TORTS AND DAMAGES

Final Examination

Part A

Tell whether the following statements are true or false. (2 points each
item)

1. FALSE.

2. FALSE.

3. FALSE.

4. TRUE.

5. FALSE.

6. TRUE..

7. TRUE.

8. FALSE.

9. TRUE.

10. TRUE.

Part B

Answer the following questions clearly and concisely. A mere yes or no

will not merit any consideration.

a. Is the breach of promise to marry by itself actionable? Explain your

answer. (5 points)

Answer:
As a general rule a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong (Baksh v. CA, GR No. 9733, Feb. 19, 1993). However, Article 21 of the
Civil Code also provides that “[a]ny person who wiullfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for damage. Accordingy, the the promise to marry
itself could not be a cause of action, however, the expenses paid for by any of
the party for the preparation of the wedding is an actionable cause which could
be filed at court.
 b. Can the plaintiff recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant? Explain your answer. (5 points)

Answer:
"Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa,"

No. a plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission.
It negates the basic principle of double jeopardy. As a fundamental law rule in
common law and as Philippine jurisprudence provides, no man shall suffer the
rigors of litigation for the same offense twice. As the Supreme Court puts it in
Linzag v. CA; “The doctrine of res judicata, in fact is founded on the public policy
that it is the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation and that
a party should not be vexed twice for the same cause.”

II

If a pregnant woman passenger of a bus were to suffer an abortion

following a vehicular accident due to the gross negligence of the bus driver,   
may she and her husband claim damages from the bus company for the death of
their unborn child? Explain. (10 points)

Answer:
Yes. Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. In the case at bar,
the intervening cause of the abortion per se should be considered as wanting of
merit. In Abogar vs. Cosmos Bottling Company, the Supreme Court stressed;
“When the intervening cause is set in operation by the original negligence, such
negligence is still the proximate cause.” In this case, the abortion was only set in
operation due to the original negligence, hence, the gross negligence of the bus
driver is still the proximate cause.

III

Enumerate and discuss the available defenses in negligence cases. (10

points)

Answer:
In the book of Paras, the latter enumerated the available defenses in
negligence cases as follows:

1. PLAINTIFF'S CONDUCT AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE the victim of

negligence is likewise required to exercise due care in avoiding injury to himself
Art. 2179
• Plaintiff's own negligence as the proximate cause bars him from
recovering anything

2.IMPUTED CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

• negligence is imputed if the actor is different from the person who is being
made liable.
 • Effect: mitigated liability
• applicable where the negligence was on the part of the person for whom
the plaintiff is responsible

3 .FORTUITOUS EVENTS
• caso fortuito; an event which could not be foreseen, or which though
foreseen, was inevitable. (Art. 2181)
• a person is not liable if the cause of the damage was fortuitous (Art. 1174)

4.ASSUMPTION OF RISK
• consistent with the maxim, volenti non fit injuria
• requisites
a) plaintiff must know that the risk is present
b) he must further understand its nature
c) his choice to incur it is free and voluntary
• plaintiff is excused from the force of the rule if an emergency is found to
exist or if the life or property of another is in peril or when he seeks to
rescue his endangered property.

5. DEATH
• death of the defendant will not extinguish the obligation based on quasi-
delict.
• The case will continue through the legal representative who will substitute
the deceased.

6. PRESCRIPTION
• action based on quasi delicts prescribes in 4 years, counted from the date
of the accident (Art. 1146)

7. INVOLUNTARINESS
• believed to be a complete defense in a quasi-delict case

IV

A van owned by Orlando and driven by Diego, while negotiating a downhill

slope of a city road, suddenly gained speed, obviously beyond the authorized
limit in the area, and bumped a car in front of it, causing severed damage to the
care and serious injuries to its passengers. Orlando was not in the car at the time
of the incident. The car owner and the injured passengers sued Orlando and
Diego for damages caused by Diego’s negligence. In their defense, Diego claims
that the downhill slope caused the van to gain speed and that, as he stepped on
the brakes to check the acceleration, the brakes locked, causing the van to go
even faster and eventually to hit the car in front of it. Orlando and Diego contend
that the sudden malfunction of the van’s brake system is a fortuitous even and
that, therefore, they are exempt from any liability.

Is this contention tenable? Explain. (10 points)

Answer:
No. In Sulpicio Lines vs. Sesante, the Supreme Court enumerated that
“In order to be considered a fortuitous event, however, (1) the cause of the
unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to comply
with his obligation, must be independent of human will; (2) it must be impossible
to foresee the event which constitute the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen it
must be impossible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in any manner; and (4) the obligor
must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to
the creditor.”

In the case at bar, it should be taken in consideration that when Diego, the
driver, stepped on the brakes, the same, instead of causing the vehicle to stop,
resulted to the van to go even faster and eventually hit the car in front of it. The
malfunction of the van’s brake system could not be considered as a fortuitous
event as it could be assumed that owner Orlando and driver Diego has
negligence by not exercising extraordinary diligence which they should have had
the said brake system or any other part of the vehicle thoroughly checked before
every transport operation. Art. 1733 of the New Civil Code provides that
“ Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all
the circumstances of each case.”

As a result of a strong typhoon that hit Alcala Pangasinan, on May 14,

1972, banana plants near Alcala Electric Plant fell on the electric wire which
caused it to be cut. One end of the wire was left hanging on the electric post and
the other fell on the ground under the fallen banana plants. Knowing this, the
barangay captain told an employee of the electric plant about it and asked him to
fix it. The latter said that he will look for a lineman to fix it. Manuel Saynes, a
boy living nearby, got in contact with the live cut wire which led to his death.
Fidel Saynes, father of Manuel, filed an action for damages against Teodoro
Umali, owner and manager of the electric plant. Is the owner of the electric plant
liable for damages? Explain your answer (10 points)

Answer:
Yes.

Under the Children and Attractive Nuisance Rule. Another qualification to

the rule that owners do not have a duty of care towards uninvited persons is
what is known as the “attractive nuisance rule.” This also serves as a limitation to
the rule on contributory negligence. Under the rule, an owner is liable if he
maintains in his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a
character likely to lure children in play and he fails to exercise ordinary care to
prevent children of tender age from playing therewith or resorting thereto.
(Hidalgo Enterprises vs. Balandan, 91 Phil. 488; see also Del Rosario vs. Manila
Electric, 57 Phil. 487; Taylor vs. Manila Electric, 16 Phil.

In the case at bar, the dangling lines should be considered as premises of

the electric power plant. The responsibility of keeping them organized to avoid
damages to life and limb of other persons falls to none other than the owner
himself of the power plant. It should be noted, that Fidel Saynes has a cause of
action for indemnification for the death of his son against Teodoro Umali, for the
latter failing to exercise the required diligence in keeping his dangerous
intrumentalities in order.

VI
a. Cite the cases when the existence of negligence is presumed. (5 points)

Answer:
In the Book of Paras, the latter stated that existence of negligence is
presumed when:

1. The Civil Code provides for the following cases when the existence of
negligence is presumed.
“Art. 2184. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had
been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least
twice within the next preceding two months.”

2. “Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a

person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.”

3. “Art. 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of

the defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of
dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison, except
when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or
business.’’

b. Explain the Attractive Nuisance Rule. (5 points)

Answer:
Under the Children and Attractive Nuisance Rule. Another qualification to
the rule that owners do not have a duty of care towards uninvited persons is
what is known as the “attractive nuisance rule.” This also serves as a limitation to
the rule on contributory negligence. Under the rule, an owner is liable if he
maintains in his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a
character likely to lure children in play and he fails to exercise ordinary care to
prevent children of tender age from playing therewith or resorting thereto.
(Hidalgo Enterprises vs. Balandan, 91 Phil. 488; see also Del Rosario vs. Manila
Electric, 57 Phil. 487; Taylor vs. Manila Electric, 16 Phil.

VII

a. Can the death of the defendant be raised as a defense to extinguish his

obligation based on quasi-delict? Why? (5 points)

Answer:

No. Death of the defendant will not extinguish the obligation based on
quasi-delict. In fact, an action survives even if the defendant dies during the
pendency of the case if the said case is an action to recover for an injury to
persons or property by reason of tort committed by the deceased. (Board of
Liquidators vs. Heirs of Kalaw, L-18805, Aug. 14, 1967; Aguas, et al. vs. Llemos,
et al., L-18107, Aug. 30, 1962). The case will continue through the legal
representative who will substitute the deceased. (Section 16, Rule 3, 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure).

In case a defendant died during judicial proceedings, within the

reglementary period, his counsel should inform the Court of the defendant’s
death and elect a representative. Consequently, judgment shall be rendered
against the estate of the deceased.

b. Differentiate the two types of sexual harassment. (5 points)

Answer:
In the Book of Paras, sexual harassment is classified as follows:

1) Quid pro quo cases. Quid pro quo cases are those mentioned in the first
clause of Section 3(a)(1) and Section 3(b). The defendant in those cases,
conditions employment benefits, honors, awards, or privileges on sexual favors.
Sexual favors are elicited in return for something else. This sexual harassment
can therefore be committed by a single act. A quid pro quo case is present
whenever “sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the
employment, re-employment or continued employment of said individual, or in
granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions,
or privileges” or when “the sexual favor is made a condition to the giving of a
passing grade, or the granting of honors and scholarships or the payment of a
stipend, allowance or other benefits, privileges or considerations.” This is also
present whenever the refusal to grant sexual favor “would impair the employee’s
right or privileges under existing labor law.” (Section 3[a][2]).

(2) Hostile environment cases. Hostile environment cases, on the other hand,
involve the allegation that employees or students work or study in offensive or
abusive environment. Although a single act of the defendant may be enough,
“generally, repeated incidents create a stronger claim of hostile environment,
with the strength of the claim depending on the number of incidents and the
intensity of each incident.” (King vs. Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin
System, 898 f. 2d 533, 537 [7th Cir. 1990]). This covers the cases mentioned in
the second part of Section 3(a)(1) which include cases where the “refusal to
grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee
which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee.”

VIII

Discuss the case of Picart v. Smith. Give the facts, the issues involved
and the ruling of the Supreme Court. (10 points)

Answer:

Picart v. Smith

Facts:
Plaintiff Amado Picart was traversing the Carlatan Bridge in La Union
while riding his pony when Smith, driving his car approached. Defendant Smith
blew his horn to give warning. Instead of Picart moving on the proper side, he
maneuvered his pony to the other side for reason that the incident was all of a
sudden and he has no time to go on the proper side of the road. The horse got
frightened and it turned his body across the bridge. Picart was thrown off and
got injured. The pony died. Hence, an action for damages was filed against
Smith.

Issue:
Whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car was guilty of
negligence making him liable to indemnify plaintiff Smith.

Held:
As it was assumed by defendant Smith that after he blew his horn the
plaintiff would go the proper side of the road, and when the latter instead
maneuvered to the opposite side for reason that Smith perceived that it was too
later for the horse to go safely to the proper side of the road. However, this
action occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away which makes
the control of the situation passed entirely to the defendant.
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court ratiocinated that the test by which to
determine the existence of negligence in a particular case determining whether
the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. Conduct is said to be negligent
when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an
effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the
conduct or guarding against its consequences.
However, in this particular case, the plaintiff himself was not free from fault and
was guilty of contributory negligence. It was he himself that place his life and
limb at peril with an antecedent negligence by maneuvering his pony on the
wrong side of the road.
It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not
contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the
negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances
the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending
harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference
to the prior negligence of the other party.