Notes on Relation R

Author(s): Marvin Belzer

Source: Analysis , Jan., 1996, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Jan., 1996), pp. 56-62
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Committee

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Notes on Relation R
MARVIN BELZER

Psychological approaches to personal identity emphasize relations of

'psychological connectedness' and 'continuity' between mental events as
the essence of a person. The key relation has often been abbreviated as
'Relation R'. Russell (1918) first used it, and David Lewis (1976) revived
its use. Many recent discussions of the plausibility of this type of theory,
and its impact on views about rationality and morality, have centred on
Derek Parfit's work. In this paper I will show that Parfit in his 1976 and
1984 uses the abbreviating phrase 'Relation R' in three distinct ways:
(1) according to his explicit definition of the phrase, R is 'psycholog-
ical connectedness and/or continuity';
(2) when he says identity according to the Psychological Criterion is
'non-branching R' he assumes R is 'psychological continuity';
and

(3) in his arguments that it is R (not identity) that 'matters,' R is

'psychological connectedness and continuity.'
There are significant differences between the three readings of 'R'. (1) is, I
will suggest, a relatively harmless mistake. But claims (2) and (3) are at the
heart of Parfit's work, and I suggest that some of the criticisms of his Divi-
sion argument that identity does not 'matter' need to be re-evaluated
because they assume that the third reading of 'R' plays a role that it need
not play.

1. Three readings of 'R'

(1) Parfit repeatedly defines R as 'psychological connectedness and/or
psychological continuity, with the right kind of cause' (Parfit 1984: 215,
216, 262, 271, 279, 283, 292). Recall that 'psychological connectedness'
is the holding at least one 'direct psychological connection' such as a
memory (206); and 'psychological continuity' is the holding of 'overlap-
ping chains of strong connectedness' (206) where 'strong connectedness' in
turn is said to hold when there are 'sufficiently many' direct connections
(206). Given these definitions, the 'and/or' construction (the 'inclusive'
reading of 'or') in his definition of R entails that R will hold given only
connectedness, that is, the holding of direct connections. One will do.
Suppose this connection were a quasi-memory I have now of an experience
you had yesterday. It follows that I now am R-related to you yesterday.

ANALYSIS 56.1, January 1996, pp. 56-62. ? Marvin Belzer

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 NOTES ON RELATION R 57

(2) This explicit definition of R is seriously at odds with Parfit's second use
of the phrase 'Relation R', when he uses the phrase to abbreviate the
Psychological Criterion of personal identity according to which x is the
same person as y if, and only if, x and y are in the relation of non-branch-
ing psychological continuity with the right kind of cause (207). According
to this Criterion, no degree of connectedness between x and y is required
for identity. Continuity between x and y requires only a 'chain' of strong
connectedness between them, and there may be a chain of strong connect-
edness between x and y even though there is not even one direct connection
between x and y. For instance, x may be strongly connected to z1, z, to z2,
..., and ZN to y, so we have a chain of strong connectedness (x, z1, z2, z3,
ZN.., Y) where there is pairwise strong connectedness between adjacent
members of the chain, but no direct connections between x and y. In that
case there is continuity between x and y even though there are no direct
psychological connections at all between x and y.
Now there are several passages in which Parfit uses 'non-branching R
with the right kind of cause' to abbreviate the Psychological Criterion. For
instance:

Our identity over time just involves Relation R ... provided this rela-
tion does not take a 'branching' form, holding between one person
and two different future people (216);
and

A future person will be me if he will be R-related to me as I am now,

and no different person will be R-related to me. If there is no such
different person, the fact that this future person will be me just
consists in the fact that relation R holds between us. There is nothing
more to personal identity than the holding of relation R. In nearly all
actual cases, R takes a one-one form ... When R takes a one-one form,
we can use the language of identity ... On our view, the fact of
personal identity just consists in the holding of relation R, when it
takes a non-branching form (262-63);
and

On what I call the Psychological Criterion, a future person will be me

if he will be R-related to me, and there is no other person who will be
R-related to me (267).
See also Parfit 1976: 102. Similarly he says that the Psychological Criterion
appeals not merely to single memories, or even the continuity of memory,
but 'more broadly, to Relation R' (1984: 219); it appeals 'to relation R
when it holds in a one-one form' (267). Since, as noted, the Psychological
Criterion says the fact of personal identity just consists in non-branching

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58 MARVIN BELZER

continuity (with the right kind of cause), 'R' abbreviates 'continuity' in

these passages (which is especially clear where Parfit says identity 'just
consists' in non-branching R). This means two things. First, its use here
obviously does not conform to the explicit definitions Parfit gives for 'R',
as discussed above in (1). Parfit clearly did not wish to assert, as his explicit
definitions of 'R' would suggest, that only one direct connection, such as a
quasi-memory with the right kind of cause (which is not sufficient for
strong connectedness or continuity) is sufficient for identity in the absence
of branching! (Otherwise there would have been no role for the notion of
'strong connectedness' in his account.)
Secondly, since the passages cited above are coherent only if 'R' abbre-
viates 'continuity', there is yet a third use of 'R' in Parfit's work, as is
shown below.

(3) Parfit argues that identity 'does not matter' and that it is R that
'matters' instead. In these arguments and also in earlier work, Parfit uses
'R' to abbreviate 'connectedness and continuity' which is distinct from
continuity taken alone since continuity can obtain even where there is no
connectedness at all. When he used 'R' for the first time in print (1976), he
was responding to Lewis (1976) who used 'R' to abbreviate 'mental conti-
nuity and connectedness'; Parfit used it there to abbreviate the same
phrase. He says that 'the R-relation has two components: continuity and
connectedness' (1976: 98) and he distinguishes R from continuity by
pointing out that, given the relevant definitions for 'connectedness', 'strong
connectedness', and 'continuity' (the same ones, stated above, that he
earlier used in his 1971 and later uses in his 1984), continuity does not
have degrees, whereas R does:
Since one of its components holds, in actual lives, to different degrees,
so too does the R-relation. This is why it makes a difference if it is the
R-relation, not identity, which is what matters. For this will mean that
even in actual lives there is this discrepancy: identity is all-or-nothing,
what matters has degrees (1976: 98).
In Reasons and Persons Parfit also uses 'R' in a way that presupposes this
third sense ('connectedness and continuity') when he claims that it is R that
matters (1984: 287) while also arguing that 'what fundamentally matters
are psychological connectedness and continuity' (313). He argues that
connectedness matters in addition to continuity (301); 'we should reject
the view that only continuity matters' (302, 313). This claim plays a prom-
inent role in his argument against a tenet of the Self-interest theory (313)
which says that one should have equal concern for all the parts of one's life.
If what matters has degrees, as does connectedness and continuity taken

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 NOTES ON RELATION R 59

together, one rationally can apportion concern for later selves according to
the degree of what matters. This argument makes no sense if what matters
is simply continuity, because, as Parfit is aware, continuity taken alone
does not come in degrees.

2. Why the differences matter

What I have shown so far is that Parfit uses 'R' in three distinct ways. Now
I wish to show how confusion betweeen the second ('continuity') and third
('continuity and connectedness') readings of 'R' has been significant
because it has clouded the discussion about whether identity 'matters.'
Parfit argues that

(*) if Reductionism about personal identity is true, then identity does

not matter.

His main argument for this is based upon reflection upon a hypot
case, 'My Division.' He imagines being one of three identical triplet
his brain being divided and each half being successfully transplante
the body of one of his brothers; assume that there would have been ide
had only one half of the brain been transplanted (254). Because o
'branching' of the continuity relation, the original person does not sur
there is not non-branching continuity in this story. But (the argumen
this does not mean that the pre-Division person fails to have 'what mat
in survival. In fact, Parfit says, reflection on Division shows that 'R
R is as good as ordinary survival' ( 311).
Now what is meant here by 'Relation R'? The argument itself need
to presuppose 'continuity' insofar as the Psychological Criterion
identity as 'non-branching continuity' and Parfit does not specify
the case he imagines there must be some degree of connectedness i
tion to continuity. So when he says, 'In the imagined case where I
R takes a branching form' (262), reading 'R' as continuity at least
sense. The Division argument itself does not require the stronger
reading of 'R' as 'continuity and connectedness.'
But, as I noted earlier, when he claims that it is R (and not identity)
matters, Parfit consistently uses 'R' in its third sense, as 'continui
connectedness.' Both Parfit and his critics have assumed that if id
does not 'matter' then it is R as 'continuity and connectedness' tha
matter.1 Further, because 'continuity and connectedness' comes in

1 Parfit's commentators tend to characterize 'R' in this third way when they
abbreviation. Cf. Adams 1989: 463; Johnston 1992: 604; Wolf 1986: 704 (Wo
uses 'R' in sense (1), p. 705). Shoemaker does not use 'R' but rather his own
viation 'psychological C&C' (1985: 443) to express the third sense, 'continuit
connectedness.'

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60 MARVIN BELZER

it follows from this assumption that

(A) if identity is not what matters, then what matters comes in
degrees (i.e. is 'scalar').
Some of the most trenchant attacks on (*) have emerged by way of (A).
critics argue that what matters is not scalar, and so, contrapositively fr
(A), identity does indeed matter even if Reductionism is true; so (*) is f
As Wolf says, 'the truth of reductionism neither detracts from nor sup
the reasons advanced for thinking that personal identity matters' (
716); and, as Adams says, 'the value we set on personal identity need
justification from Non-Reductionist arguments' (1989: 459).
Here is the general argument against (*) that is based on (A
Johnston suggests, we should imagine an alternative pattern of sp
concern

... structured around around what Parfit calls 'R' -

continuity and connectedness - rather than identity.
alternative pattern of concern R-variant concern. Since R
relation of psychological connectedness, a relation that
ing degrees, R-variant concern would most plausibly b
ping off as psychological connectedness weakens
(Johnston 1992: 604).
Since R comes in degrees so also our concern for our ow
for the later selves of children and friends should be appo
to the degree of connectedness between the present self an
'Friendships and loves among R-related beings wo
expected to fade in sharp correlation to changes in the per
participants of these relationships' (Wolf 1986: 711). B
continues) there is nothing irrational in our ordinary patte
which is apportioned relative to identity, not degree of
Adams puts it,
... I can reasonably have my life as a project in whic
concern for my future does not vary with any normally
ation in psychological connectedness (1989: 457)
- as can also, says Wolf, the college senior or Olympic hope
ing their distant futures (1986: 712). Moreover, in chi
rationally can have an equal concern for all the parts
rather than caring less for the distant less-connected parts
tude would likely lead loving parents to forego disciplining
sake of their adult development: 'Why should a parent
ness of the child she loves so much for the sake of an adult she loves so
little?'2).

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 NOTES ON RELATION R 61

These examples are designed to elicit the intuition that what matters
not scalar, which together with (A) entails that (*) is false.
Because this is a strong argument against (*), it is important to reme
ber that the Division argument itself does not presuppose (A). Th
Psychological Criterion treats identity as 'non-branching continuity' (n
branching R in its second sense). The claim that identity does not matter is
based entirely on the idea that the non-branching requirement is not signi
icant relative to 'what matters'. The Division argument for (*) would
through just as well with an example in which it is made plain that there i
continuity but no connectedness at all between the pre-Division person and
the post-Division people. And if it is simply continuity that matters, t
(A) is false and the counter-arguments against (*) based on (A) are no
sound.
It is equivocation on the second and third readings of 'R' that permi
Parfit himself to slide from (*) to (A). In his discussion of 'what matt
when I divide?' Parfit says that in the absence of branching of the R r
tion, 'there is nothing more to personal identity than the holding of
relation R ... but in the imagined cased where I divide, R takes a branch
form' (1984: 262). Since the Psychological Criterion says that in
absence of branching it is continuity (alone) that accounts for identity and
since no degree of connectedness is required for continuity, Parfit sho
have concluded from Division at most that it is continuity that matte
But, as we have seen, he also uses 'R' in the third way in his discussion
what matters, and it is this use that leads to his endorsement of (A).
Parfit should have concluded from Division only that identity does n
matter; and he should have left open what does matter. This position
involves no commitment to (A), and would not be open to the critical coun
ter-arguments based on (A), for it may turn out that it is strong connectedn
or continuity (or something else that is non-scalar) that matters.3 The intu

2 Wolf 1986: 711. This type of consideration also plays a crucial role in Johnston
argument that while we might reasonably extend patterns of concern (so that it is
that matters in bizarre cases), this is not the same as denying that identity matter
which he says is a 'much more radical reaction' than is warranted (1992: 611-12
His reason, however, for thinking that the denial that identity matters is 'radical'
the assumption (A).

3 Parfit of course may wish to continue to suggest that connectedness matters

addition to continuity, for reasons that go beyond the Division argument. I al
should note that some of the arguments that have been given against (*) do
depend on (A): (i) both Sosa and Wolf hold that exclusivity is so important that
would not have what matters in Division (cf. Sosa 1990; and Wolf 1986: 714-1
and (ii) Johnston discusses the bizarreness of caring 'about psychological relati
more fundamentally than ... about particular people' (1992: 607).

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62 MARVIN BELZER

tion that what matters is not scalar is not sufficient by itself to rescue th
claim that identity matters.

Bowling Green State University

Bowling Green, Ohio 43403 USA
mbelzer@bgnet.bgsu.edu

References
Adams, R. M. 1989. Should ethics be more impersonal? A Critical Notice of
Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons. Philosophical Review 98: 439-85.
Johnston, M. 1992. Reasons and reductionism. Philosophical Review 101: 589-18.
Lewis, D. 1976. Survival and identity. In The Identities of Persons, ed. A. Rorty. Berke-
ley: University of California Press.
Parfit, D. 1971. Personal identity. Reprinted in Personal Identity, ed. by J. Perry. Berke-
ley: University of California Press, 1975.
Parfit, D. 1976. Lewis, Perry, and what matters. In The Identities of Persons, ed. A.
Rorty. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Parfit, D. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Russell, B. 1918. The philosophy of logical atomism. Reprinted in The Philosophy of
Logical Atomism, ed. D. Pears. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1985.
Shoemaker, S. 1985. Critical Notice of Reasons and Persons. Mind 94: 443-53.
Sosa, E. 1990. Surviving matters. Noais 24: 297-322.
Wolf, S. 1986. Self-interest and interest in selves. Ethics 96: 704-20.

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