Ramos vs.
Director of Lands unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the
Facts:
Restituto Romero gained possession of a considerable
tract of land located in the municipality of San Jose,
Province of Nueva Ecija, in the year 1882. He took
advantage of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, to
obtain a possessory information title to the land,
registered as such on February 8, 1896. Parcel No. 1,
included within the limits of the possessory information
title of Restituto Romero, was sold in February, 1907, to
Cornelio Ramos and his wife Ambrosia Salamanca.
Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have the
title registered. Opposition was entered by the Director
of Lands on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a
good title from the Spanish government and by the
Director of Forestry on the ground that the first parcel
was forest land. The trial court agreed with the objectors
and excluded parcel No. 1 from registration.
Issue:
Whether or not the actual occupancy of a part of the land
described in the instrument giving color of title sufficient
to give title to the entire tract of land.
Held:
Yes, based on the doctrine of constructive possession.
The general rule is that the possession and cultivation of
a portion of a tract under claim of ownership of all is a
constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in
the adverse possession of another.
The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith;
and he has had open, peaceable, and notorious
possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to
apprise the community and the world that the land was
for his enjoyment. Possession in the eyes of the law
does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every
square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in
possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest
fulfilled the requirements of the law on the supposition
that he premises consisted of agricultural public land.
On the issue of forest land, Forest reserves of public
land can be established as provided by law. When the
claim of the citizen and the claim of the government as
to a particular piece of property collide, if the
Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in
reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to
the court convincing proof that the land is not more
valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes.
In this case, the mere formal opposition on the part of
the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry,
courts from giving title to the claimant.
Petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the entire
tract of land for which he asked for registration.
Registration in the name of the petitioner is hereby
granted.
Director of Lands v. CA
Facts:
A land registration case involving 128 hectares of land
located in Cabagan, Isabela. "Bruno Cabanatan "of
Cabagan, Isabela. Applicants have not produced in
evidence any composition title, the basis of their
application. It was allegedly burned in the house of Pepe
Buraga during the war.
Bruno died during the Spanish regime. The year when
he died is not known. He is survived by seven children.
Bruno had a brother named Leon, who had a son named
Honofre (Onofre) who, obtained in 1921 a tax
declaration for the 138 hectares at P5,200. In that tax
declaration, it was stated that the land is located at
Malasi, Cabagan, bounded on the north, east and south
by public land and on the west by a mountain.
Judge Mariano Rosauro issued Decree for the
registration of a parcel of land, plan 95520, with an area
of 25 hectares located at the "sitio of Malisi, Barrio of
Aggub," Cabagan. It was registered in the names of the
following heirs of Bruno as proindiviso co-owners.
The provincial fiscal, in representation of the Director of
Lands, alleged in his opposition that the land claimed by
Bruno's heirs was covered by the approved and
subsisting homestead applications of many owners. The
instant second registration case was filed in 1937 based
on an expanded survey. The applicants are the very
same heirs of Bruno who were the applicants in the first
registration case. Trial court and CA rendered decision
in favor of Bruno's heirs.
Issue:
Whether or not the heirs of Bruno had a constructive
possession over the subject land.
Held:
No.
Ratio:
SC hold that the rule on constructive possession does
not apply to this case because the major portion of the
disputed 128 hectares has been in the adverse
possession of homesteaders and their heirs and is still
part of the public domain until the patents are issued.
The area claimed is in excess of that mentioned in the
committed position title. The alleged lost composition
title cannot be given any probative value. Its contents
were not proven by secondary evidence. The precise
location of the land and the possession thereof were not
proven by the applicants.
Banco Espanol Filipino v Peterson
Facts:
On March 4, 1905, Banco Espanol Filipino (BEP)
executed a contract of loan in favor of Francisco Reyes
for P141 702.00. Reyes was already indebted to the
bank for P84 415.00. His total debt was thereforeP226
117.38. To secure payment of the P141k and the P84k,
Reyes executed a public instrument
1. Mortgaging several of his properties
2. Pledging part of his personal property to BEP (P90
591.75 worth of wines, liquors and canned goods), which
were stored at a warehouse he rented in Manila BEP
and Reyes agreed that the goods shoulder delivered to
Ramon Garcia (depositary) for safekeeping. Reyes
turned over the goods to R. Garcia by giving him the
warehouse keys.
On September 29, 1905, BEP and Reyes substituted
Luis Sierra in place of R.Garcia as the depositary. On
October 19, 1905, Juan Garcia (yes, related to Ramon)
brought an action against Francisco Reyes and Ramon
Agtarat. CFI Manila ruled against Reyes and Agtarat for
P15000.00. On the same day, Sheriff James Peterson
entered the warehouse where the goods pledged to BEP
were stored under the custody of the depositary, Sierra.
Peterson levied upon P30 000 worth of the goods
pledged to the bank, depriving the latter of possession of
the same, as stipulated in the March 4contract of loan.
Issues:
Was the contract of pledge between BEP and Reyes to
secure a loan valid?
Was Reyes still in possession of the pledged property,
thereby making the contract defective?
Held:
The contract was valid. Reyes was no longer in
possession of the pledged property. BEP had symbolic
possession of the same. The contract complies with all
the requisites of a valid pledge contract, as prescribed
by the Civil Code:
1. The property was pledged to secure a debt
2. The date of execution, the terms of the pledge, and
the property pledged appeared in a public instrument
3. The property pledged was placed in the hands of a
third person (in this case, Sierra) by common consent of
the debtor and creditor, under the supervision of an
agent (in this case, Rodriguez) of the bank Reyes, after
the pledge, parted with the possession of his personal
property, which was delivered to a third person (R.
Garcia, and subsequently, Sierra) who would take care
of them for BEP. Sierra was the third person appointed
by common consent of BEP (creditor) and Reyes
(debtor), to hold possession over the goods pledged in
favor of the bank under the direct supervision of
Rodriguez, an agent specifically appointed by the bank.
The contract in question was, therefore, a perfect
contract of pledge under articles1857 and 1863 of the
Civil Code, it having been conclusively shown that the
pledgee (BEP) took charge and possession of the goods
pledged through a depositary (Sierra) and a special
agent (Rodriguez) appointed by it, each of whom had a
duplicate key to the warehouse wherein the said goods
were stored, and that the pledgee (BEP), itself, received
and collected the proceeds of the goods as they were
sold.
The legality of the pledge was not affected by the fact
that the goods remained in the warehouse formerly
rented by Reyes the pledgor. This is because after the
pledge had been agreed upon, and after the depository
appointed with common consent of the parties had taken
possession of the said property, Reyes could no longer
dispose of the same because BEP was the only party
allowed to do so through Sierra and Rodriguez.
The symbolic transfer of the goods through delivery of
the keys to the warehouse where the goods were stored
was sufficient evidence to show that Sierra, the
depositary appointed by both BEP and Rodriguez, was
legally placed in possession of the goods. Since the
contract of pledge was valid, BEP had a better right to
the goods compared to J. Garcia. The Court ordered
either the return of the improperly levied goods, or the
payment of their value, P30 000