Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Judgments of Adminstrative Law
Judgments of Adminstrative Law
and political rights of the individual in a free society but also to estahblish certain social,
economic, educational and cultural conditions, under which his legitimate aspirations and dignity
may be realised”
“There would be an end of everything where the same man or the same body, whether of the
nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of extracting law, that of executing
the public resolutions and of trying the causes of individuals.”
Delegated legislation is an expression which covers a multitude of confusion. It is an excuse for the
legislators, a shield for the administrators and a provocation to the constitutional jurists.
---- Madison
If a new and sharp axe presented by Father Washington (the legislature) to young George (the
statutory authority) to cut timber from the father’s compound is tried on father’s favourite apple
tree, an abuse of power is clearly committed.-----------------
Edmund Burke
Rule of Law-
Separation of Powers
i. The same person should not form part of more than one of the three organs of government.
ii. One organ of the Government should not interfere with any other organ of the Government.
iii. One organ of the Government should not exercise the function assigned to any other organ.
a. Exclusivity principle which suggests structural division in all the three organs of a State
b. Functional principle which prohibits amalgamation and usurpation but not interaction of all
the three organs of State
c. Check and balance principle, meaning, thereby, that each organ of State may chack the other
to keep it within constitutional bounds.
d. Mutuality principle which means creating concord not discord, cooperation not confrontation,
engagement not estrangement amongst different organs of State to create a society of
constitutional image, which is a free, equalitarian, inclusive and rule of law society.
Functional overlapping
Judicial review is basic feature- Minerva mills Case, L Chandra, I.R Choelo,
Kihotto Hollohon v Zachillu
Art. 53 (1), 74, 79, 123, 85, 111, art. 75(3) art. 61 art. 124, 141, 145,
The administrative law and SOP go hand in hand with each other, having
common objective i.e., to decrease concentration of power in one hand and
to ensure there is no arbitrary use of power.
3 MP v Bharat Singh
6 D L Mehra v UOI 1992 The proposal of the Nagar Mahapalika, Lucknow to levy theatre tax,
Delegation of taxing @ Rs. 5 per cinema show held in a building assessed on annual
powers on local bodies- rental value of Rs. 10,000 or more and @ Rs. 3 per cinema show
effacement, held in a building assessed on annual rental value of less than Rs.
discrimination. 10,000 was accepted by the State Government by following the
procedure laid-down under the U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam,
1959. The Lucknow Nagar Mahapalika Theatre Tax Rules, 1965 were
framed and enforced with effect from December 15, 1965 and the
theatre tax was levied with effect from June 1,1967. The rate of tax
was increased from time to time and finally by a notification dated
October 30, 1979 the theatre tax was enhanced to Rs.25 per show
on all class-I cinemas with annual rental value more than Rs. 10,000
and Rs. 20 per show on all class II cinemas with annual rental value
of Rs. 10,000 or less.
The petitioners - the cinema owners/lessees in these Writ petitions
under Article 32 of the Constitution of India challenged the imposition
of theatre tax by the Respondent- Nagar Mahapalika, Lucknow,
contending that Section 172(2) of the Act was unconstitutional
because the legislature abdicate its function by delegating the
essential legislative powers upon the Nagar palikas to levy all or any
of the taxes enumerated in the Section; that the classification of
cinemas on the basis of annual rental value for the purpose of
fixing the rate of tax was arbitrary and as such was violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India; and that the classification had
no nexus with the objects sought to be achieved.
Dismissing the writ petitions of the cinema owners/lessesse, this
Court,
7 Govind Chhagan Lal Issue: Whether the publication of notification u/s 6 (5) of the Gujarat
Patel v A.P.M Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1964, covering additional varieties
Committee AIR 1976 of agricultural produce ( like ginger and onion), must not only be
SC 263 published in official gazette but must be published in vernacular i.e.,
(Procedural Guajarati Newspaper?
requirements- The question whether statute is mandatory or directory
publication) depends upon the intent of the legislature and not upon the
language in which the intent is clothed
Khub Chand v State of Raj 1967 referred
Held publication in the local news paper is mandatory
The notification could affect valuable rights if the traders
Violations could subject them to penal consequences
Absence of prober and adequate publicity the right of the
traders and agriculturalist hampered without offerding them
an opportunity to offer objections and suggestions.
Publication in the News paper attracts greatest attention of
the public than in OG
9 Atlas Cycle Industries Simple laying is merely directory, and non laying could not
Ltd. State of Haryana make the Executive order void
AIR 1979 SC 1149 Legislative Control through Laying Requirement
SC held that the impugned provisions of law which provided
that every order by the Central Govt. Or its officer or
authority “shall be laid down before both houses as soon as
may be after it is made” as merely directory and did not
make ‘laying’ a condition precedent to the making of the
order. According to the court, the word Shall in section 3(6)
of the essential Commodity Act, 1955 is not conclusive and
decisive of the matter; and the Court is to determine the true
intention of the legislature.
10 Rajnarain Singh v Section 3 of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act was in
Chairman PAC 1954 question. Power was delegated to Patna Admin. To extend
with modification and restriction any law prevailing India to
the area of Patna. Accordingly Bengal Municipality Act was
extended with modification and restriction. Sec.104 provided
levying of tax in that area with consultation with affected
people.
Tax was levied but people were not consulted. Court held
that consultation is mandatory in nature and non compliance
is procedural ultra vires.
13 J R Ragupathy State of
A P 1988 No power to the judiciary to issue writs when there is nothing on
record to show that the decision of the government was arbitrary or
capricious or was one not reached in good faith or actuated with
improper considerations or influenced by extraneous considerations.
14 Coimbatore Distt.
Central Co. Bank v The Wedsnesbury principle has given way to the doctrine of
Employee. Asson. 2007 proportionality
Discipilanry action taken against 53 workmen on accounts of acts of
misconduct and contiuinty of their illegal strike.
DOCTRINE OF PROPORTIONALITY So far as the doctrine of
proportionality is concerned, there is no gainsaying that the
said doctrine has not only arrived at in our legal system but
has come to stay. With the rapid growth of Administrative Law
and the need and necessity to control possible abuse of
discretionary powers by various administrative authorities,
certain principles have been evolved by Courts. If an action
taken by any authority is contrary to law, improper,
unreasonable, irrational or otherwise unreasonable, a Court of
Law can interfere with such action by exercising power of
judicial review. One of such modes of exercising power,
known to law is the 'doctrine of proportionality'.
'Proportionality' is a principle where the Court is concerned
with the process, method or manner in which the decision-
maker has ordered his priorities, reached a conclusion or
arrived at a decision. The very essence of decision-making
consists in the attribution of relative importance to the factors
and considerations in the case. The doctrine of proportionality
thus steps in focus true nature of exercise the elaboration of
a rule of permissible priorities.
de Smith states that 'proportionality' involves 'balancing test'
and 'necessity test'. Whereas the former ('balancing test')
permits scrutiny of excessive onerous penalties or
infringement of rights or interests and a manifest imbalance
of relevant considerations, the latter ('necessity test') requires
infringement of human rights to the least restrictive
alternative. ['Judicial Review of Administrative Action'; (1995);
pp. 601-605; para 13.085; see also Wade & Forsyth;
'Administrative Law'; (2005); p.366].
"The court will quash exercise of discretionary powers in
which there is no reasonable relationship between the
objective which is sought to be achieved and the means used
to that end, or where punishments imposed by administrative
bodies or inferior courts are wholly out of proportion to the
relevant misconduct. The principle of proportionality is well
established in European law, and will be applied by English
courts where European law is enforceable in the domestic
courts. The principle of proportionality is still at a stage of
development in English law; lack of proportionality is not
usually treated as a separate ground for review in English law,
but is regarded as one indication of manifest
unreasonableness."
The doctrine has its genesis in the field of Administrative Law.
The Government and its departments, in administering the
affairs of the country, are expected to honour their
statements of policy or intention and treat the citizens with
full personal consideration without abuse of discretion. There
can be no 'pick and choose', selective applicability of
Government norms or unfairness, arbitrariness or
unreasonableness. It is not permissible to use a 'sledge-
hammer to crack a nut'. As has been said many a time;
"Where paring knife suffices, battle axe is precluded". In the
celebrated decision of Council of Civil Service Union (CCSU) v.
Minister for Civil Service, (1984) 3 All ER 935 : (1984) 3 WLR
1174 : (1985) AC 374 (HL), Lord Diplock proclaimed;
So far as our legal system is concerned, the doctrine is well-
settled. Even prior to CCSU, this Court has held that if
punishment imposed on an employee by an employer is
grossly excessive, disproportionately high or unduly harsh, it
cannot claim immunity from judicial scrutiny, and it is always
open to a Court to interfere with such penalty in appropriate
cases. In Hind Construction Co. v. Workmen, (1965) 2 SCR 85 :
AIR 1965 SC 917, some workers remained absent from duty
treating a particular day as holiday. They were dismissed from
service. The Industrial Tribunal set aside the action. This Court
held that the absence could have been treated as leave
without pay. The workmen might have been warned and
fined. (But) "It is impossible to think that any reasonable
employer would have imposed the extreme punishment of
dismissal on its entire permanent staff in this manner." The
Court concluded that the punishment imposed on the
workmen was not only severe and out of proportion to the
fault, but one which, in our judgment, no reasonable
employer would have imposed.
"Judicial review developed to a stage today when, without
reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development
has come about, one can conveniently classify under three
heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to
control by judicial review. The first ground I would call
'illegality', the second 'irrationality' and the third 'procedural
impropriety'.
16 R. v Secretary of State
for Home Deptt. 2001
Whether the policy infringes Mr. Daly’s common law right to
maintain the confidentiality of his privileged legal
correspondence
Court held that the policy infringes Mr. Daly’s common law
right to legal professional privilege
De Freitas v Secretary 1999 referred
In determining whether a limitation (byan act, rule or
decision) is arbitrary or excessive the Court should ask itself
whether
a) The legislative objective is sufficiently important to
justify limiting a Fundamental Right;
b) The measure designed to meet the legislative obkectives
are more than is necessary to accomplish the objective
c) The measure used to impair the right or freedom are no
more than is necessary to accomplish the objective.
17 G. Sadananadan v State
of Kerala 1966 The petitioner G. Sadananadan a businessman carries on
wholesale business in Kerosene Oil, was aresetd under
defence rules,1962
The object of the DSP to eliminate the petitioner from the
field of wholesale business in Kerosene Oil so that his
relatives may benefit and obtain the dealership
Held malfide exercise of power
18 Express Newspapers
Pvt. Ltd v UOI 1986 In this case the Express Newspaper were served with notices of re-
Malafide and doctrine entry upon forfeiture of lease of land granted to them on which the
of promissory estoppel lessee had raised the buildings for printing and publishing the
newspapers.
The SC held that the action had been politically motivated
and, therefore, vitiated by malfide intention
The doctrine of promissory estoppels was used to prevent
the government form quashing the action of the Minister for
approval of a lease as it was within the scope of his authority
to grant such permission.
19 State of Bombay v K P Relevant and irrelevant considerations
Krishnan 1961
20 Ranjit Singh v UOI 1981
irrelevant considerations
In 1950, the State Government issued a manufacturing licence
renewable every year to the petitioners for the manufacture by
hand of a specified number of guns per month. The guns were
however not proof-tested. After the Arms Act 1959, came into
force, the government insisted that the guns
manufactured should undergo proof-testing. Pursuant to
that condition in 1960, the petitioners installed machinery and
plant, by making substantial investment of funds. From 1964,
the Government of India, reduced the monthly quota of guns. The
petitioners in their writ petitions under Article 32 alleged that
this reduction had resulted in considerable
hardship to them because of the fixed overhead costs which could
not be avoided. They also alleged that though in the case of a
number of other such manufacturers quotas were restored, in their
cases, the Government refused to restore the quotas. The Union of
India, however, denied the allegation of arbitrariness, and stated
that: (a) what was done was pursuant to the Industrial Policy
Resolution of 1956 which envisioned an exclusive monopoly in the
Central Government in the matter of manufacturing arms and
ammunition and that in fixing the quota the manufacturing capacity
of a concern was not a determining factor; (b) there is no
fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution to carry
on the manufacture of arms; and (c) there was laches on the
part of the petitioners.
Allowing the writ petitions,
HELD: (a)(i) Any curtailment of the quota must proceed on the
basis of reason and relevance. The Government is entitled to take
into consideration the requirements of current administrative policy
pertinent to the maintenance of law and order and internal
security. If all relevant factors are not considered, or irrelevant
considerations allowed to find place, the decision is vitiated by
arbitrary judgment. In the instant case the Government of India
had not taken into careful consideration the several elements
necessary for forming a decision on the quota permissible to each of
the petitioners. That should be done and for that purpose the
petitioners would be entitled to place before the Government
a fresh and complete statement of their case, with supporting
material, to enable the Government to reach a just decision.
(b) The Arms Act 1959, expressly contemplates the grant of licences
for manufacturing arms and an applicant for a licence is entitled to
have it considered in accordance with the terms of the statute and to
press for its grant on the basis of the criteria set forth in it.
23 A K Kraipak v UOI 1970 In this case, Naquishband, who was the acting Chief Conservator of
Application of the PNJ Forests, was a member of the Selection Board and was also a
in administrative candidate for selection to All India cadre of the Forest Service. Though
Actions. {The dividing he did not take part in the deliberations of the Board when his name
line b/w an was considered and approved, the SC held that `there was a real
administrative power likelihood of a bias for the mere presence of the candidate on the
and a quasi-judicial Selection Board may adversely influence the judgement of the other
power is quite thin and members'
is being gradually SC also made the following observations: -
obliterated.} 1. The dividing line between an administrative power and quasi-
judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. Whether
a power is Administrative or quasi-judicial, one has to look into-
a) the nature of power conferred
b) the person on whom it is conferred
c) the framework of the law conferring that power
d) the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised.
2. The principles of natural justice also apply to administrative
proceedings,
3. The concept of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice
and it entails -
(i) No one shall be a judge of his own cause.
(ii) No decision shall be given against a party without affording him a
reasonable hearing.
(iii) The quasi-judicial enquiries should be held in good faith and not
arbitrarily or unreasonably.
25 G. N. Nayak v Goa
University 2002 The case is a leading case on Rule against Bias. In this case, a senior
officer expressed appreciation of the work of a junior officer in his
confidential report. He was also a member of the Departmental
Promotion Committee to consider such junior officer along with
others for promotion. The committee recommended this junior
officer for promotion which was challenged on the ground of
personal bias actuated by an element of personal interest. The Apex
Court held that unless preference is unreasonable and is based on
self-interest, it will not vitiate an administrative decision. Taking the
opportunity, the apex court also held that preparing an exhaustive
list about relations that could possibly lead to personal bias cannot
be made.
When the rule is silent then the party has no absolute right
to be legally represented. It is the matter for the discretion
of the authorities or Tribunal. If they in the proper exercise
of their discretion, decline to allow legal representation, the
courts will not interfere but the Tribunals must not fetter its
discretion by rigid rules. A Tribunal is not at liberty to lay
down an absolute rule: “we will never allow anyone to have
a lawyer to appear for him”. The Tribunal must be ready, in a
prper case, to allow it.
Pett v. Grehound Raling Association Ltd., [1969] Pett's case
No. 2, 1970(1) QB 46: Enderby Town Football Club Ltd. v.
Football Association Ltd., [1971] Chancery Div. C.L.
Subrahmaniam v. Collector of Customs, Cochin, [1972] 3
SCR 485, referred. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v.
Dilip Kumar, [1983] 1 SCR 828, followed.
Article 14, 19 and 21 strength each other are not mutually exclusive
but mutually inclusive.
34 MD, ECIL, Hyderabad v In K Keasv Mills Co.Ltd. v UOI 173 (SC) – Held if due to non suplly
B. Karunakar 1993 of report rights of the partiers are not affected then there would
ECIL Case be no violation of PNJ
UOI v E. Bashyan 1988- a two judge Bench held that failure supply
the inquiry report to the delinquent before the disciplinary
authority took the a final decision would constitute a violation of
the PNJ.
In Kailash Chander Asthaana v State of U.P 1988- Three Judge
Bench held the copy of the enquiry report need not to be shown
to the delinquent employee.
In UOI v Mohd. Ramjan Khan 1991 SC hled held that non
furnishing of enquiry would amount to the denial of PNJ.
Following rules are laid down:
a) The delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of the
Inquiry Officer’s report before the decision.
b) Denial of the copy is a denial of reasonable opportunity to
prove his innocence and breach of the PNJ
c) In case on minor punishments procedure given in the relevant
service rules will applicable
d) When copy of the report not provided, the employees not
reinstated with back wages. The Court and Tribunal should
cause the copy of the report to be furnished to him and give
the employee an opportunity to show that his case was
prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report.
e) The Court or Tribunals don act mechanically
f) It is only if the Court or Tribunals finds that the furnishing of
the report would made a difference to the result in the case
that it should set aside the order of punishment.
39 Rupa Ashok Hurra v Even after a review petition filed u/art.137 is rejected by the SC,
Ashok Hurra 2002 that may not be the end of the road. The Court may still review the
case under its inherent power but on very restricted ground.
Curative petition
The question before a Constitution Bench in this case was whether an
aggrieved person is entitled to any relief against a final
judgment/order of the Supreme Court, after dismissal of review
petition (under Article 137 of the Constitution), either under Article 32
of the Constitution or otherwise.
Held that the Supreme Court, to prevent abuse of its process and to
cure a gross miscarriage of justice, may reconsider its judgments in
exercise of its inherent power. This was allowed by way of a curative
petition.
Grounds/ requirements
Violation of PNJ
Judge failed to disclose his connection with the subject matter
The grounds mentioned had been taken in the review petition
and that it was dismissed by circulation
Certification by a senior advocate with regard to the fulfilment
of the above requirements
The curative petition has to be circulated to the Bench of 3
senior most judges and the judges who passed the judgment
complained of, if available.
40 Secretary Gen. SC v Facts: In 1997 at the Conference of Chief Justices, all the judges
Subhash Chandra adopted a “Code of Conduct” which required them to disclose their
Agarwal 2010 assets in confidence to their Chief Justices. To see whether the judges
are complying with the Code of Conduct or not, an RTI activist Subash
Agarwal filed an RTI application seeking information from the Public
Information Officer (PIO) of the Supreme Court in this regard and also
for a copy of the adopted “Code of Conducts”. The PIO responded by
saying that the information does not exist in the court registry. On
appeal, the appellate authority directed the PIO to give name of the
officer having the relevant information and to refer the application to
the authority having the information by way of Section 6(3) of the Act.
On remission the PIO rejected the application asking to file the
application to respective High Courts.
The applicant then approached the CIC. The CIC rejected the
contentions of the Information Officer and directed him to provide the
information. This led to a writ petition in the Delhi High Court
challenging the order of the CIC. A single bench judge decided that the
order given by the CIC was correct.
An appeal was filed against the decision given by the single judge
bench.
Issues
· Whether the respondent had any "right to information" under Section
2(j) of the Act in respect of the information regarding making of
declarations by the Judges of the Supreme Court pursuant to 1997
Resolution?
· If the answer to question (1) above is in affirmative, whether CJI held
the "information" in his "fiduciary" capacity, within the meaning of the
expression used in Section 8(1)(e) of the Act?
· Whether the information about the declaration of assets by the Judges
of the Supreme Court is exempt from disclosure under the provisions
of Section 8(1)(j) of the Act?
Contention of the Appellant Side
The appellant in the plaint raised following points:
· That the appellant has no right to information under Section 2(j) of
the Act, as of the two essential ingredients second one is not being
fulfilled.
· He stated that the resolution of 1997 has no force of law, as there is
no legal or constitutional requirement as such in this regard.
· The resolution of 1997 had two parts, first one talked about punishing
a judge if he failed to fulfill values of judicial life while second part
was about the declaration of assets. However, no in-house procedure
has been established in this regard.
· The learned Attorney General relied heavily on Indira Jaising v.
Registrar General, Kailash Rai v. Jai Jai Ram, Bhudan Singh v. Nabi
Bux.
Contentions of the Respondent Side: In reply the learned council stated
that:
· The respondent is not seeking for enforcement of the resolution.
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