Jarosław Macała

Instytut Politologii Uniwersytet Zielonogórski

The Conception of Geopolitical Triangle of Powers – Karl Haushofer`s

Kontinentalblock

The conception of Euro-Asian continental block is among the greatest achievements for
which an eminent German political thinker is nowadays given credit and which is still widely
discussed by scholars. Haushofer put forward the conception in question at the turn of 30-ties
and 40-ties of the 20th century, expounding his views first in a pamphlet (50 pages) written in
1940. Even though it came out in print it was not distributed. The reasons for holding its
distribution remain unknown. One can only guess that it is the Nazis that had a hand in it. The
second edition probably came into being at the end of the same year, since it contains a
reference to the treaty of the three powers of 27 September 1940. Including no serious
alterations, it appeared in print in the first weeks of 19411. One can hardly think of any
modern handbook of the history of geopolitics or political geography which does not discuss
Haushofer`s idea of the continental block. Usually, however, scholars confine themselves to
making some brief and stereotypical remarks concerning the theory under discussion.
Nevertheless, there are some exceptions to this rule. In Poland the theory was given a more
extended treatment in works by Tomasz Klin and Piotr Eberhard2.
What spurred Karl Haushofer to write his work was the outbreak of war, which made it
necessary for Germany to determine its war objectives, its allies and enemies. He thought the
conclusion of Ribbentrop-Mołotow treaty was the right path to be followed by Germany,
regarding it as the lasting reorientation of the Third Reich`s foreign policy. In his opinion the
stipulations of the treaty did not clash with the Anti-Comintern Pact signed in November 1937
by Germany, Japan and Italy. Following the outbreak of the Second World War, the anti-
comintern pact was transformed into military alliance connecting the three states, with its ill-
1
Hans Adolf Jacobsen, Haushofer`s biographer when discussing the first edition of the pamphlet gives
only this laconic information /Karl Haushofer: Leben und Werk, vol. 1, Boppard am Rhein 1979, p. 606/. See
also Der Kontinentalblock. Mitteleuropa-Eurasien-Japan, Sec. Edition, München 1941. The importance of this
publication is attested to by the fact that it appeared under the auspices of Zentralverlag der NSDAP, that is, it
was approved of by high-ranking functionaries of the Nazi party.
2
For the interpretation of the problem of the continental block, it suffices to compare the work by Saul
B. Cohen, Geopolitics of the World System /Lanham 2003/ with the one by Dan Diner, Beyond the
Conceivable /Berkley 2000/; T. Klin, Wizje ładu międzynarodowego w niemieckiej i anglosaskiej myśli
geopolitycznej w okresie II wojny światowej /The Conception of International Order in German and Anglo-
Saxon Geopolitical Thought during the Second World War/ Toruń 2008, p. 136-148; P. Eberhardt, Koncepcje
geopolityczne Karla Haushofera, /Karl Haushofer`s Geopolitical Conceptions/, „Przegląd Geograficzny” 2009,
No 4, p. 540-543.

1
concealed goal being to defeat Western democracies and establish new spheres of influence 3.
In refusing to interpret the pact as directed against the Soviet Union, the scholar of Munich
tended to view it more as an offer of further cooperation with Stalin`s state. The latter
probably understood it the same way and was prepared - under certain conditions concerning
the delineation of the spheres of influence – to join the pact. The sygnatories to the agreement
in question, however, were not willing to meet these conditions.
This combination of alliances adhered to by Führer was approved of and supported by K.
Haushofer who treated it as a point of departure for developing all-embracing geopolitical
conception4. The conception was the result of long years of intellectual effort on the part of
German thinker who tried to determine the role Euro-Asia was supposed to play in the rivalry
of world powers affecting the future of the world and the future of Germany 5. To obtain the
status of world power – an objective which was Haushofer`s lifelong dream - Germany had to
embrace the path of war and expansion. Since the conflict between great powers could not be
avoided and the war had already started, it became of crucial importance for Germany to
define strategic and geopolitical goals choosing its allies and enemies. Haushofer made it
clear more than once that geopolitics should aspire to become some sort of applied science,
thus inspiring - at least to a certain extent - state policy6.
German thinker thought Germany were too weak to dominate the world. Hence, the country
needed allies. In 1940, after defeating France and gaining ascendancy in Europe, the Third
Reich found itself confronted with the necessity to make some new strategic choices. In
Haushofer`s judgment Germany were left with two options: either to reach an agreement with
the sea power, that is to say, Great Britain and invade the Communist East or to form Euro-
Asian block including the Soviet Union and Japan and try to defeat the main sea powers -
Albion and United States7. In Hitler`s eyes it all came down to a choice between territorial
3
A Wolff-Powęska, Doktryna geopolityki w Niemczech /Geopolitics in Germany/, Poznań 1979, p. 251;
Przestrzeń i polityka. Z dziejów niemieckiej myśli politycznej/ Space and Geopolitics. On the History of German
Political Thought/ selected and edited by A. Wolff-Powęska, E. Schultz, Poznań 2000, p. 90-91.
4
K. Haushofer, Weltpolitik von Heute, Berlin 1940, p. 288-289; Idem, Geograficzne spełnienie trójkąta,
[w:] Przestrzeń i poltyka... /Geographical Fulfilment of the Triangle, [w:] Space and Politics..., p. 494; H. A
Jacobsen, op. Cit., p. 372-374, 393-394; B. Hipler, Hitlers Lehrmeister. Karl Haushofer als Vater der NS-
Ideologie, St. Ottilien 1996, p. 216; H. H. Helvig, Geopolitik: Haushofer, Hitler and Lebensraum, w:
Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy, ed. By C. S. Gray, G. R. Sloan, London 1999, p. 235; J. Wojtkowiak,
Stosunki radziecko-japońskie 1931-1941 /The Soviet-Japan Relations 193-1941/, Poznań 2000, p. 209; M.
Kamiński, Polityka zagraniczna Związku Sowieckiego w przededniu wojny z Niemcami 1938-1941 /The Soviet
Foreign Policy on the Eve of the Second World War 1938-1941/, w: Droga ku wojnie. Polityka europejska i
amerykańska w przededniu II wojny światowej /the European and the American Policy on the Eve of the Second
World War/ ed. by T. Kisielewski, Bydgoszcz 1999, p. 51.
5
D. Diner, Beyond the Conceivable, Berkley 2000, p. 36.
6
A. Wolff-Powęska, Doktryna geopolityki..., p. 133
7
R. Sprengler, Kritik der Geopolitik: ein deutscher Diskurs, Berlin 1996, p. 101; F. Ebeling, Geopolitik.
Karl Hashofer und seine Ramwissenschaft 1919-1945, Berlin 1994, p. 207-209.

2
and trade overseas expansion. But the leader of NSDAP, even though just like Haushofer in
favor of territorial expansion designed to obtain Lebensraum, was, unlike Haushofer, more
willing to form an alliance with Great Britain, never taking that with the Soviet Union
seriously8.
According to Haushofer, the alliance with the British was likely to result in the
deterioration of Germany`s position as a great power, since it precluded German expansion in
Europe and seemed to benefit Britain to a much greater degree than it did Germany. There are
some monographs on Haushofer indicating that around the middle of 1940 he tried to initiate
some talks with that part of the British elite that remained pro-German. In his calculations,
England, already enfeebled by German triumphs, was expected to recognize German
hegemony in Europe and become willing to protect the Western flank of the Third Reich in
the event of the latter`s invasion of the Soviet Union. There is no doubt that Haushofer
realized it was a sheer folly for Germany to embroil itself in a war on two fronts. It seems,
however, that it was his son who was more active in the attempts to prevent Germany from
pursuing the kind of war just mentioned. It is in this connection that he tried to exert some
influence upon Rudolf Hess, a friend of the family, which ended up in Hess` famous but
ineffective air escapade into England in May 19419.
It seems that the line of action opted for by Haushofer was the anti-British axis Berlin-
Moscow-Tokyo which was likely to prove powerful enough to defeat Britain, prevent the
USA from entering into war on Britain`s side, and, consequently, force London into
agreement on German terms. In the first place it was the leaders of the Third Reich whom he
tried to bring round to his way of thinking. He found his ally (except for R. Hess who did not
seem to be clever enough to follow his line of reasoning) in the person of the head of
Auswärtiges Amt, Joachim von Ribbentrop, who - due to his unsuccessful episode as a
German ambassador to London - truly hated the English and favored the forming of alliance
with Japan and the Soviet Union 10. Ribbentrop sent Stalin a message 13 October 1940 in
which he wrote that “it is a historical mission to be undertaken by the four powers - the Soviet
Union, Italy, Japan and Germany – the essence of which is to elaborate a common and far-
reaching policy defining their respective interests and determining the future of all other
nations. In the fall of 1940 Hitler, inspired probably by Ribbentrop and realizing to a certain

8
Such dillema were not also foreign to Hitler both before his rise to power as well as after 1933: E.
Jäckel, Hitlera pogląd na świat /Hitler`s view of the world/, Warszawa 1973, p. 41-43, 56.
9
K. Pätzold, M. Weissbrecker, Rudolf Hess. Ciekawa historia /Rudolf Hess. Interesting Story/,
Warszawa 2001, p. 187-189; H. A. Jacobsen, op. cit., p. 402-403.
10
H. A. Jacobsen, op. cit., p. 344; W. Michalka, Ribbentrop und die deutsche Politik, München 1980, p.
14.

3
extent Haushofer`s plans, set out to visit foreign capitals (he met with the leaders of Vichy
Petain and Laval and with the Spanish dictator gen. Franco), trying to encourage other
countries to establish closer cooperation with Germany. It was to be directed against Britain,
with its final goal being the creation in Europe of “Neue Ordnung”. The continental block
Hitler had in mind would stretch over a huge area from Gibraltar to Yocohama11.
There were, however, other Nazi leaders for whom racial and ideological factors - from
which Haushofer tried to distance himself - were more important than the great powers`
rivalry set on dominating the world. The professor of Munich knew that the education of the
leaders of the Third Reich left much to be desired. He had high opinion of neither their
knowledge of the world nor their knowledge of geopolitics and was apprehensive that the
Nazi leadership would embrace racial theories as a basis for their political activity 12. This in
part may be the reason why there is some dissonance to be discerned in his work between
suggestive and colorful, but fact-ignoring, columnist-type line of reasoning and insightful
analysis carried out by serious political thinker.
There is no doubt that Haushofer had already for a long been involved time in elaborating
his conception of the Euro-Asian continental block directed against the sea powers (mainly
against Great Britain). Looking through some of his previous publications will suffice to find
that out. The German scholar believed that the creation of the block he had in mind was made
necessary by some objective geopolitical factors. Coming to terms with the Soviet Union was
likely to result in the building of a powerful block in which Germany could enjoy military and
economic advantage13. He also put emphasis upon the fact that the Anglo-Saxon countries
truly determined to maintain their ascendancy in the world posed a threat for all the great
powers of the region he defined as Euro-Asia. The western countries were looked upon as
having upset the balance of powers and as trying to keep it disturbed, since it benefitted them
both economically and politically, but was harmful to other countries. Such views were
accompanied by Haushofer`s belief that all states could be divided into two groups; the first
was made up of the states referred to as static while the second consisted of those defined as
11
M. Bloch, Ribbentrop, Warszawa 1995, p. 114-116, 153-154, 199-200, 210, 226, 258, 260-262; S.
Dębski, Między Berlinem a Moskwą. Stosunki niemiecko-sowieckie 1939-1941 /Between Berlin and Moscow.
The German-Soviet Relations 1939-9141/, Warszawa 2003, p. 425-426; G. Parker, Western Geopolitical
Thought in the Twentieth Century, London 1985, p. 89.
12
A. Wolff-Powęska, Treść i polityczne funkcje geopolityki w Niemczech 1919-1944 /The Content and
Political Functions of Geopolitics in Germany 1919-1944/, „Studia nad Faszyzmem i Zbrodniami
Hitlerowskimi” /The Studies of Fascism and The Nazi Crimes/ 1985, Vol. 9, p. 29. For the preference Hitler and
other Nazi leaders had for cooperating with Britain see: S. Żerko, Wymarzone przymierze Hitlera. Wielka
Brytania w narodowo-socjalistycznych koncepcjach i w polityce III Rzeszy do 1939 /Hiler`s Dream Alliance.
Great Britain in the Nazi Ideology and in the Policy of the Third Reich untill 1939/, Poznań 1995.
13
J. A. Agnew, K. Mitchell, G. O`Tuathail, A Companion to Political Geography, Malden-Blackwell
2003, p. 195.

4
dynamic. The former were doomed to vegetation and collapse while the latter were expected
to increase their living space by means of expansion. In this context he indicated that dynamic
Germany while having to struggle with high population density and not having enough room
to breathe was bordered by vast areas, especially in the East, which were characterized by
backwardness and a small number of inhabitants14.
Of course it was not for cultural reasons that Germany and its Italian ally ( for long ages a
part of the Western civilization) decided to go into this partnership with Japan and the Soviet
Union whose populations - despite some external trappings – differed so much from those in
Europe in lifestyle, mentality or religion. What made the very idea of the alliance seem
difficult to accept was that it involved the necessity to - inherent in it - to recognize Germany
as part of Euro-Asian land area and as a state that for geopolitical reasons needed to turn
towards the East in the search of its living space it was craving so much. Haushofer`s choice
of allies was also affected, it seems, by his conviction that Western civilization was in state of
crisis, the fact which in his opinion left Germany justified in joining forces with Russia and
Japan. This judgment was also in keeping with his criticism of Western countries which he
regarded as plutocratic and devoid of higher ideals and values. Haushofer`s opinions were
clearly driven by his growing anti-liberalism, anti-materialism and anti-capitalism.
Liberalism, materialism and capitalism, he argued, were entirely foreign to the German spirit.
In expounding such views, Haushofer let himself carried away with some sort of misticism,
treating national community and its land as an organic whole rooted in transcendent,
extrasensory sphere. His stance was anti-modern and anti-occidental. It is no wonder then that
he advocated authoritarian system of government, which in turn was a clear indication that he
put both state and the nation ahead of individual citizens 15. With such views it was not
difficult for him to disregard all the bonds Germany seemed to have had with the West since
time immemorial. The West dominated by the Anglo-Saxon states refused to acknowledge
Germany`s position as a great power. It is for this reason that Haushofer thought it was
possible to reconcile some ideological beliefs with the appreciation of a growing role of space
in the world politics.

14
K. Haushofer, Weltpolitik von heute..., p. 38-46; Idem, Geograficzne zasady polityki wewnętrznej, w:
Przestrzeń i polityka /Geographical Principle of Internal Policy, w: Space and Politics/..., p. 31-353, 378-380.
For more thorough analysis of the place of Great Britain in the German Interwar Goepolitics see: F. Ebeling,
Geopolitik. Karl Haushofer…, p. 107-109.
15
Przestrzeń i polityka /Space and politics/..., p. 59-60, 64-65; F. Ebeling, Geopolitik. Karl Haushofer...,
p. 135-139; R. Sprengel, Kritik der Geopolitik..., p. 99-102; P. Eberhardt, Koncepcje geopolityczne Karla
Haushofera /Karl Haushofer`s Geopolitical Conceptions..., p. 534.

5
 The political leaders to whom the task of erecting the block he had in mind was to fall
should follow the Roman maxim “Fas est ab hoste doceri”. Haushofer pointed out that both
politicians and columnists in Great Britain and in the USA were aware of the threat which the
political unification of Euroasia posed for the world domination their states enjoyed. The
stronger the British empire grew in the 19 th century the greater was its fear of the emergence
of the block which would turn out to be as powerful as to destroy it. Emblematic of this was
the book by Homer Lea in which he expressed the opinion that “twilight of gods in the
English speaking world empire was likely to come with the political rapprochement of
Germany, Russia and Japan.
It was Haushofer`s great adversary Halford Mackinder who advanced the conception of
Heartland which can be seen as the most coherent attempt to elucidate the significance of
Euroasia for the creation of world power capable of dominating the world. In this well-known
theory the force-centre which controls Heartland also dominates over Euroasia. Domination
of Euroasia was more than likely, argued Mackinder, to translate itself into domination of the
whole world. What, however, Mackinder regarded as the most serious danger was the
possibility of Russia - which controlled much of the Heartland - becoming dependent on
Germany. This was the reason why Macinder decided - after the First World War - to support
the idea of creating a chain of independent states separating Germany and Russia. Haushofer
who shared the premises on which Mackinder`s theory was based thought it was best-advised
for Russia and Germany to forge an alliance and obliterate buffer states. Mackinder and
Haushofer differed in that the former considered the whole problem on a theoretical basis
while the latter wanted to see these ideas put through16. In his work Haushofer, one might add,
stressed the fact that it was Mackinder who deserved the credit for making the British realize
the threat which the powers controlling the Heartland were likely to pose for the British
ascendency in the world politics.
The German thinker believed that the emerging continental block was not something
entirely new in the politics of Euroasian powers. Haushofer himself did not think he deserved
to be credited with the invention of the idea of the block under discussion. He maintained that
it was already prior to the outbreak of the First World War that the need to create such a block
came to be clearly seen, say, in Japan - with which Haushofer had been well-acquainted. It
was just during his stay in the land of the rising sun that he did much to persuade his Japanese

16
L. Moczulski, Geopolityka. Potęga w czasie i przestrzeni /Geopolitics. Power in Space and Time/,
Warszawa 1999, p. 12-15, 108-109; P. Eberhardt, Koncepcje geopolityczne Karla Haushofera /Karl Haushofer`s
eopolitical Conceptions/…, p. 540.

6
interlocutors into accepting such a solution 17. In Russia which was supposed to play a key
role in constructing the block in question there was a group of influential politicians who
preferred cooperation with Germany to that with Ententa. The reason why the block was not
put into effect at that time was the inability of political elites in Germany to recognize its
significance. As determined as it was to defy the British colonial policy, the Second Reich
also defied geopolitical reality in trying to find allies near its borders and not - as Haushofer
suggested - among some distant countries that were threatened by the policy just mentioned.
This mistake was followed by a pointless war between Russia and Germany which ended up
in a defeat of both countries. This of course only played into the hands of the Western states.
The attempts to extinguish mutual distrust and conflicts between Russia and Japan were also
unsuccessful - despite the fact that there were politicians in both countries who tried to bring
about some form of reconciliation. As far as Japan was concerned, Haushofer stressed the fact
that one of the barriers which made it difficult for European countries to come to terms with
Japan was to be looked for in an ill-concealed contempt with which some Europeans tended to
treat the Asian race.
It was just because of the fear of this block that in dealing with their rivals the British
employed – as Haushofer called it – the Anaconda tactic. By this he meant the way of hunting
characteristic of a big serpent that keeps on strangling its victim for as long as to break its
bones and finally leave it unable to breathe. It was just through this “Anaconda metaphor”
that the British policy towards Germany and Japan was best summed up. The similar opinions
were also expressed in the United States, especially in view of some difficulties which the US
policy encountered in the Far East. The United States, argued Haushofer, had transformed
itself into an aggressive industrial and financial power that began to seek new markets for its
goods trying to extend the area of its influence. Haushofer also discerned how destructive an
effect the American mass culture had. There was a growing realization in the United States
that political unification of Euroasian continent, the development of its economic links and
communication networks was likely to hinder “Anakondapolitik” – even if the British and the
Americans decided to join forces. The Americans, Haushofer believed, found it hard to resign
themselves to Japan`s growing position in China which they regarded as part of their sphere
of influence. In the Americans` judgment the best line of action for them to take was to
paralyze the rise of such a block by trying to drive a wedge between its potential contractors.
The opinions similar to those expressed in the above are easily met with in Haushofer`s
other publications. Those were the opinions shared after 1918 by the majority of Germans
17
T. Klin, op. cit., p. 144.

7
who refused to accept the “Versailles diktat” as the foundation of a new geopolitical order.
There reappears in Haushofer the image of Germany as a victim of the Western powers - the
view which was in keeping with the growing nationalistic and anti-liberal trends. This also
accounts for his criticism of Western civilization on one hand and his willingness to show
some sort of appreciation for archaic mentality and antiquated social structure of Japan on the
other. Such a way of viewing reality naturally affected political choices Haushofer was ready
to support18.
But it was geopolitical issues that were Haushofer`s first concern, which is clearly seen in
his little book mentioned at the beginning of the paper. As a result of the victorious war, the
Western democracies, especially the British, gained the world ascendancy. The western
countries were determined to maintain and consolidate this dominant position, which required
them to try to weaken their potential enemies. For this reason, argued Haushofer, the British
attempted to thwart all plans for the unification of Euroasia the largest part of which remained
controlled by Russia. The unification would result in the creation of a land power too strong
to be defeated from the sea and, consequently, capable of vying with the sea powers for
domination over the whole world. To prevent such a development Great Britain and France
were doing their best to weaken Germany and Japan, to rule out their territorial expansion and
to set them at variance with Russia19.
German thinker, however, was convinced that fear and hatred make a poor adviser. To
illustrate this thesis he went so far as to garble obvious facts suggesting that it was Britain`s
irresponsible policy that led to the outbreak of the Second World War. Britain`s fault
consisted in its inability to acknowledge Germany`s aspirations to become a world power. A
victim to the Western aggression, Germans had been left with no other option but to look for
new allies to defend themselves. Hence, Haushofer endorsed the alliance with Russia, trying
to lend credence to his stance by pointing to the example once given by Otto von Bismarck. In
other words, he wanted to employ the same strategy as that opted for by some conservative
members of the German elite who did not refrain from seeking an agreement even with the
Soviet Russia – once it seemed the only way in which one could hope to build an anti-British
block.
When walking alone, Germany, the Soviet Union and Japan were too weak to resist the
British and their policy. The alliance of the three states forged in defense of the right to

18
Przestrzeń i polityka /Space and Politics/..., p.65, 80. See also other work by Haushofer that appeared
in print at about the same time as “Der Kontinentalblock”: Japan baut sein Reich, Berlin 1941.
19
See also K. Haushofer, Geopolityczne zasady polityki wewnętrznej /Geopolitical Principles of Internal
Policy/ 1927, w: Przestrzeń i polityka /Space and Poitics/…, p. 378-379.

8
develop freely was required to not only restore the balance of power upset after 1918 but also
to shake - by means of war and expansion - the very foundations of the British empire. What
Haushofer meant was not so much a destruction of Great Britain as the breaking of its
imperial monopoly. London was to be reduced to recognizing Germany`s hegemony in
Europe and its right to colonies. As far as the United States were concerned, the best way to
go was to support their isolationist policy in order to divert the Americans` attention away
from the European affairs and to make them stop siding with the British. In this connection,
he also advised carrying out some sabotage action against the Americans which was to consist
in fueling emancipation tendencies in South America20.
The execution of the plan outlined in the above was to allow Germany to consolidate its
position as a great power and to extend its area of influence. Haushofer wanted to see the
world divided into three pan-regions each of which was to be dominated by one of the
members of the Euro-Asian block21. The plan presupposed that Germany, accompanied by
Italy, would be endowed with the hegemony over the Old Continent and Mitteleuropa. The
realization of this scenario should not be thought of as implying only military victories in the
West. Haushofer was particularly interested in the vast areas in the East which upon their
colonization could serve as an agriculture and raw material base for Germany, the country
which was much more developed than the Soviet Union 22. Thus he saw the agreement with
Russia as a way of obtaining control over this underdeveloped country. In the trio he
envisaged Germany would have surpassed the two remaining partners in terms of military,
economic and intellectual potential, thereby fulfilling the aspiration to become Weltmacht.
The block under discussion depended for its emergence on the favourable stance of the
Soviet Russia which, Haushofer believed, wished to see the end of the Western Capitalism of
which the Anglo-Saxon powers were the pillar. Similar animus against the Western “big
demo-plutocracies” was declared by the Fascist states and Japan. Apart from geopolitical
reasons it was also, Haushofer believed, some kind of spiritual affinity - a sense of deep bond
with the land and the nation as well as ideological hatred of democratic and liberal West - that
brought Germany, Italy, Japan and the Soviet Union together, thus making their alliance
natural and desirable23.

20
That is the way in which the problem was viewed by Johannes Kühn, O sensie obecnej wojny /The
Meaning of the Current War/ 1940, w: Przestrzeń i polityka /Space and Politics/…, p. 518-544.
21
L. Moczulski, op. cit., p. 521522.
22
See also: A. Wolff-Powęska, Doktryna geopolityki /Geopolitical Doctrine/…, p. 178.
23
P. Chiantera-Stutte, Models of Construction of the Middle-European Identity at the Turn of the 20 th
Century: The Geopolitical and Liberal Interpretations, p. 4, http://www.fondazione-
delbianco.org/inglese/insert/News/Europe [the date of use 30 April 2009].

9
 Haushofer`s geopolitical diagnosis should above all be viewed as an offer made mainly to
the rulers of Kremlin, since with Japan Germany had already managed to come to terms. The
offer was designed to make Russians aware of all the benefits they were likely to reap by
throwing in their lot with Japan and the Third Reich. It was also designed to make them aware
of all the dangers they were likely to face by rejecting it for the agreement with the West. By
the alliance with the Western countries the Soviet Union was certain to become embroiled in a
war on both flanks. The only problem was whether the Russians were prepared to believe in
the durability of the relationship with Germany and Japan. A lot indicates that they were not 24.
The German thinker assumed, however, that the Soviets - whom he disliked and of whom he
was afraid - were willing to stick with the foreign policy traditionally pursued by Russia -
especially in so far as the cooperation with Germany was concerned. It is interesting to note
that his pamphlet includes no criticism of communism which is just one more indication that
Haushofer considered geopolitical factors as absolutely decisive in building the block under
discussion.
In view of what was said in the above, the treaty of Rapallo reached in 1922 could be seen
as Haushofer`s success and a bitter failure of Mackinder`s school. The treaty paved the way
for the cooperation between Germany and Russia - the one which despite ideological
differences was directed against the West. In the pamphlet there is a reference to the
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and the text leaves no doubt that Haushofer endorsed both the Pact
and closer cooperation of the totalitarian powers. Similarly, he supported the alliance with
Japan which was able to hold in check the sea powers in the Eastern Asia and in the basin of
Pacific Ocean. Perhaps it was because of his conviction that geopolitical factors were more
important than the ideological ones that he was willing to see in the Anti-Comintern Pact -
whose blade was directed against communism and the Soviet Union - just the first step on the
road to the creation of the continental block. It is more probable, however, that what
Haushofer found crucial about the Anti-Comintern Pact was the anti-British overtones to be
discerned in it.
The outbreak of War, made possible by the treaty of 23 August 1939, resulted in
eliminating Poland which, in Haushofer`s opinion, was created and supported by Western
countries to stand in the way of the alliance between Russia and Germany. The subjugation of
the countries that lay between Russia and Germany and the latter`s domination in this part of
Europe was supposed to strengthen the Reich`s position as against Russia and open up -

24
There is also disagreement among historians as to whether Stalin was getting ready in the first half of
1941 for a war with Germany: M. K. Kamiński, op. cit., p. 52-54.

10
according to Mackinder`s view shared by Haushofer - the way to Heartland 25. The bad
relations between the Soviet Union and Japan resulting in border conflicts in Mongolia in the
years 1938-1939 were the hindrance that prevented the creation of the block26. It was possible,
Haushofer believed, to improve the relations by making both countries realize that their
conflict was of no benefit to them and played into the hands of the British and the Americans.
Japaneese fighting China which was allied with the West were forced to keep - just because of
the Soviet threat - a big Kvantun army in the North. If they decided to come to terms with
Russia, this army could be used for defeating China and seizing control of the territories in the
south-eastern Asia - those that remained dependent on the Western countries.
When Japan and Soviet Russia decided to interrupt the fight, making cautious attempts to
entirely put an end to their conflict, Haushofer began to think that things were likely to take
the right course. He believed that in both countries the forces displaying a tendency towards
cooperation started to gain the upper hand. The situation seemed to be unfolding in
accordance with the theses advanced by Haushofer: Moscow came to pay more attention to
European problems, which required peaceful arrangements in the Far East. With time, the
Russian leaders decided it was better-advised to try to turn the Japan imperialism more
towards the South - to the Western colonial dominions and the territories dependent on the
Western countries. There were also people in the governmental circles in Japan who regarded
USA and Great Britain - and not Russia - as Japan`s most serious rival in Asia. That is why
the Japanese, relying on the aid offered by the Germans who after 23 VIII 1939 were
welcome guests in Moscow, tried to reach some agreement with Russians. Japan`s bolder
plans presupposed the agreement with Russia should be extended to the fascists states, thus
realizing the ideas included in Haushofer`s work27.
Haushofer devoted much of his attention to the question of colonies which had been left
neglected since Germany lost its own colonial dominions. That is why he carried out a
thorough analysis of military, economic and geopolitical potential of given colonies, trying to
evaluate both their advantages and disadvantages. Colonies were crucial for the West`s
geopolitical, military and economic power and allowed the metropolis to get rich by their
constant exploitation. As far as Great Britain was concerned, the colonies were also of

25
According to Macinder „Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland. Who rules the Heartland
commands the World Island. Who rules the World Island commands the World”: L. Moczulski, Geopolityka...,
p. 16-17.
26
See: J. Wojtkowiak, op. cit., p. 123-163.
27
J. Wojtkowiak, op. cit., p. 176, 178-179, 183-187, 203-208, 212-225; K. Tachikawa, La politique de la
sphere de coprosperite de la Grande Asie orientale au Japon, http://www.stratisc.org/Strategique 81 10.htm (the
website visited on 30 June 2009).

11
strategic importance. It was through the string of bases established in the colonial dominions
that Great Britain was able to control some of the key basins, becoming capable of exerting a
certain influence upon the neighboring land areas. In Haushofer`s judgement it was possible
to tear apart the string by taking advantage of all the problems Great Britain was facing in the
ongoing war. He tried to identify weak points in the British military bases and strategic
disadvantages of the territories that remained under Great Britain`s control. For example, he
indicated that the British were vulnerable to attack from the areas controlled by the Euroasian
powers /Gibraltar, Hongkong/. The clash of interests between the metropolis and those British
dominions in which the whites made up the vast majority of the population /Australia, New
Zeland, Canada/ appeared, Haushofer believed, to be another weak link in the whole British
empire. Since the states of the Continental Block had no intention of attacking the dominions
just mentioned, these seemed to have no vested interest in supporting London by force of
arms. Considering this, it seems that Haushofer advocated the idea of building a new colonial
order and did not think that Germany should confine itself to regaining the colonies lost after
the First World War.
Hence, he also contemplated the plans for the creation of a big Euroafrica which was
supposed to be put in Berlin`s control and serve as a source of raw materials for Europe also
dominated by Germany. Thus, at one stroke, Germany would have succeeded in satisfying its
colonial aspirations and in removing the French and English influence from Africa. Italy,
remaining within the German area of influence, would have been enabled to dominate the
Mediterranean, gaining ascendancy along its southern coast, traditionally controlled by the
Western countries.
Haushofer devoted as much attention to the Japan plans for territorial annexations in the
Far East, aimed at reconstruction of geopolitical order in the eastern Asia, the goal of the
reconstruction being to reduce the influence of the Western countries in favor of the Land of
the Rising Sun. The German thinker acknowledged the Japan predominance in this part of the
world and did not think Germany should try to restore its rule over these areas which were as
difficult to regain as they were to maintain because of their great distance from Germany and
communication difficulties28.
Apart from geopolitical ideas, Haushofer`s thought came to be increasingly shaped by the
belief that big nations such as Japanese and German, confined in dense territories, deprived of
natural resources, did not have enough room to breathe. For this reason, these nations had the
28
J. Macała, Nieco zapomniany Karl Haushofer /Somewhat Forgotten Karl Haushofer/, „Geopolityka”
2008, nr 1, p. 77; T. Klin, op. cit., p. 142-143; Scoala de geopolitica germana, http://www.e-
scoala.ro/geopolitica/scgermana.html (the website visited on 1 July 2009)

12
right to a larger living space, colonies being one of its crucial elements. But unlike the
colonial empires, Japan and Germany, argued Haushofer, reject imperialism, egoism and
exploitation of dependent territories and wish to focus on the civilization mission in these
areas. People living in the colonies possessed by Germany and Japan are going to be treated
definitely better than those living in the colonies possessed by other countries. Both Japan and
Germany wanted to rely for their colonial development on cooperation and concord29.
The Continental Block made it possible to hit the British empire where it was most
vulnerable. It was by giving an active support to India`s aspirations to independence that one
could contribute to ousting the British influence from Asia. In expounding his views
Haushofer admitted to having been told more than once that a large part of Indian elite seems
to dream of nothing but being still protected by Britain and preserving the status of the British
dominion. Nevertheless, he maintained that these elites have to aim at independence - even if
it was only a long term desire. The independence of India was also in the interest of Euroasian
powers. That is why they should support India`s struggle for independence, trying to increase
the difficulties encountered by the British in India, and taking advantage of their involvement
in the ongoing war. India was likely to become a desirable ally of the block, helping it
reinforce its domination over Euroasia.
So, the building of the block stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean appeared to
be the most important task these three powers should set themselves. The delineation of the
spheres of influence of the three states should be based on geopolitical rather than cultural
premises. According to Haushofer “if we take a look at the atlas of the Old World, we`ll see
that the three-man cart encompasses three outermost seas”. These seas are the Baltic Sea, the
Japanese Sea and the Adriatic Sea. He was convinced it would not be difficult for Euroasian
powers to control those seas and seizing control of them was important in terms of curbing
Britain`s sea domination. For this reason the alliance would have been able to protect the
Communist Russia against the Western countries` invasion from sea. At the same time
through her allies Russia was likely to gain open access to the waters which this big country
had often tried to gain by force of arms.
For the Continental Block to withstand all the storms sweeping across the globe it had to be
built of steel. The steel was supposed to be durable, with flexible joints, but at the same time
firm enough to make sure that every hinge in it was able to resist the most violent storm”. It

29
The conceptions similar to German theory of Lebensraum were formulated in Japan since 30ties: K.
Tachikawa, La politique de la sphere de coprosperite de la Grande Asie orientale au Japon
http://www.stratisc.org/Strategique 81 10.htm (the website visited on 30 June 2009).

13
can also be compared to the Russian three horses team in the centre of which runs a skittish
horse while two other horses running on both sides of the skittish one are not as restless and
can be relied on for curbing it, thus guaranteeing the smooth movement of the whole cart”.
It was against this background that the German thinker tried to judge “all powers of
Euroasian pact and the pact`s geopolitical advantages”. He believed all those powers were
complementary to one another not only in strategic but also in economic and military terms,
making up the area of 23 million square kilometers. The Soviet Union represented the greatest
potential and was also of key importance for the alliance because of its location. He indicated
that this largest country in the world stretched over the area of 21.352.571 square kilometers,
its coast line had 13 thousand kilometers and there were 182 mln people living in it. Japan
occupied the eastern flank of the Block and stretched over the area of 2 mln square
kilometers, possessing a long coast line and the population of 140 mln people. Because of its
location and interests it had to maintain big fleet and air force. On the other hand the Japanese
army was not as strong as the armies of each of the two remaining members of the alliance.
Germany, supported by the fascist Italy, was supposed to constitute the western flank of the
Block. Interestingly, Haushofer was of the opinion that in Europe cultural and economic
power was more important than the space a given country occupied. Germany controlled the
territory of 1 mln square kilometers /he added 3 mln kilometers in colonies to which, as he
believed, Germany had the right/ and its population ranged between 87 and 100 mln people.
Germany, however, had at its disposal a very strong and modern army and air force. This,
along with the economic potential of both the Third Reich and Europe of which it was
supposed to seize control, was to ensure that Germany would become the most powerful
member of the Block, making the German dream of Weltmacht come true. The allied Italy,
located on the most western point of the planned block, in danger of being invaded from the
sea /Italy`s coast line was 25 thousand kilometers/ had to concentrate on developing its air
force and the navy. Italy`s main asset was its population which oscilated between 56-60 mln
people30.
Haushofer was convinced that with the rise of the block its members would be put at an
advantageous geopolitical position and their total economic and military potential would lead
them to become much more powerful than Great Britain and USA. He indicated that during
the First World War Germany and Austria were much weaker than Ententa and,
notwithstanding, decided to go to war that ended in a disaster. The continental block gave a
30
In another text written at about the same time Haushofer gives slightly different data concerning
military potential of Germany, Italy and Japan: K. Haushofer, Geograficzne spełnienie trójkąta /Geografical
Fulfillment of the Triangle (1940), w: Przestrzeń i polityka /Space and Politics/…, p. 495.

14
hope that this time it is the enemies of England that were likely to win a victory. The block
also seemed to provide its contractors with an opportunity of pursuing more global policy.
That is why Haushofer was of the opinion that the block was something more than just a pure
mirage.
In trying to judge the impact Haushofer`s pamphlet had upon the plans for creating the
Continental Block one needs to say that his enthusiasm did not go hand in hand with what
could actually be achieved. His opinions were outside the mainstream of the views shaping
Germany`s foreign policy. For this reason during the interrogation taking place in the summer
of 1945 Haushofer argued with some exaggeration that his geopolitical theories “did not
affect in the least military and political activities of the Third Reich and the economic strategy
it employed”31. It is no wonder then that his call for forming the block was not basically
materialized. His pamphlet appeared in print when Germany had already decided to break
with the Soviet Union – the intention which of course was kept secret. The assent given by the
Nazi authorities to publish Haushofer`s work may have been just a part of the efforts taken to
conceal the preparations for the “Fall Barbarossa” of which Haushofer of course had no
knowledge. But his views were known and discussed in Moscow.
Haushofer lost in spite of the fact that his views were to a certain extent shared by Hess and
Ribbentrop and for a short time even by the leader of NSDAP. Finally, however, he failed to
win Hitler over to his views. The latter preferred the “anticommunist crusade”, and decided to
drive the country along the path of war with the Soviet collosus. To Hitler ideological and
racial reasons were more important than cool geopolitical calculation. Besides, the leader of
the Third Reich believed that routing Moscow would lead to the defeat of Great Britain,
making Albion willing to sign a peace treaty on German terms and acknowledge German
ascendency in Europe32.
22 June 1941 undoubtedly put an end to Haushofer`s hopes for creating the Continental
Block capable of defeating the Anglo-Saxon sea powers and securing for Germany the
position of Weltmacht. By launching an attack on the Soviet Union Germany embroiled itself
in a war on two fronts. That was the kind of war which Germany lost in the years 1914-1918.
Now during the Second World War, Haushofer believed, history was going to repeat itself. He
tried to hide his disappointment behind a verbal acceptance of Hitler`s decision and the
recognition of the fact that the communism posed the most serious threat to Germany. For this
reason achieving Lebensraum was to be made possible only as a result of destroying the

31
H. A. Jacobsen, op. cit., p. 338.
32
E. Jäckel, op. cit., p. 56-57; G. Schreiber, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, München 2007, p. 41-42.

15
Bolshevik Russia33. Haushofer also reacted with a willingness to modify his geopolitical
conceptions concerning the continental block. In a modified version the block was to be made
up of Germany and Japan - the countries which after defeating Russia were supposed to share
it - along with the rest of Asia - between their respective areas of influence. This, however,
was nothing but the vestiges of his original ideas.
Quite paradoxically, as a result of the Second World War the Communist state controlling
heartland managed to subjugate half of Europe and a large part of Asia, thus realizing
Haushofer`s dream of the continental block. The block issued a challenge to the West and
lost. The communism collapsed. It is no wonder, however, that nowadays the conception of
the continental block is most feverishly debated in Russia34.

33
He also compared the task Hitler was facing after his invasion of the Soviet Union with those of
Napoleon/ A. Wolff-Powęska, Doktryna geopolityki /Geopolitical Doctrine/..., p. 186.
34
See: A. Dugin, The Great War of Continents, http://eurosiberia.
wetpoint.com/page/The+Great+War+of+Continents [the website visited on 20 I 2011]; N. von Kreitor, Russia
and the New World Order. The Geopolitical Project of Pax Eurasiatica,
http://www.gnosticliberationfront.com/russia and the new world order.htm [website visited on 20 I 2011]

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