m a l l h o l d e r a g r i c u l t u r e a l s o e x p a n d e d after i n d e p e n
d e n c e , its v a l u e i n c r e a s i n g f r o m K i 5.9 t o K 2 6 . 0 m i l l i o n b e t w e e n
1964 and 1970. In a c o u n t r y w h o s e d o m i n a n t characteristic w a s
the pressure o f p o p u l a t i o n u p o n land, o n l y 2 per cent o f the p e o p l e
had m o r e t h a n 12 acres, and the g r e a t majority o f s m a l l h o l d e r s
w h o contributed so m u c h to the g r o w t h o f the agricultural
s u r p l u s t y p i c a l l y h a d less than t w o acres. T h e i n d i v i d u a l r e t u r n
w a s small and in a c o u n t r y w i t h a per capita i n c o m e o f K 3 8 , did
not g i v e the smallholder m u c h r o o m for m a n o e u v r e . In the early
1 9 7 0 s it w a s t h e e x p a t r i a t e - o w n e d e s t a t e s e c t o r t h a t h a d u n u s e d
l a n d still t o b e t a k e n u p i n t h e f u t u r e f o r c u l t i v a t i o n . Y e t t h e
increased m i g r a t i o n t o S o u t h A f r i c a o f the 1960s and the
e x p a n s i o n o f a g r i c u l t u r a l w a g e e m p l o y m e n t ( s o m e o f it n o m o r e
t h a n seasonal) in the p r i v a t e s e c t o r o n the estates, p o i n t e d t o the
evolution o f a permanent, l o w l y paid, unskilled agricultural
l a b o u r i n g class: the foundation o f a rural proletariat.
R e g i o n a l inequality added a m a r k e d ethnic d i m e n s i o n to the
g r o w t h o f social and e c o n o m i c inequality in these years. Least
o b v i o u s in T a n z a n i a , m o s t m a r k e d in K e n y a , the c o i n c i d e n c e o f
regional and therefore ethnic associations w i t h e c o n o m i c status
and o p p o r t u n i t y p r o d u c e d significant tensions. H e n c e in K e n y a
442

b y t h e late 1960s s e c o n d a r y - s c h o o l c h i l d r e n d e m o n s t r a t e d a k e e n
awareness o f the greater a d v a n t a g e s available to those f r o m
C e n t r a l as c o m p a r e d w i t h N y a n z a p r o v i n c e , a n e t h n i c c o n t r a s t t h a t
intensified n o d o u b t the p e r c e p t i o n s o f L u o d e p r i v a t i o n and
K i k u y u a d v a n t a g e . T r i b e and e c o n o m i c class a c q u i r e d a direct
association, illustrated dramatically b y G E M A , the w e l f a r e as
s o c i a t i o n o f K i k u y u , E m b u a n d M e r u p e o p l e , e s t a b l i s h e d in 1 9 6 8 ,
and s y m b o l i s i n g the d o m i n a n c e o f the g r o w i n g K i k u y u capitalist
interests. T h e identification o f e c o n o m i c and social status w i t h
regional and ethnic identity w a s , h o w e v e r , most tragically de
m o n s t r a t e d in U g a n d a in t h e a f t e r m a t h o f t h e 1 9 7 1 c o u p . B y 1975
A m i n ' s r e g i m e w a s b e s t i d e n t i f i e d as t h a t o f a r o b b e r b r i g a n d w h o
lacked the capacity to rule if n o t to e x p l o i t his prize. A t the s a m e
time the pattern o f p u r g e and conflict s u g g e s t e d also that m u c h
o f the b e h a v i o u r o f his f o l l o w e r s d e r i v e d f r o m their p e r c e p t i o n s
o f e c o n o m i c deprivation. T h o s e followers w e r e not only soldiers
but also m e m b e r s o f a minority for w h o m e c o n o m i c status
c o i n c i d e d w i t h e t h n i c a n d r e l i g i o u s affiliations. T h e h a r d c o r e o f
the U g a n d a n a r m y in the m i d - 1 9 7 0 s w a s M u s l i m , d r a w n f r o m the
least e d u c a t e d o f U g a n d a ' s s m a l l e s t a n d least d e v e l o p e d e t h n i c
g r o u p s . T h e i r e c o n o m i c d e s i r e s w e r e m a d e c l e a r n o t least b y t h e
m a n n e r in w h i c h t h e y p l u n d e r e d t h e b u l k o f t h e e c o n o m i c s p o i l s
m a d e available b y the e x p u l s i o n o f the A s i a n c o m m u n i t y in 1 9 7 2 .
T e n y e a r s after i n d e p e n d e n c e t h e o l d n o t i o n s o f é l i t e a n d m a s s
w e r e a g o o d d e a l less a p p o s i t e t h a n b e f o r e i n t h e f a c e o f t h e
c h a n g e s that had o c c u r r e d . E a c h state h a d r e s p o n d e d differently
b o t h t o its i n h e r i t e d e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i t y a n d t o t h e p r o c e s s o f
post-colonial change. S o m e t h i n g remarkably like a national
identity w a s increasingly apparent to those w h o crossed national
b o u n d a r i e s , a n d as g o v e r n m e n t s a n d p e o p l e r e s p o n d e d d i f f e r e n t l y
to the process o f c h a n g e . T h e c o n t i n u i n g process o f Africanisation
a n d t r a i n i n g o f h i g h - l e v e l m a n p o w e r h a d m e a n t i n T a n z a n i a , as
e l s e w h e r e , the absolute g r o w t h o f the élite, the h i g h e s t w a g e and
salary earners. Y e t T a n z a n i a h a d n a r r o w e d , if she h a d n o t
eliminated, the g a p b e t w e e n rich and p o o r , and she b e l i e v e d that
w i t h the A r u s h a D e c l a r a t i o n she had r e v e r s e d the national drift
t o w a r d s the g r o w t h o f a class-based society. In K e n y a , the
e m e r g e n c e o f a p r o p e r t y - o w n i n g class and a capitalist ethic
e p i t o m i s e d the g r o w i n g m e r i t o c r a c y and an a c h i e v e m e n t - o r i e n t e d ,
class-based society. R e g i o n a l and ethnic associations h o w e v e r , in
443

t h e m i d - 1 9 7 0 s , still d i f f u s e d p e r c e p t i o n s o f c l a s s , a l t h o u g h t h e y
h e i g h t e n e d awareness o f e c o n o m i c inequality, in a situation o f
diminishing resources.
E t h n i c d i v e r s i t y w a s t h e r e f o r e i n t h e final a n a l y s i s less i m p o r t a n t
than the u n e v e n rate o f e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t . T h e a d d i t i o n o f
t h e t e r m wabenî ( l i t e r a l l y , ' t h o s e w h o d r i v e M e r c e d e s B e n z c a r s ' ,
implying those w i t h m o n e y and p o w e r ) to K e n y a ' s political
v o c a b u l a r y , as o f apamwamba (' t h o s e n e a r e r h e a v e n ' , i m p l y i n g t h e
i m p o r t a n t people) to that o f Z a m b i a , s u g g e s t e d that in those t w o
c o u n t r i e s at l e a s t t h e r e w e r e p o w e r f u l p e r c e p t i o n s o f i n e q u a l i t y ,
and an increasing reaction to the coincidence b e t w e e n politics and
material w e a l t h . A n d in U g a n d a the c o n t i n u i n g conflict that
f o l l o w e d t h e c o u p w a s g e n e r a t e d n o t least b y t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n
o f a deprived religious and ethnic minority to keep what they had
taken b y force.
I n g e n e r a l , s o c i e t y as a w h o l e h a d m o r e o b v i o u s l y d i v i d e d i n t o
t h r e e s t r a t a : t h e salariat a t t h e t o p , t h e g r e a t m a s s o r u r b a n a n d
r u r a l p o o r at t h e b o t t o m , a n d i n t h e m i d d l e , t h e b e t t e r - o f f ,
including s o m e farmers and urban wage-earners. T h e r e w a s m u c h
to s u g g e s t that the m o s t far-reaching c h a n g e s had b e e n those in
the m i d d l e ; the n e w class o f better-off farmers, the n e w u r b a n
w o r k i n g class, w h o w e r e rapidly acquiring coherent perceptions
o f their o w n identity. W h a t w a s equally significant w a s the extent
t o w h i c h a c c e s s t o e d u c a t i o n still d e t e r m i n e d o n e ' s p l a c e i n
society.
E D U C A T I O N
T h e p o s t - w a r years w e r e characterised b y a universal and insistent

d e m a n d for education. T h e K i k u y u independent s c h o o l s (started
in the 1920s) d r a m a t i c a l l y e n l a r g e d K e n y a ' s e d u c a t i o n a l base,
a l t h o u g h at t h e s a m e t i m e t h e y i n t e n s i f i e d its u n e v e n e t h n i c
d i s t r i b u t i o n . B e t w e e n 1 9 4 3 a n d 1948 A f r i c a n s c h o o l e n r o l m e n t s
a l m o s t d o u b l e d in S o u t h e r n R h o d e s i a , w h e r e e d u c a t i o n r e m a i n e d
:
predominantly a mission responsibility. T h e C h a g a C o u n c i l p e t
itioned the V i s i t i n g U N M i s s i o n to T a n g a n y i k a o n the subject
i n 1 9 4 8 as d i d t h e N y a s a l a n d A f r i c a n C o n g r e s s t h e C o l o n i a l
Secretary in the s a m e year. In U g a n d a , w h e r e g o v e r n m e n t
e d u c a t i o n p r o c e e d e d apace, nevertheless in the 1950s, the p r i v a t e
s c h o o l s m u s h r o o m e d t o satisfy the d e m a n d s o f t h o s e w h o c o u l d
not meet the requirements o f the g o v e r n m e n t educational system.
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E D U C A T I O N
In T a n z a n i a T A N U a n d in U g a n d a the U P C , a d m i t t e d l y w i t h o n l y
l i m i t e d s u c c e s s , s e t u p s c h o o l s as p a r t o f t h e i r n a t i o n a l i s t c a m
paigns. T h e r e w a s n o d o u b t a b o u t the desire for education, n o r
t h a t it r e f l e c t e d t h e a s p i r a t i o n s o f A f r i c a n s a w a r e o f t h e k e y
relationship b e t w e e n education and e c o n o m i c opportunity.
T h e result w a s that the direction o f p o s t - w a r educational
d e v e l o p m e n t w a s a g o o d d e a l i n f l u e n c e d b y A f r i c a n p r e s s u r e s as
w e l l as b y c o l o n i a l d e s i g n a n d s e t t l e r c o n t r o l s . C o l o n i a l p o l i c y i n
t h e 1 9 4 0 s e m p h a s i s e d m a s s e d u c a t i o n f o r c i t i z e n s h i p a n d self-
g o v e r n m e n t , and an integrated process that w o u l d train a smaller
n u m b e r o f Africans for administration and also d e v e l o p a civic
consciousness. Priority w a s placed o n the d e v e l o p m e n t o f mass
primary education for rural d e v e l o p m e n t , w i t h a m o r e limited
s e c o n d a r y - s c h o o l e x p a n s i o n sufficient t o s u p p l y the t h e n limited
m a n p o w e r needs. O n that basis primary education u n d o u b t e d l y
e x p a n d e d d r a m a t i c a l l y after 1 9 4 5 , a l t h o u g h t h e e x t e n t a n d t h e
quality v a r i e d f r o m state t o state. U g a n d a a c h i e v e d a r e m a r k a b l e
expansion under G o v e r n o r C o h e n , and o n the basis o f the de
Bunsen Report on African Education o f 1953, w h i c h w a s en
thusiastically a c c e p t e d , b y 19 5 9 h a l f the c h i l d r e n o f a p p r o p r i a t e a g e
w e r e at p r i m a r y s c h o o l . I n T a n g a n y i k a , w h i c h h a d a g o o d d e a l
m o r e g r o u n d to m a k e u p than the other East African territories,
primary enrolments e x p a n d e d f r o m 142000 in 1950 t o 375000
in i 9 6 0 ; b u t it w a s K e n y a t h a t m o v e d f u r t h e r a h e a d w i t h 7 2 6 0 0 0
c h i l d r e n in p r i m a r y s c h o o l s i n i 9 6 0 c o m p a r e d w i t h 300000 i n
1949. C e n t r a l A f r i c a l a g g e d a g o o d deal b e h i n d , n o t least b e c a u s e
o f the constraints i m p o s e d u p o n African education b y the
settler-dominated federation. Z a m b i a and M a l a w i (notwithstand
i n g the latter's l o n g h i s t o r y o f m i s s i o n e d u c a t i o n ) in 1964, at
i n d e p e n d e n c e , had a c h i e v e d less p r i m a r y e x p a n s i o n than e v e n
Rhodesia.
In the 1950s, h o w e v e r , priorities c h a n g e d , and the emphasis
shifted t o s e c o n d a r y and p o s t - s e c o n d a r y e d u c a t i o n . Part o f the
explanation related to the g r o w i n g needs o f g o v e r n m e n t for
A f r i c a n m a n p o w e r as p o l i t i c a l c h a n g e a d v a n c e d , a n d t h e m e t r o
politan p o w e r s o u g h t to create that n e w r u l i n g class to w h o m they
h o p e d to hand o v e r p o w e r . A t the same time m u c h o f the pressure
for c h a n g e w a s f r o m Africans and nationalists u n w i l l i n g t o accept
the constraints o f the racially differentiated e d u c a t i o n a l s y s t e m s ,
and the pressures o f the c h a n g i n g political climate. H e n c e the
445

1950s s a w a significant e x p a n s i o n in s e c o n d a r y e d u c a t i o n , not

w i t h s t a n d i n g t h a t it w a s m e a g r e i n c o m p a r i s o n w i t h t h e a c t u a l
demand. A l r e a d y the p r o b l e m o f w a s t a g e w a s serious, a l t h o u g h
p r i m a r y - s c h o o l l e a v e r s as y e t f o u n d n o d i f f i c u l t y i n o b t a i n i n g
e m p l o y m e n t , as w o u l d b e t h e c a s e t e n y e a r s later. I n C e n t r a l A f r i c a
and in K e n y a , E u r o p e a n and, to a lesser extent, A s i a n e d u c a t i o n
still t o o k p r e c e d e n c e o v e r A f r i c a n , w h i c h i n C e n t r a l A f r i c a i n
p a r t i c u l a r l a g g e d far b e h i n d . Z a m b i a at i n d e p e n d e n c e c o n s e
q u e n t l y h a d o n l y 1200 s e c o n d a r y - s c h o o l c e r t i f i c a t e t r a i n e d p e o p l e
(of w h o m a significant minority had obtained their training
t h r o u g h S o u t h A f r i c a ) w h e r e a s K e n y a had reached that stage in
1 9 5 7 a n d T a n z a n i a i n i 9 6 0 ; a n d U g a n d a h a d s i x t i m e s as m a n y
at i n d e p e n d e n c e .
U n i v e r s i t y e d u c a t i o n a l s o s a w its r e a l b e g i n n i n g s i n t h e 1 9 5 0 s .
T h e A s q u i t h C o m m i s s i o n i n 1945 h a d r e g a r d e d t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t
o f u n i v e r s i t i e s as t h e i n e s c a p a b l e c o r o l l a r y o f t h e c o m m i t m e n t t o
p o l i t i c a l a d v a n c e b u t t e r t i a r y e d u c a t i o n w e n t a h e a d m u c h faster
in E a s t than in C e n t r a l A f r i c a . M a k e r e r e C o l l e g e in U g a n d a ,
h a v i n g s t a r t e d life i n t h e 1 9 2 0 s as a s c h o o l f o r a r t i s a n s , i n 1 9 4 9
b e c a m e a u n i v e r s i t y c o l l e g e in special relationship w i t h L o n d o n
University. O n c e again the force o f nationalism and the dictates
o f m a n p o w e r p l a n n i n g accelerated the p a c e o f e x p a n s i o n : in 1956
N a i r o b i ' s R o y a l T e c h n i c a l C o l l e g e b e c a m e the University C o l l e g e
o f N a i r o b i a n d t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f D a r e s S a l a a m b e g a n life i n
q u a r t e r s l o a n e d b y T A N U i n 1 9 6 2 , b y w h i c h t i m e all t h r e e h a d
b e c o m e constituent c o l l e g e s o f a U n i v e r s i t y o f East Africa. B y that
time, h o w e v e r , the opportunities for East Africans anxious for
education to g o abroad w e r e greatly enlarged. In i960, w h e n there
w e r e 396 K e n y a n s at M a k e r e r e t h e r e w e r e 1655 a b r o a d . I n C e n t r a l
A f r i c a , in contrast, and n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the m o v e m e n t o f a
fortunate few abroad, higher education w a s a g o o d deal s l o w e r
t o a d v a n c e a n d , at t h e U n i v e r s i t y C o l l e g e o f R h o d e s i a a n d
N y a s a l a n d set u p i n 1 9 5 6 , a g o o d d e a l m o r e r a c i a l l y b o u n d t h a n
it e v e r w a s i n E a s t A f r i c a .
T h e a c h i e v e m e n t b y the time o f independence w a s therefore not
inconsiderable. M o r e o v e r , sight should not be lost o f the extent
t o w h i c h o v e r t h e s e y e a r s it h a d b e e n p a i d f o r b y A f r i c a n s
t h e m s e l v e s , t h r o u g h t a x e s a n d s c h o o l fees. I n U g a n d a , f o r
instance, the A f r i c a n D e v e l o p m e n t F u n d s based o n the Price
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E D U C A T I O N
A s s i s t a n c e F u n d s p r o v i d e d a g r e a t d e a l o f t h e finance f o r t h e
expansion o f the 1950s.
T h e inherited e d u c a t i o n a l systems nevertheless raised i m p o r
t a n t q u e s t i o n s as t o t h e p a t t e r n o f f u t u r e d e v e l o p m e n t . I n e a c h c a s e
they absorbed a significant p r o p o r t i o n o f the recurrent b u d g e t ,
but came n o w h e r e near satisfying either the p o p u l a r d e m a n d o r
t h e n a t i o n a l n e e d . N o w h e r e w a s m o r e t h a n 50 p e r c e n t o f t h e
s c h o o l - a g e p o p u l a t i o n in p r i m a r y s c h o o l s , and in T a n z a n i a a n d
C e n t r a l A f r i c a it w a s a g o o d d e a l l e s s . T h e p r o p o r t i o n o f t h o s e
w h o continued to secondary school w a s minute. T h e availability
o f education was geographically and therefore ethnically un
b a l a n c e d . I n T a n g a n y i k a i n t h e e a r l y 19 5 o s f o r e x a m p l e , 7 9 p e r c e n t
o f the C h a g a o f K i l i m a n j a r o district w e r e in p r i m a r y s c h o o l b u t
o n l y 7 p e r cent o f the M a s a i . I n e a c h state the c o n s e q u e n c e o f this
r e g i o n a l i m b a l a n c e in d e v e l o p m e n t w a s a v i s i b l e identification o f
the n e w e d u c a t e d and p r i v i l e g e d élite w i t h a particular ethnic
g r o u p : t h e G a n d a , t h e K i k u y u , t h e L o z i as w e l l as t h e C h a g a ,
might not have had a m o n o p o l y of education, but they undoubtedly
e n j o y e d a g o o d d e a l m o r e e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t y at a t i m e w h e n
the r e w a r d s o f e d u c a t i o n w e r e v e r y great. Finally e d u c a t i o n h a d
b e c o m e i n c r e a s i n g l y l i n k e d t o e x a m i n a t i o n s as t h e m e a n s o f a c c e s s
to e m p l o y m e n t o r further training. In the 1940s c o l o n i a l
g o v e r n m e n t s had indeed e m p h a s i s e d the n e e d to link e d u c a t i o n
w i t h r u r a l life, b u t t h a t e a r l y e m p h a s i s u p o n a d a p t a t i o n t o t h e
needs o f an agricultural e n v i r o n m e n t had b e e n i n c r e a s i n g l y
u n d e r m i n e d , n o t least b y the pressures o f A f r i c a n o p i n i o n .
A f r i c a n s w h o h a d c o m e t o r e g a r d e d u c a t i o n as t h e k e y t o g r e a t e r
a f f l u e n c e a n d t h e w a y o u t o f r u r a l p o v e r t y w e r e b o u n d t o find s u c h
a n a g r i c u l t u r a l b i a s u n a c c e p t a b l e , a n d t h e y r e j e c t e d it as a f o r m
o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in a r a c i a l l y s t r u c t u r e d e d u c a t i o n a l s y s t e m . F o r
similar reasons A f r i c a n o p i n i o n defeated g o v e r n m e n t attempts in
the early 1950s t o i n t r o d u c e a basic f o u r - y e a r e d u c a t i o n , c o m p l e t e
in itself, a l o n g t h e l i n e s r e c o m m e n d e d b y t h e 1 9 5 1 B i n n s R e p o r t
for T a n g a n y i k a . N o d o u b t these suspicions w e r e strongest a m o n g
t h e é l i t e , a n d at t h a t t i m e it w a s r a c i a l i n e q u a l i t y r a t h e r t h a n t h e
elitist a n d i n e g a l i t a r i a n n a t u r e o f t h e e d u c a t i o n a l s y s t e m t h a t w a s
under attack. N e v e r t h e l e s s the mass also had educational
aspirations, and the tradition o f a m o r e academic education w a s
strong. M o r e o v e r the d e m a n d s for trained A f r i c a n m a n p o w e r and
447

the Africanisation p r o g r a m m e that a c c o m p a n i e d independence

p u s h e d educational e x p a n s i o n in the same direction.
E a c h s t a t e w a s c o m m i t t e d at i n d e p e n d e n c e t o t h e n o t i o n o f
planned educational d e v e l o p m e n t to o v e r c o m e these inherited
i n a d e q u a c i e s . T h e first o b j e c t i v e w a s t h e a b o l i t i o n o f r a c i a l
discrimination. A s a Z a m b i a n report put it: ' T h e r e w e r e certain
t h i n g s w e h a d t o d o at i n d e p e n d e n c e , a b o u t w h i c h t h e r e w a s n o
a r g u m e n t w h a t s o e v e r . F o r e x a m p l e the racist structure o f the
1
educational system had to be destroyed'. Certain other admin
i s t r a t i v e c h a n g e s f o l l o w e d , as g o v e r n m e n t s g r a d u a l l y a s s u m e d
direct control o v e r education, and the churches for the m o s t part
w e r e required t o transfer their s c h o o l s t o t h e m . Priority w a s g i v e n
i n t h e first p l a c e t o s e c o n d a r y - s c h o o l e x p a n s i o n , a n d t o a s t r a t e g y
o f m a n p o w e r planning that f o l l o w e d logically o n the p r o g r a m m e s
and training laid d o w n earlier b y c o l o n i a l g o v e r n m e n t s . T e n years
later the d e g r e e o f A f r i c a n i s a t i o n w a s i m p r e s s i v e . M a l a w i s t o o d
o u t for h e r m o r e c a u t i o u s a p p r o a c h t o A f r i c a n i s a t i o n , b u t in
Tanzania, b y 1 9 7 1 , 90-95 per cent o f senior and middle-level
c i v i l - s e r v i c e p o s t s w e r e h e l d b y c i t i z e n s c o m p a r e d w i t h 38 p e r c e n t
i n 1 9 6 2 . T h e first d e c a d e o f i n d e p e n d e n c e h o w e v e r w i t n e s s e d a
r e m a r k a b l e a c c e l e r a t i o n o f e d u c a t i o n as a w h o l e . P e r h a p s t h i s w a s
d e m o n s t r a t e d m o s t dramatically in Z a m b i a , w h i c h set o u t w i t h
a sense o f u r g e n c y to redress the inherited colonial neglect, and
doubled her primary-school enrolments between 1964 and 1972,
increased her secondary-school numbers from 1 3 8 5 3 1 0 6 1 0 0 0 and
set u p t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f Z a m b i a i n 1 9 6 5 . E q u a l l y i m p r e s s i v e , a n d
demonstrating the same kind o f i m m e n s e popular enthusiasm for
education, w a s the e x p a n s i o n in K e n y a , w h e r e b y 1975 there w e r e
t w o m i l l i o n c h i l d r e n e n r o l l e d in p r i m a r y s c h o o l s a n d 300000 in
secondary schools, and a v i g o r o u s self-help p r o g r a m m e had
p u s h e d t h e g o v e r n m e n t far b e y o n d its p l a n n e d d e v e l o p m e n t .
T h i s v e r y e x p a n s i o n p r o d u c e d its o w n difficulties, h o w e v e r , a n d
as t h e 1 9 6 0 s a d v a n c e d , e a c h s t a t e f a c e d a n e w e d u c a t i o n a l c r i s i s ,
in w h i c h p o s t - i n d e p e n d e n c e d e v e l o p m e n t c o m p o u n d e d the w e a k
nesses o f the past. E d u c a t i o n a l expansion p r o c e e d e d a g o o d deal
m o r e rapidly than e m p l o y m e n t , s o that b y the e n d o f the 1960s
there w a s a s c h o o l - l e a v e r p r o b l e m in e a c h state. H o w e v e r , the
c r i s i s i n e d u c a t i o n w e n t a g o o d d e a l d e e p e r . I n t h e first p l a c e t h e r e
w a s a conflict b e t w e e n the need for skilled citizen m a n p o w e r and
1
Education for development ( G o v e r n m e n t o f t h e R e p u b l i c o f Z a m b i a , 1976), 77.
448

E D U C A T I O N
the relevant h i g h - l e v e l training, a n d the need t o b r o a d e n

educational opportunities, create a m o r e egalitarian society, and
satisfy p o p u l a r d e m a n d . I n t h e f a c e o f l i m i t e d r e s o u r c e s t h e r e w a s
an intense c o m p e t i t i o n f o r e d u c a t i o n a l facilities w h i c h lay at t h e
heart o f the d e v e l o p m e n t process. T h i s conflict o f interest w a s also
central t o the process o f differentiation a n d the g r o w i n g inequality
in e a c h s t a t e . T h u s t h e c r i s i s o f t h e l a t e 1 9 6 0 s w a s n o t m e r e l y a b o u t
t h e m o r e efficient u s e o f m a n p o w e r ( a n d h e n c e t h e p r o b l e m s o f
wastage), school leavers, regional imbalances and the rural-urban
g a p ; it w a s a l s o a b o u t t h e p r o c e s s o f s o c i a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . I n a
situation o f g r o w i n g social a n d e c o n o m i c differentiation, access
to education remained the k e y to e c o n o m i c advance and to a
p r i v i l e g e d position in society. A c c e s s t o education w a s thus a k e y
political issue.
E a c h state r e s p o n d e d d i f f e r e n t l y t o t h i s c r i s i s , d e m o n s t r a t i n g
n o t o n l y t h e i r different i d e o l o g i c a l c o m m i t m e n t s a n d s t y l e s o f
r e s p o n s e t o inherited i n e q u a l i t y , b u t also t h e i n c r e a s i n g l y different
s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c p r e s s u r e s at w o r k w i t h i n t h e i n d e p e n d e n t
state. W h i l e t h e s a m e p o p u l a r a s p i r a t i o n s c o u l d , f o r e x a m p l e , b e
i d e n t i f i e d i n K e n y a a n d M a l a w i , it w a s a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e y c o u l d
b e h e l d i n c h e c k m o r e firmly i n t h e l a t t e r c o u n t r y t h a n t h e f o r m e r .
E d u c a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g m o r e o v e r e n c o u n t e r e d different obstacles.
H e n c e w h i l e t h e r e w a s , a s t h e 1 9 6 0 s p r o g r e s s e d , a g e n e r a l shift
back t o a strategy centred o n rural e d u c a t i o n , the m a n n e r in w h i c h
it w a s a p p r o a c h e d v a r i e d a g o o d d e a l .
I n t h i s r e s p e c t M a l a w i m o s t firmly b a s e d e d u c a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g
o n the n e e d s o f a g r i c u l t u r e as t h e k e y s e c t o r o f t h e e c o n o m y , a n d
a r g u e d that expansion o f secondary a n d h i g h e r education must
be related directly a n d primarily t o m a n p o w e r needs rather than
p o p u l a r aspirations o r d e m a n d s . T a n z a n i a also reasserted the
n e e d s o f r u r a l life a n d a t t e m p t e d a f u n d a m e n t a l r e o r i e n t a t i o n o f
h e r t o t a l e d u c a t i o n s y s t e m . P r o m p t e d m o s t o f all b y t h e a r r o g a n t
reaction o f university students in 1966 t o National Service, w h i c h
h i g h l i g h t e d the dangers o f a n e w élite, the A r u s h a D e c l a r a t i o n
spelled o u t the conflict b e t w e e n the inherited educational system
and the goals o f Tanzanian socialism. President Nyerere's subse
q u e n t Education for self-reliance o u t l i n e d a n e d u c a t i o n a l s t r a t e g y
that w o u l d p r o v i d e a seven years' basic education c o m p l e t e in
itself, a n d a p p r o p r i a t e f o r t h e r u r a l life t h a t t h e m a j o r i t y o f
T a n z a n i a n s w o u l d l e a d . P r i o r i t y w a s t h u s r e t u r n e d i n t h e late
449

1960s t o p r i m a r y e d u c a t i o n f o r r u r a l d e v e l o p m e n t , a c o m m i t m e n t
further articulated in the M u s o m a D e c l a r a t i o n o f 1 9 7 4 ( w h i c h
p r o m i s e d a f o u r - y e a r e d u c a t i o n f o r e v e r y o n e ) , b u t still s o m e w a y
f r o m a c h i e v e m e n t as o u r p e r i o d c a m e t o a c l o s e .
K e n y a ' s e d u c a t i o n a l s t r a t e g y w a s , in c o n t r a s t , t o a c c e l e r a t e t h e
p r o v i s i o n o f e d u c a t i o n a l s e r v i c e s at all l e v e l s , t o r e d r e s s r e g i o n a l
imbalances, but to equalise opportunities rather than rewards. In
t h e first d e c a d e o f i n d e p e n d e n c e g o v e r n m e n t p o l i c y , p u s h e d o n
b y a n i n f e c t i o u s s e l f - h e l p o r harambee m o v e m e n t , r e s u l t e d in
substantial expansion. A t the same time g r o s s disparities remained
and unequal access to education had contributed a great deal to
the g r o w i n g social and e c o n o m i c class f o r m a t i o n . T h i r s t for
e d u c a t i o n c o n t i n u e d as t h e b i g e x p a n s i o n in p r i m a r y e n r o l m e n t
after t h e r e m o v a l o f fees i n 1 9 7 4 s h o w e d . T h e r e s u l t s o f r a c i a l
integration varied a g o o d deal. U g a n d a and Tanzania had indeed
b e g u n the process prior to independence. K e n y a , a d o p t i n g a
c o n t r a r y line o f action, maintained the e x i s t i n g tiered structure o f
s c h o o l s inherited f r o m the settler years, s o that w h i l e racial
segregation w a s abolished, the old system o f high-and l o w - c o s t
s c h o o l s r e m a i n e d , a n d w i t h it t h e i n e q u a l i t y o f a c c e s s t o e d u c a t i o n
b a s e d i n c r e a s i n g l y o n e c o n o m i c r a t h e r t h a n r a c i a l strata. M o r e o v e r
the c o n t i n u i n g e x p a n s i o n presented significant b u d g e t a r y p r o b
l e m s t o a g o v e r n m e n t w h i c h i n 1 9 7 5 w a s s p e n d i n g 30 p e r c e n t
o f t h e state b u d g e t o n e d u c a t i o n .
K e n y a and T a n z a n i a represented the t w o extreme responses to
t h e e d u c a t i o n a l c r i s i s o f t h e i n d e p e n d e n t state. T h e y s h a r e d w i t h
the o t h e r states, h o w e v e r , certain strategies that a t t e m p t e d to
o v e r c o m e educational p r o b l e m s , for e x a m p l e the N a t i o n a l S e r v i c e
that attempted to a b s o r b s c h o o l leavers. T h e m o s t f a m o u s and
possibly the m o s t successful w a s M a l a w i ' s Y o u n g Pioneers
f o r m e d b y President B a n d a in 1963, to g i v e specialised t r a i n i n g
in a g r i c u l t u r e t o y o u n g m e n a n d w o m e n w h o t h e n r e t u r n e d t o
the land.
E d u c a t i o n a l p o l i c y t h u s c a m e full c i r c l e in t h e s e y e a r s , e n d i n g
as it h a d b e g u n w i t h a firm e m p h a s i s o n e d u c a t i o n f o r r u r a l
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . T h e r e w a s , h o w e v e r , a g r e a t difference in the
n o t i o n o f r e l e v a n c e as p a r t o f t h e p r o c e s s o f c o l o n i a l t u t e l a g e a n d
r e l e v a n c e as t h e k e y t o a m o r e r e a l i s t i c , i n d e p e n d e n t g o v e r n m e n t ' s
educational policy. N e v e r t h e l e s s the p o p u l a r aspirations remained,
a n d e d u c a t i o n w a s still in r e a l i t y as w e l l as in p o p u l a r p e r c e p t i o n s
450

E D U C A T I O N
t h e m e a n s o f u p w a r d m o b i l i t y in t h e p o s t - c o l o n i a l state. E d u c a t i o n
remained, a l o n g w i t h politics, the k e y to p r i v i l e g e and p o w e r .
I N T E R - S T A T E A N D E X T E R N A L R E L A T I O N S
I n t e r - s t a t e r e l a t i o n s p a s s e d t h r o u g h t h r e e s u c c e s s i v e s t a g e s in t h e
c o u r s e o f t h e s e 35 y e a r s . A t t h e o u t s e t , i n 1 9 4 0 , t h e p o l i t i c a l ties
w e r e essentially those created b y c o l o n i a l rulers and alien settler
c o m m u n i t i e s . N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h a t t h e s e t t l e r s in N o r t h e r n a n d
S o u t h e r n R h o d e s i a felt a g r e a t e r affinity w i t h S o u t h t h a n w i t h E a s t
Africa, the n o t i o n o f a confederation o f British Central A f r i c a n
states n o r t h o f t h e Z a m b e z i d i e d h a r d . T h e w a r y e a r s s t r e n g t h e n e d
t h e p o s i t i o n o f E u r o p e a n s , a n d i n 1945 t h e d o m i n a n t i s s u e i n
i n t e r t e r r i t o r i a l r e l a t i o n s w a s t h a t o f c l o s e r u n i o n , w h i c h h a d its
climax w i t h the creation o f the Federation o f R h o d e s i a and
Nyasaland. B y the 1950s, h o w e v e r , there w e r e also m a n y m o r e
l i n k s b e t w e e n A f r i c a n s a c r o s s t h e r e g i o n , e s p e c i a l l y as a r e s u l t o f
t h e m o v e m e n t o f l a b o u r . I n t h e 1 9 5 0 s a l s o , as t h e n a t i o n a l i s t
m o v e m e n t s a d v a n c e d , so the n e w nationalist leaders f o r g e d n e w
bonds w i t h each other and established n e w , African-oriented
political ties, and a significant d e g r e e o f c o o p e r a t i o n . T h e i r
a s s o c i a t i o n s fell s h o r t o f p o l i t i c a l u n i o n , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e
aspirations for a federation in E a s t A f r i c a , s o that i n d e p e n d e n c e
saw a third stage in their relations, w h e n inter-state relations
b e c a m e t h o s e o f n e w , s o v e r e i g n states. S o v e r e i g n t y a n d s t a t e h o o d
s i g n i f i c a n t l y a l t e r e d t h e p e r s p e c t i v e s f r o m w h i c h i n t e r - s t a t e re
l a t i o n s n o w w e r e a p p r o a c h e d , a n d i n t h e first d e c a d e o f i n d e p e n
d e n c e the d e m a n d s o f national interest b e g a n seriously to
c h a l l e n g e earlier P a n - A f r i c a n loyalties. W h i l e the c o m m i t m e n t t o
African unity did not disappear, the imperatives o f national
d e v e l o p m e n t m a d e it a m o r e difficult o b j e c t i v e t o a c h i e v e . A n e w
conflict o f interests e m e r g e d b e t w e e n national and r e g i o n a l
associations and loyalties. Independence therefore constituted a
significant w a t e r s h e d in inter-state relations w h i c h c o n t r i b u t e d t o
m a j o r r e a l i g n m e n t s w i t h i n t h e r e g i o n in t h e y e a r s after 1 9 7 0 .
T h e m o s t p o s i t i v e r e g i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t in t h e c o l o n i a l y e a r s
w a s t h a t in E a s t A f r i c a , w h i c h s a w t h e e m e r g e n c e o f a u n i q u e
regional e c o n o m i c association. A t the outbreak o f the w a r the East
African territories already shared a n u m b e r o f interterritorial
activities, c o o r d i n a t e d b y an informal annual C o n f e r e n c e o f
451

g o v e r n o r s a n d its p e r m a n e n t s e c r e t a r i a t . T h o s e c o m m o n a c t i v i t i e s
increased greatly during the w a r years, out o f w h i c h there
e m e r g e d i n 1948 t h e E a s t A f r i c a n H i g h C o m m i s s i o n : a p e r m a n e n t
e x e c u t i v e authority created b y O r d e r in C o u n c i l , h a v i n g p o w e r
to administer certain specified c o m m o n services o n an all-East
A f r i c a n basis. It consisted o f the g o v e r n o r s o f the three territories,
w h o met t w o or three times each year, a H i g h C o m m i s s i o n
s e c r e t a r i a t , w i t h its h e a d q u a r t e r s i n N a i r o b i , a n d a c e n t r a l L e g i s
lative A s s e m b l y , part appointed b y each g o v e r n o r and part
elected b y the representative element o f the territorial L e g i s l a t i v e
Councils, w i t h limited but n o t insignificant legislative p o w e r s
o v e r c o m m o n s e r v i c e s m a t t e r s . N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g A f r i c a n fears
t h a t t h e E a s t A f r i c a n H i g h C o m m i s s i o n w o u l d b e u s e d as a b a s i s
f o r s e t t l e r d o m i n a t i o n (a s i g n i f i c a n t i n f l u e n c e u p o n t h e g r o w t h o f
nationalist politics in those years), that b o d y p r o v i d e d a positive
basis for e c o n o m i c c o o p e r a t i o n and for regional d e v e l o p m e n t in
t h e 1 9 5 0 s a n d e s t a b l i s h e d a set o f i n t e r t e r r i t o r i a l economic
institutions o f m o r e positive v a l u e than those o f the Central
African federation. T h e three E a s t A f r i c a n territories constituted
a c o m m o n m a r k e t w i t h a m o r e o r l e s s u n i f o r m e x t e r n a l tariff. T h e y
had a c o m m o n currency. T h e y shared a n u m b e r o f c o m m o n
services, jointly administered b y the E A H C , o f w h i c h the m o s t
important w e r e the railways and harbours, airways, posts and
telecommunications and research services. T h e r e c o u l d be n o
d o u b t that the e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t o f the 1950s w a s greatly
a s s i s t e d b y t h e s e c o m m o n s e r v i c e s , a n d it w a s t h e a d v a n t a g e s o f
that e c o n o m i c association that the n e w nationalist leaders s o u g h t
to preserve w h e n Tanzania's independence necessitated changes
in its c o n s t i t u t i o n a l b a s e . H e n c e t h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n w a s
t r a n s f o r m e d in 1962 i n t o the E a s t A f r i c a n C o m m o n S e r v i c e s
O r g a n i s a t i o n , created b y the terms o f an agreement entered into
by the three East A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t s .
In the 1950s A f r i c a n nationalists a c h i e v e d a s e c o n d significant
level o f political cooperation t h r o u g h the Pan-African F r e e d o m
M o v e m e n t o f E a s t a n d C e n t r a l A f r i c a ( P A F M E C A ) set u p at
M w a n z a in T a n z a n i a b y the E a s t A f r i c a n nationalist leaders in
1 9 5 8 . P A F M E C A e m e r g e d as a l o o s e b u t e f f e c t i v e g r o u p i n g o f
t h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s o f all t h e E a s t a n d C e n t r a l A f r i c a n t e r r i t o r i e s .
L e a d e r s m e t regularly in an annual c o n f e r e n c e . T h e i r c o m m o n
front w a s a significant political f o r c e in the p e r i o d o f d e c o l o n i s -
45*

ation; and they w e r e able also to p r o v i d e an important degree o f

assistance to territorial nationalist m o v e m e n t s . P A F M E C A p r o
v i d e d s i g n i f i c a n t a s s i s t a n c e f o r U N I P i n t h e first g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s
in N o r t h e r n R h o d e s i a in 1962, and for K A N U in the K e n y a n
elections the f o l l o w i n g year. Its nationalist i d e o l o g y w a s s y m
b o l i s e d b y t h e c o m m o n r e c o g n i t i o n o f K e n y a t t a ( w h i l e still i n
r e s t r i c t i o n ) as l e a d e r a n d its o r g a n i s a t i o n a l c a p a c i t y w a s a s s u r e d
b y t h e d o m i n a n t r o l e s o f N y e r e r e a n d M b o y a . I n 1 9 6 2 , w h e n its
regional e m b r a c e w a s enlarged t o take in n o t o n l y E t h i o p i a and
S o m a l i a b u t a l s o t h e n a t i o n a l i s t o r g a n i s a t i o n s o f S o u t h A f r i c a , it
was renamed P A F M E C S A , and U N I P ' s President, K e n n e t h
K a u n d a , w a s elected c h a i r m a n , s y m b o l i s i n g n o t least the c o m m o n
c o m m i t m e n t to the liberation o f southern Africa. O n c e T a n
g a n y i k a b e c a m e i n d e p e n d e n t in 1 9 6 1 , D a r es S a l a a m b e c a m e the
natural base for the g r o w i n g liberation m o v e m e n t s o f Central and
s o u t h e r n A f r i c a , a n d P A F M E C S A , w i t h N y e r e r e as its l e a d i n g
figure, b e c a m e increasingly identified w i t h the liberation o f
white-ruled southern Africa.
I n t h e e a r l y 1960s P A F M E C A w a s g e n e r a l l y c o m m i t t e d t o t h e
c o n c e p t o f a n E a s t A f r i c a n f e d e r a t i o n , as N y e r e r e first s e t it o u t
to the M b a l e ( U g a n d a ) P A F M E C A m e e t i n g in O c t o b e r i960, and
a g a i n t o the C o n f e r e n c e o f I n d e p e n d e n t A f r i c a n States at A d d i s
A b a b a in the same year. N y e r e r e offered t o delay T a n g a n y i k a ' s
i n d e p e n d e n c e u n t i l all t h r e e E a s t A f r i c a n s t a t e s c o u l d a c h i e v e
i n d e p e n d e n c e , s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , as a f e d e r a t i o n , b u t T a n g a n y i k a
had in fact already b e c o m e i n d e p e n d e n t w h e n , w i t h K e n y a t t a and
O b o t e , N y e r e r e p l e d g e d h i m s e l f in the Federation D e c l a r a t i o n o f
A u g u s t 1963. F r o m 1961 until 1964, East African relations w e r e
focussed essentially u p o n the federation issue. T h e causes o f
f a i l u r e w e r e c o m p l e x , b u t u l t i m a t e l y t h e a t t e m p t at f e d e r a t i o n i n
t h e m i d - 1 9 6 0 s f o u n d e r e d o n t h e fears o f e a c h s t a t e f o r its n a t i o n a l
interest, p e r c e i v e d increasingly f r o m the v a n t a g e p o i n t o f
sovereignty and statehood.
U g a n d a e s p e c i a l l y i n 1 9 6 3 f e a r e d h e r f u t u r e s u b o r d i n a t i o n as
the smallest o f the three states, b u t the central issue w a s and
r e m a i n e d t h e b e l i e f t h a t K e n y a h a d a c h i e v e d h e r d e v e l o p m e n t at
Uganda's and Tanganyika's expense. East Africa's c o m m o n
market had w i t h o u t d o u b t made a positive and significant impact
o n the r e g i o n ' s e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t in the years after 1 9 4 5 . It
had p r o d u c e d a substantially unified m a r k e t and a g o o d deal o f
453

d e v e l o p m e n t o f m a n u f a c t u r i n g . B u t the benefits o f that d e v e l o p

m e n t s e e m e d to m a n y in the 1950s t o be u n e v e n l y distributed,
w i t h K e n y a r e c e i v i n g t h e l i o n ' s s h a r e . W h e t h e r o r n o t it w a s t h e
c o m m o n market that g a v e K e n y a the distinct a d v a n t a g e that she
enjoyed in the 1950s (rather than the accidents o f g e o g r a p h y and
history and the attractions o f the E u r o p e a n c o m m u n i t y for
international capital), U g a n d a and T a n g a n y i k a had increasingly
b e c o m e r e s e n t f u l at h e r g r e a t e r d e v e l o p m e n t . H e n c e t h e r e f o l
l o w e d a succession o f attempts to reorganise the basis o f the
e c o n o m i c association, to p r o v i d e for a great equality o f d e v e l o p
ment. In i960 the Raisman C o m m i s s i o n p r o p o s e d a n u m b e r o f
c h a n g e s , principally the i n n o v a t i o n o f the Distributable P o o l to
facilitate redistribution b e t w e e n the three territories; a n d in 1964
the K a m p a l a A g r e e m e n t attempted to add n e w rules for an
equitable distribution o f industrial d e v e l o p m e n t . T h a t agreement
had not been implemented, h o w e v e r , w h e n Tanzania's decision
to w i t h d r a w from the c o m m o n currency and to establish her o w n
C e n t r a l B a n k set i n t r a i n a s e q u e n c e o f e v e n t s t h a t s e e m e d t o
presage the end o f the association. In 1965, a c k n o w l e d g i n g the
benefits for d e v e l o p m e n t for e a c h o f t h e m , b u t a w a r e o f the
d a n g e r s o f d i s i n t e g r a t i o n , t h e t h r e e states set u p t h e P h i l i p s
C o m m i s s i o n to e v o l v e a m o r e equitable basis for c o o p e r a t i o n . O u t
o f that e m e r g e d the E a s t A f r i c a n T r e a t y for C o o p e r a t i o n , a n e w
a g r e e m e n t , s i g n e d in D e c e m b e r 1967 b e t w e e n three s o v e r e i g n
i n d e p e n d e n t states s e e k i n g t o re-establish the o l d e c o n o m i c
a s s o c i a t i o n f r o m w h i c h t h e y all d e r i v e d s t r e n g t h o n a m o r e
equitable and acceptable basis.
In spite o f the statesmanship o f that decision, the 1970s s a w the
s t e a d y g r o w t h o f d i s i n t e g r a t i v e p r e s s u r e s f r o m w i t h i n e a c h state.
U g a n d a n s , K e n y a n s and T a n z a n i a n s m a d e d e m a n d s u p o n their
g o v e r n m e n t s w h i c h required a national rather than an inter
national solution. F o r e i g n migrant labour, for example, became a
t h r e a t t o c i t i z e n s s e e k i n g e m p l o y m e n t : K e n y a n s w h o h a d tra
ditionally s o u g h t e m p l o y m e n t in U g a n d a b e c a m e ' alien A f r i c a n s ' ,
as d i d U g a n d a n s i n K e n y a , o r K e n y a n s i n T a n z a n i a . T h e m o s t
serious pressures u p o n the n e w East African C o m m u n i t y e m e r g e d
after t h e U g a n d a c o u p . O n t h e o n e h a n d T a n z a n i a ' s r e f u s a l t o
r e c o g n i s e G e n e r a l A m i n as H e a d o f S t a t e m e a n t t h a t t h e E a s t
African A u t h o r i t y , the e x e c u t i v e b o d y c o m p o s e d o f the three
heads o f state, w a s u n a b l e t o m e e t . O n the o t h e r h a n d U g a n d a ' s
454

g r o w i n g isolation p r o d u c e d n e w difficulties for c o n t i n u i n g e c o

n o m i c c o o p e r a t i o n . I n 1 9 7 2 A m i n ' s e x p u l s i o n o f all A s i a n s ,
c i t i z e n s as w e l l as n o n - c i t i z e n s , as p a r t o f h i s ' e c o n o m i c w a r ' ,
had serious repercussions e l s e w h e r e in the r e g i o n ; b u t m o r e
serious w a s the abortive invasion o f U g a n d a attempted b y former
President O b o t e ' s s u p p o r t e r s f r o m T a n z a n i a in S e p t e m b e r o f that
year. M o s t fundamental, h o w e v e r , w e r e the g r o w i n g differences
o f o u t l o o k b e t w e e n t h e t h r e e s t a t e s . N a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s as p e r c e i v e d
b y l e a d e r s s e e k i n g t o satisfy t h e i r c i t i z e n s ' a s p i r a t i o n s p u l l e d t h e
t h r e e s t a t e s a p a r t , a n d b y 1 9 7 5 t h e s e h a d m a d e it a g o o d d e a l m o r e
difficult t o c o n t e m p l a t e t h e r e g i o n a l s t r a t e g y f o r d e v e l o p m e n t o n
w h i c h ultimately the C o m m u n i t y ' s future d e p e n d e d . T h e C o m
munity's attempts to regulate c o m p e t i t i o n for resources w i t h i n the
region increasingly foundered o n the d o m e s t i c pressures exerted
u p o n national leaders w i t h i n e a c h state. W h i l e there w a s an
increasing and understandable t e n d e n c y to identify the differences
b e t w e e n t h e t h r e e states i n t e r m s o f t h e i r i d e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n s ,
t h e r o o t o f t h e i r d i s s e n s i o n w a s in t h e final a n a l y s i s t h e c o m p e t i t i o n
for scarce r e s o u r c e s b e t w e e n states w i t h significant disparities o f
e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t as w e l l as d i f f e r i n g p o l i t i c a l a s p i r a t i o n s
and priorities.
T h e central f o c u s o f inter-state relations in C e n t r a l A f r i c a in the
post-colonial years remained the struggle for i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m
w h i t e - m i n o r i t y r u l e in t h e s o u t h . R h o d e s i a ' s U D I h i g h l i g h t e d
Z a m b i a ' s c r i t i c a l p o s i t i o n as a f r o n t l i n e s t a t e , s e e k i n g t o b r e a k t h e
e c o n o m i c dominance o f South Africa and reorient her e c o n o m i c
as w e l l as h e r p o l i t i c a l l i n k s t o t h e n o r t h . A s e a r l y as 1 9 6 2 U N I P ' s
party manifesto had included a c o m m i t m e n t to build a railway to
East Africa. T h e T a n Z a m railway, l i n k i n g the C o p p e r b e l t to the
East African coast, built w i t h Chinese assistance b e t w e e n 1967
and 1 9 7 5 , w a s thus a significant l a n d m a r k in inter-state relations
for the region. B u t b y the time the T A N Z A M railway w a s
finished in 1 9 7 5 , Z a m b i a had paid a h i g h price for her stand
a g a i n s t R h o d e s i a a n d h e r c o n s i s t e n t s u p p o r t o f s a n c t i o n s as w e l l
as o f t h e l i b e r a t i o n m o v e m e n t s . H e r e c o n o m y h a d s u f f e r e d
increasingly f r o m the constraints i m p o s e d u p o n her b y her land
locked position, and her security w a s o n successive occasions
e n d a n g e r e d b y h e r c o n s i s t e n t s u p p o r t as t h e f r o n t l i n e s t a t e f o r t h e
liberation m o v e m e n t s .
P A F M E C S A d i s a p p e a r e d as e a c h p a r t i c i p a t i n g c o l o n y g a i n e d
455

independence, but a n e w organisation o f East and Central African

heads o f state, a n d heads o f g o v e r n m e n t m e e t i n g s , a t t e m p t e d
to create a n e w institutional base for regional relations and
to coordinate their policies, especially o n southern Africa. T h e
L u s a k a Manifesto o f 1969 m a d e their position o n southern Africa
c l e a r , b a s e d as it w a s o n a r e j e c t i o n o f r a c i a l i s m a n d a c o m m i t m e n t
t o n o n - r a c i a l g o v e r n m e n t ; b u t w h e r e a s it w a s t h e n h o p e d t h a t a
peaceful solution to the p r o b l e m s o f the white-ruled south m i g h t
be found, the M o g a d i s h u Declaration o f 1971 a c k n o w l e d g e d there
w a s n o w a y left f o r l i b e r a t i o n e x c e p t t h r o u g h a r m e d s t r u g g l e ; a
p o s i t i o n t o w h i c h all states s a v e M a l a w i c o m m i t t e d t h e m s e l v e s .
Paradoxically the continuing c o m m i t m e n t to the liberation o f
southern Africa and the active support g i v e n to the liberation
m o v e m e n t s i m p o s e d serious and increasing strains u p o n the
relations b e t w e e n the n o w i n d e p e n d e n t states o f the r e g i o n . T h i s
r e f l e c t e d c h a n g i n g i d e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n s as w e l l as d i f f e r i n g
national interests. E c o n o m i c realities m a d e President B a n d a reject
a break w i t h white-ruled Africa, and M a l a w i established diplo
matic relations w i t h S o u t h A f r i c a in 1967 and P o r t u g a l in 1969. H i s
c o n c i l i a t o r y p o l i c y t o w a r d s t h e s o u t h , h o w e v e r m u c h it m i g h t b e
b a s e d u p o n a realistic assessment o f the constraints o f d e p e n d e n c y ,
nevertheless earned h i m a g o o d deal o f o p p r o b r i u m f r o m his
neighbours, and o n successive occasions meetings o f the East and
Central A f r i c a n heads o f state s a w an a t t e m p t t o e x p e l M a l a w i
from that b o d y .
Z a m b i a , T a n z a n i a a n d U g a n d a d r e w c l o s e r t o g e t h e r in the late
1960s, i n w h a t w a s k n o w n as t h e M u l u n g u s h i C l u b , i n f o r m a l
m e e t i n g s o f l e a d e r s at p a r t y c o n f e r e n c e s , w h i c h t o o k p l a c e
4
between 1967 and 1973. T h e 1971 c o u p b r o u g h t U g a n d a ' s
association to an end for the time b e i n g . M o r e o v e r the need t o
coordinate their policies o n R h o d e s i a , especially f r o m 1974, meant
that the C l u b itself w a s superseded b y a similarly informal alliance
o f front-line states: Z a m b i a , T a n z a n i a , M o z a m b i q u e and B o t s w a n a
and later A n g o l a . T h e c h a n g e s in s o u t h e r n A f r i c a f o l l o w i n g the
P o r t u g u e s e c o u p in 1974 meant therefore that the focus o f
i n t e r s t a t e r e l a t i o n s m o v e d m o r e firmly t o t h e s o u t h .
Rhodesia e v a d e d a solution, notwithstanding successive talks
b e t w e e n the minority r e g i m e and a British g o v e r n m e n t not un
f a i r l y d e s c r i b e d b y Z a m b i a ' s H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r t o L o n d o n as
a ' t o o t h l e s s b u l l d o g ' . B y the m i d - 1 9 7 0 s m u c h o f the failure had
456

to be attributed to the internal crises w i t h i n the Zimbabwean

m o v e m e n t s i n e x i l e . U p t o 1973 the incipient guerrilla w a r had
b e e n militarily u n i m p r e s s i v e , n o t least b e c a u s e o f the conflicts
w i t h i n the t w o Z i m b a b w e a n m o v e m e n t s , Z A N U and ZAPU.
Nevertheless the Portuguese coup of 1974 and the end of
P o r t u g u e s e rule in A n g o l a and M o z a m b i q u e a year later consti
t u t e d a f u n d a m e n t a l w a t e r s h e d i n t h e fight a g a i n s t w h i t e d o m i
nation, and introduced a n e w , q u a l i t a t i v e l y different p h a s e in
inter-state relations in this r e g i o n .
457

C H A P T E R 9
THE HORN OF AFRICA*
M u c h m o r e t h a n m o s t p a r t s o f s u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a , t h e H o r n is
a r e g i o n w i t h a h i s t o r i c a l a n d c u l t u r a l i d e n t i t y o f its o w n , c r e a t e d
b y the interactions - and often t h e c o n f l i c t s - b e t w e e n its i n
d i g e n o u s peoples, rather than b y the imposition o f an external
c o l o n i a l i s m . T h e f o r c e s w h i c h s o d r a s t i c a l l y affected A f r i c a d u r i n g
the mid-twentieth century certainly had their impact o n the H o r n .
B u t this i m p a c t w a s m e d i a t e d t h r o u g h indigenous social and
p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m s w h i c h s o f t e n e d s o m e o f its effects, a n d a d a p t e d
it t o l o c a l f o r m s .
T H E S E T T I N G
T h e geographical configurations and historical d e v e l o p m e n t s

w h i c h e n d o w e d t h e H o r n w i t h its p e c u l i a r c h a r a c t e r h a v e b e e n
e x a m i n e d in earlier v o l u m e s in this series. In s u m m a r y , t h e y
c o m p r i s e the tensions b e t w e e n the social and political systems
derived from the central E t h i o p i a n highlands and those d e r i v e d
from the R e d Sea, G u l f o f A d e n and Indian O c e a n littoral, w i t h
a buffer z o n e o f g r e a t l y v a r y i n g w i d t h b e t w e e n the t w o . E t h n i c a l l y ,
these tensions d i v i d e the A m h a r a and T i g r e a n peoples o f the
highlands f r o m the n o m a d i c A f a r and S o m a l i o f the littoral, w i t h
t h e O r o m o ( G a l l a ) b y far t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t o f t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e
peoples. In religion, an a n a l o g o u s t h o u g h b y n o means identical
d i v i s i o n s e p a r a t e s t h e O r t h o d o x C h r i s t i a n h i g h l a n d s f r o m its
M u s l i m periphery. Politically the long-established E t h i o p i a n
state, w i t h a s t r e n g t h f o u n d e d o n a r a b l e a g r i c u l t u r e , h a s c o n
tinuously attempted to i m p o s e itself o n s u r r o u n d i n g peoples
with smaller or m o r e decentralised political structures.
T h e s e tensions did not c h a n g e w i t h the introduction into the
region either o f direct colonial rule, o r o f the technological, social
and e c o n o m i c concomitants o f E u r o p e a n penetration. M o s t
* T h e s p e l l i n g o f p r o p e r n a m e s in t h i s c h a p t e r is in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h c u r r e n t R o m a n
usage.
4 5 8

T H E S E T T I N G
24 Ethiopia, Somalia and the French Territory of the Afars and Issas.
i m p o r t a n t l y , t h e E t h i o p i a n e m p i r e w a s a b l e t o c o m b i n e its
indigenous capacity for large-scale military and administrative
o r g a n i s a t i o n w i t h t h e r a p i d a c q u i s i t i o n o f i m p o r t e d firearms i n
o r d e r b o t h t o m a i n t a i n its i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d t o e x p a n d its c o n t r o l
o v e r l a r g e areas t o the east, s o u t h and w e s t o f the h i g h l a n d c o r e .
A n A f r i c a n s t a t e t h u s r e m a i n e d i n d e p e n d e n t at t h e c e n t r e o f t h e
r e g i o n until the i n v a s i o n and c o n q u e s t o f E t h i o p i a b y Italy in
1 9 3 5 - 6 . A r o u n d it, t h e f r a g m e n t e d l i t t o r a l fell t o v a r i o u s c o l o n i a l
459

T H E H O R N OF A F R I C A
p o w e r s . T h e R e d Sea coast and the n o r t h e r n tip o f the E t h i o p i a n

plateau b e c a m e the Italian c o l o n y o f Eritrea. T h e short stretch
b e t w e e n the B a b - e l - M a n d e b and the G u l f o f Tajura w a s acquired
b y F r a n c e as t h e F r e n c h S o m a l i C o a s t ( C F S ) . T h e B r i t i s h
Somaliland Protectorate o c c u p i e d m o s t o f the Somali shore facing
the G u l f o f A d e n . A n d the Indian O c e a n coast d o w n to the
frontier w i t h British K e n y a b e c a m e Italian Somalia. N o n e o f these
t e r r i t o r i e s , h o w e v e r , w a s t o a c q u i r e a n y a p p r e c i a b l e i d e n t i t y o f its
o w n , a n d n o n e - at l e a s t u n t i l after t h e e n d o f o u r p e r i o d - w a s
to f o l l o w the path usual in other parts o f Africa b y d e v e l o p i n g
i n t o an i n d e p e n d e n t state w i t h i n the f o r m e r c o l o n i a l b o u n d a r i e s .
R e g i o n a l linkages - especially the pull o f Ethiopia o n the o n e
hand and o f Somali unification o n the other - w e r e to p r o v e t o o
strong.
A t the same time, d e v e l o p m e n t s w e r e taking place w h i c h c o u l d
n o t s i m p l y b e r e g a r d e d as e x t e n s i o n s o f t h e o l d r e g i o n a l r i v a l r i e s .
E u r o p e a n penetration created resources w h i c h could be used by
local actors to c h a n g e , drastically, the nature and location o f
political p o w e r . Western-style education w a s the m o s t o b v i o u s o f
these, but equally important w e r e the organisational technologies
w h i c h c o u l d b e used t o b u i l d p e r m a n e n t and differentiated
structures o f g o v e r n m e n t o f a sort w h i c h the E t h i o p i a n empire,
i n all its c e n t u r i e s o f e x i s t e n c e , h a d n e v e r b e e n a b l e t o d e v e l o p .
T h o s e w h o controlled these structures - w h e t h e r parties, bu
reaucracies or armies — b e c a m e the automatic wielders o f political
p o w e r , a n d w e r e able t o differentiate t h e m s e l v e s f r o m o t h e r
sections o f the p o p u l a t i o n . A n d e v e n t h o u g h the area remained,
e c o n o m i c a l l y , o n e o f the least d e v e l o p e d in A f r i c a , s o m e c h a n g e s
h a d a p p r e c i a b l e effects. T h e t h e m e o f t h i s c h a p t e r is t h e i n t e r a c t i o n
in the m i d d l e years o f the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y b e t w e e n these
i n n o v a t i o n s and the u n d e r l y i n g features o f the H o r n o f Africa.
A t the b e g i n n i n g o f o u r period, the w h o l e r e g i o n (except for
the F r e n c h enclave) had the fortuitous and transient unity
i m p o s e d b y Italian c o n q u e s t . T h e Italian o c c u p a t i o n o f E t h i o p i a
after t h e w a r o f 1 9 3 5 - 6 l e d t o t h e s e t t i n g u p o f a u n i f i e d
g o v e r n m e n t for the w h o l e o f Italian East Africa (Eritrea, E t h i o p i a
a n d S o m a l i a ) . T h i s w a s b a s e d at A d d i s A b a b a , a n d d i v i d e d i n t o
six p r o v i n c e s w i t h h e a d q u a r t e r s i n A s m a r a , G o n d a r , A d d i s
A b a b a , Jimma, Harar and M o g a d i s h u . In A u g u s t 1940, shortly
after I t a l y ' s e n t r y i n t o t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r , t h e I t a l i a n s a l s o
overran the British Somaliland Protectorate.
460

T H E S E T T I N G
T h e m a j o r l e g a c y o f this p e r i o d , in material t e r m s , w a s the

system o f roads w h i c h the Italian administration built t h r o u g h o u t
E t h i o p i a t o link w i t h t h o s e in Eritrea a n d - m o r e t e n u o u s l y -
Somalia. T h o u g h a l l o w e d to d e c a y d u r i n g the 1940s, they
remained h i g h l y important for the maintainance o f central c o n t r o l .
T h e political legacy w a s m o r e ambivalent. O n the o n e hand,
Italian c o n q u e s t h e l p e d t o stimulate a n e w sense o f E t h i o p i a n
nationalism, especially a m o n g s o m e o f those w h o had benefited
f r o m s e c o n d a r y e d u c a t i o n b e f o r e the Italian i n v a s i o n , w h i l e at the
same time breaking d o w n local a u t o n o m y m o r e ruthlessly than
an i n d i g e n o u s g o v e r n m e n t c o u l d h a v e d o n e . T h e E t h i o p i a n
resistance - the ' P a t r i o t s ' - h e l p e d t o sustain a b e l i e f in E t h i o p i a n
independence, e v e n t h o u g h the Patriot forces themselves w e r e
politically fragmented and localised in leadership and o u t l o o k . A s
against that, the Italians attempted t o m o b i l i s e local ethnic and
r e l i g i o u s i n t e r e s t s s o as t o w e a k e n t h e o l d h i g h l a n d h e g e m o n y .
T h e y e n c o u r a g e d I s l a m at t h e e x p e n s e o f O r t h o d o x C h r i s t i a n i t y
and, to the rudimentary extent that a non-participant political
s t r u c t u r e p e r m i t t e d , p r e s e n t e d t h e m s e l v e s as t h e p r o t e c t o r s o f
f o r m e r l y s u b j e c t p e o p l e s a g a i n s t A m h a r a d o m i n a t i o n . F o r t h e first
time, the great majority o f Somalis w e r e b r o u g h t under c o m m o n
rule.
I t a l y ' s e n t r y i n t o t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r , h o w e v e r , left t h e
Italian forces in the H o r n isolated f r o m the m e t r o p o l i t a n c o u n t r y ,
a m o n g a generally hostile p o p u l a t i o n . T h e rout o f the Italian
armies in N o r t h A f r i c a in D e c e m b e r 1940 c o m p l e t e d their
isolation, and released A l l i e d troops under British c o m m a n d for
an assault o n Italian East Africa. O n e a r m y i n v a d e d Eritrea f r o m
the Sudan, w h i l e another attacked Somalia f r o m K e n y a , and the
E m p e r o r H a i l e S e l a s s i e , w h o h a d flown f r o m e x i l e i n E n g l a n d t o
the S u d a n in D e c e m b e r 1940, entered E t h i o p i a t h r o u g h G o j j a m
p r o v i n c e w i t h a small A n g l o - S u d a n e s e and Ethiopian force. T h e
Italian forces w e r e s w i f t l y defeated, t h o u g h o n l y after h e a v y
fighting at K e r e n i n E r i t r e a , a n d t h e last I t a l i a n g a r r i s o n , i n
G o n d a r , surrendered in N o v e m b e r 1 9 4 1 .
T H E R E S T O R E D E T H I O P I A N E M P I R E , 1941—J2
T h e B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t h a d already m a d e clear, in F e b r u a r y 1 9 4 1 ,
t h a t it w o u l d w e l c o m e the reappearance o f an independent
E t h i o p i a n state, a n d w o u l d r e c o g n i s e H a i l e Selassie's c l a i m t o the
461

throne. Haile Selassie m a d e g o o d this c l a i m b y his p r e s e n c e o n

the spot and the allegiance he received f r o m the principal Patriot
l e a d e r s . F i v e d a y s after e n t e r i n g A d d i s A b a b a , h e a s s e r t e d h i s
p o s i t i o n b y m a k i n g h i s first m i n i s t e r i a l a p p o i n t m e n t s . T h e r e
after, h e p r o c e e d e d s t e a d i l y t o e x t e n d h i s p o w e r at t h e e x p e n s e o f
any potential rival. Haile Selassie, w h o had b e c o m e regent o f
E t h i o p i a in 1 9 1 6 a n d e m p e r o r in 1 9 3 0 , w a s a l r e a d y n e a r l y 50 y e a r s
o l d w h e n h e r e t u r n e d t o h i s t h r o n e in 1 9 4 1 . H e w a s t o r u l e
E t h i o p i a f o r a n o t h e r 33 y e a r s , u n q u e s t i o n a b l y t h e o u t s t a n d i n g
i n d i v i d u a l in the H o r n t h r o u g h o u t this p e r i o d , a n d o n e o f the best
k n o w n a n d r e s p e c t e d A f r i c a n s i n t h e c o n t i n e n t as a w h o l e as w e l l
as o u t s i d e it, n o t least as ' R a s T a f a r i ' . T h a t h e w a s o u s t e d f r o m
p o w e r in t h e m i d - 1 9 7 0 s is n o t p e r h a p s s o r e m a r k a b l e as t h e f a c t
t h a t h e h e l d it s o l o n g . O n l y p a r t l y c o u l d t h i s fact b e a s c r i b e d t o
t h e t r a d i t i o n a l l e g i t i m a c y o f t h e i m p e r i a l o f f i c e : e m p e r o r s in t h e
past had been u n d e r constant threat f r o m w o u l d - b e rivals, and
H a i l e S e l a s s i e g a i n e d p o w e r , as h e l o s t it, b y coup d'etat. It w a s
d u e q u i t e as m u c h t o h i s o w n p o l i t i c a l s k i l l s , w h i c h h a d e n a b l e d
h i m t o g a i n first t h e r e g e n c y a n d t h e n t h e t h r o n e f r o m a
c o m p a r a t i v e l y junior p o s i t i o n in the imperial family. H i s particular
s t r e n g t h w a s in r e c o g n i s i n g p o t e n t i a l l y d a n g e r o u s s o u r c e s o f
political influence, and in r e d u c i n g these to d e p e n d e n c e o n h i m
b y p l a y i n g o f f r i v a l f a c t i o n s a n d i n d i v i d u a l s . It e n a b l e d h i m t o
accommodate himself both to changing circumstances within
E t h i o p i a and to the complexities o f international politics, until he
w a s into his eighties.
H i s first t a s k i n 1 9 4 1 w a s t o r e g u l a t e h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e
British military forces, w h i c h effectively c o n t r o l l e d the c o u n t r y
p e n d i n g the formation o f a civil administration. T h i s w a s achieved
b y the A n g l o - E t h i o p i a n A g r e e m e n t o f January 1942, u n d e r w h i c h
Britain recognised E t h i o p i a n independence, but retained special
p r i v i l e g e s w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e d in E t h i o p i a n eyes an irritating slight
o n national s o v e r e i g n t y . T h e s e included the p r o v i s i o n that n o
foreign advisers be appointed w i t h o u t British g o v e r n m e n t c o n
sent, and that a British j u d g e s h o u l d hear any c o u r t case i n v o l v i n g
f o r e i g n e r s . T h i s s p e c i a l s t a t u s w a s a b a n d o n e d in a s e c o n d a g r e e
m e n t o f D e c e m b e r 1 9 4 4 , t h o u g h B r i t a i n still c o n t i n u e d t o
administer the S o m a l i - i n h a b i t e d H a u d and O g a d e n areas o f
s o u t h - e a s t E t h i o p i a . T h e r e c r u i t m e n t o f f o r e i g n a d v i s e r s - at first
British and subsequently o f several nationalities, including notably
462

T H E R E S T O R E D E T H I O P I A N E M P I R E
a number o f Americans - had been intended to promote the

extension o f the administrative reforms w h i c h Haile Selassie h a d
i n i t i a t e d b e f o r e 1 9 3 5 . T o s o m e e x t e n t , it d i d . M u c h o f t h e f o r m a l
administrative structure dating from the liberation period w a s t o
r e m a i n i n f o r c e o v e r t h e s u b s e q u e n t t h r e e d e c a d e s . A n official
g o v e r n m e n t g a z e t t e , Negarit Ga%eta w a s e s t a b l i s h e d f o r t h e
y
p u b l i c a t i o n o f a p p o i n t m e n t s , l e g i s l a t i o n a n d o t h e r official n o t i c e s .
T h e p o w e r s o f g o v e r n m e n t ministries w e r e defined in 1943, and
other imperial orders at the same p e r i o d regulated p r o v i n c i a l
g o v e r n m e n t , t h e j u d i c i a r y , a n d t h e official s t a t u s o f t h e O r t h o d o x
C h u r c h . A start w a s m a d e at f o r m a l b u d g e t i n g . B u t t h e s e
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a r r a n g e m e n t s m a d e little d i f f e r e n c e t o t h e e f f e c t i v e
allocation o f political p o w e r , w h i c h remained tightly concentrated
in t h e e m p e r o r ' s h a n d s . T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t g o v e r n m e n t a g e n c y
o f t h e 1940s a n d e a r l y 1 9 5 0 s w a s t h e office o f t h e e m p e r o r ' s
s e c r e t a r y , t h e tsahafe teât^ w h o u n d e r h i s n e w title o f M i n i s t e r
o f the P e n w a s responsible for sending o u t the imperial orders
o n w h i c h the administration entirely d e p e n d e d . T h e h o l d e r o f this
office f r o m 1 9 4 1 t o 1 9 5 5 , T s a h a f e T e z a z W a l d a - G i y o r g i s , w a s
Haile Selassie's closest confidant, a n d the principal manipulator
o f the court factions w h i c h m a n o e u v r e d for place and influence
under the throne. T h e prime minister o f the period, R a s B i t w o d e d
M a k o n n e n E n d a l k a c h e w , w a s b y c o n t r a s t little m o r e t h a n a
1
dignified figurehead.
W h i l e the re-establishment o f imperial control at the centre w a s
a comparatively straightforward matter, the provinces presented
m o r e o f a p r o b l e m . M a n y o f them, especially in the north, had
well-established traditions o f local a u t o n o m y , a n d in m a n y areas
also the Patriot leaders retained appreciable f o l l o w i n g s . Dissatis
fied f o r m e r P a t r i o t s w e r e t o l e a d m o s t o f t h e o p p o s i t i o n
m o v e m e n t s against H a i l e Selassie in t h e 1940s a n d early 1950s.
T h e e m p e r o r ' s first m o v e w a s t o s y s t e m a t i s e t h e p a t c h w o r k o f
p r e - w a r g o v e r n a t e s i n t o 1 2 p r o v i n c e s , d i v i d e d i n t o s o m e 75
s u b - p r o v i n c e s , a p p o i n t m e n t s t o all o f w h i c h w e r e m a d e f r o m t h e
centre. T h e g o v e r n o r s w e r e deprived o f military initiative b y the
creation o f a central standing army in place o f the o l d provincial
l e v i e s , a n d o f financial c o n t r o l b y a c e n t r a l i s e d t a x c o l l e c t i o n a n d
e x p e n d i t u r e s t r u c t u r e . H o w e v e r , it w a s still n e c e s s a r y t o a p p o i n t
to some o f the governorships m e n w i t h local prestige and
1
C . C l a p h a m , Halle-Selassie's government ( L o n d o n , 1969), 1 1 0 - 7 .
463

T H E H O R N O F A F R I C A
c o n n e x i o n s . T h e first t r o u b l e s a r o s e i n 1 9 4 2 i n G o j j a m , a n A m h a r a
p r o v i n c e and centre o f Patriot resistance, a n d w e r e led b y a
Patriot, D e j a z m a c h Belay Zeleke, w h o w a s evidently displeased
with the sub-provincial governorship w h i c h he had been given,
but could also d r a w o n discontents w i t h the n e w taxation system.
H i s rebellion w a s defeated w i t h o u t difficulty, b u t t o secure local
quiescence taxation w a s restored t o the pre-war level. T h e T i g r e
r e b e l l i o n o f 1942—3 w a s m o r e s e r i o u s , b o t h b e c a u s e it r e c e i v e d
m u c h greater s u p p o r t , a n d b e c a u s e s o m e o f its leaders aspired t o
separate f r o m E t h i o p i a a n d unite w i t h Eritrea, then u n d e r British
military administration. G o v e r n m e n t t r o o p s sent t o c o n t r o l the
u p r i s i n g w e r e c u t off, a n d r e s c u e d o n l y after b o m b i n g b y B r i t i s h
1
aircraft b a s e d in A d e n . I n s o u t h e r n E t h i o p i a , t h e central
g o v e r n m e n t h a d a f r e e r h a n d t o e s t a b l i s h its o w n n o m i n e e s , a n d
g o v e r n o r s h i p s c o u l d b e u s e d as r e w a r d s f o r i m p e r i a l p r o t e g e s o r
n o r t h e r n Patriots w h o m it w i s h e d t o r e m o v e f r o m their h o m e
bases. M u c h o f the exploitation w h i c h h a d characterised earlier
E t h i o p i a n administration in the area c o n t i n u e d , m o s t n o t o r i o u s
b e i n g the acquisition o f land b y R a s Mesfin Sileshi, g o v e r n o r o f
K a f f a p r o v i n c e f r o m 1 9 4 6 t o 195 5.
T H E P E R I P H E R A L A D M I N I S T R A T I O N S
T h e I t a l i a n c o l l a p s e i n t h e H o r n left t h e w h o l e a r e a ( e x c e p t f o r
the F r e n c h S o m a l i Coast) u n d e r British c o n t r o l , a n d o n c e
E t h i o p i a n i n d e p e n d e n c e h a d b e e n r e - e s t a b l i s h e d , B r i t a i n w a s left
with responsibility for the periphery. British military adminis
trations w e r e established in Eritrea, former Italian S o m a l i a , a n d
British S o m a l i l a n d , w i t h an A d m i n i s t r a t o r at Jigjiga, in E t h i o p i a ,
in c h a r g e o f t h e S o m a l i - i n h a b i t e d areas o f E t h i o p i a w h i c h h a d
been reserved for British administration. After the w a r , the
military administrations w e r e gradually replaced b y civilian ones,
but the q u e s t i o n o f w h a t s h o u l d b e d o n e w i t h the f o r m e r Italian
colonies remained open. Their disposal w a s undertaken b y the
four 'great p o w e r s ' - the U S A , U S S R , Britain and France - w h o ,
f a i l i n g t o a g r e e , left i t t o t h e G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y o f t h e U n i t e d
N a t i o n s . E s s e n t i a l l y , t h e r e w e r e t w o a l t e r n a t i v e s . T h e first,
association in s o m e form w i t h Ethiopia, w a s energetically pressed
b y t h e E t h i o p i a n g o v e r n m e n t f o r S o m a l i a as w e l l a s f o r E r i t r e a .
1
P. G i l k e s , The dying lion ( L o n d o n , 1975), 1 8 7 - 9 1 .
464

O v e r and a b o v e the f o r m a l reasons g i v e n for this c l a i m - the

alleged historic boundaries o f Ethiopia, the invasions from the
I t a l i a n c o l o n i e s i n 1896 a n d 1935, t h e d e s i r e f o r a c c e s s t o t h e s e a - it
reflected an intensely held historic m i s s i o n t o maintain and e x t e n d
the frontiers o f the state, w h i c h H a i l e Selassie shared w i t h his
p r e d e c e s s o r s as e m p e r o r a n d r u l e r o f S h o a , as w e l l as w i t h h i s
military successors. T h e s e c o n d w a s s o m e f o r m o f trusteeship,
l e a d i n g e v e n t u a l l y t o i n d e p e n d e n c e . I n t h e e v e n t , o n e t e r r i t o r y fell
into each category.
In Eritrea, the question w a s complicated b y the territory's
ethnic and religious divisions, and b y the connexions b e t w e e n
these and outside actors. T h e r e w e r e strong historic links b e t w e e n
the highland Christians, w h o comprised a b o u t half o f the p o p u
lation, and Ethiopia, and the Unionist Party (favouring union
w i t h E t h i o p i a ) w a s first i n t h e field. I t w a s h e a v i l y s u p p o r t e d b y
t h e E t h i o p i a n g o v e r n m e n t , a n d o r g a n i s e d at l o c a l l e v e l t h r o u g h
the O r t h o d o x C h u r c h . Christian support for u n i o n w i t h E t h i o p i a
w a s h o w e v e r offset b y t h e a n c i e n t r i v a l r y b e t w e e n t h e T i g r e a n
northern part o f the E t h i o p i a n plateau and the A m h a r a and
especially S h o a n south, w h i c h controlled the Ethiopian g o v e r n
ment. T h i s a m b i v a l e n c e w a s e m b o d i e d in the Christian Separatists,
later called the L i b e r a l P r o g r e s s i v e P a r t y ( L P P ) , w h o w a n t e d an
independent Eritrea, ideally in association w i t h the T i g r e p r o v i n c e
o f Ethiopia. T h e M u s l i m g r o u p s w h i c h comprised the other half
o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n c o a l e s c e d i n 1946 i n t o t h e M u s l i m L e a g u e ,
w h i c h l i k e w i s e c a m p a i g n e d for i n d e p e n d e n c e , and briefly joined
w i t h t h e L P P i n 1949-50 t o f o r m t h e I n d e p e n d e n c e B l o c . T h e B l o c
s o o n fragmented, h o w e v e r , and the Unionists w e r e able to present
a s t r o n g e n o u g h front t o help the G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y decide, in
D e c e m b e r 1950, t h a t E r i t r e a s h o u l d b e f e d e r a t e d w i t h E t h i o p i a
under the sovereignty o f the Ethiopian C r o w n . T h e L P P leader,
W o l d e a b W o l d e m a r i a m , and several M u s l i m politicians, w e n t into
e x i l e . T h e f e d e r a l a r r a n g e m e n t s c a m e i n t o effect i n S e p t e m b e r
1952, w i t h t h e E t h i o p i a n g o v e r n m e n t a s s u m i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r
d e f e n c e , c u r r e n c y a n d e x t e r n a l affairs, w h i l e a l o c a l l y e l e c t e d
g o v e r n m e n t in A s m a r a , headed initially b y the U n i o n i s t leader
T e d l a B a y r u , held residual p o w e r s .
W h i l e the main p r o b l e m in Eritrea w a s the territory's frag
m e n t a t i o n b e t w e e n h o s t i l e g r o u p s , i n S o m a l i a it w a s q u i t e t h e
o p p o s i t e : the spread o f Somalis across several territories. Since
465

the Somali-inhabited parts o f E t h i o p i a remained u n d e r British

administration b y the 1944 A g r e e m e n t , the administrative unit
established b y the Italians w a s n o t upset. T h e British adminis
tration w a s for the m o s t part willingly received b y the Somalis, b o t h
as a d e l i v e r a n c e f r o m F a s c i s m a n d b e c a u s e o f t h e s t r o n g S o m a l i
s y m p a t h i e s o f m a n y o f t h e officials i n v o l v e d i n i t , a n d a S o m a l i
p o l i c e force w a s recruited u n d e r B r i t i s h officers. D i s t r i c t a n d
p r o v i n c i a l a d v i s o r y councils w e r e created in 1946, a n d a n u m b e r
o f clubs and associations w e r e f o r m e d t o express S o m a l i aspira
tions, m o s t important b e i n g the Somali Y o u t h C l u b o p e n e d in
M a y 1943. W h e n the disposal o f Italian Somalia c a m e u p before
the four p o w e r s in 1946, the British F o r e i g n Secretary, Ernest
B e v i n , s u g g e s t e d that the existing u n i o n o f Somali territories b e
continued b y creating a trusteeship, preferably under British
supervision. T h i s ' B e v i n Plan', frequently to be i n v o k e d b y
supporters o f Somali unification, found n o f a v o u r w i t h the other
t h r e e p o w e r s - w h o r e g a r d e d it m e r e l y a s a p r e t e x t f o r e x t e n d i n g
British control - and w a s v i g o r o u s l y o p p o s e d b y Ethiopia. Since
Britain h a d a c k n o w l e d g e d E t h i o p i a n s o v e r e i g n t y in the H a u d a n d
O g a d e n r e g i o n s , t h e r e w a s little s h e c o u l d d o t o s a t i s f y t h e S o m a l i
aspirations w h i c h the B e v i n Plan had aroused, and in September
1948 t h e s e r e g i o n s w e r e t r a n s f e r r e d t o E t h i o p i a n c o n t r o l . T h e
p r o v i s i o n a l administrative line established b y the British b e c a m e ,
in t h e a b s e n c e o f a n y d e m a r c a t e d b o u n d a r y , t h e de facto f r o n t i e r
b e t w e e n E t h i o p i a a n d S o m a l i a . T h e d i s p o s a l o f S o m a l i a itself,
m e a n w h i l e , w a s referred t o the G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y o f the United
N a t i o n s , w h i c h decided in N o v e m b e r 1 9 4 9 - i n defiance o f the
w i s h e s o f m o s t S o m a l i s - t o e n t r u s t it f o r t e n y e a r s t o I t a l i a n
trusteeship. T h e S o m a l i territories w e r e thus o n c e more
1
dismembered.
T h e last a n d l e a s t s i g n i f i c a n t o f t h e m a l l , t h e F r e n c h S o m a l i
Coast, w a s i n v o l v e d o n l y v e r y indirectly w i t h these d e v e l o p m e n t s .
Its g o v e r n o r s s u c c e e d e d i n m a i n t a i n i n g i t s a u t o n o m y f r o m b o t h
t h e I t a l i a n s a n d t h e B r i t i s h i n 1 9 4 0 - 2 , t h o u g h it c h a n g e d a l l e g i a n c e
from the V i c h y g o v e r n m e n t t o the Free French in D e c e m b e r 1942.
After the w a r , the absolute authority o f the French g o v e r n o r w a s
modified b y the formation o f a Representative Council, to w h i c h
members w e r e partly appointed, and partly elected o n an extremely
restricted franchise. Seats in the c o u n c i l w e r e restricted, t o o , t o
1
I. M . L e w i s , The modern history of Somaliland ( L o n d o n , 1965), 1 1 6 - 3 8 .
466

m e m b e r s o f specified ethnic g r o u p s - F r e n c h m e n , A f a r s , A r a b s
a n d I s s a - S o m a l i s - a n d t h i s a r r a n g e m e n t p e r s i s t e d e v e n after t h e
a p p o i n t m e n t o f m e m b e r s w a s a b o l i s h e d i n 1 9 5 0 . It h e l p e d t o
ensure that politics in the territory w e r e closely b o u n d u p w i t h
local ethnic rivalries, and scarcely concerned w i t h w i d e r d e v e l o p
1
m e n t s in t h e r e g i o n as a w h o l e .
P O L I T I C I S A T I O N A N D ITS O U T C O M E
T h r o u g h o u t s u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a , t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r a n d its
aftermath helped, directly o r indirectly, to f o m e n t the g r o w t h in
African political awareness w h i c h led to the formation o f
nationalist m o v e m e n t s and ultimately to independence. In the
H o r n , w h i c h a l o n e in B l a c k A f r i c a w a s actually f o u g h t o v e r
d u r i n g t h e w a r , t h e effects m i g h t h a v e b e e n e x p e c t e d t o b e
especially m a r k e d . S o , in m a n y w a y s , t h e y w e r e . H o w e v e r , w h i l e
m a n y o f t h e b a s i c p r o c e s s e s at w o r k w e r e v e r y s i m i l a r t o t h o s e
in o t h e r p a r t s o f t h e c o n t i n e n t , t h e s e n e c e s s a r i l y i n t e r a c t e d b o t h
w i t h the u n d e r l y i n g conflicts in the r e g i o n and w i t h the a d m i n
istrative structures already outlined. T h e results w e r e varied. In
s o m e parts o f the r e g i o n , the g r o w t h o f political awareness c o u l d
be directed t h r o u g h existing structures to p r o d u c e an o u t c o m e
w h i c h reflected the aspirations o f the p e o p l e s c o n c e r n e d ; here, the
channels o f politicisation m i g h t b e said to b e ' o p e n ' . In o t h e r
territories, they w e r e ' c l o s e d ' b y structures w h i c h intervened
either to p r e v e n t political awareness from arising, or to p r e v e n t
it f r o m f u l f i l l i n g t h e a s p i r a t i o n s t o w h i c h it w a s d i r e c t e d , a n d
w h i c h led eventually to violence.
T h e clearest e x a m p l e o f o p e n politicisation w a s in Somalia and
B r i t i s h S o m a l i l a n d , w h e r e t h e first s t i r r i n g s o f m o d e r n S o m a l i
n a t i o n a l i s m w e r e e v i d e n t s o o n after t h e I t a l i a n d e f e a t . A m e a s u r e
o f S o m a l i c o n s c i o u s n e s s and o p p o s i t i o n to alien rule had b e e n
present t h r o u g h o u t the colonial period, m o s t o b v i o u s l y in the
c
campaigns o f Sayyid M u h a m m a d A b d i l l e Hasan. In the p o s t - w a r
p e r i o d , t h i s w a s f a n n e d b y t h e e v e n t s w h i c h b r o u g h t a l m o s t all
S o m a l i territories u n d e r c o m m o n rule, and r e o p e n e d the q u e s t i o n
o f their disposition. T h e n e w m o v e m e n t , w h i c h m a y be dated
f r o m the f o u n d a t i o n o f the S o m a l i Y o u t h C l u b in 1 9 4 3 , differed
1
V . T h o m p s o n a n d R . A d l o r T , Djibouti and the Horn of Africa ( S t a n f o r d , 1968), 38-45,
467

f r o m t h e o l d i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t m e a n s t h r o u g h w h i c h it
p u r s u e d its e n d s , i n its r e a d i n e s s t o a c c e p t i n n o v a t i o n s s u c h as
western education w h i c h traditionalists had regarded w i t h sus
p i c i o n , a n d i n its c o n s c i o u s a t t e m p t t o r e p u d i a t e t h e c l a n d i v i s i o n s
o n w h i c h nomadic Somali society w a s based. T h e club's support
spread rapidly, especially a m o n g educated Somalis, and b y the
t i m e it c h a n g e d its n a m e t o t h e S o m a l i Y o u t h L e a g u e ( S Y L ) i n
1947 it h a d a d h e r e n t s t h r o u g h o u t t h e S o m a l i t e r r i t o r i e s , i n c l u d i n g
the H a u d and O g a d e n and north-east K e n y a . In k e e p i n g w i t h the
e g a l i t a r i a n s p i r i t o f S o m a l i n o m a d i s m , it h a d n o s i n g l e d o m i n a n t
leader, u n l i k e m o s t nationalist m o v e m e n t s e l s e w h e r e in the
continent.
Inevitably, the S Y L c a m e to be associated w i t h s o m e g r o u p s
m o r e than others in S o m a l i society, and especially w i t h the D a r o d
w h o , as t h e l a r g e s t a n d m o s t w i d e l y s p r e a d o f t h e S o m a l i c l a n
f a m i l i e s , h a d t h e g r e a t e s t c o n c e r n f o r u n i f i c a t i o n . T h i s left t h e w a y
o p e n for the formation o f other parties based o n sectarian interests,
the m o s t important o f w h i c h in S o m a l i a itself w a s the H i z b i a
D i g i l - M i r i f l e S o m a l i ( H D M S ) f o u n d e d i n 1947 t o r e p r e s e n t t h e
sedentary D i g i l and R a h a n w e y n peoples o f the J u b a and Shebele
basin. A n u m b e r o f small pro-Italian g r o u p s w e r e also f o r m e d ,
w i t h active Italian s u p p o r t , t o press for the restoration o f S o m a l i a
to Italy. T h e S Y L had s t r o n g l y o p p o s e d Italian trusteeship, and
several clashes b e t w e e n the L e a g u e and the n e w Italian admin
i s t r a t i o n t o o k p l a c e b e t w e e n 1950 a n d 1952. H o w e v e r , t h e I t a l i a n s
w e r e strictly limited b y the terms o f their trusteeship, w h i c h w a s
t o last for o n l y t e n y e a r s , a n d b o t h sides e v e n t u a l l y realised t h e
benefits o f c o o p e r a t i o n . T h e a d v i s o r y territorial c o u n c i l f o r m e d
i n 1950 w a s t r a n s f o r m e d i n 1956 i n t o a n e l e c t e d l e g i s l a t u r e . T e n
o f t h e 70 s e a t s w e r e r e s e r v e d f o r s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s , a n d o f t h e
r e m a i n d e r t h e S Y L w o n 43 a n d t h e H D M S 13. T h e S Y L f o r m e d
a g o v e r n m e n t under 'Abdillahi 'Ise from the H a w i y e clan family.
A f t e r t h i s s u c c e s s , t h e S Y L w a s a b l e t o e x p a n d its s u p p o r t
a m o n g t h e D i g i l a n d R h a n w e y n g r o u p s . B u t as w i t h m a n y o t h e r
s u c c e s s f u l p a r t i e s , t h e m o r e its s u p p o r t e r s i n c r e a s e d , t h e g r e a t e r
t h e d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n it b e c a m e . T h e s e d i v i s i o n s e n c o m p a s s e d t h e
w h o l e range o f issues facing Somalia, i n c l u d i n g clan rivalries,
attitudes t o w a r d s Somali unification and the S o m a l i script, and
relations w i t h the A r a b w o r l d . T h e y w e r e increased rather than
d i m i n i s h e d b y t h e 1959 e l e c t i o n s , w h i c h s a w t h e S Y L w i n 83 o u t
468

o f 90 seats i n arl e n l a r g e d A s s e m b l y a n d i n c o r p o r a t e m a n y f o r m e r
m e m b e r s o f t h e H D M S . H o w e v e r , S o m a l i s w e r e at l e a s t a b l e t o
discuss these issues w i t h i n a constitutional structure w h i c h
represented them, a n d w h i c h they h a d a large share in d e v i s i n g .
W i t h i n British Somaliland there w a s none o f the u r g e n c y
imparted b y the ten-year trusteeship in Somalia, and in b o t h
political and social d e v e l o p m e n t s the territory tended t o l a g
behind. T h e S Y L spread into the territory and w a s especially
s t r o n g a m o n g the D a r o d clans in the east, b u t the d o m i n a n t party
was the Somaliland National L e a g u e ( S N L ) , w h o s e strength lay
a m o n g m e m b e r s o f the Isaq clan family w h i c h c o m p r i s e d m o s t
o f the population. N o b u r n i n g issue appeared t o f o m e n t political
p a r t i c i p a t i o n u n t i l 1 9 5 4 , w h e n t h e r e l i n q u i s h i n g o f t h e last
v e s t i g e s o f B r i t i s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n t h e H a u d left t h e g r a z i n g
lands o n w h i c h m a n y n o m a d s in the territory relied under
Ethiopian control. This caused an immediate outcry, and the
political consciousness w h i c h had been aroused did n o t disappear,
t h o u g h e v e n as l a t e a s 1 9 5 9 t h e L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l still h a d a
m a j o r i t y o f a p p o i n t e d official m e m b e r s . I n t h e F e b r u a r y i 9 6 0
e l e c t i o n s , t h e S N L g a i n e d 20 o f t h e 33 s e a t s , i t s a l l y t h e U n i t e d
Somali Party ( U S P ) 12 o f the remainder, and the S N L leader
M u h a m m a d Haji I b r a h i m Igal b e c a m e L e a d e r o f G o v e r n m e n t
Business. A l l parties f a v o u r e d unification w i t h Somalia in the
cause o f Somali unity, and there w a s considerable grass-roots
pressure f o r this t o take p l a c e as s o o n as p o s s i b l e . B r i t i s h
S o m a l i l a n d i n d e p e n d e n c e w a s h u r r i e d l y a c h i e v e d o n 26 J u n e
i960, and w h e n Somalia became independent o n the ending o f
Italian trusteeship o n 1 July, the t w o countries i m m e d i a t e l y united
as t h e S o m a l i R e p u b l i c . G o v e r n m e n t p o s t s w e r e d i s t r i b u t e d
a m o n g leading politicians f r o m b o t h territories, under the
premiership o f ' A b d al-Rashid ' A l i Shirmarke, a D a r o d S Y L
1
leader from the south.
F o r Somalis in other territories, this painless route t o nation
h o o d w a s n o t a v a i l a b l e . T h e fact t h a t E t h i o p i a w a s i n d e p e n d e n t
already, and K e n y a w a s eventually t o b e c o m e s o , w a s scarcely t o
the point. Somali aspirations w e r e n o t only * tribalist' - w h i c h did
n o t b a r t h e m f r o m political p a r t i c i p a t i o n , at a n y rate in K e n y a - b u t
separatist, w h i c h d i d . K e n y a lies o u t s i d e t h e s c o p e o f this c h a p t e r .
I n E t h i o p i a , s o m e efforts w e r e m a d e t o w i n a t l e a s t t h e s e m b l a n c e
1
L e w i s , Somaliland, 139-65.
469

o f support from locally resident Somalis, largely t h r o u g h the

m a n i p u l a t i o n o f factional disputes in w h i c h o n e side w o u l d
receive E t h i o p i a n s u p p o r t in e x c h a n g e for a declaration o f
allegiance. A f e w S o m a l i s r e c e i v e d g o v e r n m e n t j o b s in A d d i s
A b a b a or w e r e elected to the E t h i o p i a n parliament, and m a n y
m o r e w e r e g i v e n E t h i o p i a n titles. T h e m e a n s available for
e x p r e s s i n g political participation o f the k i n d that o b t a i n e d in
Somalia or British Somaliland did not, h o w e v e r , exist, and the
possibility o f a l l o w i n g the area to secede t o join the o t h e r S o m a l i
t e r r i t o r i e s , r e p u g n a n t as it w a s t o t h e h i s t o r i c n a t i o n a l m i s s i o n
w h i c h H a i l e S e l a s s i e felt h i m s e l f t o e m b o d y , w a s e n t i r e l y
excluded.
In the F r e n c h S o m a l i C o a s t , the political aspirations o f the Issa
Somalis remained for m a n y years detached from those o f the other
territories, and w e r e pressed t h r o u g h local institutions. T h e
territory v o t e d h e a v i l y t o r e m a i n w i t h F r a n c e in the 1958
R e f e r e n d u m , a n d the Issa leader w h o h a d c a m p a i g n e d for u n i o n
w i t h S o m a l i a , M u h a m m a d H a r b i , fled t o M o g a d i s h u . I n t h e
f o l l o w i n g years, the F r e n c h helped to bring A f a r s to p r o m i n e n c e
in territorial p o l i t i c s , s o that b y the t i m e the Issas h a d b e e n fully
mobilised to the cause o f S o m a l i nationalism they found the
possibility o f u n i o n w i t h the S o m a l i R e p u b l i c b l o c k e d b y an A f a r
majority, supported b y the French and Ethiopians w h o had a
c o m m o n interest in p r e v e n t i n g S o m a l i c o n t r o l o v e r the J i b u t i -
A d d i s A b a b a railway. Differences b e t w e e n Afars and Issa-Somalis
w e r e further polarised w h e n G e n e r a l de G a u l l e , visiting the
t e r r i t o r y in A u g u s t 1 9 6 6 , w a s c o n f r o n t e d b y S o m a l i d e m a n d s f o r
independence. H e reacted b y calling a referendum o n the
t e r r i t o r y ' s future in M a r c h 1 9 6 7 , in w h i c h the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , b y
m o b i l i s i n g the A f a r v o t e and e x p e l l i n g i m m i g r a n t S o m a l i s ,
s u c c e e d e d i n o b t a i n i n g a 61 p e r c e n t m a j o r i t y f o r r e m a i n i n g w i t h
F r a n c e . T h e territory, r e n a m e d the F r e n c h A f a r a n d Issa T e r r i t o r y
( T F A I ) , w a s g o v e r n e d b y this F r e n c h - A f a r alliance until 1 9 7 6 ,
w h e n t h e F r e n c h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n r e v e r s e d its p o l i c y b y s e e k i n g a
b r o a d l y based coalition to take the territory to i n d e p e n d e n c e in
1 9 7 7 . T h e m o r e n u m e r o u s A f a r l i v i n g w i t h i n E t h i o p i a w e r e left
almost entirely unadministered, and consequently unpoliticised,
u n d e r the Sultan A l i M i r r a o f A u s s a .
W h e r e a s d e c o l o n i s a t i o n in S o m a l i a a n d B r i t i s h S o m a l i l a n d l e d
t o u l t i m a t e u n i o n a n d i n d e p e n d e n c e , it w a s v e r y d i f f e r e n t i n
470

Eritrea. F o r a start, the p r o c e s s o f politicisation u n d e r the B r i t i s h

administration o f 1 9 4 1 - 5 2 had s h o w n h o w d i v e r g e n t w e r e the
aspirations o f different g r o u p s w i t h i n the p o p u l a t i o n . I n a d d i t i o n ,
association w i t h E t h i o p i a u n d e r the 1 9 5 2 f e d e r a t i o n g a v e little
o p p o r t u n i t y f o r a n y o f t h e s e a s p i r a t i o n s t o b e satisfied. T h e
E t h i o p i a n g o v e r n m e n t f r o m the start r e g a r d e d the a u t o n o m o u s
E r i t r e a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n as a d a n g e r , b o t h i n its o w n r i g h t as a
source o f p o w e r independent o f the h i g h l y centralised imperial
r e g i m e , a n d f o r its p o s s i b l e effects o n o t h e r a r e a s o f t h e e m p i r e .
It t h e r e f o r e s e t i t s e l f t o r e d u c e E r i t r e a t o c e n t r a l c o n t r o l , a p r o c e s s
achieved o v e r the ten years to 1962, w h e n the Eritrean assembly
w a s i n d u c e d t o d i s s o l v e itself. E r i t r e a w a s t h e n r e d u c e d t o t h e
status o f an ordinary E t h i o p i a n p r o v i n c e , ruled b y a g o v e r n o r -
general appointed from A d d i s A b a b a . In the process, r o o m w a s
found for quite a n u m b e r o f individual Eritreans loyal to the
g o v e r n m e n t t o be a p p o i n t e d t o h i g h p o s i t i o n s in A d d i s A b a b a .
T h e machinery for g r o u p representation, o n the other hand, w a s
d i s m a n t l e d . P o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s d i s a p p e a r e d . T h i s left o p p o r t u n i t i e s
f o r t h o s e p o l i t i c i a n s w h o h a d fled f r o m E r i t r e a at t h e t i m e o f
f e d e r a t i o n t o r e - e n t e r p o l i t i c a l life i n t h e p r o v i n c e as l e a d e r s o f
an u n d e r g r o u n d m o v e m e n t w h i c h o p p o s e d E t h i o p i a n rule b y
means o f terrorism and guerrilla warfare. T h i s m o v e m e n t , the
E r i t r e a n L i b e r a t i o n F r o n t ( E L F ) , w a s f o r m e d in the early 1960s
a n d f r o m a b o u t 1965 m a d e its p r e s e n c e felt i n E r i t r e a . I t s a c t i v i t i e s
i n t h e e a r l y y e a r s d e p e n d e d h e a v i l y o n t h e s u p p o r t it r e c e i v e d f r o m
A r a b states, especially Syria and Iraq, and w e r e largely confined
to the M u s l i m l o w l a n d s o f the p r o v i n c e . F r o m the early 1970s,
t h o u g h d i v i d e d i n t o t w o a n d l a t e r t h r e e f a c t i o n s , it g r e w t o b e
a considerable threat to the central g o v e r n m e n t , t y i n g d o w n large
numbers o f Ethiopian troops, and extending operations to the
Eritrean highlands.
I n E t h i o p i a itself, f i n a l l y , p o l i t i c i s a t i o n w a s c o n s i s t e n t l y i n
hibited b o t h positively b y the imperial g o v e r n m e n t , and negatively
b y the absence o f the stimulus to participation p r o v i d e d e l s e w h e r e
b y decolonisation. W h e r e a s in e v e r y other territory in the r e g i o n
t h e r e w a s at l e a s t s o m e p e r i o d d u r i n g w h i c h p o l i t i c i a n s w e r e
a l l o w e d to form parties, and to appeal for electoral s u p p o r t o n
the strength o f their p r o g r a m m e s o r ethnic identity, this w a s n o t
the case in E t h i o p i a o u t s i d e Eritrea. U n d e r the r e v i s e d c o n s t i
t u t i o n o f 1 9 5 5 , p r o m u l g a t e d p a r t l y at l e a s t i n r e s p o n s e t o t h e
47i

Eritrean federation, the l o w e r house o f parliament w a s from 1957

elected b y p o p u l a r suffrage; b u t since parties w e r e n o t permitted
and the C h a m b e r o f D e p u t i e s exercised n o control o v e r the
e x e c u t i v e , it r e m a i n e d l i t t l e m o r e t h a n a s o u n d i n g b o a r d f o r l o c a l
g r i e v a n c e s . U n l i k e the p o s i t i o n in Eritrea, there w a s neither the
rural political consciousness n o r the g r o u p o f exiled politicians
needed to m o u n t a guerrilla challenge to the g o v e r n m e n t . In these
circumstances, demands for increased political participation c a m e
largely from the centre: from the students and y o u n g e r educated
officials w h o w e r e t r a i n e d t o m a n t h e n e w c e n t r a l i s i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s
o f g o v e r n m e n t . T h e s e , rather than provincial politicians, consti
tuted the immediate potential opposition to the regime. M a n y o f
t h e m w e r e educated abroad, and returning h o m e from the early
1950s o n w a r d s , c a m e t o see their o w n g o v e r n m e n t , presided o v e r
b y a n a g e i n g e m p e r o r a n d h i s c o u r t i e r s , as u n c o m m i t t e d t o t h e
goals o f d y n a m i c modernisation w h i c h they s a w their c o n t e m
poraries in the nationalist m o v e m e n t s p u r s u i n g in o t h e r parts o f
Africa. M a n y o f the same ideas spread to the a r m e d forces, w h i c h
H a i l e S e l a s s i e h a d b u i l t u p r a p i d l y after t h e l i b e r a t i o n , u n t i l b y
t h e late 1 9 5 0 s it c o m p r i s e d t h r e e i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s , a n I m p e r i a l
B o d y g u a r d , a n d a s m a l l air f o r c e a n d n a v y . A m i l i t a r y a c a d e m y
established w e s t o f A d d i s A b a b a before the Italian i n v a s i o n w a s
r e a c t i v a t e d , a n d a s e c o n d o n e set u p at H a r a r in 1 9 5 8 . I n k e e p i n g
w i t h Haile Selassie's p o l i c y o f r e d u c i n g his reliance o n any single
outside p o w e r , advisers w e r e s o u g h t from several countries,
i n c l u d i n g India, Israel, N o r w a y and S w e d e n , but the main role
from 1951 w a s taken b y the U n i t e d States. T h e military constituted
a n o b v i o u s d a n g e r t o t h e r e g i m e , p a r t i c u l a r l y as m a n y o f t h e j u n i o r
officers w e r e directly c o n s c r i p t e d i n t o the a r m y f r o m the s e c o n d a r y
s c h o o l s , w h i c h Haile Selassie tried to c o u n t e r b o t h b y b i n d i n g
officers t o h i m t h r o u g h g r a n t s o f land and o t h e r f a v o u r s , a n d b y
e n c o u r a g i n g rivalries b e t w e e n units and individuals. B o t h the
d a n g e r and the imperial counter-measures w e r e illustrated b y an
a b o r t i v e coup d'etat b y t h e I m p e r i a l B o d y g u a r d i n D e c e m b e r i 9 6 0 .
A strange mixture o f palace c o u p and w o u l d - b e modernising
r e v o l u t i o n , this w a s led b y the b o d y g u a r d c o m m a n d e r and his
b r o t h e r , a r a d i c a l y o u n g official r e c e n t l y r e t u r n e d f r o m a b r o a d .
T h e rest o f the a r m e d forces r e m a i n e d l o y a l t o H a i l e Selassie, w h o
h a d b e e n a b r o a d o n a state v i s i t , a n d t h e r e v o l t w a s c r u s h e d a n d
47*

1
its l e a d e r s k i l l e d . I t h e l p e d , h o w e v e r , t o s e t a p a t t e r n o f
politicisation at t h e centre, at v a r i a n c e w i t h t h e p r o c e s s o f party
formation in s u r r o u n d i n g territories.
P O L I T I C A L D E C A Y A N D R E V O L U T I O N
B y t h e early 1960s then, t h e w h o l e r e g i o n e x c e p t f o r t h e

perennially anomalous French Somali Coast had been b r o u g h t
under the control o f t w o indigenous independent governments.
T w o m o r e contrasting regimes c o u l d scarcely b e imagined. T h e
Somali Republic c o u l d justly claim t o b e o n e o f the v e r y f e w
A f r i c a n states w h i c h w a s b u i l t o n a s e n s e o f n a t i o n h o o d s h a r e d
b y all i t s p e o p l e . T h e r e w e r e i n t e r n a l d i f f e r e n c e s , c e r t a i n l y , d e r i v e d
partly f r o m the legacies o f British a n d Italian administration, a n d
partly from divisions b e t w e e n Somali clan families, b u t these w e r e
contained within a c o m m o n culture, language and religion,
reinforced b y a national g e n e a l o g y in w h i c h all S o m a l i s h a d a
place. It w a s g o v e r n e d b y a system f o u n d e d o n consent a n d
participation, in w h i c h c o m p e t i n g political parties m a d e their
ambitions relevant t o the mass o f the p e o p l e t h r o u g h their close
reflection o f clan interests a n d alliances. S i n c e this s y s t e m w a s
f o u n d e d o n a n u n d e r l y i n g n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y , m o r e o v e r , it c o u l d
dispense w i t h the highly personalised leadership and intolerance
o f d i s s e n t f o u n d i n n a t i o n a l i s t p a r t i e s w h o s e p r i n c i p a l raison d'etre
was simply the struggle against colonialism. It could thus, in
response t o electoral pressures o r party manoeuvres, change b o t h
the prime minister, in 1964 a n d 1967, a n d the president, in 1 9 6 7 ,
peacefully and b y constitutional means.
E t h i o p i a also possessed a strong sense o f n a t i o n h o o d . T h i s ,
h o w e v e r , w a s n o t c o m m o n property as in t h e S o m a l i R e p u b l i c ,
but w a s rather the legacy o f expansion from the highland core.
T h o u g h it e n j o y e d s o m e l i m i t e d c a p a c i t y f o r a s s i m i l a t i n g i n d i
v i d u a l s , i t m a d e little p r e t e n c e at a s s i m i l a t i n g s o c i a l g r o u p s , w i t h
the result that political participation a l w a y s held the risk o f
m o b i l i s i n g the identities o f peripheral p e o p l e s in a w a y w h i c h
t h r e a t e n e d t h e w h o l e structure o f the state. E v e n d i s r e g a r d i n g t h e
1
R . G r e e n f i e l d , Ethiopia: a new political history ( L o n d o n , 1965), 33 7 - 4 5 2 ; C . C l a p h a m ,
' T h e E t h i o p i a n coup d'etat o f D e c e m b e r 1960', Journal of Modern African Studies, 1968,
6 , 4. 495-507-
473

h i s t o r i c i m p e r i a l l e g a c y , t h e r e f o r e , t h e r e g i m e c o u l d n o t afford t h e
o p e n and d e m o c r a t i c structure o f g o v e r n m e n t practised in
S o m a l i a . I n s t e a d , it c o n t i n u e d t o r e l y o n t h e c e n t r a l i s e d c o n t r o l
o f an a g e i n g e m p e r o r . T h e s y s t e m o f direct imperial s u p e r v i s i o n
t h r o u g h the Minister o f the P e n w a s to s o m e d e g r e e dismantled
after t h e d i s m i s s a l o f T s a h a f e T e z a z W a l d a - G i y o r g i s i n 195 5, a n d
administrative supervision w a s increasingly delegated, especially
to the P r i m e Minister, A k l i l u H a b t a - W a l d ; but political initiative
continued to be reserved to the E m p e r o r , w h o tolerated n o source
o f independent authority. N o mechanism therefore existed short
o f rebellion b y w h i c h the g o v e r n m e n t c o u l d be c h a n g e d .
Y e t these t w o contrasting systems w e r e b o t h to be o v e r t h r o w n
n o t m e r e l y b y coups d'etat, b u t b y m i l i t a r y - l e d g o v e r n m e n t s b o t h
o f w h i c h c o u l d claim w i t h s o m e justification to be revolutionary.
O f t h e t w o , m o r e o v e r , it w a s t h e S o m a l i r e g i m e w h i c h w e n t first.
T h e p r o b l e m s w h i c h it f a c e d w e r e c e r t a i n l y c o n s i d e r a b l e . T h e r e
w e r e i m m e d i a t e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n i n t e g r a t i n g t h e t w o r e g i o n s , re
s u l t i n g in d i s c o n t e n t especially in f o r m e r British S o m a l i l a n d , w h i c h
as t h e s m a l l e r s e c t i o n n a t u r a l l y h a d m o s t t o l o s e . T h e s e d i f f i c u l t i e s
c a m e t o a head in an a t t e m p t e d c o u p in the n o r t h in D e c e m b e r
1 9 6 1 . T h e p l o t t e r s l o s t s u p p o r t as s o o n as it b e c a m e c l e a r t h a t t h e i r
aim w a s the b r e a k u p o f the R e p u b l i c , but t w o n o r t h e r n ministers
felt o b l i g e d t o r e s i g n f r o m t h e g o v e r n m e n t t h e f o l l o w i n g y e a r i n
order to preserve their local support. Political integration w a s
h o w e v e r eased b y the fact that the p r i n c i p a l clan families straddled
the n o r t h - s o u t h d i v i s i o n . A s a result, this d i v i s i o n n e v e r w h o l l y
c o i n c i d e d w i t h party lines, and o p p o s i t i o n g r o u p s s o u g h t to
o v e r t h r o w the g o v e r n m e n t in M o g a d i s h u rather than d i s m e m b e r
the R e p u b l i c . O t h e r p r o b l e m s w e r e n o t so easily settled. T h e
e c o n o m y remained extremely p o o r , despite the receipt o f aid f r o m
m a n y sources, and attempts to secure the union w i t h the R e p u b l i c
o f the S o m a l i - i n h a b i t e d areas o f K e n y a , E t h i o p i a and the C F S /
T F A I w e r e all u n s u c c e s s f u l . T h e s e a t t e m p t s w i l l b e d e s c r i b e d
in a later section. W h a t w a s i m p o r t a n t t o d o m e s t i c politics w a s
the fact that t h e y led n o t o n l y to d o m e s t i c d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t , b u t
also to the formation, w i t h S o v i e t aid, o f an a r m y v e r y m u c h larger
than the R e p u b l i c w o u l d otherwise h a v e needed. T h i s army,
m o r e o v e r , Soviet-trained and c o m m i t t e d to a p o l i c y o f territorial
e x p a n s i o n , w a s t o a c q u i r e an i d e o l o g y a n d e t h o s v e r y different
f r o m that o f the colonially trained militaries o f m o s t other A f r i c a n
states.
474

S u p p o r t w a s equally alienated b y a succession o f increasingly

frantic f a c t i o n a l c r i s e s i n M o g a d i s h u , w h i c h a p p e a r e d t o r e f l e c t
less t h e m a j o r i s s u e s f a c i n g t h e c o u n t r y , t h a n t h e m a n o e u v r e s o f
i n d i v i d u a l s a n x i o u s t o m a i n t a i n t h e i r h o l d o n office. I n t h e first
e l e c t i o n s after i n d e p e n d e n c e , i n M a r c h 1 9 6 4 , t h e S Y L w o n a c l e a r
m a j o r i t y w i t h 69 s e a t s , f o l l o w e d b y 22 a n d 15 f o r i t s t w o m a i n
rivals, the Somali National C o n g r e s s and Somali D e m o c r a t i c
Union, and 17 for independents, most o f w h o m joined the
g o v e r n m e n t . E v e n then, h o w e v e r , a l o n g g o v e r n m e n t crisis
f o l l o w e d , h e l p e d b y splits in t h e S Y L a n d t h e practice o f secret
ballot in the N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y , a n d t h e n e w g o v e r n m e n t o f
' A b d a l - R a z a k H a j i H u s a i n w a s n o t c o n f i r m e d i n office u n t i l
S e p t e m b e r . T h e r e w e r e f u r t h e r c r i s e s i n t h e first h a l f o f 1 9 6 6 ,
leading to the dismissal o r resignation o f several ministers. In July
1967, f o l l o w i n g the unexpected election o f ' A b d al-Rashid * A l i
S h i r m a r k e as p r e s i d e n t t h e p r e v i o u s m o n t h , M u h a m m a d H a j i
I b r a h i m Igal b e c a m e p r i m e minister, a n d tried t o i m p o s e s o m e
o r d e r o n t h e p a r t y , at t h e c o s t o f w e a k e n i n g its r e p r e s e n t a t i v e
capacity. T h e elections o f M a r c h 1969, f o u g h t b y 64 parties a n d
o v e r 2000 c a n d i d a t e s , s a w a f u r t h e r s t e p t o w a r d s b r e a k d o w n a n d
l e d t o s o m e 25 d e a t h s . T h e S Y L w o n 73 seats a n d its o p p o n e n t s
5 1 , all b u t t w o o f w h o m i m m e d i a t e l y c r o s s e d t o t h e g o v e r n i n g
party in a search for posts. T h e d e n o u e m e n t c a m e w h e n President
' A b d al-Rashid w a s assassinated b y a p o l i c e m a n — m o t i v a t e d ,
apparently, b y clan rivalries - in O c t o b e r 1969. A s the S Y L caucus
met to choose a successor, the army t o o k control o f M o g a d i s h u ,
and turned o v e r the g o v e r n m e n t to a military council headed b y
1
Major-General M u h a m m a d Siyad Barre.
I n s o f a r as t h e E t h i o p i a n r e g i m e t h a t fell i n 1 9 7 4 h a d b e e n i n
p o w e r f o r o v e r 30 y e a r s , a n d c o u l d b e s e e n a s t h e last r e p r e s e n t a t i v e
o f an imperial system o f g o v e r n m e n t w h i c h had ruled Ethiopia
f o r m a n y c e n t u r i e s , a m o r e g e n e r a l a n a l y s i s o f its d e c l i n e is c a l l e d
f o r t h a n i n t h e c a s e o f t h e S o m a l i R e p u b l i c . C e r t a i n l y it w a s n o t
j o l t e d t o its e n d b y s u c c e s s i v e c r i s e s l i k e its S o m a l i c o u n t e r p a r t .
T h e years b e t w e e n 1961 a n d 1973 w e r e generally uneventful,
a s t o n i s h i n g l y s o b y c o m p a r i s o n w i t h m o s t o t h e r A f r i c a n states
during the same period. T h e same Prime Minister, A k l i l u Habta-
W a l d , r e m a i n e d i n office t h r o u g h o u t , a n d m i n i s t e r i a l p o s t s
circulated a m o n g m u c h the same g r o u p o f imperial proteges,
1
I. M . L e w i s , ' T h e p o l i t i c s o f t h e 1969 S o m a l i c o u p ' , Journal of Modern African
Studies, 1972, 10, 3, 383-408.
475

extended towards the e n d o f the period t o take in s o m e o f the

y o u n g e r generation o f graduates returned from abroad. These
m i n i s t e r s w e r e n o t f o r t h e m o s t p a r t a n y less c o m p e t e n t o r w e l l
educated, n o r a n y m o r e corrupt, than their c o n t e m p o r a r i e s
e l s e w h e r e . W h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e d t h e m w a s t h e fact that they h a d
c o m e to p o w e r within the imperial patronage n e t w o r k rather than
t h r o u g h a n y s o u r c e o f s u p p o r t in t h e c o u n t r y at l a r g e , a n d n e e d e d
t o adapt t h e m s e l v e s t o this n e t w o r k i f t h e y w e r e t o s u r v i v e . A s
a result, t h o u g h capable o f m a n a g i n g the administrative m a c h i n e r y
o f g o v e r n m e n t , they were quite unable to perform the political
function o f rallying and associating social g r o u p i n g s — w h e t h e r
m o d e r n o r traditional, central o r regional - w i t h the regime.
W h e n t h e crisis c a m e in 1 9 7 4 , t h e y c o u l d b e b r u s h e d aside,
i m p r i s o n e d , a n d in m a n y cases s u m m a r i l y e x e c u t e d , w i t h o u t b e i n g
able t o m a k e a n y substantial difference t o the m a r c h o f e v e n t s .
T h e r e g i m e ' s m o s t critical w e a k n e s s w a s its lack o f links w i t h
Ethiopian society outside a narrow g r o u p in A d d i s A b a b a . T h e
centralising m e a s u r e s i n t r o d u c e d b y H a i l e Selassie after his
restoration had decisively undermined the old provincial
autonomy, and reduced the provinces to dependence o n A d d i s
A b a b a . P r o v i n c i a l g o v e r n o r s , as a r e s u l t , b e c a m e i n c r e a s i n g l y
central appointees. I n the process, they lost the capacity, w h i c h
t h e y h a d p o s s e s s e d u p t o 1 9 3 5 , t o a c t as p r o v i n c i a l s p o k e s m e n a t
the centre, b a c k e d i f need b e b y an a r m y d r a w n f r o m their levies
and retainers. N o adequate machinery w a s d e v e l o p e d in their place
to link the g o v e r n m e n t w i t h provincial o p i n i o n . Political parties
w e r e n o t a l l o w e d t o d e v e l o p since they w e r e seen, doubtless
c o r r e c t l y , as a t h r e a t t o t h e a u t h o r i t y o f t h e e m p e r o r : t h i s i n i t s e l f
indicates the difficulty o f r e c o n c i l i n g social c h a n g e w i t h t h e
1
imperial regime. T h e C h a m b e r o f Deputies, elected b y popular
s u f f r a g e after 1 9 5 7 , d i d c o m e t o s e e i t s e l f as a f o r u m f o r l o c a l
i n t e r e s t s , a n d s i n c e e l e c t i o n s w e r e h e l d at f o u r - y e a r l y i n t e r v a l s , i t
r e m a i n e d fairly c l o s e l y i n t o u c h w i t h local o p i n i o n ; it v i g o r o u s l y
amended, for instance, the Agricultural I n c o m e T a x Proclamation
o f 1967. It w a s n o n e t h e l e s s v e r y w e a k at b o t h l o c a l a n d central
l e v e l s : at local l e v e l b e c a u s e m e m b e r s h a d t o stand f o r e l e c t i o n
o n a purely personal basis, and could n o t organise the sort o f
b a c k i n g for w h i c h a party w o u l d h a v e been required; at the centre,
because the parliament w a s entirely peripheral t o the court a n d
1
J. M a r k a k i s , Ethiopia: anatomy of a traditional polity ( O x f o r d , 1974), 331.
476

the bureaucracy t h r o u g h w h i c h the g o v e r n m e n t w a s carried o n .

T h e deficiencies o f provincial representation w e r e clearly s h o w n
b y a rebellion in G o j j a m p r o v i n c e , in the A m h a r a heartland, in
1968. T h i s w a s sparked off b y o p p o s i t i o n t o assessments for t h e
p r o p o s e d agricultural i n c o m e tax, b u t also reflected resentment
at t h e a c t i o n s o f t h e S h o a n g o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l . T h e g o v e r n m e n t
w a s n o t prepared t o face the p r o l o n g e d military action w h i c h
w o u l d h a v e been necessary t o defeat the uprising, a n d instead
1
replaced the governor-general. O t h e r small rebellions occurred
in t h e s o u t h , especially in B a l e p r o v i n c e . T h e o n e a t t e m p t w h i c h
was made to form a semi-political organisation to represent the
O r o m o p e o p l e s , n a m e d M e c h a T u l a m a after t w o c l a n a n c e s t o r s ,
w a s swiftly suppressed b y the g o v e r n m e n t in 1965. A l t h o u g h
these attempts t o mobilise rural o p i n i o n against the g o v e r n m e n t
w e r e sporadic and o f limited effectiveness, they underline the
failure o f integration w h i c h w a s m o s t e v i d e n t in Eritrea.
H a v i n g i n effect d e p r i v e d i t s e l f o f p o l i t i c a l s u p p o r t f r o m t h e
periphery, the imperial r e g i m e w a s o b l i g e d t o rely o n central
i n s t i t u t i o n s w h i c h it h a d i t s e l f c r e a t e d , b u t w h i c h h a d n o s p e c i a l
reason t o remain loyal t o the emperor. O f these, the students w e r e
the m o s t v o c a l , a n d the a r m e d forces the m o s t d a n g e r o u s . Student
o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e r e g i m e first b e c a m e e v i d e n t w h e n u n i v e r s i t y
students in A d d i s A b a b a supported the abortive c o u p in i960. T h e
first m a j o r d e m o n s t r a t i o n s t o p r o v o k e a c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h t h e
regime t o o k place in 1965. Thereafter they occurred almost
annually, most violently in 1969-70, and i n v o l v e d secondary-
school students in A d d i s A b a b a a n d s o m e o f the provincial t o w n s .
These demonstrations, expressing an inchoate yearning for
socialism and d e m o c r a c y , h a d f e w clearly defined g o a l s a n d
presented n o direct threat t o the regime, b u t they d i d m u c h t o
w e a k e n t h e a u r a o f s a c r e d a u t h o r i t y w h i c h still s u r r o u n d e d t h e
emperor, and hence indirectly helped t o hasten the d a y w h e n a
m o r e effective challenge w o u l d b e possible.
This could only c o m e from the armed forces, w h i c h b y 1970
had c o m e to include a four-division army, the Imperial B o d y g u a r d ,
a n d a n a i r f o r c e flying s o p h i s t i c a t e d j e t a i r c r a f t . I n 1 9 6 1 a n d 1 9 6 4
they had demonstrated their capacity t o enforce d e m a n d s for
higher p a y o n a reluctant g o v e r n m e n t , b u t a n y direct challenge
to the regime required b o t h a belief in alternative political
1
P . S c h w a b , Decision-making in Ethiopia ( L o n d o n , 1972), 158-69.
477

objectives and the capacity to surmount divisions within the

military. T h e s e requirements w e r e m e t early in 1974. W i t h i n the
armed forces, discontent o v e r pay and conditions coalesced w i t h
a g r o w i n g political a w a r e n e s s , especially a m o n g j u n i o r officers,
w h i c h c o m b i n e d an intense nationalism w i t h a c o n t e m p t for the
i m m o b i l i s m o f t h e o l d r e g i m e . I n t h e c o u n t r y at l a r g e , a n
e c o n o m i c c r i s i s b r o u g h t a b o u t b y t h e rise i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l o i l
prices c o m b i n e d w i t h revelations o f the g o v e r n m e n t ' s i n c o m
petence, especially in dealing w i t h a severe famine in W o l l o
p r o v i n c e . F r o m J a n u a r y o n w a r d s , a series o f m u t i n i e s , strikes a n d
demonstrations progressively challenged the government's
c o n t r o l . A k l i l u H a b t a - W a l d r e s i g n e d as p r i m e minister in F e b r u a r y ,
but his successor E n d a l k a c h e w M a k o n n e n n e v e r succeeded in
establishing his authority. T h e e m p e r o r , resorting w i t h his usual
skill t o his t i m e - h o n o u r e d tactics o f factional m a n i p u l a t i o n , f o u n d
h i m s e l f dealing w i t h social g r o u p i n g s w h i c h these tactics w e r e
powerless to control. O v e r the f o l l o w i n g six m o n t h s , political
initiative passed increasingly into the hands o f a skilfully m a n a g e d
c o m m i t t e e o f the a r m e d forces, k n o w n as t h e D e r g . B y J u l y , the
g o v e r n m e n t w a s p o w e r l e s s t o p r e v e n t t h e a r r e s t e v e n o f its o w n
m i n i s t e r s . T h e coup de grace w a s d e l i v e r e d w i t h H a i l e S e l a s s i e ' s
deposition o n 10 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 7 4 ; h e died in c o n f i n e m e n t the
f o l l o w i n g year.
In b o t h the Somali R e p u b l i c and Ethiopia, and especially the
latter, the military g o v e r n m e n t s established in 1969 a n d 1 9 7 4 w e r e
still t o o n e w at t h e e n d o f o u r p e r i o d t o m a k e p o s s i b l e a n y t h i n g
m o r e than a v e r y p r o v i s i o n a l assessment o f their role in the
r e g i o n ' s h i s t o r y . A t first g l a n c e , t h e s i m i l a r i t i e s b e t w e e n t h e t w o
regimes were striking. B o t h claimed to be revolutionary, and
a s p i r e d t o c u t t h r o u g h t h e p a r a l y s i s w h i c h h a d afflicted t h e i r
p r e d e c e s s o r s , i n o r d e r t o c r e a t e states w h i c h w e r e b o t h n a t i o n a l i s t
and socialist. H o w e v e r , t h e v e r y different structures o f t h e t w o
c o u n t r i e s s e v e r e l y affected t h e w a y s i n w h i c h t h e s e o b j e c t i v e s
could be achieved.
In the Somali R e p u b l i c - renamed the Somali D e m o c r a t i c
R e p u b l i c after t h e c o u p - it s o o n b e c a m e c l e a r t h a t t h e S u p r e m e
Revolutionary C o u n c i l ( S R C ) w o u l d be more than merely a
c a r e t a k e r g o v e r n m e n t , b u t its o b j e c t i v e s w e r e o n l y g r a d u a l l y
1
defined. Its early appeals w e r e directed largely against c o r r u p t i o n
1
I. M . L e w i s , * K i m II S u n g i n S o m a l i a : t h e e n d o f t r i b a l i s m ? ' , i n P . C o h e n a n d
W . S c h a c k ( e d s . ) , Essays in honour of Isaac Shapera ( O x f o r d , 1978).
478

and tribalism, a t e r m w h i c h in the S o m a l i c o n t e x t referred t o the

identification w i t h clans and clan families o n w h i c h political
allegiances had largely been built. G e n e r a l Siyad Barre had also
t o e s t a b l i s h h i s p e r s o n a l p o s i t i o n , w h i c h h e a c h i e v e d after t h e
e x p o s u r e o f a l l e g e d p l o t s b y his s u c c e s s i v e v i c e - p r e s i d e n t s in 1970
and 1 9 7 1 . In January 1 9 7 2 , the S R C l a u n c h e d a c a m p a i g n for
' scientific s o c i a l i s m ', w h i c h i n v o l v e d state c o n t r o l o f critical areas
o f the e c o n o m y , c o m b i n e d w i t h measures for national unification,
e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t , the sédentarisation o f n o m a d s , and the
introduction o f a S o m a l i script, o v e r w h i c h p r e v i o u s civilian
g o v e r n m e n t s had a r g u e d i n c o n c l u s i v e l y for the p r e v i o u s decade.
T h e s e measures p r o v o k e d s o m e opposition, including a clash w i t h
c o n s e r v a t i v e M u s l i m leaders o v e r the emancipation o f w o m e n ,
but the g o v e r n m e n t w a s able to d r a w o n an existing sense o f
S o m a l i identity in o r d e r to sustain s u p p o r t . T h o u g h the i d e o l o g y
o f t h e r e g i m e w a s e x p l i c i t l y M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t , a n d officials w e r e
sent for training to the S o v i e t U n i o n and N o r t h K o r e a , political
c o n t r o l r e m a i n e d in the h a n d s o f senior a r m y officers. D e s p i t e
a heavy emphasis on agencies o f public indoctrination and
c o n t r o l , n o p o l i t i c a l p a r t y w a s e s t a b l i s h e d u n t i l after t h e e n d o f
o u r p e r i o d , in 1 9 7 6 , a n d e v e n then the n e w p o l i t b u r o m i r r o r e d
the c o m p o s i t i o n o f the o l d S R C .
In E t h i o p i a , the socialist and nationalist objectives o f the
r e v o l u t i o n c o u l d n o t be so easily reconciled. T h e early m o n t h s ,
in m i d - 1 9 7 4 , w e r e a c c o m p a n i e d b y liberalisation m e a s u r e s w h i c h
included n o t o n l y press f r e e d o m and the release o f political
prisoners, but also the g r a n t i n g o f equal status to Islam w i t h
Christianity, and the relaxation o f the o l d r e g i m e ' s insistence o n
the s u p r e m a c y o f the A m h a r i c l a n g u a g e . T h i s liberalisation c o u l d
n o t l o n g s u r v i v e t h e d e m i s e o f t h e n a i v e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t all
g r o u p s had a c o m m o n interest in the creation o f a united,
d e m o c r a t i c a n d s o c i a l i s t E t h i o p i a . T h e D e r g , e l e c t e d f r o m all u n i t s
i n t h e a r m e d f o r c e s a n d all r a n k s f r o m p r i v a t e t o m a j o r , h a d little
internal coherence o n c e the r e m o v a l o f Haile Selassie w a s a c h i e v e d ,
and the raising o f political expectations and decline o f authority
e v i d e n t in the military w a s e q u a l l y clear in relations b e t w e e n
landlords and peasants, b e t w e e n ethnic and regional g r o u p i n g s ,
and a m o n g urban g r o u p s . T h e D e r g d i v i d e d b e t w e e n those led
b y the titular head o f state, G e n e r a l A m a n A n d o m , w h o f a v o u r e d
a policy o f reconciliation towards regional opposition and social
g r o u p s associated w i t h the old r e g i m e , and those led b y M a j o r
479

M e n g i s t u Haile M a r y a m w h o s o u g h t an extreme E t h i o p i a n
nationalism and a decisive break w i t h the past. T h e v i c t o r y o f the
l a t t e r f a c t i o n i n N o v e m b e r 1974 w a s a c c o m p a n i e d b y t h e e x e c u t i o n
o f A m a n a n d o v e r 50 l e a d i n g f o r m e r c i v i l i a n a n d m i l i t a r y o f f i c i a l s ,
and the despatch o f additional t r o o p s t o Eritrea, w h e r e bitter
fighting c o n t i n u e d until after the e n d o f o u r p e r i o d . B y the e n d
o f 1975, t h e D e r g r e t a i n e d p o w e r b u t h a d y e t t o e s t a b l i s h its
authority either in A d d i s A b a b a o r in the p r o v i n c e s , w h e r e
c o n d i t i o n s w e r e as u n s e t t l e d , a n d p r o s p e c t s a s u n c e r t a i n , as t h e y
had been 35 years before.
R E G I O N A L A N D I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E L A T I O N S H I P S
In contrast w i t h m a n y other parts o f Africa, w h e r e foreign

relationships c o n t i n u e d e v e n after i n d e p e n d e n c e t o t u r n o n the
c o n n e x i o n w i t h the former colonial p o w e r , in the H o r n they h a v e
consistently been fuelled b y tensions w i t h i n the r e g i o n . B o t h the
intensity o f regional loyalties and rivalries, and the weakness o f
extra-regional linkages, helped to a c c o u n t for this. E t h i o p i a ,
remaining uncolonised, did not acquire those cultural, e c o n o m i c
and political b o n d s w i t h a particular E u r o p e a n state w h i c h
characterised the colonial relationship. E l s e w h e r e in the region,
colonial links, t h o u g h present, w e r e w e a k . In b o t h Eritrea and
Italian S o m a l i a , the Italian colonisers w e r e militarily ejected in
1941; t h e B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s w h i c h r e p l a c e d t h e m
w e r e n o m o r e than t e m p o r a r y e x p e d i e n t s , and t h o u g h the Italians
r e t u r n e d t o S o m a l i a i n 1950, t h e y d i d s o u n d e r a U n i t e d N a t i o n s
Trusteeship w h i c h severely restricted b o t h the duration and the
nature o f their administration. British Somaliland, a l w a y s a
neglected corner o f empire, lost m a n y o f the normal post-colonial
l i n k s w i t h B r i t a i n o n its u n i o n w i t h S o m a l i a a t i n d e p e n d e n c e ; a
b r e a c h o f d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h B r i t a i n i n 1963, o v e r B r i t i s h
policy t o w a r d s the Somali-inhabited part o f K e n y a , further
w e a k e n e d the c o n n e x i o n . O n l y in the F r e n c h T e r r i t o r y o f the A f a r s
and Issas d i d the m e t r o p o l i t a n link remain critical, t h o u g h e v e n
there the F r e n c h remained largely because o f the tensions created
b y intra-regional rivalries; for the Afar politicians w h o controlled
the territorial assembly, the F r e n c h presence w a s vastly preferable
either t o the association w i t h the S o m a l i R e p u b l i c s o u g h t b y their
Issa rivals, o r t o the E t h i o p i a n i n v a s i o n w h i c h s e e m e d likely t o
follow any French withdrawal.
480

T h e s e rivalries turned principally o n the E t h i o p i a n - S o m a l i

dispute, and secondarily o n the status o f Eritrea. T h e forms w h i c h
they t o o k d e v e l o p e d d u r i n g the period, in k e e p i n g b o t h w i t h
changing domestic political structures and consciousness, and
w i t h the opportunities available for outside i n v o l v e m e n t . I m
m e d i a t e l y after t h e e n d o f t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r , t h e p r i n c i p a l
c o n c e r n w a s the disposal o f the f o r m e r Italian c o l o n i e s , c o n s i d e r e d
earlier in this a c c o u n t . T h e E t h i o p i a n s u c c e s s at that t i m e in
securing control o f Eritrea and fending off the B e v i n Plan for
Somali unification m a y be ascribed partly to the international
s y m p a t h y E t h i o p i a r e c e i v e d as a n e a r l y v i c t i m o f F a s c i s m , a n d a l s o
t o t h e f a c t t h a t , as a n i n d e p e n d e n t s t a t e , s h e w a s a b l e t o b e c o m e
a founder m e m b e r o f the United N a t i o n s and take part in her o w n
r i g h t at i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f e r e n c e s , w h e r e a s t h e S o m a l i s h a d n o
such representation. T h e second object o f Ethiopian d i p l o m a c y
w a s a c h i e v e d t h r o u g h the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f l i n k a g e s w i t h as m a n y
as p o s s i b l e o f t h e w e s t e r n i n d u s t r i a l i s e d s t a t e s , t h u s a v o i d i n g t h e
i s o l a t i o n s h e s u f f e r e d at t h e t i m e o f t h e I t a l i a n i n v a s i o n i n 1935.
I n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e 1940s, t h i s m e a n t r e d u c i n g h e r
d e p e n d e n c e o n B r i t a i n , w h i c h as t h e a u t h o r o f t h e B e v i n P l a n a n d
c o n t r o l l e r o f a l m o s t all t h e p e r i p h e r a l t e r r i t o r i e s w a s t h e p r i m e
target o f E t h i o p i a n suspicion. In the process, the U n i t e d States
became Ethiopia's m o s t important source o f outside aid, par
ticularly t h r o u g h the Military A i d and Assistance G r o u p w h i c h
helped train and e q u i p the n e w E t h i o p i a n a r m y . E t h i o p i a n
participation in the U N forces in K o r e a helped t o emphasise these
l i n k s , w h i l e at t h e s a m e t i m e p u b l i c i s i n g - i n a n o t h e r l e g a c y o f
1935 — t h e e m p e r o r ' s c o m m i t m e n t t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l a c t i o n a g a i n s t
aggression.
T h e 1950s w e r e a d e c a d e d u r i n g w h i c h e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s
t o o k s e c o n d p l a c e t o d o m e s t i c p o l i t i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t s . U n t i l i960,
E t h i o p i a w a s the o n l y i n d e p e n d e n t state in the r e g i o n , a n d n o t
u n t i l t h e l a t e 1950s c o u l d s h e t a k e a d v a n t a g e o f t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s
created b y the easing o f the C o l d W a r and the e m e r g e n c e o f other
i n d e p e n d e n t A f r i c a n s t a t e s . P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e 1958 A c c r a
C o n f e r e n c e o f I n d e p e n d e n t A f r i c a n S t a t e s w a s E t h i o p i a ' s first
venture into the n e w w o r l d o f African d i p l o m a c y . T o g e t h e r w i t h
H a i l e Selassie's visits t o the U S S R a n d o t h e r C o m m u n i s t states
i n 1959, t h i s c o u l d b e s e e n as a n e x t e n s i o n o f E t h i o p i a ' s t r a d i t i o n a l
policy o f multiplying and diversifying her diplomatic linkages. A t
t h e s a m e t i m e , it r e f l e c t e d a s k i l f u l a w a r e n e s s o n t h e p a r t o f
481

Ethiopia's leaders o f the need to adapt their foreign p o l i c y to a

c h a n g i n g international system.
International relations b e c a m e vastly m o r e i m p o r t a n t to the
r e g i o n w i t h S o m a l i i n d e p e n d e n c e in i960, because the S o m a l i
R e p u b l i c ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o u n i t e all S o m a l i p e o p l e s u n d e r a
s i n g l e flag a u t o m a t i c a l l y b r o u g h t h e r i n t o c o n f l i c t w i t h h e r
n e i g h b o u r s in E t h i o p i a , K e n y a a n d the C F S / T F A I . T h i s g o a l ,
p u r s u e d in different w a y s b y s u c c e s s i v e S o m a l i g o v e r n m e n t s ,
1
has consistently f o r m e d the base for S o m a l i f o r e i g n p o l i c y . In
M a r c h 1963, the Somalis b r o k e diplomatic relations w i t h Britain
o v e r her refusal t o a l l o w the N o r t h e r n F r o n t i e r D i s t r i c t o f K e n y a
to join the R e p u b l i c ; in M a y the s a m e year, P r e s i d e n t A d a n
' A b d u l l a h O s m a n a t t a c k e d E t h i o p i a at t h e i n a u g u r a l c o n f e r e n c e
o f the O A U in A d d i s A b a b a ; and the f o l l o w i n g M a r c h , brief but
i n t e n s e fighting b r o k e o u t o n t h e E t h i o p i a n - S o m a l i f r o n t i e r .
E t h i o p i a n i n v o l v e m e n t i n A f r i c a n d i p l o m a c y , o f w h i c h t h e 1963
A d d i s A b a b a Conference w a s the outstanding achievement, w a s
indeed partly a response to the threat presented to Ethiopia by
a p e r m a n e n t l y h o s t i l e state o n h e r s o u t h - e a s t f r o n t i e r . A l t h o u g h
the d e m o c r a t i c and anti-colonial S o m a l i R e p u b l i c m i g h t s e e m t o
h a v e h a d m o r e i n c o m m o n w i t h t h e o t h e r n e w states i n t h e
c o n t i n e n t than did his o w n anachronistic e m p i r e , H a i l e Selassie
s o o n appreciated that a l m o s t e v e r y A f r i c a n state shared E t h i o p i a ' s
interest in retaining the e x i s t i n g international frontiers, and that
this c o u l d b e u s e d t o i s o l a t e t h e S o m a l i s . I n a d d i t i o n , h i s o w n
p r e s t i g e as t h e s e n i o r A f r i c a n s t a t e s m a n a n d d e f e n d e r o f E t h i o p i a
against Italian F a s c i s m c o u l d be used to p r o m o t e a c o m m o n
c o n t i n e n t a l o r g a n i s a t i o n w h i c h o t h e r A f r i c a n l e a d e r s c o u l d n o t at
t h a t t i m e a c h i e v e . F o r s o m e t e n y e a r s after 1 9 6 3 , t h r o u g h H a i l e
Selassie's tireless travels r o u n d the c o n t i n e n t , his m e d i a t i o n o f
disputes b e t w e e n A f r i c a n states, the l o c a t i o n o f the O A U h e a d
quarters in A d d i s A b a b a , and the c h a m p i o n i n g o f A f r i c a n causes
in the U N a n d e l s e w h e r e , E t h i o p i a c o u l d c l a i m t o b e the
diplomatic leader o f Africa.
T h e S o m a l i R e p u b l i c ' s response to the p o s i t i o n o f w e a k n e s s in
w h i c h t h o s e E t h i o p i a n i n i t i a t i v e s left h e r t o o k t w o f o r m s . T h e
first, l o n g e r - t e r m o n e , w a s t o i n c r e a s e h e r m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h , a n d
since the major western p o w e r s w e r e already c o m m i t t e d to defend
i n g the territories she s o u g h t to acquire, in K e n y a , E t h i o p i a and
1
J. D r y s d a l e , The Somali dispute ( L o n d o n , 1964); S. T o u v a l , Somali nationalism
( C a m b r i d g e , M a s s . , 1963).
482

t h e C F S / T F A I , h e r n a t u r a l allies l a y i n t h e C o m m u n i s t b l o c . I n
N o v e m b e r 1963, the Somalis a n n o u n c e d their acceptance o f
S o v i e t m i l i t a r y a i d w o r t h n e a r l y £11 m i l l i o n , a n d b e g a n t o f o r m
a large m o d e r n army. In the shorter term, h o w e v e r , the policy
o f c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h all h e r n e i g h b o u r s w a s b o t h f r u i t l e s s a n d
e x p e n s i v e f o r s o p o o r a c o u n t r y , a n d after M u h a m m a d H a j i
Ibrahim Igal became prime minister in July 1967 he cultivated
a p o l i c y o f detente. B o t h a s p e c t s o f S o m a l i p o l i c y s u r v i v e d t h e
1969 c o u p , b u t the balance shifted g r a d u a l l y f r o m the s e c o n d b a c k
t o w a r d s t h e first. T h e S R C s o u g h t n o c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h E t h i o p i a ,
p a r t i c u l a r l y w h i l e it w a s e n g a g e d i n l a r g e - s c a l e d o m e s t i c s o c i a l
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a n d d e a l i n g w i t h t h e effects o f d r o u g h t . B u t as a
m i l i t a r y g o v e r n m e n t , it i n c r e a s e d t h e s t r e n g t h o f t h e a r m e d f o r c e s ,
and at the same time greatly intensified the c o n n e x i o n w i t h the
U S S R . T h i s in turn increased the E t h i o p i a n reliance for a r m s o n
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , w h i c h c o n t i n u e d f o r a y e a r o r t w o after t h e 1 9 7 4
revolution despite the c h a n g e in Ethiopia's domestic political
orientation. B y 1977, both A m e r i c a n reluctance to supply arms
a n d t h e n e w E t h i o p i a n r e g i m e ' s s e a r c h f o r m o r e c o n g e n i a l allies
led t o a dramatic reversal o f alliances in t h e H o r n , w i t h b o t h the
U S S R a n d C u b a h e a v i l y s u p p o r t i n g E t h i o p i a d u r i n g t h e 1977—8
Ethiopia-Somali war.
T h o u g h the Eritrean p r o b l e m in a sense b e c a m e a domestic o n e ,
f o l l o w i n g t h e i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f E r i t r e a i n t o E t h i o p i a , it c o n t i n u e d
to have international ramifications b o t h t h r o u g h the E L F ' s
constant attempts to internationalise the conflict, and t h r o u g h the
1
diplomatic means w h i c h the Ethiopians used to contain it. T h e
f o r m e r i n c l u d e d attempted hijackings o f E t h i o p i a n airliners o n
i n t e r n a t i o n a l flights, a n d t h e s u p p o r t w h i c h t h e E L F r e c e i v e d
f r o m radical A r a b r e g i m e s in Iraq, Syria, a n d L i b y a . T h e latter
turned especially o n Ethiopia's relations w i t h the Sudan, w h o s e
l o n g frontier w i t h Eritrea w a s critical in a n y attempt t o c o n t r o l
supplies r e a c h i n g the E L F , a n d t o a lesser extent those w i t h E g y p t ,
as t h e m o s t p r o m i n e n t A f r i c a n A r a b s t a t e . T h o u g h t h e r e w a s n o
e v i d e n c e o f a p p r e c i a b l e d i r e c t f o r e i g n i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h e fighting
during the period u p to 1975, the successes o f both Ethiopians
and Eritrean guerrillas depended heavily o n the support w h i c h
each w a s able to mobilise from the international e n v i r o n m e n t .
1
T . J. F a r e r , War clouds on the Horn of Africa: a crisis for detente ( N e w Y o r k , C a r n e g i e
E n d o w m e n t , 1976), 29-35.
483

S O C I A L A N D E C O N O M I C C H A N G E
In m o s t o f the H o r n , indigenous social and e c o n o m i c structures

retained a resilience w h i c h m a d e t h e m exceptionally resistant t o
c h a n g e , a n d as a r e s u l t m a d e t h e s h o c k s w h i c h t h e y s u f f e r e d a t
the end o f the period, t h r o u g h d r o u g h t and g o v e r n m e n t action,
all t h e m o r e t r a u m a t i c . P a r t o f t h e r e a s o n f o r t h i s w a s t h a t i n
E t h i o p i a a n d B r i t i s h S o m a l i l a n d , at l e a s t , t h e h a n d o f g o v e r n m e n t
was light, concerned w i t h basic maintenance functions rather than
social transformation; the same c o u l d n o t b e said t o the same
d e g r e e o f the Italian territories. M o r e i m p o r t a n t , e x i s t i n g struc
tures retained a validity because o f their adaptation t o local
circumstances, a lesson m o s t clear in the case o f S o m a l i n o m a d i s m .
F o r s o l o n g as m o s t S o m a l i s m a d e t h e i r l i v i n g t h r o u g h s e a s o n a l
m i g r a t i o n s in search o f pasture for their herds, s o l o n g w o u l d the
traditional system be the m o s t appropriate w a y o f o r g a n i s i n g
s o c i e t y . T h i s m o d e o f life, i g n o r i n g r o a d s , t o w n s a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l
b o u n d a r i e s , e q u a l l y p l a c e d g r e a t difficulties in the w a y o f t h o s e
w h o s o u g h t to i m p o s e the essentially stationary benefits o f
' m o d e r n ' life: the sedentary S o m a l i o f the J u b a - S h e b e l e basin
w e r e far m o r e d i r e c t l y affected b y b o t h s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c
change. A l t h o u g h highland Ethiopian social organisation w a s
v e r y different f r o m S o m a l i n o m a d i s m , o t h e r e l e m e n t s i n i n d i g e n
o u s society contributed to a similar result, especially in the
A m h a r a - T i g r e a n heartland from A d d i s A b a b a n o r t h to the
Eritrean frontier. Particularly i m p o r t a n t here w e r e the s t r o n g
c o n s e r v a t i v e interests v e s t e d in the p o s s e s s i o n a n d use o f land,
w i t h w h i c h t h e p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e at t h e l o c a l l e v e l a n d t h e C o p t i c
O r t h o d o x C h u r c h w e r e also strongly associated. T h e combination
w a s p o w e r f u l e n o u g h t o insulate the area f r o m effective central-
g o v e r n m e n t i n t e r v e n t i o n , as is m o s t c l e a r l y s h o w n b y t h e i m p e r i a l
g o v e r n m e n t ' s inability to exact taxes from G o j j a m p r o v i n c e , and
t h e r e v o l t s w h i c h b r o k e o u t w h e n it a t t e m p t e d t o d o s o . E r i t r e a
and the southern and western parts o f Ethiopia, w h e r e local social
structures had been w e a k e n e d b y central c o n q u e s t and land
alienation, w e r e m o r e o p e n to m o d e r n i s i n g influences.
Pressures for c h a n g e , present t h o u g h in s o m e areas r u d i m e n t a r y
b e f o r e 1940, c a m e f r o m t h r e e m a i n s o u r c e s . T h e first a n d m o s t
direct w a s g o v e r n m e n t , w h e t h e r colonial or indigenous, w h i c h
had an interest in a c h i e v i n g certain g o a l s w h i c h c o u l d o n l y b e
484

S O C I A L A N D E C O N O M I C C H A N G E
attained t h r o u g h modernisation: notably the establishment o f an

i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d s t r u c t u r e o f c o n t r o l , w h i c h c a l l e d f o r a fixed
capital h o u s i n g the necessary agencies, b o t h civil and military, the
educational systems needed to p r o d u c e appropriately qualified
people to man them, the c o m m u n i c a t i o n s systems needed to
extend their control to other parts o f the territory, and the cash
e c o n o m y n e e d e d t o finance t h e m , w h i c h i n t u r n r e q u i r e d t h e
e n c o u r a g e m e n t o f e c o n o m i c linkages w i t h the outside w o r l d .
G o v e r n m e n t s v a r i e d in the intensity w i t h w h i c h , a n d the w a y s in
w h i c h , they pursued this c o m m o n g o a l . T h e c o l o n i a l g o v e r n m e n t
o f British Somaliland w a s unquestionably the m o s t lackadaisical.
H a i l e S e l a s s i e ' s g o v e r n m e n t i n E t h i o p i a , t h o u g h i n t e n s e i n its
s e a r c h f o r c o n t r o l , w a s l i m i t e d i n t h e w a y s t h r o u g h w h i c h it c o u l d
a c h i e v e it b y t h e n a t u r e o f its o w n p o l i t i c a l b a s e , a n d t h e d a n g e r
o f c r e a t i n g f o r c e s w h i c h m i g h t — a n d e v e n t u a l l y d i d — s u p p l a n t it.
T h e F r e n c h r e g i m e in the C F S / T F A I w a s in a sense t n o r e passive,
and w a s n o t u n d e r s u c h pressure as the trustee administrations in
the f o r m e r Italian c o l o n i e s t o p r o d u c e a balance sheet o f p r o
gress achieved. T h e post-independence Somali g o v e r n m e n t came
closest t o the generality o f n e w l y i n d e p e n d e n t A f r i c a n r e g i m e s in
its p u r s u i t o f c o n v e n t i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t g o a l s ; w h i l e f r o m t h e t w o
military regimes there emanated a g e n u i n e urge, h o w e v e r
inarticulately c o n c e i v e d o r inadequately executed, for r e v o l u t i o n
ary social transformation.
A second impetus for change came from the belief o f individuals
e i t h e r i n its i n t r i n s i c d e s i r a b i l i t y , o r at l e a s t i n its c a p a c i t y t o
i m p r o v e t h e i r o w n c i r c u m s t a n c e s . O n e i n d i c a t o r is t h e w a y i n
w h i c h oppositional m o v e m e n t s to established regimes m o v e d
from the conservative to the radical side o f the political spectrum.
I n B r i t i s h S o m a l i l a n d , w h e r e as l a t e as 1935 p r o p o s a l s f o r a
g o v e r n m e n t a l s c h o o l at B e r b e r a h a d b e e n a b a n d o n e d i n t h e f a c e
o f hostile riots, the p o s t - w a r generation o f S o m a l i nationalists
s o u g h t education and criticised the colonial r e g i m e for tardiness
i n p r o v i d i n g it. H a i l e S e l a s s i e , w h o s t a r t e d h i s c a r e e r as t h e l e a d e r
o f t h e m o d e r n i s i n g f a c t i o n i n E t h i o p i a , h a d f r o m t h e 1950s
c o n s t a n t l y t o a d a p t h i m s e l f t o d e m a n d s f o r a faster rate o f c h a n g e ,
a n d b y t h e 1970s w a s s e e n as t h e p r i n c i p a l o b s t a c l e t o it. E v e n
t h e e l e c t e d S o m a l i g o v e r n m e n t , w h i c h i n t h e 1960s s a w i t s e l f as
b e i n g held back b y the conservatism o f the n o m a d i c clans o n
w h i c h it r e l i e d f o r s u p p o r t , w a s o v e r t h r o w n b y a r e g i m e w h i c h
485

THE HORN O F A F R I C A
T a b l e 9 . 1 . Estimated populations of the Horn of Africa, 19)7-74.
British
Somaliland Somalia CFS/TFAI Eritrea Ethiopia Total
1937 350000 1090000 47000 670000 —
1954 640000 1269000 63000 1000 000 15 000 000 17972000
1958 1 980000 20000000
1961 81 200
1964 2420000 22 200000
1970 2 5 50000 95 000 24626000 27271 000
1974 2 707 000 104000 27 239000 30050000
Note: allfiguresare estimates, and those for Ethiopia are especially subject
to error.
Source: United Nations demographic yearbooks, 1955, 1965, 1974 (New York).
actively sought t o resolve the p r o b l e m b y abolishing b o t h clans

and n o m a d i s m altogether. T h u s the desire f o r c h a n g e came t o b e
espoused b y important groups within indigenous society.
A third impetus for c h a n g e w a s the simple pressure o f
population o n resources. T h e total p o p u l a t i o n o f t h e r e g i o n
a p p r o x i m a t e l y d o u b l e d b e t w e e n 1 9 4 0 a n d 1975 ( t a b l e 9 . 1 ) . M u c h
o f this i n c r e a s e w a s d u e t o c h a n g e s i n h e a l t h c a r e , a g r i c u l t u r e , a n d
living conditions. T h e total increase w o u l d in a n y case h a v e placed
intolerable strain o n existing structures, e v e n w i t h o u t t h e
' r e v o l u t i o n o f r i s i n g e x p e c t a t i o n s ' b y w h i c h s o m e g r o u p s a t least
w e r e affected. I n a d d i t i o n , m a n y p e o p l e h a d t o c o p e w i t h - u n l e s s
they s u c c u m b e d t o - the great d r o u g h t in the eastern a n d southern
parts o f the H o r n in 1 9 7 2 - 4 , w h i c h caused m a n y thousands o f
deaths, especially in Ethiopia, a n d d e s t r o y e d - temporarily at
least - t h e b a s i s o f t h e S o m a l i n o m a d i c e c o n o m y .
O n e o t h e r s o u r c e o f c h a n g e t h e H o r n o f A f r i c a w a s s p a r e d : it
was n o t , unlike m a n y parts o f t h e continent, t h e scene o f deep
penetration b y foreign c o m p a n i e s bent o n e x p l o i t i n g its mineral
or agricultural resources. N o large-scale mineral extraction t o o k
place, and agricultural penetration w a s largely restricted t o a f e w
plantations in the A w a s h and J u b a - S h e b e l e basins a n d in highland
Eritrea. T h i s in itself w a s a major factor a c c o u n t i n g f o r t h e
r e s i l i e n c e o f t r a d i t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , a n d m e a n t t h a t , after t h e e n d
o f the colonial era, social and e c o n o m i c change w a s f o r the most
part undertaken under the direction o f indigenous people a n d
governments.
486

U R B A N I S A T I O N A N D E D U C A T I O N
T h o u g h the H o r n contained a n u m b e r o f long-established urban

s e t t l e m e n t s , at A k s u m , G o n d a r , H a r a r , M o g a d i s h u a n d e l s e w h e r e ,
n o n e o f these had permanent p o p u l a t i o n s o f m o r e than a f e w
thousand. Urbanisation therefore v e r y directly resulted from the
establishment o f p e r m a n e n t g o v e r n m e n t a l h e a d q u a r t e r s in the late
nineteenth century, and from n e w or i m p r o v e d communications
l i n k s w i t h t h e o u t s i d e w o r l d . I n t o t h e first c a t e g o r y c a m e t h e
territorial capitals, w h e t h e r built b y an i n d i g e n o u s g o v e r n m e n t
at A d d i s A b a b a o r b y c o l o n i a l r e g i m e s at A s m a r a , J i b u t i ,
Hargeisa and M o g a d i s h u , and the E t h i o p i a n p r o v i n c i a l capitals
w h i c h mostly derived from the e n c a m p m e n t s o f regional military
g o v e r n o r s . Into the second c a m e the ports o f M a s s a w a , A s s a b and
B e r b e r a , as w e l l as J i b u t i a n d M o g a d i s h u , a n d t h e r a i l w a y t o w n
of Dire Dawa.
A l t h o u g h r e l i a b l e figures f o r u r b a n p o p u l a t i o n s are n o t a v a i l a b l e
for m o s t t o w n s until the 1960s, urban g r o w t h appears to h a v e b e e n
fairly r a p i d , t h o u g h n o t as m e t e o r i c as i n s o m e p a r t s o f t h e
c o n t i n e n t . A d d i s A b a b a , e s t i m a t e d at a b o u t 1 0 0 0 0 0 i n h a b i t a n t s
in t h e late 1 9 3 0 s , h a d r e a c h e d 5 6 0 0 0 0 b y t h e m i d - 1 9 6 0 s a n d o v e r
a million by 1974. M o g a d i s h u ' s population similarly nearly
d o u b l e d f r o m 1 4 1 000 in 1965 t o a q u a r t e r o f a m i l l i o n i n 1 9 7 4 .
T h e E r i t r e a n c a p i t a l o f A s m a r a s t a g n a t e d after its I t a l i a n h e y d a y ,
o n l y e x p a n d i n g f r o m s o m e 1 0 0 0 0 0 i n t h e late 1 9 3 0 s t o 1 3 2 0 0 0 b y
1 9 6 5 ; t h e p o p u l a t i o n t h e n j u m p e d t o 2 9 6 0 0 0 b y 1 9 7 4 , as d r o u g h t
and the w o r s e n i n g security situation d r o v e p e o p l e f r o m the rural
areas. M o s t p r o v i n c i a l centres e x p a n d e d m o r e steadily, and b y the
m i d - 1 9 6 0 s e l e v e n t o w n s in t h e r e g i o n ( e i g h t i n E t h i o p i a ,
M o g a d i s h u and H a r g e i s a in S o m a l i a , and Jibuti) had p o p u
l a t i o n s o v e r 30000. I n t h e m i d - 1 9 6 0 s , s o m e 12 p e r c e n t o f t h e
S o m a l i , and just o v e r 5 per cent o f the E t h i o p i a n , p o p u l a t i o n l i v e d
in t o w n s o f o v e r 1 0 0 0 0 , a n d b y 1 9 7 5 t h e s e p e r c e n t a g e s a r e l i k e l y
t o h a v e d r a s t i c a l l y i n c r e a s e d , e s p e c i a l l y as a r e s u l t o f d r o u g h t .
T w o - t h i r d s o f the total p o p u l a t i o n o f the T F A I l i v e d in 1 9 7 0 in
1
Jibuti.
T h e r e a s o n s f o r t h e s e i n c r e a s e s w e r e m u c h t h e s a m e as
e l s e w h e r e in A f r i c a : g o v e r n m e n t s e r v i c e s , e c o n o m i c o p p o r t u n i
ties, a n d r u r a l drift. T a k i n g E t h i o p i a as a n e x a m p l e , A d d i s A b a b a
1
Demographic yearbooks; R . K . P . P a n k h u r s t , Economic history of Ethiopia iSoo-ipjj
( A d d i s A b a b a , 1968), 6 8 9 - 7 1 5 ; M a r k a k i s , Ethiopia, 1 6 0 - 7 1 .
487

had in 1970 a b o u t a third o f the 100000 g o v e r n m e n t e m p l o y e e s

in the c o u n t r y , a third o f the s e c o n d a r y s c h o o l s , a n d a third also
o f the h o s p i t a l b e d s . Its p o s i t i o n at the c e n t r e o f the c o u n t r y a n d
o f its c o m m u n i c a t i o n s n e t w o r k ( t h e r o a d s y s t e m r a d i a t e d o u t f r o m
A d d i s A b a b a , and roads b y p a s s i n g the capital w e r e non-existent
o r e x t r e m e l y p o o r ) e n s u r e d f o r it a d o m i n a n t t r a d i n g r o l e ; a n d
b y far t h e g r e a t e r p a r t o f i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t i o n w a s c o n c e n t r a t e d
in the city and a string o f smaller t o w n s a l o n g the r a i l w a y line
t o t h e s o u t h - e a s t o f it. T h e l a r g e r p r o v i n c i a l c a p i t a l s , s u c h as
G o n d a r , D e s s i e , H a r a r a n d J i m m a , s e r v e d i n t h e i r t u r n as
m i c r o c o s m s o f A d d i s A b a b a , attracting administrators from the
c e n t r e as w e l l as i m m i g r a n t s f r o m t h e s u r r o u n d i n g c o u n t r y s i d e .
W h i l e the c o u n t r y s i d e c o n t i n u e d t o retain a considerable resilience,
e s p e c i a l l y w h e r e it r e t a i n e d t r a d i t i o n a l s o c i a l a n d p o l i t i c a l s t r u c
t u r e s a n d a s e l f - s u p p o r t i n g e c o n o m y , it w a s t h e r e f o r e i n t h e c i t i e s
t h a t t h e m a i n effects o f m o d e r n i s a t i o n w e r e felt.
B y c o m p a r i s o n w i t h m a n y parts o f Africa, the spread o f formal
e d u c a t i o n in the H o r n w a s s l o w . In part, this w a s the result o f
an early lack o f g o v e r n m e n t action, since the Italian Fascist
administration, the m o s t d y n a m i c o f the colonial g o v e r n m e n t s in
the r e g i o n , w a s the least a n x i o u s t o train a rival elite o f S o m a l i s
o r Eritreans, w h i l e the British and F r e n c h d i d v e r y little i n d e e d ;
the E t h i o p i a n g o v e r n m e n t w a s m o r e c o m m i t t e d to educational
expansion than any o f the colonial regimes, since from the time
o f M e n e l i k it h a d r e c o g n i s e d t h e n e e d f o r a c a d r e o f e d u c a t e d
a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , b u t t h e m e a n s at its d i s p o s a l w e r e v e r y l i m i t e d ,
a n d t h e s c h o o l s e s t a b l i s h e d b e f o r e 1935 w e r e c l o s e d d u r i n g t h e
I t a l i a n o c c u p a t i o n . I n p a r t , it w a s d u e t o t h e e x i s t e n c e i n m u c h
o f the region o f established i n d i g e n o u s religious educational
systems w h i c h understandably l o o k e d w i t h suspicion o n an
i m p o r t e d alien r i v a l ; this w a s especially m a r k e d in British
Somaliland, where local opposition prevented any schools from
b e i n g o p e n e d before 1940, and in E t h i o p i a , w h e r e the O r t h o d o x
C h u r c h ' s fear o f p r o s e l y t i s a t i o n b y o t h e r C h r i s t i a n s e c t s m e a n t t h a t
m i s s i o n a r y activity w a s largely restricted t o the p a g a n areas o f the
s o u t h a n d w e s t . I n p a r t , t o o , it w a s d u e t o o t h e r d i f f i c u l t i e s ,
i n c l u d i n g the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r w h i c h severely disrupted
e d u c a t i o n in the r e g i o n and, m o r e lastingly, S o m a l i n o m a d i s m .
O n e result o f the w a r , h o w e v e r , w a s to m a k e p e o p l e t h r o u g h o u t
the H o r n a w a r e o f the efficiency o f w e s t e r n t e c h n o l o g y a n d the
c o n s e q u e n t n e e d t o m a s t e r it, s o t h a t o p p o s i t i o n t o f o r m a l
488

education o n traditionalist g r o u n d s w a s v e r y m u c h reduced. T h e

E t h i o p i a n s c h o o l s y s t e m w a s r e s t a r t e d a f t e r t h e l i b e r a t i o n i n 1941,
t h o u g h n o t u n t i l after t h e e n d o f t h e w a r i n 1945 c o u l d m u c h b e
d o n e t o e x p a n d it, a n d t h e B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s i n
Somalia and Eritrea sympathised with local demands for edu
cation, and did their best to m e e t t h e m w i t h i n v e r y limited
r e s o u r c e s . B y 1952, E r i t r e a h a d t h e h i g h e s t p r o p o r t i o n o f its
p o p u l a t i o n at s c h o o l o f a n y t e r r i t o r y i n t h e r e g i o n , e x c e p t f o r
the C F S , w h e r e m a n y o f the pupils w e r e F r e n c h o r A r a b . T h e
figures for this p e r i o d indicate the p r o g r e s s m a d e o n c e the
i m m e d i a t e effects o f t h e w a r h a d f a d e d , a n d s h o w 15 000 s c h o o l
c h i l d r e n (90 p e r c e n t p r i m a r y , 1.5 p e r c e n t o f t h e e s t i m a t e d
p o p u l a t i o n ) i n E r i t r e a i n 1952; 1700 (91 p e r c e n t p r i m a r y , 0.26
p e r c e n t o f p o p u l a t i o n ) i n B r i t i s h S o m a l i l a n d i n 1955; 11000 (88
p e r c e n t p r i m a r y , 0.86 p e r c e n t o f p o p u l a t i o n ) i n e x - I t a l i a n
S o m a l i a i n 1954; a n d 2100 (85 p e r c e n t p r i m a r y , 3.3 p e r c e n t o f
population) in the F r e n c h Somali C o a s t the same year. T h e
E t h i o p i a n figures s h o w o v e r 99 p e r c e n t o f t h e 68000 s c h o o l
c h i l d r e n c l a i m e d i n 195 2 (0.45 p e r c e n t o f e s t i m a t e d p o p u l a t i o n ) as
b e i n g i n p r i m a r y g r a d e s , a n d n o m o r e t h a n 531 i n s e c o n d a r y
schools.
B y 1962-3, t h e n u m b e r s at s c h o o l h a d m o r e t h a n d o u b l e d i n
the Somali territories and m o r e than q u a d r u p l e d in E t h i o p i a
(including Eritrea); they d o u b l e d again t h r o u g h o u t the r e g i o n
b e t w e e n t h e n a n d 1969-70, b y w h i c h d a t e t h e r e w e r e 713000
p u p i l s at s c h o o l i n E t h i o p i a , 58000 i n t h e S o m a l i R e p u b l i c a n d
7800 i n T F A I , 2.9, 2.3 a n d 8.2 p e r c e n t o f t h e t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n
respectively. A l t h o u g h the imperial g o v e r n m e n t in E t h i o p i a w a s
t o be criticised in later years for failing t o institute a crash
p r o g r a m m e o f e d u c a t i o n , t h e figures s h o w t h a t it d i d r e a s o n a b l y
w e l l b y c o m p a r i s o n w i t h its c o l o n i a l n e i g h b o u r s , d e s p i t e t h e
intensified e d u c a t i o n p r o g r a m m e i n t r o d u c e d b y the Italian trust
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n S o m a l i a a f t e r 1950. T h e s e figures r e p r e s e n t e d
o n l y a s m a l l p e r c e n t a g e o f t h e p o t e n t i a l s c h o o l p o p u l a t i o n - 14
per cent o f the appropriate age g r o u p w e r e estimated t o b e in
p r i m a r y s c h o o l a n d 1.9 p e r c e n t i n s e n i o r s e c o n d a r y s c h o o l i n
E t h i o p i a in 1 9 6 8 - 9 - b u t t h e y n o n e t h e l e s s m a r k e d a v e r y i m
1
portant force for c h a n g e .
T e r t i a r y e d u c a t i o n at first d e p e n d e d e n t i r e l y o n o p p o r t u n i t i e s
1
United Nations statistical yearbooks, 1956, 1965, 1973 (New York); Markakis,
Ethiopia, 1 4 3 - 5 9 .
489

t o study a b r o a d , initially a l m o s t o n l y in A m e r i c a n a n d W e s t e r n
E u r o p e a n universities, but subsequently in the S o v i e t b l o c and
e l s e w h e r e i n A f r i c a . T h e first s u c h i n s t i t u t i o n w i t h i n t h e r e g i o n ,
the U n i v e r s i t y C o l l e g e o f A d d i s A b a b a , w a s f o u n d e d in 1950, and
c o m b i n e d w i t h colleges o f agriculture, public health and building
to f o r m the Haile Selassie I U n i v e r s i t y in 1 9 6 1 ; the n a m e w a s
c h a n g e d t o A d d i s A b a b a U n i v e r s i t y after t h e 1 9 7 4 r e v o l u t i o n . B y
1 9 6 9 , t h e r e w e r e 4600 s t u d e n t s i n t e r t i a r y e d u c a t i o n i n E t h i o p i a ,
a n d n e a r l y 2000 a b r o a d . I n S o m a l i a , t e r t i a r y e d u c a t i o n g o t u n d e r
w a y w i t h the establishment o f specialised institutes b y the Italian
trust administration in the early 1 9 5 0 s ; the m o s t i m p o r t a n t o f
these, the S c h o o l o f Politics and A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , turned o u t a h i g h
proportion o f senior Somali administrators and politicians.
University education had to wait until the foundation o f the
U n i v e r s i t y Institute o f S o m a l i a in i 9 6 0 , and a l t h o u g h t h e r e w e r e
nearly a t h o u s a n d students in tertiary e d u c a t i o n in 1 9 7 0 , S o m a l i s
d e p e n d e d heavily o n scholarships to study abroad, especially in
Italy, E g y p t , and latterly the U S S R .
T h i s process o f educational expansion w a s a c c o m p a n i e d b y the
characteristic p r o b l e m s and deficiencies c o m m o n to the w h o l e
continent d u r i n g the period. T h e s e included a h e a v y dependence
o n f o r e i g n t e a c h e r s at t h e s e c o n d a r y l e v e l a n d u p w a r d s , a h i g h
d r o p - o u t rate, a v e r y l o w p r o p o r t i o n o f female students, a n d a
m a r k e d c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f t h e a v a i l a b l e facilities i n t h e c i t i e s as
a g a i n s t t h e r u r a l a r e a s , i n t h e s e d e n t a r y as a g a i n s t t h e n o m a d i c
p o p u l a t i o n s , a n d in the m o r e d e v e l o p e d p r o v i n c e s . I n E t h i o p i a
in 1 9 6 2 , f o r e x a m p l e , 38 p e r c e n t o f s e c o n d a r y - s c h o o l c h i l d r e n
w e r e in A d d i s A b a b a , a n d 67 p e r cent in the t w o p r o v i n c e s o f
Shoa (including A d d i s A b a b a ) and Eritrea. T h e problems o f urban
d r i f t t o w h i c h t h i s g a v e rise, a n d t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s o f t h e
syllabus for largely urban occupations (especially g o v e r n m e n t
service) were again c o m m o n ones. In addition, b o t h Ethiopia and
S o m a l i a e x p e r i e n c e d difficulties arising f r o m their national
languages. T h e desire for centralisation and national integration
i n E t h i o p i a l e d t o t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f A m h a r i c as t h e l a n g u a g e o f
i n s t r u c t i o n t h r o u g h o u t t h e c o u n t r y , at p r i m a r y l e v e l f r o m 1963
and junior secondary level from 1970. In addition to the resentment
t h i s a r o u s e d in n o n - A m h a r i c - s p e a k i n g a r e a s , e s p e c i a l l y i n E r i t r e a
a n d s o m e o f t h e s o u t h e r n p r o v i n c e s , it c r e a t e d d i f f i c u l t i e s o v e r t h e
availability o f qualified teachers and o v e r transfer to the senior
490

secondary a n d tertiary levels, in w h i c h the l a n g u a g e o f instruction

was English. In Somalia, though the use o f Somali w a s almost
u n i v e r s a l , t h e r e w a s n o a g r e e d s c r i p t f o r w r i t i n g it d o w n , a n d t h e
rivalry b e t w e e n the three c o n t e n d i n g possibilities - R o m a n script,
A r a b i c script, a n d O s m a n i y a , a sophisticated i n d i g e n o u s S o m a l i
script i n v e n t e d in a b o u t 1 9 2 0 - w a s s o intense that the elected
g o v e r n m e n t before 1969 c o u l d m a k e n o decision o n the issue at
all. E v e n t h e m i l i t a r y g o v e r n m e n t d e l a y e d u n t i l O c t o b e r 1 9 7 2
before deciding o n the R o m a n version.
A further p r o b l e m , o f a different k i n d , a r o s e f r o m t h e strains
in t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n s t u d e n t s a n d t h e s o c i e t y o f w h i c h t h e y
formed an a w k w a r d a n d atypical part. T h i s presented itself in an
acute form to the imperial regime in Ethiopia, w h e r e the
students - initially in the u n i v e r s i t y a n d s u b s e q u e n t l y in the
s e c o n d a r y s c h o o l s as w e l l - w e r e t h e o n l y g r o u p w h i c h d a r e d
e x p r e s s o p e n a n d fairly c o n t i n u o u s o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e e m p e r o r a n d
h i s g o v e r n m e n t . T h e m i l i t a r y g o v e r n m e n t after 1 9 7 4 c l o s e d t h e
university altogether a n d sent the students t o spread t h e r e v o l u
t i o n a r y i d e o l o g y i n t h e c o u n t r y s i d e , at t h e s a m e t i m e r e m o v i n g
a potential s o u r c e o f o p p o s i t i o n in A d d i s A b a b a , b u t this s c h e m e
w a s resented b o t h b y t h e students a n d in t h e c o u n t r y s i d e , a n d its
success w a s mixed. A similar scheme t o i m p r o v e rural literacy,
a n d i n v o l v i n g s c h o o l c h i l d r e n as w e l l a s s t u d e n t s , w a s i n s t i t u t e d
in t h e S o m a l i R e p u b l i c i n 1 9 7 4 , a n d w a s r a p i d l y c o n v e r t e d , after
the scale o f the d r o u g h t b e c a m e apparent, into a d r o u g h t
rehabilitation service.
B o t h E t h i o p i a and the Somalia territories w e r e fortunate,
h o w e v e r , in possessing a rich a n d well-established literary culture
w h i c h c o u l d s e r v e as a s o u r c e o f p r i d e a n d a p o i n t o f r e f e r e n c e
to educated a n d uneducated alike, in the R e p u b l i c t h r o u g h the
S o m a l i l a n g u a g e a n d i n p a r t i c u l a r its p o e t r y , a n d i n E t h i o p i a
t h r o u g h t h e l e g a c y o f a n a n c i e n t w r i t t e n l a n g u a g e , G e ' e z , a n d its
m o d e r n successor A m h a r i c . A s a result, writers in b o t h countries
continued to w o r k in an indigenous m e d i u m w h i c h , e v e n w h e n
their w o r k t o o k an i m p o r t e d f o r m s u c h as the n o v e l , c o u l d a d o p t
the subtleties o f existing m o d e s o f t h o u g h t ; o n e e x a m p l e perhaps
m i g h t b e t h e n o v e l Fikr iska mekebir ( F a i t h f u l t o t h e G r a v e ) b y
the E t h i o p i a n a u t h o r a n d politician, H a d i s A l a m a y a h u . A n a l
o g o u s l y t h o u g h less d i r e c t l y , s o m e t h i n g o f t h e i n d i g e n o u s ar
tistic t r a d i t i o n c a r r i e d o v e r i n t o t h e w o r k o f E t h i o p i a n a r t i s t s
1
49

o f t h e 1 9 5 0 s a n d 1 9 6 0 s , s u c h as A f e w o r k T e k l e a n d G a b r e - C h r i s t o s
D e s t a . N e w s p a p e r s w e r e a l s o a v a i l a b l e i n A m h a r i c , T i g r i n y a (in
E r i t r e a ) a n d S o m a l i , a n d t h o u g h c i r c u l a t i o n as a w h o l e w a s
extremely small these outsold the E u r o p e a n l a n g u a g e press. A t
the s a m e time, the resilience o f A m h a r i c d i d little for n a t i v e
s p e a k e r s o f o t h e r l a n g u a g e s w h o h a d first t o l e a r n A m h a r i c t o b e
accepted into the national culture, and subsequently to learn a
E u r o p e a n t o n g u e in o r d e r to gain access to the outside w o r l d . T h e
d a n g e r s o f a n a t i o n a l l a n g u a g e a r e , first, t h a t it m a y n o t i n c l u d e
all t h e p e o p l e s w i t h i n t h e n a t i o n a l b o u n d a r y , s e c o n d l y t h a t it m a y
r e s t r i c t its s p e a k e r s f r o m c o m m u n i c a t i n g o u t s i d e t h a t b o u n d a r y .
S o m a l i suffered f r o m the s e c o n d o f these defects, A m h a r i c f r o m
both o f them.
E c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t is p e r h a p s a m i s n o m e r f o r a r e g i o n w h i c h
remained a m o n g the p o o r e s t in Africa, and in w h i c h m a n y p e o p l e ,
e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e l o w l a n d s u b s i s t e n c e e c o n o m y , w e r e p o o r e r at t h e
e n d o f t h e p e r i o d t h a n t h e y h a d b e e n at t h e s t a r t o f it. E c o n o m i c
statistics for the H o r n w e r e a l w a y s unreliable a n d often n o n
e x i s t e n t , e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e e a r l y p e r i o d a n d a g a i n after t h e m i l i t a r y
r e v o l u t i o n s , b u t t h e p e r c a p i t a i n c o m e e s t i m a t e s o f $ U S 90 f o r
E t h i o p i a a n d $80 f o r t h e S o m a l i R e p u b l i c i n 1 9 7 4 p l a c e d t h e m
n o h i g h e r than 36th a n d 39th r e s p e c t i v e l y a m o n g the t h e n 42
1
independent African states. B o t h countries continued to h a v e a
very h i g h p r o p o r t i o n o f their populations in the subsistence
sector, and relied for their e x p o r t s almost exclusively o n agri
cultural p r o d u c t s , principally l i v e s t o c k and bananas in the R e
p u b l i c , and coffee, hides a n d oilseeds in E t h i o p i a . A l l b u t a v e r y
f e w m a n u f a c t u r e d i t e m s still h a d t o b e i m p o r t e d at t h e e n d o f t h e
period, t h o u g h s o m e simple import-substitution industries had b y
then been established, especially in E t h i o p i a .
H o w e v e r underdeveloped the e c o n o m i e s o f the H o r n m i g h t
h a v e appeared in 1 9 7 5 , nonetheless b y c o m p a r i s o n w i t h 1940 the
c h a n g e s w e r e considerable. O n e difference w i t h the p r e - w a r era
w a s that w h e r e a s then o n l y the Italian Fascist administration had
a n y f i r m c o m m i t m e n t t o p r o m o t i n g e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t , after
1945 t h i s b e c a m e o n e o f t h e r e c o g n i s e d r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f g o v e r n -
1
Le Monde ( P a r i s ) , 4 F e b r u a r y 1976.
492

m e n t , e v e n t h o u g h d i f f e r e n t r e g i m e s p u r s u e d it w i t h v a r y i n g
d e g r e e s o f i n t e n s i t y a n d all o f t h e m h a d t o d e a l w i t h t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s
o f the terrain, the w e a k n e s s o f the infrastructure, and the
s o m e t i m e s hostile attitudes o f the p e o p l e . A s a result, the n u m b e r
o f g o v e r n m e n t agencies concerned with economic management
and d e v e l o p m e n t proliferated, a process m o s t clear in Ethiopia,
w h e r e the establishment o f E t h i o p i a n A i r L i n e s in 1948 w a s
f o l l o w e d in the 1950s b y the creation o f specialised agencies for
h i g h w a y s , telecommunications and electricity; ministries for
c o m m u n i t y d e v e l o p m e n t , planning, and later land reform w e r e
set u p , a n d t h e F i r s t F i v e - Y e a r P l a n , i n a u g u r a t e d i n 1 9 5 7 , w a s
s u c c e e d e d b y t h e S e c o n d a n d T h i r d P l a n s ; t h e f o u r t h w a s still o n
t h e d r a w i n g b o a r d at t h e t i m e o f t h e r e v o l u t i o n i n 1 9 7 4 . A c e r t a i n
a m o u n t o f this activity w a s simply w i n d o w - d r e s s i n g ; the five-year
plans n e v e r a c h i e v e d the central position in g o v e r n m e n t e c o n o m i c
s t r a t e g y w h i c h w o u l d h a v e b e e n n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e i r full i m
plementation, and any substantial land reform p r o g r a m m e w o u l d
s o o n have run foul o f the political bases o f the imperial regime.
T h e specialised agencies, o n the other hand, did carry o u t n e w
and important tasks for w h i c h there had been n o place in the
preceding millennia o f independent Ethiopia. A similar process
t o o k place in S o m a l i a .
In the immediate p o s t - w a r period, n o n e o f the territories o f the
H o r n possessed either the capital o r the expertise needed t o
d e v e l o p o n their o w n , and t h o u g h the lack o f expertise w a s t o
some extent made g o o d by education o v e r the subsequent
decades, the capital deficiency remained. D e v e l o p m e n t therefore
critically d e p e n d e d o n outside assistance. In the S o m a l i territories,
this w a s p r o v i d e d until i960 (or t h r o u g h o u t the p e r i o d in
C F S / T F A I ) b y the colonial and trustee administrations. T h e
B r i t i s h military a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in the 1940s w a s l a r g e l y c o n c e r n e d
w i t h m a i n t e n a n c e functions, and e v e n in the 1950s the p a c e o f
c h a n g e in British S o m a l i l a n d remained s l o w , b u t the Italian
trustee administration in S o m a l i a p r o m o t e d i n v e s t m e n t b y b o t h
state a n d p r i v a t e interests, r e v i v e d the b a n a n a i n d u s t r y , a n d
e n c o u r a g e d p r o d u c t i o n o f c o t t o n and cereals. E t h i o p i a m e a n w h i l e
relied o n advisers o f m a n y nationalities, and o n d e v e l o p m e n t aid
w h i c h c a m e principally f r o m the U n i t e d States and from
international institutions, w h i c h b e t w e e n them accounted consis
tently for s o m e three-quarters o f external a i d ; f r o m the late 1950s
493

o n w a r d s , E t h i o p i a further diversified the sources o f assistance

to include loans from Y u g o s l a v i a and the U S S R , and subsequently
C h i n a . E x t e r n a l i n d e b t e d n e s s , h e l d s t e a d y at a b o u t $ U S 5 0 m i n
the 1950s, thereafter rose precipitously to $ U S 7 6 m in 1963,
J U S 1 3 0 m in 1968, a n d $ U S 240m in 1 9 7 3 , in o r d e r t o m e e t n o t
o n l y d e v e l o p m e n t expenditure b u t the increasing costs o f the
p u b l i c s e r v i c e . T h e S o m a l i R e p u b l i c , t o o , d i v e r s i f i e d its s o u r c e s
o f aid after i n d e p e n d e n c e in i 9 6 0 , a n d b e c a m e o n e o f t h e l a r g e s t
recipients p e r capita in the w o r l d . D e s p i t e w e l l p u b l i c i s e d R u s s i a n
a n d C h i n e s e p r o j e c t s , m o s t o f it, e v e n after t h e 1 9 6 9 r e v o l u t i o n ,
continued to c o m e from western and international agencies.
A i d w a s largely used o n infrastructural d e v e l o p m e n t s , especially
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . T h e core o f the r e g i o n ' s c o m m u n i c a t i o n s net
w o r k c o n t i n u e d to b e the Italian road s y s t e m built before 1 9 4 1 .
T h i s w a s e x t e n d e d and i m p r o v e d , especially in s o u t h e r n E t h i o p i a ,
and a n e w road w a s built to the R e d Sea port o f A s s a b , but v e r y
f e w f e e d e r r o a d s w e r e c o n s t r u c t e d , a n d in m o s t p a r t s o f E t h i o p i a
p r o d u c e had to be b r o u g h t by m u l e to the nearest main road. B u t
w h e r e a s E t h i o p i a at l e a s t h a d a f a i r l y c e n t r a l i s e d n e t w o r k r a d i a t i n g
from A d d i s A b a b a , the Somali R e p u b l i c had o n l y the m o s t m e a g r e
l a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s b e t w e e n its t w o m a j o r c e n t r e s o f p o p u l a t i o n ,
M o g a d i s h u a n d t h e S h e b e l e - J u b a b a s i n in t h e s o u t h , a n d t h e
h i g h l a n d s r o u n d H a r g e i s a in the n o r t h . T h e m o s t direct r o u t e
b e t w e e n them, m o r e o v e r , w a s barred b y the great w e d g e o f
E t h i o p i a n t e r r i t o r y , a n d a n a l l - w e a t h e r n o r t h - s o u t h r o a d w a s still
u n d e r c o n s t r u c t i o n , w i t h C h i n e s e a s s i s t a n c e , at t h e e n d o f o u r
p e r i o d . N o n e w r a i l w a y s w e r e built in the r e g i o n , b u t a n e t w o r k
o f l o c a l air s e r v i c e s , e s p e c i a l l y i n E t h i o p i a , l i n k e d o u t l y i n g t o w n s
w h i c h w e r e o n l y w i t h d i f f i c u l t y , i f at all, a c c e s s i b l e b y r o a d . T h u s
internal c o m m u n i c a t i o n s w e r e appreciably better b y the e n d o f the
p e r i o d t h a n t h e y h a d b e e n at t h e b e g i n n i n g . S o w e r e l i n k s w i t h
t h e o u t s i d e w o r l d . I n t e r n a t i o n a l a i r p o r t s w e r e b u i l t at A s m a r a ,
D i r e D a w a a n d A d d i s A b a b a i n E t h i o p i a , at J i b u t i , a n d at
H a r g e i s a , M o g a d i s h u a n d (in 1 9 7 4 ) K i s m a y u i n t h e R e p u b l i c .
Jibuti c o n t i n u e d to b e the largest p o r t in the r e g i o n , h a n d l i n g
m o s t o f E t h i o p i a ' s t r a d e e v e n after t h e 1 9 5 2 F e d e r a t i o n w h i c h
g a v e E t h i o p i a d i r e c t a c c e s s t o t h e R e d S e a at M a s s a w a a n d A s s a b ,
w h e r e a n e w m o d e r n port w a s built. T h e Somalis had n o m o d e r n
p o r t f a c i l i t i e s u n t i l 1 9 6 8 - 9 , w h e n t h e R u s s i a n - b u i l t p o r t at B e r b e r a
i n t h e n o r t h , a n d t h e A m e r i c a n - b u i l t o n e at K i s m a y u i n t h e s o u t h ,
494

both came into operation. A t M o g a d i s h u a n e w port was nearing

c o m p l e t i o n in 1 9 7 5 .
Industrial d e v e l o p m e n t within the r e g i o n w a s largely confined
to Ethiopia, and within Ethiopia to Shoa province and Eritrea.
W h i l e the b e g i n n i n g s o f industrialisation dated from the Fascist
a n d l i b e r a t i o n p e r i o d s , its g r o w t h w a s s l o w u n t i l t h e l a t e 1 9 5 0 s ;
f r o m t h e n o n w a r d s it e x p a n d e d s t e a d i l y u n t i l b y t h e 1 9 7 0 s it
accounted for s o m e 5 per cent o f gross domestic product.
Industrial textile p r o d u c t i o n g o t u n d e r w a y w i t h Indian and
J a p a n e s e i n v e s t m e n t in the m i d - 1 9 6 0 s , a n d o t h e r areas o f l a r g e -
scale p r o d u c t i o n included b u i l d i n g materials, shoes and ciga
r e t t e s . It is n o t c l e a r w h e t h e r t h e v e r y g e n e r o u s t e r m s o f f e r e d t o
f o r e i g n i n v e s t o r s h a d a n y s u b s t a n t i a l effect o n t h e s e d e v e l o p m e n t s .
S h o a p r o v i n c e contained 63.4 per cent o f industrial e m p l o y e e s in
1970, f o l l o w e d b y E r i t r e a (23.6 p e r c e n t ) , and b y H a r a r a n d
G o j j a m ; the r e m a i n i n g ten p r o v i n c e s had 1 per cent o f the total
b e t w e e n t h e m . A n a t t e m p t at r e g i o n a l i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n i n T i g r e
province energetically p r o m o t e d b y the G o v e r n o r , Ras M a n g a s h a
S e y o u m , after i 9 6 0 , e n d e d i n f a i l u r e . S o m a l i i n d u s t r y w a s l a r g e l y
confined to processing agricultural products, including meat
canning and sugar refining, t h o u g h a m o r e determined attempt
t o p r o m o t e m a n u f a c t u r e o f b a s i c g o o d s s u c h as b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s
w a s u n d e r t a k e n after t h e r e v o l u t i o n . T h e m i l i t a r y r e v o l u t i o n s i n
b o t h c o u n t r i e s , h o w e v e r , m o r e directly affected o w n e r s h i p t h a n
production, since both o f t h e m had a strong ideological hostility
to capitalism in g e n e r a l a n d f o r e i g n capitalists in particular. T h e
Somali g o v e r n m e n t nationalised banks and petrol companies s o o n
after t h e r e v o l u t i o n , a n d i n e a r l y 1 9 7 2 t o o k c o n t r o l o f all s e c t o r s
o f the e c o n o m y , i n c l u d i n g m e d i c a l facilities. In E t h i o p i a , b a n k i n g
b e c a m e a state m o n o p o l y w i t h the f o u n d a t i o n o f the State B a n k
o f E t h i o p i a in 1942, and t h o u g h p r i v a t e E t h i o p i a n - o w n e d b a n k s
w e r e later p e r m i t t e d , a n d o n e w a s f o r m e d , b a n k i n g r e m a i n e d
o v e r w h e l m i n g l y in state h a n d s , a n d the i n s u r a n c e i n d u s t r y w a s
also E t h i o p i a n i s e d f r o m 1 9 7 0 ; the state also o w n e d o r had shares
in m a n y o t h e r c o m m e r c i a l v e n t u r e s . F r o m 1 9 7 4 , h o w e v e r , the
tone and pace o f nationalisation sharply changed, w i t h the
intention o f creating a state-controlled e c o n o m y in the shortest
possible time.
T h e s e e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t s led to social c h a n g e in the f o r m
o f n e w kinds o f association created b y the n e w occupational
495

structure. T h e earliest a n d m o s t w i d e s p r e a d o f these w e r e the

u r b a n v e r s i o n s o f traditional self-help a s s o c i a t i o n s , k n o w n as
iqub edir a n d mahaber i n E t h i o p i a , c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f n e w l y u r b a n
y
ised societies. L a b o u r u n i o n s w e r e f o r m e d in Eritrea a n d a m o n g

the employees o f the J i b u t i - A d d i s A b a b a railway from the
mid-1940s o n w a r d s , a n d t h e first s t r i k e w a s r e p o r t e d a m o n g
r a i l w a y w o r k e r s i n 1947. T h e E r i t r e a n u n i o n s w e r e a c t i v e l y
i n v o l v e d i n l o c a l p o l i t i c s d u r i n g t h e f e d e r a t i o n p e r i o d , aijd t h e i r
leader, W o l d e a b W o l d e m a r i a m , j o i n e d t h e E L F , b u t in t h e rest
o f E t h i o p i a t h e y w e r e m u c h less p r o m i n e n t , a n d a legal f r a m e w o r k
a l l o w i n g t h e f o r m a t i o n o f u n i o n s w a s n o t p r o m u l g a t e d u n t i l 1962.
T h e Confederation o f Ethiopian L a b o u r Unions, w h i c h w a s then
f o r m e d , c l a i m e d s o m e 80000 m e m b e r s i n o v e r 160 u n i o n s b y 1973,
including n o t o n l y urban b u t also plantation w o r k e r s such as the
employees o f the Wonji Sugar Company. Regarded with some
suspicion b y the imperial g o v e r n m e n t , they t o o k an important
p a r t i n t h e a g i t a t i o n w h i c h l e d t o t h e r e v o l u t i o n o f 1974, a n d w h i c h
w a s initially p r o m p t e d b y a strike o f A d d i s A b a b a taxi drivers.
A G R I C U L T U R E
A limited n u m b e r o f themes e n c o m p a s s the m a i n issues a n d

developments in agricultural change in the H o r n t h r o u g h o u t o u r
period. In Ethiopia, characterised b y settled agriculture practised
under archaic tenure systems in the northern highlands a n d
generally exploitative ones elsewhere, the main issue w a s land
r e f o r m ; in the S o m a l i territories, w i t h their precarious n o m a d i c
e c o n o m i e s , it w a s s é d e n t a r i s a t i o n . O v e r l y i n g b o t h o f t h e s e w a s
the m o v e m e n t f r o m subsistence t o cash farming. W h e r e a s in the
last r e s p e c t t h e r e w a s c o n t i n u o u s t h o u g h u n e v e n c h a n g e
t h r o u g h o u t t h e p e r i o d , i n t h e first t w o c h a n g e c a m e , w i t h
dramatic suddenness, at the e n d .
Commercial agriculture developed through a variety o f
agencies, b o t h external and indigenous. W h a t these h a d in c o m m o n
was a form o f socio-economic organisation capable o f operating
a sustained c o m m e r c i a l enterprise, c o m b i n e d w i t h the essentially
political ability t o maintain c o n t r o l o v e r a suitable area o f land.
T h e result, intriguingly, w a s that in b o t h E t h i o p i a a n d the S o m a l i
region cash c r o p p i n g developed o n the peripheries o f the locally
d o m i n a n t social a n d political g r o u p i n g s . I n S o m a l i a , this m a y
496

o b v i o u s l y be ascribed in part t o the ecological inadequacy o f the

S o m a l i h e a r t l a n d s , t h o u g h it m a y a l s o b e p a r t l y a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e
resilience o f the n o m a d i c social structure; S o m a l i agriculture thus
d e v e l o p e d principally a m o n g the atypical and s o m e w h a t despised
Sab g r o u p s o f the S h e b e l e - J u b a basin, and also in the highlands
o f the extreme north-west, a r o u n d Hargeisa and B o r a m a . In
E t h i o p i a t h e p a t t e r n is still m o r e s t r i k i n g , s i n c e t h e c e n t r a l A m h a r a
highlands had been inhabited b y arable agriculturalists for m a n y
centuries, yet remained almost entirely uncommercialised to the
e n d o f o u r p e r i o d . O n e i m p o r t a n t p o i n t e r is t h e a b i l i t y o f t h e
p e o p l e o f this area, c o m p r i s i n g n o r t h e r n S h o a a n d m u c h o f the
p r o v i n c e s o f G o j j a m , W o l l o , B e g e m d e r a n d T i g r e , t o resist the
p a y m e n t o f taxes, and thus the need for a cash i n c o m e from w h i c h
tax p a y m e n t s c o u l d be m e t ; they thus a v o i d e d o n e o f the m a i n
pressures for c o m m e r c i a l agriculture in m a n y parts o f Africa.
Equally important, peasant cultivators entrenched behind ancient
systems o f land tenure w e r e able to prevent incursion by central
l a n d l o r d s , s u c h as h a p p e n e d i n m u c h o f s o u t h e r n E t h i o p i a , o r b y
foreign enterprises. A n y threat to tax e x e m p t i o n or the land-tenure
system w a s m e t b y armed revolt, m o s t clearly in the G o j j a m
rebellion o f 1968. T h e areas o f c o m m e r c i a l c u l t i v a t i o n t h u s
f o r m e d a ring r o u n d the central h i g h l a n d s , f r o m the Italian farms
o f Eritrea to the c o m p a n y plantations o f the A w a s h valley, the
coffee g r o w i n g a r e a s o f t h e s o u t h a n d w e s t , a n d t h e H u m e r a
district o n the B e g e m d e r - S u d a n e s e b o r d e r .
T h e use o f political p o w e r to generate agricultural d e v e l o p m e n t
is m o s t o b v i o u s i n t h e I t a l i a n c o l o n i a l p l a n t a t i o n s . T h o u g h t h e s e
w e r e f o u n d e d b e f o r e o u r p e r i o d , t h e y w e r e r e v i v e d after t h e w a r ,
and continued to be an important source o f vegetable and dairy
products in Eritrea, and o f bananas in S o m a l i a ; the bananas
enjoyed a protected h i g h price m a r k e t in Italy, w h i c h c o n t i n u e d
t o t a k e a v e r y h i g h p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e c r o p e v e n after it h a d b e e n
b r o u g h t u n d e r S o m a l i state c o n t r o l t h r o u g h a N a t i o n a l B a n a n a
B o a r d f o r m e d in 1970. T h e o n l y o t h e r i m p o r t a n t area o f f o r e i g n -
m a n a g e d agriculture w a s the A w a s h valley in eastern E t h i o p i a ,
site o f t h e s u g a r p l a n t a t i o n s o f t h e D u t c h H V A c o m p a n y d a t i n g
from 1 9 5 1 , and o f a British c o t t o n plantation. C o n d i t i o n s in the
s u g a r plantations, in w h i c h the E t h i o p i a n g o v e r n m e n t h a d a large
h o l d i n g , led to the formation o f o n e o f the m o s t militant trade
u n i o n s in E t h i o p i a , w h i l e at the s a m e t i m e the c o m p a n y , t h r o u g h
497

its m o n o p o l y o f t h e d o m e s t i c s u g a r m a r k e t , w a s a b l e t o s e c u r e
1
profits a m o u n t i n g t o s o m e 24 p e r c e n t o f t u r n o v e r . E l s e w h e r e ,
commercialisation t o o k place under indigenous control, t h o u g h
it m a d e a v e r y g r e a t d i f f e r e n c e w h e t h e r t h i s r e f e r r e d t o t h e l o c a l
peasantry o r t o landlords. A g r i c u l t u r e in the w h o l e southern half
o f E t h i o p i a , f r o m H a r a r in t h e east t h r o u g h s o u t h e r n S h o a t o
W a l e g a in the w e s t , w a s d o m i n a t e d b y l a n d l o r d s , a n d this area
p r o d u c e d b y far t h e greatest part o f E t h i o p i a n e x p o r t s . T h e
land-tenure system resulted from the Ethiopian conquest in the
late n i n e t e e n t h a n d early t w e n t i e t h centuries, w i t h t h e g r a n t i n g
o f rights o v e r land, w h i c h eventually became s y n o n y m o u s w i t h
o w n e r s h i p , t o b o t h h i g h officials a n d i n d i v i d u a l s e t t l e r s f r o m t h e
n o r t h ; m u c h land also remained in the hands o f the emperor, and
o f s o m e leading southern families. L a n d in southern E t h i o p i a
continued t o b e alienated from the i n d i g e n o u s p o p u l a t i o n t h r o u g h
o u t t h e r e i g n o f H a i l e Selassie, as a result b o t h o f e x p r o p r i a t i o n
by grasping g o v e r n o r s , and o f land grants made b y the emperor
as r e w a r d s f o r l o y a l t y ; m a n y a r m y o f f i c e r s w e r e i n t h i s w a y g i v e n
2
an e c o n o m i c stake in the maintenance o f the r e g i m e . In the
s o u t h e r n p r o v i n c e s as a w h o l e , s o m e 50 t o 55 p e r c e n t o f
l a n d h o l d i n g s w e r e r e n t e d i n t h e l a t e 1 9 6 0 s , c o m p a r e d w i t h less
t h a n 20 p e r c e n t i n t h e n o r t h e r n h i g h l a n d s . T h e s e l a n d o w n e r s
naturally w i s h e d t o reap a cash profit f r o m their h o l d i n g s , a g o a l
m o s t easily a c h i e v e d in the Kaffa r e g i o n b y e x p l o i t i n g the existing
w i l d coffee forest, a n d e l s e w h e r e b y p l a n t i n g coffee, oilseeds,
pulses, peppers, bananas and other crops. Coffee alone accounted
for o v e r half o f Ethiopia's exports in e v e r y year from 1954 t o 1972.
T h o u g h attempts w e r e made, principally b y foreign-aid agencies,
t o e n c o u r a g e a g r i c u l t u r a l d e v e l o p m e n t b y s m a l l h o l d e r s , t h e effect
w a s generally t o increase the payments t o landlords, and, b y
p r o m o t i n g cost-effective mechanised agriculture, t o p r o m o t e
e v i c t i o n s ; this w a s t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e C h i l a l o A g r i c u l t u r a l
D e v e l o p m e n t Unit run b y S w e d i s h aid in A r u s i p r o v i n c e , and a
similar process o f landlord c o n t r o l started t o o v e r t a k e the v e r y
rapid d e v e l o p m e n t o f c a s h - c r o p f a r m i n g at H u m e r a o n t h e
3
Sudanese b o r d e r . T h e p r o b l e m w a s r e c o g n i s e d sufficiently f o r the
1
G i l k e s , Dying lion, 150-2.
2
J. M . C o h e n , ' E t h i o p i a a f t e r H a i l e S e l a s s i e : t h e g o v e r n m e n t l a n d f a c t o r * , African
Affairs, 1973, 7 2 , 289, 365-82.
3
G i l k e s , Dying lion, 1 2 4 - 3 1 ; M . S t â h l , Ethiopia: political contradictions in agricultural
development ( S t o c k h o l m , 1974).
498

imperial g o v e r n m e n t t o set u p a M i n i s t r y o f L a n d R e f o r m in 1966,

but since this w a s c a u g h t b e t w e e n t h e v e s t e d interests o f t h e
regime's supporters in the south and the intense hostility t o
c e n t r a l i n t e r f e r e n c e i n l a n d o f a l l g r o u p s i n t h e n o r t h , it is n o t
s u r p r i s i n g t h a t it a c h i e v e d little b e y o n d s o m e v e r y u s e f u l s u r v e y
w o r k . T h e total nationalisation o f land a n n o u n c e d b y the military
g o v e r n m e n t after t h e 1 9 7 4 r e v o l u t i o n w a s t h e r e f o r e g r e e t e d w i t h
enthusiasm in parts o f the south, a n d w i t h m u c h greater reserve
i n t h e n o r t h , b u t its effects fall o u t s i d e t h e p e r i o d c o v e r e d b y t h i s
chapter.
In Somalia, a measure o f commercialisation f o l l o w e d the
g r a d u a l drift o f n o m a d i c h e r d s m e n i n t o a g r i c u l t u r e in b o t h n o r t h
and south, but for the great majority n o m a d i s m remained the only
p r a c t i c a b l e f o r m o f life, as w e l l as o n e c h e r i s h e d f o r its o w n s a k e ,
until the great d r o u g h t o f the early 1970s. D r o u g h t w a s a
recurrent danger t h r o u g h o u t the l o w - l y i n g parts o f the H o r n ,
w i t h d r o u g h t s o f great severity perhaps o n c e in a generation ; in
B r i t i s h S o m a l i l a n d , 1 9 2 7 - 8 a n d 1950—1 w e r e p a r t i c u l a r l y b a d
years. T h e d r o u g h t w h i c h spread f r o m n o r t h t o s o u t h t h r o u g h
the eastern part o f the H o r n in 1 9 7 2 - 5 w a s e x c e p t i o n a l n o t o n l y
f o r its i n t e n s i t y b u t a l s o f o r t h e e c o n o m i c a n d p o l i t i c a l
1
c i r c u m s t a n c e s w i t h w h i c h it c o i n c i d e d . F o r t h e first t i m e a m a j o r
d r o u g h t w a s s e e n n o t m e r e l y as a d i v i n e l y i n f l i c t e d p u n i s h m e n t
o r as a c a t a s t r o p h e t o b e p a s s i v e l y e n d u r e d , b u t as s o m e t h i n g
which governments might, and should be expected to, relieve.
M o r e o v e r , it c a u g h t t h e t w o m a i n g o v e r n m e n t s o f t h e r e g i o n i n
v e r y different p o s t u r e s . I n E t h i o p i a , w h e r e m a n y t h o u s a n d s o f
p e o p l e d i e d , e s p e c i a l l y i n W o l l o p r o v i n c e , i n 1973—4, t h e
g o v e r n m e n t g r e e t e d it w i t h e m b a r r a s s m e n t , c o n c e a l m e n t , a n d
then an ineffective display o f imperial g e n e r o s i t y ; this picture o f
n e g l e c t , as it e m e r g e d f r o m t h e r e v e l a t i o n s o f f o r e i g n j o u r n a l i s t s ,
w a s v e r y effectively used t o discredit the m o n a r c h y d u r i n g 1974.
In the S o m a l i R e p u b l i c , w h i c h w a s w o r s t struck in 1 9 7 4 - 5 , the
m i l i t a r y g o v e r n m e n t u s e d it as a n o p p o r t u n i t y b o t h t o a p p e a l f o r
f o r e i g n h e l p , a n d t o p r o m o t e i n d r a s t i c f a s h i o n its p l a n s f o r
sédentarisation. D e s t i t u t e n o m a d s w e r e settled b o t h o n arable
l a n d s a n d — a g r e a t i n n o v a t i o n — i n fishing c o m m u n i t i e s a r o u n d
the coast. T h e s e c h a n g e s h a d scarcely g o t u n d e r w a y at the e n d
o f o u r p e r i o d , a n d it w a s n o t y e t c l e a r w h e t h e r t h e y r e p r e s e n t e d
1
I. M . L e w i s , Abaar: the Somali drought ( L o n d o n , 1975).
499

a temporary adjustment to the drought, or a revolutionary

transformation o f the nomadic self-sufficiency o f traditional
S o m a l i life.
C O N C L U S I O N
M u c h o f the experience o f the H o r n d u r i n g the central third o f

the twentieth century derived from d e v e l o p m e n t s w h i c h w e r e
c o m m o n t o t h e w h o l e o f A f r i c a a n d , i n d e e d , t o m u c h o f t h e rest
o f the g l o b e . T h e g r o w t h o f population, the extension o f a
monetary e c o n o m y geared principally to export p r o d u c t i o n , the
introduction o f formalised educational systems and their p r o v i s i o n
o f trained m a n p o w e r t o n e w l y created state and p r i v a t e institutions
9
w h o s e m e m b e r s c a m e in c o n s e q u e n c e t o f o r m an ' elite superior
i n w e a l t h , p o w e r a n d s t a t u s t o t h e i r f e l l o w s , w e r e all o f t h e m
familiar processes elsewhere. R u d i m e n t a r y in 1940, these processes
had b y 1975 reached s u c h a level that the contrast m u s t h a v e b e e n
staggering to any Somali or Ethiopian w h o had lived t h r o u g h the
entire period, m o r e s o perhaps than in m a n y other parts o f the
continent w h e r e the e q u i v a l e n t processes had b e g u n earlier and
c o n t i n u e d m o r e e v e n l y ; b u t in this respect the H o r n m a y b e said
to h a v e experienced n o m o r e than an accelerated f o r m o f a familiar
revolution.
W h a t w a s distinctive a b o u t the H o r n w a s the absence o f the
c o l o n i a l a n d p o s t - c o l o n i a l s t a t e as a m e c h a n i s m f o r e n s u r i n g at
least an administrative a n d t o s o m e extent also a n o r m a t i v e
continuity t h r o u g h a period o f social and e c o n o m i c change. In
E t h i o p i a a n d the S o m a l i R e p u b l i c , the state w a s n o t , as e l s e w h e r e ,
an alien f r a m e w o r k externally i m p o s e d but subsequently
a c c e p t e d - i n d e e d , l a r g e l y t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d - as t h e m a t r i x w i t h i n
w h i c h the various permutations o f domestic political competition
c o u l d be w o r k e d out. It e m b o d i e d , rather, an internal and
e x p a n s i o n i s t d y n a m i c , f o r S o m a l i s as t h e a g e n c y f o r a c h i e v i n g
n a t i o n a l u n i f i c a t i o n , i n E t h i o p i a as t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f a c e n t r a l a n d
i m p e r i a l h e g e m o n y o v e r s u r r o u n d i n g a r e a s , w h i c h m a d e it p a r t
and parcel o f domestic political conflict. In b o t h countries, the
t a k e o v e r o f the state b y military r e g i m e s m o r e clearly r e v o l u t i o n
a r y t h a n a n y f o u n d e l s e w h e r e i n A f r i c a w a s p r o m p t e d - it is n o t
t o o f a n c i f u l t o s u g g e s t - b y its f a i l u r e t o l i v e u p t o t h e d y n a m i c
w h i c h w a s h e l d t o j u s t i f y its e x i s t e n c e . B e n e a t h t h e i r M a r x i s t
rhetoric, b o t h o f the revolutionary g o v e r n m e n t s expressed an
500

C O N C L U S I O N
intensified f o r m o f an existing national i d e o l o g y : in the R e p u b l i c

that o f unification, in E t h i o p i a that o f assimilation t o an essentially
central c o n c e p t i o n o f n a t i o n h o o d .
W h e r e t h e t w o states d i f f e r e d f r o m o n e a n o t h e r w a s i n t h e
implications o f this i d e o l o g y for the identities o f o t h e r g r o u p s
w i t h i n the w o u l d - b e nation. In the S o m a l i R e p u b l i c , the N R C s
attempted destruction o f clan identities w a s balanced b y an
emphasis o n a h o m o g e n i s e d S o m a l i n a t i o n h o o d in w h i c h m e m b e r s
o f all c l a n s h a d a p a r t . I n a w a y , t h e p r o c e s s w a s t h e r e v e r s e o f
that w h i c h had o c c u r r e d d u r i n g the p e r i o d o f party c o m p e t i t i o n ,
w h e n clan identities had b e e n emphasised b y politicians s e e k i n g
s u p p o r t : since clans f o r m e d part o f a S o m a l i p e o p l e , unified b y
l a n g u a g e , literature, religion and traditional descent, neither the
e n c o u r a g e m e n t nor the suppression o f clan directly threatened the
national identity. B y suppressing the clan, the N R C s o u g h t to
r e m o v e an i m p o r t a n t s o u r c e o f d o m e s t i c f e u d i n g o v e r political
and e c o n o m i c allocations, but because o f the c o m m o n S o m a l i
h e r i t a g e it d i d n o t r u n t o o g r e a t a r i s k o f p o p u l a r r e a c t i o n . T h e
c o m b i n e d process o f sédentarisation and h o m o g e n i s a t i o n w a s
indeed v e r y similar, in a m u c h s p e e d e d - u p f o r m , t o that w h i c h
had existed o v e r a l o n g period a m o n g the S a b g r o u p s o f the
J u b a - S h e b e l e basin.
C o n v e r s e l y in E t h i o p i a , just as the m o b i l i s a t i o n o f e t h n i c
i d e n t i t i e s h a d b e e n s e e n i n t h e p r e - r e v o l u t i o n a r y p e r i o d as p o s i n g
a s e r i o u s t h r e a t t o n a t i o n a l u n i t y , as w a s s h o w n b y t h e s u p p r e s s i o n
o f the M e c h a T u l a m a association, so the accession o f a r e v o l
utionary nationalist g o v e r n m e n t in A d d i s A b a b a p r o m p t e d a
localist reaction a m o n g m a n y o f the peripheral peoples. In the case
o f the cultivators o f southern and w e s t e r n E t h i o p i a , c o m m i t m e n t
to the regime c o u l d be purchased t h r o u g h a p o l i c y o f land
nationalisation w h i c h c o n f o r m e d w i t h the D e r g ' s socialist aspir
a t i o n s w i t h o u t c o n f l i c t i n g w i t h its n a t i o n a l i s t o n e s . E l s e w h e r e , t h e
policy o f assimilation to the centralist ethic implicit in E t h i o p i a n
n a t i o n a l i s m w a s n o t s o e a s i l y a c c o m p l i s h e d , t h o u g h its o u t c o m e
at t h e e n d o f t h e p e r i o d w a s still e x t r e m e l y u n c l e a r . W h a t w a s c l e a r
w a s that the processes o f social, e c o n o m i c and political c h a n g e
in the r e g i o n in the three d e c a d e s after the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r
had in m a n y respects reinforced the tensions implicit in the
m a k e - u p o f the H o r n .
501

C H A P T E R 10
EGYPT, LIBYA AND THE SUDAN
H i s t o r i c a l l y n o r t h - e a s t A f r i c a is r i v a l l e d i n i m p o r t a n c e b y n o o t h e r
r e g i o n o f the continent. E g y p t , the focal p o i n t o f this r e g i o n ,
w h i c h also comprises L i b y a and the Sudan, has successively been
o n e o f the cradles o f western civilisation, a major centre o f M u s l i m
c u l t u r e , a n d in m o r e recent times a base for P a n - A r a b a n d
Pan-Islamic resistance to political or cultural d o m i n a t i o n b y the
w e s t . I t w a s i n E g y p t t h a t t h e first p o l i t i c a l a n d , m o r e i m p o r t a n t ,
p h i l o s o p h i c a l reaction against w e s t e r n tutelage in A f r i c a t o o k
place.
L i b y a and the Sudan, E g y p t ' s western and southern n e i g h b o u r s ,
h a v e b e e n c l o s e l y l i n k e d t o its d e s t i n y . T h i s w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e
case d u r i n g o u r p e r i o d , w h e n the r e v o l u t i o n a r y c h a n g e in E g y p t
t h a t t o o k p l a c e after t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r h a d p e r c u s s i v e effects
o n t h e s o c i a l , e c o n o m i c a n d p o l i t i c a l life o f h e r n e i g h b o u r s .
Historical links w e r e reflected in similarities in the political a n d
social s p h e r e . T h e three states are p r e d o m i n a n t l y M u s l i m a n d h a d
all s u f f e r e d u n d e r s o m e f o r m o f w e s t e r n c o n t r o l , f r o m w h i c h t h e y
o n l y finally e s c a p e d d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d u n d e r r e v i e w . T h e y s h a r e d
a b a c k g r o u n d o f anti-imperialist agitation and an identity w i t h
Pan-Islamism and A r a b nationalism. T h e y also e x p e r i e n c e d ten
sions b e t w e e n secular political ideologies and traditional M u s l i m
notions o f the polity. M a n y o f these tensions w e r e attributable to
the rapid s o c i o - e c o n o m i c c h a n g e s t a k i n g place t h r o u g h o u t the
r e g i o n b u t , b e c a u s e o f the v e r y different g e o g r a p h i c a l a n d
e c o n o m i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e t h r e e s t a t e s c o m p r i s i n g it, t h e y
w e r e v a r i e d in their nature. W i t h a c o m b i n e d area o f s o m e t w o
m i l l i o n s q u a r e m i l e s (c. five m i l l i o n s q . k m ) a n d a p o p u l a t i o n o f
less t h a n 60 m i l l i o n i n 1 9 7 5 , t h e r e s h o u l d h a v e e x i s t e d a v e r y l o w
p o p u l a t i o n d e n s i t y . I n r e a l i t y , h o w e v e r , t h i s w a s n o t t h e c a s e , as
m o s t o f the land w a s u n i n h a b i t a b l e o r unfit for c u l t i v a t i o n .
E g y p t , w i t h s o m e 40 m i l l i o n inhabitants, w a s the m o s t p o p u l o u s
o f t h e t h r e e s t a t e s . A l t h o u g h it h a d a n a r e a o f 386 t h o u s a n d s q u a r e
502

EGYPT, L I B Y A A N D T H E S U D A N
miles, o n l y 3 p e r cent o f the land w a s arable, w h i c h m e a n t in real

t e r m s t h a t it h a d o n e o f t h e h i g h e s t p o p u l a t i o n d e n s i t i e s i n t h e
w o r l d . L i b y a , a l t h o u g h m o s t o f its 6 7 9 t h o u s a n d s q u a r e m i l e s w a s
also desert, had a p o p u l a t i o n o f o n l y s o m e t w o million. T h e
Sudan, w i t h 967 thousand square miles and a p o p u l a t i o n o f s o m e
18 m i l l i o n , h a d a m u c h m o r e v a r i e d t o p o g r a p h y t h a n its n o r t h e r n
n e i g h b o u r s . E a c h d i f f e r e d g r e a t l y i n its e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t .
L i b y a , b y far t h e r i c h e s t o f t h e t h r e e o n a c c o u n t o f its h u g e o i l
r e s e r v e s , t h e i m p a c t o f w h i c h w a s felt o n l y after i 9 6 0 , w a s
h a m p e r e d i n its d e v e l o p m e n t b y l a c k o f p o p u l a t i o n . E g y p t , less
favourably e n d o w e d w i t h natural resources, especially minerals,
w a s i m p e d e d i n its e c o n o m i c p r o g r e s s b y a r a t e o f p o p u l a t i o n
g r o w t h that negated m a n y o f the gains m a d e t h r o u g h increased
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n a n d i r r i g a t i o n . T h e S u d a n r e m a i n e d b y far t h e
poorest r e g i o n o f the three.
A l t h o u g h t h e e c o n o m i e s o f t h e t h r e e s t a t e s g r e w at d i f f e r e n t
rates i n t h e p e r i o d 1 9 4 0 - 7 5 , t h e i r s o c i a l effects w e r e s i m i l a r .
E c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t , in particular industrialisation, stimulated
b o t h the increasing prolétarisation o f the urban masses and the
increasing secularisation o f the élite, w i t h the p o l i t y in e a c h case
b e c o m i n g i n c r e a s i n g l y p o l a r i s e d as a r e s u l t . T h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f
trade unions, but m o r e especially the g r o w i n g i m p o r t a n c e o f the
m i l i t a r y , j o i n e d at t h e l e v e l o f t h e e x e c u t i v e o r o f f i c e r c l a s s b y
precisely those w h o had been politicised and w h o had political
experience, reflected this polarisation. F r o m c o n s e r v a t i v e M u s l i m s
to Marxists, the armies w e r e inundated b y y o u n g idealists, w h o
w a n t e d n o t o n l y t o d e f e n d the nation and the state, b u t also t o
s t e p i n t o t h e p o l i t i c a l a r e n a . A f t e r 1 9 5 2 , t h e y e a r o f E g y p t ' s coup
d'état, t h e l i n e s b e t w e e n c i v i l i a n a n d m i l i t a r y p o l i t i c s b e c a m e
blurred and the military eventually b e c a m e the mainstay o f the
p o l i t y i n all t h r e e s t a t e s .
A further c o m m o n political experience o f the three countries
in o u r period w a s the nature o f their relations w i t h the great
p o w e r s . A l t h o u g h b y m i d - 1 9 5 0 t h e y h a d all o b t a i n e d p o l i t i c a l
independence, they remained economically dependent o n one or
the other o f the great p o w e r s , particularly the U n i t e d States o f
A m e r i c a and the U n i o n o f S o v i e t Socialist R e p u b l i c s . E g y p t
a t t e m p t e d t o steer a ' n o n - a l i g n e d ' c o u r s e , b u t failed t o d o s o
because the c o u n t r y n e e d e d b o t h e c o n o m i c and military aid f r o m
external sources. Finally, the Palestinian p r o b l e m , and the repeated
503

E G Y P T , L I B Y A A N D T H E S U D A N
w a r s b e t w e e n t h e A r a b s t a t e s a n d I s r a e l left a p r o f o u n d , i f n o t
devastating, mark o n the region. A p a r t from the massive h u m a n
a n d m a t e r i a l l o s s e s , t h e r e g i o n o n t h e w h o l e w a s , as a r e s u l t ,
ideologically traumatised, resulting in a p e r i o d o f self-criticism
d u r i n g w h i c h the causes o f w e a k n e s s and defeat w e r e s o u g h t .
O n the other hand the I s r a e l i - A r a b conflict contributed to the
p o l i t i c i s a t i o n o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f all t h r e e c o u n t r i e s , a n d b r o u g h t
t o p o w e r , o r facilitated the e m e r g e n c e of, n e w social a n d political
elements. Y e t despite c o m m o n religious and historical links and
the shared struggle against colonialism and Z i o n i s m , the three
s t a t e s w e r e m a r k e d b y c o n s i d e r a b l e p o l i t i c a l a n d i d e o l o g i c a l , as
w e l l as s o c i o - e c o n o m i c , d i f f e r e n c e s .
E pt
&
T h e A n g l o - E g y p t i a n T r e a t y o f 1936 had been intended b o t h to

s e c u r e E g y p t as a n a l l y o f B r i t a i n i n c a s e o f w a r b e c a u s e o f h e r
vital strategic position, and to assuage nationalist criticism o f
Britain's role in the c o u n t r y . E v e n s o , the c o u n t r y c o n t i n u e d t o
e x p e r i e n c e s e r i o u s p o l i t i c a l u n r e s t u n t i l w e l l after t h e o u t b r e a k o f
the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r . G o v e r n m e n t s w e r e frequently reshuffled,
as t h e y o u n g a n d i n e x p e r i e n c e d K i n g F a r u q ( F a r o u k ) , w h o h a d
o n l y c o m e to the t h r o n e in A p r i l 1936, attempted to exert his o w n
authority in relation b o t h t o the r u l i n g W a f d Party and the British
H i g h C o m m i s s i o n b y s u p p o r t i n g radical politicians o r m o v e m e n t s .
In the t o w n s , the y o u n g e r and politically articulate generation,
organised into various political g r o u p s o f conflicting ideological
orientations - s o m e nationalist and s o m e ardently Islamist -
battled against each other, and continued their agitation against
t h e still c o n s i d e r a b l e B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y a n d p o l i t i c a l p r e s e n c e .
T h i s political unrest reflected a g r o w i n g politicisation o f
society, if n o t a nascent class conflict. Since the 1 9 1 9 ' r e v o l u t i o n ' ,
a n d e s p e c i a l l y as a r e s u l t o f t h e d e p r e s s i o n , t h e s o c i o - e c o n o m i c
structure o f the country had u n d e r g o n e considerable changes.
D u r i n g t h e 1 9 2 0 s , efforts at i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n h a d c r e a t e d a n
e n l a r g e d c l a s s o f w o r k e r s , as t h e g r o w i n g n u m b e r s o f t r a d e u n i o n s
indicated. M o r e important, the nationalist m o v e m e n t had
p r o m p t e d the E g y p t i a n b o u r g e o i s i e t o i n v e s t in industry, h e a d e d
504

25 Egypt.
b y the a l l - E g y p t i a n B a n q u e al-Misr, in o r d e r t o g a i n greater
independence from Great Britain and other foreign investors. B y
the early 1930s this e c o n o m i c n a t i o n a l i s m also b e g a n t o manifest
itself in radical student g r o u p s and trade u n i o n s , w h i c h called for
the b o y c o t t o f foreign, and especially British, g o o d s . E q u a l l y
i m p o r t a n t at t h a t t i m e , a n d a c o n t r i b u t i n g f a c t o r t o t h e p o l i t i c a l
t u r m o i l , w a s t h e r e v i v a l o f I s l a m as a p o l i t i c a l f o r c e . T o b e s u r e
this r e v i v a l also t o o k different f o r m s — literary o r e c o n o m i c , f o r
i n s t a n c e - b u t its t h r u s t w a s t h e r e s u s c i t a t i o n o f p r i s t i n e I s l a m .
T h e political expression o f this r e v i v a l w a s the M u s l i m B r o t h e r
h o o d (al-Ikwan al-Muslimun) headed b y the popular S h a y k h
505

H a s s a n a l - B a n n a ' , w h i c h , in the eyes o f s o m e o b s e r v e r s , repres

e n t e d t h e first m a s s - s u p p o r t e d a n d o r g a n i s e d , e s s e n t i a l l y u r b a n -
o r i e n t e d effort t o c o p e w i t h t h e p l i g h t o f I s l a m i n t h e m o d e r n
1
world. Intrinsically the I k w a n f o l l o w e d earlier (especially
nineteenth-century) Islamic reform m o v e m e n t s , but w a s activist
w h e r e earlier o n e s had b e e n m o r e p h i l o s o p h i c a l in nature.
O t h e r g r o u p s a n d o r g a n i s a t i o n s , s u c h as M i s r a l - F a t a t ( t h e
G r e e n Shirts) and the Y o u n g M e n ' s M u s l i m A s s o c i a t i o n , w e r e
also part o f this r e v i v a l , and a l t h o u g h politically i m p o r t a n t d u r i n g
the 1930s, they n e v e r attained the same d e g r e e o f w i d e s p r e a d
s u p p o r t as I k w a n . A p a r t f r o m a c o m m o n I s l a m i c o u t l o o k ,
extreme nationalist fervour and considerable political popularity
a m o n g s t the m a s s e s , e l e m e n t s in these m o v e m e n t s also shared the
belief that violence w a s a legitimate tool for the attainment o f their
objectives. T h u s b e t w e e n 1936 and 1939, w h e n martial law w a s
declared, riots and attempted assassinations b e c a m e c o m m o n p l a c e ,
and w e r e indicative b o t h o f the u n d e r l y i n g unrest in society,
especially a m o n g the y o u n g e r generation and the urban proletariat,
and the continued o p p o s i t i o n to the presence o f the British and
their E g y p t i a n collaborators. T h i s unrest w a s exploited b y foreign
p o w e r s s u c h as G e r m a n y a n d I t a l y , w h i c h w e r e t h e m s e l v e s
heading towards a conflict w i t h G r e a t Britain and France. A g e n t s
o f the Fascist p o w e r s w e r e a c t i v e l y e n g a g e d in soliciting political
support against British and French control.
N e i t h e r the pro-British g o v e r n m e n t s n o r the British H i g h
C o m m i s s i o n e r , Sir M i l e s L a m p s o n , w e r e able to p r e v e n t these
developments. Considerable diplomatic pressure w a s , h o w e v e r ,
exerted b y the British o n the W a f d and the interim g o v e r n m e n t
at l e a s t t o c u r t a i l v i o l e n c e , a n d t h e r e w e r e fears t h a t t h e B r i t i s h
m i g h t i n t e r v e n e t o p r o t e c t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . I n effect B r i t i s h t h r e a t s
i m p o s e d a secret and unilateral limitation o n E g y p t ' s s o v e r e i g n t y ,
w h i c h in the eyes o f the British g o v e r n m e n t w a s quite warranted.
A f t e r 1936 e v e n t s in E u r o p e p o i n t e d t o an international military
conflict, and therefore 'imperial c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ' had to be
secured. F u r t h e r m o r e , the M i d d l e East t h r o u g h o u t that period
w a s e x p e r i e n c i n g an increasingly v i o l e n t nationalist reaction
against A n g l o - F r e n c h c o n t r o l , especially in Palestine, Iran and
Syria, w h i c h spilled o v e r to other areas.
1
F o r a h i s t o r y o f t h e m o v e m e n t , see R i c h a r d P . M i t c h e l l , The Society of Muslim
Brothers ( O x f o r d , 1969).
J 06

T h e s e events did not escape the notice o f the m o r e radical

n a t i o n a l i s t p o l i t i c i a n s , s u c h as ' A l l M a h i r a n d G e n e r a l ' A z i z
a l - M i s r l , a n d t h e i r f o l l o w e r s . It w a s t h e y w h o t u r n e d E g y p t
i n c r e a s i n g l y t o w a r d its A r a b n e i g h b o u r s b y s u p p o r t i n g P a n - A r a b
nationalism, and espousing a collective a n t i - A n g l o - F r e n c h stance.
A l t h o u g h the British realised the implications o f these d e v e l o p
m e n t s , t h e r e w a s little t h a t c o u l d b e d o n e o t h e r t h a n t o c a j o l e a n d
t h r e a t e n , o r i n t h e last r e s o r t t o i n t e r v e n e m i l i t a r i l y , as w a s t o b e
d o n e in F e b r u a r y 1 9 4 2 , a n e v e n t t h a t w a s o n l y t o f u e l n a t i o n a l i s t
o p p o s i t i o n further.
I n A u g u s t 1 9 3 9 , as E u r o p e h e a d e d t o w a r d s w a r , ' A H M a h i r , t h e n
the c h i e f o f the royal cabinet and an o p e n l y p r o - A x i s nationalist,
w a s a p p o i n t e d p r i m e m i n i s t e r after y e t a n o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t c r i s i s .
W h i l e nationalist forces w e r e pleased, the British g o v e r n m e n t w a s
v e r y c o n c e r n e d b y this d e v e l o p m e n t , n o t necessarily b e c a u s e o f
M a h i r ' s p r o - A x i s leanings, b u t o n a c c o u n t o f his association w i t h
t h e p a l a c e , a n d i n p a r t i c u l a r h i s c l o s e ties w i t h S h a y k h a l - M a r a g h l ,
1
the rector o f A l - A z h a r since 1 9 3 5 . A l - M a r a g h l , a f o r m e r
supporter o f the W a f d , had b e c o m e the m e n t o r o f e x t r e m e Islamic
e l e m e n t s , j u s t as a l - M i s r l , t h e n E g y p t i a n c o m m a n d e r - i n - c h i e f , w a s
the inspirational leader o f the e x t r e m e nationalists, especially
a m o n g t h e y o u n g o f f i c e r s . T h e r e f o r e it w a s n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t
t h e r e c t o r , as w e l l as t h e p r e m i e r , r e s i s t e d B r i t a i n ' s p r e s s u r e s o n
E g y p t to declare w a r o n G e r m a n y . U n d e r the 1936 treaty, E g y p t
appeared t o h a v e had an o b l i g a t i o n t o d o just that, b u t o t h e r than
the declaration o f martial l a w , the g o v e r n m e n t refused t o c o m
ply. A t the same time the premier b e g a n to i m p l e m e n t several
important n e w policies. A territorial a r m y (al-Jaysh al-Murabit)
w a s c r e a t e d , h e a d e d b y ' A b d a l - R a h m a n ' A z i z , as w e l l as a S o c i a l
Affairs M i n i s t r y , w h o s e e s t a b l i s h m e n t h a d b e e n r e p e a t e d l y
d e m a n d e d b y n a t i o n a l i s t s . I n effect t h i s b r o u g h t i n t o b e i n g a n
armed force outside the c o n t r o l o f the British military mission.
M o r e o v e r , the Ministry o f W a r w a s g i v e n to another p r o - A x i s and
staunch pan-Islamic sympathiser, Salih H a r b . T h e c o m p o s i t i o n o f
t h e c a b i n e t , t h e r e f o r e , a u g u r e d ill f o r B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s , b u t
a p p e a r e d t o reflect p o p u l a r o p i n i o n . I n t e r m s o f E g y p t ' s f o r e i g n
r e l a t i o n s , it w a s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t t h e p r e m i e r v i s i t e d t h e S u d a n - t h e
first E g y p t i a n p r e m i e r t o d o s o - i n 1 9 4 0 , t h e r e b y e m p h a s i s i n g
1
F o r a c l o s e r s t u d y o f *A l l M a h i r ' s role in the crisis a n d his relations w i t h the p a l a c e ,
see P . J. V a t i k i o t i s , Nasser and his generation ( L o n d o n , 1978).
507

E g y p t ' s rights in the area. G r e a t Britain o b j e c t e d v e h e m e n t l y t o

this initiative.
I n t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h e W a f d , f e a r f u l o f l o s i n g its p o p u l a r i t y ,
p u b l i s h e d a manifesto in A p r i l 1940. W h i l s t a p p e a r i n g to p r o v i d e
an alternative to the g o v e r n m e n t ' s nationalist position b y taking
a n a n t i - B r i t i s h s t a n c e , i n r e a l i t y it d i d little m o r e t h a n i n s i s t u p o n
E g y p t ' s political i n d e p e n d e n c e . It implicitly offered c o o p e r a t i o n
w i t h the British in return for m o r e satisfactory c o n c e s s i o n s in
p o s t - w a r A n g l o - E g y p t i a n relations. T h e W a f d tried t o capitalise
o n B r i t a i n ' s p r e c a r i o u s p o s i t i o n i n E g y p t w h i l e at t h e s a m e t i m e
exploiting the angry m o o d o f the peasants and urban p o o r w h o
w e r e suffering u n d e r w a r t i m e e c o n o m i c restrictions and the
generally abject e c o n o m i c situation. C o t t o n exports, the principal
source o f foreign i n c o m e , had already been severely curtailed.
D u r i n g t h e w a r , real i n c o m e a n d p r o d u c t i o n p e r c a p i t a fell t o t h e
l o w e s t levels r e c o r d e d in the t w e n t i e t h century. F u r t h e r internal
dissatisfaction and a g r o w i n g m o o d o f rebellion w e r e the result.
E v e n before ' A l l M a h i r ' s and a l - M i s r f s r e m o v a l b y the British in
the spring o f 1940, the I k w a n and Y o u n g E g y p t Party ( k n o w n
as t h e N a t i o n a l I s l a m i c P a r t y - a l - H i z b a l - W a t a n l a l - I s l a m i - f r o m
1 9 4 0 ) , as w e l l as m a n y o f t h e r a d i c a l y o u n g o f f i c e r s , w e r e s a i d t o
1
h a v e e v e n c o n t e m p l a t e d a r e v o l u t i o n , o r at l e a s t a coup d'etat. ' A H
M a h i r ' s dismissal w a s f o l l o w e d b y t w o ineffective cabinets, b o t h
h e a d e d b y i n d e p e n d e n t s w h o a t t e m p t e d t o steer a c o u r s e o f
neutrality. M e a n w h i l e the W a f d w a s w a i t i n g in the w i n g s t o take
p o w e r . T h i s m o m e n t a r r i v e d in F e b r u a r y 1 9 4 2 after t h e m i l i t a r y
situation had deteriorated, and w h e n the A x i s forces w e r e o n the
v e r g e o f c o n q u e r i n g E g y p t . W i t h her o w n interests in E g y p t
about to collapse, Britain decided to intervene directly by pres
enting an u l t i m a t u m to the k i n g d e m a n d i n g that N a h h a s Pasha,
the leader o f the W a f d Party, should immediately f o r m a cabinet,
and b a c k i n g this u p w i t h the threat o f a r m e d force.
T h e F e b r u a r y 4 i n c i d e n t o f 1 9 4 2 , as it b e c a m e k n o w n , c o n s t i
t u t e d a t u r n i n g p o i n t i n t h e a n n a l s o f E g y p t i a n as w e l l as A r a b
h i s t o r y . Y e a r s l a t e r , after t h e J u l y c o u p o f 1 9 5 2 , G a m a l ' A b d a l -
Nasir, A n w a r Sadat and General N a g l b ( N e g u i b ) w e r e to declare
that this e v e n t , t o g e t h e r w i t h the s u b s e q u e n t d i s a r m i n g o f the
E g y p t i a n military, w a s a r o o t cause o f their determination to
o v e r t h r o w F a r u q ' s r e g i m e and rid the c o u n t r y o f the British
1
V a t i k i o t i s , Nasser.
508

military presence. E q u a l l y important, and politically o f particular

c o n s e q u e n c e at t h e t i m e , w a s t h e d i s c r e d i t i n g o f t h e W a f d P a r t y
b e c a u s e o f its a l l i a n c e w i t h B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s a n d t h e r e s u l t i n g
g r o w t h in r e v o l u t i o n a r y elements, especially the l e f t - w i n g o n e s ,
t h o u g h most o f them had o f course to operate underground. A s
a result o f the w a r t i m e situation E g y p t i a n society w a s thus e v e n
further polarised, w i t h these n e w s o c i o - e c o n o m i c and political
forces undermining the already important liberal-bourgeois par
liamentary institutions. M o r e o v e r , the W a f d , placed in p o w e r
w i t h the help o f the British, w a s increasingly estranged f r o m b o t h
the palace and the extreme nationalist and Islamic forces.
A l t h o u g h t h e W a f d r e g i m e i n t r o d u c e d l e g i s l a t i o n , s u c h as a
n e w b u d g e t , the suspension o f penalties for hoarders, the intro
d u c t i o n o f a g r i c u l t u r a l s u b s i d i e s a n d t h e l e g a l i s a t i o n o f A r a b i c as
t h e official l a n g u a g e , all o f w h i c h w e r e i n t e n d e d as p a l l i a t i v e s t o
t h e m a s s e s , it f a i l e d t o r e c o g n i s e t h e n e e d f o r l a n d r e f o r m .
M e a n w h i l e , extreme nationalists, including G e n e r a l ' A z i z al-Misrl,
maintained contacts w i t h the A x i s p o w e r s . T h o s e k n o w n to be
publicly p r o - A x i s w e r e either interned o r politically isolated.
B e t w e e n 1943 a n d 1945 t h e s t r u g g l e b e t w e e n t h e p r o - p a l a c e
factions and the W a f d c o n t i n u e d , leading to internal party
divisions and accusations o f corruption. O n 9 O c t o b e r 1944 the
k i n g d i s m i s s e d N a h h a s P a s h a , u n d o u b t e d l y i n p a r t as r e v e n g e f o r
the F e b r u a r y 4 incident, a n d a p p o i n t e d A h m a d M a h i r as p r i m e
minister. A h m a d M a h i r , the brother o f ' A l l , headed a g r o u p o f
f o r m e r W a f d i s t s , k n o w n as t h e S a ' a d i s t s , w h o h a d u r g e d E g y p t
to declare w a r o n the Fascists and w h o favoured progressive
r e f o r m s at h o m e . G e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s w e r e h e l d i n e a r l y 1 9 4 5 , b u t
the W a f d b o y c o t t e d t h e m and m a n y m e m b e r s transferred their
support either to the Sa'adists o r to the liberals. A s a result the
Sa'adists w o n their largest v i c t o r y e v e r , g a i n i n g 42 p e r c e n t o f the
p o p u l a r v o t e , w h i l e t h e l i b e r a l s g a i n e d 24.1 p e r c e n t . H o w e v e r ,
i n F e b r u a r y 1 9 4 5 , w h e n E g y p t finally d e c l a r e d w a r o n G e r m a n y ,
Premier A h m a d M a h i r w a s assassinated. H e w a s succeeded b y
M a h m u d F a h m i al-Nuqrashl, another Sa'adist. T h e death o f
M a h i r , unlike his b r o t h e r a n o t e d liberal, signalled a n e w w a v e
o f political v i o l e n c e and assassinations.
Despite the political vicissitudes that f o l l o w e d o n the February
4 incident, the W a f d had initiated o n e important, and ultimately
m o m e n t o u s , p o l i c y . T h r o u g h o u t t h e l a t t e r p a r t o f t h e 1 9 3 0 s it h a d
509

b e c o m e increasingly apparent that the radical elements supported

P a n - A r a b i s m . U n t i l then their principal c o n c e r n had been
E g y p t i a n nationalism, but w i t h the u n f o l d i n g o f the Palestinian
c r i s i s , a n d I r a q ' s a p p a r e n t c h a m p i o n s h i p o f t h e A r a b c a u s e as ' t h e
most independent' o f A r a b countries, E g y p t also embraced
P a n - A r a b i s m . T h r o u g h o u t t h e w a r it b e c a m e c l e a r , e v e n t o t h e
British, that s o m e sort o f regional organisation w a s needed, if
n o t h i n g else, to channel g r o w i n g P a n - A r a b i s t sentiment. T h u s ,
after p r o l o n g e d n e g o t i a t i o n s , t h e A l e x a n d r i a P r o t o c o l w a s s i g n e d
in O c t o b e r 1944 a n d b e c a m e the basis for the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f the
A r a b L e a g u e . Significantly, C a i r o b e c a m e the seat o f the
organisation.
T h e years f o l l o w i n g the w a r u p to the c o u p o f 1952 s a w the
rapid disintegration o f the E g y p t i a n polity. W i t h the W a f d o u t
o f p o w e r , the v a r i o u s splinter g r o u p s dissipated their political
energies o n inter-party squabbles, w i t h n o n e o f t h e m able to rule
the c o u n t r y effectively. T h e I k w a n and radical nationalists o n the
right were confronted by considerably strengthened left-wing
organisations, especially the trade u n i o n s . T h i s w a s in line w i t h
the g e n e r a l trend in the A r a b w o r l d in w h i c h the S o v i e t U n i o n
h a d g a i n e d e x p o s u r e a n d s o m e p o p u l a r i t y , a n d i n w h i c h leftist
literature had b e c o m e increasingly available. A m o n g the m o r e
important o f the left-wing g r o u p s w a s the N a t i o n a l C o m m i t t e e
o f W o r k e r s and Students, f o u n d e d early in 1945.
It w a s t h i s p o p u l a r l y s u p p o r t e d m o v e m e n t t h a t w a s l a r g e l y
responsible for the mass demonstrations against the British and
t h e g o v e r n m e n t , s u c h as t h e l a r g e - s c a l e r i o t s a n d d e m o n s t r a t i o n s
o f February 1946, during w h i c h scores o f people w e r e killed. A s
a consequence Nuqrashl's g o v e r n m e n t w a s forced to resign. After
further political v i o l e n c e Isma'Il S i d q l Pasha, w h o f o r m e d the n e w
g o v e r n m e n t , dissolved m a n y o f the left-wing organisations and
ordered the arrest o f m a n y o f their leaders in July 1946.
P o l i t i c a l u n r e s t d i d n o t a b a t e . W i t h t h e left s u p p r e s s e d , t h e
r i g h t - w i n g political parties continued the struggle against the
British and the g o v e r n m e n t . A w a v e o f assassinations f o l l o w e d ,
t o w h i c h m a n y p r o m i n e n t p o l i t i c a l figures fell v i c t i m . A s a r e s u l t
frequent c h a n g e s o f cabinets and g o v e r n m e n t s b e c a m e a feature
o f the p e r i o d ; b e t w e e n 194 5 a n d 1950 there w e r e n o less t h a n s e v e n
different a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s . A g a i n s t this b a c k g r o u n d o f disinte
g r a t i o n , t h e r a d i c a l i s a t i o n o f p r a c t i c a l l y all p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s , a n d t h e
510

disastrous Palestine w a r o f 1948-9, w h i c h n o t o n l y e x p o s e d the

weakness o f the A r a b armies, but clearly revealed the level o f
E g y p t i a n domestic corruption and political decay, the E g y p t i a n
a r m y p r e p a r e d i t s e l f f o r a coup d'etat. T w o i m p o r t a n t p o l i t i c a l
t r e n d s w e r e n o w c r y s t a l l i s e d . O n e w a s t h e g r o w t h o f leftist
organisations, and the other the d e v e l o p m e n t o f an ' A r a b - I s l a m i c
dimension o f nationalist a g i t a t i o n ' , w h i c h w a s t o p r o v i d e the basis
o f G a m a l N a s i r ' s p r o g r a m m e . T h i s p r o g r a m m e , as P r o f e s s o r
V a t i k i o t i s has noted, w a s m o r e a m e n a b l e t o e x p l o i t a t i o n b y
v a r i o u s p o l i t i c a l g r o u p s b e c a u s e it w a s m o r e e a s i l y u n d e r s t o o d a n d
m o r e readily adhered to e m o t i o n a l l y b y the masses than an already
discredited, complex, and essentially alien, constitutional
1
democracy.
T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t issues in the i m m e d i a t e p o s t - w a r p e r i o d ,
then, w e r e the v e r y nature o f the c o u n t r y ' s political institutions,
the g r o w i n g p o v e r t y o f the masses, the need for social and
e c o n o m i c r e f o r m , a n d a b o v e all B r i t a i n ' s c o n t i n u e d c o l o n i a l r o l e
i n t h e c o u n t r y . T h i s last i s s u e w a s f o c u s s e d i n t h e e y e s o f t h e
masses o n E g y p t ' s claims in the A n g l o - E g y p t i a n S u d a n . W h i l e
E g y p t insisted o n the unity o f the N i l e V a l l e y , Britain refused t o
a c k n o w l e d g e that E g y p t had a n y t h i n g m o r e than a n o m i n a l
interest in the S u d a n . A f t e r the disputed o u t c o m e o f the A n g l o -
E g y p t i a n n e g o t i a t i o n s in 1946, the m a t t e r w a s referred t o the
United N a t i o n s , w h i c h did n o t resolve the issue.
E g y p t in t h i s p e r i o d w a s t h u s c l e a r l y h e a d i n g t o w a r d s a c r i s i s
t h a t s u c c e s s i v e g o v e r n m e n t s h a d d o n e little m o r e t h a n p o s t p o n e .
N o n e o f the social and e c o n o m i c reforms they i n t r o d u c e d
constituted significant c h a n g e . In 1950 the W a f d returned to
p o w e r w i t h a majority in parliament. In o r d e r t o appease the u r b a n
proletariat and the peasants, several labour l a w s and land-reform
acts w e r e p a s s e d ; n o n e , h o w e v e r , increased the p a r t y ' s p o p u l a r i t y
sufficiently f o r t h e g o v e r n m e n t t o r u l e e f f e c t i v e l y . N o r w e r e t h e
radical nationalists appeased b y the unilateral and s u d d e n
a b r o g a t i o n o f t h e 1 9 3 6 t r e a t y i n O c t o b e r 1 9 5 1 , after r e n e g o t i a t i o n s
had failed and the w e s t e r n p o w e r s h a d a t t e m p t e d t o enlist E g y p t
into an a n t i - S o v i e t d e f e n c e alliance. I n d e e d the nationalists s a w
t h i s as a p o l i t i c a l v i c t o r y o v e r t h e o l d l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e u p p e r
b o u r g e o i s i e , and intensified their s t r u g g l e against Britain, es
pecially in the C a n a l Z o n e .
1
V a t i k i o t i s , Nasser; see a l s o h i s The modern history of Egypt ( L o n d o n , 1969).
5"

E a r l y in 1 9 5 2 the political crisis c a m e t o a h e a d w h e n British

troops clashed w i t h E g y p t i a n police units in an attempt t o take
c o n t r o l o f G o v e r n m e n t H o u s e i n I s m a i l i a , a n d k i l l e d o v e r 50
policemen. In the f o l l o w i n g days, amidst strikes, mass d e m o n -
strations a n d a g o v e r n m e n t threat t o establish ' friendship ties ' w i t h
t h e U S S R , t h e c e n t r e o f C a i r o w e n t u p i n flames. W h i l e it h a s n e v e r
been established for certain w h o the arsonists w e r e , sevetal
m e m b e r s o f the G r e e n Shirts and other extreme nationalist
organisations w e r e arrested a n d tried. O n c e again a r e v o l u t i o n a r y
s i t u a t i o n h a d a r i s e n . S i x m o n t h s l a t e r , after c o n t i n u o u s a n d
i n e f f e c t i v e g o v e r n m e n t r e s h u f f l e s , t h e F r e e O f f i c e r s a c t e d . O n 23
J u l y 1 9 5 2 , after f o u r m o r e g o v e r n m e n t s , a n d after a futile a t t e m p t
b y the k i n g t o c o n t r o l the officers, the a r m y seized p o w e r . A f e w
d a y s later K i n g F â r û q w a s exiled.
T h e m e m b e r s h i p o f the Free Officers' m o v e m e n t , ostensibly led
by the grandfatherly and popular General M u h a m m a d N a g ï b ,
w h o c o n v e n i e n t l y lent t h e y o u n g officers political l e g i t i m a c y , w a s
indicative o f the ideological fragmentation o f the Egyptian polity.
M a n y o f t h e m h a d at o n e time o r a n o t h e r b e e n associated w i t h
1
radical g r o u p s o f all the i d e o l o g i c a l p e r s u a s i o n s . I n later years
these early political c o m m i t m e n t s w e r e reflected in their style o f
l e a d e r s h i p as w e l l as i n their e c o n o m i c p o l i c i e s . I n t h e initial p h a s e
o f the ' revolution ', h o w e v e r , the Free Officers did n o t follow any
particular ideological orientation other than nationalism, v a g u e
n o t i o n s o f social egalitarianism a n d justice, as w e l l as Islamic piety.
In fact, the c o u p initially represented a rebellion b y frustrated (and
defeated) y o u n g officers w h o in the m a i n c a m e f r o m t h e
' r e a s o n a b l y affluent m i d d l e c l a s s ' .
The ' Revolutionary C o m m a n d Council ' appointed a temporary
cabinet, headed b y none other than ' A l l Mâhir, complemented b y
t w o other extreme nationalist and erstwhile G r e e n Shirt leaders,
Fathï R i d w à n and D r N û r al-Dïn Tarrâf. T h e regime w a s prim-
arily b o u r g e o i s nationalist i n character, as w a s indicated b y the
s u p p r e s s i o n o f all C o m m u n i s t as w e l l as extremist Islamic a n d
ultra-nationalist factions, s u c h as the G r e e n Shirts, b y then k n o w n
as t h e I s l a m i c S o c i a l i s t P a r t y . O b v i o u s l y t h e o f f i c e r s d i d n o t f e e l
sufficiently secure t o p e r m i t t h e existence o f o p p o s i t i o n parties,
let a l o n e i n v o l v e t h e m i n t h e g o v e r n m e n t o f E g y p t , a s t h e y
1
Additional biographical material on the Free Officers is available in A. Abdel-Malek,
Ê&pte: société militaire (Paris, 1962).
512

themselves w e r e politically d i v i d e d o v e r their principal objectives.

Instead, the council contented itself w i t h seeking n e w solutions
to old p r o b l e m s : for instance, w h a t form o f political institutions
should the R e p u b l i c a d o p t ? B e f o r e the c o m m i s s i o n s that w e r e
c o n v e n e d t o s u p p l y s o l u t i o n s c o u l d s u b m i t t h e i r findings, all
parties w e r e b a n n e d in J a n u a r y 1 9 5 3 , and replaced b y a p o p u l a r
' L i b e r a t i o n R a l l y ' , t h e first o f t h r e e a t t e m p t s b y t h e F r e e O f f i c e r s
to mobilise mass political support. W h i l e they enjoyed widespread
popularity, b o t h inside and outside E g y p t , there existed in m a n y
quarters and a m o n g s o m e elements o f the a r m y considerable
disquiet, mainly o v e r the position o f G e n e r a l N a g l b , but also
o v e r the shape o f future political institutions and the nature o f
t h e p o l i t y itself. I n t h e s p r i n g o f 1 9 5 4 , i n o r d e r t o p l a c a t e t h e
o p p o s i t i o n , the R e v o l u t i o n a r y C o m m a n d C o u n c i l ( R C C ) lifted the
ban o n parties and d e c i d e d t o h o l d a general election. T h i s
decision, h o w e v e r , divided the council, and had e v e n elicited
s o m e p u b l i c o p p o s i t i o n , mainly f r o m the trade u n i o n s . A s a result
t h e R C C felt j u s t i f i e d i n p u r g i n g t h e s u p p o r t e r s o f t h e ancien regime,
b o t h a m o n g officers a n d m e m b e r s o f the p u b l i c . W i t h the
e x c l u s i o n o f the I k w a n this p r o c e s s w a s therefore c o m p l e t e d .
H o w e v e r , the I k w a n ' s continued opposition to the military regime
f o u n d its e x p r e s s i o n i n its a t t e m p t e d a s s a s s i n a t i o n o f N a s i r
i n l a t e 1 9 5 4 , w i t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t it w a s d r i v e n u n d e r g r o u n d , a n d
all r e m a i n i n g o p p o s i t i o n e l e m e n t s b a n n e d .
Despite the b a n n i n g o f opposition to the n e w regime, the
s u c c e s s o f t h e * r e v o l u t i o n ' h a d n o t b e e n a s s u r e d , as t h e l e a d e r s h i p
w a s beset b y rivalries w i t h i n and continued public disturbances
w i t h o u t . E v e n the soldiers w e r e d i v i d e d in their loyalties. In the
e n d it w a s L t - C o l o n e l G a m a l ' A b d a l - N a s i r a n d h i s s u p p o r t e r s w h o
s u c c e e d e d in establishing effective leadership. N a s i r , b o r n in
J a n u a r y 1 9 1 8 , w a s a s h r e w d , s t u d i o u s a n d r e s e r v e d officer w h o
h a d p l a n n e d a n d l e d t h e c o u p . A f t e r t h e e v e n t h e e m e r g e d as t h e
m o s t p o w e r f u l a m o n g the original eleven conspirators. O n l y
N a g l b , w h o e n j o y e d m a s s i v e p o p u l a r a c c l a i m as a h e r o o f t h e
1 9 4 8 - 9 w a r w i t h Israel, and w h o , in contrast t o the officers,
appeared m o d e r a t e in his a p p r o a c h , o v e r s h a d o w e d Nasir. M o r e
over, N a g l b favoured a return to parliamentary politics, w h i c h
b r o u g h t h i m i n t o direct conflict w i t h the ' r e v o l u t i o n a r y * officers.
C o n s e q u e n t l y he w a s placed u n d e r h o u s e arrest in N o v e m b e r 1954
a n d N a s i r e m e r g e d as l e a d e r o f E g y p t .
513

Y e t , w h i l e N a s i r s u c c e e d e d in e l i m i n a t i n g o p p o s i t i o n w i t h i n the
r u l i n g c i r c l e s a n d in t h e p u b l i c a r e n a , t h e ' y o u n g o f f i c e r s ' still
lacked p o p u l a r legitimacy. A l t h o u g h in S e p t e m b e r 1952 the
Agrarian Reform L a w had been implemented and some modest
egalitarian measures (anti-corruption laws, rent control, etc.) had
b e e n d e c r e e d , it w a s a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e officers h a d f e w , i f a n y ,
p r e c i s e e c o n o m i c o r p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s . I f a n y t h i n g , it w a s t h e
retention o f p o w e r w h i c h w a s their main c o n c e r n . T h e r e m o v a l
o f G e n e r a l N a g l b in N o v e m b e r 1 9 5 4 w a s a m a j o r s t e p i n t h i s
direction.
T h e year 1955, therefore, p r o v e d to be o f critical i m p o r t a n c e ,
as t h e ' y o u n g o f f i c e r s ' set o u t t o c o n s o l i d a t e t h e i r c o n t r o l .
Political e v e n t s in the r e g i o n c a m e t o their aid. H a v i n g just
successfully c o n c l u d e d the negotiations w i t h G r e a t Britain a b o u t
t h e w i t h d r a w a l o f B r i t i s h f o r c e s f r o m E g y p t , it w a s i m p o s s i b l e
for Nasir's g o v e r n m e n t to join a western-sponsored defence
alliance, the so-called B a g h d a d Pact, w h i c h Iraq and T u r k e y had
agreed to enter. In any case the A n g l o - E g y p t i a n T r e a t y o f 1954
p r o v i d e d for the return o f B r i t i s h t r o o p s in case o f g l o b a l
hostilities. M o r e o v e r , this N A T O - r e l a t e d security a r r a n g e m e n t
w a s , in the e y e s o f the E g y p t i a n r e g i m e , d e s i g n e d to maintain
w e s t e r n h e g e m o n y in t h e area. F o r E g y p t , w e s t e r n i n t e r e s t s in t h e
N i l e V a l l e y a n d t h e S i n a i h a d a l w a y s b e e n a t h o r n i n t h e flesh.
A p a r t from nationalist and anti-imperialist sympathies, E g y p t i a n
leaders w e r e keenly a w a r e o f the strategic i m p o r t a n c e o f their
c o u n t r y , a fact r e p e a t e d l y s t r e s s e d b y h i s t o r y as w e l l as b y
c o n t e m p o r a r y W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n politicians and military leaders.
A s t h e d r a m a i n P a l e s t i n e u n f o l d e d a n d as I s l a m i c - c u m - n a t i o n a l i s t
f o r c e s c h a l l e n g e d w e s t e r n c o l o n i a l i n t e r e s t s , a n d as Z i o n i s t f o r c e s
s u c c e e d e d in e s t a b l i s h i n g a state o f I s r a e l , E g y p t , as t h e m o s t
p o p u l o u s , p o w e r f u l and e c o n o m i c a l l y a d v a n c e d A r a b state in the
r e g i o n , a s s u m e d its l e a d e r s h i p . I t w a s f o r t h i s r e a s o n t h a t t h e A r a b
L e a g u e headquarters h a d b e e n situated in C a i r o , a n d that the n e w
' r e v o l u t i o n a r y ' leaders o f E g y p t n o w assumed such a forceful role
in M i d d l e E a s t e r n relations w i t h the s u p e r - p o w e r s . In s u c h
circumstances a direct security arrangement w i t h the western
powers was anathema.
T h i s r e j e c t i o n w a s t a k e n as a s e r i o u s a n d u n a c c e p t a b l e r e b u f f
b y the partners in the w e s t e r n alliance a n d h a d serious i m p l i c a t i o n s
f o r E g y p t , as t h e w e s t n o w h e l d u p t h e s u p p l y o f a r m s a n d
5i4

r e s t r i c t e d t h e financial a n d o t h e r a i d s o u r g e n t l y n e e d e d b y t h e
r e g i m e t o c a r r y o u t its p l a n s f o r m o d e r n i s a t i o n . D u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d
o f w o r s e n i n g relations w i t h the west, the g o v e r n m e n t continued
w i t h t h e c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f its p o w e r b a s e .
O n 16 J a n u a r y 1956 a presidential r e p u b l i c a n s y s t e m w a s
instituted. T h e constitution formally linked E g y p t to the A r a b
n a t i o n , a n d f o r t h e first t i m e p r o v i d e d f o r s u s t a i n e d e c o n o m i c
planning. T h e constitution w a s a p p r o v e d , and the Liberation
Rally w a s replaced b y the N a t i o n a l U n i o n , the o n l y legal political
organisation. T h e president b r o a d e n e d his n e w g o v e r n m e n t b y
including a greater n u m b e r o f civilians and also r e m o v e d several
officers f r o m t h e r e g i m e , i n c l u d i n g A n w a r a l - S a d a t .
A p a r t f r o m the international pressures faced b y Nasir, and the
i n a b i l i t y t o s e c u r e l a r g e financial a i d f r o m t h e w e s t e r n p o w e r s f o r
his d e v e l o p m e n t s c h e m e s , in particular the A s w a n H i g h D a m
project, the g o v e r n m e n t ' s m o s t pressing p r o b l e m internally
remained economic development. Population g r o w t h had over
t a k e n e c o n o m i c g r o w t h a n d it h a d b e c o m e c l e a r t h a t E g y p t m u s t
rapidly industrialise. W i t h the end o f the K o r e a n w a r and the
resultant s l u m p in c o t t o n e x p o r t s , the c o u n t r y ' s already un
f a v o u r a b l e trade balance b e c a m e w o r s e . It w a s for these reasons,
and the g r o w i n g association w i t h the socialist countries, that the
g o v e r n m e n t became increasingly attracted to the notion o f a
socialist, o r rather a planned, e c o n o m y .
D u r i n g t h e first t h r e e y e a r s o f t h e r e v o l u t i o n t h e o l d c a p i t a l i s t
e c o n o m y w a s p e r m i t t e d t o f u n c t i o n , m a i n l y b y d e f a u l t , as t h e F r e e
Officers h a d little, i f any, particular e c o n o m i c p h i l o s o p h y t o h a n d
w h e n they seized p o w e r . W h i l e a w a r e o f the inequities existing
i n s o c i e t y , a n d d r i v e n b y a fair a m o u n t o f i d e a l i s m , t h e y h a d f e w
practical answers. M a r x i s m , m o r e o v e r , w a s anathema to the
r e g i m e and remained so e v e n d u r i n g the h e y d a y o f A r a b socialism,
d e s p i t e t h e fact t h a t t h r o u g h o u t t h e 1 9 3 0 s a n d 1 9 4 0 s a c o n s i d e r a b l e
a m o u n t o f M a r x i s t l i t e r a t u r e h a d c i r c u l a t e d in E g y p t . T h e L a n d
R e f o r m A c t , for example, w a s introduced not from any socialist
idealism, b u t f r o m a utilitarian r e c o g n i t i o n that liberation o f the
peasants w a s a prerequisite to continued industrial expansion.
If internal reforms and revolutionary aspirations constituted
o n e e l e m e n t o f N a s i r ' s p o l i t i c a l a n d i d e o l o g i c a l a s p i r a t i o n s , it w a s
in the r e a l m o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y that he h a d s o m e o f his greatest
s u c c e s s e s . U n a b l e t o o b t a i n financial s u p p o r t f r o m t h e U n i t e d
5M

S t a t e s f o r its d e v e l o p m e n t s c h e m e s , a n d u n a b l e t o s e c u r e W e s t e r n
E u r o p e a n support, the E g y p t i a n g o v e r n m e n t decided o n a radical
d e p a r t u r e f r o m p a s t p r a c t i c e s : it n e g o t i a t e d m i l i t a r y a n d o t h e r a i d
from the eastern-bloc countries. T h u s , w h e n the C o l d W a r w a s
at its h e i g h t , E g y p t , p o t e n t i a l l y t h e m o s t p o w e r f u l a n d c o h e s i v e
M i d d l e Eastern A r a b nation, c h o s e t o take this radical alternative
course. T h e former regional colonial p o w e r s , G r e a t Britain and
France, and the recently established Israel, reacted b y i n t e r v e n i n g
militarily in 1956. T h i s p r o v e d t o b e counter-effective.
E g y p t ' s armed forces, ostensibly defeated, w e r e rescued by
international c o n d e m n a t i o n , principally f r o m the U S A and the
U S S R , and this f o r c e d the tripartite alliance t o w i t h d r a w . G a m a l
* A b d a l - N a s i r , a s a r e s u l t , e m e r g e d as a s t r o n g a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t a n d
as t h e l e a d e r o f M i d d l e E a s t e r n A r a b - I s l a m i c r a d i c a l f o r c e s . A f t e r
the S u e z w a r , therefore, and in the c o n t e x t o f N a s i r ' s anti-
i m p e r i a l i s t c r u s a d e a n d h i s e m e r g e n c e as t h e P a n - A r a b l e a d e r , h i s
ideas assumed m o r e substance and m o v e d t o w a r d s an A r a b
nationalism concerned not only w i t h political unity, but w i t h a
socialist-inspired e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t plan. B y the turn o f the
decade E g y p t had b e c o m e the leading exponent o f A r a b socialism.
I t is t h i s a c h i e v e m e n t o f N a s i r ' s l e a d e r s h i p , a p a r t f r o m h i s
instilling a sense o f p u r p o s e and a m o d e r n E g y p t i a n identity into
his p e o p l e , for w h i c h the r e v o l u t i o n m u s t b e n o t e d . W h i l e m a n y
o f these p r o g r a m m e s either failed o r did n o t m e e t e x p e c t a t i o n s ,
they nevertheless constituted a m a r k e d and radical departure f r o m
p r e v i o u s e c o n o m i c and political attitudes.
T h e p o w e r o f the b o u r g e o i s i e - and especially the l a n d o w n e r s
and foreign property-owners - w a s curtailed, if not destroyed.
T h e attacks o n foreigners and the sequestration o f their property,
e s p e c i a l l y after t h e 1 9 5 6 S u e z w a r , p r o v e d t o b e i n m a n y c a s e s
c o u n t e r - p r o d u c t i v e , as t h e i r s k i l l s a n d s e r v i c e s c o u l d n o t e a s i l y b e
r e p l a c e d . I n d e e d , it h a s b e e n a r g u e d t h a t t h e i r d e p a r t u r e left a g r e a t
e c o n o m i c v a c u u m . T h u s , w h i l e t h e L a n d R e f o r m L a w w a s little
m o r e than a political gesture, w h i c h had instantaneously p o p u
larised the r e g i m e a m o n g s t the peasants, the e n d o f the d e c a d e
witnessed the serious implementation o f industrial d e v e l o p m e n t
plans. M o r e o v e r , b y i960 the m o s t p o w e r f u l e c o n o m i c institutions
began to be nationalised. B a n k i n g , transport, and e v e n the Press
(for o b v i o u s political reasons that h a d little t o d o w i t h e c o n o m i c s )
w e r e t a k e n o v e r b y t h e state. T r a d e u n i o n s , w h i c h u n t i l t h e n w e r e
516

an i m p o r t a n t source o f political s u p p o r t - o r o p p o s i t i o n - w e r e
r e d u c e d in n u m b e r and streamlined in o r g a n i s a t i o n . I n i960 the
first five-year d e v e l o p m e n t p l a n w a s i n s t i t u t e d , a n d t w o y e a r s
later, N a s i r d e c i d e d o n a t o t a l r e o r g a n i s a t i o n o f t h e s t a t e . I n M a y
1962, earlier trends w e r e formalised w i t h the p r o m u l g a t i o n o f the
' N a t i o n a l C h a r t e r ' , w h i c h a i m e d at a c o m p r e h e n s i v e r e s t r u c t u r i n g
o f the political institutions and the e c o n o m y o f the country. T h e
principal political party, the National U n i o n , w a s abolished and
replaced b y the A r a b Socialist U n i o n . T h i s w a s to consist o f
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s f r o m all s t r a t a o f s o c i e t y . A n e w N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y
w a s established. Essentially the political reorganisation p r o v i d e d
for a mass party (the A S U ) w h o s e p u r p o s e w a s primarily t o
m o b i l i s e the masses in the service o f the r e v o l u t i o n a n d w i t h i n
the f r a m e w o r k o f the charter, w h i l e the state w a s run t h r o u g h
a presidential system w i t h s w e e p i n g p o w e r s legitimised b y the
N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y . T h e n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n c a m e i n t o effect i n
M a r c h 1964.
W h i l e the c o u n t r y w a s m o v i n g into a n e w era, w i t h h o p e s o f
s o m e political stability and e c o n o m i c p r o g r e s s , regional e v e n t s
were once again determining E g y p t ' s course. T h e president
enjoyed considerable internal s u p p o r t until 1967, despite his
repressive measures against political dissidents, but he found
himself rapidly l o s i n g his P a n - A r a b leadership. M o r e o v e r , E g y p t
w a s i n v o l v e d in a w a r in the Y e m e n , a i m e d at the e v e n t u a l
o v e r t h r o w o f all m o n a r c h i c a l r e g i m e s i n t h e p e n i n s u l a , a n d t h i s
was draining the country's resources severely, e v e n t h o u g h the
S o v i e t U n i o n p r o v i d e d financial a s s i s t a n c e . S e v e r a l n e w p o w e r
centres h a d arisen in the area t o c h a l l e n g e N a s i r ' s p o s i t i o n d u r i n g
t h e 1 9 6 0 s as a l e a d e r o f r a d i c a l P a n - A r a b t h o u g h t a n d s o c i o
e c o n o m i c reform. A s a cardinal a d v o c a t e o f radical policies, he
was attacked b y Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and other countries,
e a c h r e p r e s e n t i n g d i v e r s e t r a d i t i o n a l a n d financial i n t e r e s t s w h i c h
had d e v e l o p e d alternative political philosophies. M o r e o v e r , their
nationalism w a s t a k i n g the increasingly virulent anti-Israeli
p o s i t i o n w h i c h since 1948 h a d b e c o m e the h a l l m a r k o f A r a b
nationalism. N a s i r ' s attempt t o reassert his a u t h o r i t y b r o u g h t h i m
into conflict w i t h Israel, w h i c h reacted b y l a u n c h i n g a p r e - e m p t i v e
air s t r i k e i n J u n e 1 9 6 7 ( s e e b e l o w ) . T h e r e s u l t a n t d e b a c l e c a u s e d
an u p h e a v a l o f unprecedented p r o p o r t i o n s in the A r a b w o r l d .
Self-criticism and self-denigration followed. T h e roots o f the
5i7

w h o l e E g y p t i a n political system w e r e threatened, and although

N a s i r offered to r e s i g n , the masses, w h e t h e r b y g o v e r n m e n t
o r c h e s t r a t i o n o r as a r e s u l t o f h i s c h a r i s m a , r e c a l l e d h i m .
In o r d e r t o reassert his a u t h o r i t y , N a s i r o r d e r e d the r e c o n
struction o f the a r m e d forces and especially the security machinery.
H e t o o k d i r e c t c o n t r o l o f all t h e p r i n c i p a l m i n i s t r i e s a n d i n s t i t u t e d
a virtual dictatorship. H o w e v e r , despite an a t t e m p t e d c o u p , N a s i r
s u r v i v e d , o n l y t o d i e o f a h e a r t a t t a c k i n late S e p t e m b e r 1 9 7 0 . I n
t h e last t h r e e y e a r s o f h i s r u l e , N a s i r w a s m a i n l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h
the maintenance o f p o w e r , the r e a r m i n g o f the military and the
search for a w a y o u t o f the A r a b - I s r a e l i impasse. M e a n w h i l e , the
e c o n o m i c p r o g r e s s that had b e e n m a d e c a m e to a standstill, w i t h
m a n y f a c t o r i e s c l o s i n g d o w n . P o l i t i c a l d e m o r a l i s a t i o n h a d set i n ,
as w a s i n d i c a t e d b y t h e i r r e p r e s s i b l e p u b l i c c r i t i c i s m a n d r i o t i n g
t h a t f o l l o w e d t h e w a r . W h a t b e c a m e i n c r e a s i n g l y e v i d e n t after
1967 w a s the priority g i v e n b y the E g y p t i a n leadership and p e o p l e
to E g y p t i a n interests, e v e n w h e n these w e r e clearly in conflict w i t h
P a n - A r a b ideals.
Nasir had made n o p r o v i s i o n s for a successor. T h e S o v i e t
U n i o n , taken b y surprise and unable to push f o r w a r d a successor
o f its o w n c h o i c e , b a c k e d t h e c o m p r o m i s e c a n d i d a t e , V i c e -
President A n w a r al-Sadat, w h o until then h a d l i v e d in the s h a d o w
o f p o w e r w i t h o u t a n y real a n d m e a n i n g f u l p o l i t i c a l d u t i e s - e v e n
his office as v i c e - p r e s i d e n t h a d b e e n d e v o i d o f i n f l u e n c e . T h e
ensuing p o w e r struggle w a s mainly c o n d u c t e d behind the scenes.
T h e divisions w e r e a l o n g i d e o l o g i c a l lines. S o m e a r g u e d for
continued association w i t h the S o v i e t U n i o n , others v e e r e d to the
w e s t , w h i l e a t h i r d g r o u p a d o p t e d a n ' E g y p t first' a t t i t u d e ,
stressing the need for e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t . In o r d e r to
c o n s o l i d a t e his p o w e r , S a d a t c o n t i n u e d h i s p r e d e c e s s o r ' s p o l i c y ,
a n d o n l y later b e g a n t h e ' d e m y t h o l o g i s a t i o n ' o f N a s i r . F u r t h e r
m o r e , he c o n t i n u e d t o pay lip service to A r a b unity b y s i g n i n g
an A g r e e m e n t o f U n i t y w i t h Syria and L i b y a in A p r i l 1 9 7 1 . T h i s
he did w i t h o u t c o n s u l t i n g the A S U o r the N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y .
A n d t h o u g h there w a s o p p o s i t i o n to this m o v e , he h a d the
s u p p o r t o f the army, especially o f G e n e r a l Sadiq. In M a y 1971
Sadat neutralised his o p p o n e n t s b y a c c u s i n g t h e m o f p l o t t i n g
against the regime, thus establishing g r o u n d s for their dismissal
a n d s u b s e q u e n t trial. H e f u r t h e r s e c u r e d h i s p o s i t i o n b y s i g n i n g
518

a Treaty o f Friendship w i t h the Soviet U n i o n to ensure its

support.
Y e t d i s c o n t e n t c o n t i n u e d . T h e late 1960s a n d e a r l y 1 9 7 0 s w e r e
m a r k e d b y a g r o w i n g r e s e n t m e n t a g a i n s t t h e r e g i m e as w e l l as t h e
S o v i e t U n i o n . W h i l e E g y p t ' s m i l i t a r y a n d financial d e p e n d e n c e
o n the eastern b l o c p r e c l u d e d an immediate and a b r u p t break in
relations, and a l t h o u g h Sadat appointed a v a g u e l y p r o - M o s c o w
Prime Minister, ' A z i z Sidql, he simultaneously d e v e l o p e d contacts
w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d w i t h c o n s e r v a t i v e states i n t h e A r a b i a n
G u l f , especially Saudi A r a b i a . T o demonstrate the intention o f
E g y p t ' s n e w foreign p o l i c y - and to gain s u p p o r t f r o m the
anti-socialist elements w i t h i n the c o u n t r y - Sadat s l o w l y initiated
t h e infitdh ( o p e n d o o r ) e c o n o m i c p o l i c y , a n d e x p e l l e d all S o v i e t
a d v i s e r s in J u l y 1 9 7 2 . T h i s m o v e p l a c a t e d t h e m i l i t a r y , w h o h a d
b e c o m e resentful o f S o v i e t influence w h i c h had been in o p p o s i t i o n
to further military operations against Israel, an attitude based o n
a n u n d e r e s t i m a t i o n o f A r a b m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s as w e l l as a d e s i r e
to maintain a position o f detente w i t h the United States. T h e
expulsion o f the Russians also o p e n e d the w a y for u r g e n t financial
a s s i s t a n c e f r o m f r i e n d l y r i c h A r a b states a n d f r o m t h e w e s t .
D e s p i t e these c h a n g e s in p o l i c y , i n c l u d i n g internal r e f o r m s -
s u c h as a n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n i n S e p t e m b e r 1 9 7 1 f o l l o w e d b y
referendums and an election - d e s i g n e d to break w i t h the past and
to p r o v i d e Sadat w i t h popular support, domestic opposition g r e w
dramatically. Student riots t h r o u g h o u t 1972 and early 1973
i n d i c a t e d o p p o s i t i o n f r o m t h e left as w e l l as f r o m c o n s e r v a t i v e
elements, w h i l e the historic differences b e t w e e n M u s l i m s and
C o p t s also reappeared. O p p o s i t i o n to Sadat's regime stemmed not
o n l y f r o m e c o n o m i c grievances, and the dismantling o f socialism,
but also from the widespread m o o d o f hopelessness and i m p o t e n c e
that resulted f r o m the 1967 w a r . T h e public appeared to d e m a n d
the resolution o f the ' n o peace, n o w a r ' stalemate. A g a i n s t these
internal pressures, E g y p t w i t h Syria d e c i d e d t o initiate an offensive
against Israel.
T h e euphoria that f o l l o w e d the O c t o b e r 1973 ( R a m a d a n ) w a r
and the resulting restoration o f national pride w e r e , h o w e v e r ,
i n s u f f i c i e n t t o offset c o n t i n u e d i n t e r n a l u n r e s t . W e s t e r n i n v e s t
m e n t s w e r e n o t f o r t h c o m i n g as r a p i d l y as e x p e c t e d , i n f l a t i o n w a s
r a m p a n t (at l e a s t 2 5 - 3 0 p e r c e n t p e r a n n u m ) a n d t h e o b v i o u s
5i9

re-emergence o f the b o u r g e o i s i e (especially in C a i r o a n d A l e x a n

dria) despite the g o v e r n m e n t ' s declared intention o f establishing
a ' s o c i a l i s t ' e c o n o m y , g a v e rise t o f u r t h e r s t r i k e s a n d r i o t s
t h r o u g h o u t 1974 and early 1975. In c o n s e q u e n c e the g o v e r n m e n t
w a s reshuffled, a n d s o m e salary increases w e r e a n n o u n c e d , m a i n l y
for civil servants. D e s p i t e these p r o b l e m s Sadat w a s able t o
maintain control o f the situation and, in 1 9 7 6 , w a s re-elected
president for a further t e r m o f six years t h o u g h he did n o t
c o m p l e t e i t , b e i n g a s s a s s i n a t e d t h e y e a r b e f o r e it w a s t o e n d .
Toe Sudan
T h e S u d a n h a d b e e n a d m i n i s t e r e d as a j o i n t A n g l o - E g y p t i a n
c o n d o m i n i u m since 1899. A f t e r 1924, w h e n Britain forced the
evacuation o f E g y p t i a n troops from the Sudan, E g y p t had ceased
to b e an effective partner in the administration o f the c o u n t r y . T h e
A n g l o - E g y p t i a n Treaty o f 1936, while confirming the c o n d o m
i n i u m , m e r e l y r e s t o r e d t o E g y p t a facade o f p o w e r , t h e r e i n s o f
t h e g o v e r n m e n t still b e i n g t i g h t l y h e l d b y t h e B r i t i s h . T h i s f o r m a l
r e i n s t a t e m e n t o f E g y p t as j o i n t , i f v e r y j u n i o r , p a r t n e r i n t h e
c o n d o m i n i u m did, h o w e v e r , permit Sudanese nationalists t o play
o n A n g l o - E g y p t i a n d i f f e r e n c e s t o p r o m o t e t h e i r o w n c a u s e . I t is
in this c o n t e x t that all m a j o r political d e v e l o p m e n t s f r o m 1940 u p
until independence must b e seen.
In 1939, in the aftermath o f the treaty, the e d u c a t e d élite f o r m e d
t h e i r first p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i s a t i o n , t h e G r a d u a t e s ' G e n e r a l C o n g r e s s ,
w h i c h ostensibly proposed t o 'assist the g o v e r n m e n t in the
progressive planning o f the development o f the country'. T h e
c o n g r e s s b e c a m e a political f o r u m for b o t h the e d u c a t e d élite a n d
t h e different r e l i g i o u s s e c t s , a n a l l i a n c e w h i c h b e g a n t o b r e a k u p
after 1 9 4 0 as f a c t i o n s e v o l v e d i n t o p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s .
A s in L i b y a and E g y p t , the outbreak o f the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r
and north-east Africa's i n v o l v e m e n t therein ( b y virtue o f Italian
a n d B r i t i s h c o n f r o n t a t i o n i n t h e a r e a ) stiffened n a t i o n a l i s t r e s o l v e t o
attain self-determination. E g y p t i a n P r e m i e r ' A l l M à h i r ' s staunch
nationalist position u n d o u b t e d l y e n c o u r a g e d the congress, es
p e c i a l l y after h i s v i s i t t o t h e S u d a n i n F e b r u a r y 1 9 4 0 . T w o y e a r s
later, i n A p r i l 1 9 4 2 , a n d u n d o u b t e d l y i n f l u e n c e d b y B r i t a i n ' s
extremely precarious political and military situation in E g y p t , the
c o n g r e s s s e n t t h e S u d a n g o v e r n m e n t a m e m o r a n d u m o f its
520

26 The Sudan.
political demands, namely self-determination and the right t o

p o l i t i c a l e x p r e s s i o n . I t a l s o r e c o g n i s e d — as a s i g n o f a p p e a s e m e n t —
E g y p t ' s natural rights in the S u d a n .
T h i s l a t t e r d e m a n d w a s p a r t i c u l a r y s i g n i f i c a n t s i n c e E g y p t still
i n t e n d e d t o a d v a n c e its c l a i m o v e r t h e S u d a n , a n d i n i t i a l l y h a d
been hostile to the c o n g r e s s ; b u t the w a r situation had spurred
o n P a n - A r a b sympathies, and Sudanese nationalists recognised the
521

importance o f political and nationalist cooperation against the

British. Sir D o u g l a s N e w b o l d , the Civil Secretary, further e x
acerbated the situation b y his outright rejection o f their demands.
T h i s w a s i n t e r p r e t e d b y m a n y as a d e l i b e r a t e s n u b t o t h e e m e r g i n g
S u d a n e s e p o l i t i c a l e l i t e . W h i l e , i n p r i v a t e , B r i t i s h officials a t
tempted t o deprecate N e w b o l d ' s policy, the political d a m a g e had
been done. N o t only w e r e the nationalists incensed, b u t the
congress's division deepened. O n e group, composed mostly o f
senior civil servants, w a s led b y Ibrahim A h m a d , the president
o f t h e c o n g r e s s a n d a t u t o r at G o r d o n C o l l e g e . It w a s w i l l i n g t o
c o o p e r a t e w i t h the g o v e r n m e n t a n d t o await the c o n c l u s i o n o f the
w a r f o r p o l i t i c a l c o n c e s s i o n s . A s s u c h it c o n s t i t u t e d t h e b a s i s f o r
the U m m a Party established in 1945. T h e other major g r o u p , led
by Isma'Il a l - A z h a r l , also a tutor at t h e c o l l e g e a n d ex-president
o f the congress, formed the Unity Front, c o m p r i s i n g hardliners
w h o s o u g h t E g y p t i a n s u p p o r t in o r d e r t o e x p l o i t the differences
between the c o n d o m i n i u m p o w e r s . T h i s political division between
those prepared t o cooperate w i t h the British administration in
their quest f o r s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t , a n d those w h o s o u g h t E g y p t i a n
s u p p o r t e v e n at t h e c o s t o f e v e n t u a l unification b a s e d o n t h e o l d
call f o r unity o f t h e N i l e V a l l e y , w a s reflected in t h e p r i n c i p a l
sectarian a n d confessional conflict w i t h i n the c o u n t r y . O n the o n e
h a n d w e r e t h e M a h d i s t s , o r t h e ansar a s t h e M a d h I h a d c a l l e d
his supporters, led b y S a y y i d ' A b d a l - R a h m a n a l - M a h d l , w h o g a v e
their s u p p o r t t o the U m m a Party. O n the o t h e r w e r e their
long-standing religious and political rivals, the members o f the
K h a t m i y y a tariqa, w h o g a v e t h e i r s u p p o r t t o t h e A s h i q q a '
(Brothers) established b y a l - A z h a r l . T h e A s h i q q a ' w a s effectively
t h e first p o l i t i c a l p a r t y t o b e f o u n d e d i n t h e S u d a n . T h e A s h i q q a '
and their K h a t m i y y a supporters feared the establishment o f a
M a h d i s t - d o m i n a t e d state in t h e S u d a n , especially o n e s u p p o r t e d
by the British. T h e y therefore l o o k e d t o E g y p t for backing,
t h o u g h n o t always for the same reasons. Furthermore, these
g r o u p s i n c o r p o r a t e d o t h e r d i v e r s e political factions, s u c h as t h e
u n i o n i s t s , s o c i a l i s t s , a n d n e o - I s l a m i s t s , w i t h little i d e o l o g i c a l
h o m o g e n e i t y except their o p p o s i t i o n t o the British administration.
I n effect, h o w e v e r , t h e s e p o l i t i c a l g r o u p i n g s f r a g m e n t e d t h e
already d i v i d e d c o u n t r y further, o r at least r e i n f o r c e d e x i s t i n g
divisions.
D e s p i t e its rejection o f the c o n g r e s s m e m o r a n d u m o f 1 9 4 2 , t h e
522

S u d a n g o v e r n m e n t w a s still a n x i o u s t o a s s o c i a t e S u d a n e s e w i t h
the administration o f their c o u n t r y and to assuage the d e m a n d s
o f t h e n a t i o n a l i s t s i n a m a n n e r t h a t w a s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h its o w n
c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e p a c e at w h i c h s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d b e
a c h i e v e d . T h u s in 1944 an a d v i s o r y c o u n c i l for the N o r t h e r n
S u d a n w a s i n s t i t u t e d , w h i c h c o n s i s t e d o f 28 m e m b e r s t o r e p r e s e n t
e c o n o m i c , social and professional interests. E i g h t e e n others w e r e
elected or a p p o i n t e d f r o m the p r o v i n c i a l c o u n c i l s . T h e c o u n c i l ,
t h o u g h able to discuss a w i d e range o f issues, had o n l y a d v i s o r y
p o w e r s . In itself an i m p o r t a n t d e v e l o p m e n t , the b o d y w a s
nevertheless w i d e l y criticised w i t h i n and outside the Sudan. T h e
e x t r e m e n a t i o n a l i s t s o b j e c t e d t o its l i m i t e d p o w e r a n d r e p r e s e n
tation (especially the e x c l u s i o n o f the S o u t h e r n S u d a n ) , w h i l e
E g y p t c o n s i d e r e d it a t h r e a t t o its o w n c l a i m s o v e r t h e S u d a n .
In c o n s e q u e n c e the A s h i q q a ' b o y c o t t e d the a d v i s o r y c o u n c i l , and
t h r o u g h o u t the r e m a i n i n g p e r i o d o f the w a r effective political
a c t i v i t i e s w e r e stifled b y t h e e m e r g e n c y c o n d i t i o n s .
W i t h the c o n c l u s i o n o f the w a r and the lifting o f martial l a w ,
b o t h E g y p t and the Sudan witnessed a resurgence o f nationalist
a g i t a t i o n , r e s u l t i n g in t h e r e n e g o t i a t i o n o f t h e A n g l o - E g y p t i a n
Treaty o f 1936, w h i c h necessarily had to deal w i t h the Sudan. T h u s
in 1 9 4 6 , w h e n t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s t o o k p l a c e , a S u d a n e s e d e l e g a t i o n
attempted to exert pressure o n b o t h E g y p t and G r e a t Britain by
r e p r e s e n t i n g its n a t i o n a l i s t c a u s e i n C a i r o . I t w a s , h o w e v e r ,
u n s u c c e s s f u l , s i n c e its m e m b e r s f a i l e d t o a g r e e o n a c o m m o n
policy, a reflection o f the political and religious differences w i t h i n
the d e l e g a t i o n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t w o i m p o r t a n t political successes
w e r e a c h i e v e d . O n e w a s the British declaration admitting the
Sudan's right to self-determination and to the establishment o f
further institutions o f self-government. T h e second w a s the S u d a n
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e C o n f e r e n c e held in J u b a in J u n e 1946, w h i c h
effectively d r e w the s o u t h o f the c o u n t r y into the process o f
p o l i t i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t . T h i s w a s s i g n i f i c a n t , as t h e s o u t h , e c o n
o m i c a l l y and politically, h a d h i t h e r t o b e e n isolated f r o m the rest
o f t h e c o u n t r y u n d e r w h a t w a s k n o w n as ' t h e S o u t h e r n p o l i c y ' .
T h u s the conference constituted an important, a l t h o u g h belated,
step t o w a r d the unification o f the country.
I f at t h i s t i m e t h e f u t u r e l o o k e d b r i g h t e r , it s o o n b e c a m e c l e a r
that the s t r u g g l e had just c o m m e n c e d . T h e A s h i q q a ' b o y c o t t e d
the 1946 conference. E g y p t , then u n d e r the premiership o f S i d q l
5^3

Pasha, c o n t i n u e d t o insist o n * the u n i t y o f the N i l e V a l l e y ' , and

thus repudiated the principle o f self-determination for the Sudan.
T h e p r o b l e m w a s , therefore, o n c e again s h e l v e d for future
consideration. O n l y the proposals for a national legislature put
u p jointly b y the U m m a Party and the British (but o p p o s e d b y
the A s h i q q a ' ) p r o c e e d e d satisfactorily, e v e n t h o u g h there w e r e
s o m e d e l a y s . I n J u n e 1948 t h e S u d a n g o v e r n m e n t , d e s p i t e
E g y p t ' s opposition, established the n e w assembly. C o n s i s t i n g o f 8 5
m e m b e r s , t h e m a j o r i t y o f w h o m w e r e d r a w n f r o m t h e n o r t h , it
b e c a m e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r l e g i s l a t i o n i n m o s t d o m e s t i c affairs,
including the relations b e t w e e n the Sudan g o v e r n m e n t and the
c o n d o m i n i u m p o w e r s . D o m i n a t e d b y the U m m a Party, the
Legislative A s s e m b l y generally followed Britain's position, while
the radical elements w e r e increasingly driven to the fringe o f the
political spectrum.
In 1950, w h e n o n c e again the A n g l o - E g y p t i a n relationship w a s
b e i n g renegotiated, r e n e w e d d o m e s t i c unrest b r o k e o u t in the
Sudan, led mainly b y the A s h i q q a ' , w h o attacked the assembly
as a p a w n o f t h e B r i t i s h . T h e s e r i o t s w e r e e f f e c t i v e i n s o f a r as t h e y
contributed to b r i n g i n g a b o u t the revision o f the rules g o v e r n i n g
the election o f the assembly. M e a n w h i l e , true to tradition, the
A n g l o - E g y p t i a n talks w e r e aborted and K i n g Faruq proclaimed
the ' u n i t y o f the N i l e V a l l e y under the E g y p t i a n C r o w n ' . Shortly
thereafter, in late 1 9 5 1 , the E g y p t i a n P r e m i e r , N a h h a s Pasha,
a n n o u n c e d the a b r o g a t i o n o f the 1899 and 1936 a g r e e m e n t s . T h u s
t h e t h r e e p a r t i e s h a d a r r i v e d at a n o t h e r d e a d l o c k , w h i c h w a s o n l y
r e s o l v e d after t h e E g y p t i a n a r m y c o u p o f J u l y 1 9 5 2 .
T h e n e w E g y p t i a n regime, ostensibly led b y G e n e r a l N a g l b ,
himself half-Sudanese, adopted a considerably m o r e flexible
a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s t h e S u d a n q u e s t i o n . I t a c c e p t e d t h e Self-
G o v e r n m e n t Statute for the Sudan w h i c h had been enacted b y the
U m m a - d o m i n a t e d L e g i s l a t i v e A s s e m b l y i n A p r i l 1 9 5 2 , as w e l l as
full S u d a n i s a t i o n o f t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w i t h i n t h r e e y e a r s . I n
J a n u a r y 1 9 5 3 , E g y p t a n d B r i t a i n a r r i v e d at a f o r m a l a g r e e m e n t
o f independence for the Sudan. H o w e v e r , the a g r e e m e n t w a s also
c r i t i c i s e d as b e i n g t o o h a s t y a n d f o r a g g r a v a t i n g t h e p o l i t i c a l
s i t u a t i o n i n t h e c o u n t r y , as it o n l y d e a l t w i t h s t r u c t u r a l a n d
administrative issues. It d i d n o t a c c o u n t for the basic p r o b l e m s
o f t h e c o u n t r y , s u c h as i n t e r - e t h n i c h o s t i l i t i e s , m i n o r i t y r i g h t s ,

s o c i o - e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t and the role o f the religious orders.

Consequently, the nationalist m o v e m e n t w a s further polarised.
P r o b a b l y because the A s h i q q a ' represented a w i d e spectrum o f
radical o p i n i o n , u n d e r the n e w n a m e o f the N a t i o n a l U n i o n i s t
P a r t y ( N U P ) , it w o n t h e e l e c t i o n s o f 1 9 5 3 , a n d a l - A z h a r l w a s
b r o u g h t to p o w e r . In the l o w e r and u p p e r houses p r o v i d e d for
b y t h e n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n t h e N U P w o n a m a j o r i t y o f 50 a n d 31
seats r e s p e c t i v e l y ; t h e U m m a P a r t y o b t a i n e d 23 a n d 8 s e a t s , w i t h
t h e o t h e r f o u r p a r t i e s h o l d i n g 24 a n d 7 s e a t s .
T o the surprise o f the E g y p t i a n s a l - A z h a r l f o l l o w e d a p o l i c y
o f c o m p l e t e independence instead o f union w i t h E g y p t . T h e n e w
d e m o c r a t i c Sudanese r e g i m e feared E g y p t i a n domination,
e s p e c i a l l y after t h e o u s t i n g o f N a g i b i n 1 9 5 4 . S o m e w r i t e r s a r g u e
that the historic animosity b e t w e e n the M a h d i s t s and the
E g y p t i a n s , w h i c h culminated in a b l o o d y clash in M a r c h 1954
d u r i n g N a g l b ' s state visit t o o p e n the S u d a n e s e parliament, per
suaded the Unionists to c h a n g e their m i n d s and t o declare the
S u d a n i n d e p e n d e n t in a joint session o f the t w o h o u s e s in
D e c e m b e r 1 9 5 5 . A m o n t h e a r l i e r (at t h e r e q u e s t o f t h e S u d a n
government) British troops had been evacuated and a plebiscite
had approved independence. But al-Azharl's g o v e r n m e n t w a s
w e a k , r e n t as it w a s b y p e r s o n a l i t y c o n f l i c t s a n d p o l i t i c a l d i s
agreements. T h e s t r o n g K h a t m i y y a faction in the N U P seceded
f r o m it, f o r m i n g t h e P e o p l e ' s D e m o c r a t i c P a r t y ( P D P ) i n J u n e
1956. T h e g r o w i n g political unrest c u l m i n a t e d in a ' h o l y alliance'
b e t w e e n the M a h d i s t U m m a Party and the K h a t m i y y a P D P , w h i c h
replaced al-Azhari's g o v e r n m e n t in July 1956, and elected
' A b d A l l a h K h a l l l , the Secretary-General o f the U m m a Party and
a p a r t i c i p a n t i n d i f f e r e n t B r i t i s h s c h e m e s f o r s e l f - r u l e , as p r i m e
minister. T h e e d u c a t e d elite had s u c c e e d e d , t h r o u g h p l a y i n g o n
differences o f the political p o w e r s , in attaining i n d e p e n d e n c e b u t ,
o n the e v e o f that independence, the religious orders had gained
the ascendancy. Confessional disputes and political factionalism
w e r e not the o n l y p r o b l e m s faced b y the n e w g o v e r n m e n t in the
S u d a n . A n o t h e r major difficulty c o n c e r n e d the north—south
division within the country, in w h i c h the p r e d o m i n a n t l y Christian
southerners w e r e pitted against the largely I s l a m i c - A r a b p o p u
lation o f the n o r t h . F r o m 1955 t o 1 9 7 2 , w h e n the A d d i s A b a b a
A g r e e m e n t w a s signed, the Sudan w a s rent w i t h violent conflict
5*5

that degenerated into civil w a r , l e a v i n g h u n d r e d s o f thousands

homeless a n d the e c o n o m y in ruins.
A l t h o u g h British policy t o w a r d the south had taken a dramatic
t u r n at t h e t i m e o f t h e J u b a c o n f e r e n c e , t h e effects o f ' t h e
Southern p o l i c y ' could not be reversed overnight. T h e policy,
w h i c h h a d deliberately i n v o l v e d m a s s i v e p o p u l a t i o n transfers a n d
a p u r p o s e f u l d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e s o u t h e r n e c o n o m y , h a d left t h e
t w o h a l v e s o f t h e c o u n t r y artificially d i v i d e d . W h i l e British
administrators later realised the futility o f s u c h a p l a n ( w h i c h h a d
b e e n a i m e d at c r e a t i n g a ' b u f f e r ' state in t h e s o u t h that c o u l d later
be linked t o British dependencies in East Africa), the e n m i t y a n d
h a t r e d w h i c h it h a d c r e a t e d b e t w e e n t h e t w o g r o u p s r e m a i n e d ,
and the negotiations o v e r independence, w h i c h the southerners
felt h a d b e e n c o n d u c t e d w i t h o u t t h e i r full p a r t i c i p a t i o n , f u r t h e r
f a n n e d t h e flames o f b i t t e r n e s s . I n A u g u s t 195 5 t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s
decision to m o v e southern soldiers from the Equatoria C o r p s to
the n o r t h , a n d the dispatch o f n o r t h e r n t r o o p s t o the south, led
to a m u t i n y b y m e m b e r s o f the corps that rapidly spread t o the
d i s t r i c t s o f J u b a , Y e i , Y a m b i o a n d M a r i d i . A l t h o u g h it w a s
q u i c k l y s u p p r e s s e d , t h e v i o l e n c e left 2 6 1 n o r t h e r n e r s a n d s o m e
1
75 s o u t h e r n e r s d e a d . S c o r e s o f s o l d i e r s f r o m t h e c o r p s s u b s e
q u e n t l y r e f u s e d t o l a y d o w n t h e i r a r m s a n d fled i n t o t h e f o r e s t s ,
from w h e n c e they b e g a n sporadic resistance.
In K h a r t o u m , the political changes in the post-independence
period w e r e n o t accompanied b y any violent political confront
ation o r b l o o d y take-overs o f p o w e r . T h e t w o successful c o u p s
in 1958 a n d 1969 w e r e peaceful, a n d these c o n f r o n t a t i o n s c o n
cerned clashes b e t w e e n personalities, and a m o n g the political
g r o u p s in w h i c h the religious orders w i t h their vast n u m b e r o f
a d h e r e n t s w e r e b y far t h e m o s t i n f l u e n t i a l e l e m e n t . I t a p p e a r e d
that the p o w e r s o f the v a r i o u s religious orders w e r e a l m o s t equal,
and that balancing c o m p r o m i s e s and shifting coalitions a m o n g
t h e m w e r e n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e c o n t i n u i t y o f t h e s y s t e m . T h a t is w h y
c o a l i t i o n s w e r e a s y m p t o m o f S u d a n e s e p o l i t i c a l life after
independence.
Instability w a s , in part, a c o n s e q u e n c e o f the failure o f
s u c c e s s i v e g o v e r n m e n t s t o a c h i e v e sufficient social a n d e c o n o m i c
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n t o a p p e a s e t h e different g r o u p s i n t h e t o w n s ,
1
M o h a m m a d O m e r B e s h i r , The Southern Sudan: background to conflict, 2nd e d .
( K h a r t o u m , 1970), 73.
526

especially the w o r k e r s , w h o s e d e m a n d s for social equality, e c o n

omic d e v e l o p m e n t and political participation continued to
threaten the fragile politico-sectarian balance. T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t
u p s h o t o f this instability w a s K h a l l l ' s ' i n v i t a t i o n ' t o the a r m y to
s e i z e p o w e r . K h a l l l ' s g o v e r n m e n t n o t o n l y f o u n d it i n c r e a s i n g l y
difficult t o s e c u r e a m a j o r i t y i n p a r l i a m e n t f o r its l e g i s l a t i o n , b u t
also faced a g r o w i n g e c o n o m i c crisis, b o r d e r disputes w i t h E g y p t
i n 1 9 5 7, a n d d i s s e n s i o n s w i t h its P D P c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r - e s p e c i a l l y
after t h e s p r i n g 1 9 5 8 e l e c t i o n - b e c a u s e o f t h e i r d i s a g r e e m e n t o v e r
the a c c e p t a n c e o f A m e r i c a n aid. F u r t h e r m o r e , the s o u t h b e g a n t o
a s s e r t its p o l i t i c a l p o w e r i n p a r l i a m e n t b y s i d i n g w i t h t h e N U P .
KhalTl's g o v e r n m e n t faced defeat o v e r the aid issue in parliament,
a n d it w a s b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d a l s o l o s e t o a v o t e
o f n o confidence scheduled for 17 N o v e m b e r 1958. T h a t m o r n i n g ,
t h e r e f o r e , t h e S u d a n f o u n d i t s e l f u n d e r its first m i l i t a r y r e g i m e ,
t h o u g h it w a s n o t t h e first a t t e m p t b y t h e a r m y t o i n t e r v e n e i n
p o l i t i c s . I n 195 7 a m i l i t a r y p l o t h a d b e e n u n c o v e r e d a n d its l e a d e r s
dismissed or demoted. A m o n g them w e r e ' A b d al-Rahman
K e i b e i d a and Ja'fer N u m a y r I , w h o w a s to b e c o m e Sudanese
p r e s i d e n t i n 1 9 6 9 after l e a d i n g a s e c o n d c o u p .
F r o m the outset the military r e g i m e tried to f o l l o w a p o l i c y o f
c o m p r o m i s e , a l t h o u g h it d i s s o l v e d p a r l i a m e n t a n d b a n i s h e d
parties. M a d e u p f r o m senior ranks in the a r m y and led b y G e n e r a l
' A b b u d , head o f the army, the n e w r e g i m e accepted A m e r i c a n
aid o n the o n e hand and, o n the other, appeased N a s i r b y
c o n c l u d i n g a N i l e W a t e r s A g r e e m e n t in 1959 w h i c h f a v o u r e d the
E g y p t i a n side. Y e t , despite these apparent successes, the g o v e r n
m e n t b e c a m e a v i c t i m o f dissent w i t h i n the ruling military junta.
M a j o r - G e n e r a l A h m a d 'A b d a l - W a h h a b , a s t r o n g supporter o f the
U m m a Party, and Brigadier Hasan Bashlr Nasir, w i t h K h a t m i y y a
affiliations, fell o u t w i t h t h e i r c o l l e a g u e s . T h i s r e s u l t e d i n ' A b d
al-Wahhab's dismissal and the appointment o f three n e w m e m b e r s
to the junta; Brigadiers M u h y l a l - D l n ' A b d A l l a h , ' A b d a l - R a h i m
Shanan and M a q b u l al-Hajj. M u h y l al-Dln and Shanan w e r e b o t h
s t r o n g s u p p o r t e r s o f N U P a n d , after i n s t i g a t i n g a f a i l e d c o u p late
i n 1 9 5 9 , b o t h w e r e s e n t e n c e d t o life i m p r i s o n m e n t .
F r o m early i960 the old politicians b e g a n to exploit the
differences inside the military junta, and o r g a n i s e d an o p p o s i t i o n
front w h i c h included al-Azharl, Khalll, Sadiq al-Mahdl, A h m a d
M a h j u b and the C o m m u n i s t s . T h e y d e m a n d e d the election o f a
5*7

n e w parliament t o draft a n e w constitution. T h e g o v e r n m e n t

reacted b y arresting them, w i t h the exception o f the p o w e r f u l
S a y y e d a l - M a h d l , w h o s e s u b s e q u e n t d e a t h affected o p p o s i t i o n
activities d u r i n g 1 9 6 1 - 2 .
D e s p i t e internal opposition, the r e g i m e m a d e s o m e e c o n o m i c
progress and successfully extended the scope o f the civil service,
w h i c h led t o the adoption o f the i960 Provincial Administration
A c t . A l t h o u g h this A c t p r o v i d e d for the establishment o f p r o v
i n c i a l c o u n c i l s w i t h l e g i s l a t i v e , e x e c u t i v e a n d a d v i s o r y p o w e r s , it
also g a v e c i v i l servants political p o w e r s as representatives o f the
g o v e r n m e n t in their districts. T h i s w o u l d explain w h y the
demonstrators during the ' O c t o b e r 1964 revolution* d e m a n d e d
a p u r g e o f t h e c i v i l s e r v i c e . H a d it n o t b e e n f o r t h e O c t o b e r
revolution, the consolidation o f the effendiyya (propertied and
m o n i e d c l a s s e s ) w o u l d h a v e b e e n c o m p l e t e , as h a d o c c u r r e d i n
s o m e other A r a b countries u n d e r military rule. T o reinforce the
Provincial Administration A c t , a central council w a s established
as t h e m a i n p o l i t i c a l i n s t r u m e n t l e g i t i m i s i n g t h e m i l i t a r y b a s e b y
i n v o l v i n g civilians. Its m e m b e r s h i p w a s partly n o m i n a t e d b y the
president, partly directly elected, and partly selected b y provincial
e l e c t o r a l c o l l e g e s . M o s t o f t h e o l d p a r t i e s b o y c o t t e d its e l e c t i o n s
except the P D P and the C o m m u n i s t s . T h e P D P had been strong
supporters o f the regime since 1961 w h i l e the C o m m u n i s t s h o p e d
t o e x p l o i t t h e e l e c t i o n s ' t o w e a k e n t h e r e g i m e t h r o u g h its o w n
institutions \
T h e w e a k e s t p o i n t o f t h e r e g i m e w a s its s o u t h e r n p o l i c y , w h i c h
e v e n t u a l l y b r o u g h t a b o u t its d e m i s e i n O c t o b e r 1 9 6 4 . S e v e r e
repression b y the army, w h i c h had b e g u n attacking the civilian
p e a s a n t r y i n t h e s o u t h as w e l l a s t h e ' r e b e l s ' a n d ' o u t l a w s ' w h o
h a d fled after t h e 1955 m u t i n y , f u r t h e r i n c r e a s e d t h e r a n k s o f t h e
a r m e d dissidents. I n S e p t e m b e r 1963 representatives o f the
various dissident g r o u p s i n v o l v e d succeeded in uniting their
disparate forces i n t o a n e w L a n d F r e e d o m A r m y , w h i c h later
adopted the name o f A n y a n y a , a term w h i c h m e a n s ' snake p o i s o n '
1
in the M a d i , M o r u and L o t u k o l a n g u a g e s . G u e r r i l l a attacks o n
police posts and a r m y barracks in the south w e r e stepped u p and
n e w training c a m p s and s u p p l y lines w e r e o p e n e d in the
neighbouring countries o f Ethiopia, K e n y a and Uganda.
1
Edgar O'Ballance, The secret war in the Sudan: ipjj-ip/2 ( L o n d o n , 1977), 59.
528

T h e g o v e r n m e n t responded b y increasing the a r m y to m o r e

t h a n 2 0 0 0 0 m e n , o f w h o m a n e s t i m a t e d 8000 w e r e s e n t t o t h e
south. Foreign missionaries, w h o m General ' A b b u d t h o u g h t had
e n c o u r a g e d the rebellion, w e r e expelled, their s c h o o l s closed and
K o r a n i c s c h o o l s o p e n e d in their place. S o u t h e r n e r s w o r k i n g in
the civil service w e r e forced to m o v e n o r t h o r r e s i g n ; others,
suspected o f aiding the A n y a n y a , w e r e arrested and imprisoned.
T h e leaders o f the n e w l y f o r m e d S u d a n A f r i c a n N a t i o n a l U n i o n ,
w h o h a d fled t o E t h i o p i a , U g a n d a a n d t h e C e n t r a l A f r i c a n
R e p u b l i c (the e x - F r e n c h O u b a n g u i - C h a r i ) , w e r e o r d e r e d h o m e ,
a n d efforts m a d e t o e x t r a d i t e t h o s e w h o r e f u s e d t o r e t u r n
voluntarily.
B y e a r l y 1 9 6 4 t h e c o n f l i c t w a s b e g i n n i n g t o h a v e a s e v e r e effect
o n t h e e c o n o m y . H u n d r e d s o f t h o u s a n d s o f r e f u g e e s h a d fled t o
the south, and relations w i t h the n e i g h b o u r i n g countries w e r e
s t r a i n e d . T r a d e a n d t r a n s p o r t s u f f e r e d , as d i d c u l t i v a t i o n . I n t h e
n o r t h t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s n e e d t o finance t h e w a r p l a y e d h a v o c w i t h
d e v e l o p m e n t plans and p r e v e n t e d t h e m f r o m increasing the
w a g e s o f g o v e r n m e n t w o r k e r s and i m p r o v i n g living standards.
A d e c i s i o n b y G e n e r a l ' A b b u d in S e p t e m b e r 1964 t o o p e n dis
c u s s i o n s in the n o r t h o n the situation in the s o u t h , c o u p l e d w i t h
the rising e c o n o m i c and social discontent, strengthened the hand
o f the o p p o s i t i o n w h i c h f o r m e d a N a t i o n a l F r o n t o f political
organisations, trade unions and professional associations and
c a l l e d f o r a g e n e r a l s t r i k e o n 24 O c t o b e r 1 9 6 4 . T h e p r e s i d e n t w a s
forced to d i s s o l v e the military junta and t o call for an e m e r g e n c y
session o f the Central C o u n c i l . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the insistence o f the
demonstrators o n the complete w i t h d r a w a l o f the military led to
the formation o f an all-party caretaker g o v e r n m e n t w i t h the
strong representation o f the National Front.
F o r t h e first t i m e i n t h e h i s t o r y o f t h e S u d a n , a C o m m u n i s t
( A h m a d Sulayman), a M u s l i m Brother (al-Rashld al-Tahir), and
representatives o f trade u n i o n s (Shafi'I A h m a d a l - S h a y k h ) and
p e a s a n t u n i o n s ( a l - A m l n M u h a m m a d a l - A m l n ) w e r e c h o s e n as
m e m b e r s o f the cabinet. T h e o l d parties w e r e each represented b y
o n e m e m b e r . Sir a l - K h a t l m a l - K h a l l f a , the n e w p r i m e minister,
w a s a n i n d e p e n d e n t m o d e r a t e w h o w a s c h o s e n f o r t h e office a f t e r
the o l d parties' rejection o f the n o m i n a t i o n s o f the C h i e f Justice,
A w a d A l l a h , and A b d l n Isma'Il, the President o f the Barristers'
529

Association, both o f w h o m were accused o f left-wing political

affiliations. G e n e r a l ' A b b u d r e m a i n e d t h e h e a d o f t h e s t a t e w i t h
o n l y titular p o w e r s .
T h e c a r e t a k e r g o v e r n m e n t b e g a n its a c t i v i t i e s b y c o n c l u d i n g
a t r u c e w i t h t h e s o u t h . F o r t h e first t i m e a s o u t h e r n e r , C l e m e n t
M o b o r o , w a s c h o s e n as a m i n i s t e r , a n d g i v e n t h e v i t a l p o r t f o l i o
o f Interior Office Affairs. T h e g o v e r n m e n t also prepared the w a y
for an early election scheduled for A p r i l 1965. T h e representation
o f the w o r k e r s in the g o v e r n m e n t b y the inclusion o f their
trade-union secretary-generals curtailed their e c o n o m i c d e m a n d s .
Y e t , the w e a k e n i n g o f the g o v e r n m e n t c a m e f r o m the o l d parties
w h o f o r m e d a s e c o n d N a t i o n a l F r o n t , w h i c h , in J a n u a r y 1 9 6 5 , sent
a letter to the p r i m e minister d e m a n d i n g an early election and the
g o v e r n m e n t ' s resignation if these elections did not take place. T h e
U m m a P a r t y c o n c u r r e d in this d e m a n d . A l - K h a l l f a w a s f o r c e d t o
resign a n d a n e w g o v e r n m e n t u n d e r his p r e m i e r s h i p w a s f o r m e d ,
f a v o u r i n g the o l d parties b u t w i t h o n e minister each for the
C o m m u n i s t s and the M u s l i m Brothers.
In M a r c h a l - K h a l l f a o p e n e d a r o u n d - t a b l e c o n f e r e n c e in K h a r
t o u m a i m e d at r e s o l v i n g t h e s o u t h e r n q u e s t i o n . I t w a s a t t e n d e d
b y representatives o f the Southern Front, a coalition o f southern
s t u d e n t s , g o v e r n m e n t officials a n d e m p l o y e e s f o r m e d i n O c t o b e r
1964, representatives o f the v a r i o u s n o r t h e r n parties, and Elia
L u p e , the leader o f the Sudan African N a t i o n a l U n i o n , w h i c h
represented those southern politicians in exile. A l s o in attendance
w a s W i l l i a m D e n g , a f o r m e r g o v e r n m e n t official f r o m t h e s o u t h
w h o h a d h e l p e d t o set u p S A N U i n 1 9 6 2 . H i s p r o p o s a l f o r a
federal c o n s t i t u t i o n in the s o u t h h a d attracted the g o v e r n m e n t ' s
interest, but had also alienated a majority o f the m e m b e r s o f
S A N U , w h o c o n t i n u e d t o f a v o u r f o r t h e s o u t h e i t h e r full
a u t o n o m y or independence. A l t h o u g h the S A N U delegation w a s
e v e n t u a l l y p e r s u a d e d t o a g r e e t o his participation in their
d e l e g a t i o n , t h e i r r e l u c t a n c e t o a c c e p t h i s s e l f - a s s u m e d r o l e as a
m e d i a t o r w i t h the a l - K h a l l f a g o v e r n m e n t w a s a m a j o r factor in
the c o n f e r e n c e ' s failure t o reach a settlement. H o w e v e r , a 1 2 - m a n
c o m m i t t e e , consisting o f six representatives f r o m the n o r t h and
six f r o m t h e s o u t h , w a s set u p t o s t u d y p r o p o s e d s o l u t i o n s f u r t h e r .
W h i l e the establishment o f the c o m m i t t e e ostensibly held o u t
h o p e that the conflict in the s o u t h m i g h t be e n d e d in f a v o u r o f
n e g o t i a t i o n , the failure o f the c o n f e r e n c e t o a g r e e o n m o r e
53o

d e c i s i v e a c t i o n left t h e s o u t h e r n p a r t i e s b i t t e r l y d i s a p p o i n t e d . O n
21 M a r c h t h e y a n n o u n c e d t h a t t h e y w o u l d b o y c o t t t h e f o r t h
c o m i n g elections, a m o v e that w a s supported b y the P D P .
H o w e v e r , the g o v e r n m e n t d e c i d e d t o p r o c e e d w i t h a p o l l in the
north, and the P D P then d r o p p e d their o p p o s i t i o n to the election,
a n d t h e i r c a n d i d a t e s s t o o d f o r office, w i n n i n g t h r e e seats o u t o f
t h e 1 7 3 t h a t w e r e c o n t e s t e d . T h e U m m a P a r t y g a i n e d 75 s e a t s a n d
t h e N U P 54 s e a t s . T h e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y , w h i c h w a s p a r t i c i p a t i n g
i n g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s f o r t h e first t i m e , t o o k o n l y e l e v e n s e a t s .
T h e election also m a r k e d the appearance o f a n e w regional
g r o u p , the Beja C o n g r e s s O r g a n i s a t i o n , w h i c h w o n ten seats.
S o o n other regional g r o u p s appeared, n o t a b l y in the N u b a
M o u n t a i n s a n d i n D a r f u r , as a r e s u l t o f t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e first
democratic experiment (1954-8) to introduce any degree o f
c h a n g e in the p o o r rural areas. B u t e v e n b e f o r e their entry o n t o
t h e n a t i o n a l s c e n e , it w a s c l e a r t h a t t h e c o n t i n u i n g f a c t i o n a l i s m
w a s m a k i n g t h e S u d a n a l m o s t u n g o v e r n a b l e . T h e e l e c t i o n figures
g a v e n o single party a w o r k a b l e majority, and the t w o b i g parties,
the U m m a and the N U P , w e r e f o r c e d t o f o r m a c o a l i t i o n
g o v e r n m e n t u n d e r the p r e m i e r s h i p o f M a h j u b , w h o in the 1930s
had been editor o f the al-Fajr m a g a z i n e g r o u p . A l - A z h a r l w a s
e l e c t e d p e r m a n e n t p r e s i d e n t o f a C o u n c i l o f F i v e . T h e first a c t i o n
o f the n e w g o v e r n m e n t w a s t o f o r m a c o m m i t t e e t o draft a
permanent constitution for the country, and a scramble b e g a n
b e t w e e n the n e w partners for n e w alliances to w i n the elections
under the p r o p o s e d presidential s y s t e m e v e n before the n e w
c o n s t i t u t i o n w a s ratified. A n d i n D e c e m b e r 1965 t h e C o n s t i t u e n t
A s s e m b l y m o v e d t o d i s s o l v e t h e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y after p u b l i c
d e m o n s t r a t i o n s a g a i n s t it b y M u s l i m B r o t h e r s w h o r e s e n t e d its
alleged anti-Islamic attitudes. E i g h t o f the eleven C o m m u n i s t
m e m b e r s w e r e dismissed f r o m the assembly.
T h e second parliamentary period was dominated by t w o
p r o b l e m s : t h e first w a s t h e b i t t e r f a c t i o n a l i s m w i t h i n p a r t i e s a n d
the deteriorating relations b e t w e e n them. T h e s e c o n d w a s the
south, w h e r e the disturbances w e r e n o w t a k i n g o n the character
o f a c i v i l w a r . A s e a r l y as 1 9 6 6 t h e U m m a P a r t y , f o r t h e first t i m e ,
f a c e d a d i v i s i o n i n its r a n k s . S a d i q a l - M a h d l , t h e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e
party, b r o k e w i t h his uncle, I m a m a l - H a d l a l - M a h d l , o v e r the
question o f demarcation b e t w e e n the M a h d i s t religious leadership
a n d the c o n t r o l o f the U m m a Party. T h e s c h i s m resulted in a
53i

further division o f the U m m a Party into the Sâdiq and al-Hadï

f a c t i o n s . A t t h e s a m e t i m e t h e leftist p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s a l s o e x p e r i -
e n c e d serious d i v i s i o n s in their r a n k s . T h i s factionalisation
e n c o u r a g e d a system o f d y n a m i c and m o b i l e coalitions. A basic
f a c t o r b e h i n d t h e d i v i s i o n s a n d p a r t y r e g r o u p i n g s after t h e 1 9 6 4
r e v o l u t i o n w a s the participation o f the l o w e r u r b a n classes in
p o l i t i c s t h r o u g h t h e i r t r a d e u n i o n s , w h i c h a c t e d as p r e s s u r e
g r o u p s . T h e i r intervention forced the discussion o f issues such
as e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t , s o c i a l c h a n g e a n d t h e d é m o c r a t i s a t i o n
o f party structures. A s a result o f the U m m a Party split, Sâdiq
a l - M a h d ï w a s elected p r i m e minister instead o f M a h j û b in M a y
1966. T h e N U P allied w i t h S â d i q w h e n he s u c c e e d e d in
m o b i l i s i n g m o s t o f the U m m a to his side. T h i s p o l i c y o f p l a y i n g
o n U m m a Party differences w a s repeated b y the N U P in 1967 w h e n
it b r o u g h t d o w n S â d i q a n d r e t u r n e d M a h j û b t o t h e p r e m i e r s h i p .
In the south conditions continued to deteriorate. O n 8 July,
after a m i n o r i n c i d e n t i n w h i c h a n o r t h e r n e r w a s w o u n d e d , t h e
M u s l i m g a r r i s o n at J u b a w e n t o n t h e r a m p a g e , m u r d e r i n g
civilians and b u r n i n g t h r o u g h o u t the t o w n . T h r e e d a y s later o t h e r
s o l d i e r s s u r r o u n d e d a c h u r c h at W a u , t h e c a p i t a l o f t h e B a h r
a l - G h a z a l p r o v i n c e , a n d o p e n e d fire o n a w e d d i n g p a r t y . C a s u a l t i e s
in the t w o e v e n t s w e r e e s t i m a t e d t o i n c l u d e m o r e t h a n a t h o u s a n d
1
dead. T h e southern parties claimed that the actions represented
a deliberate attempt b y the M a h j û b g o v e r n m e n t to d e p o p u l a t e the
s o u t h , and a r g u e d that this m e a n t that o n l y a military s o l u t i o n to
the p r o b l e m w a s possible. N e v e r t h e l e s s representatives o f the
parties remained in K h a r t o u m t r y i n g t o reach a political s o l u t i o n
w i t h first t h e M a h j û b a n d t h e n t h e S â d i q a l - M a h d ï g o v e r n m e n t s .
T h e death o f t w o southern leaders, Father S a b o r n i n o L a h u r e in
1967, and then o f W i l l i a m D e n g , w h o w a s a m b u s h e d b y w h a t w a s
p r o b a b l y a military patrol in M a y 1968, further u n d e r c u t the
position o f those seeking a political solution.
W i t h i n this c o n t e x t o f p a r l i a m e n t a r y m a n o e u v r i n g the 1968
elections w e r e held before the Constituent A s s e m b l y had agreed
o n a permanent constitution for the country. T h e s e elections
resulted in a small m a j o r i t y for the N U P a n d P D P , w h i c h h a d
r e c e n t l y u n i t e d as t h e D e m o c r a t i c U n i o n i s t P a r t y ( D U P ) . A l -
t h o u g h the D U P briefly joined w i t h a faction o f the U m m a Party
i n M a y 1 9 6 9 , t h e a r m y t o o k p o w e r a f t e r l e s s t h a n five y e a r s o f
1
O ' B a l l a n c e , Secret war, 80-1.
53*

the restored parliamentary rule. T h e s a m e reasons that lay b e h i n d

t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e first d e m o c r a t i c e x p e r i m e n t s p a r k e d o f f t h i s n e w
a r m y t a k e - o v e r , t h o u g h t h i s t i m e it w a s n o t a ' h a n d i n g - o v e r o f
power'.
T h e military t a k e - o v e r in M a y 1969 w a s a direct result o f the
a l i e n a t i o n o f t h e r a d i c a l f o r c e s after t h e d i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e
C o m m u n i s t P a r t y i n 1965 a n d t h e i r s u b s e q u e n t i n f i l t r a t i o n o f t h e
armed forces. T h e y n o w searched for extra-legal means by w h i c h
t o v o i c e t h e i r p r o t e s t s . T h i s r a d i c a l n o t e w a s c l e a r i n t h e first
s p e e c h o f the n e w military leader, G e n e r a l N u m a y r I , in w h i c h he
d e s c r i b e d t h e o l d p a r t i e s as ' w h o l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r e x p l o i t i n g t h e
state p o w e r for self-enrichment and for s e r v i n g n a r r o w partisan
interests w i t h o u t c a r i n g for the interests o f the m a s s e s ' .
T h i s coup d'etat w a s different f r o m t h a t o f 1 9 5 8 i n t h a t it w a s
led b y the m i d d l e ranks in the army. T h e c o u p obtained w i d e
s u p p o r t f r o m t h e start b e c a u s e it i d e n t i f i e d i t s e l f w i t h t h e p o p u l a r
f o r c e s a n d m a n y o f its first m i n i s t e r s w e r e a m o n g t h e l e a d e r s o f
the 1964 O c t o b e r r e v o l u t i o n . T h e n e w r e g i m e l a u n c h e d a
p r o g r a m m e to extend the public sector, to e n c o u r a g e the
participation o f international capital, and to introduce a five-year
plan for social and e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t .
D u r i n g its first y e a r t h e r e g i m e w a s c o n f r o n t e d b y t h e m i l i t a n t
ansar (i.e. M a h d i s t ) o p p o s i t i o n , a n d after c r u s h i n g t h i s r e l i g i o n -
based m o v e m e n t , the r e g i m e then b e g a n to distance itself f r o m
the C o m m u n i s t Party. T h e split o f the C o m m u n i s t s in S e p t e m b e r
1970 into the M u ' a w i y a and M a h j u b w i n g s facilitated this. T h u s ,
in N o v e m b e r 1970, three o f the R e v o l u t i o n a r y C o m m a n d C o u n c i l ,
w h o were considered to be C o m m u n i s t sympathisers, were
dismissed. T h e issues o f c o n t e n t i o n in the R C C w e r e the differences
o f o p i n i o n o v e r the question o f the p r o p o s e d project o f u n i o n
b e t w e e n the Sudan, E g y p t and L i b y a , and relations w i t h the
U S S R . T h e w o r s e n i n g relations b e t w e e n the C o m m u n i s t s and the
R C C led in J u l y 1 9 7 1 to an a t t e m p t e d c o u p headed b y a M a j o r
a l - ' A t a , w h o had earlier b e e n dismissed b y N u m a y r I . T h e success
o f t h e r e g i m e i n c r u s h i n g t h i s c o u p l e d t o its s e v e r i n g r e l a t i o n s
w i t h the eastern b l o c and l o o k i n g for help f r o m the w e s t .
Internally a policy o f institutionalising the r e g i m e w a s adopted.
A f t e r a national r e f e r e n d u m had been held in O c t o b e r 1 9 7 1 ,
N u m a y r I b e c a m e president and dissolved the R C C , and a c o n
s t i t u t i o n w a s d r a f t e d in 1 9 7 2 .
533

T h a t year N u m a y r I also turned his attention t o the south. W i t h

the help o f E t h i o p i a a n d the W o r l d C o u n c i l o f C h u r c h e s , an
agreement w a s concluded between the government and the
A n y a n y a , led b y General Joseph L a g u , to end the civil war. T h e
' A d d i s A b a b a A g r e e m e n t ' , as t h e p a c t c a m e t o b e k n o w n , g a v e
the south a f o r m o f regional a u t o n o m y w i t h i n a federal structure
o f g o v e r n m e n t . A regional people's assembly w a s set u p w i t h a
H i g h E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l , w h o s e leader w o u l d also b e a vice-
president o f the Republic. T h e Christian religion w a s t o be
recognised, together with the use o f the English language,
a l o n g s i d e I s l a m a n d A r a b i c . A l t h o u g h efforts t o i m p l e m e n t t h e
ceasefire fully p r o v e d difficult, t h e a g r e e m e n t successfully e n d e d
t h e w a r a n d l e d t o t h e r e t u r n o f m o s t o f t h e e s t i m a t e d 300000
r e f u g e e s w h o h a d fled t h e c o u n t r y d u r i n g t h e fighting. E f f o r t s t o
resettle t h e 800000 o t h e r s o u t h e r n e r s m a d e h o m e l e s s b y t h e
conflict w e r e undertaken w i t h the aid o f the United N a t i o n s
Commissioner for Refugees, the A g a K h a n , and numerous
international aid organisations. Elections to the regional assembly
w e r e held w i t h o u t incident in N o v e m b e r 1973 a n d A b e l A l i e r ,
N u m a y r l ' s o w n n o m i n e e , w a s e l e c t e d u n o p p o s e d as p r e s i d e n t .
Elections o f southerners t o the National A s s e m b l y f o l l o w e d in
April 1974.
For N u m a y r I the conclusion o f the agreement and the ending
o f the w a r , w h i c h had cost the lives o f u p to half a million
Sudanese in 17 years and w h i c h h a d devastated the e c o n o m y , w a s
1
a m a j o r a c h i e v e m e n t . U n f o r t u n a t e l y it w a s n o t m a t c h e d b y
success o n the political front in the north, w h e r e the factionalism,
b o t h a m o n g the o l d party leaders a n d w i t h i n the army, continued
to g r o w . T o help put an end to the discontent, N u m a y r I ordered
the establishment o f a one-party system. T h e Sudan Socialist
U n i o n ( S S U ) , patterned o n the E g y p t i a n A r a b Socialist U n i o n ,
h e l d i t s first c o n f e r e n c e i n 1 9 7 2 . T h i s c o n f e r e n c e a d o p t e d a
national charter as its political m a n i f e s t o a l o n g t h e lines o f N a s i r ' s
A r a b socialism.
T h e n e x t three years w i t n e s s e d a series o f attempted c o u p s
a g a i n s t t h e r e g i m e . S t u d e n t d e m o n s t r a t i o n s i n 1 9 7 3 w e r e t h e first
signs o f the g r o w i n g o p p o s i t i o n . I n S e p t e m b e r 1975 a n d J u l y 1976
the r e g i m e w a s able t o crush t w o c o u p s s u p p o r t e d b y the militant
ansar. U n d e r l y i n g t h e s e c o u p s w a s a r e - e m e r g e n c e o f r e g i o n a l i s m .
1
N o r m a n O ' N e i l l , ' S u d a n ' , Middle East yearbook, 1980 ( L o n d o n , 1980), 223.
5 34

i
27 Libya.
L e s s - d e v e l o p e d regions like the w e s t b e g a n to use the presence

o f t h e i r m e n i n t h e a r m y s e r i o u s l y t o affect t h e p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m .
Libya
B y 1 9 4 4 t h e B r i t i s h h a d e s t a b l i s h e d t h e i r t h i r d a n d final o c c u p a t i o n
o f C y r e n a i c a after t h e d e f e a t o f R o m m e r s f o r c e s i n t h e d e s e r t . T h e
B r i t i s h h a d a l r e a d y set u p a m i l i t a r y a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n n e i g h
b o u r i n g T r i p o l i t a n i a , and m o v e s t o facilitate the i n t e g r a t i o n o f the
t w o territories had b e g u n . In the s o u t h - w e s t the Free F r e n c h
f o r c e s h a d o c c u p i e d t h e F e z z a n , after a n a d v a n c e f r o m t h e i r
headquarters near L a k e C h a d . F o l l o w i n g an a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n
the F r e n c h and the British military c o m m a n d e r s in J a n u a r y 1 9 4 3 ,
535

F r e n c h authority w a s e x t e n d e d c o n s i d e r a b l y n o r t h and east into

the Tripolitanian Sahara. T h e regions o f G h a t and G h a d a m i s , also
o c c u p i e d b y the F r e n c h w e r e , h o w e v e r , to be administered b y the
F r e n c h military authorities in the n e i g h b o u r i n g territories: G h a t
b y the F r e n c h in A l g e r i a and G h a d a m i s b y those in T u n i s i a .
W i t h the liberation o f the t w o northern p r o v i n c e s f r o m m o r e
t h a n 30 y e a r s o f I t a l i a n r u l e c a m e s t r o n g h o p e s o f i n d e p e n d e n c e .
A f t e r 22 y e a r s o f e x i l e i n E g y p t , t h e h e a d o f t h e p o w e r f u l
S a n u s i y y a r e l i g i o u s o r d e r in C y r e n a i c a , S a y y i d M u h a m m a d Idrls
al-SanusI, returned to the w i d e acclaim o f b o t h t o w n s m e n and
b e d u i n . B u t h i s s t a y w a s n o t t o last l o n g . H a v i n g r a i s e d a S a n u s I
force o f 10000 m e n w h i c h f o u g h t w i t h the British against the
Italians, he insisted that Britain r e c o g n i s e the i n d e p e n d e n c e o f
C y r e n a i c a a n d t h e c l a i m s o f t h e S a n u s I t o g o v e r n it. H e r e f u s e d
to return to C y r e n a i c a p e r m a n e n t l y until his d e m a n d s w e r e met,
a n d c o n t i n u e d t o agitate for i n d e p e n d e n c e , albeit in a f o r m that
w o u l d p e r m i t the British t o c o n t i n u e stationing t r o o p s in the
country.
T h e British F o r e i g n Office, h o w e v e r , had steadfastly refused to
c o m m i t itself to independence, either for Cyrenaica or for
Tripolitania, w h i c h s o m e o f Sayyid Idrls's y o u n g e r followers
h a d insisted b e i n c l u d e d as p a r t o f SanusI d e m a n d s . Instead,
British p o l i c y remained b o u n d to a statement m a d e b y the F o r e i g n
Secretary, A n t h o n y E d e n , in p a r l i a m e n t in J a n u a r y 1942, in w h i c h
h e s t a t e d s i m p l y t h a t ' H i s M a j e s t y ' s g o v e r n m e n t is d e t e r m i n e d
t h a t at t h e e n d o f t h e w a r t h e S a n u s l s i n C y r e n a i c a w i l l i n n o
c i r c u m s t a n c e s a g a i n fall u n d e r I t a l i a n d o m i n a t i o n . '
In Tripolitania, w h e r e liberation f r o m Italian rule had b r o u g h t
forth demands b o t h for immediate independence and for national
unification, the failure o f E d e n t o m e n t i o n T r i p o l i t a n i a in his
s t a t e m e n t l e d t o fears t h a t n a t i o n a l i s t c l a i m s w o u l d b e less
favourably received than those o f Cyrenaica. After a period o f
s e v e r e a g i t a t i o n , r i o t s a n d d e m o n s t r a t i o n s f r o m 1943 t o 1 9 4 5 , a n d
the formation o f several clandestine political clubs and organis
a t i o n s , a n u m b e r o f p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s e m e r g e d i n t h e late 1 9 4 0 s , o f
w h i c h the Nationalist Party ( a l - H i z b al-Watanl), the U n i t e d
N a t i o n a l F r o n t (al-Jabha al-Wataniya al-Muttahida) and the
Free N a t i o n a l B l o c (al-Kutla al-Wataniya al-Hurra) w e r e the
m o s t important. L e d mainly b y the urban notables and merchants
o f T r i p o l i , all t h e p a r t i e s f o r m e d a g r e e d o n t h e f u n d a m e n t a l
536

principles o f b o t h i n d e p e n d e n c e and unity. T h e i r m a i n differences

centred o n recognition o f SanusI claims to leadership once
i n d e p e n d e n c e w a s a c h i e v e d and o n the future state's f o r e i g n
policy.
B e h i n d Britain's reluctance to c o m m i t itself formally to inde
p e n d e n c e for either o r b o t h o f the p r o v i n c e s lay a g r o w i n g
realisation o f the strategic i m p o r t a n c e o f the territories and an
a w a r e n e s s o f p r o m i s e s m a d e t o its w a r t i m e a l l i e s . B o t h t h e U n i t e d
States a n d the S o v i e t U n i o n h a d c o m e t o h a v e ' i n t e r e s t s ' in the
future o f the L i b y a n territories. T h e Italians, in return for their
c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h the A l l i e d p o w e r s in the later stages o f the
S e c o n d W o r l d W a r , h o p e d t h a t at l e a s t s o m e o f t h e i r o v e r s e a s
c o l o n i e s , i n c l u d i n g L i b y a , w o u l d b e r e t u r n e d , o r at t h e v e r y l e a s t
t h a t t h e y w o u l d h a v e first c l a i m s t o a n y t r u s t e e s h i p s s e t u p i n t h e m .
T h e F r e n c h w e r e e a g e r t o p r e s e r v e their rule in the F e z z a n , G h a t
and G h a d a m i s in o r d e r t o create a link b e t w e e n their c o l o n i e s
further w e s t and in Central A f r i c a . T h e n e w l y f o r m e d A r a b
L e a g u e , s p e a k i n g l a r g e l y o n b e h a l f o f E g y p t , d e m a n d e d t h a t it
b e i n c l u d e d i n a n y p l a n s t o set u p a t r u s t e e s h i p i n t h e L i b y a n
t e r r i t o r i e s . F a c e d w i t h all t h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , B r i t i s h p o l i c y w a s
to p o s t p o n e a decision o n the future o f the three p r o v i n c e s until
a peace treaty w i t h Italy had b e e n s i g n e d and the Allies had a g r e e d
o n the disposition o f Italy's f o r m e r c o l o n i e s . M e a n w h i l e , Italian
l a w , w i t h s o m e m o d i f i c a t i o n s in C y r e n a i c a , w a s t o r e m a i n in f o r c e
in the p r o v i n c e s o c c u p i e d b y Britain.
T h e e l e c t i o n o f a L a b o u r g o v e r n m e n t t o p o w e r in Britain after
the w a r , and the g r o w i n g hostility b e t w e e n the western Allies and
t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , c o m p l i c a t e d n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r t h e final p e a c e
treaty. T h e n e w L a b o u r F o r e i g n Secretary, E r n e s t B e v i n , f a v o u r e d
g r a n t i n g immediate independence to the territories, but the S o v i e t
U n i o n p r o p o s e d that a joint Soviet-Italian administration be
f o r m e d in Tripolitania. T h e U n i t e d States c o u n t e r e d this b y
s u g g e s t i n g that the w h o l e c o u n t r y be placed under a U n i t e d
N a t i o n s Trusteeship for ten years, w h i l e the F r e n c h remained
o p p o s e d t o i n d e p e n d e n c e f o r fear t h a t t h i s m i g h t f u r t h e r e n c o u r a g e
rising nationalist sentiments in A l g e r i a a n d T u n i s i a . T h e d e a d l o c k
r e m a i n e d w h e n t h e A l l i e s finally s i g n e d a p e a c e t r e a t y w i t h I t a l y
in F e b r u a r y 1947. A t the time o f signature, h o w e v e r , Britain,
France, the U n i t e d States and the S o v i e t U n i o n declared their
intention o f c o n t i n u i n g negotiations o n the future o f the L i b y a n
537

territories. If n o a g r e e m e n t w e r e reached w i t h i n a year o f the treaty

c o m i n g i n t o effect, t h e m a t t e r w a s t o b e r e f e r r e d t o t h e G e n e r a l
A s s e m b l y o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . T h e four p o w e r s also stated their
9
intention to * accept the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n o f the G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y
a n d ' t o t a k e a p p r o p r i a t e m e a s u r e s f o r g i v i n g effect t o i t \
W h e n t h e G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y finally t o o k u p t h e i s s u e i n A p r i l
1 9 4 9 , it w a s s t a r t l e d t o h e a r t h a t B r i t a i n a n d I t a l y , s u p p o r t e d b y
the U n i t e d States had, in the m e a n t i m e , d r a w n u p a plan u n d e r
w h i c h L i b y a w a s t o b e c o m e i n d e p e n d e n t o n l y after a p e r i o d o f
ten years. Trusteeships w e r e to be granted to the British in
C y r e n a i c a , t o the Italians in T r i p o l i t a n i a a n d t o the F r e n c h in
F e z z a n . N e w s o f t h e B e v i n - S f o r z a p l a n ( n a m e d after B e v i n a n d
the Italian F o r e i g n Minister, C o u n t C a r l o Sforza) resulted in mass
demonstrations t h r o u g h o u t L i b y a and in other parts o f the A r a b
w o r l d . In Tripolitania, the Nationalist Party, the United National
F r o n t and several other parties united to f o r m the Tripolitanian
N a t i o n a l C o n g r e s s Party. Its aims w e r e t o defeat the plan and
forestall a n y further attempt to r e i m p o s e c o l o n i a l rule in L i b y a .
In M a y 1949 the G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y failed, b y o n e v o t e , t o secure
a t w o - t h i r d s majority in f a v o u r o f an Italian trusteeship o v e r
T r i p o l i t a n i a a n d a final r e s o l u t i o n i n f a v o u r o f t h e B e v i n - S f o r z a
p l a n w a s d e f e a t e d b y a v o t e o f 37 a g a i n s t 1 4 i n f a v o u r w i t h s e v e n
a b s t e n t i o n s . T w o w e e k s later, S a y y i d Idrls, w i t h the s u p p o r t o f
Britain, declared C y r e n a i c a an i n d e p e n d e n t state u n d e r a SanusI
e m i r a t e , t h o u g h B r i t a i n w a s t o r e t a i n c o n t r o l o v e r f o r e i g n affairs
a n d d e f e n c e . S i x m o n t h s l a t e r , o n 21 N o v e m b e r , t h e G e n e r a l
A s s e m b l y , b y a v o t e o f 48 t o o n e , w i t h n i n e a b s t e n t i o n s , a d o p t e d
a resolution that the three p r o v i n c e s o f L i b y a b e c o m e jointly an
i n d e p e n d e n t state n o later t h a n 1 J a n u a r y 1 9 5 2 . R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s
o f the local inhabitants w e r e to meet to f o r m a National A s s e m b l y
a n d t o d r a w u p a c o n s t i t u t i o n for the future state in c o n s u l t a t i o n
w i t h a U N c o m m i s s i o n e r appointed b y the G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y and
advised b y a ten-member council c o m p o s e d o f Britain, the United
States, France, Italy, E g y p t , Pakistan and four representatives
f r o m t h e L i b y a n t e r r i t o r i e s . O n 24 D e c e m b e r 1 9 5 1 , o n e w e e k
b e f o r e t h e final d e a d l i n e , L i b y a w a s d e c l a r e d a n i n d e p e n d e n t
s o v e r e i g n state a n d S a y y i d Idrls the n e w k i n g . Britain insisted
o n his rule, despite c o n s i d e r a b l e internal o p p o s i t i o n .
O n c e Libya w a s independent, t w o fundamental problems
presented t h e m s e l v e s : the need to transform the declaration o f
53»

national unity into reality and the n e e d to d e v e l o p a v i a b l e

e c o n o m y . W h i l e t h e l a t t e r p r o b l e m w a s , at least i n t h e o r y ,
o v e r c o m e w i t h the d i s c o v e r y o f oil in the m i d - 1 9 6 0 s , the p r o b l e m
o f u n i t y c o n t i n u e d t o p l a g u e t h e m o n a r c h y u n t i l it w a s o v e r t h r o w n
in 1 9 6 9 .
D e s p i t e their c o m m o n s t r u g g l e against the Italians, b o t h
Cyrenaica and Tripolitania retained a distinct identity, and each
j e a l o u s l y g u a r d e d its o w n p r e r o g a t i v e s . C y r e n a i c a w a s a n e t w o r k
o f tribal clans d o m i n a t e d b y the S a n u s i y y a . T h i s Sufi b r o t h e r h o o d
h a d b e e n f o u n d e d in 1837 b y an A l g e r i a n s c h o l a r , S a y y i d M u
h a m m a d ibn ' A H al-Sanus! al-ldrlsl. Originally based near M e c c a ,
t h e G r a n d S a n u s I , as h e w a s l a t e r t o b e c a l l e d , r e - e s t a b l i s h e d t h e
b r o t h e r h o o d ' s h e a d q u a r t e r s at a l - Z a w i y a a l - B a y d a ' o n t h e c e n t r a l
C y r e n a i c a n p l a t e a u i n 1843 after e n c o u n t e r i n g p o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t i o n
in A r a b i a . L a t e r the b r o t h e r h o o d ' s centre w a s m o v e d t o the
J a g h b u b O a s i s , o n the L i b y a n b o r d e r w i t h E g y p t , w h i c h s o o n
b e c a m e a centre o f l e a r n i n g in N o r t h A f r i c a , s e c o n d in i m p o r t a n c e
o n l y t o E g y p t ' s a l - A z h a r U n i v e r s i t y . L i k e m a n y o f its f e l l o w
orders t h r o u g h o u t the Islamic w o r l d , the S a n u s i y y a e s p o u s e d the
c a u s e o f t h e c o m m o n p e o p l e , h e l p i n g t o set u p ' s c h o o l s ,
caravanserai, commercial and social focal points, law courts,
1
b a n k s , s t o r e h o u s e s , p o o r h o u s e s a n d b u r i a l g r o u n d s ' , as w e l l as
c e n t r e s o f l e a r n i n g w h i c h a i m e d at b r i n g i n g t h e t e a c h i n g s o f I s l a m
to those often forgotten o r neglected b y the m o r e o r t h o d o x
' ulamd\
B u t w h i l e m o s t Sufi o r d e r s w e r e p r i m a r i l y r e l i g i o u s g r o u p i n g s ,
the S a n u s i y y a , like their c o u n t e r p a r t s , the W a h h a b I in A r a b i a ,
r a p i d l y b e c a m e i n v o l v e d i n p o l i t i c s as w e l l . U n d e r S a y y i d A h m a d
a l - S h a r i f , w h o h e a d e d t h e O r d e r f r o m 1 9 0 2 u n t i l h i s d e a t h at t h e
h a n d s o f the Italians in 1 9 3 3 , the S a n u s i y y a f o r m e d w h a t E v a n s -
Pritchard has called
an embryonic state. The Head of the Order was by this time less the religious
Head of an Islamic fraternity than the leading representative of a nascent
nationalism which became increasingly conscious of itself in the long struggle
against the Italians... The Order became more and more a political organisation
which directed, administratively, economically, and militarily, the entire
Bedouin population, and morally the entire population of Cyrenaica, Bedouin
2
and townsmen alike, against the common enemy.
1
M i c h a e l G i l s e n a n , Saint and sufi in modern Egypt: an essay in the sociology of religion
( O x f o r d , 1973), 4.
2
E . E . E v a n s - P r i t c h a r d , The Sanussi of Cyrenaica ( O x f o r d , 1949), 228.
539

T h e military defeat o f SanusI resistance to Italian c o l o n i s a t i o n , the

d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e S a n u s I l o d g e s a n d t h e b a n i s h m e n t o f its
s h a y k h s , o n l y served to increase the i m p o r t a n c e o f the head o f
t h e O r d e r as a s y m b o l b o t h o f r e l i g i o u s i d e n t i t y a n d o f p o l i t i c a l
resistance. W h e n the British o c c u p i e d Cyrenaica, the decision to
resurrect the SanusI emir and to restore tribal rule f o u n d w i d e
support t h r o u g h o u t Cyrenaica. Tripolitania, o n the other hand,
w a s far m o r e u r b a n i s e d a n d s e t t l e d . It c o n t a i n e d a b o u t t w o - t h i r d s
o f the p o p u l a t i o n o f the n e w state, the better part o f the arable
l a n d , a n d a l o n g h i s t o r y o f c o m m e r c e w i t h t h e w e s t as w e l l as w i t h
s u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a a n d the A r a b east. M o r e c l o s e l y a k i n t o
n e i g h b o u r i n g T u n i s i a a n d A l g e r i a , it h a d a l a r g e B e r b e r m i n o r i t y ,
a n d a b o u t 30000 I t a l i a n s w h o h a d c h o s e n t o s t a y o n d e s p i t e t h e
Italian w i t h d r a w a l . R e n t b y political factionalism and rivalries
a m o n g the urban merchants and notables, Tripolitania had taken
the b r u n t o f Italian settlement and had o n l y reluctantly a g r e e d t o
s u p p o r t S a y y i d M u h a m m a d I d r l s as k i n g o f a u n i t e d L i b y a f o r
fear o f the Italians c o m i n g b a c k . I n r e t u r n for their s u p p o r t t h e y
d e m a n d e d a centralised f o r m o f g o v e r n m e n t under w h i c h the
m o n a r c h w o u l d share p o w e r w i t h a democratically elected
parliament.
T h e third p r o v i n c e , the F e z z a n , possessed only a b o u t 40000
inhabitants, d i v i d e d b e t w e e n a n e g r o i d p o p u l a t i o n and the
n o m a d i c T u a r e g . C u t o f f f r o m t h e s e a b y t h e d e s e r t o n all s i d e s ,
its l i n k s w e r e m a i n l y w i t h t h e A f r i c a n s t a t e s t o t h e s o u t h a n d w e s t
( w h i c h like the F e z z a n had been o c c u p i e d b y the F r e n c h ) .
T h e final v e r s i o n o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n , w h i c h w a s a p p r o v e d b y
the n e w l y f o r m e d N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y ten w e e k s prior to indepen
dence, established a federal system o f g o v e r n m e n t under w h i c h
e a c h o f t h e p r o v i n c e s h a d its o w n g o v e r n o r , a p p o i n t e d b y t h e
k i n g , an E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l , w h o s e m e m b e r s w e r e appointed or
dismissed b y the k i n g o n the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n o f the g o v e r n o r ,
and a Legislative A s s e m b l y w h i c h c o u l d also be dissolved b y the
k i n g o n the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n o f the c h i e f o f the E x e c u t i v e
C o u n c i l a n d after c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h t h e g o v e r n o r . W h i l e t h e
federal g o v e r n m e n t retained the right to legislate and execute
matters concerning foreign policy, defence and national finance,
the p r o v i n c e s retained s t r o n g p o w e r s in matters o f taxation, trade,
civil, c o m m e r c i a l and criminal l a w , education and the Press.
It w a s a situation w h i c h pleased the C y r e n a i c a n s a n d the
540

Fezzanese w h o feared that a m o r e integrated s y s t e m w o u l d result

in d o m i n a t i o n b y T r i p o l i t a n i a ; b u t it w a s b i t t e r l y o p p o s e d b y l a r g e
sections o f p u b l i c o p i n i o n in the w e s t e r n p r o v i n c e . O p p o s i t i o n
in t h a t p r o v i n c e b e c a m e e v e n m o r e i n t e n s e w h e n , w i t h i n t h e first
t w o m o n t h s o f independence, the Tripolitanian National C o n g r e s s
P a r t y w a s d i s s o l v e d a n d its l e a d e r , B a s h i r S a ' d a w l , w a s d e p o r t e d
t o E g y p t after c h a r g i n g t h a t e l e c t i o n s t o t h e h o u s e o f r e p r e s e n
t a t i v e s h a d b e e n m a n i p u l a t e d b y officials o f t h e f e d e r a l g o v e r n
ment. M a s s d e m o n s t r a t i o n s against the election results b r o k e o u t
in T r i p o l i i n F e b r u a r y 1 9 5 2 a n d w e r e b r u t a l l y p u t d o w n b y t h e
p o l i c e . I t w a s a p a t t e r n w h i c h w a s t o r e c u r after all p a r t i e s h a d
b e e n e f f e c t i v e l y b a n n e d b y t h e k i n g d u r i n g t h e first y e a r o f
i n d e p e n d e n c e . T h r o u g h o u t the 1950s and the 1960s, d e m o n s t r a
tions challenged the m o n a r c h ' s rule and they continued, despite
t h e e n a c t m e n t o f a n a m e n d m e n t t o t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o n 15 A p r i l
1953. T h e a m e n d m e n t d i s s o l v e d the federal system and replaced
it b y a m o r e c e n t r a l i s e d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n u n d e r w h i c h t h e c o u n t r y
w a s divided into administrative units subject to the control o f the
Minister o f the Interior. In O c t o b e r 1964 parliament w a s d i s s o l v e d
following widespread rioting and demonstrations against the
A m e r i c a n and British roles in L i b y a . A n e w l y elected parliament,
the fourth since i n d e p e n d e n c e , w a s d i s s o l v e d b y the k i n g the
f o l l o w i n g F e b r u a r y . E l e c t i o n s w e r e again held in M a y 1 9 6 5 , b u t
b y this time the n u m b e r o f v o t i n g c o n s t i t u e n c i e s h a d b e e n
r e d u c e d f r o m 103 t o 9 1 . S i x t e e n c a n d i d a t e s w e r e r e t u r n e d
u n o p p o s e d a n d t h e r e m a i n i n g 75 e l e c t e d m e m b e r s w e r e all
pro-government.
F o r the remaining period o f monarchical rule, the c o u n t r y w a s
torn b y the centrifugal rivalry o f the p r o v i n c e s , electoral disputes,
conflict within the R o y a l D i w a n , and disagreements b o t h w i t h i n
and outside the cabinet c o n c e r n i n g the p o w e r s o f the k i n g . W i t h
elections offering o n l y a c h o i c e o f a candidate and n o t o f
p r o g r a m m e , v o t e s w e r e cast a c c o r d i n g to tribal, family and
personal loyalties. Parliamentary deputies tended to put local
interests a b o v e national o n e s and clandestine o p p o s i t i o n m o v e
ments g r e w increasingly active. Mass demonstrations organised by
Ba'athists, various Marxist g r o u p s and w o r k e r s ' organisations
w e r e p u t d o w n b y f o r c e i n 1 9 6 2 a n d 1 9 6 4 , a n d i n 1 9 6 7 after t h e S i x -
D a y Arab-Israeli war. T r a d e unions were dissolved and students
a r r e s t e d at t h e v e r y t i m e t h a t t h e i r c o u n t e r p a r t s i n E g y p t a n d
54i

e l s e w h e r e in N o r t h Africa w e r e g a i n i n g n e w rights under socialist

regimes. B y the autumn o f 1969, the m o v e m e n t led b y C o l o n e l
M u ' a m m a r al-Qadhdhâfï (Gadafi) and the Free Officers w a s b u t
o n e o f several g r o u p s secretly w o r k i n g t o o v e r t h r o w the regime.
Q a d h d h â f ï ' s success w a s m a d e possible b y the d i s c o v e r y o f oil in
L i b y a a n d t h e rise o f a t i n y , b u t i n f l u e n t i a l , m i d d l e c l a s s c o m p o s e d
o f technicians, urban tradesmen and civil servants.
Until the discovery o f oil, the country w a s o n e o f the poorest
in the w o r l d . T h e d e c i m a t i o n o f the b e d u i n p o p u l a t i o n a n d o f
t h e i r h e r d s b y t h e I t a l i a n s w a s a m a j o r c a u s e o f t h i s , as w a s t h e
appallingly l o w level o f educational, medical and social services
p r o v i d e d for the native p o p u l a t i o n under Fascist rule. B y 1951
Libya had only four preparatory and secondary schools with a
t o t a l e n r o l m e n t o f 300 p u p i l s . T h e 1 9 5 4 c e n s u s s h o w e d t h a t 83
p e r cent o f the p o p u l a t i o n w a s illiterate. T h e w a r , in w h i c h the
c o u n t r y h a d s e e n s o m e o f t h e fiercest b a t t l e s r e c o r d e d i n m o d e r n
h i s t o r y , left m u c h o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n h o m e l e s s a n d i n a s t a t e o f
d i s e a s e a n d s t a r v a t i o n . T h e a v e r a g e life e x p e c t a n c y w a s little m o r e
t h a n 30 y e a r s . P e r c a p i t a i n c o m e w a s a b o u t $35 a y e a r ; b y 1 9 6 2 ,
d e s p i t e a n e s t i m a t e d e i g h t - f o l d i n c r e a s e , it still s t o o d a t u n d e r $ 2 7 0
a y e a r . B y 1 9 6 5 , a s t h e o i l b e g a n t o flow i n , e x p o r t e a r n i n g s r o s e
six-fold to £ 8 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 ; b y 1969 they totalled m o r e than 770
million dinars, just u n d e r £900 million. A l t h o u g h the g o v e r n m e n t
w a s m a k i n g a n effort t o r e d i s t r i b u t e s o m e o f t h i s n e w i n c o m e , a n d
to p r o v i d e better education and social services, the bulk o f the
profits w e r e drained o v e r s e a s t h r o u g h the foreign oil c o m p a n i e s
o p e r a t i n g o n L i b y a n soil. R a p i d l y increasing inflation c u t into
i n c o m e and L i b y a w a s b e c o m i n g w h a t R é m y L e v e a u has called
1
' a c a r i c a t u r e o f a c o n s u m e r s o c i e t y ' . A s t h e r u r a l p o o r fled t h e
d i s m a l c o n d i t i o n s p r e v a i l i n g in t h e c o u n t r y s i d e , t h e rate o f
u r b a n i s a t i o n increased d r a m a t i c a l l y : in t h e 1960s the p o p u l a t i o n
o f b o t h T r i p o l i a n d B e n g h a z i g r e w at a r o u n d s e v e n p e r c e n t p e r
y e a r , t w i c e as fast as t h e p o p u l a t i o n as a w h o l e .
Abroad, Algeria, Tunisia, M o r o c c o , Chad and Niger had
b e c o m e independent ; G a m a l 'A b d al-Nâsir had b e c o m e the hero
o f the A r a b s a n d o f the T h i r d W o r l d ; the Palestinians w e r e
b e c o m i n g a n e w and p o w e r f u l force in w o r l d politics. Isolated
from Africa, A s i a a n d the A r a b w o r l d b y their g o v e r n m e n t ' s
1
R é m y Leveau, ' L e Système politique libyen i n La Libye nouvelle : rupture et continuité
( P a r i s , 1975), 85.
542

pro-western policies and increasingly aware o f the potential p o w e r

their oil w e a l t h c o u l d b r i n g , L i b y a n s g r e w m o r e a n d m o r e
impatient. T h e political system w a s unable to cope. A s L e v e a u
explained i t : ' T h e administration f o u n d itself r e d u c e d t o its
d i s t r i b u t i v e f u n c t i o n , a n d this created m o r e frustration a m o n g
precisely those w h o had benefited. T h i s incapacity o f the L i b y a n
political system explains the collapse o f the m o n a r c h y and the
1
relatively easy installation o f the n e w r e g i m e /
C o l o n e l M u ' a m m a r al-Qadhdhaf! and the Free Officers t o o k
p o w e r i n a b l o o d l e s s c o u p o n i S e p t e m b e r 1 9 6 9 , a l t h o u g h it w a s
n o t u n t i l a l m o s t t w o w e e k s l a t e r t h a t Q a d h d h a f l w a s i d e n t i f i e d as
the head o f the g o v e r n m e n t a n d o f the a r m e d f o r c e s ; the names
o f the twelve members o f the Revolutionary C o m m a n d Council
w e r e n o t a n n o u n c e d until the f o l l o w i n g D e c e m b e r . K i n g Idrls,
w h o w a s i n T u r k e y at t h e t i m e , r e f u s e d t o a b d i c a t e b u t e v e n t u a l l y
accepted exile in E g y p t . W i t h the w e s t e r n p o w e r s e a g e r t o retain
their g o o d w i l l in a state that w a s n o w e x c e e d i n g l y w e a l t h y a n d
w h o s e o i l supplies w e r e vitally i m p o r t a n t as s h o r t a g e s g r e w m o r e
imminent, foreign recognition quickly followed.
O f the twelve members o f the R C C , only ' U m a r ' A b d Allah
a l - M a h a ' i s h l c a m e f r o m a relatively well-off f a m i l y ; his father w a s
a provincial administrator under the o l d regime and o f the
Circassian T u r k i s h stock w h i c h had ruled E g y p t during the time
o f t h e O t t o m a n e m p i r e . H e w a s l a t e r t o d e f e c t t o E g y p t after
allegedly attempting to overthrow Qadhdhafl. A b u Bakr Y u n u s
and M u h a m m a d A b u B a k r al-Mgarief, w h o w a s killed in a
m o t o r accident in A u g u s t 1 9 7 2 , c a m e from important t r i b e s -
Y u n u s f r o m a tribe o f the Aujila Oasis in C h a d w h i c h h a d
emigrated to Libya and al-Mgarief from the Maghariba, one o f
the nine Sa'adI tribes o f the B a n u S u l a y m . T h e remainder c a m e
from m i n o r tribes a n d p o o r e r families. Several, i n c l u d i n g Q a d h
d h a f l , c a m e f r o m oases in t h e interior w h e r e , as R u t h First has
n o t e d , ' they w e r e the country's second-class citizens, the children
o f n o m a d s o r l o w l y c u l t i v a t o r s w h o w e r e b o r n i n t h e last d a y s
2
o f the Italian o c c u p a t i o n ' .
O w i n g n o specific allegiance t o a n y o f the m o r e n o b l e tribes
or to the urban notables o f any o f the three provinces, the R C C
at its i n c e p t i o n w a s s e e n t o r e p r e s e n t t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e c o u n t r y
1
L e v e a u , ' L e S y s t e m e p o l i t i q u e ' , 84-5.
2
R u t h F i r s t , Libya: the elusive revolution ( H a r m o n d s w o r t h , 1974), 1 1 5 .
543

as a w h o l e . I n a r a d i o b r o a d c a s t t o t h e n a t i o n o n t h e m o r n i n g o f
the c o u p the R C C labelled the o l d r e g i m e 'reactionary a n d
d e c a d e n t . . . a hotbed o f extortion, faction, treachery and treason \
It d e c l a r e d L i b y a a ' f r e e , s e l f - g o v e r n i n g r e p u b l i c \ a n d p r o m i s e d
freedom, unity and social justice. T h e statement added that the
c o u p w a s ' i n n o sense directed against a n y state w h a t e v e r , n o r
against international agreements o r recognised international law \
Aside from the bulk o f the armed forces, the n e w regime
d e r i v e d its m a i n s u p p o r t f r o m t h o s e s e c t i o n s o f t h e m i d d l e c l a s s ,
many o f them civil servants and technicians, w h o had been
d e m a n d i n g a larger role for the country in determining matters
concerning oil prices and production, and a m o r e p r o - A r a b
foreign policy. T h e i r support explains the regime's subsequent
s u c c e s s i n c a r r y i n g t h r o u g h its n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n o f t h e o i l s e c t o r ,
and the adoption o f a w i d e - r a n g i n g d e v e l o p m e n t p r o g r a m m e
concentrated o n agriculture, the infrastructure and the social
services.
In addition, the n e w regime received the whole-hearted support
o f w h a t Y o l a n d e M a r t i n has d e s c r i b e d as t h e e m b r y o n i c class o f
petite bourgeoisie a n d t h o s e w h o c o n s t i t u t e d a r u r a l a n d u r b a n
1
lumpenproletariat, w h o s e employment w a s sporadic because the
p e t r o l e u m industry c o u l d o n l y absorb a certain n u m b e r o f
w o r k e r s for a specified time. O n c e the construction w o r k w a s
finished, these w o r k e r s w e n t b a c k t o the cities, w h e r e they often
c o u l d find n o e m p l o y m e n t . T h e y f o r m e d , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e s m a l l
emigre p e a s a n t r y a n d t h e p o o r b e d u i n s , t h e c l a s s o f p e o p l e w h o
inhabited the slums w h i c h s u r r o u n d e d the large cities. T h i s class
even n o w has v e r y f e w political defenders.
D e s p i t e this s u p p o r t , t h e n e w r e g i m e w a s careful t o e m p h a s i s e
its d i s a v o w a l o f t h e c l a s s s t r u g g l e a n d o f c l a s s d i s t i n c t i o n s . T h e
n e w r e g i m e w a s t o b e based o n the t w i n pillars o f Islam a n d o f
A r a b nationalism. A l c o h o l w a s banned, E n g l i s h disappeared from
street signs a n d h o a r d i n g s , a n d w e s t e r n advisers a n d consultants
were replaced b y A r a b s . British troops w e r e asked to leave and
the g i a n t A m e r i c a n air base at W h e e l u s F i e l d near T r i p o l i , t h e
largest air base outside the U S , w a s closed. Political parties, save
f o r t h e A r a b S o c i a l i s t U n i o n o f L i b y a , w h i c h w a s m o d e l l e d after
that o f E g y p t , w e r e banned. T h e natural resources o f the c o u n t r y
1
Y o l a n d e M a r t i n , ' L a L i b y e d e 1919 a 1969', La Libye nouvelle, 48-9.
544

were to be mobilised for the struggle against imperialism and the

d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e A r a b n a t i o n as a w h o l e .
I n a s p e e c h d e l i v e r e d t o t h e L i b y a n p u b l i c o n 15 A p r i l 1 9 7 3 ,
President Q a d h d h a f i a n n o u n c e d the b e g i n n i n g o f a n e w cultural
r e v o l u t i o n in w h i c h the p o p u l a r masses w e r e invited t o take p o w e r
at all l e v e l s o f g o v e r n m e n t t h r o u g h t h e f o r m a t i o n o f p o p u l a r
committees. T h e population w a s to be mobilised into armed
militia, the b u r e a u c r a c y a n d administration dismantled a n d the
c e n t r e s o f i n f o r m a t i o n t u r n e d o v e r t o t h e p e o p l e . O n e m o n t h later,
Q a d h d h a f i outlined his ' T h i r d International T h e o r y ' w h i c h he
d e s c r i b e d as ' a n a l t e r n a t i v e t o c a p i t a l i s t m a t e r i a l i s m a n d C o m
m u n i s t a t h e i s m ' . It w a s a f o r m o f d i r e c t d e m o c r a c y , as h e m a d e a n
effort t o e x p l a i n i n h i s Green Book, t h e first p a r t o f w h i c h w a s
published in 1976. O n 2 M a r c h 1 9 7 7 a N a t i o n a l C o n g r e s s w a s held
in S e b h a ; s o m e 1000 d e l e g a t e s c h o s e n b y t h e p e o p l e ' s c o m m i t t e e s ,
professional associations and trade unions attended to w o r k o u t
the details o f a n e w political s y s t e m a n d t o select n e w secretaries
w h o w o u l d supervise the reformed ministries. L i b y a adopted a
n e w name, the Socialist People's L i b y a n A r a b Jamahiriyah, w h i c h
t h e g o v e r n m e n t d e f i n e d a s a p e o p l e ' s state.
A l t h o u g h the L i b y a n revolution managed to survive several
attempted c o u p s , i n c l u d i n g o n e in the s u m m e r o f 1970 led b y ' A b d
A l l a h ' A b i d al-SanusI, ' U m a r al-Shalhl and other m e m b e r s o f the
o l d r e g i m e , t h e c r e a t i o n o f t h e p o p u l a r c o m m i t t e e s at t h e e x p e n s e
o f the A r a b Socialist U n i o n , the a r m i n g o f the militia - reportedly
against the wishes o f some o f the m o r e professional army
officers - a n d t h e m o v e t o s t r e n g t h e n ties w i t h t h e d e v e l o p i n g
countries reflected the g o v e r n m e n t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o repel a n y
attempts, internal o r external, t o o v e r t h r o w the r e g i m e .
A l t h o u g h the c o u n t r y ' s e c o n o m i c links w i t h the U n i t e d States
had i m p r o v e d b y the latter part o f the 1970s, the g o v e r n m e n t and
t h e p o p u l a t i o n w e r e still a w a r e o f v i v i d n e w s p a p e r a c c o u n t s o f
U S plans t o i n v a d e L i b y a n oil-fields f o l l o w i n g the oil e m b a r g o
o f 1973 and early 1974. T h e defection o f ' U m a r al-Maha'ishl, then
the Minister o f Planning, dissension within the R e v o l u t i o n a r y
C o m m a n d C o u n c i l o v e r t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e L i b y a n s t a t e (as
o p p o s e d t o the A r a b r e v o l u t i o n ) and student riots in B e n g h a z i
a n d T r i p o l i w e r e s i g n s o f i n t e r n a l d i s c o n t e n t as w e l l .
545

I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E L A T I O N S
Effpt
B y t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r E g y p t h a d a l r e a d y e m e r g e d as a l e a d i n g
M i d d l e E a s t e r n p o w e r , c h e c k e d o n l y b y I r a q w h i c h , as t h e o n e
recognised independent A r a b state, a t t e m p t e d to assume
l e a d e r s h i p o f all A r a b states. B u t E g y p t ' s g e o g r a p h i c a l p o s i t i o n ,
especially o n a c c o u n t o f b o t h the size o f her p o p u l a t i o n and the
S u e z C a n a l , dictated her cardinal role in her relations w i t h w e s t e r n
and eastern p o w e r s . E g y p t ' s i m p o r t a n c e w a s further emphasised
by her cultural pre-eminence and the establishment o f the A r a b
L e a g u e in C a i r o in 1944. F r o m that time o n E g y p t ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y
e x e r t e d i n c r e a s i n g i n f l u e n c e in t h e r e g i o n . H e r military
c o m m i t m e n t s d u r i n g the 1 9 4 8 - 9 w a r against Israel, and her
struggle to contain Zionist/Israeli expansion (although unsuc
cessful until 1973) g a i n e d E g y p t the role o f A r a b leadership.
Indeed, b y 1957, E g y p t had b e c o m e the principal s p o k e s m a n
for, and foreign p o l i c y p a c e m a k e r in, the A r a b M i d d l e East.
D u r i n g t h e 1940s a n d e a r l y 1 9 5 0 s t h e p r i n c i p a l f o r e i g n - p o l i c y
objective remained the r e m o v a l o f British forces from E g y p t i a n
t e r r i t o r y . T h u s , i n 1 9 4 6 , as w e l l as after t h e c o u p o f 195 2, E g y p t i a n
leaders s o u g h t n e w , o r revised, treaty arrangements w i t h G r e a t
Britain. F u r t h e r m o r e E g y p t ' s participation in the A r a b - I s r a e l i
w a r o f 1 9 4 8 - 9 inextricably i n v o l v e d her in the d e v e l o p m e n t o f
this c o n t i n u i n g c o n f l i c t . I n d e e d , s h e b e c a m e t h e p r i n c i p a l p r o
t a g o n i s t in t h e A r a b - I s r a e l i c o n f r o n t a t i o n .
Y e t , until 1955, E g y p t remained closely linked to the w e s t e r n
p o w e r s . O n l y the vicissitudes o f the C o l d W a r and the shortsighted
and rigid foreign p o l i c y o f the U n i t e d States o f A m e r i c a - w h i c h
d e m a n d e d close military and political association in return for
e c o n o m i c benefits - e v e n t u a l l y c a u s e d G a m a l ' A b d al-Nasir t o g i v e
his s u p p o r t t o t h e n o n - a l i g n e d T h i r d W o r l d b l o c , t o t u r n t o t h e
S o v i e t U n i o n for military aid, denied b y the U n i t e d States because
o f its c o m m i t m e n t s t o I s r a e l , a n d t o r e c o g n i s e t h e P e o p l e ' s
R e p u b l i c o f C h i n a in 1 9 5 6 , w h i l e c o n t i n u i n g E g y p t ' s c l o s e
e c o n o m i c relations w i t h western p o w e r s . G r e a t Britain, the U S A ,
W e s t G e r m a n y a n d F r a n c e , in s p i t e o f g r e a t p o l i t i c a l a n d
diplomatic differences, remained E g y p t ' s principal trading part
ners t h r o u g h o u t N a s i r ' s rule.
546

I n h i s Philosophy of the revolution, N a s i r d e v e l o p e d t h e n o t i o n

o f three intersecting circles e n c o m p a s s i n g the A r a b , Islamic and
African W o r l d s respectively. In these three w o r l d s , Nasir be
lieved, E g y p t ' s role s h o u l d lie. E g y p t , in her relations w i t h
those countries outside these circles, should pursue a policy o f
non-alignment, and certainly non-military c o m m i t m e n t . H i s aim
w a s t o steer clear o f t h e C o l d W a r . I n this pursuit N a s i r w a s
consistent. But, g i v e n the nature o f the C o l d W a r and his conflict
w i t h Israel, h e w a s forced t o d e p e n d increasingly o n the eastern
bloc t o obtain military aid a n d e c o n o m i c assistance.
In the early days o f the revolution, the R e v o l u t i o n a r y C o u n c i l
had f e w , if any, notions o f i d e o l o g y o r any p r o g r a m m e relating
t o f o r e i g n affairs. S i t u a t i o n s , h o w e v e r , d i c t a t e d i t s p o l i c y , m a k i n g
t h e r e g i m e ' p r a g m a t i s t ' , o r a t least o p p o r t u n i s t . I t s e i z e d , i n t e r m s
o f national interests, those opportunities w h i c h w o u l d enhance
E g y p t ' s r e g i o n a l as w e l l a s g l o b a l r o l e . T h e 1 9 5 4 n e g o t i a t i o n
securing Britain's w i t h d r a w a l f r o m E g y p t heralded the latter's
true independence and confirmed her leadership o f the A r a b
W o r l d . N a s i r t h e n s e t a b o u t e s t a b l i s h i n g h i m s e l f as c h a m p i o n o f
the anti-colonial s t r u g g l e . T h i s d e v e l o p m e n t b r o u g h t E g y p t into
direct collaboration w i t h the S o v i e t U n i o n and emphasised the
reality o f her o w n i n d e p e n d e n c e . T h e principal focus o f N a s i r ' s
f o r e i g n p o l i c y o f c o u r s e remained his relations w i t h Israel.
A l t h o u g h i n t h e first y e a r s o f t h e r e v o l u t i o n h e h a d t r i e d
n e g o t i a t i n g w i t h I s r a e l , t h e l a t t e r ' s i n t r a n s i g e n c e a n d its i n v o l v e
m e n t in the a b o r t i v e A n g l o - F r e n c h i n v a s i o n o f the S u e z Canal
after N a s i r h a d n a t i o n a l i s e d it i n 1 9 5 6 , l e d t o o p e n c o n f r o n t a t i o n .
A l t h o u g h t h e U S A as w e l l a s t h e U S S R h a d o p p o s e d t h e t r i p a r t i t e
i n v a s i o n , it w a s t o t h e l a t t e r w o r l d p o w e r t h a t N a s i r n o w t u r n e d
f o r s u p p o r t . A s a r e s u l t o f t h e i n v a s i o n N a s i r e m e r g e d as t h e
c h a m p i o n o f A r a b nationalism and the anti-colonial a n d anti-Israeli
s t r u g g l e . F u r t h e r m o r e , I r a q h a d l o n g l o s t a n y c l a i m it h a d t o
leadership o f the A r a b W o r l d .
W h i l e c h a m p i o n i n g A r a b unity, E g y p t ' s radical stance b r o u g h t
t h e c o u n t r y i n t o c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h c o n s e r v a t i v e r e g i m e s s u c h as
that o f Saudi A r a b i a . In p u r s u a n c e o f the g o a l o f A r a b unity, N a s i r
persuaded Syria t o join E g y p t in a United A r a b R e p u b l i c in 1958.
T h e union w a s short lived since the Syrians resented E g y p t ' s
a t t e m p t s t o d o m i n a t e it a n d s e c e d e d i n 1 9 6 1 . E v e n s o , N a s i r d i d
n o t l o s e h i s r o l e as l e a d e r o f t h e A r a b W o r l d a n d d i d n o t c e a s e
547

to strive for A r a b unity. E g y p t ' s n e w radical stance presented her

w i t h a d i l e m m a . W h i l e p u r s u i n g t h e g o a l o f A r a b u n i t y , s h e felt
o b l i g e d t o o p p o s e A r a b r e g i m e s s u c h as t h a t o f S a u d i A r a b i a .
E g y p t ' s m i l i t a r y i n v o l v e m e n t o n t h e s i d e o f t h e r a d i c a l f o r c e s in
the Y e m e n civil w a r further e x p o s e d the contradictions inherent
in h e r f o r e i g n p o l i c y g o a l s . A l t h o u g h s h e w a s r e c e i v i n g c o n s i d
erable aid f r o m the U S S R , o n w h i c h she w a s b e c o m i n g i n c r e a s i n g l y
d e p e n d e n t , s h e still r e q u i r e d f u r t h e r l a r g e - s c a l e finance f o r h e r
a m b i t i o u s d e v e l o p m e n t projects, and this the c o n s e r v a t i v e oil-rich
G u l f states c o u l d p r o v i d e . B u t i d e o l o g i c a l l y s h e h a d p l a c e d h e r s e l f
i n a c o r n e r . H e r i n t e r v e n t i o n in Y e m e n a l i e n a t e d h e r f r o m t h e G u l f
states, w a s d i v i s i v e o f the A r a b W o r l d and tied d o w n her military
f o r c e s as w e l l as d i v e r t i n g p r e c i o u s e c o n o m i c r e s o u r c e s n e e d e d
f o r h e r o w n d e v e l o p m e n t . B y 1965 t h e r e w e r e w e l l o v e r 7 5 0 0 0
E g y p t i a n s o l d i e r s fighting in Y e m e n a g a i n s t t h e S a u d i - s u p p o r t e d
I m a m M u h a m m a d al-Badr.
T h i s i m b r o g l i o r e s u l t e d in N a s i r l o s i n g h i s g r i p as a P a n - A r a b
leader. O t h e r forces had entered the A r a b political arena, chal
l e n g i n g h i s a u t h o r i t y : B a ' a t h i s m , t h e P a l e s t i n i a n m o v e m e n t , as
w e l l as t h e S a u d i g o v e r n m e n t . W h e n in 1 9 6 6 I s r a e l s u c c e e d e d in
attacking Syria and Jordan w i t h o u t credible E g y p t i a n military
action, President Nasir w a s largely b l a m e d for failing to thwart
Israeli m i l i t a r y m i g h t . R e a c t i n g t o t h i s s i t u a t i o n N a s i r p r o d u c e d
a s h o w o f force b y c l o s i n g the Straits o f T i r a n and d e m a n d i n g
the w i t h d r a w a l o f the U N E m e r g e n c y F o r c e f r o m Sinai. Israel's
reaction w a s totally u n e x p e c t e d . O n 5 J u n e 1967 the Israeli
D e f e n c e F o r c e d e s t r o y e d m o s t o f E g y p t ' s air f o r c e a n d f o l l o w e d
u p w i t h a Blitzkrieg o n t h e g r o u n d a g a i n s t t h e p r i n c i p a l A r a b
a r m i e s o f E g y p t , S y r i a a n d J o r d a n , all o f w h i c h w e r e s e v e r e l y
defeated.
T h e i m m e d i a t e effect o f t h i s d e b a c l e w a s t h e r e - e n t r y i n t o t h e
r e g i o n o f the U S A , w h i l e the U S S R immediately re-armed her
c l i e n t states. T h e U S A , h o w e v e r , b e c a m e , w i t h t a c i t S o v i e t
support, the principal force in search o f a political solution o f the
A r a b - I s r a e l i conflict. M o r e o v e r , E g y p t ' s adherence to the U N
R e s o l u t i o n 242 (22 N o v e m b e r 1 9 6 7 ) w h i c h i m p l i c i t l y r e c o g n i s e d
Israel's right t o exist, m a r k e d a radical n e w d e p a r t u r e in E g y p t ' s
foreign policy. A l t h o u g h subsequently a ' w a r o f attrition' broke
out d u r i n g 1969 and 1970, m o s t l y o v e r the S u e z Canal, the U N
and other western p o w e r s pursued avenues for a peaceful
548

settlement. A n d w h e n b y the s u m m e r o f 1970, the Palestinian

g u e r r i l l a f o r c e s c l a s h e d w i t h t h e J o r d a n i a n m i l i t a r y , it h a d b e c o m e
clear that the A r a b - I s r a e l i conflict had to be resolved. A l t h o u g h
still h e a v i l y d e p e n d e n t o n t h e U S S R , E g y p t ' s p r e v i o u s t o u g h
a n t i - U S s t a n c e w a s d r o p p e d in f a v o u r o f o n e s e e k i n g a c t i v e U S
i n v o l v e m e n t in t h e a r e a , as w e l l as d i p l o m a t i c a c c o m m o d a t i o n .
N a s i r ' s s u d d e n d e a t h in S e p t e m b e r 1 9 7 0 a n d A n w a r S a d a t ' s
succession m a r k e d the return to a principally E g y p t i a n - c e n t r e d
rather than a Pan-Arab-centred foreign policy.
A l t h o u g h N a s i r h a d set t h e n e w t r e n d in p o l i c y , it w a s S a d a t
w h o s u b s e q u e n t l y i m p l e m e n t e d it. A f t e r t h e c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f h i s
p o w e r base, he suddenly expelled S o v i e t military and technical
a d v i s e r s in 1 9 7 2 , p r o n o u n c e d t h e infitdh, o r e c o n o m i c o p e n d o o r ,
policy w h i c h w a s designed to attract foreign, especially western,
investors, and reached rapprochement w i t h the conservative A r a b
G u l f states. I n d e e d it w a s t h e y w h o s u p p o r t e d S a d a t ' s m i l i t a r y
s t r a t e g y b y o f f e r i n g s u p p o r t a n d financial b a c k i n g b y m e a n s o f a
coordinated strategy o f the Organisation o f A r a b Petroleum
E x p o r t i n g C o u n t r i e s ( O P E C ) . A l l this led t o his d a r i n g - yet
h i g h l y successful — military offensive across the S u e z C a n a l in
O c t o b e r 1 9 7 3 . B y d o i n g this, he had forced w e s t e r n p o w e r s t o
take a stand, and o n c e again to b e c o m e an active partner in
n e g o t i a t i n g a settlement in the A r a b - I s r a e l i conflict. W h i l e
E g y p t ' s military established a beachhead o n the eastern S u e z Canal
f r o n t , O P E C s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a n n o u n c e d t h e d r a m a t i c p r i c e rise f o r
c r u d e o i l , g i v i n g O P E C ' s s u p p o r t t o A r a b states a g a i n s t I s r a e l .
W i t h t h e S o v i e t U n i o n r e m o v e d f r o m E g y p t , b u t still i n f l u e n t i a l
in S y r i a a n d I r a q , t h e U S A m a d e a d r a m a t i c i n i t i a t i v e i n t h e M i d d l e
East. T h e U n i t e d States g o v e r n m e n t (principally in the p e r s o n o f
D r H e n r y K i s s i n g e r ) orchestrated the G e n e v a C o n f e r e n c e o n the
A r a b - I s r a e l i d i s p u t e as w e l l as t h e S i n a i a r m i s t i c e a g r e e m e n t s .
W i t h i n a year E g y p t had rejoined the western b l o c , a l t h o u g h
p u r s u i n g an essentially E g y p t - c e n t r e d policy. F a c i n g o p p o s i t i o n ,
e v e n hostility, f r o m A r a b states in r e s p o n s e t o her f o r e i g n p o l i c y ,
she b e c a m e increasingly isolated in s u b s e q u e n t years. M o r e a n d
m o r e it a p p e a r e d t h a t E g y p t ' s p r o b l e m s c o u l d o n l y b e r e s o l v e d
w i t h the assistance o f the w e s t e r n p o w e r s . T h i s w a s underlined
b y N i x o n ' s visit to E g y p t in 1 9 7 4 .
Sadat's subsequent dramatic decision to negotiate direct with
Israel to secure p e a c e and release the E g y p t i a n e c o n o m y f r o m the
549

permanent threat o f w a r w a s a logical d e v e l o p m e n t o f à foreign

policy w h i c h s o u g h t to consider E g y p t ' s o w n interests, rather
t h a n r e g i o n a l i n t e r e s t s , as p a r a m o u n t . I n s o d o i n g E g y p t , w h i c h
h a d b e e n t h e p a c e m a k e r f o r f o r e i g n p o l i c y in t h e A r a b W o r l d , p u t
h e r s e l f o u t o n a l i m b , in p a r t i c u l a r w i t h h e r n e i g h b o u r L i b y a , h e r
A r a b partner states, and to a lesser extent the S u d a n .
The Sudan
E v e n before i n d e p e n d e n c e , the S u d a n had tried to cultivate

s y m p a t h y f o r h e r c a u s e in t h e T h i r d W o r l d . H e r g e o g r a p h i c a l
p o s i t i o n , h o w e v e r , p r o d u c e d a d u a l i t y in h e r p o l i c y , n a m e l y o n e
o f i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h A r a b as w e l l as A f r i c a n c a u s e s . T h u s , t h e
S u d a n j o i n e d t h e A r a b L e a g u e as w e l l as a t t e n d i n g t h e A f r i c a n
S u m m i t C o n f e r e n c e in A c c r a in 1 9 5 8 . I n 1 9 6 3 , t h e y e a r o f t h e
creation o f the O r g a n i s a t i o n o f African Unity, the S u d a n w a s o n e
o f its e a r l y p a r t i c i p a n t s a n d j o i n e d in t h e call f o r t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n
o f t h e s t a t u s q u o in i n d e p e n d e n t A f r i c a n states. H o w e v e r , this
d i d n o t p r e v e n t S u d a n e s e g o v e r n m e n t s , at v a r i o u s t i m e s , f r o m
offering considerable political, e c o n o m i c and e v e n military support
t o l i b e r a t i o n m o v e m e n t s s e e k i n g t o o v e r t h r o w g o v e r n m e n t s in
n e i g h b o u r i n g states, o r to establish their o w n states. T h e assistance
g i v e n b y N u m a y r ï ' s r e g i m e t o H i s s a n H a b r e in t h e C h a d i a n c i v i l
w a r in t h e 1 9 7 0 s is o n e e x a m p l e ; a n o t h e r is t h e s u p p o r t g i v e n b y
the same r e g i m e to the Eritrean liberation m o v e m e n t s s t r u g g l i n g
to establish their i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m Ethiopia. A l t h o u g h relations
b e t w e e n the S u d a n and these m o v e m e n t s w e r e subject to c o n -
s i d e r a b l e flux, N u m a y r ï ' s r e g i m e in p a r t i c u l a r f o u n d it u s e f u l t o
u s e t h e m t o f u r t h e r h i s o w n i n t e r e s t s in t h e r e g i o n , f o r e m o s t o f
w h i c h w a s his effort t o p r e v e n t b o t h L i b y a a n d E t h i o p i a f r o m
becoming too powerful.
R e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e A r a b states a l s o fluctuated considerably
o v e r the years. A f t e r the disputes w i t h N à s i r ' s E g y p t o v e r the
d i v i s i o n o f t h e N i l e w a t e r s h a d b e e n s e t t l e d in 1 9 5 9 , S u d a n a n d
E g y p t greatly extended their trading links and relations i m p r o v e d
steadily. A f t e r the J u n e w a r o f 1967, S u d a n also m o v e d to
r e - e s t a b l i s h c l o s e r l i n k s w i t h t h e o t h e r A r a b states a n d s t r o n g l y
s u p p o r t e d the Palestinian cause. A t the A r a b S u m m i t C o n f e r e n c e
h e l d in K h a r t o u m in N o v e m b e r 1 9 6 7 , S u d a n j o i n e d t h e o t h e r
A r a b L e a g u e states in c a l l i n g f o r ' n o p e a c e w i t h I s r a e l , n o
550

1
r e c o g n i t i o n o f Israel, n o negotiations w i t h I s r a e l ' . I n 1970
N u m a y r I headed a conciliation committee chosen b y the A r a b
states t o m e d i a t e b e t w e e n K i n g H u s s e i n o f J o r d a n a n d P a l e s t i n i a n
guerrillas a n d h e l p e d t o b r i n g a b o u t a ceasefire t o e n d the civil
w a r in Jordan. After the July 1 9 7 1 c o u p and counter-coup,
h o w e v e r , relations w i t h b o t h L i b y a a n d E g y p t b e c a m e strained
and t h e r e g i m e t u r n e d f o r s u p p o r t t o t h e m o r e c o n s e r v a t i v e states
o f the Arabian peninsula, Saudi Arabia, K u w a i t and A b u D h a b i
in p a r t i c u l a r . T h e p r e s i d e n t c a l l e d f o r a n a l l i a n c e o f A r a b m o n e y
with western technology and Sudanese resources, and both
p o l i t i c a l a n d e c o n o m i c ties i n c r e a s e d c o n s i d e r a b l y a s a r e s u l t . I n
1975 t h e A b u D h a b i - b a s e d A r a b F u n d f o r E c o n o m i c a n d S o c i a l
D e v e l o p m e n t announced a ten-year plan to d o u b l e o u t p u t in the
S u d a n a n d s u g g e s t e d a plan u n d e r w h i c h t h e A r a b o i l states w o u l d
c o n t r i b u t e $6 b i l l i o n t o t h e S u d a n e s e e c o n o m y b y 1 9 8 5 .
H e n c e f o r t h the need t o retain the g o o d w i l l o f the A r a b o i l
producers became a major plank in N u m a y r l ' s foreign policy.
Sudan's relations w i t h the S o v i e t U n i o n and the eastern-bloc
c o u n t r i e s b e g a n t o i m p r o v e s i g n i f i c a n t l y after t h e 1 9 6 7 w a r , w h e n
the M a h j u b g o v e r n m e n t b r o k e d i p l o m a t i c links w i t h the U n i t e d
States a n d the U n i t e d K i n g d o m f o r their s u p p o r t o f the Israelis
a n d c o n c l u d e d a m a j o r a r m s d e a l w i t h t h e U S S R . D u r i n g h i s first
t w o y e a r s i n p o w e r , t h e s e ties w e r e a l s o e n c o u r a g e d b y N u m a y r I ,
w h o also forged closer diplomatic links w i t h China. H o w e v e r , the
events o f July 1971 led the regime to question the w i s d o m o f close
relations w i t h the Soviet U n i o n , w h o w e r e t h o u g h t t o have had
a h a n d i n t h e c o u p a t t e m p t , a n d a l t h o u g h d i p l o m a t i c ties r e m a i n e d
intact, relations b e c a m e considerably m o r e strained, w h i l e those
w i t h the U S a n d w i t h other western countries in E u r o p e w e r e
improved.
Libya
Until the S e p t e m b e r c o u p o f 1969 L i b y a had played b u t a m o d e s t

r o l e i n P a n - A r a b affairs, a n d h a d k e p t a v e r y l o w p r o f i l e i n t h e
w o r l d arena. I n return for earlier help b y G r e a t Britain, the U S A
and Italy, K i n g Idrls h a d leased the W h e e l u s air base a n d o t h e r
facilities t o N A T O , f o r w h i c h t h e c o u n t r y w a s f i n a n c i a l l y r e
w a r d e d . A n d a l t h o u g h t h e k i n g d o m officially s u p p o r t e d t h e A r a b
cause against Israel, w i t h o u t an effective military force h e r actual
1
A n t h o n y S y l v e s t e r , Sudan under Nimeiri ( L o n d o n , 1977), 193.
551

c o n t r i b u t i o n s w e r e m i n i m a l . T h i s c h a n g e d d r a m a t i c a l l y i n late
1969 w h e n C o l o n e l Q a d h d h a f i c a m e to p o w e r .
In 1970 Q a d h d h a f i pressed ahead w i t h his plans for w i d e r A r a b
unity. In D e c e m b e r 1969 the T r i p o l i Charter established an
alliance o f L i b y a , E g y p t and the S u d a n . It w a s f o l l o w e d b y m o v e s
towards federation o f the three countries and overtures towards
Syria. R e f e r e n d u m s h e l d in L i b y a , E g y p t a n d Syria a p p r o v e d the
proposed constitution, and the Federation o f A r a b Republics w a s
proclaimed o n 1 January 1972. In A u g u s t E g y p t and L i b y a agreed
in p r i n c i p l e t o m e r g e their t w o c o u n t r i e s , b u t E g y p t , n o w led b y
President A n w a r Sadat, w a s hesitant a b o u t p r o c e e d i n g further. A
' m a r c h o n C a i r o ' staged b y s o m e 40000 L i b y a n s to demonstrate
s u p p o r t f o r t h e m e r g e r w a s t u r n e d b a c k after it h a d c r o s s e d t h e
border. E v e n t u a l l y the m e r g e r d o c u m e n t s w e r e signed o n 1
September 1973, but severe disagreements o v e r the military
c o n d u c t o f the O c t o b e r 1973 w a r , and Q a d h d h a f i ' s rejection o f
Sadat's negotiated settlement o f the w a r , led n o t o n l y t o the e n d
o f the u n i o n plan, but also to increasing hostility b e t w e e n the t w o
countries.
T o the north and w e s t , a p r o p o s e d union w i t h M a l t a w a s
r e b u f f e d , as w a s a p a r a l l e l p r o p o s a l m a d e t o T u n i s i a n P r e s i d e n t
H a b i b B o u r g u i b a in D e c e m b e r 1 9 7 2 . A f t e r the b r e a k - u p o f the
union with E g y p t , h o w e v e r , Tunisia and Libya agreed o n a
m e r g e r p l a n w h i c h w a s a n n o u n c e d o n 12 J a n u a r y 1 9 7 4 . N e g o t i a t e d
b y T u n i s i a n F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r M o h a m m e d M a s m o u d i , it w a s
v i o l e n t l y o p p o s e d b y his P r i m e Minister, H e d i N o u i r a , w h o
dismissed h i m t w o d a y s later o n his return t o T u n i s f r o m a trip
abroad. T a l k s to outline the eventual union o f the t w o countries'
foreign and e c o n o m i c policies w e r e indefinitely p o s t p o n e d .
T h e failure o f the m e r g e r a g r e e m e n t s and the p r o c l a m a t i o n o f
t h e T h i r d I n t e r n a t i o n a l T h e o r y (The Green Book) c o i n c i d e d w i t h
a noticeable increase in s u p p o r t for r e v o l u t i o n a r y m o v e m e n t s
abroad. N e i g h b o u r i n g E g y p t and Sudan accused Libya o f sup
p o r t i n g Islamic r e v o l u t i o n a r y g r o u p s in their c o u n t r i e s ; o t h e r
benefactors o f L i b y a n arms and finance w e r e b e l i e v e d t o include
s u c h d i v e r s e g r o u p s as t h e I r i s h R e p u b l i c a n A r m y , t h e M u s l i m
M o r o L i b e r a t i o n F r o n t in the P h i l i p p i n e s , and the b l a c k liberation
g r o u p s in Z i m b a b w e ( R h o d e s i a ) a n d s o u t h e r n A f r i c a . D u r i n g t h e
L e b a n e s e civil w a r , the L i b y a n s p r o v i d e d extensive supplies and
f u n d s t o N a s i r i t e g r o u p s as w e l l as t o t h e P a l e s t i n i a n r e j e c t i o n
front.
55*

After 1975, h o w e v e r , Libyan foreign policy was emphasising

less t h e e x p o r t o f a r m s a n d m o r e t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f r e v o l u t i o n a r y
u n i t y . T h e g o v e r n m e n t t o o k its p l a t f o r m t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l a u d i -
ences t h r o u g h the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , the N o r t h - S o u t h D i a l o g u e
C o n f e r e n c e s a n d t h e n o n - a l i g n e d s u m m i t m e e t i n g s , w h e r e it
b e c a m e a leading a d v o c a t e o f the N e w International E c o n o m i c
O r d e r . D i p l o m a t i c a n d e c o n o m i c ties w i t h A f r i c a n s t a t e s w e r e
strengthened. T h e prime minister was dispatched to the L e b a n o n
t o m e d i a t e b e t w e e n t h e L e b a n e s e N a t i o n a l i s t M o v e m e n t a n d its
r i g h t - w i n g adversaries. A major military and e c o n o m i c agreement
w a s s i g n e d w i t h M o s c o w in D e c e m b e r 1 9 7 6 , b u t the g o v e r n m e n t
d e n i e d t h a t it h a d g r a n t e d t h e S o v i e t U n i o n t h e r i g h t t o s e t u p
military bases in the c o u n t r y . R e l a t i o n s w i t h E a s t e r n E u r o p e ,
particularly Y u g o s l a v i a , w i t h the southern Mediterranean
countries and Malta, and w i t h other Islamic countries, w e r e also
strengthened.
T h e profound political and e c o n o m i c transformation o f north-

east A f r i c a w h i c h o c c u r r e d after t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r a l s o
p r o d u c e d dramatic social c h a n g e in L i b y a , E g y p t and the S u d a n .
T h e e x c e e d i n g l y h i g h rate o f u r b a n i s a t i o n w a s p e r h a p s t h e m o s t
i m p o r t a n t d e v e l o p m e n t , b u t t h e r e w e r e a l s o m a j o r shifts i n t h e
d e p l o y m e n t o f the w o r k i n g p o p u l a t i o n and in the role w o m e n
p l a y e d in society.
D e s p i t e its r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l p o p u l a t i o n , L i b y a s a w its u r b a n
c e n t r e s d o u b l e i n s i z e i n less t h e n t h r e e , d e c a d e s : t h e p o p u l a t i o n
o f T r i p o l i rose f r o m just u n d e r 140000 in 1954 t o 269000 in 1 9 6 8 ;
i n B e n g h a z i t h e figures w e r e 7 0 0 0 0 a n d 1 9 1 0 0 0 r e s p e c t i v e l y ,
1
g i v i n g it a r a t e o f g r o w t h o f 1 7 3 p e r c e n t o v e r t h e 2 4 - y e a r p e r i o d .
C a i r o and A l e x a n d r i a also e x p e r i e n c e d h u g e g r o w t h rates. B y 1 9 7 6
t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f C a i r o h a d r i s e n t o 8.5 m i l l i o n , a b o u t o n e - f i f t h
o f t h e t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n o f t h e c o u n t r y . A n o t h e r 2.5 m i l l i o n l i v e d
2
in A l e x a n d r i a . T e n y e a r s e a r l i e r t h e t w o c i t i e s h a d a c o m b i n e d
total o f o n l y six m i l l i o n . K h a r t o u m ' s p o p u l a t i o n v i r t u a l l y tripled
b e t w e e n 1 9 7 3 a n d 1 9 8 0 , w h e n it w a s e x p e c t e d t o h a v e r e a c h e d o n e
million. A l t o g e t h e r the p o p u l a t i o n o f S u d a n ' s three m a i n cities -
1
B . Atallah and M . Fikry, ' L e Phénomène urbain en Libye. Problèmes juridiques
et s o c i a u x ' , Villes et sociétés au Maghreb: études sur l'urbanisation ( P a r i s , 1974), 79~8o.
2
J a n e t A b u L u g h o d , ' T h e g r o w t h o f A r a b c i t i e s ' , Middle East yearbook, 1980, 43.
553

K h a r t o u m , K h a r t o u m N o r t h and O m d u r m a n - w a s estimated to
h a v e risen t o three m i l l i o n b y 1980, o r a b o u t o n e - s i x t h o f the total
population o f the country.
T h e effects o f s u c h r a p i d u r b a n i s a t i o n v a r i e d f r o m c o u n t r y t o
c o u n t r y . W i t h t h e h u g e rise i n its o i l r e v e n u e s , L i b y a u n d e r
Qadhdhafi embarked on a massive development p r o g r a m m e to
i m p r o v e h o u s i n g a n d s o c i a l s e r v i c e s as w e l l as i n d u s t r y a n d
agriculture. H u g e n e w estates, b o t h public and private, w e r e built
in and a r o u n d the major cities, w h i l e entirely n e w u r b a n areas w e r e
planned for Misurata, Z a w i a , D e r n a and Sebha. H o w e v e r , the
p h y s i c a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f t h e c i t i e s b r o u g h t w i t h it d i s a d v a n t a g e s
that the g o v e r n m e n t did not anticipate. F o r e m o s t a m o n g these
w e r e t h e s t r a i n s o n f a m i l y life t h a t l i v i n g i n m o d e r n a p a r t m e n t s
p r o d u c e d in a society that remained tribal and traditional in
o u t l o o k . W h i l e t h e rise i n p r i v a t e i n c o m e s l e d t o t h e a c c u m u l a t i o n
o f a host o f consumer g o o d s , ranging from western-style dining
r o o m s t o cars and television sets, the g e n e r a t i o n g a p increased.
S o t o o did the sequestration o f w o m e n w h o s e p r o d u c t i v e role in
t h e h o u s e h o l d w a s d i m i n i s h e d as a r e s u l t o f t h e i m p o r t o f
c o n s u m e r g o o d s and the mass i m m i g r a t i o n f r o m the rural areas.
In C a i r o the rapid urbanisation p r o d u c e d i m m e n s e strains o n b o t h
the physical and social e n v i r o n m e n t . P r o v i d i n g h o u s i n g , social
services and urban infrastructure, w i t h o u t the hard currency
n e e d e d t o finance s u c h d e v e l o p m e n t s , d e f e a t e d N a s i r ' s a t t e m p t s
to r e m e d y the p r o b l e m s caused b y the rapid g r o w t h o f the cities.
H o w e v e r , the emphasis g i v e n to infrastructure and to the i m p o r t
o f western g o o d s and t e c h n o l o g y under President Sadat led to
even greater disruptions. S e w e r s , roads and c o m m u n i c a t i o n s
facilities b u i l t p r i o r t o t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r w e r e d i s m a n t l e d
to m a k e w a y for n e w construction p r o g r a m m e s w h i c h w e r e often
d e l a y e d a n d a b o r t e d , as t h e p r o b l e m s o f c o p i n g w i t h c o n g e s t i o n
and the perennial lack o f funds m o u n t e d . T h e influx o f foreign
c a p i t a l f o r i n v e s t m e n t i n n e w h o t e l a n d l e i s u r e c o m p l e x e s in C a i r o
a n d A l e x a n d r i a a d d e d still f u r t h e r t o t h e d e m a n d s o n e x i s t i n g
services and to the social discontent. W h i l e parts o f C a i r o b y
the m i d - 1 9 7 0 s r e s e m b l e d N e w Y o r k o r Paris, m o s t o f the
urban residential quarters w e r e neglected, o v e r c r o w d e d a n d / o r
destroyed to m a k e w a y for n e w building.
T h e S u d a n , d e s p i t e its s m a l l e r u r b a n p o p u l a t i o n , f a c e d s i m i l a r
p r o b l e m s . T h e h u g e influx o f h o m e l e s s refugees and o f i m p o v -
554

erished peasants t o the t o w n in the 1970s, c o u p l e d w i t h the p o o r

state o f t h e c o u n t r y ' s finances, made urban life e v e n more
miserable for the m a n y w h o lacked the i n c o m e needed t o b u y basic
necessities.
Aside from urbanisation, Libya, E g y p t and the Sudan w e r e also
affected b y the dramatic change in m a n p o w e r supplies and
requirements caused throughout the A r a b w o r l d b y the develop
ment o f oil-fields. B o t h the S u d a n a n d E g y p t b e c a m e major
sources o f labour supply for the oil-producing countries o f Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf, and the resulting emigration o f able-bodied
m e n left m a n y v i l l a g e s d e p l e t e d o f s k i l l e d m a n p o w e r . L i b y a , o n
the other hand, w a s forced t o i m p o r t labour, i n c l u d i n g hundreds
o f thousands o f Egyptians, to provide the m a n p o w e r needed for
its h u g e d e v e l o p m e n t p r o j e c t s . T h i s p r o d u c e d s o c i a l a n d c u l t u r a l
s t r a i n s i n t h e m a j o r c i t i e s a n d , at t i m e s , p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t as w e l l .
W h i l e the status o f m a n y w o m e n in b o t h L i b y a a n d the S u d a n
remained largely unchanged o v e r the period, the destruction o f
household p r o d u c t i o n in b o t h countries - for v a r y i n g reasons —
a d v e r s e l y affected t h e l i v e s o f t h e r u r a l w o m e n . H o w e v e r , i n
E g y p t the spread o f f e m i n i s m in the cities i m p r o v e d the l o t o f
those w h o w e r e m e m b e r s o f the u p p e r a n d m i d d l e classes. L e g a l
c h a n g e s i m p r o v i n g their position r e g a r d i n g d i v o r c e , inheritance
and c h i l d c u s t o d y , as w e l l as their g r e a t e r access t o e d u c a t i o n a l
and e m p l o y m e n t opportunities, led t o a significant c h a n g e in their
1
role in society. B y the mid-1970s the emancipation o f urban
w o m e n w a s also affecting the c o u n t r y ' s birth-rate, which had
fallen s l i g h t l y as a result o f their greater access a n d r e c e p t i v i t y t o
birth-control methods. B u t e v e n these c h a n g e s still left the
majority o f E g y p t i a n w o m e n , especially those in the villages,
plagued b y the perennial evils o f p o v e r t y and inequality.
F r o m t h e p r e v i o u s d i s c u s s i o n it is c l e a r t h a t t h e p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y
in all three states w a s c a u s e d t o a l a r g e d e g r e e b y their e c o n o m i c
p r o b l e m s . E g y p t in 1940 h a d already a considerable industrial base
a n d a h i g h l y efficient a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r . I t a l s o h a d a l a r g e
m a n p o w e r p o o l , w i t h a considerable n u m b e r o f skilled w o r k e r s .
T h u s the g r o w t h o f organised labour unions contributed exten-
1
J u d i t h T u c k e r , ' W o m e n i n t h e M i d d l e E a s t ' , Middle East yearbook, 1980, 3 7 .
555

sively to the reorganisation o f the political structure, but they also

t e n d e d t o b e c o m e c l i e n t s o f t h e l a r g e p a r t i e s , s u c h as t h e W a f d .
M o r e o v e r , E g y p t h a d little i n c o m e o t h e r t h a n f r o m a g r i c u l t u r a l
e x p o r t s , p r i n c i p a l l y c o t t o n ( w h i c h i n 1 9 5 2 a c c o u n t e d f o r 84 p e r
cent o f the total exports), thus m a k i n g her e c o n o m y h i g h l y
vulnerable to international market fluctuations.
A l t h o u g h t h e n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y E g y p t i a n r u l e r s , a n d , after
1 8 8 2 , t h e B r i t i s h , p r o v i d e d a b a s i c a n d m o d e r n e c o n o m i c infra
structure, substantial changes did not take place d u r i n g the
inter-war period. A n d d u r i n g the w a r , w i t h e x p o r t restrictions o n
c o t t o n , the e c o n o m y c a m e close to a standstill, fuelling anti-British
resentment e v e n further. T h e emphasis o n agricultural e x p a n s i o n ,
t h e r e f o r e , m u s t b e r e g a r d e d as o n e o f t h e g r e a t e r r o r s o f b o t h t h e
B r i t i s h a n d t h e E g y p t i a n g o v e r n m e n t s . B u t , as M a b r o a r g u e s :
Governments were in any case operating under severe financial constraints

since theirfiscalautonomy was constrained by the Capitulations [not abolished
until 1938] which prevented them from taxing the rich foreign community and
from imposing tariffs. Powerful vested interests became entrenched in land,
trade andfinance,and hence in the political structure; and they made sure that
government policies would favour their sectional objectives.
T h u s , as M a b r o c o n c l u d e s , ' T h e c o n d i t i o n s n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e
transformation o f an e x p o r t e c o n o m y into a m o d e r n , industrial
1
and diversified e c o n o m y did not exist.'
T h e R e v o l u t i o n a r y C o u n c i l addressed itself in 1952 t o the
abolition o f large estates and the redistribution o f land, the
r e m o v a l o f ' foreign vested interests' and the further extension o f
t h e i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r . B u t a l t h o u g h t h e officers c a m e t o p o w e r w i t h
great idealism, the political realities p r e v e n t e d s w e e p i n g a n d
immediate e c o n o m i c changes. T h e y had n o particular e c o n o m i c
i d e o l o g y t o i m p l e m e n t , a n d t h e i r initial d e c r e e s a m o u n t e d i n r e a l
e c o n o m i c t e r m s t o v e r y little. L a n d r e f o r m , f o r e x a m p l e , a f f e c t e d
o n l y six per cent o f the total c u l t i v a t e d land a n d w a s essentially
a political measure to obtain greater public, but e s s e n t i a l l y / ^ / / ^
(peasant), support.
U n t i l 1956 - w i t h the e x c e p t i o n o f the m u c h p u b l i c i s e d A s w a n
H i g h D a m s c h e m e - there w e r e f e w signs o f any real e c o n o m i c
i n i t i a t i v e . It w a s t h e n t h a t t h e S u e z a n d o t h e r f o r e i g n c o m p a n i e s
w e r e nationalised, ' w h i c h meant that the greater part o f the
foreign share in the E g y p t i a n e c o n o m y had been liquidated'. T h i s
1
R . M a b r o , The Egyptian economy ip;2-ip?2 ( O x f o r d , 1974), 23.
556

w a s f o l l o w e d b y further nationalisations o f i n d i g e n o u s c o m p a n i e s ,
i n c l u d i n g t h e p o w e r f u l B a n q u e a l - M i s r , E g y p t ' s first n a t i o n a l
b a n k . B y i 9 6 0 t h e p u b l i c s e c t o r w a s n e a r l y t h e s a m e s i z e as t h e
private sector.
A s a result o f g r o w i n g S o v i e t influence, b u t especially o f the
failure o f the E g y p t i a n - S y r i a n u n i o n , N a s i r p r o c l a i m e d in M a y
1962 t h e N a t i o n a l C h a r t e r w h i c h s e t o u t s w e e p i n g c h a n g e s i n t h e
socio-economic structure o f the country. Influenced b y Soviet
advisers a n d a g r o w i n g socialist literature, this charter o u t l i n e d
the r e g i m e ' s plans for industrialisation: the e x p a n s i o n o f t h e
i n d u s t r i a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , t h e n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n o f n e a r l y all r e m a i n i n g
p r i v a t e a n d financial e n t e r p r i s e s , c l o s e r c o n t r o l o f f o r e i g n a i d , a n d
a l i m i t o f 100 feddans e a c h f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l o w n e r s .
T h e development plan o f 1960-5 w a s followed b y another
c o v e r i n g t h e f o l l o w i n g five y e a r s . T h e s e w e r e d e s i g n e d t o
establish an A r a b m o d e l o f socialist planned e c o n o m y . B y the
m i d - 1 9 6 0 s , the ' o l d b o u r g e o i s i e ' h a d b e e n d i s m a n t l e d , as o n e
1
author has asserted.
Large-scale foreign loans, especially e c o n o m i c assistance f r o m
the S o v i e t U n i o n a n d o t h e r eastern-bloc states, assisted this
e c o n o m i c transformation. A l t h o u g h there w a s a noticeable i m
p r o v e m e n t in t h e e c o n o m y , w i t h a n a v e r a g e g r o w t h rate o f a b o u t
6 p e r c e n t t h r o u g h o u t this p e r i o d , three factors militated against
c o n t i n u o u s g r o w t h . T h e first, a n d p e r h a p s t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t ,
w a s t h e d e c r e a s e i n f o r e i g n p r i v a t e as w e l l as p u b l i c i n v e s t m e n t —
n o d o u b t o n a c c o u n t o f w e s t e r n fears o f S o v i e t i n v o l v e m e n t .
A s e c o n d p r o b l e m w a s that o f an u n w i e l d y a n d c o n s e r v a t i v e
bureaucracy, a problem which confounded successive generations
o f governments. Third w a s the high cost o f maintaining the
military establishment. Nevertheless, progress w a s made t h r o u g h
the e x p a n s i o n o f industrial exports. C o t t o n exports, for instance,
in 1970 a c c o u n t e d for o n l y 49 p e r cent o f total e x p o r t s . E x p o r t s
o f manufactured g o o d s a n d o f p e t r o l e u m (from Sinai) h a d
increased f r o m a b o u t 7 p e r cent t o a b o u t 40 p e r cent o f the total
e x p o r t d u r i n g the same period, w i t h f o o d processing a n d textiles
predominating.
T h e 1967 w a r h a d serious consequences for the e c o n o m y . N o t
only w a s E g y p t deprived o f revenues from the Suez Canal, but
the substantial a n d rapidly e x p a n d i n g e x p o r t revenues generated
1
Ibid.
557

b y the e x p a n d i n g oil p r o d u c t i o n in the Sinai w e r e also lost. In

c o n s e q u e n c e , u n t i l after t h e O c t o b e r w a r o f 1 9 7 3 , t h e S o v i e t
U n i o n and s o m e A r a b states, n o t a b l y L i b y a and S a u d i A r a b i a ,
a s s i s t e d E g y p t . A f t e r S a d a t h a d i n s t i t u t e d h i s infitdh p o l i c y in
1 9 7 1 , and gradually dismantled the ' s o c i a l i s t ' e c o n o m y , w e s t e r n
investors slowly began to return. H o w e v e r , western public
i n v e s t m e n t s r e m a i n e d c a u t i o u s as l o n g as t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h
Israel c o n t i n u e d . In the p r i v a t e sector, h o w e v e r , E g y p t c o n t i n u e d
t o b e h e a v i l y d e p e n d e n t o n o u t s i d e finance, n o w f r o m s u c h
i n s t i t u t i o n s as t h e W o r l d B a n k a n d t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l M o n e t a r y
F u n d , a n d t h e i n c r e a s i n g l y f r i e n d l y O P E C c o u n t r i e s . B u t , as i n
1 9 5 2 , t h e c o r e p r o b l e m f a c i n g E g y p t ' s e c o n o m y w a s still t h e
seemingly insurmountable demographic problem, with a popu
l a t i o n g r o w t h o f 2.5 p e r c e n t p e r a n n u m , b u t a n a n n u a l G D P
i n c r e a s e o f o n l y 1.3 p e r c e n t ( 1 9 7 0 - 5 ) .
U n l i k e E g y p t , t h e S u d a n h a d a s m a l l i n d u s t r i a l b a s e w h e n it
attained independence. Indeed, b y i960, o n l y 2 per cent o f the
G D P came from manufacturing industries, w h i c h b y 1973 had
increased only to 7 per cent. T h e Sudan's major p r o b l e m s w e r e
its p o o r c o m m u n i c a t i o n i n f r a s t r u c t u r e a n d t h e l a c k o f a n i n t e g r a t e d
a n d efficient a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e a n d e c o n o m i c p l a n n i n g
agencies. M o r e o v e r , the c o u n t r y lacked adequate funds for
d e v e l o p m e n t until the mid-1970s. Y e t the Sudan had great
d e v e l o p m e n t potential w h i c h c a m e t o be r e c o g n i s e d o n l y in the
latter part o f o u r period.
T h e Sudanese, like the E g y p t i a n , e c o n o m y w a s largely depen
d e n t o n t h e c u l t i v a t i o n o f c o t t o n , a m o u n t i n g t o a b o u t 45 p e r c e n t
o f the total i n c o m e f r o m exports. T h e G e z i r a irrigation s c h e m e
o f 300000 a c r e s , w h i c h o p e n e d i n 1 9 2 5 , c o n t i n u e d t o c o n s t i t u t e
t h e b a c k b o n e o f t h e c o u n t r y ' s e c o n o m y . Y e t l e s s t h a n 10 p e r c e n t
o f the cultivable land w a s b e i n g utilised agriculturally. T h u s ,
d u r i n g t h e 1 9 7 0 s t h e S u d a n b e c a m e i n c r e a s i n g l y a t t r a c t i v e as a
potential agricultural supplier to African, and especially M i d d l e
E a s t e r n , states.
T h e p e r i o d b e t w e e n 1 9 3 6 a n d 1 9 4 2 s a w t h e rise o f a n i n d i g e n o u s
c o m m e r c i a l class d u e to the r e i n v e s t m e n t o f capital g a i n e d f r o m
the large p r i v a t e agricultural s c h e m e s in the W h i t e N i l e area.
T h e s e private schemes w e r e primarily o w n e d b y the w e l l - t o - d o
religious families and pensioned civil servants w h o f o r m e d the
bulk o f the g o v e r n m e n t ' s Sudanese supporters. F o r e i g n c o m -
558

m u n i t i e s , s u c h as t h e G r e e k s a n d S y r i a n s ( w h o a l s o h a d a l a r g e
p r e s e n c e i n E g y p t ) , as w e l l as t h e E g y p t i a n s , E u r o p e a n s a n d
Muwalladin ( S u d a n e s e o f E g y p t i a n a n d T u r k i s h o r i g i n ) w e r e n o t
e n g a g e d in a g r i c u l t u r a l activities. T h e y r e m a i n e d , h o w e v e r ,
d o m i n a n t i n c o m m e r c i a l life a n d i n t h e e x p o r t t r a d e .
T h e bulk o f the Sudan's trade w a s carried o n w i t h the t w o
C o n d o m i n i u m p o w e r s , E g y p t and the United K i n g d o m . T h e
remainder o f the Sudan's foreign trade w a s w i t h n e i g h b o u r i n g
countries, and mostly consisted o f cotton, g u m arabic and sesame.
T h e h e a v y d e p e n d e n c e o n c o t t o n e a r n i n g s w a s , as i n t h e c a s e o f
E g y p t , o n e o f t h e m a j o r i n c o m e p r o b l e m s , as i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o t t o n
p r i c e s fluctuated w i t h d e m a n d . M o r e o v e r , t h e c o u n t r y l a c k e d a n y
r e a l i s t i c p o l i c y f o r d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n o f its r e v e n u e s o u r c e s , n o r d i d
there exist a definite industrialisation p o l i c y . O n l y g i n n e r i e s , s o a p ,
g l a s s a n d v e g e t a b l e - o i l f a c t o r i e s w e r e e s t a b l i s h e d t o satisfy t h e
needs o f the g r o w i n g urban c o m m u n i t i e s . T h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s role
in e n c o u r a g i n g i n d u s t r i a l d e v e l o p m e n t w a s l i m i t e d t o t h e
p r o d u c t i o n o f s p a r e p a r t s f o r its t r a n s p o r t n e t w o r k .
In 1956, o n the e v e o f i n d e p e n d e n c e , an A c t w a s passed to
e n c o u r a g e industrial d e v e l o p m e n t b y attracting domestic and
foreign capital. T h e A c t a l l o w e d for large tax e x e m p t i o n s and
r o y a l t i e s , a n d it p r o m i s e d g o v e r n m e n t s u b s i d i e s . D e s p i t e t h i s ,
industrial e x p a n s i o n in the private sector remained principally
c o n c e n t r a t e d i n t r a d i t i o n a l a r e a s s u c h as t r a n s p o r t a n d a g r i c u l t u r e .
I n d i g e n o u s capital, w i t h o u t b a c k i n g from international c o m p a n
ies, w a s u n w i l l i n g t o f a c e t h e i n v e s t m e n t r i s k s . B e c a u s e o f t h i s f e a r ,
t h e g o v e r n m e n t s i n office a l w a y s e n c o u r a g e d t h e p r o m o t i o n a n d
e x p a n s i o n o f the p u b l i c sector. In 1961 ' A b b u d ' s military r e g i m e
l a u n c h e d a ' t e n - y e a r p l a n ' w h i c h a i m e d at t h e d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n o f
the c o u n t r y ' s e c o n o m y b y establishing g o v e r n m e n t a l industrial
schemes, especially the canning sector, w h i c h w a s b a c k e d b y the
I M F and the W o r l d Bank. Nevertheless, expansion remained
s l o w , a n d t h r o u g h o u t t h e 1960s n e i t h e r t h e m i l i t a r y n o r t h e
civilian g o v e r n m e n t s w e r e able to i m p r o v e the e c o n o m y
significantly.
In 1970 N u m a y r l ' s military regime introduced a five-year
d e v e l o p m e n t plan. T h e target o f the plan w a s to secure an increase
in t h e G D P at a n a v e r a g e a n n u a l r a t e o f 7.6 p e r c e n t as a g a i n s t
4.9 p e r c e n t i n t h e p r e v i o u s five y e a r s . B u t , l i k e all p r e v i o u s
s c h e m e s , it c o n c e n t r a t e d o n i n c r e a s i n g a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n b y
559

60 p e r c e n t . B u t t h e p l a n w a s s h o r t - l i v e d , as it d e p e n d e d o n
m a s s i v e aid f r o m the socialist b l o c . T h e political c h a n g e s that t o o k
p l a c e after t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e 1 9 7 1 p r o - C o m m u n i s t coup
reintroduced western and especially A r a b (principally O P E C )
aid and led t o the r e v i s i o n o f the nationalisation decrees o f M a y
1970. A n e w p o l i c y to link the A r a b oil m o n e y and western
technical k n o w - h o w to exploit the Sudan's vast agricultural
p o t e n t i a l w a s p u r s u e d after 1 9 7 3 . H o w e v e r , d u e t o t h e c o n t i n u i n g
p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y , t h e flow o f c a p i t a l w a s l i m i t e d .
L i b y a w a s r a t e d as o n e o f t h e p o o r e s t c o u n t r i e s i n t h e w o r l d
u n t i l t h e first m a j o r o i l d i s c o v e r i e s i n t h e e a r l y 1 9 5 0 s , a n d e v e n
then the subsequent concessionary agreements ( 1 9 5 5 - 6 ) t o o k a
decade to p r o d u c e substantial profits. T h e c o u n t r y ' s principal
i n c o m e before the discovery o f oil w a s derived from agriculture
a n d f r o m l e a s i n g fees f r o m British a n d A m e r i c a n military bases
in the c o u n t r y . O t h e r N A T O countries p r o v i d e d additional
financial assistance, w h i c h barely m e t the annual costs o f r u n n i n g
t h e state. It w a s t h i s f i n a n c i a l d e p e n d e n c y , i n t e r n a l c o r r u p t i o n a n d
lack o f e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t that p r o m p t e d the military to
i n t e r v e n e in l a t e 1 9 6 9 .
B y J a n u a r y 1 9 7 0 t h e n e w g o v e r n m e n t w a s r e a d y t o l a u n c h its
c a m p a i g n for h i g h e r oil prices. A f t e r a series o f p r o d u c t i o n
c u t b a c k s , and in the case o f R o y a l D u t c h Shell a s h u t - d o w n o f
its L i b y a n t e r m i n a l , t h e c o m p a n i e s s e t t l e d o n e b y o n e . T h e n e w
p r i c e w a s set at $ 2 . 5 3 a b a r r e l , t h e h i g h e s t o u t s i d e t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s . T h e g o v e r n m e n t t h e n a n n o u n c e d t h a t it r e g a r d e d t h i s as
a rectification o f past injustices, n o t a n e w price, and that m o r e
d e m a n d s w e r e t o c o m e . F o u r m o n t h s later t h e g o v e r n m e n t g a v e
n o t i c e o f a n e w i n c r e a s e i n o i l t a x e s as w e l l as a n e w p r i c e
'differential' to c o m p e n s a t e b o t h for the h i g h e r quality and the
l o w s u l p h u r c o n t e n t o f L i b y a n c r u d e a n d its p r o x i m i t y t o w e s t e r n
m a r k e t s . In the face o f a decision o f the s t a t e - o w n e d Italian
company, E N I , and o f France's E R A P , not to cooperate with a
secret alliance o f A m e r i c a n , British, D u t c h and o t h e r F r e n c h firms
f o r m e d to fight the L i b y a n d e m a n d s , the c o m p a n i e s agreed. In
A p r i l 1 9 7 1 , the T r i p o l i A g r e e m e n t raised the p o s t e d price o f
L i b y a n c r u d e t o j u s t u n d e r $3.45 a b a r r e l , a n i n c r e a s e o f 35 p e r
c e n t . T h e a g r e e m e n t a l s o p r o v i d e d f o r a d d i t i o n a l s m a l l rises e a c h
y e a r u n t i l 1 9 7 5 , as w e l l as a n i n c r e a s e i n t h e r a t e o f i n c o m e t a x
p a i d b y t h e c o m p a n i e s f r o m 5 t o 5 5 p e r c e n t . F o r t h e first t i m e
560

the threat o f an e m b a r g o had been e m p l o y e d , but the a g r e e m e n t

o f t h e c o m p a n i e s , a n d m e d i a t i o n b y E g y p t , m a d e it u n n e c e s s a r y
to translate the threat i n t o action.
A f t e r t h e p r i c e rises o f t h e e a r l y 1 9 7 0 s , t h e f o u r - f o l d r i s e t h a t
f o l l o w e d the O c t o b e r 1973 w a r and the nationalisation o f the oil
s e c t o r , L i b y a ' s o i l p r o d u c t i o n d r o p p e d c o n s i d e r a b l y , f a l l i n g at o n e
point to b e l o w o n e million barrels a day. B y the end o f 1 9 7 5 ,
h o w e v e r , w o r l d demand for higher grades o f crude oil, w h i c h can
p r o d u c e m o r e p e t r o l than the h e a v i e r fuels n e e d e d t o heat h o m e s
and industry, w a s rising and L i b y a n production w a s able to
r e c o v e r its n o r m a l l e v e l o f t w o m i l l i o n b a r r e l s a d a y . B y t h e e n d
o f 1 9 7 7 t h e g o v e r n m e n t w a s p r e d i c t i n g a n a v e r a g e o f 2.4 m i l l i o n
barrels a day. In line w i t h this e x p a n s i o n the g o v e r n m e n t s i g n e d
n e w exploration and production agreements w i t h several western
c o m p a n i e s t o d e v e l o p n e w o i l a n d g a s fields b o t h o n s h o r e a n d i n
the M e d i t e r r a n e a n . L i b y a also increased her participation in
refining and m a r k e t i n g o f crude oil - the so-called d o w n s t r e a m
operations - and expanded her refining capacity. D e v e l o p m e n t o f
the petrochemical sector and the expansion o f the c o u n t r y ' s o w n
t a n k e r fleet w e r e a l s o u n d e r w a y . I n A p r i l 1 9 7 2 t h e g o v e r n m e n t
instituted a p r o v i s i o n a l o n e - y e a r d e v e l o p m e n t plan, f o l l o w e d in
the n e x t year b y o n e for three years. W i t h additional r e v e n u e s after
the a u t u m n o f 1 9 7 3 , this plan w a s a m e n d e d t o a l l o w for increased
expenditure o n agriculture and social services.
C O N C L U S I O N
T h e p e r i o d f r o m 1936 t o 1975 heralded historic c h a n g e s in

n o r t h - e a s t A f r i c a t h a t still c o n t i n u e t o affect t h e r e g i o n . F o r e m o s t
a m o n g these w e r e the a c h i e v e m e n t o f i n d e p e n d e n c e in the case
o f S u d a n a n d L i b y a a n d t h e rise o f n e w c l a s s f o r c e s t h r o u g h o u t
t h e a r e a . T h e t a k e - o v e r o f p o w e r b y t h e m i l i t a r y after t h e f a i l u r e
o f a t t e m p t s at d e m o c r a t i c r u l e , a n d t h e r e a l i g n m e n t o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l
relations, w e r e also themes that m a r k e d the three countries d u r i n g
this p e r i o d . F i n a l l y , w h i l e E g y p t a n d t h e S u d a n w r e s t l e d w i t h t h e
need to create a viable e c o n o m y that w o u l d sustain independence,
L i b y a g r a d u a l l y m o v e d o u t o f the o r b i t o f the p o o r e r states a n d
b y 1 9 7 5 w a s a b l e t o u s e its o i l - f e d w e a l t h t o affect d e v e l o p m e n t s
n o t o n l y in the r e g i o n b u t in o t h e r parts o f A f r i c a and the M i d d l e
E a s t as w e l l . I n t h e S u d a n a n d L i b y a t h e a c h i e v e m e n t o f f o r m a l
561

independence was followed b y attempts to resolve internal

differences that h a d b e e n exacerbated d u r i n g the c o l o n i a l p e r i o d .
In the S u d a n these differences w e r e especially p r o n o u n c e d o v e r
the q u e s t i o n o f the s o u t h ; in L i b y a t h e y c o n c e r n e d the v e r y
different c u l t u r e s o f T r i p o l i t a n i a a n d C y r e n a i c a . S i n c e e a c h o f
these disputes focussed o n the v e r y n a t u r e o f the state and
indicated the difficulty o f creating national loyalties in the w a k e
o f i n d e p e n d e n c e , they often c u t across class lines and led to
p a r t i c u l a r l y b i t t e r f a c t i o n a l fighting t h a t , as o f t e n as n o t , s p i l l e d
o v e r into the streets o f the major cities. A l t h o u g h E g y p t , w i t h
its l o n g h i s t o r y o f n a t i o n a l u n i t y , a v o i d e d c l a s h e s o f t h i s k i n d , t h e
disputes o v e r the S u d a n in the early 1950s clearly p l a y e d a role
i n t h e rise o f t h e F r e e O f f i c e r s a n d i n t h e c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f N a s i r ' s
personal power.
In E g y p t and the Sudan, the g r o w t h o f industry and transport
d u r i n g the w a r created a n e w class o f u r b a n w o r k e r s that b y the
end o f the conflict w a s ready to challenge the traditional
landowners and, to a certain extent, the n e w l y enriched merchant
class, for p o w e r . A l t h o u g h this p r o c e s s w a s d e l a y e d in L i b y a , the
e m e r g e n c e o f a n e w t e c h n o c r a t i c élite in the w a k e o f the
c o m m e n c e m e n t o f oil p r o d u c t i o n , and the subsequent expansion
o f g o v e r n m e n t administration, gradually destroyed the p o w e r o f
the m o n a r c h y and m a d e possible the 1969 r e v o l u t i o n . T h e
c o m b i n a t i o n o f factional struggles against national unity w i t h the
e m e r g e n c e o f class conflict led to p r o l o n g e d internal dissension
in the r e g i o n in the 1950s and 1960s. T h i s w a s m e t w i t h repression
a n d , at d i f f e r e n t t i m e s i n t h e t h r e e c o u n t r i e s , w i t h a t a k e - o v e r o f
p o w e r b y the military. Y e t the failure o f the r e g i m e s t o c o m e t o
grips w i t h b o t h e c o n o m i c and social c h a n g e , and to create viable
channels o f political expression, had led b y the mid-1970s to the
e m e r g e n c e o f n e w o p p o s i t i o n against the military rulers in the
Sudan, E g y p t and Libya.
I n f o r e i g n affairs, all t h r e e s t a t e s m o v e d c l o s e r t o t h e S o v i e t
U n i o n a n d a d o p t e d v a r i o u s d e g r e e s o f n o n - a l i g n m e n t in an
a t t e m p t t o f u r t h e r t h e i r efforts t o r e m o v e t h e l a s t v e s t i g e s o f
western d o m i n a t i o n . L i k e the experience w i t h d e m o c r a c y , h o w
ever, the close links w i t h the Soviet U n i o n p r o v e d to be
t e m p o r a r y , as e a c h r e g i m e d i s c o v e r e d t h a t a l l i a n c e s w i t h M o s c o w
carried u n a c c e p t a b l e c o n d i t i o n s . A s a result A n w à r Sàdàt in E g y p t ,
N u m a y r I in the S u d a n and Q a d h d h à f i in L i b y a b y the m i d - 1 9 7 0 s
562

C O N C L U S I O N
had all reopened or extended their relations with the west,

particularly on the trade and economic levels, in an attempt to gain
more room for manoeuvre. The emergence of the Arab oil states
in the Middle East helped to encourage this trend and, in addition,
provided a new source of potential aid and comfort which each
of the regimes sought to exploit to the fullest extent possible.
563

C H A P T E R 11
THE MAGHRIB*
T h e M a g h r i b , w h i c h i n A r a b i c m e a n s t h e p l a c e o f t h e s u n s e t , is
n o t a p r e c i s e g e o g r a p h i c a l t e r m . It h a s b e e n c o n s t r u e d at its
n a r r o w e s t as M o r o c c o a l o n e a n d at its b r o a d e s t as all o f n o r t h e r n
A f r i c a w e s t o f E g y p t , i n c l u d i n g M a u r i t a n i a , w h e r e A r a b i c is t h e
national language. T h e present chapter excludes b o t h L i b y a and
Mauritania and focusses u p o n the political and e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p
m e n t o f the c o r e countries, A l g e r i a , M o r o c c o and T u n i s i a , in a
c o m p a r a t i v e perspective s u g g e s t e d b y their similar colonial
e x p e r i e n c e s . T h e F r e n c h p r e s e n c e d e c i s i v e l y r e s h a p e d all t h r e e
societies, t h o u g h in different w a y s , reflecting the particular
colonial situations. In Algeria, w h e r e o c c u p a t i o n b y the F r e n c h
b e g a n in 1830, the i n d i g e n o u s e c o n o m i c and political o r d e r w a s
m o s t a f f e c t e d , w h e r e a s M o r o c c o , t h e l a s t t o l o s e its i n d e p e n d e n c e ,
w a s least affected, especially in the n o r t h e r n z o n e , w h i c h in 1 9 1 2
fell u n d e r S p a n i s h r a t h e r t h a n F r e n c h c o n t r o l . I n a l l t h r e e s o c i e t i e s
F r e n c h education (and H i s p a n o - A r a b i c e d u c a t i o n in Spanish
M o r o c c o ) f o r m e d n e w elites i m b u e d w i t h nationalism and e a g e r
to take o v e r the m o d e r n e c o n o m i c and political structures largely
d o m i n a t e d b y E u r o p e a n settlers. Pre-colonial traditions influenced
the i n d e p e n d e n t r e g i m e s , established in M o r o c c o and T u n i s i a in
1 9 5 6 , a n d i n A l g e r i a i n 1 9 6 2 , o n l y i n s o f a r as t h e y w e r e r e f r a c t e d
t h r o u g h the prism o f anti-colonial struggle.
T h e m a j o r i n f l u e n c e u p o n t h e s e r e g i m e s w a s t h e s t r u g g l e itself,
w h i c h w a s m o r e p r o t r a c t e d a n d v i o l e n t in the M a g h r i b than in
m o s t o f colonial Africa because o f the m o r e extensive F r e n c h and
s e t t l e r i n t e r e s t s c o n d i t i o n i n g it. I t g e n e r a t e d p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s w h o s e
o r g a n i s a t i o n s and social f o l l o w i n g s in turn h e l p e d t o define the
n e w regimes and their respective strategies o f d e v e l o p m e n t . T h e
S e c o n d W o r l d W a r is a c o n v e n i e n t s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r a d i s c u s s i o n
o f w h a t h a p p e n e d a f t e r i n d e p e n d e n c e , f o r n o t o n l y d i d it c a t a l y s e
latent nationalist forces and generate an international climate m o r e
s y m p a t h e t i c t o a n t i - c o l o n i a l m o v e m e n t s , b u t it a l s o a c c e l e r a t e d t h e
* T h e s p e l l i n g o f p r o p e r n a m e s i n t h i s c h a p t e r is i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h F r e n c h and
English usage.
564

28 The Maghrib с. 1975.

T H E M A G H R I B
pace o f political confrontation in the M a g h r i b t o a speed that w a s

faster t h a n t h a t t o w h i c h p o s t - w a r F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t s c o u l d
r e s p o n d w i t h appropriate reforms. U l t i m a t e l y , in fact, t h e A l g e r i a n
cancer w a s to destroy the Fourth Republic.
T H E S T R U G G L E F O R I N D E P E N D E N C E
France's control o v e r her N o r t h African possessions appeared

a l m o s t a s s e c u r e o n t h e e v e o f t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r a s i n 1930,
w h e n the hundredth anniversary o f the capture o f Algiers seemed
to portend an eternal F r e n c h presence. T h e handful o f M u s l i m
politicians d e e m e d responsible f o r earlier civil disturbances in
T u n i s a n d in a n u m b e r o f M o r o c c a n cities w e r e either in g a o l o r
in exile, a n d t h e m o s t militant o f t h e nationalist parties, t h e
T u n i s i a n N é o - D e s t o u r a n d the Parti d u P e u p l e A l g é r i e n ( P P A ) ,
w e r e o f f i c i a l l y b a n n e d a n d o n l y b a r e l y v i s i b l e . T h e fall o f F r a n c e
i n J u n e 1940, h o w e v e r , s h a t t e r e d t h e m y t h o f F r e n c h i n v i n c i b i l i t y .
W h i l e the only immediate consequence, apart from the destruc
tion o f the French fleet at M e r s - e l - K e b i r in A l g e r i a , w a s t h e
Spanish take-over o f the international city o f T a n g i e r , the
subsequent A n g l o - A m e r i c a n invasion o f North Africa launched
on 8 November 1942 h a d t r e m e n d o u s repercussions. French
forces loyal t o the V i c h y regime w e r e routed, and civil authority
w a s temporarily subjected t o an o v e r w h e l m i n g military presence :
the Allies in M o r o c c o a n d A l g e r i a , a n d the G e r m a n s in Tunisia,
where fighting raged for six months between R o m m e l ' s Afrika
K o r p s a n d a c o m b i n e d A n g l o - A m e r i c a n force. D u r i n g this time,
in M o r o c c o as in T u n i s i a , t h e t o p F r e n c h administrator remained
o n l y n o m i n a l l y i n office, a l a m e d u c k o f t h e V i c h y r e g i m e , w h i l e
in A l g e r i a t h e F r e n c h w e r e e n g a g e d , as o n e A l g e r i a n leader p u t
it, i n ' a r e a l r a c e f o r p o w e r . R e p u b l i c a n s , G a u l l i s t s , M o n a r c h i s t s ,
and J e w s w e r e each t r y i n g t o cash in o n their collaboration w i t h
1
the Allies a n d protect their particular interests.'
I n M o r o c c o , S u l t a n M o h a m m e d b e n Y o u s s e f ' s m e e t i n g o n 22
J a n u a r y 1943 w i t h F r a n k l i n R o o s e v e l t a n d W i n s t o n C h u r c h i l l
w h e t t e d h i s a p p e t i t e f o r a r o l e i n w o r l d affairs a n d ' a n e w f u t u r e
2
for m y c o u n t r y ' . H e discreetly encouraged the fusion o f the t w o
1
Fcrhat Abbas, 'Manifeste du peuple algérien', cited by Charles-André Julien,
U Afrique du Nord en marche, third ed. (Paris, 1972), 247.
Roger Le Tourneau, Évolution politique de 1*Afrique du Nord mu
1
(Paris, 1962), 206.

566

principal p r e - w a r nationalist parties into the n e w Istiqlal

( I n d e p e n d e n c e ) P a r t y , w h i c h i s s u e d i t s first c a l l f o r M o r o c c a n
independence o n 11 January 1944. I n T u n i s i a a n d A l g e r i a w a r t i m e
conditions e n c o u r a g e d their respective nationalist leaders, H a b i b
Bourguiba and the more moderate Ferhat A b b a s . In Tunisia,
M o n c e f B e y e x e r c i s e d real s o v e r e i g n t y b y a p p o i n t i n g a c a b i n e t
o f ministers o n 1 J a n u a r y 1943 w i t h o u t t h e c o n s e n t o f t h e F r e n c h
resident-general. B y exiling M o n c e f in M a y (with the agreement
o f the Allies) o n unjustified c h a r g e s o f c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h t h e A x i s ,
the F r e n c h n o t o n l y created a n e w national s y m b o l b u t eliminated
the only viable alternative t o H a b i b B o u r g u i b a ' s m o r e militant
brand o f nationalism. A n d even in A l g e r i a , w h e r e nationalism had
s e e m e d less d e e p l y r o o t e d , F e r h a t A b b a s issued a M a n i f e s t o o f t h e
A l g e r i a n P e o p l e o n 12 F e b r u a r y 1 9 4 3 , after c o n t a c t s w i t h a h i g h
1
A m e r i c a n as w e l l a s a F r e n c h o f f i c i a l . T h e m a n i f e s t o c a l l e d f o r a
separate A l g e r i a n constitution g u a r a n t e e i n g ' i m m e d i a t e a n d
effective' political participation for the M u s l i m majority. After
h a v i n g confessed s e v e n years earlier t o his inability t o d i s c o v e r
an A l g e r i a n n a t i o n distinct f r o m t h e F r a n c e o f w h i c h it w a s a part,
A b b a s n o w c o n c l u d e d that * the h o u r has passed w h e n an A l g e r i a n
M u s l i m can ask t o b e a n y t h i n g b u t a M u s l i m A l g e r i a n ' , that is,
2
o f Algerian, not French, nationality. Indeed, to contain the
g r o w i n g nationalist tide w o u l d h a v e required substantial reform.
In theory the p r o b l e m o f reform w a s simpler in the t w o
Protectorates than in Algeria. In Tunisia and M o r o c c o the
F r e n c h h a d p r e s e r v e d t h e s e m b l a n c e o f p r e - c o l o n i a l state institu
tions, w i t h the b e y and the sultan respectively exercising n o m i n a l
s o v e r e i g n t y u n d e r treaties w h i c h a c c o r d e d a F r e n c h resident-
g e n e r a l full c o n t r o l o v e r t h e i r f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s . I n p r a c t i c e ,
h o w e v e r , t h i s F r e n c h f o r e i g n m i n i s t r y official h a d a l s o e x t e n d e d
his c o n t r o l , in t h e f o r m o f a direct administration w h i c h at the
u p p e r e c h e l o n s w a s f o r t h e m o s t p a r t staffed b y F r e n c h n a t i o n a l s ,
o v e r internal m a t t e r s as w e l l , o n the s t r e n g t h o f his a u t h o r i s a t i o n
in e a c h treaty t o carry o u t ' reforms w h i c h the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t
3
c o n s i d e r s u s e f u l ' . S i g n i f i c a n t r e f o r m after t h e w a r c o u l d h a v e
taken the f o r m o f e x p a n d i n g the effective jurisdictions o f in
d i g e n o u s ministers a n d administrators. Instead the F r e n c h C o m
m i t t e e o f N a t i o n a l L i b e r a t i o n , after r e m o v i n g M o n c e f , i m p o s e d
1
J u l i e n , UAfrique du Nord, 381.
2 3
Ibid., 247. Ibid., 49-50.
567

T H E M A G H R I B
a F r e n c h secretary-general u p o n the Tunisian g o v e r n m e n t to

r e s t r i c t its p o w e r s e v e n f u r t h e r . H o w e v e r , i n 1945 t h e T u n i s i a n s
w e r e g i v e n control o f an additional ministry together w i t h slight
increases in electoral representation, but these limited reforms
o n l y served further t o d i s c o u r a g e T u n i s i a n nationalists w h o m i g h t
o t h e r w i s e h a v e a c c e p t e d a p r o g r a m m e t h a t c l e a r l y l e d t o self-
g o v e r n m e n t w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f t h e P r o t e c t o r a t e . I n d e e d it
w a s t h e F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t ' s l a t e r r e f u s a l , o n 15 D e c e m b e r 1951,
to c o u n t e n a n c e a m e a n i n g f u l , if g r a d u a l , transfer o f p o w e r , that
p r e c i p i t a t e d t h e final s h o w d o w n b e t w e e n t h e N e o - D e s t o u r a n d
the P r o t e c t o r a t e authorities that led t o i n d e p e n d e n c e . L i k e w i s e in
M o r o c c o , w h e r e fewer indigenous cadres had been trained, the
F r e n c h r e s p o n d e d t o n a t i o n a l i s t d e m a n d s f o r i n d e p e n d e n c e first
b y arresting leaders o f the Istiqlal and then b y initiating a
p r o g r a m m e o f e c o n o m i c but not political reforms.
A l g e r i a ' s l e g a l f r a m e w o r k w a s less s u s c e p t i b l e t h a n that o f the
P r o t e c t o r a t e s t o i n c r e m e n t a l r e f o r m s that c o u l d h a v e satisfied a n d
reinforced moderate nationalists like Ferhat A b b a s . A l g e r i a w a s
in t h e o r y an integral part o f F r a n c e , m a d e u p o f three d e p a r t m e n t s
administered b y the F r e n c h Ministry o f the Interior t o g e t h e r w i t h
the Saharan territories w h i c h w e r e under military rule. T h e three
departments, headed b y a g o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l appointed b y the
French council o f ministers, also enjoyed a measure o f budgetary
a u t o n o m y n o t shared b y their counterparts in m e t r o p o l i t a n
France. T h e o n l y potential channels for M u s l i m participation w e r e
consultative municipal, departmental, and supra-departmental
a s s e m b l i e s , d o m i n a t e d b y E u r o p e a n s e t t l e r s a n d , a f t e r 1944, the
F r e n c h parliament. T h e l o g i c o f the system c o u l d permit measures
mitigating inequalities o f personal and civic status b e t w e e n
M u s l i m s and n o n - M u s l i m s b u t n o t the sorts o f political reform
t h a t r e c o g n i s e d A l g e r i a n ( M u s l i m ) n a t i o n a l i s m a n d o f f e r e d it a n
institutional f r a m e w o r k . Indeed, de Gaulle's deputy, G e n e r a l
C a t r o u x , indignantly rejected A b b a s ' s manifesto, especially the
s p e c i f i c r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s a d d e d t o it t h a t t h e ' A l g e r i a n n a t i o n '
be recognised and a constituent assembly be elected by universal
suffrage t o draft an A l g e r i a n c o n s t i t u t i o n . T h e farthest d e G a u l l e
w o u l d g o w a s n o m i n a l l y t o e x t e n d F r e n c h c i t i z e n s h i p t o all
A l g e r i a n M u s l i m s , m a r g i n a l l y t o increase their representation in
various local assemblies, and integrate several tens o f thousands
o f t h e m i n t o t h e E u r o p e a n e l e c t o r a t e t h r o u g h t h e ordonnance o f
568

7 M a r c h 1944. S u c h reforms, c o m i n g t o o late, c o u l d n o l o n g e r

satisfy F e r h a t A b b a s o r m o s t o t h e r r e l a t i v e l y ' a s s i m i l a t e d * A l
g e r i a n M u s l i m s w h o had w a n t e d o n l y t o b e F r e n c h . M u c h less d i d
t h e y satisfy M e s s a l i H a d j ' s o u t l a w e d P a r t i d e P e u p l e A l g e r i e n
y
( P P A ) o r t h e r e f o r m i s t *ulamd ( r e l i g i o u s s c h o l a r s ) , w h o h a d
affirmed the existence o f an A l g e r i a n nation b e f o r e the w a r .
Virtually o v e r n i g h t A b b a s ' s n e w m o v e m e n t , the Friends o f the
Algerian Manifesto, acquired half a million voting members (out
o f a p o s s i b l e M u s l i m m a l e e l e c t o r a t e o f 1.7 m i l l i o n ) , a n d t h e P P A
g a i n e d c o n t r o l o f it.
W h i l e radicalising public o p i n i o n d u r i n g the spring o f 194$, the
P P A h a d a l s o b e e n o r g a n i s i n g a c l a n d e s t i n e maquis, t h e A r a b
F o r c e s o f the Interior, a l o n g the lines o f the forces o f the F r e n c h
R e s i s t a n c e . It s e e m s t h a t a g e n e r a l i n s u r r e c t i o n a g a i n s t F r e n c h r u l e
w a s a l r e a d y u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . O n 8 M a y , f o l l o w i n g t h e official
celebrations o f the v i c t o r y o v e r G e r m a n y , v i o l e n c e erupted in
Setif w h e n police tried to discipline M u s l i m demonstrators and
a s h o t w a s fired. B a n d s b e g a n i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y t o k i l l E u r o p e a n s ,
and the v i o l e n c e spread so q u i c k l y to other distant parts o f the
C o n s t a n t i n e D e p a r t m e n t t h a t it s e e m s t o h a v e i n v o l v e d s o m e
d e g r e e o f organisation, t h o u g h n o fully elaborated plan. P o s s i b l y
s o m e P P A militants had j u m p e d the g u n . T h e F r e n c h reaction,
i n t u r n , p r o b a b l y e n s u r e d a f u t u r e i n s u r r e c t i o n . T h e official
v e n g e a n c e f o r 103 F r e n c h l i v e s w a s p e r c e i v e d as v e r g i n g o n
g e n o c i d e : 6000 t o 8000 A l g e r i a n s k i l l e d , f o r t h e m o s t p a r t b y
F r e n c h armed forces rather than b y e n r a g e d o r p a n i c k e d settlers.
' O n t h a t d a y t h e A l g e r i a n p e o p l e l o s t its i l l u s i o n s a n d u n d e r s t o o d
t h a t it w o u l d n e v e r b e free a n d r e s p e c t e d u n t i l it b e c a m e
y
s t r o n g . . . the R e v o l u t i o n had b e g u n , a s p o k e s m a n o f the F r o n t
1
de Liberation Nationale ( F L N ) subsequently o b s e r v e d . The
impact o f the F r e n c h repression u p o n the future leaders o f the
A l g e r i a n r e v o l u t i o n that erupted o n 1 N o v e m b e r 1954 c a n n o t be
overemphasised. A tragic cycle o f terror, repression and counter-
t e r r o r w o u l d finally i n v o l v e s u b s t a n t i a l p r o p o r t i o n s o f A l g e r i a n
M u s l i m s a n d settlers a l i k e .
In the M o r o c c a n and T u n i s i a n Protectorates, b y contrast,
independence w a s achieved primarily b y political processes that
set l i m i t s t o t h e u s e o f v i o l e n c e . T h e u n d e r l y i n g s e t t l e r i n t e r e s t s ,
w h i c h w e r e n o t as g r e a t as t h o s e i n A l g e r i a , w e r e m o r e a m e n a b l e
1
El Moujabid, n o . 23, 5 M a y 1958, c i t e d b y J u l i e n , UAjrique du Nord, 379.
569

T H E M A G H R I B
t o p o l i t i c a l m e d i a t i o n . I n 1955 F r e n c h N o r t h A f r i c a ' s 1.7 m i l l i o n

settlers constituted 11 p e r c e n t o f A l g e r i a ' s p o p u l a t i o n b u t o n l y
6.7 a n d 5.2 p e r c e n t , r e s p e c t i v e l y , o f T u n i s i a ' s a n d M o r o c c o ' s .
T h e y had appropriated o v e r one-quarter o f A l g e r i a ' s arable land
a n d e a r n e d o v e r h a l f t h e i n c o m e d e r i v e d f r o m a g r i c u l t u r e , a n d 90
per cent o f that derived from exports. In T u n i s i a they o w n e d
one-fifth o f the arable land b u t o n l y 7 per cent in M o r o c c o . M o s t
settlers l i v e d in the cities, b u t in A l g e r i a they m o n o p o l i s e d the
i n d u s t r i a l a n d t e r t i a r y s e c t o r t o a far g r e a t e r e x t e n t t h a n i n t h e
P r o t e c t o r a t e s . I n d u s t r y d e v e l o p e d m o r e r a p i d l y i n M o r o c c o after
the w a r , b u t E u r o p e a n industrial interests w e r e less o p p o s e d t o
M u s l i m i n t e r e s t s t h a n w a s A l g e r i a ' s r a c i s t petite bourgeoisie.
A l g e r i a ' s m i l l i o n settlers w e r e sufficiently p o w e r f u l t o p r e v e n t
any French g o v e r n m e n t from d e v e l o p i n g a coherent policy o f
reform o r e v e n p r o p e r l y i m p l e m e n t i n g the A l g e r i a n statute o f
1947, w h i c h g a v e M u s l i m s h a l f the seats in an A l g e r i a n a s s e m b l y
and representation in the F r e n c h N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y . Elections
w e r e systematically r i g g e d b y a F r e n c h administration that w a s
' c o l o n i s e d ' b y settler interests. Settlers also s a b o t a g e d F r e n c h
efforts t o r e f o r m t h e P r o t e c t o r a t e s , f o r t h e y e n j o y e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
and political influence in Paris, notably t h r o u g h the Radical Party
w h i c h participated in m o s t g o v e r n m e n t cabinets o f the F o u r t h
R e p u b l i c . B u t t h e y c o u l d n o t , as i n A l g e r i a , c o n t i n u a l l y e x c l u d e
i n d i g e n o u s nationalists f r o m the exercise o f p o w e r . T h e v i o l e n c e
that e n g u l f e d A l g e r i a after 1 9 5 4 w a s in l a r g e m e a s u r e the
c o n s e q u e n c e o f the settlers' p o w e r o v e r w e a k g o v e r n m e n t s in
Paris t o b l o c k any d i a l o g u e , let a l o n e n e g o t i a t i o n , w i t h F r e n c h -
educated nationalists. Tunisians and M o r o c c a n s , b y contrast, w e r e
i n r e g u l a r c o n t a c t w i t h F r e n c h officials b o t h i n P a r i s a n d i n t h e i r
respective capitals o f T u n i s and Rabat.
I n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e s o c i o - e c o n o m i c s t a k e s at i s s u e , h o w e v e r , t h e
strengths and structures o f the nationalist forces in the three
F r e n c h territories o f N o r t h A f r i c a varied considerably and also
conditioned the course o f colonial conflict. T h e i r relative strength
and c o h e s i o n in T u n i s i a , for instance, explains the m o r e e c o n o m i c
use o f v i o l e n c e there than in M o r o c c o , despite relatively m o r e
e n t r e n c h e d a n d less a d a p t a b l e s e t t l e r i n t e r e s t s i n w h a t w a s t h e
older o f the t w o Protectorates.
T h e nationalist m o v e m e n t s , in turn, w e r e largely c o n d i t i o n e d
57o

T H E S T R U G G L E FOR I N D E P E N D E N C E
b y the élite structures o f their r e s p e c t i v e societies. B y the S e c o n d

W o r l d W a r the ' t r a d i t i o n a l ' élite used b y the F r e n c h in their
' n a t i v e ' administration had lost their m o r a l authority in b o t h
A l g e r i a and Tunisia. A l t h o u g h they remained s t r o n g in M o r o c c o ,
their status d e p e n d e d i n c r e a s i n g l y o n their h a v i n g a F r e n c h
education. T h i s F r e n c h - e d u c a t e d M o r o c c a n élite c a m e p r e d o m i
nantly f r o m the b o u r g e o i s i e o f F e z , the so-called Fassis. A f t e r this
é l i t e s e a l e d its a l l i a n c e w i t h t h e p a l a c e b y t h e f o r m a t i o n o f t h e
Istiqlal Party, the F r e n c h authorities c a m e t o rely increasingly
u p o n rural notables, especially chieftains o f B e r b e r o r i g i n like
T h a m i a l - G l a w i , P a s h a o f M a r r a k e s h , as far as ' n a t i v e ' a d m i n i s
tration w a s concerned. T h u s the F r e n c h reinforced a l - G l a w i ' s
a u t h o r i t y at t h e e x p e n s e o f t h e s u l t a n , a l t h o u g h t h e F r e n c h h a d
originally pacified the c o u n t r y in the latter's n a m e . Ultimately a
coalition o f these rejected urban notables w a s t o t r i u m p h o v e r the
rural notables the F r e n c h n o w c o - o p t e d , b u t n o t b e f o r e urban
isation and industrialisation had generated other social forces in
support o f the nationalist s t r u g g l e . T h e leaders o f this coalition
w e r e insufficiently o r g a n i s e d t o k e e p these forces u n d e r political
control, and their generally h i g h traditional urban status, w h i l e
g i v i n g t h e m a certain h o m o g e n e i t y , h a r d l y h e l p e d t h e m in their
efforts t o e n l i s t t h e s u p p o r t o f a p r i m a r i l y r u r a l s o c i e t y , o r e v e n
o f o t h e r u r b a n strata.
T h e F r e n c h - e d u c a t e d elites o f A l g e r i a a n d T u n i s i a w e r e s u b
stantially larger than their M o r o c c a n counterpart, d u e t o the
extension o v e r longer time-periods o f French education. B y the
S e c o n d W o r l d W a r their social origins w e r e also m o r e hetero
g e n e o u s , d u e t o a g r e a t e r f r a g m e n t a t i o n o f t h e t r a d i t i o n a l elites,
the b r o a d e r bases o f recruitment into the F r e n c h educational
system, and t o the o p p o r t u n i t i e s for social m o b i l i t y offered b y
c o l o n i a l r u l e . T r a d i t i o n a l s o c i a l s t a t u s d i d n o t , as i n M o r o c c o , c u t
individuals off f r o m large s e g m e n t s o f their respective societies.
B u t , in t h e c a s e o f A l g e r i a , e d u c a t i o n d i d . W h e r e a s i n t h e
Protectorates the system o f m o d e r n education g a v e a considerable
p l a c e t o A r a b i c , t h e A l g e r i a n s y s t e m t r e a t e d A r a b i c as a f o r e i g n
l a n g u a g e . T h e p r o v i s i o n i n d e G a u l l e ' s ordonnance o f 1 9 4 4 c a l l i n g
for greater infusions o f A r a b i c into the educational system w a s
not implemented. Consequently, French-educated Algerians did
not, like their counterparts in M o r o c c o and T u n i s i a , enjoy
privileged access to a potentially national culture. In Tunisia, the
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T H E M A G H R I B
tradition o f a bilingual education, represented b y Sadiki College,

e n g e n d e r e d é l i t e c o h e s i o n w i t h o u t c u t t i n g it o f f f r o m t h e A r a b i c -
speaking masses. Tunisia, t o o , w a s linguistically m u c h m o r e
h o m o g e n e o u s than either A l g e r i a o r M o r o c c o , w h e r e Berber-
s p e a k e r s c o m p r i s e d r e s p e c t i v e l y 25 a n d 4 0 p e r c e n t o f t h e
p o p u l a t i o n . C o n s e q u e n t l y t h e élite n o t o n l y e n j o y e d t h e distinction
o f being educated in F r e n c h w a y s b u t also possessed a capacity
f o r s o c i a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t w o u l d e n s u r e its c u l t u r a l h e g e m o n y .
I n A l g e r i a , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e évolués w e r e fit o n l y f o r a n
assimilation into a F r e n c h society that refused t o accept them. T h e
majority o f this élite h a p p e n e d t o b e K a b y l e rather than A r a b ;
a n d a n y c o h e s i o n a n d m a s s f o l l o w i n g s it d e r i v e d f r o m s h a r e d e t h n i c
o r i g i n s b o o m e r a n g e d against its c l a i m t o b e a national élite. I n
1 9 4 9 , f o r i n s t a n c e , A i t A h m e d w a s d i s m i s s e d as l e a d e r o f t h e
P P A ' s Secret Organisation (forerunner o f the F L N ) for espousing
' B e r b e r particularism'. B e r b e r - A r a b rivalries should n o t , h o w
ever, b e overstressed in analysing political cleavages within the
élite: b u t n o shared K a b y l e identity c o u l d h o l d it t o g e t h e r , m u c h
less assure it cultural h e g e m o n y .
F r e n c h - e d u c a t e d T u n i s i a n s in fact acquired c o n s i d e r a b l y m o r e
c o h e s i o n than their A l g e r i a n o r e v e n their M o r o c c a n counterparts.
B y the e v e o f the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r , half o f those entering Sadiki
C o l l e g e c a m e f r o m t h e Sahel, t h e agricultural area s o u t h o f T u n i s
that concentrated one-tenth o f Tunisia's population in closely
interconnected b u t rival villages n o t t o o dissimilar, sociologically
speaking, from those o f A l g e r i a n Kabylia. T h e s e sons o f peasant
freeholders w e r e b y t h e n t a k i n g o v e r t h e élite F r a n c o - A r a b
e d u c a t i o n a l institutions that earlier, as in M o r o c c o , h a d fallen b y
d e f a u l t t o t h e s o n s o f u r b a n n o t a b l e s , t h e m a m l u k s a n d baldi o f
T u n i s . U p w a r d l y m o b i l e , t h e S a h e l i a n s c o u l d n o t find r e a d y
acceptance w i t h i n t h e traditional u r b a n élite. B u t their shared
origins p r o v i d e d a ready source o f solidarity in their n e w
c o n t e x t - a n d c o m i n g f r o m the Sahel d i d n o t , as in the case o f
the K a b y l e o f A l g e r i a , prevent them from acquiring cultural
h e g e m o n y . T h r o u g h regional solidarity they w e r e able t o p r o m o t e
a national culture readily acceptable to other educated Tunisians,
i n c l u d i n g sons o f t h e traditional élite. T h e i r o r g a n i s a t i o n a l
vehicle, the N é o - D e s t o u r , w a s historically rooted in the Sahel, b u t
in t h e 1940s it a c q u i r e d a s t r o n g base in T u n i s , l a r g e l y u n d e r t h e
leadership o f y o u n g m e m b e r s o f established families.
57*

T h e ultimate c h a l l e n g e t o the e d u c a t e d élite in e a c h N o r t h

A f r i c a n territory w a s a political o n e . It c o u l d hardly a v o i d
b e c o m i n g i n v o l v e d in the nationalist s t r u g g l e . I n d e e d failure t o
a s s e r t l e a d e r s h i p w o u l d o n l y a l l o w o t h e r f o r c e s t o c a p t u r e it b y
default. T h e failure o f the A l g e r i a n élite h a d already b e c o m e
apparent b y 1945, w h e n a congress o f the Friends o f the A l g e r i a n
Manifesto proclaimed Messali Hadj 'the incontestable leader o f
t h e A l g e r i a n p e o p l e ' at t h e e x p e n s e o f F e r h a t A b b a s . B e f o r e t h e
w a r Messali had organised m a n y o f the A l g e r i a n emigrants
w o r k i n g in France, and his P P A had also acquired considerable
strength in w o r k i n g - c l a s s districts o f A l g i e r s . A b b a s , o n the o t h e r
hand, t h o u g h representing a substantial p o r t i o n o f the educated
élite, c o u l d n o t o r g a n i s e the s p o n t a n e o u s mass s u p p o r t his
manifesto had suddenly aroused. A radical minority o f the
i n t e l l e c t u a l s j o i n e d t h e P P A , l e g a l l y r e c o n s t i t u t e d as t h e M o u v e
m e n t p o u r le T r i o m p h e d e s L i b e r t é s D é m o c r a t i q u e s ( M T L D ) ,
to contest p o s t - w a r elections. A further division that w a s n o t
experienced to the same d e g r e e b y the M o r o c c a n o r T u n i s i a n élite
w a s that b e t w e e n French-educated and A r a b i c - e d u c a t e d intellec
tuals. T h e latter, n u m e r i c a l l y w e a k b u t e x p r e s s i n g the p o w e r f u l
ideal o f a national A l g e r i a n culture, had created their o w n Islamic
reform m o v e m e n t under the leadership o f A b d e l h a m i d B e n Badis.
H e had died in 1940 b u t his m o v e m e n t e n d u r e d , further w e a k e n i n g
the claims o f the F r e n c h - e d u c a t e d élite t o national leadership. In
t h e final p h a s e s o f t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e s t r u g g l e t h i s F r e n c h - e d u c a t e d
élite, i n d e c i s i v e and w r a c k e d b y internal d i v i s i o n s , w a s t o p r o v e
i t s e l f m a r g i n a l . T h o u g h m a n y o f its m e m b e r s h a d r a l l i e d t o t h e
F L N b y 1 9 5 6 , it w a s t o b e s u b j e c t e d t o t h e d i r e c t i v e s o f t h e v e r y
different b r e e d s o f m e n w h o h a d o r g a n i s e d t h e r e v o l u t i o n .
In the P r o t e c t o r a t e s the élites w e r e m o r e c o h e s i v e and m a i n
tained c o m m a n d o f their respective nationalist m o v e m e n t s . B e i n g
c u l t u r a l l y l e s s c u t o f f f r o m t h e i r s o c i e t i e s t h a n t h e A l g e r i a n évolués^
they also s u c c e e d e d in m o b i l i s i n g substantial mass s u p p o r t . B o t h
the Istiqlal and the N é o - D e s t o u r w e r e able, for instance, t o
9
m o b i l i s e t h e K o r a n i c ' free s c h o o l s s i m i l a r t o t h e o n e s B e n B a d i s
established in A l g e r i a . H o w e v e r , the M o r o c c a n s e x p e r i e n c e d
c o n s i d e r a b l y m o r e difficulty than the T u n i s i a n s in c o n t r o l l i n g the
social forces they helped to unleash. F o r o n e thing the Fassis did
not possess a built-in peasant base like that o f the Sahelians. M o r e
i m p o r t a n t l y , the T u n i s i a n s had a h e a d start o f r o u g h l y o n e
573

T H E M A G H R I B
g e n e r a t i o n n o t o n l y in F r a n c o - A r a b e d u c a t i o n b u t also in political
experience. In the p o s t - w a r period their mass organisation w a s
considerably m o r e d e v e l o p e d than w a s that o f the n e w l y founded
Istiqlal. Perhaps, t o o , the relatively m o r e m o d e s t class o r i g i n s o f
t h e T u n i s i a n é l i t e c o n t r i b u t e d t o its g r e a t e r a b i l i t y t o a s s i m i l a t e
organisational techniques from the French Socialist and C o m
m u n i s t Parties and also, incidentally, f r o m a settler c o m m u n i t y that
h a d b e e n m o r e e x p o s e d t h a n M o r o c c o w a s t o F a s c i s m as w e l l as t h e
Socialist and C o m m u n i s t m o v e m e n t s .
In addition t o differences b e t w e e n the élites, the strength o f
l i n k a g e s b e t w e e n élites and the masses also v a r i e d w i t h the d e g r e e
and types o f social dislocation that m a d e masses 'available* for
nationalist activity. N a t i v e A l g e r i a n society had experienced the
greatest dislocation before the outbreak o f the revolution. B y the
m i d - 1 9 5 0 s at l e a s t h a l f o f t h e m o d e r n A l g e r i a n w o r k - f o r c e w a s
in F r a n c e and the majority w a s n o l o n g e r K a b y l e . E v e n if the
A l g e r i a n é l i t e h a d b e e n m o r e c o h e s i v e , it w o u l d h a v e h a d
difficulty o r g a n i s i n g a n d c o n t r o l l i n g the proletariat. O n l y in 1956
w a s a n A l g e r i a n t r a d e u n i o n finally f o u n d e d , t h o u g h t e n s o f
t h o u s a n d s o f A l g e r i a n s h a d a c q u i r e d s o m e political e x p e r i e n c e in
French trade unions. O n the other hand Tunisia enjoyed a
tradition o f a u t o n o m o u s trade u n i o n i s m . T h o u g h earlier attempts
had failed, Farhat H a c h e d successfully f o u n d e d the U n i o n G é n é r a l e
T u n i s i e n s d u T r a v a i l ( U G T T ) in 1946 in close c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h
the N é o - D e s t o u r leadership. T h e Tunisian w o r k i n g force w a s
relatively small and accessible, concentrated in T u n i s , Sfax, and
s o u t h e r n m i n i n g c e n t r e s . B y 1 9 5 5 at l e a s t 80 p e r c e n t o f t h e
U G T T ' s 150000 m e m b e r s had also joined the N é o - D e s t o u r Party.
E v e n in M o r o c c o substantial n u m b e r s o f peasants w e r e already
b e i n g attracted t o the n e w E u r o p e a n cities before the S e c o n d
W o r l d W a r . M o r o c c o ' s post-war e c o n o m i c b o o m , relatively
greater than those o f other more developed colonial economies,
permitted the process o f urbanisation to catch u p w i t h and e v e n
s u r p a s s t h a t o f t h e o t h e r t e r r i t o r i e s b y 195 5. T h e r a p i d i t y o f t h e
process itself contributed to instability. In the p o s t - w a r period
there w a s p r o b a b l y less u n e m p l o y m e n t o r d i s g u i s e d u n e m p l o y
m e n t in the n e w M u s l i m u r b a n c o n c e n t r a t i o n s a r o u n d E u r o p e a n
Casablanca than in either A l g i e r s o r T u n i s . M i s e r a b l e shanty
t o w n s o f t h e k i n d t h a t s u r r o u n d e d all N o r t h A f r i c a n c i t i e s w e r e
n o t necessarily potential tinderboxes o f social unrest. B u t in
574

Casablanca they w e r e t o b e c o m e s o , in part because the B e r b e r

i m m i g r a n t s retained their rural roots w h i l e assimilating n e w roles
and identities, and in part because in M o r o c c o ' s e x p a n d i n g
e c o n o m y they w e r e better off a n d c o u l d h a r b o u r rising aspirations.
A s in A l g e r i a , t r a d e - u n i o n i s m w a s relatively u n d e r d e v e l o p e d , a n d
the urban proletariat a n d sub-proletariat escaped the c o n t r o l a n d
organisation exercised o v e r them in T u n i s i a b y the N é o - D e s t o u r .
B u t their rising expectations w e r e t o c o i n c i d e w i t h those o f
M o r o c c a n nationalism.
T h e efforts o f t h e c o l o n i a l a u t h o r i t i e s t o stifle n a t i o n a l i s t
aspirations o n l y intensified their appeal. T h e nationalist leaders,
h o w e v e r , w e r e faced w i t h the p r o b l e m o f h o w t o channel the
b u r g e o n i n g forces and h o w to direct the struggle. T h e i r ability
to d o s o d e p e n d e d o n the scale reached b y the conflict a n d their
o w n organisational capacities.
T u n i s i a benefited f r o m an élite that w a s better o r g a n i s e d than
those in the other t w o countries a n d f r o m a F r e n c h administration
that w a s relatively m o r e enlightened a n d able t o a v o i d the excesses
c o m m i t t e d i n M o r o c c o a n d , m o r e e s p e c i a l l y , i n A l g e r i a after t h e
Second W o r l d W a r . B r e a k d o w n s in negotiations for reforms
r e s u l t e d n o t s o m u c h i n w i d e s p r e a d v i o l e n c e as i n r e n e w e d T u n i s i a n
efforts t o o r g a n i s e t h e r a n k a n d file s o as t o c o n v i n c e F r a n c e t h a t
a m o d e r n T u n i s i a n n a t i o n - B o u r g u i b a ' s pays réel - r e a l l y e x i s t e d
and had t o b e recognised. W i t h negotiations for further reforms
at a s t a n d s t i l l i n 1 9 4 5 , B o u r g u i b a d e p a r t e d f o r C a i r o t o s e e k
support from both the A r a b L e a g u e and international public
opinion. His deputy, Salah b e n Youssef, h o w e v e r , remained in
T u n i s to d e v e l o p the organisation o f the party, o u t l a w e d since
1938 a n d p a r t l y c o m p r o m i s e d b y t h e w a r t i m e c o n t a c t s o f s o m e
o f its s e c o n d a r y l e a d e r s h i p w i t h t h e G e r m a n s . A s w e l l a s t h e
U G T T , the U n i o n Nationale des Agriculteurs Tunisiens and the
U n i o n T u n i s i e n n e des Artisans et C o m m e r ç a n t s w e r e also created
i n t h e late 1 9 4 0 s . T h e N é o - D e s t o u r w a s a l s o a b l e f o r a t i m e t o
establish a N a t i o n a l F r o n t w i t h t h e D e s t o u r , its p r e - w a r rival that
had clearly lost the contest for national leadership. T h e o n e sector
recalcitrant t o N é o - D e s t o u r control w a s that o f the students a n d
faculty o f Z i t o u n a , the traditional Islamic university o f T u n i s . O n e
o f t h e s e n i o r * ulamâ\ F a d h l b e n A c h o u r , t r i e d w i t h s o m e s u p p o r t
from the U G T T to d e v e l o p an a u t o n o m o u s m o v e m e n t . T h e
N é o - D e s t o u r youth organisation, h o w e v e r , w a s more than a
575

T H E M A G H R I B
m a t c h for Z i t o u n a students o n the streets, a n d b y 1951 a majority

o f these, frustrated b y lack o f university r e f o r m a n d prospects for
e m p l o y m e n t , w e r e sympathisers w i t h , o r m e m b e r s of, B o u r g u i b a ' s
party.
T h e ' S u p r e m e W a r r i o r ' himself returned t o T u n i s in 1949
w i t h the consent o f the French resident-general to stimulate n e w
efforts a t s e t t i n g u p a n a u t o n o m o u s T u n i s i a n g o v e r n m e n t . T h e
French g o v e r n m e n t favoured further reforms, and t w o m e m b e r s
o f the N e o - D e s t o u r , including Salah b e n Youssef, w e r e mandated
t o j o i n a ' h o m o g e n e o u s ' (all T u n i s i a n ) g o v e r n m e n t i n 1 9 5 1 .
H o w e v e r , late in t h e year n e g o t i a t i o n s o v e r t h e g r a n t i n g o f
internal a u t o n o m y collapsed u n d e r settler pressures. B o u r g u i b a ' s
decision t o precipitate matters b y e n g a g i n g in mass agitation
against French attempts to introduce Franco-Tunisian c o -
sovereignty m e t w i t h predictable police repression, including his
o w n a r r e s t o n 18 J a n u a r y 1 9 5 2 . M o p p i n g - u p o p e r a t i o n s , n o t a b l y
o n C a p B o n , resulted in scores o f Tunisian deaths b u t c o u l d n o t
compare w i t h the operations launched against the Algerians in
1945. T h e A l g e r i a n deaths h a d n o t served the cause o f any
political organisation, whereas the Tunisian ones contributed to
a national m y t h o l o g y o f sacrifice a n d m a r t y r d o m incarnated b y
B o u r g u i b a in p r i s o n a n d p r o p a g a t e d b y the party faithful.
A n y eventual trade-union challenge to his o r the party's
authority w a s severely diminished o n 5 D e c e m b e r 1952, w h e n
Farhat H a c h e d w a s assassinated' u n d e r conditions that h a v e n e v e r
been elucidated' but w h i c h undoubtedly involved French
1
( C o r s i c a n ) h a n d s . T e r r o r a n d c o u n t e r - t e r r o r s p r e a d i n 195 3, w h i l e
m o s t o f the N e o - D e s t o u r leadership w a s either in prison o r exile.
Nevertheless clandestine party n e t w o r k s managed to keep m o s t
o f t h e 3000 a r m e d fellagha ( g u e r r i l l a s ) , e s p e c i a l l y t h o s e r e c r u i t e d
from the Sahel, under political control. Consequently, w h e n the
M e n d e s - F r a n c e g o v e r n m e n t i n d i c a t e d t h a t it w a s p r e p a r e d t o
grant internal a u t o n o m y t o Tunisia, B o u r g u i b a , transferred t o
F r a n c e i n 195 5, w a s a b l e t o o r d e r t h e m t o l a y d o w n t h e i r a r m s .
Tunisia's w a s the only national liberation m o v e m e n t in N o r t h
Africa to enjoy some o f the g l a m o u r o f conducting a guerrilla
r
s t r u g g l e f ° i n d e p e n d e n c e w i t h o u t l o s i n g c o n t r o l o f it - p a r t l y ,
n o doubt, because Mendes-France acted before the violence g o t
o u t o f h a n d , s e l e c t i n g T u n i s i a , rather t h a n M o r o c c o , t o test o u t
1
L e T o u r n c a u , Evolution politique, 130; cf. J u l i e n , UAfrique du Nord, 389.
576

h i s p o l i c y o f r e f o r m i n g t h e P r o t e c t o r a t e s s o as t o p r e s e r v e a F r e n c h
A l g e r i a . E v e n b e f o r e h i s s u r p r i s e v i s i t o f 31 J u l y 1 9 5 4 t o T u n i s ,
h o w e v e r , the N e o - D e s t o u r had m a n a g e d to build u p a political
apparatus o f 100000 m e m b e r s w i e l d i n g d e c i s i v e m o r a l a u t h o r i t y
o v e r the p o p u l a t i o n . P o l i c e repression, in m o d e s t d o s e s o v e r
e x t e n d e d p e r i o d s , h a d u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y h e l p e d the e d u c a t e d elite
t o f o r g e a n a t i o n . W h e n B o u r g u i b a w a s finally a l l o w e d t o r e t u r n
o n 1 J u n e , 1 9 5 5 , his m o r a l authority s e e m e d unlimited. T h o u g h
he w a s challenged within the party b y Salah ben Y o u s s e f , w h o
w a s opportunistically calling for immediate independence, he
t r i u m p h e d o v e r his former d e p u t y b y a p p e a l i n g t o the political
realism o f a seasoned party and trade-union leadership. After the
p a r t y c o n g r e s s h e l d at S f a x i n N o v e m b e r , t h e p a r t y c a d r e s w e r e
o n B o u r g u i b a ' s side and b e n Y o u s s e f ' s o n l y recourse w a s to
4
terrorism. T h e l a s t Y o u s s e f i s t ' b a n d w a s m o p p e d u p in the spring
o f 1956. M e a n w h i l e B o u r g u i b a had achieved independence and
j o i n e d t h e n e w g o v e r n m e n t as p r i m e m i n i s t e r .
N e i t h e r in M o r o c c o n o r A l g e r i a d i d t h e r e g r o w u p a d i s c i p l i n e d
party organisation to match that o f Tunisia. T o o w e a k to d e v e l o p
a u t o n o m o u s leadership, the u r b a n e d u c a t e d elite that f o u n d e d the
Istiqlal had to rely o n the sultan for m o s t political initiatives. In
1946 Sultan M o h a m m e d b e n Y o u s s e f obtained permission f r o m
the resident-general and the authorities o f the Spanish z o n e to
t r a v e l b y l a n d t o T a n g i e r , w h i c h h a d r e g a i n e d its 1 9 2 3 s t a t u s as
a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l c i t y after its b r i e f w a r t i m e o c c u p a t i o n b y S p a i n .
B y m a k i n g this trip he p r o v i d e d the c o n t e x t for h u g e p u b l i c
demonstrations o f loyalty affirming M o r o c c o ' s national unity.
W h i l e he w a s in T a n g i e r , he also m a d e an electrifying s p e e c h in
w h i c h he omitted compliments to France, and by gestures o f
p r o t o c o l , t o o , signalled to international o p i n i o n his impatience
w i t h F r e n c h tutelage. In reaction, G e n e r a l Juin, the F r e n c h
R e s i d e n t - G e n e r a l , ordered Istiqlal publications to be c e n s o r e d and
in 1948 a l l o w e d his D i r e c t o r o f Political Affairs, C o l o n e l J e a n
L e c o m t e , to c o n c o c t abusive p r o p a g a n d a against the sultan and
1
his f a m i l y . T h i s o n l y c o n s o l i d a t e d Sultan M o h a m m e d ' s n e w
a u t h o r i t y as l e a d e r o f t h e n a t i o n a l i s t m o v e m e n t . T h e f o c u s o f
F r a n c o - M o r o c c a n conflict b e c a m e the sultan himself. Irritated b y
political criticisms v o i c e d b y Istiqlal notables, G e n e r a l Juin
e n c o u r a g e d rivals o f the sultan, led b y a B e r b e r chief, T h a m i
1
J u l i e n , UAfrtque du Nord, 3 9 3 - 4 .
577

T H E M A G H R I B
a l - G l a w i , t o stage a tribal r e v o l t . T h e F r e n c h h o p e d , in fact, t o

w e a k e n the forces o f A r a b urban nationalism b y setting the
predominantly Berber tribesmen against them. In 1951 the revolt
w a s called off w h e n the sultan capitulated under the threat o f
deposition and signed a protocol c o n d e m n i n g ' the methods o f a
certain p a r t y ' . B u t t w o years later, w h e n h e refused t o s i g n decrees
that w o u l d h a v e a c c o r d e d a share o f M o r o c c a n s o v e r e i g n t y t o
French citizens, a second revolt w a s staged. T h i s time an
exceptionally w e a k g o v e r n m e n t in Paris c a v e d in t o pressure b y
l o c a l officials, F r e n c h s e t t l e r s , a l - G l a w i a n d o t h e r n o t a b l e s o p p o s e d
t o n a t i o n a l i s m . T h e s u l t a n w a s d e p o s e d o n 20 A u g u s t 1 9 5 3 a n d
e x i l e d t o M a d a g a s c a r . B u t h e still e n j o y e d r e l i g i o u s as w e l l as
p o l i t i c a l l e g i t i m a c y i n t h e e y e s o f m o s t M o r o c c a n s , a n d Sidna (' o u r
L o r d ' ) w o u l d b e c o m e the rallying cry o f a nation ready to take
up arms.
E v e n h a d they desired t o p r e v e n t urban terrorism, the Istiqlal
leaders c o u l d n o t h a v e d o n e a n y t h i n g because since D e c e m b e r
1952 they h a d b e e n g a o l e d f o r their alleged i n v o l v e m e n t in the
uprising o f Casablanca's proletariat in the w a k e o f Farhat H a c h e d ' s
assassination. D u r i n g the t w o years f o l l o w i n g the sultan's d e p o
sition M o r o c c o experienced urban terrorism, counter-terror, a n d
finally a r m e d i n s u r r e c t i o n i n t h e c o u n t r y s i d e f r o m b a s e s l o c a t e d
in the S p a n i s h z o n e . M e a n w h i l e t h e S p a n i s h authorities h a d
embarked in 1952 u p o n a policy o f collaboration w i t h the
n a t i o n a l i s t s , p e r m i t t i n g f r e e d o m o f t h e P r e s s at least c o n c e r n i n g
a c t i v i t i e s i n t h e F r e n c h z o n e . T h e khalifa, t h e s u l t a n ' s d e p u t y i n
t h e S p a n i s h z o n e , c o n t i n u e d after M u h a m m a d ' s d e p o s i t i o n t o
exercise authority in his n a m e , a n d the Spanish H i g h C o m m i s
sioner publicly supported M o r o c c a n protests against the French
action. In the French z o n e there w a s considerably more violence
t h a n t h e r e w a s i n T u n i s i a after B o u r g u i b a ' s a r r e s t . T h e e n t i r e
structure o f local authority built u p b y the F r e n c h in the
c o u n t r y s i d e u n d e r t r i b a l caids a n d t h e i r c l i e n t s finally c o l l a p s e d i n
1955, o n c e a l - G l a w i , realising that he w a s losing support, rendered
obeisance t o the sultan. T o p r e v e n t further disorder, the F r e n c h
h a d t o r e i n s t a t e S u l t a n M o h a m m e d , w h o , as K i n g M o h a m m e d V ,
b e c a m e M o r o c c o ' s indispensable arbiter, the o n e authority
a c c e p t e d b y all M o r o c c a n political forces - the urban a n d rural
resistance m o v e m e n t s , the urban notables o f the Istiqlal a n d other
578

m i n o r parties, the proletariat, and rural notables c o m p r o m i s e d b y

French collaboration.
In stark contrast to b o t h the T u n i s i a n and M o r o c c a n experi
ences, the A l g e r i a n r e v o l u t i o n failed t o e n g e n d e r a c o n c r e t e l o c u s
o f a u t h o r i t y w h i c h all r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s c o u l d a c c e p t . B e f o r e 1 9 5 4
t h e p o l i t i c i a n s h a d b e e n h o p e l e s s l y d i v i d e d as w e l l as f r u s t r a t e d
i n t h e i r efforts t o w o r k w i t h i n t h e e l e c t e d b o d i e s i n s t i t u t e d b y t h e
A l g e r i a n Statute o f 1947. I n 1 9 5 4 the P P A - M T L D suffered a
f u r t h e r d i v i s i o n b e t w e e n its l e a d e r , M e s s a l i H a d j , a n d a m a j o r i t y
o f the central c o m m i t t e e . T h i s d i v i s i o n precipitated the o u t b r e a k
o n 1 N o v e m b e r o f a r m e d insurrection. H a v i n g failed t o reconcile
the t w o factions, a self-styled R e v o l u t i o n a r y C o m m i t t e e o f U n i t y
and A c t i o n , c o m p o s e d m o s t l y o f m e m b e r s o f the party's para
military b o d y , decided that existing parties and legal political
p r o c e s s e s w e r e futile a n d t h a t t h e o n l y w a y t o a c h i e v e A l g e r i a n
independence w a s t h r o u g h violence. Indeed the decisions to
e n g a g e i n u n l i m i t e d s t r u g g l e a n d t o o r g a n i s e o n l y after l a u n c h i n g
the insurrection indicate a d e g r e e o f political alienation a m o n g the
leadership that w a s a major source o f w e a k n e s s . O n c e the
r e v o l u t i o n w a s l a u n c h e d , it w a s e v e n m o r e d i f f i c u l t t o d e v e l o p a
political organisation for c o o r d i n a t i n g and ideologically shaping
the r a w guerrilla recruits w h o h a d s p o n t a n e o u s l y rallied to the
Front de Liberation Nationale. Furthermore, the only experiences
shared b y m o s t o f the r e v o l u t i o n a r y leaders w e r e para-military
o n e s . T h e y t e n d e d t o b e less e d u c a t e d t h a n the leaders o f the
A l g e r i a n p a r t i e s t h e y d i s p l a c e d a n d less e d u c a t e d t h a n t h e N e o -
D e s t o u r and Istiqlal leaders. T h o u g h the F L N m a n a g e d in
difficult w a r t i m e c o n d i t i o n s i n s i d e A l g e r i a t o c o n v e n e a c o n g r e s s ,
h e l d i n t h e S o u m m a m V a l l e y i n A u g u s t 1 9 5 6 , its r e s o l u t i o n t o
accept the ' priority o f the political o v e r the military o r g a n i s a t i o n '
could not be implemented.
It w a s i n t h e m o r e i s o l a t e d m o u n t a i n o u s r e g i o n s , s u c h as
G r e a t e r K a b y l i a and the A u r e s , that the guerrillas, despite an
i m p r o v i s e d b e g i n n i n g , acquired the strongest roots. H e r e the
F L N w a s a b l e t o d e v e l o p a p o l i t i c a l as w e l l as a m i l i t a r y
organisation, but c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h other parts o f A l g e r i a
b e c a m e difficult. T h e r e v o l u t i o n a c q u i r e d i r r e v e r s i b l e m o m e n t u m
o n 20 A u g u s t 1 9 5 5 , w h e n g u e r r i l l a s t o u c h e d o f f a p o p u l a r
i n s u r r e c t i o n a g a i n s t 26 E u r o p e a n c e n t r e s i n t h e r e g i o n o f C o n -
5 79

T H E M A G H R I B
s t a n t i n e , r e s u l t i n g i n 123 d e a d , i n c l u d i n g 7 1 E u r o p e a n s , m a n y o f
t h e m d o n e to death w i t h k n i v e s and sticks. F r e n c h reprisals t o o k
1 2 7 3 l i v e s b y t h e official c o u n t a n d m o r e t h a n o n e t h o u s a n d
prisoners. T h e major consequence, h o w e v e r , was to s o w a panic
a m o n g E u r o p e a n settlers t h r o u g h o u t A l g e r i a that w o u l d p u t
pressure o n French g o v e r n m e n t s to build up an o v e r w h e l m i n g
military presence. B y the f o l l o w i n g s u m m e r there w e r e o v e r
400000 t r o o p s in the c o u n t r y . B y the a u t u m n o f 1957 the F r e n c h
had fully r e g a i n e d the military initiative a n d had w o n the ' Battle
o f A l g i e r s ' , e l i m i n a t i n g t h e last e f f e c t i v e g u e r r i l l a p r e s e n c e s i n t h e
capital, including the leadership established b y the S o u m m a m
Congress.
T h e F r e n c h F o u r t h R e p u b l i c w a s t h e first p o l i t i c a l v i c t i m o f
these ostensible victories. B y c o n d o n i n g extensive use o f torture,
and by a l l o w i n g the army to take o v e r the administration o f
A l g e r i a , the g o v e r n m e n t s o f G u y M o l l e t and his successors lost
considerable m o r a l authority in F r a n c e w i t h o u t g a i n i n g the
confidence o f the settlers. A f t e r mass settler d e m o n s t r a t i o n s in
A l g i e r s o n 13 M a y 1 9 5 8 , i n f a v o u r o f k e e p i n g A l g e r i a F r e n c h
under sympathetic military authorities, G e n e r a l de G a u l l e w a s
a b l e t o fill t h e r e s u l t a n t p o w e r v a c u u m i n P a r i s . T h e F r e n c h
political system, h o w e v e r , w a s not the only v i c t i m o f the A l g e r i a n
war. Algeria's indigenous political forces w e r e also disrupted b y
the massive F r e n c h military presence, w h i c h e v e n included
electrified defensive lines o n the c o u n t r y ' s b o r d e r s w i t h M o r o c c o
and Tunisia.
A f t e r the battle o f A l g i e r s , A b a n e R a m d a n e , the F L N ' s
principal s u r v i v i n g leader and the organiser o f the S o u m m a m
C o n g r e s s , w a s strangled to death b y m e m b e r s o f his o w n party.
Previous divisions within the F L N leadership had been mitigated
in p a r t b y t h e i l l - a d v i s e d F r e n c h k i d n a p p i n g o f o n e o f its s e c t i o n s ,
w h i c h had included A h m e d B e n Bella. B u t thereafter the F r e n c h
m i l i t a r y quadrillage, c o u p l e d w i t h G e n e r a l C h a l l e ' s m o b i l e t a c t i c s ,
put the guerrillas continually o n the run, p r e v e n t i n g t h e m from
d e v e l o p i n g a political organisation inside their territory. T h e F L N
w a s o r g a n i s e d i n t o s i x wilayas, o r r e g i o n a l c o m m a n d s , w h i c h i n
t h e o r y c o v e r e d t h e e n t i r e c o u n t r y i n c l u d i n g t h e S a h a r a , b u t it
b e c a m e i n c r e a s i n g l y difficult t o c o m m u n i c a t e a m o n g o r e v e n
1
w i t h i n t h e m , m u c h less b e t w e e n t h e m a n d their a r m s d e p o t s a n d
1
C o l o n e l A m i r o u c h e , the c o m m a n d e r o f W i l a y a III ( G r e a t e r K a b y l i a ) , had h u n d r e d s
o f h i s m e n e x e c u t e d in 1959 t o p r e v e n t s e c u r i t y l e a k s .
580

sanctuaries in Tunisia a n d M o r o c c o . T h e G o u v e r n e m e n t
P r o v i s o i r e d e la R é p u b l i q u e A l g é r i e n n e ( G P R A ) w a s established
in T u n i s i a u n d e r t h e n o m i n a l leadership o f F e r h a t A b b a s , w h o
h a d rallied t o t h e F L N , b u t it c o u l d neither s u p p l y n o r c o n t r o l
t h e wilayas. M o r e o v e r , t h e g e n e r a l staff o f t h e F L N , b a s e d n e a r
the A l g e r i a n frontier w a s outside the c o n t r o l o f its ministries
l o c a t e d i n T u n i s . T h e C h i e f o f Staff, C o l o n e l H o u a r i B o u m e d i e n n e ,
d e v e l o p e d a well equipped standing a r m y o f 40000 m e n that
p r o v e d in 1962 t o b e the o n l y organised force capable o f
controlling independent Algeria.
T h e Evian A c c o r d s reached between the French and the
provisional Algerian g o v e r n m e n t s in M a r c h 1962, h o w e v e r ,
represented political v i c t o r y f o r t h e F L N , as w e l l as d e G a u l l e ' s
triumph o v e r the forces that h a d b r o u g h t h i m t o p o w e r . T h e
a g r e e m e n t called f o r a n i m m e d i a t e ceasefire f o l l o w e d b y a
referendum. This w a s held o n 8 April, and an o v e r w h e l m i n g
majority o f A l g e r i a n s v o t e d f o r independence. D u r i n g t h e tran
sition period from M a r c h t o July the A l g e r i a n s displayed remark
able discipline i n t h e face o f m a c a b r e p r o v o c a t i o n s b y e x t r e m i s t
E u r o p e a n s h o p i n g t o stir u p mass v i o l e n c e a n d thus p r e v e n t
independence. T h e constraining orders o f F L N leadership hastily
dispatched t o Algiers b y the provisional g o v e r n m e n t w e r e uni
versally respected. B u t i f the moral authority o f the F L N w a s
u n q u e s t i o n e d ( e x c e p t p e r h a p s b y s o m e o f t h e 80000 A l g e r i a n
M u s l i m s w h o h a d f o u g h t o n t h e F r e n c h side a n d b y other
c o l l a b o r a t o r s ) , its leadership r e m a i n e d seriously d i v i d e d d u r i n g
the spring a n d s u m m e r o f 1962. I n institutional terms the F L N
n o l o n g e r existed. A s the president o f the provisional g o v e r n m e n t
subsequently explained, ' A military and political bureaucracy w a s
f o r g e d i n e x i l e . . . [ i n ] t h e a b s e n c e o f i n t e r i o r [ p o l i t i c a l ] life.
Internal d e m o c r a c y , criticism a n d self-criticism, a n d serious
criteria in the c h o i c e o f leaders w e r e all i g n o r e d , thus o p e n i n g t h e
91
d o o r t o arrivisme a n d flattery. H i s g o v e r n m e n t w a t c h e d h e l p l e s s l y
as wilaya l e a d e r s , s w e l l e d b y t e n s o f t h o u s a n d s o f n e w r e c r u i t s
p a r a d i n g as s e a s o n e d r e v o l u t i o n a r y v e t e r a n s , j o c k e y e d f o r p o s i t i o n
w i t h the ' h i s t o r i c ' chiefs o f the r e v o l u t i o n , such as A h m e d B e n
Bella, just released f r o m prison, a n d f o r m e r political leaders like
Ferhat A b b a s . Boumedienne's army made Ben Bella's the winning
1
Y o u s s c f b e n K h e d d a , ' C o n t r i b u t i o n à l ' h i s t o r i q u e d u F L N ' , m i m e o , A p r i l 1964,
A l g i e r s , c i t e d b y E l b a k i H e r m a s s i , Leadership and national development in North Africa
( B e r k e l e y a n d L o s A n g e l e s , 1972), 1 4 1 .
581

T H E M A G H R I B
coalition, and in the p r o c e s s m o w e d d o w n h u n d r e d s o f guerrillas

in early S e p t e m b e r . ' T h e S u m m e r o f S h a m e ' , h o w e v e r , o n l y
reflected earlier d e v e l o p m e n t s w i t h i n the F L N , for r e v o l u t i o n a r y
leaders had liquidated m a n y o f their colleagues d u r i n g the w a r .
D e s p i t e b r a v e fighting a n d b r i l l i a n t d i p l o m a c y t h a t w o n i n d e p e n
d e n c e against incredible o d d s , the F L N failed t o b u i l d political
i n s t i t u t i o n s , m u c h less a r t i c u l a t e a c o h e r e n t i d e o l o g y , as h a d t h e
N é o - D e s t o u r in T u n i s i a , for g u i d i n g s u b s e q u e n t d e v e l o p m e n t and
l e g i t i m a t i n g l e a d e r s h i p . Y e t e i g h t y e a r s o f fighting - c o m p a r e d
w i t h o n l y t w o years o f sporadic terrorism in the Protectorates -
h a d u t t e r l y d i s l o c a t e d A l g e r i a n s o c i e t y . W h e t h e r o r n o t as m a n y
as 1.5 m i l l i o n A l g e r i a n s l o s t t h e i r l i v e s , as t h e i n d e p e n d e n t
A l g e r i a n g o v e r n m e n t claimed, the casualties w e r e e n o r m o u s .
R o u g h l y one-third o f the rural p o p u l a t i o n , m o r e o v e r , w a s re
g r o u p e d into centres controlled b y the F r e n c h army, and m a n y
m o r e escaped t o o t h e r r e g i o n s and m o v e d t o the cities. A n d in
t h e final d a y s b e f o r e i n d e p e n d e n c e it w a s n o t j u s t i n t h e c o u n t r y
s i d e , as i n M o r o c c o , t h a t F r e n c h a u t h o r i t y c o l l a p s e d . A n
e s t i m a t e d 90 p e r c e n t o f t h e s e t t l e r p o p u l a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g m u c h
o f the administration, failed t o return f r o m their s u m m e r
'holidays'.
T H E I N D E P E N D E N T R E G I M E S
H o w e v e r bitter the s t r u g g l e for i n d e p e n d e n c e h a d b e e n , the n e w

regimes maintained many o f the colonial legal and bureaucratic
f o r m s . O n e o f t h e first a c t s o f B e n B e l l a ' s g o v e r n m e n t w a s t o e n a c t
a decree, t o be superseded o n l y in 1 9 7 3 , r e v a l i d a t i n g m o s t
legislation o f the colonial r e g i m e . T h e A l g e r i a n s s i m p l y o c c u p i e d
t h e v a c a t e d F r e n c h offices a n d r e - e n a c t e d t h e i r r o u t i n e s - w i t h
s o m e F r e n c h technical assistance. E a c h r e g i m e displayed authori
t a r i a n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n h e r i t e d f r o m its c o l o n i a l p r e d e c e s s o r , f o r
c o n q u e s t o f t h e state m a c h i n e r y i n e a c h c a s e w e a k e n e d t h e
nationalist m o v e m e n t . In p o w e r , the nationalists tried t o p r e v e n t
any c o u n t e r v a i l i n g institutions from e n c o u r a g i n g and regulating
conflicting interests. T h e y almost u n a n i m o u s l y v a l u e d national
unity o v e r political participation w h e n e v e r the t w o seemed to be
in c o n f l i c t . S t i l l , t h e p a r t i c u l a r m i x o f a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m i n e a c h s t a t e
varied w i t h the d e g r e e o f bureaucratic c o n t r o l that the F r e n c h had
exercised o v e r society, the extent to w h i c h social g r o u p s w e r e
o r g a n i s e d , a n d a b o v e all t h e s o u r c e s o f l e g i t i m a c y a v a i l a b l e t o e a c h
582

leader, w i t h the constraints they m i g h t i m p o s e u p o n h i m . If p o w e r

e v e r y w h e r e a p p e a r e d c o n c e n t r a t e d , its s c o p e v a r i e d , as d i d t h e
e x t e n t t o w h i c h it t o l e r a t e d - o r h a d t o t o l e r a t e - o p p o s i t i o n a n d
t h e p l a y o f c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s . A n d p e r h a p s as i m p o r t a n t as t h e
m i x o f authoritarianism for d i s t i n g u i s h i n g the different r e g i m e s ,
w e r e the respective loci o f interests o n w h i c h they seemed,
u l t i m a t e l y , t o rest. F o r t h e s e c o u l d d e f i n e a r e g i m e ' s o b j e c t i v e s
j u s t as p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s e s c o u l d r e s h a p e i n t e r e s t s .
C u r i o u s l y it w a s t h e T u n i s i a n r e g i m e t h a t m o s t f u l l y d e v e l o p e d
the bureaucratic-authoritarian tendencies o f the colonial period.
A l t h o u g h a m o r e c o h e s i v e nationalist elite had built s t r o n g e r
p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a n its n e i g h b o u r s b e f o r e i n d e p e n d e n c e ,
t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s w o u l d , i n t h e last a n a l y s i s , s i m p l y r e i n f o r c e
bureaucratic control and eventually w i t h e r a w a y , so that the
r e g i m e t o l e r a t e d less p l u r a l i s m a n d c o n c e n t r a t e d m o r e p o w e r o n
i t s e l f t h a n t h o s e o f its n e i g h b o u r s .
B o u r g u i b a inherited intact an administrative apparatus o n l y
s l i g h t l y less e l a b o r a t e t h a n A l g e r i a ' s . B u t b e c a u s e b e n Y o u s s e f ' s
revolt had verged on civil war, B o u r g u i b a dismissed thoughts
( p u b l i c l y e n t e r t a i n e d e a r l i e r ) o f a l l o w i n g f a c t i o n s {tendances) t o
c o m p e t e w i t h i n the N e o - D e s t o u r . In 1961 he w a s to h a v e ben
Y o u s s e f assassinated. M e a n w h i l e , h a v i n g benefited d u r i n g the
c r i s i s o f 1955 f r o m U G T T s u p p o r t , h e e n c o u r a g e d r i v a l s o f t h e
t r a d e - u n i o n leader, A h m e d b e n Salah, t o d e p r i v e the latter o f his
political base. T h e issue w a s n o t s o m u c h party control o f the trade
u n i o n s as i n t r a - p a r t y p o l i t i c s . B e n S a l a h , w h o h a d b e e n a p a r t y
l e a d e r b e f o r e b e c o m i n g a t r a d e - u n i o n official, w a s p u s h i n g f o r t h e
N e o - D e s t o u r to a d o p t socialist e c o n o m i c policies that B o u r g u i b a
o p p o s e d . O n c e ben Salah had been neutralised, B o u r g u i b a m o v e d
t o r e o r g a n i s e t h e p a r t y , s u b j e c t i n g its l o c a l c e l l s i n 1 9 5 8 t o t h e
regional and local administration o f the Ministry o f the Interior
a n d p u r g i n g a n u m b e r o f its m o r e f r e e - w h e e l i n g l e a d e r s , n o t a b l y
f r o m the F e d e r a t i o n o f T u n i s . M e a n w h i l e he used his formal
p o w e r s as h e a d o f g o v e r n m e n t t o m o d i f y t h e c o m p o s i t i o n a n d
f u n c t i o n i n g o f t h e p a r t y ' s d e l i b e r a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s at t h e n a t i o n a l
level.
A f t e r B o u r g u i b a h a d b e e n i n v e s t e d as p r i m e m i n i s t e r i n 1 9 5 6
b y t h e n o m i n a l l y s o v e r e i g n b e y , a n d g a i n e d t h e full s u p p o r t o f
an elected N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y n o m i n a t e d b y the party's Political
583

T H E M A G H R I B
B u r e a u , h e w a s a b l e t h e n e x t y e a r t o e l i m i n a t e all f o r m a l
constraints u p o n his p o w e r b y the simple e x p e d i e n t o f h a v i n g the
N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y r e m o v e the b e y and declare T u n i s i a a R e p u b l i c ,
w i t h B o u r g u i b a its h e a d o f state. T h e n e w p r e s i d e n t a c q u i r e d t h e
bey's s o v e r e i g n p o w e r s and limited the National A s s e m b l y to
drafting a constitution. M e a n w h i l e he appointed and dismissed
ministers freely, and had the party's N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l m o d i f y the
c o m p o s i t i o n o f t h e P o l i t i c a l B u r e a u t o reflect h i s c h a n g e s .
G r a d u a l l y party institutions atrophied, for the effective l o c u s o f
p o w e r b e c a m e t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n c o n t r o l l e d b y a de facto p r e s i
dential r e g i m e . T h e constitution o f J u n e 1959 reflected these
realities a n d o m i t t e d a n y m e n t i o n o f t h o s e e l e m e n t s i n t h e
s t r u c t u r e s o f t h e s i n g l e - p a r t y s y s t e m t h a t in o t h e r o n e - p a r t y states
s o m e t i m e s place limits o n the exercise o f p o w e r .
T h e fusion o f party and state t e m p o r a r i l y g e n e r a t e d an e n o r
m o u s capacity to mobilise, regulate, and extract resources from
the society. E n t h u s i a s m inspired b y the independence struggle
w a s effectively c o n v e r t e d into s u p p o r t for the ' s t r u g g l e against
u n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t ' , e s p e c i a l l y after 1 9 6 1 , w h e n B o u r g u i b a d e
cided to implement ben Salah's e c o n o m i c p r o g r a m m e , w h i c h
i n v o l v e d w i d e - s c a l e r e g u l a t i o n o f t h e e c o n o m y b y t h e state. T h e
e x p e r i m e n t failed b e c a u s e b e n Salah had b e e n d e p r i v e d o f
independent s u p p o r t w i t h i n the party o r trade union. In dismissing
h i m in 1 9 6 9 , B o u r g u i b a i m p l i c i t l y a d m i t t e d t h e s h o r t c o m i n g s o f
a political s y s t e m that had placed n o limits either o n his c h o i c e
o f subordinates o r o n their exercise o f p o w e r . B u t rather than
i m p l e m e n t i n g political reforms, he p r o c e e d e d in the f o l l o w i n g
three years to re-enact the course o f events that had enabled h i m
t o c o n c e n t r a t e p o w e r o n h i m s e l f i n t h e first p l a c e . F i r s t h e
appealed to the liberals, headed b y A h m e d Mestiri, w h o had
o p p o s e d ben Salah and a d v o c a t e d a strengthening o f the party's
deliberative institutions t h r o u g h a limited exercise o f internal
d e m o c r a c y . T h e p a r t y c o n g r e s s h e l d at M o n a s t i r i n 1 9 7 1 ratified
these v i e w s , ruling that the central c o m m i t t e e elected b y the
c o n g r e s s s h o u l d in t u r n e l e c t B o u r g u i b a ' s P o l i t i c a l B u r e a u .
B o u r g u i b a , h o w e v e r , had already dismissed Mestiri from the
M i n i s t r y o f the Interior and p r o c e e d e d to a p p o i n t his o w n
P o l i t i c a l B u r e a u . A n o t h e r c o n g r e s s h e l d at M o n a s t i r in 1 9 7 4
reversed the decisions o f the earlier o n e , and m e a n w h i l e the
584

liberals w e r e p u r g e d f r o m the party a n d e v e n f r o m honorific posts

in t h e N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y .
T h e p a r t y i n fact h a d b e c o m e a h o l l o w s h e l l , a n d B o u r g u i b a ' s
l e g i t i m a c y c a m e t o rest m o r e o n h i s h i s t o r i c r o l e as f o u n d i n g
father than o n a n y c o n s e n s u s c o n c e r n i n g social r e f o r m . I n 1975
B o u r g u i b a b e c a m e president-for-life, b u t m e a n w h i l e his a p p o i n t e d
successor, Prime Minister Hedi N o u i r a , w a s able t o mobilise
c o n s i d e r a b l y less p o w e r t h a n h a d A h m e d b e n S a l a h . O p p o s i t i o n
was d e v e l o p i n g , a n d the p u r g e d leaders - Mestiri inside the
c o u n t r y a n d b e n S a l a h a b r o a d - w e r e t r y i n g t o o r g a n i s e it i n t h e
form o f n e w parties. M e a n w h i l e , a slightly y o u n g e r generation o f
apparatchiks h e a d e d b y M u h a m m a d S a y a h w a s t r y i n g t o p r e s e r v e
the one-party s y s t e m at a c o s t o f increasing repression.
Bureaucratic-authoritarian tendencies also d e v e l o p e d in the
M a g h r i b ' s o t h e r single-party state, A l g e r i a . B u t n o A l g e r i a n
enjoyed the solid s u p p o r t that the N e o - D e s t o u r h a d afforded
Bourguiba, and consequently the consolidation o f p o w e r in
Algeria w a s a m o r e c o m p l e x process. Bereft o f organised forces,
other than Boumedienne's A r m e e Nationale Populaire ( A N P ) ,
A h m e d B e n Bella made believe, a n d perhaps actually did believe,
that he w a s consolidating p o w e r b y h a v i n g the F L N nominate a
National Constituent A s s e m b l y that he c o u l d dominate. T h e
constitution o f September 1963 formally delineated a highly
centralised presidential system a n d explicitly prescribed for the
F L N a role n o t dissimilar from that practised b y the N e o - D e s t o u r
in T u n i s i a . B e n Bella c o m p l e t e d his edifice in 1964 b y c o n v e n i n g
a party congress that acclaimed his p r o g r a m m e w i t h f e w m o d i
fications, mostly c o n c e r n i n g the role o f Islam. T h e Charter o f
A l g i e r s castigated the state f o r ' b u r e a u c r a t i s m ' , w h i l e g l o r i f y i n g
an ideal b u t i n t a n g i b l e party. B o u m e d i e n n e w o u l d sardonically
o b s e r v e that B e n Bella's advisers called for ' " t h e w i t h e r i n g a w a y
1
o f t h e s t a t e " b e f o r e it has b e e n c o n s t r u c t e d ' .
2
U n d e r l y i n g t h e charter's ' t h e o r e t i c a l i n t o x i c a t i o n ' w a s t h e fact
o f B e n Bella ' h a v i n g t o rely u p o n the a r m y t o remain in p o w e r
w h i l e at t h e s a m e time s e e k i n g t o u n d e r m i n e B o u m e d i e n n e ' s
3
i n f l u e n c e ' . E a c h t i m e i n 1963 a n d 1 9 6 4 t h a t g u e r r i l l a l e a d e r s t o o k
1
C i t e d b y J e a n L e c a a n d J e a n - C l a u d e V a t i n , UAlgeriepolitique: institutions et regime
2
( P a r i s , 1975), 270. y lbid. 270.
3
W i l l i a m B . Q u a n d t , Revolution and political leadership: Algeria, 19)4-1968 ( C a m
b r i d g e , M a s s . , 1969), 228.
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T H E M A G H R I B
up arms to pressure B e n Bella for a greater share o f political

influence, he called u p o n the A N P t o p u t t h e m d o w n . T h e net
result w a s greater influence for B o u m e d i e n n e ' s O u j d a g r o u p ,
w h i c h h a d b e e n n a m e d after t h e M o r o c c a n b o r d e r t o w n w h e r e
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, A h m e d Medeghri, A h m e d K a i d , and Cherif
B e l k a c e m had served w i t h B o u m e d i e n n e in 1 9 5 7 . B e n Bella
a t t e m p t e d t o l i m i t t h e g r o u p ' s i n f l u e n c e b y c o n c e n t r a t i n g a t its
expense m o r e formal p o w e r s in his o w n hands a n d b y c o o p t i n g
s o m e o f t h e f o r m e r wilaya l e a d e r s i n t o t h e p a r t y . H e e v e n
appointed T a h a r Z b i r i and M o h a m m e d Chaabani to k e y posts in
the A N P w i t h o u t B o u m e d i e n n e ' s consent. T h e tactic d i d n o t
w o r k . Chaabani openly rebelled and w a s captured b y the army and
executed o n orders from B e n Bella, against B o u m e d i e n n e ' s
wishes. Z b i r i o b s e r v e d that B e n Bella * constantly s o u g h t t o create
clans, o p p o s i n g o n e t o the other, s o that w h e n o n e clan w a s
1
destroyed, he w o u l d create a n e w o n e t o destroy those r e m a i n i n g ' .
O n c e B o u m e d i e n n e felt s u f f i c i e n t l y t h r e a t e n e d t o s t a g e a c o u p ,
Z b i r i sided w i t h h i m a n d led the squad that arrested B e n Bella
w i t h o u t b l o o d s h e d in the early hours o f 19 June 1 9 6 5 .
I n ' readjusting' the r e v o l u t i o n B o u m e d i e n n e stressed collective
l e a d e r s h i p , b u t a l s o t h e n e e d f o r a s t r o n g s t a t e a p p a r a t u s t o fulfil
revolutionary goals. In practice he had already concentrated
c o n s i d e r a b l e p o w e r b y staffing t h e A N P w i t h f o r m e r o f f i c e r s o f
the F r e n c h army. W i t h o u t r e v o l u t i o n a r y credentials o f their o w n ,
they w e r e necessarily loyal. T h e higher civil service, t o o , w a s
staffed i n l a r g e p a r t b y A l g e r i a n s w h o h a d w o r k e d u n d e r t h e
F r e n c h a n d their interests also c o n v e r g e d w i t h those o f a r e g i m e
d e t e r m i n e d t o p r o t e c t t h e state apparatus f r o m interference b y t h e
F L N . Legislation w a s immediately passed guaranteeing the rights
o f civil servants. C o m m u n a l elections in 1967 h a d the result o f
d e v e l o p i n g local clienteles that w e r e dependent o n the Ministry
o f the Interior (controlled b y a m e m b e r o f the Oujda group) t o
t h e d e t r i m e n t o f w h a t w a s left o f t h e p a r t y ' s i n f l u e n c e .
Theoretically, collective leadership w a s exercised b y the C o u n c i l
o f the R e v o l u t i o n , a s h a d o w y 26-man b o d y , the composition o f
w h i c h w a s p u b l i s h e d o n l y a m o n t h after t h e c o u p . I t i n c l u d e d
substantial numbers o f former guerrilla leaders, w h o w e r e also
1
C i t e d b y Q u a n d t , Revolution, 228. I n A l g e r i a n p o l i t i c a l j a r g o n a c l a n m e a n s a c l i q u e
o f politicians, n o t necessarily related b y either family o r i d e o l o g i c a l ties, b u t sharing
tactical interests. T h e ' O u j d a g r o u p * w o u l d b e o n e e x c e p t i o n a l l y d u r a b l e e x a m p l e .
586

c o - o p t e d i n t o the party secretariat b u t e x c l u d e d f r o m the real

p o w e r centres in the A N P , the security forces, a n d the k e y
ministries. B y 1967 collective leadership, other than that exercised
by the closely knit O u j d a g r o u p , w a s n o l o n g e r functioning. A
banal labour dispute triggered an uprising in the army, led b y
T a h a r Z b i r i , b u t forces loyal t o B o u m e d i e n n e easily suppressed
it, a n d Z b i r i ' s p o t e n t i a l allies i n t h e c o u n c i l a n d i n t h e p a r t y w e r e
a l s o r e m o v e d f r o m office. Z b i r i e s c a p e d t o T u n i s i a , b u t a s e n i o r
f e l l o w officer, Said A b i d , w a s r e p o r t e d t o h a v e c o m m i t t e d suicide.
H a v i n g consolidated p o w e r , B o u m e d i e n n e freely e n c o u r a g e d the
d e v e l o p m e n t o f a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e state u n d e r l e a d e r s h i p r e c r u i t e d
p r i m a r i l y f o r its p r o f e s s i o n a l s k i l l s r a t h e r t h a n p r e v i o u s p o l i t i c a l
affiliations. S i n c e , h o w e v e r , t h e p a r t y r e m a i n e d e f f e c t i v e l y a n
e m p t y s h e l l d e s p i t e r e p e a t e d a t t e m p t s t o ' r e s t r u c t u r e ' it, t h e
r e g i m e c o u l d n o t acquire the capacity temporarily generated in
Tunisia to mobilise and regulate society. Until 1977 the o n l y
structures for eliciting political participation w e r e ' p o p u l a r
a s s e m b l i e s ' at t h e c o m m u n a l a n d , after 1 9 6 9 , mlqya l e v e l .
B o u m e d i e n n e tried in 1972 t o build u p a p o p u l a r base b y
e m b a r k i n g u p o n land reform, a lengthy process that succeeded
in splintering the O u j d a g r o u p . A h m e d K a i d w a s dismissed f r o m
h i s p o s i t i o n as p a r t y d i r e c t o r , a n d I n t e r i o r M i n i s t e r A h m e d
M e d e g h r i died in 1974 in circumstances that remain o b s c u r e .
P o s s i b l y as a r e s u l t o f t h e s e e v e n t s , C h e r i f B e l k a c e m b e c a m e
p o l i t i c a l l y i n a c t i v e , a n d A b d e l a z i z B o u t e f l i k a , w h i l e r e m a i n i n g as
foreign minister, appeared to play a s o m e w h a t independent
political role b y v i r t u e o f his personal c o n n e x i o n s . In the face o f
i n c r e a s i n g e c o n o m i c d i f f i c u l t i e s , B o u m e d i e n n e h a s t i l y set a b o u t
establishing constitutional structures that w o u l d formally c o n c e n
trate political p o w e r o n himself. First a n e w national charter
w a s p u b l i c l y d i s c u s s e d a n d ratified b y p l e b i s c i t e i n J u n e 1 9 7 6 .
T h e n , w i t h little d i s c u s s i o n , a c o n s t i t u t i o n w a s s i m i l a r l y ratified
in N o v e m b e r , f o l l o w e d b y a presidential election o f the single
c a n d i d a t e , B o u m e d i e n n e , a n d finally, i n F e b r u a r y 1 9 7 7 , b y
N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y elections. W h i l e granting m o r e p o w e r to the
p r e s i d e n t t h a n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1963 h a d a c c o r d e d t o B e n B e l l a ,
the n e w o n e also permitted B o u m e d i e n n e to appoint a vice-
p r e s i d e n t arid p r i m e m i n i s t e r . B u t f r o m M a y 1 9 7 7 h e w a s r u l i n g
w i t h o u t organised political support. A plurality o f fragile c o
a l i t i o n s c o n t i n u e d , as u n d e r B e n B e l l a , t o c o m p e t e f o r p o l i t i c a l
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T H E M A G H R I B
influence, but their p o w e r bases d e p e n d e d o n personal relation

ships a m o n g officers a n d a d m i n i s t r a t o r s rather t h a n o n g u e r r i l l a
n e t w o r k s or p o p u l a r folio w i n g s . A s in one-party T u n i s i a , a
pervasive administration contained and muted conflict b e t w e e n
social forces, p r e v e n t i n g t h e m from organising.
In M o r o c c o , b y contrast, the m o n a r c h y e n c o u r a g e d political
c o m p e t i t i o n a m o n g different s o c i a l g r o u p s o n t h e p r i n c i p l e o f
d i v i d e a n d r u l e . N o t m u c h s t i m u l a t i o n w a s n e e d e d , as t h e p o l i t i c a l
f o r c e s u n l e a s h e d b y i n d e p e n d e n c e w e r e h e t e r o g e n e o u s b u t at t h e
s a m e t i m e r e l a t i v e l y c o h e s i v e . T h e y h a d b e e n less f r a g m e n t e d b y
colonial conquest and nationalist m o v e m e n t s than those o f
M o r o c c o ' s more intensively colonised neighbours. T h e only
potential threat to M o h a m m e d V ' s authority w a s the Istiqlal
Party. It a d v o c a t e d a constitutional m o n a r c h y b u t also u r g e d the
formation o f a ' h o m o g e n e o u s , ' that is, one-party g o v e r n m e n t t o
take o v e r the administrative apparatus o f the Protectorate - and
i n effect t o s u b j e c t t h e s o v e r e i g n t o a n e w P r o t e c t o r a t e . M o h a m m e d
V , instead, a w a r d e d cabinet positions to a splinter rival party
w h i l e r e s e r v i n g leadership o f the n e w royal a r m e d forces for his
son, Hassan, and other key security posts for unconditional
monarchists. T h o u g h he w a s unable to p r e v e n t the Istiqlal f r o m
g a i n i n g s o m e cabinet positions, neither did he d i s c o u r a g e rural
expressions o f discontent against administrators f r o m the cities
i m p o s e d b y the party.
T h e k i n g p u r s u e d a strategy n o t unlike that attempted b y the
administration o f the French Protectorate. H e e n c o u r a g e d
t r a d i t i o n a l r u r a l n o t a b l e s , o f t e n o f t h e s a m e f a m i l i e s as t h o s e
e a r l i e r t h r u s t a g a i n s t h i m b y t h e r e s i d e n t - g e n e r a l , t o a c t as a
c o u n t e r w e i g h t t o t h e I s t i q l a l . W h e n finally i n 1 9 5 8 h e p e r m i t t e d
a ' h o m o g e n e o u s ' g o v e r n m e n t to be formed, a rural rebellion
o b l i g e d it t o r e c o g n i s e t h e M o u v e m e n t P o p u l a i r e , a p a r t y o f
predominantly Berber supporters o f the monarchy. M e a n w h i l e
t h e I s t i q l a l i t s e l f s p l i t u n d e r t h e s t r a i n s felt b y t h e m i n i s t e r s
because o f c o m p e t i n g loyalties to k i n g and party, and w i t h the
backing o f the U n i o n Marocaine du Travail ( U M T ) a n e w ,
ostensibly m o r e radical party, the U n i o n N a t i o n a l e des F o r c e s
P o p u l a i r e s ( U N F P ) w a s f o u n d e d in J a n u a r y 1 9 5 9 . S u b s e q u e n t
d i v i s i o n s b e t w e e n its r a d i c a l i n t e l l e c t u a l s a n d its t r a d e - u n i o n b a s e
w o u l d also be exploited b y the m o n a r c h y .
B y the t i m e he died in 1 9 6 1 , M o h a m m e d V h a d c o n s o l i d a t e d
588

the m o n a r c h y ' s c o n t r o l o f the c o u n t r y s i d e t h r o u g h n e t w o r k s o f

notables associated w i t h the Ministry o f the Interior. C o m m u n a l
elections held in i960 further d e m o n s t r a t e d that the Istiqlal,
c h a l l e n g e d in the cities b y the U N F P , c o u l d n o l o n g e r d r a w a
majority o f the v o t e s . T h e time n o w seemed ripe to modernise
t h e m o n a r c h y . H a s s a n I I , w h o h a d s t u d i e d l a w at t h e U n i v e r s i t y
o f B o r d e a u x , w a s m o r e r e f o r m - m i n d e d than his father and ready
t o t r a n s f o r m h i s t r a d i t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y as a n a r b i t e r i n t o t h a t o f a
plebiscitary monarch-president. W i t h the collaboration o f A h m e d
R e d a G u e d i r a , w h o w a s a politically astute, French-trained l a w y e r ,
and m o r e in the tradition o f N a p o l e o n III than o f Charles de
Gaulle, Hassan aimed to acquire a strong democratic majority by
e x p l o i t i n g urban divisions w h i l e k e e p i n g his solid rural base, and
then to undertake reforms that w o u l d undercut support for the
U N F P . T h e first p h a s e o f t h e o p e r a t i o n w a s a s u c c e s s . T h e
c o n s t i t u t i o n ' t h a t I h a v e m a d e w i t h m y o w n t w o h a n d s ' (a
G a u l l i s t e c h o ) w a s o v e r w h e l m i n g l y ratified b y p o p u l a r r e f e r e n d u m
o n 7 D e c e m b e r 1962. Calls b y the U N F P for abstention, m o r e o v e r ,
w e r e n o t fully e n d o r s e d b y the U M T . T h e Istiqlal w a s then
d i s m i s s e d f r o m t h e g o v e r n m e n t , lest i n t h e s u b s e q u e n t l e g i s l a t i v e
e l e c t i o n s it c a p i t a l i s e o n its a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h t h e t r i u m p h a n t p a l a c e .
T h e k i n g , h o w e v e r , w a s n o t w i l l i n g t o c o m p r o m i s e his
non-partisan status b y o p e n l y identifying w i t h G u e d i r a ' s n e w
party, the F r o n t D é m o c r a t i q u e des Institutions Constitutionnelles
( F D I C ) . C o n s e q u e n t l y the s e c o n d phase failed. In b o l d l y c o n c e i v e d
but hastily arranged legislative elections G u e d i r a w a s unable to
w i n a majority o f the seats. M o r e o v e r the F D I C w a s a h e t e r o
g e n e o u s coalition o f palace personalities and traditional notables
from the Popular M o v e m e n t , w h i c h w a s also divided. W i t h the
h e l p o f s c a t t e r e d i n d e p e n d e n t d e p u t i e s it a c h i e v e d a p a r l i a m e n t a r y
m a j o r i t y , b u t t h e o p p o s i t i o n p l a y e d o n its d i v i s i o n s r a t h e r t h a n
vice versa. Instead o f b o w i n g to a n e w parliamentary majority,
the k i n g b r o u g h t the constitutional experiment to an end b y
d e c l a r i n g a state o f e m e r g e n c y i n J u n e 1 9 6 5 . H e c o n t i n u e d t o r e l y
o n rural support to rule the cities, but had to a b a n d o n any
s u s t a i n e d efforts a t r e f o r m l e s t t h e y u n d e r c u t t h e m o n a r c h y r a t h e r
than progressive urban forces. Despite a n e w constitution
p r o m u l g a t e d i n 1 9 7 0 , p o l i t i c a l life r e m a i n e d i n s u s p e n s e ,
increasingly subject to police repression ultimately b a c k e d b y the
royal a r m e d forces. Hassan kept his M i n i s t e r o f the Interior,
589

T H E M A G H R I B
G e n e r a l O u f k i r , in p o w e r , despite his alleged part in the k i d n a p

p i n g and p r e s u m e d assassination o f M e h d i ben Barka, the
p r i n c i p a l l e a d e r o f t h e leftist U N F P , i n P a r i s i n 1 9 6 5 , u n t i l t h e
g e n e r a l t u r n e d a g a i n s t t h e k i n g i n 1 9 7 2 . P a r a d o x i c a l l y , t h e at
tempted c o u p s o f 1971 and 1972 from w h i c h the k i n g mira
c u l o u s l y e s c a p e d w i t h h i s life t e n d e d t o f o r t i f y h i s l e g i t i m a c y as a n
i n d i s p e n s a b l e a r b i t e r a m o n g u r b a n f o r c e s fearful o f m i l i t a r y
d i c t a t o r s h i p . I n M a y 1 9 7 7 , all t h e p a r t i e s p a r t i c i p a t e d i n l e g i s l a t i v e
elections u n d e r a n e w constitution, p r o m u l g a t e d in 1 9 7 2 , that
offered less d i r e c t p o p u l a r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h a n t h a t o f 1 9 6 2 . T h e
k i n g c o n t i n u e d t o c o n t r o l t h e state a p p a r a t u s i n h e r i t e d f r o m t h e
P r o t e c t o r a t e w h i l e also d e t e r m i n i n g t o his tactical a d v a n t a g e the
g r o u n d rules for political participation. B u t in r e l y i n g for social
control u p o n pluralistic competition, he exercised considerably
less p o w e r t o effect s o c i a l c h a n g e t h a n t h e M a g h r i b ' s o t h e r
a u t h o r i t a r i a n r u l e r s c o u l d at t i m e s m a r s h a l .
A u t h o r i t a r i a n g o v e r n m e n t s that are neither fully c o n s t i t u t i o n a l

n o r buttressed b y a totalitarian i d e o l o g y usually h a v e difficulty in
acquiring legitimacy. T h e N o r t h African regimes were no
e x c e p t i o n . T h e y e a c h benefited initially f r o m their respective
leaders' i n v o l v e m e n t in the struggle for independence, but
eventually they had to g r o u n d their authority in other forms o f
l e g i t i m a t i o n . S h o r t l y after t a k i n g p o w e r , f o r i n s t a n c e , B e n B e l l a
tried t o acquire ' r e v o l u t i o n a r y ' legitimacy b y p r o m o t i n g an
A l g e r i a n ' s o c i a l i s m ' based o n the idea o f a self-managed industrial
a n d a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r . T h e m y t h o f autogestton, h o w e v e r , w a s a n
u n f o r t u n a t e c h o i c e b e c a u s e it j u s t i f i e d a p r i v i l e g e d s t a t u s f o r t h e
w o r k e r s o f f o r m e r c o l o n i a l estates and small enterprises, rather
than for the marginal peasants and others w h o had contributed
m u c h m o r e to the revolution. P r o m o t i n g self-management,
m o r e o v e r , did not seem quite compatible with building a strong
state. B o u m e d i e n n e s c r a p p e d autogestion i n f a v o u r o f a t h r e e - f o l d
industrial, cultural, and agrarian revolution to be carried out
u n d e r t h e d i r e c t i o n o f a s t r o n g state. I n T u n i s i a , t o o , a t h o r o u g h
'structural transformation' o f the e c o n o m y under the banner
' D e s t o u r S o c i a l i s m ' w a s s u p p o s e d t o e n g e n d e r e c o n o m i c take-off.
U n t i l B o u r g u i b a halted the e x p e r i m e n t in 1969, the m y t h c o n
v e n i e n t l y j u s t i f i e d state i n t e r v e n t i o n . I n M o r o c c o , g i v e n its o s
t e n s i b l y l i b e r a l e c o n o m y , t h e r e w a s less stress u p o n a c h i e v e m e n t .
Instead, a peculiarly M o r o c c a n synthesis o f o r t h o d o x and mara-
590

9 1
boutic Islam enlisted politically strategic * traditional intellectuals
i n s u p p o r t o f t h e m o n a r c h y . S o a l s o i n T u n i s i a , after 1970 a n
obsession w i t h the history and m y t h o l o g y o f the national m o v e
ment w a s intended t o refurbish B o u r g u i b a ' s image.
W i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f autogestion, t h e m y t h s d i d n o t o v e r t l y
express the interests o f a particular class o r social s e g m e n t ;
T u n i s i a n a n d A l g e r i a n s o c i a l i s m i n t h e i r official f o r m s r e j e c t e d t h e
inevitability o f class conflict. E a c h r e g i m e s e e m e d , h o w e v e r , t o
be conditioned b y underlying social forces, e v e n if each also
e n j o y e d a m e a s u r e o f a u t o n o m y e n a b l i n g it t o r e s h a p e t h e m . O n
balance the M o r o c c a n monarchy, b y e n c o u r a g i n g social pluralism,
s e e m e d t h e m o s t i m m o b i l i s e d b y t h e f o r c e s it h a d h e l p e d t o c r e a t e .
Since social control depended u p o n maximising the n u m b e r o f
c o n t e n d i n g forces, t h e r e g i m e c o u l d n o t systematically sacrifice
the interests o f any for the sake o f an o v e r a l l d e s i g n . F o r instance,
sufficient c o n c e s s i o n s h a d t o b e m a d e t o t h e u r b a n p r o l e t a r i a t t o
maintain the credibility o f the U n i o n Marocaine d u Travail,
b e c a u s e it s e r v e d as a c o u n t e r w e i g h t t o t h e U N F P . Y e t t h e
c o m m e r c i a l interests o f the Fassi b o u r g e o i s i e also h a d t o b e
r e s p e c t e d , lest t h e I s t i q l a l r e j o i n i t s r i v a l . I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n a t t h e
expense o f the countryside, o r e v e n agrarian reform, had t o b e
ruled o u t because such policies w o u l d have endangered the royal
control o f the countryside exercised t h r o u g h traditional notables.
M o r o c c a n s o c i e t y w a s in fact far m o r e c o m p l e x t h a n p a r t y labels
indicated. T h e notables o f the Popular M o v e m e n t , for instance,
did n o t constitute a h o m o g e n e o u s social force. T h e m o n a r c h y w a s
c
constrained b y neither a landed feudal ' n o r an urban b o u r g e o i s
class, b u t it h a d t o b u y off influential i n d i v i d u a l s a n d families t o
m i n i m i s e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f different i n t e r e s t s c o a l e s c i n g . A t first
the r o y a l p a t r o n a g e n e t w o r k s d e p e n d e d u p o n a judicious distri
b u t i o n o f t h e spoils o f settler s o c i e t y ; s u b s e q u e n t l y u n d e r H a s s a n
I I , ' p l a n n e d c o r r u p t i o n * i n v o l v e d v i r t u a l l y all p o l i t i c a l a c t o r s
w i t h t h e s u p r e m e fixer, t h e k i n g . T h e m a j o r c o n s t r a i n t u p o n t h e
m o n a r c h y w a s t h e m o r a l as w e l l a s t h e financial e x p e n s e , y e t
' M o r o c c o c o u l d u n d e r t a k e its o w n h o u s e c l e a n i n g o n l y at t h e c o s t
2
o f reduced political c o n t r o l ' .
In Algeria, b y contrast, social forces w e r e considerably m o r e
fragmented b y independence, and the regime managed to keep
1
R é m y L e v e a u , Le Fellah marocain défenseur du trône ( P a r i s , 1976), 9 1 - 4 , s t r e s s e s t h e
political influence o f these élites trained in traditional Islamic s c h o o l s a n d universities.
2
J o h n W a t e r b u r y , ' C o r r u p t i o n , political stability a n d d e v e l o p m e n t : E g y p t a n d
M o r o c c o ' , Government and Opposition, 1976, 1 1 , 4, 437.
591

T H E M A G H R I B
corruption under control despite p u m p i n g considerable oil wealth

into the public sector. Consequently neither organised pressure
groups n o r vertically integrated patronage n e t w o r k s put u p o n the
r e g i m e constraints that w e r e a n a l o g o u s t o those existing in
M o r o c c o . O n c e Boumedienne had consolidated p o w e r , the
r e g i m e , in fact, e n j o y e d c o n s i d e r a b l y m o r e a u t o n o m y t h a n either
o f its n e i g h b o u r s . T o b e s u r e , s o c i a l i n e q u a l i t i e s b e c a m e v i s i b l e
after i n d e p e n d e n c e , d e s p i t e a n officially s o c i a l i s t i d e o l o g y , b u t t h e
spoils o f settler society w e r e distributed m o r e s p o n t a n e o u s l y a n d
widely than in M o r o c c o , and did n o t consolidate either an
Algerian bourgeoisie o r any other organised social force.
T h e r e w a s n o h a r d e v i d e n c e that t h e state's m a n a g e r s a n d
higher civil servants constituted o r were in the process o f
constituting a self-perpetuating ruling class. H o w e v e r , s o m e
M a r x i s t critics h a v e a r g u e d that, o n c e B o u m e d i e n n e h a d crushed
t h e Z b i r i r e v o l t a n d w i t h it p r e s s u r e s f o r s e l f - m a n a g e m e n t , t h e
regime consolidated an administrative bourgeoisie. Indeed, be
cause o f the earlier d e v e l o p m e n t o f A l g e r i a n capitalism d u r i n g the
c o l o n i a l e r a , t h e l a n d w a s e v e n less e q u i t a b l y d i s t r i b u t e d i n A l g e r i a
t h a n i n M o r o c c o . I t is p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e c i v i l s e r v a n t s a n d
technocrats recruited into the state apparatus b y v i r t u e o f their
educational qualifications came from the relatively m o r e privileged
landed families. C o m m u n a l reform in A l g e r i a m a y also h a v e
e n h a n c e d t h e i n f l u e n c e o f t h e s e f a m i l i e s w i t h i n t h e state a p p a r a t u s ,
w h i c h , as i n M o r o c c o , w a s c o n t r o l l e d a n d r e g u l a t e d t h r o u g h t h e
Ministry o f the Interior rather than the party. W i t h i n B o u m e d i -
e n n e ' s c o r e o f p r o f e s s i o n a l officers i m p o r t a n t f a m i l i e s w e r e a l s o
r e p r e s e n t e d , a s is i l l u s t r a t e d b y t h e p r e s e n c e w i t h i n t h e O u j d a
g r o u p o f A h m e d K a i d and A h m e d M e d e g h r i . B u t the agrarian
r e f o r m o f 1 9 7 2 , w h a t e v e r its l o n g - r u n i m p a c t , fulfilled o n e
immediate short-term purpose. B y w i p i n g o u t absentee land
o w n e r s a n d l i m i t i n g p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y , it b r o k e u p n a s c e n t
c o n n e x i o n s b e t w e e n t h e l a n d o w n i n g b o u r g e o i s i e a n d t h e official
c o n t r o l l i n g state apparatus. A s B o u m e d i e n n e explained in intro
4
d u c i n g the r e f o r m , Either the agrarian revolution will s u c c e e d . . .
or w e will e n d u p w i t h a n e w Algerian bourgeoisie that will
perhaps b e t o u g h e r a n d m o r e vile than the colonial b o u r g e o i s i e
1
that used t o exploit u s . ' T h e other possible social base for an
administrative b o u r g e o i s i e w a s the private industrial sector, b u t
1
Annmirt de l*Afrique du Nord, 1972, 1 1 , 720.
2
59

a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e g u l a t i o n s a n d t a x a t i o n l a w s w e r e still s t i f l i n g i t
in t h e m i d - 1 9 7 0 s . C o l l u s i o n b e t w e e n t h e p u b l i c a n d p r i v a t e s e c t o r
might eventually generate a bourgeoisie, but meanwhile the
regime enjoyed considerable autonomy and seemed constrained
only b y personal rivalries a m o n g the t o p leadership a n d perhaps,
as a r e s u l t o f its m i l i t a r y b a c k g r o u n d , b y i t s v e r y d e t a c h m e n t f r o m
civil society.
Until 1969 the Tunisian regime enjoyed greater coherence than
e i t h e r o f its n e i g h b o u r s b y v i r t u e o f i t s g r o u n d i n g i n a p o l i t i c a l
class created before i n d e p e n d e n c e . T h i s class c o u l d b e identified
w i t h an educated élite, b u t n o t w i t h a n y o f the social g r o u p s , s u c h
as w o r k e r s , m e r c h a n t s o r l a n d o w n e r s , c o n t r o l l e d b y t h e p a r t y
t h r o u g h the national organisations. It s e e m e d f o r a w h i l e , in fact,
t h a t t h e o n l y m a j o r c o n s t r a i n t u p o n b e n S a l a h ' s efforts t o
transform T u n i s i a n e c o n o m i c a n d class structures w a s insufficient
capital a c c u m u l a t i o n in w h a t after all w a s t h e p o o r e s t o f t h e t h r e e
Maghribian societies. Possibly the hesitations o f international
o r g a n i s a t i o n s , n o t a b l y t h e W o r l d B a n k , t o k e e p financing e x p e n
1
s i v e state p r o j e c t s c o n t r i b u t e d t o b e n S a l a h ' s d o w n f a l l . B u t h i s
a m b i t i o u s attempts t o regulate virtually all sectors o f the e c o n o m y
cut deeply into the regime's political credit at h o m e . F o r instance,
the party replaced a veteran trade unionist, H a b i b A c h o u r , w i t h
a p r o v i n c i a l g o v e r n o r at the head o f the U G T T , in order t o p u n i s h
the union for protesting against currency devaluation in 1964.
N e i t h e r party n o r u n i o n c o u l d retain plausible claims t o represent
a n y t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e state apparatus.
A s t h e party disintegrated u n d e r t h e i m p a c t o f b e n Salah's state
capitalism, the social forces that h a d originally created it freed
t h e m s e l v e s f r o m its d i s c i p l i n e . I f b e n S a l a h c o u l d r e l y u p o n t h e
party t o i m p l e m e n t r e f o r m s o f w h o l e s a l e a n d e v e n retail c o m m e r c e
that primarily hit p e o p l e f r o m D j e r b a w h o played a d o m i n a n t role
i n t h e s e s e c t o r s , h e c o u l d n o t c o u n t o n it t o t r a n s f o r m a g r a r i a n
structures i n its historic s t r o n g h o l d , t h e Sahel. It w a s a r e v o l t o f
peasants f r o m O u a r d a n i n e , a village that had o n c e supplied
fellaghas f o r B o u r g u i b a , t h a t s e a l e d b e n S a l a h ' s f a t e . E v e n s o , t h e
peasants p r o b a b l y h a d n o t demonstrated spontaneously, for
leading m e m b e r s o f t h e political class h a d a c c u m u l a t e d p r o p e r t y
after i n d e p e n d e n c e , i n c l u d i n g s o m e o f t h e s e t t l e r s ' l a n d a n d o t h e r
small enterprises. A f t e r b e n Salah's demise in 1969 parts o f the
1
J e a n P o n c e t , ha Tunisie à la recherche de son avenir ( P a r i s , 1974), 96.
593

T H E M A G H R I B
public sector, including land and i m p o r t - e x p o r t m o n o p o l i e s , also

reverted to private and politically well connected hands.
Contracting business and the tourist 'industry', already d e v e l o p
i n g d u r i n g the b e n Salah era, s u b s e q u e n t l y flourished. It seemed
possible that the new Tunisian bourgeoisie would begin to
d e v e l o p sufficient a u t o n o m y t o u n d e r m i n e p a r t y h e g e m o n y . A t
the same time the trade-union m o v e m e n t w a s also b e c o m i n g m o r e
independent under a leadership that had o w e d m o r e t o Farhat
H a c h e d than to B o u r g u i b a . R e g i o n a l rivalries seemed, t o o , to be
intensifying in the m i d - 1 9 7 0 s ; the party's leadership w a s increas
i n g l y S a h e l i a n , as w e r e t h e t o p m i n i s t e r s a n d o t h e r h o l d e r s o f
strategic offices; m o r e o v e r , conflict w i t h i n the t o p leadership
tended t o reflect traditional rivalries a m o n g Sahel villages. I f
u n d e r B o u r g u i b a t h e r e g i m e still e n j o y e d a c e r t a i n a u t o n o m y , it
seemed o n l y a matter o f time before the various social forces
w o u l d p r o d u c e a m o r e pluralistic system.
S T R A T E G I E S OF D E V E L O P M E N T
In the areas o f e c o n o m i c a n d cultural p o l i c y , the three r e g i m e s

p u r s u e d different strategies w h i c h reflected the differences in their
u n d e r l y i n g social bases. A l g e r i a after 1967 a n d T u n i s i a until 1969
v i g o r o u s l y e x p a n d e d their p u b l i c sectors; in 1970 total p u b l i c
e x p e n d i t u r e s c o m p r i s e d 43 a n d 4 1 p e r c e n t o f t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e
G D P s , c o m p a r e d t o a M o r o c c a n t o t a l o f o n l y 26 p e r c e n t . E v e n
d i s c o u n t i n g p e t r o l e u m r e v e n u e s , rates o f p u b l i c e x p e n d i t u r e w e r e
c o n s i d e r a b l y h i g h e r in A l g e r i a and T u n i s i a than in M o r o c c o .
Boosted by petroleum revenues, Algerian public investment was
a l m o s t t r i p l e t h a t o f M o r o c c o after 1 9 7 3 , t h o u g h M o r o c c o h a d
the s l i g h t l y larger p o p u l a t i o n . C l e a r l y A l g e r i a c o u l d afford t o
e m b a r k u p o n m o r e a m b i t i o u s d e v e l o p m e n t p l a n s t h a n its n e i g h
b o u r s . T o s u s t a i n its ' r e v o l u t i o n a r y ' l e g i t i m a c y , t h e s t a t e w a s t o
i m p l a n t ' industrialising industries', or industries that w o u l d lead
t o further industrialisation, w h e r e a s M o r o c c o , f o l l o w e d after 1969
by Tunisia, simply p r o m o t e d enclaves exporting agricultural and
m i n e r a l p r o d u c e t o E u r o p e , a n d s e r v i c i n g its t o u r i s t s . Y e t it w a s
hardly certain that i m p o r t i n g expensive factories utilising the
latest t e c h n o l o g i e s w o u l d liberate the A l g e r i a n e c o n o m y , m u c h
less result in self-sustaining industrial e x p a n s i o n . T h e s u c c e s s o f
t h e A l g e r i a n e x p e r i m e n t d e p e n d e d a l s o i n p a r t o n its c u l t u r a l a n d
594

S T R A T E G I E S OF D E V E L O P M E N T
agrarian * r e v o l u t i o n s ' - d e v e l o p m e n t in areas w h e r e M o r o c c o

and Tunisia had m o r e coherent infrastructures.
I n t h e t e n y e a r s f o l l o w i n g i n d e p e n d e n c e it w a s T u n i s i a t h a t p l a c e d
the greatest stress o n ' h u m a n i n v e s t m e n t ' , f o r the B o u r g u i b i s t
élite h a d b e e n c o n v i n c e d t h a t e d u c a t i o n w a s t h e k e y t o p r o g r e s s .
E v e n before e n g a g i n g in systematic e c o n o m i c p l a n n i n g , B o u r
guiba urged a psychological revolution against ' r e t r o g r a d e ' be
h a v i o u r s u c h as w o m e n w e a r i n g v e i l s ( ' t h o s e filthy r a g s ' ) a n d
w o r k e r s slacking off d u r i n g the m o n t h o f R a m a d a n ( w h e n
M u s l i m s a r e e x p e c t e d t o fast b e t w e e n s u n r i s e a n d s u n s e t ) . I n 195 8
he virtually destroyed the bastion o f the religious establishment,
Z i t o u n a U n i v e r s i t y , t o g e t h e r w i t h its s u p p o r t i n g K o r a n i c s c h o o l s ,
by integrating them w i t h the national educational system. B o u r
g u i b a c o u l d w a g e his veritable cultural r e v o l u t i o n , o f c o u r s e , o n l y
because o f w i d e s p r e a d s u p p o r t f r o m a bilingual élite that in turn
m a n a g e d the apparatus o f a mass party. E v e n so, he had to
back-track o v e r R a m a d a n . In retrospect, his major c o n t r i b u t i o n
to Tunisia m a y h a v e been to unify and almost universalise an
essentially bilingual f o r m o f instruction, thus perpetuating an
o p e n , E u r o p e - o r i e n t e d é l i t e a n d g i v i n g it a m a s s b a s e . U n l i k e
Ataturk, h o w e v e r , he subsequently made peace w i t h the Islamic
e s t a b l i s h m e n t a n d a p p r o p r i a t e l y a p p o i n t e d as muftî a b i l i n g u a l
scholar w h o headed the Islamic Studies department o f the U n i
versity o f T u n i s , thus furthering Tunisia's cultural interactions.
F o r different reasons neither M o r o c c o n o r A l g e r i a w a s a c h i e v
ing such a balance. In M o r o c c o the m o n a r c h y required the
legitimation o f traditional intellectuals; hence the Q a r a w i y i n e
U n i v e r s i t y at F e z a n d t h e B e n Y o u s s e f U n i v e r s i t y at M a r r a k e s h ,
t h o u g h less d e v e l o p e d t h a n Z i t o u n a at i n d e p e n d e n c e , w e r e
expanded rather than integrated into the national system. W i t h i n
the state u n i v e r s i t y s y s t e m separate sections d i s p e n s e d instruction
in F r e n c h a n d A r a b i c , s y s t e m a t i c a l l y d i v i d i n g t h e e d u c a t e d é l i t e .
R e c k l e s s efforts after i n d e p e n d e n c e t o A r a b i s e i n s t r u c t i o n i n t h e
p r i m a r y s c h o o l s resulted in serious d e t e r i o r a t i o n at the s e c o n d a r y
l e v e l , b e c a u s e A r a b i s t s w e r e n o t available in sufficient n u m b e r s
to teach technical subjects. Efforts in the m i d - 1 9 6 0 s t o increase
the hours d e v o t e d to F r e n c h in the primary s c h o o l s met, h o w e v e r ,
w i t h the o p p o s i t i o n o f the Istiqlal, w h i c h w a s w e d d e d t o total
A r a b i s a t i o n . T h e m o n a r c h y c o u l d n o t afford t o s a c r i f i c e its r o o t s
595

T H E M A G H R I B
in A r a b - I s l a m i c culture f o r t h e n e e d s o f a n e c o n o m y o r i e n t e d t o
French markets.
In A l g e r i a , b y contrast, traditional intellectuals h a d n o p o w e r
base at independence, a n d the legitimacy o f neither B e n Bella n o r
B o u m e d i e n n e d e p e n d e d u p o n them. B u t A l g e r i a h a d t o create a
national culture, whereas the former Protectorates h a d only to
adapt theirs. E d u c a t e d elites h a d articulated their respective
Tunisian and M o r o c c a n heritages before independence in w a y s
that m o s t o f the A l g e r i a n nationalist leaders c o u l d n o t . A f t e r
independence, consequently, cultural reconstruction had an ur
g e n c y in A l g e r i a that w a s n o t present in the other t w o countries.
T h e fact, t o o , that t h e K a b y l e s h a d e n j o y e d d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e
French educational opportunities made the problem o f 'nation-
building ' e v e n m o r e urgent - a n d potentially divisive. A s in
M o r o c c o , Arabisation o f the colonial school system w a s encou
raged, b u t m o r e cautiously n o t o n l y f o r lack o f trained Arabists
but also because m a n y o f the s c h o o l teachers inherited from the
French administration w e r e Berbers from the K a b y l e . Shortly
after i n d e p e n d e n c e a M i n i s t r y o f R e l i g i o u s A f f a i r s w a s c r e a t e d ,
a n d b y 1965 i t w a s e s t a b l i s h i n g a t r a d i t i o n a l s y s t e m o f s c h o o l s a n d
Islamic institutes, as t h o u g h A l g e r i a w e r e d e t e r m i n e d t o b u i l d u p
the obstacles t o bilingualism that h a d already thwarted M o r o c c o ' s
educational planning. B y 1 9 7 6 one-quarter o f the students in
A l g e r i a ' s state universities w e r e f o l l o w i n g c o u r s e s t a u g h t e x
c l u s i v e l y in A r a b i c , a n d in fields s u c h as l a w a n d letters t h e F r e n c h
section appeared t o h a v e e v e n less future than in M o r o c c o . A n
i d e o l o g i c a l stress o n n a t i o n a l u n i t y m a d e cultural b i f u r c a t i o n less
acceptable than in M o r o c c o , yet Algeria's need for technically
trained, bilingual o r multilingual cadres w a s also greater, g i v e n
its s t r e s s o n i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n .
I n d e e d , fifteen y e a r s a f t e r i n d e p e n d e n c e A l g e r i a r e m a i n e d t h e
land o f cultural paradox. Officially the National Charter established
t h e p r i n c i p l e o f a n A l g e r i a n urnma, u s i n g f o r t h e first t i m e a t e r m
Tunisians, Moroccans, and other Arabic-speaking peoples had
hitherto reserved for the A r a b , and originally for the Islamic,
c o m m u n i t y . I n its n e w c o n t e x t t h e terms perhaps placated t h e
B e r b e r K a b y l e s , m u c h a s b e l o n g i n g t o a n A r a b umma h a d s e r v e d
the cultural interest o f A r a b Christians in the N e a r East. Y e t the
option o f Arabisation w a s 'irreversible' and w a s eventually to
' exclude the existence o f t w o juxtaposed sectors' in the educational
596

S T R A T E G I E S O F D E V E L O P M E N T
1
system. T h e traditional system o f religious education w a s also
to b e superseded b y a greater e m p h a s i s o n Islam in t h e state
schools. B u t meanwhile m o r e university students w e r e f o l l o w i n g
e x c l u s i v e l y F r e n c h instruction in A l g e r i a than in t h e rest o f N o r t h
Africa, and the graduates o f the French sections w e r e so favoured
in career o p p o r t u n i t i e s o v e r those o f the A r a b i c sections that t h e
A r a b i s t s in l a w a n d letters w e n t o n strike in 1 9 7 7 , d e m a n d i n g that
p u b l i c - s e c t o r c o m p a n i e s A r a b i s e their a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s o as t o b e
able t o hire t h e m .
O f course student strikes h a d b e c o m e c o m m o n p l a c e in M o r o c c o
and Tunisia. E v e n before Hassan II succeeded t o the throne,
students represented b y the U n i o n Nationale des Etudiants
Marocains ( U N E M ) had sided w i t h M e h d i b e n Barka in o p p o s i n g
the m o n a r c h y ' s consolidation o f political p o w e r t h r o u g h the
c r o w n prince's control o f the army. U N E M , w i t h support from
the majority o f students, consistently s u p p o r t e d t h e radical w i n g
o f t h e U N F P , a n d s t u d e n t o p p o s i t i o n i n t e n s i f i e d after t h e k i d
n a p p i n g and p r e s u m e d assassination o f b e n B a r k a in 1965. U N E M
w a s dissolved in 1973 b u t the agitation continued. T u n i s i a n
students, t o o , a c q u i r e d political g r i e v a n c e s . A majority in t h e late
1960s o b j e c t e d t o the p a r t y ' s r i g i d c o n t r o l o f t h e s t u d e n t
organisation, the U n i o n Generate des Etudiants Tunisiens
( U G E T ) . F r o m 1 9 7 1 until 1976 the g o v e r n m e n t did n o t e v e n
c o n v e n e the annual U G E T congress, and the students repudiated
the leadership elected in 1976 in favour o f other legally u n r e c o g
nised representatives. I f the Tunisians w e r e i n v o l v e d in strikes
and d e m o n s t r a t i o n s less frequently than the M o r o c c a n s , their
b e h a v i o u r w a s e v e n less tolerable t o a political elite that p l a c e d
a greater value o n student solidarity w i t h the regime. U n d e r l y i n g
their respective political g r i e v a n c e s , h o w e v e r , w a s a g r o w i n g
realisation shared b y the students and regimes o f b o t h countries
that the educational systems w e r e n o t adapted t o e c o n o m i c needs.
A f t e r 1966 b o t h g o v e r n m e n t s h a d tacitly d r o p p e d their g o a l o f
u n i v e r s a l p r i m a r y e d u c a t i o n , b u t it w a s p o l i t i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t t o c u t
back or e v e n prevent increasing enrolments in secondary and
higher education despite the diminishing e m p l o y m e n t oppor
tunities for graduates.
Table 1 1 . 1 , comparing secondary and higher education enrol
ments for selected years in the three countries, s h o w s that
1
F r o n t d e L i b e r a t i o n N a t i o n a l e . Charte Nationale ( A l g i e r s , 1976), 67.
597

T H E M A G H R I B
T a b l e i I . I . The evolution of secondary and higher education

in the Maghrib (ooos).
1961-2 1966-7 1970-1 1974-5
Algeria secondary 47-5 134.7 28 .7

7
a
419.8
higher 3* 9-3 22.6 a
359
Morocco secondary 99.0 241.7 298.9 400.0
higher 4.8 7-5 13.6 32.8
Tunisia secondary 65.2 120.6 I953 I79.O
higher 3.6 7-1 IO. I 13-7
Note: Enrolments as percentages of eligible populations were not computed,

but it should be noted that in 1974 the total populations of Algeria, Morocco,
and Tunisia were respectively 16.3, 16.9, and 5.6 million.
a
1971-2-
Algerian enrolments were surpassing those o f M o r o c c o b y the

mid-1970s. T h e regime h a d successfully enlisted university ac
t i v i s t s t o assist t h e a g r a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n d u r i n g v a c a t i o n s , b u t
ironically they tended t o c o m e f r o m t h e F r e n c h sections, a n d at
the Universities o f Algiers a n d Constantine conflict w i t h the
A r a b i s t s e r u p t e d i n 1975 b e c a u s e candidates f o r student e l e c t i o n s
w e r e r e q u i r e d t o h a v e p a r t i c i p a t e d as v o l u n t e e r s i n t h e c o u n t r y s i d e .
F r o m a primary-school base in 1 9 7 4 almost d o u b l e that o f
M o r o c c o , A l g e r i a c o n t i n u e d t o e x p a n d e d u c a t i o n a t all l e v e l s , w i t h
p r i o r i t y a c c o r d e d t o s c i e n t i f i c a n d t e c h n i c a l fields. B u t r a p i d
expansion coupled with Arabisation w a s probably not so much
m e e t i n g t h e c o u n t r y ' s needs in skilled m a n p o w e r as increasing
d i s g u i s e d u n e m p l o y m e n t i n t h e b u r g e o n i n g state a p p a r a t u s .
If student unrest h a d underlying e c o n o m i c causes in all three
c o u n t r i e s , c u l t u r a l life a l s o t e n d e d t o r e f l e c t a g r o w i n g m a l a i s e .
A f t e r i n d e p e n d e n c e m o s t literature c o n t i n u e d , e x c e p t in T u n i s i a ,
to b e written in French and published in France. T h o u g h the
A l g e r i a n poet, M a l e k Haddad, lamented that they w e r e 'direct
v i c t i m s o f c o l o n i a l a g g r e s s i o n . . . expelled f r o m their l a n g u a g e just
1
as t h e f e l l a h s h a d b e e n e x p r o p r i a t e d ' , A l g e r i a n o u t p u t i n c r e a s e d
after 1 9 6 5 . D e s p i t e efforts o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t t o ' r e c u p e r a t e ' s u c h
n o v e l i s t s a s M o h a m m e d D i b , a n d t h e y o u n g firebrand R a c h i d
B o u d j e r a , t h e y preferred, like their y o u n g M o r o c c a n c o u n t e r p a r t s ,
M o h a m m e d K h a i r - E d d i n e and Tahar Ben Jelloun, to live abroad.
1
L e c a a n d V a t i n , UAlgirie politique, 295-6.
598

I n D i b ' s Le Maitre de cbasse, p u b l i s h e d i n 1 9 7 3 , p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y

in c o n t e m p o r a r y A l g e r i a , w h i l e n o t explicitly c o n d e m n e d , seems
as d i s t a n t a n d a l i e n a s i n t h e c o l o n i a l e r a h e d e s c r i b e d i n a n e a r l i e r
t r i l o g y . F o r B o u d j e r a ' t h e C l a n ' r u l e s * B a r b a r y ' , a n d it a r r e s t s a n d
p e r h a p s t o r t u r e s t h e h e r o o f La Repudiation, w h i c h a p p e a r e d i n
1969. Boudjera w a s n o m o r e polemical in his descriptions o f
A l g e r i a t h a n K h a i r - E d d i n e o f M o r o c c o i n Le Deterreur, p u b l i s h e d
in 1 9 7 3 . T h e better y o u n g writers in A r a b i c w e r e also c o n t r o
versial. T h e U n i o n o f Tunisian Writers tried t o e x c l u d e y o u n g
formalists, b u t o n e o f their leaders, E z z e d i n e M a d a n i , w r o t e plays
that criticised the regime b y depicting autocracy in historical
settings. T h o u g h a Tunisian propagandist boasted in 1973 o f a
1
' n e w profession b e i n g created, that o f cultural o r g a n i s e r s ' , a
counter-culture also seemed t o b e d e v e l o p i n g , b u t within a
national tradition that seemed m o r e assured than that o f A l g e r i a .
A s far as e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t w a s c o n c e r n e d , e a c h r e g i m e
concentrated o n the m o d e r n agricultural, manufacturing, and
m i n i n g sectors that h a d been largely in E u r o p e a n hands before
i n d e p e n d e n c e . Little w a s d o n e in the traditional rural areas.
C o n s e q u e n t l y u r b a n i s a t i o n c o u l d n o t b e c o n t r o l l e d , d e s p i t e efforts
as e a r l y as 1 9 5 8 i n T u n i s i a t o s t e m it b y t e a r i n g u p s h a n t y - t o w n s
and sending squatters back t o the countryside. T h e most important
economic safety-valve w a s the European labour market. B y the
m i d - 1 9 7 0 s as m a n y N o r t h A f r i c a n i m m i g r a n t s w e r e l i v i n g i n
E u r o p e , f o r the m o s t part in F r a n c e , as there h a d b e e n E u r o p e a n s
i n N o r t h A f r i c a t w o d e c a d e s e a r l i e r - o v e r a m i l l i o n a n d half. T h e
m a j o r i t y c a m e f r o m A l g e r i a , w h e r e t h e d e v e l o p m e n t efforts h a d
been the m o s t ambitious. Since the Algerian investments w e r e
h i g h l y capital intensive, centred o n p e t r o l e u m , iron a n d steel, a n d
manufacturing industries i n v o l v i n g a h i g h level o f t e c h n o l o g y ,
non-agricultural e m p l o y m e n t w a s n o t expanding rapidly e n o u g h
t o a b s o r b natural increases in available m a n p o w e r , m u c h less rural
m i g r a n t s . B u t t h e E u r o p e a n l a b o u r m a r k e t dried u p as a result
o f the w o r l d recession that b e g a n in 1975, a n d France banned
further i m m i g r a t i o n .
F a m i l y p l a n n i n g w a s officially e n c o u r a g e d in T u n i s i a , w i t h
modest success, but w a s virtually abandoned in M o r o c c o d u e t o
o p p o s i t i o n b y the Istiqlal. A l g e r i a ' s hospitals d i d n o t publicise
1
Annuaire de PAfrique du Nord, 1 9 7 } , 1 2 , 4 4 .
599

T H E M A G H R I B
c o n t r a c e p t i o n facilities, d u e t o a c o m b i n a t i o n o f religious a n d
ideological pressures. A l l three regimes d i d try, h o w e v e r , t o d a m
the rural tide b y u n d e r t a k i n g public w o r k s projects : P r o m o t i o n
Nationale in M o r o c c o , a n d similar ' w o r k s i t e s for the struggle
against u n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t ' in Tunisia, w e r e financed largely w i t h
assistance f r o m the U n i t e d States until the mid-1960s b u t
subsequently they dwindled, because o f decreasing aid. Tunisia,
f o l l o w e d b y A l g e r i a , then tried t o stabilise its p e o p l e o n t h e land
b y b u i l d i n g a n e x t e n s i v e n e t w o r k o f state c o o p e r a t i v e s . A l l that
r e m a i n e d o f b e n S a l a h ' s s c h e m e o f a g r a r i a n r e f o r m in T u n i s i a after
1969, h o w e v e r , w e r e the c o o p e r a t i v e s , i n fact state farms, o r i g i n a l l y
i n t r o d u c e d o n s o m e o f the f o r m e r settler estates. N e i t h e r M o r o c c o
n o r T u n i s i a w a s w i l l i n g t o e m b a r k o n a real r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f
indigenously o w n e d property. B y contrast, Algeria's 'agrarian
r e v o l u t i o n ' e f f e c t e d s o m e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n after 1 9 7 2 , b u t o n l y a
m i n o r i t y o f t h e landless actually benefited. M o r e o v e r , at least
one-quarter o f these apparently refused in 1974 t o stay o n the land
1
because traditional agriculture n o l o n g e r appeared v i a b l e . T h e
r e g i m e h a d constructed s o m e h u n d r e d ' socialist villages ' b y 1 9 7 7 ,
b u t a t c o s t s p e r h a p s t r i p l e t h e b u d g e t e d $5000 p e r f a m i l y d w e l l i n g .
T h e second four-year plan (1974-7) continued to favour industry
o v e r agriculture, and n e w industrial projects w e r e expected t o cost
2
five t i m e s a s m u c h a s n e w a g r i c u l t u r a l a n d i r r i g a t i o n s c h e m e s .
M o r o c c o and Tunisia devoted proportionately more public
resources t o agriculture, b u t investments tended (despite s o m e
s y m b o l i c land d i s t r i b u t i o n , n o t a b l y i n M o r o c c o in 1 9 7 2 after t h e
s e c o n d a t t e m p t o n H a s s a n ' s life) t o b e n e f i t e s t a b l i s h e d l a n d o w n e r s
p r o d u c i n g for a m o d e r n e x p o r t sector rather than the rural masses,
o n l y s o m e o f w h o m c o u l d b e ' a b s o r b e d ' into that sector as hired
h a n d s . I n M o r o c c o t h e n a t i o n a l i r r i g a t i o n office w a s a b o l i s h e d
in 1964 s o that t h e M i n i s t r y o f the Interior c o u l d exercise c o n t r o l
o v e r irrigated areas. S u b s e q u e n t l y a series o f d a m s , w h i l e d e
v e l o p i n g M o r o c c o ' s tremendous irrigation potential, principally
i m p r o v e d the properties o f m e d i u m a n d large landowners be
h o l d e n t o t h e r e g i m e . T u n i s i a ' s irrigated areas m o r e than d o u b l e d
after i n d e p e n d e n c e , b u t l a n d o w n e r s b e n e f i t i n g f r o m p u b l i c i n
vestments w e r e required to reimburse the government.
1
Bruno Etienne, U Algérie, cultures et révolution (Paris, 1977), 219.
2
République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Ile Plan quadriennal 1974-1977 y
Rapport général (Algiers, 1974), 89.
600

In Algeria, t o o , m o s t o f the public investment in agriculture

until the early 1970s w a s channelled t o the m o d e r n sector,
especially for the u p k e e p o f lands that h a d b e l o n g e d t o the settlers.
T h o u g h s o m e third o f these s e e m t o h a v e b e e n a c q u i r e d after
1
i n d e p e n d e n c e b y p r i v a t e A l g e r i a n o w n e r s , t h e rest w e r e o r g a n i s e d
into cooperatives run in theory b y former agricultural w o r k e r s
or, in s o m e cases, b y veterans o f the w a r for i n d e p e n d e n c e . M o s t
o f t h e s e s o - c a l l e d s e l f - m a n a g e d f a r m s r a n at a c o n s i d e r a b l e l o s s
f o r s e v e r a l y e a r s after i n d e p e n d e n c e , a n d m u c h o f t h e s t a t e ' s
agricultural b u d g e t w a s spent o n an administration designed t o
s u p e r v i s e t h e m , p r o v i d e t h e m w i t h seeds, a n d fertiliser, a n d
m a r k e t their p r o d u c e . P r o d u c t i v i t y d r o p p e d b y as m u c h as h a l f
i n t h e first f i v e y e a r s a n d n a t i o n a l p r o d u c t i o n s u b s e q u e n t l y
2
stagnated o r declined. B y the mid-1970s Algeria w a s spending
at l e a s t o n e - t h i r d o f i t s p e t r o l e u m r e v e n u e s o n f o o d i m p o r t s .
W h i l e M o r o c c o and Tunisia also had t o i m p o r t w h e a t , their
a g r i c u l t u r a l s i t u a t i o n s w e r e n o t as c a t a s t r o p h i c .
In all three c o u n t r i e s , then, a rural sub-proletariat c o n t i n u e d ,
as b e f o r e i n d e p e n d e n c e , t o m o v e i n t o t h e c i t i e s . B e t w e e n 1 9 6 6 a n d
1973, for example, Algeria's 'urban and semi-urban' population
w a s e s t i m a t e d t o h a v e i n c r e a s e d b y a l m o s t 50 p e r c e n t , c o m p a r e d
to a rural increase o f o n l y 14 p e r cent. R u r a l dislocation w a s least
severe in M o r o c c o , b u t b y 1971 o v e r one-third o f the p o p u l a t i o n
w a s urban. U n e m p l o y m e n t , perhaps highest in Algeria, w a s
increasing everywhere, and none o f the regimes seemed capable
o f d a m m i n g the rural e x o d u s .
I n a l l t h r e e c o u n t r i e s it w a s a s s u m e d i n t h e e a r l y 1 9 6 0 s t h a t t h e
s o l u t i o n t o this p r o b l e m w a s rapid industrialisation. H o w e v e r , t h e
M o r o c c a n five-year plan elaborated in i960 w a s never imple
m e n t e d , in part f o r lack o f a d e q u a t e financial resources, b u t i n part,
t o o , b e c a u s e o f the m o n a r c h y ' s interest in s h o r i n g u p its f o l l o w i n g
a m o n g r u r a l n o t a b l e s . I n T u n i s i a , B o u r g u i b a g a v e b e n S a l a h full
f r e e d o m in 1962 t o i m p l e m e n t plans that the F r e n c h e c o n o m i s t ,
G e r a r d Destanne de Bernis, had helped h i m elaborate in 1956.
H e a v y industry, i n c l u d i n g iron a n d steel, w a s t o b e created t o
generate a self-sustaining industrialisation process that w o u l d
eventually a b s o r b the rural migrants. T h e o p p o r t u n i t y costs o f
1
E t i e n n e , U Algérie, 213.
2
K a d e r A m m o u r , C h r i s t i a n L e u c a t e a n d J e a n - J a c q u e s M o u l i n , ha Vote algérienne
( P a r i s , 1974), 73.
601

T H E M A G H R I B
such industries w e r e n o t carefully studied, for the value o f an

industrial infrastructure t o o k precedence o v e r 'capitalist' c o n
siderations o f profitability. It w a s a s s u m e d that a steel industry
o p e r a t i n g at a l o s s w o u l d n e v e r t h e l e s s i n t h e l o n g r u n s a v e f o r e i g n
currency and stimulate manufacturing industries. T h e experiment
failed in T u n i s i a t h r o u g h a lack o f capital n e e d e d f o r s u c h
expensive investment, and the r e g i m e turned instead t o private
foreign enterprise, offering favourable terms for investments in
small enterprises geared t o E u r o p e a n markets. M o r o c c o , t o o ,
a t t e m p t e d t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s e its c a p i t a l b y s t i m u l a t i n g j o i n t
v e n t u r e s a i m e d at e x p o r t m a r k e t s , a n d b o t h c o u n t r i e s a l s o
generated considerable invisible foreign-exchange earning b y
encouraging foreign tourism.
Algeria, o n the other hand, rejected dependence o n foreign
capital and readily accepted the m y t h o f industrialising industries '
1
p r o p o u n d e d b y d e B e r n i s . B y acquiring in 1 9 7 1 a majority
interest in the major F r e n c h oil p r o d u c e r s o p e r a t i n g in the
c o u n t r y , t h e r e g i m e n o t o n l y e n h a n c e d its r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t a n d i n g
but acquired a painless means o f accumulating capital. R e v e n u e s
a m o u n t e d t o o v e r $4 b i l l i o n a n n u a l l y after 1 9 7 3 , a n d t h e r e g i m e
w a s i n v e s t i n g in g a s liquefication plants t o e x p o r t natural g a s , o f
w h i c h Algeria held 5 per cent o f the w o r l d ' s reserves. M e a n w h i l e
it w a s b u i l d i n g a d i v e r s i f i e d i n d u s t r i a l b a s e c e n t r e d o n s t e e l a n d
p e t r o c h e m i c a l s , m u c h as t h e F r e n c h h a d p r o j e c t e d in their 1 9 5 9
C o n s t a n t i n e Plan, b u t o n a m o r e a m b i t i o u s scale. In 1 9 7 5 , f o r
instance, w o r k w a s b e g u n o n an integrated electronics industry
w h i c h A l g e r i a n s w e r e simultaneously b e i n g trained t o run. T h e
g o v e r n m e n t intended to leap into the technectronic era a n d master
t e c h n o l o g y a n d p r o d u c t i o n facilities currently available o n l y in t h e
m o s t a d v a n c e d i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s . B u t q u i c k t e c h n o l o g i c a l fixes
s e e m e d e v e n less likely than d e p e n d e n t b o u r g e o i s d e v e l o p m e n t
to resolve problems o f unemployment. Algeria risked b e c o m i n g
more technologically dependent o n the multinational companies,
t h e m o r e o f t h e i r t e c h n o l o g y it i m p o r t e d . B y 1 9 7 6 , w i t h 1 4 p e r
c e n t o f its f o r e i g n - e x c h a n g e e a r n i n g s m o r t g a g e d b y d e b t s e r v i c i n g ,
it w a s a l m o s t a s i n d e b t e d as T u n i s i a h a d b e e n i n 1 9 7 1 . T h e
A l g e r i a n p e r c e n t a g e w a s expected t o reach 24.9 b y 1982 a n d then
decline, b u t the liquefication projects expected to p r o d u c e n e w
1
G é r a r d D e s t a n n e d e Bernis, ' L e s Industries industrialisantes et les o p t i o n s
a l g é r i e n n e s ' , Revus Tiers Monde, 1971, 12, 47.
602

1
r e v e n u e s t o p a y off t h e d e b t s w e r e s e r i o u s l y d e l a y e d . I n fact
administrative and human shortcomings w e r e endangering m u c h
o f t h e A l g e r i a n e c o n o m i c effort. P u b l i c s e c t o r m a n a g e m e n t t e n d e d
at i n t e r m e d i a t e l e v e l s t o a v o i d t a k i n g i n i t i a t i v e s , a n d a d m i n i s
trative regulations tended in any e v e n t t o obstruct action. W h e t h e r
these w e r e g r o w i n g pains o r c o n g e n i t a l defects o f state capitalism
remained to be seen.
In the short run m a n y o f the n e w industries w e r e operating,
i f at a l l , at c o n s i d e r a b l y l e s s t h a n full c a p a c i t y . E v e n s o , b e t w e e n
1 9 7 1 a n d 1 9 7 3 m o r e t h a n f o u r t i m e s as m u c h f e r t i l i s e r w a s b e i n g
p r o d u c e d as c o u l d b e c o n s u m e d , a n d l o c a l l y a s s e m b l e d t r a c t o r s
w e r e saturating the rural markets. T h e agrarian r e v o l u t i o n w a s d e
signed in part t o increase the p u r c h a s i n g p o w e r o f the c o u n t r y
side sufficiently t o a b s o r b n e w industrial p r o d u c t s , y e t capital
intensive industrialisation tended t o increase inequalities o f
i n c o m e distribution b e t w e e n urban a n d rural areas. T h e n e w
A l g e r i a n industries continued t o be heavily dependent o n imports
o f capital g o o d s a n d c o m p o n e n t s ; 70 p e r cent o f the o r i g i n a l
investments and comparable proportions o f operating expendi
2
tures in the early 1970s required f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e . T h e tripling
o f p e t r o l e u m revenues b e t w e e n 1973 and 1974, h o w e v e r , p r o v i d e d
opportunities for further industrialisation, t h o u g h p e t r o l e u m
p r o d u c t i o n appeared t o h a v e reached a plateau.
S o also, the quintupling in 1974 o f the price o f phosphates,
M o r o c c o ' s and Tunisia's principal export, g a v e these liberal
e c o n o m i e s a s h o t i n t h e a r m , j u s t as T u n i s i a w a s b e c o m i n g a
modest petroleum exporter. Neither regime w a s tempted, h o w
e v e r , t o risk ' i n d u s t r i a l i s i n g ' industrial d e v e l o p m e n t o n its
windfall export earnings, w h i c h remained modest b y Algerian
standards. Rather, the M o r o c c a n five-year plan for 1973-8 ap
peared even to abandon import substitution for a policy o f
e x p o r t - l e d g r o w t h that m i g h t m a x i m i s e its c o m p a r a t i v e a d v a n t a g e
in w o r l d m a r k e t s . I n d u s t r y w a s g i v e n priority, r e c e i v i n g a l m o s t
40 p e r c e n t o f t h e p r o j e c t e d p u b l i c a n d p r i v a t e i n v e s t m e n t s , b u t
primarily t o m a k e o f M o r o c c o ' a base for assembling and
3
completing' products manufactured elsewhere. H o w e v e r , the
1
Le Monde, 29 M a r c h 1977.
2
Abdellatif B e n a c h e n h o u , ' F o r c e s sociales et accumulation d u capital au M a g h r e b ' ,
Annuaire de PAfrique du Nord, 1973, la, 336.
3
C i t e d b y H a b i b a l - M a l k i , ' C h r o n i q u e eco n o m i q u e ' , Annuaire de i*Afrique du Nord,
i973> 594.
603

T H E M A G H R I B
p e r c e n t a g e o f i m p o r t e d i n p u t in M o r o c c a n industry d i d n o t appear
to e x c e e d A l g e r i a ' s . M o r o c c a n (and ' Tunisian) e c o n o m i c de
v e l o p m e n t seemed passively to c o n f o r m to a n e w international
division o f labour, whereas Algeria was actively trying to change
b o t h t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r d e r a n d its p l a c e i n it. N e i t h e r a p p r o a c h
to d e v e l o p m e n t , h o w e v e r , c o u l d c o m e to grips w i t h the basic
d e m o g r a p h i c p r o b l e m . P a r a d o x i c a l l y , the least ' p r o g r e s s i v e '
regime, that o f the M o r o c c a n m o n a r c h y , e m p l o y e d the largest
p r o p o r t i o n o f the p o p u l a t i o n in the s e c o n d a r y sector a n d the least
in the over-staffed services sector. C o l o n i a l history and natural
a d v a n t a g e s as w e l l as m o n a r c h i c a l s t r a t e g y e x p l a i n , m o r e o v e r ,
w h y a greater p r o p o r t i o n r e m a i n e d r o o t e d in the c o u n t r y s i d e .
F O R E I G N A F F A I R S
D o m e s t i c politics largely c o n d i t i o n e d the foreign policies o f the

independent regimes, especially w i t h respect to the former colonial
p o w e r . M o r o c c o , for instance, a v o i d e d confrontations w i t h
F r a n c e o v e r e c o n o m i c i s s u e s d u r i n g t h e first d e c a d e o f i n d e p e n
dence because * M o r o c c a n i s i n g ' E u r o p e a n agricultural and c o m
mercial interests w o u l d h a v e tended t o benefit the Istiqlal rather
than the clients o f the m o n a r c h y w h o c o u l d subsequently be
f a v o u r e d . C o n v e r s e l y , B o u r g u i b a b e l i e d his usual p r u d e n c e in
1 9 6 1 w h e n h e b e s i e g e d F r e n c h m i l i t a r y i n s t a l l a t i o n s at B i z e r t a , a n d
a g a i n in 1964, w h e n he nationalised r e m a i n i n g settler lands. H e
w a s a t t e m p t i n g t o k e e p u p w i t h A l g e r i a n p r o g r e s s in d e c o l o n i
sation, b u t he w a s also t r y i n g t o b u y s u p p o r t for u n p o p u l a r state
s o c i a l i s m at h o m e . S i m i l a r l y , B e n B e l l a w a s s e e k i n g s u p p o r t at
h o m e w h e n h e o p t e d in 1963 f o r s e l f - m a n a g e d farms at the
e x p e n s e o f those o w n e d b y absentee settlers, and B o u m e d i e n n e
m a r s h a l l e d sufficient l e g i t i m a c y in 1 9 7 1 , w h e n he nationalised
F r e n c h p e t r o l e u m interests, to e m b a r k the f o l l o w i n g year u p o n
an agrarian ' r e v o l u t i o n ' that d i v i d e d his r u l i n g coalition o f state
technocratic and l a n d o w n i n g interests. T h e three regimes,
h o w e v e r , e x p e r i e n c e d less c o n f l i c t w i t h F r a n c e t h a n w i t h e a c h
other, and intra-Maghribian relations, in turn, w e r e e v e n m o r e
closely related to the internal politics o f the respective r e g i m e s .
D e s p i t e the i n t e r m i n g l i n g o f M a g h r i b i a n élites in F r e n c h univer

sities a n d t h e f o r m a t i o n i n C a i r o o f a M a g h r i b B u r e a u i n 1 9 4 5 ,
604

t h e m o v e m e n t s o f n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o nw e r e n o t c o o r d i n a t e d . I n f a c t
elements of the FLN supported Salah ben Youssef, Bourguiba's
r i v a l , i n 1 9 5 5 , a n di n 1 9 6 2 B o u r g u i b a f a v o u r e d t h e A l g e r
provisionalgovernment that Ben Bella and Boumedienne then
defeated. Before Algeria was independent, its struggle was a
source of solidarity against a common colonial adversary, yet also
an embarrassment to independent Tunisian and Moroccan
governments committed to a variety of agreements and under
standings with France. Leaders of the three dominant political
p a r t i e sm e t a t T a n g i e ri n 1 9 5 8 a n d p r o c l a i m e dt h e p r i n c i p l eo f a
North African Confederation, but not even a confederation of
s t u d e n t u n i o n s g o t o f f t h e g r o u n d . I n a d d i t i o n t o d i f f e r i n gp o l i t i c a l
structuresand divergent economic policies,shared borders were
a more immediate obstacle to any sort of Maghribian union.
Borders established by France had naturally favoured itsfirst
colonised territory,Algeria. Morocco feltthat France and Spain
had sliced further territoryfrom the historichomeland: not only
the traditionalSpanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on the
M e d i t e r r a n e a n , b u t a l s o T a r f a y a , I f n i ,a n d t h e S p a n i s h S a h a r a , p l u s
Mauritania and other portions of French West Africa extending
into Mali and Senegal. Morocco peacefullyrecovered Tarfaya, in
1 9 5 8 ,a n dI f n i ,i n 1 9 6 9 ,f r o mS p a i n ,b u tF r a n c eg r a n t e di n d e
d e n c e t o i r o n - r i c h M a u r i t a n i a i n i960. B y r e c o g n i s i n g t
s t a t e , T u n i s i a i n c u r r e d f o u ry e a r s o f M o r o c c a n e n m i t y . I n 1 9 6 1
Morocco and the Algerian provisional government agreed to
form a confederation and also to discuss possible border rectifi
cations after Algerian independence. Morocco was claiming
considerable areas of French Algeria'swestern Sahara, including
Tindouf and iron-ore deposits at Gara-Djebilet. Tunisia also
claimed 1 piece of desert extending from its southern frontiers,
in which oil was discovered.
Independent Algeria, however, was as intransigent in defence
of itsSaharan borders against itsneighbours' claims as the FLN
had been against earlier French plans to establish a separate
S a h a r a n e n t i t y . A b o r d e r w a r w i t h M o r o c c o i n 1 9 6 3 ,i n w h i c h
p e r h a p s 3 0 0w e r e k i l l e d , c o n v e n i e n t l yr e i n f o r c e d b o t hr e g i m e s
home but did not resolve the underlying dispute. A subsequent
agreement to ratifythe existing frontier and to exploit the iron
m i n e s j o i n t l yw a sn o ti m p l e m e n t e d . I n 1 9 7 4 ,a si n 1 9 6 3 , a f t
weathering severe internal crises,King Hassan rallied virtually
60 j

T H E M A G H R I B
u n a n i m o u s d o m e s t i c s u p p o r t for i r r e d e n t i s t c l a i m s , t h i s t i m e for
the S p a n i s h Sahara. H e tried t o o b t a i n A l g e r i a n s u p p o r t in re
t u r n for r a t i f y i n g t h e A l g e r i a n - M o r o c c a n b o r d e r a g r e e m e n t o f
1972, b u t A l g e r i a instead s u p p o r t e d self-determination for this
territory inhabited b y s o m e 70000 n o m a d s . M o r o c c o , h o w e v e r ,
p e r s u a d e d M a u r i t a n i a , w i t h w h o m r e l a t i o n s h a d finally b e e n
established in 1970, t o accept M o r o c c a n s o v e r e i g n t y o v e r the
northern half o f the territory, w h i c h contained the w o r l d ' s largest
reserves o f p h o s p h a t e s , in return for Mauritanian s o v e r e i g n t y
o v e r the southern part w h i c h contained iron ore. In N o v e m b e r
1 9 7 5 H a s s a n m o b i l i s e d s o m e 3 50000 c i v i l i a n s f o r a ' g r e e n m a r c h '
in the n a m e o f Islam t o ' liberate' the territory, i g n o r i n g an adverse
ruling from the International C o u r t o f Justice c o n c e r n i n g
M o r o c c o ' s historic claim. W i t h F r a n c o o n his death-bed, Spain
agreed to cede administration o f the territory to M o r o c c o and
M a u r i t a n i a p e n d i n g a r e f e r e n d u m . M u c h o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n fled
to Algeria, w h i c h supported Polisario, the strongest o f the
Saharan political factions. T w o years later M o r o c c o w a s m i r e d in
a l e n g t h y g u e r r i l l a w a r , its a r m y b e i n g r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e s e c u r i t y
not o n l y o f the vast reaches o f the former Spanish Sahara but also
o f Mauritania, w h i c h w a s under increasing pressure from
Polisario. A l g e r i a , b a c k e d b y L i b y a , persisted in s u p p o r t i n g the
S a h a r a n g u e r r i l l a s d e s p i t e S a u d i a n d o t h e r efforts t o m e d i a t e
A l g e r i a n — M o r o c c a n differences.
T h e r o o t o f the conflict lay n o t so m u c h in either a M o r o c c a n
interest in the B o u C r a a phosphate deposits o r an A l g e r i a n o n e
i n a n o u t l e t f r o m T i n d o u f t o t h e A t l a n t i c as i n K i n g H a s s a n ' s
internal political n e e d s and an A l g e r i a n interest in p r e s e r v i n g a
favourable regional balance o f power. Maghribian economic
integration, s y m b o l i s e d b y the creation in 1964 o f a P e r m a n e n t
Consultative C o m m i t t e e o f e c o n o m i c ministers, also foundered -
e v e n w h e n not disrupted b y border disputes - against Algeria's
determination to consolidate a dominant economic position
b e f o r e c o n s e n t i n g t o s i g n i f i c a n t m u l t i l a t e r a l tariff r e d u c t i o n s .
Algeria, too, pressured Tunisia not to implement a union w i t h
L i b y a that had b e e n p r o c l a i m e d jointly by Presidents B o u r g u i b a
and Q a d h d h a f i in 1974.
It w a s natural, w i t h i n d e p e n d e n c e , that the M a g h r i b s h o u l d reknit

ties w i t h o t h e r p a r t s o f t h e A r a b w o r l d t h a t t h e c o l o n i a l c o n q u e s t s
606

had largely severed. M o r o c c a n and Tunisian independence c o

i n c i d e d , h o w e v e r , w i t h t h e rise o f N a s i r , E g y p t ' s u n i o n w i t h S y r i a ,
and the unedifying struggles b e t w e e n Nasirists and Ba'athists
o v e r precedence within the v a n g u a r d o f A r a b unity. T h e M o r
occan monarchy w a s w a r y o f a m o v e m e n t that subverted monar
chies, w h i l e B o u r g u i b a a n d m u c h o f his F r e n c h - e d u c a t e d elite
v i e w e d P a n - A r a b i s m as a t h r e a t t o t h e i r w e s t e r n - o r i e n t e d v a r i a n t
o f nationalism. T h e Tunisian president, t o o , h a d m o r e immediate
reasons for detesting Nasir. E g y p t harboured Salah b e n Y o u s s e f
a n d a p p e a r e d i n 195 8 t o h a v e b e e n i n v o l v e d i n a p l o t t o a s s a s s i n a t e
B o u r g u i b a . A s late as 1 9 6 6 t h e T u n i s i a n f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r w a s
accusing Nasir o f ' micro-imperialism' and o f using methods o f
'intimidation, blackmail, a n d c a l u m n y ' t o i m p o s e his political line
1
o n o t h e r c o u n t r i e s . T u n i s i a as w e l l a s M o r o c c o s u p p o r t e d S a u d i
A r a b i a ' s c a m p a i g n at this t i m e f o r a n Islamic s u m m i t t o c o u n t e r
Nasir's influence.
O n the other hand, personal relations b e t w e e n B e n Bella and
N a s i r w e r e c l o s e , a n d A l g e r i a w a s c o u n t e d i n 1963 as o n e o f t h e
four r e v o l u t i o n a r y A r a b states, a l o n g w i t h E g y p t , Iraq, a n d Syria.
S y m b o l i c ties w i t h t h e e a s t r e i n f o r c e d A l g e r i a ' s q u e s t f o r n a t i o n a l
'authenticity', and massive imports o f Egyptian and Syrian
s c h o o l t e a c h e r s c o n t r i b u t e d t o its p r o g r a m m e o f A r a b i s a t i o n . Y e t
Algerians, considering themselves the only people in the A r a b
w o r l d t o h a v e carried o u t a real r e v o l u t i o n , t e n d e d t o share t h e
T u n i s i a n elite's disdain o f A r a b revolutionary posturing. E g y p t i a n
schoolteachers w e r e resented. A n d w h i l e consistently supporting
the Palestinian L i b e r a t i o n O r g a n i s a t i o n ( P L O ) , A l g e r i a n s scarcely
concealed their impatience w i t h the Palestinians' inability t o p u r g e
their ranks, b y physical liquidation i f need b e , t o f o r g e a coherent
and rational strategy against the Zionist foe. T h o u g h A l g e r i a w a s
the o n l y N o r t h African country actually t o send c o m b a t units t o
the 1967 w a r , reactions t o E g y p t ' s a g r e e m e n t t o a cease-fire w e r e
also s y m p t o m a t i c : there w e r e demonstrations in A l g i e r s n o t o n l y
against the British and A m e r i c a n imperialists b u t also against the
Russians f o r insufficient military aid t o E g y p t a n d Syria a n d
a g a i n s t t h e E g y p t i a n s f o r g i v i n g u p t h e fight.
T h e w a v e o f A r a b sympathies raised t h r o u g h o u t t h e M a g h r i b
by the June w a r did, h o w e v e r , stimulate the regimes into greater
1
C i t e d b y W i l f r i d K n a p p , North West Africa: a political and economic survey ( L o n d o n ,
t h i r d e d i t i o n , 1977), 394.
607

T H E M A G H R I B
s u b s e q u e n t i n v o l v e m e n t i n A r a b affairs. T u n i s i a ' s P r i m e M i n i s t e r ,
B a h i L a d g h a m , p l a y e d a c e n t r a l r o l e i n t h e efforts o f t h e A r a b
L e a g u e to mediate b e t w e e n the P L O and the Jordanian g o v e r n
m e n t . K i n g H a s s a n dealt brilliantly w i t h fractious military officers
b y s e n d i n g an e x p e d i t i o n a r y c o r p s t o Syria in 1 9 7 2 . Its fortuitous
p r e s e n c e a n d b r a v e s h o w i n g in the O c t o b e r w a r o f 1973 g a v e the
m o n a r c h y a d d i t i o n a l A r a b - I s l a m i c l u s t r e at h o m e , as d i d t h e
c o n v e n i n g o f t w o A r a b s u m m i t m e e t i n g s at R a b a t i n 1 9 6 9 a n d
1 9 7 5 . M o r o c c a n c o n t r i b u t i o n s a l s o e n s u r e d official A r a b s i l e n c e
o v e r the e x - S p a n i s h Sahara, d e s p i t e c o n s i d e r a b l e A l g e r i a n aid t o
E g y p t and Syria in 1973. W i t h support from S u d a n and E g y p t ,
M o r o c c o b l o c k e d A l g e r i a n efforts t o h a v e t h e O r g a n i s a t i o n o f
A f r i c a n U n i t y e n d o r s e its p o s i t i o n o n S a h a r a n s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n .
M o r o c c a n military assistance t o Z a i r e in 1977 seemed an i n g e n i o u s
tactic for m o b i l i s i n g d i p l o m a t i c s u p p o r t f r o m c o n s e r v a t i v e A f r i c a n
regimes, and ensuring France's continuing favour.
T h e f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s o f all t h r e e r e g i m e s c o n t i n u e d , t w o d e c a d e s
after d e c o l o n i s a t i o n b e g a n , t o r e v o l v e a b o u t their r e s p e c t i v e
French connexions. I f the C o m m o n Market, w i t h w h i c h each
c o u n t r y s i g n e d a similar a g r e e m e n t in 1 9 7 6 , had b r o k e n F r a n c e ' s
virtual trade m o n o p o l y , the former Protectorates continued to
rely h e a v i l y u p o n F r e n c h military, e c o n o m i c , and cultural assis
t a n c e , w h i l e A l g e r i a l o o k e d a b o v e all t o t h e G a u l l i s t t r a d i t i o n o f
F r e n c h f o r e i g n p o l i c y f o r s u p p o r t o f its n e w w o r l d e c o n o m i c
order and o f a Mediterranean cleansed o f super-power military
presences. E a c h N o r t h A f r i c a n c o u n t r y w e n t t h r o u g h a series o f
crises w i t h F r a n c e , and the breaks c o n t i n u e d t o be m o r e traumatic
than disputes w i t h other industrial p o w e r s . M o r e o v e r the illusion
usually persisted after a crisis that the antagonistic F r e n c h p o l i c y
t h a t h a d p r e c i p i t a t e d it w a s a n a b e r r a t i o n t h a t a s u b s e q u e n t F r e n c h
g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d correct. Since the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r
B o u r g u i b a h a d c o n s i s t e n t l y a r t i c u l a t e d s u c h a p e r c e p t i o n ; it w a s
c o n s o n a n t w i t h his step-by-step ' B o u r g u i b i s t ' tactics o f national
l i b e r a t i o n a n d w a s a p p a r e n t l y v i n d i c a t e d i n 1 9 7 2 b y h i s first official
v i s i t , as p r e s i d e n t , t o P a r i s : ' W i t h w h a t j o y , w i t h w h a t p r i d e , w i t h
w h a t e m o t i o n I r e d i s c o v e r , i n t h e e v e n i n g o f m y life, F r a n c e , a n d
h e r f r i e n d s h i p as I d r e a m e d o f it i n m y e a r l y y o u t h . I f I w a s t h e
d e t e r m i n e d a n d l o y a l a d v e r s a r y o f a c e r t a i n F r a n c e , it w a s i n o r d e r
608

9 1
to cooperate better w i t h another, eternal F r a n c e . . . If hardly a
sentimental francophile like B o u r g u i b a , B o u m e d i e n n e also acted
o n the assumption o f an eternal F r e n c h debt. H e b l a m e d France
for A l g e r i a n deficits in their 197 5 balance o f p a y m e n t s a n d for b a c k
ing M o r o c c o ' s d i p l o m a c y o n the Spanish Sahara. Earlier K i n g
Hassan had considered de G a u l l e to be misconstruing the F r e n c h
national interest in f a v o u r i n g A l g e r i a .
A s a c o u n t e r w e i g h t t o F r e n c h i n f l u e n c e , all t h r e e c o u n t r i e s
relied principally u p o n the U n i t e d States, despite the latter's basic
interest in c o u n t e r i n g n o t F r e n c h b u t S o v i e t influence. In the cases
o f M o r o c c o and T u n i s i a , d e p e n d e n c e o n U n i t e d States aid, w h i c h
t o t a l l e d r o u g h l y $1 b i l l i o n , w a s e v i d e n t . W h e n F r a n c e c u t o f f
c r e d i t s t o T u n i s i a i n 1 9 5 7 b e c a u s e o f its a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e F L N ,
the U n i t e d States replaced t h e m . W h e n F r a n c o - M o r o c c a n re
l a t i o n s w e r e r u p t u r e d i n 1965 o v e r t h e b e n B a r k a affair, t h e U n i t e d
States c o n t i n u e d t o s u p p o r t M o r o c c o . Neutralist A l g e r i a , b y
c o n t r a s t , r e l i e d f o r m u c h o f its a r m a m e n t s u p o n t h e S o v i e t U n i o n ,
n o t the U n i t e d States. O n m o s t international issues, w h e t h e r
V i e t n a m , A n g o l a , o r e c o n o m i c relations b e t w e e n the industrial
countries and the T h i r d W o r l d , the A m e r i c a n s and the A l g e r i a n s
w e r e at l o g g e r h e a d s , a n d d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w e r e o f f i c i a l l y
s e v e r e d f r o m 1 9 6 7 t o 1 9 7 4 . B u t A l g e r i a p a i d f o r its a r m s a n d f o r
carefully limited S o v i e t military c o o p e r a t i o n , e n s u r i n g just
sufficient c o n t a c t t o reinforce a n t i - C o m m u n i s t biases a m o n g the
A l g e r i a n officers, w h o c o n t i n u e d t o b e l a r g e l y French-trained.
T h e n a v a l b a s e a t M e r s - e l - K e b i r r e m a i n e d i n A l g e r i a n h a n d s after
t h e F r e n c h d e p a r t e d i n 1 9 6 8 , j u s t as t h e T u n i s i a n o n e at B i z e r t a ,
r e c o v e r e d in 1 9 6 4 , r e m a i n e d in T u n i s i a n , n o t A m e r i c a n , h a n d s .
T h e o n e t y p e o f assistance A l g e r i a really did need, h o w e v e r ,
i n its s t r u g g l e s w i t h F r a n c e o v e r e c o n o m i c i s s u e s , w a s m a n a g e r i a l
a n d t e c h n o l o g i c a l . S h o r t l y after i n d e p e n d e n c e t h e n e w s t a t e
p e t r o l e u m c o m p a n y , Sonatrach, enlisted private A m e r i c a n c o n
sultants. B y p u r c h a s i n g considerable p r i v a t e t e c h n o l o g i c a l assis
tance, Sonatrach w a s able to m a n a g e progressively larger sectors
o f the p e t r o l e u m industry, culminating in the nationalisations o f
1 9 7 1 . O n e astute F r e n c h o b s e r v e r also n o t e d in 1 9 7 7 that the
principal threat to French cultural supremacy w a s perhaps not so
2
m u c h A r a b as A n g l o - S a x o n c u l t u r e . S o m e o f t h e p u b l i c - s e c t o r
1 2
Ibid., 394. E t i c n n e , UAlgirie, 177.
609

T H E M A G H R I B
companies w e r e s p o n s o r i n g a d v a n c e d training and entire under

graduate p r o g r a m m e s t a u g h t in E n g l i s h . T h e U n i t e d States, t o o ,
had b e c o m e Algeria's largest export market, and w a s w i t h W e s t
G e r m a n y s e c o n d o n l y t o F r a n c e as t h e p r i m e s o u r c e o f i m p o r t s ,
whereas the p r o p o r t i o n o f trade w i t h C o m m u n i s t countries
remained almost negligible and was declining.
W h e t h e r o r n o t flags w o u l d f o l l o w t r a d e i n t h e final q u a r t e r
o f t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , t h e A l g e r i a n e c o n o m y s e e m e d at l e a s t
as i n t e r l o c k e d w i t h t h o s e o f t h e a d v a n c e d c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s as
those o f M o r o c c o and Tunisia. ' N e o - c o l o n i a l ' or ' d e p e n d e n c y '
r e l a t i o n s h i p s are p e r h a p s i n d e f i n a b l e , s u b j e c t t o t h e p e r s u a s i v e
definitions o f countries like A l g e r i a that try to restructure their
e c o n o m i c relationships. B u t the m o r e A l g e r i a continued to i m p o r t
a d v a n c e d t e c h n o l o g y into hastily i m p r o v i s e d structures, the m o r e
d e p e n d e n t o n c o n t i n u e d i n j e c t i o n s o f w e s t e r n c a p i t a l it w a s l i k e l y
to b e c o m e , o n terms that neither an i d e o l o g y o f autocentric
d e v e l o p m e n t n o r p e t r o l e u m revenues c o u l d indefinitely soften.
Ultimately the three regimes remained equally dependent o n the
political and e c o n o m i c e v o l u t i o n o f the industrial w o r l d , especially
o f their E u r o p e a n n e i g h b o u r s , and their degrees o f d e p e n d e n c e
w e r e perhaps p r o p o r t i o n a t e to the variations in the character o f
their responses.
610

C H A P T E R 12
FRENCH-SPEAKING TROPICAL AFRICA
F r e n c h c o l o n i s a t i o n in t r o p i c a l A f r i c a resulted in the c r e a t i o n o f
14 n e w c o u n t r i e s , all o f w h i c h b e c a m e i n d e p e n d e n t i n i960, w i t h
the e x c e p t i o n o f G u i n e a w h i c h h a d b e c o m e a s o v e r e i g n state t w o
1
years earlier. T o g e t h e r these c o u n t r i e s - n a m e l y B e n i n , C a m -
e r o u n , the Central A f r i c a n R e p u b l i c , C h a d , C o n g o , G a b o n ,
G u i n e a , the I v o r y C o a s t , M a l i , Mauritania, N i g e r , Senegal, T o g o
and U p p e r V o l t a — c o v e r a v a s t area o f o v e r three m i l l i o n square
m i l e s , b u t t h e i r c o m b i n e d e s t i m a t e d p o p u l a t i o n i n 1975 w a s o n l y
j u s t o v e r 50 m i l l i o n . T h u s t h o u g h t h e y a r e l a r g e r i n s i z e t h a n
E u r o p e less t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , t h e y h a v e o n l y a t e n t h o f its
population.
T o d i s c u s s f r a n c o p h o n e t r o p i c a l A f r i c a as i f it w e r e a u n i t is
m i s l e a d i n g . T h o u g h all t h e s t a t e s t h a t c o m p r i s e it w e r e c o l o n i s e d
b y F r a n c e a n d still u s e F r e n c h as t h e i r official l a n g u a g e , t h e s e
facts c a n n o t d i s g u i s e t h e m a n y d i f f e r e n c e s a m o n g t h e m t h a t
h a v e b e c o m e m u c h m o r e p r o n o u n c e d since independence. S o m e
c o u n t r i e s , s u c h as C h a d a n d U p p e r V o l t a , suffered d u r i n g t h e
p e r i o d under consideration f r o m their l a n d - l o c k e d position and
scarce resources, w h i c h resulted in l o w i n v e s t m e n t and a s l o w ,
a n d s o m e t i m e s n e g l i g i b l e rate o f e c o n o m i c g r o w t h . O t h e r s like
G a b o n a n d t h e I v o r y C o a s t , b o t h r e l a t i v e l y r i c h in a g r i c u l t u r a l a n d
mineral resources, enjoyed rapid e c o n o m i c g r o w t h . T h e i r coastal
l o c a t i o n and g o o d p o r t facilities h e l p e d t h e m t o sustain an a c t i v e
foreign trade and to attract w o r k e r s from p o o r e r n e i g h b o u r i n g
states. G u i n e a , b y contrast, t h o u g h rich in mineral a n d a g r i c u l t u r a l
resources and located o n the Atlantic O c e a n , had a g o v e r n m e n t
w h i c h throughout our period p r o v e d incapable o f harnessing
t h e s e a d v a n t a g e s t o t h e b e n e f i t o f its p e o p l e .
T h e states o f f r a n c o p h o n e t r o p i c a l A f r i c a i n h e r i t e d a u n i f o r m
p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m f r o m F r a n c e at i n d e p e n d e n c e , b u t w i t h i n a s h o r t
time m a n y o f t h e m had u n d e r g o n e institutional changes, s o m e o f
1
A t i n d e p e n d e n c e B e n i n w a s still c a l l e d b y t h e n a m e it w a s g i v e n as a F r e n c h c o l o n y ,
D a h o m e y . It c h a n g e d t o B e n i n i n 1975.
6n

‘The map which appears here in the printed edition has
been removed for ease of use and now appears as an
additional resource on the chapter overview page’.

F R E N C H - S P E A K I N G T R O P I C A L A F R I C A
t h e m a b r u p t o n e s i n t h e form o f m i l i t a r y c o u p s . A m o n g g o v e r n
ments led b y the military there w e r e striking variations. S o m e ,
like that o f G e n e r a l L a m i z a n a o f U p p e r V o l t a , s o u g h t to return
to civilian rule, w h i l e that o f M a r i e n N g o u a b i in C o n g o tried to
e s t a b l i s h a s o c i a l i s t state. E v e n a m o n g l e a d e r s w h o r e t a i n e d t h e
p o s i t i o n s they acquired d u r i n g the transfer o f p o w e r b y F r a n c e ,
there w e r e w i d e d i v e r g e n c e s in the w a y they u s e d t h e m . P r e s i d e n t
L e o p o l d S e n g h o r o f Senegal, for example, pursued policies o f
moderate reform and cooperation w i t h the former colonial p o w e r ,
while President S e k o u T o u r e o f G u i n e a p u s h e d for radical social
and e c o n o m i c c h a n g e , k e e p i n g his distance f r o m F r a n c e w h i l e
actively courting the Eastern E u r o p e a n countries.
S o m e states h a d l a r g e M u s l i m m a j o r i t i e s , o t h e r s C h r i s t i a n
m a j o r i t i e s . T h e i r p o p u l a t i o n s differed m a r k e d l y i n m a n y o t h e r
w a y s - density, place o f residence, ethnic and social b a c k g r o u n d
and sources o f i n c o m e . S o m e states, like M a l i , N i g e r a n d C h a d ,
are e n o r m o u s , e a c h l a r g e r t h a n F r a n c e a n d G e r m a n y c o m b i n e d ,
y e t t h e d e n s i t y o f t h e i r p o p u l a t i o n s w a s p a t h e t i c a l l y t h i n . A l l 14
states t o g e t h e r h a d a p o p u l a t i o n t h a t w a s o n l y t w o - t h i r d s t h a t o f
N i g e r i a . P e r c a p i t a i n c o m e i n states l i k e M a l i a n d C h a d w a s as l o w
as $80 i n 1975, w h i l e t h a t o f t h e I v o r y C o a s t a n d G a b o n w a s as
h i g h as $3 50, a n d u r b a n i s a t i o n a n d t h e m o n e y e c o n o m y w e r e w e l l
advanced.
G i v e n t h e v a r i e t y o f d i f f e r e n c e s a m o n g t h e 14 s t a t e s , it b e c o m e s
i n c r e a s i n g l y difficult t o t r e a t t h e m as a u n i t . S u c h a n a p p r o a c h m a y
m a k e s e n s e f o r t h e y e a r s b e f o r e i n d e p e n d e n c e w h e n t h e y w e r e all
r u l e d b y F r a n c e in a l a r g e l y s i m i l a r m a n n e r , a n d w h e n t h e F r e n c h
administration w a s able t o dictate the terms o f the m o n e y
e c o n o m y , to control their borders and to i m p o s e certain c o m m o n
social, political and e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t s . T h e general c o n
s e n s u s h a s b e e n t h a t t h e effect o f t h i s F r e n c h c o n t r o l w a s u n i q u e ,
a n d is o f m a j o r i m p o r t a n c e i n e x p l a i n i n g t h e p o s t - i n d e p e n d e n c e
s i t u a t i o n in t h e f r a n c o p h o n e s t a t e s o f t r o p i c a l A f r i c a . It is t r u e t h a t
d u r i n g the c o l o n i a l era F r e n c h administrators, soldiers and traders
did i m p o s e c o m m o n structures u p o n these states, b u t the F r e n c h
t h e m s e l v e s w e r e thinly spread o n the g r o u n d . T h e i r greatest
i m p a c t w a s o n the small A f r i c a n elite that attended F r e n c h s c h o o l s
a n d w o r k e d in F r e n c h offices o r c o m m e r c i a l h o u s e s . O f c o u r s e
the d e p t h o f the impact o f F r a n c e varied f r o m c o l o n y to c o l o n y
b u t , h o w e v e r d e e p it m a y h a v e b e e n , w h a t h a s b e c o m e i n c r e a s i n g l y
614

c l e a r s i n c e i n d e p e n d e n c e is t h a t m a n y o f t h e f r a n c o p h o n e t r o p i c a l
A f r i c a n s t a t e s h a v e as m u c h i n c o m m o n w i t h A r a b i c - , E n g l i s h - o r
P o r t u g u e s e - s p e a k i n g n e i g h b o u r s as w i t h e a c h o t h e r . T r a d i t i o n a l
pre-colonial relationships, m a s k e d b y the colonial frontiers i m
p o s e d b y F r a n c e , h a v e b e g u n t o reassert t h e m s e l v e s . N e w political
and e c o n o m i c centres h a v e strained the links f o r g e d a m o n g these
states b y t h e c o l o n i a l e x p e r i e n c e . N i g e r i a a n d t h e c o u n t r i e s o f t h e
M a g h r i b , for instance, b e g a n to exert an influence o n the former
A f r i q u e O c c i d e n t a l e Française ( A O F ) i n c o n c e i v a b l e in c o l o n i a l
t i m e s . W h a t w a s s i g n i f i c a n t i n t h e first 15 y e a r s o f i n d e p e n d e n c e ,
t h e n , w a s the e m e r g e n c e o f a n e w state s y s t e m in the r e g i o n w h e r e
the F r e n c h c o n n e x i o n diminished in i m p o r t a n c e . E v e n t s since
i n d e p e n d e n c e a g g r a v a t e d t h o s e differences a m o n g states that h a d
been neutralised b y colonial rule, w h i l e n e w e c o n o m i c and
political relationships e m e r g e d in the r e g i o n .
S o , t h o u g h w e w r i t e a b o u t the f r a n c o p h o n e states o f t r o p i c a l
A f r i c a as a g r o u p , it is i m p o r t a n t t o r e c o g n i s e t h a t w h i l e t h i s m a k e s
g o o d s e n s e f o r t h e p e r i o d u p t o i n d e p e n d e n c e , d u r i n g t h e 15 y e a r s
that f o l l o w e d such a g r o u p i n g b e c a m e increasingly arbitrary.
F O R M A L P O L I T I C A L D E C O L O N I S A T I O N
T h e constitutional history o f francophone tropical Africa during

c o l o n i a l t i m e s is r e l a t i v e l y e a s y t o d e s c r i b e b e c a u s e o f t h e n a t u r e
o f F r e n c h policy. U n l i k e E n g l i s h colonial administration, that o f
F r a n c e w a s h i g h l y c e n t r a l i s e d , w i t h all p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s b e i n g
m a d e b y the M i n i s t r y o f C o l o n i e s in F r a n c e and passed o n to the
g o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l o f the F r e n c h W e s t African Federation ( A O F )
w i t h its c a p i t a l i n D a k a r , a n d t h e g o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l o f t h e F r e n c h
E q u a t o r i a l A f r i c a n F e d e r a t i o n ( A E F ) w i t h its c a p i t a l i n
B r a z z a v i l l e , w h o i n t u r n t r a n s m i t t e d t h e m m o r e o r less u n i f o r m l y
to the g o v e r n o r s o f the constituent territories. T o g o and C a m
e r o u n , f o r m e r G e r m a n c o l o n i e s and thereafter L e a g u e o f N a t i o n s
Mandates and United N a t i o n s T r u s t Territories, w e r e treated
separately, a l t h o u g h essentially the same policies w e r e p u r s u e d in
them. O f c o u r s e the i m p a c t o f those central decisions varied
considerably depending o n the environment, o n existing social
and e c o n o m i c c o n d i t i o n s , o n the state o f A f r i c a n political o r
g a n i s a t i o n , a n d o n s u c h f a c t o r s as t h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e c o l o n i a l
administrators themselves.
615

A f t e r t h e fall o f F r a n c e at t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e S e c o n d W o r l d
W a r , t h e V i c h y r e g i m e a p p o i n t e d P i e r r e B o i s s o n as H i g h C o m
missioner for Black Africa. Effectively he w a s only g o v e r n o r -
general o f A O F for, under the leadership o f the G u y a n e s e Felix
E b o u e , C h a d g a v e its s u p p o r t t o t h e F r e e F r e n c h o f G e n e r a l d e
G a u l l e a n d w a s s o o n f o l l o w e d b y t h e o t h e r c o l o n i e s o f A E F as
w e l l as b y C a m e r o u n . A f t e r t h e A l l i e d l a n d i n g i n F r e n c h N o r t h
Africa, B o i s s o n t h r e w in his lot w i t h the Free F r e n c h , t h o u g h he
w a s s o o n replaced b y a Gaullist g o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l . U n d e r the
Free French administration, compulsory crop cultivation and
extensive recruitment to help the Allied cause b e c a m e the order
o f the day, b u t the w a r t i m e support o f the A f r i c a n colonies w a s
n o t i g n o r e d b y d e G a u l l e : at t h e B r a z z a v i l l e C o n f e r e n c e i n l a t e
January 1944 a n u m b e r o f major reforms w e r e projected w h i c h
g a v e a n e w c h a r a c t e r t o t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n F r a n c e a n d its
t r o p i c a l A f r i c a n c o l o n i e s a n d , t h o u g h it d i d n o t e n v i s a g e self-
g o v e r n m e n t for t h e m , permitted a measure o f self-rule.
I n r e t r o s p e c t , it is c e r t a i n t h a t F r a n c e , l i k e G r e a t B r i t a i n a n d
other colonial p o w e r s , w o u l d not have been able to hold o n to
its c o l o n i e s . W i t h t h e r i s e o f t h e s u p e r - p o w e r s , t h e E u r o p e a n s t a t e s
ceased to dominate the non-industrialised countries. E c o n o m i c ,
social a n d political difficulties in F r a n c e p u s h e d F r e n c h leaders t o
r e l i n q u i s h c o l o n i a l c o n t r o l w h i l e , w h e n it b e c a m e c l e a r t h a t
n e i g h b o u r i n g B r i t i s h c o l o n i e s w e r e set f i r m l y o n t h e r o a d t o
i n d e p e n d e n c e , f r a n c o p h o n e A f r i c a n l e a d e r s w e r e l e s s a n d less
willing to accept French domination. T h e m o v e to independence
from France o f the tropical A f r i c a n colonies w a s generally a
peaceful one, t h o u g h there w e r e periods o f violence, particularly
in C a m e r o u n . It can also b e a r g u e d that the 14 f r a n c o p h o n e
t r o p i c a l A f r i c a n states b e n e f i t e d f r o m d e c o l o n i s i n g v i c t o r i e s w o n
w i t h b l o o d s h e d in o t h e r parts o f the F r e n c h e m p i r e - especially
Algeria and Vietnam.
T h i s l a r g e l y p e a c e f u l t r a n s f e r o f p o w e r is p a r t l y e x p l a i n e d b y
the p o s t - w a r reforms s t e m m i n g f r o m the Brazzaville r e c o m m e n
dations that w e r e adopted b y the F r e n c h National A s s e m b l y . T h e
reforms progressively extended citizenship to Africans and
granted them freedom o f assembly and association.
Before 1945, F r e n c h colonial policy had oscillated b e t w e e n t w o
f o r m u l a e . T h e first w a s ' a s s i m i l a t i o n ' - * t h e f i c t i o n w h e r e b y t h e
616

1
c o l o n i e s w e r e t r e a t e d as i n t e g r a l p a r t s o f F r a n c e ' . A s s i m i l a t i o n
had roots in the principle that all m e n are equal, asserted b y
Jean-Jacques Rousseau and expressed in the French R e v o l u t i o n
o f 1789. I n their enthusiasm t o translate t h e principle into l a w t h e
F r e n c h revolutionary leaders extended the legal rights o f F r e n c h
citizenship t o the f e w colonies France then possessed. H o w e v e r ,
the n u m b e r s o f citizens in France's tropical African colonies
remained small. Before the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r the policy o f
assimilation w a s applied only in the four c o m m u n e s o f Senegal -
Dakar, St L o u i s , Rufisque and G o r é e . A l l persons, black and
white, b o r n in these c o m m u n e s w e r e legally F r e n c h citizens
governed by French law, although Africans were allowed to
follow M u s l i m personal l a w ; they also had the right t o elect o n e
d e p u t y t o the F r e n c h C h a m b e r o f D e p u t i e s . T h e y elected their
o w n mayors and municipal councillors and members o f a local
a s s e m b l y w i t h p o w e r s s i m i l a r t o t h o s e o f t h e conseils-généraux i n
France.
The only other Africans w h o became legally eligible for French
citizenship w e r e s o m e g r a n t e d t h e p r i v i l e g e in the 1930s. O n l y a
handful o f highly educated Africans w i t h the appropriate quali
fications a c t u a l l y a p p l i e d f o r t h e s t a t u s o f citoyen* s i n c e i t m e a n t
f o r e g o i n g their cultural identity, family l a w a n d c u s t o m s . I n d e e d
t h i s w a s t h e flaw o f t h e a s s i m i l a t i o n p o l i c y e v e n i n t h e o r y - it h a d
validity only for those few Africans w h o s e b a c k g r o u n d and values
w e r e s i m i l a r t o t h o s e o f F r e n c h m e n , t h a t is f o r a m e r e h a n d f u l
o f individuals w h o p r o v e d t o be m o r e c o n c e r n e d w i t h their n e w
F r e n c h identity than w i t h their A f r i c a n o n e .
T h e s e c o n d colonial formula identified in p r e - w a r F r e n c h p o l i c y
w a s ' a s s o c i a t i o n ' . T h i s p o l i c y w a s a d v a n c e d at t h e e n d o f t h e
n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , w h e n i m p e r i a l i s m w a s o n t h e rise i n E u r o p e .
W h e r e assimilation had been the demand o f the French Left,
association b e c a m e that o f the F r e n c h R i g h t . It implied a
p a t e r n a l i s t b e l i e f t h a t it w a s r i g h t a n d p r o p e r f o r F r e n c h m e n t o
€
care for * b a c k w a r d ' g r o u p s o f associated ' Africans - t o protect
t h e m as w e l l a s c o n t r o l t h e m . A s s o c i a t i o n b e c a m e t h e d o m i n a n t
theme o f French colonial policy before the Second W o r l d W a r ,
1
See Thomas Hodgkin and Ruth Schachter, 'French-speaking West Africa in
transition International Conciliation (New York : Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, no. 528), May i960, 389.
2
In 1940, for instance, there were less than 2000 in French West Africa as a whole.
617

a n d u n d e r it A f r i c a n s w e r e ' s u b j e c t s ' o f F r a n c e w i t h v i r t u a l l y n o
rights o f representation, either in F r a n c e o r in the c o l o n i e s . T h e y
had n o access to higher civil service posts, or universities, w h i c h
w e r e o n l y o p e n t o ' c i t i z e n s '. N o r d i d t h e y h a v e m u c h o p p o r t u n i t y
to gain a secondary education. ' S u b j e c t s ' c o u l d be drafted into
colonial forced l a b o u r brigades and the a r m y , and c o u l d b e tried
and sentenced o n the spot b y F r e n c h administrators under the
indigénat t h e c o l o n i a l c o d e o f a d m i n i s t r a t i v e j u s t i c e , f o r w h a t e v e r
y
suspected offence. T h u s they lived u n d e r the authoritarian rule o f

colonial administrators w i t h virtually n o legal recourse. O n l y the
h a n d f u l o f ' c i t i z e n s ' h a d a r i g h t t o j u d i c i a l trial.
T h e s e t w o concepts o f assimilation and association w e r e
i n v o k e d in the d e b a t e s o n d e c o l o n i s a t i o n a m o n g F r e n c h a n d
A f r i c a n l e a d e r s after t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r . B o t h c o n c e p t s
excluded the possibility o f the d e v e l o p m e n t o f nationalism in the
F r e n c h A f r i c a n territories. E v e n the F r e n c h C o m m u n i s t s w e r e
a s s i m i l a t i o n i s t s a n d h a d little s y m p a t h y f o r A f r i c a n n a t i o n a l i s m .
T h e y believed the r e v o l u t i o n in France had t o take priority. M o s t
African leaders w e r e striving to achieve the p r o m i s e o f
assimilation: equal, n o t separate, rights. Y e t the l o g i c o f n u m b e r s
m a d e full e q u a l i t y a m o n g F r e n c h m e n a n d A f r i c a n s i n a g r e a t e r
F r e n c h polity impossible, for African v o t e r s , i n c l u d i n g those o f
N o r t h Africa, w o u l d outnumber metropolitan French voters.
F u r t h e r m o r e , the e c o n o m i c costs o f assimilation w o u l d h a v e been
p r o h i b i t i v e , g i v e n the disparity in l e v e l s o f F r e n c h a n d A f r i c a n
e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t . W h e r e c o u l d t h e f u n d s b e f o u n d t o raise
workers' compensation, welfare, education and other economic
and social benefits in f r a n c o p h o n e Africa t o the levels o b t a i n i n g
i n m e t r o p o l i t a n F r a n c e ? B y t h e late 1 9 5 0 s , t h e F r e n c h L e f t a n d
m a n y o f the A f r i c a n nationalists w e r e clear that assimilation w a s
impracticable. Independent right o f association w i t h the m o t h e r
c o u n t r y n o w b e c a m e their g o a l , and the w a y w a s o p e n t o
nationalist d e v e l o p m e n t and in time i n d e p e n d e n c e . T o b e g i n w i t h ,
the p o s t - w a r F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t s initiated colonial reforms that
c o n f o r m e d w i t h the old assimilationist policies, rather than a
separate national existence for their colonies. Liberal reforms,
p r o p o s e d b y t h e first C o n s t i t u e n t A s s e m b l y i n A p r i l 1 9 4 6 , g i v i n g
the c o l o n i e s a d e g r e e o f a u t o n o m y , w e r e defeated in the s u b s e q u e n t
referendum. T h e second Constituent A s s e m b l y drafted the m o r e
c o n s e r v a t i v e O c t o b e r 1946 constitution o f the F o u r t h F r e n c h
618

R e p u b l i c . It h e l d that the R e p u b l i c w a s ' i n d i v i s i b l e ' ( A r t i c l e I)

a n d p l a c e d t h e ' o v e r s e a s t e r r i t o r i e s ' , as t h e c o l o n i e s w e r e n o w
d e s i g n a t e d , firmly w i t h i n t h e u n i t a r y R e p u b l i c ( A r t i c l e 60).
A l t h o u g h France and her colonies w e r e called a ' U n i o n ' , the eight
territories in A f r i q u e O c c i d e n t a l e Française a n d the f o u r in
A f r i q u e E q u a t o r i a l e F r a n ç a i s e (see fig. 29) h a d n o s e p a r a t e i n t e r
national existence. T o g o and C a m e r o u n , in contrast, w e r e ' a s
sociated territories ' in the U n i o n , a n d n o t an integral part o f the
F r e n c h R e p u b l i c , because o f their U N T r u s t e e s h i p status.
P o w e r o v e r legislation for the ' overseas territories ' in matters
o f ' criminal l a w , the organisation o f p u b l i c freedoms, and political
and administrative o r g a n i s a t i o n ' (Article 72) b e l o n g e d to the
French executive. T h e council o f ministers had the right to adopt
decrees n o t e x p r e s s l y c o n t r a d i c t e d b y l e g i s l a t i o n - ' after p r e v i o u s
consultation w i t h the A s s e m b l y o f the U n i o n ' (Article 72).
A l t h o u g h this p r o v i s i o n w a s enacted largely b e c a u s e delegates t o
the Constitutional C o n v e n t i o n r e c o g n i s e d that the French
National Assembly was unlikely to spend m u c h time o v e r African
p r o b l e m s , it r e s u l t e d i n a c o n t i n u a n c e o f c o n t r o l o v e r A f r i c a n
affairs b y t h e F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t , w h i c h a l s o h a d full c o n t r o l o f
the overseas civil service.
Y e t the F o u r t h R e p u b l i c m a d e s o m e significant c h a n g e s in the
rights o f Africans. Forced labour w a s abolished. A l l African
s u b j e c t s r e c e i v e d F r e n c h c i t i z e n s h i p ( A r t i c l e 8 1 ) t h o u g h n o t all
w e r e e n f r a n c h i s e d . A t t h e s a m e t i m e , t h e a b o l i t i o n o f t h e indigénat
a n d a c o n c o m i t a n t r e v i s i o n o f t h e p e n a l c o d e g a v e all A f r i c a n s
access to courts and legal rights. M o r e o v e r , the extension o f
' republican liberties ' a l l o w e d Africans t o f o r m their o w n political
o r g a n i s a t i o n s , w h i c h had n o t existed o p e n l y b e f o r e , e x c e p t in the
four c o m m u n e s o f Senegal. A further s t r o n g i n d u c e m e n t to f o r m
African political organisations w a s the elections that t o o k place
o n three levels o f political representation. T h o s e Africans w i t h the
v o t e elected delegates to territorial assemblies w h i c h m e t in the
i n d i v i d u a l capitals o f the 12 territories a n d t w o T r u s t T e r r i t o r i e s .
Until 1957 they w e r e elected b y t w o electoral c o l l e g e s in each
t e r r i t o r y . T h e first c o m p r i s e d F r e n c h m e n a n d t h e h a n d f u l o f
pre-war African citizens; the second comprised the n e w African
citizens w i t h the v o t e . In 1946 the criteria for the v o t e w a s status.
T h u s , for example, m e m b e r s o f assemblies or cooperatives o r
unions, or holders o f French decorations w e r e enfranchised.
619

Literates a n d t a x - p a y i n g heads o f families w e r e a d d e d later. T h e

early franchise w a s severely limited, b u t w a s gradually e x p a n d e d
u n t i l t h e loi-cadre o f 1 9 5 6 g r a n t e d v i r t u a l l y u n i v e r s a l a d u l t s u f f r a g e .
I n S e n e g a l , f o r e x a m p l e , w h i c h , as a r e f l e c t i o n o f its s p e c i a l s t a t u s
had a single electoral college, only 2 per cent o f the total
p o p u l a t i o n w a s registered t o v o t e in 1 9 4 5 . B y 1 9 5 1 this h a d
i n c r e a s e d t o 29 p e r c e n t a n d , i n 1 9 5 6 , t o 36 p e r c e n t . U n i v e r s a l
a d u l t s u f f r a g e i n 195 7 r a i s e d t h e p e r c e n t a g e o f t h e r e g i s t e r e d p o p u
lation t o 46. B y contrast, in the I v o r y Coast, w i t h a substantially
smaller E u r o p e a n p o p u l a t i o n , t h e p e r c e n t a g e s registered w e r e less
t h a n o n e p e r c e n t i n 1 9 4 5 , 8 p e r c e n t i n 1 9 5 1 , 36 p e r c e n t i n 1 9 5 6
1
a n d 60 p e r c e n t i n 1 9 5 7 .
E a c h t e r r i t o r i a l a s s e m b l y i n t h e 1 9 4 5 - 5 6 p e r i o d e l e c t e d f r o m its
r a n k s five m e m b e r s o f t h e t w o f e d e r a l G r a n d s C o n s e i l s o f F r e n c h
W e s t Africa o r o f Equatorial Africa, w h i c h m e t in D a k a r and
Brazzaville respectively. A t the metropolitan level, Africans were
represented in b o t h houses o f the French parliament, in the
A s s e m b l y o f the French U n i o n and in the E c o n o m i c C o u n c i l .
T o g o a n d C a m e r o u n w e r e e x c l u d e d f r o m representation at the
federal level b e c a u s e o f their special status, b u t they d i d send
deputies t o Paris.
T h e n u m b e r o f African representatives in France w a s never
large, since the l o g i c o f assimilation w a s never accepted, a n d o n e
F r e n c h v o t e n e v e r c o u n t e d as less t h a n t h e e q u i v a l e n t o f t e n
African votes. African deputies were n o t numerous e n o u g h
directly t o decide major issues in the F r e n c h assembly, b u t b y
collaborating o n F r e n c h issues w i t h parties in the successive
French multi-party g o v e r n m e n t s , they managed to exact some
concessions for Africa. T h e federal assemblies a n d the territorial
assemblies w e r e initially largely consultative a n d o n l y h a d limited
p o w e r s i n t h e fields o f finance.
T h o u g h African representatives w e r e relatively powerless, the
existence o f three levels o f representation w a s important for
p o l i t i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t s i n f r a n c o p h o n e A f r i c a . R o u g h l y e v e r y 18
months b e t w e e n 1946 t o 1958, African voters turned o u t t o elect
representatives t o o n e o r other o f the assemblies. W h e t h e r o r n o t
1
Percentages are calculated w i t h the figures p r o v i d e d in R u t h Schachter M o r g e n t h a u ,
Political parties in French-speaking West Africa ( O x f o r d , 1964), A p p e n d i x e s 5, 7. T h e
p o p u l a t i o n f i g u r e s f o r b o t h c o u n t r i e s a r e a p p r o x i m a t e f o r 1945 a n d a r e b a s e d o n 1958
estimates f o r the other three years. I v o r y Coast population figures are apparently
substantially underestimated.
620

the political parties w h i c h d e v e l o p e d in response actually

o r g a n i s e d the p o p u l a t i o n o n d e m o c r a t i c lines o v e r the l o n g r u n ,
t h e y d i d p o l i t i c i s e it s i g n i f i c a n t l y . A f r i c a n s b e c a m e a c c u s t o m e d t o
a c k n o w l e d g i n g territorial issues a n d personalities. T h e y b e c a m e
familiar w i t h the n o t i o n that they o r their leaders, a n d n o t o n l y
the F r e n c h , c o u l d m a k e decisions. Finally, the A f r i c a n élite g a i n e d
significant political experience w h i c h led eventually t o d e m a n d s
to g o v e r n their o w n countries. T h u s , the p o s t - w a r reforms
prepared the w a y for the peaceful transition to independence.
N e v e r t h e l e s s , f o r t h e first t e n y e a r s after t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r ,
i n d e p e n d e n c e w a s s e l d o m a m a t t e r o f p u b l i c d e b a t e . I t w a s , after
all, i l l e g a l u n d e r t h e F r e n c h c o n s t i t u t i o n . A f r i c a n s e l e c t e d t o t h e
F r e n c h National A s s e m b l y pushed rather for reforms that w e n t
further t o equalise the position o f Africans and F r e n c h m e n . T h e
deuxième loi Lamine Guèye o f 30 J u n e 1 9 5 0 , n a m e d a f t e r t h e first
depute o f S e n e g a l , f o r e x a m p l e , g a v e A f r i c a n c i v i l s e r v a n t s e q u a l
pay a n d conditions o f w o r k w i t h their F r e n c h counterparts,
i n c l u d i n g v a c a t i o n s i n m e t r o p o l i t a n F r a n c e . ( T h e première loi
Lamine Guèye', p a s s e d i n M a y 1 9 4 6 , h a d e x t e n d e d c i t i z e n s h i p t o a l l
A f r i c a n sujets, w h i l e a l l o w i n g t h e m t o r e t a i n t h e u s e o f c u s t o m a r y
l a w . ) I n 1 9 5 2 A f r i c a n t r a d e - u n i o n l e a d e r s o b t a i n e d t h e code du
travail w h i c h satisfied m a n y u n i o n c l a i m s f o r m i n i m u m w a g e
standards, limitation o n hours o f w o r k , family allowances, holidays
with pay, the right o f collective bargaining and the validity o f
c o l l e c t i v e a g r e e m e n t s , t h e c o s t o f w h i c h w a s t o p r o v e far b e y o n d
the e c o n o m i c capacity o f t h e A f r i c a n s u c c e s s o r states.
O n another level, African politicians consistently pressed for
universal suffrage a n d the elimination o f the dual electoral c o l l e g e .
S t e p b y s t e p b e t w e e n 1945 a n d 1 9 5 7 A f r i c a n s a c h i e v e d t h e s e g o a l s .
A t the level o f the territorial assembly there w a s a p r o g r e s s i v e
r e d u c t i o n in t h e n u m b e r o f seats r e s e r v e d f o r E u r o p e a n v o t e r s .
F i n a l l y , u n d e r t h e loi-cadre o f 1 9 5 6 , t h e f r a n c h i s e f o r a l l d i r e c t
elections b e c a m e universal o n the basis o f a single electoral
college. B y this date pressures in m e t r o p o l i t a n F r a n c e a n d
overseas had p r o d u c e d a change in attitudes o f the E u r o p e a n
m i n o r i t y , s u c h as p l a n t e r s a n d b u s i n e s s m e n , w i t h i n t e r e s t s i n
Africa, w h o f o r m e d an influential l o b b y in France. T h e y c a m e t o
the v i e w that they h a d m o r e t o gain from attempting t o collaborate
with dominant African g r o u p s than b y trying t o o p p o s e them.
I n d e e d b y 19 5 6 A f r i c a n d e m a n d s f o r s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t w e r e v e r y
621

strong. African political parties, trade unions and youth

m o v e m e n t s w e r e organised for, and experienced in, placing
pressures o n the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t . Simultaneously, the w e a k
ness o f F r a n c e w a s increasingly e v i d e n t : defeated in V i e t n a m and
facing a major w a r in A l g e r i a , F r e n c h leaders did n o t w a n t t r o u b l e
o n yet another front, and w e r e therefore prepared to consider a
c h a n g e in p o l i c y t o w a r d s their increasingly restive tropical
African territories.
T h e first s i g n o f a c h a n g e i n F r e n c h p o l i c y t o w a r d t r o p i c a l
Africa c a m e w h e n the 1954 M e n d e s - F r a n c e g o v e r n m e n t , u n d e r
pressure from the United Nations, projected n e w constitutions for
the T r u s t Territories o f T o g o and C a m e r o u n , w h i c h a l l o w e d t h e m
a m e a s u r e o f a u t o n o m y . A l t h o u g h t h e s e d i d n o t satisfy e i t h e r
T o g o l e s e o r C a m e r o u n i a n n a t i o n a l i s t s , t h e y d i d raise t h e q u e s t i o n
i n n e i g h b o u r i n g F r e n c h - s p e a k i n g A f r i c a n t e r r i t o r i e s as t o w h y
they t o o should n o t h a v e internal self-government. Discussions
escalated, and resulted in a redefinition o f the p o s i t i o n o f
f r a n c o p h o n e A f r i c a n territories in relation to F r a n c e .
T h e loi-cadre o f 1 9 5 6 , w i t h i m p l e m e n t i n g d e c r e e s i n 1 9 5 7 ,
c o n c e d e d a d e g r e e o f a u t o n o m y to the francophone tropical
colonies. T h e territorial assemblies acquired n e w legislative p o w e r s
o n specified matters - land, soil c o n s e r v a t i o n , agriculture,
f o r e s t r y , fisheries, m o s t m i n e r a l r i g h t s , i n t e r n a l t r a d e , c o d i f i c a t i o n
o f customary law, primary and secondary education, health,
cooperatives and urbanisation. M o s t important, the assemblies
c o u l d e l e c t p r e d o m i n a n t l y A f r i c a n e x e c u t i v e s , k n o w n as C o n s e i l s
du G o u v e r n e m e n t , w h i c h assumed control o v e r the civil servants
w o r k i n g in t h e fields e n u m e r a t e d a b o v e . T h e F r e n c h g o v e r n o r
remained in c o n t r o l o f the o t h e r (French) ' s t a t e ' services, p o s
sessed certain reserve p o w e r s and presided o v e r the C o n s e i l d u
G o u v e r n e m e n t . B u t the elected A f r i c a n vice-president a c q u i r e d in
p r a c t i c e t h e s t a t u s a n d i n i t i a t i v e o f a p r i m e m i n i s t e r - at l e a s t i n
the majority o f territories w h e r e h e w a s the leader o f the party
w h i c h effectively controlled the assembly.
T h e r e f o r m s o f 1 9 5 6 - 7 w e r e a t u r n i n g p o i n t in the relations
b e t w e e n F r a n c e a n d t h e o v e r s e a s t e r r i t o r i e s . B y g r a n t i n g self-
g o v e r n m e n t , e x c e p t i n finance, d e f e n c e a n d f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s , t o
the tropical A f r i c a n territories, the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t admitted
that the 1946 constitution was impracticable. T h e reforms n o w
d i v i d e d t h e ' indivisible' Republic into c o m p o n e n t territories, and
622

distributed p o w e r b e t w e e n t h e m and France. T h e next step, total

i n d e p e n d e n c e , w a s a l m o s t i n e v i t a b l e , a l t h o u g h this w a s n o t
immediately recognised b y the moderate F r e n c h leaders in p o w e r
in F r a n c e .
After the collapse o f the F o u r t h R e p u b l i c , the n e w 1958
constitution o f the Fifth R e p u b l i c reflected France's c h a n g e d
a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s t h e c o l o n i e s . T h e r e f e r e n d u m o f 28 S e p t e m b e r
9
1 9 5 8 g a v e A f r i c a n t e r r i t o r i e s t h e o p t i o n o f v o t i n g 'non t o t h e n e w
constitution, and thus o f c h o o s i n g total independence. President
9
d e G a u l l e e m p h a s i s e d t h a t 'non m e a n t a n e n d t o a l l F r e n c h
9
e c o n o m i c , t e c h n i c a l a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a i d . T o v o t e 'out m e a n t
a c c e p t i n g the status o f an a u t o n o m o u s R e p u b l i c in the n e w F r e n c h
C o m m u n i t y a n d b e i n g assured o f c o n t i n u e d F r e n c h aid. In spite
o f d e G a u l l e ' s threat, the c h o i c e w a s real, t h o u g h the t e r m s w e r e
set b y F r a n c e . I n 1 9 5 8 F r e n c h p o l i t i c i a n s still b e l i e v e d a u t o n o m y
w a s a feasible alternative t o total i n d e p e n d e n c e . ' A u t o n o m o u s
R e p u b l i c s ' w e r e created w h i c h n o l o n g e r sent deputies t o France
a n d h a d m u c h m o r e c o n t r o l o v e r d o m e s t i c affairs. T h e p o w e r s o f
the territorial assemblies b e c a m e residual rather than e n u m e r
ated, and the C o u n c i l s o f Ministers remained responsible t o t h e m
(as t h e y h a d b e e n s i n c e t h e loi-cadre o f 1 9 5 6 ) . E a c h R e p u b l i c
a d o p t e d its o w n c o n s t i t u t i o n . O n l y c e r t a i n e n u m e r a t e d m a t t e r s -
c u r r e n c y , c o m m o n e c o n o m i c a n d financial p o l i c y , d e f e n c e a n d
foreign policy, higher education — were to be indirectly subject
to c o n t i n u i n g F r e n c h control in that they w e r e reserved for the
C o m m u n i t y . T h e F r e n c h a s s u m e d that c o n t i n u e d aid w a s sufficient
inducement for the small and generally p o o r individual African
territories to f o r g o c o m p l e t e independence.
Indeed, the French g o v e r n m e n t had hitherto reinforced the
d e p e n d e n c e o f t h o s e t e r r i t o r i e s b y not g r a n t i n g p o w e r o r a u t h o r i t y
t o t h e f e d e r a l a s s e m b l i e s , w h i c h w o u l d a t least h a v e g i v e n t h e s e
s m a l l t e r r i t o r i e s s o m e s t r e n g t h as a g r o u p . T h e r e f o r m s o f 1 9 5 6 - 7
h a d r e d u c e d t h e i r p o w e r s a n d d i d n o t p r o v i d e f o r e x e c u t i v e s at
the federal level. T h e 1958 constitution d i d n o t r e c o g n i s e the
e x i s t e n c e o f t h e federations, a n d in 1 9 5 9 t h e y w e r e officially
dismantled. T h e y w e r e easy e n o u g h to break u p — and the
d e c i s i o n c o n d e m n e d t h e p o o r i n l a n d states i n p a r t i c u l a r t o g r e a t e r
p o v e r t y a n d i s o l a t i o n after t h e b r i e f e u p h o r i c b i r t h o f t h e s e p a r a t e
n e w nations. N o w o n d e r m o r e powerful neighbours s o o n began
t o n i b b l e a t t h e i r b o r d e r s after i n d e p e n d e n c e . B y c o n t r a s t , B r i t i s h
623

p o l i c y in N i g e r i a transferred p o w e r t o a federal g o v e r n m e n t .
F e d e r a t i o n d i d n o t h a v e a n e a s y c o u r s e after i n d e p e n d e n c e , f o r
N i g e r i a suffered a n a g o n i s i n g c i v i l w a r w h e n t h e o i l - r i c h a r e a o f
Biafra attempted t o s e c e d e ; yet afterwards the prospects o f a large,
p o p u l o u s and p r o s p e r o u s state m a d e N i g e r i a into the d o m i n a n t
W e s t A f r i c a n p o w e r , t o w e r i n g o v e r its m a n y f r a n c o p h o n e n e i g h
b o u r s . I t is h a r d t o e s c a p e t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e F r e n c h
g o v e r n m e n t w a n t e d the t r o p i c a l A f r i c a n states t o b e small, p o o r ,
weak, divided and thus dependent.
F u l l i n d e p e n d e n c e w a s at t h e t i m e o f t h e r e f e r e n d u m n e v e r
t h e l e s s a l r e a d y u n d e r d i s c u s s i o n i n all A f r i c a n c o l o n i e s , t h o u g h
m o s t A f r i c a n leaders w e r e n o t ready t o g i v e u p F r e n c h aid. T h u s ,
o f the 12 territories v o t i n g in the 1958 r e f e r e n d u m , o n l y G u i n e a
v o t e d ' n o n \ T o g o a n d C a m e r o u n , as U N T r u s t T e r r i t o r i e s , w e r e
already scheduled for independence, and did not v o t e . E l e v e n
territories then joined the F r e n c h C o m m u n i t y , presided o v e r b y
the president o f France, w i t h a consultative E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l
1
c o n s i s t i n g o f t h e h e a d s o f 13 c o n s t i t u e n t g o v e r n m e n t s . In
principle, there w a s also a H i g h C o u r t o f Arbitration and a
C o m m u n i t y Senate, consultative only, w h i c h included represen
tatives o f the constituent legislatures; but the C o m m u n i t y n e v e r
really t o o k f o r m , b e i n g o v e r t a k e n b y e v e n t s .
B y 1 9 5 9 - 6 0 t h e t e m p o o f p o l i t i c a l c h a n g e all o v e r t h e A f r i c a n
continent had q u i c k e n e d . Radical African leaders w e r e actively
d e m a n d i n g independence from France, w h i c h faced a c o n t i n u i n g
w a r in A l g e r i a and w a s threatened internally b y the possibility o f
c i v i l w a r . B e l e a g u e r e d o n all s i d e s , t h e F r e n c h g a v e w a y t o t h e
idea o f i n d e p e n d e n c e for Africa, w h i l e c l i n g i n g to the n o t i o n that
aid w o u l d assure F r e n c h influence, i f n o t c o n t r o l , in the area. T h e
F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t s p o n s o r e d an a m e n d m e n t to T i t l e X I I o f the
1958 c o n s t i t u t i o n , w h i c h p e r m i t t e d the 11 m e m b e r s t o b e c o m e
independent yet remain w i t h the C o m m u n i t y and r e c e i v e aid.
B y t h e e n d o f i 9 6 0 all t h e 1 4 t e r r i t o r i e s o f f r a n c o p h o n e t r o p i c a l
A f r i c a h a d b e c o m e politically s o v e r e i g n states a n d m e m b e r s o f the
U n i t e d N a t i o n s . T h e s o v e r e i g n t y w a s p o l i t i c a l o n l y ; it w a s h a r d
t o a r g u e that a n y o f the n e w states w a s v i a b l e in an e c o n o m i c sense
and m a n y o f the borders appeared p o r o u s indeed. C r e a t i n g viable
nation states o u t o f these n o m i n a l l y i n d e p e n d e n t units b e c a m e
the difficult a n d c h a l l e n g i n g tasks o f the A f r i c a n f o u n d i n g fathers.
1
T h e other members were Malagasy and metropolitan France.
624

P O L I T I C A L P A R T I E S A N D L E A D E R S
P O L I T I C A L P A R T I E S A N D L E A D E R S , I 944-60
T h e constitutional advances m a d e in francophone tropical Africa

after t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r w e r e a c c o m p a n i e d b y t h e d e v e l o p -
ment o f political parties and other p o p u l a r organisations, i n c l u d i n g
trade unions and y o u t h m o v e m e n t s . Because o f the special nature
o f the F r e n c h colonial system, w h i c h rejected the idea o f inde-
pendence and for m a n y years e n t w i n e d political reforms w i t h the
concept o f 'assimilation', m a n y o f the African organisations
w h i c h eventually b e c a m e part o f the nationalist m o v e m e n t s in
A f r i c a w e r e b o r n w i t h labels m a d e in F r a n c e . T h e r e w a s a b r a n c h
o f the French Socialist Party ( S F I O , Section Française de
l'Internationale O u v r i è r e ) in S e n e g a l ; there w e r e A f r i c a n parties
affiliated t o t h e F r e n c h C o m m u n i s t , C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t i c , a n d
1
Radical Socialist Parties; the A f r i c a n trade-union m o v e m e n t s
w e r e s i m i l a r l y affiliated w i t h m e t r o p o l i t a n u n i o n s .
G i v e n the alliance w i t h F r e n c h parties and the federal arrange-
ments in Africa, political parties f o r m e d interterritorial n e t w o r k s
at t h e o u t s e t . T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t w a s t h e R a s s e m b l e m e n t
D é m o c r a t i q u e A f r i c a i n ( R D A ) , f o u n d e d in B a m a k o in O c t o b e r
1 9 4 6 . R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f v i r t u a l l y all t h e t e r r i t o r i e s w e n t t o t h e
f o u n d i n g m e e t i n g . T h e c o n v e n e r s w e r e six F r e n c h W e s t A f r i c a n
deputies: Félix H o u p h o u ë t - B o i g n y o f the I v o r y Coast, L a m i n e
G u è y e and L e o p o l d S e n g h o r o f Senegal, S o u r o u M i g a n A p i t h y
o f D a h o m e y , Fily D a b o Sissoko o f Soudan and Y a c i n e D i a l l o o f
G u i n e a . Unfortunately, f r o m the point o f v i e w o f creating a
c o m m o n A f r i c a n front, o p p o s i t i o n b y the socialist minister for
overseas France caused the Africans allied w i t h the S F I O to
w i t h d r a w , w i t h the result that, a l t h o u g h representatives appeared
from m o s t territories, s o m e o f the m o s t i m p o r t a n t leaders o f the
time w e r e excluded. Perhaps the m o s t notable w i t h d r a w a l w a s
Senegal, w h o s e leaders w e r e then m e m b e r s o f the S F I O . T h u s
b e g a n the rivalry b e t w e e n Senegal and the I v o r y Coast.
T h e most powerful R D A leader w a s H o u p h o u ë t - B o i g n y ,
t h o u g h t h e r e w e r e s e c t i o n s i n all t h e t e r r i t o r i e s o f A O F , w i t h t h e
exception o f Mauritania, and several o f the A E F territories. T h e
R D A w a s the d o m i n a n t party in S o u d a n , G u i n e a , the I v o r y C o a s t ,
G a b o n a n d C h a d , a n d its s e c t i o n s p l a y e d a n i m p o r t a n t r o l e i n
politics (if n o t d o m i n a n t ) in U p p e r V o l t a , N i g e r , C a m e r o u n
1
A p p e n d i x 12 i n R u t h S c h a c h t e r M o r g e n t h a u , Political parties, 4 1 7 fT.
625

a n d C o n g o - B r a z z a v i l l e . I t e x i s t e d as a m i n o r p a r t y i n S e n e g a l a n d
D a h o m e y . T h e unity o f the R D A w a s n o t based o n tight
interterritorial organisation b u t rather o n cooperation b y the
leaders, their c o m m o n colonial experiences in e d u c a t i o n a n d
e m p l o y m e n t , and their c o m m i t m e n t t o African emancipation. T h e
weakness o f interterritorial organisation became evident as, once
the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t p u s h e d for separate territorial a u t o n o m y
u n d e r t h e loi-cadre r e f o r m s , l e a d e r s d e f e n d e d t h e i r s e p a r a t e t e r r i
torial interests.
T w o major internal crises in the R D A illustrate the c o m p e t i t i o n
w h i c h l e d t o i t s d e m i s e . T h e first c a m e t o a h e a d i n 1 9 5 0 , w h e n
H o u p h o u e t - B o i g n y and the majority o f the party's parliamentary
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s d e c i d e d t o b r e a k p a r l i a m e n t a r y ties w i t h t h e
F r e n c h C o m m u n i s t P a r t y , ties w h i c h d a t e d f r o m t h e t i m e w h e n
the C P w a s in p o w e r in France. I n the c h a n g e d political climate
o f France the alliance w i t h the C o m m u n i s t s had b e c o m e a serious
liability for the R D A leaders w h o n o w w a n t e d t o a d o p t a p o l i c y
o f constructive collaboration with the French government. T h e
crisis w a s e v e n t u a l l y r e s o l v e d at t h e c o s t o f r e m o v i n g t h e
secretary-general o f the party, expelling dissident party sections
i n C a m e r o u n , S e n e g a l , a n d i n d i v i d u a l s o n t h e left w i n g o f t h e
N i g e r s e c t i o n . A s a r e s u l t t h e official R D A f a c e d s t r o n g c r i t i c i s m
f r o m t h e left f o r s o m e y e a r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y f r o m t r a d e u n i o n s , y o u t h
movements and student organisations.
T h e s e c o n d c r i s i s a r o s e o u t o f t h e loi-cadre d e c r e e s o f 1 9 5 6 - 7 .
It t u r n e d o n t h e r e l a t e d i s s u e s o f i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d f e d e r a l i s m
v e r s u s territorialism, a n d w a s b r o u g h t into the o p e n at t h e third
R D A C o n g r e s s , w h i c h a l s o t o o k place at B a m a k o in S e p t e m b e r
1 9 5 7 . B y t h i s t i m e , t h e p o w e r f u l G u i n e a a n d S o u d a n sections —
w h i c h s t o o d for m o v i n g rapidly t o w a r d total i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d
f o r p r e s e r v i n g t h e f e d e r a t i o n as t h e o n l y m e a n i n g f u l f r a m e w o r k
for that independence - w e r e in a position t o challenge the leader
ship o f the I v o r y C o a s t . H o u p h o u e t - B o i g n y , reluctant t o see his
prosperous territory p a y i n g the greater part o f the cost o f an
expensive federation o f largely impoverished members, advocated
the principle o f territorial a u t o n o m y within a closely knit F r e n c h -
A f r i c a n c o m m u n i t y . T h i s i s s u e , a n d H o u p h o u e t - B o i g n y ' s atti
tude, b r o u g h t a b o u t the disintegration o f the interterritorial
R D A , after t h e r e f e r e n d u m o f S e p t e m b e r 1 9 5 8 .
O t h e r interterritorial g r o u p i n g s n e v e r a c q u i r e d as m u c h influ-
626

e n c e as t h e R D A . T h e y t o o k t h e f o r m o f t e m p o r a r y a l l i a n c e s
a m o n g t e r r i t o r i a l p a r t i e s ; a n d t h e i n i t i a t i v e in t h e f o r m a t i o n o f
such alternative g r o u p i n g s generally c a m e from the d o m i n a n t
m a s s p a r t y i n S e n e g a l . T h e first o f t h e s e g r o u p i n g s w a s t h e
I n d é p e n d a n t s d ' O u t r e - M e r ( I O M ) , f o u n d e d b y S e n g h o r i n 1948
to project the influence o f his n e w l y f o u n d e d B l o c D é m o c r a t i q u e
S é n é g a l a i s ( B D S ) at t h e l e v e l o f t h e F r e n c h p a r l i a m e n t , i n c l u d i n g
parliamentary representatives from U p p e r V o l t a , D a h o m e y and
G u i n e a . F o r five y e a r s t h e I O M e x i s t e d o n l y as a p a r l i a m e n t a r y
a l l i a n c e w i t h t h e F r e n c h C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t s . A t its c o n f e r e n c e
in B o b o - D i o u l a s s o i n 1 9 5 3 , it a t t e m p t e d t o b e c o m e a n e x t r a -
parliamentary m o v e m e n t , e m p h a s i s i n g the principle o f A f r i c a n
a u t o n o m y w i t h i n a federal F r e n c h R e p u b l i c . T h e I O M w a s
r e p l a c e d in e a r l y 1 9 5 7 b y t h e C o n v e n t i o n A f r i c a i n e , a n d t h i s i n
t u r n in 195 8 b y t h e P a r t i d u R e g r o u p e m e n t A f r i c a i n ( P R A ) , w h i c h
u n i t e d a l m o s t all n o n - R D A p a r t i e s o u t s i d e M a u r i t a n i a . It t h e n
m a d e s t r e n u o u s , a l t h o u g h u n s u c c e s s f u l , efforts t o e s t a b l i s h a s i n g l e
unified p a r t y c o v e r i n g all o f t h e A O F t h r o u g h a m e r g e r w i t h t h e
R D A . T h e initiative failed; Senegalese leaders w e r e unable to
o v e r c o m e a pattern o f resistance against their claims to leadership
w h i c h h a d its o r i g i n s i n r e s e n t m e n t s a g a i n s t t h e p r e - w a r p r i v i l e g e s
o f the ' o l d citizens'.
B y 1 9 5 8 - 9 t h e different l e a d e r s o f A O F w e r e o p e n l y c l a s h i n g
o n strategies and goals. S é k o u T o u r é and M o d i b o K e i t a w a n t e d
immediate independence, for example, but T o u r é w a s w i l l i n g and
a b l e t o p u s h f o r it, e v e n i f it m e a n t G u i n e a b e c o m i n g i n d e p e n d e n t
o n its o w n . K e i t a , in a l a n d - l o c k e d c o u n t r y w i t h f e w r e s o u r c e s ,
b e l i e v e d i n d e p e n d e n c e s h o u l d b e a c h i e v e d as a g r o u p . T h u s T o u r é
l e d G u i n e a t o v o t e 'non* t o t h e 1 9 5 8 r e f e r e n d u m , w h i l e K e i t a v o t e d
t
r e l u c t a n t l y oui\ but led M a l i into a union w i t h Senegal b y
f o r m i n g a n e w i n t e r t e r r i t o r i a l p a r t y , t h e P a r t i d e la F é d é r a t i o n
Africaine ( P F A ) in M a r c h 1959, w i t h the intention o f r e v i v i n g the
n o w defunct federation. Initially the P F A had sections in D a h o m e y ,
U p p e r V o l t a a n d N i g e r , b u t its s t r o n g e s t o p p o n e n t was
H o u p h o u ë t - B o i g n y w h o h a d m o r e t o offer t h e s e c o u n t r i e s t h a n
either the S e n e g a l e s e o r M a l i a n leaders. H o u p h o u ë t - B o i g n y w a s
n o t in f a v o u r o f i m m e d i a t e i n d e p e n d e n c e , and m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y
h e w a s n o t a f e d e r a l i s t , s i n c e t h e I v o r y C o a s t , as t h e w e a l t h i e s t
t e r r i t o r y in t h e A O F , s t o o d t o l o s e f r o m j o i n i n g a s t r o n g
independent federation. H o u p h o u ë t - B o i g n y c h o s e to t e m p t his
627

w e a k e r n e i g h b o u r s w i t h promises o f assistance a n d w a s able t o

f o r m t h e m i n t o a counter-alliance as distinct f r o m a federation.
T h u s the Entente came into being, to oppose the P F A and the
Mali Federation. T h e Entente included the I v o r y Coast, U p p e r
Volta, D a h o m e y and Niger. Mali w a s composed only o f Senegal
and Soudan.
In A E F similar tensions existed. T h e strongest o p p o n e n t s o f a
federation w e r e in G a b o n w h i c h , b e i n g rich like the I v o r y C o a s t ,
resented C o n g o - B r a z z a v i l l e ' s p r e - e m i n e n c e in t h e federation, as
the h o m e o f t h e capital o f an o t h e r w i s e p o o r federation w h i c h
G a b o n subsidised. G a b o n ' s leaders preferred a u t o n o m y , a l t h o u g h
later o n G a b o n p r o v e d w i l l i n g t o j o i n in u n i o n s f o r limited
cooperation in b o t h e c o n o m i c and political matters.
T h u s t h e c e n t r i f u g a l t e n d e n c i e s s e t i n m o t i o n b y t h e loi-cadre
p r e v a i l e d . T o m o s t o b s e r v e r s it s e e m e d c l e a r t h a t t h e s t a t e s o f
francophone tropical Africa w o u l d h a v e been better off politically
and economically had they continued t o be organised o n the
federal basis that h a d b e e n established b y t h e F r e n c h at t h e
b e g i n n i n g o f the colonial era. W h a t e v e r France's role in ensuring
the break-up o f these federations o n the e v e o f independence,
there c a n b e n o d o u b t that for the great majority o f A f r i c a n s the
principle o f a u t o n o m y w i t h i n their g i v e n territorial b o r d e r s w a s
m o r e attractive than federation. Indeed, h o w e v e r m u c h their
l e a d e r s m a y h a v e b e e n c o n c e r n e d w i t h i n t e r t e r r i t o r i a l affairs, a s
far a s s e c u r i n g t h e i r h o m e b a s e w a s c o n c e r n e d , t h e y w e r e s t r i c t l y
national in organisation and appeal.
T h e struggle t o create interterritorial alliances p r e o c c u p i e d o n l y

the handful o f educated Africans w h o constituted the political
élite. M o s t A f r i c a n s h a d their o w n idea o f w h a t a political party
s h o u l d b e . I n d e e d , i n spite o f t h e identity o f labels, it w o u l d b e
a mistake t o assume that the African organisations h a d the same
characteristics as their m e t r o p o l i t a n h o m o n y m s . O f necessity, t h e
A f r i c a n institutions reflected their e n v i r o n m e n t s , a n d these w e r e
q u i t e different f r o m F r a n c e . M o s t A f r i c a n s w h o w e r e e d u c a t e d h a d
been ' subjects ', and c o u l d o n l y attend schools w h i c h discriminated
against t h e m . T h e y a c q u i r e d certificates w h i c h w e r e n o t e q u a l t o
those g i v e n in F r e n c h schools and prepared t h e m o n l y for
p o s i t i o n s a s s u b o r d i n a t e s t o F r e n c h officials o r commerçants.
Paradoxically, their experience w i t h the inequalities o f assimilation
628

led t h e m to place great v a l u e o n equivalencies. E d u c a t e d A f r i c a n s ,

r e s e n t i n g c o l o n i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , t o o k as t h e i r m o d e l s F r e n c h
f o r m s a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s . It w a s n a t u r a l f o r t h e m t o o r g a n i s e i n t h e
f o r m o f parties and natural that the constitutions a d o p t e d before
a n d after i n d e p e n d e n c e w e r e b a s e d o n F r e n c h t r a d i t i o n . Y e t a
b r o a d g u l f separated A f r i c a n reality f r o m F r e n c h reality. M o s t
A f r i c a n s w e r e i l l i t e r a t e in F r e n c h , t h o u g h q u i t e a f e w w e r e l i t e r a t e
in A r a b i c . M o s t w e r e o r i e n t e d t o t h e i r e t h n i c c o m m u n i t i e s a n d
had never been exposed to national representative institutions.
T r a d i t i o n a l l e a d e r s still m a i n t a i n e d a n i m p o r t a n t r o l e i n d i r e c t i n g
t h e affairs o f t h e m a s s o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n , w h o c o n t i n u e d t o l i v e
in r u r a l a r e a s . E v e n t o w n s m e n m a i n t a i n e d c o n t a c t s w i t h
traditional leaders in the c o u n t r y s i d e . M o s t traditional leaders
w e r e a c c u s t o m e d t o h a v i n g F r e n c h - t r a i n e d m e n a c t as i n t e r m e d i
aries w i t h t h e E u r o p e a n s : t h e s e F r e n c h - t r a i n e d m e n w e r e t h u s
in p o s i t i o n s o f p o l i t i c a l p r o m i n e n c e . B u t t h e y , in t u r n , h a d t o w i n
the support o f traditional and religious leaders, or devise a means
o f undercutting their p o w e r and reaching directly to individual
m e n and w o m e n . R e l i g i o u s leaders like M u s l i m marabouts, chiefs,
a n i m i s t s a g e s a n d official o r ' s e p a r a t i s t ' C h r i s t i a n l e a d e r s c o u l d
exact their price f r o m the elected representatives. T h e i r ability t o
b l o c k or control p r o g r a m m e s , or influence party d e v e l o p m e n t s ,
d e p e n d e d o n the n u m b e r o f p e o p l e under their c o m m a n d o r
influence, and the resources they controlled.
T h e conditions facing the n e w party leaders varied w i d e l y from
c o u n t r y to country. E v e n t h o u g h m a n y had shared such c o m m o n
e x p e r i e n c e s as b e i n g s t u d e n t s at t h e É c o l e N o r m a l e W i l l i a m P o n t y
in S e n e g a l o r i n t e r r i t o r i a l s c h o o l s , t h e p o l i t i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n s o f t h e
d i f f e r e n t l e a d e r s w e r e n o t i d e n t i c a l . T h e y differed in e t h n i c o r i g i n s
and status, in religion, w e a l t h , practical e x p e r i e n c e , i d e o l o g y , and
in the c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h t h e y b u i l t their o r g a n i s a t i o n s . T h e
14 c o u n t r i e s v a r i e d in t h e s i z e a n d d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e i r e t h n i c
g r o u p s , the size and experience o f their western-educated élite, the
presence or absence o f large n u m b e r s o f F r e n c h colonisers, their
g e o g r a p h y and e c o n o m i c resources, their infrastructure and the
m o d e r n i s i n g impact o f colonial rule.
T h u s t h e w i d e s p r e a d rise o f p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i n all t h e t r o p i c a l
A f r i c a n c o l o n i e s o b s c u r e d s o m e real differences. N e v e r t h e l e s s , a
pattern e m e r g e s . A t the outset, w h e n the franchise w a s limited,
parties w e r e d o m i n a t e d b y the important p e o p l e o f the territory,
629

o f t e n t h e r e f o r e b y officially d e s i g n a t e d ' c h i e f s ' . T h e s e ' p a t r o n *

p a r t i e s f r e q u e n t l y h a d d i r e c t o r i n d i r e c t F r e n c h official b l e s s i n g
and c o m p e t e d w i t h ' m a s s ' parties, w h i c h d r e w their leaders f r o m
a m o n g the m o r e anti-colonial educated Africans, w h o m a d e
s e r i o u s efforts t o e n r o l l t h e m a s s e s d i r e c t l y . I n s o m e t e r r i t o r i e s ,
mass party leaders reached villages before the franchise b e c a m e
universal, and u n d e r c u t the local leaders. B y the early 1950s a mass
party b e g a n t o a s s u m e p r e c e d e n c e in m a n y territories, b u t d i d n o t
b e c o m e s e c u r e , e x c e p t i n S e n e g a l , u n t i l after t h e loi-cadre r e f o r m s
of 1956-7.
Thereafter most countries w e r e dominated by a single party,
w h i c h stressed direct participation in politics t h r o u g h the multi
plication o f local branches, parallel w o m e n ' s and y o u t h organis
ations, regional, territorial and e v e n interterritorial m e e t i n g s and
o r g a n s o f the Press. T h e s e parties e m p l o y e d organisers, distributed
party cards and collected dues. T h e U n i o n Progressiste Sénégalaise
( U P S ) , the Parti D é m o c r a t i q u e de G u i n é e ( P D G ) , the Parti
D é m o c r a t i q u e d e la C ô t e d ' I v o i r e ( P D C I ) o f t h e I v o r y C o a s t , t h e
C o m i t é de l'Unité T o g o l a i s e ( C U T ) , and the B l o c D é m o c r a t i q u e
d u G a b o n ( B D G ) all c o n s i d e r e d t h e m s e l v e s t o b e m a s s p a r t i e s ,
identified m o r e o r less w i t h d e m o c r a t i c r e f o r m s in their n e w l y
i n d e p e n d e n t s t a t e s . E v e n c o u n t r i e s w h e r e it w a s d i f f i c u l t t o
d i s c e r n a s e r i o u s effort t o o r g a n i s e t h e r u r a l m a j o r i t y — s u c h as
Mauritania - developed one major controlling party under a
French-educated leader w h o espoused modernising goals. Indeed,
the distinction b e t w e e n p a t r o n and mass parties, best seen
t h r o u g h a t u r n o v e r o f l e a d e r s h i p at t h e l o c a l l e v e l b e f o r e
independence, usually faded a w a y in the period after
independence.
W e discuss b e l o w t w o examples o f mass party d e v e l o p m e n t ,
G u i n e a a n d S e n e g a l , in o r d e r t o illustrate the c o m m o n t r e n d in
t h e 1 4 c o u n t r i e s , a n d t h e d i v e r s i t i e s a m o n g t h e m as w e l l . S o m e
' mass ' parties w e r e led b y nationalists w h o also supported radical
social reform. S é k o u T o u r é , the G u i n e a n President, for example,
had been i n v o l v e d in a G r o u p e d ' É t u d e s C o m m u n i s t e s ( G E C ) ,
o r g a n i s e d b y F r e n c h C o m m u n i s t s in his c o u n t r y in the i m m e d i a t e
p o s t - w a r p e r i o d , and in trade-union politics initially associated
w i t h the C o m m u n i s t unions in France. T h e imprint o f the F r e n c h
p r e s e n c e , h o w e v e r , w a s less m a r k e d in G u i n e a than in c o u n t r i e s
s u c h as S e n e g a l o r t h e I v o r y C o a s t , b e c a u s e f e w s e t t l e r s h a d
630

e s t a b l i s h e d t h e m s e l v e s t h e r e a n d t h e r e h a d b e e n little c a p i t a l
investment. A n A f r i c a n élite h a d n o t b e e n able t o o r g a n i s e
p o l i t i c a l l y i n p r e - w a r G u i n e a , b u t S é k o u T o u r é , w h o h a d little
f o r m a l e d u c a t i o n a n d h a d b e e n a p o s t a l c l e r k b e f o r e h i s rise t o
p o w e r , w a s a b l e t o c r e a t e a s u c c e s s f u l m a s s p a r t y after t h e w a r .
A l t h o u g h the immediate impact o f the French reforms under
the F o u r t h R e p u b l i c in G u i n e a w a s the creation o f ethnic a n d
regional parties, T o u r é ' s o w n Parti D é m o c r a t i q u e d e G u i n é e
( P D G ) , h o w e v e r , had national pretensions and followed the
o r g a n i s a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s o f its p a r e n t R D A . B u t w h e n m o s t R D A
t e r r i t o r i a l b r a n c h e s b r o k e t h e i r ties w i t h t h e F r e n c h C o m m u n i s t
P a r t y , S é k o u T o u r é ' s t r a d e u n i o n r e m a i n e d affiliated t o t h e F r e n c h
C o m m u n i s t - d o m i n a t e d u n i o n . H e r o s e t o p r o m i n e n c e as t h e
territorial leader b y o r g a n i s i n g a successful strike in 1953 against
t h e i n s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e n e w l y p a s s e d code du travail. T h e r e a f t e r
he c o n s o l i d a t e d his gains politically w i t h a rapid national spread
o f his party w h i c h w o r k e d closely w i t h his u n i o n — indeed, the
leaders w e r e m o s t l y the same p e o p l e . A l t h o u g h the P D G lost the
1954 elections, p r o b a b l y t h r o u g h interference b y alarmed
c o n s e r v a t i v e F r e n c h a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , it c o n t i n u e d t o g r o w . A
c h a n g e in the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t in 1 9 5 4 b r o u g h t in a m o r e
tolerant colonial administration and the P D G w o n the 1 9 5 6 - 7
elections. M e a n w h i l e , T o u r é sought to appeal to v a r y i n g regional
a n d e t h n i c g r o u p s b y n o t i n g h i s f a m i l y ties t o g r e a t t r a d i t i o n a l
leaders o f the past and emphasising the unifying principles o f
Islam, anti-colonialism and M a r x i s m . A t the same time he de
plored ethnic divisions and the d o m i n a n c e o f ' c h i e f s ' o r trad
itional leaders.
In 1 9 5 7 he engineered a major c h a n g e in territorial adminis
t r a t i o n t h a t r e m o v e d official c h i e f s f r o m t h e i r p o s t s a n d h e
c o n t i n u e d thereafter to undercut their p o w e r w h e n e v e r possible.
Still t h r e a t e n e d b y l e a d e r s o f t h e r e m n a n t e t h n i c p a r t i e s a n d b y
other G u i n e a n intellectual g r o u p s , S é k o u T o u r é w a s impelled b y
his u r b a n u n i o n s u p p o r t e r s t o t a k e a r a d i c a l s t a n d c o n c e r n i n g
independence. His o w n anti-French orientation and nationalism
led h i m naturally t o f a v o u r i n d e p e n d e n c e , b u t the penalities f o r
G u i n e a ' s 'non' v o t e i n 1 9 5 8 w e r e v e r y h i g h . T h e l a c k o f p o w e r
o f traditional leaders and the effectiveness o f his organisation
9
e n s u r e d a 'non v o t e i n t h e 1 9 5 8 r e f e r e n d u m . T h e n , as it w a s still
to be in the 1970s, c o m m u n i c a t i o n w a s irregular a n d i n c o m p l e t e ,
631

e v e n a m o n g c l o s e A f r i c a n p o l i t i c a l allies in t h e v a r i o u s f r a n c o
p h o n e s t a t e s . I t is p o s s i b l e t h a t T o u r e m i g h t n o t h a v e c a l l e d f o r
€ 9
a non v o t e h a d h e n o t t h o u g h t t h a t o t h e r p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s w o u l d
f o l l o w h i s s u i t , as D j i b o B a k a r y i n N i g e r d i d , a n d h a d h e n o t h a d
an a n g r y confrontation w i t h de G a u l l e , w h o w a s actively
c a m p a i g n i n g f o r a 'out* v o t e , o n t h e o c c a s i o n o f t h e l a t t e r ' s official
visit to C o n a k r y in A u g u s t 1958. Separate, early independence led
t o isolation for G u i n e a . It u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y r e i n f o r c e d the difficulty
o f territorial r e g r o u p i n g into o n e o r m o r e federations w h i c h w e r e
already unlikely to be realised, since the F r e n c h had already
dismantled the federal institutions o f b o t h A O F and A E F .
It w a s i n f a c t t h e m o d e r a t e l e a d e r - L e o p o l d S e d a r S e n g h o r -
w h o i n 195 9 c r e a t e d a n e w f e d e r a t i o n - t h e M a l i F e d e r a t i o n - w i t h
the radical Soudanese leader, M o d i b o K e i t a . S e n g h o r w a s n o t
identified w i t h s w e e p i n g social reforms. H e w a s n o t fiercely
anti-colonial and n o t u r g e n t l y M a r x i s t in his e c o n o m i c p r o
g r a m m e . N o n e t h e l e s s h e , l i k e all t h e o t h e r s o - c a l l e d m o d e r a t e s ,
d e v e l o p e d into a nationalist.
S e n e g a l w a s u n i q u e b e c a u s e o f its l o n g a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h F r a n c e ,
the early existence o f a s m a l l ' c i t i z e n ' class in the f o u r c o m m u n e s ,
a relatively l a r g e n u m b e r o f e d u c a t e d p e o p l e h a v i n g at least
s e c o n d a r y - s c h o o l t r a i n i n g , a n d its r e l a t i v e l y e x t e n s i v e i n f r a s t r u c
t u r e , i n c l u d i n g a m a j o r p o r t . F u r t h e r m o r e , it h a d b e e n t h e c a p i t a l
o f the A O F federation. S e n e g a l had, h o w e v e r , o n l y o n e e x p o r t
crop, groundnuts, and few mineral resources. Early contacts w i t h
France assured a relatively h i g h degree o f politicisation, e v e n
b e f o r e 1948. It w a s n o t e x c l u s i v e l y ' c i t i z e n s ' in the c o m m u n e s
w h o entered politics. A t a v e r y early stage traditional leaders
learned to put pressure indirectly o n French administrators to
obtain favours. African elected representatives, too, kept judicious
ties w i t h p o w e r f u l t r a d i t i o n a l l e a d e r s o u t s i d e t h e c o m m u n e s f o r
the m o n e y and support they c o u l d obtain.
T h e first w o u l d - b e n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l p a r t y in S e n e g a l , f o u n d e d
in 1936, w a s c o n n e c t e d w i t h the m e t r o p o l i t a n F r e n c h Socialist
Party and headed by a ' c i t i z e n ' lawyer, Lamine G u e y e . His
c o n s t i t u e n c y w a s initially o n l y the ' c i t i z e n ' g r o u p , t h o u g h his
p a r t y d i d m a i n t a i n ties w i t h t h e u n e n f r a n c h i s e d i n t e r i o r . T h e r e f o r e
w h e n t h e B r a z z a v i l l e r e f o r m s w e r e u n d e r d i s c u s s i o n , h e c h o s e as
his d e p u t y a candidate w h o c o u l d appeal t o the masses outside
the c o m m u n e s , L e o p o l d Sedar S e n g h o r . In s o m e w a y s G u e y e ' s
6 J 2

choice w a s ironic. S e n g h o r w a s an intellectual, poet and g r a m -

marian, a naturalised citizen. Furthermore, he w a s a Catholic in a
predominantly M u s l i m country, and a Serer rather than a m e m b e r
o f the dominant W o l o f g r o u p . B u t S e n g h o r also p r o v e d a
masterful politician. H e immediately perceived the need t o w o o
the rural masses a n d their traditional leaders directly, a n d w a s
critical o f G u è y e for n o t d o i n g this appropriately. A p o w e r
s t r u g g l e s o o n d e v e l o p e d b e t w e e n t h e t w o m e n a n d i n 1948
S e n g h o r formed his o w n party, the B l o c D é m o c r a t i q u e Sénégalais
( B D S ) . D e s p i t e efforts b y G u è y e t o w i n o v e r r u r a l l e a d e r s , it w a s
S e n g h o r w h o g a i n e d the r e p u t a t i o n as t h e ' m a n o f the p e o p l e ' .
B y 1951 h i s p a r t y h a d b e c o m e d o m i n a n t i n S e n e g a l .
S e n g h o r , and his s e c o n d - i n - c o m m a n d , M a m a d o u D i a , stressed
that theirs w a s a socialist mass party c a l l i n g f o r r e f o r m . T h e y built
t h e B D S , w h i c h b e c a m e t h e B l o c P o p u l a i r e S é n é g a l a i s i n 1956 a n d
t h e U n i o n P r o g r e s s i s t e S é n é g a l a i s e i n 1958, o n t h e b a s i s o f e t h n i c
and religious g r o u p s w h i c h asserted their p o w e r in relation t o the
' o l d citizens'. F u r t h e r m o r e , they built alliances w i t h s o m e o f the
m o s t p o w e r f u l M u s l i m leaders in central Senegal. Y e t , b e t w e e n
1951 a n d i960, S e n g h o r a l s o t o o k i n t o a c c o u n t p e r i o d i c d e m a n d s
o f radical t o w n s m e n , ' y o u n g T u r k s ', w h o w a n t e d i n d e p e n d e n c e
a n d r e v o l u t i o n a r y i n t e r n a l r e f o r m s , s u c h as r e d u c i n g t h e p o w e r s
o f traditional leaders. S e n g h o r astutely g a u g e d the m o m e n t w h e n
c o m p r o m i s e w a s n e c e s s a r y a n d a b s o r b e d d i s s i d e n t g r o u p s i n 1956
a n d a g a i n i n 195 8. B y o f f e r i n g p o s i t i o n s w i t h i n t h e p a r t y , a n d l a t e r
t h e g o v e r n m e n t t o t h e d i s s i d e n t s a n d t a k i n g at l e a s t n o m i n a l l y
m o r e radical stances, S e n g h o r deflected the g r i e v a n c e s o f suc-
cessive groups o f ' y o u n g T u r k s ' .
I n t e l l e c t u a l s o f t h e left c o n t i n u e d t o d i s a g r e e w i t h S e n g h o r : a t
t
t h e 1958 r e f e r e n d u m a l e f t - w i n g g r o u p b r o k e o f f f r o m t h e U P S
to f o r m the Parti d u R e g r o u p e m e n t Africain ( P R A ) , w h i l e a g r o u p
o f university students h a d f o r m e d the Marxist Parti Africain
de l'Indépendence ( P A I ) the year before. B o t h parties c a m p a i g n e d
9 9
f o r a 'non t h o u g h S e n g h o r s u c c e s s f u l l y o b t a i n e d a 'oui m a j o r i t y .
S e n g h o r w a s consistently p r a g m a t i c in p o l i c y , a n d called o n l y
for a g r a d u a l m o v e t o state socialism. H e j o i n e d w i t h M o d i b o
K e i t a , despite the radical i d e o l o g y o f the latter, t o f o r m t h e M a l i
Federation, since he believed the e c o n o m i c and political p o w e r
o f the t w o countries combined w o u l d be m u c h greater than if they
r e m a i n e d separate. L i k e i m p e r i a l A u s t r i a , S e n e g a l , as h e a d q u a r t e r s
633

Table 1 2 . 1 . Francophone tropical Africa, 1960-7j.
Population Size (sq.m) Capital Head of government
Benin 3030000 4347; Porto N o v o 1963 Hubert Maga

(Dahomey until 197;) 1963 General Christophe Soglo*
1963-4 Sourou Migan Apithy and Justin Ahomadegbe
1965 General Christophe Soglo*
1967 Colonel Alphonse Alley*
1968 Emile Zinsou
1969 Major Kouandete*
1970 Maga, Apithy, Ahomadegbe
Lt-Colonel Mathieu Kerekou (president since 1972)*

Cameroun 6600000 183736 Yaounde
President Alhaji Ahmadou Ahidjo
Central African Republic 2100000 *4<>5}5 Bangui
President David D a c k o
(Oubangui-Chari until 1958) Field Marshall Jean-Bedel Bokassa (since 1966)*
Chad 3950000 493750 Ndjamena President Francois Tombalbaye
General Felix Malloum (since 1975)*
Congo 1 300020 132000 Brazzaville i960 President A b b e Fulbert Youlou

(Congo-Brazzaville) 1963 President Alphonse Massemba-Debat*
President Marien Ngouabi (since 1968)*
Gabon 978000 103347 Libreville President Leon M'ba

949x6 Conakry President Sikou Toure
Guinea 4310000
Ivory Coast 5600000 124500 Abidjan President Felix Houphouet-Boigny
Mali (Soudan until i960) 5600000 478822 Bamako i960 President M o d i b o Keita
Colonel Moussa Traore (since 1968)*
Mauritania 1500000 598000 Nouakchott i960 President Mokhtar Ould Daddah
Niger 4500000 489000 Niamey i960 President Hamani Diori

Lt-Colonel Seyni Kountche (since 1974)*
Senegal 5900000 105 870 Dakar i960 President Leopold Sedar Senghor
Togo 2400000 21925 Lome i960 President Sylvanus Olympio

1963 President Nicolas Grunitsky
General Etienne Gnassingbe Eyadema (since 1967)*
Upper Volta 5 900000 105 870 Wagadugu i960 President Maurice Yameogo
General Sangoule Lamizana (since 1966)*
* coup

o f A O F , had the m o s t to lose f r o m a b r e a k - u p o f the federation.

B u t S e n g h o r w a s u n w i l l i n g to tolerate the interference o f K e i t a
in S e n e g a l e s e p o l i t i c s , o r the p o s s i b i l i t y that radical S e n e g a l e s e
l e a d e r s m i g h t find a n a l l y i n t h e S o u d a n e s e p r e s i d e n t . T h i s i s s u e
o f political trust precipitated the break-up o f the M a l i Federation
i m m e d i a t e l y after its i n d e p e n d e n c e i n A u g u s t i 9 6 0 . S e n g h o r
r e m a i n e d in secure c o n t r o l in S e n e g a l , based o n his alliances w i t h
traditional leaders, while projecting a p r o g r a m m e o f gradual
reform.
I n all 1 4 states t h e 1 9 5 0 s w e r e t h e h i g h p o i n t o f n a t i o n a l i s m ,
w h e n leaders rose to p r o m i n e n c e , and built political parties to g i v e
substance to the liberation that decolonisation had b r o u g h t to
f r a n c o p h o n e t r o p i c a l A f r i c a . U p till t h e t i m e o f F r e n c h w i t h d r a w a l ,
the desire for i n d e p e n d e n c e unified Africans. T h e r e f o r e they
a c c e p t e d t h e b o r d e r s set b y t h e F r e n c h . W h e n t h e F r e n c h
w i t h d r e w , the c l e a v a g e s in A f r i c a n society b e g a n t o c o m e to the
fore; independence seriously strained, indeed eroded, the w e a k
n e w national institutions o f the n e w nations. I n d e p e n d e n c e
d e m o n s t r a t e d that leaders, e v e n charismatic f o u n d i n g fathers,
w e r e barely skilful e n o u g h to c o p e w i t h these c l e a v a g e s . Inde
p e n d e n c e c a m e as a s h o c k t o m o d e r a t e a n d r a d i c a l l e a d e r s a l i k e .
T h e brief period o f reforms, f o l l o w i n g the c o m p a r a t i v e l y short
period o f colonial rule, had not prepared t h e m o r their p e o p l e for
s o v e r e i g n t y . T h e 1 4 n e w s t a t e s w e r e w e a k at b i r t h .
T H E D I F F I C U L T I E S OF N A T I O N - B U I L D I N G , 1960-75
T h e c o l o n i a l e x p e r i e n c e d i d little t o p r e p a r e A f r i c a n s for the

m u l t i p l e tasks o f c r e a t i n g v i a b l e s o v e r e i g n states w h e r e n o n e h a d
existed p r e v i o u s l y . T h e distance b e t w e e n the A f r i c a n élite and the
r e s t o f t h e p e o p l e b e c a m e q u i t e e v i d e n t , as i n m a n y c o u n t r i e s
political institutions withered. F r o m the pre-independence period
o n w a r d s , African leaders had been a w a r e o f the need to create a
national loyalty. B u t to w h i c h African entity? T h e ethnic g r o u p ,
the territory, A O F , the continent? T h e y used ' e t h n i c arithmetic'
in an attempt t o add u p r e g i o n a l loyalties into national o n e s ,
c h o o s i n g t e r r i t o r i a l p a r t y l e a d e r s , a n d l a t e r g o v e r n m e n t officials,
in a balance reflecting the ethnic c o m p o s i t i o n o f their states. M a j o r
ethnic g r o u p s w e r e thus able to identify w i t h leaders c h o s e n for
i m p o r t a n t national g o v e r n m e n t a l offices, and in this w a y w i t h
636

D I F F I C U L T I E S O F N A T I O N - B U I L D I N G
national g o v e r n m e n t . In v a r y i n g d e g r e e s all the f r a n c o p h o n e

leaders f o l l o w e d this p o l i c y w h i c h , h o w e v e r , r e v e a l e d the n e w
s t a t e s ' w e a k n e s s e s , f o r it r a n c o u n t e r t o t h e e g a l i t a r i a n c u r r e n t s
in n a t i o n a l i s t i d e o l o g y . A r a d i c a l l e a d e r l i k e S é k o u T o u r é d i d n o t
w i s h t o admit in public that he selected personnel partly for their
ethnic attributes. H e insisted that o n l y merit c o u n t e d , and m o v e d
firmly t o u n d e r c u t t r a d i t i o n a l l e a d e r s w h o h a d a f o l l o w i n g i n t h e
countryside a m o n g their o w n ethnic g r o u p s and c o u l d threaten
the national g o v e r n m e n t there.
In Senegal, a so-called democratic country, p o w e r f u l traditional
l e a d e r s e x i s t e d i n t h e f o r m o f M u s l i m m a r a b o u t s w h o w e r e firmly
entrenched in the m o n e y e c o n o m y , d o m i n a t i n g the g r o u n d n u t -
p r o d u c i n g z o n e s in the central W o l o f - s p e a k i n g area. A l t h o u g h
marabouts tolerated the appointment from D a k a r o f trained
administrators w h o w e r e carefully rotated t o prevent them from
forgetting their national v o c a t i o n , these administrators w e r e
ineffectual i f t h e y w e r e u n a b l e t o d e a l w i t h p o w e r f u l r e g i o n a l
M u s l i m leaders. T h i s often meant g i v i n g them m o n e y o r tem
pering a g o v e r n m e n t a l p r o g r a m m e w h i c h offended a m a r a b o u t . It
also meant administrative pleading for the support o f the
marabouts for agricultural production campaigns, health and
vaccination p r o g r a m m e s and for settling disputes, for example,
b e t w e e n Fula n o m a d s w h o w e r e gradually b e i n g pushed off their
g r a z i n g lands, and the encroaching W o l o f , Serer o r T u k o l o r
farmers. T h e continued importance o f the marabouts t h r o u g h the
early 1970s ensured that g o v e r n m e n t a l national reforms p r o
gressed at a snail's pace a n d reduced the prospects for a d é m o
1
cratisation o f local politics. In Mali, b y contrast, neo-traditional
l e a d e r s w e r e w e a k e r a n d less e n t r e n c h e d i n t h e m o n e y e c o n o m y
than in Senegal. Leaders o f the national party, the U n i o n
Soudanaise (US), had come to p o w e r b y appealing to opponents
o f traditional leaders rather than relying solely o n marabouts o r
t h e i r e q u i v a l e n t s . T h e S o u d a n e s e l e a d e r , first M a m a d o u K o n a t e ,
and then his successor, M o d i b o K e i t a , obtained support from
radical t o w n s m e n a n d f r o m e x p l o i t e d g r o u p s in the c o u n t r y s i d e ,
s u c h as fishermen w h o w e r e b a r r e d f r o m fish p r e s e r v e s , r a d i c a l
M u s l i m s r e p r e s s e d b y F r e n c h officials, a n d f o r m e r s l a v e s o f t h e
n o r t h e r n B e r b e r s . Y e t M o d i b o K e i t a also e m p h a s i s e d ties t o g r e a t
1
See L u c y C r e e v e y (Behrman), ' M u s l i m politics a n d d e v e l o p m e n t in S e n e g a l ' ,
Journal of Modern African Studies, 1977, 1 5 , 2, 2 6 1 - 7 7 .
637

leaders o f the past, a n d paid h o m a g e t o selected l i v i n g n e o -

traditional leaders w h o claimed descent from p r e - E u r o p e a n
Sudanic rulers. T h e platform o f the U n i o n Soudanaise called for
e l i m i n a t i o n o f t h e p o w e r o f l o c a l t r a d i t i o n a l l e a d e r s , a s w e l l as
reduction o f the privileges o f the n e w l y e m e r g i n g administrative
class.
T h e U n i o n Soudanaise attempted to follow a national pro
g r a m m e o f egalitarian reform and austerity, b u t w a s severely
handicapped b y poverty and communication problems. B y 1968,
w h e n M o d i b o K e i t a w a s imprisoned b y a military uprising, he had
l o s t v i r t u a l l y all h i s s u p p o r t , u r b a n a n d r u r a l . A m o n g t h e
dissatisfied g r o u p s w e r e leaders o f t h e traditional t r a d i n g families.
S o m e , in pre-colonial times, h a d b e c o m e w e a l t h y in trans-Saharan
trade, a n d others, in the c o l o n i a l era, o p e r a t e d a W e s t A f r i c a n trade
1
n e t w o r k . K e i t a ' s military successor, Captain D i a k i t e , tried t o g i v e
s o m e e n c o u r a g e m e n t t o the W e s t A f r i c a n traders, b u t w a s unable
to o v e r c o m e the barriers t o trade established b y his independent
n e i g h b o u r s . T h u s , a l t h o u g h it h a d b e e n a w e l l i m p l a n t e d p a r t y ,
the U n i o n Soudanaise disintegrated under the w e i g h t o f e c o n o m i c
p r o b l e m s and the dissatisfaction o f important urban a n d rural
families.
S e n g h o r w a s forced to placate selected regional and religious
l e a d e r s , w h i l e K e i t a l o s t office i n p a r t b e c a u s e h e l o s t t h e
confidence o f p o w e r f u l c o m m e r c i a l families. In Congo-
2
Brazzaville A b b e Y o u l o u and his successor, Marien N g o u a b i ,
also h a d their p r o b l e m s balancing ethnic loyalties. Y o u l o u had
relied o n s u p p o r t f r o m the F r e n c h administration, b u t h e also h a d
an ethnic base a m o n g a s u b - g r o u p o f the K o n g o , the Lali, w h o
w e r e located in Brazzaville and had a l o n g history o f political
activity. Y o u l o u did n o t d e v e l o p an elaborate national political
party and w a s therefore unable t o consolidate his p o w e r . H i s
s u c c e s s o r , after a m i l i t a r y c o u p , w a s A l p h o n s e M a s s e m b a - D e b a t
w h o s e base o f support w a s a m o n g the K o n g o . Y o u l o u had been
a c o n s e r v a t i v e a t t a c k e d b y t r a d e u n i o n i s t s a n d leftist i n t e l l e c t u a l s .
Massemba-Debat's regime, therefore, t o o k o n the rhetoric o f
M a r x i s m a n d p l e d g e d radical social reforms. Unrest c o n t i n u e d -
1
S e e R u t h Schachter M o r g e n t h a u , ' S t r a n g e r s , nationals a n d m u l t i n a t i o n a l s ' in
W i l l i a m A . S h a c k a n d E l l i s H . S k i n n e r ( e d s . ) , Strangers in African societies ( B e r k e l e y ,
«979)-
2
C a l l e d s i m p l y C o n g o a f t e r 1970 b e c a u s e t h e B e l g i a n C o n g o w a s b y t h e n Z a i r e .
638

D I F F I C U L T I E S OF N A T I O N - B U I L D I N G
C o n g o ' s w e a k national institutions did n o t attract c o o p e r a t i o n

f r o m the e x i s t i n g social g r o u p s , w h e t h e r m o d e r n o r traditional.
T h u s , w h e n another military c o u p placed M a r i e n N g o u a b i in
office i n 1 9 6 8 , h e h a d t o r u l e a c o u n t r y w h i c h h a d n e v e r c o a l e s c e d .
His o w n support c a m e from the n o r t h e r n M b o s h i , and right
t h r o u g h t h e e a r l y 1 9 7 0 s h e i n d i c a t e d h i s fear o f t h e p o w e r f u l
K o n g o . H e d i s m i s s e d officials o f K o n g o o r i g i n a n d h a d u n e a s y
r e l a t i o n s w i t h Z a i r e , w h i c h h e f e a r e d m i g h t s e r v e as t h e b a s e f o r
a K o n g o c o n s p i r a c y a g a i n s t h i m . T h u s , e v e n u n d e r a leftist
military g o v e r n m e n t rival ethnic g r o u p s w e r e a threat to stability
and a clear hindrance to m o d e r n i s a t i o n . M o r e o v e r , ethnic c o n
s i d e r a t i o n s affected f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s w i t h n e i g h b o u r i n g A f r i c a n
states, in p a r t i c u l a r Z a i r e .
T h e s e three national e x a m p l e s illustrate n o t o n l y the i m p o r t a n c e
o f ethnicity, but also, m o r e generally, the ephemeral quality o f the
p a r l i a m e n t a r y i n s t i t u t i o n s left b y t h e F r e n c h c o l o n i s e r s . A t
independence, African leaders t o o k control o f political institutions
left b e h i n d b y t h e d e p a r t i n g c o l o n i s e r s . T h i s w a s a s t e p i n t h e
transfer o f p o w e r , b u t n o t t o stability. In fact, the political
institutions w i t h w h i c h the 14 nations w e r e b o r n either disap
peared or became empty forms. After independence, elections, if
t h e y t o o k p l a c e at a l l , i n c r e a s i n g l y r e s e m b l e d l o y a l t y p a r a d e s .
Party structures w e r e eroded. T h e francophone countries w e n t
rapidly from multi-party to one-party states; m a n y w e r e subse
q u e n t l y supplanted b y military regimes. G o v e r n m e n t rested in the
hands o f increasingly authoritarian leaders w h o , w h a t e v e r their
political i d e o l o g y , if they kept legislatures, unions and parties,
m a d e sure they w e r e w e a k and tried to build s o m e k i n d o f national
s t a b i l i t y a r o u n d p e r s o n a l l o y a l t y t o t h e m s e l v e s , as e x e m p l i f i e d b y
Presidents T o u r e o f Guinea, Senghor o f Senegal, H o u p h o u e t -
B o i g n y o f the I v o r y C o a s t and A h i d j o o f C a m e r o u n .
In s o m e states, the c o n s e n s u s that had s u r r o u n d e d the f o u n d i n g
fathers faded, p a r t l y d u e t o pressures r e s u l t i n g f r o m rapid b u t
u n e v e n e c o n o m i c g r o w t h . I n o t h e r states t h e c o n s e n s u s d i s s o l v e d
altogether, partly because o f e c o n o m i c stagnation or decline.
Rapid c h a n g e characterised the I v o r y C o a s t , w h i c h attracted large-
s c a l e F r e n c h i n v e s t m e n t , b o t h b e c a u s e o f its n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e , a n d
because the g o v e r n m e n t f a v o u r e d overseas investors. Senegal,
a l t h o u g h p o o r e r , h a d e n o u g h in the w a y o f o n g o i n g c o m m e r c i a l
concerns to keep French m o n e y - and m a n p o w e r - c o m i n g into
639

the country. C a m e r o u n h a d an injection o f m o n e y f r o m the

discovery o f oil; G a b o n and Niger had revenues from uranium,
and G u i n e a from bauxite. In these countries the g o v e r n m e n t
leaders c o u l d c o u n t , at least in part, o n m e e t i n g e x p e c t a t i o n s o f
u r b a n as w e l l as traditional rural leaders o u t o f t h e s t e a d y g r o w t h
o f revenues. T h e s e countries b e c a m e richer. B u t others b e c a m e
p o o r e r , a n d g o v e r n m e n t s in t h e p o o r states h a d t o s t r u g g l e m u c h
h a r d e r f o r s t a b i l i t y t h a n t h e i r affluent n e i g h b o u r s .
T h i s o f c o u r s e d i d n o t m e a n that t h e richer states d i d n o t h a v e
problems. Félix H o u p h o u ë t - B o i g n y ' s g o v e r n m e n t in the I v o r y
Coast, for example, faced major political obstacles d u r i n g the
period in question. T h e r e w e r e border p r o b l e m s in the north,
partly caused b y U p p e r V o l t a ' s dependence o n the I v o r y Coast,
and the migrations o f M o s s i labourers w h o came to the I v o r y
Coast t o w o r k o n the c o c o a farms and returned h o m e periodically.
Within the I v o r y Coast there w e r e ethnic and regional problems.
Before independence H o u p h o u ë t - B o i g n y h a d created an alliance
o f t r a d i t i o n a l l e a d e r s f r o m t h e r u r a l a r e a s ; after i n d e p e n d e n c e ,
h o w e v e r , the alliance disintegrated. O n e i m p o r t a n t reason f o r this
w a s that e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t spread v e r y unevenly. T h e
p e o p l e s in t h e b u r g e o n i n g coastal area a r o u n d A b i d j a n b e c a m e
better off than their n e i g h b o u r s in m o r e remote interior sections ;
the c o c o a - g r o w i n g area, w h i c h w a s H o u p h o u ë t - B o i g n y ' s h o m e
area, benefited greatly. I n t h e t o w n s a n d in the rapidly c h a n g i n g
countryside there w a s tension between ' n a t i v e ' Ivoiriens and
D a h o m e a n and other 'strangers' from poorer neighbouring
states : M a l i , G u i n e a a n d U p p e r V o l t a , f o r e x a m p l e .
T h e r e w e r e g r o w i n g cleavages also b e t w e e n m o d e r n Ivoirien
leaders, t h e n e w élite, a n d t h e rest o f the p e o p l e . T h i s p r o b l e m w a s
c o m m o n t o a l l n e w l y i n d e p e n d e n t A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s , b u t it w a s
m o r e m a r k e d in the I v o r y C o a s t because g r o w t h w a s m o r e rapid
and m o r e resources w e r e i n v o l v e d . A n additional special feature
o f cleavages in the I v o r y Coast and other francophone countries
r e s u l t e d f r o m t h e F r e n c h c o l o n i a l a s s i m i l a t i o n p o l i c y . T h e deuxième
loi Lamine Guèye a n d t h e code du travail left A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t s
w i t h a tradition o f h i g h w a g e s a n d benefits o r i g i n a l l y g i v e n t o
F r e n c h citizens. S e n e g a l a n d the I v o r y C o a s t t h r o u g h the 1960s,
for e x a m p l e , paid for vacations in France for their higher-level
administrators. G o v e r n m e n t officials e x p e c t e d , a n d r e c e i v e d ,
m u c h better h o u s i n g than that available t o others, as w e l l as cars
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D I F F I C U L T I E S O F N A T I O N - B U I L D I N G
and o t h e r valuable benefits. T h e small g r o u p o f w a g e - e a r n e r s in

t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r , t h r o u g h t h e code du travail, a l s o r e c e i v e d
m i n i m u m - w a g e g u a r a n t e e s far a b o v e w h a t r u r a l w o r k e r s c o u l d
r e c e i v e . I n d e e d , t h e s t a t e i n w e s t e r n A f r i c a w a s b y far t h e l a r g e s t
e m p l o y e r , a n d p r o d u c e d little w e a l t h , y e t t a x e d t h e a l r e a d y
hard-pressed African peasants t o p a y for the disproportionately
high privileges o f the frequently n o n - p r o d u c t i v e wage-earner. In
the 1950s, the a v e r a g e w a g e o f A f r i c a n s in t h e p u b l i c sector in
Senegal w a s t w i c e that o f G h a n a , e v e n t h o u g h t h e latter c o u n t r y
1
was m u c h richer. E v e n t h o u g h prices w e r e higher in Senegal,
a n d strict c o m p a r i s o n w a s d i f f i c u l t , t h a t d i f f e r e n c e u n d e r l i n e s t h e
financial p r o b l e m i n m a n y f r a n c o p h o n e c o u n t r i e s .
T h e I v o r y C o a s t w a s n o e x c e p t i o n . T h r o u g h o u t t h e 1960s a n d
1970s, H o u p h o u e t - B o i g n y m a n a g e d t o c o n t a i n p e r i o d i c instability
stemming from these m a n y sources. B a c k e d b y the French, he
disarmed dissatisfied elite m e m b e r s w i t h a r e g u l a r reshuffling o f
the g o v e r n m e n t , c o - o p t i n g , w h e n h e c o u l d , o u t s p o k e n o p p o n e n t s .
O c c a s i o n a l l y h e held state d i a l o g u e s w i t h ethnic leaders, r a n g i n g
from civil servants to lorry drivers. T h e s e dialogues s h o w e d
c o n s u m m a t e political skill, yet e v e n H o u p h o u e t - B o i g n y m i g h t
n o t h a v e b e e n s o s u c c e s s f u l o v e r m o r e t h a n 30 y e a r s o f l e a d e r s h i p
w i t h o u t the phenomenal g r o w t h in the wealth o f his country.
T h e e c o n o m i c stagnation o f Mali forms a striking contrast.
W h e n t h e M a l i F e d e r a t i o n split apart, S o u d a n t o o k t h e n a m e M a l i
and c l o s e d its b o r d e r s w i t h its f o r m e r partner, despite t h e fact that
it w a s n o w l a n d - l o c k e d , w i t h its m a j o r t r a d e - r o u t e s t o D a k a r c u t
off. I t s m o n e y e c o n o m y w a s p a r a l y s e d . T o s o l v e t h e p r o b l e m
r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h i s s e l f - i n f l i c t e d w o u n d , its l e a d e r s s o u g h t a l t e r
native political unions, in particular a close link w i t h G u i n e a . T h e
l e f t - w i n g i d e o l o g y o f the t w o g o v e r n m e n t s m a d e this a reasonable
c o m b i n a t i o n , b u t e c o n o m i c a l l y it d i d n o t h e l p . T h e e c o n o m y a n d
infrastructure o f G u i n e a w e r e oriented t o its coast, there w a s n o
rail-link w i t h M a l i , a n d G u i n e a itself w a s p o o r . T r a n s p o r t links
w i t h the I v o r y Coast w e r e inadequate and the distance to Abidjan
w a s great. A s dissatisfaction w i t h the resultant e c o n o m i c hardships
g r e w , Keita's g o v e r n m e n t became increasingly authoritarian. H e
w o r s e n e d the e c o n o m i c situation b y w i t h d r a w i n g M a l i from the
F r e n c h W e s t A f r i c a n franc z o n e in 1962. T h e price o f c o n t r o l o f
1
See R u t h Schachter M o r g e n t h a u , ' O l d cleavages a m o n g n e w W e s t African states:
t h e h e r i t a g e o f F r e n c h r u l e ' , Africa Today, A p r i l 1 9 7 1 .
641

his o w n c u r r e n c y w a s t h a t t h e M a l i a n franc w a s n o l o n g e r
t r a n s f e r a b l e o u t s i d e its b o r d e r s w i t h its s e v e n different n e i g h b o u r s .
A s c o n d i t i o n s deteriorated, K e i t a tried t o return t o the franc z o n e ,
b u t this d i d n o t h e l p . O p p o s i t i o n g r e w , as K e i t a b e c a m e m o r e
stridently Marxist a n d dictatorial, until his a r m y arrested h i m in
1968.
G u i n e a fared s l i g h t l y b e t t e r e c o n o m i c a l l y t h a n M a l i , a n d S é k o u
T o u r é did manage t o hold o n to the leadership. W h e n the French
w i t h d r e w all t h e i r p e r s o n n e l after G u i n e a h a d v o t e d t o t a k e
i n d e p e n d e n c e , t h e y left a w e a k m o d e r n i n f r a s t r u c t u r e a n d a
severely u n d e r d e v e l o p e d e c o n o m y - n o industrial structure and
a poorly organised agricultural system. T o u r é , t h o u g h a Marxist,
called for e c o n o m i c help f r o m w e s t e r n nations like the U n i t e d
States as w e l l as f r o m C o m m u n i s t c o u n t r i e s . A t t h e g o v e r n m e n t a l
level France ignored the appeal, while the Soviet U n i o n and the
e a s t e r n b l o c b e g a n t o t r y t o fill t h e v o i d left b y t h e F r e n c h . B u t
it w a s p r i v a t e f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f G u i n e a ' s
iron and bauxite, and the resulting revenues, that kept the
g o v e r n m e n t afloat. I n i960 T o u r é w i t h d r e w f r o m t h e f r a n c z o n e
and established a national currency; changed four times b y the
e a r l y 1970s, it w a s a l m o s t w i t h o u t v a l u e i n o t h e r c o u n t r i e s . T h e
G u i n e a g o v e r n m e n t also sought to replace the African m i d d l e m e n
in t h e t r a d i n g n e t w o r k w i t h t h e n a t i o n a l i s e d d i s t r i b u t i o n o f g o o d s .
B y t h e mid-1960s t h e G u i n e a n d o m e s t i c m o n e y e c o n o m y w a s i n
disarray; the currency w a s severely devalued and there w e r e f e w
g o o d s i n t h e m a r k e t p l a c e t o b u y w i t h it i n a n y c a s e .
Guinea did not improve her economic position b y turning to
socialist countries for aid a n d trade. T h e r e w e r e m a n y p r o b l e m s
w i t h e x c h a n g e a n d p a y m e n t arrangements, w h i c h s o m e critics
1
argue actually made G u i n e a more dependent. G u i n e a ' s e c o n o m i c
p r o b l e m s a n d lack o f effective administration disillusioned the
élite, a n d p r o d u c e d a sense o f hopelessness in the c o u n t r y s i d e .
M a n y p e o p l e left t o l i v e a b r o a d , w h i l e it b e c a m e difficult f o r
foreigners to receive permission to c o m e to Guinea. T o u r é
e m e r g e d as a n a u t o c r a t , r e m o v i n g h i s c r i t i c s w i t h i n t h e p a r t y , real
or potential, allegedly for plotting against h i m . H e attempted t o
rally n a t i o n a l s u p p o r t b y m o b i l i s i n g t h e p o p u l a t i o n t o resist
n u m e r o u s real o r m a n u f a c t u r e d a t t e m p t e d c o u p s , s o m e o f w h i c h
1
L a n s i n é K a b a , ' G u i n e a n p o l i t i c s : a c r i t i c a l h i s t o r i c a l o v e r v i e w ' , Journal of Modern
Africa Studies, 1977, 1 5 , 1, 39.
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D I F F I C U L T I E S OF N A T I O N - B U I L D I N G
he suggested w e r e organised from abroad. In i960 he accused the

F r e n c h , a n d in 1 9 6 1 h e e x p e l l e d t h e R u s s i a n a m b a s s a d o r o n s u c h
a c h a r g e . I n 1965 h e b r o k e r e l a t i o n s w i t h F r a n c e b e c a u s e o f
another anti-governmental plot. In 1969 he u n c o v e r e d yet another,
t h e * L a b e ' p l o t , as a r e s u l t o f w h i c h 13 p e o p l e w e r e s e n t e n c e d t o
death. In 1970 an attack w a s m a d e o n C o n a k r y , s u p p o r t e d b y the
P o r t u g u e s e , a c c o r d i n g to a U N investigation. It w a s the largest-
s c a l e a t t e m p t at a n o v e r t h r o w o f t h e T o u r e r e g i m e a n d as a r e s u l t
91 p e o p l e w e r e s e n t e n c e d t o d e a t h . O t h e r a t t e m p t e d c o u p s w e r e
' u n c o v e r e d ' between 1970 and 1974, and T o u r e frequently
denounced foreign and domestic plotters. H e did strike a m o r e
p e a c e f u l n o t e i n 1975 w h e n , after h i s r e - e l e c t i o n f o r a t h i r d t e r m
in office, h e a n n o u n c e d t h a t n o r m a l r e l a t i o n s w o u l d b e re
established w i t h France.
G u i n e a after i n d e p e n d e n c e w a s , t h u s , o f t e n i n p o l i t i c a l t u r m o i l .
T o u r e c r e a t e d a p e o p l e ' s m i l i t i a t o fight ' s u b v e r s i o n ' , t o s u p p r e s s
plots against his g o v e r n m e n t a n d t o c o u n t e r b a l a n c e the a r m y . I n
G u i n e a , unlike M a l i , the a r m y barely existed, w a s kept d i v i d e d ,
in m o t i o n , a n d o u t o f s i g h t . A s m a n y o f t h e f o u n d i n g f a t h e r s w e r e
i m p l i c a t e d i n t h e ' p l o t s ' , f e w r e m a i n e d i n p u b l i c life. L e a d e r s i n
office c a m e m o r e a n d m o r e f r o m a m o n g t h o s e e d u c a t e d after
i n d e p e n d e n c e . T h e y r e c e i v e d definite p r i v i l e g e s in the f o r m o f
e x c e l l e n t h o u s i n g , a c c e s s t o s c a r c e c o n s u m e r g o o d s a n d fine c a r s .
T h u s T o u r e k e p t in p o w e r , t h o u g h the c o u n t r y s t a g n a t e d
politically and economically.
N a t i o n - b u i l d i n g i n t h e 1 4 f r a n c o p h o n e states d u r i n g t h e 1960s
a n d e a r l y 1 9 7 0 s w a s n o t e a s y , as t h e s e c a s e s t u d i e s s h o w . S e n e g a l
a n d t h e I v o r y C o a s t h a d f e w e r difficulties t h a n t h e o t h e r s . C a n it b e
a r g u e d that the relative stability o f Senegal and the I v o r y C o a s t ,
c o m p a r e d t o M a l i a n d G u i n e a , w a s in p a r t t h e r e s u l t o f t h e i r
different i d e o l o g i e s ? T h e e v i d e n c e is i n c o n c l u s i v e . B o t h M a l i ' s
and G u i n e a ' s leaders a d o p t e d policies that d i s c o u r a g e d local
agriculture and c o m m e r c e . T o u r e ' s g o v e r n m e n t lived o n foreign
investment. H o w e v e r , s o m e moderate g o v e r n m e n t s had similar
difficulties w i t h a g r i c u l t u r e a n d c o m m e r c e . T h e d r o u g h t o f t h e
e a r l y 1 9 7 0 s i n c r e a s e d p o v e r t y i n all t h e c o u n t r i e s b o r d e r i n g t h e
S a h a r a a n d e x a c e r b a t e d p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y in M a u r i t a n i a , C h a d ,
N i g e r and U p p e r V o l t a , w h a t e v e r the type o f regime.
I n all 1 4 states c r e a t i n g t h e e x t e r n a l n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s w a s
a s t r u g g l e , and leaders f r o m the m o d e r n elite w e r e a m i n o r i t y that
643

Table 12.2.
Population statistics
3
Education'
(Cities Major
over % of ethnic
Size of 100000) age 6-14 Religion'' groups
Popu largest % of V. % of in
lation* city pop.* urbanised Type Schools Pupils pop. school
Benin
3030000 180000 10 Primary 825 186000 n.a. Catholics 15 Fon 2 8 b
Cotonou Secondary
& Muslims 13 Adja 7
technical 7i 3M53 Bariba 6
University 1 600 Yoruba 5
Cameroun
6600000 340000 8 Primary 4137 938071 16 80 Catholics 17 Bamileke n c
Douala (*4) d
Secondary
& Protestants 17 Beti-Pahouin 10
technical *79 84363 Muslims 20 Tikar 5
University 1 n.a.
Central
African Republic
2100000 350000 17 2 9
Primary 778 178550 55 Christians 35 Banda 33*
A Secondary
Bangui (J6) d
& Muslims 5 Baya 29

technical 38 10960
University 1 n.a.

Chad
3950000 193000 5 5 Primary 707 183250 5 22 Christians 5 Arab 20*
Ndjamena (14) Secondary
& Muslims 52 Sara
technical 664 9762
University 1 n.a.
Congo
1300020 290000 22 Primary I 0
33 3°7'94 30 n.a. Catholics 34 K o n g o 45*
Brazzaville (4o) d
Secondary
& Protestants 10 Bateke 20
technical 122 87800 Muslims 1 Babangi 16
University 1 1436 Gabonese 15
Gabon
978000 85000 9 Primary 734 121400 13 95 Catholics 42 Fang
Libreville (*8) d
Secondary
& Protestants 18 Bakoto
technical 77 686 Muslims 1 Mitshogo
University » 135
Guinea
4310000 525671 12 Primary 1984 191287 5 n.a. Muslims 75 Susu*
Conakry ('9) d Secondary
& Catholics 1.5 Mandingo
technical n.a. 2785 Fulani
University

Table 12.2. (cont.)
Population statistics
0
Education
(Cities Major
over % of ethnic
Size of 100000) age 6-14 Religion 0
groups
Popu largest % of % % of in
2
lation city pop* urbanised Type Schools Pupils pop. school %
Ivory Coast
5 600000 600000 13 Primary n.a. 681735 14 65 Catholics 12 Akan
Abidjan {zof Secondary
& Muslims Kru
technical
& 106517 Mande
University 6500 Senufo
'Higher' Lagoon
Lobe
Mali
5600000 380000 7 Primary 1222 254634 22 Muslims 65 Mandingo
Bamako 03) d
Secondary
& Christians ; Soninke
technical 6444 Dogon
University Songhai
'Higher' 5 2200
Mauritania
1500000 140000 9 Primary 47000 17 Muslims 99 Moors*
Nouakchott (11) Secondary
& Christians 1 Fulani 75
technical 26 7084 Tukolor etc. 25
University n.a.

Niger
1
4500000 125 OOO Primary 139000 13 Muslims 85 Hausa
Niamey (9) d
Secondary
& Christians 1 Tukolor 6
technical 44 13810 Fulani 7
'Higher' 5*i Fulani
University
Senegal
b
4500000 600000 13 13 Primary n.a. 269997 8 40 Muslims 80 Wolof i 6
Dakar (28)«» Secondary
& Catholics 10 Tukulor 6
technical 68 208 Fulani 7
'Higher' 5 200 Serer 7
University n.a. Diola 3
Togo
240OOOO 2JOOOO Primary 934 290000 13 60 Muslims 8 Ewe 8 b
Lome (H) d
Secondary
& Christians 25 Ouatchi 6
technical 90 31000 Kabre 10
University 1 1385
Upper Volta
1
5900000 125000 Primary 1370 144 376 3 11 Muslims 20 Mossi
Wagadugu (8) d
Secondary
& 58 14416 Christians 10 Fulani
technical 450 Dioula
University
1 b c
Africa yearbook and who's mho, London: Africa Journal Limited, 1977. Europa yearbook, 1977. Gwendolen Carter,
d
Five African states, Victor LeVine, ' T h e Cameroon federal republic', Cornell U . Press, 1963, 291. Calculations by Richard Hay,
'Patterns of urbanisation and socio-economic development in the Third World: an overview', in Third World urbanisation, R. Hay
and J. Abu-Lughod (eds.), Chicago: Maaroufa Press Inc., 1 9 7 7 , 9 2 - 3 . Hay's percentages depend on country reported 'urbanised'
population in 1971 - it refers to % of population in cities o f 20000 or over.

h a d t o d i l u t e t h e m a j o r i t y ' s t r a d i t i o n a l t i e s , e v e n as t h e y u s e d t h e m
to reinforce national loyalties and institutions. A s the capacity o f
t h e g o v e r n m e n t s g r e w , as m o d e r n e d u c a t i o n a n d t h e m o n e y
e c o n o m y spread, g r o u p s w i t h an interest in the n a t i o n a l institu
t i o n s a l s o g r e w : s u c h as p l a n t e r s i n t h e I v o r y C o a s t , m i g r a n t f a r m
labourers in U p p e r V o l t a , miners in G a b o n and G u i n e a , and,
e v e r y w h e r e , civil servants and the urban p o p u l a t i o n tied to
w a g e - e a r n i n g jobs. T h e s e g r o u p s had national interests that
o v e r r o d e o r at l e a s t c o m p e t e d e f f e c t i v e l y w i t h l o c a l i s e d e t h n i c o n e s .
A f r i c a n national leaders also h a d difficulty r e a c h i n g i n d i v i d u a l
citizens except rhetorically, t h r o u g h radio, newspaper and w o r d
o f m o u t h . In practice they often had to deal t h r o u g h intermedi
aries, chiefs and o t h e r traditional leaders, to assure results and
i m p l e m e n t p r o g r a m m e s . R e a c h i n g the rural p o p u l a t i o n b e c a m e
p r o g r e s s i v e l y m o r e difficult for g o v e r n m e n t s in c o u n t r i e s w h e r e
t h e v a l u e o f t h e c u r r e n c y h a d d r a s t i c a l l y d i m i n i s h e d , as i n M a l i
and G u i n e a . T h e r e the g o v e r n i n g urban elite, financed b y
i n j e c t i o n s o f o v e r s e a s a i d , r e m i t t a n c e s o r r o y a l t i e s , a l m o s t floated
a b o v e the rural population. F e w national institutions w e r e suited
t o deal w i t h s u c h strains, a n d in s o m e states, like C h a d , e v e n the
a r m y had difficulty h o l d i n g t o g e t h e r , and indeed e v e n t u a l l y
disintegrated.
In several cases o n l y outside intervention b y the former
colonial p o w e r c o u l d shore u p regimes unable to deal w i t h the
strains o f i n d e p e n d e n c e . F r e n c h t r o o p s s t a b i l i s e d P r e s i d e n t
S e n g h o r d u r i n g his crisis w i t h M a m a d o u D i a , and President D i o r i
o f N i g e r d u r i n g his s t r u g g l e w i t h D j i b o B a k a r y . L e o n M ' B a
remained president o f G a b o n in F e b r u a r y 1964 solely because the
F r e n c h intervened o n his behalf. In C h a d , President T o m a l b a y e
called u p o n F r e n c h t r o o p s t o help h i m fight n o r t h e r n separatists
s u p p o r t e d f r o m L i b y a . T h i s did n o t , h o w e v e r , s t o p his assassin
ation in 1 9 7 5 .
T h e F r e n c h did not try to p r e v e n t political r e v o l u t i o n s f r o m
o c c u r r i n g in their f o r m e r c o l o n i e s , e x c e p t in areas w h e r e their o w n
direct interests w e r e affected. N o t s u r p r i s i n g l y these w e r e the m o s t
economically viable o f the former colonies, or those h a v i n g
significant mineral potential.
648

S O C I A L , E C O N O M I C A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G E
T h e break-up o f the A O F and the A E F federations shattered the

c o h e s i v e n e s s , and r e d u c e d the h o r i z o n s , o f F r e n c h - s p e a k i n g
tropical A f r i c a . T h e separate states b e c a m e w e a k rivals. T h e
former federal capitals o f D a k a r and Brazzaville declined in
i m p o r t a n c e . T h e l a n d - l o c k e d states suffered s e v e r e e c o n o m i c
d e c l i n e s , w h i l e the e c o n o m i e s o f m o s t coastal states lost i m p o r t a n t
traditional markets and sources o f labour supply. T h e e c o n o m i e s
o f s t r o n g e r nations outside the area, like N i g e r i a , the N o r t h
A f r i c a n states a n d e v e n Z a i r e , a t t r a c t e d a w a y t r a d e a n d p e o p l e .
W i t h i n the f r a n c o p h o n e area n e w centres o f e c o n o m i c d y n a m i s m
e m e r g e d , m o s t n o t a b l y in the I v o r y C o a s t , G a b o n and C a m e r o u n .
O t h e r e c o n o m i c s h o c k s a c c o m p a n i e d independence, in particular
the d r o u g h t in the early 1970s a n d the sharp rise in the c o s t o f
oil and i m p o r t e d g o o d s . Inflation in F r a n c e w a s automatically
passed o n to the franc-zone A f r i c a n states. L i k e their political
institutions, the e c o n o m i c and social institutions o f the franco
p h o n e states w e r e i n c r i s i s d u r i n g t h e first 15 y e a r s o f
independence.
T o d e t e r m i n e the patterns that d e v e l o p e d in the 1 4 f r a n c o p h o n e
c o u n t r i e s i n t h e 1 9 4 0 - 7 5 p e r i o d , w e s h a l l l o o k at s o m e c o m m o n
indicators o f c h a n g e : religion, education, urbanisation and econ
o m i c g r o w t h . T h e s e indicate the d e g r e e to w h i c h p e o p l e l i v i n g
in villages o r g a n i s e d o n a traditional basis w e r e d r a w n i n t o
institutions and activities w h i c h c h a n g e d their orientations to
their families, ethnic g r o u p s and t o t h e m s e l v e s . S e c o n d , these
indicators w e r e important for the A f r i c a n élite, w h o s o u g h t
e c o n o m i c p r o g r e s s a n d a b e t t e r life. T h i r d l y , t h e y w e r e i m p o r t a n t
to t h o s e in political c o n t r o l for an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f p r o b l e m s t h e y
m i g h t have to confront. T h e spread o f mass education, for
e x a m p l e , raised e x p e c t a t i o n s in states w i t h o u t the r e s o u r c e s t o
fulfil t h e m . U r b a n i s a t i o n , t o o , i m p l i e d r a p i d l y e x p a n d i n g p o p u
l a t i o n s i n t h e c i t i e s , dissatisfied i f t h e r e w e r e n o j o b s o r a m e n i t i e s .
T h e spread o f the universal religions, Islam and Christianity,
c o u l d place people b e y o n d the control o f the political leaders,
w h i l e e r o d i n g p u r e l y local ties a n d l o y a l t i e s .
B e c a u s e , d u r i n g t h e c o l o n i a l p e r i o d , d e c i s i o n s f o r all t e r r i t o r i e s
w e r e f o r m u l a t e d i n F r a n c e , t h e official r e c o r d s o f F r e n c h t r o p i c a l
Africa s h o w a deceptive uniformity, particularly before the
649

Second W o r l d W a r . In practice, o f course, French colonial

officials h a d t o a d a p t t o t h e s p e c i a l c o n d i t i o n s o f e a c h t e r r i t o r y ,
so that e v e n before independence there w e r e m u c h greater
differences b e t w e e n t h e territories in b o t h their infrastructure a n d
social c o m p o s i t i o n than the colonial records suggest. T h u s the role
o f M u s l i m l e a d e r s i n different W e s t A f r i c a n t e r r i t o r i e s d e p e n d e d
in p a r t o n t h e i r r e l a t i v e p o w e r at t h e t i m e o f t h e F r e n c h c o n q u e s t .
W h e r e t h e F r e n c h c a m e u p a g a i n s t p o w e r f u l M u s l i m l e a d e r s after
s u b j u g a t i n g t h e m militarily they incorporated t h e m a n d their
successors into their administration. W h e r e M u s l i m leaders w e r e
w e a k o r f e w in n u m b e r they w e r e ignored o r actively repressed.
Senegal and the I v o r y C o a s t respectively p r o v i d e e x a m p l e s o f these
1
differing a p p r o a c h e s . A g a i n , in practice t h e F r e n c h i n v e s t e d their
resources in territories w h e r e their returns w e r e greatest, s o that
the remote a n d inaccessible land-locked territories like C h a d o r
S o u d a n h a d f e w e r F r e n c h officials a n d c o l o n i s e r s a n d r e c e i v e d less
a t t e n t i o n as far as d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e i r s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c
infrastructure w a s concerned.
W h i l e e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t , the spread o f education and
u r b a n i s a t i o n w e r e o b j e c t s o f c o l o n i a l effort - e i t h e r t o e x t r a c t
profit o r t o i m p r o v e l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s - the spread o f religion w a s
l a r g e l y b e y o n d t h e c o n t r o l o f F r e n c h officials. T r u e , a t t i m e s t h e y
f a v o u r e d M u s l i m s as s u p e r i o r t o a n i m i s t s b e c a u s e t h e y w e r e
l i t e r a t e , a n d u s e d t h e m t h e r e f o r e as c l e r k s a n d i n t e r p r e t e r s : t h i s
is n o t t h e m a j o r e x p l a n a t i o n , h o w e v e r , f o r t h e r a p i d s p r e a d o f
Islam during the colonial period. Local political dynamics c o u n t e d
a great deal m o r e . A d o p t i o n o f o n e o r another universal religion
helped cement alliances o r enmities. In the nineteenth century the
spread o f Islam w a s an a n s w e r , in part, t o the social u p h e a v a l s
o f the time — Islam b o u n d together warring g r o u p s , w h i c h both
fought the colonial invaders and attempted to conquer other
A f r i c a n g r o u p s . Christianity, t o o , g r e w partly as a result o f the
desire b y African g r o u p s t o transcend limits set b y traditional
a u t h o r i t i e s o r b y s o c i a l b a r r i e r s , s u c h as s l a v e r y .
I n t h e late c o l o n i a l p e r i o d , h o w e v e r , w h e n t h e m o n o p o l y o f
g o v e r n m e n t institutions w a s in the hands o f the m o d e r n elite,
religion became important to them politically. Religion could be
used t o arouse the enthusiasm o f potential supporters for leaders
1
S e e L u c y C r e e v e y ( B e h r m a n ) ' T h e F r e n c h M u s l i m p o l i c y in Senegal*, in D a n i e l
F . M c C a l l ( e d . ) , Aspects of West African Islam ( B o s t o n , 1971).
650

o f n e w parties, o r to close the ranks o f a n e w political g r o u p

a g a i n s t t h e a t t r a c t i o n s o f o u t s i d e r s f r o m a different r e l i g i o n . I n
the A E F the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h w a s a p o w e r f u l political force,
a l t h o u g h the substantial majority o f the p o p u l a t i o n n e v e r w e n t
to c h u r c h and practised rituals m i x i n g A f r i c a n pre-Christian
beliefs w i t h Christian doctrine. T h e C a t h o l i c C h u r c h had e d u c a t e d
m a n y m e m b e r s o f the n e w élite in D a h o m e y , T o g o , C a m e r o u n
and the I v o r y C o a s t (and t o a lesser extent Senegal). T h i s training
resulted in i n v i s i b l e b u t i m p o r t a n t social links b e t w e e n m a n y
leaders and the clergy. T h e C a t h o l i c C h u r c h s o u g h t to build o n
this r e l a t i o n s h i p a n d t o d e e p e n its i n f l u e n c e i n A f r i c a after
independence b y p r o m p t l y a p p o i n t i n g m o r e A f r i c a n priests to
h i g h p o s i t i o n s in the c h u r c h . T h e c l e r g y c o n t i n u e d t o h a v e an
i m p o r t a n t r o l e i n d a i l y life, e s p e c i a l l y i n r u r a l a r e a s , w h e r e
parishioners w o u l d often seek the a d v i c e o f their priest w h e n
confronted with a new problem. Individual clergymen continued
to h a v e considerable influence w i t h m e m b e r s o f the political élite
w h o m they k n e w well. B u t the c l e r g y had to tread w a r i l y to a v o i d ,
if possible, o p e n clashes w i t h other religious leaders o r w i t h
s e c u l a r g r o u p s w h i c h m i g h t l a b e l t h e c h u r c h , w i t h its h e a d q u a r t e r s
i n R o m e , as n e o - c o l o n i a l i s t .
M u s l i m efforts t o s p r e a d t h e faith w e r e n o t s o h a m p e r e d . T h e r e
w e r e M u s l i m s i n all 1 4 c o u n t r i e s , a l t h o u g h t h e y w e r e a m a j o r i t y
(in 1 9 7 5 ) o n l y i n C h a d (52 p e r c e n t ) , G u i n e a (75 p e r c e n t ) , M a l i
(65 p e r c e n t ) , M a u r i t a n i a (99 p e r c e n t ) , N i g e r (85 p e r c e n t ) a n d
S e n e g a l (80 p e r c e n t ) . I s l a m h a d c o n t i n u e d t o s p r e a d b e t w e e n 1 9 4 0
a n d 1 9 7 5 i n all t h e t e r r i t o r i e s . It w a s a b l e t o a d a p t t o A f r i c a n s o c i a l
traditions, and to accept p o l y g a m y w i t h o u t demur. M o r e o v e r ,
Islam w a s unlikely to be identified w i t h a E u r o p e a n colonial
p r e s e n c e , e v e n b y its d e t r a c t o r s . A f t e r i n d e p e n d e n c e , w h e n M i d d l e
Eastern and N o r t h African nations b e g a n to g i v e gifts to support
the extension o f K o r a n i c education and the construction o f n e w
m o s q u e s i n v a r i o u s c o u n t r i e s , I s l a m w a s still s e e n as i n d i g e n o u s ,
as a c o m p l e m e n t a n d e x t e n s i o n t o A f r i c a n t r a d i t i o n s .
M u s l i m leaders, w h o w e r e almost w i t h o u t exception Africans
a n d n o t A r a b s ( o r E u r o p e a n s , as m o s t C a t h o l i c c l e r g y h a d b e e n ) ,
u s u a l l y w e r e less h e s i t a n t t h a n t h e i r R o m a n C a t h o l i c c o u n t e r p a r t s
to s u p p o r t a political cause openly. In countries w i t h a large
M u s l i m majority, g o v e r n m e n t leaders usually had to strike
b a r g a i n s w i t h the M u s l i m leaders, especially in M a u r i t a n i a a n d
651

Senegal. B u t the roles o f M u s l i m leaders varied. In s o m e localities

e s t a b l i s h e d M u s l i m l e a d e r s w e r e m o d e r n i s e r s w h o a c t e d as
intermediaries b e t w e e n g o v e r n m e n t leaders and the peasants.
T h u s , in S e n e g a l , t h e y h e l p e d t o spread the c u l t i v a t i o n o f
g r o u n d n u t s , e n c o u r a g e d trade and u r g e d their f o l l o w e r s to v o t e
in elections. M a n y w e r e , h o w e v e r , w a r y o f social r e f o r m , b l o c k e d
health c a m p a i g n s , objected to the creation o f rural secular schools
a n d w e r e o p p o s e d t o efforts t o o r g a n i s e r u r a l p r o d u c i n g o r s e l l i n g
cooperatives. L o c a l l y , thus, s o m e M u s l i m leaders c o u l d s l o w
d o w n development schemes while other Muslim reform groups
might support them.
Internationally, h o w e v e r , the M u s l i m leaders in f r a n c o p h o n e
A f r i c a h a d little w e i g h t . F o r f r a n c o p h o n e A f r i c a n s , b e i n g M u s l i m
rarely implied any feeling o f solidarity w i t h n o n - A f r i c a n M u s l i m s —
o r indeed w i t h M u s l i m s in o t h e r A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s , w h e t h e r
English- or French-speaking. T h e notable exception was Shaykh
I b r a h i m a N i a s s , the T i j a n i y y a leader o f K a o l a c k in S e n e g a l , w h o
had considerable influence in N o r t h e r n N i g e r i a , particularly
K a n o . M u s l i m unity in the area w a s rather s y m b o l i s e d b y
pilgrimages to M e c c a or international congresses o f M u s l i m s ; but
n o close inter-state u n i o n s o f M u s l i m s w e r e f o r m e d . F u r t h e r m o r e ,
the historic tension b e t w e e n the A r a b s and Berbers o f the n o r t h
and the Black A f r i c a n g r o u p s south o f the Sahara m a d e M u s l i m
solidarity across this r e g i o n m o r e s y m b o l i c than real. T h i s w a s
to b e c o m e v e r y apparent in the civil w a r in C h a d . O n l y a n o m i n a l
p o l i c y o f b r e a k i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h I s r a e l after 1 9 7 3 s i g n a l l e d a
l i m i t e d c o m m o n f r o n t , a n d t h i s w a s n o t c o n f i n e d t o states h a v i n g
M u s l i m majorities.
E v e n the national political p o w e r o f M u s l i m leaders w a s
l i m i t e d ; it m i g h t s l o w d o w n m o d e r n i s a t i o n , b u t it n e v e r b r o u g h t
it t o a h a l t . I n p a r t i c u l a r , m o d e r n s e c u l a r e d u c a t i o n , a d o p t e d b y
all t h e f r a n c o p h o n e l e a d e r s , u n d e r c u t t r a d i t i o n a l I s l a m i c v a l u e s ,
and spread inexorably. In the pre-independence period few
African children had the o p p o r t u n i t y to g o to school, a l t h o u g h
w h e r e s c h o o l s w e r e a v a i l a b l e t h e y w e r e filled. T h e F r e n c h h a d
instituted a system o f primary and secondary schools w h i c h
s e r v i c e d first t h e F r e n c h p o p u l a t i o n s a n d s e c o n d l y t h e A f r i c a n s .
After the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r the n u m b e r o f schools increased,
a n d t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f D a k a r w a s f o u n d e d in S e n e g a l . P r i m a r y
s c h o o l s remained concentrated in the larger t o w n s and cities and
652

v e r y few w e r e f o u n d in the countryside. T h e handful o f secondary

s c h o o l s w e r e also l o c a t e d in t h e larger t o w n s . S u p p l e m e n t i n g this
system were the Christian mission schools w h i c h , before
independence, h a d been responsible in m a n y territories for
training a substantial element o f t h e e d u c a t e d élite. T h e s c h o o l
s y s t e m e x i s t i n g at i n d e p e n d e n c e , h o w e v e r , h a d left t h e o v e r
w h e l m i n g majority o f school-age Africans w i t h n o access
to education.
F r a n c o p h o n e A f r i c a n élites, o n the w h o l e , defined m o d e r n
e d u c a t i o n i n t e r m s o f F r e n c h s t a n d a r d s , e v e n if, a s n a t i o n a l i s t s ,
they s a w the negative impact o f F r e n c h schools o n the sense o f
identity o f African children. African children had to study history
texts b e g i n n i n g w i t h s u c h i m m o r t a l lines as ' O u r ancestors the
G a u l s h a d b l u e e y e s a n d fair h a i r . . . ' a n d r e c o u n t i n g w i t h
a p p r o b a t i o n t h e c o l o n i a l feats o f t h e E u r o p e a n p o w e r s . T h e y a l s o
had t o study all subjects in a f o r e i g n l a n g u a g e : F r e n c h . T h e
curriculum basically f o l l o w e d the F r e n c h o n e , t h o u g h F r e n c h
colonial administrators d e v e l o p e d s o m e technical p r o g r a m m e s for
specific p u r p o s e s , s u c h as a special d i p l o m a f o r m e d i c a l assistants
r e q u i r i n g less s c h o o l i n g a n d d i f f e r e n t t o p i c s f r o m t h o s e t a u g h t i n
regular F r e n c h medical s c h o o l s . B u t A f r i c a n students - at p r i m a r y
a n d s e c o n d a r y s c h o o l s , a n d t h e l u c k y handful at t h e u n i v e r s i t y -
w a n t e d equality o f standards a n d s a w t h e m s e l v e s as c o m p e t i n g
f o r t h e s a m e g o a l s a n d d e g r e e s as s t u d e n t s i n F r a n c e .
W h e n independence came, African leaders, m a n y o f w h o m had
studied t o b e c o m e teachers, w e r e faced w i t h a dual p r o b l e m . M o s t
w a n t e d t o spread mass education. Y e t they h a d t o redefine
educational g o a l s t o meet specifically A f r i c a n needs. T h e y a d o p t e d
n e w texts w h i c h included A f r i c a n history. B y t h e m i d - 1 9 6 0 s , all
14 c o u n t r i e s h a d either established technical s c h o o l s , i n c l u d i n g
schools for public administrators, teacher-training colleges, agri
cultural training p r o g r a m m e s , and para-medical p r o g r a m m e s for
m i d w i v e s and practising nurses, o r added to those already in
existence. T h e y had not, h o w e v e r , sorted o u t h o w to Africanise
academic p r o g r a m m e s for African applicants to the universities,
w h i c h remained for the greater part o f o u r period under French
academic direction. M o s t feared there w o u l d b e a loss o f standards
as a c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h e A f r i c a n i s a t i o n o f c o u r s e s . T h e c u r r i c u l u m
c o n t i n u e d t o l e a d t o a baccalauréat, a n d r e s e m b l e d t h a t o f t h e
French secondary school, so African students other than those
655

FRENCH-SPEAKING TROPICAL AFRICA
from G u i n e a could still compete with their French peers for

university entrance. M a n y continued to apply for entrance to
university courses in France, e v e n after most o f the francophone
states had built their o w n universities.
T h e French educational system w a s part o f the colonial legacy,
a product o f assimilation, rigid and expensive, and required an
unusually large number o f expatriates to keep it g o i n g . W i t h the
possible exception o f G u i n e a , the independent francophone states
built o n French precedents. Technical education w a s w e a k . Most
o f the African elite valued the same basic skills and advancements
as did the French, and accepted industrialisation and modernised
agriculture as necessary; so they emphasised education in the
French language. O n l y Guineans departed from the precedent,
with disastrous results. E v e n Mauritania, with Arabic as its lingua
franca, maintained its French educational system intact, with
Arabic merely being made a required subject. In the other
countries French remained the official language. W h i l e there were
numerous African languages, they were little used in the school
systems, t h o u g h there w a s some use o f them on national radio
and television.
A l l 14 countries attempted to spread education from the t o w n s
to the countryside, and they continued to import French teachers.
It w a s many years after independence before there were e n o u g h
Africans to staff primary schools and then in only a few countries.
A t the secondary s c h o o l and university levels, French assistance
continued to be required. In G u i n e a , S e k o u T o u r e remained
hostile to 'intellectuals', and refused therefore to see the need for
arts as well as technical faculties in a university. E v e n Guinea,
h o w e v e r , needed assistance in technical and secondary schools.
Mauritania was also an e x c e p t i o n ; it did not have a university;
lack o f resources rather than i d e o l o g y appeared to be the reason.
It also did not have sufficient educated people to staff its schools.
T h e differing success in getting children into s c h o o l in the 14
countries reflected varying g o v e r n m e n t a l priorities. But the three
richest countries also had the highest proportions o f school-age
children in s c h o o l : I v o r y Coast (75 per cent), G a b o n (95 per cent),
C a m e r o u n (80 per cent). In 1975 countries w h i c h were the most
urbanised also had h i g h numbers o f school-age children in school.
T h u s b o t h the Central African R e p u b l i c (55 per cent) and C o n g o
(30 per cent) had more in school than most other countries.
654

C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , s o m e o f t h e l o w e s t figures w e r e i n t h e l e a s t
u r b a n i s e d a n d p o o r e s t c o u n t r i e s , s u c h as U p p e r V o l t a ( n p e r
1
c e n t ) , N i g e r ( i 3 p e r c e n t ) a n d M a u r i t a n i a ( 1 7 p e r c e n t ) . T o g o (60
per cent) w a s an e x c e p t i o n ; neither h i g h l y urbanised n o r v e r y
w e a l t h y , it r a n k e d f o u r t h i n s c h o o l i n g , h a v i n g b e n e f i t e d b o t h f r o m
a s t r o n g m i s s i o n a r y p r e s e n c e a n d its T r u s t e e s h i p s t a t u s d u r i n g t h e
colonial period.
I n f r a n c o p h o n e t r o p i c a l A f r i c a , as e l s e w h e r e o n t h e c o n t i n e n t ,
schooling was linked closely with urbanisation. Large-scale
r e c o r d e d u r b a n g r o w t h i n v i r t u a l l y all t h e 1 4 c o u n t r i e s b e g a n
with incentives provided by European colonisers. T h e m o n e y
e c o n o m y , h o w e v e r , supplied the m o s t p o w e r f u l stimulus: major
t r a d i n g p o s t s , a n d later t h e m a j o r d i s t r i b u t i o n c e n t r e s f o r c a s h
crops and i m p o r t e d g o o d s , g r e w rapidly d u r i n g the colonial
period. Frequently the capital g r e w m o r e rapidly than any other
t o w n , sometimes assuming the role o f a ' p r i m a t e ' city, rivalled
b y n o o t h e r u r b a n c e n t r e a n d u n i t i n g all a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , i n d u s t r i a l ,
c o m m e r c i a l a n d p o l i t i c a l p o w e r , as w e l l as t h e m o s t e x t e n s i v e
infrastructure and service n e t w o r k . After the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r ,
a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y after i n d e p e n d e n c e , t h e l a r g e s t t o w n s g r e w at a n
e x p o n e n t i a l rate.
S e n e g a l p r o v i d e s a n e x a m p l e o f this p a t t e r n , a l t h o u g h e a c h
c o u n t r y h a d its o w n i d i o s y n c r a c i e s ( t a b l e 1 2 . 3 ) . I n S e n e g a l t h e
trend towards urban concentration continued throughout
1 9 4 0 - 7 5 , w i t h o u t the benefit o f an a c c o m p a n y i n g substantial
g r o w t h in the e c o n o m y . T h i s resulted in a v a r i e t y o f p r e d i c t a b l e
p r o b l e m s , a m o n g t h e m a n i n c r e a s e in u n e m p l o y e d o r p a r t i a l l y
e m p l o y e d w o r k e r s in the u r b a n areas, primarily in D a k a r . In 1 9 7 2 ,
f o r e x a m p l e , o n l y 18 2 1 8 p e r s o n s o u t o f a p o p u l a t i o n o f 7 1 4 1 4 9
h e l d w a g e - p a y i n g j o b s . T h e rest w e r e u n e m p l o y e d o r e n g a g e d i n
the informal sector, w h e r e returns o n w o r k w e r e typically v e r y
l o w . M a n y other f r a n c o p h o n e tropical African nations s h o w e d the
same pattern o f urban expansion without equally large e c o n o m i c
g r o w t h . M i g r a t i o n to the city, and city g r o w t h due to natural
causes, w e r e v e r y difficult t o s t o p . Officials s p o k e o f c o n t r o l l i n g
1
S t a t i s t i c s in r e g a r d t o c h i l d r e n i n s c h o o l a n d u r b a n i s a t i o n d e p e n d o n g o v e r n m e n t a l
d o c u m e n t s a n d in s o m e c a s e s a p p e a r t o b e g r o s s e s t i m a t e s o r a r e a l t o g e t h e r l a c k i n g .
B o t h p e r c e n t a g e o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n in s c h o o l a n d p e r c e n t a g e o f s c h o o l - a g e in s c h o o l
are r e p o r t e d i n t a b l e 12.2 b e c a u s e t h e l a t t e r figures w e r e n o t a l w a y s r e l i a b l e a n d s e e m
t o be m o r e o f an estimate than the f o r m e r ( w h i c h w e r e calculated directly, also f r o m
official figures).
655

T a b l e 1 2 . 3 . Urban growth in Senegal.
1904 1930 I960-I 1974
Dakar (and Goree) 25 100 64000 374000 714149

Rufisquc-Bargny 19200 20000 49000
Ziguinchor 700 8 200 29800 49003
Diourbel 500 11 300 28600 38574
Louga 1400 6 300 16 300
St Louis 28 500 19400 48800 86851
Kaolack 300 13300 69 600 105878
Thies 2 800 12600 69 100 8
9 437
Urban population 78 500 15 5100 686600
Total population I 290000 1900 000 3 110000 4222803
% urban 6.1 6.2 22.1 44
Source: Lucy Creevey, ' Religious attitudes and development in Dakar, Senegal',
World Development, July 1980, 8, 504.
urbanisation a n d i n v e s t i n g in rural areas, b u t they d i d little.

Leopold S e n g h o r a n d Félix H o u p h o u ë t - B o i g n y , a m o n g other
leaders, s o u g h t a n d received aid from international organisations
to i m p r o v e rural areas, b u t the disparity b e t w e e n urban a n d rural
z o n e s in this p e r i o d actually increased, as t h e e x a m p l e o f S e n e g a l
demonstrates (see table 12.4).
F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e g a p b e t w e e n t h e city p o o r a n d their n e w élite
n e i g h b o u r s a p p e a r e d t o b e g r o w i n g , d e s p i t e efforts b y s o m e
leaders, s u c h as M a r i e n N g o u a b i in t h e C o n g o , t o i m p r o v e t h e
l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e city p o o r . A n d in t h e absence o f rural
i m p r o v e m e n t s t o offset u r b a n a m e n i t i e s , a n y i m p r o v e m e n t s i n c i t y
services f o r the p o o r m a y e v e n h a v e helped attract urban
migration.
O t h e r r e a s o n s , t o o , influenced t h e rate o f u r b a n i s a t i o n - a m o n g
t h e m t h e Sahelian d r o u g h t o f the early 1970s. I n the l a n d - l o c k e d
countries o f C h a d , N i g e r , U p p e r V o l t a , M a l i , a n d also t o a lesser
e x t e n t i n t h e c o a s t a l states o f M a u r i t a n i a a n d S e n e g a l , t h e d r o u g h t
led t o a drastic agricultural decline. W h e r e c r o p s h a d f o r m e r l y
g r o w n they could g r o w n o longer. Accurate estimation o f the
c o n s e q u e n c e s is n o t p o s s i b l e . M a n y p e o p l e d i e d a n d m a n y m o r e
m i g r a t e d t o t h e cities o r t o n e i g h b o u r i n g agricultural z o n e s w h e r e
water w a s available, a n d w h e r e they p u s h e d other w o r k e r s off the
656

Table 1 2 . 4 . Medical personnel and education in Senegal, 1964 and 1974.
Education: percentage
Thousands Thousands Thousands in schools, ages 6 - 1 4
Population o f people per o f people per o f people per
(thousands) Doctors doctor Midwives midwife Nurses nurse Boys Girls
Regions 1964 1974 1964 1974 1964 1974 1964 1974 1964 1974 1964 1974 1964 1974 1964 1974 1964 1974
Cap Vert 517 699 81 214 6. 4 3-3 90 211 5.7 3-3 223 864 2.3 0.8 63 70 43 58
Casamance 562 619 10 10 56.2 61.9 9 16 62.4 38.7 106 320 5.3 1.9 21 42 10 21
Diourbel 538 635 8 10 67.3 79-4 10 19 53.8 33-4 9* 250 5.9 2.5 6 15 3 10
River 371 389 M.7 25.9 12 *9 30.9 20.5 147 310 2.5 1-3 14 33 6 27
Sénégal Oriental 162 245 4 5 40.5 49.0 I 5 49.0 45 127 3.6 1.9 6 22 I 16
Sine Saloum 766 814 11 H 69.6 58.1 14 26 54.7 31-3 146 2
97 5-2 2.7 26 23 14 17
Thies 442 556 15 13 29.5 42.7 2 34 54.7 16.4 95 289 4.7 *-9 20 31 13 23
Total 3358 3957 144 281 23-3 14.1 138 330 *4-3 12.0 858 2457 3-9 1.6 *3 45 14 26
Source:L. Creevey (Behrman), 'Muslim politics and development in Senegal', Journal of Modem African Studies, 1977, 15, 2, 267.
The educational comparison between 1964 and 1974 is not exact - for example, Verrière excluded non-Africans, mainly found
in Dakar.

Table 12.5. Economic status.
Economically Per capita Imports/exports

active % of EAP GNP million CFA
population in agriculture Agriculture (US|) Major (1976 St
(EAP) or herding % of G N P >975* exports = 250 FA)
Benin 1110000 7J }° 110 Cocoa beans 1974

Palm oils I - 27100
Cotton lints E - 12621
Cameroun (180482)° 75 35 250 Coffee '975

Cocoa beans I - 12810)
Cotton E - 102087
Wood
Aluminium
Central (566 jooy= 85 5° 160 Coffee 1975

African d
(45 5 ° ° ) Cotton I - 14614
Republic Diamonds E - 10112
Chad 1 271000 »9 & animal 80 Cotton 1974

products I - 2205}
100 Animal products E - 9053
Congo 340 Wood products 1974

Sugar I - 29658
Palm oil E - 24970
Cocoa
Tobacco
Potash
Petroleum
Gabon (381400)' 50 + 1310 Wood products 1975

Manganese 1 - 100559
Uranium E - 201921
Guinea 80 (5 % of MO Aluminium 1971* (million

exports) Pineapples syli)
Coffee I - 1976
Palm kernels E- IIJ5
exports) Cocoa I - 141 396
Timber E - 254572
Petroleum
Mali 85 5° 70 Groundnuts 19748 (million
(75 % of Cotton Mali francs)
exports) Animal products I - 60800
E - 16990
Mauritania (360000 70 (c. 50 % of 200 Iron ore 19748 (million
Agriculture) exports) Fish ouguiya)
(30ooo) b
Copper I - 5 J45
concentrates E-8175
Niger 90 ( 5 7 % of 100 Animal products '975

exports) Peanut products I - 26000
Uranium E - 20000
Senegal 1738000 70 (50% of 280 Peanut products 1975
exports) Phosphates I - 119876
E - 96151
Togo 90 40 180 Phosphates '974
Cocoa I - 28612
Coffee E-45174
Upper Volta 2855000 95 (100% of 7° Animal products '975
exports) Groundnuts -I-32386
Cotton E - 9369
Notes:
1 b c d
Calculations by Richard Hay, 'Patterns of urbanisation', 92-3. Wage earners only. Employed. Unemployed.
e
Guinea has its own unconvertible currency: 1972 | i = 227.4 syli. ^ Major export. 6 Mali has its own currency: 1976
$1 = 500.0 Mali francs. Mauritania has its own currency: 1976 Si = 214.73 ouguiya.
Source: Europayearbook, 1977.

land and t o the cities. In these, the p o o r e s t o f the f r a n c o p h o n e

tropical African countries, the d r o u g h t accelerated the e c o n o m i c
d e c l i n e that f o l l o w e d i n d e p e n d e n c e . T h e r e w a s little that g o v e r n
m e n t s , w i t h f e w r e s o u r c e s at t h e i r c o m m a n d , c o u l d d o t o s t e m
u r b a n m i g r a t i o n o r t o a l l e v i a t e its i m p a c t .
T h e e c o n o m i c s t a t u s o f t h e 1 4 n a t i o n s at t h e e n d o f o u r p e r i o d
is i l l u s t r a t e d b y t a b l e 1 2 . 5 . T h e I v o r y C o a s t , C a m e r o u n a n d G a b o n
demonstrated some modernisation o f agriculture and eventual
1
g r o w t h o f industry. In C a m e r o u n , a g r o w t h in plantation
a g r i c u l t u r e - coffee, c o c o a , c o t t o n a n d w o o d p r o d u c t i o n - w a s
reinforced by mineral resources : bauxite and oil. C a m e r o u n had
one o f the highest G D P per capita and, a l t h o u g h w e a l t h clearly
was not evenly spread, there w e r e n e w e c o n o m i c g r o u p s devel
o p i n g t h r o u g h o u t the country w h o benefited from agricultural
production.
G a b o n a l s o h a d a c o n s i s t e n t g r o w t h i n its G D P . I t h a d
great w e a l t h in natural resources c o m p a r e d t o the o t h e r c o u n t r i e s
and the highest G N P per capita - $ 1 3 1 0 - but since the b u l k o f
its n a t i o n a l i n c o m e c a m e f r o m o i l , t i m b e r p r o d u c t s , u r a n i u m a n d
o t h e r m i n e r a l s , it d i d n o t d i r e c t l y b e n e f i t t h e m a s s o f t h e
p o p u l a t i o n w h o w e r e directly e n g a g e d in subsistence a g r i c u l t u r e .
W i t h its s m a l l p o p u l a t i o n , it w a s t h e ' Y e m e n ' o f f r a n c o p h o n e
Africa. It had the largest e x p o r t surplus a m o n g the 14 countries
and, next to the I v o r y C o a s t , the largest a m o u n t o f exports.
T h e I v o r y C o a s t w a s the one agriculturally based e c o n o m i c
success a m o n g the f r a n c o p h o n e tropical states. It had the s e c o n d
h i g h e s t G N P per capita a n d the g r o w t h rate o f the G N P w a s
a r o u n d 1 1 p e r c e n t p e r a n n u m f r o m 1960—75. T h e c o u n t r y d r e w
t h e a t t e n t i o n o f f o r e i g n i n v e s t o r s b e c a u s e o f its r i c h r e s o u r c e s i n
cash crops, lumber, oil products and minerals. Since success
generated further success, the a m o u n t and kind o f investments
g r e w larger and m o r e d i v e r s e ; the e c o n o m y w a s in a c t i v e ferment.
N e w g r o u p s e m e r g e d into the m o n e y e c o n o m y . A l t h o u g h there
w a s s o m e t r i c k l e - d o w n o f benefits r e s u l t i n g in a rise in l i v i n g
standards for m a n y people, a major criticism o f the I v o r y Coast's
e c o n o m y i n t h i s p e r i o d w a s t h a t it first o f all b e n e f i t e d t h e
m e m b e r s o f t h e n e w a n d p r i v i l e g e d é l i t e , a n d m u c h o f its w e a l t h
w a s transferred to France.
1
A l l G N P p e r a n n u m g r o w t h r a t e f i g u r e s c o m e f r o m African yearbook and who's who,
1977-
660

In the C o n g o l e s e e c o n o m y the b u l k o f trade w a s n o t large, b u t

the Congo had considerable resources to exploit, including
petroleum and potash. In the early p o s t - i n d e p e n d e n c e p e r i o d , the
C o n g o ' s g r o w t h r a t e w a s s l o w b u t b y t h e e a r l y 1970s it had
j u m p e d to a per a n n u m G D P g r o w t h rate o f 11.1 per cent. T h e
Congo was relatively prosperous, even in the early post-
independence period, b y c o m p a r i s o n w i t h the countries b o r d e r i n g
the Sahara.
Mali, N i g e r , U p p e r V o l t a and C h a d , f o l l o w e d b y the Central
A f r i c a n R e p u b l i c , w e r e t h e p o o r e s t c o u n t r i e s o f t h e 14 w i t h little
d e v e l o p e d i n f r a s t r u c t u r e o r r e s o u r c e s f o r e x p o r t . T h e first t h r e e
suffered b a d l y f r o m t h e d r o u g h t ; b u t e v e n p r e v i o u s l y t h e i r
e c o n o m i e s had n o t exhibited signs o f g r o w t h . Mauritania in
c o n t r a s t h a d v i r t u a l l y its e n t i r e s p a r s e p o p u l a t i o n l i v i n g as
n o m a d i c h e r d e r s at t h e b a r e s t s u b s i s t e n c e l e v e l , b u t its G D P
m u l t i p l i e d b y t w o a n d a h a l f t i m e s f r o m i960 t o 1970. T h i s
g r o w t h , h o w e v e r , w a s d e c e p t i v e . It c a m e f r o m i r o n o r e and
c o p p e r e x p o r t s b e g u n i n t h e 1960s a n d c o n t r a s t e d w i t h t h e
absence o f any substantial exports before. E v e n w i t h a positive
balance o f trade and relatively h i g h G N P per capita, Mauritania
w a s o n e o f the poorest countries. T h e mineral exports had to c o v e r
h e a v y i n v e s t m e n t , a n d s o t h e r e w a s little t o d i s t r i b u t e t o p e o p l e .
Benin, T o g o , G u i n e a and Senegal w e r e also p o o r , a l t h o u g h
their e c o n o m i c p l i g h t s e e m e d less desperate t h a n the five c o u n t r i e s
j u s t m e n t i o n e d , b e c a u s e t h e y h a d s o m e m i n e r a l r e s o u r c e s as w e l l
as e x p o r t c r o p s . M o r e o v e r , t h e s e s t a t e s h a d fertile s o i l a n d , w i t h
the e x c e p t i o n o f S e n e g a l , g o o d rains, so subsistence f a r m i n g c o u l d
meet quite a few needs. O f the four, o n l y G u i n e a had extensive
resources - a potentially rich c o m m e r c i a l agriculture, iron and
v e r y p u r e a l u m i n i u m - b a u x i t e r e s e r v e s , as w e l l as w a t e r - p o w e r
p o t e n t i a l . S e n e g a l h a d a r e l a t i v e l y h i g h G N P p e r c a p i t a , b u t it
e x p o r t e d little a n d h a d a l a r g e t r a d e d e f i c i t . F o r all its l o n g c o n t a c t s
w i t h F r a n c e a n d its a d v a n t a g e s i n t h e f o r m o f i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ,
derived from h a v i n g been capital o f A O F , Senegal had severe
e c o n o m i c p r o b l e m s . T h e expansion o f the p r o d u c t i o n o f p h o s
phates w a s a hopeful sign, but the major commercial c r o p and
export, groundnuts, did not expand. Senegalese groundnuts
suffered f r o m c o m p e t i t i o n i n t h e w o r l d m a r k e t i n t o w h i c h t h e y
w e r e t h r u s t i n t h e e a r l y 1970s, w h e n F r a n c e w i t h d r e w t h e s u b s i d y
she had continued to pay since colonial days.
661

T h e o n e area in w h i c h c h a n g e s e e m e d g e n e r a l l y p o s i t i v e w a s
in t h e field o f c u l t u r e . T h r o u g h o u t t h e last d e c a d e s o f c o l o n i a l r u l e
a n d i m m e d i a t e l y after i n d e p e n d e n c e , F r a n c o p h o n e tropical
A f r i c a n artists a n d w r i t e r s b e g a n t o reach a n i n c r e a s i n g l y b r o a d e r
and enthusiastic audience in Africa and b e y o n d . T h e r e h a d been
o u t s t a n d i n g e a r l y a u t h o r s , s u c h as t h e S e n e g a l e s e w r i t e r s O u s m a n e
S o c é , w h o s e n o v e l , Karim, w a s p u b l i s h e d i n P a r i s i n 1937, a n d
L e o p o l d S é d a r S e n g h o r , w h o s e c o l l e c t i o n o f p o e m s , Chants
d'ombres, w a s p u b l i s h e d , a l s o i n P a r i s , i n 1945. B e r n a r d D a d i é o f
t h e I v o r y C o a s t b e g a n w r i t i n g i n t h e 1930s a n d b e c a m e a n o t e d
p o e t a n d p l a y w r i g h t . A l l o f t h e m w e r e heavily influenced b y their
F r e n c h colonial past. T h e y w r o t e in F r e n c h perhaps in part
because o f their e d u c a t i o n , perhaps in part because the m a r k e t for
b o o k s w a s primarily French-speaking. Y e t they often described
A f r i c a n life a n d c u l t u r e a n d t h e s t r a i n s o f a d a p t i n g t o t h e
E u r o p e a n presence and the a c c o m p a n y i n g destructive forces o f
m o d e r n i s a t i o n . T h e s e A f r i c a n w r i t e r s a n d artists m a i n t a i n e d a
l i v e l y d i a l o g u e i n t h e p a g e s o f Présence Africaine, 2l c u l t u r a l r e v u e
f o u n d e d b y A l i o u n e a n d C h e i k h A n t a D i o p o f Senegal. Its
headquarters, o n the R u e des É c o l e s in Paris, also h o u s e d a
b o o k s t o r e a n d a p u b l i s h i n g h o u s e specialising in A f r i c a n w r i t i n g s .
O t h e r o u t s t a n d i n g a r t i s t s i n c l u d e d M o n g o B e t i ( Ville cruelle) :
J o s e p h O w o n o {Tante Bella), a n d F e r d i n a n d O y o n o {Une vie de boy),
all f r o m C a m e r o u n ; a n d C a m a r a L a y e o f G u i n e a {L'Enfant noir).
In Senegal, C h e i k h A n t a D i o p attracted attention w i t h his
c o n t r o v e r s i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f A f r i c a n h i s t o r y , Nations nègres et
culture p u b l i s h e d i n 1954. O n e o f t h e b e s t k n o w n A f r i c a n a r t i s t s
w a s O u s m a n e S e m b è n e ; h i s b o o k s , s u c h as Les Bouts de bois de Dieu,
p u b l i s h e d i n i960 a n d h i s films, b e g i n n i n g w i t h Borom Sarette,
generated w o r l d w i d e interest.
A l t h o u g h s o m e critics o f the f r a n c o p h o n e tropical A f r i c a n
authors, in particular s o m e E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g A f r i c a n writers, h a v e
d e c r i e d their w o r k as t o o h e a v i l y influenced b y F r e n c h culture
a n d l i t e r a r y t r a d i t i o n s , m a n y o f t h e i r n o v e l s , p o e m s , p l a y s , films
and treatises r e c e i v e d international a c c l a i m f o r their b e a u t y , crafts-
m a n s h i p a n d distinctive assertion o f an A f r i c a n cultural reality.
O n e p o i n t stands o u t f r o m this e x a m i n a t i o n o f e c o n o m i c a n d
s o c i a l d e v e l o p m e n t f r o m 1940 t o 1975 : t h e i n f l u e n c e o f F r a n c e
continued t o be great. A l t h o u g h the individual nations m o v e d
a w a y f r o m e a c h o t h e r as e c o n o m i c , s o c i a l a n d p o l i t i c a l d i v e r s i t i e s
662

i n c r e a s e d a m o n g t h e m , t h e y all s h a r e d t h e s a m e c o l o n i a l l e g a c y .
T h e c o l o n i a l p e r i o d , w h i l e brief, h a d l a u n c h e d t h e i r m o d e r n
e c o n o m i e s . E x c e p t for G u i n e a , France continued to control
foreign e x c h a n g e and convertibility. T h e F r e n c h had designed thé
n e t w o r k o f roads, railroads and c o m m u n i c a t i o n systems oriented
to the coast and to France. E c o n o m i c and p o p u l a t i o n m o v e m e n t s
f o l l o w e d the n e w transport n e t w o r k w h i c h had replaced the
system o f trans-Saharan trade and migration o f the pre-colonial
era.
T h e t e c h n o l o g y o f the m o d e r n e c o n o m i c system w a s French,
and so, t o o , w e r e the c o n c e p t s o f m a n a g e m e n t . A l t h o u g h there
w e r e similar concepts in a n g l o p h o n e and f o r m e r B e l g i a n c o l o n i e s ,
there w a s a special F r e n c h character to institutions and practices
in f o r m e r F r e n c h territories. T h e use o f the F r e n c h l a n g u a g e and
the continued importance o f the F r e n c h system o f education g a v e
depth to the French influence, e v e n t h o u g h traditional culture had
d e e p r o o t s . M o r e i m p o r t a n t , h o w e v e r , as p e o p l e left v i l l a g e s a n d
w e n t to the t o w n s , o r s i m p l y w e r e d r a w n o n t o the fringes o f a
w a g e - b a s e d m o d e r n agriculture, they w e r e t o u c h e d b y the F r e n c h
heritage, by French g o o d s , currency, language and practices.
T h e colonisers o f French-speaking tropical Africa departed

reluctantly. E x c e p t in G u i n e a , the c o n n e c t i n g e c o n o m i c , p o l i t i c a l
and cultural ties, w h i c h w e r e established in the c o l o n i a l p e r i o d ,
d i d n o t s i m p l y b r e a k at i n d e p e n d e n c e , b u t r a t h e r a l t e r e d a n d
faded.
I n d e p e n d e n c e m a d e p o s s i b l e c h a n g e s in the pattern o f inter
national relations w h i c h had hitherto been controlled b y the
F r e n c h ; it o p e n e d d i r e c t a c c e s s t o all o t h e r c o u n t r i e s , t o t h e U n i t e d
N a t i o n s a n d o t h e r m u l t i l a t e r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . F o r t h e first t i m e at
i n d e p e n d e n c e the states o f f r a n c o p h o n e tropical A f r i c a h a d direct
official c o n t a c t , f o r e x a m p l e , w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d R u s s i a ,
Japan, G e r m a n y , the U n i t e d K i n g d o m and a n g l o p h o n e tropical
Africa, w i t h S o u t h Africa, C h i n a and India. Y e t , in practice,
p o v e r t y , the limits built into the monetary system b y the rules o f
the franc z o n e , a n d the practical barriers t o alternatives, k e p t
relations w i t h France preponderant. M o s t other nations r e c o g
n i s e d F r e n c h h e g e m o n y i n its f o r m e r c o l o n i e s .
663

T h e m o s t p e r s i s t e n t ties w e r e t h e e c o n o m i c o n e s , s i n c e t h e y
rested o n m u t u a l necessities and a d v a n t a g e s . In the c o l o n i a l era,
the French had redirected the bulk o f trans-Saharan trade to the
Atlantic coast, and turned the m o n e y e c o n o m y t o w a r d s the export
of products which French consumers wanted. French investment
flowed into potentially lucrative coastal regions - p ro d u ci n g
p a l m - o i l in D a h o m e y , g r o u n d n u t s in S e n e g a l , coffee a n d c o c o a
in the I v o r y C o a s t . T h e s e i n v e s t m e n t s w e r e m a d e w i t h o u t any
t h o u g h t o f m e e t i n g local needs, e v e n in foodstuffs, o r o f p r o d u c i n g
the e c o n o m i c infrastructure that c o u l d eventually support inde
p e n d e n t states. N o t until after the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r d i d the
F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t p u t a sizeable a m o u n t o f aid into the
d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e t e r r i t o r i e s , t h o u g h it w a s l i t t l e i n a b s o l u t e
terms o r in terms o f A f r i c a n needs. O n l y in 1947 w a s a d e v e l o p m e n t
1
fund, F I D E S , established for the F r e n c h African colonies.
B e t w e e n 1947 and 1956 F r e n c h p u b l i c capital i n v e s t m e n t in the
A O F alone w a s b e t w e e n 750 million and one billion dollars, w h i l e
t h e F r e n c h , i n a d d i t i o n , p a i d 27 p e r c e n t o f t h e n o r m a l c o s t s o f
civil administration. F r e n c h funding w a s not e n o u g h for rapid de
v e l o p m e n t , except in the relatively w e a l t h y territories o f the I v o r y
C o a s t a n d G a b o n . R a t h e r , t h e d e p e n d e n c e o f all t h e c o l o n i e s o n
the m é t r o p o l e resulted f r o m F r e n c h s u p p o r t for the territorial
b u d g e t s and F r e n c h insistence o n b e i n g the d o m i n a n t foreign
e c o n o m i c partner.
W i t h i n d e p e n d e n c e in i960, France r e v i e w e d her e c o n o m i c
obligations to her former colonies. After the devaluation o f the
franc in 1958 F r e n c h - m a n u f a c t u r e d g o o d s b e c a m e m o r e c o m
petitive o n the international market. T h e need o f F r e n c h industry
f o r p r o t e c t i o n in f r a n c o p h o n e t r o p i c a l A f r i c a b e c a m e l e s s , a n d
m a n y F r e n c h industrialists s o u g h t o u t l e t s in o t h e r parts o f A f r i c a ,
particularly N i g e r i a . F r e n c h industry b e c a m e increasingly inter
ested in c o m p e t i n g for markets w i t h G e r m a n y and the U n i t e d
K i n g d o m ; global and E u r o p e a n priorities t o o k precedence o v e r
fading imperial ones. N o French g o v e r n m e n t , h o w e v e r , wanted
to g i v e a w a y the decided a d v a n t a g e o v e r other countries enjoyed
b y France in her relations w i t h her former colonies. E v e n so, w h i l e
F r e n c h aid and assistance in the 1960s s h o w e d a relative stability
in the total figure, there w a s a m a r k e d decline in the p e r c e n t a g e
1
F o n d s d'Investissement et de D é v e l o p p e m e n t É c o n o m i q u e et Social des Territoires
d ' O u t r e - M e r , s u c c e e d e d i n 1958 b y t h e F o n d s d ' A i d e e t d e C o o p é r a t i o n ( F A C ) .
664

this r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e t o t a l F r e n c h b u d g e t , a n d i n f l a t i o n c u t i n t o
the effectiveness o f the s u m . T h e same pattern w a s e v i d e n t in trade
and monetary transactions.
A p p r o x i m a t e l y h a l f t h e F r e n c h a i d figures r e p r e s e n t e d t e c h n i c a l
assistance personnel, o f w h o m a b o u t half w e r e teachers. T h e
technicians t o o k the place o f the colonial civil servants and in
9
countries like Senegal and the I v o r y C o a s t the F r e n c h * a d v i s e r s
c o n t i n u e d t o b e a f a m i l i a r s i g h t , a l o n g w i t h t h e petits bourgeois w h o
had c o m e o u t t o w o r k o r try their fortune in colonial times and
d e c i d e d t o s t a y o n after i n d e p e n d e n c e . T h e f a i r l y h e a v y t e c h n i c a l
a s s i s t a n c e figures - e x c e p t f o r t h e m i l i t a r y c o n t i n g e n t - w e r e
justified i n F r a n c e as a n o b l i g a t i o n t o p r o v i d e f o r f o r m e r c o l o n i a l
civil servants.
G e n e r a l l y in the p o s t - i n d e p e n d e n c e p e r i o d the f r a n c o p h o n e
tropical African territories received s l o w l y d e c l i n i n g assistance
from France. A l l fourteen, therefore, faced a s t r o n g need to orient
t h e i r e c o n o m i e s i n s u c h a w a y as t o a t t r a c t i n v e s t m e n t f r o m o t h e r
countries and from multi-national corporations. A few African
leaders t o o k the position that F r e n c h d o m i n a t i o n w a s m o r e costly
t h a n it w a s w o r t h . T h u s , as a l r e a d y m e n t i o n e d , S e k o u T o u r e t o o k
G u i n e a o u t o f the franc z o n e and s o u g h t aid and i n v e s t m e n t f r o m
eastern bloc countries; M o d i b o K e i t a pulled M a l i o u t o f the
A f r i c a n franc z o n e a n d s o u g h t a i d f r o m C o m m u n i s t c o u n t r i e s .
M o s t other f r a n c o p h o n e leaders s t r u g g l e d for aid and trade
w h e r e v e r t h e y c o u l d find i t : t h e y c o u l d n o t afford t o d o o t h e r w i s e ,
and they w e r e t o o w e a k to d e r i v e benefits f r o m c o o p e r a t i n g w i t h
each other. In the event France continued to be a major source
o f aid to her f o r m e r c o l o n i e s . A g a i n G u i n e a w a s the e x c e p t i o n ,
b u t M a l i r e t u r n e d t o t h e f o l d a n d m a d e c l e a r its d e s i r e f o r
i n c r e a s e d F r e n c h a s s i s t a n c e . C o n g o , f o r all its leftist r h e t o r i c ,
remained h e a v i l y d e p e n d e n t o n F r a n c e for aid and technical
assistance. G u i n e a , also, periodically g a v e indications o f interest
in r e s u m e d e c o n o m i c relations w i t h F r a n c e , t h o u g h w i t h o u t
t a k i n g concrete steps until 1978. M e a n w h i l e , the U n i t e d States
g a v e G u i n e a and the o t h e r countries s o m e aid. T h e E u r o p e a n
D e v e l o p m e n t F u n d and other d o n o r organisations made increas
i n g i n v e s t m e n t s a n d gifts t o these states. T h e C l u b d u S a h e l w a s
a m u l t i - d o n o r effort t o i m p r o v e S a h e l i a n c o n d i t i o n s after t h e
d r o u g h t . T h u s o t h e r d o n o r s entered the area.
After independence France remained the major trading partner
665

T a b l e 1 2 . 6 . Trade between francophone tropical Africa and France.
% %
Year Imports Exports
Cameroun 1975 46 29 (22% Netherlands)
CAR 1971 61 56
Chad 1973 4* 3 (6 % Nigeria, 5 % Congo,
3 % CAR)
Congo 1974 52 28
Dahomey 1972 40 38
Gabon 1973 56 37
Guinea 1969 2 (25 % Norway)
Ivory Coast 1973 44 26
Mali 1971 42 18 (24% Ivory Coast)
Mauritania 1972 41 20 (18% United Kingdom)
Niger 1973 35 49
Senegal 1974 41 51
Togo 1974 34 45
Upper Volta 1975 43 19 (48 % Ivory Coast)
Source: Calculated from import/export figures in Europa yearbook, 1977.
1
f o r t h e states o f f r a n c o p h o n e t r o p i c a l A f r i c a w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n
of Guinea. T h e countries w h i c h had the most wealth and the
h i g h e s t rate o f g r o w t h w e r e able t o attract i n v e s t m e n t f r o m a n d
trade w i t h other d e v e l o p e d nations. G a b o n , the I v o r y Coast and,
to a lesser d e g r e e , S e n e g a l c o u l d a n d d i d receive investments f r o m
other nations, in particular G e r m a n y , the U n i t e d States a n d Japan.
T h e Camerounian g o v e r n m e n t w a s e v e n able to make decreasing
dependence o n French trade a matter o f priority. In the other
p o o r e r f r a n c o p h o n e A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s t h e r e w e r e a l s o shifts f r o m
the sole d o m i n a n c e o f F r a n c e in 1940 t o the situation s h o w n in
t a b l e 1 2 . 6 . H o w e v e r , it is i m p o r t a n t t o r e a l i s e t h e figures a r e o n l y
relative, for there w a s a g r o w i n g * unofficial' sector o f trade that
d i d n o t s h o w u p i n official r e c o r d s . I t w a s b a s e d o n s m u g g l i n g
across currency zones. L a n d - l o c k e d countries traded m o r e w i t h
wealthier African neighbours than w i t h France: Chad, Mali and
U p p e r V o l t a h a d neither developed mineral deposits n o r any other
item to export to France. N i g e r exported uranium to France,
1
T h e official figures, w h i c h a r e F r e n c h i n o r i g i n , d o n o t i n c l u d e t h e ' u n o f f i c i a l *
i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e , w h i c h is e x t e n s i v e .
666

otherwise she, too, would have had such a trade pattern; her
* unofficial' imports from Nigeria were heavy.
A l l the states, Guinea - and Mali for a time - excepted, used
foreign exchange controlled by the Bank of France, and French
materials inherited from the colonial era. I t was easier to refurbish
the railways, for example, by buying from the country of origin.
The dominance of France in trade was stronger on the import than
the export side of African ledgers.
As the Algerian war drew to a close, it became French policy
to strengthen the franc zone by encouraging trading outside it.
French officials believed their former tropical African colonies
were not as rich as other parts of Africa, and initiated policies to
allow French businesses access to the resources and markets of
the rest of the continent.
These objectives followed from a vision in which Europe, led
by France, would be more than just a good neighbour to Africa,
but rather a big brother with a hegemony that could limit
competition from other industrialised states. That meant seizing
the moment following the end of colonialism to obtain economic
opportunities previously held closely by European rivals. This
policy explains why the French government did not hesitate to
intervene actively in the Nigerian and Zairean wars, for example.
Yet French policy at the same time sought to cooperate w i t h the
evolving European Community, so as to limit access by Japan,
the United States, and of course Russia to francophone tropical
Africa.
Though the number of French troops in tropical Africa
declined, the French continued to be the self-appointed military
guardians of the territorial integrity o f the former colonies, and
intervened from time to time to maintain the old colonial borders.
French taxpayers grumbled, yet the policy continued of limited
intervention to restore domestic balance within one or another
African state, to maintain French hegemony, or to reinforce
African borders against encroachment by more powerful
neighbours.
The border between the Mediterranean African states and the
Sahelian states was one zone o f French intervention. The zone was
thought to have mineral resources, such as uranium (in Niger) or
o i l ; there were very few inhabitants, and no water. Pressure in
France for mineral resources such as oil or uranium, led it to
667

intervene in the zone after independence. Libya attempted to

intervene, to a limited extent, in Niger, but more directly in Chad.
French troops and planes were used to balk Libyan intervention
almost from the time of independence itself. The population of
the northern part of Chad, Muslim and often nomadic, resented
the rule of Christian or animist southerners; Libyan reinforcement
of separatism in northern Chad fed the controversy, and threatened
the very existence of the state. Chad had the greatest cleavage
between Muslims and non-Muslims, a difference which charac
terised in varying degrees all the people of the Sahel states.
Desire to keep hold of potential economic resources, such as
uranium mines at Arlit and elsewhere in the Saharan zone,
motivated French defence of Niger against encroachment by
Libya. After the rise of OPEC, when uranium prices rose sharply
in the world market, the French military advisers did nothing to
prevent a coup against President Hamani Diori, w h o had ruled
since independence. Diori's government was beset by economic
troubles after the drought and had made moves to open Saharan
uranium concessions to American and other non-French comp
anies, thus threatening to reduce French influence.
Mauritania was another state in whose controversies the French
intervened militarily. After Morocco and Mauritania had divided
the former Spanish Morocco between them, the Polisario inde
pendence movement resisted the occupation of their country by
these t w o states and were helped in this by Algeria. The
Moroccans and Mauritania became allies and therefore the Moroc
cans were able to place their troops dangerously close to
Nouakchott, the capital of Mauritania. This advanced K i n g
Hassan's territorial ambitions for a greater kingdom of Morocco,
which had caused Morocco to challenge separate independence
for Mauritania and even its entry into the United Nations. This
threat to the borders o f Mauritania concerned the Senegal
government which did not want a powerful Morocco as a
neighbour. Therefore the Senegalese government invited French
troops and planes back into Dakar in the 1 9 7 0 s .
French aid to Biafra during the Nigerian w a r had a dual
objective. One was to eliminate the threat of a potential Nigerian
hegemony in Western Africa, by breaking up the most highly
populated and richest African state which was attracting more and
more migrants from its poorer neighbours. The other French
668

objective was to gain access to Nigerian oil and markets. After the
Biafran claim to independence failed, the French tried to make
friends with the victorious government. A certain tension re
mained, however, and French power reinforced the wariness of
Nigeria that was characteristic of that country's smaller, weaker
francophone neighbours.
No country sought seriously to replace France in trade, in aid
or strategically in francophone tropical Africa during the 1960—75
period. France saw no reason to cede its special place to any other
power, including Russia. France shifted its strategy, however,
from frequent internal interventions in the 1960s to greater
emphasis in the 1 9 7 0 s on keeping encroaching outsiders away.
A m o n g the francophone tropical African states, which had
been bound together firmly during the French colonial era, ties
faded, indeed more quickly than between them and France. For
a while after independence some evidence of cooperation
remained, such as common membership in the franc-backed
monetary zone. Often reluctantly, out of sheer economic necessity,
most states shared such luxury items as the airline, A i r Afrique,
and stayed in producers' unions to face the world market, or in
customs unions to simplify border procedures and control. Yet
when the leaders felt it necessary, they dispensed with these forms
of cooperation. Thus, even conservative Mauritania moved out
of the African monetary zone, Cameroun set up its o w n airline
and various countries moved in and out of regional planning
groups as their domestic situations dictated. Each nation sought
to pursue its o w n self-interest as defined by its ruling elite. Each
wanted a university, rather than to share the expense with a
neighbour. No national government was willing to surrender any
significant amount of national power or to share it. The history
of the Mali Federation shows what most African leaders feared
might happen in a political union o r federation: intervention by
one partner in the local affairs of the other. Another example of
an unsuccessful effort to create a federation was the G h a n a -
Guinea-Mali union. Toure and Keita agreed with K w a m e
Nkrumah that a strong federal union was needed to fight
neo-colonialism. Guinea accepted aid from and union with Ghana
almost immediately after the French withdrew all their aid and
services. After the break-up o f the Mali Federation, in December
i 9 6 0 , the Republic of Mali joined in the union. The G h a n a -
669

Guinea-Mali union, called the Union of African States ( U A S )

according to its charter issued in Accra in July 1 9 6 1 , was
anti-colonial, anti-French and Marxist in tone. In addition, the
charter called for the pooling of resources and a common
orientation in domestic as well as foreign policy. The U A S had
support from some North African leaders, w h o hosted the
Casablanca Conference in 1 9 6 1 . In practice, however, the leaders
of the three countries continued to run their o w n governments
separately. The economies of the three countries were not
complementary and the union did not last long enough to allow
a real test of the avowed aim to unify the three states.
Meanwhile, leaders in the rest of francophone tropical Africa
were trying to find their o w n formula for cooperation which was
less ambitious. By the early 1960s the political differences between
Leopold Senghor and Felix Houphouet-Boigny had diminished.
To preserve existing borders and avoid alienating potential
foreign donors, all the equatorial states, Cameroun, Madagascar
and all the other West African francophone states with the
exception of Togo, met at Brazzaville in December i 9 6 0 to form
the Union Africaine et Malgache ( U A M ) . They, too, condemned
colonialism, but cautiously, and sought to advance their popu
lations economically and socially by concerted action. But they
vowed non-interference in each other's affairs and condemned
subversion at the follow-up conference in Monrovia in May 1 9 6 1 .
The U A S and the U A M resolved their differences when they
formed together the Organisation of African Unity ( O A U ) in
Addis Ababa in early 1 9 6 3 . Nevertheless, the francophone tropical
African states continued to feel the need for a regional grouping.
The U A M states formed the African and Malagasy Common
Organisation ( O C A M ) in February 1 9 6 5 , including all the fran
cophone tropical states except Guinea. Madagascar, Rwanda and
Zaire also joined. Mauritania withdrew in 1 9 6 5 , and Mauritius
became a member in January 1 9 7 1 when the O C A M became the
1
O C A M M . O C A M M called for cooperation, social and cultural
as well as economic. Members reached economic agreements
and undertook joint activities, such as a computer-training insti
tute in Gabon, and the customs and economic union of Central
1
T h e extra M stands for ' Mauricienne \ C a m e r o u n also w i t h d r e w , finding m o r e
useful e c o n o m i c relations outside the O C A M M .
670

A f r i c a , i n c l u d i n g all t h e f o r m e r A E F states a n d C a m e r o u n . A t t h e
United N a t i o n s and other international gatherings the franco
p h o n e A f r i c a n states k e p t their distinct and separate n e t w o r k .
T h e s e m o v e s t o w a r d s cooperation a m o n g the francophone
tropical A f r i c a n states w e r e h a r d l y w h o l e h e a r t e d , h o w e v e r , a n d
w e r e i n r e a l i t y n o t v e r y e f f e c t i v e , s i n c e t h e r e w a s little f o l l o w -
t h r o u g h o f their plans, and there w e r e often squabbles a m o n g
m e m b e r s t a t e s . T h o u g h all f o u r t e e n l a r g e l y r e t a i n e d t h e b o r d e r s
established b y the F r e n c h , they often disputed b o r d e r s w i t h each
other, for example, Mali w i t h Mauritania, N i g e r w i t h Bénin,
U p p e r V o l t a w i t h Mali. T h e y w e r e rivals for F r e n c h favours and
for o u t s i d e aid and i n v e s t m e n t . T h e y w e r e u n a b l e f u n d a m e n t a l l y
t o alter t h e e c o n o m i c p a t t e r n s t h e y h a d i n h e r i t e d w i t h i n d e p e n
dence. Initiative for possible c h a n g e s c a m e f r o m outside their
b o r d e r s . T h e r e w e r e m o v e s i n i t i a t e d b y N i g e r i a , after it b e c a m e
w e a l t h y f r o m o i l f o l l o w i n g t h e rise o f O P E C , t o c r e a t e a n
e c o n o m i c c o m m u n i t y o f W e s t A f r i c a n states, w h i c h also i n c l u d e d
Bénin, the G a m b i a , G h a n a , G u i n e a , G u i n e a - B i s s a u , the I v o r y
CQast, U p p e r V o l t a a n d N i g e r . N i g e r i a also i n t e r v e n e d in C h a d ' s
i n t e r n a l difficulties a n d o f f e r e d s o m e a i d t o N i g e r a n d B é n i n ,
w h o s e p o r t o f C o t o n o u it u s e d t o r e l i e v e t h e c o n g e s t i o n i n
the port o f L a g o s .
A n o t h e r i n i t i a t i v e c a m e f r o m W e s t e r n E u r o p e , as F r e n c h p o l i c y
c h a n g e d . G r a d u a l l y F r a n c e t r a n s f e r r e d s o m e o f its e c o n o m i c
responsibilities for the former colonies to the E u r o p e a n C o m m o n
M a r k e t . A s l o n g as B r i t a i n h a d s t a y e d o u t o f t h e C o m m o n M a r k e t ,
the e x i s t e n c e o f separate franc a n d sterling z o n e s in A f r i c a raised
considerable barriers to regional integration and trade. O n c e
Britain joined the C o m m o n M a r k e t , the barriers b e t w e e n a n g l o
p h o n e and f r a n c o p h o n e tropical A f r i c a b e c a m e less r i g i d , a n d
c o o p e r a t i o n b e c a m e m u c h easier. B y 1975 the C o m m o n M a r k e t
a n d associated states ( a n g l o p h o n e a n d f r a n c o p h o n e f o r m e r c o l
onies) had signed the L o m é C o n v e n t i o n . F r o m the E u r o p e a n side
the L o m é C o n v e n t i o n m a r k e d an attempt to protect the f o r m e r
colonial markets against n o n - E u r o p e a n competition. O n the
African side, the c o n v e n t i o n guaranteed the associated A f r i c a n
states p r e f e r e n t i a l t r e a t m e n t i n t h e E u r o p e a n m a r k e t , p r o m i s e s o f
aid a n d c o o p e r a t i v e t r a d e a r r a n g e m e n t s , a p r o g r a m m e t o s t a b i l i s e
prices o f exported c o m m o d i t i e s ( S T A B E X ) , and foreign capital.
671

The African partners were not, however, prevented from ac

1
cepting investment from other countries.
There were also many changes in francophone tropical Africa,
initiated by shifts in the structure of the international economy,
coming from international institutions like the UN, from
U N C T A D , currency changes, shifts in relations among donors,
changes in energy patterns, in commodity prices o r from w o r l d
inflation. The initiative for most o f these changes remained
outside the hands of the francophone tropical African states.
Thus, independence brought a change in the pattern of
francophone African international relations, a multiplication of
diplomatic contacts and greater vulnerability to changes in the
global balance of power. The change in the structure of the
international economy that accompanied the rise of O P E C
affected the 14 states. They suffered new and higher costs, and
found some new sources of aid. Some tried to benefit from the
split between China and Russia - Guinea, Mali and Congo, for
example, all of which received Chinese aid. The intervention in
Africa by Cuban troops worried many of the governments,
particularly Senegal, the I v o r y Coast and Cameroun. Many of the
states tried also to benefit from the renewed rivalry that accom
panied the search for raw materials in Africa by developing states,
such as the United States, Japan and even South Africa.
In spite of difficulties, economic as well as political, all 14 states
remained intact during 1960-75. They sought ways to develop,
to strengthen their institutions and give substance to their newly
acquired statehood. The cluster of French language, habits and
institutions inherited from French colonial rule continued to
define the area. ' Francophonie', nurtured from France, remained
a cultural as well as a political reality in tropical Africa.
Economically survival was still a question for the poorer states.
Self-reliance was not around the corner. In agriculture imports
were growing, and while the population grew, the potential was
not realised. In commerce the market potential of the area could
not be realised as long as frontiers were not open and free
circulation of people and goods was hampered. In industry the
1
F o r a m o r e l e n g t h y discussion o f this subject, see R u t h Schachter M o r g e n t h a u ,
' T h e d e v e l o p i n g states o f Africa Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, J u l y 1 9 7 7 , 4 3 2 , 80-94, a n d M o r g e n t h a u , ' A f r i c a n p o l i t i c s : b a c k g r o u n d a n d
prospects i n F r e d e r i c k A r k h u r s t ( e d . ) , Africa in the seventies and eighties ( N e w Y o r k ,
1970), 1 6 - 4 7 .
672

start was slow. Separate independence may have appealed strongly

to the leading political groups, but for most of the population the
economic fruits of freedom remained out of reach.
For the future many development tasks could only be done
through regional tropical African cooperation, across franco
phone-anglophone lines : such as developing the Sahel from the
regional capital of Wagadugu, or making the inter-state rivers
like the Niger, the Volta or Senegal navigable and harnessing
them for electric power. Constraints in communications, agri
culture, capital and human resources, pointed to many years of
w o r k ahead. The international transactions of the 1 4 states might
in future become relatively less with each other (except culturally)
and more with their other neighbours. The Mediterranean states,
or states like Nigeria, Zaire and Angola, might become stronger
poles of attraction - or they might not, should they threaten to
overpower the weaker francophone states. In such a case the latter
might group among themselves with smaller West African
anglophone states. Meanwhile, the heritage of French colonial
rule was fading in the m i d - 1 9 7 0 s , and the outlines of an African
state system were becoming visible.
673

CHAPTER 13
MADAGASCAR
P O L I T I C A L A N D C O N S T I T U T I O N A L H I S T O R Y :
PRE-IN D E P E N D EN C E
On the eve of the Second W o r l d W a r , the vast majority of

Malagasy were French sujets w h o had extracted few political
concessions from Paris. But political awareness was developing,
especially among the urbanised Merina, whose leaders, Jean
Ralaimongo and Joseph Ravoahangy, had agitated in favour of
equal civil and political status with the Europeans and the reform
of local labour regulations. Their campaign achieved Malagasy
representation on a consultative body created in 1 9 2 4 , called the
Délégations Économiques et Financières. The administration
dominated the Délégations, quarrelled with the settlers' represen-
tatives, and ignored the Malagasy delegates. A s a result the
Malagasy gained limited knowledge of parliamentary procedure
from them. Léon Cayla's term as governor-general ( 1 9 3 0 - 9 )
witnessed the suppression of political activities and a decree
establishing arbitrary arrest; anti-government newspapers were
banned and labour was tightly controlled. Under pressure from
the Popular Front government, he permitted the formation of the
first trade unions in 1 9 3 7 . When he returned to France in 1 9 3 9
he left a colony in which the mass of the population accepted
French rule. But he also left behind an educated élite which
harboured political and personal grievances against the
administration.
The outbreak of the Second W o r l d W a r produced a wave of
Malagasy patriotism, which the new Governor-General, Marcel
de Coppet, used to mobilise Madagascar's resources. The collapse
of France resulted in de Coppet's recall by the Vichy regime and
the re-appointment of Cayla, w h o was forced to leave nine months
later because he had reached retirement age. His successor was
Armand Annet, w h o repressed all opposition, discriminated
against the Malagasy, and abolished the Délégations. The Allies
674

P R E - I N D E P E N D E N C E
blockaded the island from late 1 9 4 1 , invaded it with a British force

in May 1 9 4 2 , and forced Annet to surrender the following
November. The British retained the Vichy administrators until
January 1 9 4 3 , when they handed over power to the incoming Free
French. In Allied hands, the island became a supplier of men and
raw materials for the war. Between 1943 and 1945 the pressure
on the Malagasy became intense, as the administration proceeded
to conscript men for the army and forced labour, and to extract
150 million francs in 'contributions' for the war effort. Inflation
rose rapidly, but wages hardly at all, while shortages became acute
and the black market flourished. Farmers were forced in 1 9 4 4 to
sell their entire crop to the government's Office du Riz at a low
and fixed price, and then when they needed rice for their o w n use
to buy it back at a higher cost. Mass discontent became widespread.
Governmental reforms were few, though the Free French did give
the fokonolonas (village councils) some additional responsibilities
and supported the concept of a new representative council. This
body, which separated the settlers and Malagasy into t w o electoral
colleges and pitted both against the governor-general's 30 ap
pointees, was established in 1 9 4 5 . The council had no control
over the budget; the settlers, w h o represented little more than one
per cent of the population, were grossly over-represented on it;
and the governor-general could dissolve it at will. Despite its
flaws, it was an improvement over the Delegations, and it
embodied the principle established at the Brazzaville Conference,
whereby colonial representatives could sit in the French National
Assembly and Senate. Membership of the French parliament gave
Malagasy leaders important contacts with French officials and
experience in the art of governing, both of which were later to
prove invaluable.
The ideas articulated at Brazzaville and the principles of
self-determination embodied in the Atlantic and United Nations
Charters inspired Ravoahangy and Joseph Raseta, both of whom
demanded that they be applied to Madagascar. The Malagasy
voters elected the t w o Merina leaders to the first Constituent
Assembly of the Fourth French Republic, but, once in Paris, the
representatives discovered that all French parties were opposed
to Malagasy independence or even autonomy. They therefore
joined forces with Jacques Rabemananjara, a Betsimisaraka, w h o
was elected to a third Malagasy seat in early 1 9 4 6 , to form the
675

M A D A G A S C A R

PRE-IN D E P E N D E N C E
Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache (MDRM).

They attempted unsuccessfully to introduce an independence bill
in the assembly in 1 9 4 6 . In early October all Malagasy obtained
French citizenship, though only some 1 0 0 0 0 had the vote, when
the island became an overseas territory. A t the same time forced
labour was abolished. A statute of 25 October divided the island
into five provinces, each with its o w n budget and assembly, but
the M D R M , dedicated as it was to national unity for independence,
interpreted this reform as a French attempt to set the cotters
(coastal peoples) against the Merina. They were in part correct;
the administration did view the M D R M as a Merina separatist
party dedicated to the re-establishment of the former Merina
monarchy, and for this reason it supported the Parti des Déshérités
Malgache (PADESM). The name of this party reflected very
clearly the fact that it was composed of peoples w h o considered
themselves socially, economically and politically underprivileged.
Prior to the French conquest ( 1 8 9 5 ) the island kingdom of the
Merina spread from the high plateaux and established a hegemony
over a number of other ethnic groups. Although the French
destroyed the monarchy and attempted both to favour the cotters
and play them off against their former masters, nonetheless the
Merina continued to dominate life in the island. They remained
the most well educated, the largest and the most advanced ethnic
group in terms of the assimilation of western ideas and technology,
and thus the French found themselves forced to recruit them for
positions in government, commerce and the military. This Merina
monopolisation of key positions at all levels resulted in a form
of sub-imperialism which has parallels with the situation in
Rwanda and Burundi at the time of their independence. The
French naively assumed, as did a number of cotters, that the Merina
leadership would attempt to turn back the clock and re-establish
the old monarchy, and hence they favoured the P A D E S M . The
M D R M gathered support rapidly among the Merina, but its
membership also embraced t w o extremist groups born during the
Second W o r l d W a r , the Jeunesse Nationaliste ( J I N A ) and the
Parti Nationaliste Malgache ( P A N A M A ) . Both contained some
cotters, were more aggressive and anti-French than the M D R M
leadership, and desired a complete break with France, whereas the
M D R M leaders wanted independence within the French Union.
In the elections to the National Assembly held in November 1 9 4 6 ,
677

M A D A G A S C A R
the three M D R M leaders were re-elected. Subsequent elections for

the French Senate and Council of the French Union, as well as
for Madagascar's provincial assemblies and National Represen
tative Assembly, produced more M D R M victories. A t the very
height of its success, the party was struck a death blow when an
anti-European rebellion broke out on 29 March 1 9 4 7 .
It is still not clear whether the revolt was coordinated by some
central agency. Even if it was, the various attacks were badly
organised and poorly executed. The attack on the Manakara
military garrison was successful, but assaults on other posts and
the major towns and cities were all abortive. The areas hardest
hit by the rebels were on the east coast, where export crops and
illegal exploitation of Malagasy labour were most prominent,
although the rebellion also spilled over into the highlands. Some
28 European settlers and many more Malagasy were killed by the
rebels; communications links were severed and public and mission
buildings destroyed. Additional French troops arrived in the
island, and by late 1 9 4 8 the rebellion was over. The suppression
of the rebellion was brutal. The administration claimed that 1 1 0 0 0
people of all races had died; the French Communist Party
1
published a total of 90 0 0 0 . Governor-General de Coppet, during
his second term of office from 1 9 4 6 to 1 9 4 8 , accused the three
deputies and the M D R M of master-minding the rebellion, and
quickly banned the party. Raseta and Ravoahangy were con
demned to death, although their sentences were later commuted,
while Rabemananjara was given life imprisonment. Attempts to
probe the rebellion's roots produced a variety of causes, ranging
from the discontent over low wartime crop prices and labour
abuses to the racism of French settlers and officials. What does
seem clear is that the leadership lay not with the three deputies,
but with the leaders of J IN A and P A N A M A , notably Rakoton-
drabe, Betrevola and Ravelonahina. The young extremists in these
secret societies wanted a break with France. Once the revolt was
under way the deputies, w h o were probably aware of the rebels'
plans, disassociated themselves from it, but by then it was too late
and all nationalists were branded traitors by the French.
The revolt shocked the French, and this feeling was shared by
Governor-General Pierre de Chevigne ( 1 9 4 8 - 5 0 ) , w h o succeeded
1
Estimates o f the actual n u m b e r o f M a l a g a s y killed vary widely. F o r e x a m p l e ,
N . H e s e l t i n e , Madagascar ( L o n d o n , 1971), 181 g i v e s 60-80000.
678

PRE-IN D E P E N D E N C E
de Coppet and instituted surveillance of anti-French suspects,

arbitrary arrest, and imprisonment without trial on a wide scale.
P A D E S M split into quarrelling factions, and legitimate grievances
against the administration went unheard until the arrival of
Robert Bargue ( 1 9 5 0 - 4 ) , w h o did much to repair relations
between the nationalists and the French. Bargue turned the
attention of the island's assembly towards socio-economic ques
tions and blunted the thrusts of the infant Communist movement,
the Parti de l'Union du Peuple Malgache (PUPM), while his
successor, A n d r é Soucadaux ( 1 9 5 4 - 6 0 ) , permitted the Malagasy
to petition Paris for an amnesty and the release of those convicted
of involvement in the rebellion. Paris arranged the requested
amnesty and granted a pardon to those sentenced to more than
15 years' imprisonment, while Ravoahangy, Raseta and Rabe-
mananjara were released from prison and exiled to France. In
Madagascar, Soucadaux helped establish the socialist Parti Social
Democrat (PSD) in 1 9 5 6 , which was led by the cotter leader,
Philibert Tsiranana. In the elections to the French National
Assembly, Tsiranana was elected deputy just in time to witness
the passage of the loi-cadre, which created a common electoral roll
for the territory, introduced universal suffrage, granted a measure
of internal autonomy, and inaugurated a system of minis
terial government. Paris, h o w e v e r , continued to control defence,
foreign relations, civil liberties, and finance through the
governor-general.
Political parties emerged in numbers during 1 9 5 6 , and their
support ranged from regionalist, to Christian, to socialist. The
more stable parties were Norbert Zafimahova's Union Démocra
tique et Sociale Malgache (UDSM), the Aknonton'ny Kongres'-
ny Fahaleoventenana Madagaskara ( A K F M - Congress Indepen
dence Party), the Mouvement National pour l'Indépendence de
Madagascar ( M O N I M A ) , the Rassemblement Chrétien de Mada
gascar (RCM), and the Renouveau National Malgache (RNM).
Elections were held in 1 9 5 7 for the new assembly and provincial
councils. A ^//>r-PSD-UDSM alliance was carried to p o w e r in
Majunga, Tuléar and Fianarantsoa provinces, thereby blocking
any Merina domination of those provinces or the nation. Tsiranana
was elected head of government on 1 May 1 9 5 8 . In August 1 9 5 8 ,
not long after he came to power, de Gaulle visited Madagascar
to campaign for his constitutional proposals for the overseas
679

M A D A G A S C A R
territories. These envisaged full internal autonomy with the status

of Republic within a French community. A vote against de
Gaulle's proposal would result in Madagascar or any other
territory that took this course being given independence ' with all
its consequences ' which would mean a withdrawal of all French
aid and services. Tsiranana's party campaigned for a vote in favour
of de Gaulle's proposals and in the referendum held in September
1958 Madagascar voted 7 7 per cent in favour of them. However,
Tsiranana thereafter sought to undercut radical pressures, in
particular those from the left-leaning A K F M which had cam
4
paigned for a no ' vote, and he pressed France for a more definite
separation. The Franco-Malagasy Accords, negotiated in April
i 9 6 0 , defined a new relationship and Madagascar achieved formal
independence on 26 June i 9 6 0 .
P O L I T I C A L A N D C O N S T I T U T I O N A L H I S T O R Y :
P O S T - I N D E P E N D E N C E
The period 1 9 6 0 - 7 2 did not witness any sudden changes in

Franco-Malagasy relations. Although by i 9 6 0 there were a
substantial number of trained Malagasy, Paris arranged to retain
up to 1 5 0 0 French technicians and teachers on the island, and
ensured that key positions in most of the ministries were held by
French nationals. Tsiranana's communications, financial, military
and security advisers were all French. In the private sector, 3 6 0 0 0
expatriates remained in commerce, agriculture or the professions
because the P S D - U D S M alliance favoured foreign investment and
the maintenance of good relations with France. A t the inter
governmental level the t w o finance ministries cooperated closely.
French aid continued at a high level throughout the 1 9 6 0 s , though
much of it returned to France in the form of the repatriation of
profits and purchases of capital equipment. In 1 9 6 8 France was
still supplying 63 per cent o f Madagascar's imports and taking 45
per cent of her exports. A t the military level, the French navy
commanded Diego-Suarez, the French air force maintained a base
at Ivato, and French nationals were training Malagasy soldiers
well into the 1960s. Although Tsiranana possessed a 3000-man
mobile police known as the Gendarmerie and a ^//Vr-dominated
para-military bodyguard, known as the Force Républicaine de
Sécurité (FRS), to offset the power of the army, he nonetheless
680

kept French forces nearby. In foreign affairs he remained a close

supporter of France, and was wary of the Americans. On his
initiative, links with South Africa were formed in 1 9 6 8 in order
to encourage tourists from that country. Close relations were
established with the EEC, West Germany, Italy, Spain, Japan and
Israel, but he discouraged contacts with Communist countries
other than Yugoslavia, and did not show much interest in African
affairs, though Madagascar became a member of the Organisation
Commune Africaine et Malgache ( O C A M ) . His attachment to
France and his commercial relations with Pretoria angered the
A K F M which advocated the expulsion o f white settlers and
servicemen, including some 50000 Comorans holding French
citizenship, as well as the nationalisation of French firms and
South African tourist facilities.
When Tsiranana came to power, he had recalled the three
deputies exiled in 1 9 5 4 and invited them to join his government.
Raseta rejected the offer and became an independent, but Rabe-
mananjara became Minister for the National Economy, while
Ravoahangy, w h o died in 1 9 6 9 , was appointed Minister of Health.
Andre Resampa became Minister of the Interior, and later in the
decade the PSD's secretary-general. Through his efforts the P S D
launched Syndicats des Communes (cooperatives), and P S D
membership grew rapidly as thousands joined the party in search
of jobs and favours. Changes in the structure of government were
initiated, and the civil servants were brought to heel with
anti-strike legislation and severe penalties for corruption. Within
the party ranks, Tsiranana's attempts to impose obedience were
less successful. The problem of party discipline and loyalty was
partly solved by a constitutional amendment in 1 9 6 2 , which
prevented the Senate from delaying legislation, and partly by a
combination of coercion, bribery and flattery which w o n o v e r
troublesome regional leaders such as Jean Francois Jarison
(Fianarantsoa), Justin Bezara (Diego-Suarez), and Jean Natai
(Majunga). Tsiranana's policy of playing one faction off against
another was largely successful, but an illness in 1 9 6 7 , and P S D
in-fighting o v e r posts, loosened his grip on the party leadership
and opened the way for ministerial rivalries. The P S D , lacking
any firm ideology, dependent upon one strong leader, and
over-confident after a long term in office which witnessed no
major changes of any kind, was beginning to fall apart. This
681

M A D A G A S C A R
lethargy was broken in 1970—i, when Tsiranana first demoted and

then arrested his colleague Resampa, w h o m he claimed, somewhat
curiously, was, with Jaona of M O N I M A , a leader of a Peking-
Washington sponsored anti-government revolt among the A n -
tandroy. Resampa's removal highlighted the weaknesses of both
the P S D and Tsiranana, w h o was heavily dependent on his
organising abilities. It also marked the arrival of the students on
the political stage.
Opposition to the P S D before 1 9 7 0 had come from several
weak parties whose followings were small and geographically
restricted, and w h o shared only a feeling of nationalism and a
distaste of Tsiranana. Raseta's Mouvement d'Union Nationale
(MUN) eventually collapsed in the 1 9 7 0 national elections;
Jaona's M O N I M A enjoyed support only in the Tuléar area; and
Bezara's Parti Chrétien Démocratique (PCD) disintegrated in
1 9 7 0 because of internal rivalries. Far more serious a threat was
the A K F M . Unlike the P S D with its rural and cotter support, the
A K F M was mainly bourgeois, Merina, urban, and intellectual. Its
leader, a Protestant pastor, Richard Andriamanjato, had little
familiarity with rural life and never managed to make any impact
on the rural masses. All in all, the opposition was so ineffective
that Tsiranana never found it necessary to curtail freedom of
expression until 1 9 7 0 , and A K F M demands for expulsion of the
French and nationalisation of their financial holdings fell on deaf
rural ears. In order to curb its influence with Catholics and civil
servants, Tsiranana labelled the Merina-dominated A K F M
'Communist'. For the Protestant Merina, Tsiranana came to
represent everything they detested: a Catholic cotter attempting to
govern those w h o viewed themselves as the natural rulers of the
island.
It was the armed revolt in April 1 9 7 1 of the impoverished
Antandroy peasants, frustrated by the greed and corruption of the
tax collectors, that gave Tsiranana's career its rudest jolt. The
revolt, led by Jaona, was quickly supressed, and Tsiranana used
it as an excuse for ridding himself of Resampa, a potential rival,
and for reorganising his party for the January 1 9 7 2 presidential
elections. A number of reforms placed the reins of party power
squarely in his hands and, when the voting was completed,
government officials claimed that Tsiranana had won 9 9 . 9 per cent
of the votes cast by 86 per cent of the population. But on 13 May,
682

three weeks after his third inauguration, he was toppled from

power as a result of righting which took place between the F R S
1
and the %pam (unemployed) of Antananarivo, students and
labourers. The rioting, which claimed 34 lives, was sparked off
by student unrest at the Befalatanana medical school. The students
demanded equivalence with French medical degrees and when this
was not granted they went on strike. Tsiranana closed the school,
and his officials later banned the medical students' union, while
on 12 May the FRS arrested more than 400 students of the
University of Madagascar w h o demonstrated in sympathy and
imprisoned them on the island of Nosy Lava, off the north-west
coast. A n order by the Interior Ministry to return to their classes
brought 50000 demonstrators into Antananarivo's streets, where
they were fired upon by the FRS. The demonstrators promptly
went on strike on 15 May, forced the release of the 400 students,
and demanded Tsiranana's resignation, a revision of the Accords
with France and the removal of French troops. Tsiranana resigned
on 18 May and the apolitical General Gabriel Ramanatsoa, a
Merina, set up a military government. The students formed
themselves into a 'committee of struggle' ( K I M ) , while the
teachers, trade unionists and %oam met separately. Both groups
claimed to be determining the island's future, but Ramanatsoa
drove a wedge between the K I M and the others by granting the
teachers and trade unionists pay rises, whereupon most of them
lost interest in politics. The K I M continued to press changes upon
Ramanatsoa, such as a rupture of relations with France, and he
gradually saw the need to create his o w n power base. He
authorised the establishment of relations with Communist and
Arab countries, began the * Malagasisation' of education, re
negotiated the Accords with France and secured the withdrawal
of French forces.
These moves w o n Ramanatsoa a short-lived popularity with the
K I M and with Manandofy Rakatonorina's new * Power to the
People' (MFM), a seemingly Maoist group. The introduction of
a reformed Supreme Court and a new national development
council and government were accepted, but by early 1 9 7 4 his
popularity with the left had begun to wane, while his ability to
deal with Merina-cotier friction was failing. The suppression of
1
U n d e r F r e n c h r u l e it w a s k n o w n as T a n a n a r i v e .
683

M A D A G A S C A R
anti-Merina riots on the coast weakened his position in these areas,

and he was forced to step down in February 1 9 7 5 , when he proved
unable to put down a revolt by the ^//Vr-dominated Groupe
Mobile Policier (GMP). Composed of many former members of
the FRS, as well as dissatisfied soldiers and police, the rebels were
demanding a voice in national politics. Ramanatsoa could not
meet their demands, and handed power over to the Interior
Minister and head of the Gendarmerie, Colonel Richard Ratsim-
indrava, w h o formed a new government. But after a few days in
office, Ratsimindrava was assassinated by unknown parties, and
the suppression of the G M P revolt had to be carried out by the
conservative General Gilles Andriamahazo, one of Ramanatsoa's
former ministers.
A military directorate became the new form of government and
when the internal bargaining was completed Ramanatsoa's former
Foreign Minister, Captain Didier Ratsirika (Betsimisaraka), emer
ged as president of the Conseil Supreme Revolutionaire (CSR).
To balance Ratsirika and the CSR there was a * Military Develop
ment Committee' headed by Andriamahazo and dominated by
Merina. The choice of a non-Merina appeared to be an effort once
again to achieve a measure of national unity in the island; educated
as Ratsirika was in France at the Ecole Navale, and having spent
considerable time at the Malagasy embassy in that country, he was
acceptable to many intellectuals as well as cotters. However, he
seemed to have little understanding of rural life. In terms of
political ideology he imitated a number of more radical African
leaders. A s Foreign Minister he had carried out measures which
temporarily placated the K I M and M F M , and then later lobbied
successfully for the abolition of the head tax, the nationalisation
of banks, shipping lines and power companies, and the adoption
of the fokonolona as the main instrument of national development.
He nationalised cinemas, the Tamatave oil refinery and all mineral
resources, closed down the American satellite-tracking station,
and took over the holdings of the Compagnie Marseillaise de
Madagascar (CMM). His policies were revealed to the public by
radio and published as 'The Charter', or The little red book of the
Malagasy Socialist revolution. In it he explained that he would use
the fokonolona as the basis of agricultural and administrative
reform. However, the armed forces and the youth movement were
also to be employed to these ends. A referendum held in
December 1 9 7 5 approved the teachings of 'The Charter' and
684

gave Ratsirika a seven-year term in office, though it remained to

be seen whether he could retain the support of the armed forces
and, at the same time, relieve regional disparity and improve the
island's gloomy economic situation.
Society in Madagascar in 1 9 4 0 was a rigid pyramid with the

governor-general at the top and beneath him a hierarchy of civil
and military authorities w h o together ruled the Malagasy. Most
of the French in the island were transients serving with the
military, civil service, or commercial concerns and had little
interest in the local peoples. The Malagasy existed apart, with only
a few of the educated elite being able to establish regular contact
with the foreigners through professional organisations for writers
and journalists, or through personal friendships. The mass of the
Malagasy people lived simply on small farms o r in villages, or
engaged in cattle-herding in the southern part of the island.
Contact with the French was not frequent, and the most visible
person at the local level was the chefde canton or his French-speaking
Malagasy interpreter. A t the village level, the fokonolona took care
of purely local matters. Composed of the elders of a village, it
maintained local order and from time to time assisted the
European administrator in his police duties. A conservative body,
it did not act as an instrument of change, though indeed change
was about to come as a result of wartime demands for men and
raw materials. It was during the w a r that respect for traditional
authority, particularly amongst the Merina, the Betsileo and
people in urban centres, began to break down. A new force,
nationalism, was on the rise. Historically, the Merina had been
the first to experience change, and although they shared linguistic
and traditional religious bonds with the other ethnic groups, their
way of life was more exposed and receptive to French rule and
culture.
In the years following the 1 8 9 6 conquest, the Merina bourge
oisie (Hova) had continued to consolidate their position as business
men and civil servants and to form an alliance with the
aristocracy (Andriana) against the French. After independence, the
cotters replaced the French and the struggle continued. Official
policy after 1945 aimed at rapidly educating and training numbers
of cdtiers in order to provide an alternative to continued depen-
68s

M A D A G A S C A R
dence on Merina technicians, civil servants and teachers. But the

Merina hold on the life of the island was too tight to be broken
in only a few decades. They had traditionally been more receptive
to education and change than the other ethnic groups and, because
of their large numbers and central geographic location, they were
able to exercise dominance in national life until i960. The Merina
adapted with relative ease to the evolution of modern civil law,
which replaced many old traditions and customs, and it was in
their society that the importance of the clan, the extended family
and a large number of offspring had tended to decline most
rapidly. Long-standing contact with Europeans produced in the
Merina few feelings of cultural inferiority or racial antagonism,
and many of the positive traditional values of the society were
preserved. After independence other ethnic groups attempted to
emulate and overtake the Merina, so that one began to see, for
example, a change in attitude towards women in Betsimisaraka
society similar to that found on the high plateaux. Among the
Merina, women had undergone considerable intellectual devel
opment through education, and their evolution, as well as the
evolution of other Malagasy women, was being accelerated by a
rise in their standard of living. As education transformed the social
structures of the cotters, the various groups produced their own
skilled and professional people, and the Merina grip on national
life began to loosen. Another force at w o r k in the island was
inter-ethnic marriage. It was most frequent among the Merina and
Antandroy, but spread among the cotters because government
officials from the high plateaux were increasingly being posted for
long periods of time to centres away from their home areas. It
was hoped by many of the younger generation that this practice
would help to ease ethnic tensions.
A government estimate in 1975 placed the population of
Madagascar at about eight million persons. Between 1950 and
i960 the population rose from 4 207000 to 5 298 000 persons, while
an estimate made in 1962 gave a total of 5 5 36243 Malagasy and
121 358 aliens in the island. Of the foreign residents, Indians and
Chinese had become more numerous since 1945, though the
number of Europeans had declined, especially after the events of
May 1972. There were 18 ethnic groups in the island, the largest
of which was the Merina with over t w o million people, followed
by the Betsimisaraka, Betsileo, Tsimihety and Antandroy. The
686

population was not spread evenly throughout the island and its
rapid growth both in cities and rural areas was due more to a
decline in the death-rate than a rise in the birth-rate, though this,
too, had occurred. The island's t w o main centres, Antananarivo
(500000) and Majunga ( 7 6 500) had more than doubled in popu
lation since 1 9 4 5 , though elsewhere there was little urbanisation.
Antananarivo offered the rural resident opportunities for excite
ment, wage-earning, education and perhaps even a government
job. But there was another side to the capital: the problem of the
%pam, shortages in housing, water and sewage facilities, and a
spiralling cost of living.
The position of the labour force in Madagascar differed little
from that encountered in other Third W o r l d countries. In 1 9 7 1
it was estimated that out of a working population of about
3 3 0 0 0 0 0 , there were some 300000 persons drawing regular
salaries or wages. In that same year, however, an estimated 1 0 0 0 0 0
young people were about to come onto the job market. By the
end of 1 9 7 3 there were 4 0 0 0 0 unemployed young Malagasy, some
with diplomas and degrees, others with only primary school
education. In 1975 their impact was felt most acutely in the capital
and Majunga, as well as the smaller urban centres of Tamatave
( 5 9 6 0 0 ) and Fianarantsoa ( 5 8 9 0 0 ) , where they fed the extremist
movements. These s(pam were easily influenced by the indigenous
press, which was very large for a nation where only about half
of the population was literate. A t independence there were about
200 titles in circulation in Madagascar. Most of these newspapers
and periodicals had a small circulation, were limited to Antanan
arivo, and were politically oriented. Professionalism in the Mala
gasy press had always been lacking, with the exception of the
Catholic weekly Lumiere, and the news reporting was often
slanted, inaccurate and frequently shot through with libellous
statements. All newspapers had a faithful if small following and
in the capital even the unemployed found money to support their
favourite. Between May 1 9 7 2 and the coup of February 1 9 7 5 , a
truly free press was in existence for the first time in Madagascar's
history. After that coup, however, rigid censorship was estab
lished, and papers were suppressed until there were only about 60
in circulation. Lumiere had to cease production because of its
objective reporting, and the Ratsirika regime carried censorship
to the point that overseas mail was opened and incoming air
687

M A D A G A S C A R
passengers at Ivato were thoroughly searched for foreign papers.

But other barriers were lifted, and it was perhaps indicative of
Ratsirika's politics that the works of Plato, Rousseau, Marx and
Mao, banned during Tsiranana's time, were introduced in 1973
into philosophy classes of the University of Madagascar.
Christianity, introduced initially to Madagascar in 1818,
established roots among most Malagasy ethnic groups and by
1971 it was estimated that there were about 3 700000 indigenous
1
Christians in the island, representing 3 8 per cent of the population.
Protestant sects tended to predominate in Imerina, the Catholics
in Betsileo and along the east coast, while the Lutherans had a
monopoly in the south. However, much of the island was still
untouched by Christianity, but it played a dominant role, as the
majority of the elite were Christian and the churches provided an
ancillary education system to that of the government.
During the colonial perod the Merina Protestant churches,
because of their pre-1896 ties with the monarchy, were viewed
with suspicion by the administration, a suspicion heightened by
the Protestant colour of the emerging nationalist movement.
White Protestant missionaries often attempted to ensure the
neutrality of their Malagasy colleagues but their efforts were
largely in vain. The Catholic Church, rightly o r wrongly, had
often been seen by the Malagasy as an appendage of the French
colonial power, yet by 195 3 even it had officially recognised the
legitimacy of seeking independence. In 1956 there was a change
from the earlier mission status to 'The Malagasy Catholic
Church \ From that date onwards bishops and later archbishops
were drawn from the indigenous clergy; and recruitment of
missionary priests increasingly concentrated on countries other
than France.
A s control of the Protestant and Catholic Churches passed into
Malagasy hands, many of the old sectarian animosities began to
fade and in their place a new feeling of ecumenism began to
appear. After i960 the P S D demonstrated its impartiality towards
the various Christian denominations and Islam, and by 1975 all
religious bodies were largely ignored by the state and found it
necessary to fall back on their o w n human and financial resources.
1
38 p e r c e n t C h r i s t i a n (20 p e r c e n t C a t h o l i c , 18 p e r c e n t P r o t e s t a n t ) ; 5 p e r c e n t
M u s l i m ; 57 p e r c e n t t r a d i t i o n a l r e l i g i o n s .
688

E D U C A T I O N A L D E V E L O P M E N T
The system of local, regional and national schools created by

Governor-General Joseph Gallieni (i896-1905) existed virtually
untouched until the end of the Second W o r l d W a r . The conflict
put many French and Malagasy teachers into uniform, produced
a scarcity of supplies and equipment, and brought about the
physical deterioration of both state and mission schools. Access
to the best schools, those reserved for French children, continued
to be limited to the offspring of those few Malagasy with French
citizenship. Both settlers and administrators ensured that few
Malagasy ever went beyond the primary level to attend the lycées
or French universities. The middle-grade Malagasy civil servants
were trained at écoles régionales, of which the most important was
the École Myre de Vilers in the capital. This institution produced
many talented Malagasy, but most could never hope to advance
to senior government posts. This restrictive system of education
was broadened by the Brazzaville reforms, as a result of which
the Befalatanana school of medicine, and then later a school of
law and one of agriculture, were opened. Most of the secondary
schools continued to be located in or around Antananarivo, and
by 1951 two-thirds of all Malagasy were still without schooling.
The highest proportion of these illiterates were côtiers. This dismal
picture existed because the colonial administration was devoting
a mere 8 per cent of the local budget to education in 1 9 5 1 .
The missions had established the first school system of education
in the island during the early nineteenth century and their
presence continued to be felt into the mid-1970s. The state schools
continued to enrol most of the better students during the period
under discussion. W i t h the exception of t w o preparatory insti-
tutions, the École Paul Minault (Protestant) and the Collège St
Michael (Catholic), the church schools usually had inferior
facilities and charged higher fees. In spite of this some parents still
sent their children to church schools. There were definite
advantages: these schools, apart from offering a religious
education, stressed Malagasy language and literature, and
frequently offered French taught by French nationals. In some
areas they absorbed the surplus students unable to gain entry to
state schools. From i960 onwards relations between the govern-
689

M A D A G A S C A R
ment and the churches remained good and there were no state
take-overs, as was the case in many other African nations.
A five-year plan in education, launched in 1958, was under way
when the Accords were signed, and one of its goals was a literacy
rate of 70 per cent by 1972. In an attempt to alter the colonial
pattern of educational opportunities, the P S D opened schools in
cotier areas, a m o v e which helped raise the overall number of
children of school-age attending an educational institution to 5 3
per cent by 1967. On a geographical basis, however, only 10 per
cent of the children in the extreme south were in school, as
opposed to 35-50 per cent of all children in the highlands. The
reduction of this disparity continued to be one of the Ministry
of Education's key goals. The gradual rise in the national literacy
rate, and the expansion of the school population in the 1960s was
made possible in part by the increase in numbers and quality of
local teachers. For many years Malagasy teachers had been poorly
paid and trained, o v e r w o r k e d , and relegated to a position of low
social standing. Tsiranana, himself a former teacher, expanded the
number of teachers very rapidly in the 1960s, and improved their
lot by granting paid vacations and free housing or a housing
allowance, by giving rises in pay, and by reducing the number of
students per class. M o r e teacher-training colleges were built,
though in a number of cases the graduates went into professions
other than teaching. The demand for schooling outstripped the
number of Malagasy teachers, however, and French nationals still
had to be employed. In the early 1960s more than 800 French
teachers, financed by French aid, were giving instruction in 416
primary, 248 secondary, and 131 technical schools, as well as
assisting youth and sports movements.
Technical education was neglected during the colonial era and
continued to experience difficulties after i960. Technical trades
had low prestige and the education given in technical colleges did
not always match governmental and industrial demands; while the
stagnating economy found it difficult to absorb graduates after
1970. Higher education in Madagascar after independence was
centred on the Befalatanana school of medicine and the University
of Madagascar. A t the close of the Second W o r l d W a r , Paris had
begun to provide state scholarships for study in France in a wide
range of disciplines, while educational reforms enacted in 1955
created an institute of law and natural sciences in the capital to
690

which a faculté des lettres was added four years later. A s 'indepen
dence ' drew nearer, Tsiranana began to plan a national university.
His motives were three-fold. The first was to keep Malagasy
isolated from what he considered the unsavoury political climate
of France, while the second was to foster the educational cause
of the cotters within the island. Finally, Tsiranana wanted to reduce
the cost of overseas training, and during the 1960s and early 1970s
those Malagasy w h o went abroad were mainly educated in
disciplines connected with development plans. The University of
Madagascar began to hold classes in the i960—1 academic year,
and the Accords provided for sending French professors and
administrators to Madagascar as part of the aid programme. It also
made provision for France to pay its operating costs. Until about
1966 a full one-quarter of the students were non-Malagasy, mainly
French nationals, w h o could obtain a degree equivalent to those
conferred in most French universities. The old educational/ethnic
divisions were, however, perpetuated at the university because the
bulk of the students were Merina or Betsileo. Most of the
undergraduates were in medicine (30 per cent), law and economics
(29 per cent), and science (28 per cent), with only 6 per cent in
agriculture. The number of students attending the university rose
from 3271 in 1 9 6 8 , of whom 2 6 1 0 were Malagasy, 593 French and
148 of other nationalities, to 4000 in 1 9 7 2 , 7000 in 1 9 7 3 , and a
peak of 1 1 0 0 0 in 1 9 7 5 . The demand for higher education had
become so great that two new university centres were opened in
Tuléar and Diego-Suarez, and some 200 Malagasy were sent to
study in the USSR.
Education changed the face of Madagascar, because the Mala
gasy, particularly the Merina, seized upon it as a tool for
modernisation and personal advancement. Students played a
significant part in the process of decolonisation, from the for
mation of the M D R M to the rise of Ratsirika and the breaking of
the French hold on the life of the island. It was the left-wing
students, many of w h o m were unemployed or faced bleak
employment prospects upon graduation, w h o were Ratsirika's
strongest supporters. If their career prospects in Madagascar
before 1 9 7 2 had been bleak, they were now almost non-existent.
Uncertainty surrounded the new education programme in 1 9 7 2 ,
as the government debated which aspects of the French system
should be retained or discarded. France refused to recognise the
691

M A D A G A S C A R
Table 1 3 . 1 . School populations, 1972-4.
Population Teachers
Primary schools
1972 985 236 n.a.
1973 n.a. 9927
1974 1 100000 11766
Secondary schools
1972 35 000 1165
1973 n.a. n.a.
1974 57000 1478
equivalence of any new Malagasy system, whereupon the Malagasy

retaliated by creating an indigenous as well as a French educational
framework. The Malagasy system was orientated towards new
curricula and new books, while the French system, restricted to
6000 pupils, remained as before and was supervised by 200
teachers from France. Many Chinese and Indian residents, as well
as the French and some wealthy Malagasy, sent their children t o
the French schools. By 1 9 7 3 the student body at the university
was almost all Malagasy, the French students having departed.
Increasingly, however, the relevance o f the university was being
questioned because it was graduating students for w h o m there
were n o jobs, and the standards had clearly dropped. Similarly,
substantial numbers o f secondary and primary students were
ready to graduate and g o out in search o f employment.
The school system continued to expand after Tsiranana's
downfall, as table 1 3 . 1 shows; but opportunities for these
graduates were also few, and all but a handful eventually joined
the growing and dissatisfied body o f t(pam.
Madagascar's economy was based almost entirely o n agriculture

and 80 per cent of the island's population was on the land. In 1 9 4 0
this economy was monopolised by four French trading and
navigation companies, the Compagnie Marseillaise, the Com-
pagnie Lyonnaise, the Compagnie Rochefortaise, and the Com
pagnie Generate. Their Chinese and Indian agents bought up
692

agricultural products and had a virtual monopoly over the

importation of and the wholesale trade in consumer goods and
industrial equipment.
The island's economy received a significant boost during the
Second W o r l d W a r and from 1942 exports rose rapidly. The
mainstays of the agricultural exports were coffee, vanilla, sugar,
tobacco, meat, rice, cloves, sisal, raffia and lima beans, and most
were produced in the highlands, the homeland of the Merina and
Betsileo. Attempts to integrate the peasant farmers' crops into an
island-wide system of production and marketing failed. Little real
planning took place until after 1945 when France introduced and
finance^ an extensive series of projects designed in theory to
benefit the farmers, but in fact merely tying the Malagasy
economy closer to that of France. Few peasants gained any
benefits. The schemes, known variously as Secteurs Expérimen
taux de Modernisation Rurale (SEMR), Zones de Développement
(ZD), and from i960 as Collectives Rurales Autonomes Modern
isées (CRAM), devoted 44 million francs to the improvement
and modernisation of agriculture between 1947 and 1958, but their
success was limited and only the seven most productive zones
received adequate funding. W h e n the Accords were signed,
Madagascar was already part-way through the third (1958-62)
colonial five-year plan, a development programme meant to
improve the transportation and communication facilities in the
island. 'Independence' brought with it no changes in this basic
dependency of Madagascar on France; French firms failed to
indigenise their senior staff positions and retained their head
quarters and boards of governors in France. Prior to Tsiranana's
overthrow, these firms were not required to leave a share of the
profits in the island. Thus, raw materials purchased in Madagascar
could be sold in France and the profit used to buy goods for sale
in the island. It is small wonder, therefore, that Tsiranana's
successors were quick to abolish this classic colonial situation.
The first independent Malagasy five-year plan (1964—8) at
tempted to raise the standard of living, and money was set aside
for transportation, agriculture, social affairs and industry. Some
increases occurred in agricultural production, but few people
experienced increased incomes. Industry, such as it was, did not
fare much better. There was no complex of secondary industries
in Madagascar and, apart from mining, industrial activity centred
693

M A D A G A S C A R
on the rather limited processing of agricultural products such as

coffee, vanilla, cloves and perfume. The t w o most important
mineral exports, graphite and mica, were also processed only at
a basic level. From i 9 6 0 Tsiranana assisted firms which supplied
local needs such as textiles, soaps, cigarettes, and shoe factories,
breweries, plastics companies, and auto assembly plants, but all
were dependent on foreign raw materials and were able to meet
only half of the needs of local consumers. The development
board which funded these ventures, the Société National d'In
vestissement (SNI), attempted to assist other schemes such as
tourism, but none was very successful.
The very slow progress of these development ventures may be
accounted for in part by the incompetence and corruption of
Malagasy officials and managerial personnel, and in part by the
lack of good roads, the high cost of energy, and the reluctance
of the Malagasy to invest in anything other than land. In addition,
the French trading companies that had been so important during
the colonial period maintained their hold on the Malagasy
economy until 1 9 7 2 ; they failed to indigenise their senior staff
positions o r to localise their boards of directors. Since there were
few restrictions on the transfer of currencies, company profits
were routinely repatriated to France rather than invested in the
Malagasy economy. The A K F M demands for nationalisation were
countered by the P S D leaders, w h o argued that it would produce
a break with France and that this would retard the island's
economic evolution. The PSD's official policy was that, until such
time as indigenous managers, capital and expertise developed, the
expatriate firms had to be tolerated.
A s a result of Ratsirika's p o s t - 1 9 7 2 economic measures, the
economic future of the country looked gloomy. Although it had
the diversified base necessary to achieve self-sustained g r o w t h ,
and agriculture had the potential for making the island self-
sufficient in food, the problems of economic potential were bound
up with foreign investment, marketing, energy costs and
managerial problems. A t least two-thirds of French aid had gone
into long-term projects, such as transport infrastructure, in the
hopes that the discovery o f a new resource would tempt foreign
investors. But no new resource materialised. Neither the mining
ventures produced much profit, nor were the high costs of oil
exploration justified, for either the Malagasy o r the expatriate
694

firms. A sizeable budget and balance-of-payments problem

emerged in 1969 but was alleviated somewhat in 1 9 7 2 when prices
1
for agricultural produce began to rise. However, the demand for
rice outstripped local production and from 1 9 7 3 expensive
imports had to be purchased. The revolution of 1 9 7 2 , the
renegotiation of the Accords, new and very strict currency controls
imposed on French firms, and a decree of November 1 9 7 3
stipulating that all French companies had to establish their head
offices in the island, shocked the French-dominated expatriate
business community. New investment in the island became almost
non-existent, and by 1 9 7 4 the French population had sunk to
1 6 0 0 0 . A few local industries operated behind high tariff walls and
only the Japanese were now willing to invest in the country. With
Malagasy participation, they established t w o plants for meat-
extract production and fish processing.
In 1 9 7 2 the state began reserving for itself, either on a
full-ownership or a partnership basis, banking, insurance, trans
portation, external trade, power, mines, pharmaceutical products
and the film industry. The agricultural Syndicats des Communes
continued to prove unable to compete with the French e x p o r t -
import companies, while the Malagasy managers were often
appointed without sufficient training or experience. In the months
following the 1 9 7 2 revolution it had become clear that the state
import and export bodies (SINPA and S O N A C O ) had not gained
control o v e r the island's economy. They used the C M M and
Compagnie Lyonnaise as their main export and import branches,
but the French firms continued to monopolise the key sources of
credit, relations with shipping and insurance companies and links
with foreign buyers. These t w o state bodies, like the many
development boards inherited from the French or developed after
i 9 6 0 , were ineffective, top-heavy and costly. Lacking in
administrative flexibility and financial autonomy, the various
boards increased in number after 1 9 7 2 , and moved into all facets
of internal and external trade, including mining, in 1 9 7 5 . Ratsirika
nationalised the Compagnie Marseillaise in August 1 9 7 5 , took
over its assets, and replaced the French board of directors by three
Malagasy. By late 1 9 7 5 investment in mining and industry had
become stagnant and, with the exception of foreign-aid projects,
foreign investment had all but ceased. Unfortunately Madagascar
1
A g r i c u l t u r a l p r i c e s b e g a n t o fall a g a i n i n 1974.
695

M A D A G A S C A R
lacked persons trained in mining techniques and the ultimate

success of this venture was open to question.
In the opinion of Ratsirika, however, the development boards
were of secondary importance; it was the fokonolona which would
bring about real economic g r o w t h and reform in the nation.
Ratsirika believed that the local initiative of the fokonolonas would
boost economic production, and from 1973 they were empowered
to take over many of the duties of the district administration.
Their functions were later expanded to include the expropriation
and distribution of underdeveloped land to peasants organised
into cooperatives. Other responsibilities involved the supervision
of irrigation and road-building programmes, as well as the
marketing and processing of agricultural products. For this last
task the fokonolona organised vatoeka (technical committees) to
which they delegated authority in economic matters. These
committees were to have replaced the traditional Indian and
Chinese produce buyers, but they were unable to buy and
distribute sufficient goods for sale, and by the end of 1 9 7 4 the local
papers were filled with complaints concerning their inefficiency.
Another of Ratsirika's reforms made the fokonolona independent
of the local authorities - the chef de cercle, the chef de canton and the
chef de province - and restricted local technicians to an adminis
trative role. Squabbles between them and the civil servants became
common. Further problems arose from the fact that the fokonolona
were not universal in the island; they were found mainly in the
highlands and not on the coast o r in the south. The conservatism
9
of the fokonolonas members was another drawback to using them
as the basic development cells, and in spite of government
pronouncements the councils were not revolutionary bodies nor
did they favour any particular ideology. Groups of revolutionary
youth, sent out to w o r k under the elders, left in disgust and
returned to the urban centres. Thus, the island swung from French
over-centralisation to Malagasy decentralisation, in which petty
squabbling, a lack of organisation and incompetent management
predominated. The only real changes the fokonolonas produced
were negative ones: the disintegration and demoralisation of local
agencies and authorities; an unsatisfactory network of food
supply and distribution; roads which were allowed to deteriorate;
and the slow demise of economic structures without any viable
replacements. This string of failures was not an auspicious
696

beginning for a body which was supposed to produce real

economic growth and social reform in Madagascar.
The future of Madagascar was both bleak and uncertain. The
economy was beginning to slow d o w n and all indications were
that it would soon grind to a halt. The general population was
unhappy over the acute shortage of the staple food (rice) and
consumer goods. Rural banditry was on the increase and the
transportation system was beginning to break down. Foreigners
whose presence was crucial to the effective functioning of the
economy, the government and the educational system were
leaving in ever-increasing numbers. Internal politics were in a
state of turmoil with talk of plot and counter-plot, 'capitalists-
imperialists', and other alleged 'subversive elements'. Ratsirika
felt compelled to shift ministers to cope with what he considered
to be the political realities of the situation. Ethnic rivalry was still
very much alive, and though Ratsirika was attempting by various
means to foster a stronger sense of Malagasy nationhood the old
antagonisms were working against him. The future of the island
seemed destined to be one of social, economic and political
distress.
697

CHAPTER 14
ZAIRE, R W A N D A A N D BURUNDI
The apocalypse, an influential Belgian magistrate w r o t e at the end

of his colonial career, was due in 2026. University graduates,
mutinous soldiers, and messianic religious figures would sweep
away the massive colonial edifice constructed by Belgium in
Central Africa. Nationalism and Pan-Africanism were the ineluc
table consequence o f education and modernisation; the achieve
ments of the colonial system, to our satirical jurist, contained 'the
1
germ of their o w n destruction'. Elements of this prophecy were
to find their echo in the momentous transformations compressed
into the third of a century from 1 9 4 0 to 1 9 7 5 . A series of shock
waves totally altered the political landscape: a nationalist explosion
2
in Z a i r e that engulfed the prudent calendars and Eurafrican
visions of the coloniser, the turbulent eddies of which finally gave
way to the would-be leviathan state o f Mobutu Sese Seko
3
(Joseph-Desire); an ethnic revolution in Rwanda, and a pre
carious ethnocracy in Burundi, with the liquidation of the
historical monarchies in both. A s the Second W o r l d W a r began,
however, virtually no one had any premonition of the sea
changes in store.
The formal structure of the colonial state was in many respects

the logical prolongation of the absolutist Leopoldian state. The
centralised personal control the monarch aspired to achieve had
as its counterpart the pronounced concentration of powers in the
1
P a u l S a l k i n , UAfrique Centrale dans cent ans ( P a r i s , 1926).
2
T h e B e l g i a n C o n g o b e c a m e k n o w n officially as t h e R e p u b l i c o f t h e C o n g o u p o n
i n d e p e n d e n c e i n i960, t h e n t h e D e m o c r a t i c R e p u b l i c o f t h e C o n g o u n d e r t h e 1964
c o n s t i t u t i o n . T o d i s t i n g u i s h it f r o m its n o r t h e r n n e i g h b o u r b e a r i n g t h e s a m e n a m e ,
it w a s c o m m o n l y r e f e r r e d t o as * C o n g o - L e o p o l d v i l l e \ t h e n * C o n g o - K i n s h a s a ' w h e n
t h e p l a c e - n a m e o f t h e c a p i t a l c i t y w a s a l t e r e d i n 1966. I n 1 9 7 1 , t h e d e s i g n a t i o n * Z a i r e '
w a s a d o p t e d f o r b o t h t h e c o u n t r y a n d its p r i n c i p a l w a t e r w a y . T o r e d u c e c o n f u s i o n ,
* Z a i r e ' is u s e d t h r o u g h o u t h e r e a s t h e t e r m f o r t h e i n d e p e n d e n t s t a t e .
3
In 1971, all Z a i r e a n citizens w e r e r e q u i r e d t o d r o p f o r e n a m e s o f E u r o p e a n
p r o v e n a n c e in f a v o u r o f n a m e s o f African o r i g i n . F o r p e r s o n s w h o s e role e x t e n d s
b e y o n d t h e n a m e - c h a n g e d a t e , t h e f o r m e r C h r i s t i a n n a m e is i n d i c a t e d i n p a r e n t h e s e s .
698

Z A I R E , R W A N D A A N D B U R U N D I
32 Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi.
metropolitan colonial organs in Brussels. Executive authority was

vested in the Ministry of Colonies, whose s t a f f - a n d usually
minister - tended to be recruited from Catholic and conservative
milieux. The royal family also maintained an active interest,
political and economic, in colonial affairs. The king was on a
number of occasions the source of significant political initiatives.
The Chamber of Deputies received an annual report on the
administration of the colonies, and had to approve the colonial
budget, but its role as overseer was often purely nominal. Within
the colony, improving communications were making the con
centration of power in the government-general in Leopoldville
(Kinshasa) more effective. The Tilkens reforms in 1 9 3 3 had
sharply circumscribed the autonomy once enjoyed at the provincial
699

level, especially in Katanga and Orientale. The governor-general,

w h o had come to be invariably selected from the ranks of the
colonial service, had by 1 9 4 0 clearly established his pre-eminence
within the colony.
Ruanda-Urundi, as a League of Nations mandate, retained a
somewhat special status, although it was roughly analogous in
1 9 4 0 to a seventh province of the Belgian Congo. A decree of 1925
provided for its administrative integration with the Belgian
Congo for purposes of currency, security, and colonial bureauc
racy. Colonial legislation applied only if specifically extended to
Ruanda-Urundi, which retained a separate budget. The vice-
governors were, however, subordinate to the governor-general
in Leopoldville. Parenthetically, the Usumbura (Bujumbura) post
was a stepping-stone to the governor's palace in Kinshasa for
three of the four post-war Belgian Congo governors-general.
By 1 9 4 0 , the field administration of the colonial state had
achieved a thorough hegemony o v e r the subject population,
although in some areas, such as K i v u , Ruanda-Urundi, parts o f
Kasai and K w a n g o , colonial occupation was not complete until
the 1 9 2 0 s . The reform of indigenous jurisdictions in 1 9 3 3 com
pleted the task o f reorganising customary structures, and incor
porating them as auxiliaries of the colonial order. Despite a
proclaimed adherence to the doctrine of indirect rule, the territorial
administration was peremptory and interventionist on the
ground. Its capacity to sustain complete dominance was limited
at some times by shortages of personnel and resources, especially
during the peak Depression years and the Second W o r l d W a r , and
at some places by the vitality and skill of some important chiefs,
such as the nyimi of the K u b a or the bami of the Shi. The priority
accorded to obligatory cultivation, begun in 1 9 1 7 and generalised
in the 1 9 3 0 s , and to public w o r k s , taxation, and labour supply for
mine and plantation, was incompatible with real autonomy for
customary leadership.
The infrastructure of colonial p o w e r was by no means limited
to the administration; the missions and corporations were crucial
elements in the imperial order. By 1 9 3 0 there were as many
Catholic missionaries as colonial functionaries. The impact of the
church came through its control o f the educational system; its
critical though indefinable role as an agency for the transmission
of an alternative value system; its related gate-keeping function
700

in the allocation of opportunities for social mobility for the young,

and the political weight of the more articulate and aggressive
spokesmen in the senior hierarchy.
The basic framework of the capitalist sector was solidly
implanted by 1 9 4 0 . Union Minière du Haut Katanga ( U M H K )
had achieved its pre-eminent role in the national economy.
Although the heavy paternalism of the mining companies was
most pronounced in Katanga, labour-intensive exploitation of
diamonds in Kasai, tin in K i v u , and gold in the north-east cast
a long shadow over the surrounding countryside. Agricultural
capitalism was also powerful in its impact, whether organised
primarily in plantation form with large labour demands in the case
of palm-oil, or with the corporate power exercised through
processing and marketing monopolies, whose supplies were
assured through forced peasant cultivation, as in the case of
cotton. A wage-labour force, exceptionally large in comparison
with those of other African colonies at the time, had been
generated by these developments ; and the number of wage-earners
had increased from 125 1 2 0 in 1 9 2 0 to 5 3 6 0 5 5 in 1 9 4 0 .
The commanding heights of the evangelistic and capitalist
sectors were resolutely Belgian. Although, in the religious sphere,
Protestant missionary activity was tolerated, its non-Belgian
character denied it access to subsidy (until 1 9 4 6 ) , state support,
and political influence. The capitalist sector included Unilever,
active in palm-oil, and Tanganyika Concessions which was the
largest single share-holder in U M H K ; basic control of the latter,
however, remained in Belgian hands, and the economy was,
fundamentally, a national enterprise. In Ruanda-Urundi, the
relative weakness of the administrative sector was matched by the
virtual absence of a corporate domain. A few small mines existed,
tin ore being the most important, but their importance was
minuscule. The population was far too great to permit a plantation
economy to emerge. Only the mission infrastructure was com-
parable; the White Fathers, in particular, had by 1 9 4 0 already
created a remarkably thorough evangelistic structure with far-
reaching social influence.
The scope for African initiative or mobility within the con-
gealing structures of the colonial system was very limited. The
adult African was a functional unit, as suggested by the customary
census designation ' H A V * - homme adulte valide - to be harnessed
701

to export-crop cultivation, or conscripted for mine or plantation

service. Internal movement required administrative authorisation.
Except for Catholic seminaries, full secondary education was
non-existent, though some post-primary vocational institutes had
appeared. Despite these handicaps, however, a new élite was just
beginning to be visible, especially in the clerical ranks of the public
and private bureaucracies.
Each element of the colonial power structure was confident of
its capacity to direct the creation of a new society: Christian in
its values, industrial in its rhythms and disciplines, Belgian in its
orientation and loyalty. Achievement of these goals was very far
in the future, and no one doubted the immensity of the task. A t
the same time, it served as full justification for the coercive weight
of the colonial system. The presumed paternal benevolence of
these ultimate ends was doubted by few of those w h o manned the
hierarchies of state, church, or corporation, however heated might
be the debate o v e r particular pathways. T o ruler and subject, the
colonial apparatus was too powerful to imagine that it could be
dismantled.
The German Blitzkrieg swept over Belgium in t w o weeks in May

1 9 4 0 , creating a moment of disarray in the colony. The government
of Belgium fled to exile in Britain, and by autumn 1 9 4 0 was
operating from London. However, King L e o p o l d III remained
behind, and the civil service department heads continued to
operate their ministries in Brussels. Confusion persisted for
several months as to the status of the colony: residual focus of
Belgian sovereignty; dependency of the exile government in
London tied to a British alliance; or autonomous and neutral? By
late 1 9 4 0 , the partisans of the London exile government had
emerged victorious. Leadership in the colony was assured by the
most vigorous and brilliant of Belgium's proconsuls, Pierre
Ryckmans, a liberal Catholic. The London government, however,
was in no position to assert strong authority over Kinshasa; the
colonial administration became, for the first time, largely
autonomous. The effort de guerre imposed severe sacrifices, which
bore most heavily upon the African population. The Allies at first
asked for increased production of tin and gold, with cobalt,
tungsten, uranium and rubber subsequently added to the list. The
702

ZAIRE, R W A N D A A N D B U R U N D I
number of required days of corvée labour on roads, public works,

and forced cultivation was raised from 60 to 1 2 0 , a figure in reality
often exceeded. Coerced collection of wild rubber, abandoned
since the 'red rubber' scandals of the Congo Free State, was
resumed, raising rubber exports from 1 1 4 2 tons in 1 9 3 9 to 11 337
in 1 9 4 4 . Units of the Force Publique, funded by the colonial
budget, were made available to Allied forces in the Abyssinian
campaign, in West Africa, the Middle East, and even Burma.
While the territorial service redoubled its pressure on the subject
population, it was stripped of its cadres. In the words of a liberal
jurist, the field administration 'was the great sacrifice of the w a r :
1
decimated in its cadres, prostituted in its mission'.
The war effort had serious consequences for the security of the
colonial order, and engendered the most far-reaching disturbances
since the early days of Léopoldian rule. Ironically, the first
symptom appeared in the form of a revolutionary but racist white
syndicalism on the Copperbelt as European employees revolted
against the iron discipline of U M H K . In December 1941 a strike
broke out among African U M H K workers at Lubumbashi, the
first overt urban social protest movement. The immediate griev
ance was the blockage of wages in the face of a sharp increase
in living costs resulting from war shortages. More general
discontents had begun to be articulated in small discussion groups
of African elites; these ideas formed a diffuse backdrop to this
watershed event. Troops opened fire on demonstrators. The
official death toll was 60, with most popular versions reporting
a vastly greater number. Nor were ominous symptoms of a
growing threat to colonial security limited to the Copperbelt. The
Kananga (Luluabourg) garrison mutinied in February 1 9 4 4 , and
several months were required before the last mutineers were
rounded up. A major rural uprising occurred in the Masisi region
of K i v u in 1 9 4 4 , expressed through the metaphor of religious
protest. In November 1 9 4 5 , demonstrations by dock workers in
the port city of Matadi produced an official toll of seven dead and
19 wounded when troops again fired on protestors. In its
organisation and participation, the Matadi protest appeared to
show signs of nascent working-class consciousness. A more
generalised indicator of the social costs of the war effort lay in
1
A n t o i n e R u b b e n s , i n Dettes de guerre ( E l i s a b e t h v i l l e , 1945), 191.
703

the first appearance of rural exodus. By the end of the war, Belgian
officials and missionaries began to note a marked reduction in the
numbers of adult male cultivators in many areas.
Ruanda-Urundi lay on the margins of the w a r effort, and
escaped most of its rigours. There was no wild rubber, n o r large
mines, to devour its manpower. The major preoccupation was the
precarious balance between land and population. Mandate
authorities were first sensitised to the dangers when a famine in
1928—9 claimed an estimated 300000 lives, o r 1 0 per cent of the
population. Poor rains in a number of areas brought renewed
disaster in 1 9 4 3 - 4 , with again an estimated 300000 dead o r
uprooted.
In his last annual address as governor-general, Ryckmans de

clared firmly that 'the days of colonialism are o v e r ' . The future
he foresaw had little in common with that which nationalist voices
were coming to demand, but it was not a simple restoration of
the pre-war system either. The time was at hand to engineer the
first controlled participation of the African populace in local
political organs. The awakening aspirations of the mass for a more
satisfying existence were to find their fulfilment in a redoubled
programme of economic development, joined to a panoply of
social welfare measures. For the élite, a satisfying status within
the colonial hierarchy was to be defined. In the post-war era, a
delicate balance had to be maintained between the devolution of
political responsibilities and the spread of mass education. A
fundamental premise was that, in some way which only the
unfolding future would define, a Belgian framework would
remain.
W h e n Ryckmans delivered his Vers Vavenir valedictory speech,
most regarded it as a progressive statement. In Belgian circles,
nearly all could agree that the priority for economic and social
development was appropriate. Vast energies were deployed in
preparing ten-year plans for colonial development, published in
1 9 5 0 - 1 . Further, the prolonged boom in the commodity markets
from 1 9 4 6 till 1 9 5 7 meant that the colonial budget itself was
generating ample revenues to support swift expansion of the
educational system, health facilities, housing, water supplies, and
similar social services. The proposition that a satisfying niche in
704

colonial society had to be made available to the growing évolué class

also commanded fairly general assent. Racial discrimination
pervaded colonial life and legislation ; responsible colonial officials
were persuaded that these should be removed, at least for the élite,
although many in the swiftly growing European population were
not prepared to eliminate racism from their daily behaviour. But
fulfilment of the Belgian Eurafrican dream depended, at some
distant point, on the fidelity of the colonised.
During the early post-war years, when full initiative and
control remained in the hands of the coloniser, several miscal
culations hampered the application of the Ryckmans vision. The
policy wheels turned exceedingly slowly, and reforms spent years
on the drawing board. Until the late 1 9 5 0 s , the final product was
the result of compromises between colonial interest groups;
African views played almost no part in shaping the laboriously
drafted decrees, which were for the most part overtaken by events
almost before they appeared. In the case of Ruanda-Urundi, the
growing United Nations pressure for political reform imposed
unanticipated constraints. Finally, and most important, n o one
anticipated the speed at which political mobilisation would occur
once it gained full momentum in the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-
Urundi in 1 9 5 9 .
The failure of post-war reform in the political sphere in the
Belgian Congo is epitomised in the fate of the t w o most
prominent measures, the 1 9 5 2 immatriculation decree, and the
1 9 5 7 Statut des Villes. Immatriculation was intended as a solution
to the problem of the status of the élite : the central postulate was
that, as a number of Congolese intellectuals argued at that time,
évolués represented a special social class, for w h o m a particular legal
1
status had to be defined. A commission was established in 1 9 4 8
to develop legislative proposals. In the interim, a 'Carte de Mérite
Civique' was created to offer special recognition to Africans
deemed meritorious. The commission's initial proposals in 1 9 4 9
were relatively generous to the élite. Passionate opposition from
some colonial milieux, however, was sufficient to emasculate the
eventual decree which emerged in 1 9 5 2 , which offered a few
1
S e e t h e first p u b l i s h e d é l i t e m a n i f e s t o , i s s u e d i n 1944, d e m a n d i n g e x e m p t i o n f r o m
measures * w h i c h might be appropriate for the ignorant o r b a c k w a r d mass \ reprinted
i n R u b b e n s , Dettes de guerre, 128-9.
705

9
Congolese ' immatriculated status, but linked it to very few
concrete advantages. In the event, only 1 5 5 7 Cartes de Mérite
Civique and 2 1 7 immatriculation cards were issued.
Political participation was to be prudently introduced from the
ground up. Congolese would begin to share responsibility at the
higher levels of government only after a careful apprenticeship
at the base. In pursuance of this principle, a commission was
established in 1948 with a mandate to prepare a reform of
municipal institutions, providing for some form of popular
involvement. This legislation took no less than nine years in
preparation, again encountering long delays while colonial interest
groups sought guarantees for the rights of European residents.
When the law was finally adopted in March 1 9 5 7 it did make
provision for 'consultations' which, in effect, were based on an
adult male suffrage, but assured Europeans de facto parity in
representation and maintained firm administrative tutelage.
Although elections were organised in seven of the largest cities
in 1 9 5 7 and 1 9 5 8 , they were totally overshadowed by the January
1 9 5 9 Kinshasa riots, and the sudden acceleration of events that
ensued.
Post-war reform in Ruanda-Urundi followed a somewhat
different path, reflecting the impact of United Nations Trusteeship.
Belgium had been strongly opposed to the expansion of inter
national jurisdiction over the former mandated territories which
the United Nations Charter provided, in particular the specific
obligation to promote self-government. The first Visiting Mission
dispatched by the Trusteeship Council in 1 9 4 8 , while quite
laudatory on the vigour with which economic and social welfare
were promoted by the administration, expressed dismay at the
absence of provision for political advance. After renewed criti
cisms on the political front by the 1 9 5 1 Visiting Mission, a decree
was issued on 1 4 July 1 9 5 2 proposing a complex hierarchy of
councils providing for limited African participation. The con
sultations were so indirect, and so filtered through the Tutsi
1
chiefly hierarchy, that their impact was minimal.
The 1 9 5 4 Visiting Mission delivered a harsh verdict on the
timidity of political advance. It was suggested that 20 to 25 years
1
R u a n d a - U r u n d i h a d a n e t h n i c a l l y stratified s o c i e t y , w i t h t h e c o m m a n d p o s i t i o n s
o c c u p i e d p r i m a r i l y b y t h e T u t s i , p a s t o r a l i s t s w h o c o n s t i t u t e d a b o u t 15 p e r c e n t o f t h e
population. E x c e p t for an inconsequential n u m b e r o f T w a ( P y g m i e s ) , the remainder
were Hutu. Tutsi h e g e m o n y had been entrenched and systematised by 'indirect
rule'.
706

would be sufficient time to complete the Trust mission. Stung to

the quick, Belgium indignantly rejected the Visiting Mission's
recommendations, with Ryckmans himself now mounting the
counterattack. Nonetheless, in 19 5 6 Vice-Governor-General Jean-
Paul Harroy, in a move considered audacious at the time,
reinterpreted the 1 9 5 2 decree to provide for universal male
suffrage for the sub-chiefdom councils. This did substantially
increase the fraction of Hutu representation at the lowest level.
However, the indirect election mechanism for the higher-level
councils, allied to the ex officio representation of predominantly
Tutsi chiefs at each level, meant that Hutu were progressively
screened out in such a way as to leave, at the kingdom level,
exclusively Tutsi membership in Ruanda, and only 3 Hutu
members out of 31 in Urundi.
T H E RISE OF N A T I O N A L I S M
If the title of nationalist is to be given to any movement of protest

against alien rule and oppression, then origins of nationalism may
be traced back to the early days of colonial rule: the great mutinies
of 1895 and 1 8 9 7 ; movements of religious dissent such as the
Kimbanguist church; and regional uprisings such as the Pende
revolt of 1 9 3 1 . If, however, nationalism must be restricted to a
definition based upon the explicit demand for African political
rights and self-determination, then Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi
stand out for the tardiness of the nationalist challenge. The first
public claim for independence appeared in Zaire only in 1 9 5 6 ; in
all three countries, large-scale politicisation of the population
dates from 1 9 5 9 . In all three instances, mass mobilisation became
intertwined with the crystallisation of ethnic self-awareness,
which had a pronounced impact on the definition of political party
alignments. A simple but fundamental starting point for
understanding the belated appearance of African political
movements, in comparison with countries to the north and east,
is that the coloniser was not disposed to tolerate them. It was only
in 1 9 5 8 that the administration began to accept the formation of
African parties, and not till 1 9 5 9 did politicians have full scope
for legal organisation. The policy of rigorously isolating Belgian
Africa from external influences was quite effective. Only a handful
of Africans was able to travel abroad till the middle 1 9 5 0 s ; in 1 9 5 8
there were still fewer than one hundred university students from
707

the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi in Belgium. Nationalist literature

was not allowed to enter the Belgian colonies, and the transistor
revolution had not yet made radios widely available. The only
African organ of opinion, La Voix du Congolais, was edited under
the close supervision of the colonial authorities.
There were, however, harbingers of change. The future Presi
dent, Joseph Kasavubu, in 1 9 4 6 had spoken of the 'right of the
first-occupant ', a phrase referring to land issues in his native Bas-
Congo, but carrying broader implications. By the middle 1 9 5 0 s ,
the aggressive tone of some statements from the Alliance des
Bakongo ( A B A K O ) in Léopoldville w o n it increasing respect, not
only in K o n g o milieux; Kasavubu became its president in 1 9 5 4 .
In Elisabethville, political effervescence was growing, especially
in Kasaian intellectual circles. The fateful word 'independence'
was first given public African expression in 1 9 5 6 . The debate
was launched by a young Belgian professor, of liberal Catholic
connexion, A. A. J . Van Bilsen, w h o published a 30-year plan for
the independence of Belgian Africa. While the UN Visiting
Mission's proposals for decolonisation within 2 0 - 2 5 years did not
evoke immediate response from Ruanda-Urundi Africans, the
Van Bilsen plan attracted close attention among Léopoldville
intellectuals. A group of young Catholics in Léopoldville, with
tacit encouragement from some sympathetic mission and univer
sity circles, published in m i d - 1 9 5 6 the Manifeste de Conscience
Africaine, putting forward a programme rather similar to the Van
Bilsen scheme. The Conscience Africaine group was primarily
composed of persons w h o had arrived in Léopoldville from
up-river, loosely known in the local ethnic lexicon as 'Bangala'.
A B A K O leaders, social rivals, riposted a few weeks later with a
far more radical document, launching the lapidary but immensely
powerful slogan of'immediate independence'.
The debate on the future was now joined. The Catholic Church
took a measured step away from its traditional role of moral
buttress for colonial authority by announcing its support for an
ill-defined emancipation. The 1 9 5 7 Visitation of Ruanda-Urundi
by the Trusteeship Council sparked off t w o major manifestos,
which began to define more clearly the contours of decolonisation
politics in the Trust Territory. A group of Ruanda Hutu
intellectuals, led by future President Grégoire Kayibanda, issued
a 'Bahutu Manifesto'. This warned that the Hutu, whom 'the
708

departure of the Europeans might plunge into worse slavery than

before', would at least have 'the right to refuse to co-operate in
the efforts to attain independence' until the mechanisms of Tutsi
domination were dismantled. The exclusively Tutsi High Council
of Ruanda responded indirectly with a 'statement of views',
which made no mention of the Tutsi—Hutu polarity, but urged
the rapid training of an élite to w h o m p o w e r could be swiftly
1
devolved. In contemporary social perceptions, this meant the
transfer of power to the Tutsi.
The urban elections of December 1 9 5 7 in Leopold ville, Elisa
beth ville and Jadotville (Likasi) reflected the growing African
politicisation. The Léopoldville results, in particular, were a
psychological shock. The Belgian administration sought to or
ganise these elections without political parties; in the capital,
candidates associated with the A B A K O w o n 133 of 1 7 0 seats in
the African communes, which appeared to be a spectacular
triumph for the partisans of'immediate independence'.
The catalytic event which totally transformed terminal colonial
politics occurred in Léopoldville on 4 January 1 9 5 9 . The admini
stration sought to disperse a crowd gathered for an A B A K O
political meeting, a move which escalated into a vast conflagration,
spontaneous in its dynamics, massive in its participation. F o r three
tense days mobs assaulted symbolic artifacts o f the colonial
system : social centres, administrative buildings, Catholic missions
and Portuguese stores.
Nationalism in the Congo developed as a complex dialectic
between the stunned and increasingly demoralised Belgian ad
ministration, an élite which swiftly raised its demands, and a
mass which now began to play a major role. By m i d - 1 9 5 9 , the
administration had simply lost its grip on the critical area between
Léopoldville and the sea; by the end of the year, comparable
politicisation of the rural mass had occurred in K w i l u and
Maniema districts, and was present in germ in many other areas.
Political leaders were taken by surprise at the scope of rural
radicalism; rather than instigating it, the party organisers tried
desperately to restrain it, harness it to their political goals, and
2
avoid being swept away by i t .
1
T h e s e t w o d o c u m e n t s are r e p r o d u c e d in U n i t e d N a t i o n s V i s i t i n g M i s s i o n t o T r u s t
T e r r i t o r i e s in E a s t A f r i c a , 1957, Report on Ruanda-Urttndi, 6 D e c e m b e r 1957, T / 1 3 4 6 .
2
T h e ' r u r a l r a d i c a l i s m ' t h e s i s is e x p o u n d e d i n H e r b e r t W e i s s , Political protest in the
Congo ( P r i n c e t o n , 1967).
709

In R u a n d a - U r u n d i , the d e v e l o p m e n t o f nationalism w a s p r o
f o u n d l y affected b y t h e e t h n i c s t r a t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e t w o k i n g d o m s ,
and the interaction o f e v e n t s in e a c h o f t h e m , despite their separate
identities. T h e absence o f a major capitalist sector and the
m e d i a t i o n o f c o l o n i a l p o l i c y , t h r o u g h t h e t r a d i t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s as
a d a p t e d b y t h e i r u s e as i n s t r u m e n t s o f i n d i r e c t r u l e , m e a n t t h a t
t h e d i s l o c a t i n g i m p a c t o f c o l o n i a l i s m w a s m u c h m o r e diffuse.
R u r a l r a d i c a l i s m d i d a p p e a r i n R w a n d a in 1 9 5 9 , b u t w a s f o c u s s e d
o n T u t s i h e g e m o n y rather than o n the colonial system. T h e classic
language o f anti-colonial nationalism w a s primarily articulated by
T u t s i leaders, h e a v i l y p r e d o m i n a n t in the ranks o f the e d u c a t e d
é l i t e in b o t h c o u n t r i e s .
T h e spread o f political consciousness w a s accompanied b y a
parallel process o f ethnic mobilisation. T h e cultural categories
w h i c h s e r v e d as f o c i f o r t h i s n e w l y p o l i t i c i s e d s e l f - a w a r e n e s s w e r e
b y n o means simple projections o f the past; in m a n y o f the m o s t
v i s i b l e c a s e s , s u c h as L u l u a , M o n g o , o r N g a l a in t h e C o n g o , t h e y
w e r e u n i t s o f i d e n t i t y w h i c h o r i g i n a t e d in t h e c o l o n i a l p e r i o d . I n
o t h e r i n s t a n c e s , s u c h as t h e H u t u c a t e g o r y in R w a n d a a n d
B u r u n d i , c o l l e c t i v e solidarity e x t e n d e d in a quite n o v e l w a y t o a
culturally related but historically fragmented g r o u p i n g . In the
C o n g o , t h e p o l i t i c i s a t i o n o f e t h n i c i t y in t h e e r a o f n a t i o n a l i s t
politics w a s s t r o n g l y m a r k e d b y the particular c o n t o u r s o f social
c o m p e t i t i o n i n t h e p r i n c i p a l c i t i e s : K o n g o v e r s u s N g a l a in
L e o p o l d v i l l e ; M o n g o v e r s u s N g o m b e in C o q u i l h a t v i l l e ( M b a n -
d a k a ) ; S h i v e r s u s K u s u in B u k a v u ; L u l u a v e r s u s L u b a / K a s a i
in L u l u a b o u r g ( K a n a n g a ) ; K a s a i a n v e r s u s ' a u t h e n t i c ' K a t a n g a n
in E l i s a b e t h v i l l e . P a r t i c u l a r a s p e c t s o f t h e s t r a t e g i e s o f d e c o l o n
isation c o n t r i b u t e d their part. In the C o n g o ethnic associations
w e r e tolerated, t h o u g h political parties remained banned until
1 9 5 9 . T h e first c o m p e t i t i v e e l e c t i o n s w e r e l o c a t e d in t h e u r b a n
cockpit o f ethnic social competition.
T h e early post-war reforms assumed that political e v o l u t i o n

w o u l d b e s l o w , t h a t it w o u l d r e m a i n u n d e r t h e full c o n t r o l o f t h e
B e l g i a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , p r o v i d e l o n g a p p r e n t i c e s h i p at l o c a l
e c h e l o n s o f g o v e r n a n c e , offer full p a r t n e r s h i p a n d p a r t i c i p a t i o n
to the E u r o p e a n residents in A f r i c a , a n d w o u l d lead e v e n t u a l l y
t o a p e r m a n e n t l i n k a g e w i t h B e l g i u m . It w a s h o p e d t h a t s o m e
f o r m o f b o n d w o u l d tie R u a n d a - U r u n d i t o t h e rest o f B e l g i a n
710

Africa. In the event, none of these assumptions materialised. The

1958 elections in Belgium resulted in an unusual Christian
Democrat-Liberal coalition, anxious to make a new departure in
colonial policy. Governor-General Pétillon was brought to
Brussels as a technocrat minister of colonies. He at once named
a working group broadly representative of Belgian groups, but
containing no Congolese members, to prepare a blueprint for
political reform.
The W o r k i n g G r o u p Report was published on 13 January 1 9 5 9 ,
nine days after it had been made quite irrelevant by the Léopold-
ville riots. A ponderous and complex plan was put forward, with
directly elected councils only at the local level. These would then
serve as electoral colleges for higher echelons, but with a dosage
of nominated members. There was, to Congolese eyes, a discon
certing vagueness as to the attributes of these councils. There
was no provision for a responsible executive, nor any mention of
independence. Indeed, the wind was totally removed from the
sails of the W o r k i n g G r o u p Report by the surprise broadcast of
the same day by King Baudouin, the contents of which were
known in advance only to the prime minister and colonial
minister. The broadcast contained the specific pledge to lead the
Belgian Congo to independence ' without undue precipitation or
interminable delay'. During the course of 1 9 5 9 , confronted with
the tumultuous mobilisation of broad sectors of the colonial
populace, Belgium became increasingly aware of the weakness of
its position. The Algerian war provided a frightening illustration
of the cost of prolonged colonial conflict. Belgium was too small
to withstand the foreseeable international pressures that would
build up if sustained violence developed. Somehow the confidence
of the Congolese nationalist leadership, itself fragmented, had
to be won.
By the end of 1 9 5 9 , Belgium had decided that immediate
political independence offered the best chance of retaining some
influence in the Congo. It was possible to believe that the
territorial administration and the chiefs it had installed could
influence the outcome of elections in enough areas to assure a solid
bloc o f moderate' deputies. Further, the European administration
remained intact, and security would depend upon the European-
officered Force Publique. A l l of this underlay what became known
as le parti congolais\ placing an improvised, flimsy superstructure
711

of elected legislative organs and councils of ministers to rest

lightly atop the bedrock of the colonial state. On 25 January i 9 6 0 ,
agreement was reached in Belgium at a Round Table Conference
on independence for 30 June i 9 6 0 with national and provincial
elections scheduled for May i 9 6 0 . The twin processes of rural
mobilisation and politicisation of ethnicity were given renewed
impetus by the tumultuous electoral campaign. Power was to be
defined by numbers, and aspirant politicians threw into the battle
whatever resources they could discover: millennial promises,
appeals to ethnic solidarity and fears, anti-colonial fervour,
visions of national unity, and funds and advice from remarkably
diverse sources. T w o broad lines of cleavage, superimposed on
many more regional ones, emerged : moderate versus radical, and
federalist versus unitarian. The first involved, at one extreme, an
indulgent attitude towards, and close association with, the colonial
administration and, at the other, an aggressively anti-colonial
stance. The other line of division separated those strongly
committed to a centralised, unitary structure for the new state,
from those w h o advocated provincial autonomy.
The elections yielded a psychological victory for the more
radical nationalist parties. The initial hope of the administration,
the Parti National du Progrès, w o n only 15 seats in the lower
house. The major victor in most eyes was the Mouvement
National Congolais—Lumumba ( M N C / L ) which made a major
effort to offer its programme of radical, unitarian nationalism on
a national scale. In the event it w o n 33 of the 1 3 7 seats, while a
further eight were w o n by allied parties. The more dynamic
regional parties, such as Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA) and
A B A K O , swept their home areas but had only a limited bloc of
parliamentary seats. The formation of a government out of this
fractured parliament was a tortuous process, rendered even more
difficult by the realisation that the numerous party groups were
by no means disciplined, cohesive blocs. In extremis, a precarious
formula was found, which seemed to offer a glimmer of hope: the
t w o most prestigious leaders, Patrice Lumumba and Joseph
Kasavubu, became prime minister and president respectively.
The dangers of independence were reflected in the vote of
confirmation on the Lumumba cabinet: though the parties rep-
resented in the Lumumba ministry represented 1 2 0 of the 1 3 7
712

T H E RISE O F N A T I O N A L I S M
seats, the government received only 7 4 votes, o r five more than

the bare minimum.
In Ruanda-Urundi, a working group similar to that for the
Congo was sent out in the spring of 1 9 5 9 . Its report emerged in
November 1 9 5 9 , and proposed a formula rather similar to that
which had failed to take root in the Congo. The electoral
principle, already introduced in 1 9 5 6 , was again to operate at the
local council level, with elected burgomasters to replace appointed
chiefs. The councillors would serve as electors for kingdom
councils, with each mwami (king) becoming a constitutional
figurehead, outside politics and parties. Political evolution was to
proceed at the level o f the t w o kingdoms. There was virtually no
support in Rwanda o r Burundi for maintenance o f a common
framework.
In Rwanda, the series o f events which led to the establishment
in January 1 9 6 1 o f the Hutu Republic began with the sudden and
unexpected death of Mwami Rudahigwa Mutara III on 25 July
1 9 5 9 . The traditional royal council, the biru, convinced that foul
play had been involved in the mwamfs death, convened at once
without the knowledge o f Belgian officials, and announced
Jean-Baptiste Ndahindurwa as Mwami Kigeri V . This audacious
coup was meekly accepted by the Belgians, thus apparently
suggesting that real power n o w lay with the Tutsi monarchists.
Sharpened apprehensions in Hutu circles at this development
created a propitious climate for a jacquerie in November 1 9 5 9 : a
week o f rural violence, beginning with widespread burnings of
Tutsi dwellings by Hutu peasant bands, followed by Tutsi
assassination of a number o f Hutu leaders. Although the death
toll was not large (officially 13 Tutsi, 37 Hutu), the political impact
was enormous. In the aftermath of the jacquerie, some 2 2 0 0 0 ,
mainly Tutsi, fled into hastily created refugee camps in Burundi,
Zaire, Uganda and Tanzania. In the following weeks, no fewer
than 21 Tutsi chiefs and 332 sub-chiefs were killed, arrested, o r
1
forced out o f office, o v e r half of these in the north. Hutu chiefs
were appointed to fill these posts, often in disorderly conditions.
Although the Belgian administration by no means controlled the
direction of events, there is persuasive evidence that it had decided
1
R e n é L e m a r c h a n d , Rwanda and Burundi ( L o n d o n , 1 9 7 0 ) , 1 7 2 - 3 .
713

to react to them by throwing its weight on the side of the Hutu,

now organised in the Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation
Hutu ( P A R M E H U T U ) . Tutsi interests were articulated by the
Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR), radically anti-colonial in
its lexicon, royalist and chauvinistic at its core. Communal elec
tions were held in mid-1960s. W i t h U N A R generally boycotting
the elections, the result was an overwhelming triumph for
P A R M E H U T U , which captured 2390 of the 3 1 2 5 local council
seats. The structure of local power was radically altered by the
installation of Hutu burgomasters in 2 1 0 of the 2 2 9 communes
which replaced the sub-chieftaincies.
Legislative elections for a National Assembly were announced
for January 1 9 6 1 . A t the United Nations, where Belgian credibility
was at low ebb and U N A R effectively portrayed itself as an
anti-colonial movement, the General Assembly in December i 9 6 0
sought to head off an immediate P A R M E H U T U monopoly of
power by urging a Round Table Conference among the parties
and the postponement of the elections. The conference was held
in Ostend in early January 1 9 6 1 and resulted in a predictable
impasse. A t this juncture, P A R M E H U T U and the Belgian
administration in Rwanda were anxious to go forward with the
balloting, to pave the way for a swift transfer of p o w e r to
P A R M E H U T U . Brussels, however, while indignant o v e r what
appeared a systematic misunderstanding of Belgian motives,
bowed to international pressures and postponed the elections. On
28 January 1 9 6 1 , trucks arrived in the small, central Rwandan
t o w n of Gitarama, bearing the 3 1 2 6 communal councillors and
burgomasters, furtively summoned by the P A R M E H U T U lead
ership, certainly acting with the consent of the local Belgian
administration, and possibly with the tacit approval of Brussels.
By acclamation, this assemblage, acting as impromptu constituent
assembly, declared the birth of the 'democratic and sovereign
Republic of Rwanda', with Grégoire Kayibanda as prime min
ister, and Dominique Mbonyumutwa as president. The monarchy
and all its symbols were declared abolished.
The Belgian administration, although it termed the coup illegal,
accepted its results, claiming with some justice that it lacked the
power to do otherwise. The Gitarama coup fixed the structure of
power for post-colonial Rwanda; the 1 7 months which remained
before independence on 1 July 1 9 6 2 were devoted to formal
714

legitimation of the new regime, both internally and at the United

Nations. A t UN insistence, a referendum was held on the issue
of the abolition of the monarchy, and internationally super-
vised legislative elections took place in September 1 9 6 1 . The
P A R M E H U T U , however, was already in p o w e r ; the referen-
dum yielded an 80 per cent vote in favour of the Republic,
and assured the ruling party of 35 of the 4 4 seats. In a final com-
promise with the UN on 28 February 1 9 6 2 , t w o ministerial
posts and some local administrative nominations were given to
UNAR.
The building of an independent state in Burundi from 1 9 5 9 - 6 2
set off very different lines of conflict between dynastic clan and
generation. The monarchy, rather than being swept away, was
momentarily reinforced as a reassuring symbol of unity. Histori-
cally, kings of Burundi took up in turn one of four dynastic
names, Ntare, Mwezi, Mutaga, and Mwambutsa. The descendants
of a king, or ganwa (princes of the blood), formed a clan carrying
the dynastic name of the progenitor. Though intrigue within a
royal clan was certainly possible, the existence of the structurally
competing royal clans provided a relative continuity to factional
struggle absent in Rwanda ; to this must be added the much less
centralised power of the mwamhhxç in Burundi until Belgian
indirect rule enlarged its effective scope. During the twentieth
century, dynastic rivalry had hinged around the Bezi and Batare
clans, a competition intensified by the particular character of
German intervention in Burundi politics in the early years.
Throughout the Belgian period, Bangiricenge ruled under the
dynastic name of Mwambutsa. He was enthroned in 1 9 1 5 , at the
age of t w o , and died in European exile in 1 9 7 7 . The stakes of
rivalry during the colonial period were primarily chieftaincy posts
and seats on the kingdom council. W i t h independence coming on
the horizon from 195 7 , it was evident that the resources and power
at issue would be greatly enlarged.
In the 1 9 5 0 s , the Belgian administration came to be identified
with the Batare faction ; thus, when nationalist vocabulary began
to graft itself upon the Bezi-Batare rivalry, history cast the Bezi
as radical anti-colonials (associated with the Parti de l'Union et
le Progrès N a t i o n a l / U P R O N A ) and Batare (linked to the Parti
Démocratique Chrétien/PDC) as moderate collaborators with the
administration. The new ideological costumes were brought into
7M

sharper focus by the dynamic role of Prince Louis Rwagasore,

w h o became, in effect, the primary spokesman of U P R O N A upon
his return in 1 9 5 8 from university studies in Belgium. U P R O N A
had been founded by a leading Bezi figure, Leopold Biha (his full
name was Bihumugani); the PDC was launched by Pierre
Baranyanka, great grandson of Mwami Ntare. Rwagasore stood
somewhat outside the Bezi-Batare conflict as a real national figure.
He was not the heir to the throne;- as son of Mwambutsa, he
belonged to the Bambutsa clan, and not the Bezi. His national
appeal was also enhanced by his marriage to a Hutu woman, and
by a charismatic political style, as well as by his tie to the palace.
Belgian officials began to refer privately to the U P R O N A
leadership as crypto-Communist, and unmistakably sided with the
PDC
In March i 9 6 0 communal elections were announced for Nov
ember of that year. Meanwhile, an interim council was named by
the administration which was weighted toward Batare interests.
Shortly after, Rwagasore was placed under house arrest in Bururi,
in the south; other leading U P R O N A figures were also hit by
restrictive measures. The PDC, in alliance with several smaller
parties, appeared to win a sweeping mandate, taking 2004 of the
2873 communal seats, compared with only 545 for U P R O N A .
Striking while the iron was hot, the administration at once
announced that elections would be held for a legislature which
would elaborate the central political institutions of an independent
Burundi. The UN protested strongly, and the Belgians backefd
down on the question of legislative elections; however, a pro
visional council was created, with the new communal councils
acting as an electoral college. A PDC-dominated interim central
government was established, at once recognised by Belgium.
However, under heavy UN pressure, Belgium partially retreated
on 25 June 1 9 6 1 , reshuffling the interim government to confer
t w o important ministries on U P R O N A . Legislative elections
were to be held in September, and Rwagasore was released.
U P R O N A succeeded in identifying itself as the party of both
nationalism and the monarchy, and captured 58 of the 6 4 seats
and 80 per cent of the vote. This verdict led to the investiture
of Rwagasore as prime minister.
The euphoria of this triumph was short-lived. On 13 October
1 9 6 1 , a hired Greek assassin shot Rwagasore. The real conspirators
were Batare leaders, in particular the PDC leader Baranyanka's
716

sons, Jean Ntitendereza and Joseph Biroli, both of w h o m were

convicted before independence, and hanged after. They apparently
mistakenly believed they had the support of the Belgian Resident
in this disastrous assassination, a conviction probably derived
1
from contacts with some Belgian functionaries. A s Lemarchand
notes, 'Only if one remembers the historical dimensions of the
[Bezi-Batare] conflict can one understand the feelings of rage of
the Batare in the face of a situation which denied them once and
for all the opportunity to make good their traditional claims to
2
power'.
The demise of Rwagasore threw Burundi politics into disarray.
Only the charisma of Rwagasore provided U P R O N A with a
unifying force; once this was removed, intra-party strife began
to take on ominous new dimensions as for the first time Hutu-Tutsi
conflict appeared. A n d r e Muhirwa, the only significant Batare
figure in the U P R O N A leadership ranks, succeeded Rwagasore
as prime minister, perhaps somewhat blunting the intensity of the
Bezi-Batare confrontation following the Batare role in the
murder. Muhirwa, however, had social views tinged with Tutsi
chauvinism, and soon became feared and hated by Hutu leaders.
In January 1 9 6 2 , the first murders of Hutu intellectuals occurred
in Bujumbura, carried out by the U P R O N A youth, the Jeunesse
Nationaliste Rwagasore (JNR), foreshadowing the deadly perils
which lay ahead.
I N D E P E N D E N C E A N D CRISIS IN Z A I R E
W h a t burst upon the world as the 'Congo crisis' in i 9 6 0 may be

conveniently examined from four perspectives: the overlapping
breakdowns of army; the administration; the problem of national
unity; and the constitutional framework. The first flash-point was
the army, riddled as it was with discontent when independence
came. The political leaders had unwisely accepted a plan for
Africanisation of the officer corps which kept this cadre exclusively
European at the moment of independence, required a decade
before much impact would be made, and above all excluded the
current generation of other ranks from the prospect of swift
promotion that was being enjoyed by the politicians. The first
overt act of indiscipline occurred in Kinshasa on 4 July. Troops
1
W a r r e n W e i n s t e i n , Historical dictionary of Burundi ( M e t u c h e n , N J , 1976), 223-4.
2
L e m a r c h a n d , Rwanda and Burundi, 341.
7*7

in the nearest garrison at Mbanza-Ngungu (Thysville), ordered

to Kinshasa as reinforcements to cope with possible trouble in the
capital garrison, rose instead against their European officers.
Lumumba tried desperately to halt the mutiny, first by sacking
the Belgian commander, and promoting all troops one rank, then,
three days later, by announcing the total Africanisation of the
officer corps, with acceptable Belgians remaining only as couns
ellors. This was to no avail: the mutual fears and suspicions
between Europeans and Africans generated by the abrupt arrival
of independence were too pervasive. The African mutineers were
in mortal fear that the European officers would try to disarm them
and exact lethal vengeance, while the European community in and
out of the military camps was swept by lurid reports of rape and
violence perpetrated by the troops, some of which were true. New
officers were named, in some cases by election, in others by
succession of the senior NCOs, in still others under the influence
of the newly installed Zairean Commander-in-Chief, V . Lundula,
or his Chief of Staff, Mobutu. However, weeks were to pass before
anyone even loosely controlled very many troops. A s it faced a
crisis of survival, the new government was deprived of effective
control over its instrument of security.
The backbone of the colonial state was its bureaucratic structure.

Like the army, the administration carried its wholly European
flavour into independence. Not until 1 9 5 9 was there legal pro
vision for the incorporation of Zaireans into the approximately
1 0 0 0 0 executive-level posts in the bureaucracy. In i 9 6 0 , the 4645
slots in the first three ranks still contained only three Zaireans.
Furthermore, only the new generation of university graduates (the
first Lovanium graduating class was 1 9 5 9 ) was to have access to
these. Those senior clerks w h o had not metamorphosed into
politicians were as bitter as the old NCOs. Independence, it
seemed, was only for politicians.
This malaise served as backdrop for the July panic. Amongst
European functionaries, tales spread of ' black lists' of persons
destined for sacking at the first opportunity after independence.
Total panic gripped the European community in the wake of the
mutiny, and by mid-July most Belgian functionaries save those
in Katanga had fled. Of necessity, yesterday's clerks became
today's director-generals. Many had long administrative experi-
718

I N D E P E N D E N C E IN Z A I R E
enee and abilities far beyond those required for the posts in which
they had been blocked by the discriminatory structure of the
colonial service. Nonetheless, they were called upon to assume
their new responsibilities in conditions of unprecedented disarray.
For the moment, the administration was no more able than the
army to fulfil its former mission of central control.
In Katanga the European community had long considered the

province a distinctive entity, resenting centralised control from
Kinshasa and Brussels and the siphoning of Katangan resources
to finance development in the less-endowed regions. (In i 9 6 0 , 45
per cent of state revenues, and over 50 per cent of the foreign
exchange came from the Copperbelt, figures that have sharply
increased since independence.) This essentially European par
ticularism, in the final colonial days, spread to a segment of the
African leadership through the prism of an intensifying social
competition between immigrants from Kasai, especially Luba,
w h o tended to predominate at the élite end of the African
spectrum, and groups from the southern part of Katanga, w h o
came to describe themselves as 'authentic Katangans', and
organised politically behind the Confederation des Associations
Tribales du Katanga ( C O N A K A T ) . A s independence approached,
the large Belgian firms, especially U M H K , increasingly discon
certed by the radical rhetoric of the more aggressive nationalist
parties, found C O N A K A T leader Tshombe's affirmations of close
collaboration with Europeans reassuring. Lumumba viewed
Tshombe and C O N A K A T with great suspicion, both for their
visible connexions with U M H K , and for their hints that secession
was being seriously contemplated. C O N A K A T received only t w o
minor posts in the elephantine Lumumba government, while
Tshombe became provincial president. On 11 July, profiting from
the disruption in Kinshasa, Tshombe proclaimed Katanga's
independence. Belgian troops disarmed the mutinous army gar
risons in Katanga; Belgian functionaries were ordered to remain
at their posts, in contrast to the flight elsewhere. A Katanga
gendarmerie - a unit destined to serve many flags and causes - was
recruited at top speed, with the help of Belgian officers. Although
the African dimensions to the secession should not be overlooked,
it could never have been undertaken without large-scale public
and private Belgian support. On one crucial and ultimately fatal
719

front, however, Belgian aid was refused: the new state of Katanga
was not accorded official recognition by Belgium, nor by any other
country.
On 8 August, Katanga was followed out of the national door
by the Luba-Kasai region of South Kasai, in a more ambiguous
and short-lived secession. The Luba provided the stereotypical
success story in exploiting new opportunities for social advance
presented by the colonial system. Luba had migrated in large
numbers to focal points of modern activity: the Copperbelt, the
Bas-Congo-Katanga (BCK) rail line, the Kasai provincial capital
of Kananga, even to Kinshasa. Their apparent success made them
objects of hostility - and by October 1959 of violent assault — in
many places, particularly other areas of Kasai, and the Copperbelt.
The final blow came in their virtual exclusion from both the
national and provincial governments in June. Thus rejected on
all sides, the Luba cradleland of South Kasai briefly claimed
independence. A s the site of most of the industrial diamond
production, its loss in August i960 deepened the crisis faced by
the Lumumba government.
The final act in the drama of breakdown came with the split of
the central government into two centres, each claiming to be sole
repository of legality. The bifurcated executive established by the
provisional constitution, with both President Kasavubu and
Prime Minister Lumumba having important powers, was bound
to lead to trouble. The t w o leaders could not have been more
different, and the crisis laid bare certain flaws in both. Kasavubu
had shown great courage at certain junctures in his political
career; his 1946 speech on the 'right of the first occupant'; the
1956 A B A K O stance for 'immediate independence'; and a
forthright political statement on the occasion of his inauguration
as communal burgomaster in 1958. These had created a myth
which proved larger than the man. Secretive, withdrawn, aloof,
lacking in organisational talents, Kasavubu counted on events and
other forces to work on his behalf. But Lumumba was a master
organiser. In Kisangani (Stanleyville), where he first became
visible, he had achieved leadership of virtually every organisation
in sight by 1956. Of inexhaustible energy, charismatic style,
immense charm, his political personality was almost irresistible
in the final months of colonial rule. Yet joined to these talents
720

I N D E P E N D E N C E IN Z A I R E
were some fatal flaws: he suffered from an inability to collaborate

with others on an equal political plane; he was distrustful; a
mercurial, passionate and impatient man, he was prone to hasty
judgement and susceptible to sycophants. By August i960, he had
become surrounded by an inpenetrable entourage of cosmopolitan
ideological adventurers, whose ill-judged portrayals of political
reality contributed to his growing isolation. Though Kasavubu
and Lumumba remained quite close in the first phases of the crisis,
by August a profound chasm of distrust separated them. Indeed,
after mid-July they almost never met.
Kasavubu, on the basis of an ambiguous provision in the
constitution, announced over the radio on 5 September that he
was dismissing the prime minister, and proposing Ileo Songo-
Amba (Joseph) in his place. He then retired to the presidential
palace to await the further developments that many forces,
external and internal, were by then anxious to help organise.
Lumumba went into furious counterattack, announcing that he
was removing Kasavubu. Parliament, hastily convened, annulled
both sackings. On 14 September Colonel Mobutu intervened,
announcing the establishment of his o w n College of Commis
sioners, composed of university students. The thread of constitu
tionality had been lost. Lumumba's residence was surrounded by
UN troops as a measure of protection; the gesture was also, in
effect, confinement.
Kasavubu had some decisive advantages. Mobutu continued to
recognise his role as president, as did the UN. For a crucial few
days, the UN froze the situation by closing the airport and radio
station; Kasavubu's supporters benefited from continued access
to Brazzaville radio. The western, especially American and
Belgian, support for Mobutu and Kasavubu was far more effective
than anything the Soviet Union was in a position to do for
Lumumba.
By November i960, the Lumumbist forces had concluded that
it was not possible to recoup the situation from Kinshasa. They
regrouped at Kisangani, gaining control of the provincial admin
istration and army detachments. On 27 November Lumumba
escaped from UN protection in Kinshasa and tried to join his
backers in Kisangani. He was captured en route by the Kinshasa
authorities, w h o transferred him to Katanga, where he was at once
murdered. In the meantime, Lumumba's Vice-Premier, Antoine
721

Gizenga, had announced that Kisangani was the seat of the legal
government. The nadir had been reached; torn into four frag
ments, with its administration paralysed, and the army, in the words
of UN Special Representative R. Dayal, a' disorderly rabble ', prey
to diverse external rivalries, the prospects for Zaire were dim.
I N T E R N A T I O N A L I S A T I O N OF T H E ' C O N G O C R I S I S '
The internationalisation of Zairean politics is the last immediate

consequence of the crisis which requires consideration. This
began with the intervention of Belgian troops on 10 July, with
the ostensible mission of protecting the European population. On
11 July, Kasavubu and Lumumba were on the verge of agreeing
to their presence, provided their mission was restricted to its
announced purpose. However, that day was marked by the
senseless Belgian bombardment of Matadi, and Belgian military
support for the Katanga secession. Within three days, the Zaire
government had appealed for American troops, UN forces, and
a 'close watch' on the situation by the Soviet Union.
With remarkable speed, the United Nations put together an
international force, which from then till 1964 was the most
important coercive instrument in the country. The UN force,
however, was responsible to the international body and not, as
Lumumba apparently initially believed, to the Zaire government.
Theoretically, it was intended to keep the peace without inter
vening in internal affairs, an impossible assignment in the con
ditions obtaining in i960. Thus the complex patterns of interna
tional organisation politics - balances of power between the
governing organs of Security Council and General Assembly,
conflicts and rivalries between officers in the UN Secretariat and
field command in Zaire - had considerable impact on political
evolution in the country. The fatal dialectic of the Cold W a r set
in very quickly. By August, the United States had concluded that
Lumumba and his allies were dangerously susceptible to Soviet
solicitations, and committed the considerable resources of its
hyperactive intelligence agency to support political factions
seeking his o v e r t h r o w ; then during the autumn months it dabbled
in abortive assassination schemes. The Soviet Union, sensing an
unanticipated opportunity to strike a serious blow to imperialist
bastions in Central Africa, began delivering equipment and
722

T H E ' C O N G O C R I S I S '
advisers to the Lumumba forces in late August. President

Nkrumah of Ghana, in possession of a secret commitment from
Lumumba to join the stillborn Ghana-Guinea-Mali union, mus
tered all the diplomatic resources at his command to keep him in
power. In so unstructured and weakened a polity as the Zaire of
the 'Congo crisis' epoch, the impact of such forces was
considerable.
The first half of 1 9 6 1 witnessed slow movement toward a formula

of reconciliation, which might make possible a reunification of the
fragments, and the formation of a compromise national govern
ment. The Lumumbist group at Kisangani wanted to preserve the
essentials of the late prime minister's vision: a unitary state,
weighted toward the radical i 9 6 0 parties. Katanga intimated
willingness to re-enter the national community, provided that it
were reconceived in a confederal image, permitting the runaway
province to retain through internal autonomy what it was unable
to gain as a result of absence of international recognition.
Kinshasa wavered between the two, reflecting the changing
international climate. With the UN as mediator, a new start was
made in July 1 9 6 1 by reconvening parliament; all but the
C O N A K A T deputies were in attendance. The assembly was
almost evenly divided between Kisangani and Kinshasa blocs;
however, former trade-union leader Cyrille Adoula was accepted
by both as a compromise candidate. Many Lumumbists felt they
had been out-manoeuvred; Mobutu remained commander of the
now reunified army, while the security police were run by
Nendaka Bika (Victor), both key figures in the ' Binza group', an
informal clique of Kinshasa leaders enjoying strong western
(especially American) backing.
Restoration of constitutional government eased the burden on
the UN in dealing with de facto authorities without intervening
in internal affairs. In New Y o r k , however, pressure was mounting
on the UN Secretariat for some decisive action against the
Katanga secession. On 28 August 1 9 6 1 , a first gesture of force
was made in a smoothly executed operation aimed at 443
European officers and irregulars serving with the Katanga gend
armerie. Some 1 0 5 , however, eluded the UN net, and others soon
reappeared. The UN field representatives, without the knowledge
of Dag Hammarskjold, the Secretary-General in New Y o r k ,
723

devised a more far-reaching coup for 13 September, aimed at

ending the secession. This plan, however, fizzled out, and UN
forces found themselves engaged in an urban gunfight with the
inevitable casualties and damage. The epitaph to this disaster was
the tragic death of Hammarskjold himself, when his plane crashed
outside Ndola, Zambia, en route to a rendezvous with Tshombe
to negotiate a cease-fire.
In December 1 9 6 1 , renewed fighting broke out between UN
forces and the Katanga gendarmes. This time, the UN was able
both to justify its action on grounds of self-defence, and also to
thrash the Katangans. Tshombe had to seek a cease-fire, with an
agreement that appeared to commit Katanga to end the secession.
Tshombe's skill in dilatory manoeuvre was by no means exhausted,
however, and much of 1 9 6 2 was spent in sporadic and fruitless
negotiations on the execution of the agreement. Finally, renewed
conflicts in Lubumbashi between UN forces and Katanga gend
armes developed at the end of 1 9 6 2 . This time the UN command
seized the occasion to pursue the military action to a full
conclusion, by occupying all the major towns of South Katanga
and putting the Katanga gendarmes to flight. Though local
commanders exceeded New Y o r k instructions, the campaign was
swift and decisive; on 1 4 January 1 9 6 3 , Tshombe declared the end
of the secession.
The confusion which beset the central institutions in September

i 9 6 0 had soon spread to the provinces. By 1 9 6 2 , the K o n g o ,
Luba-Kasai, and North Katanga areas were de facto separate
provinces. A s provincial conflict escalated elsewhere, usually
around regional cleavages, other candidates for separate provincial
status appeared daily. J u s t possibly, many believed, a provincial
structure based on smaller units, somewhat more homogeneous
and created through the play of ethnic self-determination, could
offer a more viable structure. Out of this came the fragmentation
of the six old provinces into 21 during 1 9 6 2 and 1 9 6 3 . Although
ethnic affinity was accepted as a criterion, in fact the new units
tended to follow the lines of the former districts, the colonial
administrative echelon lying below the province. The hopes of
greater cohesion o f the new units were soon disappointed. The
issue of the regional distribution of p o w e r was pivotal in the
prolonged efforts to draft a permanent constitution to replace the
7*4

provisional document hastily concocted on the eve of independ

ence. When by 1963 parliament had reached an impasse in its
constitutional labours, a special constituent assembly, composed
of party, regional and interest-group representatives, was con
vened in Kananga in January 1 9 6 4 , to consider a draft prepared
9
with UN assistance. The w o r d ' federal was carefully expunged,
but the document contained many federal features. Beyond
constitutional formality, a large degree of informal fédéralisation
had occurred through the inability of the central government
effectively to exercise powers in its domain.
By early 1 9 6 4 , troubles mounted for the Adoula regime.
Tshombe, now in comfortable exile in Madrid, began to weave
a coalition of the discontented. The Katanga days had left ample
resources in his hands, plus friends w h o would provide more.
Radicals wercpromised national unity, disavowal of the Lumumba
murder, and an anti-American posture. Moderates were reassured
by the actual performance of Tshombe in office in Katanga.
European interests were told that he remained a friend of the west,
and a defender of private enterprise in Africa. A s the conviction
grew in many quarters that the Adoula regime was no longer able
to cope, the Tshombe alternative began to appear as a serious
possibility, not least to President Kasavubu. On 6 July 1 9 6 4 ,
Kasavubu named Tshombe as formateur of a provisional govern
ment, while awaiting the organisation of elections for a new
parliament and a permanent government as prescribed by the
Kananga constitution which had just come into effect. In contrast
to the industrious but colourless Adoula, w h o rarely made public
appearances, Tshombe was gregarious and exuberant. The new
prime minister enjoyed, for a time, astonishing popularity with
the Kinshasa crowds. Tshombe did include one Lumumbist figure
(André Lubaya) in his cabinet; otherwise it contained a full slate
of persons w h o had never before held central ministerial office.
But Lumumbist critics pointed to the continued control of the
security apparatus by Mobutu and Nendaka, a former lieutenant
of Lumumba from eastern Zaire, w h o had become a bitter enemy.
By the end of the month, various Europeans once associated with
the Katanga regime began to reappear in advisory roles. In its style
of operation, the Tshombe regime soon took on the attributes of
the old Katanga state.
7*5

Within t w o weeks of the installation of the Tshombe government,

a wave of rebellion which had broken out in several parts of the
country in early 1 9 6 4 suddenly began to coalesce and extend
rapidly. Six weeks later, a revolutionary government was pro
claimed in Kisangani, about one-third of the national territory had
been lost to the central government, and the Kinshasa regime
seemed on the brink of collapse. However, the rebellions quickly
began to give way before mercenary-led spearheads of the
national army, and by the end of the year had broken into
fragments, the rebel leadership in flight and all hopes of success
vanished. The striking receptivity of the revolutionary appeal
must be understood in the context of the hardships brought to
many by the circumstances of independence. A few privileged
categories — politicians, functionaries, officers - had enjoyed a
spectacular social ascent; but most people suffered a sharp drop
in well-being. The recollection, especially for the young, of the
campaign promises, of the hopes that independence had awakened
compared very unfavourably with the bitter reality. For older
persons, there was a curious nostalgia for colonialism: not, of
course, the vexations of European oppression, but for the order
and predictability of life, for the reliability of services which
accompanied the last years of le temps des Beiges.
While these factors may suggest a generalised predisposition to
insurrection, rebels did not find a ready audience everywhere. The
reaction of a particular local community to a call to insurrection
would depend upon its evaluation of the symbolic associations of
those making the appeal. W h o were the insurrectionaries ? Brother,
friend or foe? To this calculus was added a prudential estimate
of risks and advantages. W h o would w i n ? Dare we oppose an
approaching rebel band? W h a t risks of vengeance from the
national army would arise if we welcomed the rebels? Individuals,
factions, communities, regions derived varying responses from
these calculations.
The first embryo of rebellion appeared in October 1 9 6 3 , when
a number of Lumumbist politicians crossed the Congo River and
established a Conseil National de Liberation (CNL) at Brazzaville,
where a government prepared to provide sanctuary and facilitate
revolutionary organisation by the Lumumbist opposition came to
power in August 1 9 6 3 . A few months before, a relatively
726

little-known former Minister of Education from the i960 Lu

mumba government, Pierre Mulele, had furtively returned to Zaire
after three years in Egypt, China, and Eastern Europe. Quite
independent of the CNL, he began to organise partisan bands in
the valley forests of his native K w i l u district. More than in any
of the other rebel groups there was a strong ideological content
to the political and military instruction Mulele and his lieutenants
provided, drawn primarily from Chinese theories of peasant
revolution. The Mulele movement achieved remarkable success,
for a time, in harnessing rural discontent in his o w n ethnic
Mbundu zone, and among the neighbouring Pende. He had much
more difficulty in penetrating other groups, and some saw
themselves actively threatened by the Mulelists. Mulelist bands
passed to the attack at the beginning of 1964, but by May the
movement had become regionally encapsulated, and began to be
torn by internal tensions. Mulelism became a political myth of
formidable proportions, and it was many months before the last
of the bands left the forest.
In February 1964 the CNL established a new office in Burundi,
where the fluid political conjuncture had also become favourable.
In the Ruzizi plain, bordering Burundi, factional dispute among
the Fulero offered an initial base for rebel organisation, which
soon exposed the weakness of the national army. On 15 May the
frontier town of Uvira was taken by insurgents, opening the
Burundi border. Rebels gained another foothold, when Kalemie
(Albertville), capital of North Katanga, was captured on 19 June
by youthful insurgents from the north. A scene to be re-enacted
many times in the following weeks ensued; the national army
simply evaporated, and small, lightly armed youth bands pushed
south and east without encountering significant opposition. The
situation in Kalemie itself soon became anarchic, and Gaston
Soumialot, principal organiser of the eastern branch of the CNL,
turned his own attention to regions north and east.
By mid-July, youth bands in Maniema were structured in more
conventional form as an Armee Populaire de Liberation (APL)
under Nicolas Olenga. The A P L snowballed as it moved toward
Kisangani through zones of Lumumbist strength. In each town,
new recruits were enrolled, commercial and state vehicles seized,
bank and store vaults emptied, and sizeable stocks of equipment
and ammunition captured from the fleeing national army. From
7*7

quite modest beginnings, the A P L when it reached Kisangani on

4 August had become a force which began to match the national
army in numbers, vehicles, and small arms. In August, A P L
columns advanced in all directions: eastward from K i n d u into
Sankuru, north and west from Kisangani to Isiro (Paulis) and
Bunia, east to Lisala and Boende, all of which were in insurgent
hands by the end of August. Only one serious setback occurred;
a column of 6000 men led by Olenga was driven back at Bukavu
in mid-August by a national army garrison effectively led by
Colonel (Leonard) Mulamba Nyunyi, with some American and
Belgian advisers, and with the decisive support of Mwami Kabare,
w h o at the last moment committed his Shi followers against the
rebels.
Rebellion was at flood tide when CNL leader Christophe
Gbenye proclaimed a revolutionary national government at the
Lumumbist capital of Kisangani on 5 September. The decom
position of the People's Republic followed very swiftly after its
establishment. The constitution of mercenary units and the
incorporation of former Katanga gendarme units provided new
resources for the national army; Belgian and American logistical
support was increased. Relations between Gbenye, Soumialot and
Olenga were always uneasy, and hierarchical control intermittent
at best. The Kisangani regime found itself responsible for ad
ministering vast expanses of territory, with neither structure nor
resources to respond to their needs. The expansion of rebel
territory was accompanied by the application of revolutionary
* justice' to those associated with the central government, resulting
in the massacre of thousands of persons.
By October, the national army coUnter-offensive began in
earnest. The revolutionary government interned approximately
1800 Europeans w h o had remained in rebel-held areas and sought
to use them as a bargaining counter, both as a shield against air
raids, and to negotiate a halt of the advance on Kisangani. This
led to the controversial American—Belgian parachute operation
at Kisangani and Isiro on 24—26 November with American
planes transporting Belgian troops. A b o u t 100 Europeans and
many Africans were killed in connexion with this undertaking.
Most African opinion was deeply offended by the racial arrogance
implicit in the operation, which rested on the unstated assumption
that European lives were more important than African ones.
728

Although the Tshombe government had not invited this inter

vention, it had accepted it, so reinforcing its political isolation in
Africa.
By the end of 1 9 6 4 , as a collective threat to the central
government the rebellions had failed. Leadership, never united,
fell apart after the loss of Kisangani. However, many substantial
pockets of rebellion remained, and many months passed before
central authority was restored in a number of these. In some
instances, their persistence was abetted by the belated arrival of
external supplies: Soviet equipment, transferred by Algeria via the
Sudan, and Chinese weapons across Tanzania into the Lake
Tanganyika zone. Also, during 1965 the largest pocket of rebels,
in the Fizi-Baraka zone on the Tanzania border, benefited from
the assistance of the tireless revolutionary, Ernesto' C h e ' Guevara,
and a few dozen Cuban colleagues. They eventually became
disillusioned, but the Fizi pocket became a zone of institutionalised
dissidence from that time forward, and was never brought under
central control. Elsewhere, the process of restoring the authority
of Kinshasa was often accompanied by massacres comparable in
scale to the assassinations by the rebels.
With the nightmare of rebellion largely over, political attention

turned in 1965 to the contest for power under the Kananga
constitution. National elections were scheduled for March. The
evident challenge was to produce some sort of regrouping out of
the rich florescence of parties which then claimed to exist; no less
than 223 parties entered the 1965 campaign. It was, by now,
exceedingly difficult to organise politically outside the structure
and the resources of the state and this gave a decisive advantage
to the incumbents. In February 1 9 6 5 Tshombe launched a
national political movement intended to underpin his bid for
continued power, the Convention Nationale Congolaise
(CONACO), containing 4 9 constituent parties. The Lumumbist
bloc, which still functioned with some cohesion in the 1 9 6 3
parliament, had fallen victim to multiple splits, and had lost a
number of its leaders in the rebellions. Thus C O N A C O was the
apparent victor in the parliamentary elections, taking 1 2 2 of the
1 6 7 seats.
Parliament did not meet till September, by which time the
fragility of C O N A C O had become apparent. A n opposition bloc
729

of deputies, the Front Démocratique Congolais (FDC), emerged,

led by security chief Nendaka and former Léopoldville provincial
president Kamitatu Massamba (Cléophas). When parliament met,
the first test votes showed the Tshombe and anti-Tshombe groups
almost evenly divided. The crucial p o w e r contest was for the office
of president, to be elected by parliament and the provincial
assemblies. Kasavubu desired re-election, but Tshombe had
decided to challenge him. A s the evenness of the division became
clear, tensions began to build. On 13 October, Kasavubu dismissed
Tshombe as prime minister, and named Evariste Kimba as in-
terim premier. On 1 4 November, the Kimba government failed
to obtain a vote of confidence, by a vote of 121 to 1 3 4 (counting
both houses). Kasavubu at once asked Kimba to make a second
attempt at forming a government, but at this juncture there simply
seemed no majority available for either side. Zaire appeared once
again to be in a cul-de-sac. These were the circumstances in which
the military high command decided to install General Mobutu as
president on 25 November 1 9 6 5 . That same day, a suddenly
chastened and united parliament convened, and approved the coup
d'état by acclamation.
In a major address to the United Nations General Assembly on
4 October 1 9 7 3 , President Mobutu pronounced a harsh verdict
on the First Republic:
The situation which we have experienced from i960 to 1965 was cruel for our
people. And we must recognize that anarchy, chaos, disorder, negligence, and
incompetence were master in Zaire. Some of you look in the dictionary perhaps
to understand the definition of the word 'anarchy', while in Zaire we have
experienced it so thoroughly that many thought the word 'anarchy' was a
1
Zairean invention.
In fact, words such as * chaos * and ' anarchy ' really go too far
to convey the reality of the period. Most of the time, in most
places, the routines of life went forward. Many major economic
enterprises continued to operate. U M H K , for example, hardly
ever missed a day's work. Schools continued to function, indeed
rapidly expanded, although an academic year was lost in many
areas affected by the rebellions. Y e t disorder was fatally lodged
in the arteries of the system. Most Zaireans experienced in their
personal lives some of its repercussions : the loss of a friend or
relative ; a brutal encounter with an ill-disciplined army patrol o r
1
Études Zaïroises, S e p t e m b e r - O c t o b e r 1973, a, 79-102.
730

rampaging gang of youths; the depressing awareness that one's

ethnicity defined the quarters of town it was safe to enter. This
is why, in its unanimous acclamation of the New Regime,
parliament was faithfully representing its constituents. The First
Republic passed into history as a distasteful period which many
people a decade later still did not wish even to discuss. It is this
rejection of the legacy of the First Republic which serves as a point
of departure for an understanding of the New Regime fashioned
by President Mobutu.
T H E N E W R E G I M E , I 96 5 —7 5
Mobutu at once made his intentions clear by asking for five years
in which to rebuild the country. The complete blueprint was not
at hand; indeed, the coup had not been planned far in advance
of execution. From the outset, however, certain themes were
clear: depoliticisation, to cleanse the country of the political
divisions of the First Republic; centralisation; creation of new
political institutions; personal rule, with the presidency as the
supreme institution. Mobutu intended to serve as a political
leader, not as military caretaker; from the outset, few military
personnel were called upon to serve in either political or ad
ministrative roles.
Political parties were dissolved; parliament was retained, and
met occasionally for ritual approval of the budget for the
remainder of its prescribed five-year term. Perhaps its major
function was to serve as a well-remunerated sinecure for an
important cross-section of politicians whose discontent would
have been irritating, if not dangerous. A t the end of 1 9 6 6
provinces were reduced in number to eight plus a capital district
of Kinshasa, and transformed into purely administrative organs.
The perils of opposition were quickly demonstrated. On 30 May
1 9 6 6 , four leading figures of the First Republic (including ex-Prime
Minister Kimba) were accused of conspiracy, tried in a five-minute
court martial the following day, and hanged at once in a public
square in Kinshasa. The benefits of collaboration, on the other
hand, were seductive, as the president quickly developed exquisite
skills in patrimonial distribution of benefices.
The mercenary elements and Katanga gendarmerie units were
a serious menace, as Tshombe soon resumed plotting from
Spanish exile. Mobutu could not at first afford the risk of expelling
73i

the former and disbanding the latter, until his hold on p o w e r was
secure and the campaigns against the remaining pockets of rebels
completed. The nature of the menace was made clear when 2000
Katanga gendarmes backed by a number of mercenaries mutinied
at Kisangani in July 1 9 6 6 . A more serious mutiny occurred in July
1 9 6 7 , led by Colonel Jean Schramme, a former Belgian settler
connected with the Tshombe faction. The conspiracy was partly
aborted when Tshombe was kidnapped on the eve of the planned
uprising, and imprisoned in Algiers, where he died t w o years later,
officially of a heart attack. However, nearly 100 mercenaries and
several hundred Katangans did seize control of Kisangani, then
retreated to Bukavu, which they held until November.
x
By 9 6 7 , Mobutu was ready to give institutional form to his
new regime. A t the centre, effective p o w e r was concentrated in
the office of the president. A single national party, the Mouvement
Populaire de la Revolution (MPR), was created in May 1 9 6 7 .
Generously endowed with government funds and vehicles, the
party extended its structure throughout the country in the months
that followed. There quickly appeared jurisdictional conflicts
between the administrative and party representatives at different
echelons of government, leading to a decision in October 1 9 6 7
to fuse at each level the party and administrative responsibilities.
The MPR role was extended to all organisational sectors: unions,
youth and student organisations were converted into party
organs, and cells were established in Catholic seminaries and army
units. The apotheosis came in the 1 9 7 4 revised constitution, which
declared the MPR to be * the nation politically organised', a n d ' the
sole institution' of Zaire. The state itself, according to this
constitutional theory, was simply a dependent emanation of the
party. States, however, especially those cut from the cloth of the
bureaucratic-authoritarian colonial tradition, do not wither away
so easily. The more pervasive the party domain became, the more
indistinguishable it became from the state.
Beyond the extraordinary definition of the party role, the 1 9 7 4
constitution stands out for the breathtaking scope it gave to the
power of the president. The leader of the party automatically
became president of the Republic. He presided over all organs of
the nation: the Political Bureau of the party (which determined
broad policy goals and principles), the Council of Ministers
(charged with the execution of Political Bureau decisions), the
73*

THE N E W R E G I M E
National Legislative Council (which gave its views on budget and

details of policy decisions, but could not challenge their essence),
and the Supreme Court. Further, in effect the president named all
the members of these various organs. The style of political rule
under the Mobutu regime can be usefully described as
1
'patrimonial'. Although initially he included in top posts many
of the leading luminaries of the First Republic, they were
progressively isolated from their sources of autonomous power
and eventually thrust aside in favour of a new political generation
which had hitherto played more secondary roles, o r which had
emerged after 196 5, primarily from the growing ranks of university
graduates. Few were permitted to keep a particular post very long,
and there was constant rotation in the ruling organs. The
increasingly personalist style of the regime was evident also in the
evolution of its official ideology. The first MPR platform, the
Nsele Manifesto, issued on 20 May 1 9 6 7 , had as its central theme
'authentic Zairean nationalism'. National dignity, non-alignment,
an assertion of indigenous values in the place of imported
doctrines, such as scientific socialism o r capitalism, were its
themes. In 1 9 7 1 , Mobutu unveiled the doctrine of'authenticity';
Zairean nationalism had to reject the alienating overlay of
imposed western values to fulfil itself through the Zairean cultural
heritage. In the 1 9 7 4 constitution, ideological evolution proceeded
a further step by the establishment o f ' Mobutuism' as the national
doctrine. The content of this political thought was to be discovered
in the writings, the speeches, and the actions of Mobutu.
The Mobutu regime in its first decade had undeniable accom
plishments in the political realm. The vast country had been
effectively reunited, and most disorder ended. When Mobutu
sought a new mandate as unopposed presidential candidate in the
1 9 7 0 elections, the regime and its leader had an undeniable elan.
By the end of its first decade, the negative side of the personalist
style of rule became more evident; with state resources as a vast
patrimonial domain to be apportioned among the political elite,
inequality and corruption spread throughout the body politic. By
1 9 7 5 , a deepening social malaise was again evident, compounded
by a profound economic crisis beginning in 1 9 7 4 .
1
T h i s c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n is a d v a n c e d b y J e a n - C l a u d e W i l l i a m e , Patrimonialism and
political change in the Congo ( S t a n f o r d . 1972).
753

R W A N D A : C O N S O L I D A T I O N O F T H E H U T U R E G I M E
In comparison with its t w o neighbouring states of former Belgian

Africa, the post-independence history of Rwanda was singularly
uncomplicated, if not uneventful. The essential contours of the
post-independence distribution of p o w e r were defined by the
Rwanda revolution of 19 5 9 - 6 1 . These patterns worked themselves
out more fully after 1 9 6 2 ; in 1 9 7 3 , the legitimacy of the first-
generation independence regime had eroded, and a reshuffling of
actors though not of basic political structure occurred through
the vehicle of a military coup.
In the aftermath of the revolution, a large-scale flight of Tutsi
to neighbouring countries occurred; by 1 9 6 3 , an estimated
1 3 0 0 0 0 , or nearly one third of the Tutsi population, were refugees
in Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, and Zaire. A large part of the
factionalised U N A R élite and the exiled mwami had not aband
oned hope of reversing the revolutionary outcome. Perhaps 2000
Tutsi irregulars {ingenti) were assembled in the neighbouring
states to mount a seven-pronged assault on the Kayibanda regime
in December 1 9 6 3 . Only one of the columns, 200 strong,
advanced very far, reaching a point 1 2 miles from the capital of
Kigali before they were destroyed by the Belgian-officered Garde
Nationale Rwandaise. Savage vengeance was exacted on the Tutsi
in Rwanda, with at least 1 0 0 0 0 massacred by local Hutu bands.
This disastrous invasion was the final postscript to the revolution.
Outside the country the U N A R fell apart in the succeeding
months, and internally it was removed from the posts negotiated
for it by the UN in 1 9 6 2 . The Rwanda revolution was total and
irreversible.
In the years that followed, the Kayibanda regime gradually lost
its momentum. Regional tensions within the new Hutu political
élite emerged; Hutu from the north, whose culture and history
were quite distinctive, began to murmur that affairs were domi
nated by a clique from central Rwanda and that the Kayibanda
regime permitted too high a fraction of Tutsi students in the
university and secondary schools. President Kayibanda, whose
withdrawn life earned him the nickname of ' hermit of Gitarama
offered no resistance to the military coup organised by army
commander Juvenal Habyarimana in July 1 9 7 3 . Although the
regional balance of Hutu domination was altered, with northerners
734

R W A N D A : T H E H U T U R E G I M E
now predominant, the fundamental character of the Rwanda

revolution was maintained.
B U R U N D I : F R O M M O N A R C H Y TO TUTSI R E P U B L I C A N I S M ,
I962-75
Burundi politics in the first four years of independence are an

extraordinary tangle, involving overlapping conflicts between
ganwa clans, the monarchy and its opponents, ganwa and anti-
1
royalist Tutsi, regional Tutsi and Hima groupings, and an
emergent politicisation of the polarity between Tutsi and Hutu.
By 1 9 7 5 , fundamental transformations in political sociology had
occurred. The monarchy had disappeared; the ganwa as a hegem
onic elite had lost their role. A fundamentally unstable ethnocracy
had emerged, but was yet to meet the need for a durable social
formula compatible with the diffusion of egalitarian values and
broadened self-awareness which inevitably accompany
modernisation.
On the eve of independence, a fissure opened in the dominant
U P R O N A between what were, essentially, Tutsi and Hutu
factions. Though Hutu mobilisation was limited at that point to
Bujumbura and the Lake Tanganyika shoreline, this was the first
time that the latent ethnic polarity became openly reflected in
political structures. The Tutsi faction was led by Prime Minister
Muhirwa, while the Hutu wing was headed by Paul Mirerekano,
a Hutu merchant and mystic, w h o had once been an enthusiastic
backer of Rwagasore, and remained a champion of Hutu rights.
These factions became known as 'Casablanca' and ' M o n r o v i a '
respectively, after the radical and moderate groups of African
states of the day. The horrifying example of Rwanda, not to
mention Zaire, clearly exhibited the dangers contained in rami
fying ethnic hostilities spilling o v e r from the party into the
administration. Mwami Mwambutsa, still a powerfully integrative
symbol, tried to defuse the tensions by his increasing personal
intervention in politics. In June 1 9 6 3 , Muhirwa resigned in
disgust over the mwami's intervention; Pierre Ngendandumwe,
1
S o m e o f t h e p a s t o r a l i s t s i n s o u t h e r n B u r u n d i w e r e k n o w n as H i m a . A l t h o u g h t h e y
b e l o n g t o the same original g r o u p s as the T u t s i , in B u r u n d i they w e r e b e l i e v e d t o h a v e
m i g r a t e d f r o m a different d i r e c t i o n , a n d t o b e o f lesser status than the T u t s i . T h e y d i d
n o t participate in the structures o f T u t s i h e g e m o n y o v e r the H u t u .
755

a Hutu associated with the ' M o n r o v i a ' faction of U P R O N A , was

named as prime minister. From this point forward, however,
successive governments were responsible to the court, and not to
parliament. Executive functions were at best shared with an
expanding palace entourage, largely composed of Bezi ganwa
figures.
In singularly Byzantine fashion, Tutsi extremists were able to
bring about the o v e r t h r o w of the Ngendandumwe government
by manoeuvring this ' M o n r o v i a ' regime into recognising the
People's Republic of China, contrary to the preferences of the
mwami, not to mention the Belgian and American embassies. In
April 1964, Ngendandumwe was replaced by Albin Nyamoya, a
Tutsi of noble (but not ganwa) lineage, linked to the 'Casablanca'
group of U P R O N A . The Nyamoya ministry coincided with the
peak of the Zaire rebellions, and Bujumbura became a major focus
of international intrigue. For some months Burundi politics were
dominated by the 'Chinese factor', and tracts appeared warning
of 'Communist penetration' of Burundi. In January 1965, the
mwami again intervened to sack Nyamoya, alleging 'numerous
errors and serious misjudgement... in foreign affairs as well as
1
problems related to national progress'. Ngendandumwe was
reinstalled as prime minister, only to be murdered three days later
by Rwanda Tutsi extremists. The mwami n o w turned to Joseph
Bamina, a university-trained Hutu from a high-status lineage, and
married to a Tutsi. Bamina had momentarily served as compromise
U P R O N A president in late 1962, acceptable at that point to both
Tutsi and Hutu. A t the mwami* s behest, relations with China were
severed, and a paradoxical effort, endorsed by palace and ganwa,
was made to drain by democracy the poisonous tensions which
political instability had secreted. Elections were organised in May
1965, apparently without full calculation as to their implications.
They were remarkably free and untrammelled, and resulted in a
clear triumph for Hutu candidates. This was not at once apparent
in the party labels; the pro-Hutu Parti du Peuple w o n 10 of 33
seats, while U P R O N A w o n 21. But U P R O N A was by n o w a
shambles, with as many as five different U P R O N A lists being
presented in some constituencies. The crucial factor was that 23
of 33 winners were Hutu. Pending the naming of a new
government, the mwami designated his private secretary and
1
Weinstein, Historical dictionary, 227.
736

B U R U N D I : M O N A R C H Y T O R E P U B L I C A N I S M
leading Bezi courtier, Biha, as interim prime minister in July. On

13 September 1965 the mwami confirmed his appointment,
driving the Hutu parliamentarians to the conclusion that Mwam-
butsa intended to deny them the fruits of their electoral victory.
On 18 October 1 9 6 5 , a group of Hutu officers and men
attempted a coup. This quickly failed in Bujumbura, but in the
countryside Hutu bands attacked a number of rural Tutsi homes,
killing and burning, especially in central Muramvya province.
Vengeance was swift. Some 34 military participants in the coup
were executed, and 86 Hutu political leaders were sentenced to
death on charges of complicity. In the countryside, Tutsi bands
with army support went on the rampage, slaughtering several
thousand Hutu peasants. Until that point, all governments had
contained relatively equal numbers of Hutu and Tutsi. Henceforth,
although token Hutu representation continued, Tutsi hegemony
was clearly affirmed. Biha, wounded in the attempted coup, no
longer really functioned as prime minister. The mwami, w h o had
withdrawn to the friendlier mountains of Switzerland, could not
manage conflict by remote control. Radical Tutsi led a campaign
against the Biha regime, which they labelled a Bezi clique. In
March 1 9 6 6 , the mwami designated his 19-year-old son and heir
apparent, Charles Ndizeye, to exercise his powers on the spot, but
these were now rapidly ebbing.
In July 1 9 6 6 , Prince Charles announced his imminent succession
to the throne; in September, he was crowned as Ntare V .
Although 1 0 0 0 0 0 attended his coronation, the new mwami was
too young to have mastered the arts of political intrigue and
manoeuvre. Y e t his effort to do so rapidly brought him into fatal
conflict with the Tutsi politicians. In November 1 9 6 6 , while he was
on a state visit to Kinshasa, the monarchy was abolished.
Captain Michel Micombero, w h o had led the counterattack
against the Hutu coup participants in October 1 9 6 5 , had been
named prime minister in July 1 9 6 6 ; his cabinet, like the abolition
of the monarchy, represented a major turning point in Burundi's
history. A new generation came to power, partly recruited from
the army officer corps. Factional conflict continued to supply the
inner dynamic of Burundi politics in the post-monarchy years, but
now revolved around new foci. Micombero himself was
representative of the new generation; of mixed Tutsi-Hima
origins, and a family which did not rank highly in traditional
737

prestige, he was far removed from the Bezi-Batare groupings of

old. Regional affiliations, however, did play a growing role;
Micombero and a number of his closest collaborators came from
the Bururi district in southern Burundi. Tensions rose to the
surface in 1 9 6 9 , when a number of Hutu intellectuals were killed,
and again in 1 9 7 1 , when a number of officers from central Burundi
were tried for plotting.
The next great watershed in Burundi politics was the holocaust
of 1 9 7 2 , which took the lives of roughly 5 per cent of the
population. On April 1 9 7 2 , Hutu attacks occurred simultaneously
in three places - in Bujumbura, on the eastern border, and on the
southern lakeshore, where really serious assaults occurred, with
perhaps 2000 Tutsi murdered. The reaction was not long in
coming, with the army coordinating the carnage carried out by
armed Tutsi gangs of Rwagasore Revolutionary Youth. Educated
Hutu were a particular target, as the architects of this slaughter
were clearly determined to exclude forever a re-enactment of the
Rwanda revolution. In such circumstances, the size of the death
toll becomes a grisly secret of history; serious estimates run as
high as 200000. Another victim was the deposed mwami, w h o
returned from exile in March 1 9 7 2 ; he was murdered by a radical
Tutsi politician when the Hutu attack began.
When the weeks of terror had run their course, Micombero
installed Nyamoya again as prime minister, in an effort to at least
restore harmony among Tutsi factions. In 1 9 7 4 , Micombero
dismissed Nyamoya, and the Bururi group returned to power. In
November 1 9 7 6 , the Micombero era came to an end, with a
military coup led by Colonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, a Tutsi related
to the ousted president.
The lines of ethnic hegemony had hardened in Burundi, and
it was difficult to see how the system could transcend the inherent
limitations of a legitimacy limited to 15 per cent of the population.
The ruling class was now caught in a gigantic trap. Many of its
elite were deeply imbued with egalitarian, even revolutionary
political values, and strongly rejected the older pattern of ganwa
domination and court intrigue. Y e t the threat of the servile
insurrection, with the essentially contemporary idea of martyred
Hutuhood, loomed as an omnipresent menace. A t the moment of
crisis, as in 1 9 7 2 , the fears and emotions tied to communal survival
overcame rational thought and humane conviction, leaving the
738

B U R U N D I : M O N A R C H Y T O R E P U B L I C A N I S M
path clear for the most ruthless guardians of the ethnocratic order
to pursue their macabre tasks.
E C O N O M I C C H A N G E
The period 1 9 4 5 - 5 7 was one of extremely rapid economic growth

in the Congo, whose major exports enjoyed buoyant markets.
The most important single commodity was copper, accounting
for from 50 to 60 per cent of the total value of minerals. Wartime
production was about 1 5 0 0 0 0 tons; this rose slowly to 2 5 0 0 0 0
tons by the end of the colonial period. Of roughly equivalent
importance, with exports during the 1950s w o r t h $ 5 0 - ^ 6 0 million,
were cobalt, diamonds, and tin, with gold and manganese not far
behind. The Congo has been the world's largest producer of
cobalt and industrial diamonds. Agricultural output also surged;
in the best years in the 1 9 5 0 s , its total value came close to that of
the mineral sector. The most important crops were cotton, palm-oil
and coffee. Cotton, which peaked at 65 300 tons in 1 9 5 9 , was
grown, not wholly willingly, by peasant cultivators. Palm-oil was
both produced on plantations and collected by peasant outgrow-
ers, the latter system being particularly prevalent in Bandundu
(Kwilu). Coffee became a major crop only after the Second W o r l d
W a r , developing extremely rapidly during the price boom of the
1 9 5 0 s to reach 5 6 5 4 1 tons in 1 9 5 9 .
The speed and turmoil of independence in the Congo had far-
reaching economic consequences. Investment had ceased by 1 9 5 8 ,
to be replaced by a net capital outflow of $46 million in 1 9 5 9 . The
capitalist sector endeavoured, as a holding operation, to maintain
the use of existing installations, but not to expand until about
1 9 6 7 . Its expatriate staff, unlike those of the state, generally
remained at their posts, so there was much less dislocation than
in the public sector. Peasant agriculture was particularly hard hit,
as the marketing infrastructure eroded, prices were unfavourable,
and the coercive state apparatus which had been the major factor
in cotton production could no longer enforce its cultivation;
agriculture fell from 40 to 25 per cent of total G N P from 195 8 - 6 6 .
State finances were badly disrupted; indeed, in 1 9 6 1 the
government functioned without any budget at all. Smuggling and
tax evasion deprived the state of much of its revenue; however,
the bureaucratic establishment was expanded, and its remuneration
739

increased. The scale o f inflationary pressure is measured by an

increase in money supply from an index o f 100 in i 9 6 0 to 35 5 at
the end o f 1 9 6 4 , as compared with a decline in the volume o f total
production from 100 to 7 6 . The Congo franc had declined to one
tenth o f its i 9 6 0 value at the time of the major currency reform
of 1 9 6 7 . The budgetary deficit reached 30 billion Congo francs
in 1 9 6 5 ( $ 1 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 at the official rate).
The New Regime o f President Mobutu removed the obstacle
of insecurity by 1 9 6 7 , which permitted renewed operation o f
extant installations and plantations throughout the country. The
1 9 6 7 devaluation gave a five-year respite from inflation, and a
period of favourable export prices plus a recovery of production
to pre-independence levels produced buoyant exchange holdings;
by 1 9 7 0 Zaire was able to boast that it was one o f the rare Third
W o r l d countries whose currency was solid enough to be used in
International Monetary Fund lending. State revenues surged from
a l o w o f $ 1 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 in 1 9 6 2 to $ 2 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 in 1 9 6 8 , as public
finances were brought for a time under relative control.
However, Mobutu's patrimonial politics came to require large
outlays through a poorly controlled presidential account. By 1 9 7 4 ,
$ 1 0 0 million o f just o v e r $1 billion o f government expenditures
went officially through the presidency, and the real amount was
in fact significantly higher. Linked to the large-scale distribution
of public funds to reward fidelity was the institutionalisation o f
corruption; by one estimate, some 6 0 per cent o f the 1 9 7 1 state
revenue was diverted to purposes other than those officially
1
stated. A period o f record copper prices from 1 9 7 2 till April 1 9 7 4
produced a short-lived bonanza in public revenues, which in turn
triggered a surge of expenditures; public outlays rose from $548.3
million in 1 9 7 2 to $ 1 1 8 3 . 8 million in 1 9 7 4 . Heavy external
borrowing occurred in the early 1 9 7 0 s to finance an ambitious
programme o f development, and led to an external debt o f more
than $2 billion by 1 9 7 5 , placing the country on the brink o f
international bankruptcy.
Economic nationalism was a recurrent theme under the New
Regime, beginning in 1 9 6 6 with a decisive confrontation with the
most powerful enterprise o f the country, U M H K . Zaire insisted
that U M H K be reconstituted as a Zairean corporation, rather than
1
Jean-Philippe P c c m a n s , ' T h e social a n d e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t o f Zaire since
i n d e p e n d e n c e : a n h i s t o r i c a l o u t l i n e ' , African Affairs, A p r i l 1975, 7 4 , n o . 295, 162.
740

continuing as a Brussels-domiciled enterprise. W i t h negotiations

at an impasse, Mobutu suddenly published an ordinance on i
January 1 9 6 7 nationalising the Zairean-based installations of the
company. Although rumours circulated for a time that Mobutu
intended to bring in Japanese or French interests to manage the
nationalised copper installations, a compromise very favourable
to the former owners was soon arrived at. A n o t h e r subsidiary of
the Société Genérale (the parent company of U M H K ) , the Société
Genérale des Minerais, was assigned management rights o v e r the
Zairean enterprise, which eventually was named the Genérale des
Carriéres et des Mines ( G E C A M I N E S ) ; by way of compensation,
for 15 years it was to receive 6 per cent of gross sales, estimated
to yield between $ 1 8 0 million and $ 3 6 0 million, depending on the
prices. The net U M H K investment of external capital had been
$200 million, nearly all of which had been completed by the 1 9 2 0 s .
From 1 9 5 0 - 6 6 , U M H K profits totalled nearly $1 billion, o f which
1
roughly $320 million had been reinvested.
The zenith of economic nationalism was the 1973—5 period. On
30 November 1 9 7 3 , the president announced a sweeping set of
measures, prescribing the Zaireanisation of commerce, plan
tations, and many small and medium enterprises. The more
attractive concerns wound up reserved to the top echelon of
politicians and army officers, often acting through wives or
relatives. Vast disruption o f the commercial sector followed, as
the Zairean acquéreurs generally lacked commercial experience,
access to credit, and contacts with suppliers. Many were content
to strip the assets of their businesses. The 30 November measures
soon became intensely unpopular, and acquéreur a social epithet,
the new owners being blamed for shortages and price rises.
A t the end of 1 9 7 4 , Mobutu tried to defuse the rising
resentment by a 'radicalisation of the revolution*. Party officials
were told to abandon their businesses, and to repatriate their
foreign bank accounts. The larger Zaireanised enterprises were
placed under state control, along with a second w a v e of businesses
that had not been covered by the measures of 30 November 1 9 7 3 .
Radicalisation failed in its turn; the draconian measures were very
unevenly applied and the state-directed reorganisation of large
Zaireanised enterprises could not halt the economic haemorrhage.
In March 1 9 7 6 , Zaireanisation was, for the moment, abandoned,
1
Unite ( B r u s s e l s ) , F e b r u a r y - M a r c h 1970.

and former owners promised the 'retrocession' of their

businesses.
Another major determinant of economic policy, joined to
economic nationalism, was Mobutu's expansive vision of Zaire's
manifest destiny : a mission of leadership in Africa, an example
of what a new African state could achieve in spectacular devel-
opment. Realisation of these ambitions necessitated a rapid
increase in government resources. In the short run, this could only
be accomplished by accelerating the exploitation of Zaire's
treasure trove of minerals.
A generous investment code was promulgated in 1 9 6 9 . The
major lure was the huge deposits of copper and allied metals in
Shaba, previously held in reserve by U M H K . After vigorous
competition among assorted international interests, the largest
copper deposit was leased to a predominantly Anglo-American
consortium, the Société Minière de Tenke Fungurumé (SMTF),
headed by A M O C O Mines and Charter Consolidated (28 per cent
each). A smaller copper concession was granted to a Japanese
consortium, S O D I M I Z A . Other new investments included a
Goodyear tyre factory and General Motors assembly plant in
Kinshasa, a Continental Grain flour-mill in Matadi, and G u l f Oil
development of offshore oil deposits, which began production in
1975.
A tremendous energy and transportation infrastructure was
required to underpin these developments. Old Belgian plans to
tap the enormous hydroelectric potential of the lower Zaire River,
dating from 1 9 1 0 , were finally put into operation; Inga, phase I,
was begun in 1 9 6 6 , and completed in 1 9 6 8 . By 1 9 7 2 , w o r k had
begun on Inga II, which would raise capacity to 1.3 million
kilowatt hours (about half the capacity of Cabora Bassa) ; ultimate
potential was 30 million kilowatt hours. By 1 9 7 3 , w o r k had begun
on the gigantic direct transmission line from Inga to Shaba, whose
costs would exceed $ 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 , with plans to complete the rail
links from the copper mines to the sea.
By the early 1 9 7 0 s , the full implications of this strategy were
becoming manifest. Dependency on copper was overwhelming;
G E C A M I N E S alone contributed 50 per cent of the state revenue,
and two-thirds of the foreign exchange. Sharply deteriorating
terms of trade for peasant producers demoralised the villages.
Cotton output dropped from 6 3 0 0 0 tons in 1 9 5 9 to an average
742

of about 20000 tons in the early 1 9 7 0 s . By 1 9 7 6 , palm-oil exports

were less than one quarter the pre-independence figure. By 1 9 7 5 ,
imports of the three major cereals, maize, rice and wheat, rose
from 4 7 0 0 0 tons in 1 9 5 9 to an estimated 3 2 5 0 0 0 tons by 1 9 7 5 .
For Rwanda and Burundi, the narrow limits set by geographic
isolation from markets, high population densities, slight apparent
mineral endowments, absence of industry, and shortage of land,
ruled out the spectacular ambitions of Zaire. But with nothing
but the rural sector to nurture, both accorded agriculture a higher
priority, and avoided the pattern of rural deterioration which
characterised Zaire.
Coffee, seriously promoted since the Second W o r l d W a r ,
averaged an annual production of about 1 0 0 0 0 tons in both
Rwanda and Burundi by the late 1 9 5 0 s . After a brief drop in
production immediately after independence, output grew to an
average annual level of 2 0 0 0 0 tons each in the early 1 9 7 0 s . In 1 9 7 5 ,
this represented 90 per cent of Burundi's exports, compared to
72 per cent for Rwanda; the difference lay in the 2000 tons of tin
which Rwanda exported yearly.
The Malthusian equation was an ominous preoccupation for
both countries. Lethal famines in 1928 and 1943 demonstrated the
precariousness of the equilibrium between man and the land. In
Rwanda, by 1 9 6 8 it was estimated that only 30 per cent of the
cultivable land was fallow, with population projections suggesting
that none would remain by 1 9 8 0 . The land shortage placed
absolute limits on acreage which could be devoted to export
crops; further pressure was exerted by the one million cattle in
the t w o countries. No source of non-agricultural employment was
in prospect for more than a fraction of the peasants. In the face
of these austere circumstances, the post-independence economic
performance of both countries was surprisingly good.
The period under review brought momentous transformations in

the structure of society, and important ones in the cultural
domain. W e are doubtless too close to these changes to appreciate
their full significance, particularly in the cultural domain. One
important aspect of change, the crystallisation of new and
enlarged patterns of ethnic self-awareness, has been considered in
743

previous sections. W e will focus here particularly upon urbanis

ation, inequality, and culture. In Zaire, the institutionalisation of
a large urban sector stands out as a central contemporary trend.
In 1 9 4 0 Leopoldville, the largest city in Belgian Africa, had only
4 6 8 8 4 inhabitants; by 1 9 7 5 , there were an estimated t w o million.
Kananga, Mbuji-Mayi, Bukavu and Mbandaka, with the 1 9 7 0
census listed as having 4 2 9 0 0 0 , 2 5 6 0 0 0 , 1 3 5 0 0 0 , and 1 0 8 0 0 0
inhabitants respectively, were in 1 9 4 0 , tiny towns of 1 0 0 0 0 or less.
The urban explosion began with the Second W o r l d W a r , and
then slowly gathered force in the post-war years. Independence
brought years of extraordinary growth, triggered by the end of
controls on settlement, the rapid extension of the educational
system from the 1 9 5 0 s , and the sharp decline in rural well-being
after i 9 6 0 . The 1 9 7 0 census showed 15 per cent of the population
living in 1 1 cities with populations of over 1 0 0 0 0 0 . Although
urbanisation is of slight impact in Rwanda and Burundi, even here
the capital cities swiftly grew: Kigali from 5000 in 1 9 6 2 to
approximately 6 0 0 0 0 by 1 9 7 5 , and Bujumbura from 8000 in 1 9 4 0
to about 1 3 0 0 0 0 in 1 9 7 5 .
The character of urban life had altered as a function of this
growth. In 1 9 4 0 , the central parts of the towns were exclusively
European, with African townships of modest dimensions on the
periphery; where, as in the Copperbelt, large employers predomi
nated, company compounds for w o r k e r families, with their
ordered paternalism, were common. By 1 9 7 5 , vast squatter
communities girdled all the large towns. The former European
quarter now also housed the top ranks of the public service,
leading political figures and some successful African traders, as
well as expatriates. Until 1 9 5 7 , unemployment was a marginal
phenomenon in towns; those without jobs were simply returned
to their home communities, and only a very small fraction were
urban born. A modest recession in the western economies in 1 9 5 7
brought retrenchment to the colony, including significant
unemployment, which thereafter became a central feature of urban
life. W i t h it developed a vast and poorly measured sector of what
became known as 'informal employment': hawking, providing
small services, o r performing domestic duties at the home of a
somewhat more prosperous relative.
There were also rapidly changing patterns of stratification. In
Zaire, before i 9 6 0 stratification had been above all racial. There
744

was an absolute ceiling for Africans in the public service, and a

de facto one in private bureaucracies. Restrictions on property
ownership, access to credit, and entry to more profitable lines of
sale made African success in commerce almost impossible. Social
divisions among Africans were above all marked by prestige, as
suggested by the very term évolué, which came into currency by
1940 to denote an educated African performing a white-collar
function. A s the w o r d évolué suggests, social status was measured
by European standards. A n African w o r t h y of esteem had to
demonstrate his proximity to the domain of 'civilisation'. Edu
cation in the mission schools was certainly an indispensable
prerequisite; however, more subtle criteria than the mere number
of years in school were involved. 'Civilisation', operationally
defined, meant European culture, values and behavioural mores.
The status of évolué was conferred, in intangible ways, by the
judgement of an informal jury of missionaries, administrators and
other notables.
With independence, the top social category, the European
population, fell sharply from its peak of 110000 in 1959, then
stabilised at between 30000 and 40000. A highly remunerated
group (except for the missionaries), their life style was influential
in establishing the level of aspiration and expectation for the new
African political-administrative class which, for the first time,
commanded an income which made possible the attainment of
these dreams. In the years after independence swift rise within the
ranks of the élite depended on access to the main avenues of social
mobility. Politics, the principal though newest avenue, drew its
recruits mainly from the 25 to 35 age-group, and mainly from
those employed in the bureaucracy of both the public and private
sectors. This group had varying levels of secondary education
(university graduates were not yet present in force). The point of
entry was electoral office, or clientage ties with one w h o had
achieved political success. The great year of recruitment was i 9 6 0 ;
thereafter, access was more difficult, and criteria changed.
Additional new opportunities opened under the New Regime,
both through the apparatus of the party and technocracy.
The 10000 vacancies created at the top of the administration
by the i960 flight of Belgian functionaries provided a massive
once and for all promotion opportunity for those poised just
below. On the whole, the beneficiaries came from the category
745

of relatively senior clerks w h o could lay plausible claim to these

offices. Continued expansion of the administration made absorp
tion of the university graduates on attractive conditions easily
assured until the early 1 9 7 0 s . Private bureaucracies were much
slower to open their managerial posts to Africans : G E C A M I N E S ,
which continued to operate like a private firm after its ostensible
nationalisation in 1 9 6 7 , in 1 9 7 4 still had 1 3 6 2 expatriates (con
centrated in the technical domain), and 1 1 3 5 Africans (holding the
administrative posts).
For many, administrative and political income provided the
starting capital which could be enlarged by extramural commercial
activity, often managed by a member of the family. Especially
profitable were urban undertakings which did not require full-time
management: rental property, taxis, trucking, beverage sales. In
the early 1960s, the imposition of import controls made the traffic
in import licences extremely profitable, and brought about the
emergence of a number of prosperous, politically connected,
national import-export firms. The 1 9 7 3 Zaireanisation edict had
a powerful impact in enlarging the mercantile underpinnings of
the politico-administrative class. It should be noted that very few
of the new African businessmen emerged from the truncated,
impoverished, largely illiterate p r e - 1 9 6 0 Zairean trading
community.
Beginning in 1 9 4 0 , the size of the urban labour force expanded
quickly then stabilised. The number of wage-earners rose from
5 3 6 0 0 0 in 1 9 4 0 to 9 6 2 0 0 0 in 1 9 5 0 ; in 1 9 7 2 , the figure had fallen
slightly to 905 000. The colonial administration sought social
peace after the Second W o r l d W a r through rising real wages,
which tripled during the 1 9 5 0 - 8 period. This in turn induced the
large employers to mechanise their operations; G E C A M I N E S in
1975 produced 4 5 0 0 0 0 tons of copper with the same labour force
which had turned out less than 1 8 0 0 0 0 in 1 9 5 0 . Independence
produced a short-lived further surge in real wages, which peaked
in 1 9 6 1 for those holding permanent wage employment. Inflation
then swiftly eroded and nullified these gains; by 1 9 6 5 , real wages
were back to the 1 9 5 8 level. A n effective price-stabilisation
programme in 1 9 6 7 aimed at both the external rates of exchange
and internal price-levels. This and the introduction of a new
currency permitted a halt to inflation and a brief recovery of wage
levels. However, by 1 9 7 2 , deterioration had set in once again. The
746

International Labour Organisation reported that between 1964

and 1975 the real minimum wage (the effective remuneration level
1
for the majority of workers) fell by 5 3 per cent.
The rural sector experienced a comparable cycle. After the
harsh phase of the effort de guerre, the 1950s saw a real improvement
in rural well-being. Coercion, long the pillar of the colonial
agricultural policy, slackened, and prices paid to producers rose.
Schools, dispensaries, and clean water began to become available
in the villages. The misfortunes after i960 were particularly
detrimental to the rural sector; by 1975, real prices paid to farmers
for major crops such as cotton, coffee and palm fruits ranged from
a quarter to a third of the i960 level.
Thus a profound social malaise gripped the country. Though
contained within the authoritarian structures of the state, periodic
outbursts, such as the 1964-5 rebellions, or the wave of wildcat
strikes in 1976, were symptomatic of the discontents generated
by the contrast between the visible wealth of the administrative-
political élite and the expatriate community, and the deteriorating
situation of the mass of the populace. A t the same time, a large
element of fluidity remained in the emergent social stratification.
The expanding educational system sustained the hope of mobility
for those at the bottom, while those at the top enjoyed the
momentary use of wealth rather than secure entrenchment as a
propertied class.
The issues of stratification and inequality were differently posed
in Rwanda and Burundi, and pivoted largely around the
relationships between the two ethnic communities, Tutsi and
Hutu. The impact of the first decades of colonial rule, German
and Belgian, had been to generalise and entrench Tutsi socio
political hegemony. Early access to education had been largely
restricted to Tutsi. The premise of inequality became administra
tive ideology through a doctrine of the natural superiority of the
Tutsi ruling élite which was shared by the colonial administration
and Tutsi leaders. A crucial institution of Tutsi domination, at
the socio-economic level, was the widespread device of cattle
clientage. A patron, generally Tutsi, would provide one or more
cows to a client, normally a Hutu, in return for social and
economic services. Historically, the cattle contract had developed
1
S u s u m u W a t a n a b e , * M i n i m u m w a g e s in d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s : m y t h a n d r e a l i t y ' ,
International Labour Review, M a y - J u n e 1976, 1 1 3 , n o . 3, 353.
747

in several different forms. In central Rwanda, in the nineteenth

and twentieth centuries, it had become generalised in a form
{ubuhake) which entailed a caste-like relationship. In Burundi, the
most widespread form of clientage, ubugabtre, provided a wider
range of social choice for the client. In the post-war years, it
became an article of faith that abolition of cattle clientage was an
absolute prerequisite of social change and political development.
In 1 9 5 4 - 5 , the almost exclusively Tutsi kingdom councils in
Rwanda and Burundi, with some prodding by the colonial
administration, legally abolished cattle clientage. It later proved
that this reform, which had appeared so critical in the 1 9 5 0 s , was
simply overtaken by events. The issue of Tutsi-Hutu relation
ships, as independence approached, was translated to the political
realm. The major avenue of social mobility after 1 9 6 2 was the
limited armature of the state itself - its administration, educational
system and army. But this was too narrow a base to support a
system of stratification comparable to that of Zaire.
The sphere of cultural change is the most difficult realm of all to

understand. The mechanisms of transmission of western material
culture are massive, yet the emergent cultural synthesis did not
amount to ' acculturation \ or the replacement of the historical
cultural heritage by traits and values of western derivation. The
school system, despite efforts to reform it, remained to a large
degree western in form and content. The urban social environment
provided a very different setting from the rural community within
which the indigenous cultural heritage was formed. The transistor
radio, which became available in the 1 9 6 0 s , brought a large sector
of both urban and rural society within the reach of a world-wide
communications system. O f particular importance was the role of
the Christian Church. In all three countries, the Catholic Church
in particular had been strongly implanted. Zaire already had 500
African priests by i 9 6 0 , and by 1975 there were t w o dozen Zairean
bishops, and one Cardinal. In 1 9 6 8 , the Catholic Church claimed
the membership of 7 1 per cent of the Burundi population, and
5 5 per cent in Rwanda. A measure of the social influence of the
church lay in its periodic political conflicts with the secular
authorities in Zaire, beginning in 1 9 7 1 . The church, at that
juncture, was the major social institution which lay outside the
orbit of the state; the assaults upon it appear to have merely
748

strengthened its attraction as an alternative to the existing

socio-political order. Protestant churches were less potent, but
claimed significant followings. After i 9 6 0 , their number was
increased by official recognition of African separatist churches,
especially the Kimbanguists, rigorously suppressed by the colonial
authorities as a political threat. Following independence, in Zaire
the Kimbanguist church spread far beyond its initial K o n g o
cultural zone, especially in Kasai. In 1 9 6 8 it was admitted to
membership of the W o r l d Council of Churches.
Language was a particularly important arena and sensitive
indicator of cultural change. In Zaire, the salient trend was
towards the crystallisation of a multilingual society. The major
regional languages, particularly Lingala and Swahili, spread
rapidly during our period. Although no precise figures are
available, it is safe to assert that, by the end of it, only the most
isolated social categories of Zairean society (the elderly, rural
women, young children) were not at least bilingual. In Rwanda
and Burundi, the existence of Kinyarwanda and Kirundi as
universally known indigenous languages made less necessary the
diffusion of Swahili as the vehicular language, although the latter
played an important role in Bujumbura. W e may thus see
J
symbolically enacted on the linguistic battlefield the drama of
cultural change. The diffusion of regional languages represented
the emergence of new forms of cultural synthesis, often urban-
centred. These were also manifested in such domains as music and
dance which formed an important part of urban leisure activities,
or the syncretic forms of urban popular art. A t the same time, the
impact o f western culture continued in the linguistic as well as
other domains through the continuing spread of French.
A central plank in the platform of post-war colonial reform was

the serious commitment, for the first time, to a broad-based
educational system. The educational pyramid was, h o w e v e r , to be
constructed gradually, floor by floor. Accordingly, a vast primary
network was established in the 1 9 5 0 s , which by the year before
Zairean independence enrolled 7 0 per cent of the 6 to 1 1 age
cohort. No less than 6 4 per cent were in the first t w o grades, and
less than 3 per cent in the sixth grade. Secondary and higher
749

education was much slower to develop. In 1959, only 29000 pupils

(less than 1000 girls) were in Zairean secondary institutions, with
a mere 136 in the final-year graduating class. The foundation of
the first universities was the occasion for bitter struggle within
the inner walls of the colonial structure. The Catholic Church
forced the issue in the early 1950s, and the administration re
luctantly authorised the establishment of Lovanium University in
Leopoldville in 1954. Anti-clerical forces had to be satisfied with
the establishment of a second, state, university in Elisabethville
in 1956. The pace of educational advance in Ruanda-Urundi was
partly influenced by pressure from the United Nations. The first
UN Visiting Mission in 1948, noting 'the concept of slowness
which is one of [the] dominant characteristics of education in the
1
territory', was critical of the absence not only of any access to
university training, but even of secondary schools. Though
secondary schools were opened in the 1950s, it was only in 1963
(Rwanda) and 1964 (Burundi) that universities were founded, in
both cases with the collaboration of the Catholic Church.
In the post-war years, strong pressure from the rapidly growing
Belgian community forced the colonial administration to establish
a state network of secular secondary schools, initially reserved for
European children. The spillover of the guerre scolaire in Belgium
(1954—8) led to the substantial expansion of a state network, now
open to some Africans. Popular pressures for greater opportun
ities, as well as ideological conviction, led successive post-
independence regimes to accord top priority to the expansion of
education. Expenditures rose rapidly in this field, reaching 30 per
cent of the Zaire national budget by 1969. In i960, only 136
children completed their secondary schooling; in 1975 20000 did
so. That same year, a university which had awarded only 14
diplomas to Zaireans in i960, awarded nearly 2000 degrees. T o
the t w o original campuses were added a Protestant university in
Kisangani in 1963, and an array of specialised post-secondary
institutes, sponsored by various international agencies.
A growing sense, in Zaire, that the state had inadequate control
over its higher educational system led to a sudden and dramatic
university reform in 1 9 7 1 , by which all units were merged into
a single national university. The reform was accompanied by the
1
U n i t e d N a t i o n s T r u s t e e s h i p C o u n c i l , F o u r t h S e s s i o n , s u p p l e m e n t n o . 2. U n i t e d
N a t i o n s V i s i t i n g M i s s i o n t o E a s t A f r i c a , Report on Ruanda-Urundi and related documents,
S e p t e m b e r 1950, 12.
75°

nomination of Zairean university administrators to occupy the

command positions on all the campuses; rationalisation and
economy were to be achieved by regrouping each specialisation on
a single campus. Though the goal of national direction and
control was largely achieved, the haste and improvisation of the
implementation brought serious dislocations.
In December 1 9 7 4 , Mobutu announced that the state would
take o v e r the Catholic and Protestant secondary and primary
systems as well; though by this time the religious networks
enrolled fewer students than the state schools, they were, on the
whole, better staffed, directed and funded. Particularly at the
secondary level, the Catholic schools were far superior to those
of the state, as measured by the much greater percentage of
graduates w h o passed the national state examination. This reform,
at least in the short run, exceeded the capacities of the state to
apply, and the Catholic and Protestant Churches were invited to
resume operation of their networks in 1 9 7 7 .
The scale and resources of Zaire necessarily predestined it for a

major role on the African stage and in world politics. Just as
certainly the tiny size and poverty of Rwanda and Burundi limited
their roles to virtual invisibility. Once independence became a
familiar fact, Belgium became by far the most important diplomatic
partner for both Rwanda and Burundi, and the source of most
of their technical assistance, while the United States purchased
most of their coffee. Periodic overtures came from France to
incorporate them within the world of francophonie. Moments of
sharp ethnic tension in either state almost necessarily translated
into difficult relations with the other, as in 1963 or 1 9 7 2 . After
1 9 6 6 , both had close relations with Zaire, except for a period of
rupture with Rwanda in 1 9 6 8 - 9 created by Rwandan refusal to
extradite mercenary mutineers from Zaire w h o took refuge in the
country.
With the New Regime, Zaire moved to assert itself as actor in,
rather than as mere object of, international politics. Other African
leaders, exhausted and embarrassed by the endless convolutions
of the 'Congo crisis', were prepared to accept Mobutu, despite
reservations held by some deriving from his intimate American
75i

associations, and his suspected involvement in the decisions which

sealed Lumumba's fate. Full entry of Zaire into the African family
was symbolised by the holding in Kinshasa of the 1 9 6 7
Organisation of African Unity summit conference. From this
point forward, Mobutu had sufficiently consolidated his domestic
position to move from the modest goal of full acceptance to a
restless quest for African leadership. In 1 9 7 0 , he paid state visits
to ten African states, and in 1 9 7 2 attracted eight African heads
of state to his party conference. 1 9 7 3 was the high water mark;
Mobutu spent no less than 1 5 0 days outside Zaire, including visits
to 1 4 African states (and 1 2 others). In January 1 9 7 3 he paid a
spectacular state visit to China, returning with a pledge of
$ 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 as aid for rural development. On 4 October 1 9 7 3 , he
made a major address at the United Nations, highlighted by a
surprise announcement of a rupture with Israel t w o days before
the Y o m K i p p u r war. Thereafter, some major reverses deflated
the aspirations to African leadership of the New Regime. The
rapid economic deterioration which became evident in 1 9 7 4 made
reconciliation with western creditor powers imperative. The civil
war in Angola was disastrous for Zaire, which was deeply
committed to the defeat of the M P L A . In September 1 9 7 5 , several
Zairean battalions were operating inside Angola jointly with the
F N L A , which was long dependent on Zairean support. The
unforeseen entry of Cuban army units into the fighting in
November quickly led to disaster for the Zairean and F N L A
units. The simultaneous South African intervention in southern
Angola placed Zaire in an impossibly exposed role, humiliated by
defeat, and disgraced in Africa by complicity with apartheid and
imperialism. Although the struggle against the M P L A was
officially abandoned in February 1 9 7 6 , distrust between Angola
and Zaire remained profound.
The t w o most important extra-African partners of Zaire
between i 9 6 0 and 1 9 7 5 were Belgium and the United States.
Relations with Belgium followed a widely oscillating curve, with
moments o f fervent cordiality alternating with periods of bitter
recriminations and even rupture. A Treaty of Friendship con
cluded just prior to independence was denounced t w o weeks later
by a Zairean government outraged by the unsolicited intervention
of Belgian troops, and the military and technical assistance
rendered by Belgium to the secessionist state of Katanga. The
75*

removal of the Lumumba government on 5 September i960 led

to resumption of active ties between Kinshasa and Brussels, and
by 1963 to very close relationships. Belgian military aid was
critical in repulsing the 1964-5 rebellions. However, the U M H K
nationalisation controversy of 1966-7 brought a new cycle of
crisis. By 1970, restored intimacy was symbolised by a spectacular
royal visit by K i n g Baudouin. The 'radicalisation' period o f
1973-5 brought renewed crisis; by 1975 financial disaster made
warmer relations with Belgium again indispensable.
Although links with the United States were less dense and
multiplex than those with Belgium, America served as inter
national patron throughout most of the 1960-75 period, usually
acting in concert with Belgium. Zairean independence coincided
with a peak in global interventionism and Cold W a r preoccupation
in United States foreign policy. Exaggerated fears of a ' S o v i e t
take-over' drew the US deeply into Zairean politics in i960, both
directly in covert and diplomatic support for the removal o f
Lumumba, and indirectly through its substantial (though not
determinant) influence in the United Nations operation in Zaire.
Successive Zairean governments had intimate political ties with
the United States. However, as President Mobutu became more
self-confident, susceptibility to direct American influence dimin
ished, giving way to a frigid period in 1974—5, culminating in
allegations of American complicity in a confused conspiracy to
eliminate Mobutu in June 1975. Common opposition to the
M P L A in Angola and the exigencies of the economic crisis
restored close relations.
Relations with the Soviet Union were predominantly hostile.
The USSR made a short-lived bid at major military support to
the Lumumba regime in late August i960, but at that time - in
contrast to the Angolan situation in 1975 - the U S S R lacked the
logistical capability to intervene swiftly and effectively. W i t h the
overthrow of Lumumba, Soviet diplomats were expelled. The
USSR viewed Zaire as an American client state; Zaire accused the
Soviet Union of meddling on successive occasions (1964
rebellions, 1971 student crisis at Lovanium University, S o v i e t -
Cuban backing of M P L A in 1975, the Katanga gendarme invasions
of 1977 and 1978). China, although viewed as a dangerous source
of subversion in the early 1960s, became a warm friend a decade
later with major state visits to Peking by Mobutu in January 1973
753

and December 1 9 7 4 . In early 1 9 7 5 , China was in many respects

Zaire's closest ally, a remarkable episode (even if short-lived)
which takes us conveniently back to our starting point: the
unbelievable transformation of Central Africa in 3 5 short years.
In 1 9 4 0 , Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi were so firmly embedded
in the colonial domain that not even the most visionary prophet
could have imagined what lay beyond.
754

CHAPTER 15
PORTUGUESE-SPEAKING AFRICA
With an appendix on Equatorial Guinea
Although modelled with local variations on the ideas and struc

tures of Italian Fascism, and later stiffened by an admiration
for German National-Socialism, Portugal's Estado N o v o was
constrained to neutrality during the Second W o r l d W a r . G e o
graphical realities allowed no decisive preference for the Axis
powers before the great turning points of 1 9 4 2 : unlike Franco's
Spain, Salazar's Portugal sent no troops to aid the Germans on
its eastern front. After those turning points the merest common
sense ensured that Portugal's neutrality should be such as to p r o v e
acceptable to the western allies.
Portugal's colonies remained intact, but the overall influence
of the W o r l d W a r , though less of a nexus of change than it
proved elsewhere in colonial Africa, can now be measured as one
of various and in some ways profound effect. On the side of the
colonised, this influence constituted a formative prelude to the
beginning of anti-colonial protest in modern forms; on that of
the colonisers, it spurred the system to greater and more insistent
exploitation of natural resources and African labour. Generally,
the colonial governors anticipated hard times from interruptions
to maritime transport. Arguing the economic dangers that lay
ahead, the Governor-General of Angola, for example, told his
council during its session of 9 - 1 4 September 1 9 3 9 that 'he wished
to see the installation of a war economy'. In fact, so far as most
exports were concerned, the hard years were 1 9 4 1 - 2 , after which
there came a recovery and expansion. Sisal exports from Angola
fell by half between 1 9 4 0 and 1 9 4 1 , barely improved in 1 9 4 2 , but
more than doubled in 1 9 4 3 and rose again in 1 9 4 4 . Though
statistics were to remain gravely deficient in this sector as in
others, it seems clear that these colonised peoples had to provide
a productive ' war effort' by way of additional forced labour and
other coercions, such as was imposed elsewhere, and especially
in the Belgian Congo and French West Africa.
755

P O R T U G U É S E - S P E A K I N G A F R I C A
Steady expansion of the colonial economy began after 1 9 4 5 .

This quickened through the 1 9 5 0 s and again later; but the future
of Portuguese control was beginning by the early 1960s to be
challenged by movements of African nationalism. So that although
colonial economic expansion makes after 1945 a continuity except
in Guiñé and the islands, the whole period of 30 years can best
be understood by dividing it into t w o phases, respectively from
1945 to i 9 6 0 , and onwards from 1 9 6 1 : before and after, that is,
the rise of effective movements of African contestation. The
origins of these movements belong to the 1 9 5 0 s , even to the late
1 9 4 0 s ; their action on the ground, and the great dramas to which
it led, belong to the second phase.
The human arena o f these events can be outlined by reference
to the decennial census o f 1 9 5 0 . Its findings were really little more
than rough estimates, except in the counting of whites and
assimilated non-whites, but show at least the broad composition
of the peoples w h o were soon to become involved in long and
large upheavals. Returns for Angola gave 4 0 3 6 6 8 7 Africans (with
a slight excess of females), 7 8 8 2 6 'non-natives' (equivalent to
whites), and 3 0 0 8 9 assimilados (or non-whites admitted to the
status of 'civilised persons'). Those for Mozambique showed
5 7 3 2 3 1 7 Africans (again with a small excess of females), 9 1 9 5 4
'non-natives' (as well as 1 6 1 3 listed as ' y e l l o w ' and 1 2 6 3 0 as
'Indians'), and 4 3 4 9 assimilados. Guiñé was thought to h a v e some
5 0 3 9 7 0 Africans, together with 2263 whites, 6 0 6 4 assimilados (of
w h o m 4 5 6 8 were listed as mestiços, and no doubt included a
proportion of persons o f Cape Verdean origin), and 1 1 'Indians'.
The Cape Verde archipelago had at least 1 5 0 0 0 0 people, all of
w h o m were formally outside the categories of the indigenato,
although, for most of them, this was a narrow privilege within
1
the system: there were also some 4000 whites. Sâo Tomé and
1
In a survey of 1977 devoted to the history of Cape Verdean emigration, and
containing much otherwise unanalysed statistical material, Antonio Car re i ra finds that
the term 'forced emigration' should be applied to the 73056 Cape Verdeans listed in
official records as having gone to work in Sâo Tomé, Principe, Angola and Mozambique
in the period 1941-70. He points out that these emigrants were, in practice, subjected
to administrative coercions little different from the contract-labour system of the
indigenato, whether in regard to wage-payment or other conditions of life and work.
He doubts if the labour reforms of 1962, notably those of the Código de Trabalho Rural
of 27 April of that year, could in any case be applied, in practice, by officials long
accustomed to the 'deleterious and vitiated' systems that the Code was supposed to
displace. A. Carreira, Migraçoes nas I I has de Cabo Verde (Lisbon, 1977), 216, 224, 235,
*39-
756

P O R T U G U E S E - S P E A K I N G A F R I C A
Principe seem to have had about 6 0 0 0 0 people, again including

a few thousand whites; most of these were on Sao Tome, much
the larger island of the pair, while some 2 3 0 0 0 were migrant
'contract w o r k e r s ' from Angola, Mozambique and the Cape
Verdes. Portugal also possessed a couple of hectares at W h y d a h
in Dahomey (now Benin), the site of an old trading fort with a
commandant and assistant, until shortly after the independence
of that country in i 9 6 0 .
The total number of Africans was thus of the order of ten and
a half millions. This was probably an underestimate, but in any
case the i 9 6 0 census was to show only a small increase on these
numbers, a point that may of course be explained either by a
merely arithmetical adjustment o f ' traditional' census findings o r
by a very slow rate of natural increase. The 1 9 7 0 census figures
are of small value, given that large areas of all these mainland
territories were debarred by this time to Portuguese enquiry,
while very large numbers of rural people had fled into peripheral
countries. Enumeration in the Cape Verde archipelago in 1 9 7 0
could be less approximate since no fighting was in progress there,
and gave a total population of 2 7 2 0 0 0 o r about 1 0 0 0 0 0 more than
in 1 9 5 0 . It may be noted in this context that whereas the Cape
Verdean population appears to have suffered grievously in num
bers from drought-induced famine during 1942—3 and 1947—9 — as
with much else in Cape Verdean history, the facts remain to be
established - no such famine struck again on any serious scale
until 1 9 6 9 . Other useful points emerge from the census return.
Surprisingly, in view of later settlement policies, there were more
whites in Mozambique than in A n g o l a ; this situation w o u l d be
rapidly reversed after 1 9 5 0 , and by 1 9 7 5 the number of whites in
Angola (counting only civilians) would be at least a third more
than the number in Mozambique. Altogether, in the three
mainland colonies where the status of indigena was applied to all
not accepted as Portuguese, there were about 4 0 0 0 0 assimilados,
or considerably less than one half of one per cent of the indigenous
population. O f this tiny percentage, a large proportion was mestizo
(of mixed parentage originating from white male alliances with
non-white females); and one may safely conclude that the number
of assimilated Africans o f ' u n m i x e d ' origin was a good deal less
than one quarter of one per cent. Though statistics are lacking,
this probably rose towards one per cent in Angola and Mozam-
757

bique by about 1 9 6 5 , while an unknown but still small number

of indigenas were by this time living as assimilados without being
registered as such. Generally, these proportions portray the
factual realities of Portuguese assimilation, and help to explain the
continuing shallowness of Portuguese cultural impact even after
administrative occupation was made complete in the 1 9 3 0 s .
C O L O N I A L C O N T I N U I T Y A N D E X P A N S I O N , 1945-60
In evaluating the record on the Portuguese side a large allowance

has to be made for the propaganda of the Estado N o v o , reflecting
as this did the deep provincial isolation within which the regime
had formed and contained its spokesmen. A s late as 1 9 6 7 , when
all three mainland territories were engulfed in widespread warfare,
and the proportion of assimilated Africans was certainly no larger
than one per cent, it would remain possible for Salazar's Foreign
Minister, Franco Nogueira, to claim that Portugal ' a l o n e ' had
' practised the principle of multi-racialism, which all n o w consider
the most perfect and daring expression of human brotherhood and
sociological progress', so that ' o u r African provinces are more
developed, more progressive in every respect, than any recently
independent territory in Africa south of the Sahara, without
1
exception'.
Less unrealistic views were aired at home; and these confirmed
the essential continuity of Portuguese colonial policy from the
time of Norton de Matos's second governorship of Angola
( 1 9 2 1 - 4 ) through the purely military dictatorship of the late 1920s
and the practice of the Estado N o v o after 1 9 3 2 . The essence of
this continuity was well defined by Marcello Caetano, Salazar's
eventual successor, when a professor o f the University of Lisbon.
During a series of lectures early in the 1 9 5 0 s , Caetano explained
that
the blacks of Africa are to be governed and organised by Europeans, but are
indispensable as the latters' auxiliaries... The Africans are themselves incapable
of developing the territories they have lived in for millennia: they have made
no useful inventions, discovered no profitable technology, conquered nothing
that counts in the evolution of humanity, nothing in thefieldsof culture and
technology to be compared with the achievements of Europeans or even of
1
F . N o g u e i r a , The Third World ( L o n d o n , 1967), 1 5 4 - 5 .
758

C O L O N I A L C O N T I N U I T Y A N D E X P A N S I O N
Asiatics. The blacks of Africa are thus to be treated as productive elements

1
organised or to be organised in an economy directed by whites...
T o which J . M. da Silva Cunha, for long the regime's prominent
specialist on colonial affairs, could add with a characteristic
self-assurance that 'the principles are good, and experience is not
lacking. While mistakes have to be corrected, Portugal must
continue to serve as the master and exemplar for those peoples
2
w h o are the educators of other peoples.'
Set against this background of an intense and often passionate
attachment to economic and cultural discrimination against
Africans, even if sometimes mitigated in sexual relationships
between white males and non-white females, the task of 1945 was
seen as being to extend the policies of the 1 9 3 0 s . M o r e effectively
than before, if possible more 'rationally', the maximum amount
of labour was to be extracted from the largest feasible number of
blacks at the lowest possible cost, whether directly in white-owned
plantations and other enterprises, o r indirectly in the provision
of low-cost food produced by the rural African economy for the
benefit of populations enclosed within the colonial economy
proper. A t the same time there was to be further centralisation
of all effective controls in a reaffirmation of the Estado Novo's
rejection of previous tendencies towards giving some measure of
territorial autonomy to oversea whites.
T o these ends, one may recall, the Estado N o v o had taken o v e r
and modified the constitutional instruments of the p r e - 1 9 2 6
parliamentary regime. That regime's regulations, providing for
the coercion of labour on the principle that blacks were not
considered to be working unless for wages - that is, for whites -
were confirmed in toto. A t the same time a Colonial A c t of 1 9 3 0 ,
an 'imperial organic charter' of 1 9 3 3 , and some other regulations
had reinforced Lisbon's control of the whole imperial system. In
practice these modifications, during the 1 9 3 0 s , appear to have had
far less effect upon the scene of action than the increasingly
authoritarian attitudes of oversea governors and generals. Writing
in 1 9 3 8 , Hailey could note that their intended results were 'not
yet in full operation', and ' much indeed appears to have been left
1
M . C a e t a n o , Os nativos na economia africana ( C o i m b r a , 1954), 16, a u t h o r ' s t r a n s l a t i o n .
2
J. M . d a S i l v a C u n h a , O sistemaportugues depolitico indigena ( C o i m b r a , 1953), 236—8,
author's translation.
759

1
for determination by rules o f practice'. W i t h an interval for the
wartime years, these 'rules of practice' gradually knit together,
after 1 9 4 5 , into the strait jacket which Salazar, concerned always
to promote the identity of Portugal within a context of its
medieval history, insistently envisaged. They were also assisted
by other regulations, notably those of 1 9 5 4 which further crys
tallised the differences in status between indigena and assimilado.
The system accordingly did not develop, much less change; but it
grew in size and coercive power.
No democratic politics being permitted to any community, one
sees this g r o w t h in the economic and administrative fields. Many
more men (with an unknown but probably not small number of
women) were brought within a system of exploitation ' organised
in an economy directed by whites'. This was achieved by an
extension of labour recruitment on one hand, and of the obligatory
cultivation of export crops on the other. Thriving on both, the
colonial economy went steadily ahead after 1 9 5 0 : for example,
Angolan coffee production rose from 3 8 3 8 0 tons in 1 9 5 1 to
1 6 8 0 0 0 in 1 9 6 1 . The enlargement o f obligatory cultivation of
export crops was almost certainly very great in all three mainland
territories. A n independent observer in Mozambique during 1 9 5 8
found that 'the actual number of men, women and children w h o
are being forced to plant cotton (on acreage taken out of food
production) probably exceeds one million. In 1 9 5 6 , the 5 1 9 0 0 0
sellers received an average of $ 1 1 . 1 7 per person as their family's
2
reward for an entire year's w o r k . ' Comparable conditions existed
in central and western areas of Angola, as also to a small extent
in the groundnut zones of Guine, and were to form a major factor
in fuelling African discontent.
Forced labour formed another. Masked as 'contract labour',
this appears to have become ever more prevalent. Designed
initially by Norton de Matos during his first governorship of
Angola ( 1 9 1 2 - 1 5 ) as an improvement on surviving practices of
3
domestic s l a v e r y , contract labour had to be supplied by all fit
adult males (but excluding assimtlados) w h o could not otherwise
show that they were 'employed', which meant working for a
wage, during six months of the year. Reliable figures are again
1 2 l 6
L o r d H a i l c y , An African survey, 2nd e d . ( L o n d o n , 1945)» -
2
M . H a r r i s , Portugal*s African 'wards' ( N e w Y o r k , 1958), J I .
3
S e e N . d e M a t o s , A Provincia de Angola ( P o r t o , 1926), 15-16, 126-7.
760

lacking, but something o f the prevalence o f this system can be

seen from the official returns o f the Department o f Native Affairs
in Luanda, examined in 1 9 5 4 by another independent observer.
These showed, for all Angola, a total of about 3 7 9 0 0 0 contradados
(those w h o m Norton's much earlier regulations had designated
as servi(ais) compared with about 400 000 voluntarios (those working
1
for wages outside the 'contractual' system). For the plantation
economy, at that time, the Department o f Native Affairs worked
to a rough ratio of 3 3 contradados for each hundred hectares.
By the middle 1 9 5 0 s , in short, perhaps a quarter o f all adult
males in rural Angola were enclosed directly within the colonial
economy under conditions o f more o r less coercion. It was
evident, moreover, that regulations forbidding recruitment for
private employers were a dead letter. A n inspector-general o f
colonies, reporting in 1 9 4 7 , thought that the worst aspect o f the
labour position lay
in the attitude of the State to the recruitment of labour for private employers.
Here the position is worse in Angola than in Mozambique: because in Angola,
openly and deliberately, the State acts as recruiting and distributing agent for
labour on behalf of settlers who, as though it were natural, write to the
Department of Native Affairs for 'a supply of workers'. This word 'supply*
[fornecer] is used indifferently of goods or of men... In some ways the situation
is worse than simple slavery. Under slavery, after all, the Native is bought as
an animal; his owner prefers him to remain asfitas a horse or an ox. Yet here
the Native is not bought: he is hired from the State, although he is called a
free man. And his employer cares little if he sickens or dies, once he is working,
2
because when he sickens or dies his employer will simply ask for another.
A continuity of policy was marked in the cultural field as well.

Following a Concordat of 1 9 4 0 , a missionary statute o f 1 9 4 1
completed an earlier trend towards entrusting all education o f
Africans to Catholic missions (save for a small number o f British
Baptist and American o r Canadian Methodist missions, these
1
F i g u r e s supplied t o t h e author, in mid-1954, b y t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f N a t i v e Affairs,
Luanda. F o r a precise colonial restatement o f the continuing policy o n African labour,
see Re latorio do Gov.-Geral de Mozambique: Gen. Jose Tristao de Bettencourt ( c o v e r i n g p e r i o d
20 M a r c h 1940 t o 31 D e c e m b e r 1941), ( A g e n c i a G e r a l d a s C o l o n i a s , L i s b o n , 194 5), 7 7 - 8 5.
2
T h i s severely frank report w a s m a d e b y H e n r i q u e G a l v a o , then inspector-general
o f c o l o n i e s . K e p t s e c r e t , it w a s a f t e r w a r d s p r i n t e d b y t h e c l a n d e s t i n e o p p o s i t i o n . T h e
p a s s a g e i n q u e s t i o n is f r o m t h e a u t h o r ' s t r a n s l a t i o n i n B. D a v i d s o n , The African
awakening ( L o n d o n , 1955), 205. G a l v á o s u b s e q u e n t l y p u b l i s h e d t h e r e p o r t i n f u l l , i n a
s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t a n d m o r e a b r a s i v e t r a n s l a t i o n , i n H . G a l v a o , Santa Maria: my crusade
for Portugal, tr. W . L o n g f e l l o w ( L o n d o n , 1961), 53.
761

being tolerated because powerful governments could defend

them). The education provided was of a merely primitive nature,
being limited to a little literacy and the catechism, although white
and assimilado children could have access to a few secondary
schools run by the state. Y e t even if the Portuguese cultural
approach could have found a place for mass literacy - and as late
as 1 9 5 8 , according to an estimate of UNESCO's, illiteracy in
Portugal itself was still as high as 4 4 per cent - the economic
system posed no educational requirement. So the 1 9 5 0 statistical
review offers no surprise in showing that illiteracy for all sectors
of the population stood at 9 6 . 9 7 per cent in Angola, at 9 7 . 8 6 per
cent in Mozambique, and at 98.95 per cent in Guiñé, while even
that of the Cape Verdean population, ostensibly all o f ' civilised *
status, stood at 7 8 . 5 0 per cent. Educational facilities for the
* civilised' minority were better, but still at a low level. Even in
195 5 - 6 , with an Angolan white population totalling some 1 1 0 0 0 0
(not counting perhaps 3 5 000 assimilados), only 3 7 2 9 students were
registered in 'academic' education and 2 1 6 4 in 'technical'
1
education. A s late as 1 9 5 8 , only one Mozambican African had
acquired a university degree.
However archaic the system, Salazar and those w h o followed
him were determined to preserve it, seeing their empire not only
as a vital means of assuring a favourable balance of payments for
Portugal itself, but also, in their ideology of Lusitanian grandeur,
as being crucial to Portugal's standing and importance in the
world. On their view of the matter, any concession to liberalising
reform must lead irrevocably to Portugal's gradual displacement
by rival imperialist powers, and most probably by the controlling
influence o f the United States. A well-known declaration of
Salazar's, perfectly representative of many others made about the
colonies, may suffice to encapsulate an intransigence that was
based on fear of Portugal's imperial weakness. ' W e will not sell,
we will not cede, w e will not surrender, w e will not s h a r e . . . the
smallest item of our sovereignty', he declared at a time when
stronger colonial powers had begun to withdraw their political
controls.' Even if our constitution would allow this, which it does
2
not, our national conscience must refuse i t . '
1
M . A . Samuels and N . A . Bailey, 'Education, health, and social welfare', in
D . M . A b s h i r e a n d M . A . S a m u e l s ( e d s . ) , Portuguese Africa, a handbook ( L o n d o n , 1969),
187.
2
Q u o t e d b y N . d e V a s c o n c e l o s , Nao! ( L i s b o n , 1961), p r e f a c e . A u t h o r ' s t r a n s l a t i o n .
762

Such was to remain the official philosophy to the end; but it

acquired new life in the 1950s. Hoping for admission to the United
Nations, the regime took measures to forestall outside enquiry
into the conditions of the colonies. A constitutional change of
1951 declared that the colonies were henceforth to have the formal
status of oversea provinces of the mother-country. Duly admitted
to the United Nations in 1 9 5 5 , the regime denied having any
obligation under Article 73 of the UN Charter, which concerns
non-self-governing territories, since its oversea provinces were as
much a part of Portugal, constitutionally, as the A l g a r v e or Lisbon
itself. This at least prevented any on-the-spot investigation by
agencies of the UN, as well as releasing Lisbon from the need to
make reports.
Generally, by i 9 6 0 , the system had reached a point where its
promoters could well believe, no matter what might be argued
by sceptics, that they had reached an equilibrium capable of
further economic enlargement, but calling for no structural
change. Towards all but a minute fraction of the non-white
population, this future might offer some eventual alleviation of
'native' status, but could allow for no development into a
different system. There was quite a bit of internal criticism,
notably from such men as Augusto Casimiro w h o had served as
a provincial governor in Angola, but it made no difference. No
scandals arising from coercion, and there were many of them,
seem ever to have disturbed the certitudes of Salazar and his
principal aides. No development of any oversea variants, much
less of any non-Portuguese alternatives, could be allowed. What
Albert Perbal told the Reale Accademia d'ltalia in 1 9 4 0 , speaking
to the theme of 'Comment former les Africains à la Civilisation?*,
must hold unalterably firm. Perbal quoted as exemplary a statement
by an inspector-general of education in French West Africa:
* Evidemment, dans ce domaine, je crois que nous sommes amenés
à dire qu'il ne peut s'agir que d'une culture purement française,
et je crois que l'idéal serait de faire des lycées qui soient le plus
1
français possible.' The difference, of course, was that the Portugal
of Salazar wished or was able to form very few lycées of any kind
at all.
Complacency marched hand-in-hand with repressive severity,
and saw no reason save European and American jealousy or
1
A . P e r b a l , ' C o m m e n t f o r m e r l e s A f r i c a i n s à la c i v i l i s a t i o n ? ' , Rea/e Accademia
d'ltalia, R o m e , 1940.
763

subversion to doubt that the march could indefinitely continue.

Thus Salazar in 1 9 5 7 :
We believe that there are decadent or - if you prefer - backward races whom
we feel we have a duty to lead to civilisation: a task of educating human beings
that must be tackled in a humane way. That we do feel and act like this is shown
by the fact that there is no network of hatred and subversive organisations [in
our territories] whose aim is to reject and displace the sovereignty of
1
Portugal...
Lesser men d o w n the ranks hastened to echo the same assurance.
Even in i 9 6 0 no concession to liberalising reform was on the
programme, nor was any envisaged except as a betrayal of the
Lusitanian mission. Y e t by i 9 6 0 the ground was already shaking
beneath their feet. The future was to be different from any that
they had imagined.
The last embers of an armed resistance by * traditional' societies

had flared and died by the early 1 9 3 0 s . Administrative control was
at last complete, relatively strong in central and southern
Mozambique and in central and western Angola, weak elsewhere
and yet adequate to the government of sparse and scattered
populations. Old hostilities to colonial rule might remain vivid
in men's minds. New movements o f rejection, messianic o r
ancestral or a mixture of the t w o , might whisper their message
in the silence of the bush. But any further attempt to challenge
the regime, head-on, seemed futile. A t the present stage of
research it is hard to be sure about this; but such is one's firm
impression for the whole of the 1 9 4 0 s and the early years of the
1950s.
A n y form o f ' p r o t e s t nationalism' was similarly long in taking
shape among the literate few o f the assimilados in the towns.
c
A l w a y s divided by a cultural gulf from the preto bofal, the savage
black' of the bush, their spokesmen since the 1880s had raged
against the policies of Lisbon or at least against the representatives
of Lisbon; but Norton de Matos and other governors of the early
1920s had stamped hard on these spokesmen and the Estado N o v o
had finally shut their mouths. For the literate few, however, the
1
I n a b r o a d c a s t s p e e c h o f i N o v . 1957, q u o t e d h e r e f r o m E . d e S o u s a F e r r e i r a ,
Portuguese colonialism in Africa: the end of an era ( P a r i s , U N E S C O , 1974), 113.
764

T H E R I S E O F N A T I O N A L I S M
Second W o r l d War and its democratic victories were to contribute

to a progress in their understanding o f the colonial situation that
made itself felt soon after the war. It may be doubtful h o w far
such declarations as the Atlantic Charter, so influential among
literate Africans elsewhere, were heard in these colonial towns o f
Portuguese Africa. But the downfall of Mussolini and Hitler,
Salazar's o w n 'masters and exemplars', could not be concealed.
The very patent lessons o f that downfall penetrated even the
1
Estado Novo's 'walls of silence'. The will to protest gradually
revived. In doing so, its thinking also changed.
The earliest clear manifestation o f a new concern with protest
was Mensagem, a cultural journal launched by a small group o f
assimilados of Luanda under the leadership o f a 20-year-old poet,
Viriato da Cruz. Appearing in 1948 - only t w o issues were ever
permitted - Mensagem carried a masthead slogan whose meaning
was to echo down the years, Vamos Descobrir Angola. In the
circumstances this was equivalent to a political programme in
itself, for its well-understood implication urged that literate
Angolans must cease to be assimilated Portuguese and must find
their way across the gulf which divided them from the preto bofal,
now to be seen n o longer as an object o f contempt or charity but
as the independent citizen of tomorrow. However elusively
expressed in a poetry o f 'going to the people', this was the
assertion o f a potential nationalism. ' W h a t we wanted to r e v i v e ' ,
da Cruz recalled afterwards, ' was the fighting spirit of the African
2
writers o f the end o f the nineteenth century, but with quite other
methods. O u r movement attacked the overblown respect given
to the cultural values o f the W e s t . . .[and] urged young people
to "rediscover" Angola in every respect, and by an organised
3
and collective e f f o r t . . . ' Although by often hidden channels,
much would flow horn Mensagem.
A t about the same time another handful o f assimilados o r their
Cape Verdean equivalents reached the same position while uni
versity students in Portugal, and strove to achieve 'a sharp aware-
1
A d e s c r i p t i o n o f A . C a b r a l ' s i n h i s f o r e w o r d t o B. D a v i d s o n . The liberation of Guini
( L o n d o n , 1969), 9.
2
A n interesting a n d v e h e m e n t g r o u p , including such forceful figures as José d e
F o n t e s Pereira. S e e D . L . W h e e l e r , ' " A n g o l a is w h o s e h o u s e ? " : early stirrings o f
A n g o l a n n a t i o n a l i s m a n d p r o t e s t , 1822-1910', African Historical Studies, 1969, 2 , n o .
i , 1 ; a n d M . d e A n d r a d e ( e d . ) , La Poesie africaine d* expressionportugaise ( P a r i s , 1969).
3
A n d r a d e , La Poesie africaine, 12. A u t h o r ' s t r a n s l a t i o n .
765

ness of the need to react against the Lusitanian idea of the black
1
man, and to sketch out the route to a national affirmation'. From
their debates, too, much would flow. They secured permission to
form a centre of African studies in Lisbon, took up the study of
African languages while discussing h o w best they might ' r e -
Africanise' themselves, and were able to publish a little of the
* poetry of rediscovery' now beginning to be written by themselves
and their companions in all the Portuguese-speaking African
territories. A m o n g these students, certainly to be regarded as
conscious nationalists by 1 9 5 0 , were three w h o would make
history: Amflcar Cabral, w h o was to found the nationalist
movement of Guine and Cape Verde, as well as being an active
participant in founding that of A n g o l a ; Agostinho Neto, w h o was
to become the leading figure in Angolan nationalism; and Mario
de Andrade, another Angolan w h o was to be the first among them
all to reach a wide international audience in these difficult early
years. Others joined them or followed much the same route: the
Mozambicans Marcelino dos Santos and Eduardo Chivambo
Mondlane (the latter, exceptionally, by way of an American
university and a job at the UN), the Angolan Deolinda de Almeida
(again, exceptionally, by way of colleges in the U S A and Brazil)
and, in the years that followed, many more.
Their political problem was twofold. How should they find
their way back to African roots? Having done that, h o w could
they then build broad movements aiming at independence? They
were to solve both these bitterly difficult problems, though not
easily; but it may bear emphasising here that one of their greatest
assets, aside from clarity of mind and courage, would repeatedly
be found to lie in what seemed their greatest obstacle. This was
the complete and unrelenting denial by the regime of any demands
for constitutional or administrative reform. Had the regime
showed any real flexibility they would have had to meet their
problems by accepting concessions; and the outcome in these
Portuguese territories could then have followed the same grad
ualist road as in those of Britain and France. Denied this flexibility,
they were obliged to think in terms of a radical alternative to the
Portuguese system. What this alternative might really be, worked
itself clear only in the action upon which they embarked. But this
unquestionable need for an alternative remained, as it began, the
essential basis of their thought and practice.
1
Andrade, La Poem afrtcatne, introduction.
766

A t that time the only Portuguese at all ready to consider an

independent future for the colonies were members of the clan
destine Communist Party of Portugal. Contacts with them were
possible, whether in Lisbon or in colonial capitals, though also
dangerous; and it was through these contacts, by such evidence
as we n o w possess, that the early nationalists found their way to
Marxist forms of analysis. These in turn reinforced the argument
that any worthwhile alternative to the Portuguese system would
have to become a non-capitalist and eventually socialist alternative.
Meanwhile they wrestled with immediate difficulties. The position
of the Portuguese Communist Party was analogous with that of
the French, except for having to operate in a total clandestinity.
It was the only party in the country that was pledged to end the
colonial system, and so was often influential among African
students in Portugal; but it tended to see itself as the directing
force to that end. In the wake of the Second W o r l d W a r ,
accordingly, some attempt was made to form branch parties in
the African colonies. None ever appeared, save very briefly in
Angola around 1 9 5 4 - 5 , for this was the period in which radical
Africans in the colonies were beginning to form nationalist
organisations of their own. They thought that the Portuguese
Communists should support these organisations rather than
working in a separate organisation whose head and centre lay in
Portugal. It appears that the issue was resolved at a secret congress
of the Communist Party of Portugal in 1 9 5 7 . The handful of
Africans w h o were present argued that the proposed slogan of
'Fight against Fascism' was meaningless in the colonies, at least
for non-whites, and that any success would have to follow a
programme aimed at decolonisation. It further appears that this
was accepted. The Portuguese Communists agreed to desist from
trying to promote Communist branch-parties, and to support the
nascent movements of nationalism. In so far as these movements
were influenced by Marxism, from the start they would have to
1
come to terms with the realities of Africa.
By 1 9 5 7 these movements had already begun to take shape,
tentatively, among small groups working their way out of
' cultural associations' and other permitted ' clubs' o r ' gatherings'
towards a direct challenge to colonial authority. Some were
ephemeral and quickly suppressed. But a few, operating on the
1
Private c o m m u n i c a t i o n , A f r i c a n source. A s w a s o b v i o u s , then a n d later, m u c h
remained o b s c u r e a b o u t these early debates and initiatives.
767

principle that any effective movement would have to emerge from

a broad union of all possible adherents, and led by those w h o
belonged to the radical mainstream deriving from the late 1 9 4 0 s ,
managed t o hold their clandestine ground in face o f a n o w alerted
colonial police. Earliest among them was the Partido Africano de
Independencia da Guine e Cabo V e r d e ( P A I G C ) formed in Bissau
during September 1 9 5 6 by Cabral and five others on a 'minimal
p r o g r a m m e ' o f national independence for Guine and the histori
cally and culturally related Cape Verdes. Next came the M o v i -
mento Popular de Libertayao de Angola ( M P L A ) formed in
Luanda in December 1 9 5 6 . Nothing quite parallel happened in
Mozambique, where the first avowedly nationalist 'parties' took
shape among exiles in Rhodesia and Tanganyika during i 9 6 0 . But
in the middle of 1 9 6 2 three of these small groups came together
in Dar es Salaam as the Frente de Libertayao de Mozambique
(FRELIMO) with Mondlane as president. Although formed out
side Mozambique the component parts of F R E L I M O , at this
stage very much a coalition rather than a union of groups, already
had active contacts in northern Mozambique among the Makonde
people, and in most of the principal t o w n s ; and they were able,
through these, to recruit volunteers and spread their message.
Insignificant in numbers, these little movements barely yet
deserved the name. 'Nationalists without nations', as Cabral
would afterwards say o f them, they were obliged to substitute
themselves for a public opinion which had yet to crystallise in their
favour. The founding manifesto of the M P L A might well call for
'a revolutionary struggle' which would triumph through 'the
building of a united front o f all Angola's anti-imperialist forces,
taking n o account of colour, social situation, religious belief, o r
1
individual preference': the w o r k o f building, as they well knew,
had still t o be begun.
Trying to get on with that, the militants of these early years
threw themselves into the perilous labour of forming clandestine
groups, distributing illegal pamphlets, and recruiting supporters
w h o were ready to become participants. Perhaps peaceful forms
of agitation might yet shift Lisbon? There were those w h o still
hoped so, being duly encouraged by the independence o f Ghana
1
Q u o t e d i n M . d e A n d r a d e a n d M . O l l i v i e r , La Guerre en Angola: itude socio-iconomique
( P a r i s , 1971), 69-70.
768

in 1 9 5 7 and o f (French) Guinea in 1 9 5 8 , as well as by other signs

of change outside the Portuguese territories. But they soon had
reason to lose this hope, while others among them were already
sure that insurrection, however problematical, could be the only
way ahead.
Most o f those then active in the Luanda leadership were to die
in prison o r in combat before recording any memoirs, while other
evidence for this brief interlude o f peaceful agitation remains
scanty except in the case o f Guine. Writing a few years later, a
group of Angolans then in Algiers recalled that * pamphlet activity
increased considerably in 1 9 5 8 . Everywhere, but particularly in
Luanda, there was talk of armed revolution. Leaflets appeared that
appealed for armed struggle for the liberation o f Angola. They
denounced colonialism, called on the masses to revolt. Besides
this, legal o r illegal anti-colonial struggle was more intense than
1
ever in journals, existing organisations, football clubs, etc.' That
this information, recorded in 1 9 6 5 , was substantially accurate is
confirmed by Portuguese reactions. Special sections of the political
police (PIDE: Policia Internacional de Defesa d o Estado) had
2
been installed in the oversea territories as early as 1 9 5 4 . A n d in
April 1 9 5 9 the Governor-General o f Angola welcomed the arrival
of air-force units and some paratroops with a warning that: ' W e
are living in the time o f the leaflet... The leaflet has appeared in
3
A n g o l a . . . ' A little later that year the clash was already in the
open, first in Guine and then rapidly elsewhere.
Police repression put the match to the fuel in all three mainland
territories. In August 1 9 5 9 a strike o f dockers in Bissau, organised
by the clandestine P A I G C , was shot back to w o r k with at least
fifty dead and many wounded. In J u n e i 9 6 0 a large gathering o f
peasants w h o assembled at Mueda, in the northern district of Cabo
Delgado in Mozambique, so as to present complaints and claims
to the local governor, was fired into by police and army units with
1
C e n t r o d e E s t u d o s A n g o l a n o s ( e d . ) , Histdria de Angola ( A l g i e r s , 1965), 153. N o n e
o f t h e s e leaflets s e e m s t o h a v e s u r v i v e d . O t h e r m a t e r i a l s c l a n d e s t i n e l y c i r c u l a t e d
included foreign criticisms o f the Portuguese colonial system, as, for instance,
t r a n s l a t i o n s o f p a r t s o f m y r e p o r t a g e o f 1955, The African awakening ( L o n d o n , 1955)
( i n f o r m a t i o n o f 1970 f r o m t h e l a t e A n t o n i o d e M e l o , w h o w a s i n L u a n d a a t t h e t i m e ) .
2
M i n i s t e r i o d o U l t r a m a r , Cinco anos: 2 Agosto de 19 jo ay Julho de 19JJ ( L i s b o n , 1956),
107, 165.
3
Q u o t e d i n B. D a v i d s o n , ' T h e t i m e o f t h e l e a f l e t ' , New Statesman, 21 N o v e m b e r
1959.
769

1
the loss of several hundred killed. In the same month of i 9 6 0
a demonstration in Angola in support of the nationalist leader,
Agostinho Neto, arrested a few days earlier, was likewise assaulted
by armed police and army, again with many killed. These
shootings buried any lingering hope of progress by peaceful
means. In a later summary of the position as it now appeared, the
Mozambican leader Mondlane was undoubtedly speaking for his
companions in M P L A and P A I G C :
Two conclusions were obvious. First, Portugal would not admit the principle
of self-determination and independence, or allow for any extension of
democracy under her own rule... Secondly, moderate political action such as
strikes, demonstrations and petitions, would result only in the destruction of
those who took part in them. We were therefore left with these alternatives:
to continue indefinitely living under a repressive imperial rule, or tofinda
means of using force against Portugal which would be effective enough to hurt
2
Portugal without resulting in our own ruin...
Meeting secretly in Bissau a few .weeks after the mass killing of
August 1 9 5 9 , Cabral and his fellow leaders of the P A I G C had
already drawn the same conclusion, and fixed their policy as
struggle against the colonial system 'by all possible means,
including w a r ' . They then moved their base to Conakry, capital
of the neighbouring Republic of Guinea, and set about their
preparations. They were ready to launch their war in January
1 9 6 3 . The leaders of F R E L I M O followed suit in September 1 9 6 4 .
But the blaze of African counter-violence to the violence of the
system came earlier in Angola, and had much that was
spontaneous.
In January 1 9 6 1 an Angolan called Antonio Mariano, epony
mous leader of a dissident Christian sect known as 'Maria',
'embarked on a campaign against European authority and the
whole system of enforced cotton growing', burning seed, dis
carding tools, barricading roads, killing livestock, and chasing
away such Europeans as they met while marching to the chant
3
of hymns. Enough troops were on hand to deal with this
1
E v i d e n c e o f A l b e r t o - J o a q u i m C h i p a n d e , r e c o r d e d b y m e i n J u n e 1968 a n d
r e p r o d u c e d b y E . M o n d l a n e , The struggle for Mozambique ( L o n d o n , 1969), 117—8.
C h i p a n d e w a s p r e s e n t at t h e o c c a s i o n , a n d p u t t h e n u m b e r o f k i l l e d at ' a b o u t 6 0 0 \
2
M o n d l a n e , The struggle for Mozambique; 125.
3
J. M a r c u m , The Angolan revolution, I: The anatomy of an explosion (1y;0-1962)
( C a m b r i d g e , M a s s . , 1969), 125, d r a w i n g o n U P A ( A n g o l a n ) a n d P r o t e s t a n t m i s s i o n a r y
sources.
770

33 Angola: the risings of 1961.
outburst, but on 4 February the Portuguese found themselves

faced with another of a different order. A t a time when most of
the recognised M P L A leaders in Luanda were in prison with the
certainty of long sentences or worse, others under M P L A
inspiration led an attack to free them. This failed, but signalled
both the onset of a wild repression by settlers, police and army,
and the origins of the great revolt that was to end with success
in 1 9 7 5 .
While indiscriminate killing of Africans continued for weeks
in and around Luanda, a third rising of 1 9 6 1 , this time in March,
at first swept all before it. Moved partly by hatred of labour
coercion and partly by the leaders of a movement called Uniao
das Populajoes de Angola (UPA), based in Leopoldville (Kin
shasa) in the now independent Congo (Zaire), large numbers of
contradados and others seized control of wide areas of Uige and
Cuanza Norte, killing a large but unknown number of European
771

1
settlers, perhaps 200 in all, and driving out such police and army
posts as were then in the vicinity. Only in the following October
were army reinforcements able to recover the bulk of this
territory, but by then it was becoming apparent that they were
dealing with a movement very different in its nature from the
MPLA.
Originating in a lineage dispute within the K o n g o people
(divided between northern Angola and western Zaire, but with
its traditional centres in Angola), the U P A had appeared as U P N A
(Uniao das P o p u l a t e s do Norte de Angola) in 1 9 5 7 . Initially, it
brought together a number of kingmakers w h o supported a
Protestant nominee to t h e ' throne' of the ancient K o n g o kingship
in opposition to those w h o supported a Catholic nominee selected
and eventually enthroned by the Portuguese. From that it rapidly
moved to a demand for the renewed independence of the K o n g o
kingdom, and then in 1 9 5 9 , as U P A , extended its claim to speak
for an Angolan nationalism. But the U P A never escaped from its
K o n g o separatism, and soon, under the leadership of Holden
Roberto, became increasingly an instrument of its immediate
foreign backer, General (afterwards President) Mobutu Sese Seko
of Zaire. It would thus remain throughout the liberation w a r a
distraction, and often a destructive one, to the Pan-Angolan
2
nationalist effort of the M P L A .
D E V E L O P M E N T S IN C O L O N I A L P O L I C Y , 1961-75
The evidence of a peculiarly savage Portuguese reaction to these

risings of early 1 9 6 1 brought Angola to a close international
attention for the first time since the cocoa-slavery campaign of the
early years of the century. This evidence was detailed and
appalling, whether from newspaper correspondents, Protestant
missionaries, or other non-Portuguese sources. In mid-June the
British Baptist Missionary Society thought that a total of 20000
Africans killed might be a cautious estimate; and subsequent
enquiry has done nothing to reduce it. Huge numbers meanwhile
fled o v e r the northern frontier; their total by 3 October, according
1
E s t i m a t e o f t h e D i a m o n d C o . o f A n g o l a ( D i a m a n g ) i n its a n n u a l r e p o r t o f 30 J u n e
1961; a n d s e e C . P a r s o n s , ' T h e m a k i n g s o f a r e v o l t ' , i n Angola: a symposium ( L o n d o n ,
1962), 67.
2
S e e M a r c u m , The Angolan revolution; B . D a v i d s o n , In the eye of the storm: Angola*s
people ( L o n d o n , 1972); a n d b i b l i o g r a p h i e s i n b o t h b o o k s .
77*

D E V E L O P M E N T S I N C O L O N I A L P O L I C Y
to the International Red Cross, was about 141000, the beginnings

of a flood that would later mount towards 400000. In London,
faced with this catastrophe, a Conservative government defended
its amicable attitude to the Estado N o v o but deplored the
1
intransigence o f Lisbon's policy. T o this and other foreign
criticism o r comment, a badly shaken Portuguese government
eventually responded with a number o f constitutional reforms,
but without shifting its essential position.
The first of these reforms, announced on 28 August 1961,
repealed the Native Code o f 1954 (an extension o f earlier codes
of the same nature), and formally abolished the distinction
between indigena and assimtlado, granting all inhabitants, in prin
ciple, the same civic status. In practice, however, this brought
little change in the condition o f African 'fit adult males', w h o
remained legally subject to many labour obligations. Other
decrees of the same period sought to promote white settlement
and improve rural administration. Later measures o f 27 April 1962
went a little further, though again chiefly on paper, by abolishing
the ' moral obligation' on Africans to w o r k for wages and, with
this, the legal basis o f the contractual system. If unfolded within
a programme o f liberalisation some ten years earlier, this reform
could have made a considerable difference; as it was, it came much
too late to be able to achieve any useful purpose.
Another ten years of African armed resistance induced in 1971-2
a further set of constitutional reforms, though once again designed
primarily to reassure Portugal's n o w impatient allies that genuine
changes of structure were to be attempted. Chief among these was
a promise that the oversea provinces might accede in the course
of time to the status o f autonomous units, though with Lisbon
retaining all effective control o v e r finance and administration. A t
the same time some effort was made to widen the Estado Novo's
extremely narrow franchise to include a number o f black voters
and representatives in provincial legislatures. But once again the
tardy will to reform was overwhelmed by events, and in any case
remained at best a feeble and uncertain one.
Various post-war pressures led to more realistic efforts to moder

nise the antiquated structures o f the colonial economy: the rising
world demand for coffee, cotton, and mineral ores; the steady
1
E . g . Hansard, 15 J u n e 1961, c o l s . 712 ft*.
773

attrition of the wars set going by the nationalist movements ; the

growing interest of major foreign companies in the resources of
Angola and Mozambique; and Lisbon's continuing drive to
enlarge white settlement. Under this heading, there is little to be
said about Guiñé, where the nationalists had secured control over
about half the country's productive area by 1 9 6 8 and the colonial
economy was nearing bankruptcy; o r about the Cape Verdes,
where a long cyclical drought set in with disastrous results during
the second half of the 1960s, and where, in any case, funds for
development were completely lacking ; or about Sâo Tomé, where
a serious disturbance of 1 9 5 3 , motivated chiefly by fear of an
extension of the contractual system to non-indígenas', was followed
1
by a stiffened military control. The people of Mozambique
continued, as before 1 9 4 0 , to experience the relative stagnation
of concession companies, together with a considerable extension
of obligatory cultivation; generally, the Mozambican colonial
economy grew much more slowly than that of Angola.
W e have seen that Angolan output within the colonial economy,
extended to the indigenous economy in terms of the obligatory
production o f export crops, picked up steadily after 1 9 5 0 . By a
decade later it was rising at a much faster rate: through most o f
the 1 9 6 0 s , industrial output of all commodities and enterprises was
said to have expanded at an average annual rate of about 1 7 per
2
cent. Mineral extraction accounted for much of this: between
1965 and 1 9 7 0 , for example, the volume o f mineral exports was
3
reported to have doubled to a total o f about £ 1 7 0 million. A t
the same time, the composition o f investment changed. After
1 9 6 4 , n o w with the financial pressures of the colonial wars as a
major factor, the Estado Novo's practical monopoly o f all
investment (save for a few exceptions, such as the British-owned
Benguela Railway and the De Beers subsidiary, Diamang) had to
be brought to an end. Most enterprises were n o w permitted to
operate without a majority holding of Portuguese capital, while
mining activity could be entirely foreign-owned and financed.
1
F o r an a c c o u n t from the nationalist side, w h i c h p u t the n u m b e r o f Africans killed
b y t r o o p s u n d e r t h e o r d e r s o f G o v e r n o r C a r l o s G o r g u l h o a t 1052 p e r s o n s : C O N C P ,
Ulle de Sâo Tomé ( A l g i e r s , 1968), 65. A P r o t e s t a n t m i s s i o n a r y a c c o u n t a t t h e t i m e p u t
t h e n u m b e r o f A f r i c a n s k i l l e d a t a b o u t 200 : q u o t e d i n D a v i d s o n , The African awakening,
229-30. N o official r e p o r t , s o far as is k n o w n , w a s e v e r p u b l i s h e d .
2
Financial Times, 19 J u l y 1971.
3 D a v i d s o n , In the eye of the storm, 300.
774

D E V E L O P M E N T S IN C O L O N I A L P O L I C Y
Gulf Oil began drilling offshore from Cabinda in July 1 9 6 6 , and

struck useful deposits. A n international consortium under the
coordinating hand of K r u p p of Essen, with finance from Federal
German, Danish, Austrian and US banks, agreed in June 1965 to
produce $ US 100 million to mine iron ore at Cassinga, and went
quickly into operation. Other large corporations, including the
Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, secured prospec-
ting concessions. Most of these activities, confined to the centre
and seaboard, were able to proceed with little or no interference
from the nationalists w h o , for reasons both geographical and
1
political, were limited to the east and n o r t h . By 1 9 7 4 , Angola had
become a major interest for many investing countries. The same
trend was perceptible in Mozambique, though it was still at an
earlier stage. There the symbol of the Estado Novo's lost
monopoly was a major hydroelectric scheme at the Cabora Bassa
gorge on the middle Zambezi. Built by international capital under
South African organisation, Cabora Bassa was to provide power
for the South African grid after its (post-war) completion in 1 9 7 8 .
White settlement continued to increase in Angola and
Mozambique, though not in Guiñé, under strong government
pressure within Portugal itself, where legal emigration was n o w
2
restricted largely to these African territories. Costly and ambitious
plans were made for rural colonatos (immigrant settler zones), but
these came to little, no matter how much money was spent on
them, because of a persistent unwillingness of immigrants to live
outside the towns. This particular effort was largest in Angola,
as was also its failure. A detailed study based on official figures
showed in 1 9 7 5 that the Junta Provincial de Povoamento de
3
A n g o l a , created in 1 9 6 2 , was able to attract a total of only 1 8 2 4
1
Chiefly b y reason o f the c o n t i n u i n g hostility to the A n g o l a n national m o v e m e n t
o f t h e Z a i r e g o v e r n m e n t a n d G e n e r a l ( i n 1965, P r e s i d e n t ) M o b u t u S e s e S e k o . S e e a l s o
p a g e 793.
2
But very large numbers o f Portuguese w o r k e r s emigrated to France and other
C o m m o n M a r k e t countries, often b y s m u g g l i n g themselves o v e r the Portuguese
f r o n t i e r (o salto). F o r a n o v e r a l l h i s t o r i c a l a n d s o c i o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s , s e e E . d e S o u s a
Ferreira, ' U r s a c h e n u n d F o r m e n d e r A u s w a n d e r u n g u n d ihre B e d e u t u n g für die
E n t w i c k l u n g P o r t u g a l s ' (doctoral dissertation, R u p r e c h t - K a r l University o f Heidelberg,
1974). A l s o u s e f u l i n t h i s c o n t e x t , H u s e y i n C e l i k ( e d . ) , Les Travailleurs immigrés parlent
( P a r i s , 1970).
3
P r o v i n c i a l C o m m i t t e e for S e t t l e m e n t in A n g o l a : m e a n i n g , a b o v e all, ' w h i t e
settlement from P o r t u g a l ' . F o r a detailed analysis o f the aims and w o r k o f the junta,
see G . J. B e n d e r , Angola under the Portuguese: the myth and the reality ( L o n d o n , 1978), at
m a n y points. A l s o , for the impact o f settlement and other policies o n the relatively
d e n s e l y p o p u l a t e d a r e a s o f t h e H i g h P l a t e a u ( n o t a b l y H u a m b o ) : J. V . d a S i l v a a n d
775

European settlers to colonatos, and that fewer than half of these

1
remained in them at the end of 1 9 6 8 . The high point of white
settlement in Portugal's African territories was reached in 1 9 7 3
with an approximate total of 5 5 0 0 0 0 .
More serious in its impact on African life, especially in Angola
but also in Mozambique, was the continuing expropriation of
African land in favour of European farms and plantations. In
Angola, for example, the same careful study found t h a t ' between
the years 1 9 6 8 - 7 0 the amount of land held by Europeans in
Huambo district', relatively very fertile, 'more than doubled
(from 2 4 9 0 3 9 ha to 5 2 6 2 7 0 ha) while the area cultivated by
Africans was reduced by more than a third (36.5 per cent)', with
gross income per African farm declining from $98.00 in 1 9 6 4 - 5
2
to less than $35.00 in 1 9 7 0 . This decline d r o v e large numbers of
farmers into a wage employment which effectively cancelled any
advantages that had been supposed to derive from an end to the
contractual labour system.
Such dislocations, spiralling from policies of 'development'
which took no account of life outside the white-organised
economy, and which plunged these territories into an ever
deepening social crisis, were further enlarged by military policies
aimed at containing the nationalist revolt. O f these the most
influential was that of reordenamento rural, applied consistently to
all three mainland territories after 1 9 6 7 . Rural populations in areas
of 'nationalist infection', and gradually in most areas, were
removed manu militari from their villages or homesteads and
coralled within aldeamentos or other forms of 'guarded village',
ranging in size from small annexes around fortified camps to large
settlements within a military cordon. This was bad enough for
sedentary cultivators; the evidence suggests that it was far worse
for non-sedentary stock breeders. In the latter case, 'the resettle
ments represented cultural genocide and economic ruin for the
pastoralists whose social and economic way of life is dependent
upon the careful ecological balance they have evolved within their
J. A . d e M o r á i s , ' E c o l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n s o f s o c i a l c h a n g e i n t h e C e n t r a l H i g h l a n d s o f
A n g o l a ' , i n F . - W . H e i m e r ( e d . ) , Social change in Angola ( M u n i c h , 1973). T h i s c o n c l u d e s :
' T h e s o c i a l c o n s e q u e n c e s o f t h e s e e c o l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n s a r e d i s a s t r o u s . N o t o n l y is t h e r e
a r e g r e s s i o n in t h e s t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f r u r a l O v i m b u n d u s o c i e t y , b u t t h e r u r a l
a r e a s a r e n o l o n g e r c a p a b l e o f s u p p o r t i n g t h e p o p u l a t i o n . . . ' ( p . 98).
1
* B e n d e r , Angola under the Portuguese, 1 1 1 .
2
B e n d e r , ibid., 130.
776

1
annual transhumances'. By 1 9 7 4 more than one million rural
people had been thrust into resettlements in Angola, not much
less than a quarter of the country's whole population, while the
position in northern and central Mozambique had become closely
comparable. The plantation economy boomed, but its framework
and foundations were n o w rotted to the core.
Undismayed by any evidence to the contrary, educational policies

persisted in assuming that they need only continue in order to
succeed. Their object remained as J . M. da Silva Cunha had
defined it in 19 5 7 : ' W e are attempting to accelerate the assimilation
or complete " Portuguesation" of the natives, and to help
improve their material situation by training them for more
2
economically valued activities': in other w o r d s , for a more
effective entry to an 'economy organised and governed by
whites'. The Missionary Statute of 1 9 4 1 had laid d o w n the since
confirmed objective, and as late as 1 9 6 4 da Silva Cunha glossed
this once again when praising all those soldiers, missionaries and
others ' w h o made this the land it n o w is, thoroughly Portuguese,
with all the defects and virtues of the Portuguese: w h o made it
what it is so that it could c o n t i n u e . . . and remain Portuguese,
3
totally Portuguese, only Portuguese'. That the instruction thus
provided was of an extremely rudimentary nature was contested
by no one w h o made serious enquiry: in 1 9 6 9 , for example, an
official Lisbon institute drew attention to the fact that while
teaching missionaries in Mozambique had increased from 4 4 in
1 9 4 0 to 1 4 7 in i 9 6 0 , the number of Mozambican Africans
receiving rudimentary or functional instruction was said to have
risen from 9 5 4 4 4 in 1 9 4 2 - 3 to 3 8 5 2 5 9 iii 1 9 6 0 - 1 . The same
institute cast doubt on the figures for pupils, and added that 'in
any case these figures, although partial, leave no margin for doubt
4
as to the low level of p r o g r e s s ' . W i t h due reservations on their
accuracy, one may nonetheless offer the school-population figures
for 1 9 6 9 - 7 0 (but for 1 9 6 8 - 9 in the case of Mozambique) in table
1
B e n d e r , ibid., 138-9.
2
J. M . d a S i l v a C u n h a , Adminstracao edireito colonial(Lisbon, 1957), v o l . I , 1 6 1 : h e r e
tr. b y F e r r e i r a , Portuguese colonialism, 67-8.
3
Q u o t e d f r o m F e r r e i r a , Portuguese colonialism, 69.
4
I n s t i t u t o S u p e r i o r d e C i e n c i a s S o c i a i s e P o l í t i c a U l t r a m a r i n a ( e d . ) , Mozambique
( C u r s o d e E x t e n s á o U n i v e r s i t a r i a , A n o L e c t i v o d e 1 9 6 5 - 6 , L i s b o n ) , 645; q u o t e d h e r e
f r o m F e r r e i r a , Portuguese colonialism, 70.
777

Table 1 5 . i. Numbers of pupils {all communities).
Sào T o m é
Type of school Cape Verde Guiñé and Principe Angola Mozambique
Infant teaching — — 209 2484 964

Primary 40685 26401 9089 384884 496381
Secondary
Preparatory 2006 1254 901 25137 73°7
Secondary 799 394 264 10779 10524
Technical/Occupational 302 4î5 "3 14660 —
Arts — — — 304 —
Ecclesiastical — 720 600
Higher education (university, — — 1757 1124
social service, ecclesiastical)
Teacher training 104 — 43 1402 1124
Source: Anuario estatistico provincias ultramarinas, Lisbon, 1970, vol. I I ; quoted here from Ferreira, Portuguese colonialism, 81.

1 5 . i. In looking at the figures for secondary and higher education,

one should bear in mind that the total number of white residents
by this time was of the order of half a million. There were few
places for their children, but almost none for the children of
Africans. A s for the latter, even the most rudimentary forms of
this education had to be gained at the price of a more or less total
alienation from their o w n cultures. W h a t the Missionary Statute
had laid d o w n continued to be the rule: / I n the schools, the
teaching of the Portuguese language and its use shall be obligatory.
Outside school, missionaries and their assistants shall also use the
Portuguese l a n g u a g e . . . * The catechism might be learned and said
in African languages; otherwise, these were to be treated as
though they did not exist.
Little modified by the paper reforms of 1 9 6 1 - 2 , such attitudes
and policies persisted through the 1 9 6 0 s . They were barely
questioned from within the regime, so far as present evidence can
show, and not at all by those w h o controlled the regime. This
confidence in immobility appears to have derived from Lisbon's
belief that the nationalist risings could and would be crushed
without the need to make any serious concession to African
grievances. D o w n to the early months of 1 9 7 3 in Guine, and in
Mozambique and Angola even till the beginnings of 1 9 7 4 , little
seems to have shaken this belief. Y e t the actual course of events,
by that time, had clearly pointed to another outcome.
T H E F I G H T F O R I N D E P E N D E N C E , 1961-75
If there was no political development on the Estado Novo's side,

save of gestures which came too late or of second thoughts which
lacked sincerity, there was much on the African; and it is probably
in the development of African political thought that hindsight will
always see the central interest of these years of warfare. A s a
prelude to considering that political development, this section will
briefly review the military aspects and the chief events that led
to independence.
Militarily, the Estado N o v o was well placed in 1 9 6 2 to cope
with any form or scale of armed resistance on 'traditional' lines.
Its security services were ruthless and experienced, its armed
forces relatively large and well supplied. Whether politically or
militarily, however, it was poorly prepared to deal with any use
779

S E N E G A L
P 3 T
•Fahrn Ä
B Gabu
Cacheu
Mansoa
^•Bambadinka
X !
Madina da Boó J
X ,
agosls. 0 Q ~
G U I N E A
150 km
ATLANTIC
Approx. limits of PAIGC operations:
A Southern front B Northern front C Eastern front
OCEAN X Chief centres of first armed actions, from Jan 1963 on
southern front to mid-1963 on northern front and early
1964 on eastern front.
34 Guinea-Bissau: launching the war of liberation. Càssaca in Quitàfine

region was the locus of the crucialfirstcongress of PAIGC in
February 1964, where structures for political organisation and the mobile
army were decided upon.
of irregular warfare that was powered by a modernising political

analysis and leadership. In this respect the fact that none of
Portugal's fighting men had seen active service, though a few
senior officers had toured Hitler's battle fronts as guests of the
Wehrmacht, mattered far less than another fact: that the Estado
Novo's political leaders and military commanders were alike
convinced of possessing an absolute and inherent intellectual
superiority, and thought of their enemy either as a horde of
savages or the otherwise helpless puppets of 'international
Communism'. But the wars showed that the truth was the other
way round, and the intellectual inferiority of the Portuguese
commanders repeatedly swung the balance of strategic advantage
to the African side.
These commanders tried to compensate in muscle for what they
lacked in brain and, thanks to Portugal's allies, they found this
easy to attempt. A complete record of western aid to the Estado
780

T H E F I G H T F O R I N D E P E N D E N C E
35 Northern Mozambique: the war situation in the wake of the earliest

operations of September 1964.
N o v o as a member-state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

( N A T O ) remained impossible in these years, but this aid was
unquestionably large and continuous. It took the form of sym
pathetic diplomacy, going to the lengths of a formal celebration
of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance and a state visit to Britain of
Salazar's successor, Marcello Caetano, in July 1973, and many
corresponding moves by the United States and other western
p o w e r s ; of commercial and financial support by means o f a
multiplicity of devices, chiefly arranged by the United States; and
of a generous flow of arms and other forms o f military aid, notably
in this respect by France and West Germany. A reliable list of
781

Portuguese military aircraft in service during 1 9 7 1 - 3 , mostly on

active service in Africa, showed ten types of US manufacture,
ranging from light bombers to interceptors, transports and
trainers; one type of Spanish origin; one of Italian origin; one
of joint French and British manufacture (the S A - 3 3 0 ' P u m a '
helicopter); three more of purely French manufacture (chiefly
1
' A l o u e t t e ' helicopters); and one of West German origin. Much
napalm and some defoliants were provided, probably by the U S A ,
as well as a variety of sophisticated instruments such as
bombsights, radio equipment and the like, by a number of
countries, including Britain.
This armoury was deployed against the nationalist movements,
and the zones they controlled, through the mobilisation of
Portuguese military manpower on a rising scale to a point which
had reached its feasible maximum by 1 9 7 1 . By that time the regime
appears to have committed some nine-tenths of all its available
military resources, whose overall totals, in 1 9 7 2 , were given as
being 1 7 9 000 men in the army, 18 000 in the navy, and 2 1 0 0 0 in
the air force. Together with the conscription of settler manpower
in Angola and Mozambique, and of African service units and
local militias (including a small number of African volunteers in
' commando '-type units at special rates of pay), the Portuguese
then had in Africa a total force that was probably equivalent,
by ratio of Portuguese and US populations, to at least seven times
the largest US force deployed in Vietnam. By the same year, 1 9 7 1 ,
the Lisbon government was spending some 40 per cent of its
national budget on military purposes, or a total of Esc. 15 3 1 1 . 7
2
million out of Esc. 3 6 6 4 7 . 8 million. From an already high point
in 1 9 6 7 , these expenditures in Africa rose steadily until the end
(table 1 5 . 2 ) .
While attempting to reduce areas of contestation or recover
zones taken from their control, the Portuguese commanders also
engaged in a variety o f ' counter-insurgency * measures borrowed
from British and American experience in South East Asia. The
most important of these, and in the end the least well judged, was
reordenamento rural in its several aspects, all of them concerned
chiefly with driving peasant populations into guarded villages or
1
U N G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y , A / 9 0 2 3 ( P a r t I V ) o f 8 O c t o b e r 1973 ( R e p o r t o f S p e c i a l
C o m m i t t e e ) , 1 1 , t a b l e 6.
2
U N G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y , ibid: 8, official P o r t u g u e s e s o u r c e s .
782

Table 1 5 . 2 . Oversea territories: military budgets* {million escudos)}
Year Angola Mozambique Guiñé Cape Verde Säo Tomé

1967 782.0 834.4 88.4 19.7 10.5
1968 951.3 910.3 92.8 25.2 10.4
1969 1289.6 945.0 106.1 11.4
1970 1746.9 1346.0 163.9 37.1 15.3
I97I 2050.3 1204.3 189.7 37-3 14.5
1972 1925.1 1303.1 169.0 37.6 15.7
1973 e 2037.3 2204.7 196.8 42.5 15.0
a
Not including Timor and dependencies.
b
For an approximate sterling equivalent at the time, divide by 65.
c
Incomplete.
Source: UN General Assembly (Report of Special Committee), 9; official
Portuguese sources.
within the perimeters o f fortified camps. Much experience had

already shown that this was a policy that could succeed if the
operating power's armed forces were able t o retain a firm and
progressive strategic initiative, but that it would fail wherever this
condition could not be met. For the most part, after 1 9 6 7 , the
Portuguese commanders were unable t o meet that indispensable
condition; they nonetheless persisted with the policy. Gradually,
Portugal's comparatively copious numbers o f troops were swal-
lowed up in guarding and supplying the aldeamentos, in garrisoning
a multitude o f fixed camps and isolated posts, in trying to keep
open the bush tracks or dirt roads that led to and from such camps
and posts, while deploying occasional * offensives' against
territory held by the troops o f the liberation movements.
This went hand-in-hand with regular and sometimes daily
bombing o f nationalist-held zones and villages and, increasingly
after 1 9 6 8 , with helicoptered' search and destroy' sorties by picked
units.
Much o f this was painful and destructive, but none o f it was
enough. A clear strategic initiative on the field of battle was never
recovered. In April 1 9 7 4 a movement of young officers o f w h o m
many had developed new political outlooks as a result o f their
1
experience in the wars in Africa, and perhaps especially in G u i n e ,
1
M y i m p r e s s i o n f r o m P o r t u g u e s e a n d A f r i c a n s o u r c e s i n 1974. S e e a l s o ' M F A n a
G u i n e \ e d i t o r i a l i n P o r t u g u e s e a r m e d f o r c e s ' b u l l e t i n , Bolettm lnformativo, B i s s a u , 1 J u n e
783

PORTUGUÉSE-SPEAKING AFRICA
overthrew the Lisbon regime on the twin slogans of ' Decolon-

isation and Democratisation'. There was little or no further
fighting after that, either because the wars had come to seem futile
or unwinnable, or because the troops had had enough. The regime
preferred the second explanation. ' O u r armed forces', General
Costa Gomes told a press conference in May 1 9 7 5 , 'have reached
the limits of psycho-neurological exhaustion.' The wars, in any
case, were over. The nationalists had won.
There is almost nothing further to be said about the politics
of this period on the Portuguese side, for the nature of the Estado
N o v o and its leaders prevented any intelligent response to African
political initiatives that were inventive and continuous. Only
1
General Spinola appears to have glimpsed the potentials that
could exist in political warfare. Finding he could not beat the
P A I G C by military means, he embarked in 1 9 7 0 on a programme
of administrative propaganda designed to offer a 'better G u i ñ é '
{Guiñé melbor) which might somehow yet emerge from reform of
the colonial system. In April 1 9 7 1 , talking to a South African
journalist, he explained that ' success is not to be hoped for in a
war of this nature' unless one could mount what he called, in terms
which perhaps only a man of Spinola's cultural formation could
have devised, 'an anti-reactionary counter-revolution' to outbid
the revolution of the nationalists. Little came of this in Guiñé,
1974, n o . i , f o r d e t a i l s o f s t r u c t u r a l o r g a n i s a t i o n o f M F A i n G u i ñ é ; a n d s t a t e m e n t i n
( M F A - e d i t e d ) Vo% da Guiñé, B i s s a u . 19 A u g u s t 1974 ( m y t r a n s l a t i o n ) .
T h e colonised peoples and the people o f P o r t u g a l are allies. T h e struggle for national liberation
has contributed powerfully to the o v e r t h r o w o f Fascism and. in large degree, has lain at the base
o f the A r m e d Forces M o v e m e n t w h o s e officers have learned in Africa the horrors o f a w a r w i t h o u t
prospect, and have therefore understood the roots o f the evils w h i c h afflict the society o f
Portugal...
T h i s statement w a s the reproduction o f a reportedly unanimous declaration b y the

a s s e m b l y o f the M F A in G u i ñ é .
1
A p p o i n t e d t o g o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l s h i p a n d military c o m m a n d in G u i ñ é in the w a k e
o f G e n e r a l A r n a l d o S c h u l t z , w h o r e s i g n e d i n 1968, G e n e r a l ( t h e n b r i g a d i e r ) Antonio
S e b a s t i á o R i b e i r o S p i n o l a h a d first s e e n a c t i v e s e r v i c e a s a n o p e r a t i o n a l c o m m a n d e r i n
A n g o l a d u r i n g 1961. S o m e y e a r s e a r l i e r , a n d i n l i n e w i t h t h e s a m e i d e a s o f s t r u c t u r a l
r e f o r m , a m i n o r i t y t r e n d w i t h i n t h e r e g i m e ( a s s o c i a t e d e s p e c i a l l y , it a p p e a r s , w i t h t h e
then O v e r s e a s Minister A d r i a n o Moreira) had l o o k e d w i t h favour o n a certain measure
o f d e v o l u t i o n o f c o n t r o l f r o m L i s b o n . T h i s c a m e t o n o t h i n g , b u t g a v e rise f o r a w h i l e
d u r i n g t h e 1960s, at l e a s t a m o n g t h e m o r e p o l i t i c a l l y c o n s c i o u s o f t h e P o r t u g u e s e
c o m m u n i t y in A n g o l a , t o a h o p e that s o m e t h i n g m i g h t be d o n e .
Apart from Spinola, none o f Portugal's senior commanders was prepared to admit
t h a t t h e w a r s w e r e u n w i n n a b l e b y m i l i t a r y m e a n s . T h e y p r e f e r r e d , after t h e L i s b o n c o u p ,
to claim that the ' h o m e front', o r w h o e v e r , had ' b e t r a y e d ' them. F o r characteristic
v i e w s , s e e ( G e n e r a l s ) J. d a L u z C u n h a , K . d e A r r i a g a , B e t t e n c o u r t R o d r i g u e s , S . S i l v é r i o
M a r q u e s , Africa, a vitória traída ( L i s b o n , 1977).
784

but it is plain that Spinola was already thinking o f Portugal itself,

for he went on to say that *to support a social counter-revolution
in a developing region implies the setting-up o f dynamic, solid
and efficient structures; and to meet these needs Portugal is still
encumbered w i t h a s l o w - m o v i n g obsolescent b u r e a u c r a c y . . . w e
1
must reform the structures on the h o m e f r o n t ' . It was t o become
the Spinolist programme o f 1 9 7 4 , but years t o o late.
T h e Africans, on their side, had to begin their wars in a posture
of extreme weakness. T h e y w o n because o f their politics, but their
politics could succeed only b y steadily i m p r o v i n g their military
position. T h i s was more than difficult. T h e y had, to start w i t h ,
n o men o f military experience, t h o u g h they soon gained a few as
African officers and non-commissioned officers joined them from
the Portuguese army; and they had practically n o weapons. M o s t
of their earliest fighting volunteers were trained in A l g e r i a : for
the P A I G C in 1 9 6 0 - 1 , for M P L A a little later, for F R E L I M O in
1 9 6 3 . Gradually as their international contacts i m p r o v e d , they
were able to train others elsewhere: mostly in the U S S R and one
or t w o other countries in the East European bloc, some in
2
Y u g o s l a v i a and C u b a , and a handful in C h i n a . Initial supplies o f
small-arms, very meagre in quantity, came from the same sources.
Non-military aid was also sought in the west in line w i t h the
movements' policy o f international non-alignment. Cabral spent
many weeks in L o n d o n during i 9 6 0 ; N e t o visited old Methodist
contacts in the U S A during 1 9 6 3 ; and M o n d l a n e actually suc-
ceeded in securing some educational aid from the American F o r d
Foundation in 1 9 6 4 - 5 . But apart from winning the support o f
liberal and left-wing aid committees, notably in Holland, Britain,
Italy and Sweden, such efforts proved largely fruitless save in the
case o f Sweden, whose government, onwards from 1 9 6 7 , g a v e
1
A. J. Venter, Portugal*s war in Guiné-Bissau (Munger Africana Library Notes,
Pasadena, 19 April 1975), 190-1.
2
Early in the 1960s, before its dispute with USSR, China provided military training
for a few militants of the three movements (PAIGC, MPLA, FRELIMO). China then
withdrew all direct aid, but provided small quantities of small-arms (chiefly light
automatics and bazookas) for distribution through the Liberation Committee of the
O A U and, from about 1967, helped to staff base-training camps in southern Tanzania
in cooperation with Tanzania. In 1971 direct relations with the three movements were
again renewed, and the leaderships of each were invited serially to Peking, although
Chinese official propaganda continued, generally, to support the break-away or splinter
groups in the case of each territory (UNITA in Angola, C O R E M O in the case of
Mozambique and, briefly, the FLING group in Dakar in the case of Guiñé). During
the Angolan crisis of 1974-5, Chinese instructors trained F N L A troops in Zaire and
provided FNLA with a substantial quantity of arms for use against the MPLA.
785

each o f the movements considerable sums o f money for non-

military supplies through the para-statal Swedish International
Development Authority. A i d from the Communist countries
generally increased after about 1 9 6 8 , though at a rhythm that was
always erratic, and extended also to many forms of non-military
aid, including school holidays in the U S S R for children living in
badly bombed zones, as well as the training o f nurses, doctors and
the like. Weapons' supply, training aid and medical aid from Cuba
was initiated on a small scale by Che Guevara during his African
sojourn o f the middle 1 9 6 0 s , (notably, at this stage, t o the M P L A
in Angola), and became steadily more important for the M P L A
and P A I G C although, it appears, less for F R E L I M O in Mozam-
bique, as the years passed. Small Cuban medical teams and
artillery-training sections served continuously in the liberated
zones o f the P A I G C in Guinea-Bissau from late in the 1 9 6 0 s , but
no Cuban troops were committed to battle. By this time, t o o ,
many children from the territories were in schools in Cuba, while
adult militants were also receiving military and other training
there. A n d , as is well-known, Cuban troops served directly in
Angola, against South African invasion, from late November
1975-
Fighting from internal forest o r woodland areas linked to
external sources o f supply by guarded trails and head porterage,
the armed units o f all three movements worked generally towards
the same concept:
In order to dominate a given zone, the enemy is obliged to disperse his forces.
In dispersing his forces, he weakens himself and we can defeat him. Then in
order to defend himself against us, he has to concentrate his forces. When he
does this, we can occupy the zones that he leaves free and work in them,
1
politically, so as to hinder his return there...
This programme was as hard to carry out as it was simple to
define; but it proved both possible and the key to success. These
movements built up their slender forces, stage by stage, from
numerically very small handfuls o f fighters, each isolated in its
'zone o f contestation' and barely capable o f concerted action,
until they were able to form large mobile units, o r groups o f
mobile units, which attacked major targets. T o such forces, on-
wards from 1 9 6 8 o r 1 9 6 9 (somewhat earlier in Guiñé, somewhat
later elsewhere), there was added a variety o f specialised units
1
A . C a b r a l , q u o t e d i n Afrique—Aste, 1974, 6 6 , 25.
786

T H E F I G H T FOR I N D E P E N D E N C E
A ^ S S l Approx. areas of PAIGC presence or control. except for

some 150 or more Portuguese garrisons generally besieged
in small towns, villages, or fortified camps.
Bi i Approx. areas of contested, but chiefly Portuguese, control
CI I Approx.areas of outright Portuguese control
4 • Approx. lines of PAIGC liaison with exterior
36 Guinea-Bissau: general position in late 1968 and after. The PAIGC

continued to improve its control of areas A, and its penetration into areas
B (with occasional raids into areas C).
able to deploy mortars, light artillery, a Russian-made 1 2 2 mm

'rocket' in 1 9 7 1 and, after 1 9 7 2 , the similarly Russian-made
ground-to-air missile known as S A M - 7 . No fighting volunteers
from outside their own countries were accepted by any of the
movements.
By 1968 the P A I G C probably had some 4000 men in its regular
mobile units, as well as the beginnings of a network of local (that
is, non-mobile) village militias. Though outnumbered by about
nine to one, this small army had seized and held the strategic
initiative on the programme sketched above, and Lisbon's forces
were beleaguered in a large number of fortified towns, camps, o r
787

villages. It was then a question for the P A I G C commanders of

keeping up the pressure, picking off selected garrisons, and
preparing to assault the major points of Portuguese military
control while, at the same time, promoting and improving the
political and social institutions introduced by the P A I G C into the
large zones n o w under its firm control. A l l this was achieved with
1
small losses, although also with the disaster in January 1 9 7 3 of
losing Amflcar Cabral, assassinated at Conakry, the chief exterior
base o f the P A I G C , in a conspiracy launched by Portuguese
African agents infiltrated from Bissau. T o this the P A I G C replied
by closing its ranks in new offensive operations. In March its units
began to use S A M - 7 S with decisive effect against General Spinola's
hitherto invulnerable air force. In July the key Portuguese forti
fied camp of Guileje was destroyed by bombardment from the
ground, and the war, by the end of 1 9 7 3 , came largely to an end.
Meanwhile the P A I G C during 1 9 7 2 had carried through a
general election in its liberated zones - then some two-thirds of
all the rural areas - for the election o f regional councils which,
in turn, elected a People's National Assembly; in September
1 9 7 3 this declared Guinea-Bissau to be an independent state,
and widespread international recognition followed. A b o u t 75
countries recognised the new Republic within three months of this
declaration of September 1 9 7 3 , while the General Assembly of the
United Nations, on 2 November o f the same year, and by a very
large majority, called on the Portuguese government to cease
attacks on this sovereign republic and withdraw its armed forces.
On 1 9 November, Guinea-Bissau became the forty-second
member state of the Organisation of African Unity. Meanwhile
hostilities continued on a small scale until May 1 9 7 4 .
After the Lisbon coup o f April 1 9 7 4 the new Portuguese
government, n o w under the presidency of Spinola, asked the
P A I G C , by way o f President Senghor of Senegal, for an uncon
ditional cease-fire. The P A I G C refused this, but agreed to a truce
that would enable Lisbon to prepare itself for unconditional
evacuation. While Lisbon procrastinated, seeking to win time,
1
Confirming the general rule that combatant losses in well-conducted irregular
warfare are invariably small, official enquiries of the government of Guinea-Bissau
made in 197 j - 6 showed, for military casualties, a total of about 345 seriously wounded,
of whom 150 had suffered amputation; the number of military dead was not yet
ascertained, but this figure for wounded could suggest that the number of killed, on
the PAIGC side, was very small.
788

THE F I G H T F O R I N D E P E N D E N C E
local Portuguese commanders made contact with their opposite

numbers of the P A I G C . A consequent evacuation of Portuguese
garrisons began in late July in spite of Lisbon's opposition, and
continued without incident but n o w with Lisbon's agreement,
until 1 4 October, when the last Portuguese units left. Lisbon had
meanwhile recognised the independence of the whole country on
10 September. The new regime took o v e r in circumstances of
great economic difficulty but growing popularity. Fresh elections
to the People's National Assembly, conducted in December 1 9 7 6
throughout the country for the first time, showed large or very
large majorities for P A I G C candidates in all except t w o of the
country's ten electoral districts: in Gabu and Bafata, where
P A I G C candidates gained only 56 and 50.4 per cent of the v o t e
1
respectively. The leaders of the P A I G C confirmed their posture
of international non-alignment by seeking aid in the west as well
as the east, and receiving some from both; its internal policies,
however, assumed a non-capitalist model of development.
In the Cape Verde archipelago the clandestine network of the
P A I G C , originating in 195 7, came into the open during the middle
months of 1 9 7 4 , and was reinforced in August and later by the
return from Guiñé of Cape Verdean political and military leaders.
Pressure for independence became general, rivalry to the P A I G C
being limited to two or three small urban groupings which proved
to be too closely identified with the Portuguese system to enable
them to win any ground. A general election held under Portuguese
supervision on 30 June 1975 brought 85 per cent of the electorate
to the polls; of this, just o v e r 9 2 per cent voted for P A I G C
candidates. A n independent Republic under P A I G C leadership
was proclaimed on 5 July, and recognised by Lisbon. Its Presi-
1
This being a single-party system, votes against PAIGC candidates were signalled
by a negative vote. No doubt some of these negative votes registered opposition to
specific candidates, but in the case of the Gabu and Bafata districts the chief reason was
certainly different. These districts, as the relevant map shows, had remained under
Portuguese control almost till the end. Their populations are largely Fula and Mandinka
whose chiefs, retaining much prestige, had almost all sided with the Portuguese against
the PAIGC (cf. the general position of Fula chiefs in the nearby Futa Jalon in respect
of the French colonial system during the mid-1950s, and the Parti Démocratique de
Guinée led by Sékou Touré). The overall returns in these elections (of regional
councillors, who in turn would elect members of the National Assembly) were as
follows, compared with the similar returns in 1972 for all areas then liberated from
Portuguese control: (i) The 19/2 {partial) elections. Of 82032 voters, 79680 voted 'Yes',
2352 voted ' N o ' ; percentage of * Yes* voters, 97.1. (2) The 1976 elections {whole country).
Of 193 167 voters, 155 542 voted 'Yes', 37625 voted ' N o ' ; percentage of'Yes* voters,
80.6. (From O Militante, Bissau, 1977, no. 1.)
789

dent was the secretary-general of the P A I G C , Aristides Pereira,

while the party's deputy secretary-general, Luiz Cabral (younger
brother of Amflcar Cabral), had become President of Guinea-
Bissau. P A I G C policy had always aimed at an eventual union
between the t w o countries; organisational steps towards union
were taken in 1 9 7 6 and 1 9 7 7 . These consisted of forming a
Council of Unity whose principal task was to promote and
supervise the w o r k of joint commissions aiming at a comple
mentary and convergent development of and between the t w o
countries. Movement towards an eventual union would be ' step
1
by step, and in practical and concrete w a y s ' .
In Mozambique, at the beginning of 1 9 6 9 , F R E L I M O had
been deprived of its initial leader, Eduardo Mondlane, by assas
sination in Dar es Salaam with a parcel bomb of enemy provenance
(as later established by a Tanzanian police enquiry), but a new
leadership under the army commander, Samora Moises Machel,
was able to reinforce the movement's unity against a small faction,
led by Lazaro Nkavadame and Uriah Simango, w h o favoured one
or other form of negotiation for a compromise solution. While
holding much of the northern districts o f Cabo Delgado and
Niassa, F R E L I M O forces opened a new fighting front in the Tete
district and made rapid progress southward into the 'waist' of
Mozambique. After April 1 9 7 4 the Spinolist government in
Lisbon again tried for an unconditional cease-fire, evidently
hoping to save some part of Portuguese control from the wreck
of defeat, but FRELIMO, like its t w o companion movements,
replied that it would continue the w a r unless the Portuguese
withdrew. Frustrated of his hopes o f gaining a compromise,
Spinola resigned in September 1 9 7 4 , and the way was clear for
negotiation on the technicalities of Portuguese withdrawal.
Apprehensions that a South African force would enter southern
Mozambique failed to materialise, partly no doubt because of the
sheer speed of the Portuguese collapse and the impossibility, as
it proved, o f finding any alternative political organisation to
F R E L I M O such as might have invited South African entry (as
was to happen in Angola); and an independent Republic under
F R E L I M O leadership was proclaimed and recognised on 25 J u n e
1975.
1
S p e l t o u t in d o c u m e n t s o f T h i r d C o n g r e s s o f P A I G C (Bissau, 15-20 N o v e m b e r ,
1977) a n d e s p e c i a l l y i n A r i s t i d e s Pereira, Kelatdrio do Conselho Superior da Luta. I n
N o v e m b e r 1980 a m i l i t a r y t a k e - o v e r in G u i n e a - B i s s a u w o u l d r e j e c t u n i o n .
790

T H E F I G H T FOR I N D E P E N D E N C E
37 Mozambique: the war situation after late 1 9 7 3 .
Some rioting by Portuguese settlers in Lourenfo Marques (now

renamed Maputo) was quickly quelled; most settlers left the
country; and the chief problem for the new administration
remained to instal its structures and institutions in all those
regions, but above all in the towns, which had not been brought
under F R E L I M O control during the war. Initially, tolerable
relations were established with a South African government
which was n o w found to control electricity supply to southern
Mozamibique, and agreement was given to the completion of the
Cabora Bassa Dam and p o w e r system. But the new government
moved at once to support the nationalist cause in Zimbabwe
1
79

Approx. areas of MPLA penetration,

'Kinshasa presence, or control
(Léopoldville) Chief directions of further M P L A
' penetration
Approx. lines of M P L A liaison with
Cr""* interior
FNLA(North-West) and UNITA (East)
areas of presence, with lines of access
3 0 0 km
200miles
ZAIRE
Pereirad'Eca •
I SOUTH WEST AFRICAJSOUTH AFRICANS

\ (NAMIBIA) <1975)
(main lines of invasion)
38 Angola: approximate war situation in 1970 and after. (Note that in
1973 the MPLA in central Moxico was weakened by the defection of
part of its forces there.)
(Rhodesia), g a v e its adherence to U N sanctions on the illegal

Rhodesian regime, and encouraged Z i m b a b w e a n fighting units to
open external bases on its territory. Relations with South Africa
rapidly deteriorated after 1978, w h e n the South African g o v e r n
ment began to operate new policies o f aggressive military
* déstabilisation ' aimed especially at M o z a m b i q u e and A n g o l a .
792

A s at the onset o f the fight for independence, Angola proved

a special case, partly because of its larger white population and
its proven wealth in minerals, and partly because rivals were found
to set against the M P L A . The record here was unusually complex
and confused, and can be sketched here only in the barest outline.
A t the demise of the Estado N o v o , in April 1974, the position
of the M P L A was comparatively weaker than that o f F R E L I M O
or P A I G C in Mozambique and Guiñé. Three chief reasons could
be detected. Probably the most significant o f these lay in the long
hostility of Zaire's President Mobutu, whose policy in Angola
aimed at promoting the fortunes o f his protege, Holden Roberto,
and the latter's Kongo-manned Frente Nacional de L i b e r t a d o de
Angola (FNLA, successor to UPA). This meant, in practice, that
M P L A was barred from any logistical access to central and
western Angola by way of the Zaire frontier, a major handicap
that was suffered, in comparable geographical circumstances,
neither by F R E L I M O nor by P A I G C . A second reason lay in
defections from the leadership o f M P L A that were reminiscent
of those from F R E L I M O during 1968-9, the difference being
that these M P L A defections occurred in 1 9 7 2 - 3 . A third reason,
now of rising importance, lay in the existence o f F N L A and o f
U N I T A (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola),
initially a breakaway from F N L A led by Jonas Savimbi, as
proclaimed rivals to M P L A .
Neither o f these t w o organisations had played any significant
part in the war. The FNLA had adopted an attentiste position since
the uprisings o f 1961, and such warlike activities as it still engaged
in were chiefly aimed at hampering o r destroying the M P L A .
Established after 1968 in a small zone on the, borders of Moxico
and Bihe south-east of the town of Luso, UNITA followed much
the same line, and likewise made its peace with the Portuguese
1
army on a joint anti-MPLA agreement. Each, not surprisingly,
1
T h e r e is m u c h e v i d e n c e f o r this. See, e . g . t h e exiled e x - P r i m e Minister M a r c e l l o
C a e t a n o , i n h i s Depoimento ( R i o a n d S a o P a u l o , 1974), 180-1 ( t r . O . G j e r s t a d ) : ' T h e
e n e m y ' s [that i s , t h e M P L A ' s ] o p e n i n g o f t h e E a s t e r n F r o n t [in A n g o l a ] c o n s t i t u t e d
a tremendous preoccupation, and [General] Costa G o m e s , o n assuming responsibility
for A n g o l a ' s defence, approached the case w i t h intelligence and decisiveness. [General]
Bet ten c o u r t R o d r i g u e s r e c e i v e d t h e t a s k . . . t o pacify the r e g i o n , w h i c h h e d i d b y
reaching an understanding with the people o f U N I T A . . . * A n evidently genuine
e x c h a n g e o f letters b e t w e e n t h e U N I T A leader, J o n a s S a v i m b i , a n d t h e P o r t u g u e s e
c h i e f o f staff i n E a s t e r n A n g o l a , L t . - C o l o n e l R a m i r e s d e O l i v e i r a , d a t i n g t o l a t e 1972
a n d c o n c e r n i n g t h e i r c o l l a b o r a t i o n , w a s p u b l i s h e d i n Afriquc-Aste, 8 J u l y 1974, 6 1 ,
7-18.
793

now found fresh external supporters and advocates, especially in

South Africa and the U S A .
This led directly to a struggle for p o w e r in which the
Portuguese, holding the ring during 1 9 7 4 - 5 , sought to promote
a 'tripartite government' o f all three organisations. This proved
only an exacerbation as F N L A tried to win a foothold, increasingly
by violent means, in Luanda and other coastal towns where
M P L A had an obviously overwhelming support, while Savimbi's
organisation, UNITA, did the same in the Ovimbundu areas of
the central districts where M P L A was comparatively weak. In July
M P L A riposted by driving F N L A out o f Luanda, and was then
able to receive improved military supplies from the U S S R and
Yugoslavia (China by this time being a declared supporter of
1
F N L A and its patron, President M o b u t u ) . In September 1 9 7 5
M P L A had secured a dominant position in 1 2 out o f the country's
16 districts, and appeared able to take the rest. Helped by U S and
Chinese aid, Mobutu then reinforced F N L A units with a
considerable force from Zaire, partly o f Zairean units with
Portuguese officers, while a South African armoured force invaded
southern Angola from Namibia in cooperation with Holden
2
Roberto and Jonas S a v i m b i .
Entering Angola on 23 October, this South African force
pushed rapidly northward as far as a point beyond N o v o
Redondo, where it was halted. The M P L A n o w declared the in
dependence of a People's Republic of Angola on the agreed date o f
11 November, and set in motion an emergency plan for Cuban
military support. A t what appears to have been extremely short
notice, a Cuban force eventually o f some 13 000 men was shipped
and airlifted t o Angola. J o i n t M P L A and Cuban units then
stopped the South African northern drive and went o v e r to the
offensive against the northern force from Zaire. The latter was
driven out of the country in January 1 9 7 6 , at which point it
became clear that Pretoria must either reinforce its o w n troops
1
In point of fact, the first military supplies available to MPLA in that crucial month
of July did not come from any part of Europe, but were sent (in a Yugoslav ship) by
the PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. They included some armoured cars,
which were landed with great difficulty, and were followed by a small contingent of
PAIGC troops airlifted from Guinea-Bissau.
2
See, for example, a report from the Johannesburg correspondent of The Times, 4
February 1977. This quotes South African official sources as saying that the maximum
number of South African troops operating in Angola was 2000; outside observers had
put this number as being closer to 6000.
794

or withdraw. South African government statements n o w declared

that reinforcement would not be attempted without direct A m e r
ican support. But the Nixon administration and notably its
Secretary of State, D r Henry Kissinger, had by this time run into
sharp Congress hostility to any further American involvement in
support of FNLA or UNITA, and preferred to affirm that
Pretoria had invaded Angola on its o w n initiative. Bereft of any
direct and public American support, especially for the use of South
Africa's powerful air force, Pretoria decided to withdraw. Its units
pulled out of Huambo, Bihe and Benguela provinces early in
February, and had crossed back into Namibia before the end of
March. Behind them they left a scatter of demoralised U N I T A
and FNLA bands, weakened further by fighting between each
other since December; these either fled, or were quickly mopped
up, except in the mountains and forests of Huambo and Bihe,
1
where a number of U N I T A bands continued to be active, and the
'second war of liberation', as it was n o w called, came to an end.
With this, the new government of the M P L A was left to cope as
well as it could with the confusions and dislocations which
inevitably filled the scene. These were approached with policies
of radical reorganisation similar in principle to the policies of
F R E L I M O and P A I G C .
Sâo Tomé and Principe acceded to independence as a single
Republic without fighting or political resistance from Lisbon.
Nationalists of the Movimento de Libertaçâo de Sâo Tomé e
Principe (MLSTP) reached an agreement with Portugal on 25
November 1 9 7 4 , providing that colonial rule should end with
elections to a constituent assembly. These were held on 6 J u l y
1 9 7 5 , and gave the M L S T P a 90 per cent majority of votes. On
11 July the last Portuguese troops and administrators were
withdrawn, and independence was proclaimed the next day,
Manuel da Costa becoming the country's first president.
1
T h e s e b a n d s w e r e left w i t h d u m p s o f w a r m a t e r i a l b y t h e r e t r e a t i n g S o u t h A f r i c a n
a r m y (pulling o u t o f the H i g h Plateau early in F e b r u a r y ) and c o n t i n u e d a destructive
w a r l i k e activity across a w i d e arc o f hill c o u n t r y in n o r t h e r n H u a m b o and B i h e districts.
B y 1977 t h i s a c t i v i t y w a s d e g e n e r a t i n g m o r e a n d m o r e i n t o s p o r a d i c b a n d i t r y . T h e a r m y
o f t h e M P L A b e g a n s y s t e m a t i c o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e m in J u n e 1977, b u t f i g h t i n g
persisted. A t this stage U N I T A o p e r a t i o n s w e r e m a i n l y in S o u t h A f r i c a n - p r o m o t e d
raids a c r o s s the N a m i b i a n b o r d e r i n t o s o u t h e r n m o s t A n g o l a , a n d a c o n t i n u e d air-lifted
i n f i l t r a t i o n o f s a b o t a g e g r o u p s f o r t h e w r e c k i n g o f rail a n d o t h e r c o m m u n i c a t i o n s .
795

Lisbon allowed itself small room for manoeuvre in foreign

relations during these years o f warfare, but clearly thought that
little o r none would be required, and that the nationalist challenge
could be contained with no substantial shift o f posture. In this
respect it relied upon its membership o f the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO). The value o f this membership was
enhanced after the French withdrawal in 1 9 6 6 , when the Iberian-
Atlantic command of N A T O was moved from France to Portugal.
But whereas the active support o f individual N A T O powers
stayed practically complete until the end, Lisbon's real bargaining
power diminished. A n estimate o f 1 9 6 2 showed about 80 per cent
of U S oversea military air traffic as being dependent on the U S
base in the Azores, but another o f 1 9 6 8 (perhaps because so much
US military air traffic was by then going to Vietnam) put this
1
proportion at only 20 per cent. Till late in the 1 9 6 0 s , however,
long-range U S air transports connecting with Western Europe
appear still to have required some use o f the Azores base.
The nationalist movements had nothing to oppose the power
fully supported colonial government save some rather scrappy
African aid, unofficial but often weak links with sympathisers in
the west and, after about i 9 6 0 , a cautious though growing readi
ness o f several governments in the Soviet bloc (then including
China) to give material aid and facilities for training and education.
So far as peripheral neighbours were concerned, the P A I G C had
continuous support from Guinea and occasional support from
Senegal ; F R E L I M O could count on Tanzania and afterwards on
Zambia but not on Malawi; while M P L A found help in Congo-
Brazzaville and afterwards (till 1 9 7 3 ) in Zambia, to offset the
unrelenting hostility o f Zaire. The Liberation Committee o f the
Organisation o f African Unity was sporadically able to collect
military aid for each o f the movements, but its total volume was
always small.
The pioneering leaderships, drawn together from the first by
their common cultural background and very comparable problems
and policies, acted together in trying to evoke interest and raise
support. In 195 7 a handful of nationalists from Angola and Guiné
met in Paris, at a * réunion de consultation et d'étude pour le développement
de la lutte\ and formed themselves into a Movimento Anti-
Colonialista ( M A C ) , largely for propaganda purposes. In January
i 9 6 0 , meeting at Tunis during the second All-African Peoples'
1
A b s h i r e a n d S a m u e l s , Portuguese Africa, 4 3 6 .
796

T H E F I G H T FOR INDEPENDENCE
Conference, M A C was enlarged into a Frente Revolucionaria

Africana para a Independencia Nacional (FRAIN). Its common
action programme was signed by Abel Djassi (the pseudonym of
Amílcar Cabral, P A I G C ) , Hugo Menezes (an Angolan specifically
representing FRAIN), t w o M P L A leaders (Lucio Lara, Viriato da
Cruz), and also, though he at once cancelled his adherence, by José
1
Guilmor (the pseudonym of Holden Roberto, U P A , A n g o l a ) .
Later in i 9 6 0 members of F R A I N went on support-seeking tours
wherever they could gain access, notably in Britain and France;
Cabral spent some months in London at this time, still under his
nom de guerre. The government of Guinea, and afterwards that of
Algeria, proved especially helpful with passports. Later again, in
April 1 9 6 1 , F R A I N gave way to a Conferencia das O r g a n i z a r e s
Nacionalistas das Colonias Portuguezas (CONCP) during a meet
ing in Casablanca; and CONCP remained as a coordinating body,
based in Algiers, until the wars ended, though its activity
dwindled as each movement developed its o w n external relations.
By 1 9 6 2 the refusal of cooperation by Holden Roberto (UPA, then
F N L A , Angola) became constant, while the Mozambicans, up to
now represented in the councils of the movements chiefly by
Marcelino dos Santos, w h o was to become Vice-President of
Mozambique in 1 9 7 5 , appeared as regular participants after the
formation of F R E L I M O in that year.
In 1 9 7 6 , after independence, the question was raised of forming
a new type of coordinating body, but it became immediately
apparent that this was regarded, by some if not by all, as
undesirable. It was accepted that the five governments should not
seek to form a 'lusophone grouping' within the O A U , and that
basic political cooperation would in any case have to await the
emergence of structured political parties, only then in prospect
or course of formation. Even so, a three-day exploratory meeting
of foreign ministers of the five governments met on Sao Tomé
in May 1 9 7 6 , and some decisions were taken. The CONCP being
now outdated, no other such organisation was formed, but the
governments were recommended to agree on the principle of
prior consultation before major internal gatherings. Some coor
dination in political and cultural questions, as well as in matters
of technical, diplomatic, consular and telecommunicatory
2
common interest, was likewise recommended.
1
Photocopy of programme, with signatures, in my possession.
2
A. Pereira, Retatóno, in N6 Pintcba, 4 September 1976, vol. 2, no. 47.
797

Each government reaffirmed its position o f military non-

alignment, and western apprehensions about east-bloc bases being
established in these territories were not realised. While pursuing
anti-capitalist domestic policies, each regime went out o f its way
to secure good relations with leading western countries, as well
as with the UN and its agencies; only in the case o f Angola,
initially boycotted by the U S A , was there delay in achieving such
relations. Each government adhered to UN and O A U policy
towards the illegal Rhodesian regime and the South African
1
occupation o f Namibia. Relations with the Portuguese govern
ment improved after the latter had given up its demand that the
new regimes should meet the debts to Portugal o f the previous
colonial administrations.
T H E P O L I T I C S O F L I B E R A T I O N : T H E O R Y A N D P R A C T I C E
With differences o f emphasis o r explanation, the founding lead

erships o f the three nationalist movements (the M L S T P not really
counting till very near the end) each arrived at the same
appreciation of the problems before them. The gruesome lessons
of repressive brutality in 1 9 5 9 - 6 0 confirmed the Lisbon regime's
inflexibility, and reinforced their view that Portugal was a
sub-imperialism incapable o f practising a meaningful policy o f
reform. They saw well enough that if it had been thus capable,
as one o f them reminded his colleagues in 1 9 6 5 , ' w e should surely
2
not be at war with Portugal t o d a y ' . Things being as they were,
however, Portuguese intransigence could be turned to advantage.
For it eliminated the dangers o f a compromise solution; and they
were convinced, and found ever more confirmation in the
newly-independent Africa o f the early 1 9 6 0 s , that a compromise
solution would leave the colonial condition of their peoples
essentially unchanged. In eliminating those risks, moreover,
1
T h i s s u p p o r t f o r o t h e r m o v e m e n t s s e e k i n g t h e e n d o f racist r e g i m e s i n s o u t h e r n
Africa entered into the policies o f non-alignment o f the n e w regimes. Cf. a characteristic
statement b y Aristides Pereira, Secretary-General o f the P A I G C a n d President o f the
C a p e V e r d e R e p u b l i c i n Relatdrio do CSL, r; November 19/7:
1
In creating o u r party, w e k n e w very well that the aims o f the struggle w e were b e g i n n i n g c o u l d
n o t be reduced t o a mere liquidation o f the colonial y o k e u p o n o u r countries. T h i s is s o because
it is impossible t o destroy colonial domination w i t h o u t s t r u g g l i n g against imperialism, w h i c h is
the supporter o f colonialism in all its forms. T h i s anti-imperalist factor is a fundamental factor
in o u r policy o f n o n - a l i g n m e n t . . . '
2
A . Cabral, in P r o c e e d i n g s o f an i n t e r - m o v e m e n t conference, D a r es Salaam,
O c t o b e r 1 9 6 5 , 1 ^ Lutte de liberation nationale dans les coloniesportugaises ( C O N C P , A l g i e r s ,
1965), 152.
798

T H E P O L I T I C S O F L I B E R A T I O N
Portuguese intransigence placed before them an absolute need to

find an alternative not only to the colonial system but also, beyond
that, to any possible derivative from that system. The wars would
have to be used as an instrument to forge this alternative. ' W e
do not like w a r ; but this armed struggle has its advantages.
Through it w e are building a nation that is solid, conscious o f
1
itself...'
For the wars did indeed take hold o f this starting theory o f
change, vague and unsure as it necessarily was, and continuously
developed it further. Circumstances increasingly combined to
show that successful movements could be built and maintained
only from the ground of rural interests and o f rural participation
in serving those interests. A few townsmen might foresee a
'revolutionary future', but it very soon became clear that it was
no good telling this to the peasants. What these saw, in their
multitudes, were the * small immediate facts' of a colonial coercion:
the facts o f contract labour, obligatory cultivation, a hated system
of taxes, the pressures of the local chefe do posto and his reguíos and
police. Meaningful change would have to begin with things like
those, and offer an alternative to things like those. T o propose
a mere change of masters from privileged white to privileged
black would never be enough to justify the pains of war. In any
and every case, the peasants would rally only to movements in
which their interests and participation were seen and felt by them
as paramount. T o 'mobilise' the peasants meant to identify their
grievances and show h o w these could be removed. A P A I G C
internal directive of 1965 spoke for the general experience: * Keep
always in mind that the people are not fighting for ideas, for the
things in anyone's head. They are fighting to win material
benefits, to live better and at peace, to see their lives go forward,
to guarantee the future of their c h i l d r e n . . . ' The alternative would
have to be a modernising and egalitarian democracy, but easy
words and promises would never achieve it: 'Practise revolution-
ary d e m o c r a c y . . . Hold frequent meetings... Hide nothing from
2
the masses of our people. Tell no lies, claim no easy v i c t o r i e s . . . '
A further large conviction shaped itself. If the central objective
1
A . C a b r a l , f o r e w o r d t o D a v i d s o n , The liberation of Guiñé, 13.
2
A . C a b r a l , Palavras gerais, 1965, q u o t e d h e r e f r o m e x t r a c t i n C a b r a l , Revolution in
Guinea ( L o n d o n , 1969), a u t h o r ' s t r a n s l a t i o n , 72. C o m p l e t e F r e n c h t e x t , A . C a b r a l , Unite
et lutte ( P a r i s , 1975), e d . a n d t r . M . d e A n d r a d e , v o l . I I , 188-233; a n d i n C a b r a l , Unity
and struggle ( L o n d o n , 1979) tr. M . W o l f e r s .
799

was to create a movement in which the interests and participation

of the vast majority were to be decisive - and fully rural popu
lations were more than nine-tenths o f these peoples - this could
not be allowed to give paramountcy to the existing ideas of that
majority. On the contrary, what was needed was 'a new culture,
also based on our o w n traditions, but respecting everything that
the world today has conquered for the service o f mankind \ * A n d
this need was an imperative; it could not be negotiable. Much
bitter experience, right through the 1 9 6 0 s , proved again and again
that allowing a free rein to the ' pre-colonial' o r ' traditional' fund
of ideas w o u l d lead straight to disaster by way of inter-ethnic
disputes and rivalries, witchcraft practices, individualist am
2
bitions, and one or other degeneration into t e r r o r i s m . It became
unquestionably sure that a successful alternative system must arise
from a fight on t w o fronts: against the past as well as against the
present. This was the close grappling with absolutely local
realities which always made it certain that these wars of liberation
would lead to an alternative sui generis, n o matter h o w otherwise
glossed in revolutionary terms and titles.
Whatever the nationalists may have thought at the outset, they
became aware that n o imported examples could solve their
problems. Much evidence from their documents and statements
could illustrate this, and display the meaning they attached to a
revolutionary as distinct from a reformist nationalism. ' W e are
trying, * Neto explained in 1 9 7 0 , ' to free and modernise o u r people
by a dual revolution: against their traditional structures which can
no longer serve them' —such as ethnic separatism, witchcraft
3
belief, the oppression o f women —'and against colonial r u l e /
W h e n F R E L I M O ' t o o k up arms to defeat the old o r d e r ' , recalled
Samora Machel a little later,
W e felt the obscure need to create a new society, strong, healthy and
prosperous, in which people freed from all exploitation would co-operate for
the progress of all. In the course of our struggle, in the tough fight we have
had to wage war against reactionary elements, we came to understand our
objectives more clearly. W e felt especially that the struggle to create new
4
structures would fall within the creation of a new mentality...
1
A. Cabral, 'Resistencia cultural \ PAIGC seminar paper, November 1969.
2
For evidence of this experience, see Davidson, In the eye of the storm, 2 9 - 3 2 ; and,
for Guinea-Bissau, Davidson, Africa in modem history: the searchfor a new society (London,
1978), Chapter 30, and source references.
3
Davidson, In the eye of the storm, 279.
4
S. M. Machel, Mozambique: sowing the seeds of revolution (London, 1974), 39.
800

The styles might vary from dry realism to a vivid rhetoric; but
the meaning was the same. The challenge was to overleap the
colonial heritage but, just as much, the pre-colonial heritage as
well. Against whatever obstacles of history or human nature, it
had to be a matter of living differently in order to live better.
But h o w should the ideas of living differently be made to
develop in men's minds? The field laboratories in which the
answer was sought were the 'liberated zones'. These were more
or less large areas taken out of Portuguese control and secured
generally against Portuguese action except in aerial bombing and
sporadic ground raids. A s such, they were distinguished from
'zones of contestation' in which each side fought for control. In
Guinea-Bissau the P A I G C was able to achieve its earliest liberated
zones in 1964, progressively adding to them until 1974. F R E L I M O
reached the same position in parts of Cabo Delgado and Niassa
in 1966 and in parts of Tete in 1970; while M P L A , though under
exceptionally adverse conditions of terrain and sparse population,
achieved it in areas of eastern Angola after 1967. These zones
became a central and decisive feature in the life of the movements,
although their extent and security greatly varied with the tides of
war.
The chief effort of the leaderships in these zones was to develop
an initial peasant sympathy, o r at times a merely suspicious
tolerance, into an active peasant participation. This effort took
different forms. O f these the most important from first to last was
the promotion of local committees of self-administration derived
from assemblies, necessarily partial and inadequate at the start,
representing large villages o r groups of small villages. T o these
committees there were progressively given responsibilities arising
from the needs of the w a r as well as from the need to exercise
a local government in place of ousted colonial officials and
colonial-appointed 'chiefs'; and these responsibilities were
widened in the measure that the committees became more repre
sentative, elected, and efficient. In their mature form, in zones
liberated o v e r a long period, the best of these committees were
elected bodies concerned with local justice, through the creation
of village tribunals; with local security, through the manning of
militias; with local education and health, through the supply of
pupils and food to new elementary schools, and the provision of
food and porterage to new bush clinics staffed by newly trained
801

nurses with an occasional doctor making his rounds; and, above

all, with the forging of the ideas of a democracy based on equality
of status between all adults, and notably between women and men.
Efforts were made at the same time to provide a substitute for
banished Portuguese trading networks through sale-and-purchase
shops; these bought local produce by barter exchange for goods
imported from the exterior. Swedish aid was particularly useful
in supplying such goods, which ranged from cloth and household
utensils to transistor radios.
No doubt the results differed from zone to zone, and the mature
form of this structural model could be achieved only in a few
zones, while elsewhere the militants of the movements strove
towards it as best they could. But the overall balance of evidence
during the wars, and of what happened when the wars were over,
combines to suggest that the essential structures of an alternative
society, of a modernising and egalitarian culture, did indeed take
shape in the experience of all three movements - if also, as one
should perhaps emphasise, in widely varying degrees of maturity.
There set in, undoubtedly, a dual process of cultural develop
ment and convergence between 'the few* and 'the many'. The
peasants learned new understandings and attitudes; but so did the
originally urban leadership. Both aspects of this process helped
to solidify the movements, broaden the scope of participation, and
change the mentality of men and women; and it is in this elusive
field of experience that one must look for the keys to their success,
whether in making headway against their enemy or in preparing
for the peace that would follow the enemy's defeat. In 1 9 7 0 Cabral
offered a sketch of this crucial process:
The leaders of the liberation movements, who are generally drawn from the
* petty bourgeoisie' (such as intellectuals, clerks) or urban workers (such as
l a b o u r e r s , drivers, o t h e r employees), have to live day by day among various
peasant communities in the heart of rural populations. They learn to know their
people better. They uncover at its source the richness of their people's cultural
values, whether philosophical, political, artistic, social or moral. They achieve
a clearer perception of the economic realities, problems, sufferings and
aspirations of the masses of their people. Not without a certain astonishment,
t h e y discover t h e richness o f spirit, capacity for reasoned discussion and clear
exposition of ideas, facility for comprehending and assimilating concepts, on
the part of populations hitherto ignored, if not despised, and considered by
the coloniser, and even by some nationals, as peoples of no kind of competence.
The leaders thus enrich their own culture. They develop personally and free
802

themselves from complexes. They reinforce their ability to serve their people
through serving the movement.
O n their side, the working masses and especially the peasants w h o are usually
illiterate, and have never gone outside the boundaries of their village or region,
also come into contact with other communities and, in their turn, lose the
complexes which hampered them in their relations with other ethnic and social
groups. They break the bonds of their village universe and integrate themselves
progressively with their country and with the world. They acquire an infinity
of new insights useful to their immediate and future action within the
framework of the struggle. They strengthen their political awareness by
assimilating the principles of national and social revolution that the struggle
postulates. A n d so they become more able to play their decisive role of
1
providing the chief force in the movement of liberation.
All this being so, the armed struggle for liberation from
colonial rule, as from restrictive traditional ideas, was to be seen
not only as ' a product of the culture' promoted by that struggle,
but also as ' a determinant o f culture'; and this, ' without doubt,
is o u r people's prime recompense for the efforts and sacrifices
which w a r demands'. In thinking this, Cabral and his colleagues
were giving the concept o f ' culture' a multivalence applicable to
societies in transition from one historical phase to another: in this
case, to a regained self-rule and self-reliance, but within a world
different from any that the past had known. They saw this in
all-round terms. A new culture would be the fruit of insights
gained by participation in this building of a new society. It would
be independent, modernising, self-aware. It would induce between
the individual and the collective a relationship of harmony; and
this relationship of harmony would be such as to bind together
all w h o worked o r fought for common purposes. This was the
developing harmony of understanding and purpose which, as a
determinant, would open the way for, and accompany, organis
ational changes in the structure of existing society.
The cultural programmes of these movements accordingly
began with the teaching of this politics of liberation, and of the
morality associated with this politics: the morality, that is, of
seeking individual self-realisation through service to these devel
oping communities. The association of individuals and collec
tivities in decisions affecting their daily lives was one form of
innovation; pressure against exploitative customs and attitudes
1
A. Cabral, * National liberation and culture* (Syracuse University, Eduardo
Mondlane Memorial Lecture, 20 Feb 1970), 13; Cabral, Unite et lutte, vol. I, 332, and
Unity and struggle (London, 1979).
803

derived from the pre-colonial heritage, such as polygamy and

certain witchcraft beliefs, was another. Beyond such basic and
decisive issues, affecting as they did the very capacity of these
movements to make progress and develop, there evolved a
modernising campaign against illiteracy, and in favour of the
expansion of elementary forms of school education. Whenever
zones could be sufficiently cleared of colonial control o r military
interference, bush schools were founded where few o r none had
existed before. Even by the end of 1 9 6 8 , leading the way in this
respect, the P A I G C had some 1 4 0 0 0 children with an average age
of twelve in about 1 5 0 schools with some 220 teachers in the zones
of Guinea-Bissau which they controlled.
The few w h o were fully literate, meanwhile, saw it as a duty
to use their talents in support o f this cultural process, whether
in poetry with a markedly political and social content, o r , though
less often, in writing stories that might lay foundations for a
1
popular written literature. Life in these movements became, as
the years w o r e by, and in the broad sense indicated above, an
increasingly cultural experience for growing numbers o f those
w h o participated.
Given the background of this subtle and continuous process
of development pursued through years, the leaderships at the end
of the wars were in no mind either to hasten or to modify their
objectives. So far, through terrain often very harsh, their theory
and practice had served well, and they could measure its strengths
and weaknesses against a remarkable success. They n o w had
strong movements behind them, movements which had become
profoundly representative of their peoples, but the problems
ahead were in many ways more complex, and therefore more
difficult, than any that they had faced. The chief immediate task
was to implant law and order into towns and other areas
evacuated by the Portuguese (and, in Angola, evacuated also by
1
For examples of the poets, see several collections: for example, M. de Andrade,
Antologia temdtica de poesia Africana: /, la noite gravida de Punbais (Lisbon, 1975);
M. Dickinson (ed. and tr.) When bullets begin to flower (Nairobi, 1972) which, like the
first, has resistance poetry from all the Portuguese colonies; Agostinho Neto, Sacred
hope, tr. M. Holness (Dar es Salaam, 1974), one of Angola's leading poets (and President
of Angola); and a Cape Vcrdean poet, Ovidio Martins, Ndo vou para Pasdrgada
(Rotterdam, n.d.). For examples of new writers in prose, see J. Luandino Vieira, The
real life of Domingos Xavier (tr. M. Wolfers, London, 1977, but written c. i960 in a rich
language of Luanda slang and popular expression), and another Angolan, Pepetela, As
aventuras de Ngunga (Lisbon, n.d., but written c. 1970). The list could be much extended.
804

T H E P O L I T I C S OF L I B E R A T I O N
South African and other invaders), and then, gradually, install

throughout their countries the institutions and attitudes elaborated
or projected in the wartime zones of liberation. This latter task
was to stretch them to their utmost for a long period ahead.
The next immediate task was to cope with an invariably
disastrous economic heritage. Production had collapsed in all
urban and peripheral areas. Roads, bridges, railways were all much
damaged, and huge numbers of land-mines had to be lifted. Every
sort of technician, from book-keepers to plumbers, was in acutely
short supply. There were few or no economic statistics, and no
statisticians. They had to take into national ownership and
management a large number o f enterprises of whose nature they
could at first know almost nothing. Beyond that, they had to
found national banks, issue national currencies, and conclude a
long series of basic international agreements on trade and ex
change. It was rapidly clear that all this would take time, and that
some years must pass before production could be generally
restored even to pre-war levels.
The alternative they had begun to forge in the liberated zones
of the war years predicated a non-capitalist and eventually socialist
model. Yet they were careful, even with the wars behind them,
to measure their words. If they remained insistent on emphasising
their loyalty to a revolutionary objective defined in Marxist terms,
they did so without demagogy. Some words o f Neto's, when
talking in 1976 to an Angolan trade union congress, may probably
stand for their general attitude:
The long period of transition from a colonial society to a socialist society will
call for a multi-sided form of economic organisation. The progress of our
economic transformation towards socialism will be expressed by a steady
growth of the state sector and of the co-operative sector in the rural areas, and
1
by a steady reduction of the mixed sector, of the private capital sector...
But there would be no hurry to collectivise property. 'Millions
of Angolans o w n means of production. They have their bit of
land. A n d we are very aware of how difficult it still is, in the rural
areas, to transform these small properties into co-operative or
state property.' Change could come only with peasant agreement:
' only when the peasantry fully understands the advantage arid the
meaning of this more advanced mode of p r o d u c t i o n . . . This is a
1
Vitoria Certa, 23 O c t o b e r 1976, v o l . I I , n o . 4 4 , a u t h o r ' s t r a n s l a t i o n . A l s o i n People's
Power ( L o n d o n , 1976), N o v . - D e c . 1976, n o . 5, 6-7.
805

J
matter of years of organisation and educative w o r k . . . A s for the
relations with major foreign enterprises, such as Cabinda Gulf Oil,
Neto said that they would have to temporise, for such enterprises
alone possessed the technology required to extract oil or other
4
resources. But we do not wish to deceive foreign capitalist
monopolies by concealing the fact that we intend to follow the
road of socialising our means of production, of finance, of trade,
of services, and of everything that can be socialised...'
Meanwhile they would press on with the further promotion and
installation of the basic political structures of participation,
whether in terms of party organisation or of the state organisation
which called for assemblies and executive committees of self-rule
at all levels of government. A beginning had been made, but the
bulk of this task still lay ahead. Thus the central committee of the
M P L A in Angola asserted in a programmatic statement of
October 1 9 7 6 that
The definitive forms of our state, considered as a whole and not merely as the
apparatus of government, will arise from the representative institutions of
power, from the organs of Poder Popular [People's Power], where the working
class, the working people, participate institutionally in the command and
government of society, in all activities and in every community throughout
1
the national territory...
Corresponding statements and definitions were available from
F R E L I M O and the P A I G C . These structures would take time to
build. But they would represent, in the measure of their unfolding
development, the groundwork of the society which these move
ments had set themselves to create.
E Q U A T O R I A L G U I N E A , c. 1 9 4 0 to 1 9 7 5
... y alii, alegada de la verde masa africana,
azotada por los vientos del Atlantico,
orgullosa y solitaria, se erige una historia,
un mundo, un destino...
Written of the island of A n n o b o n , whose population in 1 9 5 0 was
1 4 0 3 , these lines from a 'lament' of Francisco Zamora might seem
to apply to all the parts of Equatorial Guinea, cut off from the
rest of Africa by the heritage of a Spanish colonial culture
1
Documentos: f Reuntdo do Comite Central do MPLA ( L u a n d a , 1976).
806

E Q U A T O R I A L G U I N E A
Table 1 5 . 3 . The censusfiguresfor ip/o.
Whites Non-whites ' Foreigners ' Totals

Fernando Po Is. 2161 14735 ^3 579 40 475
Rio Muni 1428 142 316 12432 i56176
Annobón Is. 6 497 1403
Corisco Is. 54 54
Elobey Is. 96 96
unshared by any of its neighbours in * a world, a destiny' of its

own. It remains that this little territory played out the drama of
rising nationalism in the same essential themes as its English- and
French-speaking neighbours, although with peculiarities of its
own and a denouement both bizarre and tragic. One can divide its
history in this period into three fairly distinct phases: up to 1 9 5 9 ,
when its status was raised from 'colonial' to 'provincial', taking
a leaf out of Salazar's book; between i 9 6 0 and 1 9 6 8 , when Madrid
went beyond Salazar's prescriptions and attempted a partial
decolonisation which should, as it was hoped, conserve the
territory as an integral segment of the Spanish system; and
onwards from 1 9 6 8 , when the territory became an independent
Republic. The first of these phases consisted of little more than
a continuation of previous policies; these closely resembled the
policies of Portugal and France, notably in dividing the population
into a vast majority governed as 'natives' or non-citizens, and a
very small minority (together with whites) admitted to civic status
as emancipados, assimilation to the metropolitan culture being the
only permissible means of advancement.
W a r stagnation in this phase was slightly lessened, at least in
the case of Fernando Po, by a treaty of 1943 with the British in
Nigeria, regulating the immigration of contract workers, most of
w h o m came from the Niger Delta regions. But the arrival of
Admiral Faustino Ruiz Gonzalez as governor-general in 1 9 4 9
signalled the beginnings of a consistent effort to improve the
colonial economy through the investment of budget surpluses in
better communications, in the extension of elementary schools,
and in some other initiatives. The whole phase showed a steady
growth in population, though the relevant statistics are rough
estimates save in the case of whites and, probably, of contract-
workers in Fernando Po. In 1 9 4 2 the territory was said to have
807

167158 people, including 4124 whites, most of w h o m were

permanent settlers or urban residents, and 24321 non-white
'foreigners' w h o were mostly Nigerian immigrant workers on
plantations, chiefly in Fernando Po. The 1950 census figures are
set out in table 15.3.
By i960 the whole population had g r o w n from a total of about
200000 in 1950 to about 245 000, with whites increasing to some
7000, nearly three-quarters of whom were on Fernando Po. No
later figures of any value are available; but it appears that large
numbers of Africans in Rio Muni fled abroad after about 1972,
and that the number of whites in 1975 was only a small fraction
of those w h o had lived in Rio Muni in i960.
During the Second W o r l d W a r the Madrid regime had
nourished some hope, at least until 1942, of being able to inherit
British and French colonial territory. Disappointed in this, it
responded slowly to the new political currents set going after the
end of the war, but felt it wise during the 1950s to adopt a much
more determined policy of assimilation. This took constitutional
form on 30 July 1959, when the colony became the Región
Ecuatorial de España, being divided into t w o provinces (Fernando
Po and Rio Muni). Each of these provinces proceeded in i960
to elect three deputies to the Spanish Cortes: t w o Africans and
one European in the case of Fernando Po, t w o Europeans and
one African in that of Rio Muni. A t the same time, a little earlier
than in the Portuguese system (and 14 years after the French
system), the constitutional distinction between 'natives' and
' civilised ' was abolished, while Admiral Gonzalez continued with
his programme of cultural assimilation. Already by i960 it was
claimed that the whole territory had 118 pre-primary schools, 14
primary schools, four technical schools, one secondary school, and
also, at Santa Isabel (capital of Fernando Po), a training centre
for teachers and clerks. In addition, Catholic missions were
operating 20 pre-primary schools, and t w o seminaries. The
comparison with Portuguese practice was again apparent: 'In-
struction is given in Spanish.. .Hygiene, Christian virtues,
love of the fatherland and of the Caudillo [General Franco], the
elements of Spanish language and culture, the rudiments of
agriculture: these are what is mainly t a u g h t . . .'*
This 'provincial' phase saw the beginnings of nationalism, but
1
R. Pélissier, * L a G u i n é e E s p a g n o l e Revue Française de Science Politique, 3 S e p t e m b e r
1963, 1 3 , 631.
808

chiefly among small groups w h o had taken refuge from the

Caudillo's paternal hand in Cameroun and Gabon. They formed
t w o bodies: the Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de la Guinea
( M O N A L I G E ) , and the Idea Popular de la Guinea Ecuatorial
(IPGE). Their pressures were weak, but the general trend in West
Africa was n o t ; and Madrid n o w thought it well to seek its o w n
interlocuteurs valables. A decision of 9 August 1 9 6 3 , approved by
a referendum of 15 December 1 9 6 3 , introduced the territory to
a measure of autonomy and the administrative promotion of a
'moderate* grouping, the Movimiento de Unión Nacional de la
Guinea Ecuatorial (MUNGE). This proved a feeble instrument,
and, with growing pressure for change from the UN, Madrid gave
way to the currents of nationalism. Independence was conceded
on 1 2 October 1 9 6 8 . The ' moderates * were n o w thrust aside, and
Francisco Maclas Nguéma emerged as the dominant figure.
Severely authoritarian from the start, Macias proceeded to
silence his opponents or rivals one by one, revealing his preferred
style in the renaming of Fernando Po, which became Macias
Nguéma Byoga (while A n n o b ó n became Pigalu). A new con-
stitution of 1 9 7 3 deprived Macias Nguéma Byoga of its remain-
ing provincial autonomy within the Republic, evidently to the ad-
vantage o f the Fang supremacy on the mainland. Tensions with
neighbouring countries were lessened by O A U and other medi-
ation in the same year of 1 9 7 3 , but continued to disturb relations
between the Macias regime and Nigeria and, at the time of
writing, contacts between the t w o countries seemed uncertain.
Little can be said with confidence about economic and cultural
change. In 1 9 7 4 the country's production o f cassava was estimated
by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN as being
46 000 tons; of sweet potatoes 1 9 000 tons; of bananas 12 000 tons;
of cocoa beans 1 2 0 0 0 tons; of coffee 7 2 0 0 tons; of palm-oil 4 3 0 0
tons; of kernels 2 1 0 0 tons; while power production in 1 9 6 7 was
recorded as being 9 4 7 0 0 0 0 kwh on Fernando Po and 5 7 0 0 0 0 0
in Rio Muni. In 1 9 7 5 the Guiñean peseta was replaced by the
ekuele. Some aid had been sporadically achieved from Cuba, the
U S S R and China, but there is little reliable information as to its
scale or use; and reports in 1 9 7 5 suggested that the regime was
close to bankruptcy, though some allowance may need to be made
for the fact that most of such reports have emanated from
refugees.
Towards the middle 1 9 7 0 s the Macias regime came under grave
809

accusations of being guilty of mass killings. In 1 9 7 4 the W o r l d

Council of Churches affirmed that large numbers of people had
been murdered since 1 9 6 8 in a 'reign of terror' which continued.
The same body claimed that a quarter of the whole population
had fled abroad, while 'the prisons are overflowing and to all
intents and purposes form one vast concentration camp'. Early
in 1 9 7 5 refugees in Madrid published a list of 3 1 9 persons said
to have been executed by the president's orders, and these sources
placed the number of refugees as being between 5 5 000 and
1
75 0 0 0 . A year later, reports from Madrid also spoke of clashes
within the country, and of growing opposition to the regime.
Various coups were to follow.
1
West Africa, 6 January 1975, 22. * The Times, 28 June 1976.
8lO

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAYS
I. P R E L U D E T O D E C O L O N I S A T I O N
2. D E C O L O N I S A T I O N A N DT H E P R O B L E M S O F
1
I N D E P E N D E N C E
This volume of The Cambridge History of Africa differs from the

two volumes immediately preceding it in that when it was first
planned in 1975 archival sources were available to its authors only
for the first five years in those few record offices that operate the
30-year rule. By and large, then, this is a volume whose
contributors have been unable to use archival sources directly o r
refer to works based on them. Indeed as far as Africa is concerned
it is only very recently that w o r k based on the Public Record
Office at K e w , covering the first ten years of our period, has been
published in journals and books. Notable among these have been
William R. Louis, Imperialism at bay 1941-194;: the United States
and the decolonisation of the British Empire (Oxford, 1 9 7 7 ) ; Ronald
Robinson,' A n d r e w Cohen and the transfer o f power in Tropical
Africa, 1940-1951 \ in W . H. Morris-Jones and Georges Fischer
(eds.), Decolonisation and after: the British and French experience
(London, 1980); and R. D. Pearce, The turning point in Africa:
British colonial policy 19)8-1948 (London, 1982).
If archival sources have been unavailable for most o f the period
covered by this volume, its authors have had to peruse a much
greater wealth of newspaper reports, government publications,
journal articles, sound recordings, photographs and films than for
any other period o f African history. Though here again the years
covered by this volume are unevenly provided for: the impact of
the Second W o r l d W a r on Africa is understandably scantily
treated in newspaper reports and contemporary government
1
B i l l y J. D u d l e y d i e d b e f o r e h e w a s a b l e t o d r a f t t h e b i b l i o g r a p h i c a l e s s a y t o
a c c o m p a n y C h a p t e r 2. I t w a s t h e r e f o r e d e c i d e d t h a t t h e e d i t o r o f t h i s v o l u m e , w h o i s
also author o f the p r e c e d i n g chapter, should write an essay t o c o v e r t h e literature
available f o r b o t h chapters w i t h the selection and evaluation o f b o o k s , articles and other
sources b e i n g entirely his responsibility.
8ll

B I B L I O G R A P H I C A L ESSAYS
publications, while the attention it has received from scholars in

both journal articles and monographs has been equally scant, as
David Killingray has pointed out in his article on ' Military and
labour recruitment in the G o l d Coast during the Second W o r l d
W a r ' , Journal of African History, 1 9 8 2 , vol. 2 3 . Material for the
period 1 9 4 5 — 6 0 is much more abundant, but it can in no way
compare with that available for the 15 years that succeeded it.
Before i 9 6 0 a journalist visiting West Africa, politically the most
advanced region of sub-Saharan Africa, was still something of a
rarity and usually represented the 'serious' newspapers published
in one of the metropolises of the colonial powers. This dearth of
reporting on current events in Africa was compensated for in some
countries like Nigeria and the then G o l d Coast by a vigorous local
press, and by a few specialist magazines like New Commonwealth,
African World, West Africa and The Times British Colonies Review.
It was only after i 9 6 0 , the annus mirabilis of African independence,
that the continent opened up to the international press. Similarly
before i 9 6 0 relatively few scholarly works had been published on
any African country relating to the period post-1940, and then for
the most part they were written by nationals of the metropolitan
country concerned. There were a few exceptions, such as the
American scholar James S. Coleman's magnificent study, Nigeria:
background to nationalism (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1 9 5 8 ) . The
great boom in doctoral dissertations on Africa did not begin in
earnest until after i 9 6 0 , and few of them touch on the Second
W o r l d W a r , though many deal in depth with the period 1 9 4 5 - 6 0 .
A s far as the authors of many of the chapters in this volume are
concerned, the period that has been most closely scrutinised in
the press, in journal articles and monographs, and which is
supported by a mass of sociological and economic data provided
by both governmental and international agencies, is that of
independence, as their bibliographical essays demonstrate. The
period of independence of course differs in length for each African
country, and only begins in the case of Portuguese-speaking
territories at the date with which this volume ends. Generally
we can say that by far the best served period from the point of
view of scholarly coverage, documentation and availability of
contemporary reportage is that from 1 9 6 0 - 7 5 .
There have, however, been drawbacks to this comparative glut
of material for the years since i 9 6 0 : some of it became available
812

1,2. D E C O L O N I S A T I O N A N D I N D E P E N D E N C E
too late to be made use of by our contributors; a good deal of

it, though scholarly in guise, is polemical and prescriptive in
intent.
While there have been many excellent regional and national
studies concerned with either whole o r part of our period, there
have been few continent-wide surveys of value. A number do,
however, stand out. For the earlier years Lord Hailey's An
African survey {revised 19j6) (London, 1 9 5 7 ) , is an invaluable source
with regard to the administrative, political, social and economic
record of the colonial powers in Africa. A s a study of African
reaction to this record, Thomas Hodgkin's Nationalism in colonial
Africa, published in the year the revised Survey was dated ( 1 9 5 6 ) ,
was seminal at the time and still has considerable value today.
Immanuel Wallerstein's Africa: the politics of independence (New
Y o r k , 1 9 6 1 ) provides a useful o v e r v i e w of the problems different
African states were then facing o r had just faced in the struggle
for independence. The role of political parties in this struggle and
in the consolidation of the independence settlement thereafter is
treated in Thomas Hodgkin's African political parties (Harmonds-
worth, 1 9 6 1 ) and James S. Coleman and Carl G . Rosberg (eds.),
Political parties and national integration in tropical Africa (Berkeley
and Los Angeles, 1 9 6 4 ) . Rene Dumont's UAfrique noire est mal
partie, translated as False start in Africa (London, 1 9 6 9 ) , expressed
the fears of a sympathetic but concerned agronomist for the future
of Africa under the leadership that inherited independence; as did
also the various w o r k s of Frantz Fanon, notably Les Damnes de
la terre, translated as The wretched of the earth (New Y o r k , 1 9 6 3 ) .
Ater independence there were many attempts to explain the
myriad problems faced by post-independence African states or,
as Stanislas Andreski described it, The African predicament
(London, 1 9 6 8 ) . Few were of more than passing interest, with the
exception of the works of dependence theorists discussed by Billy
Dudley at the beginning of his chapter. A s general sources for
the period 1960—75, Africa Contemporary Record (London, 1 9 6 8 to
date), the annual Africa South of the Sahara, and Roland Oliver and
Michael Crowder (general eds.), Cambridge Encyclopaedia of Africa
(Cambridge, 1 9 8 1 ) , are all useful.
No attempt is made here to treat either regional sources o r the
country-by-country sources which are adequately covered in the
bibliographical essays relating to the regional chapters, except
813

where they are of more than local interest. Nor is material relating
to economic, social and cultural change considered except where
it relates directly to Chapters i and 2, for it is fully covered in
the bibliographical essays relating to Chapters 4 and 5.
As a background to the period covered by this volume, Lord
Hailey's African survey provides a wealth of data. The chapters in
John Fage's A history of Africa (London, 1978) covering the late
colonial period and the problems of decolonisation are stimulating.
More detailed coverage is given in regional surveys: W . K n a p p
(ed.), A survey ofNorth-West Africa (Oxford, 1 9 7 7 ) , ? . J . Vatikiotis
The modern history of Egypt (London, 1 9 6 9 ) ; D. A. L o w and Alison
Smith (eds.), History of East Africa, vol. I l l (Oxford, 1 9 7 6 ) ;
J . F. A. Ajayi and Michael Crowder (eds.), History of West Africa,
vol. II (London, 1 9 7 4 ) , which can be supplemented by John
Dunn (ed.), West African states (Cambridge, 1 9 7 8 ) ; M. Wilson and
L. Thompson (eds.), Oxford history of South Africa, vol. II (Oxford,
1 9 7 1 ) , which can be supplemented by T. R. H. Davenport, South
Africa-a modern history (Johannesburg, 2 n d ed., 1 9 7 8 ) . A t the
time of going to press no comparable regional symposium was
available for Central Africa, though David Birmingham (ed.),
History of Central Africa, vol. II (in press) promised to fill the gap.
French works translated into English that are valuable for an
understanding of the colonial situation on the eve of decol
onisation are J . S. Suret-Canale, French colonialism in tropical
Africa 1900-194j (London, 1 9 7 1 ) , J . Berque, French North Africa
(London, 1 9 6 7 ) , and Robert Delavignette, Freedom and authority
in French West Africa (Oxford, 1950).
As already noted, there has been little written specifically about
the impact of the Second W o r l d W a r on Africa and information
about it has largely to be mined from national and regional
histories. The course of the war on African soil can be traced in
the official histories of the war, while the actual involvement of
Africans in that war has been the occasion of a few in-depth
studies, notably G. O. Olusanya, The Second World War and politics
in Nigeria 1939-19J3 (London, 1 9 7 3 ) , and that by D. Killingray
already cited. Walter Rodney, in World War II and the Tanânian
economy (Cornell, 1 9 7 6 ) , looks at the overall impact of the
war - political, social as well as economic - on what was then
Tanganyika. Michael Crowder does the same for West Africa in
West Africa under colonial rule and in his chapter on the Second
814

W o r l d W a r in Ajayi and Crowder {op. cit.). There is useful material

y e
in Jean Ganiage et al. (eds.), L Afrique au XX siècle (Paris, 1 9 6 6 ) .
African reaction to the war can be studied in a number of
autobiographies and political statements by African leaders, such
as Lamine Guèye's Itinéraire africaine (Paris, 1966) and Ndabaningi
Sithole's African nationalism (Oxford, 1 9 6 8 ) . Sylvia Leith-Ross,
Stepping-stones: memoirs of colonial Nigeria 1907-1960, edited and
with an introduction by Michael Crowder (London, 1 9 8 3 ) , has a
fascinating chapter on the impact of the war on Nigerians as she
perceived it. Eugene P. Schleh has compared 'The post-war
careers of ex-servicemen in Ghana and Uganda', Journal of Modern
African Studies, 1 9 6 8 , vol. 6, pp. 2 0 3 - 2 0 . Joyce Cary, in The case
for Africanfreedom and other writings (London, 1 9 4 4 ) , also considered
the impact of the war on African soldiers involved in it.
By far the most copious material available on the war concerns
the impact it had on the colonial powers, particularly with regard
to the introduction of more liberal political, economic and social
policies in their African colonies. Examination of its role in the
'transfer of p o w e r ' or 'decolonisation' has become something
of an industry. The w o r k of William R. Louis, Ronald Robinson
and R. D. Pearce has already been referred to. A l s o important are
J o h n D. Hargreaves, The end of colonial rule in West Africa (London,
1 9 7 8 ) ; D. Bruce Marshall, 'Free France in Africa: Gaullism
and colonialism', in Prosser Gifford and William R. Louis (eds.),
France and Britain in Africa: imperial rivalry and colonial rule (New
Haven and London, 1 9 7 1 ) ; and Margery Perham, Colonial sequence
19^0—1949 (London, 1 9 6 7 ) . O f vital importance to an under-
standing of the thinking of a man with influence in 'progressive'
colonial circles is Lord Hailey's The future of colonial peoples
(London, 1 9 4 3 ) .
O f the growing literature on 'decolonisation', Henri Grimal's
Decolonisation: the British, French, Dutch and Belgian empires,
1919-196) (trans. Stephen de V o s , London, 1 9 7 8 ) and Rudolf v o n
Albertini's Decolonisation: the administration andfuture of the colonies,
i919-1960 (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 1 ) give respectively a French and
German perspective on the problem. For a British point of view
A. H. M. Kirk-Greene (ed.), Africa in the colonialperiod: the transfer
ofpower - the colonial administrator in the age of decolonisation (Oxford,
1 9 7 9 ) , is useful though the contributions by many of the colonial
officials show h o w bitter memories become tempered with time;
815

perhaps a more realistic view of just h o w traumatic the 'transfer*

could be for British officials is presented by Sylvia Leith-Ross, op.
cit. The African view of the 'transfer* has still to be gleaned from
national rather than regional or continental studies, and these are
unevenly distributed over the continent. Billy J . Dudley's o w n
study of Parties and politics in Northern Nigeria (London, 1 9 6 6 ) is
a good example of a national's perspective on the problems of
decolonisation. Generally informative are w o r k s by political
leaders such as: H. K . Banda and H. M. Nkumbula, Federation in
Central Africa (London, 1 9 5 1 ) , Edouardo Mondlane, The struggle
for Mozambique (London, 1 9 6 9 ) , Patrice Lumumba, Congo, my
country (New Y o r k , 1 9 6 3 ) or J . Rabemananjara's Le Nationalisme
et problèmes malgaches (Paris, 1 9 5 8 ) . Most of the new nations of
Africa have had at least one study made by an American, French
or British scholar of their struggle for independence, and these
are noted in the bibliographical chapters for the regions into
which they fall. A few of these studies are of more than local
interest and those which Billy J . Dudley singled out for special
mention are Crawford Young's Politics in the Congo: decolonisation
and independence (Princeton, 1 9 6 5 ) and Ruth Schachter Morgenthau,
Political parties in French-speaking West Africa (Oxford, 1 9 6 4 ) . T o
these might be added Cranford Pratt's The critical phase in
Tanzania, 194J-1968 (Cambridge, 1 9 7 6 ) , Martin Kilson's Political
change in a West African state: a study of the modernisation process in
Sierra Leone (Cambridge, Mass., 1 9 6 6 ) , and Carl G . Rosberg and
9
J . Nottingham's The myth of'* MauMau (London, 1 9 6 6 ) . Generally
useful for their country case studies - though these vary in
quality - are the three volumes edited by Gwendolen M. Carter:
African one-party states (Ithaca, 1 9 6 2 ) ; Five African states: responses
to diversity (Ithaca, 1 9 6 3 ) ; and National unity and regionalism in eight
African states (Ithaca, 1 9 6 6 ) .
The constitutional inheritance of the new African states is again
the subject of a large number of national and regional studies, the
more important of which are evaluated in the bibliographical
essays relating to the regional chapters. The phenomenon of the
one-party state, which in so many African countries replaced the
metropolitan legacy of a multi-party democracy, was the subject
of much debate and a large number of studies. Perhaps the best
of these was Aristide Zolberg's One-party government in the Ivory
Coast (Princeton, 1 9 6 9 ) . His book, Creating political order : the party
816

states of West Africa (Chicago, 1 9 6 6 ) and his article on 'The

structure of political conflict in the new states of Africa ', American
Political Science Review, 6 2 , 1 9 6 8 , provide helpful insights into the
problems African states had in dealing with the constitutional
inheritance. From the African point of view these problems are
looked at from different perspectives by T o m Mboya in The
challenge of nationhood (London, 1 9 7 0 ) ; K . A. Busia in Africa in
search of democracy (London, 1 9 6 7 ) ; Bakary Traoré, M. Lô and
J.-L. Alibert in Forces politiques en Afrique noire (Paris, 1 9 6 6 ) ; and
Ali Mazrui in * Edmund Burke and reflections on the revolution
in the Congo ', an essay in his book On heroes and Uhuru-worship
(London, 1 9 6 7 ) . The question of *neo-colonialism' and 'depen
dence' is the subject of a vast and often polemical literature. A
useful introduction by one w h o is very committed to the
dependency theory is Samir Amin's Neo-colonialism in West Africa
(London, 1 9 7 6 ) . The economic inheritance, whether seen in
dependency terms or otherwise, is also the subject of a vast
literature which is exhaustively discussed in the bibliographical
essay for Chapter 5. O f more than national and regional interest
are Giovanni Arrighi's ' Labour suppliers in historical perspective :
a study of the proletarianisation of the African peasantry in
Rhodesia', Journal of Development Studies, April 1 9 7 0 , vol. 3 ;
Giovanni Arrighi and J . S. Saul (eds.), Essays on the politicaleconomy
of Africa (London, 1 9 7 3 ) ; Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya
(London, 1 9 7 4 ) ; Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons (eds.), The roots of
rural poverty in Central and Southern Africa (London, 1 9 7 7 ) ; Samir
Amin's various studies of African states, such as Trois expériences
africaines de développement : le Mali, la Guinée et le Ghana (Paris, 1 9 6 5 ) ;
and R. W . Clower, G. Dalton, M. Harwitz and A. A . Walters,
Growth without development: an economic survey of Liberia (Evanston,
1 9 6 6 ) . On the question of regional integration of the former
colonial economies, A r t h u r Hazlewood's African integration and
disintegration (London, 1 9 6 7 ) and his African economic integration:
the East African experience (London, 1 9 7 5 ) , together with Peter
Robson's Economic integration in Africa (London, 1968), provide
a good introduction to the problem. Attempts by African
economies to break out from dependence are examined in
A. A. Adedeji (ed.), The indigenisation of African economies (London,
1981).
The administration of the new African states after the departure
817

of the colonial rulers is the subject of a number o f studies of which

Morroe Berger's Bureaucracy and society in modern Egypt: a study of
the higher civil service (Princeton, 1 9 5 7 ) and A . L. A d u , The civil
service in Commonwealth Africa: development and transition (London,
1 9 7 0 ) , may be cited. The continuing role o f the traditional
administration in the post-colonial state is examined in M.
Crowder and Obaro Ikime (eds.), West African chiefs: their changing
status under colonial rule and independence (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 0 ) .
Social change is again the subject o f a vast literature, which is
analysed in depth in the bibliographical essay for Chapter 4 . The
studies in Peter C. Lloyd's The new elites of Tropical Africa
(London, 1 9 6 7 ) provide a useful introduction t o the class that
inherited the colonial state, while R. Sandbrook and R. Cohen,
(eds.), The development ofan African working class (London, 1 9 7 5 ) look
at those most likely to challenge that inheritance. The role o f the
peasant in independent Africa is considered in Palmer and
Parsons, op. cit., Arrighi, op. cit., Colin Leys, 'Politics in K e n y a :
the development of peasant society', British Journal of Political
Science, 1 9 7 1 , v o l . 1, D. C. O'Brien, The Mourides of Senegal
(Oxford, 1 9 7 1 ) and Polly Hill, Studies in rural capitalism (Cam
bridge, 1 9 7 0 ) .
Education as a factor for social mobilisation is the subject o f
many studies, notably those of Philip Foster for Ghana -
Education and social change in Ghana (Chicago, 1 9 6 5 ) , and David
Abernethy for Nigeria - The political dilemma of popular education
(Stanford, 1 9 6 9 ) . For East Africa there is an interesting com
parative study by David Court, ' T h e education system as a
response to inequality in Tanzania and K e n y a ' , Journal of Modern
African Studies, 1 9 7 5 , vol. 1 3 , no. 3. Revolution as a means o f
mobilisation is the subject of a number o f studies by Basil
Davidson with respect to the Portuguese territories, notably In
9
the eye of the storm: Angola s people (London, 1 9 7 2 ) , and by Thomas
H. Henriksen,' Peoples' war in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-
Bissau \ Journal of Modern African Studies, 1 9 7 6 , vol. 1 4 , no. 3. The
other end of the educational spectrum is brought out well in Pierre
van den Berghe, Power andprivilege in an African university (London,
1973)-
The role o f the military in the government o f African nations
succeeded the one-party state as the principal focus o f political
scientists o v e r the last 15 years. There is a useful bibliography in
818

Claude E. Welch and Arthur K . Smith, Military role and rule

(Belmont, Cal., 1 9 7 4 ) . Ruth First's classic Through the barrel of the
gun (London, 1 9 7 0 ) is the best introduction while useful local
studies are D. Austin and R. Luckham, Politicians and soldiers in
Ghana (London, 1 9 7 5 ) and S. K . Panter-Brick, Nigerian politics and
military rule (London, 1 9 7 0 ) . Alistair Home's brilliant A savage war
of peace: Algeria 19j4-62 (London, 1 9 7 7 ) shows the Algerian
soldiers as both military leaders and politicians intent on building
up the successor state to the former French department.
No essay on the bibliographical resources for the period o f
decolonisation and independence can conclude without mention
ing the many excellent journals and magazines which regularly
have articles relating to the period, notably The Journal of Modern
African Studies, West Africa, African Affairs, Cahiers d*Etudes
Africaines, Geneve Afrique, Civilisations and the invaluable Inter
national African Bibliography.
3. P A N - A F R I C A N I S M S I N C E I 940
The limitations in the primary sources as yet available for the study
of Pan-Africanism in the period 1 9 4 0 - 7 5 demonstrate many of the
problems facing the historian of contemporary history. Many o f
those most involved are still living, some in positions of p o w e r ;
obvious inhibitions follow on the candour with which their
friends and associates choose to enlighten the world as to parts
played in recent, often controversial, events. Even in the case o f
those recently dead - the example of J o m o Kenyatta comes to
mind - the same restraints still largely apply. Till the period o f
struggle for national independence in Africa, the movement and
its leaders lived, for the most part, in comparative obscurity and
had very limited resources; factors limiting the preservation and
accumulation o f future archival material. Much of the later
material is interred in the archives of governments, African and
non-African, o r o f institutions such as the O A U , the U A M ,
O C A M and E C O W A S . W h e n the day comes when historians will
have a wide degree o f access to this material, they will find it to
have been subject to the inevitable processes o f accidental and
deliberate decimation. Even so, they may well be almost over
whelmed by the sheer volume of paper that modern governments
and international bodies generate. Official papers that have been
819

published are useful, but normally portray official positions,

agreed formulae and the surface o f events, as well as giving useful
information on non-controversial matters. The Charter of the
Organisation of African Unity ( 1 9 6 3 ) is an essential document, yet
the inner debates and divisions from which it emerged can only
be inferred from it.
For the period from the eve o f the Second W o r l d W a r to the
era of independent African states, there are a number o f useful
sources, mainly printed, though archival material is to be found
in the W . E. B. DuBois papers, University of Massachusetts, the
W . E. B. DuBois papers, Accra, and the K w a m e Nkrumah
papers, Ghana National Archives, Accra. Useful material, es
pecially on West Africa, is to be found in the United States
National Archives, Washington D C , scattered in Department of
State decimal files; and Bureau o f Commerce, Bureau o f Foreign
and Domestic Trade files. Mention should be made o f the
reminiscences o f the late Professor K . A . B. Jones-Quartey, re
corded by himself, the tapes o f which are in the Centre o f African
Studies library, University o f Edinburgh. A number o f magazines
run by Pan-Africanist leaders o r institutions have survived, the
chief o f these being The Black Man (Millwood, N Y ) , Marcus
Garvey's last journalistic effort; The Keys and The Newsletter,
both organs of the League of Coloured Peoples; and its successor
WASU Magazine, both published in London by the West African
Students' Union; the African Interpreter (New Y o r k ) , journal o f
the African Students' Association; the New African (London),
organ of the West African National Secretariat; and Pan-Africa
(Manchester), edited by Ras Makonnen, and replacing the Inter
national African Service Bureau's International African Opinion,
library copies o f which d o n o t appear to exist. Mention should
also be made of The Comet (Lagos), edited by the veteran
Pan-Africanist Duse Mohamed A l i , and containing, in 1 9 3 7 - 8 , his
serialised autobiography, 'Leaves from an active life'. In West
Africa, t o o , Nnamdi Azikiwe's West African Pilot (Lagos), is
important for its race consciousness and awareness o f events in
the African continent as a whole.
A number o f autobiographies shed light on the period to the
m i d - 1 9 5 0 s . F o r candour, none excel Ras Makonnen's Pan-
Africanism from within, recorded and edited by Kenneth K i n g
( 1 9 7 3 ) . K w a m e Nkrumah's Ghana: the autobiography of Kwame
820

3- P A N - A F R I C A N I S M S I N C E I94O
Nkrumah (Edinburgh, 1 9 5 7 ) is valuable, despite its manifest

intention of fostering his o w n cult of personality. Nnamdi
Azikiwe's My odyssey: an autobiography (London, 1970) is much less
directly useful to the student o f Pan-Africanism, whilst
W . E. B. DuBois's Autobiography contains almost nothing on his
career as a Pan-Africanist, still less on anyone else's, and is mainly
concerned with justifying the pro-Soviet stance on world affairs
of his later years. However, his autobiographical w o r k Dusk of
dawn (New Y o r k , 1940) is useful in revealing his general outlook
at that time. Outside the realm of autobiography, from the pre-
independence period note should be made o f DuBois's Black folk
then and now (New Y o r k , 1 9 3 9 ) and The world and Africa (New Y o r k ,
1 9 4 7 ) , illustrating his essentially if not explicitly Pan-African
concern for African and African diaspora culture and history.
George Padmore's Pan-Africanism or Communism? (London, 1 9 5 6 )
is an important document insomuch as it sought to propagate an
official line on the history o f the movement, as well as asserting
the need for its freedom from Soviet control, and lauding
Nkrumah's political achievements. Padmore's other w o r k s o f his
prolific post-1945 years, especially Africa: Britain's third empire
( 1 9 4 9 ) , The Gold Coast revolution ( 1 9 5 3 ) , How Russia transformed her
colonial empire ( 1 9 4 6 ) , and The life and struggles of Negro toilers ( 1 9 5 6 ) ,
all published in London, illustrate the trend of thought of the man
w h o was perhaps the most influential Pan-African ideologue and
organiser of his generation. The history of the Pan-African Congress
(second edition, London, 1 9 6 3 ) , which he edited, is a major source
on the 1945 congress.
For the period from 1 9 5 8 onwards, the student o f Pan-
Africanism will find useful documentation on rival African
groupings in Louis B. Sohn (ed.), Basic documents of African regional
organisations (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 1 ) . Primary documentation for the
O A U includes the Proceedings of the Summit Conference of independent
African states, volumes 1 - 4 , Addis Ababa ( 1 9 6 3 ) ; Basic documents
of the Organisation of African Unity, Provisional Secretariat o f the
O A U , Addis Ababa ( 1 9 6 3 ) ; Assembly of Heads of State and
Government resolutions, decisions and declarations of ordinary and extra
ordinary sessions; and Council of Ministers' resolutions and declarations
of ordinary and extraordinary sessions. These chart the surface of the
O A U . Documents and resolutions o f the O A U specialised
commissions, and of its council of ministers, and assembly o f
821

Heads of State and Government, exist in mimeographed form in

the O A U Secretariat, Addis Ababa, and are issued in that form
to member governments and sometimes to friendly governments,
but are not made generally available.
Of the published works of Pan-Africanists in the era of
independent African states, pride of place for sheer quantity must
go to K w a m e Nkrumah, although the many w o r k s published
under his name after his o v e r t h r o w have probably had little
influence. More important are his p r e - 1 9 6 6 w o r k s , principally his
Autobiography, already mentioned; his attempt at a political
philosophy of decolonisation, Consciencism (London, 1 9 6 4 ) ; I Speak
of Freedom (London, 1 9 6 1 ) ; Towards colonial freedom (London,
1 9 6 2 ) ; Africa must unite (London, 1 9 6 3 ) ; and Neo-colonialism: the
last stage of imperialism (London, 1 9 6 5 ) . It is plain even from these
works that Nkrumah failed to provide Pan-Africanism with either
a coherent ideology or plan of action. O f modern African
Pan-African leaders, only Julius Nyerere could offer any rivalry
to this flood of print, with works such as his Freedom and unity
(Dar es Salaam, 1 9 6 7 ) ; Freedom and socialism (Dar es Salaam, 1 9 6 8 ) ;
and Freedom and development (Dar es Salaam, 1 9 7 3 ) . These illustrate
his trend away from an emphasis on regional and all-African unity,
towards an internal solution to his peoples' problems. O f the
revolutionary leaders in former Portuguese Africa, Amilcar
Cabral's occasional writings show great insight into problems of
African unity, although circumstances were not such as to allow
him to address the question in a systematic manner. His Revolution
in Guiñé. An African people's struggle (London, 1969) contains such
material, as does a reported interview with him in Basil Davidson,
The liberation of Guiñé (London, 1 9 6 9 ) . In a category of its own,
apart from official documents and the writings of individual
Pan-Africanists, is the Resolutions and selected speeches from the Sixth
Pan-African Congress (Dar es Salaam, 1 9 7 6 ) , containing as it does
some frankly critical material about the O A U and many African
leaders and states.
Before passing o v e r to secondary sources, mention should
briefly be made of some published primary material on the
relations of the diaspora to Pan-Africanism since the 1 9 5 0 s .
Richard Wright's Black Power (New Y o r k , 1 9 5 4 ) is a classic
account of the problems faced by a sympathetic black American
in coming to terms with both the old and the new Africa. Other
822

3- P A N - A F R I C A N I S M S I N C E 1940
accounts o f visits to and sojourns in Africa are to be found in

Malcolm X , The autobiography of Malcolm X (London, 1 9 6 6 ) and
Ernest Dunbar (ed.), The black expatriates (London, 1 9 6 8 ) . Imamu
Amiri Baraka (ed.), African Congress (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 2 ) gives
insight into the fervent if ill-organised Pan-Africanism o f many
black Americans at that time, while the Resolutions and selected
speechesfrom the Sixth Pan-African Congress contain material on the
diaspora delegations at that meeting. The image o f Africa held
by an illiterate Afro-Cuban survivor into modern times from the
slave era is given in Esteban Montejo, recorded and edited by
M. Barnet, Autobiography of a runaway slave (London, 1968).
However, o f modern West Indians, the one w h o has most
profoundly affected thinking about modern Africa has perhaps
been Frantz Fanon; his Toward the African revolution (New Y o r k ,
1 9 6 7 ) , and The wretched of the earth (second English edition,
London, 1 9 6 7 ) have been immensely influential, though perhaps
more so outside than inside Africa. Finally, Alex Hailey's enor
mously successful novel Roots (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 6 ) , subsequently
produced as a television serial, graphically demonstrates the
sentiments of modern black Americans towards their African
origins.
Secondary works comprise both a small number o f general

works, and a plethora of monographs, biographies and articles.
O f the general works, the earliest were Philippe Decraene's Le
Panafricanisme (Paris, 1 9 5 9 , second edition, 1 9 6 1 ) and Colin
Legum's Pan-Africanism (London, 1 9 6 2 ) . Both were journalistic
works, and although useful in their day, now seem outdated. Like
Adekunle Ajala's Pan-Africanism, evolution, progress and prospects
(London, 1 9 7 3 ) and V . B. Thompson's Africa and unity (London,
1 9 6 9 ) , both pay little attention to events before the post-Second
W o r l d W a r period; likewise all four o f these w o r k s pay most
attention to the formal and institutional aspects of Pan-Africanism,
and show little interest in the diaspora contribution. Imanuel
Geiss's The Pan-African movement, the most scholarly o f the
general works, appeared in its English edition in 1 9 7 4 . It has only
an epilogue on events after 1 9 4 5 , and is essentially a w o r k on the
historic roots of the movement. I. Wallerstein's Africa: the politics
of unity (London, 1 9 6 8 ) , entirely relates to the era o f African
independence, as does J o n WoronofFs Organising African unity
823

(Metuchen, N J , 1 9 7 0 ) . Woronoff and Wallerstein are in some ways

closer to a batch o f w o r k s specifically on the O A U than to the
truly general works. In this category, a particularly important
contribution has been made by Z . Cervenka, with his w o r k s The
Organisation of African Unity and its Charter (London, 1 9 6 9 ) and
The unfinished questfor unity (London, 1 9 7 7 ) . General surveys o f the
O A U are offered in Boutros Boutros-Ghali, L?Organisation de
/'Unite Africaine (Paris, 1 9 6 9 ) , Michael Wolfers, Politics in the
Organisation of African Unity (London, 1 9 7 6 ) and Yassin El- A y o u t y
(ed.), The Organisation of African Unity after ten years (New Y o r k ,
1 9 7 5 ) . A more limited remit is thoroughly investigated in
Berhanykun Andemicael, The OAU and the UN (New Y o r k ,
1976).
Problems of regionalism have received the attention of several
studies. O n East Africa, there is A . J . Hughes, East Africa: the
search for unity (London, 1 9 6 3 ) , J . S. Nye J r , Pan-Africanism and
East African integration (Cambridge, Mass., 1966) and Richard Cox,
Pan-Africanism in practice (London, 1 9 6 4 ) . All are n o w somewhat
out o f date. In the case o f West Africa, the books on regionalism
overlap with w o r k s dealing with francophone Pan-Africanism.
Although it only considers events up to 1 9 4 5 , J . A . Langley's
Pan-Africanism and nationalism in West Africa, 1900-194j (Oxford,
1 9 7 3 ) is nevertheless an essential introductory w o r k . The first
general look at West African regionalism was Claude E. Welch
J r , Dream of unity: Pan-Africanism and political unification in West
Africa (Ithaca, 1 9 6 6 ) . More specifically on the francophone states
are a number o f w o r k s : W . Foltz, From French West Africa to the
^tÛFederationQüev? Haven, 1 9 6 5 ) ; V . Thompson's West Africa's
Council of the Entente (Ithaca, 1972)* and Albert Tevoedjre's
Pan-Africanism inaction: an account of the UAM (Cambridge, Mass.,
1 9 6 5 ) , which tends to uncritical sympathy with its subject.
Because its author was Foreign Minister of Senegal, Doudou
Thiam's The foreign policy of African states (London, 1 9 6 5 ) has a
certain air o f authority, especially on the francophone sphere.
Throwing light not only on West African Pan-Africanism, but an
era in Pan-Africanism as a whole, are W . Scott Thompson's
Ghana's foreign policy, 19 / 7 - 1 9 6 6 (Princeton, 1969) and perhaps the
best, and certainly one o f the most sympathetic (though not
uncritically so), o f the biographical w o r k s on Nkrumah, Basil
Davidson's Black star (London, 1 9 7 3 ) .
824

3- P A N - A F R I C A N I S M S I N C E I94O
Basil Davidson has also made a most distinguished contribution

to the understanding of the revolutions in tropical Africa in the
1960s and 1 9 7 0 s , and although these works are not primarily o r
directly on Pan-Africanism, they d o offer a critique o f the
shortcomings of the formal Pan-Africanism o f the O A U , and are
therefore essential reading. They are Which way Africa? (London,
1 9 6 7 ) ; The liberation of Guiné (London, 1 9 6 9 ) and In the eye of the
storm (London, 1 9 7 2 ) , as well as, with J . S l o v o and A . R.
Wilkinson, Southern Africa: the new politics of revolution (London,
1 9 7 6 ) . In the category of works on modern African revolutionary
struggles, mention should also be made of Colin Legum and Tony
Hodges, After Angola (London, 1 9 7 6 ) , and Eduardo Mondlane's
The struggle for Mozambique (London, 1 9 6 9 ) .
A number of works throw light on the attitude to Africa o f
New W o r l d blacks. In this category come Harold Isaacs'
distinguished w o r k , The new world of Negro Americans (New Y o r k ,
1 9 6 4 ) ; Robert G . Weisbord's Ebony kinship (Westport, 1 9 7 3 ) ;
John A . Davis's Africa seen by American Negroes (Paris, 1 9 5 8 ) ;
A. C. Hill and Martin Kilson, Apropos of Africa (London, 1 9 6 9 ) ,
which is a collection o f documents on 'sentiments o f American
Negro leaders on Africa from the 1800s to the 1950s ' ; and Richard
Moore's 'Africa conscious Harlem' in J . H. Clarke (ed.), Harlem,
a community in transition (New Y o r k , 1 9 6 4 ) .
Concerning economic aspects of African unity, mention might
be made of two works. These are Reginald H. Green and A n n
Seidman, Unity or poverty? (London, 1 9 6 8 ) , and I. W . Zartman, The
politics of trade negotiations between Africa and the E.E.C. (Princeton,
1 9 7 1 ) . Zartman is also the author o f International relations in the new
Africa (Englewood Cliffs, N J , 1 9 6 6 ) , which contributes t o the
literature on the relations of African states in the first decade o f
post-colonial Africa.
Concerning cultural Pan-Africanism, there is no w o r k which
deals with all aspects o f the question. However, there is a
considerable literature both on and o f négritude; o f fundamental
importance here is the journal Présence Africaine, published in Paris
since 1 9 4 7 , and which contains many contributions by such figures
as Leopold Sédar Senghor, Aimé Césaire, and the Haitian D r
Jean Price-Mars (who was a great influence on the founders o f
négritude), as well as sympathetic commentaries on their writings
and thought. The writings o f both Senghor and Césaire are t o o
825

voluminous for discussion here, but leaving aside the large corpus
of poetry produced by both men, reference should at least be made
to Césaire's Discours sur le colonialisme, published by Présence
Africaine in Paris in 1 9 5 5 , and to the selection of Senghor's
writings in Liberté I; Négritude et humanisme (Paris, 1 9 6 4 ) . The
works on négritude, and especially on Senghor's role in it, are again
far too numerous to list comprehensively here, but t w o useful
studies in this area are Jacques Louis Hymans, Leopold Sédar
Senghor. An intellectual biography (Edinburgh, 1 9 7 1 ) , written with
considerable cooperation from its subject; and I. L. Markovitz,
Leopold Sédar Senghor and the politics of négritude (London, 1 9 6 9 ) . A
totally different approach to the role of culture in African
liberation than that espoused by the négritude movement can be
found scattered in the writings of Amflcar Cabrai, and especially
in the speech entitled 'The role of culture in the liberation
struggle', given to a U N E S C O Conference in Paris in 1 9 7 2 , and
printed in Guinea Bissau: towardfinalvictory (Richmond, BC, 1 9 7 4 ) .
For Cabrai, the search for authentic cultural ' r o o t s ' characteristic
of négritude was irrelevant for the African masses, w h o had never
lost their culture in his opinion, and was no more than a
preoccupation of the alienated African petite bourgeoisie under
colonial rule. The most noted anglophone critic of négritude is the
South African Ezekiel Mphahlele; reference should be made to
his w o r k s The African image (London, second revised edition
1 9 7 4 ) , Voices in the whirlwind, and other essays (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 2 ) ,
and 'Remarks on négritude', reprinted in his African writing today
(London, 1 9 6 7 ) . From within the francophone w o r l d , the
Martiniquan psychiatrist, political thinker and revolutionary,
Frantz Fanon, produced perhaps the most trenchant attack on
négritude, both in relation to the West Indies and Africa, and like
Cabrai saw it as a doctrine emanating from those intellectuals w h o
belonged to neither the white world, which rejected them, nor
the black world, which they turned to as they perceived that
rejection. He first developed these ideas at length in his Peau noire,
masques blancs (Paris, 1 9 5 2 ) . Finally, a reaffirmation in the m i d - 1 9 7 0 s
of the concept of Africanity as central to the understanding of and
development of modern African culture is outlined in W o l e
Soyinka's introduction to his Myth, literature and the African world
(Cambridge, 1 9 7 6 ) .
826

4- S O C I A L A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G E
4. S O C I A L A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G E
The sources for Africa's social and cultural history since the
Second W o r l d W a r are both vast and diverse, since they include
virtually all writing on Africa in the social sciences in this period.
Of great importance are the major journals: Africa ( 1 9 3 0 - ) ,
Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines ( i 9 6 0 - ) , Journal of Modern African
Studies ( 1 9 6 3 - ) , Canadian Journal of African Studies ( 1 9 6 7 - ) ,
and African Affairs, published for many years previously as the
Journal of the Royal African Society but radically reshaped after 1 9 7 2 .
There is also, of course, a host o f journals specific to particular
disciplines and particular countries o r areas o f Africa, mostly
founded since i 9 6 0 . The published papers from the series o f
International African Seminars, held intermittently since 1 9 5 9 ,
indicate h o w quickly scholarly perspectives, as well as the
actualités, have changed since the burgeoning of modern Africanist
scholarship in the early 1960s when the majority o f African
countries gained their independence. O f particular value here are
A. W . Southall (ed.), Social change in modern Africa (London, 1 9 6 1 ) ;
P. C. Lloyd (ed.), The new élites of tropical Africa (Oxford, 1 9 6 6 ) ;
W , H. Whiteley (ed.), Language use and social change (London,
1 9 6 8 ) ; S. Amin (ed.), Modern migrations in Western Africa
(London, 1 9 7 4 ) and D. J . Parkin (ed.), Town and country in Central
and Eastern Africa (London, 1 9 7 5 ) .
Of the pioneer attempts to break from static anthropological
models o f African society and to understand the social sources o f
nationalism, several are still w o r t h reading: M. Gluckman,
'Analysis of a social situation in Zululand', Bantu Studies, 1 9 4 0 ,
vol. 1 4 , 1 - 2 , G. Balandier, Sociologie actuelle de l'Afrique noire
(Paris, 1 9 5 5 ) and T. Hodgkin, Nationalism in colonial Africa
(London, 1 9 5 6 ) . Many o f the best studies of the nationalist
movements in particular countries — such as J . S. Coleman,
Nigeria: background to nationalism (Berkeley, 1958) o r R. L. Sklar,
Nigerian political parties (Princeton, 1 9 6 3 ) , D. Austin, Politics
in Ghana 1946-1960 (Oxford, 1 9 6 4 ) o r D. E. Apter, Ghana in
transition (Princeton, 1 9 5 5 ) , and other such works mentioned in
the regional chapters — contain original syntheses o f local-level
studies in relation to nationalism. F o r East Africa, J . M. Lons
dale's paper, * Some origins o f nationalism in East Africa', Journal
of African History, 1 9 6 8 , v o l . 9, 119—46, has been very influential.
827

J . Iliffe's masterly Modern history of Tanganyika (Cambridge, 1 9 7 9 )

sets the nationalist period in the longue duree and achieves great
sophistication in the integration of social, cultural, economic and
political data. A number of useful collections of papers on social
change, covering the period of nationalist mobilisation into
independence, have been made: I. Wallerstein, Social change: the
colonial situation (New Y o r k , 1 9 6 6 ) , P. L. van den Berghe, Africa:
social problems of change and conflict (San Francisco, 1 9 6 5 ) , J .
Middleton, Black Africa: its peoples and their cultures today (London,
1 9 7 0 ) , R. I. Rotberg and A . A . Mazrui (eds.), Protest and power in
Black Africa (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 0 ) , R. Cohen and J . Middleton, From
tribe to nation in Africa (Scranton, 1 9 7 0 ) . The genre continues with
P. C. W . Gutkind and I. Wallerstein's Political economy of
contemporary Africa (Beverly Hills, 1 9 7 6 ) and other volumes in the
Sage Series on African modernisation and development, where
the Marxist perspectives which have become influential since the
early 1 9 7 0 s are evident.
Migration and urbanisation have been pegs upon which every
kind of argument about social change and development have been
hung since the U N E S C O volume edited by Daryll Forde, Social
consequences of urbanisation and industrialisation in Africa south of the
Sahara (Paris, 1 9 5 6 ) . The themes are linked in H. K u p e r (ed.),
Urbanisation and migration in West Africa (Berkeley, 1 9 6 5 ) and
W . A . Hance, Population, migration and urbanisation in Africa (New
Y o r k , 1 9 7 0 ) , a general survey with extensive bibliography. The
journal African Urban Notes ( 1 9 6 4 - ) is specifically valuable here.
To the already-mentioned I A I Seminar volumes on migration
edited by Amin ( 1 9 7 4 ) and Parkin ( 1 9 7 6 ) may be added the special
number of African Perspectives (Leiden, 1 9 7 8 / 1 ) on theories of
migration. For West Africa, A. L. Mabogunje's Urbanisation in
Nigeria (London, 1 9 6 8 ) broke new ground in conceptualising
what w e mean by ' t o w n s ' ; J . Gugler and W . G. Flanagan's
Urbanisation and social change in West Africa (Cambridge, 1 9 7 8 ) has
a useful bibliography. Studies of particular West African towns
are too numerous to list: a number are reviewed in J . D. Y . Peel,
'Urbanization and urban history in West Africa', Journal of
African History, 1980, vol. 2 1 . East Africa has been less well-served
(but see Parkin ( 1 9 6 4 ) on Kampala), and several studies exist of
towns in West Central Africa: G. Balandier's pioneer study,
Sociologie des Brassavilles noires (Paris, 1 9 5 5 ) , J . S. La Fontaine,
828

City politics: a study of Leopoldville (Cambridge, 1 9 7 0 ) , and V . Pons,

Stanleyville: an African urban community under Belgian administration
(London, 1 9 6 9 ) . Central and South Africa have both attracted
notable w o r k , as much concerned with rural/urban links as with
urban forms in themselves: studies by A. L. Epstein, J . C.
Mitchell, W . Watson, J . Van Velsen and others associated with
'Manchester social anthropology' and the former Rhodes-
Livingstone Institute at Lusaka, and w o r k from South Africa,
notably the two-volume Xhosa in town (ed. P. Mayer, Cape Town,
1 9 6 1 ) and M. Wilson and A. Mafeje's study, Langa (Cape Town,
1 9 6 3 ) . With the establishment of the 'Bantustans' in South Africa
and the emergence of new radical schools of social science and
history (see especially Journal of Southern African Studies (1976— ) ) ,
the academic terrain changed greatly in the 1 9 7 0 s ; for a recent
study of migratory labour in the South African periphery, see
C. Murray, Families divided (Cambridge, 1 9 8 1 ) on Lesotho.
Ethnicity figures in nearly all accounts of nationalist o r post-
independence politics. Useful collections of regional studies are
R. Melson and H. W o l p e (eds.), Nigeria: the politicsofcommunalism
(East Lansing, 1 9 7 1 ) , and P. H. Gulliver, Tradition and transition
in Fast Africa (London, 1 9 6 9 ) . A . Cohen's account of the Hausa
community in Ibadan, Custom and politics in urban Africa (Man
chester, 1969) and J . C. Mitchell's The Kalela dance (Manchester,
1 9 5 6 ) , are both classic studies of urban ethnicity. D. C. O'Brien's
Saints and politicians (Cambridge, 1 9 7 5 ) is a witty, trenchant
account of a country, Senegal, whose mode of political integration
is relatively free of ethnicity.
Until recently, the literature on religion was oddly imbalanced.
Independent churches were better covered than ' mission' ones -
see the survey by D. B. Barrett, Schism and renewal in Africa
(Nairobi, 1 9 6 8 ) , though its explanation is simplistic and
untenable - and Islam was often better covered than Christianity -
compare the IAI volume edited by I. M. Lewis, Islam in tropical
Africa (Oxford, 1 9 6 6 , second edition 1980) with that on Christianity
in tropical Africa by C. G. Baeta (Oxford, 1 9 6 5 ) . This is n o w
largely redressed with the appearance of t w o major books:
E. Fashole-Luke et al. (eds.), Christianity in independent Africa
(London, 1 9 7 8 ) , and A . Hastings's remarkable synthesis, A history
of African Christianity iyjo-ipyj (Cambridge, 1 9 7 9 ) .
Discussion of stratification began, particularly for English-
829

speaking Africa, with the analysis of elites : see the special issue
of UNESCO's International Social Science Bulletin, 1 9 5 6 , vol. 8,
devoted to 'African e l i t e s ' ; and the theme was picked up again
by P. C. Lloyd, The new elites. French discussion was always more
in terms of class, as in several papers, by J . - C . Pauvert, P. Mercier
and G. Balandier, in Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie, from 1 9 5 4
(no. 1 6 ) to 1965 (no. 38). From the 1 9 7 0 s onwards, under the
growing influence of Marxist ideas, class analysis of African
societies became predominant, evidenced in at least one major new
journal: Review of African Political Economy ( 1 9 7 4 - ). In East
Africa the w o r k of G. Arrighi and J . S. Saul - see their Essays on
the political economy of Africa, New Y o r k and London, 1 9 7 3 - and
C T. Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya (London, 1 9 7 4 ) have been
influential. Some of this w o r k tends to a rather crude reductionism,
e.g. M. Mamdani, Politics and class formation in Uganda (London,
1 9 7 6 ) ; but G. Kitching's Class and economic change in Kenya ( 1 9 8 0 )
is rich and subtle. Class analysis of such scope or scale has not
yet been produced for West Africa ; though R. Stavenhagen's analy
sis of the Ivory Coast, Social classes in agrarian societies (Garden
City, 1 9 7 5 ) , G. Williams in various works (e.g. Nigeria: economy
and society, London, 1 9 7 6 ) and several contributors to J . Dunn
(ed.), West African states (Cambridge, 1 9 7 8 ) , have shown the way.
Much writing on class formation focusses on particular sectors.
A s regards the rural sector, most of that on West Africa has
concentrated on the rise and, latterly, the decline of small-scale
commercial agriculture : S. S. Berry, Cocoa, custom and socio-economic
change in rural Western Nigeria (Oxford, 1 9 7 5 ) ; Polly Hill, Studies
in rural capitalism in West Africa (Cambridge, 1 9 7 0 ) ; D. C. O'Brien,
The Mourides of Senegal (Oxford, 1 9 7 1 ) ; and B. Beckman, Organising
the farmers (Uppsala, 1 9 7 6 ) . Studies of this genre on East and
Central Africa are more limited; e.g. N. Long, Social change and the
individual (Manchester, 1 9 6 8 ) , G. Lamb, Peasant politics (Lewes,
1 9 7 4 ) . There has been a large literature evaluating ujamaa policies
in Tanzania: e.g. M. v o n Freyhold, Ujamaa villages in Tanzania
(London, 1 9 7 9 ) and G. Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania
(London, 1980). Latterly the agrarian development of southern
Africa has been seen anew in the light of its historical origins:
see R. Palmer and N. Parsons (eds.), The roots of rural poverty in
Central and Southern Africa (London, 1 9 7 7 ) , mostly relating to
before 1 9 3 0 , but several contributions range into the independence
830

period. Latterly too there has been important w o r k on 'rural

development' and its implications for rural class formation: see
studies relating to Nigeria, Ghana, Niger, Senegal, Tanzania,
Sudan and Kenya in J . Heyer, P. Roberts and G. Williams (eds.),
Rural development in tropical Africa ( 1 9 8 1 ) . A fresh treatment of
' peasantisation ' in a longer historical perspective is in M. A. Klein
(ed.), Peasants in Africa ( 1 9 8 0 ) , with case studies of West and
southern Africa.
The treatment of urban class formation has been fullest in
respect of wage-earners. Apart from several excellent case studies :
e.g. R. Grillo, African railwaymen (Cambridge, 1 9 7 4 ) , on East
Africa; R. Jeffries, Class, power and ideology in Ghana ( 1 9 7 8 ) ;
A. Peace, Choice, class and conflict ( 1 9 7 4 ) , on Lagos, there are
two useful collections, which extensively review earlier writing:
R. Sandbrook and R. Cohen (eds.), The development of an African
working class (London, 1 9 7 5 ) and P. C. W . Gutkind, R. Cohen and
J . Cooper (eds.), African labor history ( 1 9 8 1 ) . The informal sector
has received less concentrated treatment, though it features
throughout the literature on urbanisation, and in ethnographies
of particular towns. For the miscellaneous urban poor, see
K. Hart, ' Informal income opportunities and urban employment
in Ghana', Journal of Modern African Studies, 1 9 7 3 , vol. 1 1 , 6 1 - 8 9 ,
and several papers in R. Bromley and C. Gerry, Casual work and
employment in Third World cities ( 1 9 7 9 ) . A n important marker for
discussion has been the I L O report, Employment, incomes and
equality: a strategy for increasing productive employment in Kenya
(Geneva, 1 9 7 2 ) . Particularly in West Africa (but increasingly
elsewhere) women play an important role in petty trade; see here
N. Hafkin and E. Bey (eds.), Women in Africa: studies in social and
economic change (Stanford, 1 9 7 6 ) . More studies of commercial
groups are needed — but see Marris and Somerset ( 1 9 7 1 ) ,
E. O. Akeredolu-Ale, The underdevelopment of indigenous entrepren-
eurship in Nigeria (Ibadan, 1 9 7 9 ) , M. G. Schatzberg, Politics and
class in Zaire: bureaucracy, business and beer in L,isala (New Y o r k ,
1980).
G o o d institutional studies, ethnographies or social histories of
the evolution of upper-class groups, as against the somewhat static
studies of 'emergent elites' in the 1950s and 1 9 6 0 s , are rare.
R. Luckham's study, The Nigerian military (Cambridge, 1 9 7 1 ) and
P. L. van den Berghe's study of academics, Power and privilege in
831

an African university (London, 1 9 7 3 ) , are valuable; A . Cohen's

study of the Freetown Creoles, The politics of élite culture (Berkeley,
1 9 8 1 ) is unique of its kind. Anthropological studies of kinship may
also be useful: e.g. for Ghana, C. Oppong's Marriage among a
matrilinealélite (Cambridge, 1 9 7 4 ) . The literature on education and
mobility is also very relevant (e.g. P. J . Foster, Education and social
change in Ghana (Chicago, 1 9 6 5 ) ; P. J . Foster and R. Clignet, The
fortunate few (Evanston, 1966)). The best study conceived within
the ' tradition-to-modernity ' school, which transcends many of its
limitations, is D. N. Levine's study of Ethiopia in the late 1 9 5 0 s ,
Wax and gold (Chicago, 1 9 6 5 ) . On questions of culture, identity
and policy, however, it is usually best to turn directly to African
writers themselves. A . A . Mazrui's writings eloquently cover
most of the themes of concern to Africa's intelligentsia; see
especially his Political values and the educated class in Africa ( 1 9 7 8 ) .
The writings of political leaders, both theoretical (Nkrumah,
Nyerere, Touré, Cabrai) and autobiographical (Nkrumah, A w o l -
o w o , Kaunda, the sardauna of Sokoto) and, of course, African
novels, are always illuminating. Finally, there are the major
journals in which current political and cultural themes have been
debated: particularly Presence Africaine (Paris, 1 9 5 0 - ) and
Transition (Kampala, 1 9 6 1 — 1 9 7 ? ) .
5. T H E E C O N O M I C E V O L U T I O N OF D E V E L O P I N G A F R I C A
The subject matter of this presentation is very broad and the

existing literature equally extensive, covering such wide-ranging
themes as underdevelopment, imperialism, colonialism, Pan-
Africanism, class struggle and revolution, accumulation and
distribution of wealth and several other related economic and
political issues in the equally broad field of planning and devel
opment in Africa. Obviously, such a bibliographic review has to
be selective of only a few from the large corpus of books and
articles in learned publications. The selection has been guided
principally by the need to relate the review to the main strands
of thought in the quest for understanding the economic and social
development of Africa.
There exists a wealth of information on the economic devel
opment of Africa as a whole. The bulk of this relates to the period
after the Second W o r l d W a r during which most countries of the
region attained political independence. Some of the published
832

5. T H E E C O N O M I C E V O L U T I O N
works were written in anticipation of the developmental relation

ships and problems that were to follow political emancipation,
while others were devoted to analysing Africa's economic
evolution and diagnosing the ills of the continent's slow pace of
development and consequent failure to uplift its masses from
poverty, ignorance, poor health and other common forms of
deprivation.
A detailed historical survey of useful background material for
studying and appreciating Africa's social and economic evolution
and the circumstances connected with this is provided by
R. W . July, Precolonial Africa: an economic and social history (New
Y o r k , 1 9 7 5 ) . Economic and social phenomena touching on issues
such as environment and economic adaptation, concepts of
private property, the idea of profit, the uses of surplus, and the
role of the state in mercantile development are dealt with in a
historical perspective.
G. Dalton, 'Traditional production in primitive economies',
Quarterly journal of Economics, 1 9 6 2 , vol. 7 6 , no. 3, 360—78 further
provided background information on the role of traditional
institutions in shaping the patterns of development, the receptivity
of Africans to innovations and the containment of the social costs
and dislocations of introducing new economic forms. This aspect
receives further treatment in the chapter by J . B. Elliot, 'The
character and prospects of African economies', in J . S. Uppal and
L. R. Salkever (eds.), Africa:problems in economic development (New
Y o r k , 1 9 7 2 ) , 5—26. The evidence for positive response to incen
tives and the particular circumstances responsible for lack of
response in the African setting are analysed by S. D. Neumark,
'Economic development and economic incentives', The South
African Journal of Economics, 1 9 5 8 , vol. 26, no. 1, 5 6 - 6 3 .
The w o r k by Charles Haines, Africa today (Baltimore, 195 5) is
evidence of the development of intellectual interest in Africa after
the Second W o r l d W a r . A b o u t the same time, W . A . Hance, in
his book African economic development (New Y o r k , 1958) presented
a series of studies covering agricultural and industrial develop
ment, transport problems and case studies of Liberia, the Central
African Republic and Madagascar. Written before most countries
of the region achieved independence, the book reviewed the
underdeveloped state of the economy and the gradual transition
from subsistence to exchange economy.
Using the comparative method, Clive Dewey and A. G.
833

Hopkins (eds.), Imperial impact: studies in the economic history

of Africa and India (London, 1 9 7 8 ) , discussed former imperial and
colonial economic policy to illuminate their economic experiences
and so contribute to the study of the developmental problems of
new independent states. For whatever they were w o r t h , efforts
were made by governments in the colonial era to plan the
economies of their colonies, as demonstrated by Barbu Niculescu,
Colonial planning: a comparative study (London, 1 9 5 8 ) in a survey
of the development plans of some 60 dependent territories. Of the
priorities common to all the plans, communication and agriculture
ranked the highest, followed by education and health.
Global considerations of African development problems and
processes have been the concern of many authors. Thus, Uppal
and Salkever, Africa:problems in economic development, presented an
anthology of articles and excerpts on the problems and processes
of economic development in Africa as a whole. The article by
A. M. Kamarck, 'African economic development: problems and
prospects', Africa Report, 1 9 6 9 , vol. 1 4 , no. 1, 1 6 - 2 0 is in the same
vein and reflects some of the views also developed in his book
The economics of African development (New Y o r k , 1 9 6 7 ) , which is
an illuminating study of the economic development o f Africa as
a whole. The ties (economic, cultural and educational) with
Western Europe are underlined along with the dependence for
capital, personnel, technology and other infrastructural require
ments long after political emancipation was attained.
Donald Rothchild and R. L. Curry, in Scarcity, choice and public
policy in Middle Africa (Berkeley, 1 9 7 8 ) assessed, among other
issues, the benefits as well as the costs of multinational corpor
ations' investments in Africa. That the MNCs, with their
increasing oligopolistic powers, were creating a small, but rela
tively privileged 'labour aristocracy' of well-paid employees
while restricting the growth o f wage employment opportunities
in the modern sector was put across by G. A r r i g h i , ' International
corporations, labour aristocracies and economic development in
Africa', in Robert T. Rhodes (ed.), Imperialism and underdevelopment
(New Y o r k , 1970). S. Langdon, in the article,' Multinational firms
and the state in Kenya', Institute of Development Studies Bulletin,
v n o
*977> ° l - 9> - 3 6 - 4 1 , saw the state as an independent
institution which was contriving a symbiosis between the multi
national corporations and the auxiliary bourgeoisie.
In order to explain why Nigeria suffered from instability, the
834

5. T H E E C O N O M I C E V O L U T I O N
role of the state and its officials were examined in terms of their
relationship to multinationals - the means by which Nigeria was
incorporated into the global capitalist system. Thus T. Turner, in
her paper, 'Multinational corporations and the instability of the
Nigerian state', Review of African Political Economy, 1 9 7 6 , no. 5,
6 3 - 7 9 , argued that the crucial nexus of the economy was a triad
relationship between multinational corporations, commercial
middlemen, and state officials.
The satellitisation and peripherisation of the African economy
were all aspects of the growing significance of the interrelationship
of external and internal factors of development in Africa. Such
considerations sought to underline the dynamics of the structural
changes in economic patterns which have evolved in the continent.
This, for example, is evident in the treatise on African modern
economic history by J . Forbes Munro in Africa and the international
economy 1800-1960: an introduction to the modern economic history of
Africa south of the Sahara (London, 1 9 7 6 ) . In a broader, more
comparative perspective, he took as his central theme the inte
gration of Africa into, and the subsequent structural shaping of
African economies by, the modern international economy.
S. Amin, 'Development and structural change: the African
experience, 1 9 5 0 — 1 9 7 0 ' , Journal of International Affairs, 1 9 7 0 , vol.
24, no. 2, 2 0 3 - 2 3, set out to examine the concept o f development'.
For him, the African experience has shown that 'development'
should be regarded as the continuation of the political struggle
for independence. In the article, ' Underdevelopment and depen
dence in Black Africa - origins and contemporary forms', Journal
of Modern African Studies, 1 9 7 2 , vol. 1 0 , no. 4 , 5 0 3 - 2 4 , he showed
how the forms of colonial penetration in Africa were conditioned
by the social relations and structures met in the three macro-regions
of Africa which he identifies as: Eastern and Southern Africa;
West Africa, Cameroun, Chad and Sudan; and the Congo River
basin. In all three macro-regions, he argued, the organisation of
export production resulted in the abolition of traditional societies
and conversion to their current status of dependent and peripheral
formations.
R. Dumont, in False start in Africa (New York, 1 9 6 9 ) , subscribes
to the same views and argues that the structural imbalance and
dependence on exports was responsible for the present chronic
trade deficits.
Structural dependence of African economies has been strength-
»35

ened by the balkanisation o f the continent. It has therefore been

held that the present structure of underdevelopment in Africa
stems from the incorporation of the continent into the expanding
capitalist system over a period of some four centuries, a process
completed during the nineteenth o r early twentieth century with
the partition of Africa and the imperialist expansionism of
industrial capitalism. These are the views advocated in the w o r k
by Richard Harris and his colleagues in The political economy of
Africa: underdevelopment or revolution (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 5 ) . In New
direction for economic development in Africa (London, 1 9 7 6 ) , Emanuel
A. Okwuosa traced economic thought and approach to devel
opment in Africa and the linkage of her economy to the economies
of the western world and to the continent's colonial past; he
argued that Africa should carve out her own path to development
without necessarily breaking off the mutual interdependence
between the different economic systems.
The economic consequence o f the partition of Africa is well
emphasised by Reginald Green and A n n Seidman in Unity or
poverty? The economics of Pan-Africanism (Harmondsworth, 1968).
They argued that balkanisation impeded economic growth and
independence and as a result African countries were unable to
achieve real economic growth and higher living standards on their
own. Both authors further showed that the structural imbalance
resulting from over-dependence on the export of one o r a few
primary products made economies extremely vulnerable, highly
dependent and incapable of internal adjustment.
But why did efforts, especially after independence, fail to alter
the inherited status quo} Once again Richard Harris, The political
economy of Africa, offered some clues to this. The volume,
restricted to Tanzania, Zambia, South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria and
Kenya, provided an analytical perspective of the interrelationship
of political and economic factors as a prerequisite for under
standing the causes of underdevelopment and the condition for the
development of the continent. His views are to some extent shared
by A n n Seidman, Planning for development in sub-Saharan Africa
(New Y o r k , 1 9 7 4 ) . She argued that, since independence, few
countries succeeded in achieving their objectives of improvement
in the lives o f their people; she then explored the fundamental
constraints inherent in the inherited institutional and resource
allocation patterns which thwarted efforts to attain delayed devel
opment goals in 1960s.
836

5- T H E E C O N O M I C E V O L U T I O N
Presenting the result of a symposium sponsored by the Haile

Selassie I Prize Trust in 1 9 6 6 , R. K . Gardiner et al. (eds.), Africa
and the world (Addis Ababa, 1970) agreed that Africa was passing
through a critical phase in her economic development. Ideally
agricultural development had to go hand in hand with industrial
development, while educational and manpower planning and
training should be undertaken concurrently.
As well as the global perspective, efforts have also been directed

at assessing developments at the regional and country levels,
touching on the same issues as those dealt with above. Thus, the
articles in R. C. O'Brien (ed.), The political economy of underdevelop
ment: dependence in Senegal (Beverly Hills, 1 9 7 9 ) were directed at
refining the debate on African political economy. The contributors
were concerned about the exploitative features of Senegal's
dependence on France and the world capitalist system in general.
The origin of the most acute of the present problems is to be found
in the colonial and post-colonial relationships with France marked
by unequal trade exchange and satellisation or peripherisation
in terms of the métropole-satellite model.
In the same vein, Colin Leys in Underdevelopment in Kenya
(London, 1 9 7 5 ) , postulated that colonialism led to the incor
poration of the Kenyan economy into an increasingly global
capitalist economy with the periphery subordinated to the centre.
There was no free competition at the periphery, which was
dominated by monopoly elements controlling the significant
factors of production. Thus, the colonial period was marked by
state activity for the benefit of European settlers creating
conditions of monopoly.
The central theme in A. G. Hopkins's An economic history of West
Africa (London, 1 9 7 3 ) , is the interaction of the various internal
and external factors which have determined the structure and
growth of the market economy of West Africa. He contended that
Africans were 'economic men' responding to opportunities.
Having discarded the stereotype of the ' traditional ' he argued that
the expansion of the domestic market was retarded not by
institutional rigidities determined by anti-capitalist values, but by
identifiable economic obstacles.
There is a general analysis of current and future evolution of
the economy of the Maghrib in the literature. W o r k s which also
focus on economic integration include Samir Amin's UÉconomie
837

du Maghreb, z vols. (Paris, 1966). Others are A. Tiano, Le

Développement économique du Maghreb (Paris, 1 9 6 8 ) ; C. F. Gallagher,
The United States and North Africa: Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia
(Cambridge, Mass., 1 9 6 3 ) ; J . d'Yvoire, Le Maghreb et la Com
munauté Économique Européenne (Paris, 1 9 6 5 ) .
An important aspect of the situation in East Africa is clearly
brought out in a series of writings covering the activities of the
now defunct East African Common Market. These studies
include: D. P. Ghai, 'Territorial distribution of the benefits and
costs of the East African Common Market', in C. Leys, and
P. Robson (eds.), Federation in East Africa: opportunities and
problems (Nairobi, 1 9 6 5 ) , W . T. Newlyn, 'Gains and losses in the
East African Common Market', Yorkshire Bulletin, November
1965 ; and Philip Ndegwa, The Common Market and development in
East Africa, 2 n d edition (Nairobi, 1968).
Education and manpower planning should, for maximum

effectiveness, be dealt with pari passu, since the two sectors are
highly interrelated. This linkage is very well demonstrated by
Richard Jolly, in Planning educationfor African development (Nairobi,
1969). The author developed an ingenious new technique, based
on intensive field experience, for showing the levels of educational
attainment in a country and how they are built up by flows
through the educational system. The technique is also used to
bring out the basic manpower problems of Ghana, Uganda, and
Zambia, and to show how current educational policies affect the
level and composition of the stock of qualified manpower for the
future.
Specific contributions directed mainly at the analysis of edu
cational policies and problems are featured in several publications,
among which the following can be cited: Julius K . Nyerere,
Education for self-reliance (Dar es Salaam, 1 9 6 7 ) ; W . W . Brickman,
'Tendencies in African education', Educational Forum, May 1 9 6 3 ,
vol. 27, 3 9 9 - 4 1 6 ; and G u y Hunter, Educationfor a developing region :
a study in East Africa (London, 1 9 6 3 ) .
In his work, Harbison generally considered the relationship
between education and manpower planning; F. H. Harbison and
C. Myers, Education, manpower and economic growth (New Y o r k ,
1964) ; F. H. Harbison, Human resources as the wealth of nations (New
Y o r k , 1 9 7 3 ) . Problems of manpower development and diagnosis
838

of the attendant problems have received the attention o f several

studies. R. G. Hollister, in 'Manpower problems and policies in
Africa', International Labour Review, 1 9 5 9 , vol. 9 9 , no. 5, 5 1 5 - 3 2 ,
analysed, among other issues, the shortage of skilled manpower;
rural-urban drift and unemployment; malfunctioning of the wage
system and components of an integrated manpower policy.
Employment in Africa and related critical issues were the
subject o f an I L O contribution (Geneva, 1 9 7 1 ) , while P. De Briey
focussed on ' T h e productivity o f African labour', International
Labour Review, 1 9 5 5 , vol. 7 2 , 1 1 9 - 3 7 . Labour migration has had
significant economic and social consequences, particularly in the
countries of southern Africa. This is the subject of the article by
T. Soper on ' Labour migration in Africa' in the Journal of African
Administration, 1 9 5 9 , vol. 1 1 , 9 3 - 9 .
In a historical study, R. Cohen, Labour and politics in Nigeria,
194J-19J1 (London, 1 9 7 4 ) , traced the history o f the labour
movement in Nigeria and tried to establish w h y factionalism
prevailed; while G . Arrighi discussed the emergence o f different
forms o f the bourgeoisie {petite, bureaucratic etc.) as a result o f the
investment policies of oligopolistic corporations and consortia
(see G . Arrighi, 'International corporations, labour aristocracies,
and economic development in Africa', in Robert T. Rhodes (ed.),
Imperialism and underdevelopment (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 0 ) ) .
The agricultural sector had a central role to play, particularly
in the resolution of the food crisis that increasingly faced the
continent in the period covered by this volume. K. R. M. Anthony
et aL in Agricultural change in tropical Africa (Ithaca, 1 9 7 9 ) con
centrated on the process of agricultural change and on the
factors that permit widespread increase in farm productivity and
income.
S. C. Jain in the Agricultural development of African nations,
2 vols. (Bombay, 1 9 6 5 ) , presented a study o f agro-economic
structure, focussing on general agricultural development and on
policies conducive to successful and rapid economic growth o f
the African countries covered. Considerations o f the role o f the
state and mechanisation, crop and livestock production, land use
and ownership in agricultural development are adequately covered
by I. A . Svanidze in ' The African struggle for agricultural
productivity', Journal of Modern African Studies, 1 9 6 8 , vol. 6, no.
3, 3 1 1 - 2 8 .
839

Internal as well as external trade relations and conditions have

been shown to be related to Africa's colonial and imperial
heritage. Thus Claude Meillassoux (ed.), Development of indigenous
trade and markets in West Africa (Oxford, 1 9 7 1 ) adopted a Marxist
perspective in his introduction. He considered the effects of the
growth of markets on social relations, the intensity of long-distance
trade, and the impact of European capitalism.
P. H. Turner made a comprehensive study of the workings of
commercial institutions in Africa in The commerce of new Africa
(London, 1 9 6 9 ) . Problems such as the supply of capital, the
availability of skilled manpower, reform of outdated customs and
practices are dealt with along with other more complex issues
arising from the rapid pace of economic development and social
change.
With the external orientation of African commerce, seaports
assume a critical role. B. S. Hoyle and D. Hilling, in Seaports and
development in tropical Africa (London, 1 9 7 0 ) underline, through
a collection of essays by geographers, the important role of
seaports in the economic growth of underdeveloped areas.
Maritime transport also affects the local level of industrialisation,
mineral extraction and export. Thus the United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa provided an assessment of the current state
and past growth of industry in U N E C A , Industrial development in
Africa: problems and prospects (New Y o r k , 1 9 6 7 ) .
Studies on minerals are available and M. BostockandC. Harvey
have edited a collection of papers under the title: Economic
independence and Zambian copper (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 2 ) . A n early
wartime study by Albert W . Postel, The mineral resources of Africa
(Philadelphia, 1 9 4 3 ) , indicated Africa's annual production of each
type of existing and known mineral along with the annual world
production and the annual production of the world's chief
producers. Similarly, N. de K u n in The mineral resources of Africa
(Amsterdam, 1 9 6 5 ) , describes in detail the mineral wealth, the
geology, and the various sources of energy, for all the countries
of the continent.
It has been commonly realised in the literature that political

freedom has not been matched by economic independence.
D. P. Ghai edited a collection of essays titled Economic independence
in Africa (Nairobi, 1 9 7 3 ) which presented case studies of the
840

policies pursued to obtain economic independence in Zambia,

Kenya, Sudan and Egypt.
G. Arrighi and J . Saul in Essay on the political economy of Africa
(New Y o r k , 1 9 7 3 ) , tried to demonstrate the extent to which
' structures o f domination' (shaped by interaction of contemporary
imperialism with patterns of domestic class formation) were the
most important variables affecting the prospects for African
progress and development. The authors argued that socialism
was, in fact, becoming a real necessity in order to ensure the
further development of the continent.
This socialist orientation, with variations on the theme of class
struggle, coloured the works of several authors including African
leaders. Such studies include: K w a m e Nkrumah, Class struggle
in Africa (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 0 ) , in which he held that the colonial
period gave rise to the development of ' capitalist social structures '
in Africa; and Frantz Fanon, Les Damnés de la terre, translated as
The wretched of the earth (New Y o r k , 1963). Fanon perceives what
Amin, Nkrumah and others correctly identified - that this new
ruling class was dependent for its privileged position upon the
intermediary role which it played in the neo-colonial framework.
As Cabrai put it, decolonisation made possible an alliance between
the local bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie of the capitalist metro-
poles (Amflcar Cabrai, 'The struggle in Guinea', International
Socialist Journal, 4 4 2 ) .
Other studies in the socialist/Marxist tradition include:
E. J . Berg, 'Socialism and economic development in tropical
9
Africa ,Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1 9 6 4 , vol. 7 8 , no. 4 , 5 4 9 - 7 3 ;
F. Burke, 'The Search for Ujamaa', in W . Friedland and C.
Rosenberg (eds.), African socialism (Stanford, 1 9 6 4 ) ; K w a m e
Nkrumah, J speak offreedom (London, 1 9 6 1 ) , and Towards colonial
freedom : Africa in the war against world imperialism (London, 1 9 6 2 ) ;
Julius Nyerere, Socialism and rural development (Dar es Salaam,
1 9 6 7 ) ; and Freedom and socialism (London, 1968). The related
contribution of L e o p o l d Senghor, On African socialism (New
Y o r k , 1 9 6 4 ) , stressed the importance of culture in the task of
nation-building, noting that it was not an appendage that could
be dispensed with without damage to the entire fabric. The
following three publications (among others) dwelt on the 'hu
manist ' socialist views of the President of Zambia on development
in his country: Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia's economic revolution: the
841

Mulmgushi Declaration (Lusaka, 1 9 6 8 ) ; Humanism in Zambia

(Lusaka, 1 9 6 7 ) ; and Towards complete independence: after Mulungushi
(Lusaka, 1 9 6 9 ) .
It is now clear that the various attitudes represented either by
socialist or capitalist thinking have been employed by govern
ments in trying to reformulate their national development strategies.
E. Marcus was concerned with this problem in 'The economic
role of the government in independent tropical Africa', American
Journal of Economics and Sociology, 1 9 6 5 , vol. 2 4 , no. 3, 3 0 7 - 1 5 .
The collection of papers edited by A . Adedeji under the title
Indigeni!(ation of African economies (London, 1 9 8 1 ) , assessed the
impact of government intervention in development planning, and
gave a historical background to indigenisation.
U. G. Damachi in his book Leadership ideology in Africa: attitudes
towards socio-economic development (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 6 ) , claimed that
many leaders had propounded different ideologies — Kaunda's
Humanism; Seretse Khama's Kagisano; Nyerere's Ufamaa;
Gaddafi's Green Revolution, etc. A s already implied above, the
socio-economic development thinking of these leaders reflected
a heavy reliance on socialist principles; all of them emphasised
state control which necessarily limits the scope for private
enterprise. G u y Hunter in The best of both worlds? A challenge on
development policies in Africa (London, 1 9 6 7 ) showed how the
transfer of institutions, technology, and values from one society
to another with completely different structures proved infertile or
caused social distortions and precipitated a ' revolution o r rising
frustrations' with consequent social and military upheavals.
Even before the advent of political independence, and since then,

there has been a growing body of opinion in support of
integrating, in one form or another, the generally small economies
of the equally small and balkanised states in Africa.
A r t h u r Hazlewood (ed.), in African integration and disintegration:
case studies in economic and political union (London, 1 9 6 7 ) , presented
a collection of papers on the way African states endeavoured to
integrate their economies, and in some cases their political
systems, in the face of powerful forces tending to pull them apart.
The study is therefore concerned mainly with the politics as well
as the economics of integration. Both R. H. Green and K . G. V .
Krishna, in Economic co-operation in Africa: retrospect and prospect
(Nairobi, 1 9 6 7 ) , reviewed developments in the field in 1965 and
842

5- THE E C O N O M I C E V O L U T I O N
analysed the institutional framework for and the dynamics of

economic union together with considerations of external influ
ences on and opposition to African economic cooperation and
integration. The w o r k by A . M. A k i w u m i on the Judicial aspects
of economic integration treaties in Africa (Leiden, 1 9 7 2 ) examined the
general concept of international law in economic cooperation and
analysed the various legal frameworks (treaties, conventions, etc.)
adopted in the process, using to advantage the experiences of
EAC, U D E A C and other such international organisations.
Other contributions on the problems of economic integration
in the continent include, among others, P. N. C. Okigbo, Africa
and the Common Market (London, 1 9 6 7 ) ; F. V . Walker, 'Regional
economic integration in Africa', in Uppal and Salkever, cited
above; and P. Robson, Economic integration in Africa (Evanston,
1968).
Valuable surveys of economic and customs unions and the
commercial policy of protectionism and tariff bargaining appeared
in the following publications, which have both theoretical and
practical interest: J . Viner, The customs union issue (New Y o r k ,
x
9 5 ° ) ; J - E. Meade, Problems of economic union (London, 1 9 5 3 ) ;
R. G. Lipsey, 'The theory of customs unions: a general survey',
Economic Journal, Sept. i 9 6 0 ; G. H. Johnson, ' A n economic
theory of protectionism, tariff bargaining, and the formation of
customs unions', Journal of Political Economy, 1 9 6 5 ; and C. A.
Cooper and B. F. Massell, ' Toward a general theory of customs
unions for developing countries', Journal of Political Economy
(Chicago), 1 9 6 5 , vol. 7 3 .
Contributions on African sub-regional integration with a focus
on the development, benefits and problems of the East African
Common Market, are: D. V . Co w e n , ' Towards a common market
in Southern Africa', Optima, June 1 9 6 7 ; D. P. Ghai, 'Territorial
distribution of the benefits and costs of the East African Common
Market', in C. Leys and P. Robson (eds.), Federation in East
Africa: opportunities and problems (Nairobi, 1 9 6 5 ) ; W . T. Newlyn,
' Gains and losses in the East African Common Market', Yorkshire
Bulletin, November 1 9 6 5 ; and P. Ndegwa, The Common Market and
development in East Africa (Nairobi, 1 9 6 5 , second edition 1 9 6 8 ) .
For the Maghrib sub-region, A . Robana wrote The prospects for
an economic community in North Africa: managing economic integration
in the Maghreb states (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 3 ) .
843

6. S O U T H E R N A F R I C A
The problem of assessing the significance of recent events is a

major difficulty faced by anybody rash enough to attempt a brief
history of southern Africa over so turbulent a period as the past
forty years. Peoples' experiences and claims vary and their
interpretations of what has happened differ widely. One contem
porary, when asked what he thought were the most significant
events to have occurred during the period, put high on his list
the granting of constitutional independence to the Transkei in
October 1 9 7 6 . Another contemporary regarded it as 'irrelevant;
a mere book-entry'. Both people were young with acute political
minds. One is white and a member of the ruling National Party;
the other, black, has since died in prison for his political activities.
To take t w o further examples, the great Xhosa poet and writer,
S. E. K . Mqhayi, resigned as a teacher from Lovedale, an insti
tution which prided itself on being particularly sympathetic to the
African cause, because he felt the history he had to teach was
unduly biased and uncritical of white conquest. On the other side
of the fence, an Afrikaner nationalist in 1 9 4 7 justified his party's
attack on dual-medium schools where white children were taught
in both Afrikaans and English. ' O u r children', he complained,
' sit in dual medium schools which means that if you tell the one
section its history, you hurt the other. Thus w e paper over the
1
cracks neatly, else w e are race-haters.' The way to a better
2
understanding of events must, as a recent b o o k on ethnocentrism
in historical writing points out, pass through the arena o f conflict
where historians with different interpretations and perspectives
face each other and try to incorporate the others' views into their
o w n work. New books had to be written in Europe when children
in the international schools were first required to learn history in
a language other than their own. That day is still a long way off
in South Africa. Meanwhile one has to pick one's way forward,
ever mindful of the extent to which one's o w n views, experiences
and place in society filter not only the interpretation of events but
also their selection.
Nor is perspective the only difficulty. Paradoxically, where a
major problem lies in deciding what to leave out, there is an acute
1
C i t e d b y D u n b a r M o o d i e , The rise of Afrikanerdom ( B e r k e l e y , 1975)» * 4 ° -
2
R o y P r e i s w e r k a n d D o m i n i q u e P e r r o t , Ethnocentrism and history ( N e w Y o r k , 1978).
844

lack of information and of interpretation from some points of

view. Much important writing is either banned or, for fear of
police action, hidden away; sometimes destroyed; often never
published. In a world of Sami^dat, many facts will not emerge
from their hiding places, including peoples' heads, for years to
come. During the 1960s almost an entire generation of black
writers went voluntarily or involuntarily into exile; bans were
imposed so that their books could neither circulate nor be quoted
in South Africa. Nor is it only black writers w h o have been thus
'erased from the scene'. Books ordered from outside do not
always arrive; works read abroad cannot always be brought back
and re-read when needed. Important material is published overseas
of which scholars inside the country are not always aware.
Another barrier inhibiting the gathering of information is the
diversity of languages in the region. Much has been printed -
though not all of it preserved - in a wide variety of languages
ranging from Afrikaans and Arabic through to Yiddish and Zulu.
In addition, until 1 9 7 9 state papers in South African archives were
not open to the public until 50 (now 30) years after they had been
written and thus the police records on such important political
movements as the Ossewa Brandwag or Umkbonto we Si^we which y
were responsible for sabotage during the early 1940s and 1960s
respectively, were not available and our information was limited
to press cuttings, court records, or the memoirs of retired
policemen. Until more monographs have been written which
draw on this hidden wealth (including the fast-disappearing oral
material), southern African history must remain fragmentary.
Despite these difficulties, the area is one of the most richly
documented in the continent and there is a mass of relevant
writing, ranging from government commissions to unpublished
student theses. W h a t follows is simply an introduction to enable
the reader to go straight to some of the most important of the
source material and interpretative writing currently available in
English.
It is best to begin with the bibliographical tools. Reuben
Musiker's South African bibliography: a survey of bibliographies and
bibliographical work (Cape Town, second edition, 1980) provides
an admirable guide as to what is available. This is supplemented
by his guide to important bibliographies and reference books
published in the W o r l d Bibliographic Series as South Africa
845

(Oxford, 1 9 7 9 ) . For books in general the SA national bibliography

which has been published regularly since 1 9 5 9 is comprehensive.
Government publications are listed in the House of Assembly's
Index to the manuscript annexures and printed papers of the House of
Assembly including select Committee Reports and Bills and also principal
motions and resolutions and Commission Reports 1910-1961 (Cape
Town, 1963) which has a useful section on reports o f government
commissions. This is supplemented by the Library of Parliament's
unpublished Index to the printed annexures of the House of Assembly
1962-19/1 (mimeo, Cape Town). In addition, there is the Depart
ment o f Cultural Affairs, Bibliography of the Department of Statistics
1910-1968 (Pretoria, 1969). G o o d bibliographies focussing on
particular fields include G . E. Gorman, The South African novel
since 19 jo: an information and resource guide (Boston, 1 9 7 8 ) and
University of the Orange Free State, Institute for Contemporary
History, Bibliography on South African political history, 1902-19/4,
vol. I (Bloemfontein, 1 9 7 8 ) . Also important, not least as a measure
of the amount o f archival material n o w available is Susan
G. W y n n , African political material: a catalogue of the Carter-Karis
collection (Bloomington, 1 9 7 7 ) . The impact of censorship in the
country is recorded in Jacobsen's Index of objectionable literature
(Pretoria).
For a guide to unpublished research w o r k scholars should
consult Stefanus I. Malan, Union catalogue of theses and dissertations
of the South African universities, 1942-19j8 (Potchefstroom, 1 9 5 9 ) ,
together with the Annual supplements compiled by the Ferdinand
Potsmas Library in Potchefstroom. For theses written at other
universities around the world the best guide is Oliver B. Pollak
and Karin Pollak, Theses and dissertations on Southern Africa: an
international bibliography (Boston, 1 9 7 6 ) . A rich quarry to be mined
by historians of southern Africa is the periodical literature, most
of which is recorded in the Annual index to South African periodicals
compiled by the City of Johannesburg Public Library since 1 9 4 0 .
Many of the books and articles cited in these bibliographies deal
not only with South Africa but also with other countries in the
region. But for references focussed specifically on these countries
the best guides are: Richard P. Stevens, Historical dictionary of
Botswana (Metuchen, 1 9 7 5 ) ; John J . Grotpeter, Historical
dictionary of Swaziland (Metuchen, 1 9 7 5 ) ; Eckard Strohmeyer,
846

Namibian national bibliography 1971-19JJ (Basle, 1978) and Shelagh

M. Willett and D. Ambrose, Lesotho (Oxford, 1980).
W e turn now to books (most of which themselves contain
useful bibliographies) which may be regarded as starting points
for those wishing to read more deeply. A wider, though by no
means comprehensive, set of references is included in the
bibliography at the back of this volume. The t w o volumes of the
Oxford history of South Africa edited by Monica Wilson and
Leonard Thompson (Oxford, 1 9 6 9 and 1 9 7 1 ) broke new ground
and sparked off a lively debate about the interpretation of South
African history. A good general w o r k which takes account of this
ferment amongst scholars is T. R. H. Davenport, South Africa - a
modern history (Johannesburg, second edition, 1 9 7 8 ) although Leo
Marquard, The peoples and policies of South Africa (London, fourth
edition, 1 9 6 9 , retitled A short history of South Africa) remains the
best brief account. T w o books which look specifically at the
different interpretations of the various schools of thought are, for
the earlier years, F. A. Van Jaarsveld, The Afrikaners' interpretation
of South African history (Cape Town, 1 9 6 4 ) and, for the 1 9 7 0 s ,
Harrison Wright, The burden of the present (Cape Town, 1 9 7 7 ) .
There is as yet no major w o r k by a black historian whose
experience and perspective is so badly needed for a fuller
understanding of the past.
For Swaziland there is J . S. M. Matsebulo, A history ofSwaziland
(Cape Town, second edition, 1 9 7 6 ) . In addition there is a major
biography by Hilda Kuper, Sobhuqa II (London, 1 9 7 8 ) . For
Namibia the best introduction remains J o h n H. Wellington, South
West Africa and its human issues (Oxford, 1 9 6 7 ) supplemented, for
details of the subsequent decade, by J . H. P. Serfontein, Namibia?
(Randburg, 1 9 7 6 ) . For the international aspects see J o h n Dugard
(ed.), The South West Africa/Namibia dispute, documents and scholarly
writings on the controversy between South Africa and the United Nations
(Berkeley, 1 9 7 3 ) . A major change in historical approach has been
the change in time depth and archaeologists have provided
evidence for this. It is summarised in R. R. Inskeep, The peopling
of Southern Africa (Cape Town, 1 9 7 8 ) . Southern Africa has
produced an unusually large number of in-depth studies of society
in transition. Isaac Schapera's books on the Tswana, beginning
with Tswana law and custom (London, 1938), Monica Hunter's
847

Reaction to conquest (London, 1 9 3 6 ) , E. J . and J . D. Krige's The

realm of a rain queen (London, 1 9 4 3 ) and Hilda Kuper's An
African aristocracy (Oxford, 1 9 4 7 ) laid the foundation.
Amongst more recent studies three books which demonstrate
something of the depth and range of modern anthropology are
Richard B. Lee and Irwen De V o r e (eds.), Kalahari hunter gatherers
(Cambridge, Mass., 1 9 7 6 ) ; Axel Ivar Berglund, Zulu thought
patterns and symbolism (Uppsala, 1968), and Colin Murray, Families
divided: the impact of migrant labour in Lesotho (Cambridge, 1 9 8 1 ) .
For the sociological contribution one might begin with Heribert
Adam (ed.), South African sociological perspectives (London, 1 9 7 1 ) .
In the field o f economics there are good general w o r k s on four
of the five countries under consideration but in confining
themselves to political boundaries of a single nation state all of
them remain essentially partial descriptions. But taken together
the following four books provide a comprehensive o v e r v i e w :
D. Hobart Houghton, The South African economy (Cape T o w n ,
fourth edition, 1 9 7 6 ) ; Wolfgang H. Thomas, Economic development
in Namibia (Munich, 1 9 7 8 ) ; I L O Jobs and Skills programme for
Africa (Jaspa), Options for a dependent economy: development\
employment and equity problems in Lesotho (Addis Ababa, 1 9 7 9 ) ; and
C. Colclough and S. McCarthy, The political economy of Botswana:
a study of growth and distribution (Oxford, 1980). For those w h o find
delving into statistical tables illuminating, t w o invaluable sources,
albeit confined to one country, are published by the Department
of Census in Pretoria: Union statistics for fifty years 1910-1960 and
the biennial South African statistics whose 1 9 7 8 edition contains
a number o f tables covering a long run of years.
In labour there are t w o classics which complement each other.
But both Sheila T. van der Horst, Native labour in South Africa
(Cape Town, 1 9 4 2 ) and Edward Roux, Time longer than rope
(Wisconsin, second edition, 1 9 6 4 ) focus primarily on the period
before 1936 and are best read for understanding of the roots from
which subsequent labour developments grew. More recent studies
include Francis Wilson, Labour in the South African gold mines
1911-1969 (Cambridge, 1 9 7 2 ) and Eddie Webster (ed.), Essays in
Southern Africa labour history (Johannesburg, 1 9 7 8 ) . Similarly,
S. H. Frankel, Capital investment in Africa (London, 1938) laid the
foundation for understanding the further development of
international economic links during the period. This remained
848

virtually the only study until, as with labour, a spate of books and
articles were published in the 1 9 7 0 s . A guide, though it needs
up-dating, to some o f these may be found in J a n Edwards,
Bibliography on foreign investment in South Africa (Johannesburg,
1 9 7 5 ) . T w o books on some of the infrastructural links being
forged in Africa south o f the equator are: G u y A r n o l d and Ruth
Weiss, Stragetic highways of Africa (London, 1 9 7 7 ) and Keith
Middlemas, Cabora Bassa: engineering and politics in Southern Africa
(London, 1 9 7 5 ) which together show something of the significance
of links binding together South Africa and other parts o f the
continent which lie outside the regional definition used in this
volume.
Given the very wide range of material available, it is difficult
to reduce one's desert island list o f political reading to less than
a dozen books. The best descriptions of government in the decade
before 1 9 4 8 are to be found in t w o outstanding political
biographies: W . K . Hancock, Smuts: thefieldsof force 1919-19 jo
(Cambridge, 1968) and Alan Paton, Hofmeyr (Cape T o w n , 1 9 6 4 ) .
A contemporary account o f Afrikaner politics in the wilderness
is to be found in Michael Roberts and A . E. G . Trollip, A South
African opposition 1959-1941 (Cape T o w n , 1 9 4 7 ) whilst the best
reference for the next decade is Gwendolen M. Carter, The politics
of inequality: South Africa since 1948 (London, second edition,
1 9 5 9 ) . Perceptive analysis o f transformations within Afrikaner-
dom since the 1960s is undertaken by Heribert Adam, Modernising
racial domination (Berkeley, 1 9 7 1 ) , and by Heribert Adam and
Hermann Giliomee, The rise and crisis of Afrikaner power (Cape
Town, 1 9 7 9 ) . A longer-term perspective is well provided by
T. Dunbar Moodie, The rise of Afrikanerdom (Berkeley, 1 9 7 5 ) , and
W . A . de Klerk, The Puritans in Africa (London, 1 9 7 5 ) . For a view
from inside the laager see A . N. Pelzer (ed.), Verwoerd speaks:
speeches 1948-1966 (Johannesburg, 1 9 6 6 ) .
The most important collection of original documents in politics
from a black perspective is contained in Thomas Karis and
Gwendolen M. Carter (eds.), From protest to challenge, o f which
vols. II and HI (Stanford, 1 9 7 3 , 1 9 7 7 ) cover the years 1 9 3 5 - 6 4 .
For general accounts o f African political resistance see Peter
Walshe, The rise of African nationalism in South Africa (London,
1 9 7 0 ) , Gail M. Gerhart, Black Power in South Africa (Berkeley,
1 9 7 8 ) and T o m Lodge, Black politics in South Africa since 194J
849

(Johannesburg, 1983). For the best detailed account of a specific

confrontation between the state and its people see Charles
Hooper, Brief authority (London, i960), whilst accounts of the
impact of apartheid on those affected by it are provided by Naboth
Mokgatle, The autobiography of an unknown South African (Berkeley,
1971) and Z. K . Matthews, Freedom for my people (London, 1980).
For a contemporary record of all political developments the
Annual survey of race relations, published by the South African
Institute of Race Relations in Johannesburg, is invaluable.
In the field of law, A . S. Matthews, Law, order and liberty in South
Africa (Cape T o w n , 1971), Albie Sachs, Justice in South Africa
(Berkeley, 1973), Muriel Horrell, Laws affecting race relations in South
Africa 1948-1976 (Johannesburg, 1978) and J o h n Dugard, Human
rights and the South African legal order (Princeton, 1979), provide
a comprehensive overview. In military affairs Neil Orpen et al.,
South African forces, World War II, 6 vols. (Cape T o w n , 1968-77)
covers the early period in minute detail, whilst the best intro
duction to the later period is Basil Davidson, J o e S l o v o and
Anthony R. Wilkinson, Southern Africa: the new politics of revolution
(Harmondsworth, 1976). In science the best book is A . C. Brown
(ed.), A history of scientific endeavour in South Africa (Cape T o w n ,
1977).
For education in general it is best to begin with E. G. Malherbe,
Education in South Africa (Cape T o w n , 1977) whilst also reading
I. B. Tabata, Education for barbarism (East London, i960) to
understand the depth of black opposition to the imposed education
system. A preliminary guide to the confrontation between church
and state during the period is J o h n W . de Gruchy, The Church
struggle in South Africa (Grand Rapids, 1979); t w o original sources
from either end of the spectrum are Basil Moore (ed.), Black
theology: a South African voice (London, 1973) and W . A . Landman,
A plea for understanding: a reply to the Reformed Church in America
(Cape T o w n , 1968). For discussion of the rapidly growing
independent churches which lie outside the boundaries of the
major traditional Christian denominations, see Bengt Sundkler,
Bantu prophets in South Africa (London, second edition, 1961).
Gabriel Setiloane, The image of God among the Sotho-Tswana
(Rotterdam, 1976) is also illuminating.
It is not possible to select any one novel to represent the wealth
of literature written during this period. Some of the more
850

important books are listed in the bibliography. Here three

anthologies may serve to whet readers' appetites. Nadine
Gordimer and Lionel Abrahams (eds.), South African writing to-day
(Harmondsworth, 1 9 6 7 ) ; Richard Rive (ed.), Quartet (London,
1 9 6 5 ) ; and Jean Marquard (ed.), A century of South African short
stories (Johannesburg, 1 9 7 8 ) . In addition to prose, a lot of poetry
welled up during the 1 9 7 0 s , some of which is in the anthology
edited by G u y Butler and Chris Mann, A book of South African
verse in English (Cape T o w n , 1 9 7 9 ) .
To conclude, it is perhaps w o r t h making the point that those
wishing to understand Southern Africa better will often learn
more from the wide range of novels, plays, poetry and autobio
graphies written during this period than from much of the more
academic analyses. Certainly twentieth-century South Africa
cannot be understood, any more than nineteenth-century Russia,
from the work of academics alone. But South Africa, as yet, has
no Tolstoy.
7. E N G L I S H - S P E A K I N G W E S T A F R I C A
Books covering several African territories are seldom more useful

than those covering a number of European countries. There are
exceptions. Thomas Hodgkin pioneered the serious study of
African politics by foreign scholars with his Nationalism in colonial
Africa (London, 1 9 5 7 ) . Concerned largely with Commonwealth
West Africa this was a landmark. From the British side, in The
turning point in Africa (London, 1 9 8 2 ) , R. D. Pearce chose the
decade 1 9 3 8 - 4 8 , not the following years when independence was
achieved, as the watershed in British colonial policy. For in 1 9 4 7
the Colonial Office - if not the Labour government - decided,
chiefly because of developments in the Gold Coast and Nigeria,
that African colonies must become independent' within a gener
ation'. Hodgkin's and Pearce's books provide the background
to political development in West Africa up to 1 9 5 7 .
A m o n g books dealing with West African economies in general,
two are classics: Peter Bauer's West African trade (Cambridge,
1 9 5 4 , second edition London, 1963) which is concerned with only
Nigeria and Ghana, and Polly Hill's Studies in rural capitalism in
West Africa (Cambridge, 1 9 7 0 ) , which is also concerned with these
t w o countries, and analyses the way in which rural people, the
great majority, 'order their economic behaviour'.
851

Nigeria
Four American 'blockbusters', o f 500 pages or more, are essential

for understanding Nigerian politics up to 1 9 6 6 . They are James
S. Coleman, Nigeria: background to nationalism (Berkeley, 1 9 5 8 ) ;
Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian political parties (Princeton, 1 9 6 3 ) ;
C S. Whitaker, The politics of tradition (Princeton, 1 9 7 0 ) a fascin
ating and sympathetic analysis o f the then Northern Nigeria by
a black American; and J . N. Paden, Religion and political culture in
Kano (Berkeley, 1 9 7 3 ) whose discussion o f the role o f Muslim
Brotherhoods in politics is significant far beyond K a n o . A British
contribution is Nigerian government and politics (London, 1 9 6 6 ) by
J o h n P. Mackintosh et al. while Billy J . Dudley, Parties andpolitics
9
in Northern Nigeria (London, 1 9 6 8 ) provides an interesting

analysis by a Southern Nigerian.
A vast number of other books by Nigerians and outsiders deal
with Nigerian politics. Books by o r about individual politicians
are essential for understanding the post-Second W o r l d W a r era.
My life (Cambridge, 1 9 6 2 ) by the Sardauna o f Sokoto — believed
to have been ' ghosted' by a senior administrative officer - covers
the period up to self-government of the Northern Region in 1 9 5 9 .
W e await a biography o f Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. Chief
A w o l o w o , the most prolific author among the Nigerian leaders,
produced in 1 9 4 6 Path to Nigerian freedom (London, 1 9 4 6 ) and,
among later w o r k s , his autobiography, Awo (Cambridge, i 9 6 0 ) .
D r Azikiwe's autobiography My odyssej (London, 1 9 7 0 ) takes his
story up to 1 9 4 7 — when he was already an experienced journalist
and politician. African revolutionary (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 3 ) is an
inadequate biography (taking the story up to 1 9 7 0 ) o f Malam
Aminu K a n o , the NEPU leader and one o f the most interesting
of Nigeria's politicians. Chris Offodile's biography, Dr M. I.
Okpara (Enugu, 1980), is t o o short to d o justice to Azikiwe's
successor as leader of the NCNC, and one o f the most under
estimated politicians in Nigeria.
From countless books about Nigeria's economy one can
recommend Planning without facts (Cambridge, Mass., 1 9 6 6 ) by
Wolfgang G . Stolper, an American w h o was briefly in charge o f
Nigeria's economic planning unit. In Industrialisation in an open
economy: Nigeria 194J-1966 (Cambridge, 1 9 6 9 ) Peter K i l b y argues
that government efforts had little effect in promoting industri
es

7- E N G L I S H - S P E A K I N G W E S T A F R I C A
alisation. Professor W . Arthur Lewis's short Reflections on Nigeria's

economic growth (OECD, 1 9 6 7 ) is nevertheless the best of its kind.
Books that are more significant for understanding Nigeria than
their titles suggest include : Education in Northern Nigeria (London,
1 9 8 1 ) by Ozigi and Ocho; Nigerian census, 1963 (Benin, 1 9 7 2 ) by
I. I. Ekanem; The Second World War and politics in Nigeria (Lagos
and London, 1 9 7 3 ) by G. O. Olusanya; and the Willink report on
minorities (London, 1 9 5 8 ) . The administration of Nigeria 1900 to i960
(London, 1970) by I. F. Nicolson began, if with exaggeration, the
'démystification' of Lugard. It was taken a stage further by
Jeremy White in Central administration in Nigeria (Dublin, 1 9 7 1 ) .
Of the memoirs of British officials the fullest is But always as
friends (London, 1968) by Sir Bryan Sharwood-Smith, w h o retired
as G o v e r n o r of Northern Nigeria in 195 7 after 36 years in Nigeria.
T w o general books for the layman hold their places down the
years: Michael Crowder, The story of Nigeria (London, many
editions); and Nigeria (London, 1 9 6 8 ) by Walter Schwarz.
For the civil war, J o h n de St Jorre's The Nigerian civil war
(London, 1 9 7 2 ) is still the standard work. General Obasanjo's My
command (Ibadan, 1980) is concerned mainly with war operations.
A m o n g many other books on the war and the secession,
N. U. Akpan's The strugglefor secession {London, 1 9 7 1 ) is a valuable
account of events leading to secession and of the administration
of the rebel areas. A civil servant, he was head of the Biafran
administration. Alexander Madiebo, commander-in-chief of the
Biafran army, offered a somewhat different approach in The
Nigerian revolution and the Biafran war (Enugu, 1980).
Ghana
No book on an African subject can have been recommended more

often - or more properly - than Dennis Austin's Politics in Ghana,
1946-60 (Oxford, 1 9 6 4 ) . A useful background is provided by
Ghana: the road to independence (London, i 9 6 0 - n e w edition) by
F. M. Bourret. D r Nkrumah's numerous publications range
from his Autobiography (London, 1 9 5 7 ) , believed to have been
'ghosted', to Africa must unite (London, 1 9 6 3 ) , Neo-colonialism, the
last stage of imperialism (London, 1 9 6 5 ) and the obscure philos
ophical work Consciencism (London, 1 9 6 4 ) . Study of these is
necessary for understanding the course of Ghanaian politics until
853

his death and after. In contrast are the scholarly w o r k s o f D r

Kofi Busia, w h o became prime minister in 1 9 6 9 , in particular
his standard w o r k , The position of the chief in the modern political
system of Ashanti (London, 1 9 5 1 ) .
A m o n g books by Nkrumah's lieutenants are Africa unbound
(New Y o r k , 1 9 6 3 ) by Alex Quaison-Sackey, a considerably more
balanced w o r k than Africa's golden road (London, 1 9 6 5 ) by Kwesi
Armah. Inside the massive Reap the whirlwind (London, 1968) by
Geoffrey Byng, Nkrumah's attorney-general and later adviser,
a really good book struggles to get out. There is strong criticism
of Nkrumah in Kwame Nkrumah: the anatomy of an African
dictatorship (London, 1 9 7 0 ) by Peter Omari, a Ghanaian university
lecturer and international civil servant. In Black star (London,
1 9 7 3 ) Basil Davidson produced, after Nkrumah's death, an
appraisal which recognised his 'important failings' but claimed
that his influence on the course o f events would always seem
significant. From its title the subject matter o f Political corruption:
the Ghana case (Stanford, 1 9 7 5 ) by Victor T. Le Vine can be
inferred.
A m o n g studies of particular topics, Organising the farmers by
Bjorn Beckman (Uppsala, 1 9 7 4 ) describes the fluctuating relations
between cocoa farmers and the CPP. Uses and abuses ofpoliticalpower
(Chicago, 1 9 7 1 ) by Maxwell Owusu analyses the relationship
between wealth and local political power in Swedru in the
south-central region, up to 1 9 6 6 . It concludes that the real object
of politics in Ghana was p o w e r rather than wealth.
A m o n g books describing Ghana's social scene are Social
structure of Ghana (Accra, 1 9 8 1 ) by Max Assimeng, a teacher at
Legon, w h o tries to relate social phenomena in Ghana to those
in the rest of the w o r l d ; Society and bureaucracy in contemporary Ghana
(Berkeley, 1 9 7 5 ) by R. M . Price; and Achimota in the national setting
(Accra, 1 9 7 7 ) by Francis Agbodeka, published to mark the
institution's golden jubilee, assesses the college's importance in
the nation's life.
A n American blockbuster, Ghana's foreign policy, 19J7-66
(Princeton, 1 9 6 9 ) by W . Scott Thompson, overshadows all other
books in this field. But for an understanding of Nkrumah's
approach to external affairs a much shorter book, The administration
of Ghana's foreign policy 1917-6} (London, 1 9 7 5 ) by Michael
Dei-Annang, is essential. He was principal secretary, Ministry of
854

Foreign Affairs, 1959-61, and head o f the African Affairs

Secretariat, 1961-66.
A m o n g many books on Ghana's economy, Nationalism and
economic development in Ghana (McGill, 1969) by Roger Genoud is
perhaps the most important. O f several studies concerned with
the enterprise, The Volta River Project (Edinburgh, 1980) by David
Hart is the most critical o f the benefits it offered to Ghana. The
two volumes o f A study of contemporary Ghana (London, i960)
edited by Walter Birmingham, I. Neustadt and E. N. Omaboe,
covers not only the economy but subjects such as land tenure and
even religion. Tony Killick's Development economics in action
(London, 1978) examines both the Nkrumah and the post-
Nkrumah years. Nobody has written the essential study that will
demonstrate that Ghana's economic decline was the direct result
of the corruption of both the Nkrumah regime and those o f his
successors.
Sierra Leone
Scholars from a number o f countries, as well as Sierra Leoneans

themselves, have produced valuable studies o f the country. There
are, however, significant gaps: no biography exists, for example,
of Sir Milton Margai.
A good introduction is Cyril P. Foray's Historical dictionary of
Sierra Leone (Metuchen, 1977). J o h n R. Cartwright, Politics in
Sierra Leone 1947—67 (Toronto, 1970) is a standard w o r k , but
Martin Kilson, Political change in a West African state (Cambridge,
Mass., 1966), offers a more restricted but more stimulating study.
Because o f the community's political as well as social signifi
cance, Leo Spitzer, The Creoles of Sierra Leone (Wisconsin, 1974),
which takes the story up to 1945 and covers the emergence o f
Wallace-Johnson, is of general interest. I would put in a plea, too,
for the delightful A Krio-English dictionary (Oxford, 1980) compiled
by Clifford N. Fyle and Eldred D. Jones. N. A . Cox-George,
Finance and development in West Africa: the Sierra Leone experience
(London, 1961) is the first major study o f the country's social and
economic development. A later study is The economic system ofSierra
Leone (Durham, NC, 1967) by Ralph Gerald Saylor, w h o concludes
that the cost o f government intervention in economic affairs far
outweighed its benefit. A specialised but essential study is The
Sierra Leone diamonds (London, 1965) by H. L. Van de Laan.
»55

Liberia
Liberia is usually treated as a * special case' in West Africa. It

is not normally included in the multitude of w o r k s covering the
whole area, since it is neither a francophone nor a Commonwealth
state. There are, however, a number o f good books - the best
perhaps inevitably critical - dealing specially with the country.
Liberia: the evolution of privilege (Ithaca, 1969) by J . Gus Liebenow,
emphasises that in spite of Tubman's reforms the elite entrenched
themselves in the new foreign enterprises. In Tribe and class in
Monrovia (Oxford, 1 9 6 4 ) Merran Fraenkel, whose fieldwork was
done in 1 9 5 8 , rejected the analogy between Americo-Liberians
and European 'settlers', but saw the correlation between ethnic
origin and social class as still significant.
A member o f the vigorous K r u tribe, Tuan W r e h , used the
Liberian motto The love of liberty brought us here (London, 1 9 7 1 ) as
the ironic title o f his critique o f the Tubman regime. Another
'tribal' Liberian w h o , like W r e h , was in government service as
a lawyer, Anthony Nimley, criticises the extortion practised by
officials and the nepotism governing their appointments in The
Liberian bureaucracy (Washington, DC, 1 9 7 7 ) . This emphasises that
until 1 9 3 4 the country had not even a nominally 'accountable'
civil service.
The classic book on Liberia's economy is Growth without
development (Evanston, 1 9 6 6 ) . The authors, R. W . Clower,
G. Dalton, M. Harwitz and A . A . Walters, were university
economists w h o carried out an economic survey of Liberia in
1 9 6 0 - 2 for the government and US AID. The book, their
'unofficial' report, emphasised that unless political aims were
changed, increased revenues would be irrelevant. Kinder judge
ments were made in books by t w o American writers: The jet
lighthouse (London, i 9 6 0 ) by Galbraith Welch; and Liberia:
America's Africanfriend (Chapel Hill, 1962) by R. Earle Anderson.
The official view is to be found in Tubman of Liberia speaks
(London, 1 9 5 9 ) and The official papers of William V. S. Tubman
(Monrovia, 1 9 6 8 ) , well-produced collections o f speeches.
856

The Gambia
Few books are devoted exclusively to the Gambia. Harry

A. Gailey's A history of the Gambia (London, 1 9 6 4 ) deals with
events up to the eve of independence ( 1 9 6 5 ) . Information about
the Gambia is, however, to be found in books concerning West
Africa in general, Commonwealth West African states, or Senegal.
Senegambia (Aberdeen, 1 9 7 4 ) , edited by R. C. Bridges, proceedings
of a colloquium held at Aberdeen University in 1 9 7 4 , discusses
issues which have since come to dominate Gambian politics. The
nature of poverty (London, 1 9 7 5 ) by Margaret Haswell deals with
the Gambia's nutritional problems, and so agriculture.
Books about the intervention of soldiers in politics have become

a secondary industry. Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone are
discussed in most of the general w o r k s , some of which seek a
pattern which is not there. These include J . M. Lee, African armies
and civil order (London, 1 9 6 9 ) . More specific, and relevant, are
single-country studies, such as Robert Pinkney, Ghana under
military rule 1966-1969 (London, 1 9 7 2 ) ; Robin Luckham, The
Nigerian military, 1960—1967 (Cambridge, 1 9 7 1 ) and N. J . Miners,
The Nigerian army 19 j6—1966 (London, 1 9 7 1 ) . Victor O. Olusanya,
Soldiers and power (Stanford, 1 9 7 7 ) examines the 'development
performance' of the Nigerian military. In Soldiers and oil (London,
1 9 7 8 ) edited by Keith Panter-Brick, 13 scholars, Nigerian and
British, discuss many different aspects of Nigeria under military
rule. Thomas S. Cox, Civil-military relations in Sierra Leone (Cam
bridge, Mass., 1 9 7 0 ) concludes that military intervention in
politics complemented civilian intervention in military matters.
In Nigeria and Ghana participants in, or close observers of,
military takeovers produced numerous memoirs. These include
Why we struck (Ibadan, 1 9 8 1 ) by Adewale Ademoyega, w h o sees
events in Marxist terms; and Nigeria'sfivemajors (Onitsha, 1 9 8 1 )
by Ben Gbulie, another planner of the 1 9 6 6 coup. For Ghana the
most important book is The Ghana coup (London, 1966) by the then
Colonel Afrifa, Brigade-Major to Colonel K o t o k a w h o planned
the 1 9 6 6 takeover. Politics of the sword (London, 1 9 7 7 ) is by
General A. K . Ocran, w h o brought in the units under his
command in support of the coup.
Several writers have been tempted to illuminate the affairs of
«57

one state by comparing it with another. W e had a useful

comparison, or contrast, in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Cambridge,
1 9 7 6 ) by Christopher Clapham, covering the 1960s and early
1 9 7 0 s . Eleven papers on 'alternative strategies' appear in Ghana
and the Ivory Coast (Chicago, 1 9 7 1 ) edited by Philip Foster and
Aristide R. Zolberg. In Nigeria and Ghana (Englewood Cliffs, N J ,
1966) J o h n E. Flint discusses the t w o countries' differing political
paths, while Olajide A l u k o called his Ghana and Nigeria 19J7—70
(London, 1 9 7 4 ) 'a study in inter-African discord'. A curiosity in
this field is The politics of pluralism (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 5 ) by David
R. Smock and Audrey C. Smock. This contrasted, to Ghana's
disadvantage, the policies pursued in the Lebanon and in Ghana,
to deal with the t w o countries' common problem of 'pluralism'.
Trade unions played a more significant political than industrial
role in both Ghana and Nigeria. Class, power and ideology in Ghana
(Cambridge, 1 9 7 8 ) , by Richard Jeffries, analyses the S e k o n d i -
Takoradi railwaymen's strike of 1 9 6 1 , which exposed the CPP
government's claims to radicalism. The role of trade unions in the
development process (London, 1 9 7 4 ) , by Ukandi G o d w i n Damachi,
is concerned with Ghana. It traces the worsening relations
between the CPP government and the workers, as well as union
activities under both the Busia and military regimes. The title of
Labour and politics in Nigeria, 194J-71 (London, 1 9 7 4 ) by Robin
Cohen explains the book's scope. The trade union movement in
Nigeria (London, 1 9 6 9 ) by W o g u Ananaba was written by a
leading actor in the drama. In Choice, class and conflict (Brighton,
1 9 7 9 ) , Adrian Peace analyses attitudes of workers after the civil
war in the Agege and Ikeja industrial estates, and union disputes
with the G o w o n government.
Another category of books concerns relations between West
Africa and Communist countries about which, at the time of
independence, some western commentators were almost hysteri
cal. A n objective survey is provided by Robert Legvold in Soviet
policy in West Africa (Harvard, 1 9 7 0 ) , which includes sections on
Nigeria and Ghana, Books by disillusioned West African students
include Moscow diary (London, 1 9 6 7 ) by William Anti-Taylor, one
of the first Ghanaian students to go to Moscow, and On the tiger's
back (London, 1 9 6 2 ) by the Nigerian Aderogba Ajao, w h o spent
six years in East Germany.
The list of books about the English-speaking West African
858

states - many of them ephemeral - is being added to at an

enormous rate each year. T o this must also be added the huge
number of articles published in scholarly journals o f which the
Journal of Modern African Studies is perhaps the most notable. A n
indispensable source for the course o f political, social, economic
and cultural events over this period is the weekly magazine West
Africa.
The volume of source materials for the scholar o f the recent
history of West African states is swelled not only by the many
published government reports but by the archives which in the
case of the former British colonies are n o w open for the first
decade of our period in Britain and in some cases can be consulted
for more recent years in the individual states.
8. EAST A N DC E N T R A L A F R I C A
Extensive documentary and secondary sources are available for

the study o f East and Central Africa, although not every country
in the region has received equal attention, and the materials vary
a great deal in value. A reasonably comprehensive guide to
sources for East Africa is to be found in vols. II and III o f the
History of East Africa (Oxford, 1965 and 1 9 7 6 ) , while Tony
Killick, The economies of East Africa provides a comprehensive
guide to the sources on economic development of that region. For
the East African Community see J o h n Bruce Howell, Subject guide
to official publications (Library o f Congress, 1 9 7 6 ) .
Volume V of L. Gann and P. Duignan's Colonialism in Africa,
a bibliographicalguide to colonialism in sub-Saharan Africa (Cambridge,
1 9 7 4 ) is the most useful starting point for Central Africa. A n d r e w
Roberts' History of Zambia (London, 1 9 7 6 ) contains an up-to-date
bibliographical appendix which lists the main secondary sources
for Zambia, and Robin Palmer's Land and racial discrimination in
Rhodesia (London, 1 9 7 7 ) should also be consulted for Rhodesia.
A great deal of valuable material is contained in the unpublished
papers of the East African Institute o f Social Research, n o w the
Makerere Institute o f Social Research, and of the research
institutes of the Universities of Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.
Particularly useful are the mimeographed conference papers o f
the annual social science conference that has been held under one
title or another since 1 9 5 0 . Reference should be made t o Makerere
859

Institute of Social Research, Kampala, Institute publications

19jo-1970, and Research and publications, 1968-69; also to Univer
sity of Nairobi, Institute for Development Studies, Research and
publications (annual); University of D a r es Salaam, Bureau of
Resources Assessment and Land Use Planning, List ofpublications,
and Economic Research Bureau, List of discussion papers. For the
publications o f the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, see: University
of Zambia, Institute for Social Research, A complete list of the
publications of the former Rhodes-Livingstone Institute.
Each colonial government and Great Britain as the colonial
power published a range o f official materials which are an
invaluable source o f information for the colonial period. These
include on the one hand annual departmental and other reports,
and on the other the findings of a range of commissions of
enquiry. Mention may be made here only of East Africa Royal
Commission, 19JJ—JJ: report (Chairman Sir Hugh D o w ) Cmd 9 4 7 5 ,
1 9 5 5 ; Report of the Commission on the Civil Services of the East African
Territories and the East African High Commission 19J3-J4 (Lidbury
Report) (London, H M S O , 1 9 5 4 ) ; Report of the Uganda Relationships
Commission, 1961 (Munster Report) (Entebbe, 1 9 6 1 ) ; Report of the
Fiscal Commission (Nairobi, 1 9 6 3 ) . F o r the Central African
federation reference should be made to the A d v i s o r y Commission
on the Review of the Constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland, Cmnd 1 1 5 1 , i 9 6 0 , 'Report and Evidence', 5 volumes
(the Monckton Commission).
The Proceedings o f the Legislative Council and the National
Assembly which replaced it are an important source of information
on political change for each state, although most especially for
Kenya. Tanganyika, as a Trust Territory, was the subject o f
reports by the Visiting Missions (of 1 9 4 8 , 1 9 5 1 , 1 9 5 4 , 1 9 5 7 and
i 9 6 0 ) . For Zambia a particularly useful study of conditions
immediately prior to independence is United Nations, Report of
the UNJECA JFAO economic survey mission on the economic develop
ment of Zambia (the Seers Report) (Ndola, 1 9 6 4 ) .
In addition to the statistical publications o f each territorial
government, reference should be made to the East African
economic and statistical bulletin, (quarterly from September 1 9 4 8 to
June 1 9 6 1 ) succeeded by the Economic and statistical review, and to
the Central African Statistical Office's Federal monthly digest. The
availability o f reliable economic data becomes more variable after
860

8. E A S T A N D C E N T R A L A F R I C A
independence. The Annual economic report remains the most

authoritative statement o f economic development for Kenya,
Zambia, Tanzania and Malawi. For Malawi especial note should
be made of the Statement of development policies 19/1—1980 (Zomba,
1 9 7 1 ) and the Compendium of statistics, 19JJ-6J (Ministry o f
Development and Planning, 1 9 6 6 ) . Economic data for Uganda
since 1 9 7 1 and for Rhodesia since 1965 is a good deal more
difficult to obtain, and for Zambia at the time of writing the latest
Statisticalyearbook published was for 1 9 7 1 , although the Monthly
digest of statistics remains a reliable source.
D. A . L o w and J o h n Lonsdale's Introduction to vol. I l l o f the
History of East Africa draws together the many threads o f recent
scholarship to provide a valuable introduction to colonial policy
and decolonisation, although reference must also be made to Gary
Wasserman's The politics of decolonisation (Cambridge, 1 9 7 6 ) which
draws upon recently available settler archives to provide a
significant reassessment o f the role o f settlers in Kenya's transfer
of power. Cranford Pratt's The critical phase in Tanzania 194 j-1968
(Cambridge, 1 9 7 6 ) provides not only a critical account o f the
failure of Britain's multiracial strategy in Tanganyika but also
provides a perceptive analysis o f Colonial Office thinking at this
time. See also for the period o f decolonisation and the transfer
of power, David Goldsworthy, Colonial issues in British politics
194j-1961 (Oxford, 1 9 7 1 ) ; W . P. Kirkman, Unscrambling an
Empire, a critique of British colonial policy 19j6—1966 (London,
1 9 6 6 ) ; and J . M. Lee, Colonial development and good government
(Oxford, 1 9 6 7 ) . More recent writing on the transfer o f power,
benefiting from additional official materials that have become
available under the 30-year rule, has begun to probe further
than was hitherto possible the underlying assumptions and
motivations, and the influences upon policy changes after 1 9 4 0 - 5 ,
and to reassess the process o f decolonisation. See, inter alia,
W . H. Morris-Jones and Georges Fischer (eds.), Decolonisation and
after: the British and French experience (London, 1 9 8 0 ) ; J o h n
Hargreaves, The end of colonial rule: essays in colonial history (London,
1 9 7 9 ) ; and James Morris, Farewell the trumpets (London, 1 9 7 8 ) .
David J o h n Morgan, The official history of colonial development, 5 vols.
(London, 1980), written with full access to official sources,
provides a good deal o f information but is essentially a straight
forward documentary account.
861

The role o f white-settler communities in the decolonisation

process is dealt with in A . Emmanuel, ' W h i t e settler colonialism
and the myth of investment imperialism', New Left Review,
M a y - J u n e 1 9 7 2 . Gary Wasserman, in The politics of decolonisation
(Cambridge, 1 9 7 6 ) , and ' T h e independence bargain: Kenya
Europeans and the land issue 1 9 6 0 - 6 2 ' , Journal of Commonwealth
Political Studies, July 1 9 7 3 , v o l . 1 1 , has documented the role of
settler and commercial groups in the bargaining process that
accompanied the transfer o f power in Kenya, a story taken up by
Colin Leys in Underdevelopment in Kenya: the political economy of
neo-colonialism (London, 1 9 7 4 ) . See also A . Amsden, International
firms and labour in Kenya 194J—1970 (London, 1 9 7 1 ) . While there
is as yet n o comparable analysis for any of the other states in the
region, the role o f corporate capital in the decolonisation process
had emerged at the end o f the 1 9 7 0 s as a major issue f o r debate
among historians, although one as yet unresolved.
The most useful general survey o f the colonial period in East
Africa is the History of East Africa, vol. II, edited by V . Harlow
and E. M. Chilver (Oxford, 1 9 6 5 ) , covering the period from
1900 to 1 9 4 5 , and vol. I l l , edited by D. A . L o w and Alison Smith
(Oxford, 1 9 7 6 ) , from 1945 to 1 9 6 3 . There is a rich literature from
which to supplement the country chapters in those volumes,
but space allows mention of only a few. For Tanzania, essential
reading is J o h n Iliffe's A modern history of Tanganyika (Cambridge,
1 9 7 9 ) . Henry Bienen's Tanzania: party transformation and economic
development (Princeton, 1 9 7 0 ) must remain an indispensable source
for the T A N U Party, and G . A . Maguire's Towards uhuru in
Tanzania: the politics of participation (Cambridge, 1969) is the best
introduction to the dynamics o f party politics and nationalism at
the grass-roots level. F o r Zanzibar, Michael Lofchie's Zanzibar:
background to revolution (Princeton, 196 5) is the most comprehensive
account of Zanzibar's politics in this period. Nelson Kasfir, in his
'Cultural sub-nationalism in Uganda' in Victor Olorunsola's The
politics of cultural sub-nationalism in African politics up to 1970 (New
Y o r k , 1 9 7 2 ) , which takes the analysis up to the military coup o f
1 9 7 1 , approaches Ugandan politics from the perspective of ethnic
cleavage and conflict. While there is a rich array o f ethnographic
material for most parts o f Uganda, it is Buganda that has been
most richly served by scholars. O f the extensive studies o f
Buganda mention can be made here only of Christopher Wrigley's
862

8. EAST A N D C E N T R A L A F R I C A
Crops and wealth in Uganda (Kampala, 1959), D. A. L o w and

R. C. Pratt's Buganda and British overrule 1900-193; : two studies
(Oxford, i960), and The King's men: leadership and status in Buganda
on the eve of independence (London, 1964), edited by L. A . Fallers,
whose own contribution constitutes the most authoritative study
of social change in Buganda.
The Kenyatta election: Kenya 1960-1961 by George Bennett and
Carl Rosberg (London, 1961) must remain the most authoritative
introduction to Kenyan politics in the nationalist period, as
Rosberg and Nottingham's study of Mau Mau, The myth of Mau
Mau: nationalism in Kenya (New Y o r k , 1966) remains indispensable
on the role of the K i k u y u . The latter must now however be
supplemented by more recent w o r k on K i k u y u politics, especially
Frank Furedi's 'The African crowd in Nairobi: popular move
ments and élite polities', in Journal of African History, 1973, vol.
14, no. 2. Four nationalist leaders have written autobiographical
accounts of the nationalist years from very different political per
spectives: Oginga Odinga's Not yet uhuru (London, 1967), Tom
Mboya's Freedom and after (London, 1963), Josiah Kariuki's
Mau Mau detainee (Oxford, 1963), and Bildad Kaggia's Roots
offreedom (Nairobi, 1975). The most perceptive study of President
Kenyatta is Jeremy Murray-Brown's Kenyatta (London, 1972).
Events in independent East Africa have generated a consider
able literature. William Tordoff's Government and politics in Tan-
%ania (Nairobi, 1967) provides a valuable analysis of changes in
government and administration in the first five years of inde
pendence over the transition to the one-party state. Pratt's The
critical phase, cited above, is a perceptive analysis of the emergence
of Tanzania's socialist strategy, and of the central role played by
President Nyerere; and Lionel Cliffe and J o h n Saul have edited
a valuable collection of essays in their two-volume Socialism in
Tanzania (vol. I, Politics, vol. II, Policies) (Nairobi, 1972, 1973)
covering the years from the Arusha Declaration to the early 1970s.
Tanzania's one-party state has attracted a good deal of scholarly
writing of which mention must be made of One-party democracy
(Nairobi, 1967), the volume of essays on the first general election
of 1965 edited by Lionel Cliffe. The three volumes of President
Nyerere's speeches, Freedom and unity (Dar es Salaam, 1967),
Freedom and socialism (1968) and Freedom and development (1973)
provide a perceptive guide to the development of Tanzania's
863

national ethic. While the Ugandan coup o f 1 9 7 1 has generated a

good deal of literature none has provided an authoritative account
of that event, although Ali Mazrui's Soldiers and kinsmen: the making
of a military ethnocracy (Chicago, 1 9 7 5 ) , which seeks to place the
1 9 7 1 coup and General Amin in Ugandan history, is a perceptive
analysis of the post-colonial state. Michael Lee's African armies and
civil order (New Y o r k , 1969) is the best source for information on
the Ugandan military up to 1 9 6 9 , and Henry Kayemba, former
private secretary to ex-President Obote and subsequently Minister
of Health in Amin's regime, until his defection in 1 9 7 7 , has
provided an inside account o f the Amin regime in his State of blood
(London, 1 9 7 7 ) .
For the post-colonial state in Kenya, Cherry Gertzel's The
politics of independent Kenya (Nairobi, 1 9 7 0 ) provides a detailed
account o f Kenyan politics up to 1 9 6 8 , and Colin Leys's Under
development in Kenya is essential for its critical analysis of the Kenyan
political economy up to the 1 9 7 0 s . Gerald Holtham and A r t h u r
Hazlewood's study, Aid and inequality (London, 1 9 7 6 ) , while
concerned primarily with economic development, provides an
equally perceptive analysis o f western influence in independent
Kenya from a more sympathetic viewpoint. Former Vice-President
of Kenya Oginga Odinga's Not yet uhuru, cited above, is a critical
account o f the first years o f independence by one o f the central
actors, which provides useful insights into Kenya's factional
politics. Richard Sandbrook's Proletarians and African capitalism:
the Kenyan case 1962—70 (London, 1 9 7 5 ) provides not only an
important study o f the role o f labour in Kenyan politics, but also
contributes a good deal to an understanding o f the factional basis
of Kenyan politics. But perhaps the most important study o f
independent Kenyan politics is Geoff Lamb's Peasant politics
(London, 1 9 7 4 ) , a case study o f politics at grass-roots level in one
K i k u y u district that illuminates the nature o f centre-locality.
C. J . Gertzel, M. Goldschmidt and D . Rothchild (eds.), Govern
ment and politics in Kenya (Nairobi, 1 9 6 9 ) , provides a useful guide
to the working of government but t w o government reports are
also essential reading: Report of the Mai%e Commission of Inquiry
( 1 9 6 6 ) , and Report of the Commission of Inquiry {Public Service
Structure and Remuneration) 1970-71 (Ndegwa report). Y . P. Ghai
and J . P. McAuslan's Public law and political change in Kenya
(Nairobi, 1 9 7 0 ) is an authoritative account of the manner in which
864

8. EAST AND C E N T R A L A F R I C A
institutional change has assisted in the centralisation of power in

Kenya, and Goran Hyden and Colin Leys's * Elections and politics
in single-party systems: the case of Kenya and Tanzania' in the
British Journal of Political Science, October 1 9 7 2 , provides a critical
analysis of the trend to authoritarian rule that characterises the
region as a whole.
Of the extensive literature on East African regional association,
mention can be made only of three books: Donald Rothchild's
Politics of integration: an East African documentary (Nairobi, 1 9 6 8 )
reproduces extracts from basic documents covering the history of
East African association and is a useful guide to the literature.
Colin Leys and Peter Robson's Federation in East Africa (Nairobi,
1 9 6 5 ) covers the efforts to establish a federation in the early 1 9 6 0 s ,
and A r t h u r Hazlewood's Economic integration: the East African
experience (London, 1 9 7 5 ) surveys the strengths and weaknesses
of the East African economic association up to the eve of its
collapse in the m i d - 1 9 7 0 s .
The most succinct analysis of the East African economies up to
1963 is probably B. van Arkadie and D. Ghai's chapter in P. Rob-
son and D. A. Lury, The economies of Africa (London, 1 9 6 9 ) , and
for the post-colonial state, R. H. Green's article 'Ugandans pre
pare to work for progress', in East Africa Journal, August 1 9 6 6 ,
and B. van Arkadie's chapter on Tanganyika in M. Faber and
D. Seers, Crisis in planning, vol. 3 (Sussex, 1 9 7 2 ) are particularly
useful. T. Szentes, ' Economic policy and implementation prob
lems in Tanzania: a case study', in African perspectives, edited by
C. Allen and W . Johnson (Cambridge, 1 9 7 1 ) , provides a percep
tive critique of the impact of foreign capital on the Tanzanian
political economy by a Marxist economist. Rural development in
post-Arusha Tanzania is dealt with in a number of contributions
to Cliffe and Saul's volumes on Socialism in Tanzania cited above,
and in the volume on Rural cooperation in Tanzania produced by
the Rural Development Committee at the University of Dar es
Salaam. The most perceptive critique of ujamaa is G o r a n Hyden's
'Ujamaa, villagisation and rural development in Tanzania', in the
Overseas Development Review for April 1 9 7 5 .
The ILO's Employment, incomes and equality: a strategy for
increasing productive employment in Kenya (Geneva, 1 9 7 2 ) , provides
a good deal of material on both social as well as economic change
in independent Kenya, and Colin Leys's Underdevelopment in Kenya
865

cited above is a perceptive critique from a neo-Marxist perspective

of Kenya's capitalist development strategy and her neo-colonial
dependency. The volume edited by Judith Heyer, J . K . Maitha
and W . M. Senga, Agricultural development in Kenya, an economic
assessment (Nairobi, 1 9 7 1 ) is the most authoritative survey of the
agricultural economy.
Christopher Wrigley's chapter on 'Changes in East African
society' in v o l . I l l of the History of East Africa must stand out
for its sensitive and authoritative analysis of social change,
drawing upon not only his o w n w o r k but also on that of the
outstanding group of social scientists associated with the East
African Institute of Social Research at Makerere. Elite formation
at the national level is the subject of Aidan Southall's chapter in
P. C. Lloyd (ed.), New elites of tropical Africa (Oxford, 1 9 6 6 ) , and
at grass-roots level in a fascinating study of grass-roots change
in a northern district in Joan Vincent's more recent African elite:
the big man of a small town (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 1 ) . M. P. K . Sorrenson's
Land reforms in the Kikuyu country (Nairobi, 1 9 6 7 ) provides an
essential introduction to the history of land alienation and the
independence land settlement which was the basis for the emer
gence of the Kikuyu bourgeoisie which R. van Zwanenberg
identifies in his ' Neo-colonialism and the origin of the national
bourgeoisie in Kenya between 1940 and 1 9 7 3 ' , in Journal of Eastern
African Research and Development, 1 9 7 4 , vol. 4 , no. 2. The best
analyses of post-colonial society are Colin Leys's 'Politics in
Kenya: the development of peasant society', in the British Journal
of Political Science, July 1 9 7 1 , v o l . 1, and Walter Elkan's 'Is a
proletariat emerging in Nairobi?', in Economic Development and
Cultural Change, 196J-7J, vol. 2 4 .
For the role of labour in the colonial state, a wealth of detailed
information is available in Anthony Clayton and Donald Savage's
Government and labour in Kenya 189J-1963 (London, 1 9 7 4 ) ; in
W. H. Friedland's Vuta Kamba: the development of trade unions in
Tanganyika (Stanford, 1 9 6 9 ) ; and Walter Elkan's Migrants and
proletarians: urban labour in the economic development of Uganda
(London, 1 9 6 1 ) . Finally the most sensitive introduction to the role
of education in the process of class formation is David Court's
' Education as social control: the response to inequality in Kenya
and Tanzania', in the Journal of Modern African Studies, January
1 9 7 7 . The source material for Central Africa is a good deal more
866

uneven, and for Malawi a good deal more limited. Patrick

Keatley's The politics of partnership (Harmonds worth, 1 9 6 3 ) pro
vides the most useful introduction; Richard Gray's The two
nations: aspects of the development of race relations in Rhodesia and
Nyasaland (Westport, Conn., 1 9 7 4 ) is an analysis of economic and
social history up to 1 9 5 3 , and Philip Mason's Year of decision:
Rhodesia and Nyasaland in i960 (London, i 9 6 0 ) continues the story
up to i 9 6 0 . L. H. Gann's History of Northern Rhodesia: early days
to 19j3 (London, 1964) is a detailed and complex account of that
territory, and three studies of Rhodesia complement each other:
Colin Leys's European politics in Southern Rhodesia (Oxford, 1 9 5 9 ) ,
Larry Bowman's Politics in Rhodesia: white power in an African state
(Cambridge, Mass., 1 9 7 3 ) , and Giovanni Arrighi's The political
economy of Rhodesia (The Hague, 1 9 6 7 ) , which is essential for its
analysis of politics and class formation. Claire Palley's The
constitutional history and law of Southern Rhodesia (Oxford, 1 9 6 6 ) is
a major contribution to our understanding of the law and working
of the formal structure of government up to UDL
Robert Rotberg's Rise of nationalism in Central Africa: the making
of Malawi and Zambia, 1873-1964 (Cambridge, Mass., 1 9 6 5 )
remains the most informative introduction to the growth of
African nationalism across the region as a whole. The most
detailed and authoritative study of Zambian nationalism is David
Mulford's Zambia: the politics of independence, 19J7-1964 (London,
1 9 6 7 ) . The most perceptive study of African politics on the
Copperbelt remains however A. L. Epstein's Politics in an urban
African community (Manchester, 1958) a study of Zambia's miners
in the context of social change in the 1950s. Ian Henderson's un
published Ph.D. thesis,' Labour and politics in Northern Rhodesia
1 9 0 0 - 1 9 5 3 ' (Edinburgh University, 1 9 7 7 ) adds significantly to but
in no way supersedes Epstein's study. Elena Berger's Labour, race
and colonial rule (Oxford, 1 9 7 4 ) provides a detailed analysis of
colonial labour policy for the Copperbelt.
There is as yet no full-length study of African politics in
Rhodesia, although t w o useful accounts by Rhodesian African
politicians are Ndabaningi Sithole's African nationalism (Cape
Town, 1 9 5 9 ) and Nathan Shamuyarira's Crisis in Rhodesia
(London, 1 9 6 5 ) . Nor is there any major study of African
nationalism in Malawi, although Clyde Sanger's Central African
emergency (London, i 9 6 0 ) is a fascinating eye-witness account of
867

the 1 9 5 9 Emergency by one of Africa's most sensitive and

experienced journalists; and the Report of the Nyasaland Commission
of Inquiry 19J8-J9, Cmnd 8 1 4 (London, H M S O , 1 9 5 9 ) (the Devlin
Report) provides a vivid account of mass nationalism.
Richard Hall's The high price of principles, especially the second
edition (Harmondsworth, 1 9 7 3 ) , identifies better than any other
source the dynamics of nationalist politics and the basic issues at
stake in independent Zambia, while William Tordoff edited
Politics in Zambia (Manchester, 1 9 7 4 ) , a valuable collection of
essays on political development between 1 9 6 4 and the introduction
of the one-party state in 1 9 7 2 . Donald Rothchild's 'Rural-urban
inequalities and resource allocation in Zambia', in the Journal of
Commonwealth Political Studies, 1 9 7 2 , vol. 1 0 , no. 3, documents the
rural-urban cleavages which remain the focus of Zambian politics,
and Jan Pettman provides a useful study of the implications of
her front-line position for Zambia's foreign and domestic policies.
Although there is a good deal less available on the politics of
Malawi, useful insights are provided by R. Hodder-Williams's
'Dr Banda's Malawi', in the Journal of Commonwealth and Com
parative Politics, March 1 9 7 4 . Banda (London, 1 9 7 4 ) , Philip Short's
stimulating biography of Malawi's president, is also a perceptive
analysis of the country's political system.
The most perceptive study of Rhodesia focussed upon UDI is
Robert Good's UDI: the international politics of the Rhodesian
rebellion (London, 1 9 7 3 ) , and for the years since 1 9 6 5 , R. W .
Johnson's How longcan South Africa survive?(Oxford, 1 9 7 7 ) . William
Barber's The economy of British Central Africa: a case study of economic
development in a dualistic society (London, 1 9 6 1 ) remains the most
extensive treatment of the economy of the region as a whole,
although his concept of dualism has been seriously challenged.
W. L. Taylor's chapter, 'The economy of Central Africa', in
Robson and Lury's The economies of Africa concentrates on the ten
years of the Central African federation. Phyllis Deane's Colonial
social accounting (Cambridge, 1 9 5 3 ) is a detailed study of the
economies of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in the late 1940s
which emphasises the village economy and its importance in
Central African economic life, and at the same time provides
important insights into the nature of social change. Deane's
article, 'The industrial revolution in British Central Africa', in
Civilisations, vol. 12 (Brussels, 1962) also provides an authoritative
868

introduction to industrial development in Central Africa in the

1950s. Robert Baldwin's Economic development and export growth: a
study of Northern Rhodesia 1920-1960 (Berkeley, 1966) is the most
authoritative study of the g r o w t h of that economy, and Arthur
Hazlewood and P. D. Henderson's Nyasaland: the economics of
federation (Oxford, 1965) is indispensable for an understanding of
Malawi's colonial economic legacy. The most important, if not
the most comprehensive, treatment of the Rhodesian political
economy is Arrighi's The political economy of Rhodesia cited above,
while his * Labour supplies in historical perspective: a study of the
proletarianization of the African peasantry in Rhodesia', first
published in English in The Journal of Development Studies, April
1 9 7 0 , no. 3, challenges the basic assumptions of Barber's w o r k
quoted above and provides a radical analysis of the impact of
European economic systems on the predominantly agricultural
African societies of that territory.
Economic development in the early years of independence in
Zambia is best followed in the collection of essays, Constraints on
the economic development of Zambia (Nairobi, 1 9 7 1 ) , edited by Charles
Elliot, although the most stimulating introduction to the Zambian
political economy is surely Anthony Martin's account of the
economic reforms of 1 9 6 8 - 6 9 , Minding their own business (Har-
mondsworth, 1 9 7 5 ) ; while Richard Sklar in his Corporate power in
an African state (Berkeley, 1 9 7 5 ) has produced a major study of
the mining companies which have dominated the economy.
A good deal less information is available for Malawi since
independence. D. H. Humphrey's Malawi since 1964: economic
development, progress and problems (Zomba, 1 9 7 4 ) and Kathryn
Morton's Aid and dependence (London, 1 9 7 5 ) provide an overview,
the latter with a good deal of basic data on Malawi's aid relations.
The most useful introduction to Malawi's development strategies
is however the government's o w n Statement of development policies
1971—1980.
As at Makerere in Kampala so at the Rhodes-Livingstone
Institute in Livingstone and then Lusaka, a distinguished group
of social scientists over the 1940s and 1950s produced an
outstanding body of literature on social and economic change, in
both rural and urban Central Africa. The crucial process of
urbanisation is treated in a succession of fine monographs, of
which mention here can be made only of G. and M, Wilson's An
869

essay in the economics of detribalisation (Livingstone, 1 9 4 1 - 2 ) and

Epstein's Urban politics cited above, while J . Clyde Mitchell's The
Kalela dance (Manchester, 1 9 5 6 ) must now stand as the classic
analysis of ethnicity in the urban situation. For the post-colonial
state, Robert H. Bates's Rural responses to industrialisation: a study
of village Zambia (New Haven, 1 9 7 6 ) provides a detailed analysis
of the relations between town and country, and the effects of
industrialisation on rural life.
The most useful introduction to the relationship between the
Central African states and South Africa and their place in
southern Africa is K. Grundy's Confrontation and accommodation in
southern Africa (Berkeley, 1 9 7 3 ) , and to B. Mtshali's and A.
Hughes's chapters, on Zambia and Malawi respectively, in
Cervenka's Land-lockedcountries ofAfrica (Uppsala, 1 9 7 3 ) . Malawi's
relations with South Africa receive special attention in Caroline
McMaster's Malawi: foreign policy and development (New Y o r k ,
1974).
9. T H E H O R N OF A F R I C A
There are good bibliographical guides to all of the territories in

the Horn. H. G. Marcus, The modern history of Ethiopia and the Horn
of Africa: a select and annotated bibliography (Stanford, 1 9 7 2 ) covers
the whole region. For Ethiopia, there are t w o further general
bibliographies, A. Hidaru and D. Rahmato, A short guide to the
study of Ethiopia (London, 1 9 7 6 ) and C. F. Brown, Ethiopian
perspectives: bibliographical guide to the history of Ethiopia (Westport,
1 9 7 8 ) . A separate brief bibliography of Eritrea is available
in K. Chekole, 'Eritrea: a preliminary bibliography', Africana
Journal, 1 9 7 5 - 6 , vol. 6. Somalia is covered in M. K. Salad, Somalia:
a bibliographical survey (London, 1 9 7 2 ) , and the literature on
Djibouti is discussed in W . S. Clarke, 'The Republic of Djibouti:
an introduction to Africa's newest state and a review of related
literature and sources', Current Bulletin of African Affairs, 1 9 7 7 - 8 ,
vol. 1 0 .
The Second World War: The campaigns of 1 9 4 0 - 1 and the
subsequent British administrations of occupied territories have
been described in contemporary official publications, notably The
Abyssinian campaigns (London, 1942), The first to be freed (London,
1944), and Lord Rennell of Rodd, British military administration of
occupied territories in Africa, 1941-4/ (London, 1948). George
870

9- T H E H O R N OF A F R I C A
Steer, Sealed and delivered (London, 1 9 4 2 ) is a contemporary

account of the campaign by a British journalist with a strong
sympathy for the Ethiopian cause. No adequate history of the
Ethiopian resistance has been published, the most detailed avail
able account being in Richard Greenfield, Ethiopia: a new political
history (London, 1 9 6 5 ) .
Ethiopia
The official gazette, Negarit Gaêta, has been published since 1 9 4 2

in Amharic and English, and includes all legislation and major
government appointments. Other useful series of official docu
ments include Statistical abstract (Central Statistical Office, 1 9 6 3
onwards), surveys of the various provinces (CSO, 1 9 6 6 - 6 8 ) , Land
tenure surveys of the provinces (Ministry of Land Reform, 1 9 6 7 - 7 0 ) ,
and the Administrative directory produced by the Imperial Ethiopian
Institute of Public Administration at t w o - or three-year intervals
from May 1 9 5 7 until the late 1960s. There are no census records
or published parliamentary papers, and economic information is
most easily gained from the regular series published by the United
Nations, though Economic progress of Ethiopia (Ministry of
Commerce and Industry, 195 5) is useful for the post-war period.
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has
published Ethiopia: a preliminary survey ( 1 9 5 0 ) , Economy of Ethiopia:
main report ( 1 9 6 7 ) , and Economic growth and prospects in Ethiopia
(1970).
Ethiopian central government between 1 9 4 1 and 1 9 7 4 has been
fairly fully covered. Margery Perham, The government of Ethiopia
(London, 1 9 4 8 , second edition, 1 9 6 9 ) is largely concerned with
the period before 1 9 3 6 , but also discusses the changes made after
1 9 4 1 , and the second edition includes a postscript on developments
in the intervening two decades. Christopher Clapham, Haile-
Selassie's government (London, 1969) treats the development of the
central government between 1 9 4 1 and 1 9 6 7 in some detail, while
J . Markakis, Ethiopia: anatomy of a traditional polity (Oxford, 1 9 7 4 )
is a more general analysis of the development of Ethiopian society
and politics up to the eve of the 1 9 7 4 revolution. P. Schwab,
Decision-making in Ethiopia (London, 1 9 7 2 ) , deals only with a single
issue, the agricultural income tax of 1 9 6 7 , but is particularly useful
in following through its attempted implementation in the
countryside.
871

G. A . Lipsky et al., Ethiopia: its people, its society, its culture (New
Haven, 1962), and Robert L. Hess, Ethiopia: the modernisation of
autocracy (Ithaca, 1970), are both useful general introductions
drawn largely from secondary sources. The only general history
of Ethiopia covering the modern period, Greenfield's Ethiopia,
cited above, concentrates heavily on the t w o post-war decades and
especially on the attempted coup d'etat of i960, an incident also
discussed in Clapham, ' The Ethiopian coup d'etat of December
i 9 6 0 ' , Journal of Modern African Studies, 1968. The only available
biographies of leading Ethiopians during the period are, un
surprisingly, of Haile Selassie himself. L. Mosley, Haile Selassie: the
conquering lion (London, 1964) is uncritical in treatment and almost
entirely confined to the pre-1941 period, whereas P. Schwab, Haile
Selassie I: Ethiopia's Lion of Judah (New Y o r k , 1979), takes a
more critical end-of-reign perspective. Christopher Clapham,
'Ethiopia', in R. Lemarchand (ed.), African kingships in perspective
(London, 1977) discusses his political role. His Selected speeches
1918-196/ have also been published (Addis Ababa, 1967).
The dramatic events of 1974 and their aftermath have produced
a large literature, amongst which may be mentioned C. Legum,
Ethiopia: the fall of Haile Selassie's empire (London, 1975), and M.
and D. Ottaway, Ethiopia: empire in revolution (New Y o r k , 1978).
Patrick Gilkes, The dying lion (London, 1975) is despite its title
largely concerned with the pre-revolutionary period, and includes
useful material on the political economy of the imperial regime
and on opposition to Haile Selassie. The often polemical literature
on the nature and policies of the post-revolutionary regime lies
beyond the period covered by this essay. Local and provincial
government has been very little studied, the outstanding exception
being J . M. Cohen and P. H. Koehn, Ethiopian provincial and
municipal government: imperial patterns and postrevolutionary changes
(East Lansing, 1980). Other material on local politics includes
C. B. Rosen,' The Governor-General of Tigre Province: structure
and antistructure', in H. G. Marcus (ed.), Proceedings cited below,
and P. T. W . Baxter, ' Ethiopia's unacknowledged problem: the
O r o m o ' (African Affairs, 1978).
The ethnographic literature includes t w o outstanding studies of
the Amhara, D. N. Levine, Wax and gold: tradition and innovation
in Ethiopian culture (Chicago, 1965), and A . Hoben, Land tenure
among the Amhara of Ethiopia (Chicago, 1973). Levine's Greater
872

9- T H E H O R N OF A F R I C A
Ethiopia: the evolution of a multiethnic society (Chicago, 1974) is a

more speculative and controversial volume. Ethnographic writing
on other Ethiopian peoples, including the Afar, Dassanetch,
Gurage, K o n s o , Majangir, Mursi, O r o m o (Galla) and Tigreans,
falls beyond the scope of this essay. Rural society and economic
change has been examined in several studies, the best general
overview being J . M. Cohen and D. Weintraub, Land and peasants
in imperial Ethiopia : the social background to a revolution ( Assen, 1975).
One particular development project, the Chilalo Agricultural
Development Unit (CADU), has received a disproportionate
amount of attention, including books by M. Stahl, Ethiopia:
political contradictions in agricultural development (Stockholm, 1974)
and B. Nekby, CADU: an Ethiopian experiment in developing peasant
farmings and articles by J . M. Cohen in Economic Development and
Cultural Change, 1974, and the Journal of Developing Areas, 1975.
L. Bondestam, 'People and capitalism in the north-eastern low-
lands of Ethiopia' (Journal of Modern African Studies, 1974)
examines one of the most dynamic areas of Ethiopian cash-crop
farming.
In addition to the IBRD reports already noted, a useful outline
of the economy appears in Assefa Bequele and Eshetu Choie, A
profile of the Ethiopian economy (Nairobi, 1969), while G. J . Gill,
Readings on the Ethiopian economy (Addis Ababa, 1974) is a source-
book for student use. J . Halpern, 'La Planification et le dével-
oppement en Ethiopie après la deuxième guerre mondiale'
{Culture et Développement, 1974) deals with government economic
policy, and Teketel Haile-Mariam, 'The impact of coffee on the
economy of Ethiopia', in S. R. Pearson et al., Commodity exports
and African economic development (Lexington, 1974) discusses the
role of the principal export crop. Chapters on urbanisation in
Ethiopia appear in several general collections, by B. Winid in
R. Jones, Essays on worldurbanisation (London, 1975), by J . J . Palen
in A. H. Richmond and D. Kubat, Internal migration (London,
1976), and by P. and E. F. K o e h n in R. A. Obudho and S. El-
Shakh, Development of urban systems in Africa (New Y o r k , 1979).
On education, Helen Kitchen (ed.), The educated African (London,
1962) provides the best general overview of the period up to i960,
while Teshome G. Wagaw, Education in Ethiopia: retrospect and
prospect (Ann A r b o r , 1979), gives a post-imperial perspective. For
further appraisals see the articles by O. D. Hoerr in East African
873

Economic Review, 1 9 7 4 , and by M. N. Lovegrove in Comparative

Education, 1 9 7 3 .
Periodicals on Ethiopia, publication of which was affected by
the 1 9 7 4 revolution and subsequent upheavals, include Ethiopia
Observer ( 1 9 5 7 - ) , Journal of Ethiopian Studies ( 1 9 6 3 - ) , Journal
of Ethiopian Law (1964— ), and Ethiopian Journal of Education
( 1 9 6 7 - ). Finally, the papers delivered at the occasional con
ferences on Ethiopian studies have been published in widely
scattered places: the First International Conference (Rome, 1 9 5 9 ) ,
in E. Cerulli (ed.), Atti del Convegno Internationale di Studi Etiopici
(Rome, i 9 6 0 ) ; the Second International Conference (Manchester,
1 9 6 3 ) , in Journal of Semitic Studies, 1 9 6 4 , v o l . 9, no. 1 ; the Third
International Conference (Addis Ababa, 1 9 6 6 ) , in R. K . P. Pank-
hurst, ed., Proceedings of the Third International Conference of Ethiopian
Studies (Addis Ababa, 1 9 6 9 - 7 0 ) ; the Fourth International
Conference (Rome, 1 9 7 2 ) , in IV Congresso Internationale di Studi
Etiopici (Problemi Attuali di Scient(a e di Cultura, Quaderno no. 191)
(Rome, 1 9 7 4 , 2 vols); this was followed by an American
conference, published in H. G . Marcus (ed.), Proceedings of the First
United States Conference on Ethiopian Studies, 1973 (East Lansing,
1 9 7 5 ) ; the Fifth International Conference was divided into t w o
sections, the first (Nice, December 1 9 7 7 ) published in J . Tubiana
(ed.), Modern Ethiopia: from the accession of Menelik II to the present.
Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies
(Rotterdam, 1980), the Second (Chicago, April 1 9 7 8 ) in
R. L. Hess (ed.), Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference of
Ethiopian Studies, Session B (Chicago, 1 9 7 9 ) . The Sixth International
Conference was held in Tel A v i v in April 1 9 8 0 , and the Seventh
in Lund, Sweden, in April 1 9 8 2 .
Eritrea
Material specifically on Eritrea falls into t w o groups, that on the

post-war British administration and the disposal of the territory
by the United Nations, and that on the liberation movements from
the mid-1960s onwards. On the first period, G . K . N. Trevaskis,
Eritrea: colony in transition, 1941-19/2 (London, i 9 6 0 ) was written
by a British administrator, E. S. Pankhurst and R. K . P. Pank-
hurst, Ethiopia and Eritrea: the last ten years of the reunion struggle,
1941-19j2 (Woodford, Essex, 1 9 5 3 ) by t w o dedicated supporters
874

9- T H E H O R N O F A F R I C A
of unification with Ethiopia. Articles by L. Ellingson in the

Journal of African History, 1 9 7 7 , and by Tiruneh Andargatchew in
Northeast African Studies, 1 9 8 0 - 1 , look at the period with the
benefit of hindsight. For t w o books on the later period, see
A. Fenet et al., La Question de /'Erythrée (Paris, 1 9 7 9 ) and R.
Sherman, Eritrea: the unfinished revolution (New Y o r k , 1980). A
large number of pamphlets and articles cover much the same
ground, as do several of the works noted under International
Relations.
Somalia
The Somali Republic must rank among the lowest o f African

states in terms o f its level o f academic coverage, and material on
many aspects o f its modern history is sparse. The immediate
post-war period is documented in the British official publications,
and for the period of its trusteeship the Italian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs published a detailed annual Rapport du Gouvernement Italien
y
à l Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies sur r administration de tutelle
de la Somalie (Rome, 1 9 5 1 - 9 ) ; the British Colonial Office reports
on the Somaliland Protectorate are much briefer and appeared
biennially. Aspects of the transfer of power are also discussed in
G. A . Costanzo, Problemi costituîonali della Somalia nella prepa
ration airindipenden%a, 19J7-1960 (Milan, 1962), and D . Hall,
*Somaliland's last year as a Protectorate', African Affairs, 1 9 6 1 .
The most useful Somali government publication is Statistical
abstract (Mogadishu, 1 9 6 4 - ) .
There is, fortunately, an excellent general history, I. M. Lewis,
A modern history of Somalia (London, second revised edition, 1980),
and the same author has written extensively on Somali politics and
society, including A pastoral democracy (London, 1 9 6 1 ) , ' T h e
politics of the 1969 Somali coup ', Journal of Modern African Studies,
1 9 7 2 , 'The nation, state and politics in Somalia', in D . R. Smock
(ed.), The search for national integration in Africa (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 5 ) ,
and Abaar: the Somali drought (London, 1 9 7 5 ) . The strong
connexions between Somali culture, society and politics are made
clear by D. D. Laitin, Politics, language and thought: the Somali
experience (Chicago, 1 9 7 2 ) , and also by B. W . Andrzejewski and
I. M. Lewis, Somali poetry (Oxford, 1964). The fullest analysis o f
the changes undertaken by the post-1969 military government is
P. Decraene, L*Expérience socialiste somalienne (Paris, 1 9 7 7 ) , but see
875

also D. D. Laitin, 'The political economy of military rule in

Somalia', Journal of Modern African Studies, 1 9 7 6 . V . G . Solodov-
nikov, Ucenye Zapiski Sovetsjo-Somalijskoj Ekspedicii (Moscow,
1 9 7 4 ) provides a Soviet view of post-1969 social and economic
development during a period when relations with Somalia were
close. A . A . Castagno, in Helen Kitchen (ed.), The educated African
(New Y o r k , 1 9 6 2 ) surveys educational development up to
independence.
The considerable literature on Somalia's international relations,
and especially on the 'Somali dispute', is surveyed in a later
section.
CFS/TFAI
The available material on Djibouti is dominated by t w o substantial

volumes, V . Thompson and R. Adloff, Djibouti and the Horn of
Africa (Stanford, 1968), and P. Oberlé, Afars et Somalis: le dossier
de Djibouti (Paris, 1 9 7 1 ) . The subsequent political development of
the microstate can be followed in articles by Shilling {Journal of
Developing Areas, 1 9 7 3 ) , Marks {African Affairs, 1 9 7 4 ) , Leymarie
{Revue Ffrançaised'ÉtudesPolitiques Africaines, 1 9 7 7 ) , and K . Shehim
& J . Shearing {African Affairs, 1980).
International Relations
The international relations literature is overwhelmingly domin

ated by the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia which, though
breaking out into large scale warfare only after the period covered
by this volume, was a consistent element in the politics of the
region from 1 9 4 1 onwards. E. S. Pankhurst, Ex-Italian Somaliland
(London, 1 9 5 1 ) , provides an early Ethiopian viewpoint geared to
the disposal by the United Nations of the former Italian colonies,
while Saadia Touval, Somali nationalism (Cambridge, Mass., 1 9 6 3 )
and J . Drysdale, The Somali dispute (London, 1 9 6 4 ) , both take it
from the post-independence Somali perspective. C. Hoskyns, The
Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya dispute 1960-196-7 (Dar es Salaam, 1 9 6 9 ) ,
and V . Matthies' monumental Die Gren^konflikt Somalias mit
Aethiopien undKenya (Hamburg, 1 9 7 7 ) are concerned with the legal
and diplomatic basis of the dispute. Finally, the war of 1 9 7 7 - 8
gave rise to a substantial literature, much of it concerned with the
Horn as a whole, and especially with the level of external
intervention. T w o volumes which go back into the historical
876

9. T H E H O R N OF A F R I C A
bases for the conflicts both in the Ogaden and in Eritrea are
T. J . Farer, War clouds on the Horn of Africa (second revised
edition, New Y o r k , 1 9 7 9 ) and Bereket Habte Selassie, Conflict and
intervention in the Horn of Africa (New Y o r k , 1980), the latter being
the w o r k of a committed Eritrean nationalist.
IO. E G Y P T , L I B Y A A N D T H E S U D A N
T w o of the standard works on Egypt used by both scholars and

general readers are The history of Egypt (London, second edition,
1980), by P. J . Vatikiotis and Egypt: imperialism and revolution
(London, 1 9 7 2 ) by the eminent French scholar Jacques Berque.
The first is a revised version of The modern history of Egypt, which
appeared in 1 9 6 9 , and contains chapters on the nineteenth-century
history of Egypt and the British occupation as well as on the
reaction against Europe during the period from 1 9 3 0 to 1 9 5 0 .
Additional chapters cover the period of the Second W o r l d W a r
and the decline of the Wafd Party from 1 9 3 9 to 1 9 5 2 , the coup
by Nasir and the Free Officers and political and social
developments to 1 9 7 9 . Interestingly, the revised version contains
a new final chapter on educational and cultural developments in
the modern period, including comments on the w o r k of the
playwright Tawflq al-Hakim, the novelist A b d al-Rahman al-
SharqawT and the educational writings of Mahmud A m l n al-Alem.
Jacques Berque's study poses a useful contrast to the w o r k by
Vatikiotis, in that it looks at the history of Egypt from the eyes
of the indigenous citizens themselves. Sections on the history of
imperialism and decolonisation are followed by a close examin
ation of both peasant and village life, literature and social change
as well as on political and economic developments.
Another work by Vatikiotis, Nasser and his generation (London,
1 9 7 8 ) takes a closer look at the period following the 1 9 5 2
revolution, but it also includes material on Nasir's origins, the
Y o u n g Egypt society and the Muslim brotherhood not easily
available elsewhere. The Society of Muslim Brothers (London, 1 9 6 9 ) ,
by Richard P. Mitchell, remains a classic w o r k of its kind. Aside
from discussing the origins, history and organisation of the
brotherhood, it includes useful chapters on other Islamic organ
isations in Egypt and the debate about the nature of an Islamic
state.
Students of class structure and class conflict will find t w o w o r k s
«77

of particular use: Mahmoud Hussein's L'Egypte: lutte de classes et

libération nationale (Paris, 1 9 7 5 ) and Anouar Abdel-Malek's Egypte:
société militaire (Paris, 1 9 6 2 ) . Both cover the growth of the
Communist Party in the 1940s and the development o f class
consciousness under Nâsir, as well as the conflicts between Nàsir,
the party and the intellectuals. Finally, a new w o r k , Egypt : portrait
of a president (London, 1 9 8 1 ) , by an Egyptian sociologist resident
in Paris, Ghali Shoukri, brings the history of Egypt up to date
and includes very useful material on both Sadat's domestic and
foreign policies as well as on the growth of Islamic militancy in
the late 1960s and early 1 9 7 0 s .
Few satisfactory works exist on the modern history o f Libya,
but t w o notable exceptions are J o h n Wright's Libya (London,
1969) and Ruth First's Libya : the elusive revolution (Harmondsworth,
1 9 7 4 ) . The first contains a good overview of the struggle for
independence and of political and economic developments during
the reign of King Idrïs. The second also includes material on the
resistance to Italian colonisation, the independence movement and
the role of the United Nations, but in addition includes sections
on the role of the army after the 1 9 6 9 coup, the growth of religious
ideology and Qadhdhâfï's relations with his A r a b and African
neighbours. La Libye nouvelle: rupture et continuité (Paris, 1 9 7 5 )
contains essays by several notable French scholars on everything
from the geography and history of Libya to the status of women
and changes in rural society. Another work, published by CNRS
a year earlier, Villes et sociétés au Maghreb: études sur l'urbanisation,
includes an essay by B. Atallah and M. Fikry on ' Le phénomène
urbain en Libye: problèmes juridiques et sociaux'.
P. M. Holt's A modem history of the Sudan from the Funj Sultanate
to the present day (London, second edition, 1963) remains the classic
w o r k on the Sudan. More recent developments are covered by
Anthony Sylvester, in Sudan under Nimeiri (London, 1 9 7 7 ) ,
although critics of the president will find little comfort for their
views here. T w o other works are essential for an understanding
of the civil w a r : The Southern Sudan by Mohamed Orner Beshir
(Khartoum, 1 9 6 8 ) and The secret war in the Sudan: 19jj-1972 by
Edgar O'Ballance (London, 1 9 7 7 ) . Islam in the Sudan (London,
1 9 6 5 ) by J . Spencer Trimingham is invaluable for students of the
Brotherhoods and their role in society and politics. Islam,
nationalism and communism in a traditional society (London, 1 9 7 8 ) ,
878

despite its title, is mainly a history o f the Communist Party in the

Sudan and contains documents on the rise and decline of the party
not obtainable elsewhere.
While many of the above-mentioned books cover economic
development as well as politics and history, the w o r k s of t w o
Middle Eastern economic historians, Robert Mabro and Patrick
O'Brien, are also useful. The first has written an essay on 'Libya'
in Wilfred K n a p p (ed.), North West Africa: a political and economic
survey (London, third edition, 1 9 7 7 ) , and together with Patrick
O'Brien contributed an article on 'Structural changes in the
Egyptian economy, 1 9 3 7 - 1 9 6 5 ', to a w o r k edited by M. A . Cook
entitled Studies in the economic history of the Middle East (London,
1 9 7 0 ) . O'Brien has also written an essay on ' T h e long-term
growth of agricultural production in Egypt: 1 8 2 1 - 1 9 6 2 ' , pub
lished in P. M. Holt (ed.), Political and social change in modern Egypt
(London, 1968). Social anthropologists and students o f tribal
societies will fund the extensive w o r k s of E. E. Evans-Pritchard on
the Nuer, Shilluk and Azande of the Sudan and on The Sanussi
of Cyrenaica (Oxford, 1949) indispensable.
Finally, mention must also be made of the numerous annual
reviews and yearbooks published on the Middle East and Africa,
some of which contain useful general summaries of historical and
economic developments in the post-war era. A m o n g these are The
Middle East and North Africa published annually since the early
1 9 5 0 s by Europa Publications, London, and Africa Guide and the
Middle East Annual Review published each year by W o r l d o f
Information Ltd., Saffron Walden (England). The Middle East
Yearbook 1980 (International Communications Ltd., London),
contains a series of valuable essays on political, economic and
social change in Libya, Egypt and the Sudan in the 1 9 7 0 s by
several well-known African, A r a b and western scholars.
II. T H E M A G H R I B
The most useful reference w o r k on the contemporary Maghrib

is the Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, published since 1962 by the
Centre de Recherches et d'Études sur les Sociétés Méditerrané
ennes of the University of Aix-Marseille III. In addition to
systematic and critical bibliographies, political, diplomatic, econ
omic, and social commentaries on each country, and related
879

documentation, it assembles academic articles each year around

a common theme. Maghreb, published by the Documentation
Française, was more useful between 1 9 6 4 and 1 9 7 3 than subse
quently, when as Maghreb-Machreq its coverage of the Maghrib was
progressively diminished.
The best general survey of the area is Wilfrid K n a p p , North
West Africa: a political and economic survey, (London, third edition,
1 9 7 7 ) , though Charles F. Gallagher, The United States and North
Africa (Cambridge, Mass., 1 9 6 3 ) is still w o r t h consulting, as is
Jean Despois, U Afrique du Nord (Paris, 1 9 6 4 ) . The only w o r k s ,
however, that have attempted systematically to compare and
explain national processes of development and political change in
the three countries are Clement Henry Moore, Politics in North
Africa (Boston, 1 9 7 0 ) and Elbaki Hermassi, Leadership and national
development in North Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1 9 7 2 ) .
Douglas Ashford, t o o , tried to attribute differences in specific
policy areas to differences in the respective regimes treated in his
National development and local reform'.politicalparticipationin Morocco,
Tunisia, and Pakistan (Princeton, 1 9 6 7 ) . Another promising
approach to the area is that o f political anthropology, best
exemplified in Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud (eds.), Arabs
and Berbers (London, 1 9 7 3 ) .
The most stimulating political study of the pre-independence
period remains Charles-André Julien, L'Afrique du Nord en marche
(Paris, 1 9 5 2 ) , supplemented by an excellent critical bibliography
in the third edition ( 1 9 7 2 ) . In an equally penetrating, but more
phenomenological vein is Jacques Berque, French North Africa,
translated by Jean Stewart (London, 1 9 6 7 ) , while standard
political history, country by country, is covered by Roger Le
Tourneau, Évolution politique de l'Afrique du Nord musulmane,
1920-1961 (Paris, 1 9 6 2 ) . Nationalism in each country is also
treated separately in L. J . Duclos, L. Duvignaud, and J . Leca, Les
Nationalismes maghrébins (Études Maghrébines 7, Paris, Fondation
Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1 9 6 6 ) . Further case studies
include, for Algeria : André Nouschi, La Naissance du nationalisme
Algérien (Paris, 1 9 6 2 ) , Colette and Francis Jeanson, L'Algérie hors
la loi (Paris, second edition, 1 9 5 6 ) , and William B. Quandt,
Revolution and political leadership: Algeria, 19j4-1968 (Cambridge,
Mass., 1 9 6 9 ) ; for Morocco: J o h n P. Halstead, Rebirth of a nation:
the origins and rise of Moroccan nationalism, 1912-1944 (Cambridge,
880

Mass., 1 9 6 7 ) ; Robert Rézette, Les Partis politiques marocains (Paris,

1 9 5 5 ) , and Stéphane Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan conflict (New
Haven, Conn., 1 9 6 8 ) ; for Tunisia: Charles A . Micaud, Leon Carl
Brown and Clement Henry Moore, Tunisia: the politics of
modernisation (London, 1 9 6 4 ) .
There have also been a number of political biographies of
nationalist leaders. Jean Lacouture, Cinq hommes et la France (Paris,
1 9 6 1 ) provides vivid portraits of Mohammed V , Habib Bourguiba
and Ferhat Abbas, while Ania Francos and Jean-Pierre Séréni offer
an informative if somewhat less than critical account of the career
of Un Algérien nomméBoumediène (Paris, 1 9 7 6 ) . Even more adulatory
are Attilio Gaudio, Allai al-Fassi, ou l'histoire de l'Istiqlal (Paris,
1 9 7 2 ) , misleading by its very title, and Félix Garas, Bourguiba et
la naissance d'une nation (Paris, 1 9 5 6 ) . The figures in question have
done better by themselves in their respective works, Independence
movements of North Africa (Washington, 1 9 5 4 ) and La Tunisie et la
France (Paris, 1 9 5 4 ) . Their output of books and speeches has been
prodigious; Al-Fassi's Al-naqd al-dhati (Cairo, 1 9 5 2 ) appeared
in French translation in the newspaper Al-Istiqlal during the
month of March, 1 9 5 7 . The Tunisian Ministry o f Information has
regularly published Bourguiba's speeches since independence. A
convenient selection o f Citations du Président Boumediène was edited
by Khalfa Mameri (Algiers, 1 9 7 5 ) . Opposition leaders have also
published their reminiscences and analyses: Ferhat Abbas, La
Nuit coloniale (Paris, 1 9 6 2 ) , Mohammed Boudiaf, Où va l'Algérie?
(Paris, 1 9 6 4 ) , Mehdi ben Barka, Option révolutionnaire au Maroc
(Paris, 1 9 7 4 ) , to cite but a few.
Elite transformation during the colonial period has not else-
where received the remarkable treatment o f Henri de Montety,
'Vieilles familles et nouvelle élite en Tunisie', translated by
William I. Zartman for the volume he edited, Man, state and society
in the contemporary Maghreb (London, 1 9 7 3 ) . Consequently there is
no good baseline for subsequent comparisons, as Jean-Claude
Vatin concludes from his monumental ' re-reading ' of the colonial
period in L'Algérie politique, histoire et société (Paris, 1 9 7 4 ) . Jean
Morizot, L'Algérie kabylisée (Paris, 1 9 6 2 ) provides some indi-
cations o f the disproportion o f Kabyles occupying strategic
positions, but the best sociological and anthropological studies o f
Algeria have focussed on societal rather than élite transformations.
Pierre Bourdieu, The Algerians (Boston, 1 9 6 2 ) , discusses changes
881

induced by the insurrection from a perspective somewhat similar

to that o f Frantz Fanon, A dying colonialism (New Y o r k , 1 9 6 5 ) , but
both authors overestimated the changes in authority relationships
within the family engendered by participation in the revolution.
In Morocco, with the notable exception of A n d r é Adam, Casa
blanca (Paris, 1 9 6 8 ) , the countryside received more attention than
urban strata. One o f the more interesting monographs linking the
t w o is J o h n Waterbury's study o f the Soussi merchants, North for
the trade (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1 9 7 2 ) . The straight ethno
graphic w o r k o f Julio Caro Baroja, Estudios Saharianos (Madrid,
1 9 5 5 ) , was of course more appropriate for the Spanish Sahara. The
only comparative study o f urban élites is found in Samir Amin,
L* Économie du Maghreb (Paris, 1 9 6 6 ) , abridged in the translation by
Michael Perl, The Maghreb in the modern world (London, 1 9 7 0 ) , but
it is confined to indicators o f employment and income
distribution.
Yet despite such juridical works as Maurice Flory and Robert
Mantran, Le Régime politique des pays arabes (Paris, 1 9 6 7 ) , the
principal political studies o f the independent regimes have fo-
cussed on élites and their interactions. Perhaps the most outstand
ing and certainly the most readable of these is J o h n Waterbury,
Commander of the Faithful: the Moroccan political élite — a study of
segmented politics (London, 1 9 7 0 ) , but the first part o f Rémy
Leveau, Le Fellah marocain défenseur du trône (Paris, 1 9 7 6 ) , offers
the explanation for the elite's apparently anachronistic behaviour
that originally escaped Waterbury, namely the monarch's strategy
with respect to rural élites. The most methodologically self-
conscious of the élite studies is that o f Quandt, cited above; in
contrast Jean Leca and Jean-Claude Vatin suggest a variety o f
methods, from juridical and ideological to systemic analysis
eclectically borrowed from Anglo-Saxon political scientists, for
presenting their encyclopaedic study o f independent Algeria,
L'Algérie politique: institutions et régime (Paris, 1 9 7 5 ) . A somewhat
uneven but provocative synthesis raising the question o f a ruling
class is Bruno Etienne's L'Algérie, cultures et révolution (Paris,
1 9 7 7 ) . Tunisia's one-party system permitted a blending of élite and
institutional analysis; Clement Henry Moore, Tunisia since
independence: the dynamics of one-party government (Berkeley and Los
Angeles, 1 9 6 5 ) , was more sceptical of the party's mobilisational
efforts than Lars Rudebeck, Party and people (New Y o r k , 1 9 6 9 ) ,
whose approach was functionalist.
882

More recently the Centre de Recherches et d'Études sur les

Sociétés Méditerranéennes has published t w o studies of the three
national élites, La Formation des élites politiques maghrébines (Paris,
1 9 7 3 ) , and Élites, pouvoir et légitimité au Maghreb (Paris, 1 9 7 3 ) .
Michel Camau, La Notion de démocratie dans la pensée des dirigeants
maghrébins (Paris, 1 9 7 1 ) provides useful material for analysing their
efforts to legitimate themselves; for Morocco, Clifford Geertz,
Islam observed (New Haven, Conn., 1968), and Ernest Gellner,
Saints of the Atlas (London, 1 9 6 9 ) , provide important clues.
Other than Moore, Politics, and Ashford, National development,
there are no systematic comparative attempts to correlate regimes
with policies and strategies of development, but Leveau, Le Fellah,
presents a fascinating case study, while Algeria and Tunisia seem
most honestly served, respectively, by Gérard Viratelle, L'Algérie
algérienne (Paris, second edition, 1 9 7 0 ) and, ideology aside, Jean
Poncet, La Tunisie à la recherche de son avenir (Paris, 1 9 7 4 ) . A n d r é
Tiano, Le Maghreb entre les mythes (Paris, 1 9 6 7 ) offers useful
comparative economic data, while Abdellatif Benachenhou,
* Forces sociales et accumulation du capital au Maghreb ', Annuaire,
1 9 7 3 , vol. 1 2 , 3 1 5 - 4 2 , essentially concerns Algeria. A concise
balance sheet of the performance of the Algerian economy since
independence is given by Kader A m m o u r , Christian Leucate, and
Jean-Jacques Moulin, La Voie algérienne (Paris, 1 9 7 4 ) while the
vagaries o f self-management, which elicited a number of studies,
are treated most exhaustively by Gérard Duprat, Révolution et
autogestion rurale en Algérie (Paris, 1 9 7 3 ) , in regional and national
political contexts. Useful policy studies in Morocco include A n d r é
Tiano, La Politique économique etfinancièredu Maroc indépendant
(Paris, 1 9 6 3 ) , and William I. Zartman, Morocco: problems of new
power (New Y o r k , 1 9 6 4 ) . Cultural trends and policies since
independence constituted the focal theme of the Annuaire, 1 9 7 3 ,
vol. 1 2 , and Jean Dejeux has provided an exhaustive guide and
bibliography o f Littérature maghrébine de langue française (Ottawa,
1 9 7 3 ) . Abdelkebir Khatibi, as perhaps befits a writer w h o is also
a sociologist, limits his analysis to novels in Le Roman maghrébin
(Paris, 1968), but has the advantage of including Arabic as well
as French sources. Issues of Arabisation and cultural development
have perhaps been discussed most extensively in Algeria, and
Abdallah Mazouni, Culture et enseignement en Algérie et au Maghreb
(Paris, 1 9 6 9 ) , presents balanced views, as in a more historical
perspective does Mostefa Lacheraf, Algérie: nation et société (Paris,
883

1 9 6 5 ) . Contemporary Arabic thought may increasingly be shaped

by Maghriban intellectuals such as Abdallah Laroui and Hichem
Djaït, whose most mature works to date are, respectively, La Crise
des intellectuels arabes (Paris, 1 9 7 4 ) and La Personalité et le devenir
arabo-islamiques (Paris, 1 9 7 4 ) , just as discourse about Islam ben-
efited from an earlier w o r k by the late Malek Bennabi, Vocation
de rIslam (Paris, 1 9 5 4 ) .
12. F R E N C H - S P E A K I N G T R O P I C A L A F R I C A
This is a brief selection of the numerous documents, books and

articles o f the 1 4 countries o f francophone Africa. The early ones,
written during o r immediately after the colonial period, discuss
the countries as a block - o r frequently as t w o , A O F and A E F .
General sources are few in the period after independence, as the
countries themselves drew apart and built relations with neigh-
bouring territories according to new social, economic and political
imperatives, which had n o reference to their former connexions
in one of the t w o colonial federations. After the mid-1960s,
bibliographic material tends to refer to individual countries, and
to concentrate on but a few, ignoring others.
From 1 9 4 0 to i 9 6 0 , a number of sources provide useful
information on French colonial policy and early political move-
ments o f the entire area, o r one o f the t w o federations. A m o n g
the classics on colonial policy are the books written by former
colonial officials such as Lord Hailey and his French counter-
part, Robert Delà vignette (see Lord Hailey, An African survey
(London, 1 9 5 7 ) and Robert Delà vignette, Paysannerie et prolétariat
(Paris, 1 9 4 8 ) o r Freedom and authority in French West Africa
(Oxford, 1 9 5 0 ) . In the same vein, Henri Brunschwig, La Colon-
isation française (Paris, 1 9 4 9 ) and Henri Labouret, Colonisation,
colonialisme, décolonisation (Paris, 1 9 5 2 ) are also valuable sources of
information on French colonial practices.
Documentation Française (Paris) periodically issued studies, in its
Notes et études documentaires, such as La République de Guinée (no.
3202, 1 9 6 5 ) ; La République de Haute Volta (no. 2 6 9 6 , i 9 6 0 ) ; La
République du Mali (no. 2 7 3 9 , 1 9 6 1 ) ; and La République du Niger
(no. 2638, i 9 6 0 ) . Background information on French policy,
including geographic and economic data, may be found in
Jacques Richard Molard, Afrique Occidentale Française (Paris,
884

1 9 5 6 ) . Books by French scholars represent different political

orientations and therefore have different interpretations of events
and policies; such as Jean Suret-Canale, Afrique Noire, occidentale
et centrale (Paris, 1 9 5 8 ) , Gil Dugué, Vers les États-Unis dAfrique
(Dakar, i 9 6 0 ) , Ernest Milcent, L'AOF entre en scène (Paris, 1 9 5 8 ) ,
Hubert Deschamps, U Éveil politique africain (Paris, 1 9 5 2 ) and
André Blanchet, L'Itinéraire des partis africains depuis Bamako (Paris,
1 9 5 8 ) . Kenneth Robinson, 'Constitutional reform in French
Tropical Africa', Political Studies, 1 9 5 8 , v o l . 6, gave a valuable,
although brief, perspective on the changing post-war institutions
of the French colonies. Later sources with the advantages of more
time to consider the content and impact of French colonial policy
in this period provide invaluable material - see, for example,
Michael Crowder, Colonial West Africa: collected essays (London,
1 9 7 8 ) ; Catherine Coquéry-Vidrovitch, 'Mutations de l'impérial-
isme colonial français dans les années 3 0 ' , African Economie
History, 1 9 7 7 , vol. 4 ; A . S. Kanya-Forstner, The conquest of the
Western Sudan (Cambridge, 1 9 6 9 ) ; Amidu Magasa, Papa-
commandant a jeté un grandfiletdevant nous: les exploités des rives du
Niger 1900-1962 (Paris, 1 9 7 8 ) ; and J . R. de Benoist, La Balkan-
isation de l'Afrique occidentale française (Dakar, 1 9 7 8 ) and Lansiné
Kaba's Wahabiyja: Islamic reform and politics in French West Africa
(Evanston, 1 9 7 4 ) .
The most detailed analysis in English on political movements
in French-speaking West Africa (which also includes analysis of
French colonial policy), is Ruth Schachter Morgenthau's Political
parties in French-speaking West Africa (Oxford, 1 9 6 4 ) . Another
book which gives sketches of political movements and specific
political events in the A E F in the immediate pre-independence
period is by Virginia Thompson and her husband Richard Adloff,
The emerging states of French Equatorial Africa (Stanford, i 9 6 0 ) .
Debates among scholars, particularly those writing in English,
over the organisation and impact o f early African political
movements, were sparked off by the w o r k s of Thomas Hodgkin,
and Thomas Hodgkin and Ruth Schachter ; see Hodgkin, National-
ism in colonial Africa (London, 1 9 5 6 ) , African political parties
(London, 1 9 6 1 ) , and Hodgkin and Schachter, 'French-speaking
West Africa in transition', International Conciliation (May, i 9 6 0 ) .
Politics in French-speaking Africa were also described using a
development paradigm by James S. Coleman in ' T h e politics o f
885

sub-Saharan Africa', in Gabriel A . Almond and James S. Coleman

(eds.), The politics of developing areas (Princeton, i 9 6 0 ) . Many other
writers provide valuable insights on late pre- (and early post-)
independence politics. A m o n g these are Kenneth Robinson and
W . J . M. Mackenzie, Five elections in tropical Africa (Oxford, i 9 6 0 ) ,
William J . Foltz, From French West Africa to the Mali Federation
(New Haven, 1 9 6 5 ) .
Writers on the economic problems of the area in the immediate
post-colonial period include Elliot Berg, w h o wrote ' The econ
omic basis of political choice in French West Africa', The
American Political Sciences Review, June i 9 6 0 , and 'French West
Africa' in Walter Galenson (ed.), Labor and economic development
(New Y o r k , 1 9 5 9 ) . Economic information, as well as social and
demographic data, was available from the Annuaires statistiques,
published for the A O F and the A E F intermittently between the
t w o world wars and in the pre-independence period. All countries
published their o w n Annuaires statistiques in the post-independence
period - not surprisingly countries with more administrative
resources, including foreign assistance, produced statistics more
regularly and reliably than their poorer neighbours. Thus, Senegal
and the Ivory Coast offer considerable data, while Chad or Upper
Volta d o not. A general source on economic developments in the
region is A . G . Hopkins, An economic history of West Africa (New
Y o r k , 1 9 7 3 ) . C. Meillassoux wrote and edited useful anthropo
logical studies, including UEsclavage en Afrique pré-coloniale
(Paris, 1 9 7 5 ) and Femmes, greniers et capitaux (Paris, 1 9 7 5 ) .
A decade after independence, scholars produced a variety of
economic studies including country studies at the W o r l d Bank and
general ones, such as Accelerated development in sub-Saharan Africa
(Washington, 1 9 8 1 ) , and the annual World development report
(Washington, DC). I. Ouedrago, M. D . Newman and D. W .
Norman produced The farmer in the semi-arid tropics of West
Africa: partially annotated bibliography (ICRISAT, Patancheru,
India, 1 9 8 2 ) . Elliot Berg's 'Reforming grain marketing systems
in West Africa' is one of the interesting economic studies in
Proceedings of the International Workshop on Socio-economic Constraints
to Development in Semi-arid Tropical Agriculture (ICRISAT, Patan
cheru, India, 1980). Scholars with varying approaches to economic
issues are increasingly focussing on specific sectors or regions. For
example, some interesting recent studies are S. B. Baier's An
886

economic history of Central Niger (Oxford, 1 9 8 0 ) ; Jane Guyer's * The

food economy and French colonial rule in central Cameroun',
Journal of African History, 1 9 7 8 , vol. 1 9 ; and J . M. Watts, ' A silent
revolution: the nature of famine and the changing character of
food production in Nigerian Hausaland', Ph.D. thesis, University
of Michigan (Ann A r b o r , 1 9 7 9 ) . Data on the export sectors of the
various national economies is available; for example, on the effects
of the Lomé Convention, see Paule Bouvier, L'Europe et la
coopération au développement (Brussels, 1980).
Other post-independence w o r k s focus increasingly on specific
countries. L'Afrique Noire politique et économique (Ediafrique, La
Documentation Africaine, Paris, 1 9 7 7 ) gives basic data. Analysis
can be found in James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg (eds.),
Political parties and national integration in tropical Africa (Berkeley,
1964) ; or the series of three volumes edited by Gwendolen Carter,
African one-party states (Ithaca, 1 9 6 2 ) , Five African states: responses
to diversity (Ithaca, 1 9 6 3 ) , National unity and regionalism in eight
African states (Ithaca, 1 9 6 6 ) . A l s o relevant are: Peter Gutkind and
Immanuel Wallerstein, The political economy of contemporary Africa
(Beverly Hills, 1 9 7 6 ) ; Michael Lofchie, The state of the nations,
constraints on development in independent Africa (Berkeley, 1 9 7 1 ) ;
and J o h n Dunn (ed.), West African states, failure and promise
(Cambridge, 1 9 7 8 ) .
Turning to each of the 1 4 countries, the material available is
uneven, and often by journalists recounting political crises,
appearing in such sources as Le Mois en Afrique, Africa Report,
Jeune Afrique, Présence Africaine and Marchés Tropicaux. Articles
can also be found in the Journal of Modern African Studies and other
scholarly journals. Jeune Afrique puts out a useful yearbook
(Paris); so does Colin Legum (ed.), African contemporary record
(New Y o r k ) and Africa south of the Sahara (London). Literature
is substantial on the Ivory Coast, Senegal and Cameroun. In regard
to the I v o r y Coast, there are few studies on the pre-colonial and
early colonial period; an exception is the study by F. J . A m o n
d'Aby La Côte d'Ivoire dans la cité africaine (Paris, 1 9 5 1 ) . Claude
Meillassoux's Anthropologie économique des Gouro de Côte d'Ivoire
(Paris, 1 9 6 4 ) and T. Weiskel's French colonial rule and the Baule
peoples (Oxford, 1980), are excellent additions to the literature. A
thorough study of politics in the post-independence period was
written by Aristide Zolberg, One-party government in the Ivory Coast
887

(Princeton, 1 9 6 4 ) . This book analysed one-party democracy as

practised in the Ivory Coast and illustrated major shifts in the role
of the political party after independence. Zolberg later co-edited,
with Philip Foster, another volume including in-depth political
analyses of the Ivory Coast and its neighbour Ghana, Ghana and the
Ivory Coast (Chicago, 1 9 7 1 ) . A n o t h e r interesting comparison
between the impact of colonialism in an English colony and in
a French one can be found in David Guyer, Ghana and the Ivory
Coast: the impact of colonialism in an African setting (New Y o r k ,
1 9 7 0 ) . More controversial is the critical study by Samir Amin, Le
Développement du capitalisme en Côte d'Ivoire (Paris, 1 9 6 7 ) . Michael
Cohen published a serious analysis of the growth of urbanisation
in the Ivory Coast, Urban policy andpolitical conflict in Africa: a study
of the Ivory Coast (Chicago, 1 9 7 4 ) . Jean-Louis Fyot, Méthode de
planification: L'expérience de la Côte d'Ivoire (Paris, 1 9 7 2 ) , took an
early look at planning there. Bastiaan den Tuinden published an
economic study for the W o r l d Bank, Ivory Coast, the challenge of
success (Baltimore, 1 9 7 8 ) .
There is a wealth of sources on the pre-independence period
in Senegal. Access to Senegal has been easy for scholars, particu
larly for English-speakers venturing into francophone Africa.
Because it is the oldest colony with a special political history, it
has attracted analysts and historians of all nationalities. The
following books are only a selected few of those available.
V. Monteil's books and articles on Senegal, based on his long
years in the country at the Institut Français d'Afrique Noire
(IFAN) provide interesting material on politics and social change
with a special emphasis on religion; see Monteil, Esquisses
sénégalaises (Dakar, 1 9 6 6 ) . Several authors focussed on the Muslim
brotherhoods which are powerful economically and politically in
Senegal. A m o n g these are Cheikh Tidiane Sy, La Confrérie
sénégalaise des Mourides (Paris, 1 9 6 9 ) , Lucy Creevey (Behrman),
Muslim Brotherhoods and politics in Senegal (Cambridge, 1 9 7 0 ) and
Donal Cruise O'Brien, Saints and politicians (Cambridge, 1 9 7 5 ) .
There have been a number of political histories of Senegal, among
them one by Michael Crowder, Senegal: a study in French assimilation
policy (London, 1 9 6 2 ) and more recent political studies such as
François Zuccarelli, Un Parti politique africain: l'Union progressiste
Sénégalaise (Paris, 1 9 7 0 ) , Pierre Gonidec, La République de Sénégal
(Paris, 1 9 6 8 ) , and Edward J . Schumacher, Politics, bureaucracy and
888

rural development in Senegal (Berkeley, 1 9 7 5 ) . A l l political studies

analyse the strength of the rural areas, particularly the dominant
groundnut zone. Thus the particular rural concentration by
Schumacher, a political scientist, is also the focus o f works by
V. Diarassouba, UÉvolution des structures agricoles du Sénégal (Paris,
1968) and J . L. Balans et al., Autonomie locale et intégration nationale
au Sénégal (Paris, 1 9 7 5 ) . The political philosophy of Leopold Sédar
Senghor, négritude, has also received considerable attention, for
example, by Irving Leonard Marko witz in Leopold Sédar Senghor and
the politics of négritude (New Y o r k , 1969). W . A . E. Skurnik has
written a study of foreign policy in Senegal, The foreign policy of
Senegal (Evanston, 1 9 7 2 ) , concentrating on the conservative
socialism of Senghor. Samir Amin wrote for Senegal, as he did
for the Ivory Coast, a critical analysis from a radical perspective,
see Le Monde des affaires sénégalais (Paris, 1 9 6 4 ) , and his Trois
expériences africaines de développement : le Mali, la Guinée et le Ghana
(Paris, 1 9 6 5 ) .
Cameroun has numerous published sources including Richard
Joseph, Radical nationalism in Cameroun (Oxford, 1 9 7 7 ) , David
Gardinier, Cameroon: United Nations challenge to French policy
(Oxford, 1 9 6 3 ) , Edwin and Shirley Ardener, Plantation and village
in the Cameroons (London, i 9 6 0 ) , C. K . Meek, Land tenure and land
administration in Nigeria and the Cameroons (London, 1 9 5 7 ) . Victor
Azarya, Dominance and change in North Cameroon : the Fulbe aristocracy
(Beverly Hills, 1 9 7 6 ) , R. Clignet, The Africanization of the Labor
Market: Educational and Occupational Segmentation in the Cameroon
(Berkeley, 1 9 7 6 ) , Willard Johnson, The Cameroon Federation:
political integration in a fragmentary society (Princeton, 1 9 7 0 ) , David
Kom, Le Cameroun: essai d'analyse économique et politique (Paris,
1 9 7 1 ) , Victor T. Le Vine, The Cameroon Federal Republic (Ithaca,
1 9 7 1 ) , Adamou Ndam Ngoya, Le Cameroun dans les relations
internationales (Paris, 1 9 7 6 ) , Michel Prouzet, Le Cameroun (Paris,
1 9 7 4 ) , Neville Rubin, Cameroon: An African Federation (New
Y o r k , 1 9 7 1 ) ; and Nid va Kofele-Kale (ed.), An African experiment
in nation building: the bilingual Cameroon Republic since reunification
(Boulder, Colorado, 1980).
Bénin and Togo, like Niger, Upper Volta and Mauritania, and
the four former Equatorial African States, are less well studied.
Sources on these countries include Robert Cornevin, Le Dahomey
(Paris, 1 9 7 0 ) ; A. Akindélé and C. Aguessy, Dahomey (Paris, 1 9 5 5 ) ;
889

D o v Ronin, Dahomey : between tradition and modernity (Ithaca, 1975);

Maurice A . Glélé, Naissance d'un état noir, l'évolution politique et
constitutionelle du Dahomey de la colonisation à nos jours (Paris, 1969);
I. A . Akinjogbin, Dahomey and its neighbours (Cambridge, 1967);
and Jacques Lombard, Un système politique traditionnel de type féodal:
les Bariba du Nord-Dahomey (Paris, 1965). Niger sources include
Pierre Bonardi, La République du Niger: naissance d'un état (Paris,
i960); Edmond Séré de Rivières, Le Niger (Paris, 1952), Pierre
Donaint et François Lancrenon, Le Niger (Paris, 1972); Richard
Higgott's 'Structural dependence and decolonisation in a West
African land-locked state: Niger', Review of African Political
Economy, J a n - A p r i l 1980, 4 3 - 5 8 , gives a different point of view.
R. Higgott and F. Fugelstad discuss ' T h e 1974 coup d'état in
Niger' in the Journal of Modern African Studies, September 1975,
vol. 13. On Upper Volta, see Elliott Skinner's The Mossi of Upper
Volta (Stanford, 1964) and African urban life: the transformation of
Ouagadougou (Princeton, 1974), as well as the essays edited by J o h n
Caldwell et al., Upper Volta (New Y o r k , 1975). Sources on
Mauritania include Christine Gamier and Philippe Ermont, Désert
fertile : un nouvel état, la Mauritanie (Paris, 1960) ; Alfred G. Gerteiny,
Mauritania (London, 1967); Richard M. Westebbe, The economy of
Mauritania (New Y o r k , 1971) and Marcel Piquemol-Pastré, La
République Islamique de Mauritanie (Paris, 1969); G . Désiré-
Vuillemin, Contribution à l'histoire de la Mauritanie de 1900 à 1934
(Dakar, 1962), and C. Moore, 'One-partyism in Mauritania',
Journal of Modem African Studies, 1965, vol. 3. On Togo, see James
Coleman, Togoland (New Y o r k , 1956), and Robert Cornevin, Le
Togo (Paris, 1973).
Mali and Guinea received special attention for their proud
independence and for their radical political language; numerous
studies were carried out as a result. Recent material has been
difficult to find on Guinea. A partial list includes Fernand Gigon,
Guinée, état-pilote (Paris, 1959); Jean Suret-Canale, La République
de Guinée (Paris, 1970); Maurice Houis, Guinée française (Paris,
1953); Ladipo Adamolekun, Sékou Touré's Guinea: an experiment
in nation building (London, 1976), which includes a good biblio-
graphy; Claude Rivière, Mutations sociales en Guinée (Paris, 1 9 7 1 ) ;
Sékou Touré's Oeuvres complètes (Paris, n.d.) gives his interpretation
of events. Lansiné Kaba gives another in his articles in the Journal
of Modern African Studies: 'Cultural revolution, artistic creativity,
890

and freedom of expression in Guinea', June 1 9 7 6 , vol. 1 4 and

'Guinean politics: a critical historical o v e r v i e w ' , March 1 9 7 7 ,
vol. 1 5 .
For Mali, G. Snyder, One-party government in Mali (New Haven,
1 9 6 5 ) , K. Ernst, Tradition and progress in the African village: the
non-capitalist transformation of rural communities in Mali (London,
1 9 7 6 ) ; William I. Jones, Planning and economic policy: socialist Mali
and her neighbors (Washington, 1 9 7 6 ) , Edmond J o u v e , La Republique
du Mali (Paris, 1 9 7 4 ) ; Horeya T. Megahed, Socialism and nation-
building in Africa: the case of Mali, 1960-1y 68 (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 0 ) ;
and Nicholas S. Hopkins, Popular government in an African town
(Chicago, 1 9 7 2 ) .
The four countries which formed the A E F have been relatively
little studied in depth. W o r k s include Jacqueline Bouquerel, Le
Gabon (Paris, 1 9 7 0 ) ; Brian Weinstein's Gabon (Cambridge, Mass.,
1 9 6 6 ) ; J . Cabot and C. Bouquet, Le Tchad (Paris, 1 9 7 3 ) ; Georges
Diguimboye, L'Essor du Tchad (Paris, 1 9 6 9 ) ; Richard Westebbe
et al. y Chad: development, potential and constraints (Washington,
1 9 7 4 ) ; John W o r k s , Pilgrims in a strange land: Hausa communities
in Chad (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 6 ) ; the bibliography by Philippe Frémeaux,
La Rébellion tchadienne (Paris, 1 9 7 3 ) ; Virginia Thompson and
Richard Adloff's Conflict in Tchad(Berkeley, 1 9 8 2 ) ; Samuel Decalo,
' Regionalism, political decay and civil strife in Chad ', Journal of
Modern African Studies, 1 9 8 0 , vol. 1 8 . Other useful works are
Marcel Soret's Histoire du Congo, capitale Brazzaville (Paris, 1 9 7 8 )
and Pierre Kalck, Central African Republic, a failure in decolonization
(London, 1 9 7 1 ) .
13. M A D A G A S C A R
The most noteworthy works on the period by Malagasy writers are

R. W . Rabemananjara's Madagascar, histoire de la nation malgache
(Paris, 1 9 5 2 ) , E. RvAaimhoitra's Histoire de Madagascar (T&n&native,
1 9 6 5 ) , and R. Rajemisa-Raolison's Dictionnaire géographique et hist
orique de Madagascar (Fianarantsoa, 1 9 6 6 ) . All three should be used
in conjunction with H. Deschamps' Histoire de Madagascar (Paris,
1 9 7 2 ) and A. Spacensky's Cinquante ans de vie politique de Ralamongo
à Tsiranana (Paris, 1 9 7 0 ) . Other French works of a general nature
are M. de Coppet's Madagascar et Réunion (Paris, 1 9 4 7 ) , R. Pascal's
La République malgache (Paris, 196 5 ), and C. Cadoux's La République
malgache (Paris, 1 9 6 9 ) . Pierre Boiteau, a French Communist and
891

M D R M sympathiser, wrote Contribution à l'histoire de la nation

malgache (Paris, 195 8) in which he makes the M D R M appear more
nationalist than extremist, thereby playing down the role of
P A N A M A and J I N A . In English the most valuable works are
R. Adloff and V . Thompson's The Malagasy Republic (Stanford,
1 9 6 5 ) and N. Heseltine's Madagascar (London, 1 9 7 1 ) . There are
also several valuable periodicals, the Bulletin de l'Académie Malgache,
the Bulletin de Madagascar, the Revue de Madagascar, and Notes
Reconnaissances et Explorations. For the English-speaking world the
'Madagascar' section in Africa Contemporary Record (London) is
an invaluable source of information on Malagasy affairs.
On the political side A. L. Annet reflects the Vichyite viewpoint
in Aux heures troublées de l'Afrique française, 19)9-1942 (Paris,
1 9 5 2 ) , while in the post-war period one of the earliest protests
against colonial rule came from J . Rabemananjara, author first
of Un malgache vous parle (Paris, 1 9 4 6 ) and then later of Témoignage
malgache et colonialisme (Paris, 1 9 5 6 ) and Nationalisme et problèmes
malgaches (Paris, 1 9 5 8 ) . When used in conjunction with R. Rabe-
mananjara's Madagascar sous la rénovation malgache (Paris, 1 9 5 3 )
they give a clear picture of Malagasy grievances and aspirations
prior to i 9 6 0 . A good overview of political events is found in
Spacensky's 'L'Evolution politique malgache, 1 9 4 5 — 1 9 6 6 ' , in La
Revue Française de Science Politique ( 1 9 6 7 ) and R. Darsac's 'Contra-
dictions et partis malgaches' in the Revue d'Action Populaire
( 1 9 5 8 ) . Explanations as to w h y the rebellion took place are few.
B. C Daniel's typescript, 'Les Événements de Madagascar'
appeared at the École Nationale de la France d'Outre M e r
( 1 9 4 8 - 9 ) but it is merely descriptive and not analytical. O.
Mannoni attempted to explain the rebellion in terms o f psycho-
logical dependency in his Psychologie de la colonisation (Paris, 1 9 5 0 ) ,
but the first scholarly w o r k was J . Tronchon's L'Insurrection
malgache de 1947 (Paris, 1 9 7 4 ) . G . Althabe's earlier w o r k , Oppression
et libération dans l'imaginaire ( 1 9 6 8 ) , is also w o r t h consulting,
mainly because it influenced some o f the people involved in the
events of May 1 9 7 2 . Lastly there is P. Stibbe's Justice pour les
Malgaches (Paris, 1 9 5 4 ) , a detailed account o f the trial o f the three
deputies written by their left-wing lawyer.
For the years after i 9 6 0 , studies on Malagasy politics are both
highly legalistic in approach and careful in their treatment of
Tsiranana. Spacensky's Cinquante ans... is rich, well-researched,
and compulsory reading. R. Archer's Madagascar depuis 1972 — la
892

13- M A D A G A S C A R
marche d'une révolution (Paris, 1 9 7 6 ) , a clearly written synthesis of

events since 1 9 7 2 , contains important material on the President
and the bourgeoisie. Malagasy political parties are dealt with in
a series of articles in the Revue Française d'Études Politiques
Africaines, 1 9 6 9 to 1 9 7 5 . Foreign policy before 1 9 7 2 is explored
by G. Cognac and G . Feuer in Les Conventions de co-operation entre
la République malgache et la République française (Tananarive, 1 9 6 3 ) ,
while Madagascar's relations with the rest o f the world are
outlined by J . Maestre, author of La République malgache et les
organisations africaines (Tananarive, 1 9 6 8 ) , and P. Decraene in his
article ' L a Diplomatie malgache à la recherche de nouveaux
partenaires ', which appeared in Le Monde Diplomatique ( 1 9 6 9 ) . The
best overview o f foreign policy after 1 9 7 2 is found in Africa
Contemporary Record. Material on local government can be gleaned
from C. Cadoux's monograph on the subject, La Commune malgache
(Mantasoa, 1 9 6 7 ) and his article in L'Actualité Juridique ( 1 9 6 5 ) ,
'Les Nouveaux Aspects de l'organisation locale à Madagascar'.
Finally the trade union movement is dealt with in P. Delval's ' Le
syndicalisme à Madagascar', Pénant, 1 9 6 5 . There are no serious
studies of any of the pressure groups.
The social and cultural life o f Madagascar has not received as
much attention as it deserves : see, however, H. Berthier's Notes
et impressions sur les moeurs et coutumes du peuple malgache (Tananarive,
1 9 3 3 ) , J . Faublée's Ethnographie de Madagascar (Paris, 1 9 4 6 ) , and
R. Dandouau and G. Chapus's Histoire des populations de Madagascar
( 1 9 5 2 ) . O. Mannoni's Psychologie de la colonisation (Paris, 1 9 5 0 )
contains useful material and should be read in conjunction with
R. Ralibera's Vatçaha et Malgaches en dialogue (Tananarive, 1 9 6 6 ) .
T w o important studies are P. Colin's Aspects de l'âme malgache
( 1 9 5 9 ) and R. Andriamanjato's Le Tsiny and le Tody dans la pensée
malgache (Paris, 1 9 5 7 ) , while a less scholarly w o r k is D. Raman-
driavohona's Le Malgache: sa langue, sa religion (Paris, 1 9 5 9 ) . Social
change during the 1950s is discussed in O. Hatzfeld's article
'Evolution actuelle de la société malgache', which appeared in
Monde non Chrétien ( 1 9 5 3 ) , and in the 1960s by J . Lapierre in
'Problèmes socio-culturels de la nation malagache', Cahiers Inter-
nationaux de Sociologie ( 1 9 6 6 ) . The latter's conclusions are especially
interesting when compared with those published by the Malagasy
government's research bureau under the title L'Enquête
démographique - Madagascar, 1966 ( 1 9 6 7 ) . No study of Malagasy life
would be complete without a consideration of the fokonolonas. No
893

definitive study exists, but valuable information is found in

C. Ranaivo's 'Les Expériences de fokonolona à Madagascar',
which appeared in Monde non Chrétien ( 1 9 4 9 ) , F. Arbousset's he
Fokonolona à Madagascar (Paris, 1 9 5 0 ) , and G. Condaminas's Foko-
nolona et communautés rurales en Imerina (Paris, i 9 6 0 ) . These titles
are complemented by R. Dumont's Évolution des campagnes mal-
gaches (Tananarive, 1 9 5 9 ) , a study on rural life. The role of women
is considered by E. Radaody-Ralarosy in ' L a Femme malgache
dans la cité', which was published in the Bulletin de l'Académie
Malgache ( i 9 6 0 ) , while the Annales de l'Université de Madagascar
( 1 9 6 7 ) printed ' L a Femme, la société, et la droit malgache'.
Several authors have written on the foreign elements in the island ;
G. Gayet produced 'Immigrations asiatiques à Madagascar' for
Civilisations ( 1 9 5 5 ) , and J . Ratsima published 'Les Congrégations
chinoises de Madagascar ' in a 1 9 6 0 issue of the Revue de Madagascar.
D. Bardonnet wrote a similar article for the Annuaire Française de
Droit International ( 1 9 6 4 ) entitled, 'Les Minorités asiatiques à
Madagascar' and which contains some useful material. The
standard w o r k on Christianity is H. Vidal's La Séparation des
Églises et de l'État à Madagascar, 1861-1962 (Paris, 1 9 6 9 ) , but of
greater value is Père P. Lupo's Église et décolonisation à Madagascar
(Fianarantsoa, 1 9 7 3 ) . A s for the press, all that exists is R. LTtalien's
unpublished thesis from the École des Hautes Études, 'Mada-
gascar, 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 6 0 : une étape vers la décolonisation' ( 1 9 7 5 ) .
The various issues of the Revue Économique de Madagascar and
the Travaux du Centre d'Etudes Rurales carry useful articles on the
economic life o f the island. General studies worth consulting are
M. Rudloff's Économie du tiers monde, v o l . I (Tananarive, 1 9 6 1 ) ,
G, Bastion's Madagascar, étude géographique et économique (Paris,
1 9 6 7 ) , and the International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment's substantial Economy of the Malagasy Republic ( 1 9 6 8 ) .
French aid to Madagascar was outlined by R. Hoffer in his
Co-opération économique franco-africaine (Paris, 1 9 5 7 ) . Other useful
works were M. Gaud's Ees Premieres Expériences de planification en
Afrique noire (Paris, 1 9 6 7 ) , and a book by R. Gendarme which
revealed the stranglehold the large French companies had
on Madagascar, UÉconomie de Madagascar (Tananarive, i 9 6 0 ) .
Gendarme's study had an enormous impact on some Malagasy
nationalists. Another helpful w o r k by P. Ottino, Ees Économies
paysannes malgaches du Bas-Mangoky (Paris, 1 9 6 3 ) , provides a
894

scholarly analysis of the economic structure of the south-west part

of the island. Material on the economic functions of the communes
is located in t w o books, one by M. Surbiguet entitled Les Sociétés
d'économie mixte à Madagascar (Tananarive, 1 9 6 6 ) , and the other by
A. Bergeret, Les Sociétés d'aménagement agricole à Madagascar
(Tananarive, 1 9 6 7 ) . The most analytical study o f economic life in
the rural areas was Y. Prats's w o r k , Le Développement communautaire
à Madagascar (Paris, 1 9 7 2 ) .
14. Z A I R E , R W A N D A A N D B U R U N D I
Abundant bibliographie and documentary sources are available

for the study of contemporary Zairean, Rwandan, and Burundi
history. Useful select but reasonably comprehensive biblio
graphies, covering the social and economic as well as political
spheres, may be found in René Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi
(London, 1 9 7 0 ) , and Crawford Young, Politics in the Congo
(Princeton, 1 9 6 5 ) . For the colonial period, T. Heyse, assisted by
J . Berlage, regularly produced the exhaustive Bibliographie du
Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi, appearing in Cahiers Belges et
Congolais, nos. 4 - 2 2 (Brussels, 195 3). The Musée Royal de l'Afrique
Centrale has provided annual ethnographie bibliographies. For the
' Congo crisis Dominique Ryelandt compiled a virtually complete
listing, published as a supplement to Études Congolaises in 1 9 6 3 .
The most recent period, for Zaire, is best covered by Edouard
Bustin, in Cahiers du CEDAF (Brussels, nos. 3 and 4 , 1 9 7 1 ) (which
also covers earlier periods).
Major Belgian documentary sources include the Rapports
Annuels sur 1' Administration du Congo Belge, présentés aux Chambres
Législatives, and the analogous document for Ruanda-Urundi ; the
proceedings of the Conseil Colonial, which was required to debate
all legislative enactments for the Belgian colonies ; the records o f
the Conseil du Gouvernement and its provincial counterparts.
The annual opening address of the governor-general to the
Conseil du Gouvernement constitutes the most authoritative
statement of official policy. Pierre Piron and J . Devos in their
compilation o f the Codes et lois du Congo Belge (last colonial edition
1 9 5 9 , with a 1 9 7 0 post-independence update for Zaire), provide
not only the legal texts, but also legislative histories and com
mentaries, which illuminate their intent and background.
895

The involvement of the United Nations with Rwanda and

Burundi as a result of its Trust status, and Zaire as a consequence
of its operation there from i 9 6 0 to 1 9 6 4 leaves in its wake an
important documentary deposit. F o r Rwanda and Burundi, the
reports o f the triennial Visiting Missions ( 1 9 4 8 , 1 9 5 1 , 1 9 5 4 , 1 9 5 7 ,
i 9 6 0 ) , plus the several ad hoc commissions dispatched from
1 9 6 0 - 1 9 6 4 , are an important source. For Zaire, in addition to the
various reports of the secretary-general on the UN operation,
several of the key participants have provided their personal
accounts; these include H. T. Alexander, African tightrope
(London, 1 9 6 6 ) , Rajashwan Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjold
(Princeton, 1 9 7 6 ) , Conor Cruise O'Brien, To Katanga and back
(New Y o r k , 1 9 6 2 ) , and Carl v o n Horn, Soldiering for peace (New
Y o r k , 1 9 6 7 ) . The major UN documents are conveniently as-
sembled by the Chronique de Politique Étrangère, v o l . X V , nos.
4 - 6 (1962).
For the post-independence period, government documents are
abundant but of uneven value. For Zaire, government positions
are diffused through the daily bulletins of Agence Zairoise de Presse
(earlier Agence Congolaise de Presse). Proceedings of the national
parliament and, for the First Republic, its provincial counterparts,
provide some glimpses of what was happening, but the irregularity
of the sessions, plus the narrow range o f subjects considered
during the Second Republic, limit their utility. The most valuable
Zairean government document is the Rapport Annuel of the
Banque du Zaire, issued since 1 9 6 7 . Current economic data is
provided in Conjonctures Économiques, issued by the Département
d'Économie Nationale. Comparable bulletins of economic statis-
tics are published by the Rwanda Ministère de la Coopération
Internationale et du Plan, and the Institut Rundi des Statistiques.
A number o f serials devoted to contemporary developments in
the former Belgian colonies deserve mention. For the pre-
independence period, these include Zaire (Louvain), Problèmes
d'Afrique Centrale (Antwerp), Problèmes Sociaux Congolais (Lubum-
bashi, earlier Bulletin de CEPSI). F o r the i 9 6 0 to 1 9 7 5 period
in Zaire, the most important are Études Zaïroises (Kinshasa, earlier
Études Congolaises), Zaire-Afrique (Kinshasa, earlier Congo-Afrique),
Cahiers Économiques et Sociaux (publication of the important
Institut de Recherches Économiques et Sociaux at the Kinshasa
campus of the Université Nationale du Zaire), Courrier Africain
896

14- Z A I R E , R W A N D A A N D B U R U N D I
and Travaux Africains of the Centre de Recherche et d'Information

Socio-Politiques (CRISP), from 1 9 5 9 to 1 9 7 1 , then reorganised
as Cahiers du CEDAF from 1 9 7 1 (Brussels, Centre d'Études et
de Documentation Africaine).
Major reference works include the Encyclopédie du Congo Belge,
3 vols. (Brussels, 1 9 5 3 ) , and the handbooks on each country
prepared by the American University: US Army area handbook for
the Republic of the Congo {Léopoldvillé) (Washington, 1 9 6 2 , revised
edition, 1 9 7 9 ) ; G o r d o n C. McDonald et al., Area handbook for
Burundi (Washington, 1 9 6 9 ) ; Richard F. Nyrop et al., Area hand
book for Rwanda (Washington, 1 9 6 9 ) . F o r Burundi, invaluable
political information is found in Warren Weinstein, Historical
dictionary of Burundi (Metuchen, 1 9 7 6 ) . Documents pertaining to
the Rwanda revolution are found in the CRISP publication,
Rwanda Politique ipjS-ip6o (Brussels, 1 9 6 1 ) . A magnificent record
of Zairean current history is provided in the annual CRISP
yearbooks, Congo 19jp and successors, published from 1 9 5 9 to
1 9 6 7 . In addition, special documentary histories were published
by CRISP o f t w o major political parties, the Parti Solidaire
Africain and the A B A K O , as well as the Katanga secession and
the 1 9 6 4 rebellions.
The melodramatic events o f 1 9 5 5 - 6 5 in Zaire have generated
such a vast literature that only a few of the most important can
be mentioned here; conversely, serious treatments of the pre-
decolonisation phase, o r the New Regime since 1 9 6 5 , are far
fewer. On the terminal colonial period, special note may be made
of Roger Anstey, King Leopold's legacy (London, 1 9 6 6 ) , and Jean
Stengers, ' L a Belgique et le Congo', in Histoire de la Belgique
contemporaine (Brussels, 1 9 7 5 ) , as well as Y o u n g ( 1 9 6 5 ) . Decolon
isation and the crisis is given most authoritative analysis and
documentation in the annual CRISP volumes noted above. F o r
the international aspects, Cathryn Hoskyns remains the best
source, The Congo since independence (London, 1 9 6 5 ) . The Belgian
dimension is well represented in Ganshof van der Meersch, Fin
de la souveraineté belge au Congo (The Hague, 1 9 6 3 ) , and in an
interesting public debate by many o f those most closely involved,
edited by Pierre de V o s , La Décolonisation (Brussels, 1 9 7 5 ) . On the
dynamics of Zairean nationalism and political parties, especially
useful are Herbert Weiss, Political protest in the Congo (Princeton,
1 9 6 7 ) , and René Lemarchand, Political awakening in the Congo
897

B I B L I O G R A P H I C A L E S S A Y S
(Berkeley, 1964). From a Zairean perspective, Thomas Kanza

provides an autobiographical analysis in Conflict in the Congo
(Baltimore, 1 9 7 2 ) . Biographies have appeared o f three o f the
major leaders: Ian Colvin, The rise and fall of Moise Tshombe
(London, 1968), Charles-André Gilis, Kasavubu au coeur du drame
congolais (Brussels, 1 9 6 4 ) ; Francis Monheim, Mobutu, l'homme seul
(Brussels, 1 9 6 2 ) . On Lumumba, see René Lemarchand in Walter
Skurnik (ed.), African political thought: Lumumba, Nkrumah and
Touré, and Jean van Lierde (ed.), La Pensée politique de Patrice
Lumumba. O n the rebellions, in addition to the CRISP study,
useful monographs have been contributed by Renée Fox, W , de
Craemer, and J . M. Ribeaucourt in Études Congolaises, vol. 8
(January-February 1 9 6 5 ) , and Young, in Ali Mazrui and Robert
Rotberg (eds.), Power and protest in Black Africa (London, 1 9 7 0 ) .
On the early years of the Mobutu regime, the best study is
Jean-Claude Williame, Patrimonialism and political change in the
Congo (Stanford, 1 9 7 1 ) . Especially important for later Mobutu
years are Michael G . Schatzberg, Politics and class in Zaire (New
Y o r k , 1980) and G u y Gran (ed.), Zaire: the political economy of
underdevelopment (New Y o r k , 1980). A n overview of the first t w o
decades of independence is provided in J . Vanderlinden (ed.), Du
Congo au Zaire 1960-1980 (Brussels, 1 9 8 1 ) . A leading politician and
intellectual, Kamitatu Massamba (Cléophas), has published t w o
sharply critical studies, La Grande Mystification du Congo-Kinshasa
(Paris, 1 9 7 1 ) , and Le Pouvoir au portée du peuple (Paris, 1 9 7 7 ) .
The crucial process of urbanisation is treated in several mono-
graphs : Valdo Pons, Stanleyville (London, 1969) ; Jean La Fontaine,
City politics (Cambridge, 1 9 7 0 ) , and Paul Raymaekers, L'Organis-
ation des spnes de squatting (Brussels, 1 9 6 4 ) , on Kinshasa;
F. Grévisse, Le Centre extra-coutumier d'Elisabethville (Brussels,
1 9 5 1 ) ; and the 1 9 7 5 doctoral dissertation of Nzongola Ntalaja,
'Urban administration in Katanga'. In the ethnographic domain,
Jan Vansina provides an invaluable reference work, in Introduction
à l'ethnographie du Congo (Brussels, 1966). Major recent works
providing an overview of the impact of colonial administration
on particular societies are Wyatt McGaffey, Custom and government
in the Lower Congo (Berkeley, 1 9 7 0 ) , and Edouard Bustin, Lunda
under Belgian Rule (Cambridge, 1 9 7 5 ) .
Economic change is remarkably well covered. For the pre-
independence situation, the best study is Fernand Bézy, Problèmes
structurels de l'économie congolaise (Louvain and Paris, 1 9 5 7 ) . The
898

outstanding team of economists gathered at Lovanium in the

1960s jointly produced Independence, inflation et développement (Paris,
1968), a comprehensive treatment of the political economy of the
early independence years. Also important are Fernand Bézy,
Jean-Philippe Peemans and Jean-Marie Wautelet, Accumulation et
sous-développement au Zaire 1960-1980 (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1981);
Jean-Louis Lacroix, Industrialisation au Congo (Paris, 1967), and
Christian Coméliau, Conditions de la planification et du développement:
l'exemple du Congo (Paris, 1969). On the urban economy, viewed
at the household level, Joseph Houyoux, Budgets ménagers : nutrition
et mode de vie à Kinshasa (Kinshasa, 1973) is excellent. The best
analysis of agricultural history is provided in the 1975 Brussels
dissertation of Mulambu Mvuluya, 'Le régime des cultures
obligatoires et le radicalisme rural au Zaire ( 1 9 1 7 - 1 9 6 0 ) ' . Jean-
Philippe Peemans has recently offered, in a series of contributions,
an insightful overview of economic history, including the best
treatment of the political economy of the Mobutu period;
particularly valuable are The political economy of Zaire in the seventies
(Louvain, 1974), and his chapter in Peter Duignan and
L. H. Gann, The economics of colonialism (London, 1975).
Rwanda and Burundi have received far less attention, and have
long suffered a tendency to generalise findings in a particular
portion of one kingdom to all of both; especially the royalist
model of ethnic caste relations derived from central Rwanda. The
classic statement of this view is Jacques Maquet, The premise of
inequality in Rwanda (Oxford, 1961), whose structural-functional
model of Tutsi hegemony has been widely challenged (for
example, in Helen Codere, The biography of an African society,
Rwanda 1900-1960, Marcel d'Hertefelt, Les clans du Rwanda ancien
(Tervuren, 1970), and Catharine Newbury's 1975 Wisconsin
dissertation 'The cohesion of oppression: a century of clientship
in Kinyaga, Rwanda'.
By far the most valuable overall political history is Lemarchand,
Rwanda and Burundi, which focusses upon the decolonisation
process and the tumultuous first half-decade of independence. For
the 1972 Burundi tragedy, the best available analysis is Warren
Weinstein and Robert Schrire, Political conflict and ethnic strategies:
a case study of Burundi. Rural development issues are well analysed
in Philippe Leurquin, Le Niveau de vie des populations rurales du
Ruanda-Urundi (Louvain, i960).
899

15. P O R T U G U E S E - S P E A K I N G A F R I C A
On the Portuguese side, all administrative archives in Lisbon

remained closed to inspection for the whole period under review,
and what may be regarded as primary official sources are largely
limited to the publications of such bodies as the Instituto Nacional
de Estatistica and the Junta de I n v e s t i g a t e s do Ultramar, some
of which are usefully factual but others not. Angola is generally
better off than its companion territories in this respect as in others,
thanks not least (for the most recent years) to the publications of
the Missáo de Inquéritos Agricolos at Luanda under the leadership
of E. Cruz de Carvalho and J . Vieira da Silva; among these,
attention may be drawn to an investigation into rural education
conducted by F.-W. Heimer, Educando e sociedade nas areas rurdis de
Angola (Luanda, 1972). On the other hand, there is a very large
quantity of Portuguese books and ephemera, though of greatly
varying interest. Some of these are officially sponsored surveys
which, if invariably careful to offer no criticism, still contain
valuable information. Among these may be mentioned a series of
volumes sponsored by the Agencia Geral do Ultramar, and
compiled for the most part by H. Galváo and C. Selvagem,
Imperio ultramarino portugués; for instance, Angola, vol. I l l (Lisbon,
1952), and Mozambique (with India etc.), vol. IV (195 3). The census
returns of 1940 and 1950 are usefully considered by A. Moreira,
As élites das provincias portuguesas de indígenato (Guiñé, Angola,
Mozambique) (Lisbon, 1956). Useful commentaries will also be
found in C. F. Spence, Mozambique (London, 1963). Many mem-
oirs, commentaries and controversies were also written or written
about. A guide to much of all this is in two good bibliographies:
G. J . Bender et aL, Portugal in Africa (Los Angeles, 1972), a
catalogue of the extensive collection of Portuguese colonial
materials assembled in the library of the University of California
at Los Angeles; and G. J . Bender and A. Isaacman,' The changing
historiography of Angola and Mozambique', in C. Fyfe (ed.),
African studies since 194J (London, 1976), a survey and listing of
principal works.
Aside from the constitutional texts of the Estado N o v o and
from Salazar's rare but interesting speeches on African questions
(see, for instance, a speech to the National Assembly of 30 Nov.
i960, which I myself have managed to read only in a Spanish
900

I}. P O R T U G U E S E - S P E A K I N G A F R I C A
version: Portugal y la campaña anticolonialista (Santiago, Chile)),

several commentaries on the regime's theory and practice may be
singled out as being of especial value. One such is J . M. da Silva
Cunha, O sistema portugués de política indígena (Coimbra, 1 9 5 3 ) ,
where this veteran of the Estado N o v o discusses the gap between
intentions and achievements; another, notable for its lapidary
identification of the regime's objectives, is M. Caetano, Os nativos
na economía Africana (Coimbra, 1 9 5 4 ) . These are representative of
a small group of authoritative texts produced for no propagandist
purpose, and may be compared with statements made urbi et orbi,
all merely polemical, such as A. Moreira, Portugal's stand in Africa
(New Y o r k , 1 9 6 2 ) , and F. Nogueira, The United Nations and
Portugal (London, 1 9 6 3 ) , or The Third World (London, 1 9 6 7 ) .
Against these may be set a number of critical studies from
within the regime or its dissident periphery, notably the writings
of H. Galváo in 1 9 4 7 and after. This author's excoriating internal
report to a closed session of the National Assembly, made in 1 9 4 7
while he was still inspector-general of colonies but moving into
strong dissidence, was published clandestinely in Portugal and
reproduced in part in English in B. Davidson, The African
awakening (London, 1 9 5 5 ) , and in extenso by Galváo himself in his
Santa Maria (London, 1 9 6 1 ) . W o r t h reading in the same context
is a memoir by the veteran Norton de Matos, written at the age
of 86 from a position generally critical of the Estado Novo's
policies: Africa nossa (Lisbon, 1 9 5 3 ) . A m o n g immediate post-coup
studies, outstanding is E. de Sousa Ferreira, Aspectos do colonialismo
Portugués (Lisbon, 1 9 7 4 ) .
Compared with studies of Angola or Mozambique, Guiñé,
Cape Verde and Sao Tomé fare poorly throughout the period. For
Guiñé there is A . Teixeira da Mota, Guiñé Portuguesa, 2 vols.
(Lisbon, 1 9 5 4 ) ; but this should be compared with the ecological
survey of the later nationalist leader, Amilcar Cabral, while still
in Portuguese government employment, in Boletim cultural da
Guiñé Portuguesa (Bissau, 1 9 5 4 - 6 ) , and reproduced in part in
A. Cabral (ed. M. de Andrade), Unite et lutte, vol. I (Paris, 1 9 7 5 ) .
Da Mota's book has a bibliography listing 387 titles. Cape
Verdean sources are notably defective, but something may be got
from A. Mendes Correia, Ultramar Portugués, vol. II (Lisbon,
1 9 5 4 ) , and a little from H. de Oliveira, Cabo Verde: Quinto ano de
seca (Lisbon, 1 9 7 3 ) , while the works of A. Carreira, writing
901

between 1966 and 1 9 7 7 , are continuously useful. Notable among

the last is his Migrates ñas llhas de Cabo Verde (Lisbon, 1 9 7 7 )
which, apart from useful historical notes on the period here in
question, offers the first serious published analysis of Cape
Verdean emigration and its various motives; usefully, this book
is also available in English. A first general bibliography of
Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, incomplete but valuable, is
J . M. McCarthy: Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde Islands: a compre-
hensive bibliography (New Y o r k and London, 1 9 7 7 ) . Sao Tomé is
the subject of a pioneering geographical and sociological survey
by F. Tenreiro, A Ilha de Sao Tomé (Lisbon, 1 9 6 1 ) .
A m o n g overall social studies for all territories, generally useful
for its statistics and analyses, is E. de Sousa Ferreira on the
cultural and educational aspects of the system, Portuguese colonialism
in Africa (UNESCO, 1 9 7 4 ) . Cultural and economic issues are also
discussed helpfully in some of the chapters in D. M. Abshire and
M. A . Samuels (eds.), Portuguese Africa: a handbook (London,
1 9 6 9 ) ; and, for Angola, see also W . Marques, Problemas do
desenvolvimento de Angola, 2 vols. (Lisbon, 1 9 6 5 ) . A general
historical survey of Angola in this period, strong on the Portu-
guese side but weak on the African, is in parts of D. L. Wheeler
and R. Pelissier, Angola (London, 1 9 7 1 ) . This may be contrasted
with a history written from the African side, Historia de Angola
(Porto, 1 9 7 4 ) , and with B. Davidson, In the eye of the storm:
Angola's people (London, 1 9 7 2 ) . The P A I G C has also produced a
history from the nationalist side: Historia: a Guiñé e as llhas de Cabo
Verde (Bissau, UNESCO, 1 9 7 4 ) .
Generally, for the period of the liberation wars, the Portuguese
bibliography dries to a trickle of descriptive or defensive works.
The most useful among these, for Angola, is H. E. Felgas, Guerra
em Angola (Lisbon, 1 9 6 1 ) , to which may be added journalistic
reportages such as P. da Costa, Urn mésde terrorismo (Lisbon, 1969).
Of continuing value for these years is the long series o f reports
made by the relevant special committee to the General Assembly
of the United Nations, covering all territories with detail from all
available sources; while the research and records section of the
UN Department of Political Affairs also published a valuable
series of summaries of major developments, and these, though
made for internal use, may no doubt be n o w generally available
for study. T o these should be added a book written by Salazar's
902

IJ. P O R T U G U E S E - S P E A K I N G A F R I C A
exiled successor, M. Caetano, Depoimento (Rio and Sao Paulo,

1 9 7 4 ) , and General Spinola's revealing interview with A . J .
Venter in the latter's Portugal's war in Guiné-Bissau (Pasadena,
1 9 7 3 ) . A notable study of the regime's military and administrative
effort in wartime Angola, with an extensive bibliography, is
G. J . Bender, Angola under the Portuguese: the myth and the reality
(London, 1 9 7 8 ) .
For the period of the wars on the African side, by contrast, the
bibliography of primary sources in ephemera, movement
documents, and published (or unpublished) writings by nationalist
leaders, is comparatively copious, while from 1 9 6 6 onward there
is a wide range of books, articles and papers by many foreign
observers. A s to the ephemera, a partial but useful collection is
housed by the University of London, while a large collection
going up to 1965 is at the Hoover Institute at Stanford; the latter
is catalogued in R. H. Chilcote, Emerging nationalism in Portuguese
Africa (Stanford, 1 9 6 9 ) , while the same author, in another
publication under the same title (Stanford, 1 9 7 2 ) , has reproduced
some of the more important documents in this collection.
Essential writings by Amflcar Cabrai are in his Unité et lutte, while
a few of such writings appeared in A. Cabrai, Revolution in Guinea
(London, 1 9 6 9 ) , and about two-thirds, including most of the
important items, in Unity and struggle (tr. M. Wolfers, London,
1 9 7 9 ) ; by Eduardo Mondlane in his The struggle for Mozambique
(London, 1 9 6 9 ) ; by Samora Machel in a booklet, Mozambique:
sowing the seeds of revolution (London, 1 9 7 4 ) ; while, for Angola, see
Documentos da independência (Department of Information, Luanda,
1 9 7 5 ) . Agostinho Neto's programmatic and other statements had
yet to be collected, but see, for a small collection covering 1 9 6 7 - 7 3 ,
A. Neto, Pensamento politico (Luanda, 1 9 7 6 ) . These sources are
indispensable to an understanding of the development of
nationalist theory and practice. For the period after independence,
nationalist newspapers such as Vitoria Certa and Jornal de Angola
(Luanda), No Pintcha (Bissau), and Tempo (Maputo) have much
valuble material, while Nô Pintcha has also published a very long
run of extracts from Cabral's writings, some of them for the first
time. By 1 9 8 0 , the whole bibliography was in rapid expansion.
External studies of the nationalist movements, often with the
reproduction of interviews and documents, include : for Guinea,
G. Chaliand, Lutte armée en Afrique (Paris, 1 9 6 7 ; Armed struggle
903

in Africa, New Y o r k , 1 9 6 9 ) ; B. Davidson, The liberation of Guiné,

with a foreword by Amflcar Cabrai (London, 1 9 6 9 ) ; R. Ledda,
Una rivoluzione Africana (Bari, 1 9 7 0 ) ; and L. Rudebeck, Guinea-
Bissau (Uppsala, 1 9 7 4 ) . For Angola: R. Davezies, La Guerre en
Angola (Bordeaux, 1 9 6 8 ) ; J . Marcum, The Angolan revolution, I:
The anatomy of an explosion 19/0-62 (Cambridge, Mass., 1969) and
B. Davidson, In the eye of the storm. For Mozambique : L. Passerini
(ed.), Colonialismo Portoghese e lotta di liberazione nel Mozambico
(Turin, 1 9 7 0 ; chiefly documents); B. Davidson, ' L a Guerrilla
africaine', in Le Monde Diplomatique (Paris, Nov. 1 9 6 8 ) ; J . S. Saul,
' F R E L I M O and the Mozambique Revolution ', in G. Arrighi and
J . S. Saul, Essays on the political economy of Africa (New Y o r k ,
1 9 7 3 ) ; S. Correa and E. Homem, Mozambique :primieras machambas
(Rio de Janeiro, 1 9 7 7 ) ; B. Munslow, 'The liberation struggle in
Mozambique and the origins of post-independence policy', in
University of Edinburgh (ed.), collected conference papers,
Mozambique, Edinburgh, 1 9 7 9 ; and the same author, Mozambique :
the revolution and its origins (London, 1983).
Although merely introductory save in respect o f basic national
ist writings, this brief list will at least serve to point the reader
in useful directions, beyond which individual bibliographies in
many of the studies cited, as well as the more general bibliographies
mentioned above, will indicate the further scope of materials
available by the early 1980s.
The historical sketch of this territory is based chiefly on A . de

Unzueta y Yoste, Guinea continental espanola (Madrid, 1 9 4 4 ) , and
Islas del Golfo de Guinea (Madrid, 1 9 4 5 ) ; L. B. Corella, Manuales del
Africa espanola (Madrid, 1 9 5 0 ) ; documentation supplied for the
purposes of the General Assembly (e.g. A / 5 0 7 8 / A d d . 3 of 26
March 1 9 6 2 ) ; Documentation Française, Notes et études documen
taires, les territoires espagnols d'Afrique (Paris, 1 9 6 3 ) ; and R. Pelissier,
' La Guinée espagnole ', in Revue Française de Science Politique, Paris,
Sept. 1 9 6 3 , v o l . 1 3 , 3 ; as well as on a variety of ephemera.
Information from the nationalist side is scanty, above all for the
years after 1 9 7 0 , while Spanish official archives have not been
inspected.
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921

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922

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Hance, W. A. African economic development. New York, 1958.
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923

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6. S O U T H E R N AFRICA
Suggestions for further reading in addition to titles mentioned in the

bibliographical essay and in footnotes; asterisks indicate English editions of
books originally published in another South African language.
Abrahams, P. Mine boy. London, 1946.

Ashton, H. The Basuto. London, 1952.
Ballinger, M . From union to apartheid. Cape T o w n , 1969.
Barber, J. P. South Africa's foreign policy 194J—1970. London, 1973.
Barker, A . The man next to me. London, 1962.
Bloom, H. Episode. London, 1956.
*Brink, A . Dry white season. London, 1980.
Benson, M . The African patriots. London, 1963.
Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland. Report of an economic
survey mission (Chairman C. Morse). London, i960.
Brandel-Syrier, M . Black women in search of God. London, 1962.
Brookes, E . H. Apartheid - a documentary study of modern South Africa. London,
1968.
Brown, A . C. ed. A history of scientific endeavour in South Africa. Cape T o w n , 1977.
Brutus, D . Letters to Martha and other poemsfrom a South African prison. London,
1968.
925

Bundy, C. The rise and fail of the South African peasantry. London, 1978.
Bunting, B. The rise of the South African reich. Harmondsworth, 1969.
Moses Kotane South African revolutionary. London, 1975.
y
Butler, J., Rotberg, R. I. and Adams, J. The black homelands of South Africa.
Berkeley, 1977.
Butterfteld, P. H. A history of education in Lesotho. Pretoria, 1977.
Carstens, W. P. The social structure of a Cape Coloured reserve. Cape Town, 1966.
Carter, G. M. and Philip, M. From the front line: speeches of Sir Seretse Khama.
London, 1980.
Cervenka, Z. and Rogers, B. The nuclear axis. London, 1978.
Clarke, E. and Ngobese, J. Women without men. Durban, 1975.
Cronje, G. Regverdige rasse-apartheid. Stellenbosch, 1947.
Davenport, T. R. H. & Hunt, K. S. The right to the land. Cape Town, 1974.
Davies, R. H. Capital, state, and white labour in South Africa, 1900-1960.
Brighton, 1979.
Desmond, C. The discarded people. Johannesburg, c. 1967.
Devereux, S. South African income distribution 1900-1980. Cape Town, 1983.
De Vries, J. L. Mission and Colonialism in Namibia. Johannesburg, 1978.
Dikobe, M. The Marabi dance. London, 1973.
Driver, C. J. Patrick Duncan: South African and Pan-African. London, 1980.
Friedman, B. Smuts: a reappraisal. Johannesburg, 1975.
Fugard, A. Three Port Elizabeth plays. New York, 1974.
Goldblatt, D. Some Afrikaners photographed. Sandton, 1975.
Gordimer, N. A world of strangers. Harmondsworth, 1962.
The black interpreters. Johannesburg, 1973.
Gordon, R. J. Mines, masters and migrants. Johannesburg, 1977.
Gray, S. A survey of English South African literature in the last ten years: research
developments. Johannesburg, 1982.
Greenberg, S. Race and state in capitalist development. New Haven, 1980.
Harvey, C. ed. Papers on the economy of Botswana. London, 1981.
Hellman, E. ed. Handbook of race relations in South Africa. Cape Town, 1949.
Hepple, A. South Africa: workers under apartheid. 2nd ed. London, 1971.
Verwoerd. Harmondsworth, 1967.
Hoernle, R. F. South African native policy and the liberal spirit. Johannesburg,
1945.
Holleman, J. F. ed. Experiment in Swaziland. Cape Town, 1964.
Horrell, M. ed. Annual survey of race relations in South Africa. Johannesburg,
1946-79.
Houghton, D. H., Wilson, M. et al. Keiskammahoek rural survey. 4 vols.
Pietermaritzburg, 1952.
Houghton, D. H. and Dagut, J. eds. Source material on the South African economy
1860-1970. 3 vols. Johannesburg, 1973.
Huddlestone, T. Naught for your comfort. Johannesburg, 1956.
Hugo, P. Quislings or realists? a documentary study of''Coloured' politics in South
Africa. Johannesburg, 1978.
Hyam, R. The failure of South African expansion 1908-19. New York, 1972.
Inskeep, R. The peopling of southern Africa. Cape Town, 1978.
926

Jabavu, N . Drawn in colour. London, i960.

Jones, D . Aid and development in southern Africa. London, 1977-
Jordan, A . C. Towards an African literature. Berkeley, 1973.
*The wrath of the ancestorîLovedale, 1980.
Joseph, H. Tomorrow's sun. N e w York, 1967.
*Joubert, E. The long journey of Poppie Nongena. Johannesburg, 1980.
Khaketla, B. M . Lesotho 1970 : an African coup under the microscope. London, 1971.
Khoapa, B. A . et al. eds. Black review. Four annual surveys. Durban, 1973-7-
Khopung, E. Apartheid: the story of a dispossessed people. Dar es Salaam, 1972.
Kotze, D . A . African politics in South Africa 1964-1974. London, 1975.
Kruger, D . W. South African parties and policies. Cape T o w n , i960.
Kuper, A . Kalahari village politics. Cambridge, 1970.
Kuper, H. Indian people in Natal. Pietermaritzburg, i960.
Kuper, L. Passive resistance in South Africa. London, i960.
An African bourgeoisie : race, class andpolitics in South Africa. N e w Haven, 196 5.
Laclau, E. ed. Capital accumulation and violence.
La Guma, A . ed. Apartheid. London, 1971.
Lee, R. B. The IKung San: men, women and work in a foraging society. Cambridge,
1979.
Legum, C. ed. Africa contemporary record: annual survey and documents. London,
1969- .
Lerumo, A . Fiftyfightingyears. London, 1971.
Lewin, H. Bändlet. London, 1974.
Luthuli, A . Let my people go. Johannesburg, 1962.
Malan, D . F. Afrikaner volkseenheid en my ervarings op die pad daarheen. Cape T o w n ,
1961.
Mandela, N . The struggle in my life. London, 1978.
Manganyi, N . C. Being black in the world. Johannesburg, 1973.
Marais, J. S. The Cape Coloured people. Johannesburg, 1939.
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Mbeki, G . South Africa: the peasants' revolt. Harmondsworth, 1964.
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Nattrass, J. South African economy: its growth and change. Cape T o w n , 1981.
Ngubane, H. Body and mind in Zulu medicine. London, 1977.
Ngubane, J. K . An African explains apartheid. London, 1963.
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N o Sizwe. One Anania, one nation: the national question in South Africa. London,
1979.
927

Nsekela, A. J. ed. Southern Africa: towards economic liberation. London, 1981.

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Sachs, E. S. (Solly). Rebels daughters. Alva, 1957.
9
Sadie, J. S. Projections of the South African population 1970-2020. Johannesburg,

1973.
Sampson, A. Drum. London, 1956.
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Scott, M. A time to speak. London, 1958.
Selwyn, P. Industries in the southern African periphery. London, 1975.
Sepamla, S. S. J. The Soweto I love. London, 1977.
Sihlali, L. L. The philosophy tenets and traditions of NlE.U.M. Unknown, n.d.
Silk, A. A shanty town in South Africa. Johannesburg, 1982.
Sillery, A. Botswana: a short political history. London, 1974.
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Pietermaritzburg, 1978.
Simons, H. J. and Simons, R. E. Class and colour in South Africa 18/0-19/0.
Small, A. Kitaar my kruis. Cape Town, 1962.
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Stevens, R. P. Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland. London, 1967.
Stubbs, A. ed. Steve Biko: I write what I like. London, 1978.
Study project on external investment in South Africa and Namibia, ed. Foreign
investment in South Africa. 5 vols. London, 1974-81.
Stultz, N. TranskeP s half loaf: race separatism in South Africa. New Haven, 1979.
928

Surplus People Project. Forced removals in South Africa: the SPP reports. 5 vols.
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THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY

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List of figures page x

The Second World War: prelude to decolonisation

Decolonisation and the problems of independence 5 2

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T h e African diaspora and post-194 5

5 T h e economic evolution o f developing Africa 192

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8 East and Central Africa 383

10 Egypt, Libya and the Sudan 502

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Burundi: from monarchy to Tutsi republicanism,

15 Portuguese-speaking Africa 755

Bibliographical essays 811

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1 Africa, 1940 page 3

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29 F r a n c o p h o n e tropical A f r i c a : the w e s t e r n states 612

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In the English-speaking w o r l d , the C a m b r i d g e histories h a v e

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continent, and the setting up o f the colonial structures b e t w e e n

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M a n y p e o p l e h a v e assisted the E d i t o r in the p r o d u c t i o n o f this

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W h e t h e r the Second W o r l d W a r marked a decisive stage in the

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historical survey, there m i g h t , therefore, seem to be a case for

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the terms o f the A n g l o - E g y p t i a n T r e a t y o f 1936, w h i l e indepen­

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w e r e expansionists w h o d r e a m e d d u r i n g the w a r o f creating an

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{MAURITANIA French territory of

I Areas still under colonial rule SOUTH o

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the terms o f the A n g l o - E g y p t i a n T r e a t y o f 1936, w h i l e indepen