G.R. No.

L-47757-61 January 28, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABUNDIO R. ELLO, As 4th Assistant of
Provincial Bohol VICENTE DE LA SERNA. JR., as complainant all private
prosecutor, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bohol
Branch II, ANO DACULLO, GERONIMO OROYAN, MARIO APARICI, RUPERTO
CAJES and MODESTO S SUELLO, respondents.

FACTS:
Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower court separate information against sixteen
persons charging them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772
SECTION 1. Any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking
advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or
possessing the property of the latter against his will for residential, commercial or any
other purposes, shall be punished by an imprisonment ranging from six months to one
year or a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand pesos at the
discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
The persons accused was allegedly, with stealth and strategy, enter into, occupy and
cultivate a portion of a grazing land physically occupied, possessed and claimed by
Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr.
Judge Echaves issued an omnibus dismissing the five informations on the grounds
(1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through "stealth and strategy",
whereas under the decree the entry should be effected "with the use of force,
intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the
landowner", and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis of the same kind or species
the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land

ISSUE:
whether Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts,
applies to agricultural lands
RULING:
The SC ruled that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to
pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting
in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made
by well-to-do individuals. The squatting complained of involves pasture lands in
rural areas.
The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court
does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended
to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule
of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when
the legislative intent is uncertain.
G.R. No. 89483, 30 August 1990
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
HON. EUTROPIO MIGRINI and TROADIO TECSON

FACTS:
The New Armed Forces Anti-Graft Board (Board) under the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) recommended that private respondent Lt. Col. Troadio
Tecson (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended,
and Rep. Act No. 1379, as amended.  Private respondent moved to dismiss. The Board
opposed. Private respondent filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction
with the Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Metro Manila.  According to petitioners, the
PCGG has the power to investigate and cause the prosecution of private respondent
because he is a “subordinate” of former President Marcos. Respondent alleged that he
is not one of the subordinates contemplated in Executive Orders 1, 2, 14 and 14-A as
the alleged illegal acts being imputed to him, that of alleged amassing wealth beyond
his legal means while Finance Officer of the Philippine Constabulary, are acts of his
own alone, not connected with his being a crony, business associate, etc. or
subordinate as the petition does not allege so.  Hence the PCGG has no jurisdiction to
investigate him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent acted as a “subordinate” under E.O. No.1 and
related executive orders.
RULING:
NO. Civil Case decision dismissed and nullified. TRO was made permanent.
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, that is – where
general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and
specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but
are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those
specifically mentioned. The term “subordinate” as used in E.O. Nos. 1 and 2 would
refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or
his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in E.O.
No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in E.O. No.
2.
The PCGG is ENJOINED from proceeding with the investigation and prosecution of
private respondent, without prejudice to his investigation and prosecution by the
appropriate prosecution agency.

G.R. No. 106719 September 21, 1993

DRA. BRIGIDA S. BUENASEDA, Lt. Col. ISABELO BANEZ, JR., ENGR. CONRADO
REY MATIAS, Ms. CORA S. SOLIS and Ms. ENYA N. LOPEZ, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY JUAN FLAVIER, Ombudsman CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, and NCMH
NURSES ASSOCIATION, represented by RAOULITO GAYUTIN, respondents.

The petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary

Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court, seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman directing the preventive suspension
of petitioners Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda et.al. The questioned order was issued in
connection with the administrative complaint filed with the Ombudsman (OBM-ADM-0-
91-0151) by the private respondents against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. The Supreme Court required respondent Secretary to
comply with the aforestated status quo order. The Solicitor General, in his comment,
stated that (a) “The authority of the Ombudsman is only to recommend suspension and
he has no direct power to suspend;” and (b) “Assuming the Ombudsman has the power
to directly suspend a government official or employee, there are conditions required by
law for the exercise of such powers; [and] said conditions have not been met in the
instant case”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and
employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the
investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees.
HELD:
YES. Petition was dismissed, status quo lifted and set aside.
When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power “to recommend the
suspension” of a public official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to “suspension,” as
a punitive measure. All the words associated with the word “suspension” in said
provision referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine,
censure. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, the word “suspension” should be given
the same sense as the other words with which it is associated. Where a particular word
is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made
specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is
associated.
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively
suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a
procedural, not a penal statute. The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance
with the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the administrative
charges.
G.R. No. 79094 June 22, 1988
MANOLO P. FULE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of respondent Appellate Court,
which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Lucena City, Branch LIV,
convicting petitioner (the accused-appellant) of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
(The Bouncing Checks Law) on the basis of the Stipulation of Facts entered into
between the prosecution and the defense during the pre-trial conference in the Trial
Court. At the hearing of August 23, 1985, only the prosecution presented its evidence.
At the subsequent hearing on September 17, 1985, petitioner-appellant waived the right
to present evidence and, in lieu thereof, submitted a Memorandum confirming the
Stipulation of Facts. The Trial Court convicted petitioner-appellant.
On appeal, respondent Appellate Court upheld the Stipulation of Facts and affirmed the
judgment of conviction. Hence, this recourse, with petitioner-appellant contending that
the Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals erred in the decision of the Regional Trial
Court convicting the petitioner of the offense charged, despite the cold fact that the
basis of the conviction was based solely on the stipulation of facts made during the pre-
trial on August 8, 1985, which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his counsel. In
Sec.4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures:
SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. — No agreement or admission made
or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused
unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel. (Rule 118) [Emphasis
supplied]
Having been effective since January 01, 1985, the above rule is applicable.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as
mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in
evidence.

HELD:
YES. Judgment of respondent Appellate Court is REVERSED and this case is hereby
ordered RE-OPENED and REMANDED to the appropriate Branch of the Regional Trial
Court of Lucena City, for further reception of evidence.By its very language, the Rule is
mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction, negative words and phrases are
to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory
(McGee vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 820 [1954]). The use of the term “shall” further
emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to
impose a duty which may be enforced (Bersabal vs. Salvador, No. L-35910, July 21,
1978, 84 SCRA 176). And more importantly, penal statutes whether substantive and
remedial or procedural are, by consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the
government and liberally in favor of the accused (People vs. Terrado No. L-23625,
November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 648).
G.R. No. L-35910 July 21, 1978
PURITA BERSABAL, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE SERAFIN SALVADOR, as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Caloocan City, Branch XIV, TAN THAT and ONG PIN TEE, respondents.
FACTS:
[P]etitioner Purita Bersabal seeks to annul the orders of respondent Judge and to
compel said respondent Judge to decide petitioner’s perfected appeal on the basis of
the evidence and records of the case submitted by the City Court of Caloocan City plus
the memorandum already submitted by the petitioner and respondents. The second
paragraph of Section 45 of R.A. No. 296, otherwise known as the Philippine Judiciary
Act of 1948, as amended by R.A. No. 6031 provides, in part, as follows:
Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed cases on the basis of the evidence
and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts: Provided, That the
parties may submit memoranda and/or brief with oral argument if so requested … .
(Emphasis supplied).
A decision was rendered by said Court which decision was appealed by the petitioner to
the respondent Court. The respondent Judge dismissed petition on August 4,
1971 upon failure of defendant–appellant to prosecute her appeal, with costs against
her. Petitioner filed her memorandum. The respondent Court denied the motion for
reconsideration on October 30, 1971. Petitioner filed a motion for leave to file second
motion for reconsideration which was likewise denied by the respondent court on March
15, 1972.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the light of the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 45 of
Republic Act No. 296, as amended by R.A. No. 6031, the mere failure of an appellant to
submit on time the memorandum mentioned in the same paragraph would empower the
Court of First Instance to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to Prosecute.
HELD:
NO. The challenged orders of Respondent Judge dated August 4, 1971, October 30,
1971, and March 15, 1972 are set aside as null and void.
RATIO:
The above cited provision is clear and leaves no room for doubt. It cannot be interpreted
otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is optional on the part of the parties.
Being optional on the part of the parties, the latter may so choose to waive submission
of the memoranda. And as a logical concomitant of the choice given to the Parties, the
Court cannot dismiss the appeal of the party waiving the submission of said
memorandum the appellant so chooses not to submit the memorandum, the Court of
First Instance is left with no alternative but to decide the case on the basis of the
evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts. In other words, the
Court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an appellant
to submit his memorandum, but rather it is the Court’s mandatory duty to decide the
case on the basis of the available evidence and records transmitted to it.
As a general rule, the word “may” when used in a statute is permissive only and
operates to confer discretion; while the word “shall” is imperative, operating to impose
a duty which may be enforced (Dizon vs. Encarnacion, L-18615, Dec. 24, 1963, 9
SCRA 714, 716-717). The implication is that the Court is left with no choice but to
decide the appealed case either on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted to
it, or on the basis of the latter plus memoranda and/or brief with oral argument duly
submitted and/or made on request
G.R. No. 117188 August 7, 1997
LOYOLA GRAND VILLAS HOMEOWNERS (SOUTH) ASSOCIATION,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HOME INSURANCE AND GUARANTY
CORPORATION, EMDEN ENCARNACION and HORATIO AYCARDO, respondents.

FACTS:
[T]his is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the decision of the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC). This
quasi-judicial body recognized Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association (LGVHA)
as the sole homeowners’ association in Loyola Grand Villas, a duly registered
subdivision in Quezon City and Marikina City that was owned and developed by Solid
Homes, Inc. For unknown reasons, however, LGVHAI did not file its corporate by-laws.
LGVHAI was informed by HIGC that they had been automatically dissolved. LGVHAI
lodged a complaint with the HIGC. They questioned the revocation of LGVHAI’s
certificate of registration without due notice and hearing and concomitantly prayed for
the cancellation of the certificates of registration of the North and South Associations by
reason of the earlier issuance of a certificate of registration in favor of LGVHAI. After
due notice and hearing, private respondents obtained a favorable ruling from HIGC
recognizing them as the duly registered and existing homeowners association for
Loyola Grand Villas homeowners and declaring the Certificates of Registration of Loyola
Grand Villas Homeowners (North) Association, Inc. and Loyola Grand Villas
Homeowners (South) Association, Inc. as hereby revoked or cancelled.
The South Association appealed to the Appeals Board of the HIGC but was dismissed
for lack of merit. Rebuffed, the South Association in turn appealed to the Court of
Appeals, but it simply reiterated HIGC’s ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the
date of its incorporation, as mandated by Section 46 of the Corporation Code, result in
its automatic dissolution.
HELD:
NO. Petition DENIED. Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
[U]nder the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself (optima
statuli interpretatix est ipsum statutum), Section 46 of the Corporation Code reveals the
legislative intent to attach a directory, and not mandatory, meaning for the word
“must” in the first sentence thereof. Note should be taken of the second paragraph of
the law which allows the filing of the by-laws even prior to incorporation. This provision
in the same section of the Code rules out mandatory compliance with the requirement of
filing the by-laws “within one (1) month after receipt of official notice of the issuance of
its certificate of incorporation by the Securities and Exchange Commission.” It
necessarily follows that failure to file the by-laws within that period does not imply the
“demise” of the corporation. By-laws may be necessary for the “government” of the
corporation but these are subordinate to the articles of incorporation as well as to the
Corporation Code and related statutes.
[I]f the languages of a statute considered as a whole and with due regard to its nature
and object reveals that the legislature intended to use the words “shall” and “must” to
be directory, they should be given that meaning.  
G.R. No. 109902 August 2, 1994
ALU-TUCP, Representing Members: ALAN BARINQUE, with 13 others, namely:
ENGR. ALAN G. BARINQUE, ENGR. DARRELL LEE ELTAGONDE, EDUARD H.
FOOKSON, JR., ROMEO R. SARONA, RUSSELL GACUS, JERRY BONTILAO,
EUSEBIO MARIN, JR., LEONIDO ECHAVEZ, BONIFACIO MEJOS, EDGAR S.
BONTUYAN, JOSE G. GARGUENA, JR., OSIAS B. DANDASAN, and GERRY I.
FETALVERO, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NATIONAL STEEL
CORPORATION (NSC), respondents.

FACTS:
[P]etitioners, as employees of private respondent National Steel Corporation (NSC),
filed separate complaints for unfair labor practice, regularization and monetary benefits
with the NLRC, Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City. The complaints were
consolidated and after hearing, the Labor Arbiter declared petitioners “regular project
employees who shall continue their employment as such for as long as such [project]
activity exists,” but entitled to the salary of a regular employee pursuant to the
provisions in the collective bargaining agreement. It also ordered payment of salary
differentials.
The NLRC in its questioned resolutions modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision. It affirmed
the Labor Arbiter’s holding that petitioners were project employees since they were
hired to perform work in a specific undertaking — the Five Years Expansion Program,
the completion of which had been determined at the time of their engagement and
which operation was not directly related to the business of steel manufacturing. The
NLRC, however, set aside the award to petitioners of the same benefits enjoyed
by regular employees for lack of legal and factual basis.
The law on the matter is Article 280 of the Labor Code, where the petitioners argue that
they are “regular” employees of NSC because: (i) their jobs are “necessary, desirable
and work-related to private respondent’s main business, steel-making”; and (ii) they
have rendered service for six (6) or more years to private respondent NSC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are considered “permanent employees” as opposed to being
only “project employees” of NSC.
HELD:
NO. Petition for Certiorari dismissed for lack of merit. NLRC Resolutions affirmed.
RATIO:
Function of the proviso. Petitioners are not considered “permanent employees”.
However, contrary to petitioners’ apprehensions, the designation of named employees
as “project employees” and their assignment to a specific project are effected and
implemented in good faith, and not merely as a means of evading otherwise applicable
requirements of labor laws.
On the claim that petitioners’ service to NSC of more than six (6) years should qualify
them as “regular employees”, the Supreme Court believed this claim is without legal
basis. The simple fact that the employment of petitioners as project employees had
gone beyond one (1) year, does not detract from, or legally dissolve, their status as
“project employees”. The second paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor Code, quoted
above, providing that an employee who has served for at least one (1) year, shall be
considered a regular employee, relates to casual employees, not to project employees.
G.R. No. 98382 May 17, 1993
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and EPIFANIO DE LA CRUZ, respondents.

FACTS:

a complaint brought by the Epifanio dela Cruz for the reconveyance to him (and
resultant damages) of two (2) parcels of land mortgaged by him to the defendant
Philippine National Bank (Manila), which the defendant allegedly unlawfully foreclosed.
The defendant then consolidated ownership unto itself, and subsequently sold the
parcels to third parties. The amended Answer of the defendant states on the other hand
that the extrajudicial foreclosure, consolidation of ownership, and subsequent sale to
the third parties were all valid, the bank therefore counterclaims for damages and other
equitable remedies.
From the evidence and exhibits presented by both parties, the Court is of the opinion
that the following facts have been proved: Two lots, were mortgaged to the defendant
Philippine National Bank. The lots were under the common names of the plaintiff
(Epifanio dela Cruz), his brother (Delfin) and his sister (Maria). The mortgage was made
possible because of the grant by the latter two to the former of a special power of
attorney to mortgage the lots to the defendant. The lots were mortgaged to guarantee
promissory notes
the instant complaint against the defendant Philippine National Bank is hereby ordered
DISMISSED, with costs against the plaintiff. The Counterclaim against the plaintiff is
likewise DISMISSED, for the Court does not believe that the complaint had been made
in bad faith.
ISSUE:
The notices of sale under Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, on
extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage are required to be posted for not less
than twenty days in at least three public places of the municipality or city where the
property is situated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred pesos, such
notices shall also be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city.
RULING:
The rule is that statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage
foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with, and that even slight deviations
therefrom will invalidate the notice and render the sale at least voidable Interpreting
Sec. 457 of the Code of Civil Procedure (reproduced in Sec. 18(c) of Rule 39, Rules of
Court and in Sec. 3 of Act No. 3135), this Court held that if a sheriff sells without notice
prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure induced thereto by the judgment creditor, and
the purchaser at the sale is the judgment creditor, the sale is absolutely void and no title
passes. This is regarded as the settled doctrine in this jurisdiction whatever the rule may
be elsewhere
. . . It has been held that failure to advertise a mortgage foreclosure sale in compliance
with statutory requirements constitutes a jurisdictional defect invalidating the sale and
that a substantial error or omission in a notice of sale will render the notice insufticient
and vitiate the sale

the New Civil Code, for the purpose of counting the first week of publication as to the
last day thereof fall on April 4, 1969 because this will have the effect of extending the
first week by another day. This incongruous repercussion could not have been the
unwritten intention of the lawmakers when Act No. 3135 was enacted. Verily, inclusion
of the first day of publication is in keeping with the computation where this Court had
occasion to pronounce,, that the publication of notice on June 30, July 7 and July 14,
1968 satisfied the publication requirement under Act No. 3135. Respondent court
cannot, therefore, be faulted for holding that there was no compliance with the strict
requirements of publication independently of the so- called admission in judicio.
G.R. No. 167982             August 13, 2008
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner,
vs.
MERCEDITAS DE SAHAGUN, MANUELA T. WAQUIZ and RAIDIS J.
BASSIG, respondent.*

FACTS:
respondent Raidis J. Bassig, Chief of the Research and Publications Division of the
Intramuros Administration, submitted a Memorandum to then Intramuros Administrator
Edda V. Henson recommending that Brand Asia, Ltd. be commissioned to produce a
video documentary for a television program, as well implement a media plan and
marketing support services for Intramuros. the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of
the Intramuros Administration, composed of respondent Merceditas de Sahagun, as
Chairman, with respondent Manuela T. Waquiz and Dominador C. Ferrer, Jr. , as
members, submitted a recommendation to Henson for the approval of the award of said
contract to Brand Asia, Ltd. On the same day, Henson approved the recommendation
and issued a Notice of Award to Brand Asia, Ltd.
 contract of service to produce a video documentary was executed
 the BAC, with Augusto P. Rustia as additional member, recommended to Henson the
approval of the award of contract for print collaterals to Brand Asia, Ltd. On the same
day, Henson approved the recommendation and issued a Notice of Award/Notice to
Proceed to Brand Asia, Ltd.
 a contract of services to produce print collaterals was entered between Henson and
Brand Asia, Ltd.
an anonymous complaint was filed with the Presidential Commission Against Graft and
Corruption (PGAC) against Henson in relation to the contracts entered into with Brand
Asia, Ltd.
Henson was dismissed from the service by the Office of the President upon
recommendation of the PGAC which found that the contracts were entered into without
the required public bidding and in violation of Section 3 (a) and (e) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
an anonymous complaint was filed with the Ombudsman against the BAC in relation to
the latter’s participation in the contracts with Brand Asia, Ltd. for which Henson was
dismissed from service.

Fact-Finding Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) filed criminal and administrative charges

against respondents, along with Ferrer and Rustia, for violation of Section 3 (a) and (c)
of R.A. No. 3019 in relation to Section 1 of Executive Order No. 302 and grave
misconduct, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service and gross
violation of Rules and Regulations pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987

ISSUE:
whether Section 20 (5) of R.A. No. 6770 prohibits administrative investigations in cases
filed more than one year after commission, and (2) whether the Ombudsman only has
recommendatory, not punitive, powers against erring government officials and
employees.
RULING:
 well-entrenched is the rule that administrative offenses do not prescribe. Administrative
offenses by their very nature pertain to the character of public officers and employees.
In disciplining public officers and employees, the object sought is not the punishment of
the officer or employee but the improvement of the public service and the preservation
of the public’s faith and confidence in our government.
It is, therefore, discretionary upon the Ombudsman whether or not to conduct an
investigation of a complaint even if it was filed after one year from the occurrence of the
act or omission complained of.
Thus, while the complaint herein was filed more than seven years after the commission
of the acts imputed against respondents, it was within the authority of
the Ombudsman to conduct the investigation of the subject complaint
On the second issue, the authority of the Ombudsman to determine the administrative
liability of a public official or employee, and to direct and compel the head of the office
or agency concerned to implement the penalty imposed is likewise settled.
G.R. No. 172409             February 4, 2008
ROOS INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION, INC. and OSCAR TOCMO, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and JOSE
MARTILLOS, respondents.

FACTS:

Private respondent Jose Martillos (respondent) filed a complaint against petitioners for
illegal dismissal and money claims such as the payment of separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement plus full backwages, service incentive leave, 13 th month pay, litigation
expenses, underpayment of holiday pay and other equitable reliefs before the National
Capital Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission
Respondent alleged that he had been hired as a driver-mechanic but was not made to
sign any employment contract by petitioners. As driver mechanic, respondent was
assigned to work at Carmona, Cavite and he worked daily from 7:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.
at the rate of P200.00 a day. He was also required to work during legal holidays but was
only paid an additional 30% holiday pay. He likewise claimed that he had not been paid
service incentive leave and 13th month pay during the entire course of his employment.
On 16 March 2002, his employment was allegedly terminated without due process
Petitioners denied respondent’s allegations. They contended that respondent had been
hired on several occasions as a project employee and that his employment was
coterminous with the duration of the projects. They also maintained that respondent was
fully aware of this arrangement. Considering that respondent’s employment had been
validly terminated after the completion of the projects, petitioners concluded that he is
not entitled to separation pay and other monetary claims, even attorney’s fee
The Labor Arbiter ruled that respondent had been illegally dismissed after finding that
he had acquired the status of a regular employee as he was hired as a driver with little
interruption from one project to another, a task which is necessary to the usual trade of
his employer
The Labor Arbiter ordered petitioners to pay respondent the aggregate sum
of P224,647.17 representing backwages, separation pay, salary differential, holiday
pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay

ISSUE:
Whether or not bond is an indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the
employer and that the perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the
manner prescribed by law is mandatory and jurisdictional
RULING:
The Court reiterates the settled rule that an appeal from the decision of the Labor
Arbiter involving a monetary award is only deemed perfected upon the posting of a cash
or surety bond within ten (10) days from such decision. Article 223 of the Labor Code
non-compliance with such legal requirements is fatal and has the effect of rendering the
judgment final and executory. It must be stressed that there is no inherent right to an
appeal in a labor case, as it arises solely from the grant of statute
The intention of the lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable requisite for the
perfection of an appeal by the employer is underscored by the provision that an appeal
may be perfected "only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond." The word "only"
makes it perfectly clear that the LAWMAKERS intended the posting of a cash or surety
bond by the employer to be the exclusive means by which an employer’s appeal may be
considered completed. The law however does not require its outright payment, but only
the posting of a bond to ensure that the award will be eventually paid should the appeal
fail. What petitioners have to pay is a moderate and reasonable sum for the premium of
such bond.
G.R. No. 169435             February 27, 2008
MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal
Mayor, CAROLINE ARZADON-GARVIDA, petitioner,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF MARCOS, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal
Mayor, SALVADOR PILLOS, and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:
The Petitioner Municipality of Nueva Era seek to reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) to a certain extent that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12,
Laoag City, Ilocos Norte, in a case that originated from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
(SP) of Ilocos Norte about the boundary dispute between the Municipalities of Marcos
and Nueva Era in Ilocos Norte.
The Municipality of Nueva Era was created from the settlements of Bugayong,
Cabittaoran, Garnaden, Padpadon, Padsan, Paorpatoc, Tibangran, and Uguis which
were previously organized as rancherias, each of which was under the independent
control of a chief. In the virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 66 5 dated September 30,
1916 united these rancherias and created the township of Nueva Era. The Municipality
of Marcos, on the other hand, was created on June 22, 1963 pursuant to Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3753 entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Marcos in the Province of
Ilocos Norte
Marcos did not claim any part of Nueva Era as its own territory until after almost 30
years,7 or only on March 8, 1993, when its Sangguniang Bayan passed Resolution No.
93-015.8 Said resolution was entitled: "Resolution Claiming an Area which is an Original
Part of Nueva Era, But Now Separated Due to the Creation of Marcos Town in the
Province of Ilocos Norte."
Marcos submitted its claim to the SP of Ilocos Norte for its consideration and approval.
In view of its claim over the middle portion of Nueva Era, Marcos posited that Nueva Era
was cut into two parts. And since the law required that the land area of a municipality
must be compact and contiguous, Nueva Era's northern isolated portion could no longer
be considered as its territory but that of Marcos'. Thus, Marcos claimed that it was
entitled not only to the middle portion of Nueva Era but also to Nueva Era's isolated
northern portion. These areas claimed by Marcos were within Barangay Sto. Niño,
Nueva Era.
Nueva Era reacted to the claim of Marcos through its Resolution No. 1, Series of 1993.
It alleged that since time immemorial, its entire land area was an ancestral domain of
the "tinguians," an indigenous cultural community. It argued to the effect that since the
land being claimed by Marcos must be protected for the tinguians, it must be preserved
as part of Nueva Era. Nueva Era claimed R.A. No. 3753 specifically mentioned seven
(7) barrios of Dingras to become Marcos, the area which should comprise Marcos
should not go beyond the territory of said barrios.
On March 29, 2000, the SP of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era. The fallo of its
decision. R.A. No. 3753 expressly named the barangays that would comprise
Marcos, but none of Nueva Era's barangays were mentioned. The SP thus construed,
applying the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that no part of Nueva Era was
included by R.A. No. 3753 in creating Marcos.

ISSUE:
whether or not the mode of appeal adopted by Marcos in bringing the case to the CA is
proper; and (2) whether or not the eastern boundary of Marcos extends over and covers
a portion of Nueva Era.

RULING:
No part of Nueva Era's territory was taken for the creation of Marcos under R.A. No.
3753. Since only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos' source of
territory, Nueva Era's territory is, therefore, excluded. Under the maxim expressio unius
est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing not
mentioned. If a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything
else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and effect. This
rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and
natural workings of the human mind. Legislature intended other barangays from Nueva
Era to become part of Marcos, it could have easily done so by clear and concise
language. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not by
interpretation or construction be extended to other matters. The rule proceeds from the
premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute
had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned. Furthermore, this conclusion on the intention of the legislature is
bolstered by the explanatory note of the bill which paved the way for the creation of
Marcos. Said explanatory note mentioned only Dingras as the mother municipality of
Marcos. Where there is ambiguity in a statute, as in this case, courts may resort to the
explanatory note to clarify the ambiguity and ascertain the purpose and intent of the
statute. Despite the omission of Nueva Era as a mother territory in the law creating
Marcos, the latter still contends that said law included Nueva Era. It alleges that based
on the description of its boundaries, a portion of Nueva Era is within its territory.

G.R. No. 180235

ALTA VISTA GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB, Petitioner,
vs.
THE CITY OF CEBU, HON. MAYOR TOMAS R. OSMEÑA, in his capacity as Mayor of
Cebu, and TERESITA C. CAMARILLO, in her capacity as the City Treasurer,
Respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner is a non-stock and non-profit corporation operating a golf course in Cebu City.
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City enacted City Tax: Ordinance No. LXIX,
otherwise known as the "Revised Omnibus Tax: Ordinance of the City of Cebu. Through
the succeeding years, respondent Cebu City repeatedly attempted to collect from
petitioner its deficiency business taxes, fees, and charges for 1998, a substantial portion
of which consisted of the amusement tax on the golf course. Petitioner steadfastly
refused to pay the amusement tax arguing that the imposition of said tax by Section 42
of the Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance, as amended, was irregular, improper, and
illegal. Petitioner reasoned that under the Local Government Code, amusement tax can
only be imposed on operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, or places where one
seeks to entertain himself by seeing or viewing a show or performance

ISSUE:
Whether or not there can be amusement tax on golf course

RULING:
Golf course cannot be considered as an amusement place and is therefore not subject
to amusement tax. According to Section 140 of the Local Government Code on
amusement tax, the province may levy an amusement tax to be collected from the
proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing
stadia, and other places of amusement.
In applying the principle of ejusdem generis, where a general word or phrase follows an
enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter
follows the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be
restricted to persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class
as those specifically mentioned. A golf course is not similar to that of the expressly
provided amusement places as it cannot be considered as an amusement place in
itself. An amusement place is defined as a place where people enter to witness a show
or a performance.