AGCOILI vs FARINAS

FACTS: Petitioners failed to appear in two hearings before the house committee
for an alleged violation of RA 7171, RA 9184, and PD 1445. A show cause order
was issued against them which led them to attend to the next hearing where they
were allegedly subjected to threats and intimidation. Finding the need to protect
themselves, petitioners filed a petition for Habeas corpus and a subsequent
omnibus petition to compel the Court to assume jurisdiction over the former
before the Court of Appeals and upon assumption, to direct the CA to forward the
records of the case to the Court for proper disposition and resolution. Co-
petitioner marcos, filed a petition for issuance of a writ of prohibition with a
prayer for the ancillary remedy of a preliminary injunction against the
respondents. While the petition for Habeas corpus was still pending both
petitioner and co-petitioner filed another petition for the issuance of writ of
amparo contending that their rights to liberty and personal security were violated
as they have been detained, while Marcos is being threatened of arrest.
ISSUE: should the writ of amparo be granted?
HELD: NO. Even in civil cases pending before the trial courts, the Court has no
authority to separately and directly intervene through the writ of Amparo. While
there is no procedural and legal obstacle to the joining of a petition for habeas
corpus and a petition for Amparo,  the peculiarity of the then pendency of
the Habeas Corpus Petition before the CA renders the direct resort to this Court
for the issuance of a writ of Amparo inappropriate. Moreover, the Court
categorically pronounced that the Amparo Rule, as it presently stands, is confined
to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof.

CALLO vs MORENTE
FACTS: Parker was charged for deportation for being an undesirable,
undocumented, and overstaying alien. It was alleged that she was a fugitive from
USA with an outstanding warrant. She was subsequently arrested and detained in
the immigration detention facility. She was charged with falsification and use of
falsified documents. She then filed a petition for habeas corpus against the
Bureau of Immigration. The latter alleges that the SDO served as the legal
authority to detain parker and that she cannot be deported without the
disposition of the criminal case against her. The detention was held legal by both
the RTC and the CA. Subsequently, Callo filed a writ of amparo for the Immediate
Release of Parker from Detention, arguing that Parker is a natural-born Filipino
citizen. And that the life of Parker is endangered in the detention center.
ISSUE: Should the writ of amparo be issued?
HELD: NO. The protective writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to expeditiously
provide relief to violations of a person's constitutional right to life, liberty, and
security, and more specifically, to address the problem of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof. It is clear that the elements of
enforced disappearance are not attendant in this case. There is also no threat of
such enforced disappearance. Callo contends that Parker's life is endangered in
the Immigration I Detention Facility because of the threats against her by her co-
detainees and the living conditions of the facility which pose health problems for
Parker. Unfortunately, these allegations - even if proven - will not support the
issuance of a writ of amparo.  Lastly, the petition for the writ of amparo was filed
by Callo. However, there was no allegation of her relationship to Parker which
violates the order of priority provided for by law.

CIDG vs CAYANAN
FACTS: Cayanan and Perez were forcibly taken by a group of armed men led by
SPO2 Pascua and has not been seen nor heard from then. A petition for habeas
corpus was filed in behalf of Cayanan by his wife, alleging that Cayanan was being
illegaly detained by the head of the CIDG. Despite repeated demands by the wife
and other relatives, the CIDG failed to produce the body of Cayanan and denied
that they had custody over cayanan or having detained him. The RTC then issued
a writ of amparo ordering the CIDG director to conduct further investigations and
for SPO2 pascua to appear before the court. The CIDG filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied.
ISSUE: WON sufficient evidence supported the grant of the writ of amparo by the
RTC?
HELD:YES, aSection 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo specifies the degree of
proof required from the petitioner as a respondent named in the petition for the
writ of amparo, states that the Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence
Required. – The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. That the respondent discharge her burden
of proof when she provided substantial evidence to support her petition for the
writ of amparo such as the Sinumpaang salaysay of Perez, Pascual admission that
the abduction took place but inserted himself as another victim, and the
presentation of other witnesses of the respondents there was substantial
evidence and it never impaired

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BRAGA ET AL VS ABAYA
FACTS:
The petitioners in this case sought the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus
and/or writ of kalikasan with a prayer for the issuance of a TEPO to stop the DOTC
project to modernize the Davao Sasa Wharf. They alleged that the DOTC neither
conducted prior consultation and public hearings nor secured the approval of the
sanggunian. And that the respondents have begun the process of transgressing
their right to health and a balanced ecology through the bidding process.  The
environmental impacts can have consequences for the health of the population of
the port city. In their defense, respondents claimed that the petition was
premature because the project was still in the bidding process, with no proponent
to implement it.

ISSUE: Should the writ of kalikasan be issued be issued?

HELD: NO, the High Court ruled that it cannot issue a writ of kalikasan. It pointed
out that the writ may be issued when there is a violation involving environmental
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces in order to arrant the issuance of
the writ. The SC enumerated the reasons being: (1) the petition failed to identify
the particular threats from the Project itself; (2) The petition is misleading
because it only identified the risks but neglected to mention the existence and
availability of mitigating measures; and (3) Court does not have the technical
competence to assess the Project, identify the environmental threats, and weigh
the sufficiency or insufficiency of any proposed mitigation measures.

SEGOVIA VS CLIMATE CHANGE COMMISSION

FACTS: The petitioners sought the issuance of writs of kalikasan and continuing
mandamus to compel the implementation of environmental laws, specifically for
the respondents to implement the: (1) Road Sharing Principle in all roads; (2)
divide all roads for all-weather sidewalk and bicycling; and (3) submit a time-
bound action plan for the purpose.
ISSUE: (1)whether the petitioners have standing to sue? (2) whether there is basis
to issue the writs?
HELD: (1) YES, the liberalized requirements on standing have allowed the filing of
citizen’s suit for the enforcement of rights and obligations under environmental
laws. They stated that in a writ of kalikasan, it is sufficient that the person filing
represents the inhabitants prejudiced by the environmental damage subject of
the writ.
(2) NO, the Court noted that a party petitioning the issuance of a writ of kalikasan
has to show that a law, rule, or regulation was violated or would be violated. But
there is no showing of that public respondents are guilty of any unlawful act or
omission that constitutes a violation of the petitioners’ right to a balanced and
healthful ecology. Petitioners fell short of showing a threat or an actual violation
of their constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology arising from an
unlawful act or omission by, or any unlawful neglect on the part of, the
respondents that would warrant the writs’ issuance

GIOS SAMAR vs DOTC

FACTS: A project on the airport development, operations, and maintenance of the
Bacolod-Silay, Davao, Iloilo, Laguindingan, New Bolo, and Puerto Princesa Airports
were bundled for bidding purposes. The petitioners filed the petition for
prohibition assailing the constitutionality of the bundling of the projects. They
argue that the bundling is unconstitutional because it will: create monopoly, allow
the creation and operation of a combination of restraint of trade, violate anti-
dummy law, and enable companies with shaky financial backgrounds to
participate in the projects.
ISSUE: is the issue on the constitutionality of the bundling of the projects within
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court considering its rule-making power?
RULING: NO, the constitutionality of the bundling of the Projects are inextricably
intertwined with underlying questions of fact, the determination of which require
the reception of evidence. The Supreme Court is not a trier of fact and thus not
within the scope of its jurisdiction. The Constitution states that judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice not only "to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable" but also "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." It has thereby expanded the concept of judicial power, which up to
then was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving
rights that were legally demandable and enforceable.
Pursuant to its constitutional rule-making power, the Court promulgated new sets
of rules which effectively increased its original and concurrent jurisdiction with
the RTC and the CA. Under these Rules, litigants are allowed to seek direct relief
from this Court, regardless of the presence of questions which are heavily factual
in nature. Judgments in petitions for writ of amparo, writ of habeas data, and writ
of kalikasan rendered by lower-ranked courts can be appealed to the Supreme
Court on questions of fact, or law, or both, via a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court. In practice, petitions for
writ of amparo, writ of habeas data, and writ of kalikasan which were originally
filed before this Court invariably found their way to the CA for hearing and
decision, with the CA's decision to be later on brought before us on appeal. our
referral of the case to the CA for hearing, reception of evidence, and decision is in
consonance with Section 2, Rule 3 of our Internal Rules which states that if the
Court, in the exercise of its discretion, decides to receive evidence, it may
delegate the same to one of the appellate courts for report and recommendation.

CASTANEDA VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: petitioners were charged with violation of the anti-hazing law. The
prosecution were given three trial dates in a span of 7days to present their
evidence but their witnesses failed to appear in all of it. Subsequently, the RTC
dismissed the case against the petitioners. The prosecution moved for a
reconsideration but was denied. They then filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA which reinstated the criminal case against the petitioners and ordered the
resetting of the presentation of evidence. The petitioners opposed arguing
among others that the reinstatement violated their right to due process of law
and tantamount to grave abuse of discretion as there was a violation of their right
to speedy disposition of cases.
ISSUE: Was the petitioners’ right to due process violated?
HELD: NO. In dismissing criminal cases based on the right of the accused to
speedy trial, courts weigh the circumstances attending each case, factors such as
the length of delay, reason for the delay, defendants assertion or non-assertion of
the right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay must be
considered. In this case, it must be noted that the case was only postponed thrice
and for a period of less than a month. The facts can not indicate that the
prosecution of the petitioners had been unjustly delayed by the prosecution,
specifically the failure of its witnesses to attend the scheduled hearing.