[G.R. No. 110286. April 2, 1997.]
" 1
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. RENERIO P. VERGARA, ERNESTO T.
CUESTA, JR., PEDRO G. DAGAÑO and BERNARDO
P. CUESTA, Accused, RENERIO P.
VERGARA, Accused-Appellant.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Aurelio D. Menzon for Accused-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
CRIMINAL LAW; P.D. 704 AS AMENDED BY P.D. NO.
1058; THE TRIAL COURT ACTED CORRECTLY IN
FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY FOR
VIOLATING SECTIONS 33 AND 38 THEREOF. —
Nestor Aldas, an Agricultural Technologist and Fish
Examiner working with the Department of Agriculture,
Palo, Leyte, who examined the fish samples taken from the
accused, testified that he was with the team patrolling, on
04 July 1992, the waters of San Pedro Bay, Baras, Palo,
Leyte, when he, like the other members of his team,
witnessed the use of explosives by the accused. Fish
samples from the catch showed ruptured capillaries,
ruptured and blooded abdominal portion, and crushed
internal organs indicating that explosives were indeed used.
The Court is convinced that the trial court has acted
correctly in finding accused-appellant guilty of the offense
charged.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
From the decision, dated 10 February 1993, of the Regional
Trial Court, 8th Judicial Region, Branch 7, in Tacloban
City, finding accused Renerio P. Vergara guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 92-09-508 of a
violation of Section 33 of Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No.
704, as amended by P.D. No. 1508, an appeal to this Court
has been interposed.cralawnad
Vergara was charged, together with his three co-accused,
namely Ernesto T. Cuesta, Jr., Pedro G. Dagaño and
Bernardo P. Cuesta, on 25 September 1992, in an
information that read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The undersigned Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte accuses
Ernesto T. Cuesta, Jr., Pedro G. Dagaño, Renerio P.
Vergara and Bernardo P. Cuesta of the crime of Violation
of Section 33, Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1058, committed as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 4th day of July, 1992, in the
Municipal waters of Palo, Province of Leyte, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without any authority of law,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally catch, take and gather fish belonging to the
anchovies species known locally as ‘bolinao’, with the use
of explosives contained in a bottle and called in the
vernacular as ‘badil’, which bottled explosives after being
ignited and hurled to the sea, produced explosion and
caused the death of the said fish which were hit or affected
by such explosion.
"CONTRARY TO LAW.
Vergara alone was arraigned and brought to trial; his co-
accused escaped and remained at large.
It would appear that at about 7:30 in the morning of 04 July
1992, a team composed of deputized Fish Warden and
President of the Leyte Fish Warden Association Jesus P.
Bindoy, Police Officers Casimiro Villas and Diosdado
Moron of the Palo PNP Station, Leyte, Fish Wardens Mario
Castillote and Estanislao Cabreros and Fish Examiner
Nestor Aldas of the Department of Agriculture were on
board, "Bantay-Dagat," a pumpboat, on "preventive patrol"
along the municipal waters fronting barangays Baras and
Candahug of Palo, Leyte, when they chanced upon a blue-
colored fishing boat at a distance of approximately 200
meters away. The boat, 30 feet long, had on board appellant
Renerio Vergara and his three co-accused Bernardo Cuesta,
Pedro Dagaño and Ernesto Cuesta, Jr., and was on parallel
course toward the general direction of Samar. 2
Momentarily, the team saw appellant throw into the sea a
bottle known in the locality as "badil" containing
ammonium nitrate and having a blasting cap on top which,
when ignited and thrown into the water, could explode. The
explosion would indiscriminately kill schools and various
species of fish within a certain radius. Approximately three
seconds after appellant had thrown the "badil" into the sea,
the explosion occurred. Vergara and Cuesta dove into the
sea with their gear while Dagaño and Cuesta, Jr., stayed on
board to tend to the air hose for the divers. 3
The team approached the fishing boat. SPO2 Casimiro
Villas boarded the fishing boat while Fish Warden Jesus
Bindoy held on to one end of the boat. Moments later,
Vergara and Cuesta surfaced, each carrying a fishnet or
"sibot" filled with about a kilo of "bolinao" fish scooped
from under the water. Having been caught red-handed, the
four accused were apprehended and taken by the patrol
team to the "Bantay-Dagat" station at Baras, and later to the
police station in Palo, Leyte. The fishing boat and its
paraphernalia, as well as the two fishnets of "bolinao," were
impounded. The accused, however, refused to sign and
acknowledge the corresponding receipts
therefor.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
On 10 February 1993, following the submission of the
evidence, the trial court rendered judgment convicting
Vergara, viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, said Renerio Vergara is hereby sentenced
to a penalty of Twenty (20) years to life imprisonment as
punished under Sec. 2, of PD 1058.
"This Court further orders the confiscation of the fishing
boat of Mario Moraleta including the following
equipments: 1 air compressor, 3 sets of air hoses, and the 3
pieces of ‘sibot’ having been found to be instruments of the
crime.
"SO ORDERED" 4
In his appeal, Vergara submitted the following assignment
of errors:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF AUTHORITY WHEN IT COMPLETELY
IGNORED THE TESTIMONY OF EMILIO LINDE.
"2. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF AUTHORITY WHEN IT GAVE MUCH
WEIGHT TO BIASED WITNESSES WHOSE
TESTIMONIES WERE GLARINGLY INCONSISTENT.
1
"3. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE
Page
ABUSE OF AUTHORITY WHEN IT OPENLY
SHOWED BIAS AGAINST THE ACCUSED DURING
THE TRIAL OF THIS CASE." 5
Emilio Linde sought to corroborate the claim of appellant
that it was another unidentified group of fishermen who
threw the bottle of explosives at a school of "bolinao" fish.
It was obvious, however, said the trial court, that the
statement of this defense witness was incredulous since he
apparently had not at all been on board the fishing boat in
the company of the accused at the time of the incident.
Even the rather lengthy counter-affidavit of the four
accused completely missed to mention Linde. The court a
quo went on to observe that the demeanor of the accused at
the witness stand and the substance of his testimony failed
to elicit belief.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Trial courts are tasked to initially rule on the credibility of
witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense.
Appellate courts seldom would subordinate, with their own,
the findings of trial courts which concededly have good
vantage points in assessing the credibility of those who take
the witness stand. Nevertheless, it is not all too uncommon
for this Court, in particular, to peruse through the transcript
of proceedings in order to satisfy itself that the records of a
case do support the conclusions of trial courts.
Fish Warden Jesus Bindoy gave a detailed account of the
4th July 1992 incident. Thus
"FISCAL DAGANDAN:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q In the morning of the 4th day of July, 1992 do you
recall where you were?
"A We were on the sea fronting barangays Baras and
Candahug.
"Q What municipality?
"A Palo, Leyte.
"Q Did you have anyone with you in this particular
incident?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Who were they?
"A Two policemen Casimiro Villas, Jr. and Diosdado
Moron and my fellow fish warden and one from the
Department of Agriculture.
"Q Will you identify your co-fish warden who were present
at that time?
"A Mario Castillote, Estanislao Cabreros, Jr.
"Q How about that employee from the Department of
Agriculture, who was he?
"A Nestor Aldas.
"Q What were you doing at that particular time on this
place fronting barangay Baras and Barangay Candahug,
Palo, Leyte?
"A We were watching for illegal fishers.
"Q What is your authority in this particular task?
"A We are the bantay dagat members of Palo.
"A Do you have any written authorizing evidencing that
position?
"A Yes, ma’am, our deputized ID (witness is showing ID
No. 1432-91)
"FISCAL DAGANDAN:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
For the records your honor I will quote this ID: This is to
certify that Jesus P. Bindoy is a deputy fish warden vested
with full power and authority to enforce all existing fishery
laws, rules and regulations (SGD) Leopoldo Romano,
[D]irector, Department of Agriculture, Region 8.
"FISCAL DAGANDAN:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q Since you claimed that you were on the sea fronting
barangays Baras and Candahug in what vehicle were you in
at that moment?
"A We were in a motorized pumpboat.
"Q So, what unusual incident if any that transpired?
"A In that morning we saw a blue pump boat which is
about 200 meters away from us.
"COURT
What time in the morning?
"A About 7:30 in the morning more or less.
"FISCAL DAGANDAN:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q About how long is this colored blue pumpboat?
"A More or less 30 feet.
"Q At about this distance of 200 meters were you able to
visualize or see if there were any passengers in that blue
colored pumpboat?chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
"A Yes, ma’am.
"Q Were you able to identify them?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Who were they?
"A The one infront of the pumpboat was Renerio Vergara,
Bernardo Cuesta, Pedro Dagaño and Ernesto Cuesta, Jr.
"Q You mentioned of Renerio Vergara, whom you saw in
that blue colored pumpboat and you identified earlier
Renerio Vergara. Is he the same person?
"A Yes, they are one and the same person.
"Q At the time you saw these persons loaded in that color
blue pumpboat what were they doing?
"A I saw them paddling.
"Q Towards what direction?
"A Towards the direction of Samar.
"Q And where were you in relation with that pumpboat that
was paddled towards Samar area?
"A We were situated parallel to them.
"Q So what happened at this particular time?
"A That was when we saw Renerio Vergara threw a bottle
to the sea and after that we heard an explosion.
2
Page
"Q Did you come to know what particular bottle was it
thrown to the sea?
"A It was a dynamite (badil).
"Q As a member of this bantay dagat are you familiar with
this ‘badil’ which you earlier mentioned?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Will you describe this particular device?
"A This bottle is filled with ammonium nitrate and on top is
a blasting cap.
"Q So in case this is used by fishermen, how do they
operate this ‘badil’?
"A It is ignited and then thrown to the sea and this result in
the killing of fishes at the sea.
"Q In this particular instance when you heard the explosion
how far were you to this blue pumpboat?
"A About 200 meters.
"Q So what did you do after you heard this explosion?
"A After the explosion we slowly approached them.
"Q From the time you saw this bottle being thrown to the
sea by Vergara up to the time you heard this explosion
about how many minutes elapsed?
"A About 3 seconds.
"Q At about how near were you to this blue pumpboat?
"A We went near to a distance of one hundred meters.
"Q So, what did you do at this distance?
"A We kept on watching them first and after we knew that
the two persons dived to the sea that was the time that we
approached the pumpboat.
"Q Were you able to recognize these two persons who
dived?
"A Yes, ma’am.
"Q Who were they?
"A Renerio Vergara and Bernardo Cuesta.
"Q You said there were four persons loaded in that
pumpboat. How about the other two what were they doing?
"A The two persons were there, one watching the hose that
was used by the two persons who dived for breathing.
"Q So, what else did you do?
"A When we approached the pumpboat it was Casimiro
Villas, a policeman who boarded the pumpboat.
"Q How about you what did you do when Casimiro Villas
boarded the pumpboat?
"A I was the one holding on to the blue pumpboat.
"Q So, what else was done if any by the members of your
team?
"A While we were there we let the two persons who dived
surface and they were carrying with them fishnet filled with
‘bolinao’ fish and then we told them that we will bring
them to our temporary station at Baras, Palo.
"Q Do you know the specie of this bolinao?
"A Anchovies.
"Q About how heavy were these fishes of bolinao in the
fishnet?
"A About one kilo per fishnet.
"Q How many contraption were carried by them?
"A Each one of them was carrying one ‘sibot’ (fishnet).
"COURT
So, two divers two nets?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q And each has a catch of one kilo?
"A Almost one kilo.
"Q So, two nets two kilos more or less?
"A Yes, sir.
"FISCAL DAGANDAN:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q So, after that what did you do?
"Q When we arrived at our temporary station at Baras, Palo
we gave the fishes to the fish examiner and we had the
pumpboat inventoried and told them to sign the receipt we
made.
"Q Do you recall if you made an apprehension report of the
incident you witnessed?
"A Yes, ma’am.
"Q I show you an original copy of apprehension report
dated July 4, 1992 addressed to the Regional Director,
Department of Agriculture, Tacloban City stating that the
following offenders namely Renerio Vergara y Prisno,
Pedro Dagaño y Gadin, Ernesto Cueta y Tobilla and
Bernardo Cuesta y Pedrero were apprehended and the
violation is fishing with the use of dynamite, the original of
which is found on page 4 of the records. Will you examine
the same and tell this court what relation has that to the
report you said you made?
"A This is the apprehension report that we prepared on July
4, 1992." 6
Nestor Aldas, an Agricultural Technologist and Fish
Examiner working with the Department of Agriculture,
Palo, Leyte, who examined the fish samples taken from the
accused, testified that he was with the team patrolling, on
04 July 1992, the waters of San Pedro Bay, Baras, Palo,
Leyte, when he, like the other members of his team,
witnessed the use of explosives by the accused. Fish
samples from the catch showed ruptured capillaries,
ruptured and blooded abdominal portion, and crushed
internal organs indicating that explosives were indeed
used.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
The Court is convinced that the trial court has acted
correctly in finding accused-appellant guilty of the offense
charged.
Sections 33 and 38 of P.D. No. 704, as amended by P.D.
3
No. 1058, read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Page
"Sec. 33. Illegal fishing; illegal possession of explosives
intended for illegal fishing; dealing in illegally caught fish
or fishery/aquatic products. — It shall be unlawful for any
person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken
or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine
waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous
substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in
paragraphs (1), (m) and (d), respectively, of section 3
hereof: Provided, That mere possession of such explosives
with intent to use the same for illegal fishing as herein
defined shall be punishable as hereinafter provided:
Provided, That the Secretary may, upon recommendation of
the Director and subject to such safeguards and conditions
he deems necessary, allow for research, educational or
scientific purposes only, the use of explosives, obnoxious
or poisonous substance or electricity to catch, take or gather
fish or fishery/aquatic products in specified area: Provided,
further, That the use of chemicals to eradicate predators in
fishponds in accordance with accepted scientific fishery
practices without causing deleterious effects in neighboring
waters shall not be construed as the use of obnoxious or
poisonous substance within the meaning of this section:
Provided, finally, That the use of mechanical bombs for
killing whales, crocodiles, sharks or other large dangerous
fishes, may be allowed, subject to the approval of the
Secretary.

"Section 38. (1) By the penalty of imprisonment ranging

from twelve (12) years to twenty-five (25) years in the case
of mere possession of explosives intended for illegal
fishing; by imprisonment ranging from twenty (20) years to
life imprisonment, if the explosive is actually used:
Provided, That if the use of the explosive results in 1)
physical injury to any person, the penalty shall be
imprisonment ranging from twenty-five (25) years to life
imprisonment, or 2) in the loss of human life, then the
penalty shall be life imprisonment to death."cralaw
virtua1aw library

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo appealed

from is affirmed in toto. Costs against Accused-
Appellant.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

4
Page

[G.R. No. 119619. December 13, 1996.]
RICHARD HIZON, SILVERIO GARGAR, ERNESTO
ANDAYA, NEMESIO GABO, RODRIGO ABRERA,
CHEUNG TAI FOOK, SHEK CHOR LUK, EFREN
DELA PENA, JONEL AURELIO, GODOFREDO
VILLAVERDE, ANGELITO DUMAYBAG,
DEOMEDES ROSIL, AMADO VILLANUEVA,
FRANCISCO ESTREMOS, ANGEL VILLAVERDE,
NEMESIO CASAMPOL, RICHARD ESTREMOS,
JORNIE DELA PENA, JESUS MACTAN, MARLON
CAMPORAZO, FERNANDO BIRING, MENDRITO
CARPO, LUIS DUARTE, JOSEPH AURELIO,
RONNIE JUEZAN. BERNARDO VILLACARLOS,
RICARDO SALES, MARLON ABELLA, TEODORO
DELOS REYES, IGNACIO ABELLA, JOSEPH
MAYONADO, JANAIRO LANGUYOD, DODONG
DELOS REYES, JOLLY CABALLERO and
ROPLANDO ARCENAS, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15417 affirming
the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52,
Palawan in Criminal Case No. 10429 convicting petitioners
of the offense of illegal fishing with the use of obnoxious or
poisonous substance penalized under Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 704, the Fisheries Decree of 1975.
In an Information dated October 15, 1992, petitioners were
charged with a violation of P.D. 704 committed as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 30th day of September 1992, at Brgy.
San Rafael, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused crew members and fishermen of F/B Robinson
owned by First Fishermen Fishing Industries, Inc.,
represented by Richard Hizon, a domestic corporation duly
organized under the laws of the Philippines, being then the
owner, crew members and fishermen of F/B Robinson and
with the use of said fishing boat, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously the said accused
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
one another catch, take or gather or cause to be caught,
taken or gathered fish or fishery aquatic products in the
coastal waters of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, with the
use of obnoxious or poisonous substance (sodium cyanide),
of more or less one (1) ton of assorted live fishes which
were illegally caught thru the use of obnoxious/poisonous
substance (sodium cyanide)." 1 chief, took the plastic with the specimens from the freezer
The following facts were established by the prosecution: In
September 1992, the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan
received reports of illegal fishing operations in the coastal
waters of the city. In response to these reports, the city
mayor organized Task Force Bantay Dagat to assist the
police in the detection and apprehension of violators of the
laws on fishing.
On September 30, 1992 at about 2:00 in the afternoon, the
Task Force Bantay Dagat reported to the PNP Maritime
Command that a boat and several small crafts were fishing
by "muro ami" within the shoreline of Barangay San Rafael
of Puerto Princesa. The police, headed by SPO3 Romulo
Enriquez, and members of the Task Force Bantay Dagat,
headed by Benito Marcelo, Jr., immediately proceeded to
the area and found several men fishing in motorized
sampans and a big fishing boat identified as F/B Robinson
within the seven-kilometer shoreline of the city. They
boarded the F/B Robinson and inspected the boat with the
acquiescence of the boat captain, Silverio Gargar. In the
course of their inspection, the police saw two foreigners in
the captain’s deck. SPO3 Enriquez examined their
passports and found them to be mere photocopies. The
police also discovered a large aquarium full of live lapu-
lapu and assorted fish weighing approximately one ton at
the bottom of the boat. 2 They checked the license of the
boat and its fishermen and found them to be in order.
Nonetheless, SPO3 Enriquez brought the boat captain, the
crew and the fishermen to Puerto Princesa for further
investigation.
At the city harbor, members of the Maritime Command
were ordered by SPO3 Enriquez to guard the F/B
Robinson. The boat captain and the two foreigners were
again interrogated at the PNP Maritime Command office.
Thereafter, an Inspection/Apprehension Report was
prepared and the boat, its crew and fishermen were charged
with the following violations:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Conducting fishing operations within Puerto Princesa
coastal waters without mayor’s permit;
2. Employing excess fishermen on board (Authorized —
26; On board — 36);
3. Two (2) Hongkong nationals on board without original
passports." 3
The following day, October 1, 1992, SPO3 Enriquez
directed the boat captain to get random samples of fish
from the fish cage of F/B Robinson for laboratory
examination. As instructed, the boat engineer, petitioner
Ernesto Andaya, delivered to the Maritime Office four (4)
live lapu-lapu fish inside a plastic shopping bag filled with
water. SPO3 Enriquez received the fish and in the presence
of the boat engineer and captain, placed them inside a large
transparent plastic bag without water. He sealed the plastic
with heat from a lighter. 4
The specimens were brought to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) sub-office in the city for examination
"to determine the method of catching the same for record or
evidentiary purposes." 5 They were received at the NBI
office at 8:00 in the evening of the same day. The receiving
clerk, Edna Capicio, noted that the fish were dead and she
placed the plastic bag with the fish inside the office freezer
to preserve them. Two days later, on October 3, 1992, the
chief of the NBI sub-office, Onos Mangotara, certified the
specimens for laboratory examination at the NBI Head
Office in Manila. The fish samples were to be personally
transported by Edna Capicio who was then scheduled to
leave for Manila for her board examination in Criminology.
6 On October 4, 1992, Ms. Capicio, in the presence of her
and placed them inside two shopping bags and sealed them
with masking tape. She proceeded to her ship where she
placed the specimens in the ship’s freezer.
Capicio arrived in Manila the following day, October 5,
1992 and immediately brought the specimens to the NBI
Head Office. On October 7, 1992, NBI Forensic Chemist
Emilia Rosaldes conducted two tests on the fish samples
5
and found that they contained sodium cyanide,
Page
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"FINDINGS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Weight of Specimen.. . . . 1.870 kilograms Examinations
made on the above-mentioned specimen gave POSITIVE
RESULTS to the test for the presence of SODIUM
CYANIDE. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
REMARKS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sodium Cyanide is a violent poison." 7 showed the captain the fish samples. Although the captain
In light of these findings, the PNP Maritime Command of
Puerto Princesa City filed the complaint at bar against the
owner and operator of the F/B Robinson, the First
Fishermen Fishing Industries, Inc., represented by herein
petitioner Richard Hizon, the boat captain, Silverio Gargar,
the boat engineer, Ernesto Andaya, two other crew
members, the two Hongkong nationals and 28 fishermen of
the said boat.
Petitioners were arraigned and they pled not guilty to the
charge. As defense, they claimed that they are legitimate
fishermen of the First Fishermen Industries, Inc., a
domestic corporation licensed to engage in fishing. They
alleged that they catch fish by the hook and line method
and that they had used this method for one month and a half
in the waters of Cuyo Island. They related that on
September 30, 1992 at about 7:00 A.M., they anchored the
F/B Robinson in the east of Podiado Island in Puerto
Princesa City. The boat captain and the fishermen took out
and boarded their sampans to fish for their food. They were
still fishing in their sampans at 4:00 P.M. when a rubber
boat containing members of the PNP Maritime Command
and the Task Force Bantay Dagat approached them and
boarded the F/B Robinson. The policemen were in uniform
while the Bantay Dagat personnel were in civilian clothes.
They were all armed with guns. One of the Bantay Dagat
personnel introduced himself as Commander Jun Marcelo
and he inspected the boat and the boat’s documents.
Marcelo saw the two foreigners and asked for their
passports. As their passports were photocopies, Marcelo
demanded for their original. The captain explained that the
original passports were with the company’s head office in
Manila. Marcelo angrily insisted for the originals and
threatened to arrest everybody. He then ordered the captain,
his crew and the fishermen to follow him to Puerto
Princesa. He held the magazine of his gun and warned the
captain "Sige, huwag kang tatakas, kung hindi babarilin ko
kayo!" 8 The captain herded all his men into the boat and
followed Marcelo and the police to Puerto Princesa.
They arrived at the city harbor at 7:45 in the evening and
were met by members of the media. As instructed by
Marcelo, the members of the media interviewed and took
pictures of the boat and the fishermen. 9
The following day, October 1, 1992, at 8:00 in the morning,
Amado Villanueva, one of the fishermen at the F/B
Robinson, was instructed by a policeman guarding the boat
to get five (5) fish samples from the fish cage and bring
them to the pier. Villanueva inquired whether the captain
knew about the order but the guard replied he was taking
responsibility for it. Villanueva scooped five pieces of lapu-
lapu, placed them inside a plastic bag filled with water and
brought the bag to the pier. The boat engineer, Ernesto
Andaya, received the fish and delivered them to the PNP
Maritime Office. Nobody was in the office and Andaya
waited for the apprehending officers and the boat captain.
Later, one of the policemen in the office instructed him to
leave the bag and hang it on a nail in the -wall. Andaya did
as he was told and returned to the boat at 10:00 A.M. 10
In the afternoon of the same day, the boat captain arrived at
the Maritime office. He brought along a representative from
their head office in Manila who showed the police and the
Bantay Dagat personnel the original passports of the
Hongkong nationals and other pertinent documents of the
F/B Robinson and its crew. Finding the documents in order,
Marcelo approached the captain and whispered to him
"Tandaan mo ito, kapitan, kung makakaalis ka dito,
magkikita pa rin uli tayo sa dagat, kung hindi kayo lulubog
ay palulutangin ko kayo!" It was then that SPO3 Enriquez
informed the captain that some members of the Maritime
Command, acting under his instructions, had just taken five
(5) pieces of lapu-lapu from the boat. SPO3 Enriquez
saw only four (4) pieces of lapu-lapu, he did not utter a
word of protest. 11 Under Marcelo’s threat, he signed the
"Certification" that he received only four (4) pieces of the
fish. 12
Two weeks later, the information was filed against
petitioners. The case was prosecuted against thirty-one (31)
of the thirty-five (35) accused. Richard Hizon remained at
large while the whereabouts of Richard Estremos, Marlon
Camporazo and Joseph Aurelio were unknown.
On July 9, 1993, the trial court found the thirty one (31)
petitioners guilty and sentenced them to imprisonment for a
minimum of eight (8) years and one (1) day to a maximum
of nine (9) years and four (4) months. The court also
ordered the confiscation and forfeiture of the F/B Robinson,
the 28 sampans and the ton of assorted live fishes as
instruments and proceeds of the offense,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered finding the accused SILVERIO GARGAR,
ERNESTO ANDAYA, NEMESIO GABO, RODRIGO
ABRERA, CHEUNG TAI FOOK, SHEK CHOR LUK,
EFREN DELA PENA, JONEL AURELIO, GODOFREDO
VILLAVERDE, ANGELITO DUMAYBAG, DEOMEDES
ROSIL, AMADO VILLANUEVA, FRANCISCO
ESTREMOS, ARNEL VILLAVERDE, NEMESIO
CASAMPOL, JORNIE DELACRUZ, JESUS MACTAN,
FERNANDO BIRING, MENDRITO CARPO, LUIS
DUARTE, RONNIE JUEZAN, BERNARDO
VILLACARLOS, RICHARD SALES, MARLON
ABELLA, TEODORO DELOS REYES, IGNACIO
ABELLA, JOSEPH MAYONADO, JANAIRO
LANGUYOD, DODONG DELOS REYES, ROLANDO
ARCENAS and JOLLY CABALLERO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Fishing with the
use of obnoxious or poisonous substance commonly known
as sodium cyanide, committed in violation of section 33
and penalized in section 38 of Presidential Decree No. 704,
as amended, and there being neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances appreciated and applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, each of the
aforenamed accused is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from a minimum of
EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to a maximum of
NINE (9) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS and to pay the
costs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Article 45, in relation to the
second sentence of Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a) Fishing Boat (F/B) Robinson;
b) The 28 motorized fiberglass sampans; and
c) The live fishes in the fish cages installed in the F/B
Robinson, all of which have been respectively shown to be
tools or instruments and proceeds of the offense, are hereby
ordered confiscated and declared forfeited in favor of the
government.
6
SO ORDERED." 13
Page
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners contend that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
"I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE MERE "POSITIVE RESULTS TO
THE TEST FOR THE PRESENCE OF SODIUM
CYANIDE" IN THE FISH SPECIMEN, ALBEIT
ILLEGALLY SEIZED ON THE OCCASION OF A
WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND ARREST, IS
ADMISSIBLE AND SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR THE
PETITIONERS’ CONVICTION OF THE CRIME OF
ILLEGAL FISHING.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT HOLDING THAT THE STATUTORY
PRESUMPTION OF GUILT UNDER SEC. 33 OF
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 704 CANNOT PREVAIL
AGAINST THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION
OF INNOCENCE, SUCH THAT THE GRAVAMEN OF
THE OFFENSE OF ILLEGAL FISHING MUST STILL
BE PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT REVERSING THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL
COURT AND ACQUITTING THE PETITIONERS." 14
The Solicitor General submitted a "Manifestation in Lieu of
Comment" praying for petitioners’ acquittal. 15
The petitioners, with the concurrence of the Solicitor
General, primarily question the admissibility of the
evidence against petitioners in view of the warrantless
search of the fishing boat and the subsequent arrest of
petitioners. More concretely, they contend that the NBI
finding of sodium cyanide in the fish specimens should not
have been admitted and considered by the trial court
because the fish samples were seized from the F/B
Robinson without a search warrant.
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure and the
arrest of persons without a judicial warrant. 16 As a general
rule, any evidence obtained without a judicial warrant is
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is,
however, subject to certain exceptions. Some of these are:
17 (1) a search incident to a lawful arrest; 18 (2) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving motor
vehicle; 19 and (4) search in violation of customs laws. 20
Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and
aircrafts for violations of customs laws have been the
traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a
search warrant. It is rooted on the recognition that a vessel
and an aircraft, like motor vehicles, can be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search
warrant must be sought and secured. Yielding to this
reality, judicial authorities have not required a search
warrant of vessels and aircrafts before their search and
seizure can be constitutionally effected. 21
The same exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing
vessels and boats breaching our fishery laws. These vessels
are normally powered by high-speed motors that enable
them to elude arresting ships of the Philippine Navy, the
Coast Guard and other government authorities enforcing
our fishery laws. 22
We thus hold as valid the warrantless search on the F/B
Robinson, a fishing boat suspected of having engaged in
illegal fishing. The fish and other evidence seized in the
course of the search were properly admitted by the trial
court. Moreover, petitioners failed to raise the issue during
trial and hence, waived their right to question any
irregularity that may have attended the said search and
seizure. 23
Given the evidence admitted by the trial court, the next
question now is whether petitioners are guilty of the offense
of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances.
Again, the petitioners, joined by the Solicitor General,
submit that the prosecution evidence cannot convict them.
We agree.
Petitioners were charged with illegal fishing penalized
under sections 33 and 38 of P.D. 704 24 which provide as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 33. Illegal fishing, illegal possession of explosives
intended for illegal fishing; dealing in illegally caught fish
or fishery/aquatic products. — It shall be unlawful for any
person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken
or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine
waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous
substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in
paragraphs (l), (m) and (d), respectively, of section 3
hereof: Provided, That mere possession of such explosives
with intent to use the same for illegal fishing as herein
defined shall be punishable as hereinafter provided:
Provided, That the Secretary may, upon recommendation of
the Director and subject to such safeguards and conditions
he deems necessary, allow for research, educational or
scientific purposes only, the use of explosives, obnoxious
or poisonous substance or electricity to catch, take or gather
fish or fishery/aquatic products in the specified area:
Provided, further, That the use of chemicals to eradicate
predators in fishponds in accordance with accepted
scientific fishery practices without causing deleterious
effects in neighboring waters shall not be construed as the
use of obnoxious or poisonous substance within the
meaning of this section: Provided, finally, That the use of
mechanical bombs for killing whales, crocodiles, sharks or
other large dangerous fishes, may be allowed, subject to the
approval of the Secretary.
It shall, likewise, be unlawful for any person knowingly to
possess, deal in, sell or in any manner dispose of, for profit,
any fish or fishery/aquatic products which have been
illegally caught, taken or gathered.
The discovery of dynamite, other explosives and chemical
compounds containing combustible elements, or obnoxious
or poisonous substance, or equipment or device for electric
fishing in any fishing boat or in the possession of a
fisherman shall constitute a presumption that the same were
used for fishing in violation of this Decree, and the
discovery in any fishing boat of fish caught or killed by the
use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance or by
electricity shall constitute a presumption that the owner,
operator or fisherman were fishing with the use of
explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance or
electricity."cralaw virtua1aw library
x          x          x
Sec. 38. Penalties. — (a) For illegal fishing and dealing in
illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. —
Violation of Section 33 hereof shall be punished as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
7
Page
x          x          x

(2) By imprisonment from eight (8) to ten (10) years, if
obnoxious or poisonous substances are used: Provided,
That if the use of such substances results 1) in physical
injury to any person, the penalty shall be imprisonment
from ten (10) to twelve (12) years, or 2) in the loss of
human life, then the penalty shall be imprisonment from
twenty (20) years to life or death;"
x       x       x."25cralaw:red
The offense of illegal fishing is committed when a person
catches, takes or gathers or causes to be caught, taken or
gathered fish, fishery or aquatic products in Philippine
waters with the use of explosives, electricity, obnoxious or
poisonous substances. The law creates a presumption that
illegal fishing has been committed when: (a) explosives,
obnoxious or poisonous substances or equipment or device
for electric fishing are found in a fishing boat or in the
possession of a fisherman; or (b) when fish caught or killed
with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous
substances or by electricity are found in a fishing boat.
Under these instances, the boat owner, operator or
fishermen are presumed to have engaged in illegal fishing.
Petitioners contend that this presumption of guilt under the
Fisheries Decree violates the presumption of innocence
guaranteed by the Constitution. 26 As early as 1916, this
Court has rejected this argument by holding that: 27
"In some States, as well as in England, there exist what are
known as common law offenses. In the Philippine Islands
no act is a crime unless it is made so by statute. The state
having the right to declare what acts are criminal, within
certain well-defined limitations, has the right to specify
what act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as what
proof shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and
then to put upon the defendant the burden of showing that
such act or acts are innocent and are not committed with
any criminal intent or intention." 28
The validity of laws establishing presumptions in criminal
cases is a settled matter. It is generally conceded that the
legislature has the power to provide that proof of certain
facts can constitute prima facie evidence of the guilt of the
accused and then shift the burden of proof to the accused
provided there is a rational connection between the facts
proved and the ultimate fact presumed. 29 To avoid any
constitutional infirmity, the inference of one from proof of
the other must not be arbitrary and unreasonable. 30 In fine,
the presumption must be based on facts and these facts
must be part of the crime when committed. 31
The third paragraph of section 33 of P.D. 704 creates a
presumption of guilt based on facts proved and hence is not
constitutionally impermissible. It makes the discovery of
obnoxious or poisonous substances, explosives, or devices
for electric fishing, or of fish caught or killed with the use
of obnoxious and poisonous substances, explosives or
electricity in any fishing boat or in the possession of a
fisherman evidence that the owner and operator of the
fishing boat or the fisherman had used such substances in
catching fish. The ultimate fact presumed is that the owner
and operator of the boat or the fisherman were engaged in
illegal fishing and this presumption was made to arise from
the discovery of the substances and the contaminated fish in
the possession of the fisherman in the fishing boat. The fact
presumed is a natural inference from the fact proved. 32
We stress, however, that the statutory presumption is
merely prima facie. 33 It can not, under the guise of
regulating the presentation of evidence, operate to preclude
the accused from presenting his defense to rebut the main
fact presumed. 34 At no instance can the accused be denied
the right to rebut the presumption, 35
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The inference of guilt is one of fact and rests upon the
common experience of men. But the experience of men has
taught them that an apparently guilty possession may be
explained so as to rebut such an inference and an accused
person may therefore put witnesses on the stand or go on
the witness stand himself to explain his possession, and any
reasonable explanation of his possession, inconsistent with
his guilty connection with the commission of the crime,
will rebut the inference as to his guilt which the prosecution
seeks to have drawn from his guilty possession of the stolen
goods." 36
We now review the evidence to determine whether
petitioners have successfully rebutted this presumption. The
facts show that on November 13, 1992, after the
Information was filed in court and petitioners granted bail,
petitioners moved that the fish specimens taken from the
F/B Robinson be reexamined. 37 The trial court granted the
motion. 38 As prayed for, a member of the PNP Maritime
Command of Puerto Princesa, in the presence of authorized
representatives of the F/B Robinson, the NBI and the local
Fisheries Office, took at random five (5) live lapu-lapu
from the fish cage of the boat. The specimens were packed
in the usual manner of transporting live fish, taken aboard a
commercial flight and delivered by the same
representatives to the NBI Head Office in Manila for
chemical analysis.
On November 23, 1992, Salud Rosales, another forensic
chemist of the NBI in Manila conducted three (3) tests on
the specimens and found the fish negative for the presence
of sodium cyanide, 39 thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Gross weight of specimen = 3.849 kg.
Examinations made on the above-mentioned specimens
gave NEGATIVE RESULTS to the tests for the presence of
SODIUM CYANIDE." 40
The Information charged petitioners with illegal fishing
"with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance (sodium
cyanide), of more or less one (1) ton of assorted live
fishes." There was more or less one ton of fishes in the F/B
Robinson’s fish cage. It was from this fish cage that the
four dead specimens examined on October 7, 1992 and the
five live specimens examined on November 23, 1992 were
taken. Though all the specimens came from the same
source allegedly tainted with sodium cyanide, the two tests
resulted in conflicting findings. We note that after its
apprehension, the F/B Robinson never left the custody of
the PNP Maritime Command. The fishing boat was
anchored near the city harbor and was guarded by members
of the Maritime Command. 41 It was later turned over to
the custody of the Philippine Coast Guard Commander of
Puerto Princesa City. 42
The prosecution failed to explain the contradictory findings
on the fish samples and this omission raises a reasonable
doubt that the one ton of fishes in the cage were caught
with the use of sodium cyanide.
The absence of cyanide in the second set of fish specimens
supports petitioners’ claim that they did not use the poison
in fishing. According to them, they caught the fishes by the
ordinary and legal way, i.e., by hook and line on board their
sampans . This claim is buttressed by the prosecution
evidence itself. The apprehending officers saw petitioners
fishing by hook and line when they came upon them in the
waters of Barangay San Rafael. One of the apprehending
officers, SPO1 Demetrio Saballuca, testified as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
8
Page
"ATTY. TORREFRANCA ON CROSS-
EXAMINATION:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
 for the first laboratory test, boat engineer Ernesto Andaya
Q : I get your point therefore, that the illegal fishing did not only get four (4) samples of fish but actually got
supposedly conducted at San Rafael is a moro ami type of five (5) from the fish cage of the F/B Robinson. 47 The
fishing [that] occurred into your mind and that was made to Certification that four (4) fish samples were taken from the
understand by the Bantay Dagat personnel? boat shows on its face the number of pieces as originally
"five (5)" but this was erased with correction fluid and
A : Yes, sir. "four (4)" written over it. 48 The specimens were taken,
sealed inside the plastic bag and brought to Manila by the
Q : Upon reaching the place, you and the pumpboat, police authorities in the absence of petitioners or their
together with the two Bantay Dagat personnel were SPO3 representative. SPO2 Enriquez testified that the same
Romulo Enriquez and Mr. Benito Marcelo and SPO1 plastic bag containing the four specimens was merely
Marzan, you did not witness that kind of moro ami fishing, sealed with heat from a lighter. 49 Emilia Rosaldes, the
correct? NBI forensic chemist who examined the samples, testified
that when she opened the package, she found the two ends
A : None, sir. of the same plastic bag knotted. 50 These circumstances as
well as the time interval from the taking of the fish samples
Q : In other words, there was negative activity of moro ami and their actual examination 51 fail to assure the impartial
type of fishing on September 30, 1992 at 4:00 in the mind that the integrity of the specimens had been properly
afternoon at San Rafael? safeguarded.

A : Yes, sir. Apparently, the members of the PNP Maritime Command

and the Task Force Bantay Dagat were the ones engaged in
Q : And what you saw were 5 motorized sampans with an illegal fishing expedition. As sharply observed by the
fishermen each doing a hook and line fishing type? Solicitor General, the report received by the Task Force
Bantay Dagat was that a fishing boat was fishing illegally
A : Yes, sir. More or less they were five. through "muro ami" on the waters of San Rafael. "Muro
ami" according to SPO1 Saballuca is made with net with
Q : And despite the fact you had negative knowledge of this sinkers to make the net submerge in the water with the
moro ami type of fishing, SPO3 Enriquez together with Mr. fishermen surround[ing] the net." 52 This method of fishing
Marcelo boarded the vessel just the same? needs approximately two hundred (200) fishermen to
execute. 53 What the apprehending officers instead
A : Yes, sir. discovered were twenty eight (28) fishermen in their
sampans fishing by hook and line. The authorities found
x       x       x" 43 nothing on the boat that would have indicated any form of
illegal fishing. All the documents of the boat and the
The apprehending officers who boarded and searched the fishermen were in order. It was only after the fish
boat did not find any sodium cyanide nor any poisonous or specimens were tested, albeit under suspicious
obnoxious substance. Neither did they find any trace of the circumstances, that petitioners were charged with illegal
poison in the possession of the fishermen or in the fish cage fishing with the use of poisonous substances.
itself. An Inventory was prepared by the apprehending
officers and only the following items were found on board IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and the
the boat:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15417
is reversed and set aside. Petitioners are acquitted of the
"ITEMS QUANTITY REMARKS crime of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous
substances defined under Section 33 of Republic Act No.
F/B Robinson (1) unit operating 704, the Fisheries Decree of 1975. No costs.

engine (1) unit ICE-900-BHP SO ORDERED.

sampans 28 units fiberglass

outboard motors 28 units operating

assorted fishes more or less 1 ton live

hooks and lines assorted

x       x       x" 44

We cannot overlook the fact that the apprehending officers

assorted hooks and lines for catching fish. 45 For this
obvious reason, the Inspection/Apprehension Report
prepared by the apprehending officers immediately after the
search did not charge petitioners with illegal fishing, much
less illegal fishing with the use of poison or any obnoxious
substance. 46

The only basis for the charge of fishing with poisonous

substance is the result of the first NBI laboratory test on the
four fish specimens. Under the circumstances of the case,
however, this finding does not warrant the infallible
conclusion that the fishes in the F/B Robinson, or even the
same four specimens, were caught with the use of sodium
9

cyanide.
Page

Prosecution witness SPO1 Bernardino Visto testified that

Page 10

[G.R. No. L-25434. July 25, 1975.]
HONORABLE ARSENIO N. ROLDAN, JR., in his
capacity as Acting Commissioner, Philippine Fisheries
Commission, and THE PHILIPPINE
NAVY, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE FRANCISCO
ARCA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila (Branch I) and MORABE, DE
GUZMAN & COMPANY, Respondents.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz and Solicitor
Augusto M . Amores, for Petitioners.
J . C . Yuseco and A. R. Narvasa for Private Respondent.
SYNOPSIS
The Court of First Instance of Palawan ordered the seizure
of two vessels of respondent company in connection with
illegal fishing with dynamite committed within the
territorial waters of Palawan. Respondent company filed a
complaint with application for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction with the Court of First Instance of
Manila. Respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction after a bond was filed for the release
of the vessels. Petitioner’s motion to reconsider the order
was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain
respondent judge from enforcing the questioned order.
The Supreme Court granted the petition ruling that
respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the preliminary mandatory injunction and further in
denying the motion to reconsider the same. It is basic that a
court cannot interfere with the judgments, orders and
decrees of another court of concurrent or coordinate
jurisdiction having equal power to grant the relief sought by
injunction. Since the two vessels were already in custodia
legis under the sole control of the Palawan Court of First
Instance, the Manila Court of First Instance cannot interfere
with and change that
possession.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Writ of preliminary mandatory injunction set aside as null
and void.
SYLLABUS
1. ACTIONS; JURISDICTION; PLACE WHERE
CRIMINAL OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED
DETERMINES JURISDICTION. — The Court of First
Instance of Palawan has jurisdiction to order the seizure of
boats caught in connection with illegal fishing with
dynamite within the territorial waters of Palawan. The rule
is that "the place where a criminal offense was committed
not only determines the venue of the action but is an
essential element of jurisdiction."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; COURT MAY NOT INTERFERE WITH
JUDGMENTS, ORDERS OR DECREES OF COURT OF
CONCURRENT/ COORDINATE JURISDICTION;
REASON. — One court cannot interfere with the
judgments, order or decrees of another court of concurrent
or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the
relief sought by injunction; because if coordinate courts
were allowed to interfere with each other’s judgments,
decrees or injunctions, the same would obviously lead to
confusion and might seriously hinder the administration of
justice.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Where the vessels
which were subject to forfeiture as instruments of the crime
to be utilized as evidence in the criminal cases for illegal
fishing committed within the territorial waters of Palawan
were already in custodia legis under the sole control of the
Palawan Court of First Instance, the Manila Court of First
Instance cannot interfere with and change that possession.
4. ID.; DISMISSAL; PRELIMINARY WRIT CANNOT
SURVIVE THE MAIN CASE. — A preliminary writ, like
any other interlocutory order, cannot survive the main case
of which it was but an incident; because "an ancillary writ
of preliminary injunction loses its force and effect after the
dismissal of the main petition."cralaw virtua1aw library
5. FISHERIES ACT (ACT NO. 4003); FISHING WITH
DYNAMITE; PENALTY THEREOF. — Section 12 of the
Fisheries Act otherwise known as Act No. 4003, as
amended, prohibits fishing with dynamite or other
explosives which is penalized by Section 76 thereof "by a
fine of not less than P1,500.00 nor more than P5,000.00,
and by imprisonment for not less than one (1) year and six
(6) months nor more than five (5) years, aside from the
confiscation and forfeiture of all explosives, boats, tackles,
apparel, furniture, and other apparatus used in fishing in
violation of Section 12 of this Act." Section 78 of the same
Fisheries Law provides that "in case of second offense, the
vessel, together with its tackles, apparel, furniture and
stores shall be forfeited to the Government."cralaw
virtua1aw library
6. ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION THAT EXPLOSIVES ARE
USED IN FISHING. — Under the second paragraph of
Section 12 of the Fisheries Act "the possession and or
finding of dynamite, blasting caps and other explosives in
any fishing boat shall constitute a presumption that the said
dynamite and/or blasting caps and explosives are being
used for fishing purposes in violation of this Section, and
that the possession or discovery in any fishing boat of fish
caught or killed by the use of dynamite or other explosives,
under expert testimony shall constitute a presumption that
the owner, if present in the fishing boat, or the fishing crew
have been fishing with dynamite or other
explosives."cralaw virtua1aw library
7. ID.; FISHING WITHOUT LICENSE; PENALTY
THEREFOR. — Under Section 78 of the Fisheries Act, as
amended, any person, association or corporation fishing in
deep sea fishery without the corresponding license
prescribed in Section 17 and 22 of Article V of the
Fisheries Act or any other order or regulation deriving force
from its provisions shall be punished for each offense by a
fine of not more than P5,000.00 or imprisonment for not
more than one year, or both, in the discretion of the Court: .
. . provided, . . ., That in case of second offense, the vessel
together with its tackle, apparel, furniture and stores shall
be forfeited to the Government."cralaw virtua1aw library
11
8. ID.; PHILIPPINE NAVY MAY ENFORCE FISHERIES
ACT. — Under Section 13 of Executive Order no. 389 of
Page
December 23, 1950, reorganizing the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the Navy has the function, among others, "to
assist the proper governmental agencies in the enforcement
of laws and regulations pertaining to . . . fishing. . ."cralaw
virtua1aw library
9. TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE; AUTHORITY OF
PERSON EXERCISING POLICE AUTHORITY TO
SEARCH/SEIZE ANY VESSEL. — Section 2210 of the
Tariff and Customs Code, as amended by DP No. 34 of
October 27, 1972, authorizes any official or person
exercising police authority under the provisions of the
Code, to search and seize any vessel or air craft as well as
any trunk, package, bar or envelope on board for any
breach or violation of the customs and tariff laws.
10. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS;
RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCH/SEIZURE; EXCEPTION, REASON. — Search
and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircraft
for violations of the custom laws have been the traditional
exception to the constitutional requirement of a search
warrant, because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the
locality in which the search warrant must be sought before
such warrant could be secured; hence, it is not practicable
to require a search warrant before such search or seizure
can be constitutionally effected.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; SEARCH/SEIZURE AS AN INCIDENT
OF LAWFUL ARREST. — Another exception to the
constitutional requirements of a search warrant for a valid
search and seizure is a search or seizure as an incident of a
lawful arrest. Under our Rules of Court a police officer or a
private individual may, without a warrant, arrest a person
(a) who has committed, is actually committing or is about
to commit an offense in his presence; (b) who is reasonably
believed to have committed an offense which has been
actually committed; or (c) who is a prisoner who has
escaped from confinement while serving a final judgment
or from temporary detention during the pendency of his
case or while being transferred from one confinement to
another (Sec. 6, Rule 113, Revised Rules of Court).
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Where the
members of the crew of fishing vessels were caught in
flagrante illegally fishing with dynamite and without the
requisite license, their apprehension without a warrant of
arrest while committing a crime was lawful. Consequently,
the seizure of the vessel, its equipment and dynamites
therein was equally valid as an incident to a lawful arrest.
13. COMPROMISE AGREEMENT; COMPROMISE
DOES NOT COVER INSTANT CASE. — The alleged
compromise approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources cannot be invoked by the respondents
because the same referred to about thirty (30) violations of
the Fisheries Law committed by the private respondent
from March 28, 1963 to March 11, 1964. The violation by
the two vessels of private respondent, by reason of which
these were apprehended and detained by the Philippine
Navy upon request of the Commissioner of Fisheries, were
committed on August 5 or 6, 1965.
14. ID.; WHEN THE SAME MAY BE AVAILED OF. —
The power to compromise would exist only before a
criminal prosecution is instituted; otherwise the Department
Secretary or any of his sub-alterns can render criminal
prosecutions for violation of the fisheries law a mere
mockery. Section 80 (j) of Act No. 4003, as amended,
precludes such a compromise the moment the Fisheries
Commissioner decides to prosecute the criminal action in
accordance with Section 76 and 78 of the other penal
provisions of the fisheries law.
15. WORDS AND PHRASES; "VESSEL", CONSTRUED.
— The two vessels in the case at bar fall under the term
"vessel" used in Secs. 17, 76 and 78, as well as the term
utilized in the second paragraph of Section 76 of the
Fisheries Act. They can also fall under the term "fishing
equipment" employed in Section 4 of Republic Act 3512;
because a fishing equipment is never complete and cannot
be effectively used in offshore or deep sea fishing without
the fishing boat or fishing vessel itself. And these two
vessels of private respondent certainly come under the term
"fishing vessels" employed in paragraph 5 of Section 4 of
the same Republic Act 3512 creating the fisheries
Commission. The word "boat" in its ordinary sense, means
any water craft. The fishing boats in the instant case are
likewise vessels within the meaning of the term "vessel"
used in Section 903 and 2210 of the Tariff and Customs
Code.
DECISION
MAKASIAR, J.:
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction to restrain respondent Judge from enforcing his
order dated October 18, 1965, and the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction thereunder issued.
On April 3, 1964, respondent company filed with the Court
of First Instance of Manila a civil case docketed as No.
56701 against petitioner Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio
N. Roldan, Jr., for the recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex
VI (one of two fishing boats in question) which had been
seized and impounded by petitioner Fisheries
Commissioner through the Philippine Navy.
On April 10, 1964, respondent company prayed for a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction with respondent court,
but said prayer was, however, denied.
On April 28, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila set
aside its order of April 10, 1964 and granted respondent
company’s motion for reconsideration praying for
preliminary mandatory injunction. Thus, respondent
company took possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI from
herein petitioners by virtue of the above said writ.
On December 10, 1964, the Court of First Instance of
Manila dismissed Civil Case No. 56701 for failure of
therein petitioner (respondent company herein) to prosecute
as well as for failure of therein defendants (petitioners
herein) to appear on the scheduled date of hearing. The
vessel, Tony Lex VI or Srta. Winnie however, remained in
the possession of respondent company.
On July 20, 1965, petitioner Fisheries Commissioner
requested the Philippine Navy to apprehend vessels Tony
Lex VI and Tony Lex III, also respectively called Srta.
Winnie and Srta. Agnes, for alleged violations of some
provisions of the Fisheries Act and the rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder.
On August 5 or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats were actually
seized for illegal fishing with dynamite. Fish caught with
dynamite and sticks of dynamite were then found aboard
the two vessels.
On August 18, 1965, the Fisheries Commissioner requested
the Palawan Provincial Fiscal to file criminal charges
against the crew members of the fishing vessels.
On September 30, 1965, there were filed in the Court of
First Instance of Palawan a couple of informations, one
against the crew members of Tony Lex III, and another
12
against the crew members of Tony Lex VI — both for
violations of Act No. 4003, as amended by Commonwealth
Page
Acts Nos. 462, 659 and 1088, i.e., for illegal fishing with
the use of dynamite. On the same day, the Fiscal filed an ex
parte motion to hold the boats in custody as instruments
and therefore evidence of the crime (p. 54, rec.), and cabled
the Fisheries Commissioner to detain the vessels (p. 56,
rec.)
On October 2 and 4, likewise, the Court of First Instance of
Palawan ordered the Philippine Navy to take the boats in
custody.
On October 2, 1965, respondent company filed a complaint
with application for preliminary mandatory injunction,
docketed as Civil Case No. 62799 with the Court of First
Instance of Manila against herein petitioners. Among
others, it was alleged that at the time of the seizure of the
fishing boats in issue, the same were engaged in legitimate
fishing operations off the coast of Palawan; that by virtue
of the offer of compromise dated September 13, 1965 by
respondent company to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, the numerous violations of the Fishery
Laws, if any, by the crew members of the vessels were
settled.
On October 9, 1965, Petitioners, represented by the
Solicitor General, opposed the above-mentioned complaint,
alleging among others, that: (1) the issuance of the writ
would disrupt the status quo of the parties and would render
nugatory any decision of the respondent court favorable to
the defendant; (2) that the vessels, being instruments of a
crime in criminal cases Nos. 3416 and 3417 filed with the
Court of First Instance of Palawan, the release of the
vessels sans the corresponding order from the above-
mentioned court would deprive the same of its authority to
dispose of the vessels in the criminal cases and the
Provincial Fiscal would not be able to utilize said vessels as
evidence in the prosecution of said cases; (3) that as
petitioners herein were in possession of one of the vessels
in point, they cannot now be deprived of the legal custody
thereof by reason of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 56701;
(4) that petitioner Fisheries Commissioner has the power to
seize and detain the vessels pursuant to Section 5 of
Republic Act No 3215 in relation to Sections 903 and 2210
of the Revised Tariff and Customs Code: (5) that
respondents herein have not exhausted administrative
remedies before coming to court; (6) that the compromise
agreement approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and indorsed to the Fisheries
Commissioner is never a bar to the prosecution of the crime
perpetrated by the crew members of the vessels belonging
to respondent company.
And again, on October 15, 1965, herein petitioners filed
their memorandum praying for the denial of the application
for preliminary mandatory injunction.
On the same day, October 15, 1965, herein petitioners filed
an urgent motion to submit additional documentary
evidence.
On October 18, 1965, herein petitioners, as defendants in
said Civil Case No. 62799, filed their answer to the
complaint with affirmative defenses, reiterating the grounds
in their opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and adding that herein private
respondent admitted committing the last violation when it
offered in its letter dated September 21, 1965 to the Acting
Commissioner of Fisheries, to compromise said last
violation (Exh. 12, pp. 60-61, rec.)
On said day, October 18, 1965, the respondent Judge issued
the challenged order granting the issuance of the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction and issued the
preliminary writ upon the filing by private respondent of a
bond of P5,000.00 for the release of the two vessels (pp.
95-102, rec.)
On October 19, 1965, herein petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order issuing the preliminary writ on
October 18, 1965 on the ground, among others, that on
October 18, 1965 the Philippine Navy received from the
Palawan Court of First Instance two orders dated October 2
and 4, 1965 requiring the Philippine Navy to hold the
fishing boats in custody and directing that the said vessels
should not be released until further orders from the Court,
and that the bond of P5,000.00 is grossly insufficient to
cover the Government’s losses in case the two vessels,
which are worth P495,000.00, are placed beyond the reach
of the Government, thus frustrating their forfeiture as
instruments of the crime (pp. 103-109, rec.)
On November 23, 1965, respondent Judge denied the said
motion for reconsideration (p. 110, rec.)
WE rule that the respondent Judge of the Manila Court of
First Instance acted without jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion when he issued on October 18, 1965 the
order directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and when he refused to reconsider the
same.
I
When the respondent Judge issued the challenged order on
October 18, 1965 and the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction pursuant thereto, the fishing vessels were already
under the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of
Palawan by virtue of its orders of October 2 and 4, 1965,
upon motion of the Provincial Fiscal (pp. 54, 55, rec.),
directing the Philippine Navy to detain (pp. 108, 109, rec.)
said vessels, which are subject to forfeiture as instruments
of the crime, to be utilized as evidence in Criminal Cases
Nos. 3416 and 3417 for illegal fishing pending in said court
(pp. 54-55, rec.). The said vessels were seized while
engaging in prohibited fishing within the territorial waters
of Palawan (pp. 45, 48,-53, rec.) and hence within the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Palawan, in
obedience to the rule that "the place where a criminal
offense was committed not only determines the venue of
the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction"
(Lopez v. Paras, L-25795, Oct. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616,
619). The jurisdiction over the vessels acquired by the
Palawan Court of First Instance cannot be interfered with
by another Court of First Instance. The orders of October 2
and 4, 1965 by the Palawan Court of First Instance
expressly direct the Philippine Navy "to hold in custody"
the two vessels and that "same should not be released
without prior order or authority from this Court" (pp. 108,
109, rec.). Only the Palawan court can order the release of
the two vessels. Not even the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources nor the Fisheries Commissioner can
direct that the fishing boats be turned over to private
respondent without risking contempt of court.
The grave abuse of discretion committed by the respondent
Judge was heightened by the fact that he did not reconsider
his order of October 18, 1965 after he was informed by
petitioners in their motion for reconsideration filed on
October 19, 1965 that the Palawan Court of First Instance
had already issued the two orders dated October 2 and 4,
1965 directing the Philippine Navy to hold in custody the
fishing boats until further orders.
It is basic that one court cannot interfere with the
judgments, orders or decrees of another court of concurrent
or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the
relief sought by injunction; because if coordinate courts
were allowed to interfere with each other’s judgments,
13
decrees or injunctions, the same would obviously lead to
confusion and might seriously hinder the administration of
Page
justice (Ongsinco, etc. v. Tan, Et Al., 97 Phil. 330; PNB v.
Javellana, 92 Phil. 525; Montesa v. Manila Cordage
Company, 92 Phil. 25; Hubahib v. Insular Drug Company,
64 Phil. 119; Hacbang, Et. Al. v. The Leyte Auto Bus
Company, Et Al., G.R. No. L-17907, May 30, 1963, 8
SCRA, 103, 107-109; NPC v. Hon. Jesus de Vera, G.R. No.
L-15763, Dec. 22, 1961, 3 SCRA, 646, 648; Cabigao v. del
Rosario, 44 Phil. 182; Araneta & Uy v. Commonwealth
Insurance Company, 55 OG 431; Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, Vol. III, 1970 ed., p. 64).
As early as October 2 and 4, 1965, the two boats were
already in custodia legis under the sole control of the
Palawan Court of First Instance. The Manila Court of First
Instance cannot interfere with and change that possession
(Hacbang v. Leyte Bus Co., Inc., supra; NPC v. Hon. Jesus
de Vera, supra).
It is immaterial that the vessels were then in the Philippine
Navy basin in Manila; for the same in no way impugns the
jurisdiction already vested in the Palawan court, which has
custody thereof through the Philippine Navy. This is
analogous to the situation in Colmenares versus Villar (L-
27124, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 186, 188-9), wherein We
ruled "where the illegal possession of firearms was
committed in the town where the Court sits, the fact that the
firearms were confiscated from the accused in another town
does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court" (pp. 186, 189).
It is likewise of no moment that the herein respondents
were not notified by the herein petitioners of the seizure of
the questioned vessels by the Philippine Navy, because
such previous notice is not required by law.
II
The dismissal on December 10, 1964 of the first Civil Case
No. 56701 by the Court of First Instance of Manila had the
necessary effect of automatically dissolving the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction issued therein on April
28, 1964, directing the return of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI
(pp. 156-157, rec.). Such a preliminary writ, like any other
interlocutory order, cannot survive the main case of which
it was but an incident; because "an ancillary writ of
preliminary injunction loses its force and effect after the
dismissal of the main petition" (National Sugar Workers’
Union, etc., v. La Carlota Sugar Central, Et Al., L-23569,
May 25, 1972, 45 SCRA 104, 109; Lazaro v. Mariano, 59
Phil. 627, 631; Saavedra v. Ibañez, 56 Phil. 33, 37; Hi Caiji
v. Phil. Sugar Estate and Development Company, 50 Phil.
592, 594).
Moreover, the writ of preliminary injunction issued on
April 28, 1964 in Civil Case No. 56701 was directed
against the detention of the vessel Tony Lex VI for
violations committed prior to August 5, 1965, and therefore
cannot and does not extend to the seizure and detention of
said vessel for violations on August 5 or 6, 1965, which
violations were not and could not possibly be the subject-
matter of said Civil Case No. 56701 which was filed on
April 3, 1964 (p. 12, rec.)
III
Herein petitioners can validly direct and/or effect the
seizure of the vessels of private respondent for illegal
fishing by the use of dynamite and without the requisite
licenses.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3512 approved on March 20,
1963 empowers the Fisheries Commissioner to carry out
the provisions of the Fisheries Act, as amended, and all
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, to make
searches and seizures personally or through his duly
authorized representatives in accordance with the Rules of
Court, of "explosives such as . . . dynamites and the
like . . .; including fishery products, fishing equipment,
tackle and other things that are subject to seizure under
existing fishery laws" ; and "to effectively implement the
enforcement of existing fishery laws on illegal
fishing."cralaw virtua1aw library
Paragraph 5 of Section 4 of the same Republic Act 3512
likewise transferred to and vested in the Philippine
Fisheries Commission "all the powers, functions and duties
heretofore exercised by the Bureau of Customs, Philippine
Navy and Philippine Constabulary over fishing vessels and
fishery matters . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 12 of the Fisheries Act, otherwise known as
Republic Act No. 4003, as amended, prohibits fishing with
dynamites or other explosives which is penalized by
Section 76 thereof "by a fine of not less than P1,500.00 nor
more than P5,000.00, and by imprisonment for not less than
one (1) year and six (6) months nor more than five (5)
years, aside from the confiscation and forfeiture of all
explosives, boats, tackles, apparel, furniture, and other
apparatus used in fishing in violation of said Section 12 of
this Act." Section 78 of the same Fisheries Law provides
that "in case of a second offense, the vessel, together with
its tackle, apparel, furniture and stores shall be forfeited to
the Government."cralaw virtua1aw library
The second paragraph of Section 12 also provides that "the
possession and/or finding, of dynamite, blasting caps and
other explosives in any fishing boat shall constitute a
presumption that the said dynamite and/or blasting caps and
explosives are being used for fishing purposes in violation
of this Section, and that the possession or discover in any
fishing boat or fish caught or killed by the use of dynamite
or other explosives, under expert testimony, shall constitute
a presumption that the owner, if present in the fishing boat,
or the fishing crew have been fishing with dynamite or
other explosives." (Italics supplied).
Under Section 78 of the Fisheries Act, as amended, any
person, association or corporation fishing in deep sea
fishery without the corresponding license prescribed in
Sections 17 to 22 Article V of the Fisheries Act or any
other order or regulation deriving force from its provisions,
"shall be punished for each offense by a fine of not more
than P5,000.00, or imprisonment, for not more than one
year, or both, in the discretion of the Court; Provided, That
in case of an association or corporation, the President or
manager shall be directly responsible for the acts of his
employees or laborers if it is proven that the latter acted
with his knowledge; otherwise the responsibility shall
extend only as far as fine is concerned: Provided, further,
That in the absence of a known owner of the vessel, the
master, patron or person in charge of such vessel shall be
responsible for any violation of this Act: and Provided,
further, That in case of a second offense, the vessel together
with its tackle, apparel, furniture and stores shall be
forfeited to the Government" (Emphasis supplied).
Under Section 13 of Executive Order No. 389 of December
23, 1950, reorganizing the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
the Philippine Navy has the function, among others, "to
assist the proper governmental agencies in the enforcement
of laws and regulations pertaining to . . . Fishing . . . (46
OG 5905, 5911).
Section 2210 of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended
by PD No. 34 of October 27, 1972, authorized any official
or person exercising police authority under the provisions
of the Code, to search and seize any vessel or air craft as
well as any trunk, package, bag or envelope on board and to
search any person on board for any breach or violation of
14
the customs and tariff laws.
Page
When the Philippine Navy, upon request of the Fisheries
Commissioner, apprehended on August 5 or 6, 1965 the
fishing boats Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI, otherwise
known respectively as Srta. Agnes and Srta. Winnie, these
vessels were found to be without the necessary license in
violation of Section 903 of the Tariff and Customs Code
and therefore subject to seizure under Section 2210 of the
same Code, and illegally fishing with explosives and
without fishing license required by Sections 17 and 18 of
the Fisheries Law (pp. 46-47, rec.)
The operation of the fishing boat Tony Lex III was
suspended pursuant to the order dated January 28, 1964
issued by the Commissioner of Fisheries pending the final
determination of the case against it for illegal fishing with
explosives on January 21, 1964 (p. 34, rec.) and remained
suspended until its apprehension on August 5 or 6, 1965 (p.
46, rec.)
For illegal fishing with explosives on March 23, 1963, the
renewal of the fishing boat license of Tony Lex VI was
suspended for one year from the time said boat was moored
at Pier 14 at North Harbor, Manila, without prejudice to the
institution of a criminal case against its owner and/or
operator, pursuant to the order dated May 19, 1964 issued
by the Commissioner of Fisheries (pp. 35-36, rec.), the
motion for reconsideration of which order was denied by
the Commissioner of Fisheries in an order dated August 17,
1964 (pp. 41-42, rec.)
For illegal fishing with dynamite on March 28, 1963, the
operation of Tony Lex VI was suspended by the
Commissioner of Fisheries in an order dated April 1, 1963
(p. 62, rec.)
For illegal fishing again with explosives on April 25, 1963,
the fishing boat Tony Lex VI together with its tackle,
apparel, furniture and all other apparatus used in fishing
was ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
Government and a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 was
imposed on its owners-operators, without prejudice to the
filing of the necessary criminal action, pursuant to the order
of June 2, 1964 of the Commissioner of Fisheries (pp. 37-
38, rec.)
Again, for committing the same violation on June 19, 1963,
a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 was imposed on the
owners-operators of fishing boat Tony Lex VI pursuant to
the order of June 4, 1964 issued by the Commissioner of
Fisheries (pp. 39-40, rec.)
It appears, therefore, that since January 28,1964, the fishing
boat Tony Lex III was suspended from operating and was
ordered moored at Pier 14, North Harbor, Manila (pp. 34,
46-47, rec.); and that the fishing vessel Tony Lex VI was
suspended for one year from May 24,1964 and was actually
ordered forfeited to the Government pursuant to the order
of June 2, 1964 for repeated violations of Section 12 of the
Fisheries Act (pp. 37-38, rec.). As a matter of fact, when
apprehended on August 5 or 6, 1965, both vessels were
found to be without any license or permit for coastwise
trade or for fishing and unlawfully fishing with explosives,
for which reason their owners and crew were accordingly
indicted by the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan for illegal
fishing with dynamite and without the requisite license (pp.
48-53, rec.)
As heretofore intimated, the two fishing boats were
apprehended on numerous occasions for fishing with
dynamite from March 28, 1963 to March 11, 1964, which
violations private respondent, as owner-operator, sought to
compromise by offering to pay a fine of P21,000.00 for all
said prior violations.
Such previous violations of Sections 12, 17 and 18 of the
Fisheries Act committed by the two fishing boats, Tony
Lex III and Tony Lex VI, from March 28, 1963 until
August 5 or 6, 1965, rendered the said vessels subject to
forfeiture under Sections 76 and 78 of the Fisheries Act, as
amended.
Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and
air crafts for violations of the customs laws have been the
traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a
search warrant, because the vessel can be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search
warrant must be sought before such warrant could be
secured; hence it is not practicable to require a search
warrant before such search or seizure can be
constitutionally effected (Papa v. Mago, L-27360, Feb. 28,
1968, 22 SCRA 857, 871-74; Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil.
770, 774; Carroll v. U.S. 267, pp. 132, 149, 158; Justice
Fernando, The Bill of Rights, 1972 ed., p. 225; Gonzales,
Philippine Constitutional Law, 1966 ed., p. 300).
The same exception should apply to seizures of fishing
vessels breaching our fishery laws: They are usually
equipped with powerful motors that enable them to elude
pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or Coast Guard.
Another exception to the constitutional requirement of a
search warrant for a valid search and seizure, is a search or
seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest (Alvero v. Dizon,
76 Phil. 637; Justice Fernando, The Bill of Rights, 1972
ed., p. 224). Under our Rules of Court, a police officer or a
private individual may, without a warrant, arrest a person
(a) who has committed, is actually committing or is about
to commit an offense in his presence; (b) who is reasonably
believed to have committed an offense which has been
actually committed; or (c) who is a prisoner who has
escaped from confinement while serving a final judgment
or from temporary detention during the pendency of his
ease or while being transferred from one confinement to
another (Sec. 6, Rule 113, Revised Rules of Court). In the
case at bar, the members of the crew of the two vessels
were caught in flagrante illegally fishing with dynamite and
without the requisite license. Thus their apprehension
without a warrant of arrest while committing a crime is
lawful. Consequently, the seizure of the vessel, its
equipment and dynamites therein was equally valid as an
incident to a lawful arrest.
The alleged compromise approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources on September 13, 1965
(pp. 63-64, 158-159, rec.) cannot be invoked by the
respondents because the said compromise referred to about
thirty violations of the fisheries law committed by the
private respondent from March 28, 1963 to March 11,
1964. The violations by the two vessels of private
respondent by reason of which these vessels were
apprehended and detained by the Philippine Navy upon
request of the Commissioner of Fisheries, were committed
on August 5 or 6, 1965.
Moreover, the power to compromise would exist only
before a criminal prosecution is instituted; otherwise the
Department Secretary or any of his sub-alterns can render
criminal prosecutions for violations of the fisheries law a
mere mockery. It is not in the public interest nor is it good
policy to sustain the viewpoint that the Department
Secretary can compromise criminal cases involving public,
not private, offenses after the indictment had been instituted
in court. The fishing vessels together with all their
equipment and the dynamites found therein are not only
evidence of the crime of illegal fishing but also subject to
forfeiture in favor of the Government as instruments of the
crime (Art. 45, Revised Penal Code, Sec. 78, Act No. 4003,
as amended). Section 80(j) of Act No. 4003, as amended,
precludes such a compromise the moment the Fisheries
Commissioner decides to prosecute the criminal action in
15
accordance with Sections 76 and 78 of the other penal
provisions of the fisheries law. Furthermore, any
Page
compromise shall be upon the recommendation of the
Fisheries Commission (Section 80[i], Act No. 4003), which
did not recommend such a compromise for the violation on
August 5 or 6, 1965 of Section 12 in relation to Sections 76
and 78 of Act No. 4003, as amended. On the contrary, the
Fisheries Commissioner requested the Provincial Fiscal to
institute the criminal cases (pp. 43-45, rec.) and the
Provincial Fiscal filed the corresponding informations
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 3416 and 3417 on
September ‘30,1965 against the owners and the members of
the crew of the vessels (pp. 48-53, rec.)

It should be noted that in the first indorsement dated

September 13, 1965 of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources approving the compromise fine of
P21,000.00 for the various violations committed previous
to August 5 or 6, 1965 (pp. 34-42, 47, 58-64, 149-155, 158-
159, rec.), the Department Secretary "believes that the offer
made by the company was an implied admission of
violations of said provisions of the Fisheries Law and
regulations, . . ." (pp. 63, 158, rec.). The said approval was
granted after the private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the indorsement dated March 5, 1965 of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
disapproving the offer by private respondent to pay the fine
by way of compromise.

There can be no dispute that the term fishing boat

employed in the second paragraph of Section 12 of the
Fisheries Act applies to the vessels Tony Lex III and Tony
Lex VI. Even private respondent refers to said fishing boats
as fishing vessels "engaged in fishing operations" or "in
commercial fishing" in paragraph IV of its complaint in
Civil Case No. 62799 (p. 13, rec.), as well as in its various
communications to the Fisheries Commissioner (pp. 60-61,
65, 82, rec.). The two fishing vessels Tony Lex III and
Tony Lex VI likewise fall under the term vessel used in
Sections 17, 76 and 78, as well as the term boats utilized in
the second paragraph of Section 76 of the Fisheries Act.
They can also fall under the term fishing equipment
employed in Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3512: because a
fishing equipment is never complete and cannot be
effectively used in off-shore or deep-sea fishing without the
fishing boat or fishing vessel itself. And these two vessels
of private respondent certainly come under the term fishing
vessels employed in paragraph 5 of Section 4 of the same
Republic Act 3512 creating the Fisheries Commission.

Hence, no useful purpose can be served in trying to

distinguish between boat and vessel with reference to Tony
Lex III and Tony Lex VI. As a matter of fact, the accepted
definition of vessel includes "every description of water
craft, large or small, used or capable of being used as a
means of transportation on water" (Cope versus Vallete,
etc., 199 U.S. 625; U.S. v. Holmes, 164 Fed. 884; Charles
Barnes Co. v. One Dredge Boat, 169 Fed. 895, and Yu Con
v. Ipil, 11 Phil. 780).

The word boat it its ordinary sense, means any water craft
(Monongahela River Construction, etc. v. Hardsaw, 77 NE
363, 365). The fishing boats Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI
are likewise vessels within the meaning of the term vessel
used in Sections 903 and 2210 of the Tariff and Customs
Code.

WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED

AND THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED
OCTOBER 18, 1965, THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
MANDATORY INJUNCTION ISSUED THEREUNDER
AND THE ORDER DATED NOVEMBER 23, 1965, ARE
HEREBY SET ASIDE AS NULL AND VOID, WITH
COSTS AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT.

Castro (Chairman), Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and

16

Martin, JJ., concur.
Page

[G.R. NOS. 111202-05 : January 31, 2006]
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, Petitioner, v. THE
COURT OF APPEALS; Honorable Arsenio M.
Gonong, Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court, Manila,
Branch 8; Honorable MAURO T. ALLARDE,
Presiding Judge, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
Kalookan City, Branch 123; AMADO SEVILLA and
ANTONIO VELASCO, Special Sheriffs of Manila;
JOVENAL SALAYON, Special Sheriff of Kalookan
City, DIONISIO J. CAMANGON, Ex-Deputy Sheriff of
Manila and CESAR S. URBINO, SR., doing business
under the name and style "Duraproof
Services," Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
These Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition, with Prayers
for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order, are the culmination of several court
cases wherein several resolutions and decisions are sought
to be annulled. Petitioner Commissioner of Customs
specifically assails the following:
A) Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
dated February 18, 1991 in Civil Case No. 89-
51451;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
B) Order of the RTC of Kalookan dated May 28, 1991 in
Special Civil Case No. C-234;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
C) Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 6,
1992 in CA-G.R. SP No.
24669;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
D) Resolution of the CA dated August 6, 1992 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 28387;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
E) Resolution of the CA dated November 10, 1992 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 29317;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
F) Resolution of the CA dated May 31, 1993 in CA-G.R.
No. CV-32746; andcralawlibrary
G) Decision of the CA dated July 19, 1993 in the
consolidated petitions of CA-G.R. SP Nos. 24669, 28387
and 29317.
Petitioner also seeks to prohibit the CA and the RTC of
Kalookan1 from further acting in CA-G.R. CV No. 32746
and Civil Case No. 234, respectively.
The whole controversy revolves around a vessel and its
cargo. On January 7, 1989, the vessel M/V "Star Ace,"
coming from Singapore laden with cargo, entered the Port
of San Fernando, La Union (SFLU) for needed repairs. The
vessel and the cargo had an appraised value, at that time, of
more or less Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000).
When the Bureau of Customs later became suspicious that
the vessel's real purpose in docking was to smuggle its
cargo into the country, seizure proceedings were instituted
under S.I. Nos. 02-89 and 03-89 and, subsequently, two
Warrants of Seizure and Detention were issued for the
vessel and its cargo.
Respondent Cesar S. Urbino, Sr., does not own the vessel
or any of its cargo but claimed a preferred maritime lien
under a Salvage Agreement dated June 8, 1989. To protect
his claim, Urbino initially filed two motions in the seizure
and detention cases: a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion to
Lift Warrant of Seizure and Detention. 2 Apparently not
content with his administrative remedies, Urbino sought
relief with the regular courts by filing a case for
Prohibition, Mandamus and Damages before the RTC of
SFLU3 on July 26, 1989, seeking to restrain the District
Collector of Customs from interfering with his salvage
operation. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 89-
4267. On January 31, 1991 the RTC of SFLU dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction because of the pending seizure
and detention cases. Urbino then elevated the matter to the
CA where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 32746. The
Commissioner of Customs, in response, filed a Motion to
Suspend Proceedings, advising the CA that it intends to
question the jurisdiction of the CA before this Court. The
motion was denied on May 31, 1993. Hence, in this petition
the Commissioner of Customs assails the Resolution "F"
recited above and seeks to prohibit the CA from continuing
to hear the case.
On January 9, 1990, while Civil Case No. 89-4267 was
pending, Urbino filed another case for Certiorari and
Mandamus with the RTC of Manila, presided by Judge
Arsenio M. Gonong,4 this time to enforce his maritime lien.
Impleaded as defendants were the Commissioner of
Customs, the District Collector of Customs, the owners of
the vessel and cargo, Vlason Enterprises, Singkong Trading
Company, Banco do Brazil, Dusit International Company
Incorporated, Thai-Nam Enterprises Limited, Thai-United
Trading Company Incorporated and Omega Sea Transport
Company, and the vessel M/V "Star Ace." This case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 89-51451. The Office of the
Solicitor General filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that a similar case was pending with the RTC of SFLU. The
Motion to Dismiss was granted on July 2, 1990, but only
insofar as the Commissioner of Customs and the District
Collector were concerned. The RTC of Manila proceeded
to hear the case against the other parties and received
evidence ex parte. The RTC of Manila later rendered a
decision on February 18, 1991 finding in favor of Urbino
(assailed Decision "A" recited above).
Thereafter, on March 13, 1991, a writ of execution was
17
issued by the RTC of Manila. Respondent Camangon was
appointed as Special Sheriff to execute the decision and he
Page
issued a notice of levy and sale against the vessel and its
cargo. The Commissioner of Customs, upon learning of the
notice of levy and sale, filed with the RTC of Manila a
motion to recall the writ, but before it could be acted upon,
Camangon had auctioned off the vessel and the cargo to
Urbino for One Hundred and Twenty Million Pesos
(P120,000,000). The following day, Judge Gonong issued
an order commanding Sheriff Camangon to cease and
desist from implementing the writ. Despite the order,
Camangon issued a Certificate of Sale in favor of Urbino.
A week later, Judge Gonong issued another order recalling
the writ of execution. Both cease and desist and recall
orders of Judge Gonong were elevated by Urbino to the CA
on April 12, 1991 where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 24669. On April 26, 1991, the CA issued a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining the RTC of Manila
from enforcing its cease and desist and recall orders. The
TRO was eventually substituted by a writ of preliminary
injunction. A motion to lift the injunction was filed by the
Commissioner of Customs but it was denied. Hence, in this
petition the Commissioner of Customs assails Resolution
"C" recited above.
On May 8, 1991, Urbino attempted to enforce the RTC of
Manila's decision and the Certificate of Sale against the
Bureau of Customs by filing a third case, a Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with the RTC of
Kaloocan.5 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 234.
On May 28, 1991, the RTC of Kaloocan ordered the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
Philippine Ports Authority and the Bureau of Customs from
interfering with the relocation of the vessel and its cargo by
Urbino (assailed Order "B" recited above).
Meanwhile, on June 5, 1992, Camangon filed his Sheriff's
Return with the Clerk of Court. On June 26, 1992, the
Executive Judge for the RTC of Manila, Judge Bernardo P.
Pardo,6 having been informed of the circumstances of the
sale, issued an order nullifying the report and all
proceedings taken in connection therewith. With this order
Urbino filed his fourth case with the CA on July 15, 1992, a
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus against
Judge Pardo. This became CA-G.R. SP No. 28387. The CA
issued a Resolution on August 6, 1992 granting the TRO
against the Executive Judge to enjoin the implementation of
his June 26, 1992 Order. Hence, in this petition the
Commissioner of Customs assails Resolution "D" recited
above.
Going back to the seizure and detention proceedings, the
decision of the District Collector of Customs was to forfeit
the vessel and cargo in favor of the Government. This
decision was affirmed by the Commissioner of Customs.
Three appeals were then filed with the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) by different parties, excluding Urbino, who
claimed an interest in the vessel and cargo. These three
cases were docketed as CTA Case No. 4492, CTA Case
No. 4494 and CTA Case No. 4500. Urbino filed his own
case, CTA Case No. 4497, but it was dismissed for want of
capacity to sue. He, however, was allowed to intervene in
CTA Case No. 4500. On October 5, 1992, the CTA issued
an order authorizing the Commissioner of Customs to
assign customs police and guards around the vessel and to
conduct an inventory of the cargo. In response, on
November 3, 1992, Urbino filed a fifth Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA to assail the
order as well as the jurisdiction of the Presiding Judge and
Associate Judges of the CTA in the three cases. That case
was docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 29317. On November 10,
1992, the CA issued a Resolution reminding the parties that
the vessel is under the control of the appellate court in CA-
G.R. SP No. 24669 (assailed Resolution "E" recited above).
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 24669, 28387 and 29317 were later
consolidated and the CA issued a joint Decision in July 19,
1993 nullifying and setting aside: 1) the Order recalling the
writ of execution by Judge Gonong of the the RTC of
Manila; 2) the Order of Executive Judge Pardo of the RTC
of Manila nullifying the Sheriff's Report and all
proceedings connected therewith; and 3) the October 19,
1993 Order of the CTA, on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Hence, in these petitions, which have been
consolidated, the Commissioner of Customs assails
Decision "G" recited above.
For purposes of deciding these petitions, the assailed
Decisions and Resolutions will be divided into three
groups:
1. The Resolution of the CA dated May 31, 1993 in CA-
G.R. No. CV-32746 with the additional prayer to enjoin the
CA from deciding the said case.
2. The Order of the RTC of Kalookan dated May 28, 1991
in Special Civil Case No. C-234 with the additional prayer
to enjoin the RTC of Kalookan from proceeding with said
case.
3. The Decision of the RTC of Manila dated February 18,
1991 in Civil Case No. 89-51451, the Resolutions of the
CA dated March 6, 1992, August 6, 1992, November 10,
1992 and the Decision of the CA dated July 19, 1993 in the
consolidated petitions CA-G.R. SP Nos. 24669, 28387 and
29317.
First Group
The Commissioner of Customs seeks to nullify the
Resolution of the CA dated May 31, 1993 denying the
Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to prohibit the CA
from further proceeding in CA-G.R. No. CV-32746 for lack
of jurisdiction. This issue can be easily disposed of as it
appears that the petition has become moot and academic,
with the CA having terminated CA-G.R. No. CV-32746 by
rendering its Decision on May 13, 2002 upholding the
dismissal of the case by the RTC of SFLU for lack of
jurisdiction, a finding that sustains the position of the
Commissioner of Customs. This decision became final and
entry of judgment was made on June 14, 2002.7
Second Group
The Court now proceeds to consider the Order granting an
injunction dated May 28, 1991 in Civil Case No. C-234
issued by the RTC of Kalookan. The Commissioner of
Customs seeks its nullification and to prohibit the RTC of
Kalookan from further proceeding with the case.
The RTC of Kalookan issued the Order against the
Philippine Ports Authority and Bureau of Customs solely
on the basis of Urbino's alleged ownership over the vessel
by virtue of his certificate of sale. By this the RTC of
Kalookan committed a serious and reversible error in
interfering with the jurisdiction of customs authorities and
should have dismissed the petition outright. In Mison v.
Natividad,8 this Court held that the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Collector of Customs cannot be interfered with by
regular courts even upon allegations of ownership.
To summarize the facts in that case, a warrant of seizure
and detention was issued against therein plaintiff over a
number of
vehicles found in his residence for violation of customs
laws. Plaintiff then filed a complaint before the RTC of
Pampanga alleging that he is the registered owner of certain
vehicles which the Bureau of Customs are threatening to
seize and praying that the latter be enjoined from doing so.
The RTC of Pampanga issued a TRO and eventually,
18
thereafter, substituted it with a writ of preliminary
injunction. This Court found that the proceedings
Page
conducted by the trial court were null and void as it had no
jurisdiction over the res subject of the warrant of seizure
and detention, holding that:cra:nad
A warrant of seizure and detention having already been
issued, presumably in the regular course of official duty,
the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga was indisputably
precluded from interfering in said proceedings. That in his
complaint in Civil Case No. 8109 private respondent
alleges ownership over several vehicles which are legally
registered in his name, having paid all the taxes and
corresponding licenses incident thereto, neither divests the
Collector of Customs of such jurisdiction nor confers upon
said trial court regular jurisdiction over the case. Ownership
of goods or the legality of its acquisition can be raised as
defenses in a seizure proceeding; if this were not so, the
procedure carefully delineated by law for seizure and
forfeiture cases may easily be thwarted and set to naught by
scheming parties. Even the illegality of the warrant of
seizure and detention cannot justify the trial court's
interference with the Collector's jurisdiction. In the first
place, there is a distinction between the existence of the
Collector's power to issue it and the regularity of the
proceeding taken under such power. In the second place,
even if there be such an irregularity in the latter, the
Regional Trial Court does not have the competence to
review, modify or reverse whatever conclusions may result
therefrom x x x.
The facts in this case are like those in that case. Urbino
claimed to be the owner of the vessel and he sought to
restrain the PPA and the Bureau of Customs from
interfering with his rights as owner. His remedy, therefore,
was not with the RTC but with the CTA where the seizure
and detention cases are now pending and where he was
already allowed to intervene.
Moreover, this Court, on numerous occasions, cautioned
judges in their issuance of temporary restraining orders and
writs of preliminary injunction against the Collector of
Customs based on the principle enunciated in Mison v.
Natividad  and has issued Administrative Circular No. 7-99
to carry out this policy.9 This Court again reminds all
concerned that the rule is clear: the Collector of Customs
has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture
proceedings and trial courts are precluded from assuming
cognizance over such matters even through petitions
for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus .
Third Group
The Decision of the RTC of Manila dated February 18,
1991 has the following dispositive portion:cra:nad
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, based
on the allegations, prayer and evidence adduced, both
testimonial and documentary, the Court is convinced, that,
indeed, defendants/respondents are liable to
plaintiff/petitioner in the amount prayed for in the petition
for which [it] renders judgment as follows:
1. Respondent M/V Star Ace, represented by Capt. Nahum
Rada, Relief Captain of the vessel and Omega Sea
Transport Company, Inc., represented by Frank Cadacio is
ordered to refrain from alienating or transfer[r]ing the
vessel M/V Star Ace to any third
parties;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
2. Singko Trading Company to pay the following:
A. Taxes due the Government;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
b. Salvage fees on the vessel in the amount of
$1,000,000.00 based on the Lloyd's Standard Form of
Salvage Agreement;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
c. Preservation, securing and guarding fees on the vessel in
the amount of $225,000.00;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
d. Salaries of the crew from August 16, 1989 to December,
in the amount of $43,000.00 and unpaid salaries from
January 1990 up to the present;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
e. Attorney's fees in the amount of P656,000.00;
3. Vlazon Enterprises to pay plaintiff in the amount
of P3,000,000.00 for damages;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
4. Banco do Brazil to pay plaintiff in the amount of
$300,000.00 in damages; and finally,
5. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
On the other hand, the CA Resolutions are similar orders
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
Judge Gonong and Judge Pardo from enforcing their recall
and nullification orders and the CTA from exercising
jurisdiction over the case, to preserve the status quo
pending resolution of the three petitions.
Finally, the Decision of the CA dated July 19, 1993
disposed of all three petitions in favor of Urbino, and has
the following dispositive portion:cra:nad
ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing disquisitions,
all the three (3) consolidated petitions for certiorari are
hereby GRANTED.
THE assailed Order of respondent Judge Arsenio Gonong
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8, dated,
April 5, 1991, in the first assailed Petition
for Certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 24669); the assailed Order
of Judge Bernardo Pardo, Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8, dated July 6, 1992, in the
second Petition for Certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 28387);
and Finally, the assailed order or Resolution en banc of the
respondent Court of Tax Appeals[,] Judges Ernesto Acosta,
Ramon de Veyra and Manuel Gruba, under date of October
5, 1992, in the third Petition for Certiorari (CA-
G.R. SP No. 29317) are all hereby NULLIFIED and SET
ASIDE thereby giving way to the entire decision dated
February 18, 1991 of the respondent Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 8, in Civil Case No. 89-51451 which
remains valid, final and executory, if not yet wholly
executed.
THE writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued by
this Court on March 6, 1992 and reiterated on July 22, 1992
and this date against the named respondents specified in the
dispositive portion of the judgment of the respondent
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8, in the first
Petition for Certiorari,
which remains valid, existing and enforceable, is hereby
MADE PERMANENT without prejudice (1) to the
petitioner's remaining unpaid obligations to herein party-
intervenor in accordance with the Compromise Agreement
or in connection with the decision of the respondent lower
court in CA-G.R. SP No. 24669 and (2) to the government,
in relation to the forthcoming decision of the respondent
Court of Tax Appeals on the amount of taxes, charges,
assessments or obligations that are due, as totally secured
and fully guaranteed payment by petitioner's bond, subject
to relevant rulings of the Department of Finance and other
prevailing laws and jurisprudence.
19
We make no pronouncement as to costs.
Page
SO ORDERED.
The Court rules in favor of the Commissioner of Customs.
First of all, the Court finds the decision of the RTC of
Manila, in so far as it relates to the vessel M/V "Star Ace,"
to be void as jurisdiction was never acquired over the
vessel.10 In filing the case, Urbino had impleaded the vessel
as a defendant to enforce his alleged maritime lien. This
meant that he brought an action in rem under the Code of
Commerce under which the vessel may be attached and
sold.11 However, the basic operative fact for the institution
and perfection of proceedings in rem is the actual or
constructive possession of the res by the tribunal
empowered by law to conduct the proceedings.12 This
means that to acquire jurisdiction over the vessel, as a
defendant, the trial court must have obtained either actual
or constructive possession over it. Neither was
accomplished by the RTC of Manila.
In his comment to the petition, Urbino plainly stated that
"petitioner has actual[sic] physical custody not only of the
goods and/or cargo but the subject vessel, M/V Star Ace, as
well."13 This is clearly an admission that the RTC of Manila
did not have jurisdiction over the res. While Urbino
contends that the Commissioner of Custom's custody was
illegal, such fact, even if true, does not deprive the
Commissioner of Customs of jurisdiction thereon. This is a
question that ought to be resolved in the seizure and
forfeiture cases, which are now pending with the CTA, and
not by the regular courts as a collateral matter to enforce his
lien. By simply filing a case in rem against the vessel,
despite its being in the custody of customs officials, Urbino
has circumvented the rule that regular trial courts are
devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or
regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted
in the Bureau of Customs, on his mere assertion that the
administrative proceedings were a nullity.14 cra
On the other hand, the Bureau of Customs had acquired
jurisdiction over the res ahead and to the exclusion of the
RTC of Manila. The forfeiture proceedings conducted by
the Bureau of Customs are in the nature of proceedings in
rem15 and jurisdiction was obtained from the moment the
vessel entered the SFLU port. Moreover, there is no
question that forfeiture proceedings were instituted and the
vessel was seized even before the filing of the RTC of
Manila case.
The Court is aware that Urbino seeks to enforce a maritime
lien and, because of its nature, it is equivalent to an
attachment from the time of its existence. 16 Nevertheless,
despite his lien's constructive attachment, Urbino still
cannot claim an advantage as his lien only came about after
the warrant of seizure and detention was issued and
implemented. The Salvage Agreement, upon which Urbino
based his lien, was entered into on June 8, 1989. The
warrants of seizure and detention, on the other hand, were
issued on January 19 and 20, 1989. And to remove further
doubts that the forfeiture case takes precedence over the
RTC of Manila case, it should be noted that forfeiture
retroacts to the date of the commission of the offense, in
this case the day the vessel entered the country. 17 A
maritime lien, in contrast, relates back to the period when it
first attached,18 in this case the earliest retroactive date can
only be the date of the Salvage Agreement. Thus, when the
vessel and its cargo are ordered forfeited, the effect will
retroact to the moment the vessel entered Philippine waters.
Accordingly, the RTC of Manila decision never attained
finality as to the defendant vessel, inasmuch as no
jurisdiction was acquired over it, and the decision cannot be
binding and the writ of execution issued in connection
therewith is null and void.
Moreover, even assuming that execution can be made
against the vessel and its cargo, as goods and chattels to
satisfy the liabilities of the other defendants who have an
interest therein, the RTC of Manila may not execute its
decision against them while, as found by this Court, these
are under the proper and lawful custody of the Bureau of
Customs.19 This is especially true when, in case of finality
of the order of forfeiture, the execution cannot anymore
cover the vessel and cargo as ownership of the Government
will retroact to the date of entry of the vessel into
Philippine waters.
As regards the jurisdiction of the CTA, the CA was clearly
in error when it issued an injunction against it from
deciding the forfeiture case on the basis that it interfered
with the subject of ownership over the vessel which was,
according to the CA, beyond the jurisdiction of the CTA.
Firstly, the execution of the Decision against the vessel and
cargo, as aforesaid, was a nullity and therefore the sale of
the vessel was invalid. Without a valid certificate of sale,
there can be no claim of ownership which Urbino can
present against the Government. Secondly, as previously
stated, allegations of ownership neither divest the Collector
of Customs of such jurisdiction nor confer upon the trial
court jurisdiction over the case. Ownership of goods or the
legality of its acquisition can be raised as defenses in a
seizure proceeding.20 The actions of the Collectors of
Customs are appealable to the Commissioner of Customs,
whose decision, in turn, is subject to the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the CTA.21 Clearly, issues of ownership over
goods in the custody of custom officials are within the
power of the CTA to determine.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions
are GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila dated February 18, 1991 in Civil Case No. 89-
51451, insofar as it affects the vessel M/V "Star Ace," the
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan dated May
28, 1991 in Special Civil Case No. C-234, the Resolution of
the Court of Appeals dated March 6, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 24669, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
August 6, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 28387, the Resolution
of the Court of Appeals dated November 10, 1992 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 29317 and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated July 19, 1993 in the consolidated petitions in
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 24669, 28387 and 29317 are all SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Kalookan is enjoined
from further acting in Special Civil Case No. C-234. The
Order of respondent Judge Arsenio M. Gonong dated April
5, 1991 and the Order of then Judge Bernardo P. Pardo
dated June 26, 1992 are REINSTATED. The Court of Tax
Appeals is ordered to proceed with CTA Case No. 4492,
CTA Case No. 4494 and CTA Case No. 4500. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
20
Page

[G.R. No. 172678, March 23 : 2011]
SEA LION FISHING CORPORATION,
PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
When an instrument or tool used in a crime is being
claimed by a third-party not liable to the offense, such
third-party must first establish its ownership over the same.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
January 10, 2006 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 91270 which denied the Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus[2] questioning the twin
Sentences[3] both dated May 16, 2005 and the Order [4] dated
August 4, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Puerto Princesa City, Branch 52 in Criminal Case Nos.
18965 and 19422.  Likewise assailed is the May 5, 2006
Resolution[5] of the CA denying the Motion for
Reconsideration[6] thereto.
Factual Antecedents
In response to fishermen's report of poaching off Mangsee
Island in Balabac, Palawan, a combined team of Philippine
Marines, Coast Guard and barangay officials conducted
search and seizure operations therein.  There they found
F/V Sea Lion anchored three nautical miles northwest of
Mangsee Island.  Beside it were five boats and a long
fishing net already spread over the water.  The team
boarded the vessel and apprehended her captain, a Filipino,
and a crew composed of three Filipinos and three Chinese.
Also arrested were 17 Chinese fishermen aboard F/V Sea
Lion.
Various charges were thereafter filed as follows: (1)
Violation of Section 97[7] of Republic Act (RA) No.
8550[8] against all those arrested, docketed as I.S. No. 2004-
032; (2) Violation of Section 90[9] of the same law against
the captain of F/V Sea Lion, the Chief Engineer, and the
President of the corporation which owned said vessel,
docketed as I.S. No. 2004-061; and (3) Violation of Section
27(a) and (f)[10] of RA 9147[11] and of Section 87[12] of RA
8550 against all those arrested and the President of the
corporation which owned the vessel, respectively docketed
as I.S. Nos. 2004-68, 2004-69, and 2004-70.
Ruling of the Provincial Prosecutor
While the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan dismissed I.S.
Nos. 2004-61, 2004-68 and 2004-69, he nevertheless found
probable cause for the remaining charges [13] but only
against the 17 Chinese fishermen.[14]  This was after it was
found out that the crew of F/V Sea Lion did not assent to
the illegal acts of said 17 Chinese fishermen who were
rescued by the crew of the F/V Sea Lion from a distressed
Chinese vessel.   The prosecutor concluded that the crew,
unarmed, outnumbered and hampered by language barrier,
acted only out of uncontrollable fear of imminent danger to
their lives and property which hindered them from asserting
their authority over these Chinese nationals.  Accordingly,
corresponding Informations against the 17 Chinese
fishermen were filed in court.
With the crew of F/V Sea Lion now exculpated, petitioner
Sea Lion Fishing Corporation filed before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor an Urgent Motion for Release of
Evidence[15] alleging that it owns the vessel.  Said Office
thus issued a Resolution[16] dated August 25, 2004, viz:
WHEREFORE, F/[V] Sea Lion is hereby recommended to
be released to the movant upon proper showing of
evidence of its ownership of the aforesaid vessel and the
posting of a bond double the value of said vessel as
appraised by the MARINA, if through any court accredited
company surety, or equal to the aforesaid value[,] if by cash
bond.   Said bond shall be on the condition that [the] vessel
owner shall make [the vessel] available for inspection
during the course of the trial.[17]   (Emphasis supplied.)
This Resolution was later amended through a Supplemental
Resolution[18] dated September 10, 2004 reading as follows:
This pertains to the Resolution of the undersigned dated 25
August 2004 recommending the release of the vessel F/[V]
Sea Lion.  In addition to the conditions therein, the release
of the said vessel shall be with the approval of the
Provincial Committee on Illegal Entrants which has
jurisdiction over all apprehended vessels involved in
poaching.[19]
Petitioner, however, failed to act in accordance with said
Resolutions.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The case for Violation of Section 97 of RA 8550 was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 18965 while that for
Violation of Section 87 of the same law was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 19422.  The Chinese nationals entered
separate pleas of "not guilty" for both offenses. Later,
however, in Criminal Case No. 18965, they changed their
pleas from "not guilty" to "guilty" for the lesser offense of
Violation of Section 88, sub-paragraph (3)[20] of RA 8550. 
Hence, they were accordingly declared guilty of said lesser
offense in a Sentence[21] issued by the RTC of Puerto
21
Princesa City, Branch 52 on May 16, 2005, the dispositive
Page
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, with the plea of guilty of all the accused to
the lesser offense, the Court hereby finds the Seventeen
(17) accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals
for the crime of Violation of Section 88, sub-par. (3) of
R.A. 8550 and sentences them to suffer an imprisonment of
FIVE (5) YEARS TO SIX (6) YEARS, SIX (6) MONTHS
AND SEVEN (7) DAYS.   The Fishing Vessel F/V Sea
Lion I as well as the fishing paraphernalia and equipments
used by the accused in committing the crime [are] hereby
ordered confiscated in favor of the government.
The x x x confiscated vessel and all the fishing gadgets,
paraphernalia and equipment are hereby ordered to be
placed under the [temporary] custody of the Philippine
Coast Guard. The latter is hereby directed to prepare and
submit to this Court the inventory of all confiscated items
within 15 days from receipt of this order.  Further, the
Commander of the Philippine Coast Guard should observe
the diligence of a good father of the family in the
preservation and maintenance of the entrusted confiscated
items until the final disposition thereof by the Court.
Having appeared that the accused have been detained since
January 19, 2004, the period of their detention is hereby
credited in their favor.
SO ORDERED.[22]
A Sentence[23] in Criminal Case No. 19422 was also issued
on even date, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, with the plea of guilty of all seventeen (17)
accused, the Court hereby finds them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of Violation of
Section 87 of R.A. 8550 (Poaching) and sentences them to
pay a fine of One Hundred Thousand (US$100,000.00)
Dollars to be paid to the Republic of the Philippines.  The
Fishing Vessel F/V Sea Lion 1 as well as the fishing
paraphernalia and equipments used by the accused in
committing the crime  [are] hereby ordered confiscated in
the favor of the government.
The x x x confiscated vessel and all the fishing gadgets,
paraphernalia and equipment are hereby ordered to be
placed under the [temporary] custody of the Philippine
Coast Guard.   The latter is hereby directed to prepare and
submit to this Court the inventory of all confiscated items
within 15 days from receipt of this order.  Further, the
commander of the Philippine Coast Guard should observe
the diligence of a good father of the family in the
preservation and maintenance of the entrusted confiscated
items until the final disposition thereof by the Court.
The Provincial Jail Warden of Palawan is hereby ordered to
release all the above-named accused unless held for some
other lawful cause or causes.
SO ORDERED.[24]
It was only after the issuance of the above Sentences that
petitioner again made its move by filing a Motion for
Reconsideration[25] on June 24, 2005.  It prayed for the trial
court to delete from said Sentences the confiscation of F/V
Sea Lion. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor filed an
Opposition thereto.[26]  After receipt of petitioner's
Reply[27] to said Opposition, the trial court denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus[28] with the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On January 10, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed
Decision denying the petition.[29] The CA ruled that there
was no lack of jurisdiction, excess of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court since it had
jurisdiction over the crimes as alleged in the Informations
and the penalty for violating the laws stated therein. 
Necessarily, it had the authority to seize the F/V Sea Lion
which was mentioned in the said Informations.  The CA
further held that while the petitioner attempted to claim as
its own the fishing vessel in its Motion for Reconsideration
dated June 24, 2005, its effort is undeserving of merit due
to failure to adduce evidence.  Lastly, the CA declared that
the petitioner did not avail of the proper procedural
remedy.  After the trial court recognized its personality to
intervene in the Order dated August 4, 2005, petitioner's
recourse should have been an appeal and
not certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. [30]
The appellate court also denied petitioner's subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration[31] in its assailed Resolution
dated May 5, 2006.[32]
Thus, petitioner filed this Petition for Review
on Certiorari raising the sole issue of whether the
confiscation of F/V Sea Lion was valid. [33]
The Parties' Arguments
Petitioner contends that F/V Sea Lion should be released to
it because it is the registered owner of said vessel and her
captain and crew members were not among those accused
of and convicted in Criminal Case Nos. 18965 and 19422. 
To buttress its contention, petitioner invokes Article 45 of
the Revised Penal Code which provides:
ART. 45. Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or
instruments of the crime. -  Every penalty imposed for the
commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of
the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with
which it was committed.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated
and forfeited in favor of the Government, unless they be
the property of a third person not liable for the offense,
but those articles which are not subject of lawful commerce
shall be destroyed.   (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner also claims that it was denied its right to due
process of law when it was not notified of the judicial
proceedings relative to the confiscation of the fishing
vessel.  It argues that such notification was necessary
considering that the provincial prosecutor was duly
informed of its claim of ownership of the F/V Sea Lion.
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues
that since the 17 Chinese nationals were charged with
violations of the provisions of RA 8550, a special law,
Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply.  This
is in view of Article 10 of said Code which specifically
declares that acts punishable by special laws are not subject
to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.  They are only
supplementary to such laws unless the latter should
specifically provide the contrary.  Hence, the forfeiture and
confiscation of the fishing vessel under RA 8550 are
different from the forfeiture and confiscation under the
Revised Penal Code which are additional penalties imposed
in the event of conviction.  And, since RA 8550 provides
that the vessel used in connection with or in direct violation
of the provisions of RA 8550 shall be subjected to
forfeiture in favor of the government without mention of
any distinction as to who owns the vessel, the forfeiture of
F/V Sea Lion was proper.
22
The OSG also contends that even if Article 45 of the
Revised Penal Code is applicable, still the present petition
Page
must fail due to petitioner's failure to present its third-party
claim at the earliest opportunity.  It likewise argues that
petitioner was not deprived its right to due process
considering that it was given ample opportunity to be heard
particularly when its motion for release of the F/V Sea Lion
was granted by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
subject to certain conditions.  However, it opted not to
comply with the conditions imposed by the prosecutor and
instead waited for the trial court's final disposition of the
case.
Our Ruling
The petition has no merit.
We note, at the outset, that petitioner pursued an incorrect
remedy when it sought recourse before the CA.  The filing
of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court before the CA is limited only to the correction of
errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court. [34]  "A special civil action
for certiorari is an independent action, raising the question
of jurisdiction where the tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." [35]  party other than the accused.  Article 45 required too that
The CA did not find either lack or error of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion. There was no jurisdictional error
because based on the Informations,[36] the offenses were
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court. The penalties imposable under the law were also
within its jurisdiction.  As a necessary consequence, the
trial court had the authority to determine how the subject
fishing vessel should be disposed of.  Likewise, no grave
abuse of discretion attended the issuance of the trial court's
order to confiscate F/V Sea Lion  considering the absence
of evidence showing that said vessel is owned by a third
party. Evidently, the remedial relief pursued by the
petitioner was infirm and improper.
We also agree with the CA's observation that the trial court
impliedly recognized petitioner's right to intervene when it
pronounced that petitioner failed to exercise its right to
claim ownership of the F/V Sea Lion.  This being the case,
petitioner should have filed an appeal instead of a petition
for certiorari  before the CA.  Under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, certiorari is unavailing when an appeal is the
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.[37]  "The nature of the
questions intended to be raised on appeal is of no
consequence. It may well be that those questions will treat
exclusively of whether x x x the judgment or final order
was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion x x x.  This is immaterial.  The
remedy, to repeat, is appeal, not certiorari as a special civil
action."[38]  The jurisdiction of a court is not affected by its
erroneous decision.[39]  The orders and rulings of a court on
all controversies pertaining to the case cannot be corrected
by certiorari if the court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter and over the person.[40]  Thus, we agree with the
CA's dismissal of the petition.
Even assuming that the CA may resolve an error of
procedure or judgment, there was none committed in this
particular case.
Petitioner's claim of ownership of F/V Sea Lion is not
supported by any proof on record.  The only document on
record that is relevant in this regard is a request for the
release of the F/V Sea Lion based on petitioner's alleged
ownership filed with the Provincial Prosecutor.  While the
latter authorized the release of said fishing vessel, this was
conditioned upon petitioner's submission of a proof of
ownership and the filing of a bond, with which petitioner
failed to comply. Even when judicial proceedings
commenced, nothing was heard from the petitioner.  No
motion for intervention or any manifestation came from
petitioner's end during the period of arraignment up to the
rendition of sentence. While petitioner later explained
before the CA that its inaction was brought about by its
inability to put up the required bond due to financial
difficulties, same is still not a sufficient justification for it
to deliberately not act at all.
It was only after the trial court ordered the confiscation of
F/V Sea Lion in its assailed twin Sentences that petitioner
was heard from again.  This time, it filed a Motion for
Reconsideration dated June 24, 2005[41]  to which was
attached a copy of an alleged Certificate of Registration
issued by the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA). [42] 
However, as correctly observed by the CA:
Significantly, the lack of any factual basis for the third-
party claim of ownership was not cured at all when the
petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration before the
trial court.  At that point, evidence should have been
adduced to support the petitioner's claim (so that a new trial
or reopening of the trial on the confiscation aspect should
have been prayed for, rather than a mere motion for
reconsideration.)  There is firstly the factual issue - to be
proved by proper evidence in order to be properly
considered by the court - that the vessel is owned by a third
proof be adduced that the third party is not liable for the
offense.  After the admission by the accused through their
guilty plea that the vessel had been used in the commission
of a crime, we believe and so hold that this additional
Article 45 requirement cannot be simply inferred from the
mere fact that the alleged owner is not charged in the same
case before the court.[43]
Accordingly, petitioner's recourse to a motion for
reconsideration was not proper. Although it attached a copy
of an alleged Certificate of Registration, the same cannot be
considered by the trial court because it has not been
formally offered, pursuant to Section 34, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court.  As suggested by the CA, petitioner should
have instead moved for a new trial or reopening of the trial
on the confiscation aspect, rather than a mere motion for
reconsideration.[44]
Finally, petitioner's contention that it was deprived of its
right to due process in the confiscation of F/V Sea Lion has
no factual basis.  As correctly pointed out by the CA:
That the trial court concluded that no denial of due process
occurred is likewise legally correct, perhaps not in the exact
way expressed in the assailed order, but for what the reason
articulated in the assailed order directly implies.  As we
discussed above, the petitioner did not intervene before the
trial court to claim ownership of the fishing vessel, nor
were there records before the court showing a third-party
claim of ownership of the vessel; the formal introduction of
evidence that would have formally brought the third-party
ownership of the vessel to light was prevented by the plea
of guilt of the accused.  There was therefore no third-party
property right sought to be protected when the trial court
ordered the confiscation of the vessel.
Significantly, the lack of any factual basis for the third-
party claim of ownership was not cured at all when the
petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration before the
trial court.  At that point, evidence should have been
adduced to support the petitioner's claim (so that a new trial
or reopening of the trial on the confiscation aspect should
have been prayed for, rather than a mere motion for
reconsideration.)  There is firstly the factual issue - to be
proved by proper evidence in order to be properly
considered by the court - that the vessel is owned by a third
party other than the accused.  Article 45 required too that
23
proof be adduced that the third party is not liable for the
offense.  After the admission by the accused through their
Page
guilty plea that the vessel had been used in the commission
of a crime, we believe and so hold that this additional
Article 45 requirement cannot be simply inferred from the
mere fact that the alleged owner is not charged in the same
case before the court.

It was under this legal situation that the trial court issued its
assailed order that correctly concluded that there had been
no denial of due process.  Given the absence of any
admissible evidence of third-party ownership and the
failure to comply with the additional Article 45
requirement, the court's order to confiscate the F/V Sea
Lion pursuant to Article 87 of R.A. No. 8550 cannot be
incorrect to the point of being an act in grave abuse of
discretion.[45]

In fine, it has been established beyond reasonable doubt

that F/V Sea Lion was used by the 17 Chinese fishermen in
the commission of the crimes.  On the other hand,
petitioner presented no evidence at all to support its claim
of ownership of F/V Sea Lion.  Therefore, the forfeiture of
F/V Sea Lion in favor of the government was proper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision

dated January 10, 2006 and the Resolution dated May 5,
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91270
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Corona, C.J., (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De

Castro, and  Perez, JJ., concur.

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