World Power and National Security

The Motives and Rivalry of the Anglo-German Naval Arms Race, 1898-1914
Nick Kaizer – 100108257

Glackens, L. M , Puck, 1909. “I see your cruiser and raise you a dreadnought!”

Dr. Paul Doerr

April 7th 2014
Power and Statecraft
 During the late 1800s and early 1900s, British foreign policy shifted. From the Middle

Ages until the nineteenth century, Britain’s primary enemy had been France, and Britain had

often been an ally of German states. However, by the first decade of the 1900s Britain was

informally allied with France and its relations with the German Empire were deteriorating. The

decline of relations between the United Kingdom and Germany was the result of Anglo-German

rivalry which developed during the 1890s and intensified into the 20 th century. Economic,

industrial, and colonial competition from Germany irritated the British, but the most contentious

issue was the rapid and costly expansion of the Kaiserliche Marine. This was seen as a threat to

Britain’s national security, and so Britain responded with many reforms and expensive

construction programs. This costly naval race was a result of Germany’s desire to enhance its

own world influence and Britain’s desire to retain its naval supremacy, the high regard the Kaiser

had for naval power, Germany’s desire to become a world power, and the importance of

Britain’s navy to its own security. Neither side was willing to relent during the race, which

resulted in an intense naval arms race and the construction of two powerful and innovative

dreadnought battle fleets on either side of the North Sea.

The expansion of the Kaiserliche Marine was undertaken in part because of the Kaiser’s

personal interest and his respect for navies, particularly the Royal Navy. The naval forces of

Prussia and the German Empire under Wilhelm I and Frederick III were small and intended for

coastal defense duties. Wilhelm II, however was a navy enthusiast and was particularly fond of

the Royal Navy, in which he was a honourary admiral. 1 He supported the construction of a

proper blue seas navy for Germany, which he wanted to rival and emulate the Royal Navy. He

retained his fondness for England despite this naval competition. 2 Even during 1908, during the

1
Robert K. Massie, Castles of Steel: Britain, Germany, and the Winning of the Great War at Sea, (New York:
Ballantine Books, 2003) 7-12
2
Ibid

1
height of the Anglo-German naval race, Wilhelm II stated in an interview with the Daily

Telegraph that he was still very fond of Britain and was upset that so many Britons were

suspicious of his naval expansion.3 In this interview he justifies the expansion, which he admits

many Britons would be afraid of, as necessary for Germany to achieve a status of a world

power.4

Many members of Wilhelm II’s government, including the Kaiser himself, wanted to turn

Germany into a world power, and they felt that in order to do this they needed to become a naval

power. During his 1901 speech to the North German Regatta Association, Wilhelm said that “In

spite of the fact that we have no such fleet as we should have, we have conquered for ourselves a

place in the sun.”5 He attributed a navy to national success in this speech, and encouraged

Germans to continue to become seafarers.6 In speeches made to the Reichstag in 1897 and 1899,

Bernhard von Bülow, who would become Wilhelm’s Chancellor in 1900, said that Germany

deserved the chance of an empire like that of other great powers, and a powerful navy would

give Germany its chance at world power. 7 Many other Germans, and some Britons, agreed that

Germany’s naval expansion was a result of its desire to enhance its imperial power. 8 Karl Blind,

a German living in Britain, justified his home country’s naval expansion in 1903 as a necessary

defense against nearby powers, notably France and Russia, which had both powerful armies and

3
"The Daily Telegraph Affair (October 28, 1908)." GHDI. Accessed March 25, 2014. http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-
dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=757.
4
Ibid
5
Kaiser Wilhelm II. "Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany: Speech to the North German Regatta Association, 1901."
Fordham University: Modern History Database, Last modified 1998. Accessed February 24, 2014.
http://www.fordham.edu/Halsall/mod/1901Kaiser.asp.
6
Ibid
7
Bernhard von Bulow, "Germany and 'World Policy," Origins of the First World War, Gordon Martel (Edinburgh:
Pearson Education Limited, 2008), 97-98; Bernhard von Bülow "Bernhard von Bülow's "Dynamic" Foreign Policy
(December 11, 1899)." GHDI. Accessed March 25, 2014 http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?
document_id=779
8
British Admiralty, "Admiralty’s Secret Memorandum to Canada, 20 August, 1912," World War One Document
Archive. Last modified Feburary 28, 2000. Accessed March 3 2014. http://www.gwpda.org/naval/pwr01000.htm.;
Eyre Crowe "Perceptions of German Foreign Policy in England (January 1, 1907)." GHDI. Accessed March 20,
2014 http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=784

2
powerful navies, and argues that it was not a threat to Britain. 9 However, the Navy Laws and

reforms conducted by Alfred von Tirpitz and subsequent war planning shows that the navy was

built to challenge Britain.

The intention of the Navy Laws and planning for the expanding Kaiserliche Marine was

to create a battle fleet which would be able to challenge the Royal Navy’s predominance. Tirpitz

often asserted that the biggest naval threat for Germany was the Royal Navy, and if Germany

was to become a naval power it needed a navy which could counter that threat. 10 Tirpitz’s long

term plan was to rapidly build ships and enhance the operational strength of the German navy.

As the Royal Navy would be the biggest challenge, Tirpitz relied on the German government to

keep relations between Germany and Britain friendly so that Britain would not take notice of the

buildup and react until after the Kaiserliche Marine had passed the so called “danger zone,” the

period in which it was too small to challenge the Royal Navy. 11 When the Kaiserliche Marine

had passed the danger zone, it would be so strong that the Royal Navy could not attack the

German battle fleet head on without risking massive casualties, and therefore its naval

supremacy.12 Paul Kennedy argues that Tirpitz’s actual goals may have been to surpass the Royal

Navy entirely, not just to become the second largest naval power. 13 In addition to assuming that

the British would not react in time to counter Germany’s growth, Tirpitz’s strategy was based on

the assumption that the Royal Navy would continue to maintain powerful squadrons around the

9
Karl Blind, "Why Germany Strengthens Her Navy," The North American Review, 176, no. 558 (1903): 699-710,
10
Alfred von Tirpitz, "The Tirpitz Memorandum of June 1897 ," Origins of the First World War, ed. Gordon Martel
(Edinburgh: Pearson Education Limited, 2008), 96-97.
11
Paul Kennedy, The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982).:
417-418
12
Ibid
13
Paul Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1945, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983). 154

3
world, and would therefore have fewer ships stationed in Britain. 14 Tirpitz’s calculations were

inherently flawed; the British reacted almost instantly to the buildup of German battleships.15

The British government and public equated Britain’s naval predominance with national

security. The British public was very proud of their navy, more so than the British Empire itself,

according to David Howarth.16 Command of the ocean was essential for British strategy and

security, and this was recognised by most, if not all, segments of British society, even those who

were in favour of reducing the naval budget. Maintaining Britain’s naval supremacy was

ingrained in the national consciousness.17 As a result, the British government and admiralty

maintained a policy of keeping the Royal Navy capable of challenging the next two largest

navies in the world. By 1906, the Germans had replaced Russia as one of these two powers the

Admiralty was concerned about.18 Some Germans, including Karl Max Lichnowsky, the German

ambassador to London, agreed. He told his government in 1912 that “Great Britain as a world-

power stands and falls with her predominance at sea. If we ourselves were responsible for the

safeguarding of an empire like that of Great Britain, we should without a doubt strive to maintain

our sea power with the same solicitude as that now shown by the British Ministers.” 19 The British

were prepared to invest into costly building programs to keep their navy the strongest in the

world, due to its importance to protecting Britain’s empire, trade, and home security. The

importance of Britain’s naval supremacy in Britain prevented the Liberal government, which was

elected in 1906 on the promise of reducing the naval budget, from slowing the arms race.

14
Kennedy, 1983: 134-144
15
Kennedy, 1982: 250-252; Kennedy, 1983: 130-156
16
David Howarth, A Brief History of British Sea Power: How Britain Became Sovereign of the Seas, (London:
Constable & Robinson, 2003): 395
17
Massie, 2003: 10; British Admiralty
18
British Admiralty; Kennedy, 1983: 130-156; Crowe; Britain Strove for Peace: 8-9
19
Karl Max Lichnowsky, "Germany, Sir Edward Grey, andForeign Policy," Origins of the First World War, ed.
Gordon Martel (Edinburgh Gate: Pearson Education, 2008), 108-109.

4
 Many members of the Liberal government which came to power in 1906 wanted to

reduce the naval budget in favour of social reforms. The Liberal Party won a landslide victory in

1906. The party included many men who wanted a reduced naval budget, and advocated

spending on social programs instead.20 In 1908, when the government was preparing naval

estimates, the Prime Minister’s office was flooded with letters concerned about the state of the

economy due to the naval budget.21 In 1903, the military (the largest portion of which was the

navy) consumed 29.95% of the British budget, while social services consumed 33%, only 3%

more.22 However, instead of being reduced, the annual naval expenditure increased by

18,250,000, or almost 70 percent, between 1907 and 1914.23 By 1908 most of the Liberals and

other small navy members of the government began to side with the expansionists. 24 People were

very concerned about the expansion of the German navy, and Britain’s naval supremacy was

seen as the protection of everything that the Liberals held dear, including Britain’s constitutional

government and free trade.25 Many small-navy advocates still considered the two power standard

too important to Britain’s welfare and security to vote to reduce the navy while the Kaiserliche

Marine was a major threat.26 The Royal Navy’s predominance was so important to Britain than

even the radical left-wing politicians who had campaigned to reduce the naval budget, voted to

pour even more money into the arms race.

The British government was still interested in reducing the navy and increasing social

spending, but they would not do so and risk losing their naval predominance. Instead, the British

20
Howard Weinroth, "Left-Wing Opposition to Naval Armaments in Britain before 1914," Journal of
Contemporary History, 6, no. 4 (1971): 96-108
21
Weinroth 104-108
22
Kennedy, 1983: 99
23
John H. Maurer, "Arms Control and the Anglo-German Naval Race before World War I: Lessons for Today?,"
Political Science Quarterly, 112, no. 2 (1997): 290
24
Weinroth 104-115
25
Ibid
26
Ibid

5
attempted to negotiate arms limitation treaties with Germany. Britain wanted a naval arms

limitation treaty with Germany, but only one which would guarantee their supremacy. An

agreement for Britain therefore had to limit the production battleships to a ratio which kept the

Royal Navy significantly stronger than the Kaiserliche Marine.27 Sir Edward Cook, writing after

the outbreak of the First World War, considered this a very reasonable condition. 28 However,

Germany would not agree to such a limitation. The Kaiser firmly believed that a country had the

right to decide on the level of armaments that the state needed. 29 Germans argued that no other

emerging naval power had been forced to reduce its armaments in the past, including the English

navy under Cromwell in the mid-1600s, and therefore Germany had every right to expand their

navy and achieve their rightful place as a world power. 30 There were dissenters; some Germans

argued that an alliance with Britain would secure their naval needs. 31 However, they were a

minority, as most Germans did not want their navy to be limited. Neither side was willing to

budge from their position in order to agree to any arms limitations, so nothing resulted from the

various negotiations conducted during the prewar period. Failing to reach such an agreement,

both governments continued their policies of warship construction.

Both fleets built many warships and enacted reforms, mostly spearheaded by Tirpitz and

Fisher. The First Navy Bill in Germany, passed in 1898, authorized 19 battleships and 8

armoured cruisers, and the Second Navy Bill, which was passed in 1901, authorized 38

battleships and 20 armoured cruisers.32 Tirpitz had also organized vast suppliers, officer training,

27
Maurer: 288-291
28
Sir Edward Cook, How Britain Strove for Peace: A Record of Anglo-German Negotiations, 1898-1914, (London:
Macmillan and Co. Limited, 1914): 1-17
29
Cook: 14
30
Kennedy, 1982: 418-419
31
Ibid
32
Massie, 2003 9; Kennedy, 1983: 113-114

6
and other institution to bolster the effectiveness of the fleet. 33 The Kaiserliche Marine was

expanding, and was becoming a large and threatening force of modern warships based only a few

hours away from the British Isles. Britain had a massive lead in all types of warships, but the

rapid German construction programs alarmed the Admiralty, who feared that by 1920 the

German navy would be as large as the British navy in 1912 was. 34 The British concerns led to

reforms within the Royal Navy. In 1904, Admiral Sir John Fisher was appointed First Sea Lord 35

and instituted many important reforms. Fisher had over one-hundred obsolete vessels struck off

the active service list or sold for scrap. He received a lot of criticism for this, but this move freed

up thousands of sailors and many maintenance funds, bolstering the effective capacity of the

fleet’s modern warships.36 In addition, Fisher moved many warships, including many capital

ships, from foreign stations to the Home Fleet, giving Britain a much stronger force available to

counter the German forces in the North Sea. 37 The Anglo-Japanese alliance, signed in 1902

helped solidify Britain’s naval position in the Far East, 38 meaning that Fisher could afford to

move more ships from the Far East back to Britain. These two reforms greatly reduced the costs

of the navy and bolstered its effectiveness. His most important action as First Sea Lord, however,

was the construction of HMS Dreadnought.

HMS Dreadnought was a battleship of a revolutionary design; it featured a main battery

of ten twelve inch guns, whereas even the most modern battleships before Dreadnought had only

four twelve inch guns, supported by smaller calibre guns. The twelve inch guns had both

superior range and superior destructive power compared to smaller caliber guns. Dreadnought

33
British Admiralty; Robert K. Massie, Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War, (New
York: Random House, 1991): 172
34
British Admiralty
35
Fisher was appointed First Sea lord on Trafalgar Day, which he saw as a particularly good omen for his reforms
36
Kennedy, 1983: 113-114; Massie, 1991: 452-467
37
Massie, 1991: 452-467
38
"The Anglo-Japanese Alliance," Gordon Martel, Origins of the First World War (Edinburgh: Pearson Education,
2008), 100.

7
also had a steam turbine engine, which made her much faster than any other battleship. With

superior speed, this battleship could, in theory, dictate the range of a battle between capital ships,

which would give her ten twelve inch gun battery a decisive advantage. HMS Dreadnought

effectively rendered all other battleships, which came to be termed pre-dreadnought battleships,

obsolete, and resulted in an intensification of the naval arms race focusing on construction of

dreadnought battleships.

Dreadnought gave the Royal Navy a decisive advantage in terms of firepower, but it also

resulted in a costly intensification of the arms race, as all countries began to construct

dreadnought-style battleships. By the time that Dreadnought was proving herself at sea, Britain

was already building more dreadnoughts, while Germany was trying to catch up, after

construction of the first German dreadnought, SMS Nassau, was delayed for twelve months

between 1906, when her keel was laid, and 1907, when construction resumed. Spending on the

navy and warship constructions increased annually for both powers, as each designed and built

newer battleships and battle cruisers to counter each other’s newest class of warships. By 1912

the newest battlecruisers were significantly heavier, faster, and stronger than the first

battlecruisers launched in 1908.39 By 1914 HMS Dreadnought herself had been rendered

obsolete in terms of firepower, armour, and speed. 40 The construction programs were very

expensive, but the British Admiralty was committed to maintaining a ratio of three to two

dreadnoughts over Germany. Australia and New Zealand both helped by financing one battle

cruiser, and Canada attempted to authorize contributing $35 million to construct three

battleships, though the bill was stopped by the Senate. 41 Between 1906 and 1914, Britain had
39
Massie, 1991: 494-500
40
Massie, 1991: 910-911
41
British Admiralty, Bill 21. The Naval Aid Bill. 2nd Session, Canadian House of Commons, 12th Parliament,
George V., 1912. World War One Document Archive. Last modified February 28, 2000. Accessed March 3 2014.
http://www.gwpda.org/naval/pwr01000.htm, Roger, Sarty. The Canadian Encyclopedia. Historica Canada, 2013.
"Naval Aid Bill." http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/en/article/naval-aid-bill/ (accessed March 7, 2014).

8
completed ten battle cruisers and twenty-two battleships, with ten more battleships under

construction.42 Germany had completed seven battle cruisers and seventeen battleships, with four

more battleships under construction (though two would never be completed).43

By the outbreak of the First World War, Britain had out-built Germany and retained its

naval dominance. The naval race had begun as a result of Germany’s naval expansion. This

challenge to Britain’s naval dominance sent shockwaves through Britain’s population and

government, and despite the government’s desire to reduce the naval budget; Britain responded

with various naval reforms and expensive construction programs. The intensity of the naval arms

race was a result of the importance of naval power to each nation. Germany saw naval power as

the key to becoming a world power, and essential to expand German power and influence

worldwide. Britain, however, saw its naval predominance as essential to Britain’s security, and

was unwilling to allow Germany to challenge the Royal Navy. The smaller German navy’s

strategy of avoiding a major fleet action, which would put the Germans at a major disadvantage,

and try to destroy a portion of the Royal Navy failed. Germany kept its expensive battle fleet idle

in port and relied on its submarine fleet to attack British commerce; the very strategy that Tirpitz

had said would be useless against the British. Due to the importance of naval power to the two

rival powers, the naval arms race between Britain and Germany fueled the antagonism between

the two on the eve of the First World War.

42
Massie, 1991: 910
43
Massie, 1991: 911

9
 Bibliography
Primary Sources
Admiralty, British. "Admiralty’s Secret Memorandum to Canada, 20 August, 1912," World War
One Document Archive. Last modified February 28, 2000. Accessed March 3 2014.
http://www.gwpda.org/naval/pwr01000.htm.

Blind, Karl. "Why Germany Strengthens Her Navy." The North American Review. no. 558
(1903): 699-710.

Bülow, Bernhard von. "Bernhard von Bülow's "Dynamic" Foreign Policy (December 11,
1899)."GHDI. Accessed March 25, 2014
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=779

Bülow, Bernhard von. “Germany and ‘World Policy.’” Martel, Gordon. Origins of the First
World War. Edinburgh Gate: Pearson Education, 2008.

Canadian House of Commons. The Naval Aid Bill. Bill 21, 2nd Session, 12th Parliament, George
V., 1912. http://www.gwpda.org/naval/pwr02000.htm

Cook, Sir Edward. How Britain Strove for Peace: A Record of Anglo-German Negotiations,
1898-1914. London: MacMillan and Company, 1914.

Crowe, Eyre. "Perceptions of German Foreign Policy in England (January 1, 1907)." GHDI.
Accessed March 20, 2014
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=784

Kaiser Wilhelm II. "Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany: Speech to the North German Regatta
Association, 1901." Fordham University: Modern History Database, Last modified 1998.
Accessed February 24, 2014. http://www.fordham.edu/Halsall/mod/1901Kaiser.asp

Lichnowsky, Karl Max. “Germany, Sir Edward Grey, and Foreign Policy.” Martel, Gordon.
Origins of the First World War. Edinburgh Gate: Pearson Education, 2008.

Roger, Sarty. The Canadian Encyclopedia. Historica Canada, 2013. "Naval Aid Bill."
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/en/article/naval-aid-bill/ (accessed March 7,
2014).

“The Anglo-Japanese Alliance.” Martel, Gordon. Origins of the First World War. Edinbourgh:
Pearson Education, 2008.

"The Daily Telegraph Affair (October 28, 1908)." GHDI. Accessed March 25, 2014.
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=757.

Tirpitz, Alfred von. "The Tirpitz Memorandum of June 1897," Martel, Gordon. Origins of the
First World War. Edinburgh Gate: Pearson Education, 2008.
10
 Secondary Sources
Howarth, David. A Brief History of British Sea Power: How Britain Became Sovereign of the
Seas. London: Constable & Robinson, 2003.

Kennedy, Paul. Strategy and Diplomacy. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983.

Kennedy, Paul. The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914. London: George Allen and
Unwin, 1982.

Maurer, John H. "Arms Control and the Anglo-German Naval Race before World War I:
Lessons for Today?." Political Science Quarterly. no. 2 (1997): 285-306.

Massie, Robert K. Castles of Steel: Britain, Germany, and the Winning of the Great War at Sea.
New York: Random House Publishing Group, 2003.

Massie, Robert K. Dreadnought : Britain, Germany, and the coming of the Great War. New
York: Random House, 1991.

Sumida, Jon Tetsuro. "Sir John Fisher and the Dreadnought: The Sources of Naval Mythology."
The Journal of Military History. no. 4 (1995): 619-637.

Weinroth, Howard. "Left-Wing Opposition to Naval Armaments in Britain before 1914."

Journal of Contemporary History. no. 4 (1971): 93-120.

Image
Cover: Glackens, L. M. "File:Naval-race-1909.jpg." Original Publication: Puck 1909.
Wikipedia: The free encyclopedia. Accessed March 7, 2014.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Naval-race-1909.jpg.

Below: City of Art, "German Naval Construction Budgets 1894-1914." Accessed January 28,
2014. http://www.cityofart.net/bship/german_budget.html

Launching of SMS Kaiserin, a German dreadnought, in 1911 at Kiel

11