John Stuart Mill's Liberal Feminism

Author(s): Wendy Donner

Source: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic
Tradition, Vol. 69, No. 2/3, Papers Presented at the American Philosophical Association Pacific
Division Meeting 1992 (Mar., 1993), pp. 155-166
Published by: Springer
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 WENDY DONNER

JOHN STUART MILL'S LIBERAL FEMINISM*

(Received23 July,1992)

In this paper I explore and defend some aspects of John StuartMill's

liberalfeministpoliticaltheoryand its foundationsin his moralphiloso-
phy.' Feminist ethics and political theory is rich and diverse. One
importantquestion in feminist debate is whether historicalmoral and
politicaltheories ought to be rejectedentirelyby feministsor whether
at least some historicalthinkershave valuablecontributionsto make to
a feminist revisioningof the traditionalcanon. I contend that there is
muchin Mill'sphilosophywhichis in harmonywith feministvision and
thought.2While Mill's liberal feminism is complex, my focus in this
paper is on his conceptionsof value, of humannatureand of the self,
and I leave for anotheroccasion an examinationof the politics of his
liberalfeminismand his views on the sexualdivisionof laborwithinthe
family.3Liberal feminist theories have been the subject of intense
discussion and criticism in current debates among feminist scholars.
While this examinationhas several facets, I concentratehere on some
recent critiqueswhich find fault with liberal feminismfor its allegedy
flawed values of individualismand its flawed conception of human
nature and the relation of self to the community.I argue that Mill's
conceptionsof the self, individualism,and self-developmentmeet many
of the concerns raised by these critics whose concerns are more
correctlyfocusedon othermodelsof liberalism.
Mill's moral theory and his views of humannatureand of the good
have importantimplicationsfor his liberalpoliticalphilosophy,shaping
it into a form of radicalegalitarianism.I arguethat Mill'sconceptionof
value for humansessentiallyinvolves a notion of self-development.Let
me begin by setting out the core values which shape Mill's liberal
feminism. While some critiques of liberalism by both feminist and
communitarianthinkersassumethat there is one unifiedliberaltheory,
there are also several divergentstreamsof liberalthought.The correct

Philosophical Studies 69: 155-166, 1993.

C 1993 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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156 WENDY DONNER

targetof these critiquesis a liberalismbuilt on core values of possessive

and abstract individualismand a view of moral agents as rational
egoists. For example, Alison Jaggarcriticizes the alleged liberal com-
mitmentto abstractindividualism.According to Jaggar,abstractindi-
vidualism assumes that human beings are ontologicallyprior to and
independentof society. "Logicallyif not empirically,humanindividuals
could exist outside a social context;their essentialcharacteristics,their
needs and interests, their capacities and desires, are given independ-
ently of their social context and are not createdor even fundamentally
altered by that context."4She also points to the common liberal as-
sumptionof egoismwhichholds that "peopletypicallyseek to maximize
their individualself-interest"althoughshe concedes that Mill is not the
worst offender in this case.5Jaggarclaims that these views are funda-
mentally male and should not be accepted by feminists.6But Mill
himselfdecisivelyrejectstheseviews.
Mill is a utilitarianas well as a liberal and is thus committed to
locatingvalue in mental states of happinessor satisfaction.But he is a
qualitativehedonist and claims that the qualityor kind of happinessis
importantin assessingits value; moreover,the most valuablekinds of
happiness are those that engage humansin developingand exercising
certain capacities.Mill's core value of developmentand self-develop-
ment is not a fixed unity, but an intricatebalance of elements.To be
more specific, the most valuable forms of happiness are those of
engagementin the use of intellectual,affective and moral or caring
capacities.Mill maintainsthat these are generichumancapacitieswhich
our society has an obligationto nurture,and which members of our
societyhavea rightto havedeveloped.7
The developmentof our intellectual,feeling and moral capacitiesis
crucialto our well-being.Mill does not order these capacitieshierarchi-
cally, but he holds that these aspects of our naturemust balance each
other. In addition,since these capacitiescan manifestand be promoted
in diverse ways, this allows room for the differentexperiencesof men
and women to have equal play, but does not imply that women will
seek to become like men. Mill's argumentsfor the developmentof our
reasoningcapacitiesare well known. What perhapsneeds emphasisin
the context of his feministtheory is his stress on the importanceof the
internalcultureof the individual,or on the developmentof our feelings

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 JOHN STUART MILL'S LIBERAL FEMINISM 157

and our capacities of caring for others.8This resonates with some

principles of a feminist ethic of care. As well he argues that in the
process of moral development children must be socialized to feel
connected to others and to take pleasurein their happinessand well-
being. The deeper point is that Mill's utilitariancommitmentsrequire
him to maintainthat feelings are pivotal to moralityand that if we are
to take pleasurein intellectualpursuitsor in the good of otherswe must
be persons who feel deeply, who are in touch with our emotions, and
who are motivatedby our concern for others. Cultivationof sympathy
with others is the foundationof moral development,and two widely
held tenets of feminism- a stress on the importanceof feelingsand of
sympatheticattachmentsto others - flow from this. Unselfish feelings
are a basic element of human nature.9These feelings of sympathy,
which must be cultivated, are the basis for both generalized moral
feelings and social feelings or sociality.Our moral/socialside and our
intellectual/individualistside are both elements of our nature, and
Mill's refusal to elevate the one above the other importantlyaffects
both his conceptof self-developmentandhis egalitarianliberalism.

But there is this basis of powerfulnaturalsentiment.... This firm foundationis that of

the social feelingsof mankind;the desire to be in unitywith our fellow creatures,which
is alreadya powerfulprinciplein humannature,and happilyone of those whichtend to
become stronger,even without express inculcation,from the influencesof advancing
civilization.The social state is at once so natural,so necessary,and so habitualto man,
that, except in some unusualcircumstancesor by an effort of voluntaryabstraction,he
never conceives himselfotherwisethan as a memberof a body. . . . In this way people
grow up unable to conceive as possible to them a state of total disregardof other
people's interests. . . . They are also familiarwith the fact of cooperatingwith others,
and proposingto themselvesa collective, not an individual,interest,as the aim . . . of
their actions. . . . He comes, as though instinctively,to be conscious of himself as a
being who of course pays regardto others.The good of others becomes to him a thing
naturallyandnecessarilyto be attendedto."''

This development of our generic human capacities in childhood

socializationis the first part of the process and in the usual course of
events, when we reach adulthood we take control of this process as
individualsand continueit as one of self-development.In this continua-
tion, we nurturethe higher-ordercapacitiesof individuality,autonomy,
and sociality.These capacitiesare also balancedholisticallyand social-
ity and cooperativeness are given equal play with autonomy and
individuality.Mill does not compromisehis conviction that autonomy

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158 WENDY DONNER

and individualityare essential components of a happy human life.

However, his conceptions of individualityand autonomy and his
balancingof the various aspects of self-developmentmake his theory
responsiveto feminismandits concerns.
Certainversions of liberal individualism- abstractand possessive
individualism,- have rightlyborne the bruntof feministcriticism.Mill
joins other feminists in this repudiation,and his individualismis a
reactionagainstwhathe sees as objectionableegoisticindividualism.He
rejectsthe view, pivotal in other brandsof liberalism,that humanssee
their good as being bound up in the acquisitionof materialthings and
in the control and dominationand power over others.'1He rejectsthe
notion that control or power over one's one life and destiny requires
control and dominationof others.This rejectionis categorical,and he
heaps outrageand derisionupon those men who brutalizeand tyrannize
theirwives.He claimsthat "thelove of power and the love of libertyare
in eternal antagonism. . .. The desire of power over others [is al
depravingagencyamongmankind." 12
Mill's individualismand autonomywork together. Individualismis
the process in which and the abilityby means of whichwe discoverour
own endowmentor balance of talents based on the generic capacities,
for althoughall humanshave these talents,the blend will vary and take
many forms. This mix of talents is not a set essence, but is a rangeof
possibilitiesfrom within which we can make choices and create and
shape ourselves.Autonomyis the capacityto criticallyreflectupon and
endorse our commitments,our character,and our lives and revise them
if we want. The most worthwhileforms of humanhappinessand lives
result from this discovery of possibilitiesand this choice of lifestyles
and pursuits on its foundation.Mill believes that it is essential that
women as well as men have genuine choices about the commitments
andpursuitsof theirlives.
This conception of autonomyas self-determinationand power over
our lives is consistent with feminist vision. Many feminist writers
eloquentlyelaborateupon the significanceof empowermentand self-
determinationfor women, and the harmdone to women when they are
denied these goods. Otherwritersare more ambivalentabout the value
of autonomyfor women.However,Bell Hooks movinglyelucidatesthe

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 JOHN STUART MILL'S LIBERAL FEMINISM 159

hazardsthat can resultfrom devaluingstrengthand self-affirmationfor

women.
Sexistideology teacheswomen thatto be femaleis to be a victim.Ratherthan repudiate
this ... women's liberationistsembracedit, makingshared victimizationthe basis for
woman bonding. ... Bonding as victims created a situationin which assertive, self-
affirmingwomen were often seen as having no place in feminist movement. ...
Ironically,the women who were most eager to be seen as 'victims'... were more
privilegedand powerfulthan the vast majorityof women in our society.An exampleof
this tendencyis some writingabout violence againstwomen.Womenwho are exploited
and oppressed daily cannot afford to relinquishthe belief that they exercise some
measure of control, however relative, over their lives. They cannot afford to see
themselvessolely as 'victims'because their survivaldepends on continuedexercise of
whateverpersonalpowerstheypossess.'3

Mill's individualismvalues social beings and does not celebrate

isolated individuals lacking social connections.14His individualism
regardsthe individualas the locus, source and evaluatorof value.Value
is located in each individual,and the value of groups flows from the
value of its individual members. So while individuals are socially
situatedand embeddedand have relationswith others,it is the individ-
ual, and not the communityas a whole, that bears value, and thus each
individualmust be treatedwith appropriaterespect.Millianindividuals
are accustomedto makingand carryingout choices and their lives are
an expressionof their particularity.15Mill highlightsthe spontaneityof
the process:our characterand commitmentsmust flow from our inner
being and not be imposed from without. While persons have the
potential to grow if their social circumstancespermit, the develop-
mental path of each is unique and thus diversity of lifestyles and
characteris bothdesirableandinevitable.
Mill claims that the dualismset up by some criticsbetween individ-
uality and sociality is incorrect.These values are complementary,not
contradictory,and development of individualitynot only must be
balancedby developmentof sociality,but it is essentiallytied to it such
that one of these values, properly understood, cannot be achieved
withoutthe other. They are two sides of the same coin, two aspects of
one whole, a flourishinghuman being, and must grow together and
balanceeach otherat everystage.
To sum up: Mill'sconcepts of value, of the self, and of its relationto
the communityand of individualismare in accord with feministtheory.

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160 WENDY DONNER

But this surveyraises other questionsto which I devote the remainder

of this paper. One tendency in some feminist and communitarian
thought denigrates,sometimes to the point of altogetherdenying,the
worth of an independent self with strong boundariesand a zone of
privacy,and consequentlydenies any place for the attendantvalues of
individualismand autonomy. Such feminist and communitariancri-
tiques of the liberalself and individualismshould properlyaddresstoo
strongan emphasison the individual,an out of balanceof the elements,
ratherthan deny outrighttheirimportance.When these theoriesviolate
their own methodologyby creatinga dualismbetweenideals of individ-
ualism/autonomyand of sociality/caring,when they go further and
claim a conflict between these ideals in which a stark choice must be
made, they advancea positionwhichis at odds with defensibleviews of
human functioning. If each cluster of individualism/autonomyor
sociality/caringis taken to an extremewithoutits appropriatebalance
of the other, what results is not health and well-beingbut deformity.
Furthermore,these critiques also often err in equatingindividualism
and self-love (or, more appropriately,love of self) with selfishnessand
egoism. Selfishness and egoism masquerade as self-love; they are
imposters.A selfish person does not love herself; the very opposite. If
she did love herself, her love would flow from her being beyond her
boundaries.There is no other sourcefor love of others.This points to a
deeper problemwith the dichotomousmappingof individualism/caring
andthe otherdualismsdirectedat liberalfeministsby thesecritics.
The criticismsare based upon the false assumptionthat there is just
so much love, caringor concern to be divided up. If you love youself,
on this picture,you deplete the amount of love that is availableto be
directed at others or the community.Conversely,if you are involved
deeply with others outside yourself,there is less love left for yourself.
But this pictureis mistaken,for love is not the sort of energythat lends
itself to such divisions.It grows dynamically;the more thatis expressed,
the more that is created.Not only is it false thatif you love yourselfyou
have less for others,but the truthis that unless you love yourself,your
ability to love others or involve yourself in communityis hampered.
One of the most difficulthuman projects is to engage in that process
wherebyyou struggleto love and accept yourself.Yet untilwe do learn
to love ourselves,and to follow throughby discoveringand creatinga

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 JOHN STUART MILL'S LIBERAL FEMINISM 161

life in accord with our individualityand use our power of autonomous

choice, we will engage in selfish substitutesto fill the void. However,
there are still hazardsif an appropriatebalance between care for self
and care for others (particularlydependentothers such as children)is
not maintained.16
The problemwe must grapplewith is how to balance the values of
individualismand sociality.To try to get the rightbalance of different
elementsis tricky.As we attemptto strikethe rightbalance,it is well to
keep in mind some of the dangersof communitythat some feministand
communitariantheorists can overlook, the very dangersthat a liberal
theorist like Mill is at pains to argue against so eloquently. Some
communitariansand feministspainta highlyromanticizedpictureof the
communitythey seek.
According to mainstreamcommunitariantheories such as those of
Sandel and Taylor,the correct view of the self is not the independent,
unencumbered,autonomous, reflective self of liberalism, who can
questionthe valuesof the community,but the sociallyembeddedself of
communitarianismwho is fully immersed in the "way of life" of the
communityand fully acceptingof its values.17Will Kymlickaexplains
that,
On the liberal view of the self, individuals are considered free to question their
participationin existing social practices,and opt out of them, should those practices
seem no longer worth pursuing.As a result, individualsare not defined by their
membershipin any particulareconomic, religious,sexual, or recreationalrelationship,
sincetheyarefree to questionandrejectanyparticularrelationship....
Communitariansbelieve that this is a false view of the self. It ignores the fact that
the self is "embedded"or "situated"in existingsocial practices,that we cannot always
standbackandopt out of them.'8

According to communitarians,liberals fail to see that individuals

require a social context to develop their human capacities.A shared
culture and way of life is essential for the meaningfulpursuit of life
plans. Many of the argumentsof communitarianscan be disputed.But
what are the special dangers here for feminist communitarians?One
dangeris that the more we move towarda view that individualsought
to be immersedin and sharethe way of life of the community,the more
we risk shuttingout or excludingthose who are membersof minorities,
or who do not agree with the majority,and the more we risk such
things as silencingor coercing those who are differentor who do not

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162 WENDY DONNER

agree. This danger is rather clear if we take the case of present day
North Americansociety as our community.In this case feministsmust
part company with mainstream upholders of community, for, as
Kymlicka points out, "the problem of the exclusion of historically
marginalizedgroupsis endemicto the communitarianproject."19 North
American culture is male-shapedculture, and women's perspectives
and experiencesare systematicallyexcluded.Feministsmust challenge,
ratherthan accept or be immersedin, such a way of life. On Sandel's
argument,"membersof marginalizedgroups must adjusttheir person-
alities and practicesso as to be inoffensiveto the dominantvalues of
the community."20 Thisis obviouslyunacceptable.
However,those communitarian feministswho rejectindividualismdo
not have mainstreamNorth American society in mind as their model
of community.They envisage building a smaller communityaround
feminist values in which they would live accordingto their principles.
As Iris Young points out, the feministideal of communityrelies on a
"desirefor closeness and mutual identification."21 The feminist ideal
often goes beyond sharedvaluesto sharedunderstanding: communityis
seen as "a unification of particularpersons through the sharing of
subjectivities:Persons will cease to be opaque, other, not understood,
and instead become fused, mutually sympathetic,understandingone
another as they understandthemselves."This is an "ideal of shared
subjectivity,or the transparencyof subjectsto one another."22
However,severaldangersapplyto this model of feministcommunity.
Young arguesthat "thedesire for communityrelies on the same desire
for social wholeness and identificationthat underliesracismand ethnic
chauvinismon the one hand and politicalsectarianismon the other".23
Even within this feministcommunity,any process that seeks to define
the identityand valuesof the groupwill therebyexclude,marginalizeor
silence those who differ, and the temptationwill exist to label as "not
feminist"those in the minority.The last thirtyyears have illustratedthe
richness,power and diversityof feministthought.There is no reasonto
expect a reductionin this diversity,and it is a challengefor feminist
groupsto accept and encourageit. Young puts well the pitfallsthatmay
be encountered.
The striving for mutual identification and shared understanding among those who seek
to foster a radical and progressive politics, moreover, can and has led to denying or
suppressing differences within political groups or movements. Many feminist groups,

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 JOHN STUART MILL'S LIBERAL FEMINISM 163

for example,have soughtto foster relationsof equalityand reciprocityof understanding

in such a way that disagreement,difference,or deviation have been interpretedas a
breech of sisterhood,the destructionof personalrelatednessand community.There has
often been strong pressure within women's groups for members to share the same
understandingof the worldandthe samelifestyle.24

Politicalgroupsor communitieswho ignore traditionalliberalvalues

of individuality,freedom of expression and diversity of lifestyle and
push too stronglyfor common group understandingcan enter into a
dynamic in which agreementis forced or factions arise. Such groups
can continuein these dynamics,thinkingthat if only they can reachthe
rightunderstandingand get all groupmembersto see it that the faction-
alism will cease. But the solution is not to find the right common
understanding,for it is the very process that creates the dynamic.
Instead,the solution is to accept diversityand heterogeneityas part of
the territoryof feminismand to use the energyof diversityand debate
to promotefeministvision.
Even in the case of a feminist communitywhose members are in
substantialagreementon principlesand valuesof the community,issues
remainfor which liberalvalues are the balance.Even withinclose-knit
groups,issues of solitude,privacyand overlapcan arise.Humanbeings
are multi-aspectedand multi-dimensionalcreatures,and even in this
case of substantialagreementaroundfeministprinciples,many aspects
and layers of their beings can escape from the boundariesand confines
of group definition.Some membersmay desire both deep involvement
in the communityand a largemeasureof solitude.In a state of solitude
one lives alone, or, more interestingly,one lives with oneself. It is
possible, and indeed may be necessaryfor some, to combinea measure
of solitudewith a measureof communityinvolvement.JaniceRaymond
explores solitude as a condition of female friendship."Thinkingis
where I keep myself company,where I find my originalfriend,if you
will. It is the solitude,as opposed to loneliness,where I am alone with,
butnot lonelyin, the companionshipof myself."25
Membersof communitiesmay also choose to combinetheirinvolve-
ment with a measureof privacy,anothertraditionalliberalvalue. They
may choose not merelya physicalseparationof walls to secure privacy
from the group, but they may also desire to remainopaque in certain
respects,to shield parts of themselvesfrom group contact and scrutiny
and understanding.They may not want to be transparentto the others

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164 WENDY DONNER

in all respects. They may have this desire not because of a wish for
secrecy or because they want to hide something,but because they may
simplydesire to hold a part of themselvesin reservefor themselvesor
for intimates.26The part of themselvesthat they share with intimates
may be a different aspect of themselves than that shared with the
community,or it may be a partthatis in tensionwith communityvalues.
These separationsand tensionsmay be chosen as part of an overalllife
whichthe communityonly partiallyglimpses.
Finally, a person may have layered or even conflictingaspects of
themselves which lead to different commitmentsto different groups.
Again, these aspects or commitmentsmay form part of a meaningful
life which is only partially shared with these different groups. For
example, a women may stronglyidentify with a communityof radical
feminists engaged in environmentalactivism.The values of the group
may be entirely social and political. This woman may also strongly
identifywith a communityof Buddhistson the path of the warrior,and
may practice meditationin order to attain the state of peacefulness,
balance and centeredness which is the foundation of her activist
strength. Neither of these groups may be aware of the other, and
perhaps if they were, few members of either could identify with the
values of the other. Yet these values resonatewith this woman'sdiffer-
ent aspects and commitmentsand she understandsand has integrated
both sets of values.
The antidotefor the dangersof too strong a relianceon community
are certain principles of Mill's liberalism,especially his principlesof
tolerance,freedom of expression,respect for the dignityof all persons,
and respectfor idiosyncracyand diversityof lifestyle.It is well to recall
Mill's argumentsin On Liberty for the importance of encouraging
debate and expression of minority opinion and encouragingexperi-
ments in lifestyle.He expressesconcernsthat in the absenceof ongoing
debate truthwill be suppressedand beliefs will be held as dead dogmas
rather than living truths.27Mill argues that "diversityof opinion" is
necessaryto progressin understanding,and that a communityis never
justifiedin silencingits minoritymembers.28

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 JOHN STUART MILL'S LIBERAL FEMINISM 165

NOTES

* I am grateful to Laura Purdy, Mary Anne Warren, Ann Donchin, Catherine

HopwoodandRoss Andalorofor commentsand support.
I In the first part of this paper I draw upon an interpretationof Mill's moral and
political philosophy which I more fully develop and defend in my book The Liberal
Self: John Stuart Mill's Moral and Political Philosophy (Ithaca:Cornell University
Press,1991).
2 For a useful guide to currentviews of feministethics, see FeministEthics,ed. Claudia
Card (Lawrence,Kansas:UniversityPress of Kansas, 1991), especiallyAlison Jaggar,
"FeministEthics:Projects,Problems,Prospects",78-104. Also see FeministInterpre-
tationsand Political Theory,ed. MaryLyndonShanleyand CarolePateman(University
Park,PA: PennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress, 1991) for a helpfulcollectionof feminist
viewsof the canon.
3 John Stuart Mill, The Subjectionof Women,in Essays on Sex Equality,ed. Alice
Rossi (Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress, 1970), 125. See also SusanMoller Okin,
Womenin WesternPolitical Thought(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1979) and
SusanMollerOkin,Justice,Gender,and the Family(BasicBooks, 1989).
4 Alison Jaggar,FeministPolitics and Human Nature (Totowa,New Jersey:Rowman
& Allenheld,1983), 29.
5 Ibid.,31.
6 Ibid.,40-46.
7 Donner, 160-87.
' Donner,97-106; 112-17.
9 John StuartMill, "Sedgwick'sDiscourse",in The CollectedWorksof John StuartMill
33 vols., ed. John M. Robson (Toronto:Universityof Toronto Press, 1974-91) 10:
60.
"' Mill, Utilitarianism,
in CollectedWorks10: 231-32.
C. B. Macpherson,ThePolitical Theoryof PossessiveIndividualism(Oxford:Oxford
UniversityPress, 1962).
12 Mill, TheSubjectionof Women,in Rossi, 238.
13 Bell Hooks, "Sisterhood:Political SolidarityBetween Women",in Janet Kourany,
James Sterba and RosemarieTong, eds., FeministPhilosophies(PrenticeHall, 1992),
392. See also JaniceRaymond,A Passionfor Friends(BeaconPress, 1986), 192-99.
14 Mill, Utilitarianism,
10: 216; Donner, 141-5 2.
15 Mill, Oh Liberty,in CollectedWorks,18: 264.
16 Sarah Lucia Hoagland, "Some Thoughts About 'Caring'",in Card, 256-7; Jean
Grimshaw,Philosophyand Feminist Thinking(Minneapolis:Universityof Minnesota
Press, 1986), 176-86.
17 Will Kymlicka, ContemporaryPolitical Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1990), 206-207.
'1 Ibid., 207.
1 Ibid.,227.
20
Ibid.,228.
21 Iris Maron Young, "The Ideal of
Communityand the Politics of Difference",in
Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. LindaNicholson(New York:Routledge,1990), 301. For
a fuller statementof Young's politics of differencetheory, see Iris Young, Justiceand
the Politics of Difference(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1990). I am not here
claiming that Young would accept my model of balance of different capacities and
elements.
22 Ibid.,309.
23 Ibid.,302.

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166 WENDY DONNER

24 Ibid.,312.
25 Raymond,222.
26 Kymlicka,257-62.
27 Mill, On Liberty,243.
28 Ibid.,229.

Departmentof Philosophy
CarletonUniversity
Ottawa,OntarioKJS 5B6
Canada

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