LLAMADO VS COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 84850 June 29, 1989

FACTS OF THE CASE

Ricardo A. Llamado was Treasurer of Pan Asia Finance Corporation. Together with
Jacinto N. Pascual, Sr., President of the same corporation, petitioner Llamado was prosecuted for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in Criminal Case No. 85-38653, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 49. The two w had co-signed a postdated check payable to private respondent
Leon Gaw in the amount of P186,500.00, which check was dishonored for lack of sufficient
funds. In a decision dated 10 March 1987, the trial court convicted the petitioner alone, since
jurisdiction over the person of Pascual, who had thoughtfully fled the country, had not been
obtained. Petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of one (1) year of prision
correccional and to pay a fine of P 200,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. Petitioner was also required to reimburse respondent Gaw the amount of
P186,500.00 plus the cost of suit. petitioner through counsel orally manifested that he was taking
an appeal. Having been so notified, the trial court on the same day ordered the forwarding of the
records of the case to the Court of Appeals. While his Appellant's Brief was being finalized by
his then counsel of record, sought advice from another counselor. On 30 November 1987,
petitioner, with the assistance of his new counsel, filed in the Regional Trial Court a Petition for
Probation invoking Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended. The Petition was not, however,
accepted by the lower court, since the records of the case had already been forwarded to the
Court of Appeals. Petitioner asked the Court of Appeals to grant his Petition for Probation or, in
the alternative, to remand the Petition back to the trial court, together with the records of the
criminal case, for consideration and approval under P.D. No. 968, as amended.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for probation, despite the prior perfection of the appeal, be
granted?

Ruling: No, the petition for probation should be dismissed.

Under the Probation law of 1976, it is stated that under Section 4(2):

“Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a

fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court, with notice to the
appellate court if an appeal has been taken from the sentence of conviction. The filing of the
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal, or the automatic withdrawal of a
pending appeal.”

In its amendment on December 1977, the said provision amended, and stated as:

“Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a

fine with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. An application for probation shall be
filed with the trial court, with notice to the appellate court if an appeal has been taken from the
sentence of conviction. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to
appeal, or the automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal. In the latter case, however, if the
application is filed on or after the date of the judgment of the appellate court, said application
shall be acted upon by the trial court on the basis of the judgment of the appellate court.”

As clearly stated under the subsequent amendment, that An application for probation
shall be filed with the trial court, and if an appeal has been taken, the filing of such shall be
deemed a waiver. If the appeal is already perfected, then there is no other recourse but to dismiss
the petition for probation, where, The Court of appeals have no jurisdiction to settle the case.

Courts have no authority to invoke "liberal interpretation' or "the spirit of the law"
where the words of the statute themselves leave no room for doubt or interpretation. the spirit of
the law and the intent that is to be given effect are to be derived from the words actually used by
the law-maker, and not from some external and transcending the words of the legislature.
PEOPLE VS ECHAVES
GR NO. L-47757-61, JANUARY 28, 1980

FACTS OF THE CASE

On October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower court separate
informations against sixteen persons charging them with squatting as penalized by Presidential
Decree No. 772. in the year 1974 continuously up to the present at barangay Magsaysay,
municipality of Talibon, province of Bohol and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with stealth and strategy, enter into, occupy and cultivate a portion of
a grazing land physically occupied, possessed and claimed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. as
successor to the pasture applicant Celestino de la Serna of Pasture Lease Application No. 8919,
accused's entrance into the area has been and is still against the win of the offended party; did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously squat and cultivate a portion of the said
grazing land; said cultivating has rendered a nuisance to and has deprived the pasture applicant
from the full use thereof for which the land applied for has been intended, that is preventing
applicant's cattle from grazing the whole area, thereby causing damage and prejudice to the said
applicant-possessor-occupant, Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr.

Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order dated December 9, 1977
dismissing the five informations on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered
the land through "stealth and strategy", whereas under the decree the entry should be effected
"with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of
the landowner", and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the
cultivation of a grazing land. Because of that order, the fiscal amended the informations by using
in lieu of "stealth and strategy" the expression "with threat, and taking advantage of the absence
of the ranchowner and/or tolerance of the said ranchowner". The fiscal asked that the dismissal
order be reconsidered and that the amended informations be admitted. The lower court denied the
motion. It insisted that the phrase "and for other purposes" in the decree does not include
agricultural purposes because its preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agriculture and
makes reference to the affluent class. From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this
Court under Republic Act No. 5440. The appeal is devoid of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not that trial Court is correct in holding that the said law is intended only to
Urban community

Ruling: No, The court held that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to
pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban
communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do
individuals. The squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas. The rule of
ejusdem generis invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the
decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal
constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is
resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain
PEOPLE VS PURISIMA
GR No. L-42050-66

FACTS OF THE CASE

Twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented,
respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve
one basic question of law.These Petitions or appeals involve three Courts of First Instance,
namely: the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, presided by Hon. Amante P. Purisima
(17 Petitions), the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVIII, presided by Hon. Maximo A.
Maceren (8 Petitions) and, the Court of First Instance of Samar, with Hon. Wenceslao M. Polo,
presiding, (1 Petition). Before those courts, Information were filed charging the respective
accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On
a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective
cases filed before them the details of which will be recounted below an Order quashing or
dismissing the Information, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts
which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one
essential element of the crime. Thus, are the Information filed by the People sufficient in form
and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under
Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9? This is the central issue which we shall resolve and
dispose of, all other corollary matters not being indispensable for the moment.

ISSUE: whether or not the information filed by the people sufficient in form and substance to
constitute the offense of “Illegal possession of deadly weapon” penalized under Presidential
Decree No. 9?

RULING: No, The Court affirms the decision of the lower court to dismiss the petitions.

In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure a presidential decree in these

cases the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative
intent is the controlling factor. in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that
undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction
of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable,
mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences. It is to be presumed that
when P.D. was promulgated by the President there was no intent to work a hardship or an
oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression, arming one person with a
weapon to impose hardship on another, and so on.
There are certain aids available to ascertain the intent or reason for P.D. 9(3); First, the
presence of events which led to or precipitated the enactment of P.D. 9. These events are clearly
spelled out in the "Whereas" clauses of the presidential decree, thus: (1) the state of martial law
in the country pursuant to Proclamation 1081 dated September 21, 1972; (2) the desired result of
Proclamation 1081 as well as General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are particularly mentioned in
P.D. 9; and (3) the alleged fact that subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence,
criminality, chaos, aid public disorder mentioned in Proclamation 1081 are committed and
abetted by the use of firearms and explosives and other deadly weapons.

UNITED STATES VS HART

GR NO. 8848, NOVEMBER 21, 1913

FACTS OF THE CASE

The Defendants, Hart, Miller, and Natividad, were arraigned in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga on a charge of vagrancy under the provisions of Act No. 519, found guilty, and were
each sentenced to six months' imprisonment. Hart and Miller were further sentenced to a fine of
P200, and Natividad to a fine of P100. All appealed. The defense showed that Hart and one Dunn
operated a hotel and saloon at Angeles which did a business, according to the bookkeeper, of
P96,000 during the nineteen months preceding the trial; that Hart was also the sole proprietor of
a saloon in the barrio of Tacondo; that he raised imported hogs which he sold to the Army
garrison at Camp Stotsenberg, which business netted him during the preceding year about
P4,000; that he was authorized to sell several hundred hectares of land owned by one Carrillo in
Tacondo; that he administered, under power of attorney, the same property; and that he furnished
a building for and paid the teacher of the first public school in Tacondo, said school being under
Government supervision. The defense showed without contradiction that Miller had been
discharged from the Army about a year previously; that during his term of enlistment he had
been made a sergeant; that he received rating as "excellent" on being discharged; that since his
discharge he had been engaged in the tailoring business near Camp Stotsenberg under articles of
partnership with one Burckerd, Miller having contributed P1,000 to the partnership; that the
business netted each partner about P300 per month; that Miller attended to business in an
efficient manner every day; and that his work was first class.

Under the said Law, it is provided that;

“(1) Every person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability
to work, and who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling; (2) every person
found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses, or tramping or straying through
the country without visible means of support; (3) every person known to be a pickpocket, thief,
burglar, ladrone, either by his own confession or by his having been convicted of either of said
offenses, and having no visible or lawful means of support when found loitering about any
gambling house, cockpit, or in any outlying barrio of a pueblo; (4) every idle or dissolute person
or associate of known thieves or ladrones who wanders about the country at unusual hours of the
night; (5) every idle peron who lodges in any barn, shed, outhouse, vessel, or place other than
such as is kept for lodging purposes, without the permission of the owner or person entitled to
the possession thereof; (6) every lewd or dissolute person who lives in and about houses of ill
fame; (7) every common prostitute and common drunkard, is a vagrant.”

The Attorney-General that as visible means of support would not be a bar to a conviction
under any one of the last four clauses of this act, it was not the intention of the Legislature to
limit the crime of vagrancy to those having no visible means of support.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is the intention of the law to limit the crime of vagrancy to those
having no visible means of support.

RULING: Yes, The Court held in the affirmative.

When the meaning of a legislative enactment is in question, it is the duty of the courts
to ascertain, if possible, the true legislative intention, and adopt that construction of the statute
which will give it effect. The construction finally adopted should be based upon something more
substantial than the mere punctuation found in the printed Act

the absence of visible means of support or a lawful calling is necessary under these
statutes to a conviction for loitering around saloons, dram shops, and gambling houses is not
even negatived by the punctuation employed. the three of the defendants were earning a living by
legitimate methods in a degree of comfort higher that the average. Their sole offense was
gambling, which the legislature deemed advisable to make the subject of a penal law. The games
in which they participated were apparently played openly, in a licensed public saloon, where the
officers of the law could have entered as easily as did the patrons.
EUGENIO VS DRILON
GR no. -109404 , January 22, 1996

FACTS OF THE CASE

On May 10, 1972, private respondent purchased on installment basis from petitioner
and his co-owner/developer Fermin Salazar, two lots in the E & S Delta Village in Quezon City.
Acting on complaints for non-development docketed as NHA Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620 filed by
the Delta Village Homeowners' Association, Inc., the National Housing Authority rendered a
resolution on January 17, 1979 inter alia ordering petitioner to cease and desist from making
further sales of lots in said village or in any project owned by him. While NHA Cases Nos. 2619
and 2620 were still pending, private respondent filed with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication
and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), a
complaint (Case No. 80-589) against petitioner and spouses Rodolfo and Adelina Relevo
alleging that, in view of the above NHA resolution, he suspended payment of his amortizations,
but that petitioner resold one of the two lots to the said spouses Relevo, in whose favor title to
the said property was registered. Private respondent further alleged that he suspended his
payments because of petitioner's failure to develop the village. On October 11, 1983, the
OAALA rendered a decision upholding the right of petitioner to cancel the contract with private
respondent and dismissed private respondent's complaint.

On appeal, the Commission Proper of the HSRC reversed the OAALA and, applying
P.D. 957, ordered petitioner to complete the subdivision development and to reinstate private
respondent's purchase contract over one lot, and as to the other is ordered to immediately refund
to the complainant-appellant all payments made thereon, plus interests computed at legal rates
from date of receipt hereof until fully paid.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PD 957 can be retroactively applied to contract entered prior to its
enactment.

RULING: Yes, The Court held in the positive.

The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced
when ascertained Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true
intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of
the act. reading from the preamble, the legislative intent must have been to remedy the by
having P.D. 957 operate retrospectively even upon contracts already in existence at the time of
its enactment the State will not be able to exercise its regulatory functions and curb fraudulent
schemes and practices perpetrated under or in connection with those contracts and transactions
which happen to have been entered into prior to P.D. 957, despite obvious prejudice to the very
subdivision lot buyers sought to be protected by said law. It is hardly conceivable that the
legislative authority intended to permit such a loophole to remain and continue to be a source of
misery for subdivision lot buyers well into the future
PEOPLE VS ASTORGA
GR NO. 110097, December 22, 1997

FACTS OF THE CASE

Appellant Arnulfo Astorga was charged with violation of Article 267, paragraph 4
of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:

“That on or about December 29, 1991 in the Municipality of Tagum, Province of

Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with deliberate intent and by means of force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously kidnap Yvonne Traya, a minor, 8 years of age, thereby depriving her of her
liberty against her will, to the damage and prejudice of said offended party.” He pleaded not
guilty, and eventually convicted with the said felony. The statement of the accused was based on
the premise that he was drunk, and he did not forcefully brought and dragged Yvonne on route to
Tagum, Davao City. He stated that it is merely a confusion brought upon by him being drunk.
While His defense was satisfactorily rebutted by the Prosecution’s witnesses, including the
statement of Yvonne, and the men who chased after them. On the appeal was filed directly with
this Court in view of the penalty imposed

ISSUE: Whether or not the Crime of Kidnapping is satisfactorily committed

RULING: No, The Court held in the negative.

It is clear that the appellant and the victim were constantly on the move. They went to
Maco Elementary School and strolled on the school grounds. When nobody was at the
Luponlupon bridge, appellant took the victim to the highway leading to Tagum, Davao. At that
time, Yvonne pleaded with appellant that she really wanted to go home to Binuangan, but
appellant ignored her pleas and continued walking her toward the wrong direction. Later on, the
group of Witness Arnel Fabila spotted them.

Appellant Astorga carried the victim and ran, but Fabila's group chased and caught up
with them. This narration does not adequately establish actual confinement or restraint of the
victim, which is the primary element of kidnapping. Appellant's apparent intention was to take
Yvonne against her will towards the direction of Tagum. Appellant's plan did not materialize,
however, because Fabila's group chanced upon them. The evidence does not show that appellant
wanted to detain Yvonne; much less, that he actually detained her. Appellant's forcible dragging
of Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot be said to be an actual confinement or restriction on
the person of Yvonne. There was no "lockup." Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of
kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.

The felony committed in this case is grave coercion under Article 286 of the same
code. Grave coercion or coaccion grave has three elements: (a) that any person is prevented by
another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his or
her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either
by material force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control
over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of
another has no right to do so or, in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of a
law or in the exercise of any lawful right

The intent of detaining or forcefully locking up Yvonne is not clearly established by the
prosecution. Hence, The Court deems it only proper to change the said felony from kidnapping
to grave coercion.
PEOPLE VS DEGAMO
GR NO. 121211, April 30, 2003

FACTS OF THE CASE

On October 4, 1994, a complaint was filed before the trial court charging appellant
with the crime of rape to which, upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty. On January 17, 1995,
before the start of the trial proper, the court a quo allowed the complaint to be amended to
include the allegation that by reason of the incident of rape, the victim has become insane, to wit:
The Prosecutor accuses Roneto Degamo alias Roy of the crime of rape

That on or about the 1st day of October 1994 at around 1:00 o clock in the early
morning, in Brgy. Punta, Ormoc City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused being then armed with a bladed weapon, by means of violence and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
the complainant herein Ellen Virtudazo, against her will and in her own house. All contrary to
law and with the aggravating circumstances that the said offense was committed in the dwelling
of the offended party, the latter not having given provocation for the offense; and that by reason
of the incident of rape, the victim become insane. Hence it should Qualify the Crime of Rape,
and elevate the penalty to Death Penalty.

The trial Court sentenced the accused with reclusion Perpetua to Death hence the
automatic appeal for review to the high Court. The Accused contented that it should not qualify
the crime of rape with the qualifying circumstance of the victim being insane, according to
Accused, the incapacity of the victim is temporary only and as a result not qualify the crime.
Since insanity as a qualifying circumstance is only applicable when it is permanent and
perpetually inflicted with the victim

ISSUE : WHETHER OR NOT THE CRIME OF RAPE SHOULD BE QUALIFIED BY

VIRTUE OF THE VICTIM’S INSANITY

RULING : Yes, The High Court ruled in the affirmative

It is a doctrine in statutory construction that it is the duty of the court in construing a

law to determine legislative intention from its language. The history of events that transpired
during the process of enacting a law, from its introduction in the legislature to its final validation
has generally been the first extrinsic aid to which courts turn to construe an ambiguous act. The
interpellations on Senate Bill No. 21 which later evolved into R.A. No. 2632 did not include the
rationale for the inclusion of the victims insanity by reason or occasion of rape as a qualifying
circumstance. Neither did the legislators discuss the degree of insanity of the victim by reason or
on occasion of rape for it to be considered as a qualifying circumstance.
 the words perpetual and incapacity were not retained by the legislators. They merely
used the word insanity. It is well-established in legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute,
care should be taken that every part or word thereof be given effect since the lawmaking body is
presumed to know the meaning of the words employed in the statute. it is without any doubt that
when the legislators included the victims resultant insanity as a qualifying circumstance in rape
cases, it did not intend or impose as a condition that the insanity must be of permanent nature, or
that it should have been manifested by the victim before the filing of the complaint of
information, before, during or after trial. Otherwise, it would have been so expressly stated
CRUZ VS COURT OF APPEALS
GR no. 108738, June 17, 1994

FACTS OF THE CASE

Complaining witness Andrea Mayor is a businesswoman engaged, among others, in

granting interest-bearing loans and in rediscounting checks. Sometime in 1987, she was
introduced to herein petitioner, Roberto Cruz who at that time was engaged in the business of
selling ready-to-wear clothes at the Pasay Commercial Center. From then on, petitioner has been
borrowing money from Mayor. On March 15, 1989, petitioner borrowed from Andrea Mayor one
hundred seventy six thousand pesos (P176,000.00). On April 6, 1989, Mayor delivered the said
amount to petitioner himself in the latter’s stall at the Pasay Commercial Center. Cruz, in turn,
issued Premiere Bank Check No. 057848 postdated April 20, 1989 for same amount. When the
check matured, complaining witness presented it to the drawee bank for payment but the same
was dishonored and returned for reason "account closed." When notified of the dishonor,
petitioner promised to pay his obligation in cash. No payment was made, hence, an information
for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed against the petitioner.

The Petitioner’s contention was the complainant, knew from the start of the closed
account, and the drawing of the check is merely an act to ensure or to secure the obligation, him
having no intention to draw and use the check as payment.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE
VIOLATION OF BP 22

RULING: YES, The Court held in the affirmative.

BP 22, is a special law, which in nature is mala prohibitum. Hence intent and malice is
not a material element for the perpetration or the commission of the crime. What is material is
the act of drawing a check which has no funds, for whatsoever purposes the drawer may having
to draw the check. BP 22 applies even in cases where dishonored checks are issued merely in the
form of a deposit or a guarantee. The enactment in question does not make any distinction as to
whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or merely to
guarantee the said obligation. In accordance with the pertinent rule of statutory construction,
inasmuch as the law has not made any distinction in this regard, no such distinction can be made
by means of interpretation or application. Furthermore, the history of the enactment of subject
statute evinces the definite legislative intent to make the prohibition all-embracing, without
making any exception from the operation thereof in favor of a guarantee. This intent may be
gathered from the statement of the sponsor of the bill which was enacted later into Batas
Pambansa 22, when it was introduced before the Batasan Pambansa, that the bill was introduced
to discourage the issuance of bouncing checks, to prevent checks from becoming "useless scraps
of paper" and to restore respectability to checks, all without distinction as to the purpose of the
issuance of the checks.
PEOPLE VS MANANTAN
GR NO. 14129 July 31, 1962

FACTS OF THE CASE

An information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First

Instance of that Province, defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section
54 of the Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in
the finding a probable cause that the crime charged as committed by defendant. Thereafter, the
trial started upon defendant's plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information on
the ground that as justice of the peace the defendant is one of the officers enumerated in Section
54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding that a
justice of the peace is within the purview Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense
counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs.
Macaraeg, (CA-G.R. No. 15613-R, 54 Off. Gaz., pp. 1873-76) where it was held that a justice of
the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on
this second motion to dismiss, the answer of the prosecution, the reply of the defense, and the
opposition of the prosecution, the lower court dismissed the information against the accused
upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT UNDER SECTION 54 OF THE REVISED ELECTION CODE,

THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE IS INCLUDED AMONGST THOSE PROHIBITED BY
LAW?

RULING: YES, The High Court ruled in the affirmative.

The maxim "casus omisus" can operate and apply only if and when the omission has
been clearly established. In the case under consideration, it has already been shown that the
legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers
precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. Rather, they were merely called by
another term. In the new law, or Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, justices of the peace
were just called "judges."
The weakest link in our judicial system is the justice of the peace court, and to so
construe the law as to allow a judge thereof to engage in partisan political activities would
weaken rather than strengthen the judiciary. On the other hand, there are cogent reasons found in
the Revised Election Code itself why justices of the peace should be prohibited from
electioneering. Along with Justices of the appellate courts and judges of the Court of First
Instance, they are given authority and jurisdiction over certain election cases

The Exclusion of the term of Justice of the peace and Judges of the “Court of First
instance” is to broaden up the inclusions within the term such as Judges on Labor and other kinds
of Judges and Justices. Our law-making body has consistently prohibited justices of the peace
from participating in partisan politics. They were prohibited under the old Election Law.
Likewise, they were so enjoined by the Revised Administrative Code.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GR NO. 83815 , February 22, 1991

FACTS OF THE CASE

The constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being challenged by petitioners

on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those
provided in the Constitution. According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution," the only exceptions against holding any other office or
employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-
President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII
thereof; and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council
by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII. Whereby in the said Executive order 284, which
authorizes cabinet officials to hold other positions other than their primary position, as stated
under sections 1, 2 and 3, which according to the petitioner runs contrary to the Constitution.

ISSUE : WHETHER OR NOT THE SAID EXECUTIVE ORDER IS CONSIDERED

UNCONSTITUTIONAL

RULING: Yes, The High Court ruled in the affirmative.

In constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under

consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in
mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be
prevented or remedied. he object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the
Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished

This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government soon led to
abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-
enrichment. It is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications to hold other office
or employment, the prohibition pertains to an office or employment in the government and
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The explained that the phrase
“unless otherwise provided in this constitution” must be given a literal interpretation to refer only
to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself which are Section 3 of Article VII and
Section 8 of Article VIII
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 178056 November 18, 2008

FACTS OF THE CASE

During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33
municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other
municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No.
9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local
Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality
into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain,
municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue
Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. After the effectivity of
RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29,
which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24
municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th
Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution
No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the
Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills.
The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from
the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009. On 22 December 2006, the House of
Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in
February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills
lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the
President’s signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine
whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their
municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional
for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal
protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into
cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more
cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of
the Local Government Code.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT The Cityhood laws are unconstitutional.

RULING: YES, The High Court ruled in the affirmative.

The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the
criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one
Local Government Code.The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local
Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of
a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood
Laws.

The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation
of a city. No other law, not even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent
of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the
the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the
Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

There can be no resort to extrinsic aids if the language of the law is plain, clear and
unambiguous. Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, did not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement, not even to
respondent municipalities whose cityhood bills were then pending when Congress passed RA
9009. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contains no
exemption whatsoever. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality
desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to
go beyond the letter of the law in applying Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009.
DE LEON VS DUTERTE
GR no. 252118, May 2020

FACTS OF THE CASE.

Petitioner alleged that the president has been absent from several engagements during
the pandemic of Covid-19, and puts a serious doubt as to the actual health condition of the
President. He filed a request under FOI, with the Office of the President so as to secure the
necessary medical health bulletins and Certificate of the President, to no avail, his request was
not successfully reciprocated by the said office. He filed a petition for mandamus, alleging that,
under Section 12 of the Article VII of the Philippine Constitution, is an actionable and
demandable right that the Petitioner may file via Petition for Mandamus.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT The Petitioner’s Petition for Mandamus should be granted.

RULING: No, The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

Based on the deliberations of the Commission, “ We are called upon to be more trusting
with respect to the Office of the President, that they will know what appropriate means to take in
order to release this information to the public in satisfaction of the public’s right to know of the
presidency. The state of health or analysis as to the actual condition of the president should be
left to the president and his doctor, and that the burden to the Office of the President to choose
the appropriate means of releasing information to the public:”
PRIMCIAS VS OCAMPO
GR NO L-6120

FACTS OF THE CASE

Petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Manila with two
statutory offenses, namely, (1) with a violation of Commonwealth Act No. 606, which was
docketed as criminal case No. 18374, in that he knowingly chartered a vessel of Philippine
registry to an alien without the approval of the President of the Philippines and (2) with a
violation of section 129 in relation to section 2713 of the Revised Administrative Code, which
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 18375, in that he failed to submit to the Collector of
Customs the manifests and certain authenticated documents for the vessel "Antarctic" and failed
to obtain the necessary clearance from the Bureau of Customs prior to the departure of said
vessel for a foreign port.

On April 23, 1952, before the trial of said criminal cases, petitioner filed a motion praying that
assessors be appointed to assist the court in considering the questions of fact involved in said
cases as authorized by section 49 of Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known as Revised Charter
of the City of Manila, which provides that "the aid of assessors in the trial of any civil or
criminal action in the Municipal Court, or the Court of First Instance, within the City, may be
invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure." This motion was opposed by
the City Fiscal who appeared for the People of the Philippines. the court issued an order denying
the motion holding in effect that with the promulgation of the Rules of Court by the Supreme
Court, which became effective on July 1, 1940, all rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts of the Philippines previously existing were not only superseded but
expressly repealed, that the Supreme Court, having been vested with the rule-making power,
expressly omitted the portions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding assessors in said Rules
of Court, and that the reference to said statute by section 49 of Republic Act No. 409 on the
provisions regarding assessors should be deemed as a mere surplusage.

ISSUE: The right of the petitioner to a trial with the aid of assessors is an absolute substantive
right, and the duty of the court to provide assessors is mandatory.

RULING: Being substantive in nature, it is not difficult to see why the provisions concerning
trial by assessors embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure have not been incorporated by the
Supreme Court in the present Rules of Court. To have done so, it would have been a travesty of
its rule-making power which, by direct mandate of the Constitution, is limited to matters
referring to pleading, practice and procedure. The application that the respondents draw from the
failure to incorporate these provisions in the present Rules of Court to the effect that the intention
was to eliminate them or repeal them all together cannot, therefore, stand in the light of the
observations and authorities we have above adverted to.
CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION v. OPLE
GR. No. L-44717
28 August 1985

FACTS OF THE CASE

This is a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the decision of the respondent
Secretary, now Minister of Labor which denied the petitioner's claim for holiday pay and its
claim for premium and overtime pay differentials. The petitioner claims that the respondent
Minister of Labor acted contrary to law and jurisprudence and with grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating Sec. 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and in issuing Policy Instruction
No. 9, both referring to holidays with pay.

On May 20, 1975, the Chartered Bank Employees Association, in representation of

its monthly paid employees/members, instituted a complaint with the Regional Office No. IV,
Department of Labor, now Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) against private
respondent Chartered Bank, for the payment of ten (10) unworked legal holidays, as well as for
premium and overtime differentials for worked legal holidays from November 1, 1974. (NLRC)
ruled in favor of the petitioners ordering the respondent bank to pay its monthly paid employees,
holiday pay for the ten (10) legal holidays effective November 1, 1974 and to pay premium or
overtime pay differentials to all employees who rendered work during said legal holidays. On
appeal, the Minister of Labor set aside the decision of the NLRC and dismissed the petitioner's
claim for lack of merit basing its decision on Section 2, Rule IV, Book Ill of the Integrated Rules
and Policy Instruction No. 9.

ISSUE WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER ACTED CONTRARY TO LAW AND

ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE CLAIMS OF THE PETITIONER

RULING: YES, The High Court ruled in the positive.

While it is true that the respondent Minister has the authority in the performance of his
duty to promulgate rules and regulations to implement, construe and clarify the Labor Code, such
power is limited by provisions of the statute sought to be implemented, construed or clarified. An
administrative interpretation which diminishes the benefits of labor more than what the statute
delimits or withholds is obviously ultra vires. Any slight doubts must be resolved in favor of the
workers. This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate of promoting social justice and
affording protection to labor, To resolve the labor dispute in the light of the parties' own
collective bargaining agreement and the benefits given by law to all workers. When the law
provides benefits for "employees in all establishments and undertakings, whether for profit or
not" and lists specifically the employees not entitled to those benefits, the administrative agency
implementing that law cannot exclude certain employees from its coverage simply because they
are paid by the month or because they are already highly paid. The remedy lies in a clear
redrafting of the collective bargaining agreement with a statement that monthly pay already
includes holiday pay or an amendment of the law to that effect but not an administrative rule or a
policy instruction.

PEOPLE VS PUNO
GR NO. 97471, February 17, 2007

FACTS OF THE CASE

Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue, Quezon

City called Nika Cakes and Pastries. She has a driver of her own just as her husband does, At
around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal
driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on account of
local election there) arrived at the bakeshop. He told Mrs. Socorro that her own driver Fred had
to go to Pampanga on an emergency (something bad befell a child), so Isabelo will temporary
(sic) take his place. Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so she got
into the Mercedes Benz of her husband with Isabelo on the wheel. After the car turned right in
(sic) a corner of Araneta Avenue, it stopped. A young man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded
the car beside the driver. Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front seat
and went onto where Ma. Socorro was seated at the rear. He poke (sic) a gun at her. Isabelo, who
earlier told her that Enrique is his nephew announced, "ma'm, you know, I want to get money
from you." She said she has money inside her bag and they may get it just so they will let her go.
The bag contained P7,000.00 and was taken. Further on, the two told her they wanted
P100,000.00 more. Ma. Socorro agreed to give them that but would they drop her at her gas
station in Kamagong St., Makati where the money is? The car went about the Sta. Mesa area.
Meanwhile, Ma. Socorro clutched her Rosary and prayed. Enrique's gun was menacingly storing
at her soft bread brown, perfumed neck. He said he is an NPA and threatened her. The car sped
off north towards the North superhighway. There Isabelo, Beloy as he is called, asked Ma.
Socorro to issue a check for P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro complied. She drafted 3 checks in
denominations of two for P30 thousand and one for P40 thousand. Enrique ordered her to
swallow a pill but she refused, Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later, he
changed his mind and turned the car again towards Pampanga. Ma. Socorro, according to her,
jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side of the superhighway and, after some
vehicles ignored her, she was finally able to flag down a fish vendors van. Her dress had blood
because, according to Ma. Socorro, she fell down on the ground and was injured when she
jumped out of the car. Her dress was torn too. On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the
matter to CAPCOM. Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was arrested trying to
encash Ma. Socorro's P40,000.00 check at PCI Bank, Makati.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said robbery can be classified as "highway robbery" under PD No.
532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)

RULING: No, The Court ruled in the negative.

The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of
robbers. The heart of the offense consists in the formation of a band by more than three armed
persons for the purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation is sufficient to constitute a violation
of art. 306. It would not be necessary to show, in a prosecution under it, that a member or
members of the band actually committed robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable
by violent means. The crime is proven when the organization and purpose of the band are shown
to be such as are contemplated by art 306. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a band,
whose members were not primarily organized for the purpose of committing robbery or
kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply because robbery
was committed by a band of more than three armed persons, it would not follow that it was
committed by a band of brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306, it is required that the band "sala
a los campos para dedicarse a robar."

The purpose of brigandage is indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only a

particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed
participants. The martial law legislator, in creating and promulgating Presidential Decree No.
532 for the objectives announced therein, could not have been unaware of that distinction and is
presumed to have adopted the same, there being no indication to the contrary. This conclusion is
buttressed by the rule on contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn from the time
when and the circumstances under which the decree to be construed originated.
Contemporaneous exposition or construction is the best and strongest in the law.
ABAQUIN SECURITY AND DETECTIVE AGENCY, INC vs. ATIENZA
G.R. No. 72971. October 15, 1990.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Petitioner security agency employed private respondent Antonio B. Jose as a
security guard on August 29, 1959. Almost twenty-five (25) years later or on April 12, 1984,
Jose voluntarily resigned in view of his failing health and his desire to withdraw his cash
deposits with petitioner. He was then sixty-one (61) years old. After Jose had executed a
certificate of discharge acknowledging full payment of his services as well as a quitclaim of all
demands against petitioner, the latter, relying on the absence of any management policy or
agreement between them regarding retirement or termination benefits, paid Jose only his cash
deposits. Feeling aggrieved, Jose filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint against petitioner for separation pay, or in lieu
thereof, gratuity benefits equal to one-half month salary for every year of service and other
benefits provided for by law.

Labor Arbiter Domingo V. del Rosario dismissed Jose's complaint on the following
grounds: (a) an employee's enjoyment of retirement benefits or separation pay under Article 288
of the Labor Code and Sections 13 and 14 (a), Rule I, Book VI of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code is subject to the existence of a retirement plan, individual or
collective agreement or established management policy; (b) Jose cannot claim under said
implementing rules benefits which are not granted by the Code, otherwise the then Ministry of
Labor would be guilty of legislative usurpation; and (c) Jose was put in estoppel when he
executed the certificate of discharge and when he voluntarily resigned.

The NLRC construed Section 14 (a) of Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the Labor Code in relation to the second paragraph of Article 288 as entitling
a retiring employee to termination pay of one-half (1/2) month for every year of service in the
absence of any agreement or employer policy on retirement pay. It ruled that said Section 14 (a)
was intended "to give full effect and application to Article 288 of the Labor Code (which) covers
all retiring employees, regardless of the existence of any agreement, company policy or
otherwise." It added that under the principle of equity, it is only just and fair to reward retiring
employees for their long years of faithful service to their employer. Moreover, the NLRC said
that Jose's execution of the certificate of discharge "never implied (his) abdication" or waiver of
the benefits due him under existing laws on account of the principle that labor standards are not
subject to waiver or any agreement which would deprive the workingman of said benefits.

ISSUE: whether or not a 61-year-old security guard who voluntarily resigned is entitled to
retirement benefits under Article 288 of the Labor Code

whether or not Sections 13 and 14 (a), Rule I, Book VI of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code can alter, repeal or modify said Article 288.
RULING:

Article 287 recognizes that existing laws already provide for a scheme by which
retirement benefits may be earned or accrue in favor of employees, as part of a broader social
security system that provides not only for retirement benefits but also death and funeral benefits,
permanent disability benefits, sickness benefits and maternity leave benefits. Section 14 of
Implementing Rule I, like Article 287 of the Labor Code, does not purport to require
‘termination pay’ to be paid to an employee who may want to retire but for whom no additional
retirement plan had been set up by prior agreement with the employer. What Section 14 of
Implementing Rule I may be seen to be saying is that where termination pay is otherwise payable
to an employee under an applicable provision of the Labor Code, and an additional or consensual
retirement plan exists, then payments under such retirement plan may be credited against the
termination pay that is due, subject, however to certain conditions.

While it is true that the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by

executive officers whose duty is to enforce it should be given great weight by the courts, still if
such construction is so erroneous, as in the instant case, the same must be declared as null and
void. It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct constitutional (and/or
statutory) interpretation, in the context of the interactions of the three branches of the
government, almost always in situations where some agency of the State has engaged in action
that stems ultimately from some legitimate area of governmental power
ADASA VS ABALOS
GR NO. 168617
February 19, 2007

FACTS OF THE CASE

Abalos alleged in the complaints-affidavits that petitioner, through deceit, received and
encashed two checks issued in the name of respondent without respondent's knowledge and
consent and that despite repeated demands by the latter, petitioner failed and refused to pay the
proceeds of the checks. Respondent alleged in the complaints-affidavits that petitioner, through
deceit, received and encashed two checks issued in the name of respondent without respondent's
knowledge and consent and that despite repeated demands by the latter, petitioner failed and
refused to pay the proceeds of the checks. "one part of the statute cannot be reconciled or
harmonized with another part without nullifying one in favor of the other." In the instant case,
however, Section 7 is neither contradictory nor irreconcilable with Section 12. As can be seen
above, Section 7 pertains to the action on the petition that the DOJ must take, while Section 12
enumerates the options the DOJ has with regard to the disposition of a Petition for Review or of
an appeal.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN THE DECISION

RULING: No, The Court affirmed the decision of the appellate Court.

Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the provisions of DOJ
Circular No. 70 violated three basic rules in statutory construction. First, the rule that the
provision that appears last in the order of position in the rule or regulation must prevail. Second,
the rule that the contemporaneous construction of a statute or regulation by the officers who
enforce it should be given weight. Third, petitioner where the word "shall" had been construed as
a permissive, and not a mandatory language.

The all-too-familiar rule in statutory construction, in this case, an administrative rule of

procedure, is that when a statute or rule is clear and unambiguous, interpretation need not be
resorted to. Since Section 7 of the subject circular clearly and categorically directs the DOJ to
dismiss outright an appeal or a Petition for Review filed after arraignment, no resort to
interpretation is necessary.

Petitioner's reliance to the statutory principle that "the last in order of position in the rule or
regulation must prevail" is not applicable. In addition to the fact that Section 7 of DOJ Circular
No. 70 needs no construction, the cited principle cannot apply because, as correctly observed by
the Court of Appeals, there is no irreconcilable conflict between Section 7 and Section 12 of
DOJ Circular No. 70. Section 7 of the circular provides.
"one part of the statute cannot be reconciled or harmonized with another part without nullifying
one in favor of the other." In the instant case, however, Section 7 is neither contradictory nor
irreconcilable with Section 12. As can be seen above, Section 7 pertains to the action on the
petition that the DOJ must take, while Section 12 enumerates the options the DOJ has with
regard to the disposition of a Petition for Review or of an appeal.