LIVELIHOOD AND ENVIRONMENT~~~·5

This series centres on the theme of 'Livelihood and Environment'

which has been a long··term research progranune of the Faculty of
Environmental Studies, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
The programme focuses on poor groups in developing countries
and the practices and possibilities of sustaining livelihoods among
such groups with an emphasis on the influence of regional contexts
and specific local environments.
The programme does not conceive of the local environment as
an undivided' spatial system' but focuses on socio··economic strati··
fication and geographical differentiation. Also, in terms of the 'ex··
ternal influences' on livelihood maintenance in local environments,
LIVELIHOOD AND ENVIRONMENT--··5
the studies are not limited to economic flows, but show an aware~
ness of these flows being rooted in political and socio-cultural net-
works with long historical roots. Furthermore, the programme
undertakes political-·economic analyses of the allocation of means
between regions in which the role of regional elites acting as' devel-
opment brokers' between the regional population and those who
are in power in the'higher' echelons is considered.
The studies constituting this series describe and analyze the strat-
egies adopted towards livelihood maintenance at the levels of the
individual, household and other organized groups of people. In
this approach to livelihood maintenance, the way people organize
their basic material existence holds a central position, namely, the
production and provision of basic needs such as food, water, shel·
tel', energy, furnishing and clothing. Another element studied is
how and where the cash income earned is used.
Although the manuscripts for this series are screened by a pub-
lications committee, the views expressed remain those of individual
authors.

I)clhi/T'hoUSJlld (hks/London
Copyright © Maarten Bavinck, 2001 for my friend N agooran,
who epitomizes the cocky fishermen of the Coromandel Coast
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in
in the past, the present, and hopeflllly the fllture too.
any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photo-
copying, recording or by any information storage or retrieval system,
without permission in writing from the publisher.

First published in 2001 by

Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd

M-32 Market, Greater Kailash, Part 1
New Delhi 110 048

Sage Publications Inc Sage Publications Ltd

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Published by Tejeshwar Singh for Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd, typeset
by Deo Gratis Systems, Chennai in 10pt. Book Antigua and printed at
Chaman Enterprises, Delhi.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Bavinck, Maarten, 1954--
Marine resource management: conflict and regulation in the
fisheries of the Coromandel Coast / Maarten Bavinck.
p. cm. - (Livelihood and environment; 5)
Includes bibliographical references (p. ).
1. Fisheries - India - Coromandel Coast. I. Title. II. Series.
SH300.C67 B38 639.22095482- dc21 2000 00-059155

ISBN: 0-7619-9470-X (US-Hb) 81-7036-945-2 (India-Hb)

Sage Production Team: Leena Taneja Rao, Parul Nayyar, O. P. Bhasin

and Santosh Rawat
List ofMaps and Plates 8
List ofAbbreviations 9
Foreword by J01m Kurien 10
Acknov)ledgements 12
Notes on Transliteration, Names and Currency 14

Part I: The Setting 21

1. A Theoretical Perspective on Fishing Conflicts 23

2. The Blue Revolution in Coromandel Coast Fisheries 46

Part 2: The Artisanal Fishing Sector 77

3. Artisanal Fishing and the Fishing Hamlet 79

4. The Rule System of Attisanal Fishermen ]12
5, Pancllayr ats and the of Artisanal Fishing 141

Part 3: The Mechanized Boat "177

6, The Boat Fishermen of I\oyapuram 179

The Rule in Mechanized Fishing 210
8. The Boat-owner Associations of Re)vatJUTal'n 240
The Fisheries n""",rhnp'nf 273
9, The Fisheries Department and ()fficlal
Regulation Policy 275
10 The Conventions 308
11 C:oromandel Coast in Perspective 336

363
376
378
Index 390
About the Aut/lOr 395
 MAPS AND LIs'r OF

Maps AIADMK All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam,

Map1 Coastal Tamil Nadu 16 ruling party in Tamil Nadu from 1977 to 1987 and
Map2 The Coromandel Coast 17 again from 1991 to 1996.
Map3 Fishing Grounds of Mechanized Boats Campaign Against Joint Ventures
CAJV
from Madras 18 CMFRI Central Marine Fisheries Research Institute
Map4 Royapuram Fishing Iiarbour 19 Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, ruling party in
DMK
Tamil Nadu from 1976 to 1977, 1989 to 1991, and
from May 1996 onwards.
Plates FDO Fisheries Development Office
Plate 1 Kattumaram Fishermen Launching an Inspector of Fisheries
IF
Unmotorized Craft 170 MDMI< Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
Plate 2 Village Meetings - Platforms for MLA Member of Legislative Assembly
Decision-making and Justice 171 MPEI)A Marine Products Export Development Authority
Plate 3 A Day Boat on its Way to the Fishing Grounds 172 SIF Sub-Inspector of Fisheries
Plate 4 Boat Owners on the Occasion of Launching a TMC Tamil Maanila
New Craft 173 VAO Administrative ()fficer
Plate 5 Paperwork in Tamil Nadu Fishe~ies
Department Headquarters 174
Plate 6 Front View of a Tamil Nadu Fisheries
Department Office - Wall Paintings
Champion the Ruling Political Party 175
 7
,:¥Es 1111111• • ••
Conflict over both the access to and the use of natural resources is
becoming increasingly evident in developed and developing coun-
tries today. These conflicts are hard to resolve because they involve
a plethora of issues and numerous claimants. The situation is often
more complicated in developing countries as the parties have dif-
feril.g socio-cultural backgrounds, varying histories of involvement
with the resource in question, and different economic motivations.
Moreover, the state has frequently failed to arbitrate in a timely,
effective and fair manner when conflicts arose. This shortcoming
has placed resources and the livelihood of people who depend on
thi:;m in jeopardy. The history of India's inshore marine fisheries
resources is a case in point.
Maarten Bavinck's study is a meticulous and painstaking effort
to examine three manifestations of tenurial claims and the result-
ing condition of legal pluralism in the common inshore sea along
the CorOlnandel Coast of Tamil Nadu. He first analyses the age-
old territorial claims and fishery regulations of the artisanal fish-
ing community, focusing on one particular village in Chingleput
District. 'This is followed by an examination of the more recent rule
system of the trawler owners operating from Royapuram harbour
of North Madras. Finally, in response to the increasing conflicts
between the two parties, he reviews the legal conventions of the
state of Tamil Nadu. The development of these three legal systems,
their own bases and realms of legitimacy, as well as their uneasy
coexistence along the Coromandel Coast, form the main focus of
Bavinck's work. I lis narrative reveals the dynamic manner in which
the interactions between the systems alter the contours of each of
them. Henceforth, the people involved in each system will have to
take account of each other's presence and restructure their claims
on the inshore sea accordingly.
By implication, Bavinck's argument is that conflict need not be
perrnanent nor always take the same form over time. Events-·· such
----------------------·:·----,···,,·=--
!·iJreJPord II
as the discovery of new resources, market expansion, technological
change, environmental externalities, organizational to
name a few --can alter the interaction between claimants. Events
can even lead to collabc)f'ation between formerly conflicting groups;
as when a more powerful new claimant appears on the scene. The
latter tendency was evident when uniorls of artisanal
associations of trawler owners, and state officials in many mario
time regions of India came together in 1996 and] 997 to oppose the
spate of joint ventures with foreign firms intending to harvest the
marine resources of India.
Maarten Bavinck' s study makes a distinct contribution to social
theory by linking the field of sea tenure studies to the discourse on
legal fJ]uralism. His work challenges the cO~1Ce.ption that sea tenure
claims are largely restricted to traditional flshmg commumtIes, an
impression we get from the well··known works of marine anthro··
pologists. His analysis also questions the view that the state IS al·
ways the dominant player. 'These are insights which could re~';hape
our efforts to improve marine resource IT)-anagement.
Having worked closely with artisanal fishworker movements
in India and other developing countries, I have been enthused
Maarten Bavmck's numerous insights. As an' outsider', he has been
able to elucidate the organizational strategies fishermen and others
enlnlov to usage of the coastal comrnons. We need to en··
courage more of research, which em··
beds social theories in reaJiti(~s of people's
Books of this kind contnbute to the realization of more convivial
social and a lEltura] resources.
John Kurien September 1999
Centre for Development Studies
Thiru vananthapuram

This book started as a doctoral dissertation, which was submitted
to the University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands in 1998. AI ..
though many people contributed to its realization, my first debt is
to my excellent team of academic supervisors: Isa Baud, Ad de
Bruijne and Jojada Verrips. They helped to keep the project on
course and added to whatever depth it may have. In the COurse of
the research process, I benefited from the advice of Franz von
Benda-Beckmann, Rob van Cinkel, Svein Je1itoft, Flip Quarles van
Ufford, Rathin Roy, David Rudner, Eberhard Weber, and Joop de
Wit.
Many people facilitated my research in India. I mention the
following: Dr. A. Dhananjayan, Fr. F. Jeyapathy, Dr. John Kurien,
N. Ram and The Hindu (archives), R Sankaralingam of the Roja
Muthiah Foundation, S. Ramakrishnan of CRe-A, Prof. A. Ramesh,
RS. Ranganatham, Dr. S.s. Sivakumar, Dr. G. Stephen, Dr. S. Subbiah,
Prof. V. Sudarsen, and Dr. K.T. Thomson. Various institutions and
persons provided platforms for testing ideas. I mention the Madras
Institute of Development Studies (MIDS), the University of Madras,
and the Centre for Asian Studies Amsterdam (CASA).
A number of persons in India offered me their friendship as well
as their help. Some of them deserve special mention: Paul Appasamy,
Tom and Therese Forsthoeffel, Eva-Karin Hakansson, Michael and
Ruth Lockwood, Sebastian Mathew, Janaki Nair, MSS. Pandian
and Anandhi, and P.R Subramanian.
I thank the members of my field research team for their
commitment and their companionship. K. Karunaharan and K.
Subramanian were with me from the start and together we learned
l
a lot about fishermen as well as other matters. Saskia van der Valk
and Kim Frederiks each joined the project for three months and
contributed essential fieldwork. J. Dhanalakshmi was a pillar
throughout. J. Kumar, Raji Prabaharan, and Dr. B. Subramanian
offered support at various stages.
The fieldwork could not have been carried out without the
cooperation of people and institutions in the fisheries field. The
Fisheries Department of Tamil Nadu extended a hearty we!cClltle
from the very beginning. I single out Isaac Rajeendran, I'.V.
Ramamoorthy, V.Ramamoorthy, and the library staff for
thanks. I amalso grateful for the help extended by the Marine Prod
uets Export Development Authority (MPEDA) in Madras and the
Central Marine Research Institute (CMFRI) in Cochin. Representa-
tives of the Madras·-Chingleput Kattumaram Fishermen Welfare
Association the Committee for the Defence of Boat Fishermen in
l
Madras and Chingleput Districts, and the Panchayat Union gene~­
ally did not seem to rnind that I was poking my nose into theIr
affairs and in fact helped me in many ways.
The Netherlands Foundationfor the Advancement of
I<CH,(';]r('h (WOTRO) funded the research project generously and
with a pleasant lack of bureaucratic zeal. 'The A:sterdarn R.ese(~rch
Institute for Global Issues and Development "tudles (AC,IDcJ) of
the University of Amsterdam provided hospitality in the Nether-
as did the CERES Research School. Academic patronage
in India was provided by the Department of Geography of the
of Madras.
UvA Kaartenmakers produced the maps and the illustrations
for this book. van Weesep took professional care of the
English corrections. I thank them all. .
Finally, I would like merllion Juut Meijer and OUT chIldren
Ko()s and Mees with whom I able to share the adventure.
Luckily, it I
Maarten Bavinck
 Notes on ThJcns/:ite,vat:ion. Names and Currency 15

forms. The plural forms of Tamil terms, when used in the text,
made by adding the English morpheme s panchayat-panchayats).

N ames of and imihriduals

The r;overnment of Tamil Nadu undertook a 1ar'2:e-scale n'·('(H·~H,"n,.)
realigning and renaming districts in 1996, after this ~,n,'An",,"'"
completed. In addition, the name of the state
cllimf~e(l from Madras to Chennai. For reasons of expediency, this
lIses the nomenclature and administrative divisions
in 1995.
nn>vili!C"C!
Ihtl1sliteration word Places and individuals in this book have been reIld(~red anon"m··
This book makes use of the SiI~ lified' I eme
(1991) for the transliteratiorl of p k' .'. sc li ,proposed by, Ram ous whenever this necessary.
'. ' . spa ell ane wntte T '[
w Ilue takmg some of IIarriss' (1982)' " . .n ann words,
of m own ~rhe" b 1 . . . suggestions and adding some currency
. ., "ym a s are as follows: tIle exchange rate of the Indian (Re) was aIJon:lxi··
Rs 31 =: US$l. One lakh is equal to Rs 100,000 one
Vowels amounts to one hundred lakhs or ten million rupees.
a (for short'a')
2121 (for long' a'); and similarly
i, ii
U,uu
0, 00
e, ee..
ai, au

Consonants
I (for dental 'l')
L (for retroflex 'l')
n (for dental 'n')
N (for retroflex 'n')
l' (for dental '1")
R (for rolling' r')
t (for dental' t')
d (for retroflex' t')
~h I (~le loosely flapped retroflex '1"), and further
, c 1, g, , In, ng, p, s, sh, v, Y

This scheme is used throu ho '

~'lames, place names, caste nag , ~t, er cept 111 the case of personal
Il1g technologies. These a me~, tilt es, and names of some fish-
> re spe ec 111 theIr common anglicized
Map 1 Coastal Tamil Nadu
Map 2. The Coromandel Coast

uram
ai (Madras)
i I
f'4alvimanagar
~O\/alam
i I
i \
i I
~a¥balipuram
Bay of Bengal ./ \
i I

/
/ .•..•. /' ...'
:
i// I

Point Calimere
,t-,.

Bay of Bengal

Gulf of Mannar

Mechanized boa!
harbour 01 jetty
50 m depth line

:3 nautical mile
ooundary line
100km
Map 3 Fishing Grounds of Mechanized Boats from Madras Map 4 Royapurarn Fishing Harbour

o Boat Owner Association

Panchayat Union

--------- Day Boats 111 Fisheries Department

_ _ _ _ Tangal Boats (Fishing Harbour Section)

- ' - ' - ' - ' . SlaleBorder

_ _ _ _ Distriel Border
o Fisheries Department (FDO)
1 Light House
 Part I

The Sett:ing
 1

A protracted fisheries conflict has raged along the Coromandel

Coast of Tamil Nadu since the early 1960s. The adversaries fall
into two categories. One is the sizeable artisanal fishing popul-
ation, who depend on an array of relatively simple fishing tech·
niques. The other is a new and growing category of mechanized
boat fishermen} charged by what has become known as the 'pink
gold rush' (Kurien 1985:A70). Problems between the two arise
mainly because the shrimp targeted by the boat fishermen abound
in the same waters upon which the artisanal communities depend.
The result gear dashes and competition for resources.
The conflict has regularly turned into a physical struggle.
Artisanal fishermen have boarded that were plying their
coastline, holdh1g the for ransom. They have sacked craft
and set them on have mass protest rallies in the
streets of Madras, the state To boat owners have
armed their workers. Whether by accident
ters have led to numerous injuries and
government also became involved. The ail11 of the lej~lSlaiLl()n
introduced in 1983 was to curb the of mechanized boat
fishing by creating selpa:rate
I arrived in Madras in December 1994. By the clashes bet-
ween artisanal and boat fishermen had both in number
and intensity, since their thel97? and 1978 Madras
riots. The most obvious reason for relative calm was that boat
fishermen had shifted to other in southern Andhra

I 'Mechanized boat is the English term used III denote the small trawlers
which the government introduced ·1'110' Tamil word visaipadagu
has the same connotation
 24 Marine Resource Management
A Theoretical Perspective on FishinlJ Conflicts 25

Pradesh after the alleged decline of local fishing grounds. Mean-

as a confrontation about the rules of the game and about who de-
whIle, the locus of social conflict had moved north across the state
cides them. Governments often playa crucial role in the process,
border. Tensions along the Coromandel Coast of Tamil Nadu had
although their contribution is not necessarily positive. In fact,
thereby lost their venom and retreated more or less from the public
eye. But they had not been resolved. Pinkerton (1987:344) suggests that' the tragedy-of-the··commons
model presupposes that members of a community cause pro~lems
Suc~,problemsof fisheries development are not unique to Tamil
with respect to the resources they hold in co~mon, an.d It IS the
N~du. I hro~ghout Asia (Mathew 1990) and in much of the develop-
role of government to keep this from happenmg.. In thIS case lof
1~~) world (I latteau 1989), governments have encouraged modern
f1sh~nes sectors to est~bl~sha presence in the midst of large artisanal British Columbia fisheries] it is the state that perrruts and even cre·
ates the resource problem.' Likewise, Anderson (ibid.:334) arg.ues
fIshIng populatIOns. [hIS has often resulted in social upheavaJ.2
that the Malaysian government' choked off all efforts by the fish-
~emarkably, the problem has largely eluded scholars. An occa..
ermen to help themselves or adapt to their situation .... None
slOnal observer notes the ferocity of the clashes which sometimes
its moves] effectively addressed the problem, but all ruled out pos-
occur. And;rson (] 987:329-30), for example, refers to 'the great
sible avenues for the fishermen.'
fIShll1g War of the Penang and Perak coasts of Malaysia in the
The contemporary fishing industry is not alway~ as OOllal.nzed
:960s- a war in which 'what the fishermen were trying to do was
as this sketch would have it. For one thing, the categones of artIsanal
capture the commons" in the most literal possible sense: by use of
force' (ibid.:334). and modern fishermen cannot always be clearly distinguished.
Moreover, relations between the two need not be excessively antag·
~hy should the emotions be so intense? Cordell (1984:321),
onistic. Mathew (1990:109) points out, tensions bet.ween h~ld-
;vntll1g about the Pacific, identifies what might be a Core issue.
of different fishing ge2fs are a normal occurrence m flshenes.
New governmental policies and increasing commercialization of
The clash between artisanal and trawler fishermen
hItherto marginal fisheries are creating unparalleled opportunities
~~r developers to appropriate local sea space. The inevitable colI.. could be to form subset of a more general phenomenon. It is
not novel one is inclined to think, nor necessarily permanent.
ISIon o~ traditional and modern fishing is not merely technoloO".
Ical. I~ :~1Vol,ves con~erging: antagonisti~ systems of sea tenure' (~~
In Tamil the conflict declined after a peak in the] 970s.
1.i~:eVVlSle. in other Asian countries, when' tensions between
empha.:.>Is). ConflIct IS practIcally unavoIdable when modern fisher-
the two Inet legislative activity, the
me~, as well as governments, exploit the same sea spaces that older
problems died down The ranged from the
flshll1g populations do, though according to very different sets of
relocation of fishermen to other sectors (Malaysia), to
rules. After all, as Cordell (ibid.:303) points out, 'sea tenure issues
the depletion of coastal waters Philippines), to the banning of
are at .the Core of fishermen's livelihood. They are worth fighting
1...""I1;no (Indonesia).
over eIther on the water or in court'.
of these qu!atlJ!c'atl0ns, the problem in terms of
. , Framed in this fashion, the clashes between the two groups of
tenure rel?:mles may shed some light on the larger
frshermen emerge as a struggle for control over Scarce resources
, co'ntc'mporal'y fisheries, one thing, it throws the
diverse rej?:Uilatiorls appLied to fish resource into high
relief By ao:en,tuilhllg of conflict between different
2 For evidence on Kerala state in India, see Kurien and Achari (1988 and [1990]
cat:e2: oril?S of
l
,H'w,h,·", to the fact that fisheries
1994) and Kunen (1985); for Indonesia, see Bailey (1997) and Dwiponggo (1992);
for ~haI!and, see Ruohomakl (1996); for Malaysia, see Anderson and Anderson and McCay (] 995:227)
(1977) and Anderson (1987). Mathew (1990) proVides an overview of gear con- political issue and must,
flIcts and of flShmg legislatIOn 1Il five Asian countries. See Bavinck (1998b) for a and world views'.
g(,l:~ral lIlvestIgatlOn of the backgrounds of fishing conflicts in developing coun- relevant frcml another perspective as
tncs from a legal pluralIst perspective.
f\,.,."",ilno to McC;oodwin (1990J), 'All around the world,
 A Theoretical Perspective on FishiniJ Conflicts '2 7
26 Manne Resource Management

express a preference for customary marine tenure, whereas Dyer an~

from the coldest Arctic regions to the warmest tropical seas, there
McGoodwin (1994) refer to folk management. All these terms have
is a crisis in the world' s ~isheries. Quite simply, there are too many
disadvantages, however. To speak of 'territorial use rights' wrongly
people chasl~1g too few fIsh ....' The Food and Agriculture Organ-
suggests that regulation always has spatIal connotatlOns (d.,
IzatlOn (1995) supports this claim with its estimate that approxi-
and McGoodwin 1994:2). The prefixes 'folk','customary', and trad..
mately 70 per cent of the world's fish stocks 3 are now overfished. It
itional', on the other hand, are not only scientifically impreClse,
is increasingly recognized that India's fish resource, which is con-
centrated on the continental shelf, is under duress. The signals com- but they also isolate one category of regulatory . from a
field which logically includes the non..folk, non-customary, and
mg from Kerala, t~e country's fisheries state, are particularly loud.
Kunen and Achan (1994:218) argue that a combination of economic, non-traditionaL
Alexander (1977, [1982] 1995), Cordell (1984,1989), and Ruddle
te~hnical, and social factors has brought the coastal ecosystem in
and Akimichi (1984) prefer the term sea tenure. The ~otion neither
Hus state close to ruin. Available information indicates that catches
contains a priori assumptions on the form of r~gulatlOn nor fences
per unit of effort are decreasing consistently and that the size of
off a particular group of actors from o~her~. 1.he use of the wo~d
~arv~sted speci~s is. declining as well (ibid.:227). With regard to
'tenure' evokes associations with the mstltutlOn of land te~~le.
1 annl N adu, SCIentists of the Central Marine Fisheries Research
Comparable to its earthbound namesake, Alexander (19?5:~27.~28)
Institution (CMFRI) conclude that, 'considering that the current
and Cordell (1989) conceive of sea tenure as a property mshtutlOn;
yield is in excess of the potential ... the fishing strategy henceforth
to 'the ownership and control of economIC resources,
should lay more emphasis on fishing regulation and limited diver-
]995:128). It is about 'sea-based property nghts
sification' (1995:8-9).
(Cordell] 9891) and about the utilizati~m of fish stocks. Th~s con-
.Overfishing forms the expression of what many consider to be a
c.nv'.'." sea tenure has links with the fIeld of law as well as wlth
CrISIS of management. Symes (1996:7--8) writes the following: 'Just
as the. systems of scientific knowledge, which underpin modern
The first of sea tenure studies - if I may rank all in..
fIsher.les management, are coming under increasingly critical inter-
vestigations of regulatory practices which have be~n
rogation, so too are the institutional arrangements which have de-
made since the 1970s under this charted what was Ill!
veloped over the past 40 years or so largely to ensure the delivery
then an unknown points out how
of sCIence-based, technocratic policy.' According to Symes (ibid.:13),
revealing the . fisheries ~as.
the search for appropriate answers to the fisheries crisis must focus
on institutional restructuring. If sea tenure systems are manage.. 'During the past of . flsh
ment arrangements, as I believe they are, their study has special ing peoples have led to a startling . the _. . Inshore
seas are not, from the standpoint of most local mantnne cultures,
relevance for the resolution of the crisis in fisheries.
common property. Despite doctrines and f'Cll!1':)]Y1
1.1 Sea 1bmre Studies theories. . inshore
various kinds of informal, exclusive, rnrnrnllnCl
Scholars studying fishermen and fishing practice have an assort- or private tenure'
With the of hindsight, is som.ewhat
ment of.phrases to describe the regulatory activities they encoun-
pUZZling. In a recent paper on law and common pool resources,
teor. ChrIsty (1982) coin~d the term territorial use rights in fisheries Benda-Beckmann (] 995J), [>alton (1967:66), notes that
(1 URF), WhICh alternatlvely is called traditional use rights in fish-
'resource allocation is neuer because continuity in the
eries. Johannes and Macfarlane (1991) as well as Ruddle et aI. (1992) production of basic is never (my emphasis).
This statemenl the raison d'Nre of many a ten·
3 Although the range of products gathered by fishermen would be better described as ure both in fisheries and elsewhere. It points out that even
seafood, I prefer to use the less accurate but more readily understood word fish.
 A Theoretical Perspective on Fishing Conflicts 29
28 Marine Resource Management

effects' appropriation externalities'. Second, fishermen may inter-

though resources are not amenable to private property arrange"·
fere with each other physically in the fishmg grounds, particularly
ments, whIch frshenes are often held to be, one should not expect a
because gear types are incompatible. These are so--called 'techno··
complete absence of tenure. The important question then is not
whether or not there is a system for regulating access and with- logical externalities'. Finally, if' particular areas .or spot~ ,,> 0:.
~:lrawal rights. Rather, the issue is about its structure or, if no system
grounds are more produC!lve than others ... problems aJIS~ o~>f:r
who should have access to the productive spots and how aCCESS
IS found, about the conditions that prevented its development or
caused it to disappear. 4 Indeed, a view of the sea as an open access should be determined'. These effects are labelled
resource which is susceptible to a 'tragedy of the commons' be·" externalities'. . "
In order to deal with these dilemmas, fishermen .~. or fIshenes
longs to a particular historical phase and to the ideologies pervad-
ing it (McCay 1988; McEvoy 1986:12). agencies _ can choose from a limited range of instruments. _. .
The tenure systems discovered in many of the world's seas are
al~d Ostrom, who analyzed thirty case studies of coastal hshmg
exercised by groups or communities of fishermen sharing the use communities throughout the world, identify the most
. ,I,,"'
so rlUons.. C")I1e. rrlethod
. that fishermen
. ' use is directed less . at the
of a particular technology and a certain sea space (Cordell 1989:2-
3; Christy 1982:1; Ruddle 1988:353-54). Without mincing words diJemrnas themselves than at their parameters; these conSIst of what
on the matter, some scholars tend to link the form of sea tenure to Sc!l]ager and Ostrom (ibid.:29-30) call boundary rules ..
the characteris.tics o~ the fishing community in question, assuming this terrninology is confusing. These authors are :efernn g not .to
there IS a relationshIp between the two. rules but to criteria, and not to physical boundanes but to SOCial
ones 'rhe issue at hand is the demarcation of the group of persons
. What is the purpose of sea tenure systems? To answer this ques-
""",;,1,,,, to in fishing. In totaL Schlager and Ostrom
tion, scholars have explored the proposition that tenure systems
cern twelve ways in which right-holding groups are delimited. The
deal with problems peculiar to the use of a common pool resource.
most ones residence in particular l~cayty and ~he
Schlager and Ostrom (1993:23-24) discern three dilemmas arising
of particular They subsE~que~1tly. distmgUIsh frve
from the fact that fishing units share the exploitation of bodies of
kinds of rules which, singly in combmatIon, bear on com··
water. The first dilemma arises because fishermen' are withdrawing
mon pool dilemmas and Ostrom's assess~
fIsh from a common stock without taking into account the effects
ment of the the thirty tenure systems they analysed
of their harvesting upon each other'. Schlager and Ostrom call these
is significant. By control over fisheries, coasta~ fishing
communities apparently solve most of the problems of aSSlgJ~m~nt
4 Benda..Beckmann's statement that resource atlocation is never unstructured and technological externalities which, with appropnatIOn
amounts to a reversat of the programme of study set out by collective action theor·, externalities left undecided (ibid.:29-30)
ists, and is therefore noteworthy. The tatter tend to take the institutionat void--
The sea tenure studies which been done rest on a
'open access' - as a starting point. From there, they study the conditions under
which individuals engage in collective action to govern a common pool resource variety of biases. First, certain been.
(Ostrom 1990; Wade 1988). Benda-Beckmann proceeds from the premise that it is searched more than others. Most studies on sea tenure have hlth..
unlIkely for a group of people who depend heavily on a common resource /Jot to erto been conducted along the shores of the Atlantic ()cean, whlle
regulate access and withdrawal activities. Although instaiKes of collective action other remain With to
fill the pages of this book, I do not enter into the debate of cotlective action theory.
Asia, tenure have on small
One reason IS that fIShermen of the Coromandel Coast have a long tradition of
cotlectlve resource management. Although institutions must prove themselves
Scholars have left the fisheries of the continent as
useful tIme and time again, fishermen administrations along this coastlIne possess
a 'matter-of-fact-ness' which has contributed in no small measure to their continu-
ation. Rather than questioning the genesis of collective action, I therefore choose left out of their ;malysis in view of measure·
Appropriation extcrnalitlCs
to highlight its forms and the interactions which arise between the fishermen and (Schlager and Ostrom 1993: note 25).
ment problems lack of
other actors.
 A Theoretical Perspective on Fishing Conflicts 31
30 Marine Resource Management

hoI' on Kerala fisheries, invariably takes the vantage point of

well as of the bigger islands largely untouched 6 Despite India's dU~", . 1fishermen. He offers only a sketchy pH:ture of the
extensive coastline and vast fishing population, not one study of dl tlsana.. etor wi th which they are m conflIct. . .
sea tenure has yet been carried out in that country. The topic has Ized bo~t fIshIng se . -t.> s that have been studied almost mvan·
even been ignored in regions such as Kerala, which has engen- The smgl e tetnure;~~~s~;·men. This choice seems to be b.ased on
dered a mass of fisheries research? One reason for this lack of bal- . bly refer to ar I s a n · . . I tl e
a · · · . h .' indi enous management IS maul. y l.
ance may be the ..- fla wed supposition, as McCoodwin (1990:108) assumptIon. t aft' ~ (McCoodwin 1990:108). It is presumed
suggests, that locally developed management systems'often break '. of small-sca le IS h ers .
vIew,. rou s of fishermen, such as those worklll.g on 9
down and will not work when a fishery becomes linked to an out· that other g . p . do not actively engage m sea tenure.
side, modern market system'. boats or trawlers,. . tl established fisheries are often
Second, most academics in this field have focused on single regulatory practIces m recen y
tenure systems rather than on complex tenurial patterns. 8 More- neg.lec.ted. d'. f' 1 rl'es in Asia and elsewhere have
F all scholars stu ymg IS 1e ., .
over, most studies focus on very small entities, usually a single . m y, se~ tenure systems from the perspectlve of the . t ( 'f
fishing community. Little time has been spent analysing the . res onsible resource managernf,ll. c.
geographical ranges of particular sea tenure systems or connec·· bon these sys.tems mak e to ,p 1.977' R ddle'1988 1989b' Rudelle
Z . 1992'Johannes , .u ..
hons between tenure practices of individual fishing communities. ai.
and,ern;~'). R~ddle et 1992).I:-Iowever, several scholars
F·· ,

The focus on single tenure systems has a few obvious disadvan- and ... ~l • h ve observed that tenure anrarl?;(>
tages. Treating a tenure system as a self-contained entity makes it who have studied lnbal cultures a d ' " 1 urposes than the
sOlnetJlJleS have other backgroun s am P .,
difficult to understand the linkages between systems or how one ments of fish For instance, they may reflect the pur·
system has adapted to another. Disputes between two fishermen the structuring of trade (Pannell ~ 996~,
groups remain underexposed. Though rare, some in··depth studies 1987). The questIon IS
have been done on fishing conflicts, but they have depicted the ::>V·'-Gl.W "
traditional fisheries. Like
situation only from the perspective of one of the parties involved. ImagJll1C that established fisheries
For example, Anderson and Anderson (1977) consider the predica·· ilrl'arll:':('rnents with different aims.
ment of Malaysian trawler fishermen but barely mention the di:,C\lssea in this book is different from the
motivations or characteristics of their antagonists at sea. Jorion The industry that I have
(1984) similarly focuses on one community of pot fishermen in an
Britanny but neglects to study their trawler fishing opponents in not centuries. The
the neighbouring community. In addition, Kurien, who is a leading ""u,,1 \/"<': three

6 Sri Lanka is somewhat an exception. Alexander's ([1982] 1995) study on Sri Lanka
beachseine fisheries is one of the classics on sea tenure. Sea tenure arrangements in
Japanese coastal fisheries also have been relatively well documented (cf. Kalland
1995; Ruddle 1987, 1989a).
7 Mathew's (1991) brief study of the tenure system in the large estuary called Pulicat

Lake on the northern border of Tamil Nadu state is the only inquiry dealing
explicitly with this topic.
S The only studies I am aware of which deal with a broader range of tenurial ar-

rangements have a long-term historical focus. McEvoy's (1986) work on Califor-

nian fisheries in the period 1850 to 1980 paints a fascina ting picture of a sequence do allow for the possibility that other
" Christy ) and
of sea tenure systems. Van GinkeJ's (1993) study of two Dutch fishing commu· categories of fis!wnnen develop sea tenur", arrangements.
nities in the period 1813 to 1932 offers a more detailed view of a similar process.
 32 Marine Resource Management A Theoretical Perspective on Fishing Conflicts 33

I approach this conceptual task by turning to the academic lit-
erature on legal pluralism. I do so on the supposition that sea ten-
ure systems form a special class of legal systems. Therefore, a
constellation of sea tenure systems can be analyzed as a manifest.-
ation of ~egal pluralism. The great advantage of the legal pluralist
concept IS that It emphasizes, at least on an analytical level (Benda-
Beckmann "1997:2), the equal weight of the legal systems which are
present. This allows me to separate the various strands of fisheries
regulation without presupposing the dominance of one system over
the other.
1.2 Legal Pluralism lO
The ConcejJt ofLegal Pluralism
Benda-~eckmann(ibid.:1, note 2) observes thatthe popularization
and refmement of the concept of legal pluralism, which started in
the 1970s, was largely the work of lawyers eager to leave the con-
fmes of state-centred law. l1 Discovering a profusion of law-like
forms and normative systems - not only in post-colonial societies
but i~1 North America and Europe as well- and rebelling against
the 'r.deology of legal centralism' (Griffiths 1986:2ff.), they were
eager to document the richness of social life. The ensuing aversion
to the development of theory is the corollary of that empirical
thrust. 12 As a result, key terms ~- such as legal pluralism, legal
system, and law itself -- have remained vaguely and inconsistently
defined.
The tenn'law' is a case in point. According to one group of scholars
in the field of legal pluralism, law should be taken as a nonnative
order, a system of rules distinct from social structureD Others,
however, broaden the definition to include the social structures
generating and implementing rules; they emphasize the extreme
diversity of legal settings and deny the need for specialized bodies
in charge of law enforcement. 14 The advantage of such an approach
over the first is obvious: it removes law from its position in the
realm of ideas and connects it to social processes. It also
universalizes law to all possible social fields and societies, while
underscoring the fact that the state is only one member of the team.
The excitement it generated is understandable, But there are also
drawbacks to such an extended approach. As Tamanaha (1993:193'0
94) points out, 'so generous a view of what law is slippery slides to
the conclusion that all forms of social control are law,' In fact, he
feels that continuation along this track might ultimately result in
academic demise.
To counter this danger, Tamanaha advocates an alternative ap-
which draws inspiration from the writings of Max Weber.
""'~~f~;n,Y to Weber (Rheinstein ] 'an order will be called
law if it is the probability that coercion
(physical or psychological), to about conformity or avenge
violation, will by staff of holding themselves

10. After writing this section I happened to read Bailey's (1969) penetrating study
system and the
us 'to we need to "W"U.cr<' .nm-,nhm,'
of polItical systems. HIS chapter on encapsulated political systems (chapter 8) in
added) Benda-Beckmann (1988:897), hn'WD''''
partIcular matches my understanding of legal pluralism. Bailey too defines a sys-
is desirable.' Tamanaha (1993) pnw;,jes
tem m terms of a set of rules (ibid.:19-20) and emphasizes the role of authorities in
tique the manner in which
settling disputes (ibid.:132-41). The divergence is, of course, that Bailey is more
vincinJdv that legal pillralisll1
mterested In understanding the political process, while this for me is only one
aspect of fishenes regulation. tend to comb me rca]
their defimtion law. 'ontologically dis-
" For the history of legal pluralism, see Griffiths (1986), Merry Ci 988), Moore (1978)
and Tamanaha (1993). tinct' (ibid.:209)
BendaoBeckmann (1997) and Vanderlmd!C'l! appear to represent this group.
12 It is note-::orthy that legal pluralism is generally described as a concept, not
The latter (ibid:8) thai of meaning which offer points
theory (ct. (,nffIths 1986; Merry 1988; Tamanaha 1993). Galanter (1981:19-20, note
of ori('ntation for hurnan CCHldtH.'l
~]) Illustrates the early preoccupations of scholars in the field of legal pluralism
f

14 GalanlC'r(198J), (1986) and M.oore(J .i 9'18) represent this school of

SOClal research on law contains a number of conceptual formulations which con-
tribute to our ability to visualize the relationship between the public official
34 Marine Resource Management A Theoretical Perspective on Hshing Conflicts

specially ready for that purpose' (emphasis in the original).!" Ac- mulation and implementation. 18 From this perspective, the term
cording to this definition, a system of rules is intrinsically connected Isystem' refers to the harmonization of, and the connection between,
to the existence of a specialized body an authority - in charge of rules and authority.
enforcement. 16 IIowever, a system also presupposes a relationship between
Such an approach appears to have notable benefits. Tamanaha rules in a set - it implies a certain order and consistency. Little seems
(1993:211--12) points out that it eliminates the problematic usage to have sown more doubt among those interested in legal piuralism
of 'law' as a description for all normative behaviour and creates a than the issue of a rule system (Griffiths 1986:12; Moore 1986:12),
'useful comparative perspective on state law' .17 One could argue, and their concerns should be taken to heart. For one thing, scholars
in addition, that a vision which combines rules and authority in point out that' systemness' is a matter of degree, and that rule sys..
one conceptual framework also anchors law at nodal points in the tems need not be complete19 nor completely orderly. Second, they
social structure. That vision illuminates the fact that law is the prod- indicate that systems are subject to continuous change. According
uct of a conscious process of decision-making. Its enforcement is Moore (1978:3) argues that legal systems result from a piecemeal
thus not self-evident but the result of variable circumstances such historical and' can never become fully coherent, consistent
as the power of the law-making agency, its legitimacy, and the wholes which successfully regulate all of social life' . Adepts of legal
availability of instruments of enforcement. Moreover, connecting pluralism to stress that people make and use law,2° and that
law to authority more readily reveals its political dimensions as eXllstlngorders are endlessly vulnerable to being unmade, remade
well as its relationship to management issues. and (ibid. 1978:6). Despite their qualifications, how·
In conjunction with this conception of law, I propose that a legal ever, it is important note that scholars in the field do not refute
system. should be understood as consisting of a set of rules as well the existence of functional relations between rules in a set (d.
as the authority, or the organizing entity, responsible for its for· Vanderlinden 1989152).
Now that the of a legal is clear, it is possible to
define legal pluralism. Merry (1988:870), who is a leading author
in the field, defines pluralism situation in which two or
15 Weber stresses the aspect of enforcement in his definition, yet he neglects the more legal coexist in the social field'. its
continuing process by which rules are generated. A separation of legislative and simplicity, definition is it does
executive functions is fundamental to democratic states, but not to all bodies in- not address the nature of coexistence between
volved in the implementation of law. [therefore believe the two aspects should be
Vanderlinden (1972:19) takes the a forward by id.enti..
taken together.
16 Weber's inclusion of' a staff of people' in the definition of law correlates to Bai-
fying pluralism as a state that when
ley's (1969:132..41) review of the role authorities play in maintaining political sys-
tems. According to Bailey (ibid.:132-33), authorities are 'men whose job it is to 18 A legal system defined in this way would to
keep the rules of a structure in good order. ., It is through them that the public tional economists call an institution. Scott
at large seeks to protect itself from violence and di~;order.' His analysis of the tution as' cognitive, normative, and re~;u];lti'.le
range of authority types, from judge to mediator, as well as the distinction be
twee'n an umpire and a leader, is illuminating.
17 Tamanaha (1993:2.12) notes that the more pointed definition of law which he
subscribe'S to is not' the foundation-stone for a universal legal science' toward Wl11Ch mechan·
at least some scholars in the field of legal pluralism strive. However, it is not consist of a
cessarily restrictive either. Thus, Weber (Rheinstein 1954:6) emphaSizes that
a clan's blood vengeance could be called'an expression of law' if it is determined should the interaction
by some kind of regulatory order And Moore (1978:16) remarks that 'there' can be and not comparison of abstract
authorities with rule-making power in many forms of organized society less to behavior according to legalistic
plex than the state.'
36 Marine Resource Manct:Jfement
systems' are applicable to identical situations' (ibid.:19). Here the
issue - the 'situation' - is one and the same; social dynamics result
partly because several legal systems; or several rule-making
authorities, at least potentially claim jurisdiction 21 Thus defined,
however; a state of legal pluralism contains an innate tension, a
propensity for conflict and transformation, which makes it a fruit-
ful ground for theory. Social change can then be analyzed as the
result of the' dynamic competitive relationship' between systems
making up a state of legal pluralism as well as of the inner dynam-
ics of each individual system (Vanderlinden 1989:151).
Scholars investigating legal pluralism have tended to concen-
trate on the relationship between the legal system of the state and
another non-state legal system. Baxi (1982:331); who writes about
the situation in India, notes an undesirable side-effect of this pre-
occupation: 'relations, and comparisons between (and among) the
NSLS [non-state legal systems] still represent an uncharted arena
of investigation, both theoretically and empirically.' According to
him; the relationship between various non--state legal systems forms
an interesting field of study.
Academics; even those pleading for more attention for relations
between non-state systems, appear to agree on one thing: in a
situation of legal pluralisrn which includes the state, the state is
inevitably the most influential party. In her review of writings on
legal pluralism, Merry (1988:886) thus concludes: 'In none of [the
legal pluralist] analyses ... is there an implication that the power
relations between plural legal orders are equal: the theme instead
is the penetration and dominance of state law and its subversion at the
margins' (my emphasis). According to Merry; not only does state
law dominate over other legal systems, but state law is also en-
gaged in an on-going process of infiltration. Rather than merely
being replaced, however, subordinate legal systems tend to remodel
state influences to reflect their own interests and character.
This is as far as any of the scholars in the field of legal pluralism
are willing to go in terms of theory, and it forms an interesting
21 In a later article, Vanderlinden (1989:151) changes his emphasis somewhat He
argues that it is 'the individual who is the converging point of the multiple rc·gula
tory orders'. The replacement of the word 'situation' with 'individual' is consist
ent with the actor-oriented approach he shares with many others in the
pluralist field.
A Theoretical Perspecti1ie onPishing Conflicts 37
topic for investigation. Is the state legal system indeed dominant
in Tamil Nadu fisheries, and is it trying to increase its influence?
Three versions of the state's possible role in dealing with other
legal systems emerge from the literature on the subject. At one end
of the continuum is the option of non-involvement: the state is not
interested in activities which are governed by another legal sys-
tem, possibly because of their economic unimportance (Benda-
Beckmann 1995:3). Schlager and Ostrom (1993:19) apply this to the
field of fisheries as follows: 'In many instances government offi--
cials simply pay little attention to inshore fisheries; leaving fishers
with sufficient autonomy to design workable arrangements.' At
the other end of the continuum is the option of domination: the
state, for reasons of economics or ideology, is highly interested in
the activities governed by another legal system and makes
sucCE'ssful attempts to bring them under its own control.
A middle ground exists between the two extremes of non-
involvement and domination. This covers situations in which the
state wishes to gain control but is unable to do so. Wade (1983:36)
in about southern India concludes that ; the state continues
to have a limited ability to reach into villages and push aside
or absorb of rule that stand in its way; that is, a limited
ability to control or meddle.' The corresponding legal system in
this situation is of partial resistance and generates what
Moore (1973) terms a 'serniautonolllous social field', She believes
semi-autonomous 'can rules and customs and
symbols internally, bu I vulnerable rules and decisions
and other from the world by which [they
are] surrounded! (ibid:720). I'he fields
has gained popularity in the study of it expresses
both the independence of non-state well as their
vulnerability to forces in the wider environment. Moore herself
fin;t used the concept to study the limitations of the idea that
innovation by the state can effect social !,h'ontYD
(ibid.:723) that 'innovative or ()ther attenl].Yts
often fail to achieve their intended purposes
because new laws arc thrust upon
se.mi--autonomous social fields] in
binding obligations already in ,ov,""""-"-
 38 Marine Resource Management A Theoretical Perspective on Fishing Conflicts 39

L~qal Pluralism in the Context ofIndia panchayat system of decision-making and c~mfli~t resol~tior~~s it
is found m Indlan SOCiety. Mandelbaum (lbld .. 294-·3L)) dlstm-
As noted above, academics take legal pluralism to be a universal guishes two major functions of a caste panchayat: the redress of
phenomenon; it is found in post-colonial societies as well as in the ritual lapses connected to norms of punty and defilement, and the
West. Several authors, however, emphasize the radical difference settlement of civil disputes. A substantial number of social scien·
between these two settings. As I-looker (1975:1,2) points out, legal tists have investigated these themes. Many of those who studied
pluralism in post-colonial societies is the result of 'the transfer of panchayat dispute settlements have implicitly or explicitly can
23
whole legal systems across cultural boundaries' and the 'uneasy trasted them with procedures in government courts
coexistence' of colonial law with indigenous law. Not only is one Other observers have focused on the transformation of traditional
law system originally dominant and the other subservient, the caste structures and on the development of new organizational
principles underlying them' do not combine easily with each other'. forms serving other purposes (d. Mandelbaum ibid.:473-52.0).
Merry (1988:873) shares this view and writes of 'normative orders IIardgrave (1969) and later Templeman (J 996) point out that caste
that are fundamentally different in their underlying conceptual associations have helped to improve the position of members of
structure'. According to her, the situation in the ex-colonies is very the Nadal' caste within Tamil Nadu society. Furthermore, Mines
. different from that in the West, where non-state legal systems 'blend (1984) discusses how regional associations have furthered the eco-
more readily into the landscape'. Following this train of thought, nomic interests of a caste of weaver merchants over time.
one would expect legal pluralism in post-colonial societies to be For the purposes of the present study, the relevant question is
more pronounced than it is elsewhere. whether caste panchayats also playa role in the regulation of
Legal pluralism in India is a well documented fact. Upendra common pool resource use. This theme has not figured prominently
Baxi, a prominent sociologist of law, argues that 'we have to ac- in academic literature. Many social scientists, like Mandelbaum,
cept at the outset that there are systems of people's law in India as apparently do not allow for the possibility that panchayats have
there are systems of state law' (Baxi 1982:329, emphasis in the such functions at all however, this viewpoint has been
original). Next to the colonial law system, which left its mark in seriously A group of prominent Indian cultural ecolo··
both government and judiciary after independence, he finds a rich (Cadgil 1 and Guha (::;adgil and lyer 1989;
diversity of dispute-resolution institutions based in social entities Gadgil and Malhotra 1994) contend that collective management of
other than the state. The most notable of these are the caste common resources is actually in the fabric of Indian
panchayats. 22 As the functioning of caste panchayats has been the sodety, and that the crucial role in its per-
subject of serious study in various parts of the country, a review of formance. Their argument is that caste divided
the literature on this topic may lead to useful insights. society into thousands of groups with different occu~
The social scientists who have studied caste panchayats in India pations and patterns of resource use. The often
have generally focused on conditions in one particular caste group. sured that a single caste group had a rnonopoly the use of any
Mandelbaum (1970) is the most notable exception to this rule. spec]ltlc resource from a locale' and Gu ha
Although imbued with the structural-functionalist idiom of his As collective action theory srnal1er group can more
time, he provides a comprehensive and insightful account of the take action for the common Cultural t.raditions of nr,uipnc·(."
I

(ibid.:113) within each thus to break down

22 Mandelbaum (1970:278) defines panchayat as 'not only the group that convenes

but also...a set of processes for resolving conflict'. To avoid confusion, I take the 23 l-layden (1981, ]983) and Cnanambal (19'13) lughlighted the more trad-
term to refer only to the council installed by a social group (e.g., a caste panchayat) itional concerns of caste panehayats Cohn (] 987), (1984, 1987), and
or by a residential unit (e.g., a village panchayat) to regulate general affairs Vincentnathan (1992) those m the comparativE' study of
also chapter 5. secular dispute,,·'('s()lutHYI1.
40 Marine Resource Management A Theoretical Pmpective on Fishin..q Conjlicts

with the advent of colonialism and with the conversion of collect·· 1.3 Statement of the Problem
ively managed resources into open access resources. Currently,
however, 'pockets of good resource management under communal This book focuses on one particular inshore water body and can··
control have persisted and are ... serving as models for the re- siders a complete tenurial configuration. While taking a
assertion of such communal control' (Gadgil and Iyer 1989:240). oriented approach, it strives to demonstrate that systems are made
These cultural ecologists make up part of what Sinha et a1. (1997) by people through their organizational activity. .
call the new traditionalist discourse of Indian environmentalism. The point of departure for this study IS that three partles are
Some of the core arguments of that discourse are disputed. Even involved in the inshore fisheries of the Coromandel Coast
Cadgil and Guha (1992:4) admit that the historical as well as con- artisanal fishermen, mechanized boa 1 fishermen, and officers of
temporary evidence for their views is far from solid and that their the Fisheries Department. In view of the argument presented earl·
ideas require further elaboration.24 For example, they fail to specify ier, it may be assumed that each party if the distinction between
the origins of resource management activities, remaining content them can indeed be maintained -- will have made efforts to develop
to locate them mainly in the realm of'cultural traditions'. IIowever, their own sea tenure system. Finally, it may also be assumed that
this would appear to be too shallow an approach, as it ignores the each tenure system includes a set of rules as well as a controlling
organizational backdrop of rules and norms. It is quite reasonable authority.
in this context to suppose that caste panchayats playa role. 25 According to this schema, there are now three overlapping sea
The literature indicates, however, that other organizational en-- tenure in the inshore wa ters of the Coromandel Coast, each
tities also carry out natural resource management activities. In the of which has ItS own Charilcter and dynamic. The oldest category
agricultural villages that Wade (1988) studied, the administration of users _. artisanal fishermen would be expected to op-
of collective aspects of irrigated agriculture is handled not by within a tenure system specifically adapted to the nature
panchayats, but by voluntary entities Wade calls village councils. of their fishing economy. Boat fishermen, in contrast,
These councils make rules on cropping, the holding of livestock, would to implement a set of rules that is adapted to
and distributing water. They also appoint functionaries to take care the of the boat fishing trade. Government officers,
of special tasks and maintain a joint fund. The existence of such finally, are to with reference to a set of laws and
elaborate management structures outside the purview of the state conventions whidl frolll the rc~alm of bureaucracy and
is striking. Other authors too have documented instances of non- politics.
state management of common pool resources. Notably, the recent First and h""{lrnnc:l tenUrEl systems has to be
debate on forestry and state monopoly over forest management in established The first yUC"'.lUl follows:
India has generated a number of studies on collective management
Do the inshore fisheries of the
practices (Gadgil and Guha 1992; Poffenberger 1995; Poffenberger
three of temm>! If
and McGean 1996).
This question has several dirnensions
various sea tenure how
extent to which differ. Once this
24 One of the controversial aspects of their theory is that it appears to rehabilitate move on to the interaction of
the caste system in India. Decried and combated because of its deleterious social pluralism. The that
consequences, the caste system ironically has now been re··discovered for its whole,
some environmental effects. What kind people who identify
25 To be fair, Gadgil and Guha (1992:94,104,105) do refer to the existence of organ·
themselves With a tenure system? And how do
izational entities which enforce rules. Theil' general argument, however, is
whelmingly culturalist. the ill terre'la tel
42 Marine Resource Management A Theoretical PmjJective on Fishing Conflicts 43

This question concerns the nature of a particular manifestation of downplayed. Second, the parties are not all of the same type.
legal pluralism. One of its relevant aspects is the presumed dom- the two fishing groupings, with their organizational structures and
inance of the state. rule systems, have been set against the Fisheries as
Interaction between the three parties is assumed to occur on three their governmental equivalent. Of course, the similarity only
levels. Of all encounters, the ones which take place on the fishing so far. While fishermen form social groupings based on a particular
grounds are the most fundamental. The dilemmas arising from the source of livelihood, the department consists of civil servants with
exploitation of common pool resources generate problems among an overall responsibility for the fisheries branch. Thus, the
categories of similar units (see Section 1)/ or sectors. 26 Power dif- function on a different social level, the fonner exclusive, the latter
ferentials influence the patterns which arise. Other relations across inclusive. Moreover, the department shares its rule-making and
the sectors such as social networks, political alliances, or enforcement duties with other government agencies, such as the
participation in the same markets-may have an impact as well. police and the judiciary, which are touched upon only briefly in
As each party has its own tenure system, the contact among fish·· this book. Finally/the regula tory acti vities of the Fisheries
ennen at sea translates into contact among tenure systems. Con-- Department and of other government agencies are heavily influ-
fliets or adjustments between the various rule systems thus enced by the machinations of another category of actors: politi-
constitute the second level of interaction. The third level is the cians. Despite these qualifications, it is believed that the approach
interaction between controlling authorities. chosen may generate useful insights.
The third and final question of this book is inspired by Cordell
(1984)/ who describes the conflict between traditional and modern 1A This Study
fishing as the result of /converging, antagonistic systems of sea
tenure/. Applying this explanation to the situation observed at the l,--t::SCdl Lll Methodology
research site, the question reads as follows:
The fieldwork on which this book is based took place during one
Do frictions between sea tenure systems account for the con- uninterrupted from January] 995 to April 1996. Research
flicts which occur between artisanal and mechanized boat fish- was conducted in and around Madras (which has since been re-
ennen along the Coromandel Coast of Tamil Nadu? named Chennai), the of Tamil Nadu state. This location
appeared to the opportunity for a simultaneous study of
Significantly, this study deals only with professional conflicts-- the three sectors: artisanal boat fisheries, and
the acts of violence which stem from differences in fishing prac- the activities of the Fisheries Tvhldras contains the larg·-
tice. Friction between sea tenure systems is obviously not the only est concentration of mechanized boats in the state-·some 1,000
possible source of conflict among fishermen, although it is argu- boats operate from the fishing harbour located in the area called
ably important. Royapuram_ Furthermore, Madras sUlTcJUnded by a host of old
A schema of this kind admittedly has some shortcomings. First artisanal fishing villages_ A preliminary indicated that the
of all, by drawing lines between sea tenure systems, the transi- two of fishermen had dashed in the past.
tional zones and the areas of overlap tend to be underexposed. For Finally, most government indudin.g the l<l,:I"c,ri,,~
example, by contrasting artisanal and mechanized boat fishermen, ment, have their head offices in Madras,
the many connections between the two sectors risk being possible to procure information on ,u'''PI'nn,,'nl
veloped, both on paper and in
In the research "h,,,t.,,nl account had tC) be taken of
the dearth of Information Tamil !\lad u fislH_cnes and the desire
26 In this book, the constellation of an occupational context and a tenure system

called a 'sector'.
to understand c!eveIOl)m_ents in the as a wholc'. The first
44 Marine Resource Management A Theoretical Perspective on Conflicts 45

circumstance prompted an in-depth approach, whereas the sec- rarely visited the area, as it is reputeel to have comparatively poor
ond urged the collection of materials from the largest possible popu- fish resources.
lation and geographical region. In plotting a course, a balance Developments in aquaculture too are ignored. In 'Tamil
between both goals was sought. as in other coastal states of India, aquaculture has taken off since
'The investigation of artisanal fishing was concentrated in one the late 1980s, generating hopes for a second blue revolution but
hamlet, 40 km south of Madras, a place selected from a broader also prompting conflicts with environmentalists as well as nega·
sample of possible sites. The representativeness of the findings was tively affected groups. It is left aside for two reasons. First, the issue
verified by organizing a three-month study of another village north of fishing rights in aquaculture, which is a private property enter-
of the city as well as a random survey of twenty-one settlements prise, diverges considerably from fishing rights for inshore cap-
along the entire Coromandel Coast of Tamil Nadu. However, due ture fisheries. Moreover, there are relatively ftOw socio-economic
to its complexity and size, the study of mechanized boat fishing interactions between the two sectors. Persons who are active in
was limited exclusively to Madras. The inquiry on Fisheries De·· inshore fishing, through either capital investments or labour par
partment policy focused on its implementation at the field level, ticipation, are only marginally involved in aquaculture.
particularly with regard to the two selected fishing populations. Finally, the study does not deal with the problems of fishermen
At the same time, an attempt was made to get a general impres- alOJlg the southern Coromandel Coast and the Palk Bay area. These
sion of how policy was formulated and enforced throughout the follow from the clash between army and guerilla forces in
state (see Appendix 1 for a detailed description of the research meth- Lanka and have too little to do with fishing.
odology).
Strl-tltun- ofthe Study
Restrietions ~fthe Study
l'he book divided into five parts. 'The bulk of the data is pre-
The study, and this book, have a number of limitations. First, it has ceded by two intn)(luctory chapters, including this one, that com··
a restricted geographical focus. As the bulk of the data was col- Part] 2 describes Coromandel Coast fisheries in
lected in the Districts of Madras and of Chingleput (now divided terms and a historical analysis of developments
into Tiruvallur and Kanchipuram Districts), the analysis is clearly in the fisheries the 1950s. Fieldwork material on
most relevant to this region. The data gathered outside these dis- the three is in Parts 2, 3, and 4. Parts 2 and 3,
tricts, however, corroborates these findings and suggests that many which have a similar are devoted to the artisanal and the
developments also occurred in other areas along the Coromandel mechanized boat sectors I'll!' first chapter in both of
Coast. Some conclusions, especially those regarding government these parts contains a of the economic and social char-
policy, appear valid for Tamil Nadu as a whole. acteristics of the sector. 'rIle second then examines the existing rules
Second, the study is limited to inshore fisheries. This demarca- on fishing while the third the organizational
tion excludes at least three matters of contemporary relevance to structure which drives the rule which centres on
Tamil Nadu fisheries and/ or to particular categories of fishermen. the Fisheries Department, these into \'NO chap·
Except in passing, the issues of deep-sea fishing or the organized tel's. The first in this
struggle of fishermen throughout India to change the central gov- ture as well the contours of official hcll,,,,-,,,c
ernment's policy of encouraging joint ventures with foreign fish- a chapter the nH"a_~hnn
ing companies are not discussed. Although a few deep-sea vessels in The ClUlestic,ns
were berthed in the Madras fishing harbour, these boats worked again in the c()nCIU(.111·I~~ ,'h,nh,,-
distant fishing grounds and barely interacted with either artisanal
or mechanized boat fishermen in the region. Other deep-sea vessels
 The Blue Revolution in Coromandel Coast Fisheries 47

majority of the state's numerous artisanal fishing population, who

2 constructed harbours. They operated larger, more powerful and
To the contemporary Indian citizen, the term 'blue revolution' con-
jures up images of sun-beaten coastal plains with high-diked fish
basins and lucrative shrimp farms. It is readily forgotten, however,
that policy-·makers and politicians coined that term a generation
ago to describe not the development of aquaculture but a radical
transformation of capture fisheries. 1 The blue revolution of the 1960s
was to complement India's green revolution in agriculture: a dras-
tic change in fisheries technology would boost catches to levels
commensurate with the postulated wealth of the oceans, contrib..
ute to the economic development of the country, and, last but not
least, help feed its burgeoning population.
The blue revolution of capture fisheries was an all-India affair,
promoted by the central government and adopted with variations
in every coastal state in the country. Simultaneously with other
state governments, the Government of Tamil Nadu launched its
marine fisheries development programme in the Second Five-Year
Plan period (from 1956 to 1961), increasing financial outlays during
the 1960s and gradually terminating them in the following decade.
The innovations it introduced in catching and preservation tech-
nology proved to be enduring. Fuelled by the opening of the inter-
national market for luxury seafood products and the consequent
boom in the price of landed fish, private investors took over where
the government stopped.
One consequence of the government's development effort in
Tamil Nadu was the establishment of a dual fishing economy. The
inhabited a string of small hamlets along the shore, continued to
fish much in the same way as they did befoi'e. However, a cat·
egory of mechanized boat fishermen developed around the newly
longer-range boats, equipped with imported trawling technology.
With these resources, they came to form a favoured economic elite.
To early policy-makers, the mechanized boat fishermen were
vanguard and a source of pride, but many artisanal fishermen
adopted a different point of view. For them, the newcomers were
at best a nuisance, and sometimes even a disaster. Fishing the same
grounds as their artisanal compeers, the mechanized boat fisher··
men were the stronger in most encounters and inflicted much hard·
ship upon their counterparts.
This chapter serves two purposes. The first is to introduce the
fisheries of the Coromandel Coast of 'ramil Nadu as distinct from
other coastal regions of South India _.. socially, ecologically and tech·
nologically. The second is to provide a backdrop for later chapters
by the way fisheries along this coastline have changed since
the inception of government development programmes in the 1950s.
The information stems from a variety of oral and written sources,
as well as frotT) a survey my team and 1 conducted in twenty-one
randomly hamlets (almost 10 per cent of the total)
located thc entire Coromandel Coast. Some of the data from
this survey is summarized in and I refer the interested
reader toit in the of the narrative.
2.1 The Baseline Situation
Point Calimere, located the northern tip of neighbouring
Sri Lanka, forms a marker. To the south lie the shal..
low waters of the Palk Strait which with the Culf Mannar
and end at the tip of India in over
of about 400 km, up to the border of Andhra Pradesh at Pulkat
stretches what has historically been called the
Coast Map 1 and Map The fisheries of the latter shor<c~line

I See, for example, the plan document titled Towards a blue revolution, which was 2 The name Coromandel of the Tamil word
drafted by the State Planning Commission in 1972. The blue revolution, to which Cholamandalam" {land of the Chola it said 1.0 have extended
the title refers, is largely plwisaged in marine capture fisheries. into what now southern Andhra Pradesh (lionwll 1927:60..61).
48 Marine Resource Management
differ from those south of the landmark in more ways than one.
Obviously, both the marine environment and the geographical fea-
tures of the coasts show wide variation. But social, technical, and
historical considerations also call for the demarcation of the
Coromandel Coast as a separate entity.
The Fishermen Population
The Coromandel Coast has 229 marine fishing hamlets (kuppam),
each with anywhere between 200 and 1,200 inhabitants. The total
population of these settlements, most of which can be safely as-
sumed to be connected to the fishing profession, was 2,41,726 in
1986. This represents almost half of the coastal inhabitants of the
state, or 0.5 per cent of its total population. 3 The artisanal sector
predominates with regard to gross fish landings as well as em-
ployment. Available figures indicate, however, that the difference
in economic performance between the two sectors is diminishing. 4
Most marine fishermen belong to the fishing caste called
Pattinavar. 5 A concentration of a particular fishing caste is not
3 These figures derive from Directorate of Fisheries (1986a: Statement No.1),
Government of Pondicherry (n.d.:3), and Madras Institute of Development Studies
(1988:36). The numbers pertain to the 1980s. There were a few complications in
computing these figures, mainly because the district boundaries of Tamil Nadu do
not coincide with the Coromandel Coast. In calculating the total fishermen popu-
lation of the region, I therefore used figures for a slightly larger area, which may
have resulted in a slight exaggeration of the size of the fishermen population.
4 It is very difficult to establish the relative contribution of the artisanal and of the
mechanized boat sectors to the economy. According to the Department of Fisher
ies (1994a:3), there were 2,661 mechanized boats registered in ports along the
Commandel Coast in 1994. Assuming a ratio of twenty persons to one boat (seE'
chapter 6), this sector would be employing 53,220 persons, or close to half of the
active fishermen population in the region. It is likely, however, that many of the
persons active in mechanized boat fishing come from outside the traditional fish-
ermen population, and that the artisanal sector still generates substantially more
employment. A similar methodological problem arises with regard to the calcula-
tion of fish landings. Recent figures (Department of Fisheries 1994a:19) indicate
that the mechanized sector might be landing about half the total catches along the
Commandel Coast.
, Pattinavar is an old seafishing caste (d. Thurston and Rangachari [1909]1987:
177-86) of the Coromandel Coast. S,~veral authors (Anugraham 1940:10; Thurst
on and Rangachari:177-78; Warriar 1967: 22) speculate on the origin of the
The Blue Repolution in Coromandel Coast Fisheries 49
unique to this area. Likewise, rnany of the fishermen in the Palk
Strait and in the Culf of Mannar region belong to the Paravar caste.
Towards Kanyakumari and along the south-west coast, it is the
Mukkuvar caste which predominates. Although they dominate the
Coromandel Coast numerically, the Patlinavar are not the only caste
group involved in marine fishing. Scattered along the shoreline
but more along the southern than the northern reaches are hamlets
inhabited by Jishermfm of lower non-fishing castes as well as by
fishermen castes that normally work inland waters (d. Anugraharn
1940; Warriar 1967:25). This impression is supported by my survey
results: the twenty-one 11amlets include three which are occupied
by Pillai or Karaiyar fishermen, one by Vanniyar, one by
Sembadavar, and one by a population which includes Mudaliyar
and Harijans (see Appendix 2).6 It is unclear when these low-caste
groups entered the profession of marine fishing and how they were
accommodated. Although intermarriage appears to be rare,
Pattinavar fishermen tolerate the participation of non·-Pattinavar
groups in fisheries. Importantly, these new entrants have modelled
their fishing practices after Pattinavar techniques and apparently
also boast a similar organizational structure. This continuity has
contributed to the occupational homogeneity along the coastline.
The Pattinavar caste is traditionally divided into two endoga··
mOllS social units called Periya Pattinavar (periya meaning big) and
Sinna Pattinavar (sinna meaning small), whereby the former is
name, Tamil words for 'town' (paddaNam) and 'weavers of silk
thread' None of them is able to explail),how a predominantly rural
fishing should come to take on these titles, however. Although it is common
knowledge that the Pattinavar dominate this coastline, it is not easy to prove, as
caste affiliatIOn not recorded in censuses. My sample of twenty-one hamlets
the Coromande1 substantiates the assertion, however: sixteen (76 per
cent) have a Pattinavar population. My information on Chingleput District is that
all Pattinavar (although some settlements have a mixed
The deri,vation of the caste names Pillal or Karaiyar presents a problem (in two
ot the three harnlets these terms were used as synonyms). Various authors men-
tion the as fishermen J970 124--25; Madras Fisher-
Bureau 1916135; Thurston [1909] 198717778; Warriar 1967:25)
On the other hand, the Pillai Tlw narne 'Pillai' also
adopted by a variety of low (oral communication DaVid Rudner;
Blake 1970:126 and Warriar 196722,
50 Marine Resource Management
considered superior to the latter.? Sinna Pattinavar hamlets are
interspersed with Periya Pattinavar settlements along the coast but
appear to be more prevalent in the southern reaches (d. Anugraham
1940:10-11). My data shows that many hamlets along the northern
Coromandel Coast include members of both sub-castes. Thus, out
of sixty-four hamlets in Chingleput District, sixtee~ of the1:: (25
per cent) have a population consisting of both Penya and Smna
Pattinav2r.
The pattern of sub-caste distribution along the coast coincides
with and is possibly related to religious variation. In contrast to
the four southern districts of Tamil Nadu, where Christians pre-
dominate, the fishing population of the Coromandel Coast is pri-
marily Hindu (Department of Fisheries 1986a: Statement 4).
Nonetheless, there are some important differences between the
northern and southern sections of this coastline. s
In colonial times, members of the'two sub-castes strictly main-
tained the social barrier. This included the prohibition of sexual
relations and intermarriage, as well as the partaking of food. There
has been a general slackening of caste rules in South Indian society
in recent decades. Parallel to that trend, the separatlOn between
7 Fishermen I spoke to recount two myths about the origin of the division.
According to the first myth, the Sinna Pattinavar grouping came about as the re-
sult of transgression of caste pollution rules. A Periya Pattinavar boy eloped with
a woman of Vanniyar (washerman) caste and was subsequently bamshed and
degraded. His descendants now make up the Sinna Pattinavar. In an mterestmg
variant of this myth, the boy eloped not with a low-caste woman but with oneof
Brahmin caste, although with the same result. The second myth places the dIV-
ision at the climax of a power struggle between two mundane leaders m the flshmg
community of Madras. Both had become wealthy through smuggling - so wealthy
that they had ensured the support of the police force. Pahkkudattaan Chettiyar,
who was the stronger of the two and also had more bodyguards, called himself
Periya Pattinavar and forced the diminutive title' sinna' on his rivaL The des~end.
ants of the two adversaries now populate the coast. See Warnar (1967:22-23) for
another version of these myths of origin. . IIow different the situation may seem in single.·caste villages.
8 Fishermen in the hamlets of the northern Coromandel Coast generally worship
Gangaiyamman as the sea goddess (kadal teevan) and Desammal as the clan god-
dess (kula tcevan). Along the southern Coromandel Coast, Kanmyamman IS often
the sea goddess and Kuttiyaantavar the clan goddess (possibly the same as men-
tioned by Hiltebeitel [19971 as Kuttantavar). These obser~ations w~re confmncd
orally by Dr. G. Stephen and Dr. R. Dhananjayan of St. Xavier s Collegcc
Palayamkottai. Schombucher (1986:112) reflects on the Importance of clans amongst
the fishing population of Andhra Pradesh and Onssa.
The Blue Revolution in Coromandel Coast Fisheries 51
the two groupings has faded. In the case of the Pattinavar, this
convergence was also a matter of ideology. According to oral
sources, fishworkers' leaders and organizations since the 1940s have
linked the fishermen's perceived lack of economic progress to their
social disunity (d. Anugraham 1940:220--25). Conversely, they
emphasized that development could only take place if fishermen
would overcome their social divisions. This ideology gained
support among fishermen, especially from those living in urban
areas. 9 Although the division between Periya and Sinna Pattinavars
has therefore largely disappeared from the surface of society, its
unspent force still manifests itself in the practice of sub-caste
endogamy.
Despite minor social and cultural divisions, the fishermen popu··
lation of the Corornandel Coast as a whole is therefore relatively
uniform. Social homogeneity characterizes their settlements as well.
Fishing hamlets tend to be inhabited only by persons of the fishing
castes, which encourages a higher measure of social cohesion than
in most Indian villages.
Cohn ([1965] 1987:576) points out that 'most individuals in rural
India have two sets of predominant social relations, one that ties
them to a village community ... and one that connects them hori-
'u"hh,lh, to their (caste and sub-caste).' Ile adds that for each of
these sets, there are legal norms and persons with the authority to
enforce them (d. Baxi 1982: 335·-36). As loyalties are divided, multi-
caste sometimes suffer from a lack of community identity
and inability to take collective action. According to Wade
(1988:55), who is concerned with collective management of com-
mon resources in multi-caste villages,'!the strength of attach..
ment to non-territorial group like caste hinders emotional
attachment to the village.' In consequence (ibid.:196), 'village-based
organization . has only a weak claim to morally motivated
obedience' Dumont 1972:216·-17).
Cohn ([1965] I notes that 'by and large in these villages
caste norms and norms are coterminous.' Following this
hslwrmen made it difficult for me to enquire about
composition hamlets the coast. In one instance, a nor.-
COl)l)cTat,ive hslwrman became angry about this topic. He asked:
differences In our community or what?'
52 Marine Resource ManqiJement The Blue Repolution in Coromandel Coast J·"'isheries

train of thought, I might add that village authority stands a chance Fish~ries Departn:en:, even characterized the sea off Chingleput
of becorning more focused and of facilitating collective action for and South Areat DIstncts as 'the poorest fishing ground in the Presi·
joint interests and goals. The fishing villages of the Coromandel dency' (Madras Fisheries Bureau 1916:134). Although the volume
Coast fit into this category. In the following chapters, I sketch the of catches in these districts has expanded significantly since he
consequences of social homogeneity for the development of a wrote these lines, pointing ou t tha t the grounds may not have been
village-based system of sea tenure. qUlte as poor as he thought, his conclusion still rings true. The fish-
ing grounds of Kerala and of the southern districts of Tamil Nadu
The Marine Environment 10 are undeniably richer than those of the Coromandel Coast. lI
Tropical fisheries have two general characteristics: available fish
The fishing hamlets of the Coromandel Coast are evenly dispersed stocks tend to concentrate along the continental shelf and the stocks
along the shoreline, with an average of one hamlet for every 1.75 display a variety unknown to fishermen in colder waters. The
km of beach. The lack of geographical concentration corresponds Coromandel Coast is no exception. The continental shelf (with
to the uniformity of the environmental conditions. Over most of its depth of up to 200 m) has a steep gradient and a normal width of
length, the seashore consists of long sloping beaches uninterrupted 20 to 50 km. 12 The much richer inshore zone (with a depth of up to
by natural harbours or sudden changes of terrain. Inland, separating 50 m), where most fishing activity takes place, is generally 10 to 30
the coast from the agricul tural hinterland, lies an extensive network km wide.
of estuarine lagoons and creeks. The natural isolation of this region . Fishermen along the Coromandel Coast distinguish three kinds
is enhanced by the Buckingham Canal, which closely follows and of seabeds by their composition-sand, mud, or rock. Sand and
cuts off the seashore starting in Kaliveli tank in the south and mud predominate in the inshore fishing areas; substantial rocky
extending beyond the Andhra Pradesh border. patdws are found only in two locations south of Madras. The char··
The shore is unprotected and surf-beaten. Cyclonic storms build deter of the seabed has at least two implications: mud and rock
up in their long approach over the Bay of Bengal and batter it twice env~ronments are known to be richest in fish, whereas a sandy
a year on an average, endangering fishermen at sea and merci- seailoor generally associated with poor catches. H~owever, rocky
lessly whipping their settlements which huddle at the seaside. protuberances have another implication, for they obstruct trawling
Storms bring more than danger, however. The fishermen believe operatlons~ Mechani.zed boats tend to avoid areas with an uneven
that the oceanic turbulence they cause revitalizes the fish stocks. seabed.
This restorative effect is crucial to the fisheries of the region. Unlike Fi:~1ennen extract a number of species from the coastal
other pafts of India, the Coromandel Coast has only a few river belt. I he . of Inarine life is expn'ssed in the breadth of stat-
mouths that discharge waters and sediments into the ocean, Istlcal achvi ties carried out the C:entral M~rine Fisheries Research
attracting marine life in the process. Only one of these, the Kaveri, Institute. Its employees monitor the landings of sixty-four different
is of more than seasonal importance.
The Coromandel Coast is not known for its rich fishing grounds. " This IS r,,[[e(ted in nominal cat.·I, , , northernmost districts of the
To the contrary, F.A. Nicholson, the first director of the Madras Coromandcl Coast, which make Ill) alm()sl cent 0 f tIw state's shoreline,
contribute only. 16 Iwr cent to its tolal (.~.·lt·(.·I·\(·."'·. a "llgniicant
f proportion of which
10 A description of the marine environment of fishermen along the Coromandel . .derives from Andhra Pradesh '." ("11"111'lt'I'on
... ' . f rom D epartment o'f
Coast is severely handicapped by a lack of data (d. Sivasubramaniam 1985:52.··53
f. Isl.1ene.s.l.994a17
. '.11 . . . ....),.Th",.' coast's
.>
southern.
. .
~
sIgnl ·f'··
H,lnt1Y I.Jetter results
p.OSS1) Y ,1S consequence of Its position astnde a porh'll1 the' Palk' '~tral'I' w t :
and Silas 1995:1). In addition, most of the available data on marine species, resource
potential and catch developments applies to Tamil Nadu as a whole. The
(dlso sec Madras Institute of
] 983).
Stud":,, .. p.. 'I' "'1 .a CIS
. · , \ d m , ' s . ! anL llwan
do not distinguish between the different zones within the state. This a
I) The widthofthecontinentalshelimlamil 43km
d1aracterization of Coromandel Coast fisheries. The following section is no more Programmc ] 9832)
than an attempt at highlighting its significant features.
54 Marine Resource Management
species of fish in Tamil Nadu; these species belong to twenty-eight
groups (Marin,e Fisheries Information Service 1995:8-9). The trend
in shrimp is a case in point. Fishermen have specifically targeted it
since the early 1960s. Yet shrimp made up only between 5.1 per
cent and 6.4 per cent of the volume of catches in Tamil Nadu be-
tween 1985 and 1993 (ibid.). Along the length of the Coromandel
Coast, the following species are relatively abundant (Bay of Bengal
Programme 1983:3): ribbon fish or hairtails (Trichiuridae spp.), silver
bellies or ponyfishes (Leiognathidae spp.), sardines (Clupeoidae spp.),
anchovies (Engraulidae spp.), flying fish (Exocoetidae spp.), tuna
(Thunnus spp.), Indian mackerel (Rastrelliger kanagurta spp.), seer
fish (Scomberomorus spp.), trevally (Carangidae spp.), and of course,
shrimp (Penaeid and non-Penaeid). Recently fishermen have local-
ized exploitable stocks of cuttlefish (Cephalapoda spp.), pomfret
(Pampus spp.) and a variety of marine crustaceans. 13
Scientific insight into the potential of the inshore fishing zone is
limited, although several authors have ventured projections. Fish·
ery scientists seem to agree that many stocks in the inshore waters
of the Coromandel Coast (below 50 m in depth) are exploited to
their maximum, if not beyond this level. 14 The steady decline in
available sea space per active fisherman is an ominous signal in
this respect (Central Marine Fisheries Research Institute 1995b:5).
It is interesting to note that scientific opinion parallels the
fishermen's perspective on the state of the inshore fishing zone. In
seventeen out of the twenty-one fishing hamlets visited, fishermen's
13 The multi--species nature of fisheries has a number of side-effects. The Central
Marine Fisheries Research Institute (1995b:3) notes that it increases the number of
interac'tions among fisheries and promotes competition between fishermen using
different kinds of gear. Sivasubramaniam (1985:35) points out that the broad com-
position of species spreads thin the resources for biological studies.
14 See Central Marine Fisheries Research Institute (1987:51), Food and Agriculture
Organization (1977:1,3), Nambiar (1985) and Sivasubramaniam (1985:39) for the
state of marine resources in Tamil Nadu. In a recent report the scientists of the
Central Marine Fisheries Research Institute (1995b:8-9) conclude:' considering: that
the current yield is in excess of the potential, the opportunity for further techno-
logical upgradation of the fishing craft ... is very minimum, and the fishing strat
egy henceforth should lay more emphasis on fishing regulation and limited
diversification.' Informally, fishery scientists and officers of departments involved
in fishei'ies research and development admit that many stocks are curruntly
overexploited. Some persons disagree, however (d. Sanjeevaraj 1989:484;
Satyanarayana Rao and Mahadevan Pillai 1992:6).
The Blue Re)Jo[utiort in Coyormmde[ Coast Fisheries 55
representatives argued that catches had decreased significantly in
the past decade. Spokesmen of three other settlements asserted the
contrary, but pointed out that higher catches in their case followed
from the adoption of different technology.
Overfishing is only one of the conditions currently affecting life
in the coastal zone. Erosion, provoked by major harbour construc-
tion schernes, has worn away the coastline in various areas, cmuslng
the resettlement of fishermen and often thwarting fishing oper-
ations. Marine pollution, the result of direct discharge of domestic
wastes and industrial as well as agricultural effluent, presents a
growing threat to coastal habitats (d. Ilolmgren 1994:131-·45 and
184-208). On land, the growth of aquaculture and tourism, the
extension of urban areas, and the increasing demand for formerly
barren coastal lands have put more pressure on the fishing popu·
lation. In consequence, fishermen are no longer able to establish
new settlements at will, as they did in the past.
Fisheries Technology
James Hornell, one of the founders of the Madras Fisheries
IJepartment and a keen observer of fishing practice, noted that the
coast of the Madras Presidency, which included the region now
known as Tamil Nadu, consists of several natural divisions, 'char-
acterized by great and sometimes fundamental differences in the
for fishing' (Horne111927:60). These, he argued,
'have evolved in response to varying local conditions'. I-lornell
believed that the demands of the Coromandel Coast's distinctive
environment contributed to the developmentof similar fishing tech
nology.l would add that this process was probably encouraged by
prevailing caste and kinship ties.
Many onlookers have expressed their astonishment about the
simplicity of the fishing craft called kattumaram (Tamil for lashed
timbers) which the Coromandel Coast.
Nicholson, however, was qtllck to point out its singular effective-
ness (Madras Fisheries Bureau 'Wherethe surf is heavy,
harbours few, and the open beach the only landing place as
along the East Coast the catamaran is invaluable since
it is unsinkable, can readily and be taken through the surf,
the logs untied and carried up the beach ' The sophistication
of the kattumaram has been fully realized in yc'ars (d. Comte
56 Marine Resource Management
1980; Menon 1980 and Ramamoorthy 1982:44ff.), partly after several
unsuccessful attempts to introduce other, supposedly superior
naval designs. The type prevailing along the Coromandel Coast is
sometimes called 'raft kattumaram', in contrast to the 'boat
kattumaram' of the southern coast. Carrying a crew of one to three
and found in varying sizes, it is propelled by sailor by hand and
increasingly, in recent years, by a long-tailed outboard engine.
Hornell (1927:61) pointed out that the nets and other fishing gear
along this shoreline also displayed historical distinctiveness: ' the
main peculiarity of Coromandel fishing appliances is the predomin-
ant place taken by bag-nets operated by two or more catamarans,
and the small place taken by gill nets.' This differed from fishing
practice in Andhra Pradesh or southwards in Tamil Nadu. Although
industrial production and im10vation contributed to a standard-
ization of fishing gear in the state in recent years, some remnants
of the old material culture are still in place.
2.2 The Engineering of the Blue Revolution
The Development ofthe Export Market
Prior to the country's independence, fisheries catered mainly to
the domestic market, although one notable exception was the ex-
port of dried fish to neighbouring Sri Lanka (Ramamoorthy
1982:68). John Kurien (1985:A74-75) describes what were probably
the first furtive attempts at marketing frozen shrimp abroad in
the 1950s. The immense success of these entrepreneurs heralded a
major shift in market orientation and a veritable 'prawn rush' in
the decades that followed (Kurien 1978:1561).
The Government of India had no small hand in the development
of the foreign market. As Kurien (ibid.) points out, the discovery of
the export potential of shrimp occurred 'in a situation when foreign
exchange was a crucial need. All and sundry who ventured to take
the risks of entrepreneurship were encouraged' (my emphasis).
Throughout the post-independence era, the dearth of foreign
exchange to finance the country's import bill remained a major
concern, and the government grasped every possibility to generate
earnings. In 1972, the Ministry of Commerce of the central
government formed what was to become a powerful institution in
the fisheries field, the Marine Products Export Development
The Blue ReJ'olution in Coromandcl Coast Fi.rbcric.\ S7
Authority (MPEDA), for the specific purpose of promoting the
export of fish and fisheries products.
Nurtured in every way, the export of marine products from India
exploded from a meagre 15,732 metric tons in '1961, via 75,591 metric
tons in 1980, to 2,96,277 metric tons in 1995 (MPEDA 1997:60). The
last figure represented 6 per cent of nominal fish catches in the
country (Food and Agriculture Organization 1997:626), and a value
of more than one billion US dollars. In 1995, marine products
formed the fourth largest category of foreign exchange earners in
India after gems, cotton and textiles (d. Outlook, 17 January '1996).
In the course of time, exports diversified with regard to both
items and markets. The pioneers in the 1950s handled only shrimp,
and shipped it mainly to the USA (Kurien 1985:A74). Although
shrimp still represents 32 per cent of the volume and 67 per cent of
the value of India's seafood exports, the range of products has
increased significantly (MPEDA 1997:11, 61 ~66), as has the number
of destinations. Currently (ibid.:8), India exports marine products
to sixty-one countries, with major markets in Japan (47 per cent of
total value), in the USA (12 per cent of total value), in the European
Union (26 per cent of total value) and in South-East Asia (11 per
cent of total value). India has become one of the world's largest
seafood exporting countries, and tops the list in shrimp (Baud
1992:179).
Developments in Tamil Nadu fit in with the pattern sketched
above. Presently occupying an honourable third place in respect to
marine landings in the country, it makes an important contribu-
tion to the export drive. In 1967, the first year for which figures are
available, exporters shipped 5,438 metric tons of seafood products
from Tamil Nadu ports. In 1993, the volume had increased to 24,336
metric tons, which equalled 10 per cent of India's marine exports
(Department of Fisheries 1994a:49). The main income earner,
however, is still shrimp; it accounted for 59 per cent of the export
volume and 87 per cent of earnings in 1993 (ibid.:50). Madras and
Tuticorin are two of the country's nine major seafood exporting
The Modernization ofIndian Fisheries
Policy-makers initially justified the modernization of Indian fish··
eries by referring to the food needs of a growing population. They
58 Marine Resource Management
also pointed to the wide gap which, in their perception, existed
between the magnitude of the fish resources and the capacity of
the fishing fleet (d. Chopra 1951 :8). The desire to modernize be-
came mOre urgent when they discovered the sector's ability to bring
in foreign exchange. Policy-makers then realized that investments
in the development of fisheries were indeed worthwhile, not only
for the sector but also for the country as a whole.
The same policy-makers were persuaded that the desired in-
crease in fish production could only be achieved by fundamen-
tally altering the fisheries sector. As the writers of one authoritative
textbook phrased it, 'any attempt at greater production of fish can
be effected only by the mechanization oCthe fishing operations and
their extension into the offshore area' (ibid.:92.). Rather than build-
ing on the skills and methods of the artisanal fishing sector, the
central government and the governments of many coastal states
chose to break radically with the past. They vested their hopes in a
wholly new type of fisheries enterprise, that of mechanized boat
fishing.
On the face of it, India's blue revolution has yielded spectacular
results. Year after year, nominal catch figures increased by leaps
and bounds throughout the country. Starting at 7,52,000 tons in
1951, national production skyrocketed to 49,03,659 tons in 1995.
The same was true for Tamil Nadu. In four decades, marine catches
in Tamil Nadu have increased more than seven-fold. Total land-
ings were estimated to be about 45,700 tons in 1951--52, rising to
3,37,552 tons in 1993. 15
The Design afthe (Blue R.evalution' in Tamil Nadu
A government publication relates the following account as to how
mechanized boat fishing in Tamil Nadu took off:
The importance of fishing by mechanised fishing boats in Tamil
Nadu was realised only during the Second Plan period. Initially
15Country figures come from Agrawal et al. (1993) and Food and Agriculture
Organization (1997). Tami! Nadu figures are from Directorate of Fisheries (1986b);
CMFRI (1995a) The statistics are not entirely campara ble, as the unit of
measurement varies between long and short tons. The state figures do not include
catch data from the Union Territories of Pondicherry and Karaikal.
T71e Blue Repolution in Coromandel Coast Hsheries 59
the Government of India placed the services of competent naval
architects and master fishermen from FAD at the disposal of the
Government of Tamil Nadu [to develop] a suitable mechanised
craft for fishing with modern gear. Early in 1954--55 they under-
took surveys and recommended suitable measures for mechan-
isation of crafts and improvement in fishing methods. Based on
their surveys and recornmendations, mechanised boats suitable
for operation from sheltered bays in the Madras State were
designed (Marine Products Export Development Authority
1978:20).
One FAO naval architect stood at the cradle of all the boats
which later attained popularity through state government
programmes. Paul Ziener's first successful design in 1955 was called
the Pablo boat it measured 25 feet (7.6m) in length, had an engine
of less than 10 horsepower, and was mainly suited for gillnetting.
Its successor, the Illugason boat, was the first of his designs to be
widely distributed. This 30-footer (9.1m) had a two-ton fish hold,
and its inboard engine was between 45 and 67 horsepower. This
boat could be used for stern trawling (d. Ziener 1956). A few years
later, in 1962, a third craft carne off the Fisheries Department
drawing board. The 32-foot (9.7m) Stern Trawler Boat (STI3) had a
45 to 67 horsepower engine and a four-ton fish hold. It had several
advantages over its immediate predecessor, such as the addition
of a winch and a cabin.
These three craft formed the core of the technical innovation
programme which lasted until 1980. The Fisheries Department of
Tamil Nadu distributed the following numbers of boats between
1956 and 1980 (Bay of Bengal Programme 1983:5):
Pablo 5TB Others Total
1,234 1,068 20 2,374
FAO experts played a key role in introducing not only new types
of craft but fishing nets as well. All boats after the Pablo were meant
for trawling, and it was in this field that the experts made a large
contribution. At the time, fishermen along the Coromandel Coast
had no experience with modern trawling technology, even though
60 Marine Resource MantYlement
many of their bag-nets made use of a trawling technique. Experi-
ments carried out with bottonl otter trawls in the 1950s proved
successful, and this type of gear became popular with mechanized'
boat fishermen in the following years (Nedelec 1975:72·-73).
Another innovation occurred after the FAO conducted a series of
fishing trials together with the Fisheries Department in 1980/ this
time with high-opening bottom trawls. Mechanized boat fisher-
men in Madras and other ports welcomed the high-opening trawl
warmly, and christened it the 'FAO net'.
New boats and fishing gear formed only one facet of the Fisher-
ies Department's blue revolution programme. To ensure the success
of these innovations, it had to make substantial investments in the
infrastructure as well. After all, the state lacked many facilities and
skills essential for the operation of boats. These included boatyards,
harbours, repair facilities and vocational training schools, as well
as preservation technology to process the fresh fish. The Fisheries
Department took a leading role in establishing a variety of public
sector enterprises to meet these needs.
To build the Pablo and its successors, the Fisheries Department
established a boatyard along the central shoreline of Madras in
1956/ and three others followed. All four boatyards catered exclu-
sively for the government hire-purchase system, which lasted until
1980. As the demand for boats in the early period surpassed the
capacity of these four yards, two boatyards belonging to the co-
operative and seven belonging to the private sector were opened
during the 1960s. The latter yards constructed approximately one-
third of the boats distributed by the Fisheries Department in the
course of its scheme. Their fortunes were so tied to the government
programme, however, that they foundered after 1975. They col-
lapsed entirely when the hire-purchase system was terminated.
The Fisheries Department faced another problem in its mechan-
ized boat construction programme. As no Indian company was
manufacturing marine diesel engines suitable for small boats, these
had to be imported from abroad. This situation had changed by
1965. By then, the growing domestic demand for marine engines
had induced various local companies including Ruston, Kirloskar,
Meadows and Ashok Leyland - to enter the market.
After a boat has been built, it has to be berthed. The mechanized
boats of Tamil Nadu could not be beach-landed, and the lack of
natural shelters in the state made public investments in harbour
'1 'he Blue Repolution in Coromandel Coast Fisheries 61
facilities imperative. Besides two major fishing harbours in Madras
(1984) and Tuticorin (1972), minor ports were developed in
Cuddalore (1963)/ Nagapattinam (1969), and Sinnamuddam
(1990), and another in Pondicherry will be completed shortly. The
department commissioned simple jetties in Mandapam (1972)/
Rameswaram (1972), Kodiyakarai (1982), and Pazhaiyaar (1986).
Unfortunately, silt soon choked many of the new harbour and jetty
sites, making them less useful. One of thernajor complaints of boat
owners along the Coromandel Coast, then~fore, is the persistent
shortage of adequate berthing facilities. . .
Other needs included repair facilities and vocational trammg
centres. During the first decade of the blue revolution, the Fisher·
ies Department set up service centres in eight places along the Tamil
Nadu coast. As the mechanized boat sector grew and
mechanics entered the field, however, most of these centres were
closed or leased out. Such disparity existed between mechanized
boat fishing and artisanal fishing that the Fisheries Department
also saw the need for skills training facilities. Six Fishermen Training
Centres were started between 1956 and 1964/ one in each of the
state's maritime districts. Each had a capacity of fifty trainees per
year and provided courses in fishing tedmiques, navigation, and
mechanics. These training centres stand out among the vanous early
programmes, since they are the only ones still in operation.
Other measures addressed the problem of how to preserve the
catch. Preservation technology is essential in order to supply dis-
tant markets with a product such as fish that has such a short shelf
life. As one institution noted about the challenge in this field, 'prior
to the commencement of the First Plan .. :. modern methods of
.f
preservation of fish [were] totally absent not only in Tamil Nadu,
but also in other parts of the country' (MPEDA 1978:43). The main
techniques artisanal fishermen employed to increase the lifespan
of their product was either to dry it in the sun or to cure it in a
government fish-curing yard. 16
The introduction of new preservation technology thus had a high
n,'u""',J,, with the Fisheries Department from the First Plan period
Ib The British had established special fish-curing yards throughout the coastal zone
to promote the preservation of fish products. In these yards, fishermen were
exempted from paying the salt tax. After independence, these yards decreased in
number and dosed down altogether in 19114.
62 Marine Resource Management
(1951-56) onwards. They focused on establishing small govern-
ment ice factories not only in towns and cities, but also in the larger
fish-landing centres. In the course of several plan periods, the gov-
ernment constructed and operated thirty·-seven ice factories
throughout the state (MPEDA 1978:44, plus personal communi-
cation V. Ramamoorthy). Here again private business was quick
to respond once profitability had been established, and their efforts
soon surpassed those of the department. This is apparent in a
comparison of ice manufacturing capacities. By 1978, all ice factories
of the Fisheries Department in Tamil Nadu together had a capacity
of 86 tons of ice a day; the private sector in Madras alone produced
more than twice this amount - 209 tons. of ice daily. Since this was
the trend, it was not unreasonable for the Fisheries Department
to cease constructing new ice plants and to close down existing
ones in the 1970s. Growing dissatisfaction about the low efficiency
of the government enterprises formed another reason for this
decision.
In addition to ice factories, the Fisheries Department also estab-
lished freezing plants, cold storage buildings, and processing
facilities in the coastal zone. Here too, the private sector rapidly
took over. The following passage, which focuses on fish process-
ing, describes a usual sequence of events:
The fish processing plants in Kerala, started procuring part of
their raw material requirements from Tamil Nadu .... In due
course, when they found a steady source of raw material
supply, they started constructing their own plants in Tamil
Nadu .... After 1971-72, when the industrial momentum for
seafood processing started picking up in the private sector, the
State Government stopped the construction of any more fish
processing plants in the state (ibid.:47).
The authors of this document emphasize the involvement of entre-
preneurs from Kerala in the development of seafood processing
facilities. This appears to have been a trend in other areas of fish-
ery development in Tamil Nadu as well. Kerala entrepreneurs pre-
dominated in the first phase and were joined by local businessmen
only after some years.
Sufficient documentation exists to reconstruct developments in
the field of preservation. The changes in transportation are much
The Blue Rel'olution in Coromandel Coast Fisheries 63
less well documented. Due to the lack of preservation facilities, the
market for fresh fish in the:, 1950s could not be located far from the
fish landing sites. The present-day trade of fresh seafood products
is voluminous and complex (d. Rajendran et al.1992). Seafood criss-
crosses the subcontinent in complicated patterns. These patterns
follow demand and the development of prices in various '-0'-"'''''11'
and cities. This highly evolved trade was made possible by the
development of transport facilities, notably by road (rail transport
is older and was used extensively by dried fish traders in earlier
days as well). The export market which has developed since the
early 1960s relied on other means of transportation, particularly
aircraft and cargo vessels, to link production centres in southern
India to the loci of demand abroad. Air and sea connections have
improved tremendously, as have the facilities necessary for the
transport of seafc;od.
The Promotion ofMechanized Boat Fishing in Tamil Nadu
Once the technical niceties of boat fishing were thought out, the
Fisheries Department had to develop a plan of promotion. How
could it entice artisanal fishermen to test the new boats which re-
quired investments many times r;reater than they were used to?
And how, once the technology attained popularity, should boats
be distributed amongst the fishing population? Department offi
cers drew up a plan of action which included loan and subsidy
pa<ck,lg(:S as well as procedures to structure allocation of the boats.
the beginning, financial incentives were an important
component of the Fisheries Department's programme to promote
mechanized boat fishing. First of all, the department allowed for
payments through a system known as the hire-cum-
Durclhil,:;e scheme. According to the terms of this scheme, recipi-·
ents would make monthly instalments for a certain period of time,
a~ the end of which the boat would be their own property. In add·
ItIon, the department provided ample encouragement in the form
of ". ... . subsidies. Before 1972, the department subsidized part
of the cost of the engine and hull. The remainder was provided as
an loan, to be repaid within seven years. This incen,-
bve scheme terminated by government order in 1972, but was
. followed by another one. As of July 1974, candidates
deposIted 5 per cpnt of the cost of the boat upon receipt. 'The
64 Marine R.esource Mana;../Jernent
remainder was advanced in the form of an interest-free loan (15
per cent of the total sum) and a commercial bank 10anY As com·,
mercial interest rates were considered excessive, the state govern-
ment also subsidized the interest on loans for a period of three
years: 100 per cent interest subsidy in the first year, 66,6 per cent in
the second, and 33.3 per cent in the third. This second and last
major incentive scheme ended in 1980, coinciding with the conclu-
sion of the whole government boat distribution programme. 18
Planners intended to distribute the new mechanized boats as
fairly and as widely as possible among the fishermen in the coastal
districts of the state. In accordance with the ideology of the time,
the department initially allocated boats to fishermen's cooperative
societies. Later, the department gave preference to groups of ap-
plicants. Trainees from the Fishermen Training Centres enjoyed
high priority. , the sooner could the merger be realized. It was therefore logical to
The distribution system which was in effect between 1956 and
1968 determined that each of the six maritime districts would re-
ceive a quota of boats. The size of the fishermen population was
used as a criterion. Fisheries Department officers in each district
then distributed available boats am.ong trainee groups according
to the seniority of their application. Each recipient group made a
deposit of Rs 500 and signed a hire-purchase agreement which
spelled out their rights and duties.
The department fine-tuned the system in 1968. Officers added a
few selection criteria, such as the length of the waiting lists and the
number distributed earlier, to establish each district's quota of new
boats. Fifty per cent of the boats in each district were to go to appli-
cant groups with one or more trainees, while the other half would
go to non-trainee groups. Furthermore, half of the total number of
b6ats were reserved for fishing hamlets which had not profited
from the programme before. As there were always more appli-
cants than boats, a lottery chaired by a senior civil servant decided
17 The authors of a committee investigating the mechanization programme in 1978
view the high deposit as possibly contributing to so-called bel/ami relations (Forests
and Fisheries Department 1978:149-51;162-66).
18 A limited subsidy scheme for mechanized boat fishermen came into operation
in 1987. According to this scheme, the owner of a new boat is now eligible for 20
per cent subsidy on the cost of the engine plus hull, to a maximum of Rs 2,00,000,
Only some ten to twenty boat owners benefit from this scheme annually, however
(personal communication, Fisheries Department)
The Blue Revolution in Coromandel Coast Fisheries 65
on the beneficiaries in each of these categories. From 1974 onwards,
the seniority of the applicants rather than a lottery was the de.
cisive element in allocation practice,
The Neglect ofArtisanal Fisheries
Doc~me~ts ~nd interviews with people who played a key role at
the tlme Indicate that policy-makers in Tamil Nadu generally took
the blue revolution to be synonymous with the growth of mechan-
ized boat fishing. However, this does not mean they were oblivious
to the needs and problems of the artisanal sector. The assumption
seems to have been that when artisanal fishermen converted to
boat fishing, the sector would dissipate and merge with its succes-
sor. From this point of view, the quicker the take-off of boat fishing,
concentrate human and capital investments on the mechanized
boat sector, and to neglect the artisanal one. 19 The neglect of arb.
sanal fishing, however, should be seen in perspective. In fact, the
state government did implement some programmes aimed at
moderniZing artisanal fisheries. Artisanal fishermen also benefited
in no small measure from new market opportunities and from the
development of service facilities.
The most obvious contribution of the Fisheries Department to
the artisanal sector in the period before 1986 was in the field of
f~shing gear. One mus t remember that until the 1950s, nets used by
fIshermen along the Tamil Nadu coast were exclusively made by
hand from natural fibres. One of the Fisheries Department's first
goals was to replace natural fibres with syntht.tic ones which were
stronger and had a longer lifespan. To this endJit started distribut-
ing synthetic twines and filaments to fishermen cooperatives at
SUbSidIzed rates, were quick to adopt these new mater-
Ials, as theY,had a positive effect on catch levels. By 1965, synthetic
fI~)res had vI:tualIy replaced natural ones in net-making (State Plan-
nmg Commission 1972:24).
19 Unlike Tamil Nadu, the state government in Cujarat made the artisanal fishing
sector the of its modernization programme. Motorization of traditional
craft commenced on a scale in the 19S0s The dichotomy between
mechamzed boat and artisanal sectors is not found there (d. Kurien n,d.),
66 Marine Resource Management
For some years, nets continued to be made by hand. In the south-
ern districts of Tamil Nadu, women were traditionally in charge of
net-making, while in the northern districts it appears to have been
the men. Factory-based manufacturing started to supplant this cot-
tage industry from the late 1960s on. Warriar (1967:99) noted that
nets in Madras fishing hamlets were still made by hand in the mid-
1960s. Evidence shows that the first small net-making plant started
up in the city a few years later. In 1978 there were two private
companies, and the Tamil Nadu Agro Industries Corporation Ltd
had also just opened a plant (MPEDA 1978). By then, the people
involved in the net-making cottage industry particularly in the
southern districts·-felt a perceptible threat to their livelihood. A
strident movement to prevent the establishment of even more net--
making companies arose. This was a lost cause. As one observer
noted in 1982, 'the manufacture of nets is no longer the important
cottage industry it was until five to ten years ago, when net-making
machines were introduced in Tamil Nadu; since then, most
fishermen and women have given up making their own nets'
(Ramamoorthy 1982:61).
The Fisheries Department also encouraged the use of other types
of net and provided subsidies and loan programmes for users.
Only one new type of gear the three-walled trammel net-was
truly revolutionary. Its use spread like wildfire along the coast
because it realized substantially higher catches, mainly of shrimp
(d. Achari 1986; Joel 1985). Its diffusion, however, was mainly a
private affair.
Throughout this period, there were no modifications in the de--
sign of artisanal fishing craft. The kattumaram remained much the
same as before, and fisherrnen continued to use wind- or paddle·
power for propulsion. 20 This started to change only after 1986, when
20 To be fair, it must be said that, from the early 19505 on, national and inter·
national agencies initiated small projects to attempt to improve the performance
of artisanal fishing craft along the coast. After the failure of an early FAO experiment
aimed at motorizing an artisanal fishing boat (the Tuticorin valIam) of the Gulf of
Marmar, the attention shifted to developing or importing an alternative beach·
landing craft. Surf boat trials were conducted from 1954 to 1959 under the aus·
pices of FAO and the Indo-Norwegian Project. A Catholic service organization in
Kanyakumari conducted trials with various types of beach-landing craft in the
early 1970s (see Gillet 1981). The Bay of Bengal Programme (FAD) also generated
and tested new designs after 1980. Attempts were also made to construct
Tbe Blue Revolution in Coromandel Coast Fisheries 67
the Ministry of Agriculture of the Government of India introduced
a scheme to motorize artisanal fishing craft. The motorization of
kattumarams along the Coromandel Coast took flight after 1990
(see chapter 3).
Of course, the macro changes which were taking place in the
fishing economy also affected artisanal fishermen. Catches were
put on ice ins tead of being dried, and the dried fish market ~"'". UHf
At the same time, artisanal fishermen started to direct their oper..
ations to the demands of more distant markets, including inter.
national destinations. Market channels developed, linking naJmll2ts
to regional processing and export centres.
2.3 Blue Revolution on the Beaches
Conflicting Fishing Technologies
The previous section described the manner in which planners in-
tended the blue revolution in inshore capture fisheries to unroll.
Now I shift my focus to the real pattern of developments, which
aeVI,ued from the blueprint in two ways. First, mechanized boats
did not venture out to discover new offshore fishing grounds. In-
stead they generally fished the same inshore seas utilized by
artlsanal fishermen. Second, mechanized boats did not replace
artisanal craft in any great numbers. Instead, they were added to a
large artisanal fishing fleet. These deviations from the plan had
major rejJel·CUSSlons.
In the follOWing I consider how the fishermen reacted to
the bl~e revolution as it unfolded. Three stages are distingUished
by their atmospher~ and social dynamics: a tHai or take-off phase;
a b~om penod which ended in large-scale riots; and a decade in
WhICh conflicts This schema coincides roughly with the
one Kunen and Achari (1988) in Kerala fisheries.
kattumarams of ferro·...: ement and
o
(in teO) "c'I'la 0' d I' t . b
.00 °U WOO, WllC!\ IS e.
comrng scarcer and more expensive). Most of these trials in failure. It is only
I~ recent years that some small fibreglass models suitable for beach·landing are
achievmg a measure of popularity. My survey of twenty·onc hamlets
the coast demonstrates 2) that fisherrnen ll1
aCl':)ptmg tibr'eglass boats to replace kattumarams.
68 Marine Resource Management
The Take-off 1956 to 1966
The blue revolution in capture fisheries took almost a decade to
gain momentum. When the Tamil Nadu government introduced
the first new boat designs in the late 1950s, kattumaram ftshermen
were reticent about using them. One erstwhile Fisheries Depart-
ment official, reminiscing about the situation at the time, said, 'we
had to run after fishermen to get them interested.' ltwas only when
shrimp landing prices increased dramatically after 1960 that.mecha-
nized boats began to draw serious attention. From that time on,
demand steadily exceeded the Fisheries Department's supply..
This leads to a perplexing observation: if boat-fishing was m-
deed immensely profitable, and the Fisheries Department was
unable to meet the demand for boats, how does one explain the lag
in private-sector boat-building? After all, the private commission-
ing of boats in the Madras region probably started on~y after 1970,
well after the inception of the pink gold rush. I beheve that the
explanation must be sought in the mentality of boat-fi~hing entre-
preneurs at that time. For them, investment costs weIghed. more
heavily than possible returns. Moreover, the govern~~nt mcen-
tive package was not to be scorned. Governme~1t SubsIdIes rang~d
from 15 to 50 per cent on the costs of the engme and h.ull, whIle
loan amounts could be repaid in instalments. In practice, many
recipients did not repay their loans at all. Thus, they actually
21
obtained their boats for a fraction of the actual COSt.
Who actually obtained boats from the department? My impres-
sion is that in practice boat ownership tended to be concentrated
in the bigger towns. In part, this is because village recipients often
moved to be close to harbour sites. This was not a universal pat-
tern, however, as our survey of twenty-one fishing hamlets
demonstrates (Appendix 2). A substantial number of settlements
in non-urbanized areas boast boat ownership, particularly in the
southern part of the Coromandel Coast. It is apparently common
2\In 1995, the Fisheries Department decided to write off overdue loans that had
been made to mechanized boat owners in Tamil Nadu in the 1960s and 1970s.
AccordiJ1g to officers, 342 Madras boats were involved. The outstanding amount
for these boats was more than Rs 1,00,00,000. On the basis of these figures, each
boat owner on average would have had an outstanding debt of more than Rs
29,000. The cost of a 32-foot trawler was Rs 54,600 in 1965 and Rs 1,30,000, ten
years later (Directorate of Fisheries 1986c Annex. 2).
The Blue Revolution in Coromandel Coast Fisheries 69
there for boat owners to continue residing in their village of origin,
even though the boat may be berthed elsewhere.
Group ownership soon made way for individual ownership (d.
Thomson 1989:166). The institution called benami emerged in
mechanized boat fishing. This meant that a group of fishermen
would form a front for the actual owner, a businessman of fishing
descent or otherwise {d. Kurien 1978:1561).
The number of boats based in Madras in the mid-1960s was
probably no more than fifty. According to the respondents with
Whom I spoke, however, artisanal fishermen felt threatened from
the very beginning for a number of reasons. It was bad enough
that boat fishermen regularly intruded on their fishing grounds,
and damaged their fishing gear. Worse still, the intruders often
did so with great impunity and made use of their superior engine
power to abscond from the area if problems arose. The Madras
boats were also joined seasonally by many others from different
regions, which compounded problems for the artisanal fishermen.
In reaction to the arrival of mechanized boats, the first regional
associations of artisanal fishermen were formed in the early 1960s.
They concerned themselves with lobbying for rulings on the
hitherto unregulated mechanized boat sector.
The Pink Goldrush: 1965 to 1980
The pink goldrush in Tamil Nadu picked up around 1965 when
word spread that quick money could be earned in shrimp trawl··
ing. Investors from outside the fishermen castes discarded their
traditional contempt for the fishing occupatiqn and flocked to the
sector. At the height of this fever, a wide variety of occupational
groups were involved in mechanized boat fishing in Madras,
including traders, doctors, engineers, film stars, politicians, and
bureaucrats. In some way or other, title to ownership of boats gravi-
tated into their hands, much to the annoyance of fishermen, who
felt that their rightful position was being usurped.
Meanwhile, the number of boats in Madras kept increasing. By
1972, there were at least 150 boats plying the coast from the port;
this number increased to at least 400 in 1979,22 In evaluating these
22 Th~re was no obligation to register boats with a government authority, and
hshermen regularly moved from one place to another. It is therefore difficult
70 Marine Resource Management
figures, the geographical scale should be kept in mind. Contrary to
the present, these boats all operated in the direct surroundings of
Madras, exploiting the resources in a very limited area. Looking
back, a leader of the artisanal fishermen concluded that 'the boats
swept the sea bottom clean as efficiently as sweepers do the Madras
streets.'
The protests of artisanal fishermen gradually became more
vehement. The first truly statewide artisanal fishermen's organ-
ization was established in 1967. It was linked to the Dravidian party
(DMK), which had just taken over the reins of government from
the Congress. This organization became more forceful after it dis-
sociated itself from the DMK and took an independent path in 1972.
Its leaders staged a series of mass demonstrations to pressure state
government and politicians to take protective action. Their effect-
iveness is evidenced by the fact that the leaders of the association
were alternately bribed and attacked. The clashes grew in inten-
sity, and artisanal fishermen started capturing boats and setting
them on fire. In response, the boat owners armed their crews and
gave them licence to retaliate. When asked about this period of
fishing history, various respondents described it as a painful con-
flict, particularly because it took place between relatives. After all,
artisanal fishermen and boat fishermen were often of similar caste
and related through marriage.
How did government officers react to the mounting protest
against the mechanized boats? One former officer of the Fisheries
Department described the bewilderment of many when confronted
with protests against their brainchild. By this time, they were under
political pressure not to curtail the boat sector in any significant
way.
To manage the fishermen problem, the Tamil Nadu government
set up district peace committees in 1968. The members included
high government officials as well as representatives of both groups
to establish how many boats were based in Madras at any given time. The follow-
ing figures, mentioned by various authors studying the sector, do point out a trend.
however:
1967 43 boats (Warriar 1967:252)
1971 150 boats (Ram 1971:5)
1979 400 boats (Sivakumar et al. 1979:593).
The Blue Repolution in Coromandel Coast Fisheries 71
of fishermen. A few years later, the Fisheries Department included
a clause in the hire-purchase agreement of boats that restricted their
use to a zone beyond three nautical miles from the shore. This
which was intended to separate the contending parties at sea, later
became the cornerstone of legislation. It was very poorly enforced,
however (see chapter 9).
The state g~vernment reconstituted the district peace commit-
tees m 1972. For some years, these mediatory bodies remained as
the government's main instrument in managing the problem of
It:
the fIshermen. th~ same year, the Marine Products Export Devel..
opment Agency mlhated a registration system for mechanized boats
in order to make it easier to trace offenders. Previously, there had
b~e~l no. le.gal obligation for boats to display a number or a
dlshngUlshmg mark. Government officials and artisanal fishelrmen
~like therefore considered mandatory registration to be of
~mportance. Unforh.mately, MPEDA proved unable to carry out
Its new task and handed it over to the State Port Officer in 1978.
This too proved to be ineffective. A workable system slowly
emerged, though only after the Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing Regu
lahon Act of 1983 authorized the Fisheries Department to arrange
for registration (see chapter 10).
Even these pacifying measures could not prevent the riots which
took place between boat and artisanal fishermen in Madras in late
1977 and early 1978. Because the uprising occurred in the state
capital, involving many thousands of irate fishermen, the riots be-
came a symbol of the fishermen protest. Moreover, it was seen as
an important test case for the state government, which had just
taken office.
The 1977 and 1978 Riots
He~ded by the film star politician M.e. Ramachandran, the All
IndIa Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) came to
power for the first time in June 1977. Having starred in roles which
e~alted the poor, MGR (as the Chief Minister was called) enjoYE~d
Wide populanty, also among the fishing population (d. Pandian
:992; d.; WIt :99~:70--79). After all, he had made two movies ('Padu-
booddl and Mllnava Nanban') that highlighted their plight. Fol~
;~wmg a general trend, fishermen established MGR fan clubs
roughout the coastal area. The mfluence of MeR was highlighted
72 Marine Resource Management
by the fact that the leader of the state artisanal fishermen organ-
ization was also the chairman of a neighbourhood fan club.
The end of October 1977 heralded the start of a series of large
group fights between artisanal and boat fishermen. These confron-
tations were bigger than any that had gone before. The climax oc~
curred on November 24th. A contemporary newspaper report
describes the events in detail (The Hindu, 25 November 19'77):
A 1000-strong crowd of catamaran fishermen armed with deadly
weapons, burst into the [Madras fishing harbour] area with the
intention of mounting an attack on mechanized boatmen. When
the police intervened, the crowd became violent and started at-
tacking them, resulting in injuries to 22 policemen. Bursting of
teargas shells and lathi charge proved ineffective. In the melee,
a police inspector was trapped and dragged to the sea with the
intention of drowning him. As the warning to free him proved
of no avail, the police fired three rounds to disperse the crowd
and saved the police official. The clash between the two groups
of fishermen followed a rumourin the morning that a catamaran
fisherman had been stabbed in the high seas. Incensed, a group
of catamaran fishermen from Kasimode and nearby Tiruvottiyur
and Ennore broke into the boatyard at Kasimode and set fire to
four mechanised boats. Thereupon, a group of mechanised
boatmen, equally strong in number retaliated by throwing stones
and other missiles. Two PTC buses passing by had their
windscreens smashed in the stone-throwing. A police
party ... rushed to the spot and restored order after bursting
teargas shells to disperse the rival groups of fishermen. Police
pickets were posted in the area to prevent breach of peace. In
the afternoon, a strong crowd of catamaran fishermen, carrying
lethal weapons, stormed into the area to attack their rivals and
their boats. As the situation became explosive, the police fired
three rounds when the teargassing and lathi-charge proved in-
effective.
This newspaper report suggests that the riot was a spontaneous
expression of outrage about a rumour that an artisanal fisherman
was attacked by a mechanized boat crew. This would place it in
the same category as many other fights which took place at the
time following very similar incidents. However, the 1977 and 1978
'lhe Blue Revolution in Coromandel Coast Fisheries
riots differed from earlier clashes in two major ways: the number
of participants was far greater, and they took place in the heart of
the mechanized boat sector in Tamil Nadu. Participants and
observers still recall the fury which drove the artisanal fisherm(~n
in their attacks. As one artisanal fishermen leader of the time re
counted, they were not out to teach mechanized boat fishermen a
lesson but to destroy the mechanized boat sector as a whole. In the
end, it was the police force which prevented this from Lappening.
Skirmishes continued until February 1978, and the statewide
artisanal fishermen organization played a major role in politiciz·-
ing events. Feverish activity on the part of the government resulted
in a proposal by the Minister of Fisheries to draw up legislation
that regulated the operations of mechanized boats. The impetus
also led to an informal agreement by whi.ch boat fishermen pledged
to fish outside a three-mile limit.
The fishermen's riots of 1977 and 1978 form an interesting and
complex topic of study. The most salient question is regarding their
timing. Was it mainly, as one former Fisheries Department officer
phrased it, that artisanal fishermen 'had seriously started to feel
the pinch in their pockets, going down from an average of Rs 50 to
Rs 20 a day'? According to this reasoning, the proverbial last drop
just happened to fall in 1977. Other respondents see a connection
with the installation of the new government. They emphasize that
artisanal fishermen had particularly high expectations of the new
chief minister. The feeling was that the previous DMK government
had supported and been supported by the mechanized boat owners,
and that the tide was about to turn. Following this argument, the
riots of 1977 and 1978 were the result of a changed political
constellation in Tamil Nadu, or, to borrow a term from another
setting, a 'revolution of rising expectations' (MyrdaI1968).
However, a national context should be recognized as well. A
fishermen's union called ttJ.e National Fishworkers Forum, which
had a particularly strong base in Goa and Kerala, was established
in India in the 1970s. The Madras-based artisanal fishermen
organization was also an active member of the Forum 23 Since
! t often assumed that the Kerala artisanal fishermen's movement preceded the
, in Tamil Nadu. Kurien (1988:27) argues the contrary, however: 'In [Goa and
TamJl Naclu] fishermen, with the active animation of non-party social activists,
(onlrunted what they perceived as an aggression of their traditional rights at sea
74 Marine Resource Management
problems in the various states were relatively similar, the National
Fishworkers Forum launched a nation-wide struggle to prevent
further deterioration in the position of artisanal fishermen and to
call for suitable laws. In reaction to this agitation, the central gov-
ernment pledged to draft a Model Marine Regulation Bill which
was to be sent to all of the coastal states for adoption. The promise
of corrective legislation was therefore hanging in the air at the time
of the Madras riots. Although it is unlikely to have precipitated the
riots, the knowledge that theirs was not an isolated cause may have
acted as an extra prompt.
'Tensions Mitigated: 1980 to 1994
Various developments in the 1980s and early 1990s contributed to
a mitigation of the tensions between mechanized boat and artisanal
fishermen. First of all, the nature of boat fis.hing changed in the
1980s. Boat owners commissioned larger craft with more engine
power and bigger holds. Whereas the 30-foot boat had been popu-
lar in the 1960s, boats in the 1980s were 40 to 50 feet in length.
These craft, which were capable of staying out at sea for a number
of days, had a wider range of operation. From 1985, mechanized
boat fishermen's perspectives therefore changed. The destination
of a growing number of boats shifted from the coasts of Tamil Nadu
to the rich fishing grounds of southern Andhra Pradesh. The prob-
lems between boat owners and artisanal fishermen along the Tamil
Nadu coast were subsequently transferred to Andhra Pradesh (see
chapter 7).
Second, there are indications that during this decade and a half,
the incomes of artisanal fishermen also started to improve. This
might be due to profitable innovations such as the trammel net
and the outboard engine. However, artisanal fishermen also em-
phasize that the prices they obtained fqJ their catches rose signifi-
cantly. Thus, almost all of the spokesmen of the twenty-one
surveyed fishing hamlets agreed that, despite a declining volume
of catches, real incomes of fishermen had gone up in the past few
by trawlers owned and controlled by non-fishermen. This trend was sought to be
countered by both militant and non-militant means .... Without much delay the
effects of the Goan and Tamil Nadu movements spread to Kerala.'
The Blue Revolution in Coromandel Coast Fisheries 75
years. This certainly contributed to an improvement in relations
with boat fishermen.
Third, the number of non-fishermen investing in mechanized
boats declined drastically after 1980. This had more than one cause.
Profit levels had declined, and several years of riots had served to
scare off the casual investor. Moreover, organizations of fishermen-
owners were taking measures to remove non-fishermen from the
trade in Madras. Although these were only partially effective, they
contributed to an atmosphere that discouraged the involvement of
outsiders. The conflict between the artisanal and boat fishing sec-
tors was thereby defused. The feeling that the profession was being
destroyed by people with no historical rights was assuaged.
Finally, the state-level artisanal fishermen organization which
had played an important role during the 1970s fell apart in 1982.
Its demise was triggered by a combination of financial squabbles,
sub-caste rivalries, and leadership problems, as well as by the fact
that concrete results had proved so difficult to obtain. Although
conflicts between artisanal fishermen and boat owners kept occur-
ring on the local level, they no longer had the character of massive
and violent political struggles. As the supralocal organization of
artisanal fishermen fell apart, boat owners took steps to fuse their
associations into a more effective body. All in all, the relations be-
tween the two sectors had improved significantly by the mid-1990s,
although tensions continued to surface time and time again.
2.4 Conclusions
This chapter described a densely populate<t.coastal setting in which
policy-makers started in the 1950s to create their version of a blue
revolution. At the outset, the Coromandel Coast already had a large
and old population of artisanal fishermen. They fished the inner-
most sea area, where the highest concentration of marine resources
was found. Since their settlements are spread out along the shore-
line, few inshore fishing grounds will have remained untouched.
This fishermen population was not only large, it was also relatively
homogeneous. No major ethnic or religious divisions affected them.
The settlements themselves were socially cohesive, no doubt a re-
sult of their exclusively fishermen population.
Policy-makers designed a scheme aimed primarily at creating a
rift in the tradition of fishing. In the end, the plan also created a
76 Marine Resource Management

breach in the fishermen population. Most importantly, policy-

makers introduced a new catching technology - mechanized
boats - which differed radically from anything previously known.
To be fair, the aim was to involve the artisanal fishing population Part 2
in the process of modernization. The policy-makers expected that
the new technology would contribute to the social and economic
The Artisanal t'lshUltg ;S4~ct<)r
welfare of the artisanal fishermen. However, the blue revolution
unleashed new forces and generated new dynamics. The basic probe
lem was that boat fishermen exploited the same ecological niche
upon which artisanal fishermen depended, and this set a spiral of
conflict into motion. The large-scale riots which took place in
Madras in 1977 and 1978 provoked the Fisheries Department to
take serious steps in the field of marine regulation. From then on,
there were three parties to inshore fisheries: artisanal fishermen,
mechanized boat fishermen, and the state.
 3

The three chapters which comprise Part 2 are devoted to the sea
tenure system of artisanal fishermen. As will become clear in the
course of the discussion, this sea tenure system is both comprehen-
sive and intricate. Its character is partly a function of its age; fish··
ing is an old profession along the Coromandel Coast, and many
generations of fishermen have preceded the present one. The fish·
ing population has consequently had time to develop mechanisms
to manage their fishing practices. Moreover, they could do so in
conditions of relative quiet and isolation -~ the interference of com-
peting sea tenure systems and other authorities is of recent date.
One of my propositions is that artisanal sea tenure is basically
village business. The village - and not, for example, a patrilineage
or a caste population distributed over a larger region _.- is the locus
of rule-making. It is village-level authorities that enforce whatever
rules are in place. Far from being a 'by-product of expediency', the
fishing village in my case is therefore 'the most appropriate unit of
analysis' (Breman et al. 1997:3). Thus, this chapter starts with an
inquiry into the nature of village society. I am particularly inter-
ested in whether the perception of the village as a management
unit is compatible with seeing it as an economic and social entity.
The second query follows from the fact that a system of sea tenure
an adaptation to the nature of fishing operations. What
then the salient characteristics of artisanal fishing? I take up
both issues in this first chapter.
Much of the data presented in Part 2 was collected in one par-
ticular fishing village south of Madras. Although this village is
unique in some respects, my comparative data suggests that it epit-
omizes the artisanal fishing sector alc>ng the Coromandel Coast in
80 Marine Resource Management
many ways. The perspective in these chapters therefore shifts back
and forth from the village to the regiort as a whole.
Kalvimanagar - the pseudonym I have chosen for the fishing
hamlet in which my fieldwork was concentrated - means 'place of
learning'. It is a significant epithet, reflecting some of the inhabit-
ants' values and the way they would like to be regarded as edu-
cated people who are competent in the skills of the modern world.
Any reference to the fishing profession is conspicuous by its ab-
sence. In spite of what this title might suggest, most households in
Kalvimanagar continue to depend on the sea, as have generations
before them. And although the inhabitants are aware of develop-
ments in society at large and follow those wider social trends, the
village remains their main point of reference.
Running through this exploration of the social and economic
structure of a village is a story of change. Like in all human con-
figurations/ life in Kalvimanagar is undergoing transformation.
Some changes, however, affect the village structure more than
others. By creating new tensions, they may reduce the effectiveness
of the sea tenure system in the long run.
3.1 Tl1C Fishing Hamlet
A Besieged Settlement
The fishing hamlet Kalvimanagar lies about 40 km south of Madras
city in Chingleput District, next to the New Mahabalipuram Road.
As is the case with all of the fishing hamlets along this coastline,
there is no sign indicating the hamlet/s existence. A narrow tarred
road runs east for about 1 km between fenced gardens, then ends
abruptly on an upward slope in the middle of the village. The
nearest fishing hamlet in the direction of Madras lies 3 km to the
north. The next hamlet to the southis 6 km away.
Although Kalvimanagar is located beyond the last urban ag-
glomeration in what is still a rural setting, the city looms ominously
on the horizon. A plan has recently been drafted to extend the
Madras Metropolitan Area southwards into Chingleput District,
to include eleven new villages including Kalvimanagar. 1 The
I See The Hindu, 23 May 1995. When I left Madras, the plan had yet to be ratified.'
Artisanal Fishing and the Fishin;H Hamlet 8J
inhabitants expect that the hamlet will soon be swallowed up by
the city. Indeed, Kalvimanagar may well share the fate of other
coastal hamlets which have become urban slums. If so, it will have
the dubious honour of being surrounded by the villas and resorts
of the urban elite. Land developrnent and speculation have taken
off in a big way along the coastal area south of Madras. In a bizarre
parody of the English enclosure movement, fences and walls that
often enclose no more than sand and bushes have come to criss
cross the landscape. In other locations, villas in classical architec-
tural designs with large gardens have been erected. These are
interspersed with health resorts and recreational facilities.
Industries and service organizations are also finding their way
into the region. Shrimp hatcheries have sprung up alongside many
fishing hamlets. Their offer of jobs and other benefits is offset, how··
evert by the installation of pipes that dump wastes into the sea and
by the disturbance they cause to beachseine fishing. Kalvimanagar
has two such hatcheries on its borders. Along the main road to the
east, there is a small manufacturing company offering salaried em-
ployment. To the south, a few scattered social service and cultural
institutions can be found. Directly adjacent to the hamlet, then~ is a
dairy farm belonging to a medical doctor. Other private properties
are rapidly being built. Squeezed in as it is, the hamlet population
has few possibilities of meeting its own future housing needs. This
problem is compounded by the effects of erosion. As along many
other parts of the coast, a large section of shoreline has been worn
away since the early 1970s. The result has been the loss of many
houses and gardens.
With its 153 houses huddled together on. a hillock overlooking
the sea, Kalvimanagar makes a beleaguered iinpression. Two roads
dissect the hamlet in the form of a T; one leads to the main road,
while the other runs the full length of the hamlet parallel to the
shore. Although a number of simple thatched huts still dot the outer
the majority of the population live in brick houses with at
least two rooms. Following a particularly heavy bout of erosion in
the 1970s, the Fisheries Department sanctioned the construc~
tiona! a large number of simple concrete housing units in the
hamlet. As the quality of construction was poor, however, many
InhabItants have carried out refurbishment works when their
. . permitted. A particularly intense period of building and
rebmldmg followed the distribution of receipts from the sale of
82 Marine Resource Management
village land in early 1996. From a housing poi~t of view, Kalvi-
managar today is therefore variegated and relatively pr~sperous.
A primary school was established on the w:stern sIde of the
hamlet in 1966 and almost all children attend It. Enrolment de-
clines only at the level of secondary education, for chil~ren m~st
travel some distance by bus in order to reach the school. ElectnClty
was hooked up in 1972. Nowadays, most households have ele.c~rical
power and boast fans, electric grinders, audio set~, ~nd televIsIons.
Television sales boomed in 1995, when an enterpnsmg duo erected
a satellite dish and provided cable service on a subscription basis.
Groups of men and women started congre~atingin hOl~ses ~hrou~h­
out the day, mainly to watch the old but stIll popula: 1 amd mov1~s
which are televised. Young men appear somewhat Immune to thIS
distraction. Their free time is generally spent playing cards in the
shady corners of village lanes. . Pattinavar fishing sub-caste. The only exceptions are four recent
The track leading to the main road was tarred m 1988. Further
infrastructural improvements commenced in the early months of
1996, just before the state assembly electi~ns. Sud~enly, construc-
tion started on a large water tower, with pIpes leadmg to a number
of .water faucets. Although almost every household in the hamlet
has a hand pump and the quality of water is excellent, piped water
is thought to be an improvement.
The hamlet has four small grocery shops and a tea stall. Three of
these establishments are run by people of non-fishing caste. Sev-
eral village women, most of them widows, provide other serv.ices.
One sells cooked food, another sells diesel for outboard engmes,
and three specialize in locally brewed alcohol. Many vendors who
offer special items or services pass through the hamlet ev.ery day,
lured by the regular availability of cash that is charactenstlc of a
fishing economy. Bigger business establishments are grouped
around the junction at the main road and serve a larger geograph-
ical area. Regular bus services take villagers north to Madras or
south towards Mahabalipuram.
Professional Uniformity and Increasing Diversification
There are no records, written or oral, about the origin of the village
or of its founders. 2 Informants state that the land was settled many
2 The researcher G. Stephen, who is attached to S1 Xavier's College in
Artisanal Hshing and the F'ishi11;fj Hamlet 83
generations ago, and there is no evidence to the contrary. There is
a clear awareness, however, of the sequence in which lineages ar-
rived in the area. This has important implications for the political
structure of the village.
According to the figures for early 1995, Kalvimanagar has 731
inhabitants living in 154 households of varying kinds. The most
common household form is the nuclear family, consisting of par··
ents and their offspring (73 per cent). Extended nuclear families (a
nuclear family plus a parent or sibling) make up 20 per cent of the
total, while 7 per cent consist of joint families (two nuclear or
extended nuclear families). Female-headed households - generally
originating in the death of the husband are rather common (16
per cent of the total).
The hamlet population consists, almost entirely of the Periya
immigrant families: a Nadar shopkeeper, and a few Muslim house-
holds living in a separate housing cluster to the south. In recent
years, intercaste marriages have started to take place, and this prac-
tice has reduced caste homogeneity. With the exception of the
Muslims and a stray Christian convert, the inhabitants are Hindu.
Kalvimanagar has been physically isolated until very recently.
Located on a barren strip of coastal land, the hamlet was separated
from its agricultural hinterlands by the Buckingham Canal. In the
late nineteenth century, the British established casuarina planta-
tions in the coastal zones north and south of the city in order to
meet the growing need for firewood. When asked about the sur-
roundings of the hamlet in earlier times, older inhabitants invari-
ably mention the wilderness which enclosed'them.
Although some employment may have been found in the wood
industry, the inhabitants' main source of incorne has traditionally
been fishing. In fact, villagers report that the economy was so sea-
sonally labour intensive that workers were brought in from low-
caste villages inland to participate in beachseining and to help dry
the bumper catches.
The main road from Madras to the south, the present-day Old
Mahabalipuram Road, lies to the west of the canal and could be
Palayamkottai, Tamil Nadu, notes' that, in comparison to other caste communities
ir'South India, fishermen have a shallow sense of history (oral communication).
research bears this au t.
 Artisanal FishinlJ and the FishinlJ Hamlet
84 Marine Resource ManCl;f1ement
Young unmarried women make up the bulk of this labour force
reached from the hamlet only by boat. It was only with the exten- (46 per cent). They are employed by leather and garmenl manu-
sion of the New Mahabalipuram Road on the eastern side in 1965 factur~ng~l1lts close to Madras as well as by a water company along
that the area became more accessible and economic development the mdm load. In many cases, they stop working in these places
cornmenced. when they get married;4 only two married women (4 per cent) in
Fishing is still the mainstay of the local econOlny. It is also, as we the hamlet work for a salary. Married women earn additional in··
shall see in chapter 5, the cornerstone of the hamlet's political sys· cOl:r:e from fish sales as well as from a variety of business activities.
tem. One hundred and ten households (71 per cent) depend exclu· . Ihe you th is well represented among male wage-earners as well.
sively on fishing and fish trading for their livelihood. The other Nmeteen young unmarried men (34 per cent) and nine older men
forty-four households derive some income from salaried employ" (16 per cent) hold jobs in neighbouring industries. Some of them
ment, but they continue to rely on fishing for a large part of their have taken up occupations such as electrician or house painter,
earnings. There are 185 full-time fishermen in the hamlet, and men vyhlle three are trymg theIr luck in Malaysia and Singapore. In add-
with other employment often continue to fish as a secondary occu- Ition, a few elderly men work as watchmen for nearby property
pation. Twelve women, mainly widows, earn a living by buying owners.
fish at the beach auction and selling it at retail markets. Many oth- Many people eagerly seek wage employment because it means
ers (55 per cent of all households) augment the household income a. stable source o~ il~come. This stability contrasts sharply with the
by at least occasionally selling the catches their husbands bring to fIckle r:ature.of frshmg. Many of these salaried jobs also offer more
shore? status m sOClety. At the same time, a large number of young men
A process of economic diversification is undeniably taking place, contmue to s~e theIr futures in fishing, partly because of a lack of
however. Fifty-four inhabitants are wage-earners, and their number clear alternatrves, and partly because they value the independence
is increasing as new industries corne into the area. Table 3.1 gives afforded by the occupation.
an overview: The in~abitants of Kalvimanagar have yet another important
source of mcome: the sale of land: With the booming real estate
Table 3.1 Overview of Salaried in market m. the surroundings of Madras, previously barren lands
Number % have acqUlred an enormous monetary value. Although some fam-
17 31 lites owned private plots which they were able to sell, most recent
Leather Industry
10 18 sales relate to ~o-called puRampookku lands; these are parcels which
Water Company
3 6 have been aSSigned to the village as a whole/The income thus gen-
Garment Industry
8 15 erated flows mto the VIllage fund and is divided amongst the in-
Shrimp Hatcheries
8 15
Electrician/ Mason/ Painter/ Stoneworker habitants wh? are considered village members (see chapter 5). As
4 7
Watchman/Boatman such mcome IS highly Irregular, it is difficult to generalize about its
1 2
Clerical Work
3 6 ~:I~~unt. In the fieldwork period, however, each village member
54 100 lECClved upwards of Rs 10,000 from collective land sales a sum
Total
eqUivalent to the average income generated by fishing during the
same penod. Some land was sold off over the past years too, and
there are plans for future sales as well.
3 The economic irnportance of a fisherwoman who sells the catch which a male
member of the household brings to shore should not be underestimated. Accord·
ing to fishermen informants, it can result in a 35 per cent increase of the house· I
female . , ' ~, .. 27)'. f or an excC' 11 ent ana I
Ram (1991209 ' of work patterns of different
YSIS
hold's daily income (in comparison with the income made if the catch is sold on gloUpc; In a flshmg commul1lty 111 southern Tamil Nadu.
the shore).
86 Marine Resource Management
Sociul StrMificMion
Inhabitants recognize the existence of economic differences between
households. A ranking exercise performed by villagers sheds light
on the constituents of social hierarchy (d. Alexander [1982] 1995:
36-38; Firth [1944] 1974:294-95). At the top stand the village rich.
Although their position is reflected in the ownership of a diversity
of fishing gear, they generally have other assets as well. Many of
the older rich families own agricultural land which they have leased
out to tenants. A group of nouveau riche, on the other hand, have
capitalized on new career opportunities in business or government
administration. They have reinvested a portion of their earnings in
fisheries. In some cases, rich households include a number of regu-
lar salary earners as well. At the other end of the spectrum are the
poor, who make up perhaps 15 per cent of village households. ~'hey
have some special characteristics. In many cases, they are SOCially
isolated and do not belong to any village patrilineage, and there-
fore they lack social support. Alcoholism or the death of the male
breadwinner sometimes aggravates the problem. Poor households
generally possess only a few panels of nets, just enough to li~e
from hand to mouth. The majority of fishing households stand In
between these two extremes. They have enough gear to maintain a
reasonable standard of living, and nowadays some may have an-
other source of income as well.
Although these economic differences are readily observable, the
challenge lies in the interpretation. There are two schools in South
Asian maritime anthropology: one downplays existing differences,
and another accentuates them. Ram, who represents the first type,
speaks of 'relative homogeneity and the absence of sharp stratifi-
cation between families engaged in fishing' (Ram 1991:16-17). Her
analysis is supported by the fact that economic position often cor-
responds to a phase in the household development cycle (Goody
1976; van Schendel 1981:271--73). Young households with small
children are often found at the lower end of the social spectrum, as
are female··headed households. On the other hand, households with
a number of income earners, such as those with unmarried adult
children, are frequently at their economic peak. A few years later,
after marriage obligations drain the coffers and the household seg-
ments, their situation frequently changes for the worse. Further-
more, the process of upward or downward mobility is often more
Artisanal fishing and the Fishing Hamlet 87
pronounced in families engaged in fishing than in other occupa-
tions. One reason for this is that fishermen make major investments
in short-lived and risk-prone fishing gear (Alexander 1977:248; Firth
[1944] 1974:3). Another is that investment thresholds in artisanal
fishing are often not absolute, for fishermen are able to build up
their assets bit by bit.
Other analysts point out that the boundaries between economic
categories in artisanal fishing are not entirely porous. In his book
about a Sri Lankan fishing hamlet, Stirrat (1988:47) notes that
'within the village there was a definite pattern as to which house
holds had most gear and which least, and this pattern appears to
have continued from one generation to the next.' This appears to
hold true for Kalvimanagar as well. Certain families have been
better off for long periods of time, while others have inherited a
more marginal existence.
How to reconcile these standpoints? In my opinion it goes too
far to depict the differences in Kalvimanagar as representative of
economic classes, as Thomson (1989:93--95), for example, has tried
to do. On the other hand, to speak of 'the homogeneity of poverty',
as Ram (1991:17) does, also appears unsatisfactory. I leave this
broader issue aside. For the purposes of this study, it is enough to
acknowledge that economic differences do exist and that they play
a role in village politics.
The Sexuul Division ofLabour
A much clearer and more durable distinction than the one between
classes is the division of labour between the sexes. Summarizing
worldwide research findings, McGoodwin (1990:24-25) argues that
fishing is generally a male domain, while women have more re-
sponsibility over shore-based activities. This pattern is observed
throughout South Asia (d. Nieuwenhuys 1990:151; Stirrat 1988:90).
Kalpana Ram clarifies the issue by referring to an underlying
set of cultural prescriptions. Behind this sexual division of labour
is another set of norms that relates to the sexual division of space.
Norms related to space 'prohibit women from gaining access to
the sea, and even to the spaces most intimately associated with the
~ork of fishing: the sea-front and the beach' (H.am 1991:48). In Ram's
View, thIS rule effectively excludes women from partaking in sea
tenure (ibid.:47). .
88 Manne Resource A1analfement
Ram's analysis of the sexual division of labour and space holds
true for Kalvimanagar. There too, women are rarely seen on the
shoreline except during the auction of catches. This does not mean,
as Ram appears to suggest, that women play no role at all in issues
of sea tenure. Rather, I would argue that their involvement is sec
ondary and mediated by menfolk (see chapter 5). As Ram remarks,
marginalization in sea-based activities is compensated by 'female
centrality in land-based social relations' (ibid.:202). The women in
Kalvimanagar hold the strings of the household purse and conse-
quently have an important say in all money matters, including in-
vestments, loans, and the like (d. Alexander [1982] 1995:39; Drewes
1982, Stirrat 1988:91-92).
Government Administration
From the government's point of view, Kalvimanagar is almost a
non-entity, it is no more than a ward in a Gram Panchayat.
Kalvimanagar is the biggest hamlet of four in this administrative
unit and the only one with a fishing population. In the absence of
an elected Gram Panchayat body,S administrative affairs have been
handled by a village administrative officer (VAO) based in a small
town some 10 km from the village. The VAO is the lowest rank in
a revenue system headed at the district level by a collector. Every
VAO has a few local assistants (talaiyaari) to assist him, particu-
larly in the collection of taxes, and also in tasks such as the mainte-
nance of birth and death registers.
The VAO has few reasons to visit Kalvimanagar. After all, the
inhabitants pay virtually no taxes and have barely any involve-
ment in the other field which demands much of his attention-
land matters. Thus villagers quip: 'The VAO? He comes here only
after a cyclone takes place.' Even though the VAO shows little
interest in hamlet affairs, the villagers still call upon him when it is
5 Gram Panchayats are statutory village councils installed by the government and
are different from the caste panchayats I discuss elsewhere. In Tamil Nadu, the
Gram Panchayat system has been inoperative for long periods of time. The state
government dissolved the elected Cram Panchayats in 1979 and did not hold
tions until 1989; the new bodies were dissolved two years later, however. It
only after fieldwork was completed, in October 1996, that elections were held again.
Artisanal Fishinlf and the Fishin8 Hamlet 89
in their interest to do so. His office is familiar terrain for those in
need of official papers, and occasionally he becomes an unwilling
participant in village politics.
The initiative for keeping a distance from government function..
aries also comes from the villagers themselves, however In fact,
there is a strong sentiment in Kalvimanagar ~ as in all other fish-
ing hamlets -. to refrain from taking problems to any other forum
except their own panchayat (see chapter 5). Deep aversion to police
involvement ensures that violators of this unwritten code run the
risk of social ostracism.
Kalvimanagar as a Social Entity
In their daily encounters in the village lanes, at sea, or on the
beach - the inhabitants of Kalvimanagar meet as neighbours,
friends, and professional colleagues, but also as relatives. As in
many rural societies, kinship is a driving force which permeates
work, social affairs, and politics. Except for a few immigrant fam.
ilies of different castes, villagers are related through ties of descent
or marriage. This does not make Kalvimanagar a tight social unit.
There are many relations which transcend the boundaries of the
village. Furthermore, the general tangle of kin relations is offset
each individual's loyalty to his or her patrilineage or pangaali
(pangaaLi) group. The tensions which pervade relations between
pangaali groups in the village are of a structural nature and sur-
face at regular intervals. They give village life its fragile nature.
One of the main tasks of the local panchayat is to neutralize this
potentially divisive influence.
The exogamous patrilineage, which encompasses all relations
in the male line of descent, forms an important social frame of ref.-
erence. As Norr (1976) points out, political factions in fishing vil-
lages of the Coromandel Coast also tend to form around pangaali
groups. No wonder that tensions between patrilineages are often
said to have led a village population to split up and found new
settlements. The correlation of kinship with territory and economic
activity is weaker. Although a few of the larger patrilineages in
Kalvimanagar do tend to concentrate in particular sections of the
village, many others are spread out more or less randomly. How.
ever, there are reasons to believe that this relationship may have
90 Marine Resource Mana;.qement
been stronger in the past. 6 Firth ([]944] 1974:105), writing about
Malay fisheries in the 1940s, notes that 'the Malay fishing unit is
not prirnarily dependent upon kinship as the tie of association. But
kinship often enters.' This would appear to summarize the situ-
ation in Kalvimanagar as well. Although work units frequently con-
sist of members of one pangaali group, other kinds of ties are very
common too.
Kalvimanagar is made up of twelve patrilineages, plus a small
number of single households without affiliation. The patrilineages
differ in size; the largest includes forty-seven families (30 per cent
of the total), while the smallest contains only two. They also have
different histories. Whereas some are considered indigenous, oth·
ers are remembered to have arrived in the village at different occa·
sions in the past?
Each of the various pangaali groups is ranked on three criteria:
its origin, its size, and its wealth. Whether a pangaali group is re-
membered as indigenous or not is an important factor, determin·
ing which role a group is allowed to play in hamlet affairs. It also
circumscribes the public space any individual is able to occupy.
Moreover, persons belonging to indigenous pangaali groups have
more liberties than those of outside groups. Size and wealth also
determine the position of a pangaali group within the hamlet. Thus,
it is from the largest indigenous pangaali group that the first head-
man (mutal chettiyar) is traditionally selected (see chapter 5).
Seven pangaali groups, comprising 102 households (66 per cent
of the hamlet total), are considered indigenous. Others are remem·
bered as having immigrated from other fishing villages along the
coast. The historical influx of fishermen is mirrored in the depart·
" Various factors may have contributed to a reshuffling of the village population:
sea erosion, which made many families move house; the current housing short·
age, which causes new households to build a horne wherever there is space; and
government housing programmes, with their own allocation schemes.
7 Recollection is an important aspect of pangaali group origin and affiliation. I
encountered pangaali groups that most people considered to be indigenous, but
that some elders remembered as having come from another location. Contrarily. 1
also discovered pangaali groups that were considered to be separate, even though
they had actually segmented from other pangaali groups at an earlier point lJl
time. Remembering -. or its converse, forgetting·· is at least partially a matter
time: the pangaali groups considered to be alien had probably all arrived 111
Kalvimanagar within the last three generations.
A rtisanal Fishin"q and the Fishing Hamlet 91
ure of men from Kalvimanagar at other times, which every so often
hollows out a local pangaali group. Fission often appears to be the
result of intragroup conflict, but it may also follow from the pro·
spect of economic opportunity in a new location. The length of the
migration route is striking: outsider pangaali groups in Kalvima·
nagar came from as far south as Pondicherry and as far north
the Andhra Pradesh border (total range 140 km).
Quarrels which cross pangaali group lines run the risk of develop·
ing into major disputes. Tensions between two indigenous pangaali
groups have coloured much of the hamlet's recent history. One
large group has coalesced around the first headman, a smaller
group around the local leader of the AIADMK parly. As house
holds belonging to these patrilineages are concentrated in differ-
ent parts of the village·- the south and the north, respectively
conflicts between them have territorial connotations as well.
Whereas pangaali groups unite the members of lineages in the
village in opposition to one another, affinal relationships cut across
these divisions. Marriage creates other patterns of cohesion and
distance, both inside and outside the hamlet. Table 3.2 demonstrates
the origin of marriage partners in Kalvimanagar. 8
Of the 185 married women on whom I have detailed informa-
Table 3.2 of Partners in
I' from ,f from I' & J from J from
I' &, Total
Outside Outside Outside
132 10 37 6 18S
tion, 20 per cent were born in Kalvimanagar and married men from
other pangaali groups in the village. The majority (72 per cent) of
the women were born in other fishing hamlets along the coast,
however, and married into the village at a later age. The geograph,
leal range of these marriage contacts parallels that of the male
immigrant groups discussed above. However, whereas immigrant
, I chd not draw up the genealogies which would allow for a detailed reconstruc-
tion of emigration processes, to parallel my information onimmigration. The data
on the origin of the people presently living in Kalvimanagar does, however, pro·
vlde an adequate understanding of the patterns involved.
92 Marine Resource Management
groups in Kalvimanagar stem from only a few hamlets, marriage
contacts are widely dispersed. 9 Through its kinship network, the
Kalvimanagar population is related to people from dozens of
hamlets along the coast. The main omissions, interestingly, are the
hamlets near Kalvimanagar to the north and south. In these cases,
historical enmity has precluded the establishment of marital
relations w
Although women generally move to their husband's residence
after marriage, matrilocality is common among the fishing popu-
lation of the Coromandel Coast. l1 At least ten men (5 per cent of
our survey) in Kalvimanagar had joined their wives and established
households there. In principle, if they would be joined by others of
their patrilineage or if their offspring would be particularly
numerous, this could be the start of a new pangaali group in the
village. At the seminal stage, however, these men tend to append
themselves to their wive's groups, thereby accepting a lesser role
in public affairs.
There is thus no simple correlation between Kalvimanagar as a
social unit and as a geographical one. Although several pangaali
groups are considered to be indigenous, in certain circumstances
these groups act as rivals. Moreover, a large percentage of the popu-
lation is of other descent. They retain loyalties to their places of
origin. Therefore, although all inhabitants are subsumed in a ranked
village order, with a panchayat and a headman at the top, the village
9 Blake (1970:131) makes the observation that marriage arrangements for
Coromandel Coast fishermen are made' as far as 50 miles up and down the coast-
line. If anything, this kind of kinship extension produces a kind of inter-kuppanz
[hamlet] solidarity through occasional visiting, reciprocal marriage alliances, as
well as being a social buffer at various times when money is needed, labor con-
scripted or famine expected.'
10 There appear to be variations in the marriage patterns of various pangaali groups.
Only 13 per cent of marriages in the largest and most prestigious indigenous group
involved partners from the hamlet itself, with most spouses (87 per cent, N=46)
coming from outside the village. In contrast, almost half of the marriages (45 per
cent, N=22) in a large and ambitious immigrant group involved local women. One
could speculate that the last figure is the outcome of a conscious strategy to develop
local roots.
II One facilitating condition is the dearth of immovable property in the fishing
profession, As most investments are made in movables, matrilocal residence
frequently less of a problem in fishing villages than in agricultural communi tICS
Artisanal FIshing and the Fishing Hamlet 93
community contains a 'natural' social fragility. More than in kin·,
ship, social unity is expressed in religion.
A Religious Focal Point
A set of sororal amman deities offer protection to the inhabitants of
Kalvimanagar. Nagalamman, the third sister and tutelary goddess
(uur teevan), is responsible for the welfare of the village popUla-
tion, protecting the village borders, houses, and lanes against evil
intrusions. She is the origin of prosperity and disaster. 'I'he
tionship between Nagalamman and the fishing population is a close
one, as her myth of origin demonstrates. According to this myth, a
village fisherman caught a statue in his nets one day. When he
returned to shore, it revealed itself to be the deity Nagalamman.
The villagers established her as the village goddess, and constructed
a temple in the sandy area 0.5 km north of the hamlet. The reason
for choosing this remote location was that the goddess had indi..
cated that she disliked the sounds of human habi,tation.
Nagalamman is connected to the village as a territorial unit, not
to any of the resident pangaali groups.12 As a reflection of the uni·
versality of her boon, ritual responsibilities for the goddess are div..
ided equally. All village members take turns carrying out the usual
temple rituals. The sequence of their tasks is fixed. Each member
fulfils religious duties for a period of a week, and then hands the
temple key to the next in line. All members contribute similarly to
the temple festival which is held in Nagalamman's honour.
This festival, which is normally held eVE;ry two years, is a grand
it is easily the biggest and most expensive event organized
on village premises. As every fishing village organizes such cele-
brations and the news is broadcast far and wide, temple festivals
thc' pre..eminent medium of intervillage competition for status.
Fishermen speak with gusto about the festivals they have visited.
They take a comparative and chauvinistic perspective: invariably
theirs more magnificent and more costly ,than those of the
" The debeendants of the statue's discoverer have a preferential position among
other as they constitute the statue's 'mother house' (tam! viidu). They
l,ollse,qIH.'ntlv have a ritual role to play during the temple festival. I did not find
evidence that their special status extends to other members of their pangaali group.

94 Marine Resource Management
others. In distinguishing' us' from' them', the temple festival is a
boundary-marking ritual (Cohen 1985:53) and an expressron of
collective identity. The image the inhabitants want to project among
13
their neighbours is of the village's prosperity and oneness.
Although Nagalamman is the acknowledged head of .the local
religious pyramid, other deities also have general functions or a
village--level following. The older deities include Nagalamman's
two elder sisters and a younger sister named Gangaryamman (god-
dess of the Ganges). I return to the latter in the course of chapter 4,
as she plays an important role in the fishing profession. Another
goddess, Sangootiyamman (the goddess who blows the ~onch)
joined the village pantheon in 1990 and was rmmediately grven a
place of honour. Although she plays no role with ~egard to the
occupation of fishing, her origin, like Nagalamman, rs the sea.
The influx of regional deities is a recent phenomenon. It paral-
lels the integration of the village into South Indian soci~~y (~f.
Herrenschmidt 1991). The most important of these derties ~n
Kalvimanagar is Saktiyamman (the goddess of power), whose mam
temple stands in Meelmaravattur. After a village not~ble es~ab­
lished a small temple for her in the early 1990s, she gamed wrde-
spread popularity-so much, in fact, that some have started to
afford her, and not Nagalamman, the position of village goddess.
3.2 Village Fisheries
Instruments ofFishing
Abutting on to the last houses along the seafront: the beach of
Kalvimanagar is narrow and vulnerable. Of course, rts appearance
depends on the season. In January, it slopes gradually towards a
gentle surf, leaving sufficient space for beachmg kattuma:ams and
for storing nets. Starting in August, however, the shorelme edges
closer to the village and creates a steep ascent. Dunng the subse-
quent monsoon months, heavy breakers threaten to undermrne the
1.1 The fact that a temple festival is organized at all is taken to be a sign of village
unity_ This is demonstrated in the way the inhabitants of Kalvimanagar explam
the temporary suspension of their village festivals. They attribute thiS to the ser-
ious quarrels which prevailed between village factions.
Artisanal Fishing and the Fishing Hamlet 95
seaside houses along the beach road. In this period, fishermen bring
their craft and nets right into the village streets for storage.
The seabed near the hamlet, to a depth of at least 20 fathoms, is
known for the rilany large rocks scattered in an otherwise sandy or
muddy bed. This unusual feature is replicated on a larger scale in
the Tripalur Reef, off the coast of Mahabalipuram. Rocks make for
a particular kind of fauna ~·lobsters thrive here, as do a variety of
demersal fish. A specialized hook and line fishery, which has de·
veloped in this ecological niche, sets the fishermen of this area apart
from others. The rocks have had another consequence as well.
Afraid of tearing their nets on the many protuberances, mechan-
ized boat fishermen have tended to stay away, thereby sparing
locals some of the disturbances caused elsewhere.
Although one group of fishermen recently tried to operate a
fibreglass boat from Kalvimanagar, the basic fishing craft is still
the kattumaram, constructed in varying lengths of six-shaped tim-
bers. The smallest craft (called kuttiri), with a side timber 6 to 9 feet
long, is basically fit for one- or two-man fishing trips and is pro··
pelled by a paddle or a latin sail. It is the most prevalent type of
craft. The largest kattumarams in the village have a side timber of
12 or 13 feet and take crews of two to four persons. This size is felt
to be best suited for motorization. A bigger craft would become
difficult to handle and a smaller one is too light for the weight of
the engine. In fact, all of the large kattumarams in the village are
motorized. A medium category of craft, with a length of 10 to 11
feet, is also in use. Half of the mid-size craft-as a stepping stone
to a bigger kattumaram-are motorized.
One or sometimes two teams of semi-speci~lized local fishermen-
carpenters build the kattumarams to order right in the village. This
process takes an average of three to five days. Logs are imported
{rom Kerala by a moneyed villager who has made a business of
this trade. The carpenters do not only serve the village market,
however. Fishermen from the region north of Madras as well as
from southern Andhra Pradesh regularly stop in Kalvimanagar to
place orders as well. Kalvimanagar is one of a group of villages
south of Madras which have developed a reputation for
kattumaram building. An interesting side effect of this specializa-
tion is that there is a lively trade in craft in Kalvimanagar. Villagers
Qrder new kattumarams and sell thern to outsiders, for a profitl a
few months later.
96 Marine Hesouree Management Artisanal Fishi1~q and the Fishi~q Hamlet 97

In February 1995, there were eighty-three kattumarams in the form groups to try and catch the schools of fish that frequent the
village, eleven of which were large and motorizedY A year later, coast. For this purpose, they use special nets which demand the
the number of motorized large kattumarams had more than dou- collaboration of many individuals. I will first con.sider the gear used
bled a dear indication of the popularity of mechanical propulsion. in small units, as this is the predominant mode of fishing, and then
Due to the expenses involved, most (83 per cent) of the motorized discuss the collective work fonns. 17
kattumarmns are shareholdings of two to four households. A The three most popular net types which fishermen again sub.
minority (17 per cent) are owned by a single household. 'To pur- divide on the basis of the quality and thickness of the twine used
chase the engines, a majority of fishermen obtained bank loans for by single kattumaram units are the three··walled trammel net
approximately 40 per cent of the cost of the engine and sometimes (manivalai), the mackerel net (pannuvalai), and the rock net
a subsidy as well. These loans and subsidies are mediated by the (paarvalai). Almost all fishing households in Kalvimanagar own
Fisheries Department (see chapter 9). On the lively second-hand panels of the first two types, while two··thirds possess some rock
market, however, fishermen are paying the full expense from their nets. In addition, many households operate two types of sardine
own pockets. 15 nets (kavalaivalai and taddakavalaivalai). The three most commonly
From the fishermen's perspective, motorization has a number owned net types are also the ones rnost frequently used. IS 'Table 3.3
of advantages. Because they are able to reach profitable fishing presents data on gear ownership patterns, as deduced from a ran·
grounds irrespective of currents or wind directions, and thereby dam survey of twenty-five village households.
lose less time in travel, their catch increases in size and value. As The ownership of gear has a meaning which goes beyond its
motorized craft are larger, more gear can also be taken along, which practical utility. This is brought out by fishermen's usage of the
again boosts catch rates. Finally, there is the comfort factor. Who-
ever has been aboard a motorized kattumaram and overtaken a Table 3.3 Gear U;'1n(~rslhip Patterns in
fisherman paddling home after long hours of fishing understands Gear Type Stretched % of Mean Assets"
the lure of engine propulsion for the fishing population. J6 Mesh Size Hoaseholds
For most of the year, the kattumaram fishermen of Kalvimanagar
wQrk in small units. They use a limited assortment of fishing gear, Trammel Net inner: 2.5c 96 3.75 kg
mainly for bottom fishing. During certain seasons, however, they outer: 13.5c
Mackerel Gillnet 2.5c 96 4.70 kg
Rock Gillnet 4.0c 64 5.50 kg
14 The total count of kattumarams in February 1995 was as follows: sixty-eight Sardine Gillnet (kavalaivalai) 2.5c 24 4.85 kg
kattumarams of 7 to 9 feet; six kattumarams of 10 to 11 feet; and nine kattumarams Sardine Gillnet
of 12 and 13 feet. The criterion is the length of the (shortest) side timbers. The unit 4.0c 4.70
of measurement is the mlilam, which equals the length of the forearm or approxi· The mean is calculated over the households possessing a particular kind of gear.
mately a foot.
15 Loans and subsidies for outboard motors are mediated by the Fishenes Depart-
For the technical details, some use has been made of Hornell (1927) and Thirunulu
ment and are part of the Centrally Sponsored Scheme of the Government of India al(1991).
The 1995 cost of a long.·tailed diesel engine (Lambardini or Hutz) was appron The sardine nets were more widely distributed than one would expect on the
matelyRs 25,000. The maximum subsidy and the maximum loan amount wen' baSIS of their usage rates in 1995. Schools of sardine were possibly less prevalent
both Rs 10,000. In June 1995, ten out of sixteen engines operated in Kalvimanagar this particular year. Some fishermen, however, say that there has been a declining
were bought new with a loan mediated by the Fisheries Department. Only five of trend nver a longer period of time, which would mean that widespread ownership
these applicants had also applied for and received a subsidy. The remaining of nets is actually a holdover from better times. However, there are more
engines had been bought second·hand, and the fishermen paid the full sum from tadors involved. These nets compete for a fisherrnan's favour in a season when
their own pockets. is also available, and the choice' gem'rally falls on the tramrnel net. One
16 See Bavinck (1997a) for a discussion of the processes and consequences fisherman explained that the sardine nets are valued for their constancy: one can
kattumaram motorization along the northern Coromandel Coast. of a catch worth at least Rs 50.
98 Marine Resource Man~J]el1'tent
word pangu, or share. A full share of income from a fishing oper-
ation (oru pangu) always refers to the combination of earnings from
labour and nets. A person investing only his manpower receives
only a half share (ami pangu). This signifies that he has only half of
what it takes to be a real fisherman. In accordance with a value
pattern which stresses the independent ownership of nets, even
the poorest households possess at least two vari(i'ties of gillnets.
The number of net types, as well as the quantity owned, increases
with the wealth of a family, and a large majority possess three to
four varieties. The average weight of gillnets owned by a house··
hold in 1995 was 15.8 kilos. Households with less than 10 kilos of
net were inevitably ranked amongst the village poor, and inform..
ants noted that they could hardly earn more than a subsistence
living. Many of the village rich, on the other hand, boasted more
than 25 kilos of gillnets. 19
Besides gillnets, most fishermen in Kalvimanagar still make regu-
lar use of a wide variety of hooks and line, although some are more
specialized in that method than others. This kind of fishing, as well
as the knowledge of fishing locations it presumes,2° has decreased
in recent years with the rising popularity of gillnets. Particularly
during the monsoon season, however, many fishermen still use
hooks and line. With the low costs of equipment, this method proves
to be a profitable alternative for poorer households.
Although most fishing efforts are directed towards the open sea,
the fact that most households also keep a hand-operated drag net
(koNdaivalai) demonstrates a secondary orientation toward the
brackish inland waters located south and west of the village. These
waters are a source of bait for hook and line fishing, as well as a
place of recourse when the monsoon surf prevents fishermen from
going to sea. They can then garner at least some earnings from the
inland waters.
'9 Gear quantities in Kalvimanagar are invariably calculated in kilos and not in
length. The weight of ropes, buoys and lead is excluded. Information on net own-
ership derives from the twenty-five-household sample survey.
20 McGoodwin (1990:39) points out that the marine biological knowledge of small-
scale fishermen is remarkable, both 'in terms of the depth and extent of practical
understanding, as well as the relative degree of intimacy with particular marine
environments'. The detailed knowledge Kalvimanagar fishermen have of the
adjacent sea area is revealed by the fact that many of the submerged rocks in the
inshore areas have been given names.
Artisanal Fishing and the Fishing Hamlet 99
Large schools of sardine (Clupeoidae spp.), mackerel (Rastrelliger
kanagurta spp.), pomfret (Pampus spp.), trevally (Camngidae spp.),
anchovy (Engmulidae spp.), and shrimp (Penaeid and non·Penaeid)
move up and down the coast during certain periods in the year,
often within eyesight of people on the shore. To capitalize on this
phenomenon, fishing communities in the region make use of two
large net types which demand collaboration in terms of both cap..
ital and labour investment. The beachseine (periyavalai or big net)
is shore-based and is used during a specific season. The large lift
net called idaivalai (Tamil meaning is undefined) is utilized at sea
throughout the year. Both nets once formed the core of the local
fishing economy, but they have declined in number and import..
ance (d. Thomson 1989:6'7-71).
As recently as the late 1970s, Kalvimanagar fishermen operated
about ten beachseines along the local beaches. During a season,
which lasts a full third of the year, these nets generated a large
proportion of village income. Three beachseines now remain -- one
owned individually and two by groups of patrilineal kin. Each
beachseine unit has a special plank-sewn craft (called masula boat)
to carry and launch the net and a stretch of beach (called paadu) to
which the. group has a special right. The net itself, which consists
of a cod..end connected to coil' wings and net leaders, is several
hundred metres in length; it is extended by means of long hauling
ropes (cf. Alexander [1982] 1995).
Beachseining is highly labour-intensive. Besides a group of fif-
teen or twenty regular workers, it involves a motley group of casual
helpers -- including old men, children, and even women _. who pro··
vide assistance during the final phase at e'l:ch haul. Each helper
has a right to at least some fish for the noon meal. The sizable spin-
off effects of beachseine fishing have even inspired a local prov-
erb: ' Periyavalai pooddaal uuree saappidum' (If the beachseine is shot,
the whole village eats).
The idaivalai is a large (maximum 20 x 15 m) rectangular lift net
that is shot underneath an approaching school of fish and then
raised by four kattumaram crews, each at a corner. In the past,
fishermen often used lift nets in combination with fixed fish lures
called kambi (see Hornell 1927:61-67 for a description of kambi fish-
ing). There are now five lift nets in Kalvimanagar. Two are indi-
Vidually owned, while the other three belong to groups consisting
of five to nine members of different lineages. As in the case of the
100 Marine Resource Management
beachseines, there is a regular trade in shares. The owners make
up part of the workforce. They are assisted by others who happen
to be available when a school is suddenly sighted.
The Cycle ofFishing
Fishing activities in Kalvimanagar have a daily and a seasonal
cadence, a pattern which fishermen vary somewhat from year to
year. The activities at any given time depend on the prevalence of
various species, the conditions at sea, and the demand of the market.
Last but not least, the patterns are also influenced by the inclin-
ations of the fishermen themselves.
The annual cycle can be divided into quarterly segments. January
to March is a recovery period after the lean monsoon period, a
time of increased fishing activity and catches as well as of invest-
ment in new gear. The hard northwesterly wind subsides and the
current flows from south to north. This is the principal beachseine
season. Net covers are removed, masula boats are patched up, and,
at least on mornings when the surf is low, the seines are shot. It is
also the time for cuttlefish. After February, schools of a small brown
non-Penaeid shrimp variety called semmekkeRaa tend to come in-
shore. The occasional bumper catches lead to conflicts between
kattumaram fishermen and mechanized boat crews.
The second quarter is marked by the beginning of the Hindu
new year as well as by the prime shrimp fishing season. In early
April, the two shrimp dealers of Kalvimanagar, who divide the
market into two, provide advances to active fishermen. They offer
cash in return for the pledge of shrimp catches at prices slightly
lower than the open market rate. The amounts advanced are sig-
nificant: in 1995 a fisherman on a non··motorized kattumaram re-
ceived Rs 1,000, a motorized kattumaram fisherman Rs 2,250. The
difference in amounts for non-motorized and motorized fishermen
confirms that motorized fishermen generally catch and earn more
than their non-motorized companions. This is the start of the lob-
ster (Panulirus spp.) season as well, and many fishermen go out
twice a day. They set their rock nets in the evening and collect them
the next morning. Schools of sardine regularly come inshore, and
fishermen with suitable nets try their luck at catching them. There
is a threat of danger in this second quarter, however, from the spring
cyclone called' ghost wind' (peeykaaR.Ru) which has a reputation
Artisanal Fishin.lJ and the Fishing Hamlet 101
for striking without warning. As if to make up for the weak storm
in 1995, the one which hit the Madras coast in June 1996 was intense.
The omens Were clear, however, and no Kalvimanagar fisherman
was surprised at sea.
Shrimp fishing continues throughout the third quarter and is
augmented with lobster and mackerel catches. This is the traditional
season for flying fish, a time in which hamlet fishermen search the
high seas on long and risky voyages (cf. Pajot and Prabhakaradu
1993). The option of catching high-value shrimp inshore has con.
tributed to the gradual decline of flying fish catches. This fishery
was last earned out by a group of fishermen from Kalvimanagar in
1993. September heralds the Tamil month of Puraddaasi, which fish.
errnen associate with low prices on the domestic market. The rea.
son is that widespread religious observances cause the market for
fish and meat products to collapse.
The last quarter of the calendar is dominated by the northeast
monsoon, which starts in October and continues into December.
Water currents reverse and increase in speed, and strong winds
and rain advancing from the northeast buffet the coast. This is the
traditional lean period: the surf makes it difficult to go to sea, houses
start leaking, and people come down with colds and fevers. Hook
and line fishing is at its peak during these months, and many fish.
errnen who otherwise prefer gillnets switch over. To augment their
incomes, others try their luck in the inland waters surrounding the
hamlet. Higher prices on the domestic market compensate for the
lack of regular catches to some extent. When the monsoon nears an
end, a brief migration season commences. Many fishermen leave
their families for short or long periods to try their luck down the
coast.
The 1995 monsoon was unusual in many respects. Although skies
yellowed and waves pounded the beach for several days, a cydone
failed to emerge. Moreover, the periods between squalls were abo
normally, almost dreadfully, calm-winds settled and the sea was
like a lake. The older fishermen said that they had never seen any-
thmg lIke this in their lives and that it might presage the end of the
world (kaliyugam). Nonetheless, fishing intensified, and families
had rnore money at their disposal than usual. Unfortunately, the
calm of the monsoon period was offset by a turbulent first quarter
ll\ 1996, which closed the beachseine season almost as soon as it
had begun
102 Marine Resource Management
Like the seasons, a fisherman's daily rhythm is based on regu-
larity. If a crew decides to go fishing on a particular day, they gen-
erally depart in the early morning between 1 and 3 a.m. in order to
return before the village auction commences around 8 a.m. If fish··
ing is particularly good, they may go out again, although they
often call it a day by early afternoon. Hook and line fishermen also
prefer daytime fishing. The main problem these fishermen face is
marketing. If they arrive at the beach after the auction is over, they
proceed to dry the fish, take the catch to a retail market themselves,
or keep the fish on ice until the next day's auction.
After a bath and a meal, the men often spend time repairing
their nets, either on the beach or in the shade of the village lanes.
For fishermen using outboard motors, engine repairs are a recur··
rent activity. Standing in groups around the mechanic who is
brought in from outside, they try to absorb the workings of the
new technology. The rest of the day is generally spent drinking,
playing cards, or watching television.
During 1995, the fishermen of Kalvimanagar spent slightly more
time on shore than they did at sea. There appears to be a signifi-
cant difference between motorized kattumaram crews and their
non-motorized colleagues, however. The former set out more often
than the latter. 21 The reasons for not going fishing are presented in
Table 3.4.
The table demonstrates the itnportance of two factors influenc-
ing whether or not a crew will go fishing on a particular day. First
of all, informants point to the poor catches so far that week, which
would reduce the chance of success that day. It is important to
realize that fishermen use a market perspective to define catch
quality. This means that it is not an absolute lack of fish, but a lack
of high-value products such as shrimp which makes a catch poor.
Bad weather is the other major reason fishermen might decide not
to go to sea. Both market and weather conditions combine with a
factor fishermen themselves did not mention initially but later con·
firmed: the amount of income in preceding days. When fishing has
21 The motorized kattumarams included in our activity register spent 54 per cent
of their days at sea, whereas non-motorized katturnarams went out only 36 per
cent of the days. This difference, which may be somewhat exaggerated but none·
theless indicative, follows not only from the advantages afforded by engine"
crossing the surf and reaching profitable fishing grounds, but also from the pres'
sure on motorized kattumaram crews to recoup their investments.
Artisanal Fishinff and the Fishing Hamlet 103
Table 3.4 Reasons for not going out fishing in Kalvimanagar
%
Poor Catches Recently 452
Bad Weather Conditions 31.9
Obligatory Village Meetings 6.7
Social Events Involving the Crew 6.1
Illness of a Crew Member 2.6
Repair/ Maintenance 15
Crew Problems 0.3
No Craft Available 0.3
Miscellaneous 5.4
Total 100.0
been particularly good, or when there have been other sources of
income, such as the sale of village land, Kalvimanagar fishermen
often take days off for no other purpose than to relax. They reason
that they have already earned enough to live on over the past few
days. This behaviour is typical for the artisanal fishing economy,
and is not found in the fishing industry of Madras (see Part 3).
However, village women often express their discontent with what
they see as a demonstration of laziness: 'Why are you sleeping?
So-and-so caught five lobsters today!'
Kalvimanagar fishermen concentrate their fishing operations in
the 20 fathom inshore belt. Proceeding directly eastward, this takes
them no further than 7 km from shore. Generally speaking, the
non-motorized kattumaram crews remain closer to shore than the
motorized ones. The latter regularly venture beyond a depth of 20
fathoms,whereas the fanner generally oper~te within a depth range
of 10 fathoms. The north-south range of fishing operations is sub··
stantial, however. Not only do fishing operations regularly take
men into the waters of adjacent villages, but longer trips are also
far from unusuaL Following a rumour or just a hunch of good fish-
Kalvimanagar fishermen habitually proceed down towards
Mahabalipuram or up towards Madras.
The aruwal migration season allows for longer sojourns in other
places. Migration patterns follow the affinal kinship network. Their
take Kalvimanagar men to the hamlets where their sisters
now live or where their mothers come from. They transport their
craft and nets by sea or by bullock cart and spend up to a tnonth in
their relatives' households, always adapting themselves to local
104 Marine Resource .Management
fishing rules. The hamlets in the surroundings of Mahabalipuram
are a particularly popular destination, since they skirt the rich fish-
ing grounds around Tripalur Reef. For motorized kattumaram fish-
ermen, this fishing ground is now within a day's range; but other
fishermen reach it more slowly and spend at least a few days on
location.
Between November 1995 and January 1996, one-fourth to one-
third of the kattumaram fishermen in Kalvimanagar spent several
days or more fishing in other fishing hamlets. Reciprocal migration
is less common, since Kalvimanagar's local fishing grounds are not
renowned. However, fishermen from other villages sometimes visit
Kalvimanagar in the shrimp season between April and August.
The Economics ofF'ishing 22
The smaller fishing units in Kalvimanagar are regularly composed
of the members of a single household, such as a father and son.
However, in larger units, and certainly in motorized fishing, where
capital costs are generally too high for one household to bear, house-
holds band together. In many cases, they are related to each other,
but partnerships based on friendship and professional consider-
ations are not at all unusual.
Initial investments made by a kattumaram fishing unit range
from Rs 10,000 for a small craft with hooks and line to Rs 1,00,000
for a motorized kattumaram with an average set of gillnets. Follow-
up investments are generally phased. Every year, a kattumaram
timber is replaced. Nets are added kilo by kilo, as old gear wears
out and money becomes available. Rarely does an individual mon-
opolize the ownership of the gear used by the unit. Instead, creW
members tend to pool their assets on an equal basis. Correspond-
ing assets in net ownership actually form an important criterion
for establishing a partnership, as large disparities are felt to con··
tribute to instability. In non-motorized kattumaram fishing, the craft
generally belongs to one partner (who receives 5··10 per cent of the
catch as compensation), while nets are shared on a 50/50 basis.
The institution of shared ownership is even more pronounced in
motorized fishing, where four members join together to buy the
22 Also compare Sivasubramaniam (1991), who presents one of the more thorough
studies of the economics of artisanal fishing along India's southeast coast.
Artisanal Fishin,l] and the Fishing Hamlet 105
craft and engine and contribute an equal amount of nets. When
fishing partners make identical contributions of labour and gear,
the division of fishing proceeds is uncomplicated: total returns,
minus costs, are divided equally among the participants. When
this is not the case, tensions and problems may occur, sometimes
resulting in the dissolution of the partnership.
Catch levels vary substantially from day to day and from craft
to craft. Almost 20 per cent of the fishing trips I monitored (N =686)
were considered to be a failure by the fishermen on board. Since
there was nothing worth selling, they divided the entire catch
among themselves as pataarttam (for home consumption). Three-
quarters of the catches had a monetary value of less than Rs 250,
and only 12 per cent exceeded Rs 500.
These figures mask substantial differences between motorized
and non-motorized craft. Seventy.·nine per cent of the catches of
non-motorized craft had a value below Rs 200, half the amount
generated by motorized craft (75 per cent of the latter's catches
were worth less than Rs 400). The better motorized units had an
annual gross income of more than Rs 70,000 (Rs 17,500 per share·
holder), whereas the non-motorized units earned between Rs 12,000
and Rs 18,000 (Rs 6,000 to Rs 9,000 per shareholder). Of course
there are significant variations between fishing seasons. Most in··
come is generated from May to September, while monsoon incomes
traditionally lag behind.
Fishermen market the catches landed in Kalvimanagar mainly
through two main channels. Most of the fresh fish destined for the
domestic market passes through the daily auction on the water-
front, where the auctioneer is an elderly wiqipw. Fishermen line up
with their catch and lay the fish out in the middle of a tight circle
dominated by local market wornen. A crew's fish catch is sold in
its to the highest bidder, whose name and the sum offered
are noted in an accounts book. These accounts are settled after the
women return from the market. Twelve village women, mainly
widows, act as regular fish traders. They usually travel to retail
markets in South Madras.
Export varieties are channelled through two traders who provide
annual to fishermen 23 The larger of the two enterprises
2J Advanc'c n10n('v not repaid directly by the fisherman. The trader takes a calcu"
la ted risk tha t margin he or she earns on the volume of shrimp delivered by a
106 Marine Resource Management
is run by a Muslim trader with a long history of business in the
village. Keeping shop in an abandoned house along the beach, he
deals in shrimp and lobster, as well as squid and pomfret. The fe-
male trader is descended from an old hamlet lineage. After her
husband was elected president of the Gram Panchayat, their eco
nomic prospects brightened considerably, and she went into trade.
She has a more limited clientele and assortment of goods. Both
traders havefixed contacts with export houses in Madras.
Certain seafood products go through other channels. Under some
circumstances, fishermen choose to dry the fish in the sun and sell
it to special dried fish merchants. Chanks (Xaneus Pyrum) are given
to yet another trader. And live, spawning shrimp are sold at good
prices to the shrimp hatcheries adjacent to the village.
3.3 The Relationship with the Mechanized Boat Sector
Kalvimanagar's geographical location and marine environment
have shielded it from the disturbance that has befallen other
artisanal fishing hamlets in the region. But like those other ham-
lets, the mechanized boats of Madras play an unmistakable role in
the local economy. Every day, either as specks on the horizon or in
close encounters, mechanized boats confront Kalvimanagar fish-
ennen with the existence of a competing fisheries sector.
In rnany cases, the contact is limited to sightings. Kalvimanagar
fishermen regularly observe boats with their nets drawn, as they
chug to or from the fishing grounds. In other cases there is contact
of either an accommodating or conflicting nature. For example,
Kalvinlanagar fishermen sometimes request passing boat fisher-
men to tow them to faraway fishing grounds or procure bait from
them for hook and line fishing. In return for a share of the pro-
ceeds, they occasionally ask boat fishermen to transport a bumper
fisherman over a year will be sufficient to offset the costs of the advance. Th"
traders themselves have obtained advances from the exporters with whom they
have an exclusive sales relation. The largest trader in Kalvimanagar, a Muslim
who has over one hundred clients, calculated that he had invested a total of
2,50,000 in 1995. The other trader, a woman, has 35 clients and put out Rs 80,DOD lt1
the same year. Interestingly, advances are provided on a personal basis and not
for a kal:lumaram crew as a whole. This causes problems if one crew member is
connecl:ed to one trader while another has a relationship with the other trader
Artisanal Fishing and the Fishir~J3 Hamlet 107
catch to the Madras harbour, where market prices are higher. Con-
versely, artisanal fishermen might help boat fishermen in the event
of serious engine trouble, or they might provide them with shelter
in a storm. Unknown to the owners of the boats, who generally do
not accompany their crews to sea, both parties occasionally col..
lude in the illicit sale of mechanized boat catches.
Such adjustments, however accommodating, do not preclude
conflict. Many fishermen ih Kalvimanagar argue that mechanized
boat fishing has negatively affected fish stocks in the inshore zone.
This is brought out in the following interview fragment:
Prabakaran: They are catching all fish in the whole sea, even small
fish which are growing. They are wasting the resource. Because
they are doing so, many of us are not interested in going for
fishing any more. Yesterday we went for fishing, but there were
no good catches. So today we have no interest. Now also one
boat is catching fish close to the shore. If we go far away to catch
fish, a boat may run over the kattumaram or net because they
are careless.
Kalvimanagar fishermen are not the only ones who attribute
declining catches to mechanized boat operations. In sixteen out of
twenty-one villages surveyed along the Coromapdel Coast, reo
spondents noted that catches had declined during the past decade.
In all cases, mechanized boats were identified as one of the main
causes the dwindling catches have not resulted in
lower incomes. In nineteen villages, respondents declared that
while catches had gone down, average incomes had actually in..
creased. The only possible explanation for this paradox is an in··
crease in prices, on both the domestic and the foreign market.
Indeed, there is cursory evidence thai market prices for seafood
have risen at a rate well above that of inflation. 24
24 Data on the development of export prices of scafood must be available, as gov·
ernment agencies such MPEDA arc monitoring these markets carefully. I have
not COn1Q across of thi:-,; 111ateriat however. I arn also unaware of
stucheson price. . of seafood on local markets or at landing sites. This
rt ';enous lacuna In IndIan fisheries studies. From informal observations in the
Madras region, it appears if fish pnces have rocketed in recent years. Quality
fIsh vanetles now tetch pnces similar to or higher than those of mutton and chicken.
108 Marine Resource Mrmagement
Artisanal fishermen regularly suffer damages when boats cut
through their nets with either their propellers or trawling equip-
ment. The fishermen react angrily, generally blaming the boat crew
for being negligent and callous. Incidents of this kind are some-
times followed by wild chases to capture the offending boat and
bring it to shore (see chapter 5). If this fails, the fishermen apply to
the mechanized boat owners courts (see chapter 7). Conflict is also
rife during the season of the shrimp variety called semmekkeRaa.
The dense schools of these shrimp, which sometimes appear in
shallow waters, lure large groups of artisanal fishermen as well as
mechanized boats; being in such close quarters, friction often arises
between the two groups.
The problems that Kalvimanagar fishermen experience with
mechanized boats are duplicated along the length of the Coromandel
Coast. In all of the twenty-one villages surveyed, respondents men-
tioned that conflicts with mechanized boats occur regularly.
Underlying the daily interactions between boat and kattumaram
fishermen in Kalvimanagar, there is an important -- and puzzling-
fact: Kalvimanagar fishermen have little interest in boat fishing
themselves. In fact, not one inhabitant of Kalvimanagar currently
owns or manages a boat, although at least two have done so for
short periods of time in the past. I have no evidence of boat owners
leaving the village for the city. Instead, my information reveals
that the villagers have generally kept their distance from the boat
fishing trade in terms of investments and with respect to labour
migration. Only five or six Kalvimanagar fishermen find temporary
employment as crew members on boats working out of Madras.
However, not one of them, nor any others from the hamlet, has stayed
on the job long enough to achieve the rank of' driver'. The villagers
I met who were working on boats had all suffered a material set-
back in the village, and often expressed a desire to return to artisanal
fishing. They expected their stays in Madras to be short ones.
When asked why they had not become more involved in mechan-
ized boat fishing, Kalvimanagar fishermen often point out that
boat fishing is arduous and that they are not accustomed to it. Not
only does one have to work hard, but the movement of the craft
makes it difficult to sleep on board. Moreover, while one might
earn more on a boat, city life is also more expensive. Kalvimanagar
fisherm~n generally prefer the peaceful (amaitiyaana) life of the
village: Nowadays, if they think at all about moving, it is to another
Artisanal Fishil1;8 and the Hshin/l Hamlet 109
country such as Singapore, where salaries are higher and jobs more
prestigious.
For an outside observer who aspires to go beyond the first
of proffered explanations, Kalvimanagar's lack of involvement in
boat fishing is a puzzle. After all, the village is situated near
Madras, and villagers have many relations amongst the Madras
fishing population. Why then did local fishermen not grasp the
opportunities which presented themselves when the boat fishing
industry developed? The realization that Kalvimanagar is not
unique in its lack of labour participation in boat fishing makes this
question even more urgent. The fact is that mechanized boat owners
in Madras rely to a large extent on crew members from other coastal
regions.
A hint of an explanation for this state of affairs emerges from
the following dialogue with an elderly village leader:
. The Fisheries Department never allocated boats to the
Kalvimanagar Fisheries Society?
Subramanian: No, never. In fact, some outside boat owners did
ask us why our village did not submit applications for boats. I
told them that we would not do so, as boats would disturb
artisanaJ fishing practice and damage the fishing grounds.
So ne) in the village ever wanted to apply for a boat?
Subramanian. A few people did inquire about it, but the majority
in the said that we must not take boats here. Yes, this
decision resembJed a ban (tadai). Some relatives of mine frorn
Madras also asked me whether they could base their boats here,
but J refused.
Q: SO there was opposition to having boats in the village?
Subramanian.' Many felt like that. The point is that if we permit
boats to be owned or from here, we cannot stop them
from fishing. Trawling would affect beachseine operations, and
boats would be trawling in sarne places where kattumararn
fishenTl(On set their nets.
Q: But boats corne here anyway create disturbances ...
Subramanian. But now we can tell the111 to go out further, we can
take sticks and force them to. We c(mldn't do this if the boat
owners would belong to our
Q. I have heard that in some this coastline, vi]]a~
gel's have prohibited Hu~,,·L·,;nn on belats.
110 Marine R.esource iV1anagement Artisanal Fishing and the Fishing Hamlet III

Subramanian: It was like that here too. The point is that if a vil-
lager works on a boat, he can also show the boat fishermen where
our fishing grounds are. Even now the ban is effective.
Q: But why are some Kalvimanagar fishermen now working on
boats?
Subramanian: These men are taking the risk of being ostracized.
According to this respondent Kalvimanagar's meagre involvement
in boat fishing is rooted in a consensus that to do so would be harm-
ful to artisanal fishing practice. At two points in the interview, he
takes this argument one step further. He then intimates that the
village administration actually prohibited investments and labour
participation in mechanized boat fishing. I discuss the ban on fish-
ing gear, which is a prime instrument of artisanal fisheries regul-
ation, in more detail in chapter 4. There, I also return to the village's
alleged ban on involvement in boat fishing. I argue that hamlet
administrations are likely to have utilized the gear banning instru-
ment to control the deleterious effects of boat fishing in their terri-
torial waters. One of the key explanations for Kalvimanagar's
surprising noninvolvement in mechanized boat fishing may well
be couched in these terms.
and the most structurat the frictions between pangaali groups are
not t~e only sourc~ of vIllage strife. Far more disruptive in the long
run. IS the professIonal diversification of the village population,
~hlCh ~ubvert.s the feelmg of mutual responsibility and belonging.
1:
~urthelmo~e, also undermmes the set·up of village administra.
tIon, as I wIll dISCUSS further in chapter 5.
The other topic I discussed in this chapter was the character of
artisanal fishing in Kalvimanagar. I noted its local and small-scale
c~aracter a~d emphasized the flexibility of the local fishing oper-
atIOns, as fIshermen ~~apt .their techniques and their fishing
?roun~s to the avaIlabIlIty of lmportant fIsh stocks. These dynamo
lCS, ~h~ch are replIcated through time by the adoption of new types
of fIshmg gear, place specific demands on the structure of an
artisanal sea tenure system. In addition to pressures from within
the artisan~l sea tenu~e system is also challenged by the operati01~
of mechamzed boats m Kalvimanagar waters.

3.4 Conclusions

The question posed at the start of this chapter was whether there
are any reasons for the sea tenure system along the Coromandel
Coast to be centred at the level of the fishing village. My material
does not offer an easy answer. On the one hand, I pointed out the
incidence of professional homogeneity; not only are most inhabit-
ants still involved in the fishing trade, but the differences between
individuals' fishing practices are slight. Caste is a unifying factor,
and village households are extensively com1ected through mar-
riage and descent. On the other hand, kinship relations also intro-
duce an alternative centre of loyalty and authority - the pangaali
group. The tensions between pangaali groups create a recurrent
threat to unity and a continuous challenge to village leadership.
However, it is not only on the political level that integration takes
place. The village goddess and the temple festivals in her honour
are a powerful symbol of the village as a social entity, one that is in
opposition to others along the coast. Although they are the oldest

4
THE RlJLE SYSTEM OF ARTISANAL
FISHERMEN
Artisanal fishermen of Kalvimanagar and other fishing settlements
along the Coromandel Coast employ a variety of instruments to
regulate access to the fish resource. A notion of territoriality is fun-
damental to all of these. The fishermen of each hamlet, represented
by their panchayat, have prerogatives to exploit adjacent coastal
zones. These privileges are of a special type, for one of the tenets of
artisanal fishing practice is that villages cannot restrict who fishes
in a particular area. In this sense, artisanal fishing is truly open
access. 1 Panchayats, however, can regulate how people fish, such
as by restricting the use of fishing gear. McGoodwin (1990) does
not include the regulation of fishing gear in his discussion of
artisanal fishermen's management strategies, assuming that for the
most part fishermen 'use the most effective fishing gear ~hey can
get their hands on' (ibid.:132). The material presented in the
following pages, however, challenges the generality of his
conclusion.
Mechanized boat fishermen bring a new catching technology
with them when they enter the territory claimed by village
panchayats. As the artisanal tenure system covers teclmology as
well as space, it is logical that such an incursion would elicit a reac-
tion. In this chapter I discuss the mechanized boat sector's place in
the artisanal system of rules, taking two steps. The first section
discusses the relationship artisanal fishermen of Kalvimanagar have
I My conclusion on open access contradicts the findings of Thomson (1989:83),
who argues that artisanal fishing grounds are not free for all to enter. Although
this difference of opinion may be due to the fact that we worked in different
graphical areas, [ am inclined to doubt his results on this point. Thomson appears
to confuse the posing of conditions on outsiders with the control of access.
The Rule System ofArtisanal Fishermen 113
with the sea and its denizens. This is important because a rule
system is always embedded in a body of knowledge and values.
The next section explores the contours of the artisanal rule system
and how it applies to the mechanized boat sector.
4.1 Relationship with the Sea
Foster (1965:295) was not the first, or even the last, to point out tha t
the 'nonnative behavior of the members of a group is a function of
its particular cognitive orientation.' According to Foster, peasant
behaviour could best be explained by a model called the 'Image of
Limited Good'. Peasants view their environment as one in which
desired economic goods' exist in finite quantity and are always in short
supply'. Consequently, 'an individual or a family can improve a posi-
tion only at the expense of others' (ibid.:296, italics in the original).
One of the strategies Foster thought peasants used to meet this
'threat' was to cooperate in 'placing sanctions against individual-
ism' (ibid.:301).2
Foster's writings fit in the 'barriers to change' discourse which
reigned in the 1960s and then disappeared, and for many good
reasons too, in the following decades. However, his concept of the
'Image of Limited Good' remains a useful instrument for probing
the cognitive background of th~ artisanal sea tenure system. Spe-
cifically, it sheds light on questions of belief: do artisanal fisher··
men believe the fish resource is limited and unextendable? Do they
believe that the fishing activities of one person affect the results of
another?
I begin by considering the roles of superriiiltural beings and the
to
role of fate in fishing operations. This leads a discussion of the
ways in which fishermen attempt to manipulate these forces. Then
I ideas on the linkage between individual fishing ef··
forts, whereby the phenomenon of professional envy gets special
Foster (1965:2.95) hoped to develop a' master model' which would explain a wide
range behaviour in the fields of economics, health, friendship, etc. His
model the of Limited Good' has made most impression with regard to
economic behaviour, and it is in this limited sense that I reft'r to it. Foster also
believed that the 'Image of Limited Good' probably resulted more in extreme indio
vrdualism than in cooperation between peasants (ibid.:301), a conclusion challenged
by (1979:')6) for example
114 Marine Resource ManCl;ljernent
attention. I continue the exploration of an idea of limited good later
in the chapter.
GoddesJes and Demons
In writing about Tamil fishermen, Ram (1991:51) argues that 'at-
tempts at controlling the environment focus ... on ritual, rather
than technology'. Although ritual··~ and the supernatural which it
addresses -- are of great significance in Kalvimanagar as well, Rarn
underestimates the practical orientation of fishermen. A fisherman
plagued by bad catches first reviews his fishing operations. FIe
adapts his gear and chooses a different location for setting the net.
He also adjusts his fishing practice in line with the SEc'asons and
with the natural variations in fish availability. Fishing skill is a
source of pride, and differences in skill are openly acknowledged.
Nevertheless, it is clear that fishermen families also live in a
world inhabited by goddesses, saints, demon···like creatures, and
spirits a world with undercurrents and hidden forces (d.
McCoodwin 1990:31). Dangers lurk in crevices of both physical
and social landscapes. Propitiating, and thus neutralizing, poten-
tially harmful powers is a recurring concern. It is likely that artisanal
fishermen, with their vulnerable craft, are more sensitive to such
influences than fishermen working on bigger boats. Significantly,
the mechanized boat fishermen of Madras perform fewer rituals
and generally dwell in a less religious universe 3
The ocean is the main presence in a fisherman's life and is often
referred to as Kadalammaa (sea mother)4 Opinions differ as to
3 This fits in with the 'anxiety-ritual theory' which argues that religious behaviour
varies according to the anxiety people experience in their profession. For a discus-
sion of this approach and alternative explanation[;, see van Ginkel (1987), Palmer
(1989) and Poggie and Pollnac (1988).
4 The electoral campaign for the State Assembly in May 1996 contained an indir-
ect reference to Kadalammaa. Chief Minister Jayalalitha, trying to capitalize on a
mother-of-the-nation image, used posters with texts in which the suffix ammaa
(mother) was attached to descriptive nouns in order to woo various professional
groups and caste communities. Her choice of wording in the [jihing neighbour-
hood of Madras was different, however: instead \1£ exalting her as Iwdal-ammaa, a
choice of terminology which would have caused confusion with the sea itself,
wall poster in Royapuram flaunted the more formal synonym kadal-taal/.
The Rule A rl:isana! I-ish emien I IS
whether Kadalammaa is a goddess in her own right; to my know-
ledge, there is no shrine or ritual dedicated in her name to be found
along the entire CoromandeJ Coast. Even so, the sea has sanctity as
well as a trace of volition, as is indicated by the role of sea water in
rituals of both the fishing occupations and the domestic sphere.
The sea's' character' is also revealed in such as the charm··
ing one in which the Bay of Bengal's intense desire to be close to its
sister, the Arabian Sea, causes severe erosion along the northern
Coromandel Coast.
The fact that the sea is the main source of livelihood im:pilces
religious behaviour, as the following interview fragment illustrates:
Desirzgu: The character of the sea is changeable like that of human
beings. See how calm it is now, but only 10 days ago there was a
cyclone warning. Just like people of other professions pray to
god to expedite their work, we have to pray before launching
our craft. It is like the relationship between teacher and student
in which the latter has to give respect (mariyaatai) to the former.
After all, the sea gives us our earnings (varumaanam). We must
therefore worship it like a god (atai oru teevamaaga taan
lcondaadaveeNdum). It is respected (mati) as goddess, like we re~
speet our mother. Before we shoot our nets we have to pray to
it. And when we remove fish from the nets we will pray ...
Interruption by Prabakaran: Because we are hoping to get a good
catch (rzalla varumaarzam kidailcanumnu).
Many fishermen in Kalvimanagar say that Kadalammaa is the same
as Carzgaiyamman, the goddess of the Rivel',Canges and thus, by
of all waters. Older fishermen believe that the anger of
C;;mgaiyamrnan, the moodiest of the tutelary goddesses who makes
her oracles twist violently like snakes when possessed, is the sudden
storm which rises and overwhelms fishermen at sea. Dangerous to
those who neglect her, phe is also protective of her devotees. In
tlInes of trouble, fishermen often call out her name. Others call upon
the Ivi uslim saint Nagoor, who has demonstrated a speciaJ affinity
in the fishing profession (cf. Bayly 1989).
",,·v (" " misfortune and to generally increase their Juck, fisher-
mc'n out rituals either for Kadalammaa or for Cangaiyamman.
,mange pujas (religious ceremonies) at the Jaunching of a
CLJf! or when a panel of nets is put to use for the first tirne.
I 16 Marine Resource Management
Furthermore, they say quick prayers before departing on a fishing
trip and wheh shooting the nets. To ward off bad spirits! they spit
on the first fish which is hauled on board. When misfortune tran-
scends an individual and strikes the entire community! villagers
congregate and organize a joint puja.
However! creatures other than gods also populate the seashore
and the waves. One of the more dangerous of these is a class of
guardian spirits called Annanmaar (the brothers)! who become
ferocious when disturbed (d. HiltebeiteI1989). Annanmaar dwell
in male spaces and! according to the religious specialist of the vii··
lage, have an origin which predisposes them to affecting men over
women. Annanmaar has struck many village fishermen in the past!
causing them to turn feverish and violent; only the intervention of
an oracle or of a religious specialist can relieve a victim.
Fishermen have many stories about the divine origin of various
sea creatures. Foremost is the sea turtle! which occupies an import-
ant place in Hindu mythology. Catching a turtle is supposed to
affect catches badly; if fishermen find one in their nets! they imme··
diately set it free. Upon return! the crew also holds a propitiatory
puja on the beach. s Other creatures glean status from their anom-
alous nature (Douglas 1966). The sail fish! for example! which has
a hide resembling leather and flesh like beet is also considered a
bad omen! and catching one requires ritual propitiation.
Fate and Magic
The misfortune which befalls a fisherman may originate in the tem-
peraments of the sea! the gods! or the god-like creatures he hap-
pens to encounter. These constitute a shadowy part of his working
environment - just as elusive! for that matter, as the fish he chases.
He has a limited grip on these beings and can only hope to concili-
5 The taboo on catching turtles appears to stem from the larger Hindu tradition.
One fisherman mentioned that the turtle is an incarnation of the god Vishnu; an-
other linked it to the god Pillaiyar's vehicle, the mouse. When asked about the
taboo, various fishermen informants recounted the Tamil saying 'never allow a
turtle or a tax collector (bailiff) into one's house' (aamai pugunta viidum amil1aa
pugul1ta viidul1i uRuppudaatu). Although they appear to be caught regularly, I have
never seen turtles landed or marketed in Kalvimanagar or, for that matter, in any
other domestic fish market. For similar observations from the South Asian regiol~.
see Alexander ([1982] 1995:115, 274, note 6).
The Rule System ofArtisanal Fishermen II '7
ate them. Misfortune or luck is also of human origin! however! the
result of fate or of orchestration.
Reflecting on their individual fishing performances! Kalvima-
nagar fishermen distinguish between temporary bouts of misfor·
tune and structural ones! the comparison always being with other
fishermen. Fishermen use the word tarittiram (poverty! want) to
describe the bad luck which affects all persons from time to
such as'missing a bus or losing a big fish. They thus jokingly! but
generally with a serious undertone! inform family and friends that
!misfortune has taken hold of me! (ennakku tariiiiram pidittuviddatu).
There is a connection here with the person-centric orientation. of
Hindu culture (Daniel 1984:70). The vulnerability of an in2LUs.pi-
cious period may advance misfortune, as fortune too may be rooted
in fate. A critical quality of tariUaram is that it is beyond manipu·
lation.
However, a fisherman may boost his luck beyond the levels die
tated by fate, the quality of his equipment, and his natural prow·
ess. A number of older fishermen in Kalvimanagar regularly revert
to magic in order to increase their catches. T'hey procure amulets!
or other articles from specialists in the coastal region.
informants! who all happened to be non-users of occult l11.eanS,
declared that these fishermen's catches were indeed higher on
average than those of others. An indicator of their success is the
fact that village traders are said to give these fishermen larger
money advances." However! human action also can reduce a fish..
erman's luck. The human propensity for jealousy can result in the
cas ling of the evil eye or a conscious act of sorcery.
'T1JC SU.j('m/1Canu o(Jea!ousy
Although every crew makes its own decisions on time, place, and
the method of fishing, in practice there is a great deal of synchrony.
Crews tend to fishing at the same hour and return together
in time for the auction. They often also work the same fishing
G If magit indec,d Increasing catches, the question arises as to why
It IS not used by a proportion of the Kalvimanagar fishing population. I was
not able to 1l1vestigate tlus or the reality of higher financial advances to
charm~users" One hslwrwoman's statement may contain a hint about the limited
magic 'The money III this way is not justly (niitittanaal) earned and
won't persist'
lIS Marine Resource Management
grounds and lay similar gear within hailing distance of each other.
These similarities originate L'l the pattern of professional decision-
making. Today's fishing practice is modelled on yesterday's experi-
ences: which fisherman had the best catches, and how and where
did he catch the fish? After a particularly good catch, a large group
of fishermen go out the next day to try their luck in the same loca-
tion (d. Barth 1966:10).
Since they work and live in close proximity, Kalvimanagar fish-
ennen are generally well aware of the catches brought back by their
neighbours. This is an expression of prOfessionalism. However,
propinquity combined with difference also breeds jealousy. In the
words of one fisherman, 'if we see someone else who had a good
catch, our stomachs bum (vayiRu erital).' Jealousy inadvertently
prompts the casting of an evil eye on the fortunate person.
One morning a motorized kattumaram overturned in the surf,
The engine sank and one crew member was wounded. A woman
who saw this happen exclaimed that 'this may well be the evil
eye, hasn't the crew been coming up in life?'
Worse than the evil eye, jealousy may provoke conscious acts of
sorcery and more mundane acts of violence too. A fortuitous fish-
erman may one morning find his net buoys cut loose. Moreover, if
he happens to be from another locality, he may be forced to vacate
the fishing ground.
A great effort is made to ward off jealousy, as it is such a com-
mon force. Catch values are consistently understated, for example.
But the local, who is aware of this dissembling, makes his own
calculations to arrive at an approximation of the true value.
Question: And if a fisherman has good catches, how does he pro-
tect them?
Jeevaratnam: He hides the catch.
Question: I saw Kalesh running home this morning with his fish
basket clutched tightly under his arm ...
Jeevaratnam: That's it!
If he has an unusually good catch one day, a fisherman might take
a bundle of neem (margosa) leaves along with him the next, just in
case someone had cast an evil eye. 'But not everyone does this',
says one fisherwoman, 'only those who believe that others can
affect their catches.'
The Rule System ofArtisanal Fishermen 119
The interesting question is whether jealousy relates to fisher-
men's conceptions of limitE'd good. Does one person's good for-
tune imply that someone else will automatically suffer worse
catches? Is it a matter of one person catching the fish which are
thought to 'belong' to another? Neither possibility seems to hold
true. The inhabitants of Kalvimanagar view jealousy as a purely
social phenomenon that is not connected with distribution. Every
fisherman in Kalvimanagar has his own connection to the sea and
to the forces which reign there. His fishing results vary in accord-
ance with the state of this private relationship as well as with his
tangible assets of gear and of skills. In principle, one man's fishing
activities do not affect those of another, except through the indirect
powers of jealousy.
If this was the entire story, however, a sea tenure system would
be practically superfluous. The only problems between fishermen
would then revolve around the physical collision of fishing gear.
As the following discussion points out, however, artisanal fisher-
men do believe in appropriation and assignment externalities.
4.2 Fishing Rules
In their relationships with colleagues and with the sea, the fisher-
men of Kalvimanagar have developed a flexible and interlocking
system of fishing rules. Paradoxically, one of its key principles is
open access: any fisherman may fish in any inshore waters he
wishes. This liberty has a corollary in another domain: a fisherman
has a right to discover and to use new types of fishing gear. Both of
these rights, however, are restricted by fulC8 that.are proclaimed
and enforced by hamlet panchayats. In this section, I first concen··
trate on the principle of open access. Then I discuss territoriality
and the rules of technical innovation. Other rules and principles,
such as the ones that regulate collective work forms and provide
compensation for damages, are touched on briefly, as they are less
relevant to the topic at hand.? I conclude with a discussion of
physical violence and how it relates to the rule system.
I I do not discuss the rules on etiquette (d. McGoodwin 1990:140) or on the 'find-
, which relates to the exploitation of fish stocks around stationary
objects.
120 Manne Resource ManCl;.qement
A School ofShrimp
In order to provide a focal point, I commence with an illustration
of fishing practice.
One morning in February 1995, village fishermen reported big
catches of small non-Penaeid shrimp off the coast of a hamlet to
the south of Kalvimanagar. My assistant and I joined three young
fishermen named Ravi, Mohan, and Ganapathy on their motor-
ized kattumaram. However, ours was not the only crew trying
to cash in on the bonanza. Many other fishermen from
Kalvimanagar and from villages further north proceeded in the
same direction, propelling their craft with engine power or
paddles, or just dragging them from the beach. Market women
were walking that way as well. Altogether, the beach was an
unusually busy passageway.
When we arrived at the stated location, we saw about eighty
kattumarams of varying sizes criss-crossing an area one square
km in size. Three mechanized boats surrounded by small clus-
ters of kattumarams were anchored at the far edge of activity. It
later became clear that these boats had towed kattumaram fish-
ennen from Madras to do lift net fishing. To complicate the situ··
ation further, a shore crew was pulling in a beachseine with an
end float that was at least 300 m offshore in the midst of the
crowd. Our kattumaram crew did not notice the seine activity
(at least Ravi said he had not seen it) and feverishly rushed to
release the trammel net into the enclosed water area, as a number
of other fishermen were doing. Members of the seine group pad-
dled around in the same space, and they swore at the intruders
and told them to remove their nets immediately or else. Our
crew appeased them immediately: 'Sorry, we didn't see your
seine, we are taking out the nets at once. You don't need to use
such rough language because you are right ...'. The small panel
of nets which had been in the water was filled with shrimp and
Ganapathy muttered that' if we had just been able to leave them
here for a little longer, we would have made at least Rs 1,000 to
2,000.'
After this incident, we moved closer to the point; twice we shot
the net in an erratic zigzag and rapidly pulled it in. All three
crew members, as well as the other fishermen, continuously
'lhe Rule ofA rtisanal Fishermen J2 J
monitored the performance of others out of the corners of their
eyes. Sometimes they asked passing fishermen about the quality
of other fishing spots.
Returning to the bay, Mohan and Ravi again released the tram·
mel net for about half its length. The congestion around us was
immense, and nets were laic over and in close proximity to one
another. To my surprise, silence prevailed. Only a few shouted
'get away from there' or 'not so close'. As we pulled in our net,
it tangled with another piece of fishing gear. Mohan half-
jokingly exclaimed 'where's my knife so I can cut the bastard
loose?', but unsnarled it carefully. All in all we made about five
shots before we returned to Kalvimanagar at around 2 p.m. The
catch totalled about seven kilos of shrimp, four of which were
sold to a male cycle vendor and two to a related female vendor.
The crew divided the remaining shrimp amongst themselves.
This scene is not unusual. The schools of small non··Penaeid shrimp
(semmekkeRaa) which form in certain seasons cause an unusual
congestion of fishermen in inshore waters. T'o complicate matters,
fishermen use not one but several kinds of fishing gear in the same
fishing space. Many kinds of conflicts can arise. Motorized
kattur~aram crews moving to and fro run the risk of damaging set
nets with their propeller blades; the proximity of fishing units can
result in gear tangles and perceived loss of catch; and irritations
can develop between local fishermen and outsiders. With all these
opportunities for strife, it was surprisingly quiet in the bay, and
people generally concentrated on the tasks at hand.
Access
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the shrimp fishing case was
the tolerance shown towards outside fishermen. As the news of
the school of shrimp spread, fishermen from a large region
descended on the fishing ground without even requesting pennis·
'ilon from the local population. The latter did not question the out·
sldc' fishermen's rights to partake in the harvest. This held true
even for the lift net fishermen from Madras, even though everyone
kn(Jws that the lift net is an extremely efficient fishing method.
MechanIzed boat fishermen were the only ones that did not par-
m fishing operations a point I will return to later.
122 Marine Resource Man~qement
The following interviews with fishermen confirm my observa--
tion that there are no restrictions on access to fishing space.
Interview (1)
Question: The village has land boundaries which are protected
by the gods, but are there boundaries at sea too?
Jeevaratnam and Prabakaran: No, there are no boundaries (ella i) at
sea. Wherever fishermen go is their place. They can't say it is
their property (sontam).
Jeevaratnam (laughs); If the sea would dry up, we could put up a
nice house and say it is ours.
Question: But can't you say that the sea adjac(~nt to the village
belongs to you in some way?
Jeevaratnam: We are not the only ones working here. People from
other villages also come here to fish.
Interview (2)
Question: A farmer has a special relationship with the land he
ploughs; what relation does a fisherman have with the sea?
Desingu: We can't say that the sea is our property like farmers
can. If we find a rock (with good fishing), we can't say it belongs
to us. The sea is common to all (elaarukkum sontamaanatu). Any··
one can do fishing here, people from my village, people from
other villages ....
Both interview fragments demonstrate a sense of an indivisible sea
resource that is common to its many users. The respondents point
out that, unlike land, the sea cannot be marked and claimed. This
is a product of the physical nature of the resource. One of the fish··
ermen joked that only if the sea became land could property rights
be implemented. As it is, however, the sea exists for all fishermen. 8
Besides reflecting the nature of the resource, the openness of
inshore waters is also of practical utility. As I pointed out previ··
ously, fishermen tend to follow the fish, which of course do not
H The artisanal concept of the sea as an open resource differs fundamentally from
the mare liberum espoused by Crothius and by his followers. Mare liberum was a
political statement intended to break down privileged rights and to establish free
trade. This is very different from the views of the artisanal fishermen of
Kalvimanagar, for whom open access reflects the exigency of fishing practice rather
than a political agenda.
The Rule ofArtisanalHshermen 123
confine themselves to a particular territory. In addition, SOUle
coastal regions have special resources which entice migrants dur
ing certain parts of the year. Geographical movement is therefore
an essential part of the artisaJ'lal fishing profession. A hamlet popu
lation which seals its waters off from outsiders runs the risk of
sealing itself in. This is a highly detrimental prospect.
allowing others to join in local fishing operations gives a group the
moral right to demand the same privilege if the situation so
demands. Reciprocity is a notion which colours rules on technical
innovation too, and I return to it below.
The question still remains whether open access in the artisanaJ
tenure system applies to all citizens of the Republic of India or
only to a particular social group. Can any fisherman, of any ethnic
affiliation or gear type, join in local fishing? Furthermore, can any·
one become an artisanal fisherman and join the artisanal fishing
sector?
The mechanized boat fishermen of Madras have stronger
ions on these issues than the artisanal fishermen I interviewed. 'The
large number of entrants to mechanized boat fishing has put pres
sure on facilities and on resources, making the outsider issue a
highly politicized one (see chapter 8). The same development has
not occurred in the artisanal fishing sector which is far less lucra~
tive. Although there may be a localized influx of non-fishermen
into the profession, immigration on the whole appears to have been
limited in scope. The discussion on the openness of artisanal fish··
is therefore largely theoretical in nature. 9
The headman of Kalvimcmagar was of the opinion that non·
fishermen could also fish in the village waters, so long as they
followed local rules. In all his life, however, he had never known
a non-fisherman who wanted to do so. When I asked what he
thought about lower castes being involved in fishing, he an-
swen~d. 'yes, they can catch fish (miin pidikkalaam). But we do
not have marriage relationships with them, and if they would
touch our cooking pots, we would break them.'
into village fishing generally proceeds via kinship lines of descent and
affiliation Since marriage among the Pattinavar caste is largely endogamous, it is
difficult non-fishermen to gain access tn artisanal fishing, unless they establish
their settlements. My survey of the Coromandel Coast demonstrates that this
mdeed taken place (see chapter 2).
124 Marine Resource Management
My provisional conclusion is that fishing spaces are open to the
entire population of artisanal fishermen (which largely, although
not entirely, coincides with caste). Not only do all artisanal fisher-
men benefit from reciprocal access, but they also benefit equally.
The similarity of fishing technology in the artisanal sector provides
each participant with a more or less identical point of departure.
In conjunction, reciprocity and equality remain important clauses
in the artisan'll fishermen's rule of open access.
Territoriality
The accessibility of inshore waters to all artisanal fishermen is,
however, not unqualified. This is demonstrated by the following
conversation with the crew we accompanied on the shrirnp fishing
expedition.
Question: Do you have a right (urimai) to fish in another village's
waters at all?
Ravi: Yes, we certainly have a right to fish there, but only if we
follow up instructions from local fishermen. On the other hand,
the waters off Kalvimanagar are our kingdom (iraachiyam). If
outside fishermen come here, 'we will hit them if they don't do
as we say.' [Ravi and his brother make appropriate gestures with
their fists.]
Th~se young fishermen have a clear sense of territorial privilege.
However, it is important to establish where territorial boundaries
lie. Although the matter is not entirely beyond dispute, opinion in
Kalvimanagar is generally consistent. I commence with a descrip-
tion of the borders as they are demarcated on the beach.
A water body forms the natural border between Kalvimanagar
and the next village to the south, whereas an old stream bed indi-
cates the boundary to the north. The distance between the north-
ern and the southern edges is approximately 4.5 km. These borders
have economic significance, and villagers argue that they predate
civil administration. lO Boundary disputes continue to occur fre-
10 Throughout Tamil Nadu, village borders also have a cultural significance. Daniel
(1984:77) points out that a Tamil village, conceived of as horne (uur), has a vulner··
able frontier 'through which foreign substances from beyond the village enter (in
The Rule System ofArtisanal Fishermen 12S
quently. Following two particularly vehement quarrels in the 1960s
and in the 1990s, surveyors from the Revenue Department of Tamil
Nadu surveyed and delimited both the southern and the northern
boundaries of Kalvimanagar. IIowever, one of the boundary mark·
ers has already disappeared, creating a window for future contro··
versy.
When extended eastward, land borders become sea boundaries.
Question: Where are the boundaries of Kalvimanagar waters?
Venu: From the land border marks, a line is drawn into the sea.
The space within these lines is the protected area (tadukkum idam).
Question: And out at sea, where are the boundaries there?
Second fisherman: There is no outer limit, but at a distance of
more than 15 km we do not exercise supervision.
Venu: Beyond 10 to 15 km we carmot exert control (tadukkumudi
yaatu). Beyond this distance we don't know what is happ1en.rn:g,
we don't go that far out ....
The concept of a boundary which fades with distance is com..
mon to other fishing societies (d. Acheson 1987:40). The distances
mentioned by my respondents appear somewhat exaggerated. As
boundary maintenance coincides with regular fishing activity, the
outer limit of control in Kalvimanagar lies around the 20 fathom
depth line, at about 7 km from shore. Defined in this manner,
Kalvimanagar has a sea territory of about 31 square km. The criH··
cal issue now is the significance of territory in the context of open
access fisheries. If territory indicates a realm of authority and
diction, as the young fisherman quoted (\t the beginning of this
paragraph clearly implied, what shape dot.hese powers take?
First of all, not all fishing is open access. The two stationary
fishingmethods, beachseining and fix~d-lure (kambi) fishing,!1 in
principle are restricted to the territories of the fishermen concerned.
the form of ghosts from the cremation grounds, visitors and intruders via the roads,
and deities via the stream)'. Sentinel deities are stationed at key points to protect
the inhabitants from invaders. Indeed, in former days when cholera struck
Kalvimanagar with frequency, the ritual containers in which disease was 'collected'
ceremoniously placed across the border to ensure that cholera would no longer
bother the population.
The connection between fixed-lure fishing and village boundaries is strikingly
dear In the Pulicat region north of Madras. The construction of a rocket base on
 126 Marine Resource Management
Outsiders are tolerated only if local fishermen do not make use of
their prerogative. In non-stationary open access fisheries, however,
authority has a different connotation. Village boundaries mark an
area in which the local panchayat has authority to declare rules on
the permissibility of gear types. Significantly, such rules tend to be
the same for local and for non-local fishermen. As one Kalvima--
nagar fisherman explained, 'if we would try to impose special rules
on outsiders, they would say, "the sea is not yours, it is common
property, we can fish where we want".' Unilateral gear restrictions
can have severe implications, as seen in another fishing village north
of Madras. Although it allowed locals to use gilInets, the panchayat
prohibited their use by fishermen from another village. Angered
by what they viewed as discrimination, these fishermen retaliated
by prohibiting the first group to carry out a lucrative kind of fish-
ing in their waters.
To be acceptable, the rules which a panchayat promulgates must
be universal and be motivated with reference to a common good.
The following description of an incident involving such a ruling in
Kalvimanagar illustrates the principle:
In March 1995 Kalvimanagar fishermen caught three groups of
kattumaram fishermen from an adjacent hamlet using ray fish
nets (tirukkaivalai) in village waters. As in many villages of the
northern Coromandel Coast, the Kalvimanagar panchayat has
prohibited the use of ray fish nets, as they are felt to affect avail-
able fish stocks. The culprits, who lived in a village that does
not enforce this rule, were fined Rs 150 and told not to return.
This example demonstrates that a rule intended for the common
good is imposed not only on Kalvimanagar fishermen but on out.
siders as welL Despite the fact that they were probably annoyed
about having been caught, the latter acknowledged the right of
local fishermen to apprehend them. They paid the fine and refrained
from retaliatory action.
one of the Pulicat islands (Sriharikota) led to the forced resettlemE'nt of whole vil-
lages in northern Tamil Nadu. The old fishing hamlets continued to define their
fixed-lure fishing rights on. the basis of the old borders. In their opinion, the trans-
planted villages did not partake in these rights.
The Rule ofArtisanal Fishermen 12'7
A different situation arises when outside fishermen want to
market their catches locally or intend to use the village as a teln!:JOl"
ary fishing base. Then the host panchayat may take special meas·
ures. The most common rule states that migrant fishermen may
lea ve shore only after local fishermen. In other cases they are n>
quired to pay special taxes to the host panchayatY
which experiences a low rate of annual inward migration, tal<.es no
such measures. This may also be a result of the current crisis in
hamlet administration.l3
The Allocation ofBeachseine Fishing R.~fjhts
I noted above that local fishennen have exclusive rights to
beachseine fishing and to lift net fishing around fixed-lures (kambi).
An interesting feature of the regulation of these fisheries is that it
is carried out by local groups without the involvement of the ham·
let panchayat. This confirms that the administration of artisanal
fishing matters is highly decentralized, a point which will be elabor..
ated in the next chapter. As fixed-lure fishing was organized along
similar lines as beachseining before it became defunct in Kalvima-
nagar, I limit myself to a discussion of the latter.
Beachseines operate from the seafront. Thus, beachseine rights
are based more on land than on sea boundaries. The size of
beachseitlE~ paadus, which measure 100 m or more in length, limits
the number of nets which can be operated from village territory at
one time. Oral histories of KaJvimanagar mention that there were
between four and six paadus extended over the village shoreline
When discussing this topic, my informants in Kalvirnanagar always mentioned
example of Mahabalipuram Kuppam, which absorbs a large number of mi-
annually. Disgruntled by the influx of outside fish(~rmen, the population of
Mahabalipuram Kuppam at one point banned migrants frQm landing or selling
then eatch locally. After some time, the panchayat relented, but only on condition
migrants set out later than local fishermen and pay tax on their catches. See
1hol11son (1989:86··87;137-38) for similar observations on a fishing settlement in
'iou/hern Tamil Nadu.
volume of mi[jrants may be a factor in the formulation of discriminatory
rules !\lthough phased fishing clearly suggests favouritism, it is doubtful whether
can be said of taxation. As I point out in chapter S, it is usual for fisher··
pay some kind of tax into their village fund. The taxation of migrants,
compensates the local community for any d(ecline of landing prices,
puts n!l'JLJllts on the same level as locals.
128 Marine Resource Manl{qement
until the 1980s. Beachseining remains the only present-day fishing
technique which demands a system of allocation between village
groups, since paadus are limited in number and are of dissimilar
quality. Although the number of nets has plummeted in recent
decades, the mechanism of assigning fishing rights appears to have
remained basically the same. The two most striking characteristics
are flexibility and self-regulation.
There is no question of a beachseine group having control of a
specific beach paadu for longer periods of time. First of all, the
number of available paadus in Kalvimanagar changes according
to water currents and wind, the minimum being four and the
maximum six. Moreimportantly, a fixed paadu challenges the fish-
ermen's urge to seek out the best fishing spots. The principle of
'first come, first served' therefore forms the crux of the allocation
system. 14
When the beachseine fishing season commences in January, the
first group to remove the protective covering of their net has the
right to choose a paadu. The sequence in which other groups take
preparatory measures subsequently determines their choice of sites.
The result may be a relatively stable pattern of holdings in which
every group is satisfied with its location and with the catches it
deliyers. This was the situation in 1995. The two main beachseine
groups (a third is barely operative) settled on paadus north and
south of the hamlet. However, if the fishermen are dissatisfied with
their positions, they can rotate, each group taking its turn on a
paadu. Of course, this rotating system will only work if all groups
agree to it.
If beachseines outnumber paadus, as once was the case, another
system is also utilized, whereby rights apply to a position in a
sequence of groups fishing a site. On day one, for example, the
first group arriving on the site has the right to shoot its net first-
this net is called the raaNivalai or queen's net. This shot is followed
by the next groups with other nets. On the following day, the
14 Alexander ([1982] 1995:132) emphasizes the principle of equal opportunity in
his study of the beachseine industry in a southern Sri Lankan fishing village called
Gahavalla. Although he discusses paadus (ibid.:131-33), he does not mention that
there is a constantly varying number. Generally speaking, the system of rotating
fishing rights in Gahavalla therefore appears to be characterized by more regular-
ity than is the case in Kalvimanagar.
71Je Rule System ofA rtisanal Hshemten 129
second group has the right to occupy the first position, and the
former queen's net moves to the end of the queue (d. Alexander
[1982] 1995). This system permits more nets to be used on a limited
number of paadus. It also gives each group the choice of moving to
another site if they feel fishing there is better. Thus, as the follow-
ing passage illustrates, all beachseine groups alaY converge on only
a few paadus.
In early March 1996, all three beachseine groups in Kalvimanagar
were operating from one paadu to the south of the hamlet, as
catches had been better in that location. Every day they rotated
the sequence of fishing. If a group missed its turn, the next in
line took over. As the season was considered quite bad, defaults
took place regularly.
In this self-regulating system, village leaders intervene only when
paadus come under dispute, such as when one beachseine group
refuses to vacate a paadu for another group. As beachseine groups
are partly constituted on the basis of affiliation to a particular
patrilineage, such conflicts might have wider ramifications. I
return to the varying responsibilities of leaders in the following
chapter.
Like village boundaries, beach paadus extend into the sea. The
space covered by a beachseine net 'belongs' to the group and is out
of bounds for others. 15 There1ore, in my example of shrimp fishing,
the local beachseine workers had the right to command the
kattumaram fishermen to stop fishing, whtch may explain the
latter crew's meekness.
Rules ofTi:chnical Innovation
One cannot discuss the rules of technical innovation without de-
scribing the innovation process itself. The history of fishing gear in
Kalvimanagar since the late 1950s reveals the continuous impact
famous quarrel which took place in the 1960s with the fishermen of the village
to the north of Kalvimanagar revolved around the fact that the current swept a
beachseine net from a borderline paadu into Kalvimanagar waters. There it inter-
fered with the operations of a local beachseine group. The settlement negotiated
the two villages included provisions for the effects of water currents (d. Alex-
ander [1982] 1995:116).
130 Marine Resource Management
of technical innovation. That process had three dimensions: cotton
and hemp were replaced by various synthetic fibres; gillnets and
entangling nets became popular at the expense of bag nets; and
existing net types were applied in novel ways. The impetus for
change carne from gear manufacturers, government loan pro-
grammes, and fishermen from other coastal regions. Individual fish-
ermen from the village studied the costs and benefits of new gear
types for some time before deciding to put them into practice. In
doing so, however, they had to take community procedures and
decisions into account. The hamlet panchayat not only frequently
organizes the introduction of new fishing methods, it sometimes
poses special conditions on their application as well. In some cases,
the panchayat even prohibits a kind of gear altogether.
From the outset, it must be emphasized that the hamlet
panchayat is not involved in all instances of change. Elders gener-
ally discuss only those changes which are disputed and brought to
their attention. They weigh the implications of irmovations in terms
of a body of biological knowledge as well as in terms of social pre-
rogatives. They then choose regulatory instruments from an estab-
lished repertoire. This repertoire can be seen as a continuum, with
a total ban on one side and a complete lack of regulation on the
other. A number of bans with varying intensity constitute the
middle ground. Thus, there are gear bans on fishing seasons, on
times of day, as well as on specific fishing grounds. A special type
of gear regulation controls the introduction of new fishing gear.
The standard method for introducing a new and attractive kind
of gear in Kalvimanagar is for the panchayat to set a date after
which it can be used. The reason is to ensure equal opportunity.
An older fisherman explained the principle as follows:
It is not fair if one fisherman goes fishing in the traditional way
and catches less than his neighbour who is using a new fishing
method. That is why the panchayat announces a temporary ban
(tadai) and fixes a meeting to discuss the matter and determine
an introduction date. In the meantime, all fishermen can pro-
cure the net and prepare it for use.
The manner inwhich the trammel net was introduced in Kalvima-
nagar gives an impression of the procedures followed. As was noted
in chapter 2, the trammel net caused a furore among fishermen
The Rule System ofArtisanal Fishermen 131
along the Coromandel Coast, and individual panchayats frequently
guided its inauguration. In Kalvimanagar, this also included a ban
on night-time use. Following a description of the process of intro-
duction, I look into the backgrounds of gear regulations along the
Coromandel Coast. I then return to the 'Image of Limited Good'.
The Coming ofthe Trammel Net: Enchantment and Trepidation
One fisherman remembered exactly when the trammel net
(manivalai) arrived in Kalvimanagar, as it occurred a few months
after his marriage in January 1983. His brother described how he
first heard of the net:
I have relations in Anumantai, a fishing village to the south,
and first heard about the manivalai from them. A local fisher-
man had worked on a cargo ship and brought a panel of tram-
mel nets when he carne on leave. Everyone there had started
using it, as the catches proved much better than those realized
by the other nets used. I bought a panel from my relations to try
it out.
The trammel net's fame reached Kalvimanagar through a variety
of channels. The enormous increase of shrimp catches sparked
everyone's imagination. 16
Visvanathan: Even a person not knowing anything about fishing
could get a good catch with a manivalai.
Ragavan: If it is maintained properly, a maniyalai lasts six months.
In this period it earns back the investment six times over. Even
if it would be damaged within a month, we wouldn't have a
loss.
In Kalvimanagar too, fishermen were eager to start testing the
trammel net. The panchayat, however, decided on a common
16 Along other parts of the Coromandel Coast, the trammel net is known as
appaavalili. According to a Kalvimanagar fisherman, this name originated in the
region of Mahabalipuram. When a local fisherman first used the net, the catch was
so big that he exclaimed 'Appall!' We can't carry it!' Appaa is an exclamation of
surpnse.
132 Marine Resource Management
introductory date--no one was allowed to use the net before 1st
April 1983. One young fisherman t who generally fished alone,
could not withstand the temptation, however:
I started using the net a few weeks before the fixed date, think-
ing that it wouldn't be discovered. After alt the manivalai is a
bottom set net and can't be seen from the surface. For three days
everything went according to plant but on the fourth day I was
found out; someone distrusted my catches and pulled the net to
the surface to see what it was and told the village. The headman
fined me Rs 700 for using the net without permission.
The enormous catching potential of the trammel net also filled viI··
lagers with trepidationt however.
Desingu: People were scared (baiyam irundichu)! Before the
manivalai arrived t we only had the araivalai [a single-walled
gillnet]. But the manivalai catches lobster, shrimpt fish -- all spe-
cies-inlarge numbers. We feared that old age fishermen might
suffer because of declining fish stocks - not catching fish t they
would have a hard time (miin kidaikkaamal kashdapadagiraargal).
Thinking that daytime fishing would be less harmful than night
fishing, the panchayat prohibited the use of the trarrunel net at night.
Desingu: We thought that if we would use the manivalai at night
the fish would go far away (tuurattillai pooyiruchi). Fish would
die in the net and others would flee to the deep sea due to the
smell (ooru maatariyaana vaadai adikkum, meelaalai pooyiTum). This
is the reason we imposed a ban or 'system' (system kuuda kodutta
vechiruntaangal) .
In Kalvimanagar t the need for a ban on night fishing slowly faded,
possibly because ownership had become so widespread that no
one group was disadvantaged. Usage of the trammel net is now
completely unrestricted.
Although the village has a long history of gear regulation, the
Kalvimanagar panchayat currently enforces only one gear ban in
its waters. This concerns the ray fish net, which I already referred
to above. The snail net (kachaavalai), which many fishermen
The Rule System lifArtisanal Fishermen 133
panchayats in the region banned comp~etely i~ the course of 1995
and 1996, was not officially prohibited m Kalvllnanagar, although
fishermen refrained from using it (see chapters 5 and 10). As
far as I know t there are no partial gear bans effective in the village
at present.
Motives for Gear Bans
A historical review indicates that the motivation for gear bans along
the Coromandel Coast has remained remarkably constant over time
(d. Bavinck 1997b). In each case, whether the b~n .was declared a
hundred years ago or yesterdaYt one or more fishmg panchayats
rallied to restrict the usage of a fishing appliance which was felt to
harm the group. Each panchayat has motivated its action in analo-
gous terms. ." .
'Harm' is not a one-dimensional concept. FIshermen distIngmsh
between three types or indexes of harm: harm to the fish stockt
which in turn affects the survival chances of the fishing commu-·
nity in question; harm to the majority style of ~ishing; and harm to
the community as a social entity. In anyone mstance, there IS an
intermingling of these themes. Injury to the resource is alr~'lOst
synonymous with injury to a majority gear u~er. ~t the same tlmet
injury to a gear user sometimes overlaps WIth mJury to the com-
munity as a social entity.
When fishermen along the Coromandel Coast refer to harm
imposed on the fish stock, they are concerned primarily with the
species which are important for their liveU!;lOod. These are ~he
varieties they target because of their market price and avaIlabIlIty.
Due to the limitations of their equipment, fishermen generally try
to catch the smaller demersal and pelagic species which densely
populate inshore waters. Gear bans are implemented with the fate
of this category of marine life in mind. It is the depletion of fish
stocks which fishermen fear - depletiont however, of a particular
kind. My material demonstrates that artisanal fishermen do not
foresee the eradication of marine life; rathert they are wary of an
exodus of fish from the grounds where they can be caught. -rhe
reprehensible gear types cause flight t not extinction. Fish are said to
pick up danger signals from specimens engaged in a death strug-
or from blood t which contaminates the surrounding waters with
a fetid odour.
 134 Marine Resource Management
Th~ se~ond type of harm relates to the majority style of fishing.
Tuoml-Nlkula (1985:148) points out that fishermen may compete
within a single ecological niche. Conflicts between them may be
'caused by an innovation not yet in general use, so that a natural
resource i~ exploited by different tedmical resources' (ibid.:155).
ThIs ~escnbes the context of a variety of gear prohibitions along
the Coromandel Coast. Bans on certain gear types are related to
the negative effects they are held to have on a dominant category
of fishermen's operations in a particular niche. Note that the issue
at hand is the perception and not necessarily the real incidence of
competition or harm.
The first two types of harm fishermen appear eager to avoid are
impacts that would result in economic hardship for the entire
fishing community, or at least among a sizable number of house-
holds. However, new technology can also injure the community as
a social entity. The prevention of such injury and the maintenance
of community cohesion are therefore important reasons to ban
certain fishing gear or applications thereof. One respondent re-
~ealed concern about the fate of older fishermen who are phys-
Ically unable to seek out more distant fishing grounds if new gear
caused fIsh to flee from the nearby waters. Conversely, fishermen
express unhappiness that some should profit from a new fishing
method which is not accessible to all, because of differences in
weal~h or contacts. Gear bans thus equalize opportunity within
the fIshmg hamlet. The moral notion of equal opportunity is not
unIque to the Coromandel Coast; it is found in other rural settings
too (d. Alexander [1982] 1995:4).
More than other forms of fishing regulation, gear bans provide
insight into the' cognitive orientation' of artisanal fishermen. Based
on an analysis of the notion of jealousy, I concluded earlier in this
chapter that every fisherman has his own relationship with the
sea. I also noted that, in principle, fishing activities of one indi-
vidual do not affect those of others. This is, of course, only one
part of the story. As the imposition of gear bans proves, artisanal
fishermen clearly realize that negative interactions -- appropri-
ation and assignment externalities might arise with the use of
different kinds of gear. Only after a regulation framework is
established to address the pattern of these externalities, can
individual fishermen develop their own non-competitive relation-
ships with the sea.
The Rule System o(Artisanal Fishermen 135
Do artisanal fishermen believe that the fish resource is limited?
This is a complicated question, and my answer is necessarily in-
complete. The main point is that, unlike marine scientists, who as-
sess the potential of fish stocks in a large oceanic region, artisanal
fishermen have a restricted territorial focus. They depend, after
all, on a limited sea space and the marine life which inhabits it.
Artisanal fishermen are naturally concerned about the continued
sustainability of this area. Significantly, they believe that errone
ous fishing activities affect resident fish stocks. By causing flight or
by reducing available numbers, some individuals pursue their own
benefit to the detriment of other fishermen. In this specific sense,
artisanal fishermen might be said to entertain a 'limited good'
perspective.
Rcules and Violence
In previous sections, I have tried to identify the main elements of
the artisanal sea tenure system. My effort to clarify the field may
give the reader the impression that all the issues have been laid
bare and that the system thus outlined is widely recognized, and
accepted, by the fishing community. This would b(~ incorrect. The
rule system which exists, allows wide scope for voluntary action.
Violence, or the threat thereof, lurks under many regulatory
activities, forcing the parties to take decisive action one way or the
other (d. McCoodwin 1990:128-31; Alexander 1979:16). In the
earlier example of shrimp fishing, beachseine fishermen working
in the area used a thinly-veiled threat of violence to convince the
kattumaram fishermen to heed their instructions. As a member of
that kattumaram crew later explained, one must do what local fish··
ermen say. His wording is interesting: the crew was not just obey··
a rule related to the fishing rights of a beachseine group, it was
'doing what was asked'. And why did they comply? Because local
fJshermen were numerous, they could apply physical forCE~ to sanc-
tion their request.
Kalvimanagar fishermen say that the language used at sea is
generally far more obscene and offensive than what they would
nonnally tolerate on shoreY This transgression of social etiquette
(lne fisherman gave the example that the verbal suggestion of intercourse with
the other's mother [l1gkoottaa (ozhukka)] would not be acceptable between relative
 136 Marine Resource Manfiqement
r:
is ot a chance event provoked by the tensions of the fishing enter-
pnse. Words, and the underlying threat of real violence, are
consciously used to delimit or to maintain a fishing right. I would
argue, however, that insults generally follow the fishing rules dis-
cussed above, adding emphasis and tilting behaviour in one direc-
ticm or another. Verbal abuse is the first line of attack when
f~shermen break rules or when conflicting interpretations emerge.
I,hysical vlOle~ce may be the next phase. As fishermen along the
Coromandel Coast show a tremendous capacity to rally around
aggneved kmsmen and co-villagers, a small matter rapidly tends
to develop into a group fight. It then takes all the ingenuity of fish-
ermen leaders, and of others, to defuse the situation and arrive at
an ~cceptable solution. Violence escalates most readily where the
polItical structure of the fishing population is at its weakest, which
i<; at t~e .inter-village level. As chapter 5 will explain, fishermen
have lmllted means to address nH~ problems which arise between
two or mon~ fishing hamlets.
4.3 The of Mechanized Boats
I pointed out in the previous chapter that the Kalvimanagar fisher..
men's relationship with visiting mechanized boats is one of adjust-
m~nt as well as of.conflict. In this section, I review the relationship
wI~h the mechamzed boat. sector from the point of view of the
arhsanal rule system. On the one hand, artisanal fishermen share
the notion of the sea as being a resource common to all. No one can
be eXclud~d ~rom fishing in any inshore area, whether it is adja-
c~n: to a ~lshmg .settlement or not. On its own, this principle pro-
hIbIts arhsanal fIshermen from taking action against mechanized
boat fishing. TIle fact that the boat fishermen have often emerged
from the artisanal fishing population makes it even harder to take
exclusive measures. At the same time, mechanized boat fishermen
differ from other pa~ticipants in the artisanal sea tenure system.
~otably, the~ vary WIth regard to the rules of reciprocity and equal-
Ity (see SectIon 2). The mechanized boat fishermen do not have
their own fishing territory with which they 'exchange' access with
strangers ~111 land. According to him, however, 'words spoken during fishing flov.
out to sea (kadal ZJnartlal kadaloodu senRuvidum),
The Rule System ofArtisanal Fishermen 137
artisanal fishermen. Instead, they are predators exploiting; the
terrain of others. They are also not equal to artisanal fishermen:
unlike other fishing methods, mechanized boat fishing technology
has proved inaccessible to most villagers. Instead of merging with
the artisanal sector, mechanized boat fishermen have come to con-
stitute a separate, economic category. Conceptually they are thus
both similar and dissimilar to artisanal fishermen. This (I'I<-1I,n,
engenders an ambivalent attitude among artisanal fishermen.
As I pointed out above, the artisanal rule system allows villa-
gers to regulate the usage of deleterious gear types. This instrument
has probably also been applied in an attempt to control the use of
trawling equipment in village waters. The Kalvimanagar 'CO'UCCI,
quoted in chapter 3, alludes to aban on boat fishing in the v IIl1d""·:.
His wording, however, is circumspect: it was a sort··of ban, the
sult of common consent and not of a decision-making process.
Historical evidence of bans on boat fishing along the Coromandel
Coast is still scant. Therefore, I cannot draw firm conclusions on
their prevalence. Two factors, however, are likely to have frustrated
initiatives to impose bans. The first is that a village panchayat can··
not normally prevent outsiders from operating a type of fishing
gear which some villagers are using themselves, I pointed ,out in
chapter 2 that the Fisheries Department of Tamil Nadu, which
gave impetus to mechanized boat fishing, was keen on achieving a
broad distribution of boats throughout the coastal region. How-
ever, the policy of encouraging village ownership of mechanized
boats, the traces of which are still found in some regions (see
pendix 2), is likely to have impeded any village-based efforts to
ban trawling. The only way in which village populations could
uphold their conviction in these early years was by withstanding
the temptation to apply for a boat themselves. This is indeed ,:",hat
Kalvimanagar fishermen appear to have done. Not going in for
boat fishing, they were free to oppose intrusions from outside.
But here a second obstacle arises. Pronouncing a ban is worth-·
while only if it enjoys legitimacy amongst all parties concerned.
This has been the cardinal problem. Given their superior size and
engine power, the mechanized boat fishermen are assured of
supremacy on the fishing grounds. Moreover, by forming their own
organizations and withdrawing from the hamlet panchayat system,
boat fishermen demonstrated their disregard for regulations which
went against their interests. Importantly, the state governmf~nt has
 138 Marine Resource Management
] he Rule System o['Artisanal Fishermen 139

not underwritten panchayat law, largely preferring to support the

mechanized boat fishermen in their demand for open access. In ha ve 1)een t nggerec..
. :l by the damage of fishing rear,
) not by territorial
the face of such odds, panchayat bans resembled a Quixotic solu- intrusion.
ticm of tilting at windmills. If bans were pronounced at all, their
effect would have faded with the realization that mechanized boats Question: Why do local fishermen allow boats to corne so close
were there to stay. to shore? Why don't they chase them off? . . .'
Ra avan: In the deep sea, we are Just too few to do anythmg

Question: I am surprised at seeing mechanized boats taking part

thc~ run over nets and just disappear and we cannot catch t~e~:
Pra1akaran: Closer to shore, we could chase them out as we au:
in inshore fishing without noticeable opposition from kattu-
. h' 13 t'f we do so we may get problems later: the boats.
maram fishermen. WIt many. Ul ,~ .. T 'dthi'it
when they come again will avenge the lnCldent. .0 avOl s,
Maduraiveeran: Fishermen have given up fighting. They have
is better to be quiet.
been reconciled to coexistence without struggle. Both sides have
had bad experiences with fighting, also because of the way the
police has treated us. The fear of trouble, either with boat fishermen or with law ,enforce..
ment agencies, motivates artisanal fishermen to.r.elmqUlsh ~~1~~
ever territorial rights they feel they ml?ht have. I he~e IS one . 1.
Artisanal fishermen today have a clear understanding of the
o f Sl'tua t'10n , however
, . ,in
. which. the arttsanal rule system
f does
II 1m
circumstances under which action against mechanized boats is . '
pmge on mecanJZeh " 'd boat fishing.
. J When schools o.
." sma non·I
rightful. All agree that they are entitled to compensation for the Penaeid shrimp congregate close to the shore, bringing m artlsana_
damage of fishing gear, and that an offender may be apprehended fishermen from a wider region, fishermen understand th~t r~e~ha
for this purpose wherever the incident has taken place. This prin.. . ',. db ts are not allowed to participate III the catch. InttmIdated
ciple is underwritten by the mechanized boat owner association of l1lze oa
b the numbers . of artisanal fishermen presen t ~,ec I,ar1ized bent
fi~hermen ~he
l ,. .C .
Royapuram (see chapter 7), and forms the cornerstone of a indeed tend to follow this directlve.. 1 hIS explams
common set of regulatory principles. Beyond this, there are some - ti ity of the mechanized boats in our earher shnmp-f1shmg
vestiges of the idea that certain sea territories are off-limits to ~~~~~cle~ After towing a group of liftnet fishermen to thesc~ne,
trawling.
and e~pecting a share of the proceeds for th1s serV1ce, the boat ftsh-
ermen themselves remained off to the Side.
Question: When do kattumaram fishermen have the right to
apprehend a mechanized boat? 4.4 Conclusions
Taniyarasu: You have the right to catch it if it is close by, up to
five fathoms or so. Beyond that only if they damage nets.. The central topic of this chapter was the artisanal fishermen' s r~le
. t m I identified two important components of that system. a
Notions of this kind appear to be more widespread. In another ~~~i~n ~f open access to fishing grounds; and a sense of tern tonal··
it which allows each hamlet panchayat to impose restnctlOns on
t1~~se pancha~~t
village down the coast, for example, fishermen declared that they
had the right to apprehend boats if they were trawling within a fishing in its waters. One of the most impor:ant
zone of 6,-8 fathoms, a zone which is marked by a rocky seabed. conditions relates to the usage of fishing gear, The meaSUrE.s
Despite such views, however, artisanal fishermen do not frequently panchayats take in this field range from total prolubltlOn to nOl~"
apprehend boats solely because they are fishing within their sea action, with a number of variations in between, J analysed thebP
territories. There were several rumours of such incidents in the rneas ures a:ln etl,a
foul1d ·' t tl,ey stem from three. conceptlons
.. .of' c
harm..
' .

course of my fieldwork. But every case I investigated proved to harm to the fishing grounds; harm to the maJonty style of ftc,h1ll.g,
and harm to the community as a social entlty.
 140 Marine Resource Management

Mechanized
, ,,' .
bO'lt
e
f'IS 1lmg
. appeare d on the scene from the 1960s
onwards. fh1S new technoloVY disturbed and COllfused t' , I
f'l' . :J ", ar 1sana
\~ lerrnen m more,ways than one. Their natural inclination to admit
~ ~lsh~rmen to mshore f1shmg grounds conflicted wi th their
1ealIzatIOn that mechanized boats formed a separat' 1
'\bl h ' d e c ass. ot-
N 5
e y~ mec ,amze. boat. fishing broke with the traditions of reci-
prOCity and equ~lIty m fIshing operations. The option of prohibiting
tr~wlmg operatIons m VIllage waters was not effective, however,
bccaus~ of the supenor power of boat fishermen and their disre-
gard fOl panchayat notIces. There are still vestiges of' territorialism'
':lth regard to mechanized boat operations. 1-10wever, artisanal
fIshermen along the Coromandel Coast now generally take action If the artisanal rule system were no more than a code of conduct, it
only when boats cause material damage. would be observed voluntarily and evolve independently without
any need for steering. Instead, as I demonstrate in this ch,1pI:er,
elaborate administrative structure exists at the hamlet level, a sys-
tem quite distinct from state governance. This administration takes
responsibility for making and enforcing fishing regulations. Most
social scientists who study maritime communities in South Asia
neglect the issue of non-state administration. They focus instead
on the socio-economics of fisheries (see the monographs
Raychaudhuri 1980; Stirrat 1988; Thomson 1989/ Tietze 1985).
This is also true of Alexander (1977, [1982] 1995), who offers an
otherwise penetrating analysis of the beachseine tenure system in
southern Sri Lanka. Alexander (1977:240) writes about 'the princi·
pIes by which net owners decide when their turn is due', and sug-
gests that the system is self-regulatory. However, by skirting the
topics of dispute settlement, rule generation, and rule enforcement,
he gives reason to believe that administratiye structures may have
been overlooked. 1
The administrative system I discuss here consists of more than a
series of offices. It is characterized by responsibilities, which are
borne mainly by the rank and file in the villages. The village
panchayat forms the pinnacle of village administration but is by
no means synonymous with it. One of the tasks of this chapter is to
deconstruct the notion of panchayat and to define its institutional

I Alexander concentrates his analysis of village politics on leader-centred factions.

lIe points out that the leaders of these factions used 'the beachseines to recruit and
maintain a political following' (Alexander 1977:246). Administration is a different
kind of activity than faction-building, however.

] 42 Marine Resource Managewtmt
support base. In doing so, my analysis of administration carries
rne beyond the bounds of fishing. After all, the same administrative
bodies are involved in a wide range of viJlage matters.
The first section describes the ideal·typical structure of village
administration. My data largely derives from Kalvimanagar, but I
supplement this information with material from other fishing
settlements. In the second section, I move on to the topic of fisheries
regulation and the mechanized boat fishing sector. The last section
discusses changes in village administration. As it so happened, my
period of fieldwork coincided with a major administrative crisis in
Kalvimanagar. The legitimacy of the leaders was at a low, meetings
ended in pandemonium, factions formed around a proposed land
sale, and various parts of the administrative system were severely
criticized. I argue that the Kalvimanagar crisis sheds light on issues
which affect the authority of hamlet administrations throughout
the Coromandel Coast area.
5.1 The Structure of Hamlet Administration
Levels ofAuthority
Chapter 3 raised the topic of tension between lineage and village
as a focus of loyalties. 1 pointed out that pangaali groups form
significant social units in Kalvimanagar. This structure has
ramifications in the sphere of politics and economics. In itself, this
is nothing new. Dumont ([1957] 1986:185) notes that the lineage is
, the basic grou ping' within the Kallar caste. Similar!y Schombucher,
who studied fishermen cornmunities along the northeastern coast
of India, writes that 'lineage membership is a structural principle
of social organization', at least in Andhra Pradesh (Schombucher
1986:126, my translation). She devotes many pages to the economic,
ritual and political importance of the lineage, but barely mentions
the village as a relevant entity (ibid.:117-26). Along the Coromandel
Coast, such a bias would amount to gross neglect. Not only does
the village form a religious focal point, it is an important adminis-
trative entity as well. Many of the formal structures of authority
have a village base and focus, although conflict resolution takes
place on other levels as well.
Mandelbaum (1970) demonstrates how the nature of a problem
determines which group in Indian society convenes to address it.
Panchayats and the Regulation ofArtisanul 143
He distinguishes the household, the patrilineage, and a higher level
which consists either of the village or of a larger caste unit. 'Then he
states that' at each level the leaders or elders assume the mainten·
ance functions of trying to avert difficulties within their group and
of containing and settling disputes when they break out'
(Mandelbaum 1970:270). This observation is valid for Coromandel
Coast fishing communities as well (also see Dumont [1
1986:317--20). Each group addresses the issues which arise within
its social boundaries. And each group passes along the problems
which defy solution or exceed its competence to a higher level.
Thus, a household will address a quarrel between two brothers,
while problems involving various households in a pangaali group
often require the mediation of lineage leaders. Village institutions
and leaders discuss the bigger fishing issues, calling a panchayat
circle meeting if problems prove insurmountable.
That said, it is important to reiterate that a pangaali group is
structure for conflict resolution, not for fisheries regulation. House-
holds and lineages do not possess sea territory, nor do they make
fishing rules. Regulation is the prerogative of village-level institu-
tions. For this reason, I now turn to the three core elements of viI··
lage administrative structure: village membership, village meetings,
and the panchayat council. A discussion of these institutions will
clarify who decides on and enforces fishing rules. 1commence with
the system of corporate village membership, a phenomenon which
has eluded most ethnographers and may be unique to the
Coromandel Coast.
Village Membership
Every inhabitant of Kalvimanagar is a member of the community
in the informal, day-to-day sense of taking part in village life. He
or she also may be affiliated with a local patrilineage and may de-
rive a sense of belonging from that tie as well (d. Cohen 1985:15).
Corporate membership, however, is different from either of these
forms of association, in that it is formal and achieved. Moreover,
membership bestows important rights and duties upon an indio
Vidual. Villagers call these members varikkaarars (taxpayers). Just
hke taxpayers all over the world, they fOrm the backbone of local
administration.
144 Marine Resource Management
My initial conversations with fishermen about the notion of
village membership got stranded in confusion. I realized only after
some time that this was due to the existence of two overlapping
forms of associatioh which have different origins and designs. One
is the varikkaarar system, which maintains the village as a social
entity. This system is found throughout the Coromandel Coast area
and is app;;~rently quite 01d. 2 The second is membership in the local
Fisheries Society, which was established in Kalvimanagar in] 960.
The latter type of membership defines the right to participate in
Fisheries Department programmes and has been a source of sub-
stantial material benefit. Interestingly, the two membership lists
coincide to a large extent. Here, however, I am concerned solely
with the first type.
An important characteristic of the varikkaarar system is that it
is strictly egalitarian. All village members, be they old or young,
rich or poor, have the same basic rights and duties. The origin of
this impartial set-up is unknown. It is tempting to link it to the
'spirit of egalitarianism' which McGoodwin (] 990:33) considers
characteristic of fishing all Over the world, and which Ram
(1991:122) locates along the southern coast of Tamil Nadu. How-
ever, there may be other explanations as well.
Varikkaarars are drawn from the population of the hamlet as a
whole and not from one of its pangaali groups. Not every inhabit-
ant of the village is a member, however; in fact, the membership
list indupes only about one-third of the people living in Kalvima-
nagar. As membership is achieved and not ascribed, the system
provides for the entry of newcomers and the elimination of emi-
grants. The panchayat meeting is the deciding body in these mat-
ters. At regular intervals, participants discuss candidacies and other
membership issues; this involves both paperwork and fees.
What are the criteria for selection? The membership system trad-
itionally rests on three pillars: fishing, patriarchy, and local resi-
derlCe. In c~mlbination, these insure that the membership list largely
coincides with the population of adult men residing in a village.
2 A tax system is also found along the southern part of the Tamil Nadu coast, but
there it is paid to the Roman Catholic Church (d. Sivasubramaniam 1991). Ram
(1991 :34) assumes that the Church claimed the right to levy taxes on fishermen (d.
Thomson 1989:1(1). It is quite possible, however, that the Church built on old ad·
ministrative practices.
Panchayats and the Regulation ofA rtisanal Fishing 145
Since the sea and the vagaries of fishing lie at the heart of village
life, the fact that membership is linked to the fishing profession is
not at all surprising. 3 The thre(' stages of membership namely 'no
member', 'half member', and 'full member' also coincide with
the phases of fisheries apprenticeship. According to the appren·
tice system, a boy of eight or ten years who is just starting to fish
does not receive a share of the proceeds. An advanced learner of
twelve to sixteen years obtains a half share and graduates to a full
share when he is considered fully accomplished (d. Nieuwenhuys
] 990:85···99). As membership is linked to mastery of the fishing
occupation, the age at which the panchayat meeting grants full
membership varies from person to person.
Women apparently have never been eligible for village mem-
bership. This is so natural a condition that even though the memo
bership system in Kalvimanagar is hotly debated, female
participation is not one of the public demands. Women's exclusion
from village membership correlates with their non"participation
in public office and with the undesirability of their presence in
public spaces.
Membership is further limited to those who reside in Kalvima·
nagar and contribute to village affairs. Although a formal nomin-
ation remains obligatory, fishermen who grow up and live in
village gain membership almost automatically. It can be retracted,
however, if they move away from the village for a longer period of
time. Outside fishermen who settle in the village, many of whom
come to join their wives, can and often do have their membership
rights signed over from their old place of residence. The Kalvima··
nagar panchayat poses conditions on such'il transfer, however.
These follow partly from the general conditions of membership;
the person must be a male engaged in the fishing profession and
living in the village for some years already, with the intention of
staying. On the formal side, an outside applicant must provide a
letter from his original panchayat that attests to his desire to
transfer membership. In addition, he must be willing to pay the
3 My impression from Kalvimanagar is that membership is related more to the
profession rather than to caste. Thus, when a young resident of Nadar caste re-
quested village membership at a meeting in Kalvimanagar, the consensus was
that this request should not be granted as the man was a shopkeeper and not a
fisherman. His caste was not mentioned in the discussion at all. It is possible that
this aspect did play a secondary role, however.
146 Marine Resource Management
Kalvimanagar panchayat an admission fee. This fee is substantial;
it is often called a 'fine' or even 'punishment' by the fishermen I
overheard talking. Nowadays applicants in Kalvimanagar pay
about Rs 5,000, which is the equivalent of a few months' income.
The amount of the fee and the terminology used leave no doubt
that it is a matter of buying oneself into a corporate firm. The sum
to be paid relates to the rights which follow from membership and
to the fact that other members have been paying for some of the
privileges the new member will enjoy in the future.
More than the term 'taxpayer' suggests, the title varikkaarar
signifies a shareholder with unlimited liability. Varikkaarars
shoulder collective expenditure and debts 4 and are the recipients
of handouts from joint assets. Panchayats use the village fund,
which is formed mainly through taxation, to carry out welfare ac~
tivities. These include doling out rice to village members during
the yearly off-season, when incomes are notoriously low (d.
Sudarsen et al. 1995:8-13)." Membership rights do not terminate
upon death, and widows and their children continue to enjoy the
usufruct of their deceased husbands' membership.
The money for collective expenditure typically comes from two
sources. The most common way to amass funds is for the village to
claim a percentage of each day's catch from individual fishermen.
The right to collect this money is generally auctioned to the high-
est bidder, and the amounts involved are substantial enough to
meet most financial needs. 6 Second, the panchayat may suddenly
4 The main recurrent item of collective expenditure is the temple festival; other
contemporary costs include charity and pay-offs to policemen and other officials.
The latter item may be quite substantial and depends on the problem to be 'solved'.
The attack by fishermen of the fishing village Chemmencheeri on neighbouring
Kovalam, one day in June 1996, was expected to cost the first village's administra-
tion Rs 8,00,000 to settle. This money goes for hospital bills, bribes, etc.
5 A special feature of the system emerges here. As there is no relationship between
membership and the household, the number of members per household varies
immensely. A household may thus contain several members or, in the case of some
female-headed households, none at all. This has implications for the pattern of
distribution, since households which are most needy sometimes receive the least.
This became strikingly clear in Kalvimanagar when the proceeds of collective land
sales were divided up.
h In the village of Vairavankuppam, near Pulicat Lake, the leaseholder paid
Rs 3,50,000 to the village for marketing rights in 1995, which averages Rs 4,375 per
village member. This price astounded fishermen from other villages, who
Panchayats and the Regulation ofArtisanal FishirIfJ 147
declare that a particular day's catch will go to the village fund in
its entirety. In order to minimize evasion, this announcement is
generally made after the fishermen have left for the fishing gf()ulnds.
Note that in both instances it is the fishermen who bear the brunt
of the taxes, not traders or people in other occupations.
Membership also has implications for the use of collective prop-
erty. Studies of communities engaged in estuary fishing'indicate
that membership is linked to use rights of fishing grounds as well.
Sebastian Mathew (1991:5), who analyzes the tenure system of
fishermen of Pulicat Lake to the north of Madras, argues that ac·
cess to certain fishing grounds 'is subsumed under the institution
of the talelcettu' (d. J. Pandian 1987:89-90). According to his de-
scription, the system of talekettu, or talaik:addai (household), resem··
bles the varikkaarar sysh:~m of the Coromandel Coast. Thus, for
Pulicat Lake fishermen, who operate a complex allocation sv:ste:m
in clearly defined bodies of water, villagf~ membership opens the
door to fishing activity. Although territorial exploitation pa'tteJrns
are less developed among coastal fishermen than they are among
estuary fishermen, the correlation between membership and Iter,·
ritorial rights' is unmistakable.
The discussion hitherto has concentrated on the economic as··
peets of village membership, but there is more to be said. The
varikkaarar is the everyday custodian of village well··being, its foot
soldier. Along with the title come economic as well as religious
and political tasks. As a village member, he is responsible for per-
forming ritual duties for the tutelary deity (see chapter 3.1). Village
members may also become warriors who defend the hamlet and
its honour against adversaries from otheryillages. Furthermore,
because of their pivotal role in everyday life,varikkaarars have a
pre-eminent political position. Although village meetings are not
explicitly limited to members, the group which participates in col
lective decision-making clearly overlaps with the category of
varikkaarars. It is from their circle that office-bearers are selected.
These are the contours of the village membership system as it is
practised along the Coromandel Coast. I have noted already, how~
eVi'r, that the situation in individual villages may differ from the
concluded that fishing must be very good in that location. In Kalvimanagar the
most recent lease in 1992 went for Rs 24,000, which averages about Rs 100 per
Village member (cLPandian 1987:88.-(9).
 148 Marine R.esource Management
ideal-type. In Kalvimanagar, the village membership list was last
updated in 1992 when the last auction of marketing rights took
place. The lease of marketing rights inevitably involves discussions
about membership, as any lessee is interested in knowing the
number of village members from whom he may collect 'tax'. When
the lease system collapsed, however, the membership lists became
fixed. As a result, a number of people in the village, mainly young
men and new residents, often complain about their outdated sta-·
tus. A special problem is that the village headman is in charge of
the membership list and makes minor changes as he thinks fit,
though he refuses to show the register to others. As a result, no-
body is quite sure how many members the village has, or what the
division is between partial and full members.
Like in most other fishing villages along the northern
Coromandel Coast, Kalvimanagar currently maintains a much
smaller village fund than it once did. In fact, the practice now is to
raise taxes only when large expenses are pending. There are sev··
eral reasons for this change. On the one hand, villagers have be-
come wary of entrusting large sums of money to village notables
for safekeeping, as they fear that the temptation to steal from the
cash box will be too great. On the other hand, it is no longer
imperative for village panchayats to raise money; the number of
collective causes has declined with the advent of government wel-
fare schemes. In addition, many villages now also acquire funds
by other means than direct taxation. The sale of land in Kalvima-
nagar thus generates large collective assets, as does the practice of
requesting annual 'goodwill' money from business firms near the
hamlet.
Village Meetings: Platftrms for Decision-making andJustice
I have noted above that varikkaarars play an explicit role in village
politics. The paramount institution for collective decision-making
throughout rural India is the village meeting.? The substance and
form of the village meeting as it takes place along the Coromandel
Coast does not vary significantly from the pattern as reported by
7This meeting is typically also called panchayat. See footnote 22 in Chapter 1 for
my choice of terminology with regard to the institution of panchayat.
Panchayats and the Regulation ofArtisanal Fishing 149
Mandelbaum (1970:269~315) and by (1981), so I discuss it
only briefly.
Mandelbaum (ibid.:291) makes the crucial point that the
meeting is 'a council of peers'. All participants are entitled to
and to be heard; the other side of the coin is that one's presence
alsoimplies agreement with joint decisions. To increase their sup·
port base, panchayats along the Cot'omandel Coast strive to in-
crease the rate of participation through selective administrative
Ineasures.
Mandelbaum stresses the social functions of village m,~etm~~s
which 'are a major means of assuring the internal order of a group'
(ibid.:294). Phrased differently, one could argue that village m.eet-
ings are meant to take or to legitimize decisions about matters
relating to the common good. Village give fishermen the
opportunity to talk over important topics and to arrive at an ac-
ceptable decision. Furthermore, such meetings providf~ a favoured
platform for tabling disputes and for speaking justice.
In Kalvimanagar, village meetings can take place at three loca··
tions: the portal of the nearest village temple, the open grounds in
front of the primary school, or the beach front. Meetings are often
held in the morning. To ensure the attendance of all men, the
panchayat calls a stop (mariyal) on fishing for that day. Although
transgressors of this directive are no longer punished severely,
fishermen usually comply (they do not necessarily join the meet-
ing, however). The gathering generally lasts several hours. Village
leaders tend to sit together at one side of the circle and any com··
plainants sit directly opposite. When the topic is of Widespread
interest, a ring of bystanders surrounds those who have taken a
seat in the inner circle. Discussions are heated and the buzz of
voices is audible at a distance; the only major taboo is on the use of
physical force. Thus, I repeatedly heard antagonists in a meeting
shouting at the top of their voices, while their arms remained de~
monstratively loose by their sides.
Stories told by old fishermen suggest that ritual lapses used to
be an important topic of discussion, but this issue has declined in
importance. Although intercaste marriage is not welcomed, fish-·
ennen no longer consider it tobe the heinous transgression they
once did. The same holds true for other violations of caste poIlu··
bon rules. Hamlet practice hereby seems to reflect the general dis-
array of intercaste relations in Tamil Nadu.
150 Marine Resource Management
A large number of secular matters are now brought up in village
meetings (d. Mandelbaum 1970:306). My fieldwork in Kalvima-
nagar coincided with a period of infrequent meetings, strong dis-
sen t and a consequent lack of decisiveness. The gathering
nonetheless discussed a number of community affairs, such as the
sale of a jointly owned parcel of land and the way proceeds were
to be divided. It also succeeded in drafting a joint list of candidates
for the up-corning elections for the Fisheries Cooperative Society
and for the Cram Panchayat. The large brawl between two neigh-
bouring fishing villages figured prominently in the discussion be-
cause of the danger that it might spill over to Kalvimanagar.
Similarly, the gathering also debated the near assault at sea on
Kalvimanagar's headman by fishermen from an adjacent village.
Several villagers considered this action an affront to the commu-
nity as a whole and wanted to discuss the course of action. Finally,
the gathering repeatedly argued about the timing of the next vil-
lage temple festival. Only twice did village members Ineet to adju-·
dicate fishing rights. I take these cases up in a following section.
Panchayat
Commencing, as I have done, with the egalitarian side of village
administration, it comes as a surprise to discover a system of for-
mal and sometimes autocratic leadership in fishing hamlets. s I first
consider the patterns of traditional leadership in fishing village
panchayats and the changes which have taken place. Then I exam-
ine the characteristics of some new village leaders. The dynamics
in the structure of village administration are striking. Rather than
assuming that administrative structures are fixed, villagers shape
them according to new conditions and needs.
As in most fishing areas along the CorolUandel Coast,
Kalvimanagar used to be administered by a ranked set of leaders
called chettiyars9 or headmen, who were assisted by secretaries
8 Mandelbaum (1970) approaches this incongruity from a different position. Ap-
parently, he views hierarchy as the normal state and equality as a situation to be
explained. As he thus argues (ibid.:291), 'the egalitarian aspects of the traditional
panchayat seem to pose a paradox. The need for unanimous consent and the right
of every man to be heard appear dissonant to the leitmotif of hierarchy.'
') These should not be confused with the multiple castes of Chettiyars (see Rudner
[1994] 1995). Thurston and Rangachari ([1909] 1987:178) describe the Pattinavar
Panchayats and the Regulation ofArtisanal Fishing 151
called kaariyatarisi. Each of these functionaries represented an im·
portant lineage. Their ranking directly reflected the status of the
respective village lineages (see chapter 3)HJ In the same
marginal village lineages lacked direct representation.
Villagers remember a maximum of four chettiyars op'erating
simultaneously in Kalvimanagar. This was a long time ago, how-
ever, and most inhabitants now remember only three names. 11 The
chettiyar belonging to the dominant lineage automatically became
the 'first chettiyar' (mutal chettiyar) and was entitled to affix the
phrase great affluence' (periya tanam) to his title. This first ch,ettiVBlr
I
was the sole intercessor between the village and the outside world
and the ultimate hamlet authority. In Kalvimanagar, this chettiyar
is now the only one still in office; other chettiyars have died and
successors have not, or have not yet, been appointed.
The positions of chettiyar and kaariyatarisi were and are semi-
hereditary in nature. A position belongs to a particular patnlim~ag;e
and must be filled, not necessarily by the actual son of the de,:ea.se<j,
but by any married male member with the proper attributes such
as influence and eloquence. Another important characteristic
is physical prowess (d. Mandelbaum (1970:273--78). As unanimity
is a rule and more candidates for the post generally corne forward,
positions often lie vacant for many years. The decline in Kalvima-
nagar from four chettiyars to the present one therefore may pro·'
vide a misleading impression of the significance of the office.
caste's use of chettiyar as an honorary title. In the fishing villages of the northern
Coromandel Coast, the term is used now primarily to describe the formal village
leaders. For ceremonious usage, such as in printed wedding invitations, the title is
granted to all middle-aged or older men, irrespective of their formal position. Along
the southern portion of the Coromandel Coast, traditional leaders are called
naaddaar and not chettiyar. Nowadays along all parts of the coast, the most import··
ant village leader is regularly referred to as 'president'. I use the term chettiyar as
synonym for all of these appellations throughout this book.
III Although various authors (Anugraharn 1940; Madras Fisheries Bureau 1916;
Thurston and Rangachari [1909] 1987) point out the existence of hereditary head-
men in the fishing community, no one except Warriar (1967:26) observed their
ranking. According to my information, most hamlets along the coast have been
characterized by this style of administration until only recently.
I! One of the only persons to remember a fourth chettiyar is the current chettiyar,
who, curiously, seems to have belonged to the same lineage. If this man's version
of village history is correct, his lineage used to be represented by two chettiyars
mstead of the usual one. This may signify a recently healed division.
152 Mr:t1ine Resource Management
Despite the fact that traditional office-bearers usually serve for
life, villagers argue that they can be replaced in case of incompe-
tence or misuse of power. Recent examples of abdication and of
dethronement exist in other villages down the coast. Despite fer-
vent opposition to his style of leadership, the present chettiyar in
Kalvimanagar will not consider resigning. However, deposition is
a tricky affair. As a chettiyar is first and foremost a lineage leader,
opposition can easily precipitate interlineage strife. This actually
occurred in Kalvimanagar in 1995 and 1996. Although many of the
chettiyar's lineage group agreed with the substance of the criti··
cism levelled at his functioning, they nevertheless rallied to his
defence. This goes to show that in an important sense the loyalties
of traditional hamlet administrators lie with their lineages.
Together, however, the administrators are responsible for the
village as a whole.
Although the groundwork for change certainly began earlier,
the structure of hamlet administration in Kalvimanagar received a
jolt in the late 1960s. The post of kaariyatarisi was abolished and a
seven·-member panchayat council was installed beside the three
existing chettiyars. In effecting this change, the inhabitants of
Kalvimanagar followed a regional trend. In the course of a decade,
which commenced around 1965, a reform movement swept through
the coastal area. The renewal removed old··style leaders and re-
placed them with councils and elected presidents (cf. Thomson
1989:193). In Kalvimanagar, as in many other hamlets, reform boiled
down to a broadened definition of leadership that followed old
lines. Just as before, the members of the new council were selected
according to the criteria of age, sex, and lineage, and they were
appointed for life. The chettiyar continued to hold swayY
12 The changeover in Kalvimanagar took place during a protracted struggle for
the post of 'first chettiyar'. According to one of the members elected at the time,
the new council was set up to fill the power vacuum created by the absence of a
first chettiyar'. The current chettiyar has a different version. He claims to have
established the council after his appointment in order to include lineages which
previously had not been represented in village leadership. Both testimonies prob-
ably contain an element of truth. The appointment of a council may have some
connection to the increasing difficulties in the appointment of chettiyars. But prob-
ably it also represented a wilful attempt to broaden representation at the hamlet
level.
Panchayats and the Regulation ofA rtisanal Hshing 153
During my fieldwork, I soon realized that the council which had
been installed alongside the chettiyar was not, or was no longer,
an operative entity. Its members, who were generally older un··
educated fishermen, could not compete with their articulate young
compeers in public gatherings. Thus, the council members played
only a marginal role in village affairs. To their intense displeasure,
the chettiyar also regularly neglected to consult theIn. Meanwhile,
young fishermen argued for a different kind of administrative set-
up, an elected leadership that would allow them to have more say.
Although change was in the air, it was only after the completion of
my fieldwork that a new and potentially threatening
emerged. I am aware only of its basic contours. The village 0'0,11'1,:;,-'..
ing which met in August 1996, appointed a youth council with ten
members to handle current affairs and village finances. This shift
deprived the chettiyar and the old council members of their secu·-
lar responsibilities. They retained only their ritual functions. In
accordance with the current practice of many fishing hamlets along
this coastline, the new council members are supposed to change
every year, an arrangement which will ostensibly prevent the mis-
use of power.
On the face of it, this decision of the village meeting represents
a big break with tradition. However, appearances may be
tive and practice may differ from intention. In fact, many older
villagers are only waiting to see the youth, who they see as naiVe
and overly critical, burn their fingers on the exigencies of village
administration. The new system also shares some similarities with
the old administrative set-up. The fact that a committee of elders
was put in charge of selecting youth council members is particu-
larly striking, as it maintains the control of old over young.
Moreover, the meeting also opted for a time-tested pattern of rep-
resentation, appointing one young man per lineage. 13
New-style Leaders
Up to this point, I have concentrated on traditiol1al forms of lead-
ership and their permutations - for good reason, as the persons
13 There are eleven lineages in the village and only ten youth panchayat IY,embers.
The nominee from the remaining lineage abstained, however, and his post remains
vacant for the time being.
154 Marine Resource Management
occupying these posts are formally in charge of village administra-
tion. However, there are other forms of authority in the village
these days, and the holders of new offices play important local
roles. At least two posts have substantial influence: president of
the local Fisheries Cooperative Society and Gram Panchayat
president. 14
Several ;men have successively held the post of president of the
local Fisheries Cooperative Society, which was established in
Kalvimanagar in 1960. The Fisheries Department has used its net··
work of cooperatives throughout the years to channel funds and
resources to the local level. Thus, the society president occupies a
powerful position in village society. This has been true even for
the periods in which cooperatives in Tamil Nadu were formally
suspended, such as in 1995 (see chapter 9). A number of former
office-holders have used their periods of tenure to strengthen their
local positions economically as well as politically. The last presi-
dent of the cooperative society, who is now a successful whole·
saler of kattumaram timbers, is an important opinion-maker in
the hamlet. He regularly acts as a spokesman in village meetings
for youth discontent against the traditional leaders, perhaps to
establish a platform for his personal aspirations in the field of
politics.
The Gram Panchayat president holds the key to substantial
material resources and outside contacts. Only one inhabitant of
Kalvimanagar has held this position since the Government of India
established Panchayat Raj in 1948. This man, who is commonly
designated simply as talaivar, is now in his sixties and actively
dabbles in real estate. Villagers commonly put him on par with the
chettiyar, which is reflected in the fact that they usually sit next
to each other in village meetings. Interestingly, the talaivar comes
from a recent immigrant lineage which, though numerous, would
14 I leave aside the hamlet representatives of the political parties in Tamil Nadu,
although their positions also confer status and power on the holder. Possibly be··
cause of the altercation among parties in the state government, the position of
party secretary has not provided anyone in Kalvimanagar with lasting influence.
The secretary of the AIADMK party, which was in government until May 1996, is
also one of the leaders of the pangaali group that regularly issues challenges to the
chettiyar and his lineage. He has not succeeded, however, in converting his pres-
tige into a permanent position of village authority.
Panchayats and the Regulation ofAr1:isanal Fishing 155
probably not have participated substantially in the traditional
administrative set-up.
With internal changes and the entry of new-style leaders, ad-
ministration in the fishing settlements of the Coromandel Coast
has become more complex than it was. when asked to
delineate their leaders, the inhabitants of Kalvimanagar generally
name a group which includes the chettiyar, the seven-member
council, the talaivar, and the ex-president of the Fisheries Co·
operative Society. The positions these men occupy were instated
during different historical eras. Moreover, they also have different
functions. Ritual tasks are the exclusive domain of the chlettivclr
and the old-time council. External relations, on the other hand, are
the prerogative of the chettiyar and the new-style leaders, each on
their own terrain. As village opinion-makers, however, these men
all play important roles in decision-making. Together they form
the village's political and social elite.
It is useful to dwell briefly on the position of the chettiyar in the
village administration. Several historical sources are unequivocal
about his power. For example, Warriar (1967:27) writes that the
'headman's powers are absolute. No one can question him or
argue with his decisions, for they are final and irrevocable. lIe
combines in himself legislative, executive and judicial powers'
Thurston and Rangachari [1909] 1987:183). Such statements appear
simplistic in the light of my examination of the complexities of
hamlet administration, even within the limits of the old The
first chettiyar must perform a balancing act in order to mollify the
leaders of other village lineages. Moreover, legislation is and al \N aV~'
has been an affair of the village meeting, not anyone individual
or group.
However, the chettiyar occupies a special position in the village
to the present day. In many respects he is still the 'head-man'.
According to rule, officials with business in a fishing village can
proceed only after consulting the chettiyar. This pertains to law
enforcement as well. Under normal circumstances, police officers
do not go directly to the house of a villager they wish to interro-
gate. Rather, they request the chettiyar's permission to do so. The
latter intercedes and may offer to bring the person to the police
station at a later time. In view of the reputation for ruthlessness of
the police force in India (d. Baxi 1982:84--120), the chettiyar's role
a shield and an arbitrator is of great consequence for ordinary
156 Marine ]{esource Management
villagers. The administrative crisis in Kalvimanagar became ap-
parent to 111.any people only when they realized that the police no
longer bothered to follow this prescribed route but acted directly.
The chettiyar chairs meetings which discuss larger village dis-
putes as well as those which involve non-villagers. Village members
also are obliged to confer with him before taking any action which
has political or financial implications for the collective. Because of
this general prescription, fishermen are required to ask permis-
sion from the village chettiyar before bringing a mechanized boat
to the beach.
This brings me to an important point. I noted before that village
members are shareholders with unlimited liability for collective
debts. In the past, boat owners have successfully sued village
panchayats for the damage caused to a boat or to its crew during a
scuffle with artisanal fishermen in village waters. The village fund,
which is replenished by a uniform head tax on village members,
pays such damages. By demanding that fishermen obtain his per-
mission before undertaking action, the chettiyar protects the vil-
lage against the impetuous and hot-headed actions of individual
members and thus acts as the steward of collective interests.
Sanctions
In examining the issues of enforcement and of sanction, I hope to
determine the extent to which leaders and participants in village
meetings can ensure that people will accept their decisions. A
historical review reveals a decline in the severity of available sanc-
tions. For example, people recount that in former days a chettiyar
could ensure compliance with a decision by placing a mound of
sand on an errant fisherman's kattumaram. This cautioned the
offender that all fishing activity was prohibited until he submitted
to village authority. In some instances, a transgressor would be
tied to a kattumaram and beaten with ropes. The ultimate sanction
for misbehaviour, however, was social excommunication. An ab-
errant individual or family would be isolated through the suspen-
sieHl. of all material and social intercourse. They might even be
denied access to water and to common items such as salt or a fire-
brand. Cut off from daily conversation and excluded from social
events such as weddings, these individuals left the village or, prob-
ably more frequently, repented (d. Hayden 1983; Mandelbc1Um
Punchayats and the Regulation ofArtisanal Fishing 157
1970:285-86; Pradhan 1966:135-·39).15 The last instance of excom··
munication in Kalvimanagar occurred in the late 1980s, when a
fisherman was suspected of informing the police about a smug-
gling operation from which the whole village stood to benefit. 16
Corporal punishment and excommunication no longer figure
on the list of available sanctions. Corporal punishment has lost its
social acceptability amongst inhabitants of Kalvimanagar, who now
view it as uncivilized and overly humiliating. Both these types of
sanctions also prove problematic in the face of constitutional law
(d. Templeman 1996:83). Villagers cite instances in which victims
of such practices went to court and won their case; the village lead··
ers who initiated the sanction suffered hardship and disrepute as a
result. The instruments now available to village leaders may be
more limited but do not necessarily lack effectiveness. I'! These meas··
ures consist of monetary fines and the threat of social disgrace.
Panchayat Circles and Fishermen's Associations
Authority in artisanal fisheries along the Coromandel Coast is con-
centrated at the hamlet level. Corporate membership, panchayat
meetings, and a formal leadership structure focus decision-making
on this particular tier. However, this is not necessarily the top-most
level of the political and administrative structure. Various authors
point out the existence of regional councils among caste groups in
Tamil Nadu which serve to address collective problems (d.
Karuppaiyan 1990:68-93; Mandelbaum 1970:280--86; Mines 1983;
Pradhan 1966:112-·35; Sivakumar and Sivakumar 1993:23-25). So
how do fishermen deal with larger issues '''Yhich involve several
fishing settlements or the fishing populatiol1.as a whole?
15 According to Mandelbaum (1970:285-86), the final sanction available to a caste
panchayat is the outcaste-ing of a defaulter or, still worse, the uttering of a panchayat
curse. I have heard fishermen along the Coromandel Coast frame excommunica-
tion not in terms of caste, but rather of conununity. This, of course, does not ex-
clude the possibility that caste excommunication existed in the past.
The man left Kalvimanagar along with some of his relativqs but was reconciled
a few years later. He always has denied having acted as a police informant.
17 Panchayats apparently are used to manoeuvring within the bounds of the pos-
sible. Thus, as Mandelbaum (1970:289-90) points out,' the leaders size up the fecl·
of the council and estimate whether they can get a consensus. . there is little
pomt in pronouncing a decision unless it can be enforced, and it can be enforced
only if the wielders.of power determine to do so.'
158 Marine Resource Mcmagement
Contrary to Thurston and Rangachari's observation ([1909]
1987:183), the Pattinavar caste has no tradition of caste headmen 18
or of formally constituted regional councils. No authority rules over
the hamlet chettiyars or partakes in decisions about affairs of
general concern. I Iowever, fishermen do not lack instruments for
dealing with larger matters, and interhamlet disputes do not in-
evitably result in bloodshed. The fishermen of the Coromandel
Coast have tools in their institutional repertory which allow them
to address bigger issues on an incidental basis. It functions through
what Mandelbaurn (1970:280) calls' panchayat circles'.
A problem involving two hamlets might well be solved by par-
leys between the two administrations concerned. There is an ac-
tive tradition of administrations sending each other official letters
and envoys. Unless the recipient panchayat deliberately intends to
snub the sender, it will seriously consider the matter. Sometimes a
joint meeting is also organized.
However, recognizing that tempers may flare up, disputing
parties often invite outside leaders to participate in a settlement.
Thus, panchayats along the Coromandel Coast commonly invite
functionaries from six to twenty surrounding hamlets to a meet-
ing, which is chaired by someone who is recognized as having spe-
cial authority.19 Although the usual procedure in such panchayat
circle meetings is to strive for consensus, participants can also
18 According to Thurston and Rangachari ([1909] 1987:183), the Pattinavar fishing
caste also possesses caste headmen 'who hold[s] sway over a group of villages'. I
have serious doubts about the existence of such institutions, now or in the past. At
present, I am aware of only two supralocal administrative structures. The first,
which will be discussed in more detail in chapter 8, is a federative body called the
Panchayat Union, which arose only after the fishing harbour of Madras was estab-
lished. The second concerns a cluster of seven coastal villages adjacent to Pulicat
Lake which have a habit of laying larger issues before a joint body for adjudica-
tion. I can only speculate about the origin of this last institution. It is well possible
that it is a function of the specific location (particularly since Pulicat Lake has
engendered many special regulatory structures) or a recent innovation.
19 Although the chairman may be the village leader with the greatest esteem, out-
siders may also be invited to fulfil the role. In cases which came to my attention,
the outside chairman was regularly a prominent member of the fishing caste. The
chairmen occupied such diverse positions as Member of Legislative Assembly,
Fisheries Department officer, fishermen's association president, and gang leader.
In other instances, the outsider did not belong to the fishing caste at all; these men
wielded the influence of their positions and of their reputations for impartiality.
Panchayats and the Regulation ofArtisanal Fishing 159
decide to install what is called a kaddai panchayat (an abbreviated
settlement procedure). In this case, participants agree beforehand
to abide by the chairman's decision, whatever it might be.
Although fishermen respect the decisions of panchayat
the sanctions for noncompliance are limited indeed. The adminis··
trative instrument therefore remains imperfect. 1 have heard of
several interhamlet disputes which continued to fester despite the
convention of panchayat circle meetings.
In recent years, a new kind of regional organization has been
established. A number of authors expand on the fact that caste
groups in Tamil Nadu have established broad-based associations
to further their economic and political interests (d. IIardgrave 1969;
Mandelbaum 1970:500-20; Mines 1984; Templeman 1996)
Anugraham (1940:223), who discusses the functioning of an
organization called the Fisheries Youth League in Madras and its
surroundings, provides the first indication of such modem asso~
ciations among the artisanal fishermen of the Coromandel Coast.
One of the most influential of the new associations actually emerged
after the large-·scale conflicts between kattumaram and mechanized
boat fishermen in the 1960s and 1970s (see chapter 2). In the face of
a threat to their livelihood, artisanal fishermen's leaders set up the
Tamil Nadu Kattumaram Fishermen's Association (Tarnizhnaadu
Kaddurnara Miin Pidiklcum TozhilaaLar Sangam) which rapidly ob
tained a large and vociferous following. Although organized along
modern lines, this organization replicated some of the weaknesses
of the panchayat circle. It boasted a weak organizational infrastruc~
ture and relied on the voluntary cooperation of village units. For
these reasons, and others, it began to decline in the 1980s. At present;
it differs little from other fishermen's associations that operate in
the region and barely warrant the name organization. They tend to
revolve around one leader, and lack programmes and regular ac-
tivities. Nevertheless, leaders of such associations are often
invited to chair panchayat circle meetings.
5.2 The Regulation of Artisanal Fishing
Two cases which are exemplary for harnlet administrations' ac··
tivities in the field of fisheries regulation are presented in the fol···
lowing pages. The first pertains to the process of rule formulation
and development. In that case, I discuss the prohibition of a special
160 A1arine Resource Management
net for sea snail fishing during 1995. This ban is noteworthy
because of its wide field of application and the clarity of its
motivations. The second example relates to rule enforcement. In
that case, I describe an incident in which Kalvimanagar fishermen
clashed with a mechanized boat crew from Madras. I argue that
the pattern of rule enforcement which emerges from this case epit··
omizes the process of artisanal fisheries regulation. The fact that
the offending party was a mechanized boat crew, however, allows
me to remark on the relations between the two sectors.
The Prohibition ofthe Snail Net20
In the course of 1995, a number of local seafood traders responded
to international demand and approached fishing hamlets along the
northern Coromandel Coast with a proposal. They offered to pro..
vide individual fishermen with small hoop nets called kachaavalai
(literally: a net baited with waste) for catching sea snails on the
inshore seabed. In return, the fishermen had to sell their catches to
these merchants for roughly Rs 7 a kilo, although a special price
applied to the ventricle lids or opercula.
Although familiar with the net type, artisanal fishermen of this
region had not targeted sea snails before. The salient characteristic
of the proposed fishing method was that the gear had to be baited
with decomposing pieces of ray fish or other meat, which made
this an exceptionally smelly business. Lured by the promise of
financial returns, individual fishermen in various hamlets none-
theless decided to try the net.
In Kalvimanagar, other inhabitants complained so much about
the smell caused by bait and gear that the innovators voluntarily
suspended their operations. As a result, it never came up for dis-
cussion in the village meeting. The pattern in other fishing villages
was different. Shortly after its introduction, hamlet panchayats
throughout the region started prohibiting the use of the net be-
cause they suspected that it negatively affected inshore fish stocks
(see chapter 4 for a discussion of the motives for gear bans). Within
six months, almost all of the twenty-eight hamlet panchayats for
which I have evidence promulgated the ban. Unfortunately, I was
20 I describe this example of regulatory activity in more detail elsewhere (Bavinck
1996 and 1997b).
Panchayats and the Regulation ofArtisanal Fishing 161
not able to determine exactly the place where the ban originated,
only chancing upon it after it had gained wider distribution.
In Vairavankuppam, a hamlet 40 km north of Madras, the proc-
lamation of a ban was not spectacular. Fishermen who had tried
the kachaavalai had achieved reasonably good returns, but another
group of fishermen had objected to the practice. The latter group
argued that the net should be prohibited because it scared off other
fish varieties. The agenda of the village meeting which was held a
few days later included the proposed ban, and by fishermen's stand..
ards it was a tame affair. Not only did most village members dem-
onstrate their lack of interest by staying away, but also the leaders
who did attend barely raised their voices in discussion. The pro"
ponents of a ban pointed out that the net had already been prohib-
ited in other areas. Another group countered that they could
nonetheless give it a try, but they did not object when the chettiyar
cut the discussion short and prohibited the net. 111e chettiyar in
this fishing village has the reputation of wielding old-fashioned
authority and is able to exert control (kadduppaadu), a quality the
leaders of Kalvimanagar are unfortunately felt to lack.
In north Madras, the board of the federation of fourteen artisanal
fishing hamlets, the Panchayat Union of Royapuram (see chapter
8), banned the net in a well-attended meeting on 28 March 1996.
Fishermen from one of the member hamlets had complained that
others were using the kachaavalai net in the inshore area and that
its use should be prevented. A non-member administration to the
north of the city had also made a request to this effect, which lent
the matter extra weight. After a lively discussion, the chairman
asked each representative in the federatfon,.to give his opinion.
When the vote was counted, a majority proved to favour a ban.
This decision was supported by the leader of the mechanized boat
owner association as well.
In South Madras, a proposed ban resulted in a group fight be-
tween fishermen from three adjoining hamlets and in police inter-
vention. The peace-making efforts of the Police and Fisheries
Departments ultimately resulted in a forced banning of the
kachaavalai in the third village as well (see chapter 10 for a more
elaborate description of this incident).
What are the conspicuous elements in all these instances of rule··
making? First of all, individual village leaders clearly do not de-
cide on legislation of this kind, although their opinions may carry
162 Ma:rine Resource Man'lqement
weight. Instead, such legislation is a decree of the village gather-
ing, which all members are urged, but not forced, to attend. In one
special instance, the representatives to a federated body made the
decision for all of the member hamlets.
Second, village members broach topics that raise general con-
cern. Developments in Kalvimanagar indicate that if an issue dies
a natural death, it is not necessary to decree an official ban. How·
ever, if a prohibition is heavily disputed, such as in the example of
one village in southern Madras, the local panchayat finds it diffi-
cult to take any action at all. The subsequent intervillage fight
illustrates the weakness of administration at the supralocallevel.
This particular problem was finally resolved only through govern-
ment intervention.
The spread of the kachaavalai ban from one village to another
brings up one more interesting issue. The regulated introduction
of the trammel net along this coastline in the 1980s, which was
described in chapter 4, indicates that many fishermen's rules have
a regional character. In neither of these instances, however, did
fishermen from various hamlets gather to decide on the matter.
Instead, measures spread from one place to another. The inner logic
of the decisions apparently convinced the fishermen of each village
of the necessity.
The Capture ofa lYIechanized Boat
My second example does not concern the formulation of artisana1
fishing rules. Rather, it deals with their enforcement. One particu-
lar rule states that a fisherman who damages another fisherman's
nets or craft or injures him physically must provide financial
compensation. This is, in fact, the only regulation which artisanal
fishermen vigorously enforce vis-a.-vis mechanized boats. The fol-
lowing incident took place in Ka1vimanagar in September 1995.
Unfortunately, I did not witness it myself, but I collected testimonies
from participants directly afterwards.
A group of motorized kattumaram fishermen from Kalvima-
nagar went mackerel fishing one night on fishing grounds dir-
ectly east of the village at a depth of 22 fathoms. Two small
mechanized boats from Madras appeared on the scene around
Panchayats and the Regulation ofA rtisanal Fishin,fI 163
dawn. Oblivious to the warning signals of the kattumaram fish·
ermen, the mechanized boat fishermen ploughed through two
panels of their nets and damaged them extensively. The four
crews of kattumaram fishermen in the vicinity immediately
untied the ropes that anchored their nets to their craft, deter··
mined their sea positions and began to give chase. One boat
managed to escape. 'I11e kattumaram fishermen boarded the
second boat, however, and beat up two crew members 'for their
carelessness'. The artisanal fishermen then attached their craft
to the stern of the mechanized boat and conducted it to the shore.
The village chettiyar ordered that a messenger send word to the
boat owner, who happened to be a known person from a
15 km north of Kalvimanagar. Interestingly, a Kalvimanagar fish
erman was working for the same owner, albeit on another boat.
When the boat owner arrived later that afternoon, the chettiyar
convened a small meeting on the shore. According to one of the
participants, 'the chettiyar spoke on our behalf'. Participants sub··
sequently inspected the damaged nets, and arrived at a com-
pensatory amount of Rs 5,000. This figure represented a little
more than the shop value of some 10 kilos of net and was recog··
nizably generous. The owner paid up immediately, and villag"
ers subsequently released the boat and its crew.
The fishermen who informed me about the incident were gleeful
and more than a little proud. After all, a similar incident had oc·
curred two weeks before, but then they had been unable to appre·
hend the culprit. The fishermen whose nets had been damaged at
that time had appealed to the mechanized'boat owners' associ·
ation court to obtain compensation (see chapter 7 ). Not only had
this required a lot of time, but the court's restitution was a pittance
in comparison to the damage. Everyone in the village therefore
had agreed that capturing a boat was a far better strategy than
going to court in Madras. Indeed, now their panchayat had been
able to decide the matter, which shifted the balance of power to
the advantage of artisana1 fishermen. At the same time, Kalvima..
nagar fishermen realized that habitual use of this mode of action
could have deleterious consequences as well. For example, mechan·
boat fishermen of Madras could single out their village for
rprlrJ';;'1c and beat up lone kattumaram fishermen at sea. Further-
more, the artisanal fishermen recognized another risk of boat
164 Marine Resource Management
capture; if the mechanized boat or its crew suffered injuries in the
heat of the encounter, the village could face substantial claims and
harassment.
This incident illustrates some principles of artisanal fisheries
administration - themes which also run through another instance
of rule enforcement which was briefly discussed in chapter 4. In
that case I described an incident in which Kalvimanagar fisher-
men apprehended a group of artisanal fishermen from another vil-
lage who were using ray fish nets in village waters. Since the ray
fish net is prohibited in Kalvimanagar, locals brought the trans-
gressors to the beach to face trial.
First, the capture of the mechanized boat demonstrates the im-
portant role that village members play in rule enforcement. They,
and not necessarily the village leaders, are the ones who observe
transgressions at sea. Village members are also the ones who take
corrective action, which ultimately may result in the apprehension
of the culprit. The artisanal fishermen's success in this case was
facilitated by the fact that they had recently fitted out their
kattumarams with engines. The motorization of artisanal fishing
craft, which has recently gained popularity along the Coromandel
Coast, has improved the capacity of artisanal fishermen to appre-
hend mechanized boats and to punish offenders (for an elabor-
ation of this argument, see Bavinck 1997a).
The participants in this incident admitted that, in principle, they
should have obtained permission from the chettiyar before chas-
ing the mechanized boat. As they objected, however, the distance
had made this impractical. They argued that if they had first re-
turned to shore, the hen would have flown the coop by the time
they got back to the place where the violation occurred. Indeed,
this is often the case. This anecdote points out once again how
responsibility for rule enforcement falls on the rank and file of vil-
lage members.
Second, the incident underscores the chettiyar's formal role in
the resolution of conflicts. It was the chettiyar who summoned the
boat owner and chaired the meeting, thereby legitimizing the
settlement process and elevating it to the level of a village affair.
Indeed, the village meeting was the setting for the dispute's reso-
lution. The two parties presented their versions of the events in
full view of all village members who cared to attend. Moreover,
the onlookers weighed the fairness of the final judgement.
Panchayats and the Regulation ofArtisanal Fishing 165
Finally, this example demonstrates that extraneous factors can
influence the course of administrative deliberations on fishing
rights. According to the fishermen who attended the session, the
boat owner's position as an employer of a village fisherman played
an important part. It minimized the compensation amount and
probably also expedited the peaceful settlement of the incident.
5.3 Crisis in Kalvimanagar Administration
In the preceding sections, I have sketched a rudimentary picture of
the administrative structure I found in Kalvimanagar, and in the
many other hamlets I visited. The pervasiveness of non-state ad-
ministration along the Coromandel Coast shows up in our survey
results as well (see AppendiX 2). All of the surveyed fishing vil-
lages boast a panchayat structure. Moreover, all of them have a tax
system, which indicates that the panchayats are not empty shells
but active systems of management.
The focus on administrative structure should not mask its de-
fects or the tensions which affect it. These are partly of early origin.
Lineage loyalties, which maintain another locus of power, trad-
itionally subverted village unity. And although panchayat circles
address problems which transcend the village, I noted that their
capacities are limited. However, recent developments also threaten
to undermine the workings of fisheries administration, as the situ-
ation in Kalvimanagar reveals. I will not attempt to explain the
crisis in this particular village, because its causes lie outside the
realm of fishing. Instead, I examine the underlying pattern and
focus on its implications for fisheries regulation.
The issue at hand was the proposed sale of a 7.5-acre parcel of
land outside Kalvimanagar to one of two Madras-based real-
estate developers for a staggering Rs 45,00,000, or Rs 18,000 per
village member. The matter had dragged on for some years but
reached a climax during my period of research. In the course of
the year, suspicions of malpractice and of underpricing arose,
and the village separated into two camps that revolved around
two large local lineages. Pressures mounted as outsiders became
involved, particularly the local Member of the Legislative As-
sembly (MLA) and some top-level bureaucrats who were vying
for a share. Moreover, many village members had preemptively
166 Marine Resource Management
invested the money they hoped to receive. They put it into con-
struction projects and in marriage obligations, and they were
starting to feel the financial strain. Village leaders compounded
the problem by refusing to clarify financial accounts. This cha-
otic state of affairs finally resulted in the establishment of a youth
panchayat. Although the tumult subsided once the buyer made
the first instalment, the trouble was far from over. Inhabitants
debated the criteria for village membership, for this determined
the right to a share of the collective earnings. The sale had not
been concluded by the time of my departure, and another land
sale issue already was looming on the horizon, portending a
possible continuation of strife.
The controversy brought out and exacerbated some of the current
weaknesses of the village administration, but it did not cause them.
Over a period of decades, the foundations and raison d'etre of the
administrative edifice in fishing villages of the Coromandel Coast
slowly began to deteriorate. First, many villages have lost economic
homogeneity due to the appearance of new professional opport-
unities and of labour migration. This affects the very foundations
of administration. 2 ] I noted earlier that fishing is the cornerstone in
the institutional design of village membership; village members
thus have traditionally been equivalent to adult fishermen. The
growing number of villagers who no longer carry out this trade
has undermined the set-up, causing confusion and conflict Al-
though the immediate dispute in Kalvimanagar centred on money,
the more fundamental question was: who are the shareholders in
the collective?
In a number of meetings, discussions focused on the member-
ship rights of various ambivalent categories of villagers. For
example, what are the rights of those villagers who are not fish-
ermen but students or salaried workers? As they rarely go to
sea, these individuals barely contribute to the village fund and
evade duties such as going to village meetings. However, in the
21 The dilemmas caused by economic diversification exist throughout the region.
Some panchayats have better solutions than others, however In Vairavankuppam,
for example, the panchayat obliged villagers working elsewhere to compensate
the lessee of marketing rights. The latter had complained that he was losing in-
come through the absence of several fishermen.
PanchayatT and the Regulation ofArtisanal Fishiri!1 167
words of one disgruntled fisherman, they 'do reap all the bene-
fits of membership'. The fishermen who are employed by trawler
owners in Madras are another problernatic group. Although
appear when money is distributed in the village, these fisher·'
men make a meagre contribution to village life. As one local
fisherman remarked, 'there is no widow in the village who will
be able to make a living by selling your fish.'
The main controversy in Kalvimanagar was whether the names
of such people should be deleted from the list of land sale re,
cipients. Some inhabitants thought they should be excluded,
whereas others countered that these men were born and bred in
Kalvimanagar and had just as much right to membership as any-
one else. And did they not still go out fishing in their free hours?
111e discussion proved inconclusive, and the chettiyar declined
to make fundamental alterations to the list. At various moments,
however, participants in the meeting looked beyond the topic
at hand and argued that the village should discuss the criteria
for membership more fundamentally. While they agreed with
the need for such a discussion, others pointed out that this task
would take many hours; thus, the topic was postponed.
The second factor threatening to undermine administrative struc-
ture is the decline of village self-sufficiency. In short, the inhabit-·
ants of fishing hamlets have become less dependent on collective
efforts to maintain themselves. The decline of autonomy emerges
in many areas. Taxation of members is no longer the only way to
pay for collective expenditure; other avenues such as land sale have
arisen. In addition, government welfare schemes have reduced the
need for self-sufficiency. In former times, village action offered the
only possibility for survivaL Now, government programrnes have
made many of the old village activities redundant
Third, the Tamil Nadu government has introduced alternative
power centres at the local level. These alternatives challenge the
sphere of traditional leaders and create other kinds of social div-
isions. Although they have been defunct for long periods of time,
cooperative societies and Gram Panchayats have evolved into new
platforms of political power, and this affects the pattern of village
leadership too. The lower echelons of bureaucracy and political
parties, which reach into villages more and more, affect decision'
making processes as welL
168 Marine Resource Management Panchayats and the Regulation ofA rtisanal J69

All of these macro processes are well known and clearly dis-
cernible in rural areas throughout India. A more difficult question
is whether the conflict with the mechanized boat sector has had
consequences for the strength of village administration. 'This scen-
ario is not unthinkable. The failure to control mechanized boat
fishing in inshore waters arguably was the greatest debacle of
artisanal panchayats along the Coromandel Coast in modern his··
tory. Under the patronage of the state government, mechanized
boat fishermen could ignore the directives of traditional authority
with impunity, even if they caused damage to fishing gears and to
fish stocks. I noted in the previous chapters some of the ways in
which village adrninistrations tried to safeguard the interests of
artisanal fishing, such as by establishing a regional association.
Another way, discussed in chapter 4, was to keep a maxim 11m dis-
tance from the mechanized boat sector by prohibiting village mem-
bers to work on or invest in boats.
on the basis of their style of fishing, rule system, and administra-
tive structure reacted to the arrival of this new technology. The
power differentials between the two are striking. Both at
sea and in political encounters, mechanized boat fishermen have
clear advantage. Artisanal fishermen's notions of open access to
fishing grounds admittedly opens the door to exploitation. 'The cor
ollary of open access in the artisanal sea tenure system is the
to regulate how people fish. This, however, has proved difficult
for artisanal fishennert to do. In the face of encroachment
mechanized boat fishermen, they generally take a minimalist ap·-
proach and intervene only when boats their

5.4 Conclusions

The past three chapters have described the characteristics of

artisanal fishing along the Coromandel Coast, the rules which fish-
ermen apply to fishing practice, and the administrative structures
which they use to formulate regulations and to enforce them.
Together these compose the artisanal sea tenure system, which is
both old and refined. Two aspects are of particular importance.
First, artisanal fishermen associate their regulatory prerogatives
with a particular sea territory. Second, regulations generally are
motivated in view of the long-term survival of the fishing commu-
nity in question.
These chapters have also sketched the changes which are taking
place at different levels in the artisanal fishing sector. Local ad-
ministrations have been able to handle a number of them well. Rule-
making has thus been accelerated to keep up with the rapid pace
of technological innovation. Indeed, the panchayat set--up of vil-
lage administration has demonstrated an extraordinary capacity
for self-renewal. At the same time, the artisanal system of sea ten-
ure faces a number of greater challenges, including the gradual
diversification of the hamlet fishing economy.
This is the context in which mechanized boats made their ap-
pearance. These chapters have shown how artisanal fishermen-·
Plate 1 Kattumaram Fishermen Launching an Unmotorized Craft

Plate 2 Village Meetings - Platforms for Decision-making Justice

 Plate 4 Boat Owners on the Occasion of Launching a New Craft

.~
Plate 5 Paperwork in Tamil Nadu Fisheries Department Headquarters

Plate 6 Front View of a Tauiil Nadu Fisheries Department Office- Wall Paintings Champion the Political Party
 Part 3

Mechanized
 6

The authors of a recent authoritative study on the Tamil Nadu

economy posit that the traditional and modern sectors of fisheries
are fundamentally at odds (Madras Institute of Development Stud··
ies 1988:164-65). The major difference between them', they ob~
serve, 'is in respect of their organisational structure.' Specifically,
they argue that the traditional sector has pre-capitalist traits,
whereas the mechanized sector is capitalist in nature. And about
the latter they conclude:

The mechanised sector ... is very much a part of the capitalist

system where the owners of the means of production ... have as
their main objective making profits and accumulating capital (ibid.,
my italics).

These authors are not alone in taking that position. It is received

wisdom among academics who study Indian fisheries to contrast
mechanized boat and artisanal fishing and to assume their irre-
concilability (d. Kurien 1991). As many ofthese writers support
the cause of artisanal fishermen, who are perceived to be the under-
dog, mechanized boat fishermen frequently are cast in the role of
'bad guys'.
I do not object to the use of a dualistic typology, although one
must be aware of its limitations. Rather, I disagree with using the
distinction as an excuse to exclude one-half of the duality from
study. Little effort has gone into analyzing the dynamics of the
newly established mechanized boat sector in southern India.!

I Thomson (1989) and Subba Rao (1988) are the only two academics who have

conducted an in·depth study of the mechanized boat industry concurrent with an

180 Manne Resource Management
After three chapters on the artisanal fishing sector, I now shift
my focus to the mechanized boat fishermen of Royapuram, North
Madras. In this chapter, I investigate the socia-economic character
of boat fishing and thereby lay the groundwork for a subsequent
enquiry into sea tenure. I stress three aspects. The first is the size of
the boat fishing sector and the fact that it is part of a rough and
unsettled urban milieu. Whereas a sense of community still per-
vades rural fishing hamlets, Royapuram is a place of anonymity
where people jostle for chances. I then shift to the technicalities of
boat fishing and note the large and expanding range of mechan-
ized boats. Finally, I describe boat fishing as a round-the-dock
activity that emphasizes the maximization of production. Investig-
ating the backgrounds of this state of affairs, I soon find myself
concentrating on two figures in the production process the boat
owner2 and the driver. 3
6.1 The .se1~ting; of Mechanized Boat Hshil1lG;
The Hshing Harbour
The area of Royapuram, which is located north of the railway lines
leading to the port of Madras, is known for its dusty summers,
industrial traffic, and frequent disruptions of the electricity sup-
ply. Royapuram also has a reputation for hooliganism: many of
analysis of artisanal fishing. Vijayan (1980) did a brief study of mechanized boat
fishing in Orissa, whereas Ram (1991) investigated the workings of the sector from
the perspective of migrant workers and their families.
2 I have chosen to use the term 'boat owner' in the male Singular for reasons of
clarity. However, this grammatical form has the disadvantage that it conceals im-
portant characteristics of boat ownership. Rarely does one male in a household
carry out all the tasks involved in operating a mechanized boat. The senior woman
generally plays a major role, not only in auctioneering and marketing, but in finance
as well. This continues the tradition in the fishing population whereby women are
responsible for money matters. Other males in the household - sons or brothers-
are also often involved in one way or another. The term boat owner therefore
condenses the compleXities of household management in the hypothetical role
performed by a single man. In rare cases, such as when the boat owner is a female,
the use of the male singular is even completely wrong.
3 In Royapuram, the word' driver' is used, even in Tamil, to denote the skipper of
a fishing vessel. I go along with this local practice.
The Mechanized Boat Fishermen ofRoyapuram 18 J
the rowdies terrorizing the city supposedly belong to its fishing
population. The numerical importance of fishermen in Royapurarn
is demonstrated by the fact that they often deliver the constituency's
Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA), as was the case in the
elections of 1992 and 1996. The 1992 winner was the first Minister
of Fisheries to come from Royapuram and was a significant
in fisheries politics. I will return to this topic in several contexts in
the following chapters.
The fishing harbour, which was completed in 1984, abuts the
northern flank of the Madras Port (see Map 4), adjacent to the an
cient fishing hamlet of Kasimedu. it forms a nebulous W, with the
jetty making up the central leg and two small beaches lying within
the breakwaters to the north and to the south. The harbour has
developed faster and more differently than its designers intended.
its capacity of 500 boats has already been exceeded by almost 100
per cent (d. Thirumilu et al. 1994). Although the Port Trust in~
tended it for off-loading and trade, the covered area along the main
wharf has never been used for that purpose. The commercial centre
remains on the southern beach, which fishermen refer to as
kadaloorum (Tamil for 'place by the sea') or as' auction beach'. Most
of kadaloorum, which recently was bisected by a viaduct leading
to the Madras Port, contains thatched sheds in which boat owners
and merchants inspect and handle catches. Here, boats returning
from sea unload fish onto kattumarams for transportation to shore,
where throngs of head porters, petty traders, and auctioneers await
them. Boat construction and drydocking are also concentrated in
this area. A large number of local kattumaram fishermen find space
to beach their craft in this area as well.
A relative quiet in the northern section of the harbour offsets
the congestion of the southern beach. Lacking big trade and ser-
vice facilities, this spill-over area houses mainly smaller types of
boats as well as boats owned by people from outside Madras. Many
of these craft are berthed alongside the small finger jetty adjacent
to the dockyard. This yard, which is run by the Port Trust, remains
separate from the Madras fishing economy. The reason is that
mechanized boat fishermen prefer the cheaper services of beach-
docking crews. The kattumaram fishermen who beach their craft
and repair their nets along this northern beach are considered out·
siders. They have shifted their operations from the fishing villages
north of Madras either because of the effects of coastal erosion or
 182 Marine Resource Management
because of the higher prices offered on the Madras market. Many
of them travel to and from their homes every day. In addition,
groups of migrant fishermen sometimes come in for a limited
period of time.
In between the two beaches is a long wharf. It berths an esti-
mated 150 mechanized boats at anyone time as well as a number
of larger trawlers. 4 Here boats are supplied with fuel and ice; gen-
erally speaking, they are made ready for the next voyage. A large
number of professional net makers use the covered'auction hall'
to repair or to manufacture trawling gear. Service facilities are
nearby. There are two fuel pumps, one at each end of the jetty, and
a total of ten ice factories in the harbour area alone. s A few scat-
tered workshops and stores selling anything from spare parts to
drinking water, tea and snacks cover the area behind and adjacent
to the wharf, while many others fill the streets behind.
Two influential fishermen's organizations (which are discussed
in greater detail in chapter 8) have premises in the harbour area.
The Panchayat Union, a federated body of fishermen's panchayats
which exercises de facto authority over many local affairs, has an
office on the waterfront. The Ad hoc Committee, which is the fore.·
most boat-owner association, also has a regular meeting place in
the harbour area. Its main office is located to the rear of kadaloorum.
The fishing harbour is formally administered by the Madras Port
Trust, which is also responsible for upkeep and development. The
Port Trust officials with whom I spoke confided that they would
actually like to be relieved of this task. Not only does the fishing
harbour cost more money than it generates, particularly because
users are infamous for their failure to pay harbour dues, but it is a
never-ending headache too. Squatter settlements spring up inside
the harbour area at regular intervals, and fishermen organizations
continually thwart well-intended development plans. One of the
4 The number of deep-sea trawlers based in Royapuram hovered around ten during
my research period. The majority of these belonged to private owners in Madras,
but two were survey vessels of the central government agency, Survey of India. I
exclude the deep-sea trawlers from the analysis because they represent a small
segment of activity, they fish different and more distant grounds, and they have
their own market channels and labour arrangements.
5 I use the term 'harbour area' to denote the fishing port and the adjacent fisheries-
oriented business zone.
The Mechanized Boat Fishermen ofltoyapuram 183
main problems from an official point of view is the absence of a
surrounding wall which would facilitate control over the harbour
area. Such a barrier was planned and partially constructed in the
1980s. However, construction ceased when fishermen protested
vehemently, even breaking down the wall in places. In the frame·
work of a new harbour development plan, the Port Trust is pres-
ently attempting to construct a wall around the compound again
(d. Madras Port Trust 1979 and 1993).
A number of government fisheries institutions are situated in
the harbour area. One of these is the office of the Survey of India, a
central government agency which is responsible for the survey of
fish stocks outside state waters. In addition, the area hosts a
government net factory as well as two offices of the Tamil Nadu
Fisheries Department. I discuss the latter institutions in chapter 9.
The Fishing Neighbourhoods ofRoyapuram
Prior to World War II, Royapuram included only a few fishing
hamlets, of which Kasimedu and Pannamaratoddi were the most
important. A series of events led to a multiplication of settlements.
First, there was the displacement of the population living around
the Madras Port; they had to move away at the outbreak of the
World War II (d. Anugraham 1940:162). The same thing happened
again in the 1970s, when the Port Trust constructed the Bharati
Dock to the north of the main harbour. The development en-
croached on fishermen settlements. Government housing schemes
of the past decades also contributed to the founding of new neigh-
bourhoods. These often bear the names of, prominent fishermen
leaders such as Singaravelar and Jeevaratnam, and of senior poli-
ticians. 6
Immigration contributed to the growth of the fishing popula-
tion. Although the migratory process itself is possibly of older
origin, the development of the mechanized boat industry and the
fishing harbour certainly promoted the influx of single men, and
6 In some cases, the development of new neighbourhoods led to the disappear-
ance of old hamlets. A prime example is Kasimedu, which survives in name alone.
The old village territory, which adjoins the fishing harbour, has been heavily built
up and now includes a number of neighbourhoods such as Draupadi Amrnan
Kovil, Jeevaratnarn Nagar, and Indira Nagar.
184 Marine Resource Management
later of their families, into Royapuram.7 First-generation irmnigrants
came from all parts of Tamil Nadu, but particularly from the dis-
tricts of South Arcot and Kanyakumari. Now they comprise a sig-
nificant proportion of boat owners, crew members, and other
categories of fishing labour. At least 20,000 people currently find
employment in the mechanized boat industry of Royapuram. 8
During the same time period, the local fishing population started
to seek a livelihood in fields other than fishing. This process coin-
cided with the economic development of the city. A large share of
the employment opportunities emerged in the main port as well as
on cargo vessels. But factories established in the industrial zones
to the north and to the east of Royapuram also sought employees.
Many locals of fishermen stock jumped at the chance. 9 Although
their affinity with the fishing profession thereby declined, many of
them continued to live in their old neighbourhoods. The mixed
character of these neighbourhoods incr~ased with the arrival of
blue- and white·ocollar workers of non-fishing caste in search of
low-cost housing.
The combined effect of these developments was a loss of social
cohesion. That is the conclusion drawn from an investigation of
non-state administrative structures at the neighbourhood level. The
membership system characteristic of rural fishing hamlets (see
chapter 5.1) has virtually disappeared. And with it went the com-
plex of community duties and rights. However, some vestiges of
an administrative structure remain. Thus, many, if not all, fishing
neighbourhoods of Royapuram still nominate or elect leaders to
watch over the common interests, organize temple festivals, and
collect money to meet collective expenses.
7 Warriar (1967:30-34) concluded that at the time of his study, which coincided
with the onset of mechanized boat fishing, the rate of fishermen immigration into
Madras was still very low.
S This conservative estimate is based on the number of mechanized boats. One
thousand boats with an average of ten workers each makes 10,000 people with
direct employment in fishing. For every fisherman, there is at least one person
involved in trade or in service industries. Thus, I arrive at a figure of 20,000 per·
sons in the mechanized boat industry of Royapuram.
9 Local fishermen appear to have been involved in the loading and unloading of
sea vessels since the founding of Madras in the eighteenth century. With the con-
struction and further development of the main port, fishermen organizations
demanded that a major portion of jobs be reserved for the fishing population.
After all, harbour work forms a 'natural extension' of their traditional profession.
The Mechanized Boat Fishermen ofRoyapuram 185
These macro-developments have also the variegation
of fishing neighbourhoods. The essential similarity artisanal
fishing hamlets in Tamil Nadu no exists in the area of
Royapuram. Richer boat owners prefer quiet interior areas such as
CG Colony and AJ Colony, where they build themselves three-
storey homes. The poorest families of manual workers cmd of re··
cent immigrants, on the other hand, cluster in thatch-work slums
behind the harbour and in other localities. The hardships they face
in their occupations and living conditions are compounded by the
fires which regularly reduce entire areas to ashes. 10 Other
bourhoods have a mixed population of boat workers, boat owners,
kattumaram fishermen, and others. The sordid slums adjoining the
harbour, where a mixed population lives in housing scheme
ments, has a special reputation. This is where many of RClya.pllram.'
brothels and drinking halls are found.
6.2 Mf:ch;mi,~ed Boat Fishhllg
The Mechanized Boat Sector
In January 1996, the Fisheries Department registered 784 mechan··
ized boats in the Royapuram fishing harbour. All informants agree,
however, that this figure is on the low sideY The actual number
of boats in Madras now probably hovers around 1,000. It is also
clear that the number of fishing boats in Royapuram harbour has
grown dramatically in past decades and continues to expand. In
10 Fire razed fishermen's slums four times, depriving hundreds of families of their
basic possessions during the year which I spent in Royapuram.
11 The Fisheries Department has been entrusted with registration only since the
Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing Regulation Act of 1983. Although its registration per..
formance has improved every year, it still is not completely effective. Some boats
are still registered with the State Port Officer, who was previously responsible for
registration. Furthermore, an obscure category of boats is not registered at all. From
time to time, the department therefore attempts to improve its coverage by joining
forces with the boat-owner association to conduct raids (see chapter 10). The defi-
ciencies of official registration practice could not be corrected through an inde-
pendent count, as boats are in and out of the harbour in continuous motion. For an
impression of the degree of accuracy of departmental registration, I did make
random checks on the incidence of boats without numbers. This system is not
foolproof, however, as it does not exclude the possibility of duplicate numbers,
fake numbers, etc.
J 86 Marine Resource Management
1995 alone, boat-building crews constructed at least sixty-five new
craft, which represents an increase of 6 per cent. 12 The fleet's growth
rate is of great concern to boat owners who argue that harbour
facilities are already excessively strained. Moreover, they say that
the increase in the number of boats puts market prices under pres-
sure and results in the overexploitation of fishing grounds.
This uneasiness stems not only from the magnitude of the fleet.
It is also caused by the increasing average size of the boats, which
adds to the burden on facilities. Most of the craft built in Madras in
1995 have a length of 40 feet or more, a fact that is significant in
view of the boat types operated in Madras.
Fishermen of Royapuram divide mechanized boats into two
major categories. The first type are called tangal boats (the verb
tangutal means 'to stay'), and they remain at sea for days on end.
The second type are called day boats (the English word is com·
rnonly used), and they only go out for one-day fishing trips. These
boats differ in size, in range, and in capacity. Day boats, which
average 2.4 to 32. feet in length, fish in the neighbourhood of Ma-
dras. Seldom do they go beyond Kovalam in the south and Ennore
in the north. As there is no cooled fish hold, the day's catch must
be stored on deck.
Tangal boats almost always head north towards the fishing
grounds of Andhra Pradesh. The smaller types (32.-40 feet) have holds
of 1 to 1.5 tons and go out for three or four days of fishing. They trawl
the grounds off Pulicat and the southern part of Nellore District, and
only occasionally seek out fishing grounds to the south of Madras.
The largest tangal boats (40-49 feet in length)13 have 7- to 10-ton holds
and go for fishing trips which last a week or even ten days.
12 This figure correlates quite well with the statistics of the Fisheries Department,
which registered sixty-one new boats in the course of 1995. We counted the number
of boats built at an interval of nine months: in January 1995, thirty-five boats were
under construction; in September 1995, the figure was thirty-four boats. Assuming
that 90 per cent of the vessels under construction in January were finished by Sep-
tember (the normal construction period is four months; a longer period is always
related to a lack of money on the part of the boat owner), at least sixty-five boats
were constructed in the course of the year. There might well have been more,
though. Only some of the new craft seem to have been meant as replacements for
older vessels, which tend to be patched up and redone.
13 No mechanized boat in Royapuram is longer than 49 feet. This has an adminis-
trative reason. Vessels of 50 feet and longer are considered deep··sea craft. As such,
they are licensed not by the Fisheries Department but very restrictively by (MPEDA).
The Mechanized Boat Fishermen ofRoyapuram J 87
As I noted in chapter 2, mechanized boat fishing in l'ami] Nadu
commenced with day boats. The construction of boats with a larger
range started only in the mid-1980s with the discovery of rich fish-
ing grounds off Andhra Pradesh. 'fhe two present··day categories
of vessels therefore also represent different of historical de·
velopment - the smallest boats date back to the earlier phases of
mechanized boat fishing, the larger ones to more recent times. In-
deed, figures on contemporary boat-building suggest that thirty-
three of the thirty-four boats under construction in September 1995
were longer than 40 feet, and most of them fell in the largest cat-
egory of 45 to 49 feet.
Other than these figures suggest, however, some boat owners
continue to be interested in vessels in the size range of 32 to 40 feet.
They often purchase a small boat on the second-·hand mark:et.
Gillnet boats comprise a special class of craft. Lacking trawling
equipment such as winches or booms and boasting a lower stern,
the gillnet boats of Royapuram target high-value fish such as seer
and pomfret. As the gillnetting season lasts for only nine months a
year and investments in nets are both high and risky, this kind of
operation appears to be the prerogative of richer boat owners
operating more than one craft. 14 Local informants calculate that
only 5 to 10 per cent of the fishing fleet presently consists of gillnet
boats, while the majority carries out stern trawling. Because of their
small number, I do not discuss the gillnet boats further. Day boats
make up not more than one-quarter of the boats in the fishing
harbour and their numbers are decreasing graduallyEi Well over
half of the mechanized craft therefore fall into the category of larger
14 In fact I never came across a boat owner who possessed only a giIlnct boat.
Investments in gillnet fishing in Madras always appear to foIIow investments in
trawling boats.
15 Our survey of thirty-three boat owners (possessing sixty-two boats) in
Royapuram revealed the foIIowing distribution of boat types:
Size (in Feet) Number
<32 3 (.5%)
33-39 17 (27%)
40-44 18 (29%)
45--49 18 (29%)
Unknown 6
188 Marine ReJ'ource Management
tangal boats, most of which are oriented towards the Andhra
Pradesh fishing grounds.
Mechanized boat crews generally bring along two types of bot-
tom trawl nets: one with bigger mesh for fish and a smaller-meshed
one for shrimp. They also carry otter boards, cables, and other ac··
cessories. Generally the trawl nets are of the high-opening variety.
Many tangal boat crews tote four or five nets on fishing trips, partly
as reserve material and partly because of slight variations which
pri::~dispose nets for use under different environmental conditions.
The trawl nets are not used with equal frequency. In fact, the driver
often has a favourite piece of gear fabricated by net makers in
Royapuram according to his own specifications.
The non··migratory character of the mechanized boat fleet of
Madras is striking in comparison with the past and with other parts
of India (d. Thomson 1989:132··-37; Vijayan 1980:1~3). Written as
well as oral sources indicate that boat fishermen once moved up
and down the coastline quite extensively in search of fish (d.
Pandurangan and Ramamoorthy n.d.:l). Most of the mechanized
boats of Madras now operate from this fishing harbour through-
out the year and return to this base after every trip. I discuss some
backgrounds and implications of migration patterns in the next
chapters.
Trawling Operations
Despite differences in scale and range, tangal and day boats dis-
play many similarities. One is the relative absence of navigational
instruments on both types of craft. Although most boats are in..
deed fitted with a compass, maps are a rarity. Only a few drivers
would be able to read them anyway. In addition, two-way radios
are absent, which impedes communication with shore as well as
with other vessels. 16 Boat crews thus depend on lighthouses to get
Seven of these boats were used for gillnetting, and five were owned in partner-
ship. As the survey demonstrates a bias towards richer boat owners and larger
boats, the share of day boats is certainly larger than the table shows. I estimate that
they represent perhaps a quarter of the fleet.
10 The coast guard apparently has prohibited two·way radios on fishing boats, as
smuggling and terrorist activities (from Sri Lanka) would be greatly facilitated by
such communication.
The Mechanized Boat Fishermen ofRoyapuram 189
their basic bearings. On the stretch from Madras to False Divi Point
in Andhra Pradesh, there are five lighthouses with different
signals, and every tangal boat driver must be able to re(:o~,;nlze
these landmarks.
Other positioning instruments are rudimentary as welL Even
though the first echo sounders were fitted on boats during my
fieldwork period, the vast majority of crews on a plumb line
to determine depth and substratum type. Lighthouses and lead
form a crew's basic means of orientation. When asked in which
location they carried out fishing, drivers generally
'in the area between [... J and [... J lighthouses, at a depth of [...]
fathoms'. Clearly, this navigational strategy does not take boats
to the deep sea but to inshore fishing grounds within of
the coast.
Crew facilities on board are simple, if not primitive. The cabin
on a day boat affords only sitting space. On tangal boats, which
provide surrogate homes for the five- or six..member crews for
stretches of a week or more, there is somewhat more room. A broad
platform against the rear wall constitutes the sleeping area. As space
is limited and these quarters are often pervaded by fumes front the
engine room, the crew often chooses to sleep on deck. Foodstuffs
which are brought along from shore are augmented with freshly
caught fish. This staple diet is cooked on loose kerosene burners.
Toilet facilities are non-existent and crew members squat on the
railing to answer nature's calL Music from a radio or cassette
recorder provides distraction during the voyage.
Our cards on the movements of five boats over a period of a
year provides an indication of the grounds'that are fished by the
fleet (see Map 3). Day boats generally meander back and forth
within a range of 30 km north and south. Often they shoot their
trawl nets between the cargo ships waiting to enter Madras
immediately after they leave the fishing harbour. Their normal
depth ranges between 10 and 30 fathoms but occasionally goes
down to 40 fathoms or more. Most tangal boats head north
the lighthouses of Pulicat and Arumugam towards the waters
around Krishnapatnam and Ramaypatnam, where most of the
conflicts with artisanal fishermen also occur. In rare instances, they
venture further north to the mouths of the Krishna and Godavari
rivers. Their usual depth ranges between 10 to 30 fathoms, although
they seasonally seek out deeper waters.
 190 Marine Resource Management
How does a crew decide where to fish? According to McGoodwin
(1990:39), even modern, industrialized fishermen 'usually mani·-
fest a significant understanding of the marine environments they
exploit'. Although I did not investigate this topic in depth, it seems
that Madras boat fishermen often deduce the availability of fish
from the states of currents, winds, catch compositions, etc. Accord-,
ing to their own admission, however, their knowledge hardly per-
tains to territory. Whereas artisanal fishermen are thoroughly
familiar with the sea area adjacent to their settlements, boat fisher--
men roam a far larger expanse of sea and rely on a more general
understanding of natural conditions. Not all of them are equally
skilled, however. Some drivers are praised for their ability to come
home with good catches irrespective of the season, but others have
a mechanical approach and shoot the net on the first possible
occasion.
Just as in artisanal fishing, hearsay generally provides mechan--
ized boat fishermen with a hint about the location of profitable
fishing grounds. However, because successful fishermen rarely tell
the truth about their fishing grounds or methods, less successful
crews follow those whom they think may be more fortunate or
more capable. As a result, fishing activity tends to duster at cer--
tain locations in the inshore belt.
Arriving at a potential fishing ground, a crew investigates the
sea bottom with a plumb line. The presence of sand or rocks gives
reason to move on, whereas a muddy seabed without protuberances
indicates good fishing. A trial run of two hours provide~ definite
proof. After hauling in the net and shooting it again, workers sort
the catch. The quantity of discarded fish on tangal boats is immense.
As the capacity of the hold is limited, the crew tends to keep only
the more expensive varieties and throw the remainder overboard.!7
After the limits of fuel, ice, or food supply have been reached or
having filled the hold, the driver sets course for Madras. Day boats
leave port again eady the next morning, whereas tangal boats
17 During a week-long voyage to Andhra waters, one of my assistants witnessed
the disposal of tens of baskets of under-sized or inexpensive fish varieties after
every haul. See Kullberg (1989:19-·20) for information on the large-scale disposal
of by-catches by mechanized boats going out for longer voyages. McEvoy (1986:134)
provides examples from Californian fishing. As Kullberg (1989:16) suggests, it is
likely that this practice is less common on day boats, which return to port every
day and do not have capacity problems.
The Mechanized Boat Fishermen ofRoyapuram 191
require a day of provisioning before they depart on the next voy_·
age. The pressure in both cases is high. Unless by
repairs, stormy weather, or crew problems, an owner will send his
boat out at the earliest possible moment. This contrasts greatly with
artisanal fisheries in which social events or a sufficient income are
enough to keep a fisherman at home chapter 3.).
The tangal boats in our sample were at sea for an ;nrPnHYP of 309
days (85 per cent) during 1995. The fifty--six non--fishing days were
spread throughout the year and were largely used for provisioning.
Bad weather and minor repairs were other reasons for in
port. The day boats in our sample had a less exemplary one
went fishing for only 164 days during the year, while the other
made 237 daily voyages. The main cause for their lower perfc1rnl-
ance was the incidence of technical breakdowns, while difficulties
with the crew formed a second reason. Both problems tend to af-
fect day boats more than tangal boats, as the former are older and
offer lower earning potential for workers.
A study conducted by scientists of the Central MariTI(~ Fisheries
Research Institute (Ramamurthy et a1. 1988) the corilpos"
ition of trawl catches in Madras as a function of an annual
Various species have peak seasons. Those peaks generate SIPe(:IaJ
catching effort and temporary marketing and processing chains.
Generally speaking, boat fishermen consider the months from
February to April a slack period. Catches are at a low then, and
many owners have their boats hauled ashore for major main--
tenance. After the pre-monsoonic storms of April and May, fishing
improves dramatically. When the shrimp season, which is every
fisherman's measuring stick of the year's success, commences, boat
crews have the chance to compensate for the damage of idle months.
The inception of the northeast monsoon in October does not affect
boat fishermen as much as attisanal fishermen. Nonetheless boats
spend more days in the harbour, and distant voyages are avoided.
Fishing is often good in this season, and boat owners urge their
drivers to return to sea as quickly as possible.
Risks in boat fishing are of a different order than in artisanal
fishing. Kattumaram fishermen generally undertake short fishing
trips, so if the outboard engine fails or the wind dies down, they
can generally paddle to shore. This is not the case for mechanized
boat fishermen. Long voyages make boat fishermen particularly
vulnerable to mechanical breakdowns and to bouts of bad weather.
192 Marine Resource Management
The driver often repairs smaller defects, although larger problems
leave him helpless. The only option in case of a major problem is to
hail another boat and to request a tow. The nightmare of bobbing
on the waves for days or weeks on end before another boat passes·-
if it does is one of the reasons boat fishermen cluster together.
Furthermore, it prompted the boat-owner association to promul-
gate a rule obliging passers-by to assist boats in distress.
The cyclones which threaten the eastern coastline of India bi-
armually constitute another danger. The events of June 1996 under--
lined the effects of this peril. The storm which hit the east coast of
India on June 12th surprised forty-two Madras boat crews fishing
in Andhra Pradesh waters. In the following weeks, survivors re··
counting tales of extreme hardship trickled in from all parts of the
Indian coastline and even from Bangladesh. Two months after the
storm, thirty-three fishermen who had been working on six boats
were still missing. By late September, three boat crews were still
unaccounted for, and four fishermen were confirmed dead.
The risks involved in working at sea are compounded by the
lack of safety equipment. Although the Fisheries Department makes
licensing of boats contingent on the presence of life jackets and
other life-saving gear, this equipment is rarely available on board.
Boats are not fitted with two-way radios, maps, barometers, or
medical kits. In view of this situation, it is not surprising to hear
crew members say that they are never sure whether they will return
from a voyage or not, and that they live from day to day.
6.3 The Social Organization of Mechanized Boat Fishing
Division ofLabour
One of the most striking differences between artisanal fisheries and
the fishing industry of Royapuram lies in the division of labour.
Gender forms the breakpoint for an elementary division of tasks in
the artisanal economy - men are in charge of fishing, while women
are responsible for market~related tasks. Although gender is re-
flected in the organization of work in Royapuram as well, many
more specializations have also developed. The lanes leading to the
auction beach are the domain of full·-time fish cutters, basket
makers, watchmen, net makers, mechanics, and a score of other
The Mechanized Boat J,tshermen ofRoyapuram 193
specialized workers. In addition, there is a complex division of
labour on mechanized boat units.
The most fundamental divide in mechanized boat fishing is be-
tween the owner of the craft and gear and his workers. One
comes across a fisherman without nets in kattumaram fishing. Such
. a person is generally considered pitiable. In contrast, mechanized
boat workers do not possess productive assets at all. The owner-
ship of boat fishing gear is always concentrated in the hands of
single proprietor. The boat-owning family or families, in case of
partnership is the provider of all fishing equipment, and work·
ers contribute no more than their skill and labour power to the
fishing process. 18 For this reason, Ram (1991:114) of
proletarianization when considering the fate of those artisanal
fishermen who migrate to work on mechanized boats. Unlike
wage labourers, however, the workers on mechanized boats in
Royapuram are always rewarded with a share of the catch. 19
Only in the most marginal units does an owner take on the
double role of owner··driver and participate in fishing. In ,ypnp,''11
even if he is an accomplished fisherman, the boat owner on
shore to supervise the business (d. Thomson 1989:141). He del··
egates much of this work to a manager called kanakkan (which lit··
erally means accountant). The proprietor restricts himself to
supervising the crucial moments of the production process, which
include recruiting the driver, selling the catch, dividing the returns,
and deciding on investments.
A boat crew generally collsists of six or eight men-the exact
number depends on the size of the boat and on the type offishing.
18 This differs from the practice I found in a northern Sri Lankan fishing villag<'
(Bavinck 1984:1(3). Although the ownership of mechanized boats there was vested
in individual persons or families, workers often brought along their own nets and
drew a net share in addition to the usual labour share. The inclusion of workers'
nets admittedly was easier there due to the prevalence of gillnet fishing. However,
the monopolized gear ownership on gillnet boats as well reveals the fl1ndamen~
tally different focus of production relations 11\ Madras.
19 Ram (1991:115) reports the incidence of wage labour on mechanized boats in
Rameswaram, Tamil Nadu. Furthermore, Vijayan (1980:23..24) mentions that the
workers on mechanized boats in Paradeep, Orissa, who come from Andhra Pradesh,
are given fixed wages. In general, however, the share system appears to prevail on
mechanized boats in India (d. Ram 1991 :116; Thomson 1989:143-46; Vijayan
1980:23), as it does among fishermen all over the world (d. McCoodwin 1990:33).
194· Marine Resource Management
The crew always includes a driver, an assistant~driver,and a com~
plementary set of workers called lascars. 2o Crew rnernbers go to sea
in continuous shifts, and each man has shore leave one trip in every
four. Fortangal boats that go out on seven~day voyages, this means
that a worker is home for a week each month. The driver partici-
pates in this shift system tOO, so when he is off, the assistant-driver
takes charge.
The need to spend long stretches of time together in a small space
at sea probably explains one of the peculiarities of mechanized boat
fishing in Royapuram. Interestingly, the driver and crew form a
unitt independent of the boat owner who employs them. When a
boat owner hires a driver, he is assured that the latter will bring
along a complement of workers; conversely, when he fires his
driver, an owner loses the entire crew. As a result of this arrange-
ment/ boat owners often do not know the names of the lascars
working on their boats and leave personnel matters entirely to the
drivers?1 Drivers thus emerge as the key figures in the working
groups/ for they recruit new associates, organize the work process
and the division of income, and settle any disputes which arise.
Ram (1991) observes a similar arrangement in mechanized boat
fishing in Rameswaram and in Kerala, where drivers often play
the role of labour broker. Other than with labour brokers in other
economic sectors, however, 'there seems to be none of the various
forms of labour control and paternalistic modes of hierarchy be-
tween the driver and crew members' (ibid.:116).
The driver determines the direction and intensity of fishing ef.-
fort once the boat leaves the harbour and sails beyond an owner's
control. His care or indifference is of vital importance for the fu·-
ture of the owner's investment. A responsible driver keeps watch
over craft and gear and avoids unnecessary risks and damages.
One morning, while we were walking on the jetty, I overheard a
fisherman questioning a boat owner about having fired his
20 The origin of this non-Tamil word is unclear. Interestingly, the term is appar-
ently also used for the lowest category of field officers in the Irrigation Depart-
ment (d. Wade 1982:290).
21 This situation is different from the one described by Thomson in C:olachel
(1989:141-42). Boat owners there appear to recruit their crews themselves on the
basis of kinship and personal acquaintance (d. Bavinck 1984).
T'he Mechanized Boat FishermenofRoyapuram 1%
driver. The man retorted angrily: 'Don/t you think I was
fied? I had given him Rs 200 to stay on board in the harbour
when a storm was brewing and he left, with the result that the
wind battered my boat against the wharf and it was d"rn"aod
Isn't this a good reason for dismissal'?'
The driver. had abandoned the boat contrary to his oral assurance
and to the general understanding of his role and his responsibility.
In the eyes of his employer, this provided sufficient reason for
immediate suspension.
The basic criterion an owner applies in selecting a driver is the
value of the catch he is likely to bring in. Drivers from CtJlddlalc)re
the harbour town midway down the Coromanelel Coast, have a
particularly good reputation for bringing in good catches.
are generally considered better than those from Madras. Boat own-
ers engage in serious competition for the most competent crews
and entice them with promises of extra incentives and favours.
Unlike in artisanal fishing, a boat crew's responsibilities end as
soon as the boat is moored off the auction beach in the fishing
harbour. Here the owner's shore crew, known collectively as
marattukaarars (men of the kattumaram), take over. Their first
responsibility is to unload the catch onto kattumarams and to
deliver it to the beach where it is auctioned or transported to a
storehouse. The maratt'ukaarars, who often number two or three
per boat, subsequently clean the vessel and prepare it for the next
voyage by loading fuel, ice, and foodstuffs. The manager or the
boat owner supervises this process, and a watchman guards the
craft against theft while it is in port.
A mechanized boat fishing unit thus consists of various inter-
locking work roles which constitute a status hierarchy. Its mem-
bers are united in the fact that all of them with the exception of
the manager, who is on the payroll- receive a predetermined share
of the proceeds. Thereby they all partake in the natural vicissitudes
of the fishing industry. The following fictive example (see Table
6.1) of the division of proceeds of a tangal boat's catch after a week's
voyage demonstrates the principles of the share system in
Royapuram. According to this example, the owner of the craft takes
home Rs 23/820 (Rs 19,320 plus Rs 4,500) of total income, although
he loses part to operating expenses as well as to depreciation. As-
suming there are eight crew members, each receives a little more
196 Marine Resource Management
Table 6.1 Division of Income on a Boat
Sales Value of the Catch
Operating Costs of the Boat (for Owner) 15%
Extra Incentive for the Driver 1.5%
for Marattukaarars and Watchmen 3%
Subtotal
Workers' Share of the Remainder 20%
Owner's Share of the Remainder 80%
than Rs 603, while the driver takes home Rs 1,053. A marattukaarar
earns from Rs 200 to Rs 300. In reality, the share system displays
endless variation. This is partly a matter of percentages. Up to 20
per cent of the gross income may be reserved for operating ex-
penses. The shares of shore workers may also be lower or higher
than in the example. They may even be paid in kind and not in
cash. 'l11e owner often gives the auctioneer a share of the catch as
well. Although 20 per cent of the proceeds is usually reserved for
the group of boat workers, some owners give them 18 per cent
while those who are anxious to get the best crews offer up to 23 per
cent of the net income.
Most boat owners also provide extra incentives to crew mem-
bers, in addition to their regular share. Not only do they give each
member Rs 20 to meet their expenses on every non-fishing day,
but they separately reward the landing of valuable merchandise.
Most owners thus award workers a bonus of Rs 50 to Rs 100 for
bringing in substantial quantities of cuUle-fish, live shrimp, and
other products. Furthermore, when the total value of a catch sur-
passes certain thresholds (Rs 25,000; Rs 50,000; Rs 75,000, etc.), the
entire crew is rewarded with new sets of clothes and other con-
sumer items. In such cases, the driver always receives a special
bonus, ordinarily a gold ring. However, some boat owners go fur-
ther in their efforts to please a particular driver and sometimes
even supply him with housing. 22
22 Contrary to the situation in northern Sri Lanka, where boat owners bind work-
ers by means of loans (d. Bavinck and van Dijk 1978:38), there is no credit relation··
ship between owners and crew members in Royapuram. Boat owners therefore
seek other means to retain skilled workers.
The Mechanized Boat Fishermen ofRoyapuram 197
The biggest distortions in the result from the
30,000 opportunity for cheating. Boat owners have occasion to
4,SOO manipulate figures, as the following interview with an driver
450 indicates.
900
24,150 Some traders may be his confidants, and the owner them
4,830 a portion of the catch on credit without the crew.... And
19,320
then, when we go to the owner's storehouse to divide the money
which he has put in a bag, he may only take out of the
proceeds. He may also count Rs 100 notes as R.s 50 notes. Own··
ers will consider every opportunity to won't
Question: But if you watch carefully?
Ramakrishnan: If we watch too intently the owner may think we
don't trust him [so we don't].
However, boat workers have their own methods of de<::er:,tioln
well. If they secretly sell a portion of the catch en route or even in
tlle harbour itself, for example, they are sometimes able to earn
money on the side, much to the annoyance of their errlPloVlers
1ypology ofBoat Owners
'The 1,000 bO<'1.ts in Royapuram are probably owned by no more
than 500 boat owners. 23 Our survey of a more or less relpn~sent;'\­
tive sample of thirty-three boat owners provides insight into the
differences between them. Class, place of origin,caste, and nrotl~s~
sional involvement in fishing form the basis for distinguishing vari·~
ous social categories. Boat owners can first all be divided into
three economic classes: poor, middle class, and rich.
The class of poor boat owners tends to coincide with those
ating day boats. In this category, shared ownership is .."j:;;"·;,,,,,I,,
corrunon, and owners often join the crew in fishing operations. Since
23 The lists of boat owners available with the Fisheries Department and from the
boat-owner associations do not reveal the number of boat-owning households.
One reason is that households with several boats often register them in the names
of various family members. Only a thorough study of the kinship relations be--
tween boat owners on the list would provide a more reliable estimate. The figure
of SOO boat owners was suggested by several respondents and agrees with my
own impression.
 198 Marine Re.\Vurce Management
the craft are old, breakdowns are relatively frequent. Catches are
also low because they depend on nearby and impoverished fish·
ing grounds. As a result, day boat owners have difficulty finding a
good crew and retaining them. I'alent tends to drift towards the
newer tangal boats, where facilities and earnings are better. Poor
boat owners tend to have all of their capital locked up in their boats,
generally experience more ups and downs, and can hardly imagine
a future outside of fishing. The dismissive treatment they are given
by their richer compeers in the boat-owner association reflects their
marginal status.
The proprietors of single tangal boats, who constitute the middle
cl~ss of boat owners, are definitely in a better position. Working
WIth newer equipment and fishing richer grounds, these fisher-
men tend to make more investments, pay more in operating costs,
and enjoy a higher income. They generally supervise operations
from shore and are able to attract better crews than day boat own-
ers can. Though undoubtedly better off, they too cannot picture a
future outside of fishing.
111e richest class of owners consists of those operating more than
one boat, with a current maximum of six. These households often
have other investments as well. They often dabble in trade or in
the processing of seafood items for the export market. Many also
operate ice factories, moneylending businesses, fishing gear shops,
and more recently, aquaculture farms and hatcheries. Very rarely
does one invest outside the harbour area, however. The elite con-
tinues to orient itself towards marine fishing, just as they restrict
marriage alliances to the fishing castes. 24 Boat fishing still forms
the cornerstone of their business empires, although other opportun··
ities have started to appear on their horizon. 2s
Class differentiation is criss-crossed by another kind of divide;
It is commonly referred to as 'insiders' (namma UUY aaRkal,literally
24 A review of the marriage patterns of eleven elite families since the 1960s reveals
a predilection for marriages within the Pattinavar caste with a bent towards status
advancement. Many elite families are linked to one another through marriage.
There are also many marital ties with persons of Pattinavar origin who have gone
into salaried professions.
25 Ram (1991:133) distinguishes a similar process amongst the elite of boat owners
in Colachel, who have 'already moved away from risky investments in ocean fish-
ing to more secure remuneration from investment in coconut and paddy land, as
well as the ownership of localsrnall-scale rural industry such as coir-making units'.
Ihe Mechanized Boat Fisherrnen ofRoyapuram 199
'those who belong here') versus'outsiders' (vellai utlr aaRkal, liter-
ally 'those who belong elsewhere'). This division constitutes one
of the foci of the on-going politicized debate on fishing
the mechanized boat sector, and features in 8. Here it
important to note that the term'outsider' variously denotes a boat
owner from outside the Madras and Districts or a per-
son of non-fishing caste. In some contexts, the boundaries narrow
down to Royapuram itself.
Six of the thirty-three respondents in our survey said they
from fishing populations in other parts of coastal Tamil
pecially Cuddalore and Kanyakumari. Four revealed themselves
to be of the non-fishing Nadal' caste from the south of Tamil Nadu.
Since they ventured into boat fishing for profit reasons m.em··
bel'S of this category showed the predilection to leave the
sector in the future. Their total number is probably than the
survey results suggest. That is because outsiders face substantial
hostility in Royapuram, and many have tried to erase their
The difficulties imposed on outside boat owners have contrib-
uted to the rise of a special phenomenon, known as benami owners.
Benami indicates a relationship in which a piece of property is nomi..
nally registered in someone else's name, to conceal the facts of
ownership. A number of mechanized boats in Royapuram are said
to be owned by persons outside the fishing industry who have
cretly entrusted local owners to operate their craft. In the context
of the drive to remove non··rightholders from the fishing harblJUf,
boat·owner associations in Royapurarn are making a effort
to flush out benami relationships.
Finally, the boat owners of Royapuram can be divided into
different categories according to their professional involvement in
fishing. An important category of older owners consists of pi(m(~er
boat fishermen. Such fishermen started their careers in the artisanal
sector but slowly drifted into boat fishing and learned the trade
trial and error. These men often have long experience as drivers
and stopped only, if at all, when old or rich enough to do so. Their
sea·-going backgrounds prompt a continued involvement in
operations. This tie eases interaction with the boat crew and in-
spires a different attitude toward the conflicts with the artisanal
sector.
Besides pioneers, there are two other boat··owning calteg;ories
which emerged from within the old fishing population. One consists
 200 Marine Resource ManCf;lJement
of first-generation professionals. These are persons with long-time
salaried employment in government or in industry who have
returned to invest in mechanized boat fishing. They have little prac-
tical experience in the fishing occupation and keep their distance
from the hubbub of the auction beach. Not surprisingly, these
individuals tend to see marine fishing primarily as a lucrative in-
vestment. Their horizons have broadened to include other economic
trajectories. This is also true of the other category, namely second-
generation boat owners who inherited their position. These indi-
viduals are better educated than their forefathers, have little sea
experience, and are content to supervise activities from shore. They
are more firmly rooted in the fishing business than the category of
professionals. Nonetheless, they lack the commitment to the fish-
ing trade which characterizes the previous generation.
Within the occupational category of boat owners, there prove to
be diverse strains. Differences in class are further distinguished by
variations in caste, geographical origin, and professional involve-
ment. These specific combinations have consequences for individual
career strategies, as well as for group formation and the political
process. Though divided into social segments, boat owners are
united in the pursuit of financial gain. This drive is the outcome of
not only a yearning for upward mobility, but also the economic
structure of mechanized boat fishing itself. Expanding on this
economic context, the following two sections are devoted to a
discussion of investment patterns, sources of capital, earnings, and
risk.
Boat Owners and the Pursuit ofProfit (1)
There is no doubt that mechanized boat fishing is a costly affair.
The fully equipped larger boats that are constructed on the water-
front currently cost between eight and 10 lakhs of rupees. 26 For this
reason, many fishermen resort to the second-hand market. There,
26 For indications of price developments of smaller mechanized boats between
1960 and 1986, see Directorate of Fisheries (1986c:Annex 2). Also compare S, Rao
(1988:115) and Sathiadhas and Benjamin (1990:Table 5). Not only are the larger
boats far more expensive than the smaller types, but the prices rise steeply from
year to year.
The Mechanized Boat Fishermen ofRoyapuram 20 I
the lowest price for a small boat is approximately one lakh rupees,
although the buyer of such equipment must extra expenses
for maintenance and repair.
According to informed persons in Royapurarn, only a fraction
of the boat owners in Madras can afford to finance new invest·
ments in marine fishing with their own reserves. the
great majority depend on loans from a combination of nriV;lh'
sources. Capital is not easily available, and repayment conditions
are stringent. Over half of the thirty··three boat owners in our sur·
vey indicate that they have difficulty both in capital and
making payments. The poorer the person, however, the tighter the
financial squeeze is. 27
Our survey provides an indication of the typical sources of
investment capital: pawnbrokers, traders, fish auctioneers, money-
lenders, rotating credit associations (so-called chit funds), and
friends or relatives. Only the last are arguably non-cornmercial.
Most lenders demand structured repayment with interest in one
form or another. Lenders with connections to the fishing inljustr'v
particularly traders and auctioneers, have a special reason to loan
substantial sums of money to boat owners. They are less concerned
with money than with an assured volume of merchandise. This is
in line with Stirrat's conclusions on the business stra tegies of
fish traders in Sri Lanka (Stirrat 1974:203): 'What they have to aim
for is maximising -- and if possible guaranteeing the flow of fish
through their hands, rather than maximising profits' (d. All2xcll1cter
[1982] 1995:101).
The Fish Market
Boasting a large harbour as well as an international airport, Madras
ranks as the third-largest export centre for marine products in India.
27We asked thirty-three boat owners how difficult it was for them to obtain in-
vestment capital for mechanized boat fishing, Their responses are shown below.
No Problems Some Problems Acute Problems
Poor Boat Owners 0(0%) 0(0%) 11 (100%)
Middle·,(]ass Owners 2 (18%) 4 (36%) 5 (45%)
Rich Boat Owners 4 6 1
Total 6 17
202 Marine Resource Management
l'he 141 export houses in the cit y 28 shipped a total of 18,302 tons of
seafood out of the country in 1995·-96, This represented a rupee
value of 527.65 crore, or 15 per cent of national income from mar·
ine exports (MPEDA "1997:54). Royapuram is one of the main land-
ing centres in Tamil Nadu. A large but unquantifiable proportion
of marine commodities shipped abroad pass through its auction
beach.
With the exception of one company, which operates a few deep-
sea trawlers in Madras, the export houses generally do not invest
in marine fish capture. Th<;y are content to procure their products
from fishermen. 29 Curiously enough, none of them are directly rep··
resented in the harbour. All of them procure their goods through a
network of agents or through independent middlemen working
on the auction beach, whom they bind by means of financial
advances. 3o Unless they also have trading interests, boat owners in
Royapuram do not. deal directly with exporters. This state of af-
fairs, which is financially disadvantageous to fishermen, possibly
results from exporters' business strategies. 31
The seafood landed by rnechanized boats in Royapuram passes
through a variety of market channels (cf. Kalavathy 1985; Rajendran
et a1. 1992). These vary by product and by market; the main dis-
tinction is between goods shipped abroad and those destined for
28 This figure was calculated from MPEDA (1993).lt relates to the fiscal year 1992-
93.
29 Kurien (19'78) points out that big business houses invested in the fisheries sector
of Kerala during the 19'70s. He argues (ibid.:1562) that this was mainly the result of
specific government licensing policies. Apparently this involvement has now de..
dined (oral communication from John Kurien).
30 The distinction between agents and middlemen is'a fluid one. In general, agents
are more closely connected to a particular export house, to which they deliver all
their merchandise and from which they receive loans in order to invest in clien-
tele. Their reward is a cut on each kilogramme of merchandise delivered. On the
other hand, middlemen are more independent and maintain relations with sev-
eral export houses (d. Kalavathy 1985:8).
)1 As I did not meet any exporters during my fieldwork, I can only conjecture that
it is to their advantage to maintain a layer of independent merchants and agents
between them and the sellers of marine produce. This allows them to pass on part
of the risk involved in handling a perishable product. Furthermore, the exporter is
absolved of the need to carefully follow the ups and downs of each fisherman with
whom he has a relationship. Finally, it removes him from the turmoil and occa-
sional violence which mar business on the auction beach.
The Mechanized Boat Fishermen ofRoyapuram 203
the domestic market. Luxury seafood products such as large shnrnp
and cuttlefish generally bypass the auction beach. These items are
directly transferred to the storehouses of specialized agents with
whom boat owners maintain exclusive relationships. Other
merchandise such as shark fins and pomfret also finds its way to
special dealers.
Several categories of traders serve the Indian market with
dried, or preserved seafood products. They partake in the bidding
on the auction beach, which is generally organized by women auc·..
tioneers called varattavechchi (' those who bring [the traders 32 'fhe n.
main differences among traders concern the location of their market
and the scale of their business activity. On one end of the continuurn
are wholesale merchants representing business houses in Kerala
and elsewhere; they seasonally buy quantities of fish and
transfer it to markets in or outside Tamil Nadu by train or by road.
Women traders attending various retail markets of Madras are
the other end of the scale. 33
Boat owners make a distinction between market actors with
whom they have long-term relationships the export agents and
women auctioneers and those with whom they make one··time
deals on a cash basis. To ensure a steady supply of produce,
and middlemen provide financial advances to their client boat
owners. In return, these boat owners deliver specialized items to
the trader, for a price which is a slightly lower than the free market
rate. 34 The advance money need not be repaid unless the owner
decides to shift his business to another trader. The amounts
32 The positioning of women auctioneers at the heart of beach trade contradicts
Ram's (1991 :220) statement that, because of their gender, women in southern India
must' occupy the least powerful rungs of the trading hierarchy in the fish trade'
(d. Stirrat 1988:93). My observation does not stand alone. Rajendran et al. (1992:34)
find that auctioneers in many landing centres of mechanized boats in Tamil Nadu
are women. Similarly, Sridevi (1989) notes that female financiers perform' signifi-
cant economic roles by maintaining a near monopoly over local fish trade' in
artisanal fisheries of Andhra Pradesh.
)3 See Marketing and Research Group Pvt Ltd. (1992) for a survey of fish con-
sumption patterns in Madras.
34 Amarasinghe (1989:'725), who describes 'boat-tying arrangements' in one vii·
lage in southern Sri Lanka, concludes that 'fish merchants have gradually become
the effective possessors of the fishing assets.' However, this is definitely not the
case in Royapuram.
204 Marine Resource Management
involved are substantial- shrimp traders provide advances of
Rs 1 to 2lakh per boat, whereas the ceiling for cuttlefish merchants
is Rs 20,000. 35
Varattavechchis play an important role both in auctioning the
portion of a boat's catch meant for the local market and in collect-
ing dues from retail vendors and others. As their services are
rewarded with a percentage of the catch volume, they are inter-
ested in maintaining exclusive ties with one or more boat owners.
For that reason, they extend loans ranging from Rs 20,000 to 50,000.
At least in some cases, the boat owner is expected to pay interest
on the loan.
Significantly, credit levels of both traders and auctioneers are
connected to an expected volume of trade. The case of a day boat
owner who demanded an extra advance from 'his' shrimp agent is
revealing.
Jeyabal, a boat owner and shrimp agent,36 had provided a day
boat owner called Arjunan with a small advance in exchange
for the delivery of export-quality shrimp. When Arjunan came
to ask for an extra amount one day, Jeyabal refused, and pointed
out that a day boat brings in only small quantities of shrimp. He
deemed the goodwill amount more than sufficient. Arjunan
became furious, and before others could intervene, he picked
up a knife and stabbed Jeyabal as well as one of his children.
Both were admitted into the hospital, and the police arrested
the culprit.
The knifing incident took place after the trader refused to increase
the loan to a boat owner, arguing that a raise would not be com-
35 The boat fishermen of Royapuram generally suspect traders of rigging prices at
an artificially low level. Larger traders supposedly meet on a weekly basis to col-
lectively plan their business strategy. Prices of some products apparently are also
affected by ruffian elements who use threats of phYSical violence to ensure com-
pliance with low price levels. Although this kind of hooliganism was at a low
during most of the fieldwork period, it ostensibly reared its head after the state
elections in May 1996. Ice-factory owners also appear to meet regularly and fix the
price of ice blocks.
36 There is an overlap between the categories of mechanized boat owners and of
traders in Royapuram. Larger boat owners often prove to have trade interests as
well. They invest part of their earnings in establishing supply networks.
The Mechanized Boat Hshermen ofRoyapuram 20S
mensurate with the quantity of shrimp the owner supplied. In
traders monitor their clients closely to make sure that they receive
their due. The pressure that traders and other moneylenders create
ensures that a boat owner will not bypass opportunities to send his
crew out fishing. Unlike an artisanal fisherman, who may decide
to take a day off if he has already earned enough, a boat owner
always feels someone breathing down his neck.
Boat Owners and the Pursuit ofProfit (2)
Since they rely on borrowed money to make investments, boat
owners feel pressed to earn. That drive to earn money is encour··
aged by their strong awareness of the risks inherent in boat fish··
ing, and the real possibility of setback and misfortune. boat
owner can tell tales of nets lost, boats engines jammed, and
crews incapable or negligent. Moreover, artisanal fishermen in
Andhra Pradesh and also in Tamil Nadu add to the problems by
hijacking boats and by demanding compensation for real or fictive
damages.
Sometimes problems are compounded by long of low
catches. Tangal boat owners are especially vulnerable. Depending
on the length of the voyage, operational costs range from Rs 9,000
to Rs 22,000 per fishing trip. If catches remain low, boat owners
with meagre reserves quickly run into financial difficulty. Down-
ward mobility is not an isolated phenomenon in the Royapuram
fishing area; many a boat owner has suffered serious setbacks, at
least temporarily. IIowever, very few boat owners in Royapuram
take out an insurance policy to cover catastrl?phes. One boat owner
offered an explanation:
I have several boats, and the insurance premium would cost me
tens ofthousands of rupees a year. Instead of insuring my boats,
I prefer to use the money to add a boat to my fleet and run the
risk of loss.
The cyclone of June 1996 brought out the danger of this strategy,
however, as only a few of the forty-·four boats caught in the eye of
the storm were actually insured.
Is boat fishing profitable enough to make all these risks worth-
while? Contradictions and a lack of reliable figures make it hard to
206 Marine Resource Management
draw conclusions on the viability of the sector as a whole. Clearly,
any answer will also have to be qualified in terms of time and of
the individual. In general, 1994 is said to have been better than
1995. However, even in a good year, differences arise between
rnaking a good living and those struggling at the margin. The high
construction rate of new craft in and around Madras harbour
suggests that profit levels in boat fishing are generally still high
enough to warrant investments. The income data my team and I
collected frorn two well··run tangal boats and from a day boat sup-
ports this conclusion. During 1995··96, one tangal boat owner was
able to put aside Rs 4lakh after deducting operating expenses. This
meant that he might payoff the cost of his new boat in two to three
years. The other tangal-boat owner was less successful but still
made a profit of Rs 2.1 lakh. Similarly, one of the successful day
boat owners I followed earned a profit of Rs 1.8Iakh.
The natural vicissitudes of the fishing industry, the risks in-
volved, and the combination of high operational and capital costs
induce owners to try to maximize their income on every fishing
trip. IIowever, they are severely handicapped. They lose their grip
on fishing operations as soon as their boats leave the harbour. From
that moment on, an owner rnust rely exclusively on the crew, with
at its head a driver, to protect his interests.
DriJJers and the Pursuit ofProfit
Since they playa pivotal role in the practice of boat fishing, drivers
form an important category for study. Our survey of twenty driv··
ers provides some insight into whether or not their interests match
those of the boat owners. A large proportion of boat drivers and
lascars in Royapuram come from other coastal regions of Tamil
Nadu, particularly South Arcot and Kanyakumari. 37 Fishermen
from these areas have a favourable reputation for bringing back
high catches and are therefore eagerly pursued. Eleven oLthe
drivers in our survey came from outside Madras, and many of these
were from the town of Cuddalore.
Almost invariably, the drivers had a long career in mechanized
boat fishing-- eighteen had been working on boats for over ten
\7 Thomson (1989:178--81) and Ram (1991: 113-34) describe the situation of migrants
in their region of origin and indicate some of the push factors involved.
The Mechanized Boat Hsherm-en of!?.oyajJuram 207
years. Without exception, they had climbed up through the ranks
from the position of watchmen or marattukaarar to the posts of
lascar, assistant-driver, and driver. Only four of them had obtained
a certificate from a fisheries training school; the majority learned
the trade entirely through practice. None of the respondents owned
any artisanal fishing gear in their place of origin, thereby demon-
strating a strong linkage with mechanized boat fishing 38 Although
many indicated that they had been involved in kattumaram fish-
ing in the past, this was clearly a bygone phase. Almost all respond·
ents thought they would still be working on mechanized boats in
five years. However, some of them the hope that
would have ascended to the rank of boat owner that time.
The most striking result of our survey concerns the drivers'
term connection and identification with boat fishing. Unlike the
seasonal migrants described by Ram (1991:126), who in her words
form a 'quasi-proletariat', these men have made a more or less
definite transition to boat fishing and have adapted to the career
opportunities of that sector.
Like fishermen all over the world (McGoodwin 1990:23), mechan
ized boat drivers are proud of their fishing skills. They engage in
competition for status with other drivers to see who brings in the
biggest catches or who is most sought after by boat owners. The
owners are aware of this rivalry and sometimes use it for their own
ends.
Boat owner Elavarasan operates several boats. One day his
driver, a man called Goonalan, told us that Elavarasan had
recently challenged Devaraj, the oldest driver in the company,
to bring in more fish on his next voyage than Goonalan. Devaraj
had taken up the challenge but lost, and the two drivers had
subsequently quarrelled. Goortalan now mused: 'Why should
we react to a challenge like that? Now Devaraj is ashamed and
feels bad when he sees me.'
38 Our survey of forty lascars displays a similar pattern. Here too, a large propor-
tion (37 per cent) came from the southern regions of Tamil Nadu; they had often
(67 per cent) spent more than ten years working for mechanized boat owners.
Most of them (82 per cent) owned no fishing gear whatsoever (not even any artisanal
fishing gear).
 The Mechanized Boat Fishermen ofRoyapuram 209
208 Marine Resource Management

The system of rewards and incentives reinforces every driver's
natural inclination to demonstrate his skill by bringing in high··
value catches. According to this system, a crew earns according to
its success rate. Since the boat owner is absent from the critical
phases of the production process, it is the share system which
ensures a synchrony of interests between the boat owner and his
crew. The driver and other crew members are engaged in the
pursuit of profit as well.
6.4 Conclusions
Finally, mechanized boat fishing is a continuous industry with
an enormous pressure to maintain fish production. This stems in
no small measure from the high capital costs of boat fishing. But it
also reflects the fact that principal moneylenders are interested in
a large volume of trade. The boat owners' wish to maximize pro-
duction is transmitted to the boat drivers and their crews via the
share system and the provision of incentives for special catches.
This, one could argue, is the capitalist motive which the authors
quoted at the beginning of this chapter attribute to the mechanized
boat sector and contrast to the spirit of artisanal fishing.

Three features of the boat fishing sector seem to have an impact on

the development of a system of rules. The first concerns the sector's
scale and age. Wade (1988:215) notes that collective action towards
common property management is more likely if the group of users
is small and if its boundaries are clearly defined. As I pointed out,
the mechanized boat fishing sector in Royapuram is immense, and
its population keeps fluctuating. Neither characteristic would
.appear to be conducive to the development of a rule system. Fur-
thermore, the recent origin of the sector could also be an impedi-
ment to regulation. Indeed, Pinkerton (1994:332) hypothesizes that
sea tenure arrangements usually are optimized 'where a local trad-
ition has had the possibility of developing at all'.
The second feature is the sector's independence from a particu-
lar sea space and its ability to seek out fishing grounds in a wide
ocean area. This applies to the tangal boat fishermen more than to
those using day boats. According to McGoodwin, the mechanized
boat fishermen of Royapuram as a collective are 'biosphere' rather
than 'ecosystem fishermen'.39 Ecosystem fishermen 'are depend-
ent on only one or a limited number of marine ecosystems'. Bio-
sphere fishermen, on the other hand, 'after depleting a particular
marine ecosystem of its valuable resources, may merely redirect
their efforts elsewhere' (Goodwin 1990:41). It is not unlikely, as
McGoodwin himself points out, that the ability to shift from one
fishing ground to another impedes the development of a system of
sea tenure.

.wMcGoodwin adapts the terms 'ecosystem people' and 'biosphere people', as

coined by Dasmann (1974).

7 occupation, boat fishermen attempt to either circumvent or
In comparison with the way the artisanal sector operates, the rule
s~s.tem of Royapuram boat fishermen is fragmentary at best. Sig-
mfIcantly, each system covers different sections of the regulatory
spectrum. Whereas hamlet administrations are concerned with
structuring the usage of the fish resource, the rule-making efforts
of boat-owner associations! are primarily aimed at restricting
membership of the group and controlling the seafood market. Why
is this so'?
. A number of circumstances played a role in shaping the
Royapuram rule system. First of all, neither non-fishermen nor fish-
ermen from other geographical regions have ever been as inter-
ested in entering artisanal fisheries as they have been in entering
the mechanized boat sector. The profitability of boat fishing en-
sured a continual influx of investors and resulted in what could be
described as a natural concern with social boundaries. Second, the
present state of regulation in Royapuram is possibly a necessary
phase in the developmcnt of this young economic sector. Having
just left the pioneering stage behind, control over access to a social
group may be one step in a continuing process of regulation. In-
deed, the regulatory framework has matured since the 1960s.
Organizational weaknesses also help to explain the relative absence
of rules. The associations of boat fishermen definitely have less
control over their members than the administrations of artisanal
fishing hamlets. I discuss the implications of associations' limited
control capacities in chapter 8.
I For reasons to be discussed in chapter 8, I limit my discussion to the mechanized
boat-owner associations and leave other fishermen organizations aside.
Ine Rule System in Mechanized Boat Fishing 211
However, the sparsity of rules, particularly of those that relate
to the practice of fishing, is also a matter of choice. The Pfl2ferellce
for open and unrestricted access to fishing grounds is intrinsic to
the boat fishing trade. Rather than making rules to organize their
to the rules imposed by others.
Ihis chapter focuses on that part of the boat fisheImen's rule
system which pertains to fishing practice, or to 'sea rules'. After
discussing this segment of the rule system, I a set of 'land
rules' which relate to market protection. The efforts to limit the
size of the boat fishing group are discussed in the next I
argue that the drift of the boat fishermen sea rule system contra··
dicts the precepts of the artisanal system of sea tenure. Conflicts
between the two categories of fishermen therefore are not sUJrpr'is-
ing. The mechanized boat fishermen of Madras, however, have been
reasonably successful in containing problems between the two
sectors, at least along the Coromandel Coast of Tamil Nadu. The
magnitude of their achievements in this geographical region con-
trasts with the explosive relations between the two sectors in
Andhra Pradesh.
7.1 Open Access and the of Abundance
Open Access
McEvoy (1986:125) points out that the mechanization of hsJ:leries,
which constitutes part of the transformation historians call the Sec-
ond Industrial Revolution, fundamentally changed the character
of Californian fisheries in the early decades of this century. 'Fossil
fuels', he argues, 'enabled Californians to tap new fisheries
resources whose wealth the ... fishers of the late nineteenth cen-
tury could scarcely have imagined' (ibid.:124). His analysis is also
relevant to contemporary mechanized boat fishing in Tamil Nadu.
Mechanization offers the advantages of an extended range of fish-
ing craft and a more effective usage of active fishing gear such as
trawl nets. These advantages allow mechanized boat fishermen to
seek out marine life in a larger expanse of sea and consequently to
be less dependent on the resources of a particular water space.
However, another production requirement, regular access to prime
fishing grounds, replaces the declining reliance on a small sea
212 Manne Resource Management
territory. If denied a significant proportion of the sea spaces they
want to use, boat fishermen are in serious economic trouble.
Unlike what Indian planners envisaged, mechanized boat fish-
ermen of Royapuram exploit inshore waters that have high con··
centrations of fish resources. In these spaces, confrontations with
other tenure holders reach a climax. After all, the inshore waters of
the coastline are under the tenure of panchayat administrations,
which insist that fishing activities must conform to their rules. 'T11e
state has also drafted laws which allocate rights in this zone. Open
access therefore developed from a production requirement into a
core element in boat fishermen's political programme,
The political background of boat fishermen's call for open access
is reminiscent of Grothius' plea in 1608 for the 'freedom of the seas',
which played a. role in the expansion of European capitalism
(Palsson 1991:53). Whereas Grothius advocated a universal prin-
ciple, the mechanized boat owners of Madras, however, uphold a
creed that refers mainly to themselves. Thus, many Madras boat
owners opposed the deep-sea fishing policy of the Government of
India because it would enable joint venture companies to gain ac-
cess to inshore fish resources (see chapter 8).
Open access is a component of the artisanal fishing rule system
too, although a subtle shift in meaning occurs when applied in this
context. The artisanal system is characterized by reciprocity and
equality (see chapter 4). The principle of open access plays a role in
this system but is checked by territorial codes and restrictions on
technical innovation. In boat fishing, however, the preference for
open access exists without a framework of controlling regulations.
Mechanized boat fishing has no parallel to the artisanal concep-
tion of territorial rights at sea, nor to the tradition of regulating the
usage of particular fishing gear. Significantly, boat fishermen do
not recognize the ban on the ray fish net, which is generally
observed by artisanal fishermen in the region. Moreover, open
access has lost its essence of mutuality, at least vis-a.-vis the
surrounding communities of kattumaram fishermen. One reason
is the dissimilarity in catching technologies of boats and of
kattumarams. Second, although each artisanal fishing village has
grounds which it may call its own, this is hardly true for the cat-
egory of boat fishermen. The exchange of fishing rights, which finds
structural expression in the artisanal sector, rardy occurs between
the two sectors.
'The Rule System in Mechanized Boat Fishing 213
For artisanal fishermen, the mechanized sector remains a some·
what anomalous entity. Thus, the right of access which kattumaram
fishermen grant to their compeers is not automatically extended to
mechanized boat fishelmen. I rehlrn to the manner in which mechan··
ized boat fishermen have forced entry into inshore waters and
the artisanal rule system in a later section.
The ~yth ofSuperabundance)?
McGoodwin links the 'nomadic approach' to fishing, which can be
said to characterize mechanized boat fishing in Royapuram, to
particular view of the resource. He argues that such 'biosphere fish·
ermen', as opposed to 'ecosystem fishermen', subscribe to a
of superabundance'. He describes that as 'the feeling th,~t
there are always other ecosystems and other resources to explmt
should the ones they currently favor run short' (McCoodwin
1990:41). This myth promotes the depletion of one fishing ground
after another (d. McEvoy 1986:73).
McGoodwin's typology is useful in highlighting the tendencies
of various fishing sectors. Yet it may be too simple to do justice to
the diversity of fishing practices throughout the world. I argue here
that although they are definitely more nomadic than their artisanal
compeers, the boat fishermen of Royapuram do not conform to the
criteria of absolute mobility which McGoodwin's ideal type pre·'
supposes. As they rely on certain fishing grounds and are unsure
about the existence of accessible alternatives, most Royapuram boat
fishermen do not appear to fool themselves with a 'myth of
superabundance'. .
In fact, most boat owners in Royapuram are aware of the serums
decline of the fishing grounds they depended on in the first decades
of boat fishing in the surroundings of Madras. Thirty out of thirty-
three respondents in our survey of boat owners (91 per cent) ex-
press this opinion. Table 7.1 reveals their ideas on the causes of
deterioration. The large percentage of boat owners (70 per
who state that their own activities have contributed to the decline
of fishing grounds is noteworthy. 111is realization corresponds to
the conclusion that many artisanal fish~rmen make.
I have already noted before that wl',en fishing grounds in the
Madras region declined, many boat owners transferred their
operations to Andhra waters, an action McGoodwin would deem
 214 Marine Resource Manqqement
Table 7.1 Reasons for Decline of Grounds around Madras
Reason Abs.
Mechanized Boat Fishing 12 (40%)
Ind ustrial Pollution 6 (20%)
Natural Developrnents in the Ecosystem 3 (10%)
A Combination of the Above 9 The boat-owner association has not formulated rules regarding
Total 30
characteristic of 'biosphere fishermen'. Many of these boat owners
now express pessimism about the fu ture of these new grounds too.
Some, such as the innovative and well-educated boat fisherman
quoted below, believe that alternatives may somehow materialize.
Tangal boat owner Christoraj: In our old-fashioned fish nets we
used to catch many big fish which we are not catching now.
Why this is no longer so? I think that these fish are still there but
that they are eluding us. Fishermen must become more inven-
tive -- adopt new techniques and investigate offshore fishing
grounds. I would love to hear more about the long-lining tech..
niques which are used abroad, for example.
Other boat owners are more gloomy, not only as a consequence
of their disposition and outlook but also because of very real
differences in economic positions. The boat owner quoted above
belongs to the sub-elite of Royapuram and has easy access to insti-
tutional credit. He thus has a better chance of.affording the invest-
ments which enable him to exploit other fish resources, if and when
they materialize. He is also more capable of switching to another
economic sector. For a large number of boat owners in Royapuram,
especially in the poorer ranks, this is far from true. They are more
or less imprisoned in their current fishing routine and lack confi-
dence in their abilities to grasp new opportunities. Even if they
believed in a 'myth of superabundance', these boat owners prob-
ably could not take the practical steps to follow through on their
options.
This is an important point. McGoodwin's ideal typical 'biosphere
fishermen' believe in a virtually endless resource. Therefore, they
do not need to regulate the exploitation of any fishing ground; an-
other one is always available. While this may be true of a section of
the Royapuram boat fishing population, a large category lack that
The Rule ,System in Mechanized Boat 215
confidence in a boundless resource yet perplexingly continue to
accept a lack of fishing rules.
The Sparsity of l·iishil1llY Rules
exploitation of the fish resource. Rule-making activities have been
scarce in other domains as well. The dearth of emergency proced-
ures is illustrative. The cyclone of June 1996, in which forty··two
boats went missing, highlighted the lack of cooperation among boat
owners. Thus, the boat-owner association did not send out search
parties of its own but relied mainly on others, notably the state
government, to take action. In other settings, such a measure of
inactivity would be unthinkable.='
Only a handful of 'sea rules' are in effect in Royapuram. An
important one concerns the compensation of damages. The boat··
owner association court, which discusses all professional disputes
boat owners are involved in, handles such cases." Another is an
emergency rule which requires passers-by to tow a boat with ser·
ious mechanical defects back to the harbour. Several of the cases
we witnessed in the owner··association court addressed boat crews
that failed to follow this rule. Such violations occur frequently since
boat fishermen at sea have little desire to return to harbour only to
help a colleague. By helping out, they would incur substantial costs
in terms of time and money. Therefore, according to the boat fish·
ermen 1 interviewed, the only crews who can really count on pro..
fessional solidarity are those working for a company that possesses
several boats. Owners of these companies encourage their crews
to help each other if necessary.
A final rule concerns professional cooperation between the two
fishing sectors. Although boat and ka ttumaram fishermen generally
2 The rural community of mechanized boat fishermen which I studied in Sri Lanka
in the late 19708, for example, had a rule stating that if a boat did not return to port
within a certain period of time, all other boats must go to search (Bavinck and van
Dijk 197845-46).
l Members of the mechanized boat-owner association never use the term' court'
to describe the process and setting of their activities of conflict resolution. They
prefer the term' panchayat'. However, this term has too many confusing connota·
tions. As J am discussing a specialized kind of panchayat meeting, the term' court'
is not out of placE'.
216 Marine Resource Management
operate independently of one another, some kinds of fishing op~
erations require collaboration. Thus, kattumaram fishermen in-
volved in lift net fishing (see chapter 3) regularly request boat
fishermen either to drag their craft to and from the fishing grounds
or to convey their catches to the Royapuram market. Disputes about
the division of proceeds, however, are not uncommon. After a par-
ticularly intense series of quarrels on this issue, the owner associ~
ation proclaimed an edict on 13 August 1984. The text I saw granted
a boat fisherrnan who transported a kattumaram fisherman's catch
the right to one-third of its value; moreover, if he had towed the
kattumarams to the fishing grounds ilS well, the share increased to
one-half. This rule still applies, and both the boat-owner associ-
ation and the Panchayat Union-which I describe in chapter 8
regularly hear cases that require interpretation.
Violence
Royapuram is a harsh and tumultuous area, where any dispute
has the potential to become violent. As in the case of artisanal fish-
ermen (see chapter 4), violence and the threat thereof underlie
many regulatory activities. However, the means of conflict reso-
lution available to each social category do vary; some tend to deal
out the blows, while others more often receive them. Thus, fisher-
men leaders and politicians use thugs to maintain control and to
force decisions. Boat owners, traders, moneylenders, and others
with business problem.s sometimes hire henchmen to recover debts.
And the large category of workers protect their values with the
power of their own fists, perhaps with the added strength of friends
and relatives.
The violence which taints the relation between the artisanal and
the mechanized boat sectors is central" to this study. In order to
illustrate its ramifications, I present two examples of violence be-
tween boat fishermen. These instances also introduce the subse··
quent discussion of the boat-owner association court.
Ragupathy, the 21-year-old son of Venkatesh, one of the
wealthier and more ruthless boat owners in Royapuram, re-
counted the following incident which took place during the last
voyage of their gillnet boat. While the crew waited to haul in
the nets which had been shot, another boat from Royapuram
The Rule System in Mechanized Boat Fishing 217
rammed the stern; most likely the driver had fallen at the
wheel. Before the startled crew noted its number, the boat dis
appeared into the night. No, they had not notified the boat·owner
association. Now Venkatesh's men were observing the bows of
all boats entering the harbour in search of the culprit. A week
later, the miscreants still had not been found. As one of the fam-
ily's boats prepared to leave for a fishing trip, Venkatesh
directed the crew to bring along bottles and sticks and to
anyone who bothered them hell. 'Don't worry about any pos··
sible repercussions,' he said, 'I will take care of them.'
Such arming of a crew in order to face antagonists is not uncom··
man in Royapuram. The practice reached its height during the
vere clashes with artisanal fishermen in the 1970s and undoubtedly
resulted in many deaths and injuries. Some boat owners have the
advantage of a special reputation which enables them to settle their
problems with only the mildest suggestion of a threat.
One morning a stout young man I did not know turned to a rich
boat owner named Ranganathan and laughingly informed him
that the latter's boat had damaged some of his gillnets. 'I was on
board myself and saw it happen. But your driver went off
just like that and we couldn't catch him.' To my <:ll1"n1'l<:p
Ranganathan bounced up and exclaimed angrily, 'What! But the
driver didn't tell me!' and ran off immediately to find out what
had happened. The stout man laughed. I later discovered that
he was previously a gang leader in the fishing harbour; although
he now had settled down, his notoriety alone ensured rapid reso··
lutions to any controversies in which he was involved.
The men in both examples rank at the top of the Royapuram pecking
order. Although both had the option of turning to the boat-owner
association for help, neither did so. Many disputes in Royapuram
are similarly tackled with outspoken or subtle intimidations.
7.3 Adaptation to the Sea 1enure System of
Artisanal Fishermen
I noted in section 1 that boat fishermen demand access to inshore
fishing grounds on terms that the artisanal system of sea tenure
21 X Marine Resource Manalfement
cannot accommodate. In many cases, the balance of power is in
favour of the mechanized boat sector, so any objections artisanal
fishermen make can simply be waived and overruled. However,
such behaviour has a limit. An analysis of landing rights highlights
the need for mutual adjustment.
Landini! Rights
In his thorough analysis of a village fishing economy in southern
Tamil Nadu, Thomson (1989) notes the significance of landing rights
for mechanized boat fishermen. Boat fishermen demand a foot-
hold on shore, a space where they can land catches, load fuel and
ice, change crews, and find safety in case of bad weather. In view
of the claims artisanal fishing villages make, however, one cannot
assume that such landing rights are readily granted (ibid.:83).
Thomson then distinguishes three ways in which boat owners
have procured landing rights over the years. First, the state 'cre-
ated "private shore rights" exclusively for the mechanised boats'
when it evicted artisanal fishennen families from project sites and
constructed harbours and jetties (ibid.:125). He argues that this
solved the problems associated with landing rights, at least for the
places where such infrastructural facilities were created (ibid.:137).
This point is easily overlooked. Indeed, both the legal appropri··
ation of shore area and its infrastructural development provided
the mechanized sector with a measure of independence it other-
wise might have lacked. Unlike what Thomson suggests, however,
this is not a complete independence, at least not along the
Coromandel Coast. The fishing hamlets next to the fishing har-
bour of Madras continue to have a say over the shore area. For
example, they levy taxes on locally landed fish (see chapter 8).
In the early years of mechanized boat fishing, state-built land-
ing facilities were relatively scarce. Moreover, mechanized boats
did not have the range they have today, and migration was com-
mon. These factors contributed to the development of another type
of landing rights based on agreements with host villages. Thomson
provides an intriguing analysis of the contracts which migrant boat
fishermen made, and sometimes still make, with the. panchayats of
the villages where they anchored their boats. In one village where
this practice is still in vogue (ibid.:138-39), he finds that it is the
village headrnan who grants permission to use the shore for
The Rule System in Meehanized Boat Fishing 2]
fishing activities, in return for the payment of a weekly tax to the
village fund. This contract is renewed annually. Thomson argues
that such contracts were quite common before the advent of trawl·
ing. When trawling grew in popularity, however, artisanal fisher·
men's opposition to boats increased, and 'many local communities
terminated their contracts with the outsiders' (Thomson 1989:138).
According to him, nowadays only a few villages are willing to
vide this kind of temporary berthing.
The migration of boats along the Coromandel Coast has declined
in recent years. I am not aware of any Madras boat owners who
currently make the kind of contract Thomson describes. Still, I do
not doubt that it may have existed in the past. The convention
which village administrations along the Coromandel Coast tax
migrant artisanal fishermen supports this hypothesis. The
of migrant boat fishermen in return for landing rights is only one
step removed from this practice.
The last kind of landing rights Thomson notes apply in the boat
owner's own fishing hamlet. 'In the native village ... boat owners
need not make any contracts with the local fishing corrunuJlities
because the boats can be anchored in the sea in front of their own
shore' (ibid.:141). Thomson suggests that landing rights here fol··
low automatically from the owner's membership in the village.
In the artisanal system of sea tenure, sea territory forms an
extension of shore territory. Accordingly, landing rights automat-
ically yield some kind of fishing rights as well. This is a point
Thomson appears to be aware of yet does not elaborate upon
(ibid.:86). The contracts for landing rights which he mentions for
the early phase of mechanized boat fishi11g appear to have been
partly predicated on this linkage. By termillating these contracts,
artisanal fishermen did more than deprive boat fishermen of shore
space _. they signalled that boats were not allowed to trawl in their
waters. Kalvimanagar fishermen followed a similar line of reason·
ing when they decided not to apply for boats or to allow other boat
fishermen to base their craft in the village (see chapters 3 and
4). After all, this would amount to bringing in a Trojan horse as
soon as boat fishermen acquired rights within the artisanal tenure
system, they would be more difficult to control.
Logically, boat fishermen take the opposite perspective. It makes
sense for the boat fishermen to preserve the relationship with
artisanal fishermen, as it enables them to partake in local fishing.
220 Marine Resource Management
An individual owner therefore might find it useful to maintain
contacts with his native village. And on a general level, boat fish-
ennen leaders generally find it worthwhile to emphasize the fact
that artisanal and boat fishermen together belong to a larger com-
munity of fishermen.
This discussion also offers another perspective on the Fisheries
Department's policy on the dissemination of mechanized boats
before 1974. I noted in chapter 2 that the department took great
pains to distribute boats fairly both amongst coastal regions and
Fisheries Cooperative Societies. Although boats soon clustered in
harbour towns, this policy undeniably helped to spread owner··
ship geographically. Unwittingly, however, this policy also planted
seeds of dissent in artisanal fishing hamlets.
I have described how individual mechanized boat fishermen
acquired fishing rights by attaching themselves to the artisanal
tenure system. Mechanized boat-owner associations seek the co-
operation of artisanal fishermen in other ways as well, however. In
the following section, I successively discuss the token support for
artisanal fishing rules, the rules regarding inter-sectoral fishing
operations, and the compensation system for damages to artisanal
fishermen.
TOken Support fOr Artisanal Fishing Rules
In order to defuse the tensions which sometimes arise between boat
and kattumaram fishermen, the boat-owner association occasion-
ally announces its support for artisanal fishing rules. Sometimes
this is mere tokenism. For example, the leader of the mechanized
boat-owner association in Royapuram lent his support to the
Panchayat Union's decision to prohibit the snail net (see chapter
5). However, this backing carried no obligations, as boat fisher-
men generally engage in other kinds of fishing. A more interesting
example concerns the owner association's support for a rule which
in principle did affect boat fishermen.
Half a mile due east of the fishing harbour, a buoy marks the
passageway to the Madras Port, in which vicinity large num-
bers of small non-Penaeid shrimp congregate during certain
periods of the year. At some point in the past, the Panchayat
Union of Royapuram, probably in collaboration with the boat-
The Rule System in Mechanized Boat Fishir'tJ 221
owner association, decided that fishing in this particular
was the prerogative of kattumaram thus, they pro-
hibited trawling. This ruling was the focus of a sensational
encounter in March 1995, in which kattumaram fishermen from
Royapuram captured twenty--two boats in the surroundings of
the buoy and seized all of their trawl nets. In the ensuing dis-
cussions between the two fishermen groups, the leader of the
boat-owner association affirmed the validity of the rule but none-
theless criticized the kattumaram fishermen. 'Why didn't you
inform the Panchayat Union or ourselves about this pn:)bJenl(
Why did you take authority (atikaaram) into your own hands?
Now We know about this kind of incident, the boat··owner asso··
ciation will take severe action (severe mudivu). It is our
(karumai) to ensure that you can also carry out your pr,ofE:ssiOll.
For the leader of the boat··owner association, the stakes in this meet-
ing were high. Artisanal fishermen dearly were upset by the
frequent transgressions and still possessed the trawl nets they had
seized. His direct objective was to arrange the release of the nets
and thereby to meet the immediate demands of his members. In
addition, he aimed to soothe artisanal fishermen's tempers and to
prevent an escalation of the problem. For these reasons he promised
to take measures against future transgressions. The association
leader alternatively tried to win over and to cow the participants.
His attempts eventually proved successful he retrieved the nets
in exchange for a round sum of money. A number of the artisanal
fishermen present, however, dearly did not believe his assurance
of 'severe action' against future transgresshms.
One artisanal fisherman whispered: 'What kind of decision is
this? T'he matter is an old one and these incidents will happ'en
again tomorrow. The people who are making the decision now
are rich, but what effect does this situation have for us, the poor
(eezhaiyan )?'
Indeed, the boat· owner association did not take any action beyond
warning the boat owners involved in the incident. A few days later,
some mechanized boats again damaged the nets of artisanal
fishermen in the area; the situation clearly had not altered funda-
mentally. The strict enforcement of the no--fishing rule that the
222 Marine Resource Management
association leader promised was not forthcoming. However, as the
next chapter will illustrate, this also relates to the limitations of his
power.
Material Damage and the Response
Financial redress, as understood and legitimized by mechanized
boat fishermen today, always relates to direct physical damage or
impairment. 'TIlis includes the destruction of fishing gear, both nets
and craft, and injuries to a fisherman. Indirect effects, such as a
loss of income caused by competition for the same resource, are
normally not addressed by the owner··association court. An im oo
portant precondition for compensation is that victims provide proof
for the guilt of a miscreant; I will desCl'ibE~ the nature of the evi..
dence acceptable to this court below. First, however, I describe the
context of court activity and review the ways fishermen deal with
incidents involving harm to goods or to people. Many cases of
damage are settled on the spot and never come to the attention of
the ownerooassociation court.
One boat driver recounted that he involuntarily ran over and
damaged 7.5 kilos of nets belonging to a kattumaram fisherman
in southern Andhra Pradesh. Both parties noticed the incident,
and the driver offered the other fisherman two baskets of shrimp
as compensation. The driver declared, 'I never take this kind of
case to the boat-owner association. Instead I try to settle the
matter at sea.'
These parties agreed on the basic facts and resolved the matter
through a payment in kind equivalent to the damages. As fisher-
men generally refrain from taking cash along on fishing trips, pay",
ment in kind is common practice. It has the additional advantage
of not involving the owner of the craft in the matter. Owners natur-
ally are reluctant to pay for damages which they feel may be the
result of their crew's negligence. They may even subtract the fine
from the workers' share of the proceeds. Crews therefore prefer
not to notify the owner, although they must do so in the case of
cash compensation.
Sometimes the two parties in a dispute disagree on certain points
and seek outside mediation.
The Rule System in Mechanized Boat Fishing 223
An owner-cum-driver of a day boat an incident
which his boat damaged 13 kilos of nets belonging to
kattumaram fisherman from a village south of Madras. He
milted his mistake and offered fish and shrimp in compensa"
tion, but the local fisherman wanted more than what he th()U>rht
was reasonable. The case then went to the owner-association
court, and the offending owner··cum..driver the court's
judgement.
This case is comparatively simple since the dispute concerns
the amount of compensation. However, the situation becomes more
problematic if guilt is contested or completely denied. I:'urthennore,
there are various scenarios that on whether or not the
suspect is apprehended.
In its simplest form, the suspect is im.In(~dilab~ly appn~he~nded
and the dispute becomes physicaL As in the case in
ter 5, the victim may hijack the offending boat for just financial
compensation. The difficulties for the victim are compounded,
however, if the culprit has fled the scene. Even if he has noted the
registration number of the boat or another salient charclCberistic,
the victim now must endure the time-consuming of
the owner-association court. Very frequently, however, the victim
has no clue whatsoever about the identity of the perpetrator.
First of all, most injuries to gear and to other fishermen occur at
night when visibility is poor and when many fishermen are fa··
tigued or sleeping. Just as the boat driver may be unaware of the
mishap until it has already taken place, the victim often is unable
to ascertain the characteristics of the boat in question. The flf"rnpf-
rator thus can speed off wIth little fear of discovery, and he has
good reason to do so. Conflicts of this kind can tum very ugly and
result in serious injury to the boat crew. Furthermore, the crew, as
well as the boat owner, will suffer financially from any settlement.
This explains why there are so many instances of gear darrtctge
or personal mishap in which the offending boat fishermen flee the
scene. Even if the runaway is identified, however, artisanal fisher-
men have limited trust in their ability to obtain satisfactory recant"
pense from the boat-owner association court. They therefore take
recourse to other forms of action, such as the seizure of other boats
which happen to be in the neighbourhood. Royapuram fishermen
regularly have to pay for injuries they did not commit. Although it
224 Marine Resource Management
is more or less accepted as one of the risks of mechanized boat
fishing, boat fishermen still consider it unfair.
Driver Ramakrishnan complained about a conflict he had with
artisanal fishermen while trawling for shrimp off a village south
of Madras. Another boat, which escaped, apparently had dam··
aged a section of nets belonging to a kattumaram fisherman.
However, local fishermen apprehended Ramakrishnan's boat
and insisted that he redress the damage. Since he was phys-
ically restrained from departing, Ramakrishnan reluctantly
agreed to pay Rs. 1,000 in compensation.
Such unfair apprehensions can provoke retaliations in kind.
Artisanal fishermen are very much aware that one of their own
group may be accosted at sea and forced to pay the price of their
earlier assertiveness.
Owner-association Court
The rule regarding compensation for direct injuries to gear or to
persons is an integral part of the artisanal system of fisheries regu-
lation. From there, it was probably transferred to the boat sector.
In the early days of mechanized boat fishing, however, it was
weakly implemented. Individual boat owners had a multitude of
escape routes at their disposal the registration system of boats
was flawed, and the numerous boat-owner associations and
neighbourhood councils were played off against one another.
Kattumaram fishermen did not know where to lodge their com-
plaints and generally had little hope of compensation. In fact, this
situation caused tensions to develop between the two sectors
during the 1970s, culminating in the riots of 1977 and 1978 in
Madras. Boat owners reacted to these riots by merging their asso-
ciations and structuring the compensation process. The contempor-
ary owner-association court therefore evolved during that time
period.
For three months in 1995, two courts existed in Royapuram as a
result of the competition between the two boat-owner associations
at that time (see chapter 8). It was no coincidence that each ran its
own court. In fact, courts are the most visible of their respective
organizations and serve a political purpose as well as a practical
The Rule System in Mechanized Boat J;ishing 225
one. Better than any other activity, the daily court sessions express
boat-owner associations' concern for the routine problems of their
members.
Court sessions are no more than specialized village rr1(~etm)2;s,
as their characteristic form suggests. The locations are central a
shed or covered hall close to the water's edge. The all-male 'JrlleTH"·,
pants sit on mats in a circle, with notables on one side and ag-
grieved parties on the other. Spectators form a second outer
Women are excluded from the meeting and thus do not enter the
building itself. Any woman involved in a dispute must seek a Inale
to represent her; if necessary, she may interject her comments from
the sidelines.
Yet; such courts differ from the classical village meeting. For
example, the owner-association court only discusses professional
disputes involving boat owners. The 'judges' to stay with the court
terminology corne from the group of senior members in the boat
owner association rather than from the community as a whole.
Furthermore, the court holds sessions regularly at 8 or 9 a.m. every
morning and sometimes holds a second session in the evening as
welL In addition, the court employs a paid administrative staff. A
secr'etary records proceedings in a special notebook, and Ol,e or
two salaried runners wait to transmit any messages or special in-·
structions. The judges, however, take part on a voluntary basis.
Thus, runners sometimes have to search for the quorum necessary
to judge a particular case. 4
The discussion of a case follows a fixed pattern. First, the
aggrieved party, usually a few kattumaram fishermen who may
be escorted by a local man,s explains the rriqtter at hand. Judges
4 Observations and discussions make it clear that the necessary quorum of judges
depends both on the weight of the case and on the 'position' judges occupy within
the boat owner population. Seniority relates to a combination of age, formal func--
tion in the boat-owner association, and personal history. A senior person may
decide smaller cases on his own, whereas a junior must atways have colleagues by
his side. Important cases, such as those which are complicated or which involve
big interests, always require the presence of senior judges.
5 Patterns of representation and of introduction form a fascinating topic of study
in court and council meetings, Just as women are represented by male relatives,
'outsiders' may be represented and introduced by friends or retatives who live in
the area. Since they are familiar with local circumstances, they offer practical as-
sistance and also lend more weight to the matter at hand.
 226 Marine Resource Management
interrogate the speaker closely on the sequence of events, particu-
larly about his ability to establish the identity of the culprit and the
extent of the damages. The accused party, generally a boat driver
. representing the owner who sits at the back, then relays his ver··
sion of the incident. The judges subsequently inspect the damaged
equipment themselves to assess the plausibility of the two accounts
and then confer amongst themselves. After they return to the floor,
the judges announce their decision, which often involves a com-
pensation payment or a fine. The judges base this amount on their
estimation of the value of the damaged gear at the time of the inci-
dent and not on the cost of replacement. Generally, the amount is
lower than the aggrieved party quoted, as judges assume the latter
to have exaggerated his claim. The administrative staff collects the
money from the guilty party and takes 10 per cent for 'court costs'.
This sequence condenses an often complicated and drawn-out
process into an over-orderly schema. Rarely is a case decided in
one session; it regularly spans various meetings in the course of
several weeks. During the first session, the aggrieved party gives a
report of the incident and tells his story. Depending on how pre-
cisely the accuser has identified the culprit as well as on the latter's
cooperation, both parties attend a later session to hear the judge-
ment. Then another time gap ensues while the money is collected
and disbursed. In total, aggrieved parties often visit the court four
or five times before they receive compensation. This necessitates a
considerable time investment, particularly if the individual lives
far away, and results in much grumbling.
Complainants also often criticize the handling of their claims.
In many cases I witnessed, the complainant was not satisfied with
the amount of the fine; twice he even left without accepting the
compensation money. Furthermore, judges are not always felt to
be impartial or serious in their investigations. In my estimation,
poorer boat owners face harsher treatment than those with con-
nections to the ruling clan, and single kattumaram fishermen fare
worse than those with a local support group.
The extent to which the accused party, usually a boat owner,
accepts the verdict of the court varies as welL 'TIle 1995 conflict
between the two boat-owner organizations severely impeded court
proceedings. For several months, boat owners affiliated with one
organization refused to submit to the other organization's court.
This caused major difficulties for complainants, who first had to
The Rule System in Mechanized Boatftshirl;ff
ascertain the affiliation of a culprit before lodging a complaint. In
addition, cases sometimes involved boat owners from both organ-
izations, and this created an almost insurmountable obstacle for
any complainant. However, even at other times, the administra-
tive staff sometimes has difficulties convincing boat owners to at-
tend a meeting to discuss their cases or to pay their fines. I return
to the reasons why boat-owner organizations lack control over their
members in the next chapter.
We witnessed the proceedings of forty-four cases handled
one of the two owner-association courts in the period 1995--96.(, T'he
majority (68 per cent) of these cases involved kattumaram fisher--
men on one side and mechanized boat fishermen on the other. This
confirms my impression that the central purpose of the courts is to
address the disputes with the artisanal sector. Incidents between
two boat fishermen made up 25 per cent of the totaL Seven per cent
consisted of other cases, such as a quarrel between business
ners or an argument between a boat owner and a moneylender.
An investigation into the place of origin of artisanal complain·-
ants reveals the locus of present-day conflicts between the two
sectors (see Table 7.2). The majority of cases involved kattumaram
ffishermen from the region north of Madras, while the south was
only modestly represented. This corresponds with the pfl?sent··da.y
distribution of boat fist,ing: the region north of the city forms the
Kattumaram Fishermen
Abs.
Madras to Andhra Pradesh border 14 (47%)
Andhra Pradesh 3 (10%)
Madras city 7 (23%)
Region south of Madras 4 (13%)
Unknown 2
Total 30 (100%)
6 My assistant and I attended court sessions on a random basis over a period of
several months and made notes on them. However, case proceedings often extend
over a long period of time, and it was not always clear beforehand when a case
would be discussed. Thus, we rarely managed to attend all sessions dealing with a
particular case. Nevertheless, some case histories could be determined on the basis
of extended interviews.
 228 Marine Resource Management
passageway to the fishing grounds of Andhra Pradesh that include
rich fishing sites frequented by day boats. Mechanized boats visit
the southern reaches much less regularly. These circumstances con-
tribute to a higher frequency of incidents in the region to the north
of Madras.
. Andh~'a fishermen are poorly represented in our sample, par-
tlc~larly m vIew of the number of Madras boats that ply the region.
!hIS corresponds, however, to the handicaps these fishermen face
Ir: Madr~s. Not only are they less fluent in Tamil, but they also lack
km relatl~ns in town who might provide lodging and ease their
entrance mto the Court. In addition, these statistics reflect the
explosive nature of the relations between the boat fishermen of
Madras and the population of the fishing hamlets of the Andhra
P~adesh coast. The statistics also shed light on the latter's inclin-
atIOn to seek direct action instead of taking their grievance to an
owner-association court.
7.4 Adaptation to the State Rule System
I pointed out in chapter 2 that the Fisheries Department stood at
the cradle of the mechanized boat sector, which it considered to be
the harbinger of modernity for Indian fisheries (d. Blake 1970:149).
In these circur:nstanc~s, I doubt that the state would have actively
supported arhsanal fIshermen's administrations in their claims for
•territorial jurisdiction. Instead, the department initially focused on
creating an ambiel:ce of compromise between the two groups. Only
after the clashes mcreased in intensity did the state attempt to
separate the two parties.
The state's regulatory endeavours since the late 1960s centred
on the so-called 'three-mile rule' (see chapter 9). This rule de-
clares the waters within a zone of three nautical miles (5.56 km)
from the shoreline of Tamil Nadu to be out of bounds for mech-
anized boat fishing. If seriously implemented, the rule would
pose a serious threat to mechanized boat fishing. After ali, along
most of the Coromandel Coast, the rule closes off a coastal zone
of ~p to 20 fathoms depth (see Map 2). As I noted before, mech-
amzed boats concentrate their fishing activity in the 10-to-30-
fathom depth range, which is where most fish are concentrated.
An enforcement of the three-mile rule therefore would exclude
The Rule System in Mechanized Boat Fishing 229
boat fisherman from many of the most lucrative fishing grounds
and lock them into a zone with relatively poor fishing.
inevitably would result in the bankruptcy of individual
owners and perhaps the demise of the sector as a whole.
Thus, it comes as no surprise that boat owners and their asso··
ciations vehemently protested the three-mile rule when it achieved
legal status in Government Order 991 of 1979 and was later in..
cluded in the Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing Regulation Act of 1983.
A number of Madras boat owners joined colleagues from southern
Tamil Nadu in a protracted legal battle with the state in which
they questioned the government's right to impose such restrictions
on their operations. They argued that the regulation endangered
their businesses and thereby contradicted Article 19 (lg) of the
Constitution of India. This article protects the right of every citizen
'to practise any profession, or to carryon any occupation, trade or
business' (Constitution of India 1995).
Such an appeal to constitutional rights is an instrument in the
lawyer's toolbox and need not have deeper meaning for the com-
plainants. However, the many objections lodged by boat owners
in this period appear to come from a genuine core of frustration.
They accused the government of switching sides for reasons of
political expediency. The legal curtailment of the mechanized boat
sector was a direct attack on its viability.
Although litigation delayed its implementation, various
government courts have upheld the establishment of a three-mile
fishing zone, and this rule is legally in force today. This does not
mean that it is enforced, however. The Fisheries Department lacks
the capacity for anything but the most symbQlic of sea patrols (see
chapters 9 and 10). .
The Three-mile Rule in Practice
Our survey among drivers clearly reveals the attitude of boat fish-
ermen. When asked about their knowledge of and respect for the
three.. mile rule, drivers gave lengthy and ambivalent replies.
Almost all of the respondents were aware of the rule and many of
them claimed to respect it, as 'kattumaram fisher~en also have to
live'. A number of these respondents, however, also admitted to
having had serious conflicts with kattumaram fishermen, incidents
230 Marine Resource Management
which almost certainly took place in the prohibited zone. In short,
most drivers confirmed the obvious - that they do not follow the
three-mile rule if there is a possibility of good catches inshore.
Interview (1)
A tangal boat driver in his late thirties was very brief. He said
that he knew about the three-mile zone but did not abide by it.
Shrimp are more prevalent in the inshore area and he wants to
obtain as high a catch as possible.
Interview (2)
Another 24-year-old driver who works on a day boat explained
that he fishes inshore because the owner expects him to bring in
a big catch; moreover, his boat is too small to go out further.
Interview (3)
A day boat driver in his early forties was apologetic. Yes, he
sometimes did go fishing inshore, but if he happened to damage
any nets, he did compensate the victims.
The first two statements illustrate the dynamic of mechanized boat
fishing I discussed in the previous chapter: financial incentives and
pressures motivate boat fishermen's intrusions into inshore waters.
The driver in the first case stresses his own desire to bring back a
large catch, while the second suggests that the demands of the
owner loom over the crew and spurs them on. The third case adds
another dimension. Mechanized boat workers and owners certainly
realize that kattumaram fishermen often resent their trawling in
inshore waters, particularly if this results in injury to gear or
danger to human life. Financial compensation helps to prevent an
escalation of social conflict, and boat owners often use payment of
damages as a solution to their problems with the artisanal fishing
sector.
TOken Support fOr the Three-mile Rule
In a variation of the token support for artisanal fishing rules, the
boat-owner association sometimes helps the Fisheries Department
to carry out the sea patrols it cannot arrange itself.
The Rule System in Mechanized Boat Fishing 231
In February 1995, a series of violent clashes between boat and
kattumaram fishermen rocked the southern part of Madras. The
kattumaram fishermen complained that boats were mlrlld,ln<y
upon inshore waters and demanded that they observe the three··
mile rule. The Fisheries Department was in a quandary, how·
ever, as their only patrol boat had been destroyed just a few
months before. Fearing an exacerbation of the problem, the boat·
owner association offered its help and temporarily rented the
department a boat with which to police the area. According to
rumour, however, the owner of this craft stipulated that any
apprehended boat fishermen could only be reprimanded and
not apprehended. And so, for a few weeks, the owner associa-
tion joined hands with the Fisheries Department to' enforce' the
three-mile rule.
Clearly the boat-owner association's public stand in this case was
intended more for the benefit of the outside world than for the
boat fishing population. It characterized the boat-owner associ·
ation as obliging and receptive to both the needs of the artisanal
fishing population and the exigencies of the Fisheries Department.
Logical as their contribution therefore was, the case presents a per-
plexing spectacle of boat owners helping to supervise a rule which
they ardently oppose.
Emet;JJency Intervention
Generally speaking, boat fishermen do not require outside sup--
port in solving the problems which arise with the artisanal sector
in the region of Madras. However, some conflicts erupt so sud-
denly and with such intensity that boat owners require assistance
from the state.
In the early morning of 13 July 1995, a mechanized boat headed
for Andhra Pradesh slammed into a kattumaram off the coast of
Tiruvottiyur village and killed a 22-year··old man. The driver
continued on his course without stopping. When the boat·owner
association proved unable to immediately produce the boat
owner, as the victim's fellow villagers demanded, infuriated
kattumaram fishermen apprehended three boats which hap..
pened to be passing through village waters. The fishermen then
232 Manne Resource Management
notified the association leader and demanded a ransom of
Rs 2,00,000. The latter alerted the owners of the boats but also
the Ministry of Fisheries and the Fisheries Department. Later
that day, a so~called kaddai panchayat meeting, chaired by the
MLA elected from the district, was held in the Tiruvottiyur
temple. Top~level district officials, an Assistant-Director of Fish·
eries, the Superintendent of Police, as well as senior members of
the boat-owner association attended. The chairman decided that
the boat-owner association should pay Rs 1,00,000 as compen-
sation for the incident. With this, a measure of peace returned.
Boat owners recognize that their association carmot adequately
handle the emotions involved in an incident of this kind. Ine leader
of the association, who is adept at nipping problems in the bud,
therefore immediately engaged the support of a range of govern-
ment authorities. The latter, as chapter 10 explains, have an inter-
est in maintaining peace and therefore readily cooperated. The
sequence of events made the impression of following a ready-made
scenario. As such incidents occur from time to time, and in fact
have been much worse in the past, this impression is not at all
unlikely.
7.5 Violence in Andhra Pradc~sh
The strategy developed by the Madras boat-owner association to
address the discontent of artisanal fishermen has been relatively
fruitful. At least it has helped in maintaining relations with the
fishing communities in the neighbourhood of Madras. The riots of
1977 and 1978 were the last ones, and violence has remained at a
relatively low level. When mechanized boat owners began to in-
crease the range of their vessels and moved into the waters of the
neighbouring state of Andhra Pradesh, however, a new domain of
conflict arose. As tensions along that coastline mounted, local
kattumaram fishermen responded by seizing groups of Madras
boats for ransom. Madras boat owners reacted by arming their
crews, an approach which has resulted in bloodshed and occasional
deaths.
The fact that the fishing grounds and the artisanal hamlets come
under the jurisdiction of another state government thwarted the
boat-owner association in its usual conflict management approach.
The Rule System in Mechanized Boat Fishing 233
Each Indicm state has its own administrative apparatus, and few
regular channels connect them. Thus, when conflicts started up
between fishermen of Tamil Nadu and Andhra the ad-
ministrative responsibilities of each state were unclear.? hE;himr
conflicts readily took on a political dimension when politicians from
both sides of the border seized the opportunity to boost their popu-
larity amongst their electorates. Civil servants consequently ral··
lied around 'their' fishermen, which impeded finding a
solution to the problems. Table 7.3 underscores the significance of
the Andhra Pradesh problem for Madras boat fishermen in the
period for which I have figures.
Tabte 7.3 of Madras Boats in Andhra Waters 1993 958
Year Number of Number of Number of
Boats Hostage,s taken Hostages taken
in Andhra Pradesh in Tamil Nadu
7
1993 48 218
1994 5
1995 39 204 14
Many boat owners and workers in Madras have been involved in
such incidents at some point in time. Some have had their boats
seized several times in a row. Each time they lost not only the ran-
som amount, which averages Rs 15,000 to Rs 25,000, but also the
catches in their holds, along with equipment and fuel. Sometimes
7 In the course of 1993, the governments of Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu jointly
worked out a system to handle the recurrent conflicts between fishermen of their
states. They established two interstate peacekeeping committees, one at the dis-·
trict and the other at the state level. Although implemented by government order,
this two-tiered system barely plays a role in solving disputes. The fishermen pre-·
fer a direct approach to time-consuming administrative procedures. Unlike in Tamil
Nadu, no legal framework regulates mechanized boat fishing in Andhra Pradesh.
The lack of a legal structure complicates the process of negotiation across jurisdic·
tions.
H The Fisheries Department of Tamil Nadu furnished the figures for 1993 and 1994,
whereas the 1995 figures derive from my fieldwork data. Both probably provide
low estimates, as smaller incidents involving only one or two boats and a quick
and quiet settlement may well have been overlooked.
 234 Marine Resource Management
Andhra fishermen substantially damaged the boat and bludgeoned
or otherwise mistreated the crew members. 9
Boat owners and workers in Madras, as well as officers of the
Fisheries Department, believe that incidents in Andhra Pradesh
do not result merely from the destruction of artisanal fishing gear.
They accuse artisanal fishermen of randomly seizing boats in order
to finance social events. The fact that many seizures take place in
the period preceding important Hindu festivals, therefore, is viewed
with great suspicion. Civil servants and politicians in Andhra
Pradesh are thought to benefit from seizures as well. 1O
When they seize one or more Madras boats, artisanal fishermen
in Andhra Pradesh notify the boat owners via one of the crew mem-
bers. These owners immediately meet with representatives of the
boat-owner assoc:iation and of the Tamil Nadu Fisheries Depart-
ment to devise a plan. A delegation, which always includes an
official from the Fisheries Department, leaves Madras for the scene
of confrontation as soon as possible. ll Its members meet with senior
police officials and administrators in Nellore on the way. Negoti-
ations for the release of boats and crews generally take place in a
meeting organized by the artisanal fishing community. Emotions
make the bargaining 'process difficult, and several days may pass
before the parties reach a final agreement. In addition, large sums
of money may have to be transferred from Madras to the particu-
lar location. The rule is that most of the expenses fall on the
shoulders of the owners of the boats which happen to be seized,
9 Some owners and crews appear to have a greater propel1sity to get involved in
incidents as they take greater risks. Apparently, the increased income outweighs
the cost of occasional apprehension. Of course, there is always a possibility of
mcurnng severe damages. Interestingly, a number of boat owners in our survey
indicated their preference for an opposite strategy: although they had the technol.
ogy to exploit the inshore grounds of Andhra Pradesh, they directed their crews to
stay away and to avoid conflict.
10 According to rumour, leading members in the Madras boat·owner association
receive a share of the ransom money. Some even are accused of organizing boat
seizures for their own benefit.
11 Speed is a primary concern for owners of the seized boats. They worry that the
hijackers will remove valuable items and equipment or will inflict great damage to
their property. 'The sooner one arrives, the more one can save' appears to be the
maxim. Conversations with boat owners reveal that they are generally less con·
cerned about the fate of the crew.
The Rule System in Mechanized Boat fishing 235
irrespective of their guilt. However, contributions from a "IJ':;'.UU
fund set up by the Tamil Nadu sometimes ease this
burden. 12
Sometimes an incident escalates to the point that formal inter-
vention by the state governments is called for.
Such was the case on 13 October 1995. On that day, artisanal
fishermen in Nellore District in Andhra Pradesh seized fourteen
Madras boats manned by eighty-four workers trawling in their
vicinity. Two other boat crews to escape after
had been boarded, and they took seventeen of the hijackers back
to Madras, where the latter were beaten up by a hostile
crowd. In the fight which preceded the escape of the Madras
boats, one Andhra Pradesh fisherman was killed and another
severely injured. A boat fisherman who was initially re!JoJrted
missing later surfaced in Andhra Pradesh.
The Andhra villagers demanded a ransom of severallakhs of
rupees to compensate for injuries and damages. A large rlplp(YrI··
tion, including the leader of the boat-owner association, the
affected boat owners, and an Assistant Director of Fisheries
immediately left Madras. However, negotiations at
a snail's pace. Meanwhile, a large group of boat fishermen or-
ganized a road block in Royapuram to demand more govern-
ment action. The Minister of Fisheries subsequently sent the
Corrunissioner of Fisheries to the scene. The final settlement in-
volved the exchange of 'prisoners' at the border of Tamil Nadu
and Andhra Pradesh and the payment of Rs 2,50,000 to
artisanal fishermen. lhe Madras boat"·owner association
to retrieve a part of this sum from the owners of the boats which
escaped. The association argued that these owners were respon-
sible for the injuries to artisanal fishermen which had increased
the ransom amount.
Individual boat owners and the boat··owner association generally
take a pragmatic approach in dealing with problems that occur in
t2 The Government of Tamil Nadu created a Solatium Fund on 5 May 1994 to
compensate the families of kattumaram fishermen, particularly from Andhra
Pradesh, who die at sea due to an incident involving mechanized boats from Tamil
Nadu. The families receive the sum of Rs 50,000.
236 Marine Resource Management
Andhra waters. During 1995, the association also tried to develop
a preventive strategy. It suggested that each village in Nellore Dis-
trict, the area in which most incidents take place, receive a gift of
Rs 6,000 to placate tempers and lay the foundation for a more tol··
erant atmosphere. However, the income·,raising capacities of the
association proved insufficient to meet the costs of such a sweep-
ing gesture, and the plan was shelved, at least temporarily.
Why is the fisheries situation of Andhra Pradesh so much more
explosive than the one along the Coromandel Coast? And why is
the boat-owner association of Madras unable to formulate an ap-
propriate strategy to counter the problems? Erst of all, Madras
boats now place a much' greater burden on the Andhra Pradesh
inshore areas than on the Madras areas. The influx into Andhra
waters has engendered militant regionalist sentiments in the coastal
region. As a consequence, various groups and political parties in
Andhra Pradesh have been spurred to action. The Madras boat-
owner association has found this type of opposition particularly
hard to handle. Moreover, it lacks some of the instruments which
placated artisanal fishermen in Tamil Nadu. The state border
delineates a language boundary as well as the limit of kinship net-
works. And both a shared language and kinship ties facilitate local
conflict resolution. In addition, bureaucrats and politicians involved
in the settlement of fisheries problems in Andhra Pradesh belong
to a different administrative and political system. This gap
prevents Madras boat owners from developing appropriate rela-
tions. I noted the importance of administrative and political backup
for the resolution of serious fisheries conflicts in Tamil Nadu in
Section 4.
7.6 Market Regulation
Boat owners and workers are interested in obtaining the highest
possible prices for the catches they land in the Royapuram fishing
harbour, as this determines their income. Market patterns, how-
ever, largely lie outside the scope of their influence. They can nei-
ther control the demand for marine export products nor ignore the
structure of the domestic market. One such constraint is that local
demand for fish and other marine products varies according to the
Hindu ritual calendar. In fact, the power of the boat owners hardly
The Rule System in Mechanized Boat Fishing 237
extends beyond the area of the fishing harbour. since
this is the largest fish landing centre in the region, their collective
action is not wholly without consequence. I consider the
existence of 'unfair' trading practices in the Royapuram harbour
area. I then turn to the collective attempt in 1995 to close a new
wholesale market in Madras because it with business on
the auction beach.
Control over the Royapuram Fish Market
A rule promulgated by the boat~owner association in cooper,lti,on
with the Panchayat Union limits trade on the auction to
marine products landed by fishermen from Madras and CltinglE~pllt
Districts. Thus, bumper catches from Andhra Pradesh, which are
regularly transported into Madras by lorry or train because of the
higher prices, may not enter the area. Another rule restricts fisher··
men from hamlets outside North Madras, but within Madras and
Chingleput Districts, from marketing their catches in
before 8 a.m. By that time, the auctioning of 'local' catches is over.
Both rules benefit the collective of local fishermen, as they boost
market prices for their catches. As Rajendran et al. (1992:35)
out, these rules hinder fishermen from other areas by in<:reasing
their costs and by adding a new layer of middlemen.
Market regulations of this kind are easy to draft but difficult to
implement. For one thing, the harbour area is large and difficult to
oversee. Furthermore, any local fisherman is bound to benefit if he
covertly breaks the rules. Enforcement is lafgely entrusted to the
staff of the Panchayat Union, whose main task is to collect taxes on
economic activities in the area every morning. Occupying nodal
positions in the harbour area, these staff members have the oppor-
tunity to observe rule violations. In 1995, the accounts manager of
the Panchayat Union also regularly made special rounds to inves~
tigate illegal transactions.
Although perhaps only partially effective, the measures
by the fishermen's organizations of Royapuram certainly have an
impact. This is demonstrated by the fact that a new wholesale
market for fresh marine products, mainly from Andhra Pradesh,
recently opened in Madras.
238 Marine Resource Management The Rule System in Mechanized Boat Fishing 239

The Central Market Issue owning group. All three sets of rules aim at preserving vested
economic interests and the status quo.
The major wholesale market of Madras, besides kadaloorurn in However, this is not a sufficient explanation. After all, one could
Royapuram fishing harbour, is located in the neighbourhood called expect the large group of middle class and poor boat owners that
Chintadripet. The fish auctioned here to retail vendors and to mer- is, those who lack confidence about finding alternatives to their
chants from other markets comes from the many landing centres present endangered fishing grounds -_. to favour regulations aimed
of Tamil Nadu and other states in India (d. Rajendranet al.I992:21). at resource conservation. Iiowever, for reasons external to the rule
It has recently acquired competition. The 'Central Market', named system, such regulations do not exist. One of my arguments is that
after the Central Railway Station to which it is close, grew out of the boat-owner associations of Royapuram have limited control
nothing within a period of two years. Local retail vendors appar- over their members as well as over the boat fishing industry. In
ently passed the word that lorries with fresh fish from landing sites chapter 8, I examine the mechanized boa t fishermen organizational
in Andhra Pradesh stopped at this relatively quiet road in the heart infrastructure.
of town to auction their loads at lower prices than in Royapuram.
As demand increased, so did supply. By late 1995, the volume of
trade in the Central Market had increased to such an extent that
boat owners in Royapuram feared it would affect the prices of
marine products.
In conjunction with the Panchayat Union, the boat-owner asso-
ciation subsequently launched a campaign to have the Central
Market prohibited by the government. Representatives of the two
organizations met the Commissioner of Fisheries and a number of
senior officials in the Department to discuss the matter. The latter,
however, were reluctant to provide assistance. They argued that
the competition which hurt Royapuram boat fishermen in fact bene-
fited the local consumer. The officials then referred the complain-
ants to the Madras Corporation, which is in charge of municipal
affairs. At that point the campaign was stalled by a lack of response
from municipal authorities. It is unclear whether the boat fisher-
men took up the issue again.

7.7 Conclusions

I introduced this chapter with a paradox: not only do boat fisher-

men regulate their fishing practice poorly, but they focus more on
land than on sea rules. Although the rule system has not been fully
scrutinized yet, it is clear that .some pattern does exist. Both the
preference for open access and the attempts to remove or evade
the rules imposed by artisanal administrations and by the state
reflect a desire to regulate the market and protect the present boat-

8 torical review demonstrates that organiza lions with varying scopes
I concluded chapter 7 with the observation that mechanized
boat fishermen in Royapuram have a weakly developed rule
system. This chapter starts with the supposition that the limited
capacities of fishermen's organizations may partly cause this state
of affairs. According to this line of reasoning, the organizations of
mechanized boat fishermen may lack th(~ means to enforce a more
extensive rule system than they are presently doing. Is this indeed
the case, and if so, why? This motif runs through the following
pages.
The boat-owner associations of Royapuram are in charge of
regulating boat fishing. That is why I focus the discussion on this
particular type of organization. In view of the division of labour
among other organizations in Royapuram, it is useful, however, to
begin with an overview of the broader institutional setting. I give
particular attention to the Panchayat Union, which is the boat-
owner associations' most important counterpart in harbour affairs.
One of the themes covered in this chapter is the repeated inter-
ference of politicians and government in the functioning of boat-
owner associations. I argue that boat-owner associations derive a
substantial part of their authority in and around the harbour from
the state.
I conclude the chapter with an analysis of the one segment of
rules which was left aside in chapter 7 -- the restrictions placed on
entry to the boatJishing trade. The fierce dispute which broke out
in 1995 over 'outsiders' in mechanized boat fishing highlights the
capacities of boat-owner associations to implement sea tenure
policy particularly well.
The BOf:tt-oJVner Associations ofRoyajJuram 241
8.1 The In,stitut:io:nal Division of Labour
The fishing neighbourhoods of Royapuram house a rich speci:rurn
of organizations. This institutional field is far from static. A his..
and purposes emerge at regular intervals, while others fade into
oblivion.
The Spectrum afFishermen Otganizations
Fishermen organizations in Royapuram can be divided into four
typ~~: neighbourhood administrations; professional interest groups;
polItIcal organizations; and migrant organizations. The first
consists of bodies which have evolved from the non·state adminis-
trative structure comrnonly found in the fishing hamlets of the
Coromandel Coast (see chapter 5). I discuss the most of
these, the Panchayat Union, in more detail below. It is useful to
note that this body has a broad mandate and an inclusive territor-
ial focus. Its wide scope automatically brings it into touch with
organizations belonging to the other types. Significantly, the boat·
owner associations also borrow elements from traditional admin.
istrative structure. .
Three cat(~gories of professionals in the fishing harbour had
organizations which aimed to serve the business interests of their
members in 1995. Boat owners constitute the most prominent but
also the most aberrant category. Their associations have gone be.
yond the original mission of defending professional interests; they
now tak~ part in the management of the fishing harbour. The traders
aSSOCIatIons conform more closely to the detinition of an interest
group. The foremost of these is the Kasimedu Seafood Merchant
Wel~are Association, which includes most of the large traders in
manne export products. Established in 1992 to counter harassment
by rowdies and extortionists, the association continues to defend
traders' collective interests. In addition, Royapuram counts a
mechanized boat workers union, which was founded in 1991 after
a ser~es of l.abour conflicts in the harbour. It presently leads a
margmal eXIstence its membership is small and activities rare.
The third type of organization consists of general fishermen
aSSOCIatIons. These bodies seek" the social advancement of the fish-
ennen population in Tamil Nadu and have political goals. The most
242 Marine Resource Management
important of these in 1995 were th':, Nationa,l Union of Fish~rmen
and the Tamil Nadu Fishermen l~orum (7 amlzhnaadu Mllnavar
Peeravai). The National Union of Fishermen, which was founded
in 1979/ supports political causes such as the movement to include
fishermen castes in the list of scheduled tribes. This inclusion would
bring fishermen benefits in the form of reserved jobs and place-
ment in institutions of higher education. Although dormant for the
greater part of 1995/ the National Union came to life in t~e run-up
to the state elections of May 1996. At that tune, the umon called
hunger strikes and staged demonstrations to voice i~s ~e~ands.
The Tamil Nadu Fishermen Forum revolves around an mdlvldual-
a rich young transport operator of fishermen origin. who r.e?u-
lady makes statements about larger issues and has ObVlOUS pohbeal
ambitions.
Migrant fishermen form the foundation of the final type of or-
ganization. In response to the movement to excJu~e ~utslders from
boat fishing in Madras, immigrants set up ass~C1atlOnS based. on
their regions of origin. In terms of numeric welght, the most lln-
portant ofthese are the Madras Welfare Association of Fishermen
from South Areot District (Sennaiyil Vaazhum Tenarkaadu Maavadda
Miinavar Nala Sangam) and the Madras Association of Fishermen
from Kanyakumari District (Selinaivaazh Kumaarimaavadda Miinav~r
Sangam).l Both organizations boast a heterog.eneous mem~er~hlp
that includes boat owners and workers. TheIr foremost aIm IS to
defend fishermen originating in their region from discrimination.
All of the above organizations were established by fishermen
and in some way relate to the fishing profession. Diverse as the
array may be, their office··holders share the opinion t.hat they-
and no one else - are responsible for affaIrs 1fl the ImmedIate
surroundings of the fishing harbour. As a former president of th.e
Panchayat Union said when asked about the division of responsI-
I According to its president, the Madras Association of Fishermen from
Kanyakumari District was established in 1989 and now has 289 members. The
Madras Welfare Association of Fishermen from South Areat Dlstnct was founded
in 1995 but probably had predecessors. Going on the number of fishermen from
South Areat in Madras, its membership is certainly larger than the Kanyakuman
association, although it is unlikely, as one of its leading members boasted, to number
3,000. Focusing as I did on dominant local institutions, I lack detailed informatIOn
on the activities of these organizations, which, for the most part, took place 111
secrecy.
The Boat owner AssociationJ ofRoyajJuram 243
bilities with state institutions: 'This is our place' (engal idam). Con·
sequently, members of these groups continually attempt to shield
the harbour area off from outside i.e., state -- interference. Various
factors impede the realization of self-governance, however.
First of all, the harbour infrastructure, including the land on
which it stands, belongs to the Port Trust of Madras, which tries to
exert its influence in the area. Government fisheries agencies, with
local business to carry out/ are also concentrated there. Further
more, Royapuram is an electoral constituency, and fishermen make
up a large proportion of its population. Its political potential and
the large cash flow common in mechanized boat fishing prompt
politicians to take more than average interest in this part of the
city. 'The importance of the political factor emerged in 1995 during
my fieldwork period. The Minister of Fisheries from Tamil Nadu,
D. Jeyakumar, who happens to come from a fishing neighbour·
hood in Royapuram, was also the constituency's elected MLA.
The combination of these functions resulted in increased state
intervention in fishermen' s organizations and their activities. I
discuss the logic of this intervention from the state/s perspective in
chapter 9.
Although they favour self-governance, fishermen organizations
are not always against outside intervention. In fact, they may even
try to harness the power of outside agencies in order to further
their own goals. I observe below that the dominant boat-owner
association derives its authority in no small measure from the
Minister of Fisheries and from the Fisheries Department
The Panchayat Union
The Federated Panchayat Union (Aikya Panchayat Saba!) hence·
forth called Panchayat Union .-. is an extension of the administra-
tions found in fishing hamlets and neighbourhoods; it forms, in a
sense, their second tier. Eleven neighbourhoods in the area north
of the Madras Port, all having a sizeable fishermen population,
constitute its membership. Each neighbourhood annually appoints
delegates to the central committee of the Panchayat Union. This
committee, in turn, selects a management board which handles
daily affairs. Balance is an important concept in deciding who
should have a seat on the management board. Thus, key manage-
ment positions rotate yearly from one neighbourhood to the next.
244 Marine Resource Management
The Panchayat Union was established in the early 1980s. At that
time, the Madras fishing harbour was nearing completion. Mean-
while, a scala of neighbourhood tax-collecting practices and dis-
pute settlement initiatives was creating strife and confusion. At
the time, fishermen leaders sought to streamline the administra-
tion of the harbour area and to establish a consistent and effective
excise system. The Panchayat Union was charged with carrying
out these tasks. It has since developed into a powerful agency2 that
boasts a physical infrastru~ture, an administrative staff, and
authority over local affairs. Its annual tax receipts, which are dis-
tributed among the member neighbourhoods and used to finance
temple festivals and other collective expenses, are very substantial
indeed. 3
'The Panchayat Union owns a new two-storey building behind
the harbour area. But the union's field office, which offers a direct
view of happenings on the auction beach, remains the locus of daily
activity. The six tax collectors assemble here in the early morning,
then disperse to collect taxes from traders, market women, truck
and rickshaw drivers, and the mass of small businesses in the
harbour area. Office-holders also gather here to administer justice
and to address the broad range of business problems which people
working in the area bring to their notice. lnese complaints include
disputes about land use and encroachment, individual debts and
loans, as well as trade and fishing practice. The committee of the
Panchayat Union meets frequently to discuss policy matters such
as the regulation of fisheries.
How do the activities of the Panchayat Union relate to those of
theboat-owner associations? The division of labour appears to be
clearcut: boat-owner associations oversee the collective of mechan-
ized boat fishing units, while the Panchayat Union is responsible
for the land-based activities in the harbour area as well as for the
artisanal fishermen working there. In accordance with this div··
ision, the association court (see chapter 7) limits its cases to those
2 The extent to which the Panchayat Union lives up to its administrative potential
depends on the qUillity of its leadership. Fishermen recognize that this varies from
year to year, in accordance with the capacities and dedication of the members of
the management board.
J The Panchayat Union'spffice-bearers understandably are reluctant to reveal their
financial position. Based on various observations, however, their annual income
can amount to several lakhs of rupees.
Thc Boat-owner Associations ofRoyapumm 24:;
involving mechanized boat owners. Artisanal traders
and others must turn to the Panchayat Union for assistance.
Two factors confuse this tidy state of affairs. First of all, there
are many interfaces between the mechanized boat sector and other
economic activities in the harbour area. some boat owners
will inevitably be affected by measures directed toward the arlisanal
sector. And indeed, this is what happened in 1996, when the
Panchayat Union ordered that a section of the auction beach, which
boat construction teams had encroached upon, was to be vacated
and henceforth'used only for artisanal fishing craft. The prohibition
thePanchayat Union placed on trawling in a particular
ground utilized by local kattumaram fishermen (see chapter
led to an even more direct encounter between the sectors. Such
rulings can be enforced only if the two organizations cooper'lte.
An obvious collusion occurred during my fieldwork period be··
tween the leadership of the Panchayat Union and dominant boat
owner associations. Their joint actions yielded a number of very
practical benefits.
The second factor is that this neat division of labour conceals a
latent yet fundamental difference in opinion about competencies
and jurisdiction. Many kattumaram fishermen in the harbour area,
and others too, believe that boat owners, and boat~owner associ··
ations as well, should in principle answer to the Panchayat Union.
'They argue that, just like the village panchayats on which it is based,
the Panchayat Union is responsible for the administration of all
activities within its geographical boundaries. Boat owners do not
agree with this interpretation and, more importantly, can afford
not to heed it. Thus, they claim their only <lUthority is the boat-
owner association, which exists independent of the Panchayat
Union.
From this perspective, the division of labour between the
Panchayat Union and the boat-owner associations results not from
an agreement on principles. Rather, it is grounded in a power
gle in which the dominant economic group has succeeded in
detaching itself from other segments of the population as well as
from the regular fishermen administration. 4 Although protests
j Compare this to the discussion in chapter 7 on landing rights and the manner
in which mechanized boat fishermen have attempted to gain a toehold in the
246 Manne Resource Management
surface from time to time and strain the relationship, the Panchayat
Union seems to have resigned itself to the status quo.
8.2 The Politics of Boat-owner Associations
History
The first professional association of boat owners in Royapuram,
named the Popular Boat Society, developed in the mid-1960s. With
the emergence of populist Dravidian politics in Tamil Nadu, it soon
split up into competing factions linked to different political parties
in the state arena. This was the situation at the time of the riots in
1977 and 1978 between artisanal and mechanized boat fishermen
in Madras. As a result of these riots, the leaders of the boat-owner
associations decided to bury their differences (see chapter 2).
Rather than engaging in political rivalry, they aspired to create a
joint front in order to effectively address the problems facing the
sector. Therefore, all of the earlier groups merged and established
a single boat-owner association. Its members adopted an ingeni-
ous practice that assures continuous political support and also
solves the delicate problem of selecting an association president.
The rule states that the president of the association must belong to
the ruling party in the Government of Tamil Nadu. The implica··
tion is that when the state government changes, the president of
the association must step down. The timeliness of the rule was
brought out in the elections for the Tamil Nadu Legislative As-
sembly in May 1996. The changeover from an AIADMK to a DMK
government was immediately followed by the abdication of the
boat-owner association leader in Royapuram.
Fishermen leaders today describe the history of boat-owner as-
sociations since the merger in the late 1970s as all. orderly succession
that preserved unity. Although there is some truth to this rendi-
tion, it also paints too rosy a picture. In fact, history reveals a ten-
dency toward organ.izational fragmentation followed by attempts
at consolidation. However, their representation of events correctly
suggests that one association played a dominant role throughout
artisanal sea tenure system. The situation in Royapuram indicates that it is also to
their advantage to dissociate themselves from the artisanal sea tenure system.
The Boat-owner Associations ofRoyapuram 247
this era. I return to the background of this state of affairs after dis·
cussing the tussle between the two contemporary boat-owner as·
sociations, the Ad hoc Committee and the Association. s
The Ad hoc Committee
In the early months of 1995, when I began my fieldwork, only one
boat-owner association was operating in Royapuram. Strangely
enough, it bore the name' Ad hoc Committee', and its leader, a
man called Bhaskaran, assumed the title convenor' rather than the
I
more usual title 'president'. A review of the association's recent
history provides an explanation for this peculiar terminology.
In 1989, a radical young boat owner named Chandran estab-
lished a new boat-owner association. Ite then challenged the status
quo by taking the conflicts with artisanal fishermen in Andhra
Pradesh and the outsider problem in Madras as major campaign
issues. A few years later, he was elected president of the Madras··
Chingleput District Mechanized Boat Fishermen's Association
(Sennai-Sengai Maavadda Visaipadagu Miinavar Sangam), which was
the dominant boat-owner association at that time. By May 1994,
however, Chandran and the Minister of Fisheries, D. Jeyakumar,
disagreed about the government's handling of the problems with
artisanal fishermen in Andhra Pradesh. Mutual irritations over this
issue acquired a new dimension when Chandran, in an impetuous
gesture of discontent, transferred his political loyalties to a small
opposition party, the MDMK, and took many of his supporters
with him.
The Minister initiated what amounted to asilent coup. He nomin-
ated the Ad hoc Committee, which consisted of a select group of
thirty-three boat owners, to replace Chandran's Association. In the
government order, this step was motivated in terms of the need to
5 I have chosen to adopt the following terminology in order to minimize confusion.
The boat-owner association headed by Bhaskaran is called the Ad hoc Committee.
In August 1995, the official name of this as~ociation changed to the Committee for
the Defence of Boat Fishermen in Madras and Chingleput MGR Districts (Scl1nai·
Sel1gai MGR Maavadda Visaipadagu Miil1avar Paalugaappu Kuzhu). The association
headed by Chandran, the Madras··Chingleput District Mechanized Boat Fisher
men Association (Sel1l1ai-Sengai Maavadda Visaipadagu Miil1avar Sal1gam), is referrecl
to simply as the' Association'.
248 .Marine Resource Management
'create a structure that can effectively represent all sections of
mechanized boat operators'. The new Ad hoc Committee became
'responsible for the peaceful conduct of fishing' and was also to
'settle issues arising out of dashes of fishermen's groups of Madras
and Chengalpattu MGR Districts'.6
Bhaskaran, the president of the dominant boat-owner associ-
ation from 19'78 until 1985 and a staunch supporter of the ruling
AIADMK party as well, became the Ad hoc Committee's convenor.
Chandran and his supporters sullenly retreated. In defiance of the
Minister's unilateral decree, however, they refused to surrender
the key to the boat-owner association office. This action hindered
the functioning of the Ad hoc Committee and at the same time
indicated symbolic retention of what they felt was the 'real' asso-
ciation.
The convenor made deliberate attempts to have the Ad hoc
Committee acknowledged as the legitimate heir to Chandran's
Association and as the only authority over boat-owner affairs. As
Bhaskaran explained, 'A forest can have only one raaja [king].'
Although members of the Committee were not elected by popular
vote and did not include those who had chosen Chandran's side,
the founders tried to ensure a broad base of support by f9llowing
time-honoured principles. Each of the eleven recognized fishing
neighbourhoods in Royapuram sent three representatives, the
majority of whom belonged to the category of wealthy owners.
The Ad hoc Committee chose a meeting place along the waterside
to hold daily court sessions.
To buttress the Ad hoc Committee's authority in the harbour
area, the government of Tamil Nadu unofficially allowed it a
number of privileges. The state recognized the committee as the
mouthpiece of the boat fishermen population regarding the Andhra
problems. But the government also instructed the officers 'of the
Fisheries Department in Royapuram and of the local police stations
to cooperate with any requests the convenor might make. The fact
that the committee originated outside the boat fishermen popula-
tion and continued to depend on external support warrants
6 Government Order 107 of the Department of Animal Husbandry and Fisheries,
May 5, 1995 actually mentions a committee of forty members, but only thirty-
three were appointed.
The Boat··owner Associations ofRoyapuram 249
emphasis. I will discuss some of the ways this relationship bears
on the resolution of problems in the field of fishing rights.
Chandran's As.fOciation
By the time I arrived in H.oyapuram in January 1995, Chandran's
Association was in hibernation. The accounts of their achievements,
however, continued to linger in the air. Many boat fishermen per-
ceived the office-holders of the Ad hoc Committee to be inclined
towards wheeling and dealing. In contrast, owners outside the
coterie of the Ad hoc Committee described Chandran as
cipled and to the point. Despite his youth ..-just 30 old he
already had a history of activism behind him. As co-founder of a
fishermen youth organization in the second half of the 1980s,he
spoke out loudly against the involvement of outsiders in boat fish·
ing. In the same capacity, he also advocated a structural approach
to the Andhra troubles. Specifically, he demanded that the gov
ernments of Tamil Nadu and of Andhra Pradesh develop a joint
strategy to prevent and effectively resolve any incidents which
Jnight arise. According to his proponents, this approach differed
dramatically from Bhaskaran's. The latter called for a quick finan··
cial settlement of each individual incident, a strategy which fleeced
affected boat owners and supposedly lined his own pocket.
Clearly, many people in the harbour area regretted Chandran's
deposition in 1994. When he took up the gauntlet again almost a
year later and challenged the authority of Bhaskaran and the Ad
hoc Committee in the harbour area, Chandran therefore found a
ready support base. His Association signalled its revival by con-
structing a simple thatched shed alongside the jetty to house daily
court sessions parallel to those organized by the Ad hoc Comrnit··
tee a hundred metres down the road. However, as neither party
recognized the other's judgements and court cases sometimes
involved persons from both sides, irritations and minor clashes
ensued.
The Case ofthe Tuna Longliners
The sudden arrival of five tuna longliners with Indonesian crews
in the fishing harbour in May ]995 provoked Chandran's first public
challenge 10 theAd hoc Committee's authority. According to the
250 Marine Resource Management
official story, an Indian company from Calcutta had leased these
vessels from Japan to carry out fishing in the deep-sea waters of
India. This company had obtained permission to base itself in
Madras from all relevant government authorities as well as the Ad
hoc Committee, and thus its operations were entirely legal. How-
ever, many people in Royapuram ventured doubts. According to
Chandran and his supporters, the longliners were in fact not leased
but operated in joint venture with a foreign company. This appar-
ently minor change of accent brought the longliner company and
its supporters into a political minefield. The new central govern-
ment policy to promote joint ventures in deep-sea fishing had
engendered widespread protest amongst fishermen organizations
throughout India, and the agitation continued.? Although boat
fishermen in Madras had hitherto barely participated in this move-
ment, the arrival of the longliners precipitated a wave of national-
istic unrest. Fishermen argued that the longliners were hooking
the fish which rightfully belonged to Indian fishermen and taking
catches and profits abroad, so not even the local consumer was
benefitting. According to the detractors, government agencies as
well as the Ad hoc Committee were involved in a big cover-up.
On 15 May 1995, the Association held a demonstration in Madras
against the deep··sea fishing policy of the central government in
general and against the five longliners in particular. Three weeks
later, a group of Association members, headed by Chandran, rolled
up their sleeves and marched up to the factory which supplied the
longliners with ice, threatening to burn it to the ground unless it
stopped. The proprietor backed down. Subsequently, the Associa-
tion organized a march protesting the longliners, which received a
great deal of publicity in Tamil newspapers.
7 The Government of India began to create a framework of economic liberaliza-
tion in the early 1990s. One of its first measures was to expedite the exploitation of
supposed deep-sea fish resources by means of joint ventures between Indian and
foreign companies. This policy was met with protests from artisanal and mechan-
ized boat fishermen, grouped in the Campaign Against Joint Ventures (CAJV).
This organization initiated a series of very effective demonstrations and strikes
throughout the country. In the Royapuram fishing harbour, however, the support
for this movement was minimal. Boat fishermen in Madras thus barely answered
the calls for a nation.. wide fishermen's on 2.3 November 1994 and 18 January
1996.
The Boat-OIl'ncr Associations ofRoyapuram 251
For ordinary boat fishennen of Royapuram, this was not simply
a matter of politics. The longliner company was requisitioning
quantities of ice, and doing so during a season in which demand is
high and the capacity of ice factories low. 'This added demand COIl·
siderably raised the price of ice. In addition/ many owners were
unable to procure the commodity on tirne, which caused oper··
ational delays and financial losses. The widespread discontent due
to the ice problem eventually reflected back on the Ad hoc Com·
mittee. Many of its members had investments in ice factories and
were benefiting from the situation of scarcity. Moreover, one of
them held the supply contract with the longliner company. Polit
ical pressure was forcing the Minister of Fisheries to distance him"
self from the endeavour and to speak out against joint venture
policy. Unable to afford the political consequences of silent assent
any longer, the Ad hoc Committee suddenly made an about-face.
On June 10, the committee held a hunger strike on the jetty in con·
junction with the Panchayat Union and two traders associations to
protest the presence of the longliners. A series of meetings with
port authorities and other high officials followed. It is unclear
whether the now unanimous opposition from the Royapuram fish-
ermen population tipped the balance/ but in November 1995 the
longliner company left Madras.
Unification and the Birth ofyet Another Boat··owner Association
Chandran's Association also took up the outsider problem again.
With gusto/ it attacked Bhaskaran and the Ad hoc Committee for
their laxity in allowing people with no business in Royapuram to
participate in boat fishing. I discuss the confrontations on this issue
in more detail in Section 4, but at this point it is sufficient to recog..
nize that Chandran's standpoints again won Widespread approval
from boat fishermen. His popularity was becoming a hindrance,
not only to the functioning of the Ad hoc Committee, but also to
the political ambitions of the Minister of Fisheries himself. Prob··
ably alarmed by the political schism in his constituency, and with
elections due within a year, the minister now aimed to join the two
groups.
InJune 1995, two months after Chandran's Association resumed
its activities, the Minister of Fisheries invited or ordered - repre-
sentatives from the Ad hoc Committee and the Association to his
 The Boat-OJvner Associations ofRoyapuram 253
252 Marine Resource Mana;.qement

and half·hearted. The new association did not even establish

residence for discussions. In short, his efforts to achieve a merger
fishermen court, and other activities remained at a minimal level
eventually met with success. According to the agreement reached
as well.
in July, each group appointed an equal number of representatives
in a reconstituted Ad hoc Committee. Bhaskaran was to remain
Ad hoc Committee and Association Reviewed
the COnvenor for the first year but would then pass the honour to a
successor from Chandran's erstwhile Association.
How can the existence of two boat··owner associations in 1995 be
The reconstituted Ad hoc Committee, which consisted of twenty-
explained? I already pointed out the role that political party affili···
seven members and six office-holders, left many in I\oyapuram
ations played in the disbanding of the 1994 association and in the
discontented. First of all, the agreement required Bhaskaran to dis-
subsequent establishment of the Ad hoc Committee. Yet the
miss a number of old members in order to make room for
between the two groups in the harbour area was not primarily
Chandran's representatives. Chandran's men had specifically called
matter of party politics. Chandran's shift to the MDMK had shal-
for outsiders to be removed from the membership list immediately.
low roots, and certainly not all of his supporters belonged to the
However, many on Bhaskaran's side would not agree to suspend··
MDMK camp. Moreover, although the Ad hoc Committee had been
ing persons who had contributed years of service. Bhaskaran was
established by an AIADMK minister, its membership was
in a bind, and the compromise satisfied very few inhabitants of
ically heterogeneous. This emerged clearly in the prologue to the
Royapuram. In addition, Chandran refused to join the new Ad hoc
May 1996 elections for the State Assembly. The Ad hoc Committee
Committee, as he was unwilling to work with Bhaskaran or with
split up into at least three segments, some members displayed
the Minister of Fisheries. Thus, a continued risk of a dissident locus
old-time solidarities with the DMK and with the AIADMK,
of authority remained. Ultimately, the new Ad hoc Committee
others campaigned for the new Congress party offshoot, the TMC.
joined two opposing groups of men, and many observers doubted
The conflict did not revolve around patrilineal kinship group-
whether the merger would be workable.
ings either, as is frequently the case in fishing hamlets (see
Tensions manifested themselves most clearly in the daily court
ters 3 and 5). In other respects too, it proved impossible to connect
sessions. For more than a month, Ad hoc Committee members from
the two leaders and their supporters to social segments in the boat
both sides avoided the harbour shed in which court sessions were
owner population. s I therefore suspect that these are not social
held. This course of action irritated the administrative staff-
groups but political factions, as defined by Bailey (1969:51--55).
depriving them of an extra source of income - and frustrated the
According to Bailey (ibid.:52) a faction's' raison d' etre is political
fishermen complainants awaiting a decision. The debate over out--
competition' for prizes which include positi<?ns of power. Factions
siders in mechanized boat fishing overshadowed every meeting
are transactional groups with a minimum of ideology. In line with
and paralyzed decision-making. Gradually, however, the commo-
this notion, one could argue that Chandran's challenge to the Ad
tion subsided. The cries for radical action diminished and members
hoc Committee was more closely related to gaining access to the
from the two sides displayed more willingness to cooperate. The
harbour court sessions again reflected this and were held on a regu-
lar basis once more. Opponents of the merger complained, however,
that the radical group was compromising itself by not adhering to
8 Both leaders are of fishermen stock and belong to the current boat-·fishing elite.
its ideals once it arrived in the citadel of power. Bhaskaran, the older of the two, is a veteran in harbour politics and has substantial
Chandran withdrew into the wings and concentrated for some charisma. His main political weakness is the fact that his forefathers came from a
time on his business activities. At the end of November 1995, how- fishing hamlet south of Madras, while Bhaskaran himself married into Royapuram.
ever, he and some prominent boat owners who had been left out of Chandran, on the other hand, belongs to a local chettiyar family. His support group
included younger and more ed uca ted boat owners. However, Bhaskaran's Ad hoc
the Ad hoc Committee started yet another boat--owner association.
Committee had a higher concentration of members of the economic elite.
Unlike his earlier undertaking, however, this attempt was nominal
 254 Marine Resource ManfJ;fJement
seat of political power than to convictions. In fact, several respond..
ents used this argument to explain why formerly radical Associ..
ation members became more moderate after joining the
reconstituted Ad hoc Committee.
Perhaps this view is too cynical. In fact, a number of issues
utilized by Chandran's Association to mobilize a following were
topics that had troubled the boat fishing population for some time.
Many of the group's supporters displayed genuine concern about
the future of the boat fishing trade and about the lack of direction
from the Ad hoc Committee. The competition which arose between
the two associations resulted in the promulgation of decrees as well
as in a public discussion about the problems facing the sector. To
this extent, the struggle between the two associations definitely
had substance. The fact that it did not result in new rules for
instance, on the participation of outsiders in boat fishing- is also
due to the intractability of many core issues.
The Pattern ofAssociation-building in Royapuram
The skirmishes in 1995 between Bhaskaran's Ad hoc Committee
and Chandran's Association illustrate a larger trend in boat-owner
association history. Since 'its formation in 1978, dissident boat-owner
factions have regularly challenged the dominant boat-owner asso-
ciation and sometimes taken over control. However, while institu-
tional proliferation is one evident trend, consolidation is another.
There are two reasons for boat-owner associations to merge. First,
a divided administration has numerous drawbacks for the collect-
ive of boat owners. It may disrupt the association court system and
cause inconveniences to individual boat owners, as it did in 1995.
However, divisions also invite political manipulation and weaken
the position of boat owners, both in the harbour and in relation
with other outside parties. Mechanized boat owners have inter-
faces with artisanal fishermen and the government, and it is to their
advantage to speak with one voice.
Second, the state often plays a crucial intervening role. Govern-
ment interference had an ul1lnistakable impact on the events of
1995. Not only did the Minister of Fisheries initiate the formation
of the Ad hoc Committee and bolster its position, but he also forced
the two associations to merge when problems worsened. 1 exam-
ine the nature of his involvernent in more detail in Section 3.
The Boat-owner Associations ofRoyapuram 255
Everyone in Royapuram agreed that political intercession in the
affairs of the fishing harbour climaxed in the period after 1991,
after D. Jeyakumar became the Minister of Fisheries. But how typo
ical was this involvement'? Did interventions of this kind take place
in the earlier period too? Although I did not make a detailed study
of the matter, there is reason to believe that they did. Fierce rivalry
between boat-owner associations in the harbour area causes hard·
ship for the Fisheries Department. Indeed, for the Fisheries De-
partment, and perhaps for law enforcement agencies and political
authorities too, it is useful to have a single, and cooperative, insti
tutional partner among the boat fishing population (see chapters 9
and 10). Therefore, these agencies and actors may bolster one boat-
owner association to the exclusion of rivals. If this analysis is
correct, it confirms the popular account of a succession of boat-
owner associations in Royapuram·- one created, at least in part,
by the state.
8.3 The Ad hoc Committee as ail Administrative
Membership, Decision-making, and Leadership in Royapuram
In the previous section, I considered the boat-owner associations
of Royapuram as political factions that operate in a wider setting.
Here the focus shifts to associations as administrative entities. The
Ad hoc Committee formed the dominant and most regular force in
the regulation of mechanized boat fishing in Royapuram in 1995,
and thus I limit my discussion to this organization. I compare it
with the system of village administration, described in chapter
5. I noted there that fishermen administration rests on three trad·
itional pillars. One is a system of village membership which, at
least originally, places the responsibility for the collective squarely
on the shoulders of the group of adultJishermen. The second is the
village meeting which makes decisions for the collective. And the
third is the panchayat council with representatives from the vari··
ous patrilineages. Although vestiges of the village administrative
sy-stem are visible in the current boat-owner association of
Royapuram, new forms also have developed. Those innovations
affect the legitimacy and the scope of the association.
From the perspective of traditional fishermen administration,
the Ad hoc Committee, like the Panchayat Union, is an umbrella
256 Marine Resource Management
orgcmization which represents a number of neighbourhoods. l1leor~
etically, it therefore could draw from their membership lists_ As
pointed out in chapter 6, however, the system of membership
found in fishing hamlets has largely disappeared from Royapuram.
The declining strength of neighbourhood administration has fur-
thered this process. Although each fishing neighbourhood in
Royapuram still has a set of functionaries and may even conduct
regular elections, these leaders do not have the authority of their
rural counterparts.
Having moved away from the system of village membership,
the Ad hoc Committee now relies on voluntary enrolment and on
the support of boat owners. The results, at least in 1995, were not
encouraging. In February 1995, the Ad hoc Committee had only
thirty paying members, which represented about 10 per cent of the
fleet. This number increased to 161 in November 1995 through an
active recruitment policy and by linking services to membership.
Still, however, the membership lists represented only a fraction of
the boat-owner population.
The Ad hoc Committee emulates the style of the second pillar of
fishermen's administration, the village meeting. Not only do mem-
bers conduct meetings while seated in a circle, with no outward
distinctions in levels of authority, but every participant has the right
to speak. In fact, decisions must be made unanimously. This results
in drawn-out discussions and postponement of decision-making if
opiniops remain divided. But there are important differences be-
tween the two systems as well. Only official representatives, and
not the rank and file, attend committee meetings. Ordinary mem-
bers are invited to attend the Ad hoc Committee's annual general
meeting, but not the regular gatherings. In addition, the various
categories of boat owners in Royapuram are unequally represented.
Thus, in 1995 the boat-owner elite clearly dominated proceedings
in the Ad hoc Committee, while the category of poor boat owners
in particular remained unheard.
According to the third pillar, traditional village leaders emerge
from the lineage structure which forms a social base and some-
times are delegated to larger gatherings. The Ad hoc Committee
emulates this mechanism by drawing representatives from each of
the fishing neighbourhoods of Royapuram. Unfortunately, my
research did not reveal how this nomination process actually
works. In view of the dissolution of neighbourhoods as social units,
The Boat-owner Associations ofRoyapuram 257
however, it is unlikely that these representatives have the same
social support as village leaders.
What do these changes in organizational structure imply'?
Perhaps the critical difference between the boat-owner association
and the village administration relates to partiality. The former
represents only one professional category, the boat owners, to the
exclusion of others involved in mechanized boat fisheries. More
over, it imperfectly represents the people in this professional cat·-
egory, displaying significant bias toward the class of wealthy boat
owners. Many poorer boat owners express bitterness about the Ad
hoc Committee and about its leaders. Not only do these boat owners
relate experiences of discrimination vis--a··vis those with more
power, but they intimate that leaders systematically put money
into their own pockets. 9
These factors have implications for the legitimacy of the Ad hoc
Committee and for its rulings. One inference is that its authority is
stronger in the harbour area than it is at sea, especially if boat crews
are represented in the Ad hoc Committee only via the owners, who
also have varying opinions on its legitimacy. Clearly, one cannot
expect much from the promulgation of rules on fishing practice.
Land rules, however, are a different matter. The Ad hoc Commit-
tee has a better overview of events in the harbour and a full range
of control instruments.
Control
What are the Ad hoc Committee's means for control? The range of
situations in which the committee attempts compel individual
boat owners to follow directives is wide. It varies from the pay~
ment of membership fees to the attendance of court sessions and to
the observance of special rulings. "Ine Ad hoc Committee possesses
several coercive instruments. Some of these lie within its own realm
of authority, while others depend on the cooperation of state agen··
cies.Sanctions can also be ranked according to severity; some are
Y The committee has a hidden flow of funds of unknown extent and purpose. On
the revenues side, many outside boat owners had to pay large amounts of money
to have boats registered in Madras. On the expenditure side, it is common know-
ledge that the minister (or the MLA) demand a percentage of the earnings.
258 Marine Resource Management
mild and applied frequently, while others are severe and used only
in extreme cases. I commence my review by examining the mild
methods of enforcement which originate in the fishing neighbour-
hoods.
Similar to contemporary practice in the artisanal fishing
hamlets along the Coromandel Coast, the transgression of a rule
usually results in the imposition of a cash fine payable to the Ad
hoc Committee.
Soon after they left on a fishing trip, the crew on a mechanized
boat owned by a wealthy boat owner named Nagooran encoun··
tered another boat with serious engine trouble but neglected to
tow it to the harbour. The owner of the stricken boat ultimately
submitted a complaint to the Ad hoc Committee court about
this matter. The court fined Nagooran Rs 500.
An owner who resists payment of an Ad hoc Corrnnittee fine, is
commonly denied court services until he settles the old score. If a
person continues to refuse to cooperate and if the matter is of a
serious nature, the sanction may be widened to include any kind
of assistance. As everyone periodically needs a letter of recommen-
dation or an introduction, persistent recalcitrance causes serious
inconvenience.
QuesUon: Why do owners at all comply with the convenor's call
to attend court cases or to pay fines?
Ragupatlzy: Just imagine, someone who has damaged someone
else's nets may have to pay now. At sorne other time, however,
he may be the victim of damages and need the Ad hoc Commit-
tee's help. People realize this. Besides, Bhaskaran does more than
just mediate in this field, he also helps to solve problems with
electricity supply, with telephone or with other daily problems.
Tf a person doesn't cooperate, he foregoes other advantages ...
Rather than waiting for a boat owner to report himself, the Ad hoc
Committee may decide to take direct measures against an offender
Ordinarily, they impound the otter boards and the trawl nets of a
mechanized boat. In addition to sending a warning signal, this act
seriously inconveniences a boat fishing unit.
The Boat"01vner Associations of Royapuram 259
Boat owner Antonipillai was on the Ad hoc Committee's black
list after he was accused of l11.anaging a boat for his brother··in-
law from Cuddalore. He was summoned to show the title docu··
ments for verification. When he did not appear, an Ad hoc
Committee member ordered the staff to impound the otter
boards and nets of the boat in question until Antonipillai
appeared.
In rnore severe cases, the Ad hoc Committee issues a ban on pro·
fessional services and thereby hinders or prevents a boat owner's
fishing operations. Thus, the Ad hoc Committee may prohibit the
delivery of ice or of fuel, the construction or maintenance of a
the beaching or launching of a boat, or even a boat's fishing oper··
ations. In all cases, the effectiveness of a ban depends on the
the Ad hoc Committee holds on the service providers.
Boat owner Manoharan, who is technically an outsider, since he
originates from the surroundings of Cuddalore, refused to pay
a fee of Rs 40,000 for permission to register a boat. In respon.se,
the Ad hoc Committee ordered the harbour gang that
Manoharan had engaged not to launch the craft. The gang
obeyed, and Manoharan could not find another gang that was
willing to risk the Ad hoc Committee's wrath.
Finally, the Ad hoc Committee may obtain compliance by threat-·
ening a person's life or his property. Chandran and his Associ··
ation demonstrated the effectiveness of this method when they
intimidated the owner of the factory which was delivering ice to
the tuna longliners, as recounted in Section 2.
The success of the Ad hoc Committee's sanctions depends on a
number of circumstances. The standing of the individual or the
group in question is an important variable. As some incidents
clearly reveal, poorer boat owners ~ and others, such as outsiders,
who occupy weaker positions are more responsive to sanctions
than powerful, wealthy owners. Bhaskaran was thus unable to force
the wealthy boat owner Nagooran, whom I mentioned in the ex-
ample above, to pay the imposed fine, even though he tried every
trick. Nagooran ultimately won the case in a government court.
Bhaskaran also proved unsuccessful in his attempts to control
C'handran and his group of supporters because they were too
260 Marine Resource Management
numerous and too powerful for the Ad hoc Committee's coercive
arsenal. However, Bhaskaran would be much less successful than
he is now if the state did not back the Ad hoc Committee's authority.
The Shoring up ofAuthority
The Ad hoc Committee's authority and ability to exercise control
over mechanized boat fishing in Madras depends, in large meas-
ure, on the support it receives from state agencies as well as from
the political establishment. The Minister of Fisheries' order that
the Fisheries Department and the area's civil authorities support
the Ad hoc Committee, and not Chandran's Association, had
important consequences. Not only did it galvanize the Ad hoc
Committee, but it probably also caused Chandran's Association to
abandon the field. I discuss the Fisheries Department policy of boat
registration in chapter 10. There I note that the department's prac-
tice of considering an application only if it is accompanied by a
letter of consent from the Ad hoc Committee provides the latter
with a strong instrument of control over boat owners.
Ihe local police is also a partner in the agreement made by the
Minister of Fisheries. Various parties confirm that the police un-
officially had been ordered to pay dose attention when approached
by leaders of either the Ad hoc Committee or the Panchayat Union
and to uphold their authority. This sometimes implied that indi-
vidual complainants had to go back to the organization in ques-
tion for settlement.
A group of kattumaram fishermen from Royapuram that came
into conflict with boat fishermen who were carrying out inshore
trawling in a prohibited area (see chapter 7) took the case to
the Panchayat Union and not to the police station.
Question: Why didn't you go to the police instead?
Kattumaram fishermen leader: If we had gone to the police, they
would have referred us to the Panchayat Union anyhow. They
take aetion only if a leader of the Panchayat Union visits the
police station and requests them to.
It is important to note that the mobilization of support proceeds
via individual networks. Bhaskaran thus has an excellent relation··
ship with the Minister of Fisheries as well as with many senior
The Boat-owner Associations ofRoyapuram 261
staff members of the Fisheries Department. A phone call or a visit
is generally enough to assure cooperation in a particular matter.
8.4 The Outsider Issue
The outsider issue was one of several problems considered by boat-
owner associations in 1995, but it stands out because of its inward
thrust. According to popular perception, the problem originated
in the permissiveness of fishermen leaders in the past and could be
resolved only through concerted action. But how was it to be de-
fined? What are outsiders and insiders, and where is the bOUIlld;:;IXV
between them? This debate, which highlighted the contours of an
ambivalent social structure, pitted hardliners against moderates.
Furthermore, what means does the boat-owner association
its disposal to compel individuals to follow its rulings? The
mentation of decisions on the restriction of outsider c,rl·;"it"
reveals some of the practical exigencies of control and authority in
mechanized boat fishing.
From the outset I want to make it clear that the outsider
lem in Royapuram involved investments rather than labour and
boat owners rather than workers. The important question was: does
so-and-so, who comes from a place or social group outside the
locality, have the right to operate a boat out of the Madras harbour?
This is not to deny that the large-scale immigration of workers in
boat fisheries has often had a negative effect on labour conditions
and decreased workers' incomes. However, at least to my know--
ledge, this has never become a major public issue. Unlike boat
owners, boat workers have always been f~~bly organized. In the
following section I focus on the outsider problem as it has been
debated and handled in Royapuram and largely ignore the labour
issue.
History ofthe Outsider Problem
The outsider problem is as old as mechanized boat fishing in
Royapuram. Initially, this problem was associated with patterns
of seasonal migration.
Driver Ramakrishnan: In 1968, when I, as a boy, started working
on mechanized boats, it was very common for boats to move
 262 Marine Resource Mana;qement
down to Cuddalore during the lean months from January to
~arch. At that tIme there was no problem. In those years,
Cuddalore boats were also coming to Madras to market their
fish, tank diesel and procure ice.
Originally, many boat fishermen from Kerala also visited Madras.
Periods of free access alternated with protest and the denial of
entrance.
Dh~nalakshmi (retired boat owner): One of the negative customs
WhICh has come about is that Madras people won't allow boats
from Cuddalore or from Kerala to moor here any more. In the
early years of boat fishing, objections of this kind arose in waves.
If the groups coming in were numerous and the prices of fish
went down, action would often be taken to remove the out..
siders. However, there was also a contrary movement. Local
bo~t owners would make deals with outsiders and say it was
theIr brother's boat or something of the kind. Neighbourhood
panchayats also would draw income from taxes on outside
boats.
As this respondent points out, protectionist measures often have
been motivated by declining fish prices. I observed in chapter 7
that the boat-owner association in Madras today is deeply con-
cerned about market fluctuations and has taken various measures
to control them.
In the 1970s, however, protectionist tendencies started to co-
alesce throughout northern Tamil Nadu. 10 The boat-owner associ..
ation stopped the seasonal migration of outside fishermen to
Madras, and boat fishermen in other ports did the same. Such meas-
lues were often motivated by discrimination experienced by mem-
bers of their own group. Many Madras boat owners thus recall
with indignation how many of their people tried to escape the riots
of 1977 and 1978 in Madras. They were not allowed to sell their
catches in Cuddalore and were even denied food, drink, and lodg-
mg. They assert that thIS treatment set the stage for a subsequent
closing of the Madras harbour.
10 Vijayan (1980:14) notes a similar process in the state of Orissa.
The Boat-owner Associations ofRoyapuram 263
Apparently, the termination of seasonal migration to bigger ports
like Madras largely resulted from the autonomous actions of fish-
ermen's organizations. However, this may have corresponded as
well with Fisheries Department policy. Government Order 991 of
1979 aimed, in part, to prevent an over-concentration of mechan·
ized boats in anyone location. It directed that 'mechanized boat
owners should arrange to berth their boats only in the sea area
adjoining their own fishing villages.' The 'Tamil Nadu Marine Fish·
ing Regulation Act of 1983 also contains clauses regulating boat
movement.]] In general, legislators intended to discourage the
migration of boats from one harbour to another since such move·
ments interfered with efforts to increase control over the mechan-
ized boat sector.
In addition to the issue of seasonal migration, the problem of
non-fishermen investments in'boat fishing reached a peak in Madras
in the 1970s and became an important theme in harbour politics.
By the early 1980s, many of these investors had left the scene, driven
by diminishing returns and by the conflicts which now character-
ized the relations between boat and artisanal fishermen at sea. The
discovery of the rich Andhra Pradesh fishing grounds
increased the allure of boat fishing in Madras. In view of the resist
ance of local boat owners, however, outside investors now went
underground. In this process, a local fisherman served as a front
for fishermen from other parts of the Tamil Nadu coastline or for
non·fishermen investors -. the benami relationship discussed earlier
(see chapter 6). A great deal of contemporary activism is directed
at unearthing and eliminating such fronts.
From the fishermen perspective, outsider and benami problems
are related phenomena. After all, absentee owners often seek a
benami front because they are outsiders and anticipate problems
with the local fishermen population if this fact would be made
public. 12 For this discussion, it is sufficient to treat the benami rela-
tionship as a subset of the general outsider problem.
11 See Sections '7 and 11 in Chapter 2 of the 1983 Act, which deal with the licensing
of fishing vessels in particular fishing ports, and also Rule 6 of the Tamil Nadu
Marine Fishing Regulation Rules (1983).
" Persons who wish to establish a benami relationship are said to have other
motives as well, such as a desire to avoid the tax department or the media. The
latter situation arose in November 1995, when a poor boat owner suddenly acquired
 264 Marine Resource Management
But Royapuram counts yet another complicated category of
outsiders immigrants, who are largely of fishing stock. Chapter
6 recounts that, after the debut of boat fishing, the fishermen
neighbourhoods of Madras expanded rapidly. One category of fish..
ermen immigrants developed local ties and eventually became boat
owners. What should be done with them? The debate in Royapuram
has largely centred on the rights of this borderline group.
The Definition of (Outsider)
The outsider problem ranks high on the priority list of Royapuram
boat owners today. Not only the activities of boat-owner associ..
ations but also conversations with individual boat owners reveal
this trend. Thirty-one owners in our survey sample of thirty..three
emphasized that the issue had high priority, equivalent to that of
the problems they faced in Andhra Pradesh waters (see chapter 7).
. What definition of 'outsider' do boat owners employ? Clearly,
Ideas about the distinguishing characteristics of outsiders, or non..
members, mirror those on insiders, or members. Statements reflect
a consensus that the main criteria are territoriality and descent.
Differences emerge; however, with regard to the conditions under
which outsiders can achieve membership. Varying interpretations
of rules in this field make for conceptual confusion and also con-
tribute to inaction.
Locals first of all stress that boat owners in Madras must come
from Madras or Chingleput Districts·- note that this territorial div-
ision coincides with the government's administrative units. One
common motivation for this distinction is that boat fishermen from
these districts have no other port to utilize, whereas inhabitants of
southern districts have their own harbour facilities. In addition,
Madras boat fishermen are convinced that persons of non··fishing
caste have no place in mechanized boat fishing -- this is a criterion
of descent and of ethnic affiliation. Most of them would agree with
a flpet of five new vessels. According to rumour, these craft actually belonged to
the consort of thp chief minister of Tamil Nadu at the time. Anyone familiar with
the rppressive political atmosphere in Tamil Nadu during that time period should
not be surprised that this particular benami relationship was never challenged in
public.
The Boat-owner Associations ofRoyapuram 26S
a more radical boat owner, who answered the question of whether
non-fishermen should be allowed to operate a boat in Madras,
categorically stating that 'One should be a born fisherman, of the
fishing population. Others are not allowed.' Notably, this man did
not mention a specific fishing caste but the fishing population in
generaL At no time did I hear that people were refused entry to
boat fishing simply because they belonged to a marine fishing caste
other than the Pattinavar.'3 This signals the development of a new
kind of caste consciousness (also see chapter 2).
The rule denying non-fishermen owners entrance to the
harbour does not seem to apply to persons of fishing caste who
pursue other professions and then return to invest in mechanized
boats. This concurs with the descent criterion. Although fishermen
in Kalvimanagar seriously question the membership of
people who have entered other occupations, professionals in
Royapuram appear to continue unchallenged.
Most boat owners would agree that the descent rule in principle
should be narrowed down to include only patrilineal relatives
(pangaalis) of local fishermen. This relates to the old-time
ment pattern, in which a fishing hamlet is a collection of
patrilineages (see chapter 3). ,
The rule of patrilinearity excludes affinal kin, including o'utside
men who marry local women. The same radical boat owner quoted
above explained that 'we follow Hindu law, in which the wife joins
the husband. A man who marries into Royapuram is therefore not
entitled to operate a boat here.' This interpretation, however, con·
tradicts the usual practice in artisanal fishing hamlets in which
males who marry into a community build up membership rights
over time. Indeed, outsiders hoping to gain a foothold in Madras
often have employed this strategy. Thus, it is not surprising that
the radical wing of boat owners in Royapuram has tried to elim·
inate this loophole.
At one point, members of Chandran's Association considered
obstructing the wedding of a local girl to a boat owner from
Cuddalore, because this would give the man a chance to berth
13 People belonging to inland fishing castes appear to occupy a borderline position,
but many boat owners would accept them as well.
266 Manne Resource Management
his boat in Madras. In the end, however, this plan was not car-
ried out, probably because of the negative publicity it would
receive in fishermen's circles. Marriage is, after all, a sacrosanct
event.
Another conceptual loophole relates to the rule of territoriality.
According to this rule, outsiders build up membership rights by
living in a place for a longer period of time and by participating in
fishing activities. This sterns from the conviction that roots develop
over time as old ties weaken. Old-time settlers that continue to
stress their relationships with their places of origin tend to irritate
locals.
Driver Ramakrishnan: If I settle in the Netherlands, I should not
continue to maintain close ties with India. Similarly, Cuddalore
boat owners should really settle down here. However, a portion
of them still pay taxes [uuruari] or make contributions [santaa]
to their place of origin. My employer is like that. I-:Iis daughter's
wedding invitation also mentions Cuddalore as their home town,
not Madras.
How long does it take for an outsider to be recognized as a
Madrasee and, moreover, to be allowed to operate a boat in the
locality? This issue is one of the central points of contention for
boat owners. The radical wing argues for a drastic curtailment
of immigration, whereas the moderates plead clemency for older
settlers.
The debate over the definition of an outsider therefore indicates
solid ground alternated with patches of quicksand. I discussed the
conditions necessary to transform outsiders into insiders. Interpret-
ations were seen to differ. The criteria which appear firm, such as
of district or of caste, can still generate discussion as each has a
hazy demarcation line.
The Implementation ofOutsider Rules
The difference which arose between the Ad hoc Committee and
Chandran's Association on the outsider issue was one of degree
rather than of ideological position. Both associations spoke out
against such involvemeitt. But the Ad hoc Committee took a m()rc
The Boat-owner Associations ofRoyapuram 267
moderate - some fishermen said'corrupted' standpoint, while the
Association favoured radical action. Soon after its formation,
Chandran's Association questioned the Ad hoc Committee's treat-
ment of immigrant boat owners those who had been operatl,ng
boat in Royapuram for a longer period of time. The Ad hoeCom·
mittee had developed the habit of imposing a substantlal fme.on
such owners each time they made a major change to theIr fIshmg
enterprise. Major modifications such as lengthe~ing a craf.t as ~ell
as the replacement or addition of a vessel reqUires re-reglstratIO~
with the Fisheries Department. The Ad hoc Committee used thIS
requirement to exact compliance with its demands. ~fter all, the
department requires that every applic.ation for reglstratIO~ be
accompanied by a letter of recommendatIOn from the Ad hoc Com-
mittee (see chapter 10).
Chandran expressed disdain for the favouritism the Ad hoc
Committee's policy implied and also commenced to ferre~ out
benami relationships, well into the ranks of the co~rmttee.
Chandran suspected a committee member, who had Just can··
structed a new boat, of operating it benami. Thus, Chandran ~ro·
hibited its launching until the documents were to his sa~isfactIOn.
Although the man in question tried to dodge the order m
ways, he finally yielded. Chandran's allegations apparently
out to be correct. The boat owner launched the craft only after pro··
viding proof that he had procured the vessel from the absentee
owner which made it a 'local' craft.
In the summer of 1995, the reconstituted Ad hoc Committee
commenced a general campaign against outsiders and ben~mi
relationships. The committee announced its intent to the boat fish·
ermen public in a pamphlet, as follows:
Our association is determined to remove mechanized boats from
outside as well as benami boats which fish and land their catches
in our area. In the future, these boats will be removed .... Local
fishermen should not join hands with outsiders in oper<lting
mechanized boats (my translation).
The Ad hoc Committee pursued its goal with a vengeance. In the
following months, all boat owners attending court sessions or at
least those who were less well known and less powerful were
obliged to present documents proving their identity and ownership.
 268 Manne Resource Management
Moreover, in November 1995, the Ad hoc Committee organized a
raid on the northern section of the harbour where it suspected to
find many unregistered boats belonging to outsiders. Rather than
aiming to remove these boats, however, the main goal of this ac-
tion was to raise mO!1ey. Thus, in the planning meeting before the
raid, a senior member proposed - to general acclaim - that every
outsider boat they found should be fined Rs 30,000. lIe argued
that it would be impossible to eject all outsiders and pointed out
that the Ad hoc Committee could use funds to meet the high
expenses incurred in Andhra Pradesh.
Limitations to Action
What were the effects of this movement to defend the privileges of
insiders against outsiders? Indeed, some benami relations, such as
the instance detailed above, may have been terminated through
the efforts of boat-owner associations. Certainly, the ranks of out-
siders got the message, which was spread through myriad chan-
nels, that they were not particularly welcome in Royapuram.
Interview 1
Boat owner Subramanian: I have been living in Madras for 30
years and feel like a Madrasee. Still I have no freedom. I have to
beg the Ad hoc Committee for permission to build a second
boat - I may get it, but maybe not. There are many rules and
regulations regarding outsiders like me, and I feel bitter about
this.
Interview 2
Boat owner James (an outsider on two counts because he belongs
to the non-fishing Nadar caste from the south of Tamil Nadu):
We are all Indians! Why are there separate categories of fisher-
men? The harbour has been built from tax money raised all over
India, and everybody has the right to use it!
In fact, this pressure on outsiders during 1995 resulted in the revit-
alization of migrant organizations in Royapuram.
But did the Ad hoc Committee make any progress towards their
goal of removing outsiders from the harbour area? To my know-
ledge, they did not. The reasons for this failure are threefold. First
The Boat-owner Associations ofRoyapuram 269
of all, outsiders often succeed in creating local alliances and in using
them for their defence. Absentee owners, of course, find a natural
partner in their managers, whereas fishermen from other parts of
Tamil Nadu often take recourse to marriage ties. Experience demo
onstrates that more powerful contacts with the local population
offer a person a better chance of receiving protection. Popular
rumour suggested that many of the leading figures in the boat·
owner associations actually managed boats in benami and thus
were not eager to support stringent measures.
The more ambiguous an outside boat owner's position, the easier
it is for local allies to do their work. The demarcation of insiders
and outsiders was shown to be particularly weak regarding the
achievement of membership. Marriage and long-term residence
traditionally provide outsiders with rights in a fishing community.
Although these avenues are disputed, a person who meets the
basic criteria may gather enough support to withstand untoward
action.
The second impediment stems from the contradiction between
fishermen action and state law. An outsider threatened with re-
moval from Royapuram can go to court and demand enforcement
of his constitutional rights. The memory of events in the early 1990s
overshadows present-day deliberations. At that time, Chandran's
radicalized Association ordered at least eleven boats owned by per-
sons from other districts to leave the Royapuram harbour. This
initiative ended in failure, however, when several boat owners took
the case to court and obtained a stay order. The final blow came
when the newly established boat workers union organized hunger
strikes and demonstrations to demand gov~rnment action. They
argued that the Association's order was unconstitutional and would
result in a loss of employment. A face-saving compromise finally
settled the matter in a meeting at the police station. The outsider
boats were allowed to stay, but the owners could not replace the~r
vessels or add to their fleet.
These events continue to shape decision-making. The following
interview with Bhaskaran, the Ad hoc Committee's convenor,
illustrates how.
Bhaskaran: Some people say that we should forcibly remove
Cuddalore boat owners from Madras, but we can't do this. Some
of them have gone to court and obtained a 'stay' on an association
270 Marine Resource Management
order to go and are fishing still, which is a shameful [avamaana]
thing. If we tell someone to leave from here and they do, then
we are kings who can be proud of ourselves. f-Iowever, if a per~
son goes to court and gets a 'stay', then he has more power than
before. Then he will be the raaja [king]. The association cannot
go against the court because officially the Cuddalore man has
the right to fish here.
Question: But you have other ways to stop a man-by preventing
a boat to be constructed or loaded with ice ....
Bhaskaran: That we can do. However, then the man will go to
the police and show the stay order. The police will tell the asso-
ciation not to interfere. I may be a ruling party man, but the
police will not always be favourable to me. If I go beyond the
limit, the police will thwart me.
Although Bhaskaran may have reasons to down-play his power
and his room to manoeuvre, the essential truth of his statement
cannot be doubted. Indeed, the state forum of law, which has a
powerful outreach, hinders the range of Ad hoc Committee actions.
Finally, the Ad hoc Committee also failed to reduce the number
of outside boat owners because of its own weaknesses. For example,
it pursued two contradictory goals by attempting to milk outsiders
while trying to remove them from the harbour altogether. A lack
of endurance also plays a role. This relates to a basic trait of boat-
owner associations. Like village administrations, boat-owner as-
sociations have a profound sensitivity to immediate pressures.
Consequently, they fail in long-term plarming and implementation.
8.5 Conclusions
The question at the beginning of this chapter was whether limited
administrative capacities contributed to the relative weakness of
the rule system in mechanized boat fishing. The answer is yes. Al-
though the Ad hoc Committee is the dominant boat-owner asso-
ciation today, and no paper tiger, its grip on developments in the
mechanized boat sector is partial. Several factors are to blame. First
of all, the Ad hoc Committee shares its authority over fishermen's
affairs with other non-state organizations. A reasonably clear div-
ision of labour with these organizations has emerged. Mechanized
boat fishing, strictly defined, has come to be recognized as the
The Boat-owner Associations ofRoyapuram 271
prerogative of the boat-owner associations. Nevertheless, the com-
mittee must also consider the interests and competencies of other
organizations in the harbour area. In addition, the Ad hoc Com-
mittee faces competition from rival boat-owner associations which
emerge from time to time and undermine its command over the
population of mechanized boat owners.
Other factors already pose limits to the boat-owner association's
command. I mentioned the size of the fishing industry in
Royapuram and its state of flux in chapter 6. Both of these charac-
teristics create a natural impediment to building and maintaining
an organization. Since the neighbourhood membership system
largely has dissolved, organizations such as the Ad hoc Commit··
tee are also less integrated in fishing practice than village adminis··
trations (see chapter 5). They also dispose over fewer sanctions to
enforce decisions. Significantly, they derive their existing powers
in no small measure from government departments and from pol··
itical contacts, which have their own interests in the harbour area.
However, rule-making and enforcement in mechanized boat
fishing are not only matters of control. The outsider issue, which I
discussed in the last section of this chapter, highlights the sheer
intractability of some important fishermen's issues. For at least three
reasons, the boat-owner associations of Royapuram have not been
able to find a solution to the outsider problem, which they cur-
rently recognize as one of the foremost issues. First, fishermen can-
not agree on a definition of outsider, so that no rule can be
implemented. Then, outsider fishermen can challenge a rule set by
an owner association not only in the arena of fishermen law but
also in the state law system. Finally, contra,pictions in the boat~
owner association's own goals undermine rule-making and enforce-
ment. Thus, the desire to fill the association's treasury thwarts the
pursuit of the goal of curtailing unwanted immigration.
 Part 4

Fisheries Dt::partl1l1erlt
 9

The Constitution of [ndia grants state governments responsibility

for fisheries within territorial waters which extend up to 12 naut-
ical miles from shore. 2 The central government, on the other hand,
deals with all fishing activities which take place beyond this limit
in the so··called deep sea. This division of labour has been upheld
by the Supreme Court, which was asked to judge the right of the
Tamil Nadu government to institute the Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing
Regulation Act of 1983.
State governments enjoy a tripartite and not completely over··
lapping command: over the fisheries which take place in territorial
waters, over the communities which depend on these fisheries and
over marine resources in the area. The Tamil Nadu government
largely has assigned these tasks to the Fisheries Department. It is
therefore logical for this part of the book to concentrate on the regu··
latory policy of this department.
The following two chapters investigate the character of the Pish·
eries Department's sea tenure system. Other than in the descrip·
tions of the artisanal and mechanized boat fishing sectors, here I
distinguish two layers: official policy and a more implicit set of
conventions. The topic of this first chapter is the department's offi-
cial policy regarding inshore capture fisheries, which is enshrined

I A 44 km stretch of shore along the Coromandel Coast belongs to the Union

Territory of Pondicherry, and not to Tamil Nadel. In this chapter and the following
one, however, I limit my discussion to government policy in Tamil Nadu. In line
with the topic of this study, I concentrate on the Fisheries Department's involve··
rnents in marine capture fisheries.
See Article 2.46 and Item 21 in the State List (list 2) of the 7th Schedule to the
( .onstitution.
276 Marine Resource Management The Fisheries Department and Official Regulation Policy 277

in the Tamil Nadu Marine Regulation Act of 1983. I explore the fligure 9.1 Fisheries Department's Administrative Structure
scope of this body of legislation and then discuss the reasons for
the poor execution of the Act. I take up three topics: the Fisheries
Department as em organizational entity, the relationship between
politics and bureaucracy in the state, and the history and content
of the Act. Together, these deliberations constitute the platform for
an analysis of the way the Fisheries Department in Tamil Nadu
implements the core principle of the Act, the so-called three-mile
rule. This discussion is a stepping stone to chapter 10, which high-
lights the Fisheries Department's conventions in the field of reglk'
lation.

9.1 The Fisheries Department: Stnlcture and Activities

Officers regularly point out that the Tamil Nadu Fisheries Depart-
ment is heir to nothing less than the Madras Fisheries Bureau, which
was the first department of its kind in British India and earned a
reputation as a trail blazer. Indeed, the early publications of the
bureau, which served the entire Madras Presidency, continue to
stand out because of their scope and thoroughness. Moreover, many
of the current Fisheries Department's activities are rooted in initia-
tives of the first decades of this century (d. Blake 1970:145). Des-
pite this illustrious heritage, however, the present-day department
is a dwarf in the state government's machinery and carries little
weight with other departments.
Structure afthe Department3
The Fisheries Department of Tamil Nadu is organized into a number
of divisions and regions. Three administrative layers, which coin-
cide with regional divisions, can be distinguished (see Figures 9.1
and 9.2).
" The information in this section applies to the administrative situation in 1995. I
obtained details on the structure of the Fisheries Department of Tamil Nadu from
personal communications with officers, as well as from Bay of Bengal Programme
(1983) and Blake (1970). I do not discuss the Tamil Nadu Fisheries Development
Corporation, a parastatal body which carries out commercial veI'ltures in the fish·
eries field.
The Fisheries Department is headed by a Commissioner of Fish-
eries, a professional administrator who belongs to the Ad-
ministrative Service (lAS) and is subject to regular transfers. The
Commissioner of Fisheries reports to the to Government
(Animal Husbandry and Fisheries) and to the Minister of Fisher-
ies, both of whom hold office in the Government Secretariat in an-
other part of the city. The commissioner is by senior officers
in charge of the various sectors and spearheads of departmental
activity. The Marine Fisheries Division, which is one of them, is
administered by a Joint Director (Marine). The central staff, the
administration, and the fisheries library are all housed in a rela-
tively new four-storey government office building along the main
traffic artery of Madras, which forms the department's state head··
quarters.
For administrative purposes, the state has been divided into four
regions. The Madras Region includes the four coastal districts of
Madras, Chingleput, Villupuram, and South Arcot, as well as two
inland districts. It has a coastline of 250 km and a marine fishing
population of 1,26,995 (Directorate of Fisheries 1986a:8). The
 278 Marine Resource Management The Fisheries Department and Official R~lJulation Policy 279

Figure 9.2 Fisheries Department's Authority Structure by an Assistant Director (AD) of Fisheries, who is supported
Inspectors (IF) and Sub-Inspectors of Fisheries (SIF) as well as
supplementary staff. They are in charge of implementing welfare
and development programmes at the grassroots level. They are
also responsible for implementing the Tamil Nadu Marine Fi,;hin2:
Regulation Act of 1983. In Madras District however, a special
the Fishing Harbour Section, has been entrusted with this task.
discuss it further below. Each Fisheries Development Office sub··
divides its area into smaller geographical units, which are left in
the care of a sub-inspector or inspector.

Personnel

I limit my discussion to the category as 'officers' and

ignore administrative and other support staff because officers bear
most of the responsibility for activities carried out by the ""0'-'0>"'_
ment and occupy different positions than other staff. In 1995, the
Fisheries Department of Tamil Nadu employed 290 officers rank-
ing at or above sub-inspector. Table 9.1 indicates their distribution
by rank as well as the gender ratio. Evidently, the number of fe··
male officers is very small and is concentrated in the lower ranks.
Officers are recruited in the Fisheries Department via the Tamil
Nadu Public Service Commission and must possess a college de··
gree (BSc. in biology) or a diploma from a recognized Fisheries
Training College. Most officers are proficient in English, and many
communications are still in this language.
Madras Region is headed by a Joint Director (Regional), who occu~ In general, department officers serve for life. They begin at the
pies a separate office in Madras. Its premises appear unusually bottom of the administrative hierarchy and slo;wly climb up through
sleepy. As the districts covered by this office are near the state cap- the ranks. The transfer system, which rotates officers from one
ital, district-level fisheries officers tend to bypass the regional of-
fice and take important matters directly to their superiors at
headquarters. Each administrative region also has an Inshore Fish- Table 9.1 Fisheries npln"rtm,mf' Distribution of Personnel Rank and Sex
ing Station, which is responsible for marine resource surveys and Post Total 9
rescue operations, as well as a Fisheries Training Centre. Joint Director 5 0
The third layer consists of Fisheries Development Offices (FDO) Deputy Director 10 0
in the various districts of Tamil Nadu. 4 Each of these units is headed Assistant Director 51 2
Inspec:tor of Fisheries 116 1
of Fisheries 108 2
4 In 1995, Tamil Nadu counted twenty-two districts, only fifteen of which had a Total 290 4
Fisheries Development Office. Some Fisheries Development Offices were respon·
sible for more than one district. Source: Department of Fisheries ,1996.
2S0 Marine Resource Management
departmental post to another every three years, ensures that indi-
vidual officers gain experience in various geographical regions as
well as in sections of departmental activity_ An outside observer is
struck by the club-like nature of the department All officers -- from
sub-inspector at the bottOll1 to joint director at the top of the
hierarchy-. participate in a distinctive subculture of stories, experi-
ences, and viewpoints. A special sense of connection prevails with
'batch mates'. These are indivIduals who joined the department
and went through the preparatory training programme at the same
time. Nevertheless, in the course of their careers, officers grad-
ually get to know most of their other colleagues as welL This pro-
cess is facilitated, of course, by the small of the corps and by
the average length of service. The transfer system also appears to
contribute to social cohesion. The time periods that officers spend
at outposts, often away from their families, generate particularly
strong friendships with fellow officers. Those dose ties are main-
tained even after retirement.
Significantly, very few officers corne from a fishing caste. More-
over, only a handful have ever taken part in fishing activities, and
these men generally have experience only with large trawling ves-
sels. The ignorance of many officers about the practicalities of the
fishing trade is a matter of ridicule as well as frustration for fisher-
men along the Coromandel Coast (d. McGoodwin 1990:77).
The Madras and Chingleput Hshenes Development Offices
The fishing populations of Royapuram and Kalvimanagar fall
under the charge of the Fisheries Development Offices of Madras
and Chingleput Districts respectively. I accord these offices spe-
cial attention for this reason. Table 9:2 presents an overview of the
Table 9.2 of Fisheries Offices
FDO Fishing
No. of
Madras Disi. 8 26km 46,232 40
Chingleput Disi. 12 135 km 38,723 64
Tamil Nadu 290 1,000 km 4,63,000 442
Somces: • Department of Fisheries ,1996.
+ Department of Fisheries,1986a.
The Fisheries Depart-ment and Official R~gulation Policy 281
staffing of these offices as well as an indication of the size of the
fishing population they oversee.
The Fisheries Development Office for Madras District is situ-
ated in Royapuram near the fishing harbour. It is staffed one
assistant-director, three inspectors, and two sub··inspectors, as well
as two officers with a posting from a cooperative apex
body. The staff of this office is responsible for implementing all
regular fisheries programmes in the forty fishing neighbourhoods
of Madras District. Although it nominally has a district-wide fo··
cus, its core mission lies in Royapuram, which in 1995 was polit
ically the most sensitive fishing location in the state. Not only does
Royapurarn harbour a large and vocal fishing population, but tile
Minister of Fisheries also came from this constituency and had
interest in maintaining ties with his electorate.
The Fisheries Development Office for ChingJeput District is
quiet haven compared to the Madras office. To facilitate contact
with the fishing population of the district, sub·inspectors have been
stationed in their respective zones. The artisanal fishermen of
Kalvimanagar, for example, channel most of their business through
a sub-inspector who holds office in an old ice factory several km
north of the village. This officer is responsible for twelve coastal
hamlets between the southern boundary of Madras city and the
Kovalam river mouth, a distance of about 20 km. Since the officer
only occasionally visits the hamlets himself, fishermen who rOf""';rp
specific assistance usually go to his office, frequently with a fisher-
man mediator. If the cooperation of the assistant director is can··
sidered to be of eminent importance, as in the case of many loan
applications, fishermen will go directly to the Chingleput Fisher-
ies Development Office. This office is located in Madras, only
short distance from the Fisheries Department headquarters.
The Fishing Harbour Section ofMadras
I noted above that, unlike other districts in Tamil Nadu which boast
a population of mechanized boat fishermen, the Madras Fisheries
Development Office is not in charge of irnplementing the terms of
the Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing Regulation Act of 1983. Instead,
the Fisheries Department has established a special Fishing Harbour
Section for this purpose. This administrative unit is housed in the
Inshore FishingStation of the Madras Region, which offers a good
282 Marine Resource Management T7Je Fisheries Department and Official Regulation Policy 283

view of the fishing harbour. Although it is supposed to have a staff
of nine, it presently employs only an assistant director, an inspect··
or, and two crew members who accompany the officers on any
patrol missions. In describing work patterns, however, one of the
officers sighed, 'we are so short of staff that we barely have an
opportunity to go to the field, and concentrate mainly on our office
work.' This consists mainly of registering and licensing mechanized
boats in the Royapuram fishing harbour.
Since the Madras Port Trust formally owns the land and infra-
structure in the fishing harbour area and is responsible for its main-
tenance, the Fishing Harbour Section has an unusual hierarchy.
Although staffed by the Fisheries Department and accountable to
the joint director of the Madras Region, it also answers to the Fish--
ing Harbour Management Committee. This committee is headed
by the chairman of the Port Trust and includes representatives from
the Fisheries Department, the Ministry of Fisheries, the Municipal
Corporation, the Police Department, and the mechanized boat-·
owner association. I return to the activities of the Fishing Harbour
Section in Section 4.
1977, disbanded all locally elected bodies, including CO'JP{:~ratives,
and failed to hold new elections. Consequently, the apex
regularly has been left stranded.
The bureaucracy has adapted to this state of affairs. Even when
primary societies formally did not exist, it continued to channel
many funds via FISHCOFED. The apex organization appointed
special officers to each district development office to process the
applications of individual fishermen. The inspectors and sub·
inspectors responsible for the various coastal zones assisted the
special officers in their tasks. Interestingly, the Fisheries LJE~pclrtl:nE'nt
officers often maintained contacts with the fishing population
former office-holders of primary societies (also see chapter ).
The Fisheries Department Programme: A Long-terrn View
A budgetary review is the starting point for a discussion of pro-
grammatic developments. The figures in Table 9.3 reveal that the
Fisheries Department's budget has increased dramatically from one
plan period to the next.

Cooperative Societies Table 9.3 Fisheries 1951-955

Plan Period Budget Outlay
The first fishermen cooperative societies in southern India date back (av'ertlllelur x Rs 100,(00)
to the colonial period. Following independence, the Fisheries De- First Plan 1951-56 6.3
partment of Tamil Nadu promoted the development of a co- Second Plan 1956-61 15.1
operative movement by organizing most of its loan and welfare Third Plan 1961-·66 51.5
programmes along these lines. An elaborate cooperative infrastruc- Annual Plans 1966-{'9 1325
Fourth Plan 1969-74 215.7
ture specific to the fisheries sector resulted. At the apex stands a 383.5
Fifth Plan 1974-·78
government-run organization called FISt-ICOFED, which is headed Annual Plans 1978..80 306.6
by the Commissioner of Fisheries. FISHCOFED normally services Sixth Plan 1980-85' 723.0
483 primary societies at the fishing hamlet level, or an average of Seventh Plan 1985-90' 982.7
Annual Plans 1990-92 1,309.9
slightly more than one per village (Department of Fisheries
Plan 1992-97' + 2,079.7
1994a:15). In addition, there are eighty-eight fisherwomen's coop-
Source: Department of Fisheries 1988 and 1994a.
erative societies in the state (ibid.).
, Also includes non-plan outlays.
The real condition of the cooperative movement in Tamil Nadu, + Calculated over the period 1992 to 1995 only.
however, is less healthy than these figures suggest. In the past 20
years, primary societies have been in operation only between 1989 \ The figures until 1980 do not include the so--called non-plan outlays. 'T'he propor--
and 1991, and again after 1996. They were also formally defunct in tion of non-plan to plan outlays appears to have increased significantly in Tamil
1995, during my research period. Each time it came into power, Nadu over the course of years (ef. Madras Institute of Development Studies 1988:
the AIADMK party, which has dominated state politics ever since 322..·23), and earlier figures most likely also need some adjustml'nL
284 Marine Resource Management
The upward trend in expenditure, which continued throughout
the post-mdependence period, is unmistakable and cannot be ex-
plained simply by inflation (d. Madras Institute of Development
Studies 1988:164; Nambiar 1985:14). It coincides with the unfold··
ing of the fisheries modernization programme from the 1950s and
with the ongoing incursion of the state government into the affairs
of coastal communities. Parallel to the expansion of its programme,
the department itself grew rapidly in size and in scope.
from Development to vvelfare
A characterization of the Fisheries Department's programrne, as it
developed over the years, is sufficiently complex to warrant a separ-
ate study. I describe only one trend in the department's marine
fishing programme - the shift from a development to a welfare
perspective. Officers connect the welfare perspective to two related
developments: a programmatic change from income generation to
relief and a subtle shift of focus from the fishing profession to the
fishing population. Both aspects are subsumed under the term
'welfare'.
From the outset, welfare activities were not new to the depart-
ment. On the contrary, the department has a tradition of social con-
cern which dates back to its very inception (d. Directorate of
Fisheries 1986b). During the first half of the twentieth century, it
founded schools, supported a temperance movement, and helped
to establish credit societies in the coastal zone. The dissatisfaction
many current officers express relates not to the existence of welfare
goals but to their growing centrality.
As I pointed out in chapter 2, substantial government funds were
set aside since the 1950s for the inauguration of a blue revolution
in Tamil Nadu. This was a period of large infrastructural works
and of si~eable loan and training programmes aimed at promoting
new flshmg technology. The development drive af that period
seems to have dominated the thinking of the department's person·
nel as well. Blake (1970:141), the only outsider in the early 1960s to
study the Fisheries Department in some depth, is quite outspoken:
'Today, the Fisheries Department is seen by its personnel to be a
technical departrnent interested in research and development, and
any interests in fishermen as people are purely secondary.' MOH'
The Fisheries Department and Official R.egulation Policy 28S
over, 'welfare has always been a weak area within the Department,
for there has never been the funding necessary to do more than
just visit the fishermen and take general inventory of their ailments
and complaints' (Blake 1970:142).
. By the 1970s, however, the balance had changed substantially.
On the one hand, government funds for the development of marine
fisheries were slowly being exhausted. The mechanized boat fish·
ing sector, which. received most of the funds, was becoming more
independent. In addition, the extremely high default rate on loans
to individual fishermen made government agencies reluctant to
channel more funds in this direction. At the same time, eX1Del1d·
iture for welfare programmes in the fields of housing, immr'ance,
and relief increased dramatically (d. Nambiar 1985:5).
Reflecting on these changes, one officer in 1995 commented
wryly that 'this is no longer the Department of Fisheries, but the
Department for Fishermen'. He was referring not only to the con·
tent of the department's regular programmes but also to a nc,~I';"'"
lar conception of his duties. Fisheries Department officers are often
expected - both by their superiors and by fishermen - to address
almost any kind of problem relating to the fishing population.
Assistant Director Ramesh: An extreme example of our social ser·
vice role occurred last year. The Sri Lankan navy had returned
the ashes of a fisherman from Tamil Nadu who had been killed
at sea, and I was asked to convey them to the family of the de-
ceased and to offer the department's condolences. It took me
days, as the family lives far away from Madras.
This incident suggests that even social concerns with little connec-
tion to fishing practice have found a place in departmental prac-
tice. Activities such as these, which focus more on the needs of the
fishing population than on the profession itself, induce officers t~
compare their department to the Tamil Nadu Department of
Harijan Affairs. The latter is uniquely defined by the population it
serves rather than by a sector of economic activity.
The current welfare orientation of the department frustrates at
least some of its staff. They complain about the large gap between
their job description and their professional training.
286 Marine Resource Management
STF Sivakumar: I have been technically trained for all kinds of
work related to the fishing profession. But what am I doing now?
Only social work.
Current Programmes
Only a small percentage of the activities organized by the Fisheries
Department in 1995for the marine fishing population were actually
aimed at improving their income-generating potential. The remain-
der can be categorized as welfare. The most time-consuming and
costly programme implemented in this period was the so··called
saving·-cum-relief scheme. It was intended to help fishermen fam-
ilies bridge the income gap during the monsoon season. Every fish-
erman participating in the scheme deposited Rs 45 a month over a
period of eight months, from January to August. The central and
state governments each matched the cumulative savings with an
equal amount and doled out the funds throughout the ensuing
monsoon months. Starting with only 1,847 beneficiaries in 1983,
the number of participants grew rapidly to 1,12,979 by 1993 (De-
partment of Fisheries 1994a:8).6 The district level Fisheries Devel-
opment Offices are in charge of processing applications, monitoring
payments, and disbursing the relief amounts.
In addition, an accident insurance scheme provides compensa-
tion to families of fishermen who suffer permanent injury or death
at sea. 7 The victims of natural calamities such as storms, floods,
tidal waves, and fire sometimes receive compensation from the
department. Subsidized housing programmes were established to
improve living conditions by replacing thatched huts with small
concrete houses. 8 Finally, starting in 1996, the Fisheries Department
participated in a state-wide government scheme to distribute cloth-
ing to people in underprivileged groups during the January Pongal
festival. On this occasion, the Fisheries Development Office of
h In April 1996, the central government suddenly rescinded its support to the
saving··cum-relief scheme which was becoming increasingly expensive. Its future
thereby became highly uncertain.
7 Since its inception, 1,215 fishermen families apparently have benefited from the
accident insurance scheme (Fisheries Department 1994b:16).
H The housing programme for fishermen commenced in 1975. By 1994, 20,319
houses had been completed and 8,985 were under construction (Fisheries Depart·
ment ]994b:15-16).
The Fisheries Department and Ofjicial Regulation Policy 287
Madras alone distributed 26,000 men's garments and 27,000
women's garments to fishermen's families in the city.
A fisherwomen extension scheme began in 1981 (cf. Nambiar
1985:24-25). The main activity under this scheme in 1995 was the
subsidized distribution of 10,000 aluminium fish receptacles to
market women throughout the state. Fisherwomen normally use
woven fish baskets. Apparently the aim of this project was to im·
prove not income but hygiene and ease of handling.
Of the few programmes geared to the productive side of the
fishing economy, one in particular has been highly influential in
recent years. That one provides loans and subsidies to artisanal
fishermen so they can procure outboard engines. Although
scheme of this kind was already instated in 1982, it achieved gn~ab:'r
radius and popularity after 1987, when the central goVeJ:nIlneII.t
committed its support. A total of 3,737 outboard engines had been
distributed throughout the state by 1994. 9 In addition, the govern..
ment provided a very limited number of subsidies for the construc-
tion of new boats as well as for fuel expenses to mechanized boat
owners in 1995. 10
These programmes have one important characteristic in com··
mon: they are highly labour-intensive. Due to this fact, and the
sheer size of the fishing population in each district (see Table 9.2.),
Fisheries Department officers spend a large proportion of their time
processing applications for one programme or another. One officer
made the following comment:
The department is now mainly carrying out welfare schemes.
This involves a lot of work for individual recipients, and we, the
Sub--Inspectors and Inspectors of Fisheries, have to do every-
thing without assistance. I am often doing things which should
actually be done by a clerk or even a peon. We have no assist-
ance at all. Even paper is sometimes hard to get!
'J This figure is based on a personal communication from V. Ramamoorthy. There
were three schemes for outboard engines: a state-sponsored scheme (1981 to 1988);
a scheme operated by MPEDA (] 985-91); and a scheme funded by the central
government (198'7 to present). The last has been the most extensive.
II! The Fisheries Department provided the owners of only seventy, mechanized
boats in Madras with subsidies on diesel during 1995. Less than ten boat owners
received a subsidy on the construction of a new boat.
288 Marine Resource Management
The image of responsibility for the welfare of the fishing popula··
ticm may also impede the department in other tasks.
Assistant Director Chandrakumar: I recently admonished a fisher-
man for not having applied for a licence for his boat. lIe got
angry with me and shouted that the Fisheries Department is
responsible for fishermen's welfare, not for the imposition of all
kinds of rules ....
This officer is suggesting that welfare activities are difficult to com-
bine with the department's rule enforcement tasks.
9.2 BUlreaucr~ICY and Politics
In the previous section, I described the Fisheries Department as a
self-contained administrative unit. Here I broaden the discussion
to include its relationship with the realm of politics. Bardhan
(1984:72-73) confirms the importance of the political context,
arguing that the chronic failure of policy implementation in India
results from the government's inability to insulate economic man-
agement from political processes. Political processes affect the Fish-
eries Department of Tamil Nadu in two basic ways: they steer the
general course of its programmes, and they interfere in the daily
exercise of bureaucratic tasks. By encouraging forms of corrup-
tion, they may also redirect departmental priorities. I touch on these
possibilities below.
Machine Politics and the Fishermen VOte Bank
Various authors (Scott 1972; Wade 1988) have pointed out the role
that material inducements play in the democratic election process
in India. In short, politicians use goods and services to buy and to
retain the loyalties of individual voters and of so-called vote banks.
These inducements come largely from government administration
Ruling parties maintain their electorate with a strategic applica-
tion of government programmes, while opposing parties aim to
sway votes by promising future benefit.
This system, termed machine politics, exists in Tamil Nadu too
(de Wit 1996:283). Some authors connect the welfare orientation of
The Fisheries Department and Official Regulation Policy 289
many government programmes in this state not only in the field
of fisheries but also in other areas - to the system of politics which
demands a ready stock of inducements. The Madras Institute of
Development Studies (1988:357) thus concludes that' there has been
substantial substitution between and welfare meas··
ures over the three decades [1951··1985]: The study argues that
the state government gradually displayed less interest in strucl.ural
reforms and in infrastructural investments. The government reo
placed such efforts with a broad range of more 'visible' welfare
measures. This concurs with Scott's definition of machine POlitJlCS
that emphasizes short-run particularistic gains at the expense of
long-term transformations (Scott 1972:140··44).
In the midst of a variegated state population, marine fishermen
form only one potential vote bank. Moreover, they do not form as
tight a caste group as some others in Tamil Nadu. Nevertheless,
they are numerous and distinct enough to be wooed. lI
The Fisheries Department plays a crucial role in the soliciting pro··
cess. This has probably never been so clear as in the period be-
tween 1991 and 1996, when the Minister of Fisheries was a metnber
of the fishing population.
The Minister ofFisheries
Minister D. Jeyakumar, a physically immaculate and amiable man
in his forties who belonged to the AIADMK party, was elected as
Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) from the Royapuram
constituency in 1991. This constituency, which is known to be car-
ried by the fishermen vote, traditionally has supported the rival
DMK party. When Prime Minister Rajiv Gar{dhi was assassinated
in Tamil Nadu just before the elections, however, the DMK suf··
fered the most ignominious defeat in its lifetime and also lost
Royapuram constituency. A few weeks later, Jeyakumar was ap-
pointed the Minister of Fisheries.
Jeyakumar, who was known as a party stalwart close to its
supremo Jayalalitha, had a significant role to play in nurturing the
" According to the 1986Census, the marine fishing p()pulation of Tamil Nadu
numbered 4,63,800. This was eq ual to almost 1 per cent of the total population of
the state (Directorate of Fisheries 1986a).
290 Marine Resource Management
statewide fisherman vote for the party.!2 lIe demonstrated a par·"
ticular interest in consolidating his political support base in
Royapuram, however, and appeared in the area at every possible
occasion. He made a point of attending as many religious festivals
and marriage celebrations as possible and hastened to express his
condolences to the victims of slum fires. Significantly, he also per-
sonally inaugurated almost everyone of the Fisheries Department's
projects and programmes in the area, from the most trivial to the
grandest. The local MLA frequently assumed this role in Chingleput
District.
The Madras Fisheries Development Office, the fa~ade of which
was one loud advertisement for the AIADMK party (see Plate 6),
became one of the most important vehicles for Jeyakumar's polit··
ical campaign in Royapuram. This manifested itself in various ways
during the fieldwork period. The minister maintained a telephone
hot line with the assistant director in charge of this office, whom
he had helped to appoint. He also visited the place regularly to
discuss local fisheries matters, which he subsequently left in the
care of the officers. A joint effort of the Fisheries Development
Office and the minister, for example, defused the crisis between
boat-owner associations in Royapuram in 1995. Aware of the Fish-
eries Development Office's connections, representatives of fisher-
men's organizations regularly gathered in the assistant director's
office to discuss one problem or another. Sometimes the office also
organized political festivities, such as the statewide competitions
in typical fishermen skills held along Marina Beach in February
1995.
This made the assistant director's room in the Madras office a
hotbed of activity. More than others of his rank and position, the
assistant director was caught between his superiors in the depart-
ment, the ministry, the fishermen population, and other political
currents. Not surprisingly, he regularly complained about extreme
work pressure.
12 Jeyakumar's loyalty to the AIADMK party is demonstrated by the fact that,
after the disastrous 1996 elections for the State Assembly and the subsequent split
in the party, he was one of the few ex-ministers to remain loyal to Jayalalitha. The
party subsequently nominated him candidate for the important position of mayor
of Madras.
77Je Fisheries Department and Officiui Rl£l1ulation Policy 291
Political Interference
It is not only in the main fields of policy that politicians influence
government departments. Department officers must cope with the
interference of politicians in much of their work. The Minister of
Fisheries was by far the most conspicuous political factor in the
department in 1995. Nonetheless, officers must accommodate
broader range of intruders, including MLAs elected from specific
constituencies, a variety of functionaries from the ruling party, and,
particularly in election periods, the members of the opposition as
well. Uncooperative officers see the possibility of punitive action,
such as a transfer to an unattractive post (de Zwart 1994:71). In··
deed, Wade (1982:319) points that 'transfer is the politician's basic
weapon of control over the bureaucracy.'
I have already indicated that the Madras Fisheries Development
Office played an important role in Minister Jeyakumar's re.election
campaign. However, many smaller political pressures affect Fish-
eries Department officers as well. The following example from the
1996 pre-election period indicates how officers can be caught in
the political crossfire. .
One morning the minister visited a Fisheries Development Of-·
fice to discuss the upcoming registration of participants in the
savings-cum-relief scheme. According to the rules, only active
fishermen over 18 years of age are eligible. During this visit,
however, the minister, who was proballly eager to broaden his
political base, made it clear that nordisllermen and persons
under 18 should not be excluded.
When it became public knowledge a few later that non·
fishermen were also reaping benefits, a local leader of an op-
posing party stormed into the assistant director's office and
shouted that he would take the matter to court if it continued.
To complicate matters further, a local·level functionary of the
ruling party phoned the officer the same day to say that he had
heard that there had been some problem and wondered whether
he could provide any assistance ....
Such crosswinds in departmental affairs affect almost all sections
of the Fisheries Department. They create specific patterns of
bureaucratic coping, such as a preoccupation with being covered
by the rules and by one's superiors.
292 Marine Resource Management
Has political interference increased over time? Senior officers
say it has. They suggest that in the 1960s ministers tended to lean
on their departments and respected their expertise. Now, however,
a minister often overrules a suggestion from the department and
makes decisions him·· or herself without prior consultation.
According to senior officers, the balance has shifted to the political
side, as more and more of the department's activities become sub-·
ject to interference.
Corruption
According to the system of machine politics, politicians seek to
garnish votes by keeping a tight grip on the bureaucrats who are
responsible for drafting and implementing government pro-
grammes. They have another good reason to retain control. In his
study of canal irrigation in another south Indian state, Wade
(1982:319) points out that 'the rupee price of successful politics is
very high' and that politicians 'have been able to make use of the
bureaucracy to help meet the costs of electoral competition.' 'Ihis
leads to a phenomenon ordinarily referred to as corruption. Ac-
cording to Wade, politicians often demand cuts of whatever a bu-
reaucrat in a certain position is able to make on the side. In Wade's
setting, this was effectuated by auctioning transfers to lucrative
positions. The bureaucrats concerned use every opportunity to re-
coup the amount of their investments and more, and this has seri-
ous consequences. Wade argues that 'if in some context the view
that "corruption oils the wheel" has some validity, canal irrigation
does not seem to be one of them. The engineers' and politicians'
pursuit of illicit income ... actually subverts the pursuit of public
purposes' (ibid.:314).
The well-established corruption in the Fisheries Department of
Tamil Nadu has come to resemble the systemic corruption de-
scribed by Wade (ibid.:291). Older officers argue that it has in·
creased dramatically since the late 1960s. Perhaps not quite
chance, that is also when political interference in administration is
said to have commenced. Thus, the corruption which came to my
notice frequently, although not always, had ramifications in the
realm of politics.
The most manifest form of corruption in the Fisheries Depart·
ment in 1995 appeared in the form of systematic 'cuts' on pro·
The Fisheries Department and Official Regulation Policy 293
grammes involving the distribution of benefits for fishermen. The
savings-cum-relief scheme I described earlier was one of the
moneymakers. In Chingleput District, for example, officers
ducted Rs 30 (or 2.8 per cent) from each fisherman's monsoon
lotment. If replicated along the entire coastline, this system would
generate more than three and a half million rupees in illicit income
per annum based on the 1993 estimate of 1,12,979 participants in
Tamil Nadu. 13 Other programmes, such as the ones for houSlllg
and productive loans, were similarly fleeced. Importantly, this in-
come did not flow into a few pockets but instead spread from the
top down.
Corruption is important, as it forms a hidden and
focuses departmental attention on activities with rnlDneymctKlng
potential. I return to this point in Section 4.
9.3 The Tamil N adu Marine Fishirlg .H~egula.t1(Jln Act
History
The British colonial government set up a legal framework to man··
age the regulation of fishing in inland and marine waters in,1897.
TIle Indian Fisheries Act, as it was called, prohibited the usage of
both explosives and poisons in fisheries and laid a foundation for
further legislation. The Local Legislature for the Madras Pn~si(ierlcy
amended it slightly in 1929 (Act No.2).
Most of the rules framed under the provisions of these Acts in
the Madras Presidency, and later in Tamil Nadu, pertain to inland
waters. Fishing rights in these waters frequently leased to
private parties and necessarily had to be defined. The profitable
chank and pearl fisheries of the Gulf of MannaI' were also 'Yell
regulated. Only once in the course of this century, however, did
the government issue a notification to regulate marine fisheries.
This notification concerned fixed-lure fishing in the shallow straits
of the Palk Bay that lie south of the Coromandel Coast. 14 No
regulations for other types of marine fishing existed. Most fishing
13 According to hearsay, the cut in Madras District was double that in Chingleput
District
14 Notification No. 164, March 31,1916, was slightly amended by Notification No.
Nil on April 15, 1946.
 294 Marine Resource Mana~qement
practices along the Coromandel Coast therefore rernained unregu-
lated by government during most of the twentieth century.
The Indian Fisheries Act and its 1929 amendment got a sequel
only in 1983, with the adoption of the Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing
I\egulation Act. This law created a new legal framework for marine
fishing and. specifically addressed the conflicts between artisanal
and boat fishermen along the coast. As such, it formed the tail end
of a larger regulatory effort. All of these attempts focused on separ-
ating the warring parties in fishing zones, in time periods, or in a
combination of the two dimensions.
I noted in chapter 3 that the conflicts between the two groups of
fishermen commenced in earnest during the second half of the
1960s. The first government regulation efforts also date back to
this period. In addition to establishing peace committees, the Fish··
eries Department added a new clause to the agreement with re-
cipients of mechanized boats. The new wording restricted boats
from operating within three nautical miles of shore. This first regu··
latory venture shared the implemental difficulties of its successors.
Moreover, it had a fundamental defect, namely, that it did not cover
the entire mechanized boat sector. 15
The following decade witnessed a flurry of regulatory activity
with a limited geographical focus in the southern districts of Tamil
Nadu. In 1972, the first government order on this issue ordained
that mechanized boat fishermen in Tiruchendur Taluk in southern
Tamil Nadu could fish only one day a week. This left the other
days to artisanal fishermen. Pending further judgement, it was
immediately struck by a court stay of execution. 16 In 1976 and early
197'7, civil authorities in charge of Aranthangi and Pattukottai
Taluks, which are both also in the south of Tamil Nadu, issued
15 Observers agree that this condition first emerged in the hire-purchase agree-
ment with boat recipients around 1968 or 1969. It was subsequently included in
the 'Rules governing the allotment of mechanised fishing boats by the Fisheries
Department under the hire purchase scheme' in 1972. Problems arose hecause not
all of the boats fishing in state waters were issued by the Talnil Nadu Fisheries
Department. Moreover, if a boat issued by the department was sold to a thm.l
party, it was doubtful whether the department could hold the new owners to the
terms of the original agreement.
16 The case involved Government Order 2213 of the Department of Agriculture in
19'72. The final court hearing has not yet been held, and the latest news
that the papers have been lost·- so much for )udicialefficiency.
The Fisheries Department and Official Regulation Policy 295
orders that separated the two groups of fishermen in their regions
by means of time zones. Although they too were challenged in court,
the High Court in Madras ultimately upheld these rulings.
Surprisingly, the authorities made no attempts in this time
period to regulate mechanized boat fishing along the Coromandel
Coast. After riots emerged in Madras in the last months of
however, the Minister of Fisheries convinced mechanized boat
owners in the region to informally agree to some measures.
were willing to observe a three-mile fishing zone as well as a pro-
hibition on night-time fishing. A string of' country buoys' .-- EllIT1DJe
markers which could be, and were, readily washed away or
removed - was installed off the coast of the city.
The Minister of Fisheries announced the first statewide
tion measure on 14 September 1979. Government Order 991 de-
lineated an exclusive three-mile fishing zone for artisanal fishermen
and prohibited mechanized boat fishing in any location between 6
p.m. and 6 a.m. In addition, it strove to further the registration of
mechanized boats, to prevent an over--concentration of boat fishing
in anyone place, and to regulate gear typesY Individual boat owners
and boat-owner groups mainly from the southern districts of Tamil
Nadu challenged the order in court and it was stayed. Legal cog·
wheels moved slowly, and appeals WE~re lodged against every in·
terim order. By the time the final court order was passed, on 12
September 1983, it was toolate for it ever to be implemented.
then, the Legislative Assembly had approved the Tamil Nadu Mar-
ine Fishing Regulation Act, which supplanted all earlier rulings.
Content
The Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing Regulation Act18 (Act No.8 of
1983) provides for 'the regulation, restriction and prohibition of
17 The wording of GO 991 (Department of Forests and Fisheries) is remarkably
slipshod and open to interpretation. A number of its orders, such as the prohibi·
tion of trawl nets, have never been seriously pursued. Knowledgeable observers
argue that the foremost purpose of the order was political. The Minister of Fisher-
ies at the time came from a fishing community in southern Tamil Nadu. He was
under significant pressure from local artisanal fishermen to take radical measures
18 The Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing Regulation Act is identical to the Tamil Nadu
Marine Fishing Regulation Ordinance which preceded it by a few months As the
latter was never implemented, I leave any further discussion of it aside.
 296 Marine Resource Management
fishing by fishing vessels in the sea along the whole or part of the
coast line of the State'. The two principal clauses of the Act create
zones for mechanized boat fishing, The first (Section 53) directs
that 'no owner or master of a mechanised fishing vessel shall use
or cause or allow to be used such fishing vessel for fishing oper-
ation in the sea within three nautical miles from the coast line of
the State,' The second, which is appended to the main body of the
Act in a so-called Schedule, determines that 'the mechanised fish-
ing vessel, , , shall leave the notified place of berth only after 5
a,m, and, , , re'port back at the notified place of berth concerned
not later than 9 p,m,',
The Act aimed to protect artisanal fishing practice by limiting
the operations 0'£ mechanized boats to a specific geographical area
as well as to daily fishing times. Artisanal fishermen depend mostly
on the waters directly adjacent to the coast and suffer the greatest
harm from night trawling, Therefore, the Act excluded mechanized
boats from these geographical areas and time zones, It does not,
however, contain any restrictions on artisanal fishing practice,19
Other sections of the Act laid the groundwork for the enactment
of its principal clauses as well as for future elaborations, Sections
1,2, and 3 describe the Act's geographical range (the whole of Tamil
Nadu) and its time frame (the date of commencement) and provide
definitions of key terms, Sections 7 to 14 order the registration and
licensing of all fishing vessels in the state, whereas Sections 4 and
15 to 22 describe the powers of Fisheries Department officers, as
well as the procedures and the penalties involved, The Act expli-
citly allows for further regulation by government notification (Sec-
tion 5a-·d), The Ministry of Fisheries has not yet taken advantage
of this option, however, although the department has submitted a
number of proposals.
19 The Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing Regulation Rules (GO 993 of the Department
of Forests and Fisheries, 1'7 August 1983), which constitutes the Act's executive
interpretation, extends the scope of the Act by posing restrictions on the artisanal
fishing sector as well. It primarily determines that artisanal fishermen should re-
main within a zone of three nautical miles (Section 6.6) and should only use nets
with certain mesh sizes (Section 6.3), On the basis of the Rules, a group of boat
owners from southern Tamil Nadu prevented artisanal fishermen from operating
beyond three nautical miles on one occasion. The latter challenged this action in
court but lost the case (High Court Order, 19 August 1988).
'l71e Fisheries Department ttnd R~lJulation Policy 29'1
The Legal Tussle
Boat-owner groups immediately took the Tamil Nadu Marine Fish·
ing Regulation Act to court and focused on its principal clauses.
Once again, the pleading parties largely come from the southern
districts of Tamil Nadu. Sometimes they were joined by boat··owner
groups from Madras, The battle was prolonged, In the Su..
preme Court of India confirmed the right of the state government
to draft legislation to regulate marine fishing in territorial waters,20
Other petitions submitted to the Iligh Court of Madras challenged
the clauses boat owners hated most, notably the time schedule for
mechanized boat fishing, The last of these suits was dismissed only
in ]992.
The ongoing legal conflict contributed to a postponement of the
Act's implementation. Although the Madras H.igh Court issued a
legal stay only on the time schedule, other elements of the Act
remained dormant for many years. Thus, it was only in ]989 that
the Fisheries Department issued a notification indicating which
officers exercised the powers conferred by the Act ~ this is truly
precondition for enforcement 2l
Six years later, the department's performance record remained
highly uneven. The only element in the Act which the department
pursued with some consistency during my research period was
the registr<ation of mechanized boats. Time zoning regulations
were introduced only in the southern towns of Nagapattinam,
Rameswaram, and Tuticorin. A closer look revealed that the im~
plementation of the rule in these locations stemmed less from a
desire to regulate fisheries than from the political exigencies pre~
sen ted by the ongoing conflict in neighbouring Sri Lanka, In
Madras,time-zoning in fact has never been seriously attempted,
although officers did toy with the idea at different points in time,
The other key regulation promoted by the Act, the three-mile rule,
is very poorly enforced throughout the state, even though it com·
prises part of the official regulation discourse.
20 See Crooz Edwin Fernando v. Slate ofTamii Nadu (Final ()rder, 1984, precise date
unknown) and Amritharaj v, Siale of Tamil Nadu (Final Order, 4 October] 983).
21 Compare Government Order 2.59, Department of Animal !-lusbandry and Fish-
eries, 2'7 December 1988, and Notification by the Animal Ilusbandry and Fisheries
Department, 8 March 1989.
298 Marine Resource Manaf!ement
9.4 Implementation of the Three-mile Rule
According to informed sources, the Fisheries Department has
apprehended and punished only a handful of boat fishermen in
Madras and its surroundings for violations of the three-mile rule
after a basic enforcement structure was in place. The reasons for
this state of affairs must be examined on various planes. That
review should begin with an investigation of the purpose of the
Act.
Political Calculations
The Madras Institute of Development Studies report on the Tamil
Nadu economy addresses the important question of why radical
social legislation in Tamil Nadu often contains loopholes which
facilitate large-scale violation_ The writers arrive at the sobering
conclusion 'that some development policies are designed to be
dodged' (Madras Institute of Development Studies 1988:353·-55,
my emphasis). They are token measures, drafted to pacify the nu-
merous poor while still protecting the interests of those with so-
cial and economic power (d. Baxi 1982:12).
Does the Tamil Nadu Marine Fisheries Regulation Act of 1983
fit into this category? Was it part of a deliberate plan to quell the
mounting fury of artisanal fishermen? Was it a ploy to coax them
into believing that their demands with regard to the mechanized
boat sector were being met, even though rule violations actually
were ingrained in legislation? Unlike the social legislation discussed
in the Madras Institute of Development Studies report, the Tamil
Nadu Marine Fisheries Regulation Act does not undermine its
purpose by including numerous exceptions to the rules. On the
other hand, however, it is unnecessary to build in loopholes if the
Act in its entirety is unenforceable. I return to the issue of enforce-
ability later on.
It is difficult to either prove or disprove the legislators' inten-
tions. Undeniably, however, both the adoption of the Act in 1983
and its poor implementation in the 1990s relate to political equa
tions. The kattumaram fishermen organization of the 1970s, which
was linked to the nationwide movement of artisanal fishermen,
was a potent political force in the state at the time. It is doubtful
The F¥sheries Department and Official Regulation Policy 299
whether the Act would have materialized without it. 22 IIowever,
when this organization dissolved in the early 1980s, artisanal
protest lost its momentum and the political balance was UIJ'J'_'~"
Currently, the boat fishermen population clearly has more polit·
ical influence.
Several contemporary observers point out a connection between
the non-implementation of the Act and electoral equations.
Interview 1
Assistant Director Pandian: There is no strict enforcement of rules
here because the government favours the mechanized boat fish·
ermen. Why this is so? Boat fishermen are concentrated in cer
tain neighbourhoods, and winning their favour is helpful in
getting elected. Kattumararrdishermen, on the other hand, are
spread out along the coast and don't have political clout.
Interview 2
Kattumaram fishermen leader Samikannu: If the ruling party would
go against the wishes of the mechanized boat owners, they would
lose all their votes in Royapuram next time .... But traditional
fishermen are scattered, whereas mechanized boat fishermen
are concentrated in one place ....
These respondents emphasize the effects of the district election
system in Tamil Nadu. That system shifts attention away from the
dispersed population of artisanal fishermen to the large boat fish··
ennen neighbourhood in Royapuram. 'I' he latter has many voters.
Moreover, in the period of 1991 to 1996, Minister of Fisheries
had a political interest in mollifying, and certainly not in antagon-
izing, the boat fishing sector. That sector plays a crucial economic
role in his constituency.
The boat-owner population has a number of other advantages
as well. They are relatively well organized, and their association
22 This holds true on the national level as well. One of the foremost demands of
the National Fishworkers Forum, which has joined artisanal fishermen's organ--
izations from an parts of tndia in a struggle since 1978, was for suitable marine
legislation (d. Dietrich and Nayak1989:129·33). This formed an important im-
petus for the central government to draft a model bill, which was subsequently
remitted to the governments of the coastal states for alteration and ratification.
 The Fisheries Department and Official Regulation Policy 301
300 Marine ResoureeManagernent

them, due to competition from the more efficient fishing ve:sSE~ls,

strives to maximize their political influence (see chapter 8). More-
their costly nets are also frequently by the trawljlTH~
over, their 'money power' allows them to exert substantial covert
operations.
leverage (cf. Madras Institute of Development Studies 1988:354-·
55). The economic harm which effective implementation of the
This passage suggests that resource conservation was not a in
three-mile rule would cause to the boat fishing sector should not
i~s.elf.Rather,it was included in the Act as a function of the compe"
be underestimated (see chapter 7). History demonstrates that any
tItlon between the two parties.
attempt to structurally enforce the terms of the Act generates a
An interesting question in this regard concerns the reasons that
whirlwind of protest, not only from Royapuram but from the boat-
environmental concerns have hardly surfaced in the public debate
owning population throughout the state.
on fisheries policy in Tamil Nadu. Informally, many Fisheries
. The lack of political priority for enforcement may explain why,
Department officers confide their convictions that the inshore fish
m the words of a long-time officer of the Fisheries Department,
resource has declined seriously in recent decades. Off the H:I.. U'.U.
'th~~ government has been reluctant to post staff to the implemen-
they suggest that this is a matter of great concern. Nonetheless, the
tatlOn of the Act, up to today'. It also highlights why the political
matter has not been put on the official ajJ;en,da.
establishment is not overly zealous about regulation activity. One
reason for the poor implementation of the three-mile rule thus may
Assistant Director Seelan: Personally I can tell you that there
be found in political diffidence.
no fish in the Madras region. But if I put it in black and white,
Approaching the matter from another angle reveals another
will be transferred to Kanyakumari [an unappealing that is
explanation which frames non-implementation as a fulfilment of
far from Madras].
purpose. After all, by dissipating the conflict between artisanal and
Question: Why?
boat fishermen, the Act may actually have achieved its most
Seelan: Officials don't want to read that the fish stocks are fin-
important goal. Stricter enforcement would amount to senseless
ished. They want to be able to say that there are plenty of fish
bureaucratic zealousness.
out there.
Social Objectives
'1~is officer points out an important motive for concealing
ClOns about the state of the marine resource. For more than three
In discussing the purpose of fisheries legislation, it is useful to dis-
decades, the success of the Fisheries Department's policy has been
tinguish social aims from conservationist ones and reactive from
measured in terms of increasing fish landings. That indicator cor..
proactive policy. According to the attached preamble, the Tamil
~elated to growing exports and to more foreign exchange earnings.
Nadu Marine Pishing Regulation Act was mainly intended 'to pre-
lhese trends have served to justify the expenditures made by the
vent clashes between the operators of fishing vessels and the trad··
?epartment an? reinforced belief in its continuing indispensabil..
itional fishermen'. Significantly, marine resources are mentioned
1ty. By challengmg established truths about the state of the resource,
only in connection with competition between the two groupS:23
namely that it may be over.. and not underexploited, the (lpnel'N"
ment risks creating doubts about its earlier policies. Purthermore
it will be forced to rethink its tactics, which it has not yet bee~
The main objections raised by the traditional fishermen are that,
apart from their being deprived of their legitimate prawn and
willing to do.
other fish catches from the coastal waters hitherto enjoyed by
Tl:e wording of the Act's preamble appears to be significant.
frammg 1ts purpose in terms of 'the prevention of clashes', the
23This quote is from the preamble to the Marine Fishing l'Zegulation Ordinance, authors draw attention to the conflict rather than to its causes. The
which preceded the Act by a few months and was its verbatim equivalent I motivation suggests that if clashes decrease in number and in
sume that the motivating letter was the same as well.
302 Marine Resource Management
intensity, the Act will lose its meaning and be shelved. This is in~
deed what seems to have happened. Once its pragmatic law-and~
order objectives were realized, the need to enforce the terms of the
Act tended to evaporate. 24 Phrased differently, the Act is the
expression of reactive rather than proactive policy; it tends to be
enforced only when problems emerge.
The Fisheries Department's decision not to make a policy issue
out of environmental problems appears logical. So does its deci-
sion to equate a decline of clashes with the resolution of the causes
of social friction. However, there are other factors involved as well.
To appreciate the background to these decisions, it is necessary to
consider the Fishing Harbour Section and the positions of officers
entrusted with the Act's enforcement.
The Fishing Harbour Section ofMadras
Many factors in the Fishing Harbour Section of the Fisheries
Department contribute to the precedence of paperwork over ac~
tivities such as patrols. Its peculiar hierarchy may be one of these.
The Fishing Harbour Section staff is answerable to the Fishing
Harbour Management Committee, which includes representatives
from the boat~owning population and no artisanal fishermen. This
structure does not appear to favour implementation of an Act which
aims to curb boat fishing. 26 In addition, administrative duties clearly
24 Compare the following statement from the Madras Institute of Development
Studies (1988:354-55) about the token measures which the state enacts to protect
the weaker sections of society: 'These measures are such that they do not deal
effectively with the source or the basic cause of the malady, but give the appear-
ance of quick, if selective, remedial activities'.
25 The Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing Regulation Act is not unique in its social and
not conservationist focus. Martin (1979:283--84) demonstrates a similar situation
in Newfoundland: 'The Newfoundland Fishery Regulations are distinctive as a
body of law pertaining to the regulation of a fishery because they were not enacted
primarily with a view toward husbanding the resource, i.e., conservation. Rather,
they are a political response on the part of the government to the ecologic dnd
social needs of various inshore fishing communities'. In Newfoundland fishenes.
'mediation is the norm, enforcement is the exception' (Phyne 1990:88). With the
emergence of environmental concerns, however, a tendency towards a proachve
policy rapidly became visible in Newfoundland (ibid.:98).
26 I becarhe aware of the unusual accountability structure of the Fishing Ilarbeur
Section only at the end of my research period. Thus, I was unable to its
implications.
T'he Fisheries Department and Official Regulation Policy 303
put a heavy burden on the limited staff capacity. The paperwork.
involved in registering and licensing mechanized boats is substan
tial. And this is what the officers are held answerable for. Further·
more, white-collar work enjoys a higher social status, whereas
enforcement of the Act does not the revenue of other
departmental activities. Unlike the Irrigation Department, analysed
by Wade (1982), the Fisheries Department has no real control over
its water resources. In the wide expanse of sea, the Fisheries
Department is a fledgling actor, incapable of imposing rules. It is
therefore unable to capitalize financially on the implementation or
non··implementation of the Act.
Nevertheless, enforcement of the three··mile rule is not easy, even
for a diligent and eager officer. In order to perform policing activ-
ities, the Fishing Harbour Section is equipped with a small patrol
boat. The vessel sank within the confines of the harbour during the
storm of November 1994. Although this boat was retrieved from
the sea floor, repairs took a long time and were not completed until
the summer of 1996. Therefore, the department had no autono,.
mous means of enforcing the provisions of the Act at sea for that
time period. They had to depend on the benevolence of other par-
ties such as the Inshore Fishing Station's survey section or the
mechanized boat·-owner association (see also chapter 7).
Department staff and fishermen alike emphasize that patrolling
activities are ineffective even when a patrol boat is available. Two
physical factors help explain why. First, the four coastal districts
serviced by the Fishing Harbour Section extend over 250 km of
coastline. Even if the patrol boat remained at sea 24 hours a day, it
could not conduct anything more than the Inost symbolic of pa~
trois. Second, because the three-mile zone ha~i not been marked at
sea, both boat drivers and patrollers often have difficulty judging
whether a boat is actually fishing in the forbidden zone. According
to the Madras Institute of Development Studies (1988:165-66), it is
these 'inherent difficulties' in monitoring fishing practice which
cause the policy to break down in its implementation.
The Apprehension ofPoachers
Clearly, the great majority of transgressions of the three~mile rule
are not observed and cannot be penalized. On some occasion;"
however, officers of the Fishing Harbour Section find themselves
304 Marine Resource Management
able to take action. Their reasoning indicates just how weak they
feel their position vis-a··vis boat fishermen to be, Although the Act
formally gives these officers the right to impound boats and to
penalize owners for transgressions, they do not have police au··
thority and are not entitled to make arrests, To be fully effective,
the Fisheries Department must therefore team up with the Police
Department, which has many other duties. Police support is con-
sequently limited to special occasions. 27
In accosting a boat at sea, Fisheries Department officers have to
overcome substantial handicaps. First of all, the bright red patrol
boat which the section has at its disposal is readily visible to any
other craft at sea. In addition, it is slower than most mechanized
boats. It is therefore extremely easy for trespassers to evade puni-
tive action. If a poacher is intercepted, however, other problems
arise. Not only are the officers of the Fisheries Department almost
always outnumbered, but they also lack coercive instruments such
as guns. Finally, the sea environment is infinitely stranger to them
than it is to their fishermen adversaries. Even boarding another
craft on the open seas is difficult for a person without sea legs.
Under these circumstances, Fisheries Department officers on patrol
tend to worry about their personal safety. As one officer put it:
If something happens to me at sea, my familywill receive only
Rs 60;000 compensation from the government ....
The weak position of department officers is not limited to ocean
patrols. Their action radius is curtailed on shore as well. In prin-
ciple, an officer can avoid physical confrontation at sea by noting a
poacher's registration number and then fining the owner. However,
this approach does not appear to work well in practice.
Assistant Director Ramesh: Generally the owner refuses to pay
and it is very difficult for us to recover the money.
The situation is different if the department impounds a boat and
requests the adjudicating officer to impose a penalty, although this
27The situation is different in Kerala, where the Fisheries Department has its own
police wing and is consequently able to take more effective action.
The Fisheries Department and Official Regulation Policy 305
drawn-out procedure also bears risks. As one officer explained:
I have no gun or stick. If I seize a boat and tie it to the wharf,
others may come and steal parts and the owner will sue me
personally. There is no closed off place where we can put im-
pounded boats, so this danger is always there.
In addition to the risk of being sued by a boat owner, officers also
face the possibility that an impoundment may be challenged by
the boat-owner association.
Assistant Director Ramesh: Sometimes it happens that a few boats
have been caughtand that Bhaskaran [the convenor of the boat..
owner association] comes and tells me to let them go. What can
I do but obey him? Why do I not have an alternative? Because
he will then approach his political friends who will get back at
me personally, perhaps by getting me transferred to an inhospit..
able corner of the state.
This statement demonstrates that principled action to enforce mar-
ine regulations may even negatively affect the officers' careers via
the circuitous route of politics.
A Predilection for Inertia
A baseline explanation for the lack of implementation of the Tamil
Nadu Marine Fishing Regulation Act is slowlY'p1aterializing. First,
the Fishing Harbour Section does not have the staff capacity or
equipment to enforce this piece of legislation, which has moreover
lost its political urgency. Second, the principled action of individual
officers might endanger their lives or their careers. In these cir-
cumstances, diligence is equivalent to rash behaviour. Although
they respect scrupulous action and personal courage, many offi-
cers choose to keep a low profile, particularly when the situation
or the post is prone to risk.
Assistant Director Ramesh: An officer can sometimes best follow
the policy of doing as little as possible so as to avoid antagoniz-
ing anyone. Why? If a person is unmarried, he has more freedom
306 Marine Resouree Mana8ement
The Fisheries Department and Offieial Re,gulation Policy 307

to act. But most of us have a family to take care of, and we can- mechanized boat fishing area of Royapuram and had interests
not let them suffer for our principles. If one is appointed to a there.
difficult post, the best thing therefore is to lie low until one is
Political equations are of great importance for decis:iOl'-l1nalkeJ.'s
promoted or transferred. in the Fisheries Department, who have been drawn into the sys.
tem of machine politics. Without serious backing, any attempt to
The predilection for inertia which is summarized by this state·- enforce the three-mile rule is doomed to fail. This is all the more
ment seen,s to permeate the enforcement of the Tamil Nadu Marine true because the rule is inherently difficult, if not impossible, to
Fishing Regulation Act as well as other departmental activities. It implement. ITowever, I also argued that the basic goal of the Act
encourages officers to hide under the cover of their superiors when was, quite pragmatically, to defuse the conflict between artisanal
they are in doubt. and mechanized boat fishermen. As this conflict in fact did de~CIJne
in subsequent years, structural enforcement therefore un-
9.5 Conclusions necessary. Finally, a number of circumstances provoke inertia
among officers from the Fishing Ilarbour Section, who are in
The issue addressed in this chapter is the scope and effectiveness of implementation, These circumstances include a dissonance be-
of fisheries legislation. According to the preceding discussion of tween the responsibilities as worded in the Act and their enforce.
the Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing Regulation Act, the state's rule ment capacities, a predileCtion for other land-based and
system with regard to inshore capture fisheries is clearly fragmen·· opposition from the surrounding boat fishing popUlation.
tary and incmnplete. It aims to control only one category of fisher-
men and one fishing activity, specifically those belonging to the
mechanized boat sector. This implies that the Act focuses more on
harbour sites, where mechanized boat fishermen congregate, than
on artisanal fishing centres which extend along the shoreline.
Moreover, present legislation strives to regulate only one aspect of
mechanized boat fishing, namely the interface with artisanal fish-
ing practice. In the end, this leaves many areas of fishing activity
uncharted. Nevertheless, the Act has solid footing. It is grounded
in the provisions for registration and licensing, the definitions, and
the circumscription of powers and of prerogatives. From a long-
term perspective, the state is an important actor in marine fisheries
regulation.
I sought an answer to the question about why the Fisheries
Department has implemented the terms of the Tamil Nadu Marine
Fishing Regulation Act of 1983 so poorly at different levels. First,
the political will to implement the Act--whatever part of it was
available at the time of its ratification - dissipated as the power
equations in the fisheries sector changed. The artisanal fishermen
movement went into decline, while the relative influence of mechan
ized boat fishermen -- who enjoyed electoral heft as well as 'money
power' - increased. This was certainly the case in the early 1990s.
when the then current Minister of Fisheries emerged from the

I concluded the previous chapter with two observations: that marine
legislation covers only a fraction of the regulatory issues in fishing,
and that its main clauses are poorly implemented. The Fisheries
Department's follow-up to the rules of the Tamil Nadu Marine Fish-
ing Regulation Act in fact forms part of a rich and complex prac-
tice which has evolved through interaction with the fisheries sector.
I now turn to this set of conventions, which largely leave the
responsibility for fisheries regulation with fishermen.
In this chapter, I develop the argument that the department lacks
the means to carry out an independent regulatory policy. The con-
ventions which officers have developed to deal with regulatory
issues within both the artisanal and the mechanized boat fishing
populations elaborate on particular conceptions of fishermen's
administrative structures. lbis is the first topic I address. I subse-
quently examine the manner in which officers of the Fisheries
Department react to the regulation issues which appear on their
path. I am particularly curious about the objectives of their inter-
vention. For example, by what yardstick do they measure suc··
cess? Furthermore, do they evaluate the results of interventions in
fisheries regulation disputes differently from quarrels on other
issues?
Finally, I consider what would appear to be an exception to the
convention of leaving regulation to fishermen: the intertwining of
the Fisheries Department with dominant fishermen's organizations,
particularly the boat-owner association, in Royapuram. I examine
the tensions and predicaments involved and inquire into the rea-
sons for this unusual set-up.
The Fisheries Departlnent's Regulatory Conventions 309
10.1 Attit1lH!J~S towards Hshermen Administration
The VVt:akness afthe Fisheries Department
The figures presented in Table 9.2 summarize the immensity of the
Fisheries Department's current task load. For every officer in
Chingleput District, which is the more representative of the two
districts considered in the table, there are 11.25 km of s!lc)reline,
five fishing hamlets, and 3,225 fishing people. In Tamil Nadu as a
whole, the average Fisheries Deparlment officer is responsible for
6.9 km of shoreline, three fishing villages, and 3,200 fishing
pie.! These figures, which do not include the substantial amount of
time officers spend working on welfare and in the
indicate the sheer impossibility of the department exerting effec-
tive control over fishing practice. Even if each officer was on the
road every day, the Fisheries Department would not be able to
implement a detailed regulatory schema of its own.
In addition to their land-based workload, Fisheries De:partrne:l[lt
officers must contend with the fact that fisheries regulation fre-
quently involves sea-based locations and incidents. In chapter
I noted that most officers are unfamiliar with the sea and are ap"
prehensive of the risks they face when they leave port. Mc)re,OVl2r
they lack essential facilities to make patrols. These factors form an
additional obstacle to an assertive government regulation policy.
One key reason for the scant development of the state rule sys··
tem and for the convention of leaving regulatory matters to the
fishermen themselves is the weak administrative capacity of the
Fisheries Department. Another is the way perceive the char··
acter of fishemlen.
The Singular Character ofFishermen
Fisheries Department officers, both singly and as a group, possess
a body of experience and an array of opinions regarding the fish··
ing population. All of the officers with whom I had a chance to
I This calculation presumes that half of the 290 officers in the Fisheries Department
are involved in the marine fishing sector in some way or other.
310 Marine Resource Managemertt
speak were outspoken in their views, and many of them displayed
frustration.
Interview 1
Assistant Director Sudarsen, who was upset that outstanding loans
had not been repaid: The fishermen of [...] are adamant and
rude. I have warned them several times, if you act like animals,
the Fisheries Department won't provide services any more.
Interview 2
Assistant Director Subramanian, commenting on the devastation
caused by kattumaram fishermen in a town in southern Tamil
Nadu, after a conflict with mechanized boat fishermen: I am
angry with the traditional fishermen and their panchayat. They
are illiterate and short-sighted.
Interview.3
Assistant Director Ramesh: The biggest problem [we face] is that
while Fisheries Department officers do everything to help up-
lift the fishermen, the fishermen do very little in return.
Department officers often consider fishermen to be obstinate and
uncooperative, and of quite a different breed than themselves. At
the same time, the officers are aware that fishermen are quite cap-
able of frustrating careers and even of upsetting the government
machinery as a whole. When incensed, fishermen tend to lose their
sense of reason and continue to defy authority beyond the usual
limit. As they are prone to drinking and to violence, they must be
handled with kid gloves.
Significantly, officers attribute many of the troublesome aspects
of fishermen's behaviour to their tendency to act in and as a group.
The inclination to close ranks against a perceived outside threat is
considered to be typical and distinguishes fishermen from other
so-called caste communities in Tamil Nadu. Therefore, officers
experience most difficulty in dealing with fishermen's groups. Sev-
eral officers confided that they often find individual fishermen to
be friendly and helpful. Nevertheless, when these individuals join
forces, they present a front that is closed and unresponsive.
From behind their desks, Fisheries Deparlment officers generally
feel that they are well in command when they receive fishermen
The Fisheries Department's Rl{fJulatory Conventions 311
with individual business. 2 The relationship is reversed, however,
when they visit the fishing neighbourhoods on assignment. These
areas are seen as 'relatively dangerous places', to Blake
(1970:165). Here, the fishermen are the ones with power. Blake's
lucid description of the predicament of the individual COIJP(~rative
officer visiting a fishermen's settlement holds for contemporary
department officers too (ibid.:168·-70).
The inspector walks lightly among the fishermen. He would like
to have the authority to demand payments [towards loans], but
he must use soft tones and persuasion. One of the cooperative
inspectors made this comment: 'I would like to force them (the
fishermen) to pay, but I cannot ... they would just laugh, or
maybe beat me up and chase me out of the kuppam. What can
do'? The A.D. (Assistant Director) just doesn't understand.'
'The A.D. just doesn't understand.' This complaint reveals an im-
portant aspect of the field officer's predicament. Not only is he
confronted with a potentially unwilling fishermen's group, but the
officer also is being rmshed from behind, Sandwiched between
ermen and superiors demanding that a particular assignment be
carried out, an officer's situation can be quite unenviable. This is
brought out in the following incident involving an official from
the Fishing Harbour Management Committee in Royapuram.
One morning in 1995, Sivaraj, a higher official working for the
Fishing Harbour Management Committee, visited the Panchayat
Union's field office (see chapter 8.1) along the waterfront and
requested the office-holders' cooperation. Plans for the further
development of the fishing harbour were well undf~r way, and
engineers now needed to make some measurements along the
jetty. To do so, a number of mechanized boats would have to be
moved for a day. Would the Panchayat Union and the Ad hoc
Committee please assist in having this done? For reasons which
I am not aware of, the fishermen's representatives balked. In
2 Also see Blake (1970:165): 'Reception of fishermen in department offices was
predictably tempered with official coolness, short unsmiling answers, obvious aloof-
ness, or at best, a kind of patient tolerance such as one might exhibit towards a
person displaying monumental ignorance or unrealistic requests:
312 Marine Resource Management
dismay, Sivaraj took on a submissive posture and entreated
them: 'Please think of my position too. My superiors will judge
me according to my performance.' It was to no avail he left
with empty hands.
Like this particular official, Fisheries Department officers enjoy
very limited coercive powers. They depend largely on their ability
to convince fishermen of the desirability of a pattern of action. It is
logical that they feel jealous of the prerogatives of others. One se-
nior officer reflected thus on the varying positions of officers from
several government departments in fishermen's conflicts of the
past:
Fisheries Department people generally felt that fishermen re-
spected the Police and the Revenue Departments more. Fisher-
men were afraid of officers from these departments. If a meeting
was held at one of our offices, the fishermen participants would
be shouting back and forth, but if the Police or Revenue Depart-
ments were involved, they would sit quietly. After all, the po-
lice can put a fisherman behind bars and beat him up. Fishermen
know that policemen are ruffians and that revenue officers are
powerful. Revenue people also have a way of maintaining pantaa
[an overbearing attitude]. They have learned, while coming up
in the ranks, what authority is and how to act superior. Fisheries
Department people are not trained in this. The Fisheries Depart··
ment is a technical department with many welfare schemes. And
perhaps the saying 'familiarity breeds contempt' is valid here
too.
This officer connects the department's limited powers to its welfare
image, which I discussed in chapter 9.
Department officers have limited administrative capacities.
Moreover, they are faced with what they view as a fickle and
potentially rebellious fishermen population that is eager to solve
problems in its own way.-The natural course would be to let this
transpire. However, there are two big 'ifs'. Self-regulation is pos-
sible if it does not get in the way of wider state concerns and if the
department considers it effective.
The Fisheries Department's Regulatory (;onventions 13
State Concerns and Perceptions ofFisherrnen's Administration
Two concerns have driven the Tamil Nadu government over the
past decades. The first is the unhindered growth of gross fish land··
ings and, related to this, the development of the seafood
market. The second is the desire to contain any law--and··order
lems which might arise. As I pointed out in chapter 6, environ
mental considerations have hardly found a place in official
discourse, although they have begun to generate some whispers.
Besides forming the basis for the government's activities, these
two concerns also have coloured government perceptions of the
role and value of fishermen's administrative structures. I ar:gued
in chapters 2 and 5 that the state government played a decisive
historical role in the introduction of mechanized boat fishing, and
also in quelling the resistance which arose in response to that innov-·
ation. In attempting to break the artisanal fishermen's opposition
to mechanized boats, the government used both the carrot and the
stick. In the end, at least along the Coromandel Coast, this method
was more or less successful. Resistance faltered, mechanized boat
fishing found a niche next to artisanal fishing, and fish landings
and exports increased year by year. The initial qualms that fisher·
men's administrations might stand in the way of economic progress
seemed to fade in the wake of other opinions.
Now, fishermen's administrative structures are often believed
to make a positive contribution to the maintenance of law and order.
The following statement reveals the positive valuation of fisher-
men's regulatory abilities:
Assistant Director Ramesh: Generally speaking, fishermen solve
any problems which occur themselves. The village juries are very
experienced with regard to conflicts, and generally manage to
find out what really happened quite well. It is only if they can·
not handle a problem that we are called in ....
I will return to the last sentence in this account-'it is only if they
cannot handle a problem that we are called in'- in the next sec-
tion. First, I will highlight another facet. The officer seems to believe
that fishermen manage to solve most of their problems. But he also
suggests that they do so better than any outsider could. Indeed,
who knows more about the intricacies of the fishing profession than
 314 Marine Resource Management
fishermen themselves? Few officers in the department actually dis-
pute the effectiveness of fishermen administrations in settling what
they consider to be typical fishing problems.
The Adjustment ofOfficial Law to fishing Practice
The combination of three conditions·- a lack of government regu-
latory capacities, a headstrong fishing population, and, from the
viewpoint of important state concerns, relatively effective fisher-
. men's administrations - has engendered a tendency for non-
interference. It has had another effect as well: whenever it feels
pressed to express itself on regulatory issues, the department has
usually preferred to expand upon fishermen's rulings rather than
to invent its own. This standpoint is brought out by a senior officer
who was asked why there are different conventions in different
parts of the state. As he sees it:
Rulings must come from the fishermen themselves, they must
decide on them, be interested in enforcing them. Only then can
the government come in to negotiate and formulate ....
If this is a general opinion, as I believe it is, it throws light on the
implementation of the Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing Regulation Act
of 1983. The Commissioner of Fisheries formulated the relation-
ship between the Act and fishermeh's regulations in the following
manner:
The Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing Regulation Act is a formal law,
a piece of paper; the important thing is that fishermen them-
selves arrive at some kind of settlement, even if it contradicts
the Act. Thus, fishermen in Kanyakumari can have a monsoon
ban while those in Pudukottai have a time-sharing arrangement.
And those in Madras and Chingleput have no regulation at
all ....
The convention in the department could not be formulated more
plainly: agreements between fishermen are preferred over any
outside rule, 'even if it contradicts the Act'. Why? The general feel-
ing is that they stand a greater chance of being observed.
The Fisheries Depal-tment's Regulatory Conventions 315
According to the above statements, the attitude of the Fisheries
Department with regard to fisheries regulation is highly pragmatic.
Since they are primarily interested in resolving social tensions,
officers appear to judge self-regulation more on effect than on con-
tent. I will return to this point later.
Although they respect fishermen's administrations for their
efficacy in maintaining order, officers are often disdainful about
the overall value of those administrations. The following statement
reveals that ambivalence:
The quality of fishermen panchayats is very uneven. I recall, for
example, how a village panchayat once provided two men with
letters testifying that they were the sale heir to a property. How
can two men be sole heirs? This is why we can't depend on
panchayat declarations.
This respondent suggests that what may be good for a gathering of
fishermen may not be valid in a larger arena or for other purposes.
I will argue later that this attitude deters the Fisheries Department
from making use of fishermen's administrative structures in areas
of wider societal concern, such as resource conservation. ~Iowever,
first I will consider the occasions on which the department does
involve itself in regulation matters.
10.2 The Department's Conflict Manag~ment Strategy
Non-involvement ofthe Fisheries Department
As the chapters on the artisanal and mechanized boat sectors dearly
suggest, Fisheries Department officers participate in only a small
percentage of the settlements of disputes on fisheries regulation
along the Coromandel Coast. The issues in which they are involved
have several characteristics in common. These can be determined
by identifying which disputes fishermen settle by themselves. I
recall three cases from previous chapters.
Case 1
In March 1995, kattumaram fishermen from Kalvimanagar
apprehended three kattumaram crews from a neighbouring
village who had been caught using nets prohibited by the local
316 Marine Resource Management
panchayat. The panchayat imposed a fine and demanded that
the miscreants not commit the offence again. The issue was
peacefully concluded (also see chapter 4).
Case 2
A mechanized boat from Madras cut the nets of a group of
kattumaram fishermen from Kalvimanagar early one morning
in September 1995. The kattumaram fishermen gave chase,
seized the boat and brought it to shore. The village panchayat
then summoned the owner, who was asked to compensate the
fishermen for the damages. After some negotiations, he com-
plied and the incident was closed (also see chapter 5).
Case 3
In March 1995, a large group of kattumaram fishermen from
Royapuram seized the trawl nets of twenty··three mechanized
boats fishing in an inshore area which, by the decree of fisher··
men's associations, was reserved for the artisanal sector alone.
The affair was settled by the same associations, although not to
everyone's satisfaction. Nonetheless, government authorities
were left out (also see chapter 7 ).
What do these cases have in common? First, the incidents all took
place outside the department's line of vision. This is not unusual.
Almost all disputes, even those in which the Fisheries Department
ultimately is involved, occur without its immediate knowledge.
The department generally has to be informed. These cases are distin··
guished by the fact that fishermen did not notify the department.
Second, these cases - with the partial exception of the third, to
which I return below - were of a normal kind. The fishermen par-
ties agreed on the rules, on the reality of the transgressions, and on
the modes of resolution. In addition, the judgements were not out
of the ordinary. Fishermen's administrations thus were able to re-
solve these incidents with relative ease. Finally, the three events
did not contain the elements which seem to naturally alert govern-
ment authorities: loss of life, large-scale bloodshed, and violence
or the prospect thereof.
The third incident is of a somewhat different nature than the
other two. Although it too was successfully concluded by fishermen
organizations, this case bears traces of larger tensions between
The Fisheries Department's Regulatory Conventions 317
artisanal and mechanized boat fishermen. Such tensions can
into a wider arena and therefore demand government attention.
The event was the last in a series of confrontations in which the
kattumaram fishermen had been short-changed. Their bitterness
was pronounced, and they accepted the peace proposal partly un-
der duress.
Involvement ofthe Fisheries Department
Fishermen and their leaders do not always have confidence in the
settlement capacities of their own leaders. It is therefore not un·
common for them to request that an outsider participate in a meet··
ing and apply his or her authority in order to find a solution to a
particular dispute. In some cases which came to my knowledge,
the outsider concerned was an officer of the Fisheries
He generally joined of his own volition, however, not because of
an order from superiors.
Certain disputes, however, trigger compulsory state involve-
ment. The Andhra Pradesh conflicts I described in chapter 7 are
a prominent example. The clashes between the mechanized boat
fishermen of Madras and artisanal fishermen groups of Andhra
Pradesh have resulted in bureaucratic mobilization on both sides.
Every time a boat is held for ransom in Andhra Pradesh, an officer
of the Tamil Nadu Fisheries Department joins the functionaries of
the Royapuram boat-owner association in seeking its release. The
main purpose of his participation in these missions is to intercede
with aufhorities on the other side of the state border.
However, the Fisheries Department is involved in intra··state
dispute cases as well. The rule seems to be that the state govern-
ment swings into action when it perceives risks of large-scale vio-
lence. In other words, the state steps in when it deems fishermen's
administrations incapable of solving a matter peacefully. As law
and order is primarily the responsibility of the Revenue and Police
Departments, the Fisheries Department is not always notified when
problems arise. On the other hand, officers of the department some-
times mediate in disputes without the presence of representatives
from the other agencies. Whatever department is involved, and
whether they participate singly or in concert, the immediate goal
is always the same: to defuse the crisis at hanet The gravity of the
affair determines the number of departments and the ranks of the
 318 Marine Resource Management
officers who are drawn into it. A local disorder thus may engage
only the attention of a few officers from the local police station. In
contrast, a high-ranking interdepartmental team may handle a large
and explosive conflict between fishermen's groups.
The maintenance of law and order is one of a government's
standard objectives. As I noted in section 1, however, most officers
in the Fisheries Department and the same seems to be true in the
Police Department too perceive the fishermen population to be
more prone to acts of group violence than other social categories,
and also to be more difficult" to reason with once incited. This ex-
plains the officers' preoccupation with nipping tensions within the
fishing popula tion in the bud. Officers of the Fisheries Department
have an advantage in such mediation efforts. They have an upper
hand in that they are personally acquainted with fishermen lead··
ers and also understand the organization of fishing. They team up
with law enforcement officials and wield the carrot rather than
the stick. The dispute about fishing rights addressed jointly by of.·
ficers of the Police and Fisheries Departments, which is described
below, brings out the division of labour between them.
The prohibition of the snail net or kachaavalai was one of the
most pronounced cases of fisheries regulation by artisanal admin-
istrations in the northern part of the Coromandel Coast in 1995. I
have discussed it briefly in chapter 5. In most hamlets or neigh-
bourhoods, fishermen's administrations were able to make an
independent decision on the usage of the snail net. In southern
Madras, however, the introduction of the snail net triggered a vio-
lent clash, which forced the authorities to intervene.
Case Study: The Conflict about the Snail Net in Southern Madrar1
Crowds gathered in the fishing neighbourhoods of southern
Madras on January 12, 1996 to celebrate the upcoming festival of
Pongal. The Minister of Fisheries had decided to distribute free
clothing to all fishing families in the state, and department officers
had just arrived to do so. In the midst of a throng, a fight suddenly
J Bavinck (1998a) provides a more extensive discussion of the manner in which
government authorities handled this conflict.
The Fisheries Department's Regulatory Conventions 319
erupted which soon escalated to threatening proportions. The police
station was alerted, and a short while later an assistant comnlis-
sioner (for law and order) and five policemen arrived. The atmos·
phere was charged, for many fishermen carried deadly weapons
and three persons already had suffered injuries. 4
After separating the warring parties, the police immediately
called a peace meeting with representatives of the three 1-1,,1""1"'1,0'
neighbourhoods involved Nochikuppam, Ayodyakuppam, and
Nadukuppam. From later interviews with senior officers, I learned
that the police knew about the history of animosity and violence
which existed between these neighbourhoods. They also realized
that any incident, real or imagined, might trigger a chain of group
fights. Their first task in the peace meetin,g, therefore, was to find
out the cause of this particular clash.
The fishermen told the police that the skirmish originated in a
dispute about a new gear variety, the snail net. Some months
traders had persuaded fishermen in Ayodyakuppam and in
Nadukuppam to tryout the snail net. In Ayodyakuppam, quite a
number of them had apparently started to do so, without any re··
strictions from the local panchayat. In Nadukuppam, however, the
snail net had triggered a split in the fishing population; since one
faction favoured the net and another opposed it, the panchayat
could not make a decision one way or the other. In Nochikuppam,
the panchayat had immediately prohibited the net, as fishermen
generally felt that the snail net contributed to a destruction of fish
stocks.
Differential reactions to a new fishing gear do not necessarily
cause problems between fishing neighbourhoods. The fishing
grounds of Nochikuppam, Ayodyakuppam, and Nadukuppam are
in extremely close proximity, however, and the fishermen of
Nochikuppam felt that whatever happened in adjacent waters
affected them too. They therefore insisted that the panchayats of
Ayodyakuppam and of Nadukuppam also prohibit the snail net
and told fishermen from those neighbourhoods so. A quarrel
ensued that was so serious that various panchayat leaders decided
it was necessary to hold a joint meeting. Before this could be
4 The fight was reported in The Hindu on 13 January 1996.
320 Marine Res-ouree Management
organized, however, some fishermen from Ayodyakuppam and
from Nadukuppam had used the net again. Their actions set the
scene for the fight which took place later that day.
Without mincing words, the assistant commissioner directed that
the snail net could no longer be used in these neighbourhoods. All
participants at the peace meeting apparently agreed with his decision.
Violations occurred almost immediately, however, which suggested
that the interdiction lacked local legitimacy. The assistant commis-
sioner then asked the Fisheries Department to examine the matter
in more detail and to participate in a second peace meeting.
The Fisheries Department officer who was put on the task took
his assignment seriously. He arranged hearings in each of the three
neighbourhoods. As he later informed me, he concluded from these
meetings that those in favour of a ban formed an absolute major-
ity. Moreover, the fishermen expressed very strong convictions on
the subject. They had explained the drawbacks of the snail net.
First, it is baited with rotting ray fish or other meat that has a smell
which scares off the fish varieties on which most fishermen de-
pend. In addition, the net removes snails from the sea floor and
robs the inshore area of one segment of the marine food chain. Third,
the fishermen felt that the snail net physically interfered with other
kinds of fishing operations conducted in the inshore area, such as
beachseining. Finally, they considered it unfair that the majority of
fishermen should have to tolerate a deleterious fishing technique
used by a minority.
Significantly, during these hearings, the Fisheries Department
officer also felt pressured in another direction. A delegation of snail
product traders, who were adversely affected by the fishermen's
bans, visited his office to discuss the matter. Although they were
accompanied by an important functionary of the ruling party, the
officer managed to send them away. Nonetheless, he was not sure
that he could remain free of political interference loi1g enough to
make the most efficacious settlement. The MLA representing South
Madras might involve himself on behalf of some or other faction,
or the Minister of Fisheries could ask him to take a particular stand-
point. Indeed, new style fishermen organizations in Royapuram
already were starting to voice their opinions.
One month after the clash, the second peace meeting was con-
vened in the office of the Assistant Commissioner of Police. Del··
7.'he Fis-heries- Department's- Re,rjulatory ConvmtionJ 321
egations from the three neighbourhoods and a three·person del··
egation from the Fisheries Department had been invited and I was
tolerated as an observer. When the delegation from Ayodyakuppam
did not appear at the appointed time, its members were forcibly
brought in by police bus.
The Assistant Commissioner of F'olice and the Fisheries
ment officer had prepared the meeting well. They had decided in
advance to avoid an open-ended debate and to focus on discuss··
ing the proposal drafted by the Fisheries Department officer. The
latter thus opened the meeting by emphasizing that he was inter·
ested in peace (amaiti) and wanted the problems (pirachinai) to cease.
He also said that regardless of the decision, the three panciha'vai:s
would be responsible for its enforcement. At this point the assist·
ant commissioner, in the harsh voice typical of Indian pol1oemlen
suddenly interrupted: 'Can these members really can·
trol their fellow fishermen? Are they at all capable of pHp(·j·i",'I"
enforcing rulings?' The fishermen's representatives maintained a
studious silence.
The officer of the Fisheries Department then stood up and de-
livered the following proposal, which largely repeated the argu-
ments raised by the fishermen themselves under a veneer of
objectivity.
I have something to say, but if there are other opinions,
speak out. We all know that shell or chank fishing is not indi-
genous to the Madras area, but is practised mainly in Tuticorin
and in Ramnad [in the southern districts of Tamil Nadu]. We
have found that the snail net is now causing various problems in
our region. The operations of the beachseine are being disturbed.
Also, it is true that the small snails [he makes a gesture with his
fingers to show just how small] are eaten by fish which come
inshore to feed. If you remove the snails, the fish stocks will suf-
fer. In addition, the bait used in the snail net will bring sharks
inshore, and this is also bad for the tourist industry. I believe that
we must protect the main method of fishing in this region and
the welfare of the majority of fishermen by prohibiting methods
which negatively affect it. This is why I urge you to take a deci,
sion in your panchayats to prohibit snail net fishing. Do you
agree?
322 Marine Resource Management
A brief intermission to hear possible objections followed, but there
were none. A police inspector was quick to draft the text of the
agreement. When it was read aloud, only the assistant commis··
sioner demanded a change: 'Please add that if anybody uses the
net any longer, it will be considered treachery to the nation (teesa
turoogam). The Police Department must be informed, and we will
maintain order on the basis of law articles prohibiting the inciting
of communal violence and breaches of peace.' While the inspector
typed out the final version, the assistant commissioner soothed the
ruffled feelings of fishermen's representatives with small talk about
vacancies in the Police Department and whether they could not
propose suitable candidates. All present then signed the agreement,
and the meeting ended. The Fisheries Department officer later ex··
pressed great satisfaction about the calrrmess of the proceedings
and the achieved result. I-lis confidence proved well founded, for
six months later the agreement was still in effect.
The above case study contains some unusual elements, partly
because of the personalities involved. The assistant commissioner
happened to have experience with and interest in fishermen af~
fairs and thus took the case more seriously than others might have.
The Fisheries Department officer was a diligent man, capable - at
least to some extent - of keeping outside interests at bay and of
judging the incident on its own merits. The relative lack of political
meddling is another important feature of the case; I pointed out in
chapter 9 that political interference in Fisheries Department
affairs is quite common. One can also surmise that this incident,
which took place in the state capital a few months prior to dec--
tions, demanded and received more attention from the Police and
Fisheries Departments than it might have if it had taken place at
another time or location.
Analysis afthe Snail Net Incident
The banning of the snail net is a good example of the regulatory
endeavours of fishermen panchayats. The expressed motivations
reflect the general priorities of fishermen's concerns (see chapter
4.2): the protection of important fish stocks and social justice.
Interestingly, it was only in South Madras that the ban attracted
the authorities' attention. This confirms my earlier argument that
the government steps in only when fishermen organizations fail,
The Fisheries Department's Rf{fJulatory Conventions 323
in the eyes of the authorities, to reach an agreement and
scale violence erupts. The police involvement in this incident was
not surprising in view of the possibility that fights might recur
long as the use of the snail net was disputed. According to the Fish.,
eries Department officer who joined the second peace meeting, the
participation of his department was less typical. The initiative to
join in hinged largely on the inclinations of the commanding po·
lice officer. In this case, the police officer responsible for South
Madras felt that the involvement of the Fisheries Department might
contribute to the quality and longevity of the solution.
The manner in which the two departments handled the incident
highlights the division of labour as well as the objective of conflict
management operations. By making use of his access to the fisher~
men population, the Fisheries Department officer was able to es-
tablish the background of the problem. At the same time, he could
frame a proposal which might be both accepted and enforced
fishermen themselves. The assistant commissioner, on the other
hand, made sure that the three fishermen delegations attended the
peace meeting and even sent a vehicle to fetch the reluctant
He also backed the proposal with a threat of state violence and
evocatively likened any violation to treachery. Confronted with a
plan which matched their own conceptions of harm (see chapter
4) a? well as with strong-arm tactics, the fishermen delegates
prornised to uphold the agreement and went horne.
While reflecting on the events, the Fisheries Department officer
mused that the meeting was a successful effort to 'maintain the
peace'. Since he assumed that rules work best if they come from
and are enforced by the fishermen themselves,'the officer had spent
much time investigating the arguments for and against the ban on
the snail net and testing the resolve of the parties involved. He
concluded that there was a better chance of consensus for a ban.
Then he mustered every argument he could find to convince the
representatives of the neighbourhoods which had not prohibited
the net to abandon the contested equipment. His peace meeting
speech thus spanned the full range of fishermen's arguments for a
ban and was strengthened by other arguments such as the poten··
tial ne'gative effects of the net on tourism. His efforts paid off, and
the opposing group agreed to enforce the ban.
This case points out some limitations to the departmental
approach which defines success in terms of keeping the peace.
324 Marine Resource Management
Although fishermen considered it a matter of resource conserva-
tion and social justice, the Fisheries and Police Departments treated
the snail net dispute primarily as a problem of law and order. Fish-
ermen's arguments against the net therefore were not given due
consideration, and certainly not incorporated into official marine
regulation policy. Instead, they were coated with a varnish of ob-
jectivity and utilized as a tool to arrive at a consensus. In the end,
department officers did not care whether the snail net was used or
not, nor how long the ban would be enforced; the important issue
was lowering the risk of a breach of law and order.
The question raised in the introduction to this chapter about
whether the department distinguishes a dispute about fisheries
regulation from an ordinary squabble is now answered: not
fundamentally. The actual issue under dispute is considered less
important than either the scale of conflict or the capacity of fisher-
men's organizations to contain it.
10.3 Regulatory Practice in R()ya,pUIr:hltn
In the previous sections, I have sketched the stance taken by the
Fisheries Department towards regulation by village panchayats as
one of maintaining distance, which implies that only serious dis-
putes receive direct attention. Yet a very different practice seems
to have developed in Royapuram. Here the department associates
openly with fishermen organizations and joins in the hudy-burly
of local politics. In this particular area, a reactive posture has been
transformed into an active one. I explore the background of this
unusual situation here. Then I investigate whether the department's
position is an extension of its usual attitude towards fishing regu-
lation or the expression of a fundamentally different orientation.
I take the policy of vessel registration as an example for several
reasons. s Registration is one of the structural fields of cooperation
between the Fisheries Department and the boat-owner association
of Royapuram, and relates to the issue of fisheries regulation. It is
5 To operate a boat in Royapuram, boat owners formally also need to obtain a
licence from the Fisheries Department. I limit my discussion to registration practice
only, as it has generated more confhcts and problems than licensing. This is mainly
because licensing is less thoroughly implemented: only a fifth of the boats regis··
tel'ed in Madras are actually licensed.
The Fisheries Department's Regulatory Conventions 325
also one of the areas in which the department's convention contra··
dicts official policy. For the boat..owner association, moreover, the
collaboration by the Fisheries Department in this field is of
importance. Registration does more than provide the association
with an instrument to control its unruly constituency. Registration
also is the administrative point of entry to the profession of boat
owners and therefore the locus of social strife.
The .'formalities ofVessel Registration
The rule on vessel registration is so prosaic that it is easy to over..
look its critical role in the edifice of state regulation. In the
Tamil Nadu government can enforce the central clauses of the Act
only if fishing units can be identified and traced. Second, rej:;istra-
tion, as well as licensing, allows the government to regulate the
equipment used on fishing craft. As such, it is the basis for stah~
control over the fishing sector.
The Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing Regulation Act of 1983
tion 10) stipulates that an owner must register his fishing craft with
the authorized officer of the Fisheries Department within a month
of acquisition. This officer subsequently issues the owner a certifi··
cate and a registration number that must be prominently displayed
on the craft.
Two points in the formulation of the article on registration are
significant. First, the rule is universal. marine fisherman
a craft-whether it is a kattumaram, a mechanized boat, or one of
a different type -- is obliged to have it recorded. Second, the Act
describes this formality as a matter between fishermen and an au-
thorized officer, without any kind of intermediation. Individual
fishermen submit their applications to an officer who processes
them according to formal criteria and provides the applicants with
a direct response.
The Practice ofVessel Registration
The practice of vessel registration deviates in several ways from
the wording of the Act. First of all, coverage is very incomplete
and registration is limited largely to the mechanized boat sector.
As the Act aims to control the operations of this category of fisher-
men in particular, this focus is understandable. In fact, mechanized
 326 Marine Resource Management
boat. registr~tion is one of the department's outstanding successes.
Section .10 IS the only article in the Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing
Regulation Act,that ~as been enforced relatively well. In spite of a
slow start, the hshenes Department now has registered almost all
of the mechanized boats based in Royapuram. Participants and
observers estimate that only a small percentage of boat owners,
who ~wn ~ot more t.han 10 .rer cent of the total fleet, currently defy
~he dIrective to regIster WIth the Fishing Harbour Section. Great
Impetus for registration appears to stem from the insurance branch
which now requires boat fishermen requesting coverage to sUbmi~
proof of ownership.
. Contrary to what is suggested in the Act, however, the registra-
tion process is not unmediated. Instead, the boat-owner associ-
ation intercedes between individual boat ownerS and the officers
of th~ Fishing FIarbour Section. This convention appears to origi..
nate 111 an executive order issued on behalf of the Minister of Fish..
eries in 1994. 6 According to the terms of this order, the Fisheries
!J~p~rtment can consider an application for boat registration only
If It IS accompanied by a letter of consent from the official boat-
Owner association of Royapuram.
In 1995, this order clearly conferred substantial powers on
Bhas~ar~n's Ad hoc Committee. It excluded competing boat-owner
aSSOClatlons from mediation activities and thereby provided the
Ad hoc Committee \Yith a strategic advantage. But it also trans-.
ferred a large measure of responsibility for the screening of appli-
cants from the Fisheries Department to the Ad hoc Committee. In
practice, this shift meant that persons wanting to operate a boat in
Royapuram had to meet a separate set of cri teria·- that of the asso-
ciation- before they could begin the official procedure. I noted in
chapter 8 that the intrusion of so-called outsiders into the ranks of
boat owners kindles fierce emotions in the harbour area. Boat-owner
associations use their control over the registration process to ex-
clude or to intimidate such intruders and amass funds of their own.
Officers of the Fishing Harbour Section heeded the ministerial
order carefully. They resolutely referred applicants who lacked a
". Although r was informed of its existence, I have not seen the document in ques-
tion. The executive order supposedly was issued at the same time as the formation
of the Ad hoc Committee (see chapter 8). It is not certain that registration also was
mediated by the boat-owner association before this date.
The Fisheries Department:, R~qulatory ComentiorIS 327
letter of consent to the leader of the Ad hoc C:ommittee, Bhaskaran.
Knowing that Bhaskaran enjoyed easy access to the Minister of
Fisheries and to other authorities as well, they realized that failure
to comply with the procedure could seriously damage their pro-
fessional careers.
Question: If Bhaskaran only would give Madras boat owners
recommendation letter, would you go along with this?
Inspector Sivalingam: Our hands are tied. If I give other people
registration certificate on my own, I run the risk of harassment.
I have a family and children and don't want to risk them for my
job.
Question: So if a boat owner from Cuddalore [in South Arcot
District] comes to you for registration, but does not have a letter
from Bhaskaran, you refuse him?
Inspector Sivalingam: Yes I do. I tell him to approach the MLA or
the minister and see what they can do on his behalf.
The officer's response is unequivocal: 'our hands are tied.' Execu·
tive orders clearly do not lack forcefulness. 7 In the context of
Royapuram, they predominate over the registration procedures
sanctioned by the law, and this has some novel effects. By confirm-
ing the Ad hoc Committee's selection, the department reinforces
the authority of this association over the boat fishermen popula··
tion. Thus, in effect, the department becomes a partner in the fish·
ennen's pursuit of protectionism. As I will note later, the latter
relationship creates mixed feelings among department officers.
Since a ministerial order rather than the Act is the guideline for
registration, officers of the Fishing Harbour Section are vulnerable
to attacks from dissident fishermen groups demanding the
enforcement of official procedures. The dualism between law and
practice creates opportunities for boat fishermen's factions to
engage in combat, and they drag the department along in their
wake.
7 Baxi (1982:24) remarks that administrative instructions frequently prevail over
provisions of law in Indian government. I once asked a Fisheries Department officer
with experience in the legal field about his opinion on this Inatter. He agreed with
the gist of Baxi's statement, adding that many officers in the department are not
even aware of the content of fisheries law.
328 Marine Resource Manctqement
The Politics ofBoat Registration
Boat registration triggered a protracted tug-of-war between the Ad
hoc Committee and Chandran's Association in the early months of
1995.
The struggle commenced with the Ad hoc Committee's refusal
to provide a boat owner named Manoharan with a recommen-
dation to register his boat with the Fishing Harbour Section (also
see chapter 8). Bhaskaran had imposed a fine of Rs 40,000
because Manoharan did not come from the surroundings of
Madras, even though he had lived there for many years, and
Manoharan had declined to pay it. Hoping to circumvent what
he felt to be an unjustified fine, Manoharan informed the corn-·
peting boat owner leader, Chandran. Recognizing this as a chance
to frustrate the members of the Ad hoc Committee, Chandran
te')ok up Manoharan's defence. He first met the assistant director
in charge of the Fishing Harbour SectIon and demanded that
Manoharan's boat be registered according to official procedure,
without mediation of the Ad hoc Committee. The officer, how-
ever, dragged his feet and said that he was unable to change
convention without the consent of his superiors.
Chandran then raised the stakes and requested that the Com-
missioner of Fisheries correct the policy. Surprisingly, the com-
missioner, who was neW to the department, agreed and
rescinded the order requiring a letter of recommendation from
the Ad hoc Committee. The assistant director in charge of regis-
tration, a bachelor nearing retirement, saw no reason to con-
tinue to refuse Manoharan's and Chandran's request. However,
his subordinate, the inspector responsible for the necessary
paperwork still had a period of service ahead of him. He feared
for his safety, and refused to cooperate. The case languished.
Chandran threatened to take the matter to court but did not,
possibly because >the officers had carefully failed to provide
written evidence of their refusal to register the boat. A few weeks
later, the commissioner happened to be transferred and the as-
sistant director retired. The Ad hoc Committee and Chandran's
Association were also joined. The situation returned to normal,
and mallers continued as before. Manoharan's boat still was not
registered.
The Fisheries Department's Regulatory Conventions 329
What can be learned from the description up to this point?
by associating itself with a dominant fishermen faction, the de-
partment became party to power struggles within the boat fisher
men population. Chandran's challenge to Bhaskaran which was
a relatively common one in Royapuram history (see chapter 8)
was therefore almost automatically followed up by a challenge to
the Fishing Harbour Section, which, after all, bolstered the Ad hoc
Committee's authority. In his attack against Bhaskaran, Chandran
tried to exploit the discrepancy between official registration policy
and convention. In the ensuing sparring match in which the
minister also played a role the chances of the contesting parties
alternated. The Fisheries Department officer responsible for boat
registration knew that he was likely to be mauled in the confronta·
tion and kept quiet until the storm subsided. This confirms the
bureaucratic adage (see chapter 6) that inertia is to
rashness.
The incident, however, was not over, as the following su,gglests:
Six months after the affair peaked, boat owner Manoharan, who
had lost a lot of money because he could not use his boat to fish,
finally managed to set the craft afloat without having
tered at all. The non-registration of boats like Manoharan's, how-
ever, disturbed the reconstituted Ad hoc Committee, which felt
that it was forfeiting control of the harbour area as well as
potential income. In January 1996, the Ad hoc Committee there-
fore commenced a campaign to apprehend non~registeredboats
in the harbour area and used its own arsenal of enforcement
techniques (see chapter 8). Hoping to the effectiveness
of this operation, however, Bhaskaran requested the Fisheries
Department to 'participate and to set an example by seizing some
unregistered boats. The inspector in the Fishing Harbour
tion who finally received this order from his superiors. was un..
happy. Not only did he think the operation was difficult and
somewhat risky, but some local politicians and fishermen from
other factions had advised him to not get involved.
Some weeks later when I visited his office again, however, the
officer informed me that he had recently impounded two un·
registered boats with the assistance of the Ad hoc Committee.
The inspector confided that this measure had not caused him
any harm and had in fact created an influx of applicants for boat
330 Marine Resource Management
registration. Manoharan was one of them. He had made the best
of a bad situation and paid Bhaskaran the requested fee. Now
he bore a proper recommendation letter from the Ad hoc Com·
mittee.
A striking aspect of this sequel is that the inspector of the Fishing
Harbour Section did not refuse to cooperate as he had before. AI·
though hesitant at first! he finally accommodated the wishes of the
boat-owner association and his superiors and impounded some
boats. His acquiescence suggests that the situation in January 1996
was fundamentally different than it had been six months previ-
ously. The authority crisis in the boat owning population had been
settled when the newly constituted Ad hoc Committee carne out
on top and Raja retreated into the wings. The risk of getting
involved in a local hornet's nest had concomitantly declined. In
addition! the interests of the Fisheries Department and of the boat-·
owner association tended to coincide! at least for the moment. The
department and its officers also stood to benefit from the increased
coverage advocated by the Ad hoc Committee. The tensions which
characterized the first encounter had largely dissipated! although
they were not completely resolved see the officees allusion to
parties who had advised him not to get involved.
In section 1, I noted that Fisheries Department officers tend to
value the fishermen administrations' contribution to the mainten-
ance of local order! though they do not necessarily agree with the
content of their directives. The same division pervades opinion on
the mechanized boat sector in Royapuram. 1 consider the officers'
opinion of the registration process first, then broaden the scope to
include other items of regulation for fishermen.
Opinions on the Convention ofVCssel Registration
Although they comply with the convention of not registering a boat
without the recommendation of the boat-owner association! some
officers in Royapuram privately expressed their dismay. They
pointed out that the boat··owner association's distinction between
locals and outsiders encourages protectionism in the fishing pro-
fession. They argue that this contradicts government policy as well
as core principles of the Constitution of India. After alt Article 19(9)
of the Constitution defines the right of all Indian citizens 'to practisE'
The Fisheries Department's Regulatory Conventions 331
any profession! or to carryon any occupation! trade or business'.
Although they agreed with the gist of this critique, other officers
took a more pragmatic approach.
Assistant Director Pandian: According to the Constitution,
Indian can go fishing anywhere in the Formally! there
fore! the Fisheries Department cannot subscribe to proteetion·
ism. However, fishermen!s rules are there and the rjp'n:'l1rln1P,..d
must accept their existence.
For this officer! and for many others like him! the dualism which
characterizes fisheries regulation is a fact of life. Since they do not
possess a monopoly on the definition of fishing rights! the rlp,..,,,,..I'..
ment and its officers must be accommodative! even if this contra··
diets the main thrust of law.
Opinions on Other Items ofFisheries Regulation
The practice of vessel registration demonstrates that Fisheries
Department officers in Royapuram adjust themselves to fishermen
organizations without necessarily agreeing with their policies. To
be fair! their accormnodation in this field went further than in any
other and even verged on collaboration. In other instances! their
adjustment was less pronounced or sometimes even absent.
Officers of the Fisheries Department in Royapuram are of course
aware of the daily court sessions the boat-owner association ar·
ranges (see chapter 7). In my experience; however! they never
attend or interfere in the proceedings. Indirectly! they do reinforce
the authority of the boat-owner association by referring individ-
uals with complaints about mechanized boat fishing practice to its
office-holders. This coincides with their opinion! which I discussed
earlier! that fishermen's administrations are very effective in re-
solving typical fishing problems. The fishermen campaign to
remove tuna longliners from the Madras fishing harbour (see chap-
ter 8) elicited less enthusiasm. A number of officers commented
that they thought the campaign erroneous! as the longliners were
fishing in an ecological niche untouched by local fishermen. From
their point of view! the protesting boat fishermen were hindering a
worthwhile new initiative. This standpoint was not translated into
332 Marine Resource Management
policy, however, due to the political compulsion to take restrictive
action.
When boat fishermen pressed for the closure of a newly-
developing wholesale market, the reluctance of department offi-
cers was even more pronounced. I described in chapter 7 that
fishermen's organizations in Royapuram launched a campaign at
the end of. 1995 to close the so~called Central Market, which was
beginning to threaten the seafood trade in Royapuram. Fisheries
Department officers were unanimous in their disapproval of this
initiative, which amounted to market protectionism. They reasoned
that market protectionism might be good for the boat fishermen of
Royapuram but certainly not for seafood consumers.
More than in boat registration and in the tuna longliner inci-
dent, Fisheries Department officers were able to heed their mis-
givings in this case. They were aided by two circumstances. One
crucial difference was that the bone of contention, the new whole·,
sale market, was not under fishermen control. The market does
not lie in a fishermen's area. Furthermore, the wholesale merchants
operating there come from Andhra Pradesh and not from Madras.
Since no practice of fisheries regulation existed, the department
could afford to be noncommittal. Second, the department is not
directly responsible for city markets and thus could transfer the
case to the municipal authorities. In fact, the boat fishermen cam-
paign finally dissolved there.
The Causes ofIntertwining in Royapuram
In the introduction to this chapter, I asked whether the department's
interaction with dominant fishermen organizations in Royapuram
results from external circumstances or rather from a different atti-
tude toward regulation practices in boat fishing. I have indicated
above that officers of the department entertain doubts about im-
portant elements in the boat fishermen tenure system and especially
about its protectionist tendencies. These misgivings are different
from the ones regarding artisanal sea tenure. Nonetheless, they
too are of a fundamerital nature. I argue, therefore, that rather than
reflecting a convergence of viewpoints, the Fisheries Department's
close connection to fishermen organizations in Royapuram is
matter of both political compulsion and practical utility.
The Fisheries Department's Regulatory C;onFentionJ 333
I have noted the signs of political interference. In the case of
vessel registration, the ministerial order instructing the Fishing
Harbour Section to await a recommendation letter from the boat-
owner association before commencing registration most
reveals this. At this point, I would like to recall the argument pre..
sented m chapter 9 that the Fisheries Department serves to culti-
vate and to maintain the fishermen vote bank, which is particularly
well developed in the Royapuram area. Local politicians, .
il~ the Minister of Fisheries himself in the early 1990s, team up
WIth mfluentIal fIshermen groups in Royapuram such as the boat-
owner association. Such alliances are of mutual interest: politicians
hope to capitalize on the relationship in the next election, whereas
fishermen organizations profit from government support. In the
relationship between politicians and fishennen organizations, the
Fisheries Department frequently takes on the role of go-between.
However, the department and its officers do not lack autono-
mous interests in a steady relationship with dominant fishermen
organizations in Royapuram. It is to their advantage if authority in
the harbour area is clearly defined, as the events of 1995 reveal.
The revival of Chandran's Association and his challenge to the Ad
hoc Committee inaugurated a period of uncertainty and appre..
hel:slon, particularly in the local branches of the department. There,
offl~ers were being battered by claims of contending boat-owner
factIons. Many officers thus breathed a sigh of relief when the status
quo in the boat-owning population was re-established.
. . Second, officers realize that the success of departmental activ..
Ihes m the Royapuram area depends on the cooperation of dom-
inant fishermen's organizations. As I pointed out in chapter 8,
these orgamzatIons consider fishing harbour affairs their special
prerogatIve. I recall two examples of collaboration between the boat,"
owner association and the department in which each party had its
own special interests. The first stems from my discussion in this
chapter of the practice of boat registration. The campaign to track
down unregistered boats, which the Ad hoc Committee initiated
in January 1996, furthered the bureaucratic objective of extending
departmental coverage. I do not believe that this support was a
one-tune event. Instead, the boat..owner association rnost likely
played a role throughout all phases of the mechanized boat reois..
tration effort. The other example relates to the enforcement of ~he
three-mile rule. When tensions with artisanal fishermen in Sou th
334 Marine Resource Management
The Fisheries Department's Regulatory Conventions 335

Madras reached a dangerous high in February 1995, the Ad hoc
Committee quickly provided the department with a boat that could
perform several token patrols (see chapter 7). This enabled the
department to parade as the executor of the Tamil Nadu Marine
Fishing Regulation Act. It also helped to defuse the crisis at hand
(which of course benefited boat fishermen).
If both parties benefit from collaboration, the converse would
also appear to be true. The problems fishermen organizations can
cause for individual officers are illustrated by the case of the
Harbour Management Committee official who pleaded for cooper-
ation in conducting a technical study (see Section 1). On a more
ger~erallevel,rebellious fishermen organizations in Royapuram re··
peatedly have demonstrated their capacity to obstruct and to
embarrass the department. They do so not only through subtle
political manipulations but by disrupting public life through
road blocks, strikes, and demonstrations as well.
This raises what is probably the most crucial point·- the unique
and dominant position of the Royapuram boat fishermen jn the
fishing population of Tamil Nadu. Royapuram is the largest and
probably the wealthiest mechanized boat fishing site in the state.
But it also combines these characteristics with political clout.
Although its status peaked during Minister Jeyakumar's period in
office, Royapuram's power - which is related to its proximity to
the seat of government - is undoubtedly of older origin. This combi-
nation of circumstances is the foundation of the Fisheries
Department's preoccupation with events in Royapuram and its con-
nection to dominant fishermen organizations.
in chapter 9: that the Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing Regulation Act
has a social focus rather than an environmental one. The Fisheries
Department generally considers the content of the regulations less
important than agreement itself.
The Fisheries Department's incidental involvement in artisanal
fisheries regulation is in stark contrast with its structural n""'},('l ..
pation in the regulation of mechanized boat fishing. I argued that
this pattern originates in a combination of external exigencies. As I
mentioned in chapter 8, the boat-owner association of Royapuram
definitely needs more reinforcement than most artisanal adminis..
trations because of its structural weaknesses. I Iowever, the pr,es(>.nt
configuration of departmental regulation efforts also expresses the
difference between the two sectors' leverage in government circles.
This is not unique to India. In his description of the position of
artisanal fishermen throughout the world, McGoodwin (1990:10)
concludes that 'because small-scale fishing implies a srrlall-slcale
capital commitment, it also usually implies small-scale power ....
This often places them at a great competitive disadvantage with
large-scale fishers, who form powerful organizations ... to lobby
government officials.'

10.4 Conclusions

Throughout this chapter, I have argued that the Fisheries Depart-

ment strives to let fishermen manage their own affairs, even if their
solutions contradict official marine regulation policy. This approach
is based on an assessment of the regulatory capacities of fishermen
organizations as well as on the weaknesses of the government. Only
in certain circumstances, such as when conflicts erupt into the open
and threaten to disrupt society, does the Fisheries Department in-
tervene. Nevertheless, the main purpose of these endeavours, which
are often performed in conjunction with other departments, is to
restore law and order. This coincides with one of my conclusions

11
COROMANDEL COAST
IN PERSPECTIVE
I have sketched the inshore fisheries of the Coromandel Coast of
Tamil Nadu in the previous chapters as an ongoing battle among
three parties. The first is a large artisanal fishing population which
is trying to ensure its livelihood according to age-old patterns. The
second is a new category of boat fishermen whose main goal is to
make money. And the third isa state which desires to modernize
and increase fish production and stepped in to maintain law and
order when problems between the two categories of fishermen
arose.
In these concluding pages, I gather up the threads of the dis-
course and return to the questions posed in chapter 1. These relate
to an understanding of the specificities of fisheries along
the Coromandel Coast. Behind this practical concern, however,
are several theoretical ones. In order to deal with the exigencies
of a complex common pool resource industry, I suggest a ·re-
conceptualization of the notions of sea tenure and legal pluralism.
The value of those concepts must now b~ assessed.
11.1 Recapitulation of the Research Problematic
I argued in chapter 1 that the concept of 'sea tenure' has distinct
advantages over related phraseology. Leading scholars in the field
(Alexander 1977,[1982]1995; Cordell 1984, 1989; Ruddle and
Akimichi 1984) perceive it as a property institution which relates
to ownership and control of economic resources. Their definition
in prblciple allows for a multiplicity of forms and a variety of par-
ticipants. In practice, however, sea tenure studies - certainly those
in Asia - have had a relatively restricted focus. Scholars have
Coromandel Coast Fisheries in Perspective 337
frequently focused on the traditional tenure arrangements of
artIs~nal fishermen. In doing so, they have neglected to study other
partIes such as trawler fishermen and the state. Moreover, they
have tended to explore the issue from the angle of responsible
r~~ource management. Thereby, they have disregarded the possi-
bIhty of other reasons for the tenurial set-up.
I ~roposed to expand the notion of sea tenure as it is usually
applIed and brmg other actors to the analytical level of artisanal
fish~rmen. In taking this tack, I found it useful to abandon precon-
ceptions about the objectives of tenure and instead to include a
comparison of functions in the research effort. This extension of
the field had another reason in addition to the wish to come to
grips with the dynamics of a complex fishery. It followed from the
premise that resource allocation in a common pool resource is too
imp?rtant to remain unstructured (Benda-Beckmann 1995). Byex-
tenSIon, I assumed that all interested parties are inclined to make
attempts at structuring the harvesting process. In view of this as~
sumption, it was logical to expect the state, and new categories of
fishermen as well, to develop tenure systems. By the same~oken,a
deficient tenure system is as puzzling as an elaborate one, because
it raises questions about the causes of its stunted development.
~ased on a distinction made in the debate on legal pluralism, I
defmed a sea tenure system as inevitably consisting of two parts: a
rule system and an authority which frames rules and enforces them.
I also argued that every tenure system must be anchored in an
occupational setting.
I observed that academics in the field of lygal pluralism have
Sh~W~l an aversion to the development of theory and great gener-
OSIty m recognizing 'law' in a rich variety of social fields and situ-
ations. The definition of legal pluralism I chose locates the
interaction of legal systems in the fact that they are directed at the
same' situation' (Vanderlinden 1972).
Il.2 Sea lenure in Practice and in Theory
It must be emphasized that at the inception of this research, there
was no evidence whatsoever that artisanal or mechanized boat fish-
ermen along the Coromandel Coast undertake tenurial activities.
~oreover, the state's record in the field of regulation was far from
Impressive. Any visitor to the seashore could assure him- or herself
338 Marine Resource Management
that the main clauses of the Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing Regula··
tion Act, which sought to prevent mechanized boat fishing in the
nearest coastal waters, were hardly effective. Taken together, these
circumstances made it quite uncertain whether anything other than
the rough-and-tumble of muscle power was structuring fishing
practice. The first of the three questions posed in the introduction
inquires into the existence of three sea tenure systems in
Coromandel Coast fisheries as well as into their structures.
DiJparate Groupings and Occupational Contexts
The data presented in the previous chapters confirms the assump-
tion that inshore fisheries along the Coromandel Coast currently
involve three more or less distinct social groupings: artisanal fish-
ermen, mechanized boat fishermen, and government officers from
the Fisheries Department The latter are easily distinguishable; they
do not depend on fishing for a living and, as part of government
bureaucracy, serve overriding public causes. Moreover, they have
different caste origins and participate in other social networks than
fishermen. Despite the fact that they are generally with the depart-
ment for life, and more than passers-by, the officers' involvement
with the fishing industry is transient and indirect.
The two fishermen groupings have far more in common. Not
only do they share an orientation towards the vagaries of the sea,
but in many cases they also are connected by caste, kinship, and a
common history. It must be remembered that the mechanized boat
sector is actually a very new entity, and that many older boat fish-
ermen have vivid memories of the time they were working on
kattumarams themselves. It is clear, however, that the two categor-·
ies of fishermen have subsequently drifted apart and started to
crystallize into distinct professional categories. I noted in chapter
6 that boat fishermen-·both crew members and owners tend to
stay in the business and no longer revert to kattumaram fishing.
Moreover, a new generation of boat owners has grown up lacking
personal knowledge not only of artisanal fishing but also of fish-
ing in generaL Artisanal fishermen of the Coromandel Coast, on
the other hand, lack the means to enter the mechanized boat fish-
ing sector at the top of the labour hierarchy, while they display
reluctance to enrol at lower levels.
Coromandel Coast ];Isheries in Perspective . 339
Despite the fact that both make up part of a larger inshore fish-
ing industry, the practices of artisanal and mechanized boat fish-
ing are highly disparate. The difference starts with their locations
and technologies. The artisanal sector is beach··based and spread
out in small settlements along the coastline. The mechanized boat
sector, on the other hand, is concentrated in harbour locations.
Mechanized boats have strong engines, large fish holds, and a high
range; moreover, their crews work with mobile trawling gear. This
contrasts with both the standing gear of artisanal fishermen and
the fact that the latter mostly make use of a limited sea area adja.
cent .to their settlements. Various production relations highlight
the dIfferences which follow from technology. Boat fishing is firmly
anchored in the profit-making urban economy. Its operations are
relatively capital intensive, and boat owners tend to owe large debts
to fish merchants and others. For this and other reasons, boat owners
are under pressure to realize turnover and to maximize profits.
They relay the profit motive to their crews by means of the share
system. That system encourages the 'shifting cultivation' of rich
fishing grounds, unimpeded by long-term community obligations.
Artisanal fishing, on the other hand, tends to be steered by a can
cept of 'limited good'. In conjunction with their reliance on a limit..
ed sea space, artisanal fishermen are aware that adverse fishing
ope.rations. may affect fish stocks and take measures accordingly.
ArtIsanal fIshermen usually also make up part of a cohesive social
environment in which ideas of social detriment steer individual
behaviour.
In describing the two fishing sectors in these terms, I have tended
towards a dualistic perspective. This may be the moment to com.
ment on my understanding of it. First of all, I do not contrast a
capitalist with a non-capitalist sector, nor do 1 contrast a sector
inspired by a concept of 'limited good' with one which flaunts a
'myth of superabundance'. The two sectors are not each other's
mirror images. This is the trap some authors, like those of the
Madras Institute of Development Studies (1988), appear to have
fallen into. Having described the modern sector as capitalist, they
feel obhgecl to label the artisanal sector as its opposite..However,
this position is .untenable. The artisanal sector is just as strongly
connected to the market as the mechanized boat sector, and profit
motives pervade it thoroughly. The difference, I would argue, is
one of degree. Thesame holds true for the concept of 'limited good'
 Coromandel Coast Fisheries in Perspective 341
340 . Marine Resource Management

field, such as territoriality. Artisanal fishermen recognize the pre-

I observed in chapter 7 that boat fishermen rarely subscribe to a
rogative of every settlement to regulate fisheries in adjacent and
'myth of superabundance' -- in fact, this image applies more to the
clearly bounded territories, which fade with distance from the
public discourse of politicians and bureaucrats than to the ideas of
shore. Mechanized boat fishermen, in contrast, do not recognize
fishermen. Realizing that fish stocks in their usual fishing grounds
preferential fishing territories at all. Yet sometimes they adapt them-
may soon face depletion, many boat fishermen are imprisoned in
selves to the exigencies of other rule systems. Finally, the state of
their current fishing routines and unsure of what the future holds
Tamil Nadu defines a fishing zone with only one border, which
in store for them. Their problem is, at least partly, one of a lack of
runs parallel to the shore at a distance of three nautical miles. 'fhat
control.
system was designed with one purpose in mind: to regulat mechan-
Here another factor enters the equation. I described the limited
ized boat fishing.
good perspective in the artisanal sector not as an indi~idual mat--
The differences between rule systems in single fields highlight
tel', but as one mediated by the hamlet communIty. It IS the popu··
the fact that each has a distinctive orientation. The artisanal rule
lation of the hamlet which, via administrative structures,
system aims at the conservation of important fish stocks in limited
pressurizes individual fishermen to forego shor~.. ~erm ind~vi?ual
sea territories as well as at the prevention of what I have called
benefits for the long-term interests of the group. Commumty has
social harm. It focuses mainly on the regulation of fishing practice.
lost much of its meaning in Royapuram, however, and with it,
The rule-making activities of mechanized boat fishermen, on the
broader concerns have l~st their driving force. All in all, the dual-
other hand, concentrate on maintaining social boundaries, as well
ism I observe is indicative rather than straightforward and abso-
as on the protection of the seafood market. Their fishing rules are
lute. The transitions from one sector to the other are gradual and
few in number. The system is aimed at creating inroads into the
run along more than one axis.
territories which other parties want to close off rather than at
limiting their own operations. The Fisheries Department, finally,
Contrasting Rule Systems
does not have an independent interest in inshore fishing. It con-
centrates rnainly on containing the conflict between the two fisher-
My observations led to the discovery of three more o~ less.consist-
men groupings.
ent sets of regulations which correspond to the partIes dIscussed
The contrast between the artisanal and mechanized bQat fisher-
above·~ an artisanal fishing rule system, a mechanized boat fish-
men rule systems invites further deliberation. Why should one
ing rule system, and a set of departmental co~wentions under t~1e
grouping focus more on sea- and the other on land··based rules?
banner of official legislation. These systems dIffer, fIrst of all, wIth
Economic and social realities provide the to an answer. The
respect to age and complexity. I described the artisanal rule system
fact that the artisanal rule system focuses on fishing practice reo
as the oldest and the most elaborate one, and I depicted mechan-
flects the relevance, in view of the technology, of the adjacent sea
ized boat fishermen and the state as latecomers to the field. Their
territory for long-term economic survivaL It also highlights the
rule systems are consequently less refined and still evolving. The
continued importance of 'community' for the artisanal fishing
observation that state policies and laws do not overlay an uncharted
population. Mechanized boat fishermen are, in contrast, barely
domain, but rather one crisscrossed by more ancient tenurial
interested in small sea territories; their economics suppose a
arrangements, has been made before but is worth repeating. After
broader·- and expanding ..- geographical scope. They are therefore
all, not too long ago, scholars and policy-makers alike treated the
less concerned with structuring fishing practice. The decline of com·
sea as an open access resource in which the state played a primor-
munity feeling in urban neighbourhoods reinforces this attitude.
dial regulatory role. .
Their emphasis on maintaining social boundaries is dictated by
The three rule systems, in their pure forms, emanate from radIc-
the pressure from so-called outsiders to enter the mechanized boat
ally different standpoints with regard to the practice of fishing.
fishing business and to utilize limited shore facilities. This factor
This is best illustrated by considering their views on one speCIflc
 342 Marine Resource Management
barely plays a role in artisanal fishing. The efforts boat fishermen
make to control the seafood rnarket are inspired by their ability
because of Royapura~'s dominant position as a landing centre
t? l~fluence pnces. This IS well beyond the capacity of any artisanal
flshmg population, which explains why their efforts in this field
are more restricted in scope.
In considering the rule system of the state, I made a distinction
between ~ffici2:1 ru~es (fisheries law) and a body of regulatory con-
venti.ons. The 1amll Nadu Marine Fishing Regulation Act of 1983
provIdes a broad legal foundation for more activities in the future.
At present, however, it is elaborated only with regard to the prob-
lems between mechamzed boat fishermen and the artisanal sector
It is ~ largely dormant law which was drafted at the height of
conflIcts between the two fishermen groups. Its current status is
weak because of changed political equations and its basic
unenforce~bility.F~r real policy, it is necessary to turn to the body
?f conventlOns applIed by the Fisheries Department. The core hereof
IS to leave fisheries regulation to fishermen, except when law and
order pr~blems threaten to arise. The script which subsequently
unfo~ds alm.s at a restoration of the peace, more than at principled
verdIcts on Issues of fishing practice.
Authorities Compared
I dispute the stance taken by the group of South Asian fisheries
scholars (Alexander [1982] 1995; Raychaudhuri 1980' Stirrat 1988'
Tietze 1985; Thomson 1989) who are content to des;ribe fisherie~
as a socio-economic system and existing regulations as a code of
c~nd~ct. They overlook the crucial role authorities play in the
VICISSItudes of fisheries. Rule systems are made visible - become
social facts -- only if they are backed up and regenerated. All three
tenure systems under consideration were found to include an
authority--'a staff of people', in Weber's terms (Rheinstein 1954:
5)-.and an organizational structure. Their features vary substan-
tially, however. This becomes evident from a review of two vari-
abl~s: the leve.l at. which authority is exercised, and the group or
mstltutlOn whIch IS represented. The differences on these axes ap-
pear to correlate WIth the strengths and weaknesses of the authority
m questlon.
Coromandel Coast Fisheries in Perspective 34·3
Of the three tenure systems along the Coromandel Coast, the
artisanal system is the most effective in developing and enforcing
fishing regulations. This is a function of its scale as well as of its
far-reaching delegation of responsibilities. The administration of
artisanal fishermen finds its locus in a small territorial unit, the
fishing hamlet, and rapidly loses force at higher societal levels.
Within each hamlet, many administrative tasks, including the for·
mulation and implementation of fishing rules, are delegated to the
rank and file of village members. A number of formally appointed
leaders is in charge of daily affairs. The main weakness of the
artisanal system is the lack of a supralocal structure; its absence
has hampered the developlnent of political clout. The artisanal
system is currently threatened by processes such as the professional
diversification of the fishing population, which is eroding the foun·
dations of the system.
Boat-owner associations, in contrast, are professional interest
&'TOUPS connected to particular harbour locations. The owner associ··
ation in Royapuram formally represents eleven fishing neighbour·,
hoods and belongs to a higher tier than hamlet panchayats. It also
differs from hamlet administration in that it directly represents only
one - albeit important -- segment of the fishing population in
Royapuram, namely the boat owners. Iiowever, even amongst the
boat-owner population, its legitimacy fluctuat-es. The strengths and
weaknesses of the boat-owner associations mirror those of the ham-
let panchayats in important respects. These associations have been
more effective in defending the interests of boat owners against
the outside world than in enforcing measures amongst their own
population. In order to control boat owners, they are seen to de-
pend heavily on the support of other parties such as the Fisheries
Department. In fact, I have argued that the boat-owner associ··
ations' frailties partly explain the lack of rules in mechanized boat
fishing.
The Fisheries Department is a statewide arm of government,
which is also responsive to the interests of the coastal electorate
through a system of machine politics. It operates a network of
offices and a body of trained and hierarchically positioned staff to
manage its manifold activities. The Fisheries Department is weak
in the field of regulation, because its capacities are not suited to the
immensity of its task. In addition, it faces opposition from fisher-
men who generally deprecate the infringements of officials on'their'
344 Marine Resource Management
domain. 'To realize its purposes, the department has consequently
learned to follow an indirect route and to rely on fishermen
authorities.
Sea Tenure Theory Revisited
The discussion on tenure along the Coromandel Coast has three
implications for sea tenure theory. First of all, it follows Benda-
Beckmann's (1995:1) assertion with regard to common pool re..
sources that 'allocation is never unstructured because continuity
in the production of basic goods is never unimportant.' Indeed,
here are three parties which have made conspicuous efforts to struc-
ture inshore fishing.
In my configuration, the position of mechanized boat fishermen
is especially interesting. The fact that they too have developed a
system of regulation contradicts the drift of tenure studies, espe..
cially those in Asia (but also see McGoodwin 1990). The literature
implies that sea tenure is the prerogative of small-scale 'traditional'
fishermen. The mechanized boat sector of Madras cannot, of course,
be ranked amongst the world's industrial fisheries; it forms an
intermediate category on the global technological scale. However,
these fishermen lack the dependency on small ocean territories
which characterizes artisanal fishing. And their sector is of such
recent origin that sea tenure arrangements might appear unlikely.
The fact that structures of sea tenure have indeed developed sub-
stantiates Benda-Beckmann's views.
Conversely, his hypothesis urges the explication of weak or non-
existing tenure systems. This approach too provides useful open-
ings. In the case of mechanized boat fishermen, the poorly
developed system of fishing rules thus can partly be attributed to
the structural weakness of the boat-owner association. The Fisher-
ies Department's limited involvement in sea tenure, on the other
hand, could be analyzed as the result of both its narrow objectives
and its lack of implementation capacity.
A second conclusion is that in order to capture the full breadth
of regulatory activity in a particular fishing industry, preconcep-
tions about the nature of sea tenure systems must be abandoned.
Instead, one should allow for a multiplicity of objectives, instru-
ments, forms, and development phases. In the process, sea tenure
develops from a one- into a multidimensional concept
Coromandel Coast Fisheries in Perspective 345
The data on Coromandel Coast fisheries underscores the fact
that tenure systems are not necessarily designed with responsibk~
resource management in mind. Interestingly, if the incidence of
resource management functions had been the criterion for the se··
lection of sea tenure systems in this study, it would not have been
the artisanal fishing sector which was disqualified. Instead, the ten'
ure systems of the mechanized boat sector and of the Fisheries
Department would have been discarded, because they have
other than conservation. Not only do sea tenure systems have dif-
ferent objectives, but they also make use of other instruments as
welL This is illustrated most clearly in the case of the two fisher-
men groupings. One of these, in Schlager and Ostrom's (1993)
terminology, focuses on the maintenance of boundary rules while
the other emphasizes fishing rules.
This brings me to a point which, to my knowledge, has not been
broached in sea tenure studies before: namely, that state and non·
state tenure systems may be at varying phases of development.
This is different from arguing that systems are subject to change, a
theme on which Moore (1978) has expanded with to law
and legal systems. Instead, the issue is institutional maturity. In
the case of Coromandel Coast fisheries,the artisanal system is thus
far more elaborate and deeply rooted than those of either the mechan··
ized boat sector or the Fisheries Department. Both of those sys-
tems are arguably at a fledgling stage subject to further
development.!
The example of Coromandel Coast fisheries also indicates that
various sectors, along with their associated sea tenure systems, may
differ in terms of power. In a reflection of the prevailing social
order, some systems therefore are pronounced and dominant,
whereas others are submerged and subordinate. Significantly, in
the kind of tenurial configuration I have described, power differ··
entials tend to follow a regular pattern. McGoodwin (1990:10)
explains that 'because small..scale fishing implies a small-scale
capital commitment, it usually implies small-scale power.' The
large-scale sector, on the other hand, is 'generally urban-based,
highly capitalized, and seen by national governments as more sig-
nificant and economically promising' (ibid.:14).
I I ignore the tricky questions of determination and the relationship between in-
stitutional development and change per se.
346 Marine Resource Management
My third conclusion is that despite a wide diversity, sea tenure
systems are variations of a general phenomenon and can be ana-
lysed in broadly similar terms. In order to do S?, however, one
must specify the concept more precisely. I have defmed a sea tenure
system as a combination of rules with regard to the usage of ~on:­
mon pool resources and a steering authority, the whole of WhICh IS
connected to an occupational context. This definition proves to offer
scope for variation while being precise enough for comparison.
11.3 Pluralism in Practice and in Theory
The second guiding question concerns the relationship betwe.en
the three sea tenure systems and among the people who IdentIfy
themselves with these systems. I commence with a review of the
interactions between artisanal and mechanized boat fishermen
along the Coromandel Coast during fishing operations at sea.
Interactions with regard to a Common Pool Resource
The introduction of mechanized boats and trawling technology
along the Coromandel Coast had one unexpected effect. Inste~d of
venturing out to discover new offshore fish stocl~s, ~echanIzed
boat fishermen concentrated on the same inshore fIshmg grounds
plied by artisanal fishermen. Not. all parts ?f the coastline wer~
equally frequented, and some artIsanal fIshIng hamlets -- such as
Kalvimanagar suffered less from this incursion than othe~s.
However, the overall pattern was unmistakable; from the very m-
ception of mechanized boat fishing, artisan~l, and boat fishern:en
encountered each other while fishing at sea; 10 make the sItuatIon
even more problematic, both groups regularly targeted the same
species, mainly high-value ~hrim.p, AI! in all, they c~me t.o com-
pete within the same ecologIcal nIche (~uomI-NIkula 1985.155).
Schlager and Ostrom's (1993) analySIS of mterference between
fishing units is relevant to the clash between sectors as well. There
is Widespread evidence of technological externalItIes between the
sectors, mainly because mechanized boats damage artIsanal fIsh-
ennen's standing nets. Artisanal fishermen also complam that
mechanized boats, which are more mobile and have a large catch-
ing capacity, are emptying the sea of fish. Tl~ey believe this will
necessarily affect their futures too (appropnatlOn externalItIes).
Coromandel Coast Fisheries in Perspective 347
Finally, assignment externalities occur. For exalnple, because
mechanized boats are able to react more quickly to news about a
school of shrimp, these fishermen reap a disproportionate share of
the proceeds. The pattern of interference is not unidirectionat how-
ever, as artisanal fishermen also interfere with mechanized boat
fishing. They capture boats (technological externalities), catch fish
which otherwise might be caught in trawl nets (appropriation
externalities), and limit boat fishermen's freedom to fish where and
when they wish (assignment externalities). Negative externalities
are matched by feelings of antagonism and suspicion. Artisanal
fishermen distrust boat owners and their motives and feel are
often being short-changed. Boat owners, on the other hand,
that their boats are apprehended for no reason except for eXi:lmlpll;~,
to finance a local temple festival.
Economic collaboration offsets this process of negative inter·
action to a varying extent. I mentioned that cooperation takes
between mechanized boat and kattumaram fishermen in lift net
fishing. Incidental cooperation also takes place in transportation
to the fishing grounds, in the procurement of bait, in the sale of
catches, and in the provision of information on fishing spots. In
addition, a limited number of artisanal fishermen from the region
occasionally seek employment on mechanized boats.
The Fisheries Department's role in the interactions at sea is con-
spicuous by its absence. The relationships which it entertains with
both fishermen groupings are consequently modest. Of course there
is a certain amount of give and take: the Fisheries Department de·
livers services, loans, and welfare packages in return for goodwilL
pay offs, and general cooperation. Although exchange is mean-
ingfuL it is not from the viewpoint of individual fishermen, very
frequent or intensive. The relationship cannot be considered pro-
saic, however. I noted that the department is seen as the state patron
of the fishermen population, a caretaking role which regularly takes
its officers beyond the bounds of their regular duties. These officers
frequently develop a love-hate relationship with the population
they serve.
Converging Rule Systems
The physical interactions between mechanized boat and artisanal
fishermen were noted above. Here I take the argument one step
348 Marine Resource Management
further. I note that the dilemmas which arise from the usage of a
common pool resource and of a single ecological niche have a legal
dimension. After all, the parties involved tend to interpret phys-
ical interaction in terms of rights - 'We have the right to fish in this
place (in this fashion, for these fish) because ...'; an.d also that 'they
have (or do not have) these rights'. In the lI1teractIons ~nde.r ~on­
sideration, artisanal fishermen, for example, have certall1 0pll1lOns
about mechanized boat fishermen's rights to carry out fishing
operations in particular areas. Mechanized boat fishermen, ~n the
other hand, hold opinions about the rights of kattumaram fIsh:r-
men to obstruct mechanized boat fishing. Both fishermen parties
reflect on the right of the Fisheries Department to make rules and
to impose them. And the officers of the department. similarl~ h~ve
ideas about the privileges of goven1ment and the ng~ts of fIS~I~1g
parties as well.2 All parties occasionally call upon theIr authontIes
to enforce their standpoints.
Physical interactions therefore are by definition legal i:1ter-
actions. If the persons involved participate in and refer to a smgle
tenure system (as, for example, conflicting artis~nal fishermen are
likely to do, certainly if they are from the same VIllage) the proced-
ures are clear. There is agreement about the rules and the author-
ities who decide on them. Major problems arise when persons refer
to different rule systems and different authorities (i.e., when dif-
ferent rule systems converge). . .. ..
The various rule systems reflect lucid and confhctll1g ~pmll1ns
about the joint usage of inshore fishing grounds. A mIxture of
motives colour the attitudes of artisanal fishermen along the
Coromandel Coast about the operations of mechanized boats in
inshore waters. Chapter 4 described their confusion when boat fish-
ermen appropriated the right to fish inshore. After all, ope~ acce~s
is one of the tenets of the artisanal rule system too. 3 But so IS tern-
torial privilege. The fact that boat fishermen did not respect the
2 It is apparently for this reason that Schlag~r and Ost,rom (1993) speak of property-
rights regimes in coastal fishing. The term property mdlcates some kmd of pnv-
ilege for the group holding it. , Fishing Regulation Act, is the so-called three-mile rule. That clause
3 SveinJentoft points out (personal communication) that open access is a compon·
ent of artisanal fishermen's tenure systems all over the world. Open access has
generally acted to weaken their position with regard to the intrusion of modern
fishing vessels on their fishing grounds.
Coromandel Coast Fisheries in Perspective 349
directives of artisanal fishermen fuelled much discontent. I
served that it is likely, in view of the habit of limiting the usage of
deleterious gear types, that hamlet panchayats tried to prohibit
trawling in village waters in the early years of mechanized boat
fishing. The vestiges of such measures are still visible in contem-
porary rule systems. Two factors have thwarted the issuing and
upholding of such bans.
The legal dimension becomes complicated when boat fishermen
originate from the village where they fish. As they too are
members, artisanal fishermen cannot simply chase such boat fish.
ermen away from the fishing grounds. A panchayat ban too is dif-
ficult to impose when villagers themselves engage in boat fishing.
This quandary prompted at least a number of hamlet panchayats
to forbid village members to invest in or to work on mechanized
boats. Such bans form a plausible reason for the surprising lack of
labour mobility between artisanal and mechanized boat
along the Coromandel Coast.
The second factor is the power differential between the two fish.,
ennen groupings. Artisanal fishermen simply cannot exert control
over mechanized boat operations. Incapable of imposing their will,
artisanal fishermen have tended to allow their rules on mechanized
boat fishing to lapse into obscurity. There are exceptions, however.
Artisanal fishermen are often able, through their sheer numbers,
to prevent boat fishermen from joining in the inshore harvest of
schools of non-Penaeid shrimp.
Boat fishermen's position with regard to the usage of inshore
fishing grounds is easier to explain. The boat·owner association of
Royapuram has not attempted to regulate boat fishing in any major
way. Boat fishermen do not acknowledge the territorial claims
imposed by artisanal fishermen or, for that matter, by the state.
Nor do they accept the legitimacy of fines imposed if they are caught
fishing in inshore waters. However, they do accommodate them..
selves to the reality of countervailing forces and accept, for ex-
ample, the risk of being apprehended and penalized.
The main clause of the third rule systern, the Tamil Nadu Marine
prohibits mechanized boat fishing within a zone of three nautical
miles from shore. The three-mile rule firmly contradicts the mechan-
ized boat owners' dictum of open access. If it were properly imple-
mented, it would close off many of their best fishing grounds. The
350 Marine Resource ivianCl;lJement
tl)ree-mile rule was meant to protect artisanal fishermen. It can··
not, however, be said to represent or to duplicate an artisanal fish-
ing rule, although it does resemble the precepts issued by sorne
hamlet panchayats. 'rhe artisanal fishing rule systenl also does
not allow for the possibility of a blanket provision. Rather, it
allows each hamlet administration to make and to enforce its own
decisions.
In their original forms, the three rule systems thus contradict
each other, sometimes quite blatantly. Mechanized boat fishermen
are at the centre of the conflict. Their desire to participate in fish·
ing wherever catches are possible conflict~ with the restrictions of
the other parties. As the rules in this field are mutually exclusive,
they cannot be implemented at the same time, at least not in their
full form. Accommodations are therefore imperative.
The accommodations which have taken place between the three
rule systerns reflect the fact that boat fishermen are currently the
dominant party, both at sea and in the political arena. Artisanal
panchayats largely have dropped their agenda to regulate boat
fishing in inshore waters. Instead, they concentrate on obtaining
compensation for the damages which they incur in the process.
The Fisheries Department continues to pay obeisance to the Tamil
Nadu Marine Fishing Regulation Act. In practice, however, it re-
lies on a less ambitious body of regulatory conventions to settle the
problems which arise. Boat..owner associations too have made
adjustments. I noted several instances in which owner associations
in Royapuram temporarily underwrote the state's three-mile rule
or an artisanal panchayat's ruling. Such pronouncements coincide
with particularly heavy bouts of opposition from artisanal fisher··
men and serve to mitigate their resistance to trawling. POl' this
reason, it is appropriate to label them 'token rules'.
Relations between Authorities
The relationship between the artisanal fishermen administrations
of the Coromandel Coast and the boat-owner associations of
Royapuram, as well as between their' courts', is two-sided. I have
already highlighted the artisanal fishermen's antagonism towards
boat fishermen and the various measures which their panchayats
have taken to exert control. Boat owners and their associations have
often responded in kind and tensions have mounted, only to be
Coromandel Coast Fisheries in Perspective 35 t
defused by the concerted action of fishermen leaders in conjunc-
tion with government. But there is also a positive relationship be-
tween the two fishermen's authorities. The foundations hereof lie
in the recognition of their similar origin: the fishermen panchayat.
In formal interactions, representatives of the two authorities
each other as equals. Hamlet leaders thus address the boat-owner
association as a panchayat among panchayats and its leader as
village administration chettiyar or president. T'he latter responds
in kine!. This process of symbolic levelling denies the economic
differences and power ratios between the two parties as well as
the disparate nature of their organizations. In bridging these dif
ferences, these formalities have practical value. Levelling sanctions
the application of the traditional set of tools for the resolution of
supralocal problems to the conflicts between the two sectors. It also
reduces the problems which arise between them to the level of a
tough yet manageable family quarrel. Boat owners harp most on
the themes of fraternity. This is logical. A fundamental restructuring
of boat fishing practice is contrary to their economic interests. At
the same time, they are concerned with reducing the tensions which
this practice generates amongst artisanal fishermen and which
affect their business results.
The fact that the majority of fishermen of the Coromandel Coast
belong to one caste group makes it easier for them to posit social
unity. Fishermen's leaders have tended to deprecate the differences
not only between subcastes such as Sinna and Periya Pattinavar;
the predominant marine fishing caste groups in the region, but also
between all marine fishing castes of the state" and to merge them in
one social and political movement. A conceptual regrouping of this
kind, which serves larger political goals, is not unique to the fish·
ing profession in India (cf. Fuller 1996:24). It forms a convenient
ideology, however, with which to address the conflicts over mechan·
ized boat fishing.
There have been practical adjustments as well. The measures
which boat-owner associations took to streamline and to regularize
their non-state court system represent a concerted effort to contain
the clashes with artisanal fishermen. This attempt to keep the peace
increased artisanal fishermen's chances of obtaining compensation
for damages. I noted in chapter 7 that two-thirds of the cases
handled by the owner-association court today concern incidents
between representatives of the two groupings. This indicates that

3S2 Marine Resource Martl1;qement
the association court still has an important function in mediating
conflicts between the two sectors.
The parallel existence of three courts, which correspond to three
tenure systems, is the most obvious manifestation of legal plural--
ism in Coromandel Coast fisheries. State courts provided a plat-
form for concerted efforts by boat owners to nullify government
measures aimed at restricting mechanized boat fishing. I-Iowever,
these courts have hardly played a role in mediating fishing dis··
putes. This is at least partly the result of the crisis enveloping the
Indian court system (d. Baxi 1982). Rather than applying to a state
court, fishermen make use either of the hamlet panchayat system
or of the owner-association court to settle controversies between
themselves. Just which court system fishermen tend to engage
depends not so much on choice, or so-called 'forum shopping'
(Benda-Beckmann 1981), as on the outcome of a tug-of-war which,
by analogy, may be termed'forum wresting'. Artisanal and mechan~
ized boat fishermen agree on the principles of compensation. But
they also recognize that these principles are variously interpreted
by the courts in question. The practical difference between the two
is a matter of money; the damages awarded by a village panchayat
are always higher than those assigned by the owner-association
court. As the victims of a dispute between artisanal and mechan-
ized boat fishermen almost always belong to the former category,
each grouping tends to gravitate toward its own court system. The
result is a recurring struggle over where cases should be heard.
They are generally decided by shows of strength: if artisanal fish-
errnen are able to apprehend the offender and hold the boat for
ransom, the case is decided locally. On the other hand, if the boat
fishermen have been able to escape, artisanal fishermen have little
choice than to turn to the owner-association court. Only if conflicts
escalate does the option of a peace meeting with outside mediators
arise.
Legal Pluralism Revisited
This study gives rise to three theoretical reflections on the field of
legal pluralism. The first pertains to conceptions about the weight
of various parties in a legal pluralist configuration. I noted the
tendency of academics to ascribe a dominant position to the state
(Merry 1988). My material challenges the universality of this state-
Coromandel Coast Fisheries in Pmpertive 3S3
ment. In Coromandel Coast fisheries, the state is in fact the late-
comer. It is also the authority which is weakest where the struggle
for control is actually being fought - at sea. Both in terms of refine-
ment and of effectiveness, the strong legal systems in this configur-
ation are those belonging to fishermen. The state is therefore more
than obliged to take into account the 'semi-autonomous fields'
(Moore 1973) formed by alternative tenure systems. Here indeed,
as Wade (1988:36) says, 'the state continues to have a limited ability
to ... push aside or absorb systems of rule that stand in its way'.
The state's weak position in the field of inshore fisheries regula·-
tion should not, however, be taken as absolute or timeless, nor as a
sign of the industry's' economic unimportance' (Benda-Beckmann
1995:3). After all, the seafood export industry has become one of
the largest sources of foreign exchange in the country. Instead, I
argue that the state remains aloof because the present course of
affairs is in line with its priorities. These are twofold: a steady in-
crease of seafood production and exports, and the prevention of
excessive law and order problems. The reasoning seems to be that
as long as the industry continues 'to grow and fishermen author-
ities settle most disputes with a minimum of external inputs, there
is no need for the government to get involved.
Circumstances were very different in the first decades of the
blue revolution in marine fishing. The extent of change supports
my argument that the level of state involvement in a field corres-
ponds with its time-bound objectives. I observed that the govern-
ment of Tamil Nadu, and the Government of India as well,
considered the development of a mechanized boat sector in the
1950s and 1960s to be crucial to the modernization of the ind ustry.
Available data indicates that the boat sector's Viability could only
be ensured, however, if the state broke the artisanal fishermen's
resistance to allowing newcomers into their territory. The govern··
ment consequently made large investments of manpower, of funds
and of political credit to this end - much more than is necessary
now that the boat sector has become'established'.
However, the present condition is far fronl fixed, and shifts ma y
take place again. One reason for state involvement in fisheries regu-
lation the world over is the need for conservation of depleting fish
stocks. Despite the various signals that CoromandelCoast waters
have been affected too, the Tamil Nadu government, and the Fish-
eries Department with it, have preferred to look the other way.
354 Marine Resource ManrI:cfJement
Public admission of a resource problem might, however, result in
the fonnulation of new objectives and consequently trigger greater
efforts in the regulatory field (d. Phyne 1990).
My second topic for reflection concerns the focus of legal plur-
alist studies. In India and elsewhere, scholars in this field have con-
centrated on questions of law and normative ordering (Merry 1988).
In doing so, they have ignored the legal phenomena which adjoin
the field of management. The legal pluralism which exists in this
domain could, as a matter of fact, just as well be called manage-
nlent pluralism. 4 Some authors are moving in this direction.
Macaulay (1986) thus distinguishes 'private government' from
'public government'. Largely in line with my definition of a legal
system, he defines a private government as 'a formally defined
organization which makes rules, interprets them in the context of
specific cases, and imposes sanctions for their violation' (ibid.:446).
The relation between public and private governments is character-
ized by 'interpenetration, overlapping jurisdictions, and oppor-
tunities for both harmony and conflict' (ibid.:445--46).
The central concerns of the law and management discourses are
obviously related (d. Riggs 1964:57). Management systems, to the
extent that they deal with people, generally make use of rules and
rule enforcement to attain their objectives. In managernent too, the
practice of administration cannot be divorced from the authority
which is carrying it out. And vice versa, all purposeful law -- and
is not all living law purposeful for at least some participants?--
can be termed a form of management. As law and management
have so much in common, it need not surprise the onlooker that
their vocabularies are sometimes mingled. This is certainly the case
in the literature on fisheries. The terms 'customary management'
and 'folk management', obviously borrowed from the management
discourse, are used to describe the same phenomena known else-
where as' territorial use rights' or'customary inshore sea rights' -
terms that originate in the field of law.
I believe that a reorientation of legal pluralism to the intersection
between law and managenlent opens up new vistas. Such a combin-
ation would be particularly apt when the topic of study is the regul-
ation of common pool property resource usage, whether in fisheries
or otherwise.
4 As far as I know, 'management pluralism' does not exist as a concept.
Coromandel Coast Fisheries in jYel~rfJect;"Je 355
. It was observed in chapter 1 that much of the legal pluralist
dIscourse m IndIa centres on caste. Two bodies of thought exist
SIde by sIde, and cross-pollination between them has not yet taken
place. I here IS, fIrst of all, ample anthropological literature on tIle
legal, socIal, economic, and political functions of caste panchayats
and of more recently developed caste organizations. Authors in
this. field take an organizational approach but generally skip the
~OPIC of natural resource management. A second group of academ ..
ICS a.re centred precisely on this issue. They kick up some dust by
~scnbmg far--reachIng common pool resource management fun~.­
tlOns to. the caste system. Their orientation, however, is overly
culturaIrst and neglects the organizational dimensions of natural
resource management.
My study of Coromandel Coast fisheries connects the two dis-
Courses. It points out to the first school of thought that caste
p.anchayats and their organizational offshoots may, under certain
CIrcumstances, carry out important common pool resource man.
agement functions in addition to other roles. It tells the second
school that resource management is not simply a matter of cul.-
tural rnores but a question of organization.
Significantly, this study offers empirical support to the cultural
ecologists' contention that caste groups have traditions of common
pool resource management. My material adds to the discussion in
three other ways too. First, it points out that such practices cur-
rently may not be as rare as has hitherto been assumed. If sea ten-.
ure is indeed as common along the Corornandel Coast as my data
suggests -- and why should one assume that other coastal areas are
d,ifferent? - the meagre 'pockets' of resource management which
Cadgrl and Iye~ (1989:240) suppose exist are bUilding blocks of
a, new narratIve. Second, the tenure arrangements of the
Coromandel Coast are not the relics of former abundance but the
products of ongoing efforts to structure economic life in accord-
ance with changing circumstances. Although they may have ven.
erable roots, tenu~e arrangements are not old; they are constantly
bemg renewed. Fmally, these authors fall into the same trap as
many sea tenure scholars by imbuing management with a set of
values. As I observed above, management systems can serve a wide
vanety of purposes, not all of which accord with the priorities of
envlronrnental conservation. The hazardous tenure practices of
mechanrzed boat fishermen in I~oyapuram are a case in point. But
356 Marine Resource Management
so is the artisanal sea tenure system. Although harm to the fish
stock is an important consideration for artisanal panchayats along
the Coromandel Coast, I observed other motivations to regulate
fishing effort as well.
Why have the fishermen of the Coromandel Coast been so suc-
cessful in developing sea tenure arrangements? Under what cir-
cumstances could we expect other caste groupings to do the same?
I believe that habitation patterns present an important clue. It is
probable that the settlement of marine fishermen in small, profes-
sionally homogeneous, single-caste villages has given impetus to
the development of strong administrative structures for natural
resource use. The inclusion of a caste variable is important, as it
forms an addition to the usual collective actionists' shortlist (Ostrom
1990:88; Pinkerton 1994:318-·20; Wade 1988:215·-16). Various
authors (Baxi 1982; Cohn 1987; Dumont 1972; Wade 1988) have
noted that multi-caste habitation patterns in India are character-
ized by a lack of community identity and by weak village organ-
izatiOl~s. Single-caste villages, as the data on Coromandel Coast
fisheries demonstrates, offer more opportunity for clarity of iden-
tity, of authority, and of initiatives f~he common good. One could
hypothesize that where similar circumstances prevail, other caste
groupings too may have developed effective tenure systems. s
5 The situation along the coastlines of southern Tamil Nadu as well as southern
Kerala offers an interesting comparison with the Coromandel Coast. It also gives
some indication of how complex the issue of resource management actually is. My
impression is that the baseline situation, as far as the set-up of village administra-
tion is concerned, was relatively similar in all these regions (d. Houtart and Nayak
1988:4·-5; Thomson 1989). The Catholic Church, which gained a firm foothold in
the southern coastal zone from the sixteenth century onwards, precipitated a ma-
jor restructuring of society. The positioning of the parish priest at the centre of
hamlet affairs is the most significant factor in this process. It displaced the village
panchayat, redirected many older institutions ~ such as the village tax systems-
towards the' church, and possibly contributed to a weakening of the artisanal sea
tenure system. On the other hand, however, the church is a close knit, supralocal
organization. It appears to have contributed to the forging of an artisanal fisher-
men's movement which was far more effective in countering the intrusion of mecha-
nized boats than has been the case along the Coromandel Coast. See Ram (1991)
and A. Sivasubramanian (1996) for interesting analyses of the role of the church at
the hamlet level. Dietrich and Nayak (1989), Halfdanard6ttir (1993) and Kurien
and Achari (1988), and describe the role of the church in the emergence of a fish-
ennen's movement in Kerala.
Coromandel Coast Fisherie.r in Perspective 357
. My third reflection concerns the conceptual model of legal
alrsm and Its constituent elements that is, legal systems. In
ter I, I adopted a definition of a legal system which includes a set
of rules as well as an authority. This definition is contrary to that
used by authors who discuss law in terms of normative frame.-
works or varying institutional environments. The analysis of ten
ure systems along the Coromandel Coast appears to confirm the
aptness of my choice. First of all, only by including the structure of
underlying administrative entities in the analysis could these sea
tenu~e systems be spotlighted as evolving social entities subject to
polItIcal machll1ations as well as to practical constraints. Further-
more, this formulation helped to emphasize the fact that
systems of this kind are management frameworks in which the per..
sons of 'managers', and their organizational assets, are crucial to
H:e result Finally, it created 'a useful comparative perspective' to
dISCUSS dIsparate legal systems (Tamanaha 1993).
Most a.c~dem~cs in the legal pluralist field would probably agree
that adrrul1lstrat.lve structures should be included in the analysis.
Yet there IS a dIfference between 'including the institutional as..
pect' and putting it at the heart of a definition. The latter approach
makes the form of administration a measure for the identification
of a legal system. The fact that a legal system has two components
begs the question of the criterion. I would argue that the 'ultimate
gauge for the existence of a legal system is the existence not of
separate rule systems but of different loci of authority. Indeed,
authOrItIes are the origin of whatever rules are enforced. This rea-
soning implies that a ~ew authority, which still has to develop a set of
rules, could be recogmzed as a distinct legal system before it takes
any action. In ~ractice, one would probably not take this step, how..
ever: ~or the SImple reason that every authority has to prove its
~IabilIty m pr~ctice. And one of the ways to do so is by formulat..
mg and enforcll1g rules.
I turn now to the conceptualization of legal pluralism. In chap-
ter 1, I preferred to defll1e legal pluralism as a societal condition in
which various legal systems 'are applicable to identical situations'
(Vanderlinden 1972:19). For students of Common pool resource
usage, this formulation is attractive because it reproduces, on a
conceptualleve!, what is actually happening 'in the field'. In every
day hfe, vanous groups of users with different rule systems phys.
Ically converge on a single ecological niche. This formulation is
358 Marine Resoune Management
also relevant, however, as it presupposes friction between legal
systems and a likelihood of social dynamics. Phrased differently, a
definition of this kind contains the seeds of theory -- the very kind
of theory academics in the field of legal pluralism have hesitated
to develop. Cordell, who otherwise cannot be classified in the legal
pluralist school, formulates a hypothesis which concurs with the
above definition of legal pluralism. It is the inspiration for my third
guiding question.
11.4 Friction between Sea Tenure Systems
The third question in this book is inspired by Cordell (1984:321),
who writes the following: 'The inevitable collision of traditional
and modern fishing is not merely technological. It involves con-
verging, antagonistic systems of sea tenure. All participants are
vying to enclose and dominate the most lucrative fishinggrounds'.6
After converting this statement into a hypothesis, I asked whether
the frictions between sea tenure systems account for the conflicts
which take place between artisanal and mechanized boat fisher-·
men along the Coromandel Coast of Tamil Nadu.
I noted first that the activities of mechanized boat and artisanal
fishermen take place within the same ecological niche and that there
are negative interactions between them. I then argued that these
interactions are interpreted differently by the three authorities in-
volved. Each has its own staff apparatus, including a court, to deal
with events which come to its notice. Despite the accommodations
which have taken place, conflicts between rule systems and
authorities continue to exist. These differences translate into con-
flicts between individual fishermen or groups thereof. In a general
sense, the hypothesis, and Cordell's statement, therefore appears
to stand confirmed.
The adjective 'inevitable' in Cordell's statement raises a ques-
tion, however. It suggests that the collision between tenure systems
6 Note the use of the adverb 'merely' -the 'collision of traditional and modern
fishing is not merely technological'. While emphasizing the conflict between sea
tenure systems, Cordell appears to suggest that there is something called a techno-
logical collision as well. Rather than separating' technology' and' tenure' into two'
fields, I believe it is more fruitful to view them together. After all, a conflict of sea
tenure systems often involves a conflict of technology, and vice versa.
Coromandel Coast Fisheries in Perspective 359
is unavoidable and timeless. The evidence from the Coromandel
Coast belies this. It is clear that the relations between the two fish-
ermen groupings have improved significantly since the 1970s, when
tenslOns were at their peak. I argued in chapter 2 that four factors
are responsible for the amelioration of the relationship. The first
was the dIscovery of the Andhra Pradesh fishing grounds, which
caused the greater part of the mechanized boat fleet in Madras to
~nove north. Thereby, they unburdened nearby fishing grounds.
rh~n there was a constant increase in market prices for seafood,
whIch ensured artisanal fishermen of a reasonable income even if
they were catching less than before. Third, the mechanized boat
sector has witnessed a decrease in non-fishermen investors. This
precipitated a decline of social differences between mechanized
bo.at and artisanal fishermen and an increase in positive relation-
ShIpS to compensate for the negative interference between them
Finally, organizational developments contributed to a substantiai
weakeningof the artisa.nal fishermen's protests against boat fishing.
In addltlon to thIS hst of factors, I would argue that all parties
have gradually become accustomed to the existence of other ten.-
~re syste~s. Their horizon~ have ~)ecome, so to speak, more
p~unform . In the 1970s, artlsanal fIshermen still believed they
mIght be able to do away with the mechanized boat sector al-
together. .Boat fishermen, on the other hand, acted as if they could
afford to Ignore the problems of their artisanal compeers. Fisheries
Department officers, finally, articulated their version of the blue
r~volution and were not yet aware that events might take a very
dIfferent turn. All partles have realized since that the others
are there to stay, and, most importantly, 11~we adjusted. This
accommodatlon has helped to take some of the sting out of the
confrontation.
What implic.ations does this situation have for theory with
respect to confhcts be~ween fishing sectors? Most importantly, it
pomts out that the mCldence of strife is not, as Cordell would ap-
pear to suggest, the automatic result of a collision of sea tenure
~ystems but, rather, depends on a variety of conditions. These
mclude, fIrst of all, the intensity with which fishing practices con-
verge. The implic~tion is that the higher the rate of convergence,
the more the confhcts that are likely to occur. A second factor is the
development of landing prices for seafood. The effects hereof are
various and open. I-ligher prices may contribute to an aggravation
360 Marine Resource ManaBement
Coromandel Coast Fisheries in Perspective 361

of a conflict but also to its mitigation, while lower prices may do grounds, as well as the pattern of accommodation which has
the same? Then, the existence of positive ties between the antagon- developed between them. However, accommodation between ten..
istic parties may blunt whatever conflicts arise, whereas their ab- ure systems does not mean there is cohesion or focus. The tenurial
sence may encourage disputes. Fourth, the duration of the conflict patchwork quilt currently covering inshore waters is the inadvert-
has some predictive value for the chance that adjustments will oc- ent result of the interactions of three parties. Thus, this overlay
cur. A final factor is the extent to which the parties have organized lacks a locus of synchronization and control as well as a common
themselves and the state of these organizations. set of objectives. This is one of the new conditions, and a major
problem, affecting the industry.
11.5 Epilogue There is a trend in the study of fisheries to seek the improve.
ment of resource management by consolidating control efforts. This
In a reflection on developments in the fisheries of Malaysia, which collaboration process, which involves the alignment of state and of
resemble the fisheries of the Coromandel Coast in more ways than fishermen's tenure systems towards a common set of goals, is gen-
one, Anderson argues that' a tragedy of the commons is a loss of erally called co-management. Co-management may be a worth-
control' (Anderson 1987:337, my emphasis). His choice of wording while strategy for Coromandel Coast fisheries as well, and its
is significant. From his point of v;iew, control is the key factor ex- possibilities need to be more carefully explored. If anything, how-
plaining the incidence or absence of a common pool resource dis- ever, this study has pointed out how disparate the various tenure
aster. Means of control are assumed to be present at the outset, but systems are in operation. By implication, this study has revealed
they dwindle in the course of time due to a specifiC: array of cir- the difficulty of bringing them together. As it is, there is one sea
cumstances. and three contenders.
Fishermen of the Coromandel Coast follow a strikingly similar
line of reasoning. They interpret negative developments in the in-
dustry, but also in their communities, as the result of a decline of
kadduppaadu (discipline or control). They are referring generally
to a temporary - or sometimes more permanent - weakening of
non-state authorities. This breakdown of administration in the fish-
ing hamlets and urban neighbourhoods enables individuals to fol-
low their private inclinations without fear. However, a loss of
control has also beset the fishing industry as a whole. With the
arrival of two new parties on the fishing scene and the introduc-
tion of new tenurial arrangements, fisheries have been deprived of
the focus which was available before, when artisanal fishing ad-
ministrations had clear prerogatives. I have described the conflicts
which followed the converging of artisanal fishermen, mechanized
boat fishermen, and the Fisheries Department on inshore fishing

7 Van Ginkel (1993:2) underlines the importance of the market for the structure

and development of fishing economies. He significantly positions fishermen be-

tween the Scylla of a fickle environment and the Charybdis of an equally unreli-
able market, both of which influence their survival strategies. Also see Van Ginkel
1998.
Appendices
 Appendix 1

Research Methodology

The following pages describe the organization of the research project and
the methodology applied when gathering data among mechanized boat
and artisanal fishermen and from the Fisheries Department. This appen-
dix concludes with a few remarks on the gender focus of the project.

The Or;ganization ofResearch

My research design leaned heavily on the inputs of two young university-

educated assistants, K. Subramanian and K. Karunaharan, who were loyal
to the project from beginning to end. One was assigned the Madras fishing
harbour, the other a fishing village; each spent the major part of every
working day at his research site, following up specific assignments or
more general tasks. In the first months I joined each of them for at least
one day a week. The weekly debriefing and discussion sessions provided
an opportunity to synchronize our efforts. As time went on and they
became familiar with the topic as well as with my intentions, they both
became more self-reliant. Their' dail y news' provided many of the leads
for interviews and investigations, which I then carried out. I tried to visit
each location regularly, thereby getting a feel for developments and build-
ing up friendships with fishermen and other people.
These two permanent assistants acted as my anthropological feelers,
so to speak, within sections of the fishing population. My role was basic-
ally to spread myself thin over the various research sites and topics, roam··
ing back and forth by motorcycle and maintaining oversight and control.
At the same time, however, I was involved in grassroots fieldwork myself.
This meant going along on fishing trips, attending marriages and dispute
settlements, and developing friendships with people from various walks
of life.
The Fisheries Department became more or less my own niche WIthin
the field. The main reason for me to choose that domain was that, with
my white skin and foreign university affiliation, I enjoyed a status which
opened doors that were closed to local students. The fact that English was
the primary medium of communication within the department also justi-
fied this division of labour.
Although my spoken and written Tamil is good by western stand-
ards - a result of the fact that I grew up in northern Sri Lanka and South
India and carried out earlier research on fisheries in the region - it did
not suffice for the more intricate interviews. The fisherman dialect of
Madras posed further hurdles. For this reason, I generally asked my
366 Marine Resource Managernent
permanent assistants or a freelance woman assistant to translate conver""
sations on site" Taped interviews (a minority of all exchanges) were tran""
scribed, translated and typed out by the latter. She also helped out by
translating documents as well as by doing more general secretarial tasks.
For shorter periods of time, I also employed a person from the trawler
fishing population to gather information on very specific topics.
But this was not all the assistance I had. A Dutch woman anthropolo-
gist, Saskia van del' Valk, carried out a three-month study on fishing
rights, which was completely integrated in the larger project. Kim
Frederiks, an advanced student in IIuman Geography from the University
of Amsterdam, contributed a very useful three-month study of the mechan-
ized boat-owner community in Madras. At its peak, the research team
(including freelance consultants) consisted of nine persons. Besides pro-
viding an enjoyable social environment, the availability of a team was
critical to the research design.
The Mechanized Boat Fishermen ofRoyapuram
The fishing neighbourhoods of Royapuram are chaotic and labyrinthine.
It was immediately clear that, in order to gain coherent insights, I would
have to develop a selective research strategy. After a general orientation
on the area and the kinds of activities taking place, I selected five mechan..
ized boats, the owners of which were willing to participate in an activity
register. These boats more or less represented a cross-section of the fish-
ing industry in Madras. The assumption was that if we could follow their
movements on a daily basis, we could gain an understanding of patterns
and dynamics in the industry as a whole. One of the prime responsibil·"
ities of my assistant in Royapuram for over a year was therefore to get
hold of the information necessary to fill in the activity register forms. He
was able to accomplish this seemingly simple yet Herculean task only
through extreme perseverance. Boats departed and arrived at unexpected
hours. Owners could often not be found. And their information - if at all
forthcoming - was not always reliable. Some told blatant lies. To com-
pensate for the gaps and inaccuracies, we developed a system of cross-
checking information through a variety of sources: owners, accountants,
drivers, and regular crew members.
But the activity register yielded more than what was recorded in the
forms. Our regular contacts with the members of five fishing units formed
an important source of more general information regarding the boat fish-
ing population. Through their words and behaviour, these persons - aug-
mented with others - increased my understanding of a variety of processes
and incidents. The activity register was therefore a cornerstone in our
study of Royapuram.
Appendix 1 367
Monitoring the activities of dominant fishermen organizations became
another cornerstone. We attended meetings and demonstrations, listened
in on dispute settlement sessions, noted decisions, and followed up their
reception in the area at large as well as in government circles. As time
went on and our understanding of local affairs increased, so did the wari-
ness of some boat fishermen leaders towards my research. This ultimately
resulted in us being barred from certain gatherings.
Much of our work in Royapuram amounted to playing it by ear. Hear-
ing of an interesting dispute or debate, we would follow it up from differ""
ent angles. Because I also wanted to document the history of mechanized
boat fishing in Madras, current issues would frequently form the starting
point of a discussion on the past. But not everything was done this way. I
also initiated three limited surveys among boat owners, drivers, and crew
members to find out more about their backgrounds and social character-
istics. The selection of respondents for these surveys presented special
difficulties. Whereas the mechanized boat-owner association maintains a
list of boat owners and their addresses, which facilitated drawing a
sample,l no such register existed for drivers and crew members. As these
men are generally out at sea, I ha~ to make do with people we chanced to
meet, keeping in mind a certain balance between categories such as the
kind of boats they worked on.
The Artisanal Fishermen ofKalvimanagar
In view of the scarcity of information on the existence and workings of an
artisanal sea tenure system, I took the decision to focus on one hamlet at
an early stage. But how to select it? The maximum distance from Madras
(50 km) was dictated by our limited travel facilities. I eliminated the re·"
gion north of the city because artisanal fishing here has been severely
disrupted by coastal erosion. The southern reaches. remained. My first
step was to make a quick inventory of the first twenty/hamlets, looking at
size, the importance of fishing in the local economy, and the extent of city
influence. Within two weeks, I made my choice for a settlement called
Kalvimanagar.
No bigger contrast with the hustle and bustle of I\oyapuram can be
imagined. Kalvimanagar is small, green, and quiet; life in the village has
a completely different pace than in the city. All in all, this setting is far
I The boat"owner association possesses a more or less complete list of mechanized
boats with their respective owners. But how to sample it? Taking every -nth boat
on the list would proVide a bias towards the big boat owners. The solution chosen
was to divide the list into segments and select a number of boats in each, making
sure (by means of key informants) that various economic categories were equally
represented.
368 Marine Resource Management
more conducive to a classical anthropological approach. The first act of
research, after an introductory meeting with notables, was therefore (I
remember the feeling of 'here goes the mad anthropologist') to pace off
the lanes and draw a map of the settlement, numbering each of the house
plots we encountered. This was followed up with a small door-to-door
survey to find out name, age, occupation, and place of birth of each house-
hold member. The map and household survey together formed the foun-
dation of further work: in the course oUhe next fifteen months, we repeat-
edly made use of their results.
A more difficult decision was whether or not to make a kinship ge-
nealogy. As this is a labour-intensive process, I initially opted against it--
after all, we had plenty of other things to do. In the course of the year,
however, while wondering about the origin of various conflicts which
racked the village, the issue re-emerged. It was the insistence and interest
of my assistant on site which decided the matter: he would try to group
the village households into kinship groups and also look into their his-
tory. This exercise proved immensely valuable: not only did we discover
hawaII kinds of current conflicts could be analysed as struggles between
patrilineages, we also found out how tpe traditional system of adminis-
tration and status is linked to kinship. However cursory the exercise, it
opened up a whole new avenue of research.
Parallel to the registration of mechanized boat activity in Royapuram,
I also selected five fishing units in Kalvimanagar for daily observation.
This proved far easier than in the city. Volunteers for each category of
craft (motorized/unmotorized; richer/poorer) came forward and gener-
ally proved reliable. However, it proved easier to find respondents from
the better-off segments than from poorer ones, and motorized craft were
better represented than non-motorized ones.
I initiated one other survey in Kalvimanagar: a random sample of twenty-
five heads of household (16 per cent of the total number) to look into
issues of gear ownership, labour history, future perspectives and economic
status. At a later stage, these twenty-five families were ranked by three
key informants as belonging either to the village poor, middle class, or
rich. These statements corresponded with each other, and with our own
impressions, and came to form the basis of a model of social stratification.
A study of a marine community inevitably means going out to sea:
waking up in the middle of the night, launching a craft, getting soaked in
the breakers and seasick later on, clumsily helping to pull in the nets, and
engaging in small talk in between. It entails looking into navigation tech-
niques, fishing methods, and fishermen's knowledge and"perceptions of
the sea. Obviously, such topics do not fit in survey forms. Instead, I found
my research to develop as ripples in a pool, leading outward from one
topic to the next. Thus, my study in Kalvimanagar progressed from the
Appendix I 369
basics (what parts does a craft have and what are they called, how do
they work, how much do they cost, where do the fishermen go for fish-
Ing, etc.) to fishmg nghts, the history of nets and craft, religion, trad-
ItlOnalleadershlp, and other topics.
The major fight in Kalvimanagar in the period of research, for exam-
ple, had nothing to do with fishing and everything to do with land. But to
what extent would it be wise to stick my nose in this matter? The practi-
calities of research were such that the topic could not be skirted: the quar-
rel was on everyone's mind and everyone, including ourselves, got
embrOiled m It. But our attention for the land issue also bore fruit. The
crisis in village administration which it revealed increased our under-
standing of the normal decision-making process and highlighted the
capacities and limitatIOns of village administration.
The Fisheries Department
From the very beginning, I spent a substantial amount of time at the
department, studying documents and talking to officers in various pos-
ItIOns. We discussed topics ranging from the history of the blue revolu-
tion in Tamil Nadu and the structure of the department, to their individual
tasks, and their sources of pride and frustration. As time went on friend-
ships and trust developed. '
The tracing of government regulations and court orders in the field of
marine fisheries formed a research project in itself. Not only were rele-
vant papers difficult to unearth. The next step was to determine their
range and value. It was therefore of great satisfaction when pieces of the
puzzle fmally started to fall in place and a sequence of events could be
reconstructed.
Finally, I regularly discussed incidents in the fishing hamlets and com.
mumties With the officers in charge. In this way, I I~.arned about their
opmlOns and strategies. The pinnacle of my research was the invitation to
join a peace meeting with regard to a fishing conflict in Madras. This
provided direct insight into the aims and approaches of various parties.
Broadening the Scope
To achieve a more representative understanding of the fisheries situation
along the Coromandel Coast, however, the scope of research had to be
extended beyond Royapuram and Kalvimanagar. My work in the Fisher,
les Department was a step in the right direction. Talking with officials
about the modernization of fisheries and the development of a legal frame-
work to handle problems automatically took me beyond'the confines of
any locality.
370 Marine Resource ManaBcment

Appendix: 1 371
The same was true of work in a more historical vein, A study of news-
paper archives over the past 20 years gave insight in fisheries issues which A Male-oriented Project-·-Causes and Obstacles
had come to public attention, Interviews with key players in Tamil Nadu
(ministers, government officials, fishermen leaders, and others) filled in Writi~g about the southern part of Tamil Na ' ' ,
the gaps and increased my comprehension of the social dynamics in the far-reachIng separation b t du, I\am (1991) descnbes tIl('
th h e ween male and fem I .
process of development. For fear of over extending myself, some plans WI In t e fishing communit Her. a e spaces and occupations
for historical research were also discarded, Although various archives in bndging the gap from th y. ,study demonstrates the difficulty of
t k e women s SIde wI '
Madras promised to yield interesting documents on the older history of 'a en as an example of a r I " ,1ereas mme could well be
. d' " , c na e-onented stud Th'" " ..
the fishing population, I decided against protracted archival work be- Ia Ical SOCIal dIVIsion wh' h y. L, SItuatIOn reflects "I
IC cannot be span d b ' 'C
cause of the amount of time that required. Similarly, the material con- tIler sex. ., ne y one researcher of ei-
tained in court libraries was largely left aside, The gender bias in my stud' . ,
The scope of my research was extended in various other ways too. A could have made some cor; t Y Ibs noft Just skIn dee.p , however, After all I
, ec IOn y, or exampl> I ' '
few field trips down the coast gave me a sense of the terrain and the aSSIstants. As it turned out I ' d ,e, emp oyIng more women
. ' , receIve my mal' b
differences it encompassed, A more systematic study followed towards perspec,tIve from the 0 t h n mputs a out the female
u c Woman anthropolo "t () h '
the end of the research period, when we made a random sample of twenty- ' were co II ected from my ow ' t. ' . gls. t er Impressio'ps
nIn erVlew 'thf l .,
one fishing villages along the Coromandel Coast and carried out a one- few and far between. Why? M resea s WI ,IS \erwomen. But these were
day survey of each. This exercise gave me an impression of the composition male domain. The beach a d Yth '. rch tOpIC largely coincided with the
n e sea are male" . "
of the fishing population, its administrative structure, the kinds of fish- women. And the activity of f h' "paces, rarely visited by
cat h ' IS mg - other than th I
ing carried out, etc. It must be emphasized that no such overview had . c ,'-IS a male occupation, the details o f ' e mar <eting of the
been made before. oblIvIOUS of. It is only whe f' h ' ,whIch women are often (kept)
tl n IS enes spIll over' t h
A major expansion of the study took place when the opportunity 1at women sometimes playa role. . , In 0 t e general domain
arose-after 10 months of fieldwork~to initiate a comparative village
analysis. By that time, I was convinced that the situation found in
Kalvimanagar was not wholly representative for the wider fishing com-
munity, and that it would be useful to carry out a parallel study in an··
other village with different characteristics. I finally settled for a small and
more isolated hamlet towards the border of Andhra Pradesh, located along
the mechanized boat fishermen's busy passageway to prime fishing
grounds. The study Saskia van del' Valk carried out in this village over a
period of three months focused on fishing rights, with substantial atten-
tion towards religion and gender. One of the most important sets of
insights concerned the workings of village administration when un-
encumbered by crisis.
One other attempt at obtaining a broader perspective is worth men-
tioning. In the very last month of research we organized a meeting of
fishermen's leaders from various hamlets in the surroundings of Madras
on the functioning of village panchayats, The session proved useful for
the people involved (who were often not aware of the situation in other
hamlets) as well as for my understanding of the issue,
 Appendix 2 Appendix 2 373

Coromalldel Coast Survey Results

The survey of fishing villages along the Coromandel Coast was carried
out in the period between September 1995 and May 1996. The sample
was made by selecting every tenth fishing village along the coastline. One
day was spent visiting each site. Information in each village was gather-
ed from village notables, as well as through our own observations (number
of craft, etc.). Secondary sources were also consulted.

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
General 10
14 15 16 17
General Character isol. u.fr urb u.fr u.fr isol isol isol isol 18 19 20 21
Population' 269 418 3,335 1,059 545 155 220 199 457 u.fr u.fr urb u.fr iso] isol isol
Number of 498 888 isol iso! u.fr isol isol
3029 1,239 967 145 87
Fishermen* 70 122 494 252 137 43 73 50 93 1,540 465 1,194 737 1,037
Number of 157 322 912 155 236 33 17
Salaried Persons 3 20 800 ? 54 0 018 321 145 32] 198 289
Caste MjP P P P P P P Van P 15 10
P P
150 50 12 o 40 o 4 1 1 100
Pi/K PijK Pi p P
Fishing P P P P Sem
Number of
Kattumarams 60 52 380 169 83 55 30 60 100
Percentage of 60
Kattumarams
150 o 50 116 o o 430 60 85 200 0
Motorized 70 4 8 3 ~ 2 80 37 6
Number of 3 o
Mechanized
o 6 100 o o 35 42 82 30 0
Boats 0 47000 o 0 0
Number of o 1
Fibre-glass Boats 0 o 1 000 000
50 16 0 o 3 15 20
Is there a Ban
20 o
4 42 10 0 0
on the Ray 20 o o o o o 4
Fish Net? yes no yes dorm yes no yes ?
Are there ?
Conflicts with dor no no no ? ?
Mechanized
Boats? yes
Political Set-up yes yes yes yes
Is there a
Panchayat
System in
__ !,lac~_~~_2'-~~
__ ~~~ __ yes _yes Y:'~_jes_
374 Marine RcsourceManagement
Appendix 2
Appendix 2 (Continued)

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
Is there a 20 21
Non-state
Tax System?
no yes yes Y y
What is the Y Y Y y y y y
Type of Tax
leas irr leas irr irr fish leas leas leas
none irr irr irr irr leas irr irr leas irr leas
Opinion irr
What is the
Trend in
Catches
1985··95? dow dow dow dow dow dow ? up dow
dow dow same up dow
Reasons for dow up dow dow dow dow dow
the Trend
in Catches? bids blp blp bids b blp tech bids
b b b b
What is the b tech b bids b/p b/p b
Trend in
Incomes
1985-95? up up up up up up up up up
Source: *Tamil Nadu figures, Director of Fisheries (1982).
Village Names
Figures Union Territory of Pondicherrry: Government of
1'" Vairavankuppam
Pondicherry n.d. 12 == Singarathoppu
2 == Kasikoilkuppam
Code 13 '" Periakuppam
3 = Nochikuppam
General character: isol == isolated; u.fr = urban fringe; urb = urban. 14'" Pudukuppam
4'" Thiruvanmiyur
Caste: P = Pattinavar; M == Mudaliyar; H == Harijan; Van == Vanniyar; 15 = Pillumedu
5 == Kalvimanagar
Pi == Pillai; K = Karaiyar; Sem = Sembadavar. 16 == Keezhakkarai
6 == Vemburushamkuppam
Ban on ray fish net: ? = unknown; dor = dormant ban; Y = active ban. 17 == Chinnangudi
7 == Palayanadukuppam
Non-state tax system types: leas == leasing of right to trade in one or more 18 == Kalikuppam
8 == Muttukadukuppam
seafood products to one or more persons in exchange for sum of money; 19 == Samanfhanpettai
9 '" Mudaliyarkuppam
irr = irregular collection of taxes, generally prior to the temple festival; 20 = Vanamadevi
10 '" Kanagachettykulam
fish = tax on daily fishing operations. 21 '" Kodiakadu
11 == Pudukuppam
Trend in catches 1985-95: dow == catches have gone down; up = catches
have gone up.
Reasons for trend in catches: b == activity of mech. boats; p == industrial
pollution or wastes from aquaculture; ds == activities of deep-sea vessels;
tech = improved technology.
Trend in incomes: dow == average incomes have gone down; up == average
incomes have gone up.
 Glossary 377

pangaali a patrilineal relative.

pangaali group a social group encompassing all relations in the
male line of descent.
Royapuram the fishing area of North Madras where the
GLOSSARY mechanized boat fishing harbour is located.
tangal boat a fairly large mechanized boat (33-49 ft) that
g~es out for fishing trips of several days dur-
atIon.
benami a relationship in which, unknown to the out- varattavechchi woman who auctions fish in Royapuram fish-
side world, a possession is nominally registered ing harbour.
in someone's name.
chettiyar fishing village headman's honorary title.
day boat a fairly small mechanized boat (24-32 ft) that
goes out for day trips only.
driver the skipper of a mechanized fishing boat.
Gram Panchayat a statutory village council installed by govern-
ment (to be distinguished from a non-state vil-
lage panchayat).
kachaavalai a small hoop net used to catch sea snails.
kadaloorum the commercial centre in Royapuram fishing
harbour.
kaddai panchayat a panchayat circle meeting at which the chair-
man has a decisive voice.
kattumaram the artisanal fishing craft predominating along
the Tamil Nadu coastline.
kuppam a fishing hamlet.
lascar a crew member on a mechanized fishing boat.
manivalai a three-walled trammel net.
marattukaarar a member of the shore crew in mechanized boat
fishing.
masula boat the plank-sewn craft used in beachseine fish-
ing.
mechanized boat the Indian term for trawler vessels 25-50 ft in
length.
paadu the stretch of beach utilized by a beachseine
group.
panchayat a village council not installed by the state (to be
distinguished from a Gram Panchayat).
panchayat circle a meeting of representatives from several vil-
lage panchayats.

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Achari, T.R.T., 24, 26, 66, 6'7, 356
Ad hoc Committee, 247-'71, 311, 326-
30,333-·34
Agrawal, AN., 58
AIADMK, 71, 91, 154, 246, 248, 253,
289-90
Akimichi, T., 27, 336
Alexander, P., 27, 30, 86, 87, 88, 99,
116,128-29,134,135,141,201,336,
342
Amarasinghe, 0., 203
Anderson, EN., 24,25,30, 360
Anderson, M.L., 24,30
Andhra Pradesh, 23--24, 47, 52, 56, 74,
91,95,186--93,203,205,211,213-
14, 222, 227--28, 231-38, 247-49,
264,317,332,359
Anugraham, D.D., 48, 49, 50, 51, 151,
159, 183
aquaculture, 45-46,55,81,84,106,198
artisanal fishermen associations, 69,
70,75,159,298-99
artisanal fisheries sector: general, 48,
65-67, 339, 343, 348; corporate
membership, 143--48,164,166-67,
184, 256, 343; fibre-glass craft, 66-
67, 95; hook and line fishing, 95,
98; income and investments, 73, '74,
85, 98, 102-3, 104·-5; kattumaram
technology, 55-56, 66-67, 95·-96;
labour process, 96-98, 100-4; mar-
ket perspective, 102, 105-6; migra-
tion, 101;103-4, 127; motorization,
67, 96, 102--6, 118, 121, 164, 287;
net?, 65-66, 96-98, 130-33; village
meeting, 148-50, 166-67, 256;
women,84,87-88,91-92,145
common pool resource dilemmas, 28--
29, 42, 346-48
Comte, M.C., 56
Cordell, J.c., 24, 27, 28, 31, 42, 336, 358
Coromandel Coast, 47-56, 293-95,
313, 336-38, 345, 351, 355, 361;
marine environment, 47--48, 52-·55,
94·95,99-101,301
courts, governrnent, 157, 229, 259,
269·-270,294-95, 297, 353
Cuddalore, 61, 199, 206, 262, 265-66,
Bailey, c., 24, 31 269-70
Bailey, F.G, 32, 34
Bardhan, P., 288 Dalton, G, 27
Barth, F., 118 Daniel, E.V., 117, 124
Baud, 1.5.A., 57 deep-sea fishing, 44, 182, 202, 249--51,
Bavinck, M., 24, 96, 133, 160, 164, 193, 331
194,196,215 Department of Fisheries, Tamil Nad u,
Baxi, U., 36, 38, 51, 155, 327, 352, 356 48,50,53,57,279,280,283,286
Bay of Bengal Programme, 53, 59, 66, Dhananjayan, R., 50
276 Dietrich, G, 299, 356
Bayly, S., 115 Dijk, F.M. van, 196, 215
beachseine: general, 81, 83, 99, 100, Dinamalar, 319
101, 120, 125-26, 127-29, 320-21; Directorate of Fisheries, Tamil Nadu,
beachseining rules, 127--29, 141 48, 58, 68, 200, 289
benami, 64, 69, 199, 259, 263-64, DMK, 70, 246, 253, 289
69 Douglas, M., 116
Benda-Beckmann, F von, 28,32, Drewes, E., 88
33,35,37,337,344,353 Dumont, L., 51,142,143,356
Benda-Beckmann, K. von, DWiponggo, A., 24
Benjamin, 200 Dyer, c.L., 27
Berkes, F., 31
Blake, BA, 49, 92, 228, 2'76, 284, 311 Firth, R., 86, 87, 90
blue revolution, 46, fish marketing: auction, 1(J2, 105, 203,
359 238; credit, 100, 105-6, 117, 201,
Breman, J., 79 203-5; exports, 56-·57, 201-2, 301,
313, 353; preservation, 61-62, 67,
Carrier, J.G, 31 106; lease of marketing rights, 146-·
Central Marine Fisheries Research In- 47; market regulation, 236-38, 332;
stitution (CMFRI), 26, 53, organization, 105-6, 202·-4; price
Chandran's Association, 247-54, 259, developments, 46, 68, 236-37, 262,
265-67,269,328-30,333 359; role of women, 84, 203-4, 371;
chettiyar, 90,150-56,161,164,253,351 traders associations, 204, 241;
Chopra, B.N., 58 transportation, 62--63
Christy, F.T., 26,28,31 FISHCOFED, 281-283
Cohen, A.P., 94, 143 fisheries conflicts: general, 24--25, 358;
Cohn, B.s., 39, 51, 356 Tamil Nadu, 69-75, 121, 135-36,
collective action theory, 28,39-40.356 300-302,307,312-13,315-24,336
Index 391
Fisheries Cooperative Societies, 64·6~j,
144, 150,] 54·-55, 167, 282-83
fisheries crisis, 25-26, 353-54
Fisheries Department: general, 65-67,
276-82,296--97,302·-3,305-6,309,
312, 338; corruption, 288, 303; en-
forcement of three-mile rule, 229·
31, 298--·306; fishermen housing
programme, 81, 285--86, 293;
peace-keeping efforts, 234-·35,
314-24, 334--36, 342, 353; percep
lion of fishermen, 309-15, 318,
323--24,330-·31,347; promotion of
mechanized boat fishing, 58--62,
63-65, 109, 137, no, 228; registra
tion of mechanized boats, 69, 71,
185,224,260,267-68,282,295---97,
303, 324-32; relation with fisher--
men associations, 230··-31, 233·-35,
238, 243, 248, 255, 260, 308, 324,
326--32,343; relation with realm of
politics, 288-92, 305, 307, 322, 32'7,
333; saving--cum--relief scherne,
286, 291, 293; subsidies 63-64, 68,
96, 287; welfare programmes, 282,
284--288, 309
fisheries development: Kerala, 24, 26,
30,62,73-74,262,304,356; south-
ern Tamil Nadu, 45, 49-50, 53, 56,
144,229,294--97,310,321,356
fisheries legislation, 229, 263, 275-76,
293-296,308,325,340-42
fisheries bJolitics, 70-74, 181, 212, 233,
240, 241-43, 246-47, 251-55, 257,
260, 271, 281, 288--92, 298--300,
306-·7, 333-34
fixed-lure fishing (kambivalai), 99,
125-126,127
Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO), 26, 54,57, 58
Forests and Fisheries Department,
Tamil Nadu, 64
Foster, C.M., 113
Fuller, c.J., 351
Cadgil, M, 39, 40, 355
Galanter, M., 32, 33
Gille-t, P, 66
392 Marine Resource Management
Ginkel, R van, 30, 114, 360 machine politics, 288-89, 292, 307, 343
Gnanambal K., 39 Madras Fisheries Bureau, 49, 53, 55,
Goody,J., 86 151
Government of Pondicherry, 48 Madras Institute of Development
Griffiths, J., 32, 33, 35 Studies, 48, 53, 179, 283, 284, 289,
Guha, K, 39, 40 298,302,303,339
Madras Port Trust, 183
Halfdanard6ttir, J., 356 Madras riots (1977-78), 23, 71-74, 76,
Hardgrave, R.L. Jr, 39, 159 224,232,246,262,295
Hayden, R.M., 39, 149, 156 Mahadevan PilIai, P.K., 54
Hiltebeitel, A., 50, 116 Malhotra, K.e., 39
Hindu, Tile, 72, 80, 319 Mandelbaum, D.G., 38, 39, 142, 149,
Holmgren, S., 55 150, 151, 156, 157, 158, 159
Hooker, M.B., 38 Marine Fisheries Information Service,
I-lomeli, J., 55, 56, 97, 99 54,58
Houtart, F., 356 Marine Products Export Development
Authority (MPEDA), 56-57, 59,
image of limited good, 113,119, 135, 61-62,66,71,107,186,202,287
339-40 Marketing and Research Group, 203
Iyer, P., 39,40,355 Mathew, S., 24, 25, 147
McCay, B., 25, 28
Jentoft, S., 25, 348 McEvoy, A.F., 28, 30, 190, 211, 213
Jeyakumar, Minister, J., 243, 247, 255, McFarlane, J.W., 26
289,334 McGean, B., 40
Joel, J.J., 66 McGoodwin, J.R., 25, 27, 30, 31, 87, 98,
Johannes, R.E., 26, 31 112, 114, 119,135, 144, 190, 193,
Jorion, P., 30 207,208,213,214,280,335,344,345
mechanized boat sector: general, 43,
Kalavathy, M.H., 202 48,59-61,68-70,339,344,348;boat
Kalland, A., 30 owner associations, 75, 138, 182,
Kanyakumari (Cape Comorin), 47, 66, 197-·99, 215-17, 220-27, 230-32,
199,206,242 234-39,240-71,290,299-300,303,
:. Kan/l,>paiyan, V., 157 305, 308, 317, 326, 331, 333, 335,
kinship, 70, 89-93, 103-4, 109-10,123, 343, 351; day boats, 186-91, 197-
198,225,265,269,338 98,204,206,228; fishing in Andhra
Kullberg, R, 190 Pradesh, 74, 186-88, 192, 205,
Kurien, J., 23, 24, 26, 30, 56, 57, 65, 67, 213-14, 231-36, 264, 359; future
69,73,179,202,356 perspective, 197-200, 207, 213-15;
harbours, 60-61, 180-83, 218, 243;
land sale, coastal, 81-82, 85, 142, 148, immigrants and immigrant asso-
165-66 ciations, 183·-84, 199, 206-7, 241-
legal pluralism, theory, 32-40, 352-58 42, 257, 259, 261, 264, 268. 328;
lift net (idaivalai), 99-100, 120-21, 216, income and investments, 75, 195-
347 97, 200-201, 205-6; insider versuS
local knowledge, 98, 113-19, 130, 190, outsider debate, 198-99, 240, 247,
320 249,251-52,261-70,326,341, la-
bour process and orgamzation of
Macaulay, S., 354 fishing, 188-95,339, migration of
mechanized boat fishermen, 188,
261-63; owner association court;
163, 215-17, 222--28, 244-45, 249,
252-54, 257-58, 267, 331, 351-52;
role of women, 180, ] 92,225; risks,
191-92, 205; tangal boats, 186-91,
194-96, 198-200, 205-6; technol-
ogy, 59-60, 74, 188-89, 211
Menon, K.T., 56
Merry, S.E., 32, 35, 36, 38, 352, 354
Mines, M., 39, 157, 159
Moore, S.F., 32, 33, 34, 35,37,345,352
Myrdal, G., 73
myth of superabundance, 213-15,
339-40
Nambiar, P., 54, 284, 285, 287
National Fishworkers Forum, 73-74,
299 . Ramaml1rthy, S., 191
National Union of Fishermen, 242
Nayak, N., 299, 356
Nedelec, e., 60
Nicholson, F.A., 52, 55
Nieuwenhuys, 0., 87,145
Norr, K.F., 89
Ostrom, E., 28, 29, 37, 345, 346, 347,
356
Palsson, G., 212
panchayat, 89, 126-27, 130-33, 137,
141--69,245,255,315-16,319,322,
324,343,349--52,356
panchayat circle, 157--59, 165
Panchayat Union, 158,161, 163, 182,
220-21, 237-38, 240-46, 251, 255,
260,311
Pandian, L 147
Pandian, MS.s., 71
Pandurangan, S.,_ 188
pangaali group, 83, 89-91, 93, 110, 129,
151, 154, 165, 253, 25657, 265
Pannell, S., 3]
Pattinavar, 48-51, 83, ] 23, 158, 198,
265,351
Phyne, L 302, 354
Pinkerton, E., 25, 208, 356
Plalteau, J.P., 24
Index 393
Poffenberger, M., 40
Poggie, J.J. Jr., 1]4
police involvement in fisheries, 72,
146,155-57,161,234,260,282,304,
317-23
Pollnac, R.B., 114
Pondicherry, Union Territory of, 58,
61,91,275
Popkin, S.L., 113
Pradhan, M.e., 157
Pulicat Lake, 47, 146, 147, 158
Rajendran, I., 63, 202, 203, 237, 238
Ram, K., 85, 86, 87, 114, 144, 180, 193,
194,198,203,206,207,356
Ram, N., 70
Ramamoorthy, P.V., 188
Ramamoorthy, Y., 56,62,66,287
Ramesh, A., 53
Rangachari, K., 48, 49, 150, 151, 155,
158
Raychal1dhuri, B., 141, 342
relationship artisanal and rnechanized
boat sectors: accommodation,
106-7, 215-16, 218-19, 245, 347,
350,359-61; adjudication, 162-65,
227-28,231-32,294-95, 300--302,
312, 315-17, 342; ban of
mechanized boats, 108-10, 136,
349; capture of mechanized boats,
156,162,-65,223--24,231-36,316,
347; clasHes (Tamil Nadu), ]()7-8,
138,211-13,229--30,245,260,316-
17,347; clashes (Andhra Pradesh),
211,227-228,232-36,247,249,317
religion: Gangaiyamman, 50, 94, 115;
village deities, 93--94, 147; taboos,
ritual, magic, 114-19
Riggs, FW., 354
Ruddle, K, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 336
Rudner, D_W., 49, ]50
Rl1ohomaki, 0., 24
Sanjeevaraj, P.J., 54
Sathiadas, R, 200
Satyanarayana Rau, K., 54
Schendel, W. van, 86
394 Marine Resource Management
Schlager, E., 28, 29, 37, 345, 346, 347
Sch6mbucher, E., 50, 142
Scott, J.e., 288, 289
Scott, W.K, 35
sea erosion, 55, 81, 90, 367
sea tenure: artisanal system, 79, 87-88,
119-36, 147, 159-65, 340-42; gear
restrictions, 109-10, 112, 129·-35,
160··62, 212, 318-24, 349; market
regulation, 236-38, 341; mecha-
nized boat system, 208, 211-32,
340-42; open access; 28, 112, 119,
121-124,211-13, 340,348; sea ten-
ure studies, 26-32, 336-37, 344-46,
358-59; social boundary rules, 29,
123-24,210,264-70,325,330,341,
345; territoriality, 124-27, 138-39,
212,228,341,348-49
Silas, E.G., 52
Sinha, S.S" 40
Sivakumar, c., 157
Sivakumar, S.s., 70, 157
Sivasubramaniam, A, 356
Sivasubramaniam, K., 52, 54, 104, 144
snail net (kachaavalai) 160-62, 220,
318-24
South Areat District, 53, 206, 242, 277
Sridevi, c., 203
State Planning Commission, 46, 65
Stephen, G., 50, 82
Stirrat, KL., 87, 88, 141, 201, 203, 342
Subba Rao, N., 179, 200
Sudarsen, V., 146
Symes, D., 26
Tamanaha, B,Z., 32, 33, 34, 357
Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing Regula.
tion Act, 71, 229, 263, 275-76, 279,
281,293-98,300,302,306,314,325,
334-35,338,342,349
taxation, non-state system of, 146-48,
165,167,218-19,237,244,262,266,
356
temple festival, 93-94, 110, 150, 184,
234, 244, 347
Templeman, D., 39, 157, 159
Thirumilu, P., 97, 181 Maarten Bavinck is currently coordinator of the Center for Mari-
Thomson, K.T., 69, 87, 99, 112, 127,
time Research (MARE) and is attached to the Amsterdam Research
141,144, 179,188, 193, 194, 206,
218-19, 342, 356
Institute forClobal Issues and Development Issues (ACIDS) at the
three-mile rule, 73, 228-31, 276,294- Universiteit van Amsterdam, With an M.A. in development soci-
306, 333, 341, 349 ology (1981), he worked for many years as a consultant on devel-
Thurston, E., 48, 49, 150, 151,155,158 opment issues. Rejoining academia in 1994, he completed his
Tietze, U., 141, 342 doctoral dissertation in 1998.
time zoning, 294-97, 314
Tiwari, P5., 53
trammel net (manivalai) 66, 97, 120- Dr. Bavinck has enduring ties with.South Asia and a special inter-
21, 131-33, 162 est in fisheries. Having grown up in.'Sri Lanka and south India, he
Tuomi-Nikula, 0., 134, 346 frequently returns to the region for research. One of his stlldil~S
was published as Small Fry - The Economy Of Petty Fishermen in
Vanderlinden, L 33, 35, 36,337,357
Vijayan, AJ., 180, 188, 193 Northern Sri Lanka (1984).
Vincentnathan, S.c., 39
Wade, R, 28, 37,40, 51, 194, 208, 288,
291,292,303,352,356
Warriar, K.M., 48, 49, 50, 66, 70, 151,
155,184
Weber, M., 33, 34, 342
Wit, J. de, 71, 288
Zerner, c., 31
Zwart, F. de, 291