TITLE VII.

EASEMENTS OR SERVITUDES
Different Kinds of Easements
Articles 613-619
1. Borbajo vs. Hidden View Homeowners, Inc.,

450 SCRA 315, G.R. No. 152440 January 31, 2005

FACTS: Jose C. Bontuyan, Lucy, Georgina, Helen, and Vicente Solon, Jr were the
registered owners of a parcel of agricultural land (Lot 10183-A), covering an area of 13,910
square meters situated at Barangay Bacayan, Cebu City. At the instance of Bontuyan, the
property was surveyed on May 19, 1991 to convert it into a subdivision. On July 24, 1991,
the Regional Technical Director of the DENR, Lands Management Sector, Region Office VII,
in Cebu, approved the subdivision plan. Meanwhile, in his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact
of the Solons and following the subdivision scheme in the plan, Bontuyan sold the resulting
lots to different individual as evidenced by Deed of Absolute Sale.

The road lots were sold to petitioner Felicitacion B. Borbajo. However, they obtained the
titles to the lots more than a month later on July 30, 1991. Using the advance payments of
his lot purchasers, Bontuyan proceeded to develop a subdivision which was later named
Hidden View Subdivision I. Later, he applied for and secured from the (HLURB) a License to
Sell dated July 29, 1991. She named this new subdivision ST Ville Properties. On 29 July
1994, she secured Certificate of Registration No. 05005 for the ST Ville Properties project
and a License to Sell the same from the HLURB. She also secured a Certificate of
Registration dated 18 August 1994 for another subdivision project called Hidden View
Subdivision II from the HLURB.

The residents and homeowners of Hidden View Subdivision I heard reports to the effect that
Borbajo had purchased the entire subdivision from Bontuyan through an oral agreement.
They also heard that they have no right to use the road lots, since the lots have already been
registered in Borbajo’s name. When confronted by the homeowners about her claim that she
had bought the subdivision from Bontuyan, Borbajo confirmed her claim of ownership over
the subdivision and the road lots. She also told them that they have “no right regarding the
road right-of-way.”

On August 10, 1997, the homeowners caused the construction of a guardhouse at the
entrance of Hidden View Subdivision I and hired the services of a security guard to prevent
unauthorized persons and construction vehicles from passing through their subdivision. The
measures adversely affected the residents of the subdivisions at the back, as well as
Borbajo herself since her delivery trucks and heavy equipment used in the construction of
her housing projects then on-going had been effectively prevented from passing through the
road lots.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents have the right to close the road lots.

HELD: NO. It concluded that respondents cannot legally close the road lots because these
are intended for public use. As a registered co-owner of the road lots, Borbajo is entitled to
avail of all the attributes of ownership under the Civil Code—jus utendi, fruendi, abutendi,
disponendi

Likewise, with Borbajo as a registered co-owner of the road lots, it is utterly pointless to
discuss whether she is entitled to the easement of right of way. Both from the text of Article
649 of the Civil Code and the perspective of elementary common sense, the dominant estate
cannot be the servient estate at the same time. One of the characteristics of an easement is
that it can be imposed only on the property of another, never on one’s own property. An
easement can exist only when the servient and the dominant estates belong to different
owners.
 2. Solid Manila Corporation vs. Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc.,
195 SCRA 748, G.R. No. 90596 April 8, 1991

FACTS: Solid Manila Corporation is the owner of a parcel of land located in Ermita, Manila,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 157750 of the Register of Deeds of Manila. The
same lies in the vicinity of another parcel, registered in the name of the Bio Hong Trading
Corporation under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 128784. The private respondent’s title
came from a prior owner, and in their deed of sale, the parties thereto reserved as an
easement of way.

The petitioner claims that ever since, it had (as well as other residents of neighboring
estates) made use of the above private alley and maintained and contributed to its upkeep,
until sometime in 1983, when, and over its protests, the private respondent constructed steel
gates that precluded unhampered use.

On December 6, 1984, the petitioner commenced suit for injunction against the private
respondent, to have the gates removed and to allow full access to the easement. The court a
quo shortly issued ex parte an order directing the private respondent to open the gates.

ISSUE: Whether or not an easement exists on the property.

HELD: YES, an easement exists. It is true that the sale did include the alley. On this score,
the Court rejects the petitioner’s contention that the deed of sale “excluded” it, because as a
mere right-of-way, it can not be separated from the tenement and maintain an independent
existence. Thus:

Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively
belong.

Albeit the private respondent did acquire ownership over the property—including the
disputed alley—as a result of the conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close that alley
or otherwise put up obstructions thereon and thus prevent the public from using it, because
as a servitude, the alley is supposed to be open to the public.

The Court is furthermore of the opinion, contrary to that of the Court of Appeals, that no
genuine merger took place as a consequence of the sale in favor of the private respondent
corporation. According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when ownership of the dominant
and servient estates is consolidated in the same person. Merger then, as can be seen,
requires full ownership of both estates.

One thing ought to be noted here, however. The servitude in question is a personal servitude
that is to say, one constituted not in favor of a particular tenement (a real servitude) but
rather, for the benefit of the general public. Personal servitudes are referred to in the
following article of the Civil Code: Art. 614. Servitudes may also be established for the
benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not
belong.

In a personal servitude, there is therefore no “owner of a dominant tenement” to speak of,

and the easement pertains to persons without a dominant estate, in this case, the public at
large. Merger, as we said, presupposes the existence of a prior servient-dominant owner
relationship, and the termination of that relation leaves the easement of no use. Unless the
owner conveys the property in favor of the public—if that is possible—no genuine merger
can take place that would terminate a personal easement.
 3. SPS. ELIZABETH DE LA CRUZ and ALFREDO DE LA CRUZ, vs. OLGA RAMISCAL

450 SCRA 449, G.R. No. 137882 February 4, 2005

FACTS: Respondent Olga Ramiscal is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at the
corner of 18th Avenue and Boni Serrano Avenue, Murphy, Quezon City. Petitioners SPS.
ELIZABETH and ALFREDO DE LA CRUZ are occupants of a parcel of land, with an area of
eighty-five (85) square meters, located at the back of Ramiscal’s property. The subject
matter of this case is a 1.10-meter wide by 12.60-meter long strip of land owned by
respondent which is being used by petitioners as their pathway to and from 18th Avenue, the
nearest public highway from their property. Petitioners had enclosed the same with a gate,
fence, and roof.

In 1976, respondent leased her property, including the building thereon, to Phil. Orient
Motors. Phil. Orient Motors also owned a property adjacent to that of respondent’s. In 1995,
Phil. Orient Motors sold its property to San Benito Realty. After the sale, Engr. Rafael Madrid
prepared a relocation survey and location plan for both contiguous properties of respondent
and San Benito Realty. It was only then that respondent discovered that the pathway being
occupied by petitioners is part of her property.

Through her lawyer, respondent immediately demanded that petitioners demolish the
structure constructed by them on said pathway without her knowledge and consent. As her
letter dated 18 February 1995 addressed to petitioners went unheeded, the former referred
the matter to the Barangay for conciliation proceedings, but the parties arrived at no
settlement.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to a voluntary or legal easement of right of
way.

HELD: NO. Petitioners herein failed to show by competent evidence other than their bare
claim that they and their tenants, spouses Manuel and Cecilia Bondoc and Carmelino
Masangkay, entered into an agreement with respondent, through her foreman, Mang Puling,
to use the pathway to 18th Avenue, which would be reciprocated with an equivalent 1.50-
meter wide easement by the owner of another adjacent estate.

An easement or servitude is a real right, constituted on the corporeal immovable property of

another, by virtue of which the owner has to refrain from doing, or must allow someone to
do, something on his property, for the benefit of another thing or person.The statutory basis
for this right is Article 613, in connection with Article 619, of the Civil Code.

Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable

for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner.

The immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the dominant
estate; that which is subject thereto, the servient estate.

Art. 619. Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owners. The
former are called legal and the latter voluntary easements.
4. Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation vs. Joseph Chung

SCRA 230, G.R. No. 173252 July 17, 2009

FACTS: Petitioner Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation is the registered

owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1762534 of the
Register of Deeds of Manila. The title contains a memorandum of encumbrance of a
voluntary easement which has been carried over from the Original Certificate of Title of
Encarnacion S. Sandico.

As Sandico’s property was transferred to several owners, the memorandum of encumbrance

of a voluntary easement in favor of Francisco M. Hidalgo was consistently annotated at the
back of every title covering Sandico’s property until TCT No. 176253 was issued in
petitioner’s favor. On the other hand, Hidalgo’s property was eventually transferred to
respondents Joseph Chung, Kiat Chung and Cleto Chung.

On May 26, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition to Cancel the Encumbrance of Voluntary
Easement of Right of Way on the ground that the dominant estate has an adequate access
to a public road which is Matienza Street. The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground
that it is a land registration case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the voluntary easement of right of way can be extinguished.

HELD: NO. The petition lacks merit. As defined, an easement is a real right on another’s
property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing
or allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his property, for the benefit of
another person or tenement. Easements are established either by law or by the will of the
owner.

In this case, petitioner itself admitted that a voluntary easement of right of way exists in favor
of respondents. In its petition to cancel the encumbrance of voluntary easement of right of
way, petitioner alleged that “[t]he easement is personal. It was voluntarily constituted in favor
of a certain Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico, the owner of [the lot] described as Lot No. 2,
Block 2650.”18 It further stated that “the voluntary easement of the right of way in favor of
Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico was constituted simply by will or agreement of the parties. It
was not a statutory easement and definitely not an easement created by such court order
because ‘[the] Court merely declares the existence of an easement created by the parties.

Having made such an admission, petitioner cannot now claim that what exists is a legal
easement and that the same should be cancelled since the dominant estate is not an
enclosed estate as it has an adequate access to a public road which is Callejon Matienza
Street. As we have said, the opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only
legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary easements like in the case at bar. The fact
that an easement by grant may have also qualified as an easement of necessity does not
detract from its permanency as a property right, which survives the termination of the
necessity. A voluntary easement of right of way, like any other contract, could be
extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant
estate.

Neither can petitioner claim that the easement is personal only to Hidalgo since the
annotation merely mentioned Sandico and Hidalgo without equally binding their heirs or
assigns. That the heirs or assigns of the parties were not mentioned in the annotation does
not mean that it is not binding on them. Again, a voluntary easement of right of way is like
any other contract. As such, it is generally effective between the parties, their heirs and
assigns, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.
 5. Emeteria Liwag vs. Happy Glen Loop Homeowners Association, Inc.

675 SCRA 744, G.R. No. 189755 July 4, 2012

FACTS: Sometime in 1978, F.G.R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen Loop,
obtained a loan from Ernesto Marcelo (Marcelo), the owner of T.P. Marcelo Realty
Corporation. To settle its debt after failing to pay its obligation, F.G.R. Sales assigned to
Marcelo all its rights over several parcels of land in the Subdivision, as well as receivables
from the lots already sold.

As the successor-in-interest of the original developer, Marcelo represented to subdivision lot

buyers, the National Housing Authority (NHA) and the Human Settlement Regulatory
Commission (HSRC) that a water facility was available in the Subdivision. For almost 30
years, the residents of the Subdivision relied on this facility as their only source of water.
This fact was acknowledged by Marcelo and Hermogenes Liwag (Hermogenes), petitioner’s
late husband who was then the president of respondent Happy Glen Loop Homeowners
Association (Association).

Sometime in September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block No. 5 to Hermogenes. When
Hermogenes died in 2003, petitioner Emeteria P. Liwag subsequently wrote a letter to
respondent Association, demanding the removal of the overhead water tank from the subject
parcel of land.

ISSUE: Whether or not an easement for water facility exists on Lot 11, Block 5 of Happy
Glen Loop Subdivision.

HELD: YES. Easements or servitudes are encumbrances imposed upon an immovable for
the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner,28 for the benefit of a
community, or for the benefit of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does
not belong.

The law provides that easements may be continuous or discontinuous and apparent or non-
apparent. The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code are quoted below:

“Art. 615. Easements may be continuous or discontinuous, apparent or non-

apparent. Continuous easements are those the use of which is or may be incessant,
without the intervention of any act of man. Discontinuous easements are those which
are used at intervals and depend upon the acts of man. Apparent easements are
those which are made known and are continually kept in view by external signs that
reveal the use and enjoyment of the same. Non-apparent easements are those which
show no external indication of their existence.”

In this case, the water facility is an encumbrance on Lot 11, Block 5 of the Subdivision for
the benefit of the community. It is continuous and apparent, because it is used incessantly
without human intervention, and because it is continually kept in view by the overhead water
tank, which reveals its use to the public.

Contrary to petitioner’s contention that the existence of the water tank on Lot 11, Block 5 is
merely tolerated, we find that the easement of water facility has been voluntarily established
either by Marcelo, the Subdivision owner and developer; or by F.G.R. Sales, his
predecessor-in-interest and the original developer of the Subdivision. For more than 30
years, the facility was continuously used as the residents’ sole source of water. The Civil
Code provides that continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue of a
title or by prescription of 10 years. It is therefore clear that an easement of water facility has
already been acquired through prescription.
6. Spouses Erminio v. Golden Village, GR No.180808, August 2018
7. Spouses Garcia v. Santos, G.R. No. 228334 [June 17, 2019])
Modes of Acquiring Easements
Articles 620-626
1. Ronquillo v. Roco GR NO.L-10619 Feb 28, 1958
2. NPC v. Spouses Campos GR NO. 143643 Jun 27, 2003
3. Laureana Cid v. Irene Javier GR NO.L-14116 Jun 30, 1960
 4. Fe Velasco v. Cusi
GR NO. L-33507 July 20, 1981
FACTS:
Fe Velasco is the owner of a parcel of land in Davao City. She filed in the CFI of
Davao City an action against public respondent, City of Davao for the quieting of her title
over Lot 77-B-2, a portion of which she claims to have been occupied illegally by Bolton
Street, Davao City.
The court, presided over by Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr. dismissed the case on the
ground that the complaint states no cause of action, filed by the City of Davao.
The allegations in the complaint that the Bolton Street encroached on the lot of the
plaintiff and that the defendant had continuously occupied the portion so encroached upon
do not, contrary to the conclusion of the plaintiff found in the complaint, cast '. . a cloud of
doubt on the title of the plaintiff over said portion which would justify this action.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Bolton Street is an easement and a legal encumbrance on petitioner’s lot.

RULING:
YES. Bolton Street, a public highway, was already subsisting when the OCT over the parcel
of land of Velasco was issued. It has been where it is since time immemorial. Bolton Street
constituted an easement of public highway on subject Lot No. 77, from which petitioner’s lot
was taken, when such bigger lot was originally registered. It remained as such legal
encumbrance, as effectively as if it had been duly noted, notwithstanding the lack of
annotation, on the certificate of title, by virtue of the clear and express provision of Section
39 of Act 496, which states:
Section 39 of Act 496
Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree or registration, and
every subsequent purchasers of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in
good faith shall hold the same free of all encumbrances, except those noted on said
certificate, and any of the following encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely:
xxx xxx xxx
Third. Any public highway, way, private way, … or any government irrigation.
XX
 5. Bogo-Medellin Milling v. CA
GR NO. 124699 July 31
FACTS:

Valdez purchased from Santillan, on Dec 9, 1935, an unregistered lot. Prior to the sale,
in 1929, Santillan granted Bomedco a railroad right of way for 30 years. When Valdez
acquired the land, he respected the grant. The entire length of the land was therefore
traversed in the middle by railroad tracks owned by Bomedco. The tracks were used for
hauling sugar cane from the fields to Bomedco's sugar mill.
When Valdez passed away in 1948, his heirs inherited the land. The right of way
expired sometime in 1959 but Valdez heirs allowed Bomedco to continue using the land. In
1989 Valdez demanded the legal basis for Bomedco's claim over Lot 954 and payment of
compensation for the use of the land.
Bomedco contended that the Valdez heirs’ claim was already barred by prescription
because of Bomedco's open and continuous possession of the property for more than 50
years.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Bomeco acquire the easement right of way by way of prescription.

RULING:
No. The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous because it is exercised
only if a person passes or sets foot on somebody else's land. Like a road for the passage of
vehicles or persons, an easement of right of way of railroad tracks is discontinuous because
the right is exercised only if and when a train operated by a person passes over another's
property. In other words, the very exercise of the servitude depends upon the act or
intervention of man which is the very essence of discontinuous easements.
The presence of railroad tracks for the passage of Bomedco's trains denotes the
existence of an apparent but discontinuous easement of right of way.
The party is deemed to acquire title over the easement of right of way, iff the party had:
1. Subsequently entered into contractual right of way with the heirs for the continued use
of the land under the principles of voluntary easements, or
2. Filed a case against the heirs for conferment on it of a legal easement of right of way
under Art. 649, then title over the use of the land is deemed to exist.
None of the above to acquire title over the railroad right of way was ever pursued by
Bomedco.
 6. Juan Gargantos v. Tan Yanon
GR NO. L-14652 June 30, 1960
FACTS:
Late Francisco Sanz was the former owner of a parcel of land situated in Romblon.
He subdivided the lot into three and then sold each portion to different persons, one portion
was purchased by Guillermo Tengtio who subsequently sold it to Vicente Uy Veza and
another portion, with the house of strong materials thereon, was sold to Tan Yanon,
respondent herein. This house has on its northeastern side, doors and windows over-looking
the third portion, which, together with the camarin and small building thereon, after passing
through several hands, was finally acquired by Juan Gargantos, petitioner herein.
On April 23, 1955, Gargantos applied to the Municipal Mayor for a permit to demolish the
roofing of the oldcamarin. The permit having been granted, Gargantos tore down the roof of
the camarin and to construct a combined residential house and warehouse on his lot, which
Tan Yanon opposed approval.

Because both the provincial fiscal and district engineer of Romblon recommended
granting of the building permit to Gargantos, Tan Yanon filed against Gargantos an action to
restrain him from constructing a building that would prevent plaintiff from receiving light and
enjoying the view through the window of his house, unless such building is erected at a
distance of not less than three meters from the boundary line between the lots of plaintiff and
defendant, and to enjoin the members of Municipal Council of Romblon from issuing the
corresponding building permit to defendant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property of respondent Tan Yanon has an easement of light and view
against the property of petitioner Gargantos.

RULING:

Yes. The court find that respondent Tan Yanon's property has an easement of light and view
against petitioner's property. By reason of his easement petitioner cannot construct on his
land any building unless he erects it at a distance of not less than three meters from the
boundary line separating the two estates.

This then is precisely the case covered Article 624, N.C.C which provides that the existence
of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established by the proprietor of both,
shall be considered, if one of them is alienated, as a title so that the easement will continue
actively and passively, unless at the time the ownership of the two estate is divided, the
contrary is stated in the deed of alienation of either of them, or the sign is made to disappear
before the instrument is executed. The existence of the doors and windows on the
northeastern side of the aforementioned house, is equivalent to a title, for the visible and
permanent sign of an easement is the title that characterizes its existence. It should be
noted, however, that while the law declares that the easement is to "continue" the easement
actually arises for the first time only upon alienation of either estate, inasmuch as before that
time there is no easement to speak of, there being but one owner of both estates.
7. Tañedo v. Bernad
GR NO.L-66520 August 30, 1988
FACTS:
Private respondent Antonio Cardenas was the owner of two (2) contiguous parcels of land
known as Lot 7501-A and Lot 7501-B. An apartment building was constructed on Lot 7501-A
is in which a small portion of it also stands on Lot 7501-B and on Lot 7501-B, the
improvements therein consist of a four-door apartment, two-storey house, a bodega and a
septic tank for the common use of the occupants of Lots 7501-A and 7501-B. Cardenas sold
Lot 7501-A to petitioner Eduardo Tañedo and also mortgaged Lot 7501-B to the latter with a
promise to sell the same.
However, Cardenas sold Lot 7501-B to respondent spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim.
Tañedo offered to redeem the property from Romeo Sim, but the latter refused, blocked the
sewage pipe connecting the building of Tañedo built on Lot 7501-A, to the septic tank in Lot
7501-B and asked Tañedo to remove that portion of his building enroaching on Lot 7501-B.
Consequently, Tañedo, invoking the provisions of Art. 1622 of the Civil Code, filed an
action for legal redemption and damages against the spouses Sim and spouses Cardenas.
Cardenas, on the other hand, filed a cross-claim against spouses Sim alleging that the deed
he executed was intended as an equitable mortgage. While spouses Sim insisted that it was
an absolute sale.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale to spouses Sim extinguished the easement of the use of the
drainage and septic tank by Tañedo.

RULING:
No. Article 631 of the Civil Code provides for the grounds for the extinguishment of an
easement. The alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different persons,
however, is not one of the grounds for the extinguishment of an easement. On the contrary,
use of the easement is continued by operation of law.
Furthermore, Article 624 of the Civil Code provides that an easement shall continue
actively and passively unless the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance or it
was removed before the execution of the deed. In the instant case, no statement abolishing
or extinguishing the easement of drainage was mentioned in the deed of sale of Lot 7501-A
to Tañedo. Nor did Antonio Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe and septic tank by the
occupants of Lot 7501-A before he sold said lot to Tañedo. Hence, the use of the septic tank
is continued by operation of law. Accordingly, the spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim the new
owners of the servient estate (Lot 7501- B), cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the
use of the servitude.
 8. Aneco Realty v. Landex
GR NO. 165952 July 28, 2008
FACTS:
Fernandez Hermanos Development, Inc. (FHDI) is the original owner of a tract of land in San
Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City and it subdivided the land into 39 lots. It sold 22 lots to
Aneco and the remaining 17 to Landex.
Landex started the construction of a concrete wall on one of its lots. To stop the
construction, Aneco filed a complaint for injunction with the RTC in Quezon City.
Landex claimed that Aneco was not deprived access to its lots due to the construction of the
concrete wall. Aneco has its own entrance to its property. The Resthaven Street access,
however, was rendered inaccessible when Aneco constructed a building on said street. Also,
Landex claimed that FHDI sold ordinary lots, not subdivision lots, to Aneco based on the
express stipulation in the deed of sale that FHDI was not interested in pursuing its own
subdivision project. RTC granted the complaint for injunction.
Issue:
Whether or not Aneco should be given the right of way.
Ruling:
No. What is involved here is an undue interference on the property rights of a landowner to
build a concrete wall on his own property. It is a simple case of a neighbor, petitioner Aneco,
seeking to restrain a landowner, respondent Landex, from fencing his own land.
Article 430 of the Civil Code gives every owner the right to enclose or fence his land or
tenement by means of walls, ditches, hedges or any other means. The right to fence flows
from the right of ownership. As owner of the land, Landex may fence his property subject
only to the limitations and restrictions provided by law. Absent a clear legal and enforceable
right, as here, We will not interfere with the exercise of an essential attribute of ownership.
Aneco cannot rely on the road lot under the old subdivision project of FHDI because it knew
at the time of the sale that it was buying ordinary lots, not subdivision lots, from FHDI. If
Aneco wants to transform its own lots into a subdivision project, it must make its own
provision for road lots.
 9. GOLDCREST REALTY CORPORATION v. CYPRESS GARDENS CONDOMINIUM
CORPORATION, GR No. 171072, 2009-04-07
Facts: Petitioner Goldcrest Realty Corporation (Goldcrest) is the developer of Cypress
Gardens, a ten-storey building. Goldcrest executed a Master Deed and Declaration of
Restrictions... which constituted Cypress Gardens into a condominium project and
incorporated respondent Cypress Gardens Condominium Corporation (Cypress) to manage
the condominium project and to hold title to all the common areas. Title to the land on which
the condominium stands was transferred to Cypress But Goldcrest retained ownership of
the two-level penthouse unit on the ninth and tenth floors of the condominium
Following the turnover of the administration and management of the Condominium to the
board of directors of Cypress in 1995, it was discovered that certain common areas
pertaining to Cypress were being occupied and encroached upon by Goldcrest.
Cypress filed a complaint with damages against Goldcrest before the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), seeking to compel the latter to vacate the common areas it
allegedly encroached on and to remove the structures it built thereon.

Issue: whether or not the appellate court erred in ruling that petitioner impaired the
easement on the portion of the roof deck designated as a limited common area.
Ruling: Anent the second issue, Goldcrest essentially contends that since the roof deck's
common limited area is for its exclusive use, building structures thereon and leasing the
same to third persons do not impair the subject easement. Cypress insists the said acts
impair the subject easement because the same are already beyond the contemplation of the
easement granted to Goldcrest.
In this case, we find no.cogent reason to overturn the similar finding of the HLURB, the
Office of the President and the Court of Appeals that Goldcrest has no right to erect an office
structure on the limited common area despite its exclusive right to use the same. We note
that not only did Goldcrest's act impair the easement, it also illegally altered the
condominium plan, in violation of Section 22 of Presidential Decree No. 957.
Here, a careful scrutiny of Goldcrest's acts shows that it breached a number of the
aforementioned restrictions.
petition is DENIED
 10. PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OFFICE vs LEGASPI TOWERS 300, INC. 
G.R. No. 147957 July 22, 2009
 
Facts:
Caruff Development Corporation(now Legaspi Towers 300 Inc)  owned several parcels of
land along the stretch of Roxas Boulevard, Manila. In 1979, Caruff started constructing a
multi-storey building on the mortgaged parcels of land.  Along with the other appurtenances
of the building constructed by Caruff, it built a powerhouse (generating set) and two sump
pumps in the adjacent lot covered by TCT No. 127649 (now TCT No. 200760)
 
ISSUE/S:
 
Whether or not the construction of a generator set and 2 sump pumps constitutes as
easement of the property.
 
RULING:
 
The SC ruled in the negative. Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance
imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different
owner.  In the case at bar Legaspi Towers 300 Inc. the owner of the property where the
generator set and sump pumps was built  is also the same owner of the property where the
condominium was constructed.  In fine, the properties are owned by the same person.
 11. AGRO-INDUSTRIAL VS. OBIAS
G.R. NO. 172077 OCTOBER 09, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner Bicol Agro-Industrial Producers Cooperative, Inc. acquired the assets of
BISUDECO. On April 19, 1993, petitioner filed a Complaint[5] against respondents Edmundo
Obias et. al alleging that on March 27, 1993 and April 3, 1993, respondents unjustifiably
barricaded the disputed road by placing bamboos, woods, placards and stones across it,
preventing petitioner's and the other sugar planter's vehicles from passing through the
disputed road, thereby causing serious damage and prejudice to petitioner. Petitioner
alleged that BISUDECO constructed the disputed road pursuant to an agreement with the
owners of the ricefields the road traversed. The agreement provides that BISUDECO shall
employ the children and relatives of the landowners in exchange for the construction of the
road on their properties. Petitioner contends that through prolonged and continuous use of
the disputed road, BISUDECO acquired a right of way over the properties of the landowners,
which right of way in turn was acquired by it when it bought BISUDECO's assets. Petitioner
prayed that respondents be permanently ordered to restrain from barricading the disputed
road and from obstructing its free passage

ISSUE: WON CA ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE PRINCIPLES OF

PRESCRIPTION, LACHES AND ESTOPPEL IN THE CASE AT BAR.

HELD:
We hold the same view on the issue of acquisition of an easement of right of way by laches.
To our mind, settled jurisprudence on the application of the principle of estoppel by laches
militates against the acquisition of an easement of right of way by laches.

Laches is a doctrine in equity and our courts are basically courts of law and not courts of
equity; equity, which has been aptly described as "justice outside legality," should be applied
only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law; Aeguetas nunguam contravenit
legis. Based on this principle, we find that the positive mandate of Article 622 of the Civil
Code - the statutory provision requiring title as basis for the acquisition of an easement of a
right of way - precludes the application of the equitable principle of laches.[57]
This Court agrees with the CA. The fact that the law is categorical that discontinuous
easements cannot be acquired by prescription militates against petitioner's claim of laches.
To stress, discontinuous easements can only be acquired by title. More importantly, whether
or not the elements of laches are present is a question involving a factual determination by
the trial court. Hence, the same being a question of fact, it cannot be the proper subject of
herein petition. On the other hand, as to the issue of estoppel, this Court likewise agrees
with the finding of the CA that petitioner did not present any evidence that would show an
admission, representation or conduct by respondents that will give rise to estoppel.
 12. NAGA CENTRUM V. OZALES
G.R. No. 203576, September 14, 2016

Facts:
plaintiffs-appellee own a house and lot situated at No. 28-B Valentin Street, Sabang, Naga
City which is surrounded on the North by the property of Aurora dela Cruz. on the West, by
the property of Bernardo Tawagon; and on the East and South, by the property of the
defendant-appellant.
plaintiffs-appellees were allowed to pass through the steel gate of the defendant-appellant,
the same is subject to the schedule set by the latter.prompted the plaintiffs-appellees to ask
for a permanent right of way through the intervention of the court after the defendant-
appellant refused their offer to buy the portion where the proposed right of way is sought to
be established.
As for the plaintiffs-appellees, they stressed that when they bought their property, Rizal
Street was already existing. That was before the defendant-appellant could even buy the
property where the said Rizal Street was laid. That it never occurred to them that Rizal
Street would be closed in the future as part of the defendant-appellant's property.
Issues:
whether the plaintiff has the right to demand right of way
Ruling: Yes
To be entitled to an easement of right of way, the following requisites should be met:1. An
immovable is surrounded by other immovables belonging to other persons, and is without
adequate outlet to a public highway;2.  Payment of proper indemnity by the owner of the
surrounded immovable;3.  The isolation of the immovable is not due to its owner's acts; and
4.  The proposed easement of right of way is established at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance of the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest only issues raised by petitioner in this case
relate to the third and fourth requisites.
Significantly, respondents have been using Rizal Street for so long; petitioner knew of this,
and it even granted access to respondents. At the very least, respondents have been using
Rizal Street for 23 years (or from 1980 up to 2003). While petitioner may have allowed
access by the informal settlers to Rizal Street through tolerance, the same cannot be said of
respondents; they are not informal settlers on petitioner's land.
existence of the easement of right of way was therefore known to petitioners who must
respect the same, in spite of the fact that their transfer certificates of title do not mention any
burden or easement It is an established principle that actual notice or knowledge is as
binding as registration.
petition is denied.
 13. Alolina vs. Flores
G.R. No. 198774 April 04, 2016

FACTS:
Alolino is the registered owner of two (2) contiguous parcels of land. Alolino initially
constructed a bungalow-type house on the property. In 1980, he added a second floor to the
structure. He also extended his two-storey house up to the edge of his property. There are
terraces on both floors. There are also six (6) windows on the perimeter wall: three (3) on the
ground floor and another three (3) on the second floor. In 1994, the respondent spouses
Fortunato and Anastacia (Marie) Flores constructed their house/sari sari store on the vacant
municipal/barrio road immediately adjoining the rear perimeter wall of Alolino's house. The
structure is only about two (2) to three (3) inches away from the back of Alolino's house,
covering five windows and the exit door. The respondents' construction deprived Alolino of
the light and ventilation he had previously enjoyed and prevented his ingress and egress to
the municipal road through the rear door of his house.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Alolino has acquired easement of light and view; and whether or not Alolino
has acquired an easement of right of way.
HELD:
Alolino does not have an easement of light and view or an easement of right of way over the
respondents' property or the barrio road it stands on. Articles 649-657 governs legal
easements of right of way. None of these provisions are applicable to Alolino's property with
respect to the barrio road where the respondents' house stands on.

On the other hand, an easement of light and view can be acquired through prescription
counting from the time when the owner of the dominant estate formally prohibits the
adjoining lot owner from blocking the view of a window located within the dominant estate.
Notably, Alolino had not made (and could not have made) a formal prohibition upon the
respondents prior to their construction in 1994; Alolino could not have acquired an easement
of light and view through prescription.
 14. G.R. No. 228334, June 17, 2019
SPS. TEDY GARCIA AND PILAR GARCIA v. LORETA T. SANTOS, WINSTON SANTOS
AND CONCHITA TAN

FACTS:
The instant case stems from a Complaint for easements of light, air and view, lateral
support, and intermediate distances and damages with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction and/or issuance of temporary restraining orderComplaint filed on February 18,
2009 by the Sps. Garcia against the respondents Spouses Loreta and Winston Santos(the
Sps. Santos and respondent Conchita Tan.
The subject property, which has been occupied by the Sps. Garcia for about eleven (11)
years, has a one-storey residential house erected thereon and was purchased by them from
the Sps. Santos in October 1998. At the time of the purchase of the subject property from
the Sps. Santos, the one-storey house was already constructed. Also, at the time of the
acquisition of the subject property, the adjoining lot, Lot 1, which is owned by the Sps.
Santos, was an idle land without any improvements. Lot 1 is covered by TCT No. T-
114137,7 registered under the name of the Sps. Santos. Lot 1 remained empty until the Sps.
Santos started the construction of a two-storey residential house therein on January 24,
2009. Upon inquiry from the construction workers, tedy was erroneously informed that tan
was the new owner of lot 1.
ISSUES
whether the Sps. Garcia have acquired an easement of light and view with respect to Lot 1
owned by the Sps. Santos.
HELD:
According to Article 613 of the Civil Code, an easement or servitude is an encumbrance
imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different
owner. The immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the dominant
estate; that which is subject thereto, the servient estate. In the instant case, the Sps. Garcia
assert that since they have acquired by title an easement of light and view, the owner of the
adjacent servient estate, i.e., the Sps. Santos, is proscribed from building a structure that
obstructs the window of their one-storey house.
In deciding the case, the Court first explained that easements may be acquired either
through title or prescription and enumerated the different acts by which an easement may be
acquired by virtue of title, namely: (1) a deed of recognition by the owner of the servient
estate; (2) a final judgment; and (3) an apparent sign between two estates, established by
the owner of both, referring to Article 541 (now Article 624) of the Civil Code. Citing
decisions of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, the Court explained that "under article 541 [now
Article 624] of the Civil Code, the visible and permanent sign of an easement 'is the title that
characterizes its existence' ('es el titulo caracteristico de su existencia.'
The Court declares the existence of an easement of light and view in favor of the petitioners
Sps. Tedy and Pilar Garcia. The respondents Sps. Loreta and Winston Santos are hereby
ordered to REMOVE from Lot 1 such portions of their building or structure in order to comply
with the three-meter rule as mandated under Article 673 of the Civil Code.

Rights and Obligations

Articles 627- 630

VALDERRAMA VS NORTH NEGROS SUGAR CO.

GR NO. 23810, DECEMBER 18, 1926

FACTS:
Several hacienda owners in Manapla, Occidental Negros, entered into a milling contract with Miguel
Osorio wherein the latter would build a sugar central of a minimum capacity of 300 tons for the milling
and grinding of all the sugar cane to be grown by the hacienda owners who in turn would furnish the
central with all the cane they might produce in their estates for 30 years from the execution of the
contract. Later on, Osorio’s rights and interests were acquired by the North Negros Sugar Co., Inc.

2 years after, Catalino Valderrama, Emilio Rodriguez, Santos Urra et. al, made other milling contracts
identical to the first one with the North Negros Sugar, Co., Inc. The hacienda owners, however, could
not furnish the central sufficient cane for milling as required by its capacity, so the North Negros made
other milling contracts with the various hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental Negros. This prompted
Valderrama et. al to each file a complaint against North Negros.

The CFI find that North Negros had no right to pass through the lands of the hacienda owners for the
transportation of sugar cane not grown from their lands.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of way established was restricted to transporting only sugar cane.

RULING:

SC held that it is clear that the easement was established for the benefit of all producers and of the
corporation as it is the intent of the milling contract.

Since the easement is a voluntary, apparent, continuous easement of way in favor of the corporation,
it is contrary to the nature of the contract that it is only limited to canes produced by the servient
estates since it is a well settled rule that things serve their owner by reason of ownership and not by
reason of easement. The owners also cannot limit its use for there is nothing in the contract
prohibiting the central from obtaining other sources.

SPOUSES MERCADER VS SPOUSES BARDILAS

GR NO. 163157, JUNE 27, 2016

FACTS:
Clarita Village Association erected a concrete perimeter fence to close the exit point road
within Clarita Village. The closure prompted the Spouses Bardilas to use the second exit to
Buhisan Road.
Spouses Bardilas, through Atty. Alfredo J. Sipalay, informed the Spouses Mercader of the
encroachment by about 14 square meters of the latter's residential house and fence on the right
of way. Spouses Mercader, through Atty. Rolindo A. Navarro, responded by insisting that as the
owners of Lot No. 5808-F-2-A they were equally entitled to the right of way; and that they were
proposing to buy the equivalent portion of the right of way to which they were entitled at a
reasonable price.
Spouses Bardilas rejected the claim of the Spouses Mercader and demanded for P30,000.00 as
the fair market value of the property. Finding the demand for payment of P30,000.00 by the
Spouses Bardilas to be unlawful, they filed for a declaratory relief.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents are equally "entitled to the road-right-of-way” being conferred upon
them by the TCT.

RULING:
Easement or servitude is a real right constituted on another's property, corporeal and
immovable, by virtue of which the owner of the same has to abstain from doing or to allow
somebody else to do something on his property for the benefit of another thing or person. It
exists only when the servient and dominant estates belong to two different owners. It gives the
holder of the easement an incorporeal interest on the land but grants no title thereto. Therefore,
an acknowledgment of the easement is an admission that the property belongs to another. It is
settled that road right of way is a discontinuous apparent easement in the context of Article 622
of the Civil Code, which provides that continuous non-apparent easements, and discontinuous
ones, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of title. But the phrase with
existing Right of Way in the TCT is not one of the modes of acquisition of the easement by virtue
of a title. Acquisition by virtue of title, as used in Art. 622 of the Civil Code, refers to "the juridical
act which gives birth to the easement, such as law, donation, contract, and will of the testator."

Spouses Ermino vs Golden Village

GR No. 180808, August 15, 2018
 
FACTS

Spouses Ermino are residents of Alco Homes, a subdivision located beside Golden Village Subdivision (Golden
Village). In days prior to August 12, 1995 and September 10, 1995, there was continuous heavy rain which caused a large
volume of water to fall from the hilltop subdivision to the subdivisions below. The volume of water directly hit Spouses
Ermino's house and damaged their fence, furniture, appliances and car. Spouses Ermino filed a complaint for damages
against E.B. Villarosa, the developer of Hilltop City Subdivision, and GVHAI. The Hilltop City Subdivision is found at the
upper portion of Alco Homes making it a higher estate, while Golden Village is located beside Alco Homes, which makes
both Alco Homes and Golden Village lower estates.

Spouses Ermino blamed E.B. Villarosa for negligently failing to observe Department of Environment and Natural
Resources rules and regulations and to provide retaining walls and other flood control devices which could have prevented
the softening of the earth.

ISSUE:
  Whether or not there is negligence on the part of GVHAI
 
RULING:

 NO. When GVHAI decided to construct the concrete fence, it could not have reasonably foreseen any harm
that could occur to Spouses Ermino. Any prudent person exercising reasonable care and caution could not have
envisaged such an outcome from the mere exercise of a proprietary act.

 Indeed, the act of replacing the steel grille gate with a concrete fence was within the legitimate exercise of GVHAI's
proprietary rights over its property.
Alco Homes and Golden Village are lower in elevation than the Hilltop City Subdivision,
and thus, are legally obliged to receive waters which naturally flow from the latter, as provided under Article 637 of the
Civil Code and Article 50 of the Water Code. Hilltop City Subdivision, the immovable in favor of which the easement is
established, is the dominant estate; while Alco Homes and Golden Village, those that are subject of the easement, are the
servient estates .It must be noted, however, that there is a concomitant responsibility on the part of Hilltop City Subdivision
not to make the obligation of these lower estates/servient estates more onerous. This obligation is enunciated under
second paragraph of Article 637 and Article 627 of the Civil Code. Based on the ocular inspection conducted by the RTC
of the Hilltop City Subdivision, the area was bulldozed and the hills were flattened. There were no retaining walls
constructed to prevent the water from flowing down and the soil was soft. This flattening of the area due to bulldozing
changed the course of water, which ultimately led to the passing of said water to the house of Spouses Ermino.

 Thus, the bulldozing and construction works done by E.B. Villarosa, not to mention the denudation of the
vegetation at the Hilltop City Subdivision, made Alco Homes and Golden Village's obligation, as lower estates more
burdensome than what the law contemplated.
MODES OF EXTINGUISHMENT
ARTICLE 631-633
CABACUNGAN VS CORRALES
GR NO. 16629, SEPTEMBER 30,1954

FACTS:
The complaint alleges in effect that plaintiffs, now appellants, are sisters and,
together with three other sisters, "co-heirs and co-owners" of a piece of land therein described;
that having been notified on September 6, 1952, that two of their sisters, co-heirs and co-
owners - Sofia Hidalgo Soria and C a r m e n S o r i a A b a d - h a d s o l d t h e i r u n d i v i d e d
s h a r e s i n s a i d l a n d t o defendant Quintin Corrales, an outsider, and wishing to be
subrogated to the rights of the buyer in accordance with article 1088 of the New Civil
C o d e , p l a i n t i f f s , o n t h e 1 0 t h o f t h e s a m e m o n t h , a p p r o a c h e d t h e s a i d Quintin
Corrales and his wife and co-defendant Catalina V. Corrales and rendered them P600 for
that purpose, but the tender was refused. Plaintiffs, therefore, pray that defendants be ordered to
allow them to exercise their right of legal redemption. On January, 1950, defendants, being
owners of a lot contiguous to the land h e r e i n q u e s t i o n , c o n s t r u c t e d a b u i l d i n g o n s a i d
l o t w i t h b a l c o n y a n d windows less than three meters distant from said land and with
roof that drains rain water into it in violation of Article 670 and 674, respectively, of the New
Civil Code. Plaintiffs, therefore, pray that the said balcony and windows be ordered
closed and the roofs constructed in such a way that rain water would not fall on plaintiffs' land.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the acquisition by defendants of a share in the land in question, the
easement of light, view and drainage was extinguished "by merger in t h e s a m e p e r s o n
o f t h e o w n e r s h i p o f d o m i n a n t a n d s e r v a n t e s t a t e s " pursuant to Article 631 of the
New Civil Code

RULING:
No, defendants have not become sole owners of the servient estate, for they have
acquired only a part interest therein, it cannot be said that in this case ownership of the
dominant and servient estates has been merged in the same person for the purposes of
the article cited. The Spanish Civil Co d e ( A r t . 5 4 6 ), p ro v id e s t h a t t h e e a se me n t i s
n o t e xt in g u is h e d b y t h e acquisition of a share in property A n d a s t o t h e m a t t e r o f
d r a i n a g e , A r t i c l e 6 7 4 o f t h e N e w C i v i l C o d e specifically provides "that the
o w n e r o f a b u i l d i n g s h a l l b e o b l i g e d t o construct its roof or covering in such a manner
that the rain water shall fall on his own land or on a street or public place, and not on the
land of his neighbor ,e v e n t h o u g h t h e a d j a c e n t l a n d m a y b e l o n g t o t w o o r
m o r e persons, one of whom is the owner of the proof .”

BENEDICTO VS CA
GR NO. L-22733, SEPTEMBER 25, 1968

FACTS:
The adjoining properties of the plaintiff [Heras] and the defendant Benedicto formerly belonged to one
owner, MIRIAM R. HEDRICK. On Septebmer 29, 1917, the said MIRIAM R. HEDRICK sold a portion
of the property, particularly Lots Nos. 8, 9, 22 and 23 to CLARO M. RECTO, and retained for herself
Lots Nos. 10 and 24. A copy of the Escritura de Compra-Venta in favor of Claro M. Recto.  At the time
of the sale, different buildings were located on the respective properties of Claro M. Recto and Miriam
R. Hedrick so adjoined each other that the only way the back portions of the properties could be
reached by their owners from San Marcelino street was through the passageway. Sometime in 1941,
the plaintiff Heras demolished the entire building situated on his property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not easement had been extinguished by nonuser and by the cessation of the necessity for
a passageway.

RULING:
No. Easement has not been extinguished by nonuser and by the cessation of the necessity for a
passageway.

Art. 631. Easements are extinguished:

(2) By nonuser for ten years, with respect to discontinuous easements, this period shall be computed
from the day on which they ceased to be used; and, with respect to continuous easements, from the
day on which an act contrary to the same took place;

(3) When either or both of the estates fall into such condition that the easement cannot be used; but it
shall revive if the subsequent condition of the estates or either of them should again permit its use,
unless when the use becomes possible, sufficient time for prescription has elapsed, in accordance
with the provisions of the preceding number;

For the purposes of this decision we do not find it necessary to determine whether the appropriate
period of nonuser in this case is 20 or 10 years. For one thing, there is no indubitable proof of
nonuser. The petitioner merely assumes that the passageway in question had not been in use since
1941 because the property of Heras has since gained direct access to San Marcelino street with the
demolition of his house. For another, even if we assume that the period of prescription based on
nonuser is 10 years, the very testimony of the petitioner Benedicto shows that it was only in 1946 that
he had the passageway walled in by constructing a fence, and since the present action was filed in
1955, granting that article 631 of the Civil Code is applicable, the prescriptive period has not yet
elapsed.

TANEDO VS BERNARD
GR NO. L-66520, AUGUST 30, 1988

FACTS:
The private respondent Antonio Cardenas was the owner of two (2) contiguous parcels of
land situated in Cebu City which he had inherited from Lourdes Cardenas, and more particularly
known as Lot 7501 On 5 February 1982, said Antonio Cardenas sold Lot 7501-A to herein petitioner
Eduardo C. Tanedo.

Antonio Cardenas, on that same day, also mortgaged Lot 7501-B to said Eduardo C. Tanedo as a
security for the payment of a loan in the amount of P10,000.00.

Antonio Cardenas further agreed that he would sell Lot 7501-B only to Eduardo Tanedo in case he
should decide to sell it, as the septic tank in Lot 7501-B services Lot 7501-A and the apartment
building on Lot 7501-A has a part standing on Lot 7501-B. This was confirmed in a letter, dated 26
February 1982, wherein Antonio Cardenas asked Tanedo not to deduct the mortgage loan of
P10,000.00 from the purchase price of Lot 7501-A "because as we have previously agreed, I will sell
to you Lot 7501-B.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was easement of drainage when it was sold.

RULING:
No. There was no easement of drainage when it was sold. Article 631 of the Civil Code enumerates
the grounds for the extinguishment of an easement. Said article provides:

(1) By merger in the same person of the ownership of the dominant and servient estates;
 
By nonuser for ten years; with respect to discontinuous easements, this period shall be
(2) computed from the day on which they ceased to be used; and, with respect to continuous
easements, from the day on which an act contrary to the same took place;
 
When either or both of the estates fall into such condition that the easement cannot be used; but
it shall revive if the subsequent condition of the estates or either of them should again permit its
(3)
use, unless when the use becomes possible, sufficient time for prescription has elapsed, in
accordance with the provisions of the preceding number;
 
By the expiration of the term or the fulfillment of the condition, if the easement is temporary or
(4)
conditional;
 
(5) By the renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate;
 
(6) By the redemption agreed upon between the owners of the dominant and servient estates."
 21. Salimbangon v. Tan GR NO. 185240 Jan 20, 2010
FACTS: Guillermo Ceniza died intestate in 1951, leaving a parcel of land at Poblacion,
Mandaue City. Twenty years later on July 17, 1973 his children Benedicta, Guillermo, Jr.,
Victoria, Eduardo, and Carlos executed an extrajudicial declaration of heirs and partition,
adjudicating and dividing the land among themselves.
Cabahug received Lot A; Eduardo Ceniza, received Lot B; Carlos Ceniza received Lot
C; Guillermo Ceniza received Lot D, and lastly, Victoria Ceniza, Lot E. Lots A, B, and C were
adjacent to a city street. But Lots D and E were not, they being interior lots. To give these
interior lots access to the street, the heirs established in their extrajudicial partition an
easement of right of way consisting of a 3-meter wide alley between Lots D and E, that
continued on between Lots A and B and on to the street. The partition that embodied this
easement of right of way was annotated on the individual titles issued to the heirs.
Petitioner Victoria Salimbangon later swapped lots with Benedicta, and became the
owner of Lot A, one of the three lots adjacent to the city street. The Salimbangons
constructed a residential house on this lot and built two garages on it. One garage bordered
the street while the other, located in the interior of Lot A, used the alley or easement of right
of way existing on Lot B, to get to the street. Victoria had this alley cemented and gated.
Subsequently, however, respondent spouses Santos and Erlinda Tan bought Lots B, C,
D, and E from all their owners. The Tans built improvements on Lot B that spilled into the
easement area. They also closed the gate that the Salimbangons built. Unable to use the old
right of way, the Salimbangons lodged a complaint with the City Engineer of Mandaue
against the Tans.

ISSUE: Whether or not the easement of right of way established by the partition agreement
among the heirs for the benefit of Lot A, has been extinguished.

RULING: Yes. In establishing the new easement of right of way, the heirs intended to
abandon the old one. Since this 3-meter alley on Lot B directly connected Lots D and E to
the street, it is also obvious that only the latter lots were its intended beneficiary. And, with
the ownership of Lots B, D, and E now consolidated in a common owner, namely, the Tans,
then the easement of right of way on Lot B may be said to have been extinguished by
operation of law.
As originally constituted in that agreement, each of Lots A and B was to contribute a
strip of 1.5 meters between them that when combined formed a 3-meter wide alley leading
from Lots D and E to the street. The true intent of the heirs was to give Lots D and E access
to the street. Lots A and B did not need this alley since they were facing the street.
Consequently, when the owner of Lots D and E also became the owner of Lot B, the
easement of right of way on Lot B became extinct by operation of law. The existence of a
dominant estate and a servient estate is incompatible with the idea that both estates belong
to the same person.
Moreover, he heirs executed a "Cancellation of Annotation of Right of Way," and, it was
implicit that the changed location of the easement cancelled not only the 1.5-meter strip of
easement imposed on Lot A of the Salimbangons but also their right to use the new 3-meter
easement alley that lay entirely on Lot B.
 22. Mercader v. Bardilas G.R. No. 163157 [June 27, 2016])

FACTS: The issue concerns the right of way between the owners of three parcels of lands
situated in Cebu City registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 78424 of the Registry
of Deeds in Cebu City in the name of Arsenia Fernandez, married to Simeon Cortes.
Another subdivision lot derived from Lot No. 5808-F was Lot No. 5808-F-3.
Lot No. 5808-F-1, fronted a side street into Clarita Village, and was registered under
TCT No. 88156 in the names of the children of petitioner Bernabe Mercader, Jr. by his first
wife, Rebecca, who had died in 1975. Lot No. 5808-F-2-A, situated behind Lot No. 5808-F-1,
and was covered by TCT No. 107914, and indicated therein was with an existing Right of
Way 3.00 meters wide, in the names of Spouses Bernabe Mercader and Lorna Jurado.
Lot No. 5808-F-2-B, situated behind Lot No. 5808-F-2-A, was covered by TCT No.
107915 in the names of Spouses Bardilas. The right of way mentioned in the TCT No.
107915 of the Spouses Bardilas exited into the Clarita Subdivision and was roughly 300
meters from Buhisan, a national road.
On May 11, 1992, the Clarita Village Association erected a concrete perimeter fence to
close the exit point of the right of way of the Spouses Bardilas from Lot No. 5808-F-2-B to
the existing road within Clarita Village. The closure forced the Spouses Bardilas to use the
second exit to Buhisan Road, which is from their Lot No. 5808-F-3.
Engr. Batiquin conducted his verification and investigation of the vicinity of the disputed
right of way. Engr. Batiquin later on reported the findings that the fence constructed by the
association should have the necessary permit; that said fence encroached a small portion of
the road right-of-way of Ms. Bardilas; and that a fence and portion of the residential house
owned by Mr. Mercader have also encroached the road right-of-way.

ISSUE: Whether or not The Spouses Mercaders are entitled to the road-right-of-way being
conferred upon them by title?

RULING: No. It is settled that road right of way is a discontinuous apparent easement in the
context of Article 622 of the Civil Code, which provides that continuous non-apparent
easements, and discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by
virtue of title. But the phrase with existing Right of Way in the TCT is not one of the modes of
acquisition of the easement by virtue of a title.
Acquisition by virtue of title, as used in Art. 622 of the Civil Code, refers to " the juridical
act which gives birth to the easement, such as law, donation, contract, and will of the
testator." A perusal of the technical description of Lot No. 5808-F-2-A indicates that the
phrase with existing Right of Way referred to or described Lot No. 5808-F-2-B, which was
one of the boundaries defining Lot F-2-A.
Moreover, as the owners of the servient estate, the Spouses Bardilas retain ownership
of the road right of way even assuming that said encumbrance was for the benefit of Lot No.
5808-F-2-A of the Spouses Mercader, who could not claim to own even a portion of the road
right of way because Article 630 of the Civil Code expressly provides that the owner of the
servient estate retains ownership of the portion on which the easement is established, and
may use the same in such manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement.

EASEMENT RELATING TO WATERS

ARTICLES 637- 648
 23. Banzon v. Banzon GR NO. 27296 Oct 8, 1927
FACTS: This controversy deals with two irrigation canals crossing a tract of land belonging
to the said intestate estate of Jose B. Banzon.
Plaintiff Trinidad alleges in her complaint that in the month of April, 1919, defendants
Mariano Banzon, Ursula Banzon and the latter’s husband, Alberto Aquino, without her
knowledge or consent, opened a canal across said land from east, to west, for the purpose
of drawing water from the Talisay River to irrigate their lands. In December, 1922, the same
defendants, without her knowledge or consent, opened another canal almost parallel to the
former, on the same land on the north side of the former one, to irrigate said defendants’
lands with water from the aforesaid Talisay River.
In consequence of the opening of said canals, she has suffered damages from loss of
crops, disintegration and unleveling of land, and therefore prays that the said defendants be
ordered to close and refill said canals.
In answer, the defendants denied all the allegations averring in defense that Jose
Banzon had aided in the construction of the first canal in the year 1905, as well as in the
maintenance of the same, and that he benefited therefrom during his life. After Jose’s death,
his children, together with the plaintiff also benefited from the said canal. The second canal
was built by defendant Mariano, brother of Jose, with the knowledge and consent of the
latter and his wife.

ISSUE: Whether or not lot No. 362, is free of easements, as the two canals in question do
not appear in the original certificate of the Torrens title No. 2502.

RULING: Yes. The court provides that from the facts, while the subject canals were opened
by the defendants across Jose Banzon’s land with his knowledge and consent, and are
voluntary easements, their existence, however, does not appear in the original certificate of
Torrens title No. 2502 to lot No. 362, in conformity with the provisions of the Section 39 of
Act No. 496, which provides that the registration of a servient estate under the Torrens
system extinguishes all easements to which it is subject and which have not been noted on
the certificate of title issued in accordance with the proper decree of registration.
Hence, these easements were extinguished and the defendants have lost their right to
the use of said canals. However, as to the second canal, Mariano has a right to a
compulsory easement of aqueduct, by virtue of the grant from the Director of Public Works.
This may be inferred from the provision of Article 125 of the Law of Waters, which
authorizes the owner of the land on which it is sought to impose the compulsory easement of
aqueduct, to object when the applicant is not the owner or grantee of the water. Mariano has
also complied with the requisites in Art. 558 of the same code.
 24. Gonzales v. Purificacion de Dios GR NO. L-3099 May 21, 1951

FACTS: Gonzales is the owner of a fishpond situated adjacent to the fishpond of de Dios.
The only source of water of her fishpond is Kay Pateng River, to which it has neither ingress
nor egress, because it has been completely cut off from it by the fishpond of the defendants.
After the several attempts made by her to obtain from the defendants a right of way to
and from said river to furnish a source of water to her fishpond proved futile, she filed the
present action in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Thereafter, the court designated
Asuncion, a surveyor, to investigate the premises and study the most convenient place
through which an aqueduct may be constructed for the supply of water needed by the
fishpond of the plaintiff.
Upon presentation of Asunction's findings and the parties' evidence, the court rendered
judgment allowing the plaintiff to have a right of passage for water from the river Kay Pateng
to her fishpond, on the northwest side of the dyke represented by the line connecting corners
6 and 7 of lot No. 8 of the de Dios, by constructing a canal eight meters wide and about one
hundred meters long at her expense a similar dyke, of the same height and width alongside
the said canal opposite the old dyke.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is law which justifies the grant to the appellee of an easement
of water over the land of the appellants in order to give to the appellee a source of water to
irrigate her fishpond?

RULING: Yes. Articles 557 and 558 of the Civil Code can be invoked in support of the claim
of the appellee. Article 557 provides that "any person who wishes to use upon his own land
any water of which he may have the control is entitled to take it through the intervening
estates, subject to the obligation of indemnifying the owners thereof."
The phrase "of which he may have the control" should be interpreted in connection with
article 558 (1), which means that he has a right to dispose of the water. This was interpreted
to mean one who has obtained from the government a grant to use water from a river, and
that the water may be applied must also be interpreted in the same way: that the water be
sufficient for the use intended.
If a person who has obtained from the Government a grant to use water a river from
irrigation was given the right to construct a canal over the intervening lands of other private
owners upon payment of indemnity, no valid reason is seen for not granting the same
privilege to the herein appellee who desires to draw water from a river for the use of her
fishpond.
 25. Valisno v. Adriano GR NO. L-37409 May 23, 1988
FACTS: Plaintiff Valisno is the absolute owner and actual possessor of a parcel of land in
Nueva Ecija, having bought the land from the defendant-appellee Adriano’s sister, Honorata.
The land which is planted with watermelon, peanuts, corn, tobacco, and other vegetables
adjoins that of the appellee Felipe Adriano on the bank of the Pampanga River. Both parcels
of land had been inherited by Honorata Adriano from their father, Eladio. At the time of the
sale of the land to Valisno, the land was irrigated by water from the Pampanga River through
a canal about seventy meters long, traversing the appellee’s land.
On December 1959, the appellee Adriano levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so
that the appellant Valisno was deprived of the irrigation water and prevented from cultivating
his 57-hectare land.
Valisno filed in the Bureau of Public Works and Communications a complaint for
deprivation of water rights, and a decision was rendered ordering Adriano to reconstruct the
irrigation canal, instead of restoring the irrigation canal, the appellee Adriano asked for a
reinvestigation of the case.
In the meantime, plaintiff Valisno rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own expense because
his need for water to irrigate his watermelon fields was urgent. However, smoe time later, the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications reversed the Bureau’s decision by issuing a
final resolution dismissing Valisno’s complaint for damages.
The Secretary held that Adriano’s water rights granted in 1923 ceased to be enjoyed by
him in 1936 or 1937, when his irrigation canal collapsed. His non-use of the water right since
then for a period of more than five years extinguished the grant by operation of law, hence
the water rights did not form part of his hereditary estate which his heirs partitioned among
themselves. Valisno, as vendee of the land which Honorata received from her father’s estate
did not acquire any water rights with the land purchased.

ISSUE: Whether or not to grant continued and unimpeded use of the irrigation ditch
traversing land, in order to obtain water from the Pampanga River for irrigation.

RULING: Yes. The existence of the irrigation canal on defendant’s land for the passage of
water from the Pampanga River to Honorata’s land prior to and at the time of the sale of
Honorata’s land to the plaintiff was equivalent to a title for the vendee of the land to continue
using it, as provided in Article 624 of the Civil Code, which gives that the existence of an
apparent sign of easement between two estates, established or maintained by the owner of
both, shall be considered should either of them be alienated, as a title in order that the
easement may continue actively and passively unless at the time the ownership of the two
estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of
them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed. This
provision shall also apply in case of the division of a thing owned in common by two or more
persons."
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are
appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not
specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser’s easement of necessity in a water
ditch running across the grantors land cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a
third person. As an easement of waters in favor of the appellant has been established, he is
entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference.
26. Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. CA
G.R. No. 132073 September 27, 2006
Facts:
REMMAN is a private domestic corporation engaged in the business of developing
subdivisions. REMMAN filed with the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR), through the Socialized Housing One-Stop Processing Center (SHOPC), an
application for exemption from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) over 17 parcels of land with a total land area of 46.9180 hectares located
at Bo. San Jose, Dasmariñas, Cavite.

The DAR Secretary rendered an Order denying the application for lack of merit. Thereafter,
REMMAN challenged the Orders of the DAR Secretary by filing a Petition for Review with
the Court of Appeals but declined to rule purely on the technical matters.

Dissatisfied with the ruling, REMMAN instituted the instant Petition. REMMAN, alleges that
the Court of Appeals failed to rule on the decisive factual and legal issues properly
interposed therewith. REMMAN argues that the subject parcels of land are "strip lands"
which are reserved for uses other than agricultural under the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 399; hence, the DAR Secretary was without reason to deny the exemption
applied for. REMMAN contests the validity of the emancipation patents issued to Eduardo
Adriano, et al., on the ground that there was a failure to comply with the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 27 in that there was neither payment of amortizations as required by
the law nor was there payment of realty taxes thereon by the tenant-farmers. According to
REMMAN, the emancipation patents were issued without payment of just compensation to
the Saulog family who are the previous owners of the parcels of land in question.

Issue: Whether the subject parcels of land are exempted from the coverage of the CARP.

Ruling: In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture, lands not devoted to agricultural
activity are outside the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, and these
include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) by government agencies other than the
Department of Agrarian Reform.

In the case at bar, it appears on record that petitioners in G.R. No. 132361, Eduardo
Adriano, et al., were issued their respective emancipation patents20 on various
dates. However, as was noted by the DAR Secretary in his Order of 5 June 1996, there is a
pending action involving the subject parcels of land, docketed as DARAB Case No. IV-Ca.
0087-92. The same action similarly involves the annulment of the Certificates of Land
Transfer (CLT) and the emancipation patents issued to Eduardo Adriano, et al., thus:

[T]he subject parcels of land are also the subject matter of DARAB Case No. IV-Ca.
0087-92, which is one for "annulment of the Resolution of DAR Regional Director for
Region IV, Certificates of Land Transfer, Emancipation Patents or CLOAs, which was
resolved in favor of cancellation. However, in a Resolution by the DARAB Central
Office on the same case dated May 18, 1995, it was ruled that the decision decreeing
the cancellation of the questioned EPs is not enforceable against the recipients as
they were not impleaded. Hence, the case was remanded to the Adjudicator of
Cavite for further proceedings.

EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY

ARTICLES 649 - 675

27. Spouses Ermino v. Golden Village

G.R. No. 180808 August 15, 2018
Facts:
Spouses Ermino are residents of Alco Homes, a subdivision located beside Golden Village
Subdivision (Golden Village). There was continuous heavy rain which caused a large volume
of water to fall from the hilltop subdivision to the subdivisions below. The volume of water
directly hit Spouses Ermino’s house and damaged their fence, furniture, appliances and car.
The Hilltop City Subdivision is found at the upper portion of Alco Homes, making it a higher
estate, while Golden Village is located beside Alco Homes, which makes both Alco Homes
and Golden Village lower estates vis-à-vis Hilltop City Subdivision.

Spouses Ermino blamed E.B. Villarosa for negligently failing to observe Department of
Environment and Natural Resources rules and regulations and to provide retaining walls and
other flood control devices which could have prevented the softening of the earth and
consequent inundation. They likewise claimed that GVHAI committed a wrongful act in
constructing the concrete fence which diverted the flow of water to Alco Homes, hence,
making it equally liable to Spouses Ermino.

E.B. Villarosa argued that the location of the house of Spouses Ermino is located at the
lower portion of the Dagong Creek and is indeed flooded every time there is a heavy
downpour, and that the damage was further aggravated by GVHAI’s construction of the
concrete fence. It contended, however, that the damage was due to a fortuitous
event. Meanwhile, GVHAI averred that the construction of the concrete fence was in the
exercise of its proprietary rights and that it was done in order to prevent outsiders from using
the steel grille from entering the subdivision.

Issue:
Whether or not Alco Homes and Golden Village are legally obliged to receive waters which
naturally flow from Hilltop City Subdivision.

Ruling:
Alco Homes and Golden Village are lower in elevation than the Hilltop City Subdivision, and
thus, are legally obliged to receive waters which naturally flow from the latter, as provided
under Article 637 of the Civil Code and Article 50 of the Water Code. These provisions refer
to easements relating to waters. An easement or servitude is “a real right constituted on
another’s property, corporeal and immovable, by virtue of which the owner of the same has
to abstain from doing or to allow somebody else to do something on his property for the
benefit of another thing or person.” The statutory basis of this right is Article 613 of the Civil
Code which reads: ARTICLE 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed
upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner. The
immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the dominant estate; that
which is subject thereto, the servient estate.

The bulldozing and construction work done by E.B. Villarosa, not to mention the denudation
of the vegetation at the Hilltop City Subdivision, made Alco Homes and Golden Village’s
obligation, as lower estates, more burdensome than what the law contemplated. Lower
estates are only obliged to receive water naturally flowing from higher estates and such
should be free from any human intervention. In the instant case, what flowed from Hilltop
City Subdivision was not water that naturally flowed from a higher estate. The bulldozing and
flattening of the hills led to the softening of the soil that could then be easily carried by the
current of water whenever it rained. Thus, Alco Homes and Golden Village are not anymore
obligated to receive such waters and earth coming from Hilltop City Subdivision.
 28. Costabella v. CA
GR NO. 80511 Jan 25, 1991

Facts:
Petitioners owned a lot wherein they started constructing their beach hotel. Before such
construction, the private respondent, in going to and from their respective properties and the
provincial road, passed through a passageway which traversed the petitioner’s property. As
a result of the construction, this passageway, including the alternative route, was obstructed.
Private respondent filed for injunction plus damages. In the same complaint the private
respondents also alleged that the petitioner had constructed a dike on the beach fronting the
latter’s property without the necessary permit, obstructing the passage of the residents and
local fishermen, and trapping debris of flotsam on the beach. The private respondent also
claim that the have acquired the right of way through prescription. They prayed for the re-
opening of the “ancient road right of way” (what they called the supposed easement in this
case) and the destruction of the dike. Petitioner answered by saying that their predecessor in
interest’s act of allowing them to pass was gratuitous and in fact, they were just tolerating the
use of the private respondents. CA ruled in favor of the private respondents.

Issue:
Whether or not the private respondents had acquired an easement of right of way in the form
of a passageway, on the petitioner’s property?

Ruling:
It is already well-established that an easement of right of way, as is involved here, is
discontinuous and as such cannot be acquired by prescription.

The owner of the dominant estate may validly claim a compulsory right of way only after he
has established the existence of four requisites, to wit: (1) the (dominant) estate is
surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) after
payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to the proprietor’s own acts;
and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
Additionally, the burden of proving the existence of the foregoing prerequisites lies on the
owner of the dominant estate.

Here, there is absent any showing that the private respondents had established the
existence of the four requisites mandated by law. For one, they failed to prove that there is
no adequate outlet from their respective properties to a public highway. On the contrary, as
alleged by the petitioner in its answer to the complaint, and confirmed by the appellate court,
“there is another outlet for the plaintiffs (private respondents) to the main road.” Thus, the
respondent Court of Appeals likewise admitted that “legally the old road could be closed.”
Yet, it ordered the re-opening of the old passageway on the ground that “the existing outlet
(the other outlet) is inconvenient to the plaintiff.” On this score, it is apparent that the Court of
Appeals lost sight of the fact that the convenience of the dominant estate has never been
the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way, To be sure, the true standard for the
grant of the legal right is “adequacy.” Hence, when there is already an existing adequate
outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, even if the said outlet, for one reason or
another, be inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified. For to
justify the imposition of an easement or right of way, “there must be a real, not a fictitious or
artificial necessity for it
 29. Francisco v. IAC
G.R. No. L-63996 September 15, 1989

Facts:
Ramos acquired by sale from the Eugenio sisters a parcel of land which is isolated from the
Parada Road. In March 1972, after having set up a piggery on his newly acquired property,
Ramos had his lawyer write to Eusebio Francisco — owner, to ask for a right of way through
the latter's land. Negotiations thereafter had however failed to bring about a satisfactory
arrangement. Francisco's proposal for an exchange of land at the rate of one (1) square
meter from him to three (3) square meters from Ramos, as was supposedly the custom in
the locality, was unacceptable to Ramos.

Later that year, Ramos succeeded, through the intercession of Councilor Tongco of
Valenzuela, in obtaining a three-meter wide passageway through the lot of Epifania Dila. Yet
in August, 1973, he inexplicably put up a ten-foot high concrete wall on his lot and thereby
closed the very right of way granted to him across Dila's lot. It seems that what he wished
was to have a right of passage precisely through Francisco's land, considering this to be
more convenient to him. Francisco learned of Ramos' intention and reacted by replacing the
barbed-wire fence on his lot along Parada Road with a stone wall. Ramos then insituted a
case where the court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction directing Francisco to
remove his stone fence and keep his lot open for Ramos' use.

Issue:
Whether or not Ramos is entitled to an easement of right of way over the property of
Francisco considering that another 3-meter passage was made available to him through the
lot of Epifania Dila.

Ruling: In Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. v. Capital Subdivision, Inc., this Court held that a
compulsory easement of way cannot be obtained without the presence of four (4) requisites
provided for in Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, which the owner of the dominant
tenement must establish, to wit: “(1) That the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1); (2) After
payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1, end); (3) That the isolation was not due to acts
of the proprietor of the dominant estate; and (4) That the right of way claimed is at the point
least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. (Art. 650)”

The evidence is, therefore, persuasively to the effect that the private respondent had been
granted an adequate access to the public highway (Parada Road) through the adjacent
estate of Epifania Dila even as he was trying to negotiate a satisfactory agreement with
petitioner Francisco for another passageway through the latter’s property. If at the time he
filed suit against the petitioner, such access (through the property of Epifania Dila) could no
longer be used, it was because he himself had closed it off by erecting a stone wall on his lot
at the point where the passageway began for no reason to which the record can attest
except to demonstrate the isolation of his property alleged in his complaint. But the law
makes it amply clear that an owner cannot, as respondent has done, by his own act isolate
his property from a public highway and then claim an easement of way through an adjacent
estate. The third of the cited requisites: that the claimant of a right of way has not himself
procured the isolation of his property had not been met_indeed the respondent had actually
brought about the contrary condition and thereby vitiated his claim to such an easement. It
will not do to assert that use of the passageway through Lot 860-B was difficult or
inconvenient, the evidence being to the contrary and that it was wide enough to be
traversable by even a truck, and also because it has been held that mere inconvenience
attending the use of an existing right of way does not justify a claim for a similar easement in
an alternative location.
 30. Floro v. Llenado
GR NO. 75723 Jun 2, 1995

Facts:
Mr Floro owned the Floro Park Subdivision situated in Bulacan. The subdivision has its own
access roads from the MacArthur Highway through road lot 4. Another fellow, Llenado,
owned the Llenado Homes Subdivision. He obtained the same from Mr. de Castro, when it
was known as the Emmanuel Homes Subdivision, Llenado Homes was bounded on the
south by the Palanas Creek, 5 which separates it from the Floro Park Subdivision. To the
west sat the ricelands belonging to Marcial Ipapo. The controversy brewed since Llenado
Homes did not have any passage to the MacArthur Highway. However, a proposed access
road passing the abandoned riceland of Marcial Ipapo has been specifically provided in the
subdivision plan of the former Emmanuel Homes Subdivision. This plan was approved by
the HLURB.

Because the access road through the Ipapo Riceland did not exist yet, the Llenados sought,
and were granted, oral permission by the Floros to use Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park .
At this point, remember that the agreement was merely provisional as the parties were still
drafting a contract.
Later, Floro discovered grave damage to the lots in question from the passage of heavy
machinery. He then barricaded Road Lot 5 with a pile of rocks, wooden posts and adobe
stones. He essentially implied Llenados to keep out off property.

Issue:
Whether or not the requirements for legal easement existed to allow Llenado to claim the
same against Mr. Floro.

Ruling:
For the Llenados to be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way under the Civil
Code, the preconditions provided under Articles 649 and 650 thereof must be established.
These preconditions are: (1) that the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables
and has no adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1); (2) after payment of proper
indemnity (Art.649, par. 1); (3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the
dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.); and, (4) that the right of way claimed is at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance
from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest (Art. 650).

The burden of proving the existence of the prerequisites to validly claim a compulsory right
of way lies on the owner of the dominant estate. We find that private respondents have failed
in this regard.

In order to justify the imposition of the servitude of right of way, there must be a real, not a
fictitious or artificial necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is
required by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of a
necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the servitude, the same should not be
imposed. This easement can also be established for the benefit of a tenement with an
inadequate outlet, but not when the outlet is merely inconvenient. Thus, when a person has
already established an easement of this nature in favor of his tenement, he cannot demand
another, even if the first passage has defects which make passage impossible, if those
defects can be eliminated by proper repairs.
 QUIMEN VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 112331; May 29, 1996

FACTS:
Anastacia Quimen, with her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and sister Rufina inherited a
piece of property in Pandi, Bulacan, agreed to subdivide the property equally among
themselves with their share abutting the municipal road. Behind lots of Anastacia and Sotero
is Antonios which was later divided into two and one of these was purchased by Yolanda
from her uncle Antonio through her aunt Anastacia, who was then acting as his administratix.
At first Yolanda was hesitant to buy the same because it had no access to public road but
Anastacia assuranced her that she would give her a right of way on her adjoining property
for P200 per square meter. Yolanda constructed a house on the lot using as her
passageway to the public highway a portion of Anastacias. But when finally Yolanda offered
to pay for the use of pathway, Anastacia refused to accept the payment and barred Yolanda
from passing through her property.Yolanda later purchased other lot of Antonio located
directly behind the property of her parents who provided her a pathway gratis et amore
between their house, extending about 19 m from Yolandas lot behind the sari-sari store of
Satero, and Anastacias perimeter fence which pathway leads to municipal road but not
adequate for ingress and egress because the store obstructs the pathway. Yolanda filed an
action for right of way. The Trial court dismissed the complaint but was reversed by Court of
Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not right of way should be granted to Yolanda.

RULING:
The conditions sine qua non for the grant of the easement of right of way are: a. That the
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovable and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway; b. After payment of proper indemnity; c. That the isolation was not due to acts of
proprietor of the dominant estate; d. The right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial
to the servient estateApplying Art 650 of NCC, the proposed right of way of Yolanda was the
least prejudicial as compared to the suggested passage through the property of Yolandas
father which would mean destroying the sari-sari store of strong materials.

STA. MARIA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 127549; January 28, 1998
FACTS:
Plaintiff spouses Fajardo are the registered owners of a piece of land, Lot No. 124. In 1992,
they filed a complaint against defendants Sta. Maria for the establishment of an easement
of right of way. They alleged that their lot, Lot 124, is surrounded by properties belonging to
other persons, including those of the defendants; that since plaintiffs have no adequate
outlet to the provincial road, an easement of a right of way passing through either of the
alternative defendants' properties which are directly abutting the provincial road would be
plaintiffs' only convenient, direct and shortest access to and from the provincial road; that
plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest have been passing through the properties of defendants in
going to and from their lot; that defendants' mother even promised plaintiffs' predecessors-
in-interest to grant the latter an easement of right of way as she acknowledged the absence
of an access from their property to the road; and that alternative defendants, despite
plaintiffs' request for a right of way and referral of the dispute to the barangay officials,
refused to grant them an easement.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiffs failed to prove that the isolation was not caused by themselves.

RULING:
The plaintiffs sufficiently proved that they did not by themselves cause the isolation. Neither
have the private respondents been able to show that the isolation of their property was not
due to their personal or their predecessors-in-interest's own acts." Even without the fences
private respondents' property remains landlocked by neighboring estates belonging to
different owners.

The findings of fact of both courts satisfied the following requirements for an estate to be
entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way under the Civil Code, to wit: 1. the
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway (Art. 649, par. 1); 2. there is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1); 3. the
isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.);
and 4. the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and
insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest (Art. 650).

Under Article 650 of the Civil Code, the easement of right of way shall be established at the
point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where
the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. Where there
are several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, and the easement may be
established on any of them, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least
damage should be chosen. The conditions of "least damage" and "shortest distance" are
both established in one tenement - petitioners' property.

As to the "daang tao" at the back of private respondents' property, it must be stressed that
under Article 651 the width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for
the needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time.
Therefore, the needs of the dominant estate determine the width of the easement. The
needs of private respondents' property could hardly be served by this "daang tao" located at
the back and which is bordered by a fishpond.

VILLANUEVA VS. VELASCO

G.R. NO. 130845; NOVEMBER 27, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the parcel of land, bought with a small
house on its southeastern portion. It occupied one meter of the two-meter wide easement of
right of way the Gabriel spouses granted to the Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of private
respondents, in a Contract of Easement of Right of Way.

Petitioner was unaware that Gabriels had constructed the aforementioned small house that
encroached upon the two-meter easement, and that private respondents, Julio Sebastian
and Shirley Lorilla, had filed on May 8, 1991 an action for easement, damages and with
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order against the spouses
Gabriel. As successors-in-interest, Sebastian and Lorilla wanted to enforce the contract of
easement.

The trial court issued a temporary restraining order and subsequentlyy, issued a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the Gabriels to provide the right of way and to
demolish the small house encroaching on the easement. Judge Tirso Velasco of the RTC in
Quezon City, Branch 88, issued an Alias Writ of Demolition. In 1995, the sheriff tried to
demolish the small house pursuant to the writ. Petitioner filed a Third Party Claim with
Prayer to Quash Alias Writ of Demolition, maintained that the writ of demolition could not
apply to his property since he was not a party to the civil case. As such, the contract of
easement executed by the Gabriels in favor of the Espinolas could not be enforced against
him. Also, petitioner maintained that since the easement was not annotated on the Torrens
title, it was extinguished upon the registration of the servient estate without the easement
having been annotated therein.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement on the property binds the petitioner.

RULING:
The easement on the property binds the petitioner and although he was not a party to the
suit, he is a successor-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action in
court. The Court affirmed the observation of the Court of Appeals that the easement in the
instant petition is both (1) an easement by grant or a voluntary easement, and (2) an
easement by necessity or a legal easement. A legal easement is one mandated by law,
constituted for public use or for private interest, and becomes a continuing property right. As
a compulsory easement, it is inseparable from the estate to which it belongs, as provided for
in said Article 617 of the Civil Code. Conformably then, petitioner ought to demolish
whatever edifice obstructs the easement in view of the needs of private respondents estate.

DELA CRUZ V. RAMSICAL

G.R. NO. 137882; FEBRUARY 4, 2005

FACTS:
Respondent Ramiscal is the registered owner of a parcel of land. Petitioners Sps. de la Cruz
are occupants of a parcel of land located at the back of Ramiscals property in the name of
Concepcion de la Pea, mother of petitioner Alfredo de la Cruz. A 1.10-meter wide by 12.60-
meter long strip of land owned by respondent was being used by petitioners as their pathway
to and from 18th Avenue, the nearest public highway from their property. Petitioners had
enclosed the same with a gate, fence, and roof.

Respondent leased her property, including the building thereon, to Phil. Orient Motors. Phil.
Orient Motors who also owned a property adjacent to that of respondents. In 1995, Phil.
Orient Motors sold its property to San Benito Realty and it was only then that respondent
discovered that the aforementioned pathway being occupied by petitioners is part of her
property. Respondent demanded that petitioners demolish the structure constructed by
them on said pathway without her knowledge and consent, asserting in her complaint that
petitioners have an existing right of way to a public highway other than the current one they
are using, which she owns. Petitioners, in their Answer, claimed that such use was with the
knowledge of respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are entitled to a voluntary or legal easement of right of way.

RULING:
An easement or servitude is a real right, constituted on the corporeal immovable property of
another, by virtue of which the owner has to refrain from doing, or must allow someone to
do, something on his property, for the benefit of another thing or person.The statutory basis
for this right is Article 613, in connection with Article 619, of the Civil Code.

Petitioners herein failed to show by competent evidence other than their bare claim that they
and their tenants entered into an agreement with respondent, through her foreman, Mang
Puling, to use the pathway to 18th Avenue, which would be reciprocated with an equivalent
1.50-meter wide easement by the owner of another adjacent estate.

Likewise futile are petitioners attempts to show that they are legally entitled to the aforesaid
pathway under Article 649 of the Civil Code. The conferment of a legal easement of right of
way under Article 649 is subject to proof of the following requisites: (1) it is surrounded by
other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) payment of proper
indemnity; (3) the isolation is not the result of its own acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at
the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the
foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.The first three requisites are not obtaining in the instant case.

Article 649 of the Civil Code provides that the easement of right of way is not compulsory if
the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietors own acts. What jurisprudence has
consistently maintained through the years regarding an easement of right of way, that "mere
convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as its basis. To justify the
imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial necessity for it."
Viewed from all angles, from the facts and the law, the Court finds no redeeming value in
petitioners asseverations that merit the reversal of the assailed resolutions.
 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. MANUBAY AGRO-INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 150936; AUGUST 18, 2004

FACTS:
In 1996, National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), a government-owned and controlled
corporation created for the purpose of undertaking the development and generation of
hydroelectric power, commenced its 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission
Project.

The project aims to transmit the excess electrical generating capacity coming from Leyte
Geothermal Plant to Luzon and various load centers to interconnect the entire country into a
single power grid. Apparently, the project is for a public purpose.

"In order to carry out this project, it is imperative for the transmission lines to cross over
certain lands owned by private individuals and entities. One of these lands, only a portion will
be traversed by the transmission lines, is owned by Manubay Agro-Industrial Development
Corporation.

NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation before the Regional Trial Court of Naga City
against in order to acquire an easement of right of way over the land which the latter owns.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC, held that RA 6395, as amended by PD No. 938, did
not preclude expropriation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is no "taking" of property, but merely an imposition of an encumbrance
or a personal easement/servitude under Article 614 of the Civil Code.

RULING:
The expropriation was not to be limited to an easement of a right of way.

Granting arguendo that what petitioner acquired over respondent's property was purely an
easement of a right of way, still, we cannot sustain its view that it should pay only an
easement fee, and not the full value of the property. The acquisition of such an easement
falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. This conclusion finds support in
similar cases in which the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for
private property condemned for public use

True, an easement of a right of way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and
respondent retains full ownership of the property. The acquisition of such easement is,
nevertheless, not gratis. As correctly observed by the CA, considering the nature and the
effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite
period would deprive respondent of normal use of the property. For this reason, the latter is
entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the
monetary equivalent of the land.
36. Encarnacion v. CA GR NO. 77628 Mar 11, 1991
37. Larry Williams, v. Rainero Zerda GR NO. 207146 March 15, 2017
38. Mercader v. Bardilas G.R. No. 163157, [June 27, 2016])
39. Calimoso v. Roullo G.R. No. 198594, [January 25, 2016]
 Party Wall
658-666
40. Case v. Heirs of Tuazon GR NO. 5044 Dec 1, 1909
41. Lao v. Heirs of Alburo GR NO.10372 Dec 24, 1915
42. Valenzuela v. Unson GR NO. 10266 Oct 20, 1915
43. Spouses Garcia v. Santos, G.R. No. 228334 [June 17, 2019])
Easement of Light and View
Articles 667- 673
44. Cortez v. Yu Tibo GR NO. 911 Mar 12, 1903
45. Severina Choco v. Santamaria GR NO. 6076 Dec 29, 1911
46. Soriano v. Sterberg GR NO.15628 Nov 18, 1920
47. Masongsong v. Flores GR NO. 36048 Sep 24, 1932
48. Alolino VS. Fortunato Flores GR NO. 198774 April 04, 2016
49. Spouses Garcia v. Santos, G.R. No. 228334 [June 17, 2019])
Drainage of Buildings
Articles 674 - 676
50. Cabacungan v. Corrales GR NO. L-6629 Sep 30, 1954

Lateral & Subjacent Support

Article 684
NGO SIN SING AND TICIA DY NGO VS. LI SENG GIAP AND SONS, INC
G.R. NO. 170596 NOVEMBER 28, 2008

FACTS:
Petitioner spouses Ngo Sin Sing and Ticia Dy Ngo owned a lot. They decided to
construct a 5-storey concrete building thereon, the NSS Building, and for this project, they
contracted the services of Contech Construction Technology Development Corporation
(Contech) as their General Contractor.Adjacent to their lot is a semi-concrete building known
as the Li Seng Giap Building(LSG Building), owned by Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc.
(respondent).During the construction of the NSS Building, the respondent, through its
general manager, John T. Lee,received complaints from their tenants about defects in the
building.There were cracks appearing on the floors, the steel door was bent, and concrete
slabs of the walls were falling apart. An inspection of the premises revealed that the
excavation made by Contech on petitioners' land was close to the common boundary,
exposing the foundation of the LSG Building. As a gesture of goodwill to their neighbors, the
petitioners assured the respondent that repairs would be undertaken by their contractor. In
December 1979,Contech announced that it had completed repairs on the LSG Building.
Notwithstanding this assurance, more defects in the LSG Building appeared, i.e.,tilted floors,
cracks in the columns and beams, distorted window frames. Apparently, the LSG Building
was continuously sagging and the respondent felt that it was no longer safe to occupy the
building. Respondents as owner of LSG Building demanded that petitioner should handle the
cost of rebuilding the said building. The latter refused hence a case was filed. It was decided
against the petitioner. On appeal petitioner, pleaded that its liability be tempered since the
owner of LSG was also contributorily negligent.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the liability of petitioner be mitigated due to the contributory negligence
of respondent
HELD:
Yes,during the trial it was found out that the foundation of the LSG building is the same
as the foundation of the previous building when it was bought from the previous owners.
Respondents only renovated the same and add additional 2 floors. Clearly then, the
foundation that is too old cannot hold a 4 storey building, more so when the adjacent lot was
excavated by petitioners. Thus, considering that respondent's negligence must have
necessarily contributed to the sagging of the LSG Building, a reduction of the award is
warranted. We, therefore, agree with the trial court that respondent should likewise share in
the cost of the restructuring of its building.
Although the trial court stated that petitioner as land owner had every right to excavate on
his own land, such right is not absolute as to deprive the adjacent owner sufficient lateral
support pursuant to Article 684, New Civil Code, which states that:
No proprietor shall make such excavation upon his land as to deprive any adjacent land or
building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support.
 MARGARITA F. CASTRO, PETITIONER, V. NAPOLEON A. MONSOD, RESPONDENT.
FACTS:
Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land located on Garnet Street, Manuela
Homes, Pamplona, Las Piñas City. Respondent, on the other hand, is the owner of the
property adjoining the lot of petitioner, located on Lyra Street, Moonwalk Village, Phase 2,
Las Piñas City.In 2000, respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim against sixty-
five (65) sq.m. of the property of petitioner. The adverse claim was filed without any claim of
ownership over the property. Respondent was merely asserting the existing legal easement
of lateral and subjacent support at the rear portion of his estate.
Petitioner averred that when she bought the property from Manuela Homes in 1994,
there was no annotation or existence of any easement over the property.The trial court
ratiocinated that the adverse claim of respondent was non-registrable considering that the
basis of his claim was an easement and not an interest adverse to the registered owner, and
neither did he contest the title of petitioner.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled that while
respondent’s adverse claim could not be sanctioned because it did not fall under the
requisites for registering an adverse claim, the same might be duly annotated in the title as
recognition of the existence of a legal easement of subjacent and lateral support. The
purpose of the annotation was to prevent petitioner from making injurious excavations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of lateral and subjacent support exists on the subject
adjacent properties and, if it does, whether the same may be annotated at the back of the
title of the servient estate.
HELD:
Article 684 of the Civil Code provides that no proprietor shall make such excavations
upon his land as to deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent
support. An owner, by virtue of his surface right, may make excavations on his land, but his
right is subject to the limitation that he shall not deprive any adjacent land or building of
sufficient lateral or subjacent support. Between two adjacent landowners, each has an
absolute property right to have his land laterally supported by the soil of his neighbor, and if
either, in excavating on his own premises, he so disturbs the lateral support of his neighbor’s
land as to cause it, or, in its natural state, by the pressure of its own weight, to fall away or
slide from its position, the one so excavating is liable. Here, the residential house and lot of
respondent is located on an elevated plateau of fifteen (15) feet above the level of
petitioner’s property; hence, an easement of subjacent and lateral support exists in favor of
respondent.
However, respondent’s assertion that he has an adverse claim over the 65 sq.m.
property of petitioner is misplaced since he does not have a claim over the ownership of the
land. The annotation of an adverse claim over registered land under Section 70 of
Presidential Decree 1529 requires a claim on the title of the disputed land. Therefore, an
annotation of the existence of the subjacent and lateral support is no longer necessary.
 NORTH NEGROS SUGAR vs. SERAFIN HIDALGO
GR 42334. Oct 31, 1936

FACTS:
North Negros Sugar is the owner of a site in which is located its sugar central, with its
factory building and residence for its employees, known as the "mill site." It also owns the
adjoining sugar plantation known as Hacienda "Begoña."
Across its properties North Negros constructed a road connecting the "mill site" with the
provincial highway. Through this road North Negros allowed and still allows vehicles to pass
upon payment of a tool charge of P0.15 for each truck or automobile. Pedestrians are
allowed free passage through it.
Immediately adjoining the “mill site" is Hacienda "Sañgay." Serafin Hidalgo used to pass
through the said road of North Negros, because it was his only means of access to Hacienda
"Sañgay" where he runs his billiard hall and tuba saloon.
Later on, by order of North Negros, every time that Hidalgo passed driving his
automobile with a cargo of tuba, North Negros' gatekeeper would stop him and prevent him
from passing through said road. Hidalgo in such cases merely deviated from said road and
continued on his way to the Hacienda "Sañgay" across the fields of Hacienda "Begoña,"
likewise belonging to North Negros.
ISSUE:
Can North Negros prevent Hidalgo from using the subject road
HELD:
No. It is undisputed that:
1. the road in question was constructed by North Negros on its own land, and that it
connects the central or the "mill site" with the provincial road
2. North Negros made this road accessible to the general public, regardless of class of
group of persons or entities.
There is no contention here that Hidalgo had refused to pay said tolls whenever he wanted
to drive his car along the road in question.
We, therefore, have the case of an easement of way voluntarily constituted in favor of a
community. Art. 531 and 594 read:
Art. 531 [614]. Easement may also be established for the benefit of one or more persons
or a community to whom the encumbered estate does not belong."
Art. 594 [688]. The owner of an estate may burden it with such easements as he may
deem fit, and in such manner and form as he may consider desirable, provided he does not
violate the law or public order."
There is nothing in the constitution of this easement in violation of law or public order, except
perhaps that the right to open roads and charge passage fees therefor is the State's by right
of sovereignty and may not be taken over by a private individual without the requisite permit.
This, however, would effect the right of North Negros to charge tools, but not that of Hidalgo
or of any other person to make use of the easement.
Under Art. 594, in cases of voluntary easements, the owner is given ample liberty to
establish them: "as he may deem fit, and in such manner and form as he may consider
desirable."
North Negros "considered it desirable" to open this road to the public in general, without
imposing any condition save the payment of a 15-centavo toll by motor vehicles, and it may
not now go back on this and deny the existence of an easement.Voluntary easements under
Art. 594 are not contractual in nature; they constitute the act of the owner. If he exacts any
condition, like the payment of a certain indemnity for the use of the easement, any person
who is willing to pay it may make use of the easement. If the contention be made that a
contract is necessary, it may be stated that a contract exists from the time all those who
desire to make use of the easement are disposed to pay the required indemnity.
North Negros contends that the easement of way is intermittent in nature and can only be
acquired by virtue of a title under Art. 539 [622].Hidalgo, however, does not lay claim to it by
prescription. The title in this case consists in the fact that North Negros has offered the use
of this road to the general public.
The case of Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Roxas is not controlling, as there the
attempt was to establish that the right to an easement of way had been acquired by
prescription.Here Hidalgo's contention is, that while the road in question remains open to the
public, he has a right to its use upon paying the passage fees required by North Negros.
Indeed the latter may close it at its pleasure, as no period has been fixed when the
easement was voluntarily constituted, but while the road is thrown open, North Negros may
not capriciously exclude Hidalgo from its use.
Furthermore, North Negros' evidence disclosed the existence of a forcible right of way in
favor of the owner and occupants of the Hacienda "Sañgay" under Art. 564 [649], because,
those living in the Hacienda "Sañgay" have no access to the provincial road except thru the
road in question.
 IN RE: PETITION, TRIAS v. GREGORIO ARANETA
[G.R. No. L-20786. Oct 30, 1965.]

FACTS:
In May 1963, Rafaela Trias, filed in the CFI, a petition to cancel from her Torrens
certificate of title, the annotation appearing on its back which reads as follows:
"5. That no factories will be permitted in this section."
She alleged she was the registered owner of this lot in Quezon City; that she wanted the
cancellation, not for the purpose of erecting a factory thereon, but merely to facilitate
approval of a loan she had applied for; that the restriction was illegal, because it impaired the
owner's dominical rights; and that it was a mere surplusage anyhow, because there are
zoning ordinances prohibiting establishment of factories in that district.
Gregorio Araneta opposed, alleging that: (a) the condition had been inserted in the title
pursuant to a contract of sale between it and Rafaela's predecessor-in-interest; (b) that it
received no timely notice of the petition; (c) the order disregards contractual rights and
obligations; (d) the prohibition against factories was valid, and not a surplusage.
The parties agree: (1) that the lot was part of a subdivision and originally belonged to
Tuazon selling it (thru Araneta) to a purchaser, imposed the prohibition; that such prohibition
was accordingly printed on the back of the transfer certificate issued to the purchaser; (2)
that after several transfers, always subject to the prohibition, TRias acquired the lot, again
subject to the limitation which was repeated on the back of her certificate; (3) that upon
receiving her certificate, she noticed the prohibition; and so, arguing that it infringes the
owner's right to use her land, she asked for its cancellation.
ISSUE:
Is the prohibition or limitation valid?
HELD:
Yes.Such prohibition is similar to other conditions imposed by sellers of subdivision lots upon
purchasers. It is in reality an easement, 1 which every owner of real estate may validly
impose under Art. 688, which provides that "the owner of a piece of land may establish
thereon the easements which he may deem suitable, . . . provided he does not contravene
the law, public policy or public order".
No law has been cited outlawing this condition or limitation, which evidently was imposed by
the owner of the subdivision to establish a residential section in that area, for the purpose of
assuring purchasers of the lots therein that the peace and quiet of the place will not be
disturbed by the noise or smoke of factories in the vicinity.
The limitation is essentially a contractual obligation which the seller Tuazon (thru Araneta)
imposed, and the purchaser agreed to accept. Of course, it restricts the free use of the
parcel of land by the purchaser. However, "while the courts have manifested some disfavor
of covenants restricting the use of property, they have generally sustained them where
reasonable, and not contrary to public policy . . . "
"The validity of building restrictions limiting buildings to residences, . . . restrictions as to the
character or location of buildings or structures to be erected on the land . . . has been
sustained.
Now, it is proper for Tuazon (thru Araneta) to oppose the elimination of the condition from
the certificate of title, because if it is erased, a purchaser who gets a new certificate of title
without the annotation, will hold the lot free from the encumbrance, and might build a factory
there. 2 As declared by Sec. 39 of Act 496 as amended, "every purchaser of registered
land . . . shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted in said
certificate."
The existence of a zoning ordinance prohibiting factories in the area, is immaterial. The
ordinance might be repealed at any time; and if so repealed, this prohibition would not be
enforceable against new purchasers of the land, who may be ignorant thereof. The same
remark applies to Rafaela's promise not to build a factory on the lot; new owners might not
be bound.
A problem might arise if and when the ordinance is amended so as to convert the area into
an industrial zone — impliedly permitting factories. Probably, the limitation might still bind the
lot owner (with annotation); but it is not the present issue, and we do not now decide it.
1. For that reason it was annotated, as it should, in all subsequent transfer certificates.
2. And Tuazon might be liable to those who bought lots in the subdivision relying on the
prohibition against factories in that part of the city.
ATTY. CORNELIO T. RIVERA and AUGUSTO PALOMAR vs. THE HONORABLE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LA VISTA ASSOCIATION, INC.
G.R. No. 74249. January 20, 1989

FACTS:
On July 9,1982, the petitioners filed an amended complaint for damages and injunction with
the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch IX alleging among others that:
1)they are the owners of a parcel of land located at Diliman, Quezon City described in TCT
No. 273733 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City in their names;
2)they purchased the said property from Maryknoll College Foundation, Inc. as evidenced by
the deed of sale (Annex “A" of the amended complaint);
3)Maryknoll College granted a road right of way over one half (1/2) portion of the Mangyan
Road which is owned by it;
4)On October 15, 1968, the City Mayor of Quezon City approved Ordinance No. 7613-S-68
prohibiting the closing, obstruction, preventing or otherwise refusing to the public or vehicular
traffic, the use or free access to any subdivision or community street within the jurisdiction of
Quezon City;
5) On January 20, 1982, the private respondents, its agents and representatives wilfully
closed, obstructed, prevented and refused to the petitioners and to the general public or
vehicular traffic the use of or free access to Mangyan Road, a 15-meter wide road located in
the La Vista Subdivision, one half (1/2) of which is owned by Maryknoll College in violation of
the said ordinance.
On November 15, 1982, the Court of First Instance of Rizal presided by Judge Jose P.
Castro issued an order granting the writ of preliminary injunction to prohibit La Vista
Association from preventing the petitioners and the general public from the use of the
Mangyan Road. The trial court stated that the petitioners are entitled to -the relief sought in
the light of Ordinance No. 7613 and that the closure of the Mangyan Road has caused great
and irreparable damage to the petitioners and the public.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mer convenience for the dominant estate is a sufficient basis for the
grant of an easement of right of way
HELD:
No. The Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not a sufficient basis for the grant
of an easement of right of way, there must be a real and not a fictitious or artificial necessity
for it.Notwithstanding the existence of a city ordinance, the petitioners do not have an
unquestioned right over the one-half portion of the Mangyan Road.
In the case of Ramos, Sr. v. Gatchalian Realty, Inc. (154 SCRA 703 [1987]), this Court
had the occasion to explain: “xxx To allow the petitioner access to Sucat Road through
Gatchalian Avenue inspite of a road right of way provided by the petitioner’s subdivision for
its buyers simply because Gatchalian Avenue allows petitioner a much greater ease in going
to and coming from the main thoroughfare is to completely ignore what jurisprudence has
consistently maintained through the years regarding an easement of a right of way, that
‘mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as its basis.’ To justify the
imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it.”
56. La Vista v. CA [691] 95252 Sep 5, 1997
56: BUSTAMANTE CASE
57. Unisource v. Chung
G.R. NO. 173252 July 17, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation is the registered owner of a
parcel of land. The title contains a memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary easement
which has been carried over from the OCT of Encarnacion S. Sandico. As Sandico’s property
was transferred to several owners, the memorandum of encumbrance ofa voluntary easement in favor
of Francisco M. Hidalgo was consistently annotated at the back of every title covering Sandicos property until
TCT was issued in petitioner’s favor. On the other hand, Hidalgo’s property was eventually transferred to
respondents Joseph Chung, Kiat Chungand Cleto Chung.On May 26, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition
to Cancel the Encumbrance of Voluntary Easement of Right of Way on the ground that the
dominant estate has an adequate access to a public road which is Matienza Street.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a voluntary easement between the parties.

Ruling:Yes
As defined, an easement is a real right on another’s property, corporeal and immovable,
whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or
something to be done on his property, for the benefit of another person or tenement.
Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owner. The former are called
legal, and the latter, voluntary easements.

Petitioner cannot now claim that what exists is a legal easement and that the same should
be cancelled since the dominant estate is not an enclosed estate as it has an adequate
access to a public road which is Callejon Matienza Street. As we have said, the opening of
an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not
voluntary easements like in the case at bar. The fact that an easement by grant may have
also qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as a
property right, which survives the termination of the necessity. A voluntary easement of right
of way, like any other contract, could be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by
renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate.

Neither can petitioner claim that the easement is personal only to Hidalgo since the
annotation merely mentioned Sandico and Hidalgo without equally binding their heirs or
assigns. That the heirs or assigns of the parties were not mentioned in the annotation does
not mean that it is not binding on them. Again, a voluntary easement of right of way is like
any other contract. As such, it is generally effective between the parties, their heirs and
assigns, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. Petitioner cites City of
Manila v. Entote (57 SCRA 497 [1974]) in justifying that the easement should bind only the
parties mentioned therein and exclude those not so mentioned. However, that case is
inapplicable since the issue therein was whether the easement was intended not only for the
benefit of the owners of the dominant estate but of the community and the public at large. In
interpreting the easement, the Court ruled that the clause “any and all other persons
whomsoever” in the easement embraces only “those who are privy to the owners of the
dominant estate, Lots 1 and 2 Plan Pcs-2672” and excludes “the indiscriminate public from
the enjoyment of the right-of-way easement.”