Pichel vs Alonzo

111 SCRA 341

January 30, 1982

FACTS:

Plaintiff Prudencio Alonzo was awarded by the Government that parcel of land in accordance with
Republic Act No. 477. The award was cancelled by the Board of Liquidators on January 27, 1965 on the ground
that, previous thereto, plaintiff was proved to have alienated the land to another, in violation of law. In 197 2,
plaintiff's rights to the land were reinstated.

The vendor, Prudencio Alonzo, and his wife sold to defendant the fruits of the coconut trees which may
be harvested in the land in question, in consideration of P4,200.00. Even as of the date of sale, however, the
land was still under lease to one, Ramon Sua, and it was the agreement that part of the consideration of the sale,
in the sum of P3,650.00, was to be paid by defendant directly to Ramon Sua so as to release the land from the
clutches of the latter. Pending said payment plaintiff refused to snow the defendant to make any harvest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the fruits of the coconut trees can be subject for sale.

HELD: YES.

The subject matter of the contract of sale in question are the fruits of the coconut trees on the land during
the years from September 15, 1968 up to January 1, 1976, which subject matter is a determinate thing. Under
Article 1461 of the New Civil Code, things having a potential existence may be the object of the contract of
sale. Pending crops which have potential existence may be the subject matter of the sale. Which have potential
existence may be the subject matter of sale. The purpose of the law is not violated when a grantee sells the
produce or fruits of his land. On the contrary, the aim of the law is thereby achieved, for the grantee is
encouraged and induced to be more industrious and productive, thus making it possible for him and his family
to be economically self-sufficient and to lead a respectable life. At the same time, the Government is assured of
payment on the annual installments on the land. We agree with herein petitioner that it could not have been the
intention of the legislature to prohibit the grantee from selling the natural and industrial fruits of his land, for
otherwise, it would lead to an absurd situation wherein the grantee would not be able to receive and enjoy the
fruits of the property in the real and complete sense.

Tañedo vs Court of Appeals

322 Phil. 84
January 22, 1996

FACTS:

The herein petitioner, Lazardo Tañedo, executed a notarized deed of absolute sale in favor of his eldest
brother, Ricardo Tañedo, and the latter’s wife, Teresita Barera, the private respondents. Private respondents
recorded the Deed of Sale in their favor in the Registry of Deeds and the corresponding entry was made in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 166451.On January 13, 1981, Lazaro executed another notarized deed of sale in
favor of private respondent. In February 1981, Ricardo learned that Lazaro sold the same property to his
children, petitioners herein, through a deed of sale dated December 29, 1980.Petitioners on July 16, 1982, filed
a complaint for rescission (plus damages) of the deeds of sale executed by Lazardo in favor of private
respondents covering the property inherited by Lazaro from his father. Petitioners claimed that their father,
Lazaro, executed an “Absolute Deed of Sale” dated December 29, 1980.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the sale of future inheritance valid.

2. Whether or not the subsequent execution of a deed of sale covering the same property to the same
buyers valid.
HELD.

First issue: NO.

Under Article 1347 of the Civil Code," (n)o contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance
except in cases expressly authorized by law.” Consequently, said contract made in 1962 is not valid and cannot
be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation between the parties. Thus, the “affidavit of
conformity” dated February 28, 1980, insofar as it sought to validate or ratify the 1962 sale, is also useless and,
in the words of the respondent Court, “suffers from the same infirmity.” Even private respondents in their
memorandum concede this.

Second issue: YES.

Under article 1544 of the Civil Code governs the preferential rights of vendees in cases of multiple sales,
as follows:

Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the
person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in
the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good
faith.

The property in question is land, an immovable, and following the above-quoted law, ownership shall
belong to the buyer who in good faith registers it first in the registry of property. Thus, although the deed of sale
in favor of private respondents was later than the one in favor of petitioners, ownership would vest in the former
because of the undisputed fact of registration. On the other hand, petitioners have not registered the sale to them
at all.

National Grains Authority vs IAC

171 SCRA 131
March 8, 1989

FACTS:
On August 23, 1979, private respondent Leon Soriano offered to sell palay grains to NFA through
William Cabal, the provincial manager in Tuguegarao. The documents submitted were processed, and he was
given a quota of 2,640 cavans, which is the maximum number of cavans he may sell to NFA. On the same day
and on the following day, Soriano delivered 630 cavans, which were no rebagged, classified and weighed.
When he demanded payment, he was told that payment will be held in abeyance since Mr. Cabal was still
investigating on an information received that Soriano was not a bona fide farmer. Instead of withdrawing the
palay, Soriano insisted that the palay grains be delivered and paid. He filed a complaint for specific
performance. Petitioners contend that the delivery was merely made for the purpose of offering it for sale
because until the grains were rebagged, classified and weighed, they are not considered sold.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract of sale is perfected even the number of cavans of palay was not determined.
HELD: YES.
Soriano initially offered to sell palay grains produced in his farmland to NFA. When the latter accepted
the offer by noting in Soriano's Farmer's Information Sheet a quota of 2,640 cavans, there was already a
meeting of the minds between the parties. The object of the contract, being the palay grains produced in
Soriano's farmland and the NFA was to pay the same depending upon its quality. The fact that the exact number
of cavans of palay to be delivered has not been determined does not affect the perfection of the contract. Article
1349 of the New Civil Code provides: ". . .. The fact that the quantity is not determinate shall not be an obstacle
to the existence of the contract, provided it is possible to determine the same, without the need of a new contract
between the parties." In this case, there was no need for NFA and Soriano to enter into a new contract to
determine the exact number of cavans of palay to be sold. Soriano can deliver so much of his produce as long as
it does not exceed 2,640 cavans. From the moment the contract of sale is perfected, it is incumbent upon the
parties to comply with their mutual obligations or "the parties may reciprocally demand performance" thereof.

Nool vs Court of Appeals

276 SCRA 149
July 24, 1987

FACTS

One lot formerly owned by Victorio Nool (TCT T-74950) has an area of 1 hectare. Another lot
previously owned byF rancisco Nool (TCT T100945) has an area of 3.0880 hectares. Both parcels are situated
in San Manuel, Isabela. Spouses Conchita Nool and Gaudencio Almojera (plaintiffs) alleged that they are the
owners of the subject land as they bought the same from Victorio and Francisco Nool, and that as they are in
dire need of money, they obtained a loan from the Ilagan Branch of the DBP (Ilagan, Isabela), secured by a real
estate mortgage on said parcels of land, which were still registered in the names of Victorino and Francisco
Nool, at the time, and for the failure of the plaintiffs to pay the said loan, including interest and surcharges,
totaling P56,000.00, the mortgage was foreclosed; that within the period of redemption, the plaintiffs contacted
Anacleto Nool for the latter to redeem the foreclosed properties from DBP, which the latter did; and as a result,
the titles of the2 parcels of land in question were transferred to Anacleto; that as part of their arrangement or
understanding, Anacleto agreed to buy from Conchita the 2 parcels of land under controversy, for a total price
of P100,000.00, P30,000.00 of which price was paid to Conchita, and upon payment of the balance of
P14,000.00, the plaintiffs were to regain possession of the 2 hectares of land, which amounts spouses Anacleto
Nool and Emilia Nebre (defendants) failed to pay, and the same day the said arrangement was made; another
covenant was entered into by the parties, whereby the defendants agreed to return to plaintiffs the lands in
question, at anytime the latter have the necessary amount; that latter asked the defendants to return the same but
despite the intervention of the Barangay Captain of their place, defendants refused to return the said parcels of
land to plaintiffs; thereby impelling the plaintiffs to come to court for relief. On the other hand, defendants
theorized that they acquired the lands in question from the DBP, through negotiated sale, and were misled by
plaintiffs when defendant Anacleto Nool signed the private writing, agreeing to return subject lands when
plaintiffs have the money to redeem the same; defendant Anacleto having been made to believe, then, that his
sister, Conchita, still had the right to redeem the said properties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Contract of Repurchase is valid.

HELD: NO.

A contract of repurchase arising out of a contract of sale where the seller did not have any title to the
property “sold” is not valid. Since nothing was sold, then there is also nothing to repurchase. Article 1505 of the
Civil Code provides that “where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, and who does not sell
them under authority or with consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller
had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the seller’s authority to sell.”
Jurisprudence, on the other hand, teaches us that “a person can sell only what he owns or is authorized to sell;
the buyer can as a consequence acquire no more than what the seller can legally transfer.” No one can give what
he does not have, “nono dat quod non habet”. In the present case, there is no allegation at all that petitioners
were authorized by DBP to sell the property to the private respondents. Further, the contract of repurchase that
the parties entered into presupposes that petitioners could repurchase the property that they “sold” to private
respondents. As petitioners “sold” nothing, it follows that they can also “repurchase” nothing. In this light, the
contract of repurchase is also inoperative and by the same analogy, void.