MARIANO V.
CA
G.R. No. 101522 May 28, 1993
Doctrine:
Redemption of the whole property by a co-owner within the redemption period
does not terminate the co-ownership and does not vest in him sole ownership.
FACTS:
Francisco Gosiengfiao is the registered owner of a parcel of land in
Tuguegarao. In his lifetime, he mortgaged the land to Rural Bank of Tuguegarao to
secure payment of a loan. Francisco died in without paying the debt. His intestate
heirs were: his wife Antonia and children Amparo, Carlos, Severo, Grace, Emma,
Ester, Francisco, Jr., Norma, Lina, and Jacinto.
The bank foreclosed on the mortgage but before the redemption period
expired, Antonia, Emma, Lina, Norma, Lina, Carlos and Severo executed a deed of
assignment of the right of redemption in favor of Amparo. Amparo later on sold
the land to Spouses Mariano.
Grace Gosengfiao, and the other heirs exuded in the deed of assignment
filed a complaint for recovery and legal redemption with damages against spouses
Mariano.
RTC decided in favor of spouses Mariano. CA for Grace Gosiengfiao, et. al.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a co-owner who redeems the whole property with her
own personal funds becomes the sole owner of said property and terminates the
existing state of co-ownership? (Issue recognized by CA)
HELD:
No. CA’s ruling is affirmed.
Admittedly, as the property in question was mortgaged by the decedent,
a co-ownership existed among the heirs during the period given by law to redeem
the foreclosed property. Redemption of the whole property by a co-owner does
not vest in him sole ownership over said property but will inure to the benefit of
all co-owners. In other words, it will not end to the existing state of co-ownership.
Redemption is not a mode of terminating a co-ownership.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is supported by a long line of case law
which states that a redemption by a co-owner within the period prescribed by law
inures to the benefit of all the other co-owners
ARCELONA V. CA
Article 487:
Anyone of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.
Doctrine:
While Article 487 now allows a suit by a co-owner, all the co-owners are necessary
and proper parties
FACTS:
Marcelino Arcelona, Tomasa Arcelona-Chiang and Ruth Arcelona are
natural-born Filipinos who are now naturalized Americans residing in California,
U.S.A. Together with their three sisters — Pacita Arcelona-Olanday, Maria Peaches
Arcelona-Arellano and Natividad Arcelona-Cruz (Olanday, et al) — “pets” are co-
owners pro-indiviso of a fishpond which they inherited from their deceased
parents. The six Arcelonas are named as co-owners over the fishpond.
A contract of lease over the fishpond was executed between Cipriano
Tandoc and Olanday, et al. The lease contract was for a period of 3 years but was
renewed up to February 2, 1984.
Moises Farnacio was appointed in turn by Tandoc as caretaker-tenant of
the same fishpond, effective on the date the contract of lease was executed. After
the termination of the lease contract, the lessee (Tandoc) surrendered possession
of the leased premises to the lessors, Olanday, et al.
Farancio filed a civil case for "peaceful possession, maintenance of
security of tenure plus damages, with motion for the issuance of an interlocutory
order" against Olanday, et al., (excluding the Arcelonas in US) before RTC. The case
was intended to maintain Farancio as tenant of the fishpond. lower courts
RTC: Recognized Farnacio as tenant-caretaker over the fishpond at Lomboy
District, Dagupan City; Ordered the defendants to maintain plaintiff in the peaceful
possession and cultivation of said fishpond
CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.
SC sustained the CA decision. After remand of the case, resp was placed in
possession of the property.
Pets then filed with CA a petition for annulment of the judgment against
Farancio and the sheriff. CA directed pets "to implead as defendant the RTC." CA
promulgated the assailed Decision and Resolution. Dissatisfied, Olandays lodged
this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Are all the co-owners pro indiviso of a real property indispensable parties? Does
the non-inclusion of some of such co-owners in a suit involving tenancy over said
property constitute sufficient ground to nullify the final decision rendered in such
case?
HELD:
It has been held, however, that while Article 487 now allows a suit by a co-owner,
all the co-owners are necessary and proper parties. By the same token, it is logical
that a tenant, in order to establish his status as such, must implead all the pro
indiviso co-owners.
Were the courts to permit an action in ejectment to be maintained by a
person having merely an undivided interest, a judgment in favor of the defendant
would not be conclusive against the other co-owners not parties to the suit. The
purpose of the rule is to prevent multiplicity of suits.
A tenant who fails to implead all the co-owners cannot establish with
finality his tenancy over the entire co-owned land. Co-owners in an action for the
security of tenure of a tenant are encompassed within the definition of
indispensable parties; thus, all of them must be impleaded
CC D-7240 cannot bind pets and cannot adjudicate the entire co-owned
property, not even that portion belonging to Olanday et al., ownership of the
property being still pro-indiviso. The failure to implead pets barred the lower court
from making a final adjudication. Without the presence of indispensable parties
to a suit or proceeding, a judgment therein cannot attain finality.
The want of jurisdiction of the trial court is not patent on the face of said
judgment.
The responsibility for impleading all the indispensable parties undeniably
rested on him.

Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, defines indispensable parties as Even pets had authorized Olanday, et al. to enter into a lease contract, this
parties-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. fact did not authorize the latter to represent pets in the civil case he brought.
They must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants. Their presence being a
sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power.

The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of

the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.

(Servicewide Specialists, incorporated vs. CA) An indispensable party is one whose

interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably
intertwined with the other parties that his legal presence as a party to the
proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence there cannot be a resolution of
the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or
equitable.

Art 487 of the OCC "any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment."
A co-owner could not maintain an action in ejectment without joining all the other
co-owners. Chief Justice Moran:

Were the courts to permit an action in ejectment to be maintained by a

person having merely an undivided interest in any given tract of land, a judgment
in favor of the defendants would not be conclusive as against the other co-owners
not parties to the suit, and thus the defendant in possession of the property might
be harassed by as many succeeding actions of ejectment, as there might be co-
owners of the title asserted against him.
ADLAWAN V. ADLAWAN
G.R. Nos. 65957-58 July 5, 1994
Doctrine:
A co-owner by virtue of Art. 487 is allowed to bring an action without necessity of
including all the co-owners as plaintiffs for it is presumed to be for the benefit of
all BUT if the action of the plaintiff alone, the action should be dismissed.
FACTS:
A house and lot (lot 7226) was registered in the name of Dominador
Adlawan, the father of (petitioner) Arnelito Adlawan. He is the acknowledged
illegitimate child of Dominador who is claiming that he is the sole heir. He then
adjudicated to himself the said house and lot to himself and out of generosity
allowed the siblings of his father to occupy the property provided that they vacate
when asked. Time came when he demanded that they vacate and when they
refused he filed an ejectment suit against them.
HELD:
NO. The theory of succession invoked by Arnelito would prove that he is not the
sole heir of Dominador. Since he was survived was his wife, upon his death,
Arnelito and Graciana became co-owners of the lot. Upon her death, her share
passed on to her relatives by consanguinity thus making them co-owners as well.
Petitioner contends that Art. 487 allows him to file the instant petition. (Art. 487.
Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.) It is true that a co-
owner may bring such an action w/o necessity of joining all the co-owners as
plaintiffs because it is presumed to be instituted for the benefit of all BUT if the
action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, the action should be dismissed.
Since petitioner brought the suit in his name and for his benefit alone and his
repudiation of the ownership of the other heirs, the instant petition should be
dismissed.

His aunt and uncle on the other hand, Narcisa (70) and Emeterio (59)
denied his allegations claiming that the said lot was registered in their parents’
name and they had been living in the said house and lot since birth. The only
reason why the said house and lot was transferred in Dominador’s name was when
their parents were in need of money for renovating their house, their parents
were not qualified to obtain a loan and since Dominador was the only one who
had a college education, they executed a simulated deed of sale in favor of
Dominador.

The MTC dismissed the complaint holding that Arnelito’s filiation and the
settlement of the estate are conditions precedent for the accrual of the suit. And
since Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana, her legal heirs are entitled to
their share in the lot. The RTC ordered Narcisa and Emeterio to turn over the
possession of the lot to Arnelito. It also granted the motion of execution which
was opposed by the nephew and nieces of Graciana who claim that they have a
share in the lot.

The CA reinstated the decision of the MTC holding that Arnelito and the heirs of
Graciana are co-heirs thus he cannot eject them from the property via unlawful
detainer. Thus the case at bar

ISSUE:
Whether or not Arnelito can validly maintain the ejectment suit
DEL BANCO V. IAC
G.R. No. 72694 December 1, 1987
Doctrine:
It is a basic principle in the law of co-ownership both under the present civil code
as in the code of 1889 that no individual co-owner can claim any definite portion
thereof.
Facts:
In a document executed in the municipality of san rafael, bulacan, on
february 11, 1859, three brothers, benedicto pansacola, jose pansacola and
manuel pansacola (known as fr. Manuel peña) entered into an agreement which
provided, among others:
1. that they will purchase from the spanish government the lands comprising
the island of cagbalite which is located within the boundaries of the
municipality of mauban, province of tayabas (now quezon) and has an
approximate area of 1,600 hectares;
2. that the lands shall be considered after the purchase as their common
property;
3. that the co-ownership includes domingo arce and baldomero angulo,
minors at that time represented by their father, manuel pansacola (fr.
Manuel peña) who will contribute for them in the proposed purchase of
the cagbalite island;
4. that whatever benefits may be derived from the island shall be shared
equally by the co-owners in the following proportion: benedicto
pansacola - 1/4 share; jose pansacola - 1/4 share; and, domingo arce and
Baldomera angulo - 2/4 shares which shall be placed under the care of
their father, manuel pansacola (fr. Manuel peña).
Co-owners entered into the actual possession and enjoyment of the island
purchased by them from the spanish government. They agreed to modify the
terms and conditions provided for a new sharing and distribution of the lands,
comprising the island of cagbalite and whatever benefits may be derived
therefrom, as follows:
(a) the first one-fourth (1/4) portion shall belong to don benedicto pansacola;
(b) the second one-fourth (1/4) portion shall belong to don jose pansacola;
(c) the third one-fourth (1/4) portion shall henceforth belong to the children of
their deceased brother, don eustaquio pansacola, namely: don mariano
pansacola; maria pansacola and don hipolito Pansacola;
(d) the fourth and last one-fourth (1/4) portion shall belong to their nephews and
nieces (1) domingo arce, (2) baldomera angulo, (3) marcelina flores, (4) francisca
flores (5) candelaria dela cruz, and (6)
Gervasio pansacola who, being all minors, are still under the care of their
brother, manuel pansacola (fr. Manuel peña). The latter is the real father of said
minors."
Private respondents brought a special action for petition in the court of first
instance of quezon, under the provisions of rule 69 of the rules of court, including
as parties the heirs and successors-in-interest of the co-owners of the cagbalite
island in the second contract of co-ownership
In their answer some of the defendants, petitioners herein interposed
such defenses as prescription, res judicata, exclusive ownership, estoppel and
laches.
The trial court rendered a decision* dated november 6, 1981 dismissing the
complaint
Respondent court reversed and set aside the decision of the lower court
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT CAGBALITE ISLAND IS STILL UNDIVIDED PROPERTY OWNED IN
COMMON BY THE HEIRS AND SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST OF THE BROTHERS,
BENEDICTO, JOSE AND MANUEL PANSACOLA.
Ruling:
There is nothing in all four agreements that suggests that actual or
physical partition of the island had really been made by either the original owners
or their heirs or successors-in-interest. The agreement entered into in 1859 simply
provides for the sharing of whatever benefits can be derived from the island. The
agreement, in fact, states that the island to be purchased shall be considered as
their common property.
The heirs that were represented agreed on how the island was to be
partitioned. The agreement of april 18, 1908 which supplements that of january
20, 1907 reveals that as of the signing of the 1908 agreement no actual partition
of the island had as yet been done. The second and fourth paragraphs of the
agreement speaks of a survey yet to be conducted by a certain amadeo and a plan
and
Description yet to be made.
For purposes of the aforementioned case, evidently the court used the word
"partition" to refer to the distribution of the cagbalite island agreed upon by the
original owners and in the later agreements, by the heirs and their subsequent
successors-in-interest there need not be a physical partition; a distribution of the
island even in a state of indiviso was sufficient in order that a co-owner may validly
sell his portion of the co-owned property.
Definitely, there was no physical partition of the island in 1859. Neither
could there have been one in 1894 because the manner of subdividing the island
was only provided for in the later agreements entered into by the heirs in 1907
and 1908.
It is a basic principle in the law of co-ownership both under the present
civil code as in the code of 1889 that no individual co-owner can claim any definite
portion thereof. It is not enough that the co-owners agree to subdivide the
property. They must have a subdivision plan drawn in accordance with which they
take actual and exclusive possession of their respective portions in the plan and
titles issued to each of them accordingly
What is important in the Court's ruling in the three aforementioned cases is that,
the fact that there was a distribution of the Island among the co-owners made the
sale of Domingo Arce of the portion allocated to him though pro-indiviso, valid. He
thus disposed of all his rights and interests in the portion given to him.
From book:
The fact that a deed of sale appears to convey a definite or segregated
portion of the property under co-ownership that is still undivided does not per se
render the sale a nullity.
There may be a valid sale of a definite portion of the property co-owned
even before actual partition where the rule of estoppel applies. Thus, in a case,
where the co-owner a vendor pointed out the location and even indicated the
boundaries of the portion of a particular land he was selling without objection,
protest or complaint by the other co-owners, but on the contrary acquiesced in
and tolerated such alienation and the occupation of said portion, it was held that
a factual partition or termination of the co-ownership, although partial, was
created and barred not only the vendor but also his heirs from asserting as against
the vendee any right or title in derogation of the deed of sale executed by the said
vendor.
HEIRS OF DELA ROSA V. BATONGBACAL
G.R. No. 179205 July 30, 2014
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the foll ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
The subject prope1iy consists of a 3,750 square meter-portion of the 15,001
square meters parcel of land situated in Barrio Saog, Marilao, Bulacan
denominated as Lot No. 1, and registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-1 07449[4] under the names of Reynaldo Del a Rosa (Reynaldo), Eduardo
Dela Rosa (Eduardo), Araceli Del a Rosa (Araceli) and Zenaida Dela Rosa (Zenaida).
Sometime in 1984, Reynaldo offered to sell the subject property to Guillermo
Batongbacal (Guillermo) and Mario Batongbacal (Mario) for F50.00 per square
meter or for a total of Fl87,500.00. Pursuant to the agreement, Reynaldo received
an advance payment of F31 ,500.00 leaving a... balance of F156,000.00
Mario and Guillermo, on their own instance, initiated a survey to segregate the
area of 3,750 square meters from the whole area covered by TCT No. T-107449,
delineating the boundaries of the subdivided parts. As a result, they... came up
with a subdivision plan specifically designating the subject property signed by a
Geodetic Engineer.[6] Mario and Guillermo thereafter made several demands
from Reynaldo to deliver the SPA as agreed upon, but such demands all went
unheeded.
In their Complaint docketed as Civil Case No.
215-M-90,[7] Mario and Guillermo asserted that they have a better right over the
subject property and alleged that the subsequent sale thereof effected by
Reynaldo to third persons is void as it was done in bad faith.
Reynaldo in his Answer[8] countered that the purported Contract to Sell is void,
because he never gave his consent thereto. Reynaldo insisted that he was made
to understand that the... contract between him and the Batongbacals was merely
an equitable mortgage whereby it was agreed that the latter will loan to him the
amount of P31,500.00 payable once he receives his share in the proceeds of the
sale of the land
RTC, in a Decision[10] dated 24 March 1999, dismissed Civil Case No. 215-M-90
and ordered Reynaldo to return... to the former the sum of P28,000.00 with 12%
annual interest
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision[12] dated 7 December 2006,
brushed aside the claim of equitable mortgage and held that the sale effected by
Reynaldo of his undivided share in the property is valid and enforceable.
According to the appellate... court, no SPA is necessary for Reynaldo's disposition
of his undivided share as it is limited to the portion that may be allotted to him
upon the termination of the co-ownership.
On 9 September 2007, the appellate court was notified of the death of Reynaldo,
and his heirs sought to be substituted as party in this case.[
Petitioners Heirs of Reynaldo are now before this Court via this instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari praying that the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution be
reversed on the ground that it was rendered not in accordance with the applicable
law and... jurisprudence.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A CONTRACT OF SALE BETWEEN REYNALDO
DELA ROSA AND GUILLERMO BATONGBACA
HELD:
As a co-owner of the subject property, Reynaldo's right to sell, assign or
mortgage his ideal share in the property held in common is sanctioned by law.
Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the terms in the Contract to Sell, which
limited the subject to Reynaldo's ideal share in the property held in common is
perfectly valid and binding. In fact, no authority from the other co-owners is
necessary for such disposition to be... valid as he is afforded by the law full
ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto.
Pursuant to Article 493, a co-owner has the right to alienate his proindiviso
share in the co-owned property even without the consent of his coowners. This
right is absolute and in accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner
has a full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign
or mortgage it, and substitute another person for its enjoyment. In other words,
the law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating, mortgaging his ideal
share in the property held in common.
ARAMBULO V. NOLASCO
GR No. 189420, 2014-03-26
Facts:
Petitioners, together with their siblings and their mother co-owned a 233sq.m.
Land in Tondo, Manila. When their mother died, she was succeeded by her
husband, Genero Nolasco and their children.
On January 8, 1999, petitioners filed a petition for relief alleging that all co-owners,
except for Nolasco, have authorized to sell their respective shares to the
properties, saying that in the Civil Code, if one or more co-owners shall withhold
their consent to the alterations in the thing owned in common, the courts may
afford adequate relief.
Nolasco responded that they did not know about the intention to sell, because
they were not called to participate in the negotiations regarding the sale of the
property.
The Court of Appeals granted the appeal and reversed the trial court's
decision. The Court of Appeals held that the respondents had the full ownership
of their undivided interest in the subject properties, thus, they cannot be
compelled to... sell their undivided shares in the properties. It referred to the
provisions of Article 493 of the Civil Code. However, the Court of Appeals, implying
applicability of Article 491 also observed that petitioners failed to show how
respondents' withholding of their consent would... prejudice the common interest
over the subject properties.
Issues:
Whether respondents, as co-owners, can be compelled by the court to give their
consent to the sale of their shares in the co-owned properties.
Ruling:
Petitioners, likewise petitioners before the RTC, filed the... case on the submission
that Article 491 covers the petition and grants the relief prayed for, which is to
compel the respondent co-owners to agree to the sale of the co-owned property...
affirm the reversal by the Court of Appeals of the judgment of the trial... court.
There is co-ownership whenever, as in this case, the ownership of an undivided
thing, belongs to different persons. Article 493 of the Code defines the ownership
of the co-owner, clearly establishing that each co-owner shall have full ownership
of... his part and of its fruits and benefits.
 Pertinent to this case, Article 493 dictates that each one of the parties
herein as co-owners with full ownership of their parts can sell their fully owned
part. The sale by the petitioners of their parts shall not affect the full ownership
by the respondents of the part that... belongs to them. Their part which petitioners
will sell shall be that which may be apportioned to them in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. With the full ownership of the respondents
remaining unaffected by petitioners' sale of their parts, the nature of the...
property, as co-owned, likewise stays. In lieu of the petitioners, their vendees shall
be co-owners with the respondents. The text of Article 493 says so.

Petitioners who project themselves as prejudiced co-owners may bring a suit for
partition, which is one of the modes of extinguishing co-ownership. Article 494 of
the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-
ownership, and that each co-owner may... demand at any time partition of the
thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule,
Article 498 of the Civil Code states that whenever the thing is essentially indivisible
and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who... shall
indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed. This
is resorted to (a) when the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the
co-owners but because of the nature of the property, it cannot be subdivided or
its subdivision would... prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and (b) the co-
owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned
the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners.[22] This is the
result obviously aimed at by petitioners... at the outset. As already shown, this
cannot be done while the co-ownership exists.

Partition proceeding accords all parties the opportunity to be heard, the denial of
which was raised as a defense by respondents for opposing the sale of the subject
properties.