Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Module 3 COMPLETE
Module 3 COMPLETE
3. Ledesma v Climaco
FACTS: The petitioner was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros
Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to discharge its duties. He is also counsel de parte for one of the
accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. Not only did
respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the
Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of
petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, denied the said
motion.
According to the respondent judge, "In view of the objection of the prosecution to the motion for
postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging that counsel for the accused cannot continue appearing in this
case without the express authority of the Commission on Elections); and since according to the prosecution
there are two witnesses who are ready to take the stand, after which the government would rest, the motion
for postponement is denied. When counsel for the accused assumed office as Election Registrar on October
13, 1964, he knew since October 2, 1964 that the trial would be resumed. Nevertheless, in order not to
prejudice the civil service status of counsel for the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de oficio for the
accused. The defense obtained postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963, October 28,
1963, November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964 July 26, 1964, and September 7,
1964."
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner should be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio.
RULING:NO, Ledesma may not withdraw as counsel de oficio for the sole reason of his appointment as
Election Registrar. The provision in the Constitution states that, “Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such
right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against them. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.”
This manifests the indispensable role of a member of the bar in the defense of an accused. What is incumbent
upon him as counsel de oficio must be fully fulfilled. The ends of justice would be served by allowing and
requiring Ledesma to continue as counsel the officio, since the prosecution has already rested its case—the
case being postponed at least eight (8) times. It was also noted that there was no incompatibility between his
duty to the accused and to the court and the performance of his task as Election Registrar.
Hence, because of these considerations, it is suffice for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as counsel de
oficio.
6. Angalan vs Delante
Facts: In april 1971, herein complainants mortgaged 8.102 hectares of their property to the Eustaquio
spouses in consideration of a loan in the amount of P15,000. The Eustaqios prepared a document and sked the
complainants to sign it; but because complainants were illiterates, they affixed their marks instead. It turned
out that the document was a deed of absolute sale and not a real estate mortgage. Hence, TCT No. 9926 was
issued in the name of Navarro Eustaquio.
Complainants engaged the services of respondent Atty. Leonido Delante in November 1970 as shown in the
receipt by respondent of P12,000 representing full payment of his professional fees from the complainants.
Thereafter, an amicable settlement was entered into between complainants and the Eustaquios which
stipulated that the complainants would repurchase the lot at P30,000. But since the complainants did not
have the money, Atty. Delante advanced the money to complainants, possessed the property and gathered its
produce. When the complainants tried to repay the money and recover the property, Atty. Delante refused.
Complainants learned that Delante transferred the title of the property to his name as evidenced by TCT No. T-
57932. On April 30, 204, complainants filed with the RTC of Davao a complaint for (1) nullification of the deed
of absolute sale, and (2) nullification of TCT No. T-57932; and on December 28, 2005 charged respondent with
gross violation of the Code Professional Responsibilty. In April 2007, complainants filed with the Court a
motion to withdraw the complaint for disbarment and an affidavit of desistance.
Issues:
(1.) Whether or not a motion to withdraw the complaint for disbarment and an affidavit of desistance
terminates the disbarment proceeding;
(2.) Whether or not respondent committed grave violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
bought the property of his clients without their consent and against their will.
Ruling:
1. No. A motion to withdraw the complaint for disbarment and an affidavit of desistance is immaterial. Section
5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that, “No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason
of the desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of charges, or failure of the complainant to
prosecute the same.”
2. Yes. Respondent violated Canons 16 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 16 states that
lawyers shall hold in trust all properties of their clients that may come into their possession. Respondent
should have held in trust TCT No. T-9926 and returned the property to complainants upon demand. Instead of
holding in trust the property of complainants, respondent (1) transferred the title of the property to his name,
(2) refused to return the property to complainants, and (3) referred to complainants’ charges as malicious and
untruthful. Canon 17 states that lawyers shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them.
Respondent should have been mindful of the trust and confidence complainants reposed in him. Complainants
allege that they are illiterate and that the Spouses Eustaquio took advantage of them. Complainants engaged
the services of respondent in the hope that he would help them recover their property. Instead of protecting
the interests of complainants, respondent took advantage of complainants and transferred the title of the
property to his name.
Considering the depravity of respondent’s offense, the Court finds the recommended penalty too light.
Violation of Canons 16 and 17 constitutes gross misconduct. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states
that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Court for gross
misconduct. A person who takes the 8.102-hectare property of his illiterate clients and who is incapable of
telling the truth is unfit to be a lawyer. The Court finds Atty. Leonido C. Delante GUILTY of violating Canons 16
and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court DISBARS him from the practice of law
and ORDERS that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
9. IN RE: Suspension From The Practice Of Law In The Territory Of Guam Of Atty. Leon G. Maquera
Facts:
In a Letter dated August 20, 1996, the District Court of Guam informed this Court of the suspension of
Atty. Leon G. Maquera (Maquera) from the practice of law in Guam. He was suspended from the practice of
law in Guam for misconduct, as he acquired his client's property as payment for his legal services, then sold it
and as a consequence obtained an unreasonably high fee for handling his client's case.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the disbarment or suspension of a member of the
Philippine Bar in a foreign jurisdiction, where he has also been admitted as an attorney, is also a ground for his
disbarment or suspension in this realm, provided the foreign court's action is by reason of an act or omission
constituting deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or a violation of the
lawyer's oath.
The case was referred by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation
report and recommendation. In its decision, the Superior Court of Guam stated that Maquera was the counsel
of a certain Castro. Benavente the creditor Castro, obtained a judgement against Castro, thus Castro;s
property was to be sold at a public auction in satisfaction of his obligation to Benavente. However, Castro
retains the right of redemption.
In consideration of Maquera’s legal services, Castro entered into an oral agreement with Maquera and
assigned his right of redemption in favor of the latter. On January 8, 1988, Maquera exercised Castro's right of
redemption by paying Benavente US$525.00 in satisfaction of the judgment debt. Thereafter, Maquera had
the title to the property transferred in his name.And after, sold the property to C.S. Chang and C.C. Chang for
Three Hundred Twenty Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$320,000.00).
The Guam Bar Ethics Committee filed a Petition in the Superior Court of Guam praying that Maquera
be sanctioned for violations of Rules 1.5 and 1.8(a) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules)
in force in Guam. In its Petition, the Committee claimed that Maquera obtained an unreasonably high fee for
his services. The Committee further alleged that Maquera himself admitted his failure to comply with the
requirement in Rule 1.8 (a) of the Model Rules that a lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a
client or knowingly acquire a pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless the transaction and the terms
governing the lawyer's acquisition of such interest are fair and reasonable to the client, and are fully disclosed
to, and understood by the client and reduced in writing.
On the basis of the Decision of the Superior Court of Guam, the IBP concluded that although the said
court found Maquera liable for misconduct, "there is no evidence to establish that Maquera committed a
breach of ethics in the Philippines."However, the IBP still resolved to suspend him indefinitely for his failure to
pay his annual dues as a member of the IBP since 1977, which failure is, in turn, a ground for removal of the
name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules
of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Maquera, who was suspended from the practice of law in Guam, be suspended as member of
the Philippine Bar on the same ground of his suspension in Guam.
Held:
Yes.
The power of the Court to disbar or suspend a lawyer for acts or omissions committed in a foreign
jurisdiction is found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended by Supreme
Court Resolution dated February 13, 1992, which states:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.—A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party to a
case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a
ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts
hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie
evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension
In the case at bar such transaction made by Maquera falls squarely under Article 1492 in relation to
Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Paragraph 5 of Article 1491 prohibits the lawyer's
acquisition by assignment of the client's property which is the subject of the litigation handled by the lawyer.
Under Article 1492, the prohibition extends to sales in legal redemption. This is founded on public policy
because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his
client30 and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client.
Such acts are violative of a lawyer's sworn duty to act with fidelity toward his clients. They are also
violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17 which states that "[a] lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful the trust and confidence reposed in him;" and Rule 1.01
which prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The requirement
of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the Philippine Bar but is also a
continuing requirement to maintain one's good's standing in the legal profession.
The Court notes that Maquera has not yet been able to adduce evidence on his behalf regarding the
charges of unethical behavior in Guam against him, as it is not certain that he did receive the Notice of
Hearing earlier sent by the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline. Thus, there is a need to ascertain Maquera's
current and correct address in Guam in order that another notice, this time specifically informing him of the
charges against him and requiring him to explain why he should not be suspended or disbarred on those
grounds (through this Resolution), may be sent to him.
Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the IBP that Maquera should be suspended from the practice of law for
non-payment of his IBP membership dues from 1977 up to the present. Under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the
Revised Rules of Court, non-payment of membership dues for six (6) months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the IBP, and default in such payment for one year shall be ground for removal of the name of
the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
16. Joselito F. Tejano vs. Atty. Benjamin F. Bateria, A.C. No. 8235, January 27, 2015
FACTS:
joselito F. Tejano filed an Affidavit-Complaint1 before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) of the
Supreme Court and Tejano’s own counsel, Atty. Baterina and Judge Dominador LL. Arquelada, Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Vigan City, Ilocos Sur, Branch 21. Tejano accused Judge Arquelada of acting in
conspiracy with Atty. Baterina for the former to take possession of his (Tejano) property, which was the
subject matter of litigation in the judge’s court. he case stems from Civil Case No. 4046-V, a suit for recovery of
possession and damages filed by Tejano, his mother and sisters against the Province of Ilocos Sur. In his
Affidavit-Complaint, Tejano accused Judge Arquelada of colluding with Atty. Baterina in the former’s bid to
“take possession” of their property and was “collecting rentals from squatters who had set up their businesses
inside the whole of Lot [No.] 5663. As to his counsel, Tejano claims that Atty. Baterina “miserably failed to
advance [his] cause.” Specifically, Tejano alleged that Atty. Baterina (1) failed to object when the trial court
pronounced that he and his co-plaintiffs had waived their right to present evidence after several
postponements in the trial because his mother was ill and confined at the hospital; 10 (2) manifested in open
court that he would file a motion for reconsideration of the order declaring their presentation of evidence
terminated but failed to actually do so;11 (3) not only failed to file said motion for reconsideration, but also
declared in open court that they would not be presenting any witnesses without consulting his clients; 12 and
(4) failed to comply with the trial court’s order to submit their formal offer of exhibits.
Tejano was informed to file the complaint against his counsel at the Office of the Bar Confidant, and
that the complaint against Judge Arquelada was already “being acted upon” by the OCA. Court required Atty.
Baterina to file a Comment on the complaint within 10 days from notice. 15 Failing to comply with the Court’s
order, Atty. Baterina was ordered to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with. Atty. Baterina
explained that he had been recuperating from a kidney transplant when he received a copy of the complaint.
He begged the Court’s indulgence and said that his failure to comply was “not at all intended to show
disrespect to the orders of the Honorable Tribunal.” Atty. Baterina also denied the allegation of bad faith and
negligence in handling the Tejano case. He explained that the reason he could not attend to the case was that
in 2002, after the initial presentation of the plaintiffs’ case, he was suspended by the Court from the practice
of law for two years.18 He alleged that this fact was made known to Tejano’s mother and sister. However, the
trial court did not order plaintiffs to secure the services of another lawyer. On the contrary, it proceeded to
hear the case, and plaintiffs were not represented by a lawyer until the termination of the case. 19 Atty.
Baterina instead points to the “displayed bias” and “undue and conflict of interest” 20 of Judge Arquelada as the
culprit in Tejano’s predicament. The IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline promulgated its Report and
Recommendation that respondent’s acts constitute sufficient ground for disciplinary action against him. His
gross negligence under the circumstances cannot be countenanced. It is, therefore, respectfully recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Baterina acted with gross negligence?
HELD:
Yes. The Court adopts the IBP’s report and recommendation, with modification as to the penalty. The
Code of Professional Responsibility governing the conduct of lawyers states: CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL
SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. RULE 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. RULE 18.04 – A lawyer
shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the
client’s request for information.
When a lawyer agrees to take up a client’s cause, he makes a commitment to exercise due diligence in
protecting the latter’s rights. Once a lawyer’s services are engaged, “he is duty bound to serve his client with
competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion regardless of whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed on him.”25 A lawyer’s acceptance to take up a case “impliedly stipulates [that he will] carry
it to its termination, that is, until the case becomes final and executory.”
Atty. Baterina’s duty to his clients did not automatically cease with his suspension. At the very least,
such suspension gave him a concomitant responsibility to inform his clients that he would be unable to attend
to their case and advise them to retain another counsel. A lawyer – even one suspended from practicing the
profession – owes it to his client to not “sit idly by and leave the rights of his client in a state of
uncertainty.”27 The client “should never be left groping in the dark” and instead must be “adequately and fully
informed about the developments in his case.” Atty. Baterina practically abandoned this duty when he allowed
the proceedings to run its course without any effort to safeguard his clients’ welfare in the meantime. His
failure to file the required pleadings on his clients’ behalf constitutes gross negligence in violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility29 and renders him subject to disciplinary action. 30 The penalties for a lawyer’s
failure to file the required brief or pleading range from warning, reprimand, fine, suspension, or in grave cases,
disbarment.
17. Adelita B. Llunar v. Atty. Romulo Ricafort [A.C. 6484, June 16, 2015]
FACTS: Petitioner, as attorney-in-fact of Severina Bañez, hired the respondent to file a case against father and
son Ricardo and Ard Cervantes (Ard) for the recovery of a parcel of land allegedly owned by the Bañez family
but was fraudulently registered under the name of Ricardo and later was transferred to Ard. The property was
mortgaged by Ard with the Rural Bank of Malilipot, Albay, and was the subject of foreclosure proceedings at
the time respondent was hired. Respondent was paid P95k. Petitioner discovered 3 years later that no case
involving the subject property was ever filed by the respondent with RTC Legaspi. Petitioner demanded the
return of the amount she paid respondent. Respondent argued that a complaint for annulment of title against
Ard Cervantes had actually been filed in court, though not by him, but by another lawyer, Atty. Edgar M.
Abitria. Thus, he was willing to return only what was left of the P95k after deducting therefrom the P50k that
he paid to Atty. Abitria as acceptance fee for handling the case. Petitioner refused to recognize the complaint
for annulment of title filed by Atty. Abitria and claimed that she had no knowledge of Atty. Abitria's
engagement as counsel. Besides, the complaint was filed 3 years late and the property could no longer be
redeemed from the bank. Also, the complainant discovered that the respondent had been suspended
indefinitely from the practice of law since May 29, 2002, pursuant to this Court's decision in Administrative
Case No. 5054, which the complainant suspected was the reason another lawyer, and not the respondent,
filed the complaint for annulment of title in court.
ISSUE: WON respondent is guilty of grave misconduct
HELD: Yes. The respondent in this case committed several infractions making him liable for grave misconduct.
First, the respondent did not exert due diligence in handling the complainant's case. He failed to act promptly
in redeeming the complainant's property within the redemption period. The delay of 3 years before a
complaint to recover the property was actually filed in court. The respondent clearly wasted precious time and
opportunity that were then readily available to recover the complainant's property. Under these facts, the
respondent violated Rule 18.03 of the CPR, which states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."
Note: Respondent was disbarred.
22. WACK WACK GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB, INC vs.CA, PETRONILO ARCANGEL and ANTONIO D. BERNARDO
Warning! This case has no relation under 18.04. Rather, it focuses on the duty of attorney to client; court can
recognize no other representation on behalf of client except the counsel of record.
FACTS:
Petronilo Arcangel, a former employee of petitioner filed with the CFI a money claim for overtime services
rendered to said employer, for unenjoyed vacation leave, moral damages and attorney's fees. The case was
accordingly set for trial. At the hearing, however, neither the defendant employer (petitioner) nor its counsel,
Balcoff, Poblador and Angel Cruz appeared notwithstanding the fact that they were duly notified of the
hearing. The lower court rendered judgment for the plaintiff employee. The law firm of Juan Chuidian, on
behalf of the defendant employer, filed a petition to set aside the judgment on the ground of
misunderstanding, mistake and excusable neglect, which petition was denied. And such was affirmed by the
CA
There is no disagreement as to the facts allegedly constituting the mistake, accident, or excusable negligence
upon which the employer's petition for relief was based. To which they are:
The records of this case show that the employer was represented by the law office of Balcoff and
Poblador and Angel Cruz from the inception of this case up to May 14, 1955, when law Office Juan T.
Chuidian filed its appearance upon being referred by law office of Balcoff and Poblador on May 12,
1955 the copy of the decision dated May 10, 1955 of the trial Court.
"Sometime before May 5, 1955 the employer manifested its desire to replace their counsel Messrs.
Paredes, Balcoff and Poblador in this case with Law Office Juan Chuidian. On May 5, 1955 Atty. Jesus
Sayoc of the undersigned law firm conferred with Atty. Angel Cruz of Messrs. Paredes, Balcoff and
Poblador for the purpose of securing the court file in this case and effect the substitution of attorney.
Unfortunately, Mr. Balcoff was not in the office at the moment and no one else had no authority to
turn over to Law office of Juan T. Chuidian the court papers and file in this case; besides, there were
unpaid bill due Messrs. Paredes, Balcoff and Poblador. In view of this development, Atty. Chuidian
called up Atty. Balcoff by telephone and it was agreed between the two that inasmuch as Attys.
Paredes, Balcoff and Poblador were still the attorneys of record in the case, Atty. Balcoff would sent a
representative of his law office to appear at the hearing in order to ask for postponement of the case.
Consequently, nobody in Law Office Juan Chuidian. As a matter of fact, the records of the case were
turned over to Law Office Juan T. Chuidian only after it received on May 12, 1955
ISSUE: W/N court can recognize no other representation on behalf of client except the counsel of record.
RULING: YES
The law firm of Balcoff and Poblador and Angel Cruz were still the employer's counsel of record, the law office
of Juan Chuidian having entered its appearance in the case only on May 14, 1955. As such counsel of record,
said law firm must have known that, its impending relief as counsel for the defendant notwithstanding, it is
under obligation to protect the client's interest (which includes appearance at the hearing) until its final
release from the professional relationship with such client. For its part, the court could recognize no other
representation on behalf of the client except such counsel of record until a formal substitution of attorney is
effected. Thus, any agreement or arrangement such counsel of record and its client may reach regarding the
presentation of the client' case in the court is purely their private concern. Proceedings in the court cannot be
made to depend on them. The lack of coordination or understanding between the two law firms in the instant
case cannot be considered as a legal excuse or falling within the ambit of excusable negligence to justify the
granting of relief from the order declaring the client in default, or as in the case, from a decision entered after
presentation of evidence in his absence.
27. IN RE: PUBLISHED ALLEGED THREATS AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE COURT IN THE PLUNDER LAW CASE
HURLED BY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA
FACTS: The court En Banc issued the following Resolution directing respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera to
explain why he should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for uttering some allegedly contemptuous
statements as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer newspaper in relation to the case involving the
constitutionality of the Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080) which was then pending resolution. To wit:
De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a petition filed
by Estrada's lawyers to declare the plunder law unconstitutional for its supposed vagueness.
"We are afraid that the Estrada camp's effort to coerce, bribe, or influence the justices
---considering that it has a P500 million slush fund from the aborted power grab that May-will
most likely result in pro-Estrada decision declaring the Plunder Law either unconstitutional or
vague." De Vera said he and his group were "greatly disturbed" by the rumors from Supreme
Court insiders.
De Vera warned of a crisis far worse than the "jueteng" scandal that led to People Power II if
the rumor turned out to be true. "People wouldn't just swallow any Supreme Court decision
that is basically wrong. Sovereignty must prevail."
In his Answer, respondent admitted the report in issue of the Inquirer but argued that he was merely
exercising his constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech. While he admitted to having uttered the
aforecited statements, respondent denied having made the same to degrade the Court, to destroy public
confidence in it and to bring it into disrepute.
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Leonardo De Vera be held in indirect contempt for uttering those statements.
RULING: Yes. Freedom of speech includes the right to know and discuss judicial proceedings, but such right
does not cover statements aimed at undermining the Court's integrity and authority, and interfering with the
administration of justice. Freedom of speech is not absolute, and must occasionally be balanced with the
requirements of equally important public interests, such as the maintenance of the integrity of the courts and
orderly functioning of the administration of justice.
Thus, the making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an exercise of free speech;
rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as
free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts
or public respect therefor and confidence therein. It is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere
that courts should be immune from every extraneous influence as they resolve the issues presented before
them.
Neither can we accept respondent's plea that he was duty-bound to handle all the cases referred to him by
AIB, including the personal cases of its officers which had no connection to its corporate affairs. That the
representation of conflicting interest is in good faith and with honest intention on the part of the lawyer does
not make the prohibition inoperative. Moreover, lawyers are not obliged to act either as an adviser or
advocate for every person who may wish to become their client. They have the right to decline such
employment, subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Although there are
instances where lawyers cannot decline representation, they cannot be made to labor under conflict of
interest between a present client and a prospective one.
41. Alisbo vs Jalandoon
Facts:
Ramon Alisbo engaged respondent Atty. Jalandoon as his counsel in an action to recover his share of
the estate of the deceased sps Catalina Sales and Restituto Gozuma w/c had been adjudicated to him under
the judgment of CC No. 4963 because Alisbo failed to file a motion for execution of judgment in his favor w/in
the reglementary 5year period. The salient provisions of the Contract for Professional Services (Exhibit A)
between Alisbo and Attorney Jalandoon were the following: 1. That respondent will decide whether or not to
file a suit for the recovery of Ramon Alisbo's share 2. That respondent will shoulder all expenses of litigation;
and 3. As attorney's fees, respondent will be paid 50% of the value of the property recovered.
– 4/18/70: respondent prepared a complaint w/ Ramon, Teotimo, and Pacifico Alisbo as plaintiffs and
Carlito Sales as defendant signed by him alone (CC No. 9559); on the same day, he withdrew it and replaced it
with a complaint w/ Ramon as sole plaintiff and Teotimo and Pacifico impleaded as defendants w/c
respondent and Atty. Pablo signed as counsel - 12/8/71: an amended complaint was filed w/ Ramon, his
judicial guardian Norberto, and eight others as plaintiffs, signed by Atty. Pablo alone (10 years after final
judgment) - 8/21/73: defendant Sales filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action had prescribed -
10/3/73: the CFI of Negros Occidental dismissed the case on the ground of prescription (though Ramon filed
the complaint w/in the ten-year prescriptive period, it was null and void since Ramon was insane and hence
w/o capacity to sue)
- 1/2/74: complainants charged Jalandoon w/ having deliberately caused the dismissal of CC No.
9559 and concealing the fact that he had been the former legal counsel of Sales - Jalandoon claims he only
discovered his previous professional relationship with Sales during the pre-trial on Oct. 6, 1972
ISSUE: WON Jalandoon is guilty of non-disclosure to client of adverse or conflicting interest
Ruling:
YES because: 1. Before filing the complaint, he had several interviews w/ Ramon and Norberto re: CC
No. 4963 2. He must have done research on the court records of CC No. 4963 3. For CC No. 9559, he had to
inform himself of the personal circumstances of defendant Sales -w/ this knowledge, he should have declined
employment by Alisbo due to conflict of interest - The actuations of respondent attorney violated Paragraphs
1 and 2, No. 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provide: 6. ADVERSE INFLUENCE AND CONFLICTING
INTEREST It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all the circumstances of his
relations to the parties, and any interest in or connection with the controversy, which might influence the client
in the selection of counsel. It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one
client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose. (pp. 14-15,
Solicitor General's Report.) -Jalandoon had delayed the filing of CC No. 9559, instead asking the court to
resolve the pending incidents in CC No. 4963. The first complaint w/ Ramon and his brothers was only partially
defective due to Ramon‘s insanity; by making Ramon the sole plaintiff in the second complaint, it was
rendered wholly defective and ineffectual in stopping the prescriptive period - Jalandoon alleges to have only
found out about Ramon‘s incapacity on July 17, 1971, he only amended the complaint impleading his guardian
as plaintiff 5 months . later when it had prescribed Disposition It was more than simple negligence; the Court
found respondent guilty of serious misconduct and infidelity and was suspended for a period of 2 years.
2.) When the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of the
undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance of that duty
3.) Whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any
confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment.
Based on the test there was a violation on the rule against conflict of interest due to the following:
1.) Sabitsana’s legal services were initially engaged by Aninon to protect her interest and Sabitsana
executed a deed in Aninon’s favor
2.)
3.) Sabitsana met Canete to discuss her interest over the lot bought by Aninon despite having
knowledge that Aninon’s interest clashed with Canete’s interest
4.) Despite that knowledge, he accepted the engagement from Canete
5.) Sabitsana’s knowledge of conflicting interest could be seen when he filed a case against aninon in
behalf of canete, when he impleaded aninon as a defendant in the annulment of deed of sale case
and when he filed for the annulment of the deed which he himself prepared and executed for
aninon.
The exception to the violation under Rule 15.03 cannot be applied because he did not provide full disclosure
about the cases to Aninon and Canete and acquiring their consent before accepting the engagement
44. JOSEPHINE L. OROLA v. ATTY. JOSEPH ADOR RAMOS AC. No. 9860, Sep 11, 2013
FACTS:
The respondent acted as a collaborating counsel with Atty. Ely Azaragga Jr. in representing Maricar,
Karen, and the other heirs of the late Antonio Orola in the settlement of the estate of Trinidad Laserna-Orola.
The heirs of Antonio together with the heirs of Trinidad moved for the removal Emilio Orola as the
administrator of Trinidad’s estate. Subsequently, respondent appeared as collaborating counsel for Emilio in
the same case. As such, complaints for disbarment were filed against respondent for representing conflicting
interests in violation of Rule 15.03 of the CPR.
ISSUE: whether or not respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03 of the
Code?
HELD:
YES. Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Under the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer is
prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner,
whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on
the principles of public policy and good taste. In Hornilla v. Salunat the Court explained the concept of conflict
of interest, to wit: There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue
or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument
will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed
or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the
attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him
and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge
acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of
a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to
his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.
It must, however, be noted that a lawyer's immutable duty to a former client does not cover
transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer's employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose
upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client's interests only on matters that he previously handled for the
former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.
Records reveal that respondent was the collaborating counsel not only for Maricar as claimed by him,
but for all the Heirs of Antonio in Special Proceeding No. V-3639. In the course thereof, the Heirs of Trinidad
and the Heirs of Antonio succeeded in removing Emilio as administrator for having committed acts prejudicial
to their interests. Hence, when respondent proceeded to represent Emilio for the purpose of seeking his
reinstatement as administrator in the same case, he clearly worked against the very interest of the Heirs of
Antonio particularly, Karen in violation of the above-stated rule.
Respondent's justification that no confidential information was relayed to him cannot fully exculpate
him for the charges against him since the rule on conflict of interests, as enunciated in Hornilla, provides an
absolute prohibition from representation with respect to opposing parties in the same case. In other words, a
lawyer cannot change his representation from one party to the latter's opponent in the same case. That
respondent's previous appearances for and in behalf of the Heirs of Antonio was only a friendly
accommodation cannot equally be given any credence since the aforesaid rule holds even if the inconsistency
is remote or merely probable or even if the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent
conflicting interests.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos is hereby held GUILTY of representing conflicting
interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months, with WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
45. Mabini Colleges v. Atty. Jose D. Pajarillo [A.C. 10687, July 22, 2015]
FACTS: The board of trustees of Mabini Colleges was divided into two opposing factions: (1) The Adeva Group
and (2) the Lukban Group. Mabini appointed respondent as its corporate secretary. Adeva Group issued an
unnumbered Board Resolution which authorized its members to apply for a loan with the Rural Bank of
Paracale (RBP). Lukban Group opposed the loan application because among those appointed to apply for the
loan, two were allegedly not registered as stockholders of Mabini, and that Mabini had financial difficulties.
Respondent sent a letter to RBP to assure the latter of Mabini’s financial capacity to pay the loan. RBP granted
the loan of P200k, which was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over the properties of the complainant. SEC
issued an order nullifying the appointment of the members made by Adeva group, as a result, Mabini sent RBP
a letter, informing it of the SEC Order. RBP sent Mabini a letter, informing it that the SEC Order was referred to
its legal counsel. Mabini alleged that it was only upon receipt of such letter that it became aware that
respondent is also the legal counsel of RBP. Property of Mabini was foreclosed. Mabini filed for an annulment
of mortgage against RBP. The Investigating Commissioner noted that respondent appeared for RBP in the case
for annulment of mortgage filed by his former client, Mabini.
ISSUE: WON respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests when he entered his appearance as
counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage filed by Mabini against RBP.
HELD: Yes. Respondent represented conflicting interest in violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that [a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. The rule prohibiting conflict of
interest applies to situations where in a lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly
adverse to any of his present or former clients. Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, the Court finds that
respondent represented conflicting interests when he served as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of
mortgage filed by the complainant, respondent’s former client, against RBP.
Note: Respondent suspended from practice of law for 1 year.
61. Natividad Navarro and Hilda Presbitero vs. Ivan Solidum A.C. No. 9872
Facts: Hilda S. Presbitero and Natividad P. Navarro filed a disbarment case against Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr.
Presbitero and her other daughter, Ma. Theresa P. Yulo, engaged in the services of Solidum for each of their
own cases concerning land. Yulo, pursuant to her land registration case, convinced Navarro to finance the
expenses. Navarro paid Php200, 000 for the registration expenses, but later learned that the property was
already registered in the name of one Teodoro Yulo. Meanwhile, Solidum obtained two loans of
Php1,000,000.00 from Navarro and one loan of Php1,000,000.00 to finance his sugar trading business,
securing them with postdated checks and drafting a MOA in each.
Solidum was able to pay complainants a total of Php900,000.00. Thereafter, he failed to pay either the
principal amount or the interest thereon. The checks issued by Solidum to the complainants could no longer
be negotiated because the accounts against which they were drawn were already closed. When complainants
called Solidum’s attention, he promised to pay the agreed interest for September and October 2006 but asked
for a reduction of the interest for the succeeding months. Complainants alleged that Solidum induced them to
grant him loans by offering very high interest rates. He also prepared and signed the checks which turned out
to be drawn against his son’s accounts. Complainants further alleged that respondent deceived them
regarding the identity and value of the property he mortgaged because he showed them a different property
from that which he owned. Presbitero further alleged that respondent mortgaged his 263-square-meter
property to her for Php1,000,000.00 but he later sold it for only Php150,000.00.
The IBP-CBD found that respondent was guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for committing the following acts:
(1) signing drawn checks against the account of his son as if they were from his own account;
(2) misrepresenting to Navarro the identity of the lot he mortgaged to her;
(3) misrepresenting to Presbitero the true value of the 263-square-meter lot he mortgaged to her;
(4) conspiring with Yulo to obtain the loans from complainants;
(5) agreeing or promising to pay 10% interest on his loans although he knew that it was exorbitant; and
(6) failing to pay his loans because the checks he issued were dishonored as the accounts were already
closed.
Issue: Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Ruling: Yes Respondent violated at least four provisions: Rule 1.01, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, and Rule 16.04 of
the CPR. Solidum was disbarred from the practice of law.
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Respondent agreed to pay a high interest rate on his loan from the complainants. He drafted the MOA. Yet,
when he could no longer pay his loan, he sought to nullify the same MOA he drafted on the ground that the
interest rate was unconscionable. It was also established that respondent mortgaged a 263-square-meter
property to Presbitero for P1,000,000.00, but he later sold the property for only P150,000.00, showing that he
deceived his client as to the real value of the mortgaged property. Respondent’s allegation that the sale was
eventually rescinded did not distract from the fact that he did not apprise Presbitero as to the real value of the
property.
Respondent failed to refute that the checks he issued to his client Presbitero and to Navarro belonged to his
son, Ivan Garcia Solidum III whose name is similar to his name. He only claimed that complainants knew that
he could no longer open a current bank account, and that they even suggested that his wife or son issue the
checks for him. However, we are inclined to agree with the IBP-CBD’s finding that he made complainants
believe that the account belonged to him. In fact, respondent signed in the presence of Navarro the first batch
of checks he issued to Navarro. Respondent sent the second batch of checks to Navarro and the third batch of
checks to Presbitero through a messenger, and complainants believed that the checks belonged to accounts in
respondent’s name.
CANON 16. - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME
INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Respondent had been negligent in properly accounting for the money he received from his client, Presbitero.
Indeed, his failure to return the excess money in his possession gives rise to the presumption that he has
misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the
client.
Rule 16.04. - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected
by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when
in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
While respondent’s loan from Presbitero was secured by a MOA, postdated checks and real estate mortgage,
it turned out that respondent misrepresented the value of the property he mortgaged and that the checks he
issued were not drawn from his account but from that of his son. Respondent eventually questioned the terms
of the MOA that he himself prepared on the ground that the interest rate imposed on his loan was
unconscionable. Finally, the checks issued by respondent to Presbitero were dishonored because the accounts
were already closed. The interest of his client, Presbitero, as lender in this case, was not fully protected.
Respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which presumes that the client is
disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation.6 In his
dealings with his client Presbitero, respondent took advantage of his knowledge of the law as well as the trust
and confidence reposed in him by his client.
62. Quirante vs IAC
Facts: Dr. Indalecio Casasola had a contract with a building contractor named Norman Guerrero. Philippine
American General Insurance Co. Inc. (Philamgen) acted as bondsman for Guerrero. In view of Guerrero's
failure to perform his part of the contract within the period specified, Dr. Casasola, thru his counsel, Atty. John
Quirante, sued both Guerrero and Philamgen. Philamgen filed a cross-claim against Guerrero for
indemnification. RTC ruled in favor of Dr. Indalecio Casasola by rescinding the contract ordering Guerrero
and Philamgen to pay actual damages of P129,430, moral damages of P50,000, exemplary damages of P40,000
and attorney's fees of P30,000 ordering Guerrero alone to pay liquidated damages of P300/day from
December 15, 1978 to July 16, 1979 and ordering Philamgen to pay Dr. Casasola the amount of the surety
bond equivalent to P120,000. Petition to quash the writ of execution and to compel the trial court to give due
course to the appeal was dismissed.
In the mean time, Dr. Casasola died leaving his widow and several children as survivors. Quirante filed
a motion in the trial court for the confirmation of his attorney's fees. According to him, there was an
oral agreement between him and the late Dr. Casasola that in case of recovery of the surety bond - P30K and
in case of damages excess of the surety bond, divided equally between the heirs, Atty. Quirante and Atty.
Cruz.. RTC granted the motion for confirmation.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Quirante is entitled to attorney’s fees.
Ruling: No. Well settled is the rule that counsel's claim for attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very
action in which the services in question have been rendered, or in a separate action. If the first alternative is
chosen, the Court may pass upon said claim, even if its amount were less than the minimum prescribed by law
for the jurisdiction of said court, upon the theory that the right to recover attorney's fees is but an incident of
the case in which the services of counsel have been rendered ." It also rests on the assumption that the court
trying the case is to a certain degree already familiar with the nature and extent of the lawyer's services. The
rule against multiplicity of suits will in effect be subserved.
What is being claimed here as attorney's fees by petitioners is, however, different from attorney's fees as an
item of damages provided for under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, wherein the award is made in favor of the
litigant, not of his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the judgment creditor who may enforce the
judgment for attorney's fees by execution. Here, the petitioner's claims are based on an alleged contract for
professional services, with them as the creditors and the private respondents as the debtors. In filing the
motion for confirmation of attorney's fees, petitioners chose to assert their claims in the same action. This is
also a proper remedy under our jurisprudence. Nevertheless, we agree with the respondent court that the
confirmation of attorney's fees is premature. As it correctly pointed out, the petition for review
on certiorari filed by PHILAMGEN in this Court (G.R. No. 64834) "may or may not ultimately result in the
granting to the Isasola (sic) family of the total amount of damages" awarded by the trial court.
Since the main case from which the petitioner's claims for their fees may arise has not yet become final, the
determination of the propriety of said fees and the amount thereof should be held in abeyance. This
procedure gains added validity in the light of the rule that the remedy for recovering attorney's fees as an
incident of the main action may be availed of only when something is due to the client. Thus, it was ruled
that:... an attorney's fee cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject
of recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney's fee only arises when something has
been recovered from which the fee is to be paid.
FACTS: A proceeding for disbarment was filed by complainant Angel Albano against respondent Perpetua
Coloma, a member of the Philippine Bar. In his letter complaint, complainant alleged that during the Japanese
occupation, he and his mother retained the services of respondent as counsel for them as plaintiffs in a civil
case. After which came the accusation that after liberation and long after the courts had been reorganized,
respondent failed to expedite the hearing and termination of the case, as a result of which they had
themselves represented by another lawyer. This notwithstanding, it was claimed that respondent intervened
in the case to collect her attorney’s fees. It was then alleged that during the hearing they were surprised that
respondent presented to exhibit a document showing that they as well as their co-plaintiffs in the case
promised to pay her contingent fee of whatever could be recovered in damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the charge against respondent Perpetua Coloma should be dismissed.
RULING: YES. If there was anyone guilty of bad faith in this case it is complainant and his co-plaintiffs in the
Civil Case who, after benefiting from the valuable services of respondent in said case, tried to renege on their
agreement for the payment of the latter's contingent attorney's fees by dismissing her as their counsel after
she had already won for them said case in the trial court and the Court of Appeals, and later, by attempting to
impugn the authenticity and genuineness of their written agreement for the payment of attorney's fees.
A counsel who is worthy of his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for his services. With his capital
consisting solely of his brains and with his skill, acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in the
expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on
the part of a client to escape payment of his fees. It is indeed ironic if after putting forth the best that is in him
to secure justice for the party he represents, he himself would not get his due. Such an eventuality this Court
is determined to avoid. It views with disapproval any and every effort of those benefited by counsel's services
to deprive him of his hard-earned honorarium. Such an attitude deserves condemnation.
Facts: Czarina T. Malvar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against respondents Kraft
Food Philippines, Inc. (KFPI) and/or Bienvenido Bautista.
While her appeal was pending in the SC, she and respondents entered into a compromise agreement,
whereby she was paid P40,000,000 in addition to the P14,252,192.12 earlier paid to her. She later filed a
motion to dismiss/withdraw case but before it could be acted upon, a motion for intervention to protect
attorney’s rights was filed by the law firm of Dasal, Llasos and Associates, through its counsel, retired SC
Associate Justice Josue N. Bellosillo. The motion sought, among others, that both Malvar and KFPI be held and
ordered to pay jointly and severally the intervenor’s contingent fees.
In opposing the motion, Malvar claimed that the intervenor lacked the legal capacity to intervene because it
had ceased to exist after Atty. Marwil N. Llasos resigned from the intervenor and Atty. Richard B. Dasal
became barred from private practice upon his appointment to a position in a government subsidiary. They
both personally handled her case. Besides, their dismissal was based on a justifiable cause.
Issue: Does this contention find merit?
Ruling: No. In the absence of the lawyer’s fault, consent or waiver, a client cannot deprive the lawyer of his
just fees already earned in the guise of a justifiable reason. Here, Malvar not only downplayed the worth of
the intervenor’s legal service to her but also attempted to camouflage her intent to defraud her lawyer by
offering excuses that were not only inconsistent with her actions but, most importantly, fell short of being
justifiable.
The letter Malvar addressed to Retired Justice Bellosillo, who represented the intervenor, debunked her
allegations of unsatisfactory legal service because she thereby lavishly lauded the intervenor for its dedication
and devotion to the prosecution of her case and to the protection of her interests. Also significant was that
the attorney-client relationship between her and the intervenor was not severed upon Atty. Dasal’s
appointment to public office and Atty. Llasos’ resignation from the law firm.
In other words, the intervenor remained as her counsel of record, for, as we held in Rilloraza, Africa, De
Ocampo and Africa v. Eastern Telecommunication Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 104600, July 2, 1999, 309 SCRA
566, 574, a client who employs a law firm engages the entire law firm; hence, the resignation, retirement or
separation from the law firm of the handling lawyer does not terminate the relationship, because the law
firm is bound to provide a replacement.
The stipulations of the written agreement between Malvar and the intervenors, not being contrary to law,
morals, public policy, public order or good customs, were valid and binding on her. They expressly gave rise to
the right of the intervenor to demand compensation.
In a word, she could not simply walk away from her contractual obligations toward the Intervenor, for Article
1159 of the Civil Code provides that obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
parties and should be complied with in good faith
Balingit engaged the services of Atty. Cervantes and Delarmente for the separate civil case and administrative
case against Alizadeh. Atty. Cervantes sent a demand letter to Alizadeh for the payment of 2 million pesos +
25% thereof as attorney’s fees.
Meanwhile, Atty. Cervantes prepared an agreement embodying the terms of agreement with Balangit for his
legal services. Among others, the agreement provided a payment of 30k acceptance fee, 4k appearance fee,
20% success fee, and office fees for the account of Balangit.
Balangit did not sign the agreement, but paid 45k as partial acceptance fee for the filing of the civil suit.
Cervantes also received 10k from Balangit’s daughter in law without issuing any receipt.
Despite the payments, the respondents still failed to file the separate civil suit agreed upon. During the
criminal case, the parties agreed to compromise on the amount of 1 million pesos. Learning of this, Atty.
Cervantes sent a demand letter to Balangit seeking 100k as attorney’s fees and appearance fees of 5k.
Balangit refused to pay prompting Cervantes to file a case against him for estafa.
Issue: W/N respondents violated the CPR.
Ruling:
Yes. They violated Canons 15, 16, 17, and 18.
Firstly, they failed to file the separate civil action for damages against Alizadeh despite receipt of payments
from Balangit.
Secondly, Atty. Cervantes demanded payment of 5k as appearance fee and 10% of the settlement of 1milion
as success fee even though such award was from the criminal case, and not the civil case agreed upon. It is
highly improper for a lawyer to impose additional professional fees upon his clients which were never
mentioned nor agreed upon at the time of the engagement of his services.
Assuming he was entitled to the fees, his manner of enforcement was improper. Rule 20 provides that lawyers
should avoid controversies with clients concerning their compensiation and should only resort to judicial
action to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
The manner of enforcement is by filing the necessary petition as an incident of the main action in which his
service was rendered. For example, the filiing of a motion for intervention or an independent civil action
against his client is permissible.
In this case however, Atty Cervantes chose to file a criminal case for estafa which the court cannot
countenance.
72. INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED LUIS C. DOMINGO, SR., CONSUELO DOMINGO DE LOPEZ vs. PEDRO
A. AQUINO G.R. No. L-28078 April 29, 1971
FACTS:
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan rendered judgment approving the money claim of respondent
Pedro A. Aquino against the petitioner estate by ordering the then special administratrix, Asuncion Domingo
Sta. Maria, "to pay from the available funds of the estate to Pedro A. Aquino." On appeal, the court found the
claim to be valid. According to the present petition itself, the estate's counsel of record in the appellate court,
Atty. Jose A. Unson, did not receive the notice and copy of the appellate court's judgment sent to him by
registered mail; but the estate's attorneys in the intestate proceedings pending in the lower court, Attys.
Primicias, Del Castillo and Macaraeg, were verbally informed by respondent's counsel of the judgment
rendered on appeal by the appellate court. Pursuant to said information, petitioner caused to be filed
on March 9, 1967, with the appellate court an "Appearance with Motions for Substitution and to be served
with a copy of the Judgment," stating inter alia, that the former special administratrix, Asuncion Domingo Sta.
Maria had long resigned as such with the permission of the intestate court, that the other co-special
administrator, Atty. Luis Domingo, Jr. (who had caused the prosecution of the appeal) was removed from his
trust by the intestate court's order dated May 21, 1963, for having squandered cash funds of the estate, and
that as a consequence, Mrs. Consuelo Domingo de Lopez was appointed judicial administratrix and has since
been administering the estate alone; that Mrs. Lopez as judicial administratrix wished to file a motion for
reconsideration of the appellate court's judgment and that the clerk of court be directed to serve copy of said
judgment on her counsel instead of on Atty. Unson as the former special administrator's counsel "for purposes
of starting of time to move for re-hearing or reconsideration;" and praying that as present judicial
administratrix, she be substituted in lieu of the former joint administrators and that her counsel be served
with copy of the appellate court's decision.
ISSUE: Was it proper for petitioners to substitute counsels without informing the court?
HELD:
NO. One vital factor that the present administratrix, Mrs. Lopez, has obviously failed to appreciate,
wittingly or otherwise, is that the party in the Subject case was the intestate estate of the deceased Luis C.
Domingo, Sr. and that Atty. Unson represented the estate as counsel in the said case. The fact that his services
were engaged by Luis Domingo, Jr. in his (Luis') official capacity as administrator, did not make him the
personal counsel of Luis. Thus, nothwithstanding Luis' removal as administrator, Atty. Unson continued to
represent the estate as counsel in the appellate court. He continued to be authorized to represent the estate
as its counsel, until the new administrator should terminate his services, which she never did.
The representations made by the present administrator and her counsel in the petition at bar — filed
almost five months after the appellate court's denial of her belated motion for substitution and to be served
with copy of its decision — to the effect that the appellate court had granted respondent "new and further
relief" in its decision by the award of compound interest on the sum due respondent are deplorable. They
failed to set out before the Court the full facts, viz, that respondent had duly prayed for the award of
compound interest by the intestate court in accordance with the very stipulation of the promissory note sued
upon; that respondent had duly moved the intestate court to reconsider its decision failing to provide for such
compound interest; that the intestate court, in denying respondent's motion, merely stated "that the issue
may just as well be decided in the appellate court, since both parties had indicated their intention to appeal;
and that respondent in fact filed his appeal from this adverse portion of the intestate court's decision, as well
as the non-award of the stipulated attorney's fees of P500.00. The appellate court therefore properly modified
the intestate court's decision by awarding such compound interest and attorney's fees as prayed for in the
errors assigned in respondent's brief as appellant. It results clearly that the petition, alleging and praying that
the appellate court's decision of January 20, 1967, be declared null and void for having been rendered and
entered in excess of or without jurisdiction or that this Court send for the records from the appellate court
"for purposes of review and thereafter render its own decision reversing the judgment [of the appellate
court]" notwithstanding its long having become final and executory, is utterly untenable and without legal
justification.
Petitioner's counsel are reminded of this Court's admonition in Pajares vs. Abad Santos,6 and other
cases cited therein, to wit, that "the cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so that needless
clogging of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases may be avoided. There must be more faithful
adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides that 'the signature of an attorney
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay' and expressly
admonishes that 'for a willful violation of this rule, an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action.' "
73. Felicisimo M. Montano v. IBP and Atty. Juan S. Dealca [A.C. 4215, May 21, 2001]
FACTS: Montano hired the services of Atty. Dealca as his counsel in collaboration with Atty. Ronando L. Gerona
in a case pending before the CA. The parties agreed upon attorney's fees in the amount of P15k, 50% of which
was payable upon acceptance of the case and the remaining balance upon the termination of the case.
Accordingly, Montano paid respondent the amount of P7.5k representing 50% of the attorney's fee. Even
before respondent counsel had prepared the appellant's brief and contrary to their agreement that the
remaining balance be payable after the termination of the case, Atty. Dealca demanded an additional payment
from complainant obliged by paying the amount of P4k. Prior to the filing of the appellant's brief, respondent
counsel again demanded payment of the remaining balance of P3.5k. When complainant was unable to do so,
respondent lawyer withdraw his appearance as complainant's counsel without his prior knowledge and/or
conformity.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Dealca’s conduct was just and proper.
HELD: No. The Court finds Atty. Dealca's conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal profession. Under
Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause
and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. Although he may withdraw his services when the client
deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services, under the circumstances of the present case, Atty. Dealca's
withdrawal was unjustified as complainant did not deliberately fail to pay him the attorney's fees. In fact,
complainant exerted honest efforts to fulfill his obligation. Respondent's contemptuous conduct does not
speak well of a member of the bar considering that the amount owing to him was only P3.5k rule 20.4 of
Canon 20, mandates that a lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall
resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Sadly, for not so large a sum owed to
him by complainant, respondent lawyer failed to act in accordance with the demands of the Code.
Note: Atty. Dealca was reprimanded with a warning.