As far as general exceptions under IPC are concerned, the accused cannot adopt a

“hit and trial” strategy by taking multiple pleas of general exception in a way that if
the accused fails to discharge his burden with respect to a specific plea, he can fall on
to a different defence plea. However, the accused could adopt an indirect approach
to prove a reasonable doubt against the case of the prosecution. The accused could
choose to rely on the material presented by the prosecution or by adducing evidence
through cross examination of the prosecution witnesses to create a reasonable doubt.
Thereafter, court can decide which exception would apply as per facts and
circumstances of the case. In other words, instead of taking a specific plea, the
accused could adduce evidence so as to create a reasonable doubt, leaving the court
to decide which exception will be applicable in the peculiar facts and circumstances
of the case.

1. Vijayee Singh And Ors vs State Of Uttar Pradesh (1990 AIR 1459)

The accused may raise a plea of exception either by pleading the same specifically or
by relying on the probabilities and circumstances obtaining in the case. He may
adduce the evidence in support of his plea directly or rely on the prosecution case
itself or, as stated above, he can indi- rectly introduce such circumstances by way of
cross-examina- tion and also rely on the probabilities and the other cir- cumstances.
Then the initial presumption against the accused regarding the non-existence of the
circumstances in favour of his plea gets displaced and on an examination of the
material if a reasonable doubt arises the benefit of it should go to the accused.
The accused can also discharge the burden under Sec. 105 by preponderance of
probabilities in favour of his plea. In case of general exceptions, special exceptions,
provisos contained in the Penal Code or in any law defining the offence, the Court,
after due consideration of the evidence in the light of the above principles, if
satisfied, would state, in the first instance, as to which exception the accused is
entitled to, then see whether he would be enti- tled for a complete acquittal of the
offence charged or would be liable for a lesser offence and convict him accord- ingly.
Other relevant cases on the subject matter:

1. Rishi Kesh Singh And Ors. vs The State [AIR 1970 All 51]- 9 judge bench
Allahbad HC

Para 97-98: An accused's plea of an exception may reach one of three not sharply
demarcated stages, one succeeding the other, depending upon the effect of the whole
evidence in the case judged by the standard of a prudent man weighing or balancing
probabilities carefully. These stages are. Firstly, a lifting of the initial obligatory
presumption given at the end of Section 105 of the Act; secondly, the creation of a
reasonable doubt about the existence of an ingredient of the offence; and, thirdly a
complete proof of the exception by a preponderance of probability', which covers
even a slight tilt of the balance of probability in favour of the accused's plea. The
accused is not entitled to an acquittal if his plea does not go beyond the first stage.
At the second stage, he becomes entitled to acquittal by obtaining a bare benefit of
doubt. At the third stage, he is undoubtedly entitled to an acquittal.

Para 153: Even a literal interpretation of the first part of Section 105 could indicate
that "the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within"

an exception is meant to cover complete proof of the exception pleaded, by a

preponderance of probability, as well as proof of circumstances showing that the
exception may exist which will entitle the accused to the benefit of doubt on the
ingredients of an offence. If the intention was to confine the benefit of bringing a
case within an exception to cases where the exception was established by a
preponderance of probability, more direct and definite language would have been
employed by providing that the accused must "prove the existence" of the exception
pleaded. But, the language used in the first part of Section 105 seems to be
deliberately less precise so that the accused, even if he fails to discharge his duty
fully, by establishing the existence of an exception, may get the benefit of the
exception indirectly when the prosecution fails in its duty to eliminate genuine
doubt about his guilt introduced by the accused. Again, the last part of Section 105,
even if strictly and literally interpreted, does not justify reading into it the meaning
that the obligatory presumption must last until the accused's plea is fully established
and not just till circumstances (i.e. not necessarily all) to support the plea are proved.
Moreover, a restrictive interpretation of Section 105, excluding an accused from the
benefit of bringing his case within an exception until he fully proves it, is ruled out
by the declaration of law by the Supreme Court that there is no conflict
between Section 105 and the prosecution's duty to prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt. Hence, the obligatory presumption, at the end of Section 105, cannot be held
to last until the accused proves bis exception fully by a preponderance of probability.
It is necessarily removed earlier or operates only initially as held clearly by judges
taking the majority view in Parbhoo's case, 1941 All LJ 619 - AIR 1941 All 402 (FB).

Para 154: My view, therefore, is that, in cases where the accused pleads exceptions,
the obligatory presumption is lifted as soon as there is some evidence to support the
plea. The accused may carry his plea further and succeed in creating a reasonable
doubt about an ingredient of an offence. The prosecution will have to remove this
doubt, possibly in the course of argument to succeed after this. In other cases, the
accused may have carried his case still further and established his plea by a
preponderance of probabilities. Although, there is no provision in our Criminal
Procedure Code for production of evidence in rebuttal by the prosecution, as of
right, after the accused has established an exception by a preponderance of
probability, yet, it is conceivable that, in exceptional cases, the prosecution may be
able to demolish the defence case, even after it is fully proved, by some rebutting
evidence which the Court is persuaded to admit under Section 540, Criminal P. C. in
exercise of the Court's power to decide the case justly after finding out the whole
truth. [The same view was reiterated in Partap v.The State of U.P (1976 AIR 966)]