POLITICAL LAW

I.

The proposals were not validly adopted by Congress.

Under the 1987 Constitution, the Congress has the power to amend portions of the
Constitution through three-fourths (3/4) vote of the members of the Congress, comprising
of the Senate and the House of Representatives, voting separately.

In this case, the three-fourths (3/4) vote of Congress was obtained, when both
houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives voted jointly. Thus, running
contrary to the mandate of the Constitution that the three-fourths (3/4) vote of the
Congress, shall be obtained by the three-fourths (3/4) vote of the two (2) Houses, voting
separately.

Therefore, the proposals made by the House of Representatives to increase the

legislative districts and to increase the party-list representatives were not validly adopted
by Congress.

II.

If I were consulted by those behind the new attempt at a people’s initiative, I

would advise them that they cannot propose to come up with a people’s initiative to
define a political dynasty.

Under the 1987 Constitution, people’s initiative may be resorted to for purposes
of proposing an amendment to the Constitution. The 1987 Constitution provides that the
people shall be goven equal opportunity to engage in politics and that political dynasties,
as defined are prohibited.

In this case, several citizens are attempting at a people’s initiative to propose the
definition of a political dynasty. The 1987 Constitution, mentioned that political
dynasties, as defined are prohibited. However, the 1987 Constitution did not in any way
define what political dynasties are, nor is there any enabling law defining the same. The
power of people’s inititative is limited to amendment and ratification. Thus, the power of
inititative cannot be validly exercised on the very reason that there is nothing to amend,
since no definition was placed in the 1987 Constitution and other enabling laws with
respect to the term political dynasties.

Thus, as their counsel I would advise them that they cannot propose to come up
with a people’s initiative to define a political dynasty.

III.

As the counsel of Seamacho, I will argue that once a law has been declared as
unconstitutional it can no longer be validly reenacted.

The 1987 Constitution gave the Supreme Court the authority to decide whether a
law promulgated by the Congress is constitutional or not, for purposes of checks and
balances among the branches of the government. As a rule, once the Supreme Court
decides on the unconstitutionality of a law or a provision of a law, such law or provision
cannot be further enacted since it runs against the Consititution, due to the rule of
constitutional supremacy.
 In this instant case, the Supreme Court already ruled in the case of Serrano vs.
Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. that the fifth (5th) paragraph of RA No. 8042 is
unconstitutional. Thus, the Congress cannot reinstate the provision which was previously
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. The Congress by enacting RA No.
10222, which reinstated the provision declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court,
violated the rule on constitutional supremacy.

IV.

The defense of Beauty is partly meritorious.

The COMELEC as a rule has the jurisdiction on contests related to elections.

However, once the winning candidate has already promulgated, took oath, and assumed
office, the jurisdiction with respest to election contests now rests on the Electoal
Tribunal, and the COMELEC no longer has jurisdiction over such election contests.

In this case, there was a pending disqualification case against Beauty with the
COMELEC, and the decision of the COMELEC was promulgated ten (10) days after the
elections, or days after Beauty was already proclaimed as the winning candidate, took her
oath, and assumed office. The disqualification case pending before the COMELEC was
instituted prior to Beauty’s proclamation as the winning candidate and prior to her taking
her oath of office. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal will only start to have
jurisdiciton over election cases, when such case is instituted after the winning candidate
takes her oath of office. Hence, the COMELEC at the time of the promulgation of the
decision still has jurisdiction over the person of Beauty.

Thus, making Beauty’s defense partly meritorious.

V.

The observations of Bluebean are valid.

Under the law, the party-list is granted a seat at the House of Representatives if it
obtains at least 2% of votes and that it represents a marginalized or underrepresented
sector of society.

In this case, Greenpeas as correctly observed by Bluebean, cannot be entitled to a

seat on the House of Representatives since it did not obtain at least 2% of the votes,
Greenpeas obtained 1.99% total amount of votes, falling short from what is required
under the law. Likewise, Greenpeas cannot validly participate in the party-list system
since it does not represent a marginalized or underrepresented sector of society.

Thus, making Bluebean’s observations valid.

VI.

Yes, the senators are correct in saying that Strongwill can be detained indefinitely,
since the Senate is a continuing body.

Unde the 1987 Constitution, the Senate is granted the right to place a person
during a Senate inquiry in contempt. The Senate in the exercise of its contempt power can
indefinitely, as the Senate is a continuing body.

In this case, Strongwill was detained indefinitely and the senators refused to
release him, claiming that the Senate is a continuing body. The Senate, as a continuing
body may convene from time to time, and as an exercise of its contempt power, it can
validly detain Stronghold indefinitely.

Thus, the Senate is correct in saying that Strongwill can be detained indefinitely,
since the Senate is a continuing body.

VII.

Yes, the president can still make appointments to the judiciary during the so-
called midnight appointment ban period, and Margie, the cousin of the President can be
validly appointed as a Court of Appeals Justice.

Under the 1987 Constitution, the president two (2) months prior to the end of his
term, is prohibited from making any appointment in the executive branch, unless such
appointment would be temporary in nature for purposes of filling in a vacancy. The
President also has the power to appoint, however, the power of the president to appoint is
prohibited by the Constitution. The president cannot appoint any of his family members
as his cabinet secretary, and to be the head of an office or department under the executive
branch.

In this case, Margie, the cousin of the president is being appointed as a Court of
Appeals Justice. The 1987 Constitution prohibits the appointment of relatives of the
president to positions in the executive branch. Thus, the president can validly appoint
Margie as a Court of Appeals Justice, since it is not prohiboted under the 1987
Constitution. Likewise, the president can make such appointment even within the
midnight appointment-ban, since such ban only applies to appointments in the executive
branch and not to the judiciary branch, like that in this case.

Thus, the president can still validly make appointments to the judiciary during the
so-called midnight appointment ban period, and Margie, the cousin of the President can
be validly appointed as a Court of Appeals Justice.

VIII.

No, the president does not have such authority.

Under the 1987 Constitution, the Congress, specifically the House of

Representatives has the sole power to promulgate the General Appropriations Act, and all
other branches of the government shall abide by the appropriations made by the
Congress.

In this case, the Congress has already allotted an amount of money for the
construction of the new bridge, the president and the executive branch’s duty is to
properly execute the appropriations made by the Congress, and has no autonomy to
appropriate the funds for some other project.

Thus, the president has no authority to decide against the release of the funds
under the Special Appropriations Act.

IX.

X.
 C
XI.

Yes, the court can validly decide the case even if the law has not yet become
effective.

Under the law, laws prior to its promulgation can be questioned on the ground of
being overborad. Under this rule, the people can properly petition for the review of laws
being proposed by the Congress when it sees that such law would infringe upon the
protected freedom of the people, on areas of speech.

In this case, the Solicitor General, countered the petition of the petitioners, stating
that there is no basis for the exercise of the power of judicial review since there has been
yet no violation of the law. The law allows the people to properly petition to strike down
a proposed bill when the people can see that a it would heavily affect the proper exercise
of their right to freedom of speech and expression.

Thus, the court can validly decide the case even if the law has not yet become
effective.

XII.

(A)

No, the announced 8-7 decision was not yet properly promulgated and can be
subjected to recall.

Under the law, a decision to be considered valid must be in writing, stating that
facts and the laws used to obtain such decision, and that it should be signed by all of the
incumbent members of the judiciary who participated in the deliberations

In this case, the decision has neither been signed by the incumbent members of
the judiciary who participated in the deliberations nor has ot even been reduced into
writing. Thus, there has been no decision promulgated and the decision can still be
subjected to recall.

(B)

No, the decision cannot be promulgated when the justice died.

Under the law, for a decision to be valid it should be signed by the incumbent
members of the judiciary who participated in the deliberations.

In this instant case, one of the members of the court died prior to the promulgation
of the decision. The rule is clear that for the decision to be valid it should be signed by all
of the incumbent members of the judiciary who participated in the deliberations, since
one member is no longer an incumbent member at the time of the finalization of the
decision, such decision cannot be promulgated.

(C)
 No, the Court should not release to the public the majority decision and the
separate opinions, together with their deliberations on ths issues, prior to the
promulgation of the decision.
In a case decided by the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court ruled that, a decision
becomes public only once such decision has been promulgated. However, absent such
promulgation, the majority decision and the separate opinions remains a private and
internal information which cannot be divulged to the general public.

Thus, the Court should not release to the public the majority decision and the
separate opinions, together with their deliberations on ths issues, prior to the
promulgation of the decision, since such discussion is internal and private in nature.

XIII.

XIV.

XV.

If I were the judge, I would resolve the issue in favor of the authorities.

Under the 1987 Constitution, the people are granted the freedom of expression,
which includes the right to press freeedom. However, such right may be limited on the
basis of compelling state interest test. The compelling state interest test, is one of the
limitations imposed by the laws on the freedom of the expression, when such expression
would affect public order.

In this case, the authority validly prohibited the dissemination of the news articles
made by Deepthroat since the articles would greatly affect the public order. The
authorities can validly limit the freedom of the press if the exercise of such right would
casue an grave effect on public order, which is also a valid exercide of police power.

XVI.

XVII.

Yes, COA is entitled to receive the rest of its appropriations without complying
with the DBM policy.

Under the 1987 Constitution, the constitutional commissions exercise fiscal

autonomy, and shall be limited only by the limitations imposed in the Consitution.

In this case, DBM imposed a policy of no return, no release, a policy which limits
the power of fiscal autonomy of the COA. The Constitution did not make any such
limitation to the exercise of fiscal autonomy of the COA. Absent such constitutional
limitation, the DBM has no power and authority to hold the appropriations of the COA,
absent its report on expenditures.
 Thus, COA is entitled to receive the rest of its appropriations without complying
with the DBM policy.
XX.

XXI.

XXII.

If I were the lawyer of Farmerjoe, I would petition the court for the payment of
just compensation in favor of my client, due to the unlawful taking of the property of my
client by NPGC.

Under the 1987 Constitution, the government in the exercise of its power of
eminent domain, may take a private property for public purpose, upon payment of just
compensation.

In this case, there was a taking of a private property when NPGC installed
transmission lines on the property of Farmerjoe, since Farmerjoe was not paid just
compensation, an unlawful taking took place. Thus, an action for the claim of just
compensation may be properly instituted against NPGC.

XXIII.

If I were the judge, I would rule in favor of the prosecution.

Under the Bill of Rights, the accused under custodial investigation shall have the
right to be assisted by counsel, and any confession made without the assistance of
counsel shall be inadmissible.

In this case, the confession and admission made by Edward was not done during
the custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the accused is already
considered as the main suspect and when he is already placed in custody. In the instant
case, Edward is not yet placed under custodial investigation, hence his extrajudicial
admission is admissible in evidence, as the same was made voluntarily.

XXIV.

Yes, Alienmae can invoke the right against self-incrimination even if the fear of
incrimination is in regard to her foreign law.

The 1987 Constitution provides for the right of the people to be compelled into
being a witness against himself, this right is available to anyone who is being subjected to
any governmental process wherein the right of the person against self-incrimination is
being affected.
 In this case, Alienmae is invoking her right against self-incrimination in regard to
a foreign law. Alienmae may validly invoke the right against self-incrimination because
this right is available to anyone who is being asked incriminating questions, regardless of
the law being affected. Thus, Alienmae can invoke the right against self-incrimination
even if the fear of incrimination is in regard to her foreign law.

XXV.

Yes, Rosebud is disqualified to run by reason of her citizenship.

As a rule, Filipino citizenship is retained even if a woman marries a foreigner,

unless, the national law of the foreign spouse specifically mentions that the woman shall
automatically be naturalized as a citizen of the country of her foreign spouse.

In this case, Rosebud by being married to Rockcold automatically became a

citizen of the State of Frozen. Thus, at the time of her running for Congress, she was a
dual citizen of the Philippines and the State of Frozen. As a rule, to be a candidate for a
position in Congress one should be a natural born Filipino and a citizen of the
Philippines, the law specifically prohibits a person having dual allegiance to run for
office. Thus, Rosebud should first renounce her citizenship in the State of Frozen and
have herself recognized as a citizen of the Philippines before she can be eligible to run for
office.

XXVI.

XXVII.

The law enacted by Congress exempting certain government institutions

providing social services from the payment of court fees is unconstitutional.

Under the 1987 Constitution only the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate
rules relative to the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged, such power cannot be limited and encroached upon by
the other branches of the government.

In this case, the Congress enacted a law exempting certain government

institutions providing social services from the payment of court fees, the Congress even
argued that it can enact said law since it was a legislative fiat that the Judicial
Development Fund and the Special Allowance of Judge and Justices was created,
however, such argument is unmeritorious. As a rule and as provided for by the
Constitition it is only the Supreme Court that can promulgate rules with respect to the
practice of law and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Hence, the law enacted by
Congress exempting certain government institutions providing social services from the
payment of court fees is unconstitutional.

XXVIII.

The position of the propoenents is unmeritorious.

Under the law, for a province to be validly considered as provice it should have a
contiguous land area of at least 2,000 square meters, unless, the province consists of one
or more islands, then the requirement of a contiguous land area of at least 2,000 square
meters may be excused.

In this case, the total land area of the province Hundred Isles has an aggregate
amount of 500 square meters, falling short of the 2,000 square meter requirement as
provided by law. What the law excuses in case of a province comprising of one or more
islands, is the requirement that it should comprise of a contiguous land, and not the 2,000
square meter requirement. Hence, the Hundred Isles cannot be a valid new province since
it fails to satisfy the 2,000 square meter land area requirement.

XXIX.

The claim of Ambassador Gaylor does not hold water.

Under the law, ambassadors and foreign envoys has the privilege of state
immunity, meaning they are immune from application of the law of the receiving
country, when such violation was made in the exercise of his official functions.

In this case, Ambassador Gaylor is the diplomatic representative of State Juvenus

to State Hinterlands, the receiving country. Ambassador Gaylor committed the crime of
pedophilia in State Paradise, which is not his receiving country. Hence, Ambassador
Gaylor cannot invoke his right to state immunity when he performed the crime of
pedophilia in State Paradise, because his state immunity is only limited to his receiving
country, State Hinterlands.

XXX.

As Professor Boombastick’s understudy, I would argue that the exercise of

judicial power under the 1987 Constitution is limited to the Supreme Court only.

Under the Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution only the Supreme
Court has the power to promulgate rules relative to the admission to the practice of law,
the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Said power cannot be
limited and encroached upon by the other branches of the government.

The Congress by passing RA No. 15005, which created an administrative Board

tasked with the supervision and regulation of the legal education, clearly encroached
upon the judicial power of the Supreme Court. The 1987 Constitution is clear in its
mandate that the Supreme Court has the sole power to promulgate rules relative to the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar. Thus, any law promulgated by
Congress with respect to the admission to the legal education seriously encroaches upon
the exclusive right of the Supreme Court.