Everett Steamship v. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 496, G.R. No. 122494, October 8, 1998

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, MILAGROS P.
MORADA and HON. RODOLFO
A. ORTIZ, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 89,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, respondents.
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998 469
Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 122191. October 8, 1998.*
Conflict of Laws; Actions; Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish

the existence of a foreign element, the problem could present a “conflicts” case.
—Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of
a foreign element, we agree with petitioner that the problem herein
could present a “conflicts” case. A factual situation that cuts across
territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more states
is said to contain a “foreign element.” The presence of a foreign element
is inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals and
associations are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth or
conception.
Same; Same; The forms in which a foreign element may appear are many, such
:
as the fact that one party is a resident Philippine national, and that the other is
a resident foreign corporation.—The forms in which this foreign element
may appear are many. The foreign element may simply consist in the
fact that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign
domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one State involves
properties situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element
may assume a complex form. In the instant case, the foreign element
consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is a resident
Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign
corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada with the
petitioner SAUDIA as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during
her many occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from
Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused
a “conflicts” situation to arise.
Same; Same; Damages; While Article 19 of the Civil Code merely declares a
principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to its provisions; Violations of Articles
19 and 21 are actionable, with judicially enforceable remedies in the municipal
forum.—Although Article 19
________________
*
FIRST DIVISION.
470
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to its

provisions. Thus, we agree with private respondent’s assertion that
violations of Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with judicially
:
enforceable remedies in the municipal forum. Based on the allegations
in the Amended Complaint, read in the light of the Rules of Court on
jurisdiction we find that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City
possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. Its authority to
try and hear the case is provided for under Section 1 of Republic Act
No. 7691.
Same; Same; Forum Non Conveniens; Forum Shopping; Plaintiff may not, by
choice of an inconvenient forum, ‘vex,’ ‘harass,’ or ‘oppress’ the defendant, e.g.
by inflicting upon him needless expense or disturbance, but unless the balance
is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should
rarely be disturbed.—Pragmatic considerations, including the
convenience of the parties, also weigh heavily in favor of the RTC
Quezon City assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the private interest of
the litigant. Enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained is quite
obvious. Relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial are equally
important. Plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, ‘vex,’
‘harass,’ or ‘oppress’ the defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon him needless
expense or disturbance. But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the
defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.
Same; Same; Forcing a party to seek remedial action in a place where she no
longer maintains substantial connections would cause a fundamental
unfairness to her.—Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a
quo found it best to hear the case in the Philippines. Had it refused to
take cognizance of the case, it would be forcing plaintiff (private
respondent now) to seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains substantial connections.
That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to her.
Same; Same; A party effectively submits to the trial court’s jurisdiction by

:
praying for the dismissal of the complaint on grounds other than lack of
jurisdiction.—The records show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed several
motions praying for the dismissal of Morada’s Amended Complaint.
SAUDIA also filed an Answer In Ex Abundante Cautelam dated February
20, 1995. What is very patent and explicit from the motions filed, is that
SAUDIA prayed for other
471
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998 471

reliefs under the premises. Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA has

effectively submitted to the trial court’s jurisdiction by praying for the
dismissal of the Amended Complaint on grounds other than lack of
jurisdiction.
Same; Choice-of-law problems seek to answer two important questions: (1)

What legal system should control a given situation where some of the
significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2) to what extent should
the chosen legal system regulate the situation.—As to the choice of
applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems seek to answer two
important questions: (1) What legal system should control a given
situation where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more
states; and (2) to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate
the situation.
Same; Although ideally, all choice-of-law theories should intrinsically advance

both notions of justice and predictability, they do not always do so, in which
case the forum is then faced with the problem of deciding which of these two
important values should be stressed.—Several theories have been
:
propounded in order to identify the legal system that should ultimately
control. Although ideally, all choice-of-law theories should intrinsically
advance both notions of justice and predictability, they do not always
do so. The forum is then faced with the problem of deciding which of
these two important values should be stressed.
Same; Characterization or Doctrine of Qualification; Words and Phrases;

Characterization is the “process of deciding whether or not the facts relate to
the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule.”—Before a choice can be
made, it is necessary for us to determine under what category a certain
set of facts or rules fall. This process is known as “characterization,” or
the “doctrine of qualification.” It is the “process of deciding whether or
not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule.”
The purpose of “characterization” is to enable the forum to select the
proper law.
Same; Same; An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a “test”

or “connecting factor” or “point of contact.”—Our starting point of analysis
here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation, event, or operative
fact. An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a “test” or
“connecting factor” or “point of contact.” Choice-of-law rules invariably
consist of a factual relation-
472

ship (such as property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or

point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the
place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing.
:
Same; Same; “Test Factors” or “Points of Contact” or “Connecting Factors.”
—Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the
possible test for the determination of the applicable law. These “test
factors” or “points of contact” or “connecting factors” could be any of
the following: “(1) the nationality of a person, his domicile, his
residence, his place of sojourn, or his origin; (2) the seat of a legal or
juridical person, such as a corporation; (3) the situs of a thing, that is,
the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated. In particular, the
lex situs is decisive when real rights are involved; (4) the place where an
act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a contract has been
made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The lex loci
actus is particularly important in contracts and torts; (5) the place where an
act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance of
contractual duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be
exercised; (6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that
should govern their agreement, the lex loci intentionis; (7) the place
where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The
lex fori—the law of the forum—is particularly important because, as we
have seen earlier, matters of ‘procedure’ not going to the substance of
the claim involved are governed by it; and because the lex fori applies
whenever the content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is
excluded from application in a given case for the reason that it falls
under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and (8)
the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal
relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as such. It also
covers contractual relationships particularly contracts of affreightment.”
(Italics ours.)
Same; Same; Same; Torts; Where the action is one involving torts, the
“connecting factor” or “point of contact” could be the place or places where the
:
tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred; The Philippines is the situs of the
tort where it is in the Philippines where the defendant allegedly deceived the
plaintiff, a citizen residing and working here, and the fact that certain acts or
parts of the injury occurred in another country is of no moment, for what is
important is the place where the over-all harm or the totality of the injury to
the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of the plaintiff
473
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998 473

had lodged.—Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one

involving torts, the “connecting factor” or “point of contact” could be
the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred.
And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the
Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the
alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the
Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a
Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly
believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the
performance of its duties, “act with justice, give her her due and
observe honesty and good faith.” Instead, petitioner failed to protect
her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly
occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our view what is
important here is the place where the over-all harm or the totality of the
alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human
rights of complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff below
(herein private respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify
the Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.
:
Same; Same; Same; Same; “State of the Most Significant Relationship” Rule;
The “State of the most significant relationship” rule is the appropriate modern
theory on tort liability to apply in the instant case.—With the widespread
criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti commissi, modern
theories and rules on tort liability have been advanced to offer fresh
judicial approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping abreast with the
modern theories on tort liability, we find here an occasion to apply the
“State of the most significant relationship” rule, which in our view
should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of this
case. In applying said principle to determine the State which has the
most significant relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into
account and evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue: (a) the place where the injury occurred;
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the
domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties; and (d) the place where the relationship, if any,
between the parties is centered.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the Philippines is the situs of the tort
complained of and the place “having the most interest in the problem,” the
Philippine law on tort liability should have
474

paramount application to and control in the resolution of the legal issues

arising therein.—As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that
over-all injury occurred and lodged in the Philippines. There is likewise
no question that private respondent is a resident Filipina national,
:
working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged here in
the business of international air carriage. Thus, the “relationship”
between the parties was centered here, although it should be stressed
that this suit is not based on mere labor law violations. From the record,
the claim that the Philippines has the most significant contact with the
matter in this dispute, raised by private respondent as plaintiff below
against defendant (herein petitioner), in our view, has been properly
established. Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the
situs of the tort complained of and the place “having the most interest
in the problem,” we find, by way of recapitulation, that the Philippine
law on tort liability should have paramount application to and control
in the resolution of the legal issues arising out of this case. Further, we
hold that the respondent Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter of the complaint; the appropriate venue is
in Quezon City, which could properly apply Philippine law.
Same; Pleadings and Practice; Evidence; A party whose cause of action is based
on a Philippine law has no obligation to plead and prove the law of another
State.—We find untenable petitioner’s insistence that “[s]ince private
respondent instituted this suit, she has the burden of pleading and
proving the applicable Saudi law on the matter.” As aptly said by
private respondent, she has “no obligation to plead and prove the law
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since her cause of action is based on
Articles 19 and 21” of the Civil Code of the Philippines. In her
Amended Complaint and subsequent pleadings, she never alleged that
Saudi law should govern this case. And as correctly held by the
respondent appellate court, “considering that it was the petitioner who
was invoking the applicability of the law of Saudi Arabia, then the
burden was on it [petitioner] to plead and to establish what the law of
Saudi Arabia is.”
:
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for petitioner.
475
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998 475

Padilla, Jimenez, Kintanar & Asuncion Law Offices for private

respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

seeks to annul and set aside the Resolution1 dated September 27, 1995
and the Decision2 dated April 10, 1996 of the Court of Appeals3 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 36533,4 and the Orders5 dated August 29, 19946 and
February 2, 19957 that were issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-
93-18394.8
The pertinent antecedent facts which gave rise to the instant petition, as
stated in the questioned Decision,9 are as follows:
“On January 21, 1988 defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a Flight

Attendant for its airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. x x x
On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, plaintiff

went to a disco dance with fellow crew members Thamer AlGazzawi
and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi nationals. Because it was almost
morning when they returned to their hotels, they agreed to have
:
breakfast together at the room of Thamer. When they were in te (sic)
room, Allah left on some pretext. Shortly after he did,
________________
1
Annex “A,” PETITION, October 13, 1995; rollo, p. 36.
2Annex “A,” SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION, April 30, 1996; rollo, pp. 88-
102.
3
Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo L1. Salas, and concurred in by
Associate Justice Jorge S. Imperial and Associate Justice Pacita
Cañizares-Nye.
4
Entitled “Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. Hon. Judge Rodolfo A. Ortiz, in
his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 89 of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City and Milagros P. Morada.”
5Issued by respondent Judge Hon. Rodolfo A. Ortiz of Branch 89,

Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
6
Annex “B,” PETITION, October 13, 1995; rollo, pp. 37-39.
7 Annex “B,” PETITION, October 13, 1995; rollo, p. 40.
8
Entitled “Milagros P. Morada vs. Saudi Arabian Airlines.”
9
Supra, note 2.
476

:
Thamer attempted to rape plaintiff. Fortunately, a roomboy and several
security personnel heard her cries for help and rescued her. Later, the
Indonesian police came and arrested Thamer and Allah Al-Gazzawi, the
latter as an accomplice.
When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later, several SAUDIA

officials interrogated her about the Jakarta incident. They then
requested her to go back to Jakarta to help arrange the release of
Thamer and Allah. In Jakarta, SAUDIA Legal Officer Sirah Akkad and
base manager Baharini negotiated with the police for the immediate
release of the detained crew members but did not succeed because
plaintiff refused to cooperate. She was afraid that she might be tricked
into something she did not want because of her inability to understand
the local dialect. She also declined to sign a blank paper and a
document written in the local dialect. Eventually, SAUDIA allowed
plaintiff to return to Jeddah but barred her from the Jakarta flights.
Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian

government, the Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer and
Allah after two weeks of detention. Eventually, they were again put in
service by defendant SAUDIA (sic). In September 1990, defendant
SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.
On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta
incident was already behind her, her superiors requested her to see Mr.
Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
When she saw him, he brought her to the police station where the police
took her passport and questioned her about the Jakarta incident.
Miniewy simply stood by as the police put pressure on her to make a
statement dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. Not until she
agreed to do so did the police return her passport and allowed her to
:
catch the afternoon flight out of Jeddah.
One year and a half later or on June 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a
few minutes before the departure of her flight to Manila, plaintiff was
not allowed to board the plane and instead ordered to take a later flight
to Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. When
she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi
court where she was asked to sign a document written in Arabic. They
told her that this was necessary to close the case against Thamer and
Allah. As it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before
the court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
477
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998 477

Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to

Jeddah once again and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for further
investigation. Plaintiff did so after receiving assurance from SAUDIA’s
Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, that the investigation was routinary
and that it posed no danger to her.
In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi

court on June 27, 1993. Nothing happened then but on June 28, 1993, a
Saudi judge interrogated plaintiff through an interpreter about the
Jakarta incident. After one hour of interrogation, they let her go. At the
airport, however, just as her plane was about to take off, a SAUDIA
officer told her that the airline had forbidden her to take flight. At the
Inflight Service Office where she was told to go, the secretary of Mr.
Yahya Saddick took away her passport and told her to remain in
:
Jeddah, at the crew quarters, until further orders.
On July 3, 1993, a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the

same court where the judge, to her astonishment and shock, rendered a
decision, translated to her in English, sentencing her to five months
imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the
Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and Allah, for what
happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2)
going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of
Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of
Islamic tradition.”10
Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her employer,

petitioner SAUDIA. Unfortunately, she was denied any assistance. She
then asked the Philippine Embassy in Jeddah to help her while her case
is on appeal. Meanwhile, to pay for her upkeep, she worked on the
domestic flight of SAUDIA, while Thamer and Allah continued to serve
in the international flights.11
Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed

the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly
before her return to Manila,12 she was
________________
10 Decision, pp. 2-4; see rollo, pp. 89-91.
11
Private respondent’s Comment; rollo, p. 50.
12
Ibid., pp. 50-51.
478
:
terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being informed of

the cause.
On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint13 for damages

against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi (“Al-Balawi”), its country
manager.
On January 19, 1994, SAUDIA filed an Omnibus Motion To Dismiss14

which raised the following grounds, to wit: (1) that the Complaint states
no cause of action against SAUDIA; (2) that defendant Al-Balawi is not
a real party in interest; (3) that the claim or demand set forth in the
Complaint has been waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished; and
(4) that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case.
On February 10, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition (To Motion to

Dismiss).15 SAUDIA filed a reply16 thereto on March 3, 1994.
On June 23, 1994, Morada filed an Amended Complaint17 wherein Al-

Balawi was dropped as party defendant. On August 11, 1994, SAUDIA
filed its Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint.18
The trial court issued an Order19 dated August 29, 1994 denying the
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint filed by SAUDIA.
From the Order of respondent Judge20 denying the Motion to Dismiss,

SAUDIA filed on September 20, 1994, its Motion for Reconsideration21
of the Order dated August 29, 1994. It alleged that the trial court has no
jurisdiction to hear and try
:
________________
13
Dated November 19, 1993, and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-93-
18394, Branch 89, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
14
Dated January 14, 1994.
15
Dated February 4, 1994.
16
Reply dated March 1, 1994.
17
Records, pp. 65-84.
18 Rollo, p. 65.
19 Supra, note 6.
20
Hon. Rodolfo A. Ortiz.
21
Dated September 19, 1994.
479
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998 479

the case on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code, since the proper law
applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On October 14,
1994, Morada filed her Opposition22 (To Defendant’s Motion for
Reconsideration).
In the Reply23 filed with the trial court on October 24, 1994, SAUDIA
alleged that since its Motion for Reconsideration raised lack of
jurisdiction as its cause of action, the Omnibus Motion Rule does not
:
apply, even if that ground is raised for the first time on appeal.
Additionally, SAUDIA alleged that the Philippines does not have any
substantial interest in the prosecution of the instant case, and hence,
without jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.
Respondent Judge subsequently issued another Order24 dated February

2, 1995, denying SAUDIA’s Motion for Reconsideration. The pertinent
portion of the assailed Order reads as follows:
“Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration of defendant Saudi Arabian

Airlines filed, thru counsel, on September 20, 1994, and the Opposition
thereto of the plaintiff filed, thru counsel, on October 14, 1994, as well as
the Reply therewith of defendant Saudi Arabian Airlines filed, thru
counsel, on October 24, 1994, considering that a perusal of the plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint, which is one for the recovery of actual, moral and
exemplary damages plus attorney’s fees, upon the basis of the
applicable Philippine law, Article 21 of the New Civil Code of the
Philippines, is, clearly, within the jurisdiction of this Court as regards
the subject matter, and there being nothing new of substance which
might cause the reversal or modification of the order sought to be
reconsidered, the motion for reconsideration of the defendant, is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.”25
Consequently, on February 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed its Petition for

Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of
________________
22
Records, pp. 108-116.
:
23
Records, pp. 117-128.
24
Supra, note 7.
25
Ibid.
480

Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order26

with the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution with

Temporary Restraining Order27 dated February 23, 1995, prohibiting the
respondent Judge from further conducting any proceeding, unless
otherwise directed, in the interim.
In another Resolution28 promulgated on September 27, 1995, now

assailed, the appellate court denied SAUDIA’s Petition for the Issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated February 18, 1995, to wit:
“The Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is

hereby DENIED, after considering the Answer, with Prayer to Deny
Writ of Preliminary Injunction (Rollo, p. 135) the Reply and Rejoinder, it
appearing that herein petitioner is not clearly entitled thereto (Unciano
Paramedical College, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 100335, April
7, 1993, Second Division).
SO ORDERED.”
On October 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed with this Honorable Court the
:
instant Petition29 for Review with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order dated October 13, 1995.
However, during the pendency of the instant Petition, respondent Court

of Appeals rendered the Decision30 dated April 10, 1996, now also
assailed. It ruled that the Philippines is an appropriate forum
considering that the Amended Complaint’s basis for recovery of
damages is Article 21 of the Civil Code, and thus, clearly within the
jurisdiction of respondent Court. It further held that certiorari is not the
proper remedy in a denial of a Motion to Dismiss, inasmuch as the
petitioner should have proceeded to trial, and in case of an adverse
ruling, find recourse in an appeal.
________________
26
Dated February 18, 1995; see supra, note 4.
27
Supra, note 7.
28 Records, p. 180.
29
Rollo, pp. 1-44.
30
Supra, note 2.
481
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998 481

On May 7, 1996, SAUDIA filed its Supplemental Petition for Review

with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order31 dated April 30, 1996,
given due course by this Court. After both parties submitted their
:
Memoranda,32 the instant case is now deemed submitted for decision.
Petitioner SAUDIA raised the following issues:
“I.
The trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try Civil Case No. Q-93-
18394 based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code since the proper law
applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia inasmuch as this
case involves what is known in private international law as a ‘conflicts
problem.’ Otherwise, the Republic of the Philippines will sit in
judgment of the acts done by another sovereign state which is abhorred.
II.
Leave of court before filing a supplemental pleading is not a

jurisdictional requirement. Besides, the matter as to absence of leave of
court is now moot and academic when this Honorable Court required
the respondents to comment on petitioner’s April 30, 1996
Supplemental Petition For Review With Prayer For A Temporary
Restraining Order Within Ten (10) Days From Notice Thereof. Further,
the Revised Rules of Court should be construed with liberality pursuant
to Section 2, Rule 1 thereof.
III.
Petitioner received on April 22, 1996 the April 10, 1996 decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 36533 entitled ‘Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Hon. Rodolfo A.
Ortiz, et al.’ and filed its April 30, 1996 Supplemental Petition For
Review With Prayer For A Temporary Restraining Order on May 7, 1996
at 10:29 a.m. or within the 15-day reglementary period as provided for
under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised
:
________________
31
Rollo, pp. 80-86.
32
Memorandum for Petitioner dated October 9, 1996, rollo, pp. 149-180;
and Memorandum for Private Respondent, October 30, 1996, rollo, pp.
182-210.
482

Rules of Court. Therefore, the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 36533 has not
yet become final and executory and this Honorable Court can take
cognizance of this case.”33
From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents, the following

issues emerge for our resolution:
I.
WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN

HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY
HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND TRY CIVIL CASE NO. Q-93-
18394 ENTITLED “MILAGROS P. MORADA V. SAUDI ARABIAN
AIRLINES.”
II.
WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING

THAT IN THIS CASE PHILIPPINE LAW SHOULD GOVERN.
:
Petitioner SAUDIA claims that before us is a conflict of laws that must
be settled at the outset. It maintains that private respondent’s claim for
alleged abuse of rights occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It
alleges that the existence of a foreign element qualifies the instant case
for the application of the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue
of the lex loci delicti commissi rule.34
On the other hand, private respondent contends that since her

Amended Complaint is based on Articles 1935 and 2136 of
________________
33
Rollo, pp. 157-159. All caps in the original.
34
Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 14, rollo, p. 162.
35
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
36
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damages.
483
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998 483

the Civil Code, then the instant case is properly a matter of domestic
law.37
Under the factual antecedents obtaining in this case, there is no dispute

:
that the interplay of events occurred in two states, the Philippines and
Saudi Arabia.
As stated by private respondent in her Amended Complaint38 dated

June 23, 1994:
1. “2. Defendant SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES or SAUDIA is a

foreign airlines corporation doing business in the Philippines. It
may be served with summons and other court processes at Travel Wide
Associated Sales (Phils.), Inc., 3rd Floor, Cougar Building, 114 Valero St.,
Salcedo Village, Makati, Metro Manila.x x x xxx xxx
2. 6. Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi
Arabian government, the Indonesian authorities agreed to deport
Thamer and Allah after two weeks of detention. Eventually, they
were again put in service by defendant SAUDIA. In September 1990,
defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.
3. 7. On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta
incident was already behind her, her superiors requested her to see Mr. Ali
Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
When she saw him, he brought her to the police station where the
police took her passport and questioned her about the Jakarta
incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police put pressure on
her to make a statement dropping the case against Thamer and
Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did the police return her
passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon flight out of
Jeddah.
4. 8. One year and a half later or on June 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia, a few minutes before the departure of her flight to Manila,
plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane and instead ordered to
take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Meniewy, the Chief Legal
:
Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA
office brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a
document written in Arabic. They told her that this was necessary
to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it
________________
37
Memorandum for Private Respondent, p. 9, rollo, p. 190.
38 Records, pp. 65-71.
484

turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before the court on
June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
1. 9. Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report

to Jeddah once again and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for further
investigation. Plaintiff did so after receiving assurance from SAUDIA’s
Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, that the investigation was routinary
and that it posed no danger to her.
2. 10. In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same
Saudi court on June 27, 1993. Nothing happened then but on June
28, 1993, a Saudi judge interrogated plaintiff through an interpreter
about the Jakarta incident. After one hour of interrogation, they let
her go. At the airport, however, just as her plane was about to take
off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the airline had forbidden her to
take that flight. At the Inflight Service Office where she was told to
go, the secretary of Mr. Yahya Saddick took away her passport and
:
told her to remain in Jeddah, at the crew quarters, until further
orders.
3. 11. On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff
to the same court where the judge, to her astonishment and shock,
rendered a decision, translated to her in English, sentencing her to
five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did she
realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer
and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff
guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing, and listening to
the music in violation of Islamic laws; (3) socializing with the male
crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.
4. 12. Because SAUDIA refused to lend her a hand in the case, plaintiff
sought the help of the Philippine Embassy in Jeddah. The latter helped
her pursue an appeal from the decision of the court. To pay for her
upkeep, she worked on the domestic flights of defendant SAUDIA
while, ironically, Thamer and Allah freely served the international
flights.”39
Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a

foreign element, we agree with petitioner that the problem herein could
present a “conflicts” case.
A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the
diverse laws of two or more states is said to
________________
39 Supra, note 17, pp. 65-68.
485
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998 485

:
contain a “foreign element.” The presence of a foreign element is

inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals and
associations are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth or
conception.40
The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many.41 The
foreign element may simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to
a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract
between nationals of one State involves properties situated in another
State. In other cases, the foreign element may assume a complex form.42
In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private
respondent Morada is a resident Philippine national, and that petitioner
SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the
employment of Morada with the petitioner SAUDIA as a flight
stewardess, events did transpire during her many occasions of travel
across national borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a “conflicts” situation to arise.
We thus find private respondent’s assertion that the case is purely

domestic, imprecise. A conflicts problem presents itself here, and the
question of jurisdiction43 confronts the court a quo.
After a careful study of the private respondent’s Amended Complaint,44

and the Comment thereon, we note that she aptly predicated her cause
of action on Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code.
On one hand, Article 19 of the New Civil Code provides:
________________
:
40 Salonga, Private International Law, 1995 edition, p. 3.
41
Ibid., citing Cheshire and North, Private International Law, p. 5 by P.M.
North and J.J. Faucett (Butterworths; London, 1992).
42 Ibid.
43
Paras, Philippine Conflict of Laws, sixth edition (1984), p. 24, citing
Leflar, The Law of Conflict of Laws, pp. 5-6.
44 Supra, note 17.
486

“Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith.”
On the other hand, Article 21 of the New Civil Code provides:
“Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for damages.”
Thus, in Philippine National Bank (PNB) vs. Court of Appeals,45 this Court
held that:
“The aforecited provisions on human relations were intended to expand

the concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
:
human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes.”
Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives

flesh to its provisions. Thus, we agree with private respondent’s
assertion that violations of Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with
judicially enforceable remedies in the municipal forum.
Based on the allegations46 in the Amended Complaint, read in the light

of the Rules of Court on jurisdiction47 we find that the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the suit.48 Its authority
________________
45
83 SCRA 237, 247.
46Supra, note 17, at p. 6. Morada prays that judgment be rendered

against SAUDIA, ordering it to pay: (1) not less than P250,000.00 as
actual damages; (2) P4 million in moral damages; (3) P500,000.00 in
exemplary damages; and (4) P500,000.00 in attorney’s fees.
47 Baguioro v. Barrios, 77 Phil. 120.
48Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is defined

as the authority of a court to hear and decide cases of the
487
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998 487

to try and hear the case is provided for under Section 1 of Republic Act
No. 7691, to wit:
:
“Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as
the “Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,” is hereby amended to read
as follows:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall exercise

exclusive jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(8) In all other cases in which demand, exclusive of interest, damages of

whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and cost or the value
of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the
demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00). (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
And following Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court—the

venue, Quezon City, is appropriate:
“SEC. 2. Venue in Courts of First Instance.—[Now Regional Trial Court]
(a) x x x xxx xxx
(b) Personal actions.—All other actions may be commenced and tried

where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found,
or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiff resides, at the election of the
plaintiff.”
Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also

weigh heavily in favor of the RTC Quezon City assuming jurisdiction.
Paramount is the private interest of the litigant. Enforceability of a
:
judgment if one is obtained is quite obvious. Relative advantages and
obstacles to a fair trial are equally important. Plaintiff may not, by
choice of an inconvenient forum, ‘vex,’ ‘harass,’ or ‘oppress’ the
defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon him needless expense or disturbance.
________________
general class to which the proceedings in question belong. (Reyes v.

Diaz, 73 Phil. 484, 487)
488

But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the

plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.49
Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best
to hear the case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of
the case, it would be forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek
remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where
she no longer maintains substantial connections. That would have
caused a fundamental unfairness to her.
Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary

difficulties and inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties.
The choice of forum of the plaintiff (now private respondent) should be
upheld.
Similarly, the trial court also possesses jurisdiction over the persons of
the parties herein. By filing her Complaint and Amended Complaint
:
with the trial court, private respondent has voluntarily submitted
herself to the jurisdiction of the court.
The records show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed several motions50
praying for the dismissal of Morada’s Amended Complaint. SAUDIA
also filed an Answer In Ex Abundante Cautelam dated February 20, 1995.
What is very patent and explicit from the motions filed, is that SAUDIA
prayed for other reliefs under the premises. Undeniably, petitioner
SAUDIA has effectively submitted to the trial court’s jurisdiction by
praying for the dismissal of the Amended Complaint on grounds other
than lack of jurisdiction.
________________
49Supra, note 37, p. 58, citing Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, 350 U.S. 501,
67 Sup. Ct. 839 (1947).
50
Omnibus Motion to Dismiss dated January 14, 1994; Reply (to
Plaintiff’s Opposition) dated February 19, 1994; Comment (to Plaintiff’s
Motion to Admit Amended Complaint dated June 23, 1994) dated July
20, 1994; Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint
dated June 23, 1994 under date August 11, 1994; and Motion for
Reconsideration dated September 19, 1994.
489
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998 489

As held by this Court in Republic vs. Ker and Company, Ltd.:51
“We observe that the motion to dismiss filed on April 14, 1962, aside
:
from disputing the lower court’s jurisdiction over defendant’s person,
prayed for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiff’s
cause of action has prescribed. By interposing such second ground in its
motion to dismiss, Ker and Co., Ltd. availed of an affirmative defense
on the basis of which it prayed the court to resolve controversy in its
favor. For the court to validly decide the said plea of defendant Ker &
Co., Ltd., it necessarily had to acquire jurisdiction upon the latter’s
person, who, being the proponent of the affirmative defense, should be
deemed to have abandoned its special appearance and voluntarily
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court.”
Similarly, the case of De Midgely vs. Ferandos, held that:
“When the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the

jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and
separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. If his
motion is for any other purpose than to object to the jurisdiction of the
court over his person, he thereby submits himself to the jurisdiction of
the court. A special appearance by motion made for the purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person will be held to
be a general appearance, if the party in said motion should, for
example, ask for a dismissal of the action upon the further ground that
the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter.”52
Clearly, petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial

Court of Quezon City. Thus, we find that the trial court has jurisdiction
over the case and that its exercise thereof, justified.
As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems

seek to answer two important questions: (1) What legal system should
control a given situation where
:
________________
51
18 SCRA 207, 213-214.
52
64 SCRA 23, 31.
490

some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2) to
what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation.53
Several theories have been propounded in order to identify the legal

system that should ultimately control. Although ideally, all choice-of-
law theories should intrinsically advance both notions of justice and
predictability, they do not always do so. The forum is then faced with
the problem of deciding which of these two important values should be
stressed.54
Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under

what category a certain set of facts or rules fall. This process is known as
“characterization,” or the “doctrine of qualification.” It is the “process
of deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question
specified in a conflicts rule.”55 The purpose of “characterization” is to
enable the forum to select the proper law.56
Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual
situation, event, or operative fact.57 An essential element of conflict
rules is the indication of a “test” or “connecting factor” or “point of
contact.” Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship
:
(such as property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or point
of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place
of performance, or the place of wrongdoing.58
Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the

possible test for the determination of the applica-
________________
53
Coquia and Pangalangan, Conflict of Laws, 1995 edition, p. 65, citing
Von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 Cornell L.
Rev. 927 (1975).
54 Ibid.
55
Supra, note 40 at p. 94, citing Falconbridge, Essays on the Conflict of
Laws, p. 50.
56
Ibid.
57
Supra, note 37 at p. 136; cf. Mussbaum, Principle of Private International
Law, p. 173; and Rabel, The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study, pp. 51-
52.
58
Supra, note 37, p. 137.
491
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998 491

ble law.59 These “test factors” or “points of contact” or “connecting

factors” could be any of the following:
:
1. “(1) the nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his
place of sojourn, or his origin;
2. (2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;
3. (3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is
deemed to be situated. In particular, the lex situs is decisive when
real rights are involved;
4. (4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place
where a contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a
tort committed. The lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts
and torts;
5. (5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the
place of performance of contractual duties, or the place where a
power of attorney is to be exercised;
6. (6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should
govern their agreement, the lex loci intentionis;
7. (7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are
instituted or done. The lex fori—the law of the forum—is
particularly important because, as we have seen earlier, matters of
‘procedure’ not going to the substance of the claim involved are
governed by it; and because the lex fori applies whenever the
content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from
application in a given case for the reason that it falls under one of
the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and
8. (8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically
all legal relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as
such. It also covers contractual relationships particularly contracts
of affreightment.”60 (Italics ours.)
After a careful study of the pleadings on record, including allegations in

the Amended Complaint deemed admitted for purposes of the motion
:
to dismiss, we are convinced that there is reasonable basis for private
respondent’s assertion that
________________
59
Ibid.
60
Supra, note 37 at pp. 138-139.
492

although she was already working in Manila, petitioner brought her to

Jeddah on the pretense that she would merely testify in an investigation
of the charges she made against the two SAUDIA crew members for the
attack on her person while they were in Jakarta. As it turned out, she
was the one made to face trial for very serious charges, including
adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition.
There is likewise logical basis on record for the claim that the “handing
over” or “turning over” of the person of private respondent to Jeddah
officials, petitioner may have acted beyond its duties as employer.
Petitioner’s purported act contributed to and amplified or even
proximately caused additional humiliation, misery and suffering of
private respondent. Petitioner thereby allegedly facilitated the arrest,
detention and prosecution of private respondent under the guise of
petitioner’s authority as employer, taking advantage of the trust,
confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As purportedly found by the
Prince of Makkah, the alleged conviction and imprisonment of private
respondent was wrongful. But these capped the injury or harm
:
allegedly inflicted upon her person and reputation, for which petitioner
could be liable as claimed, to provide compensation or redress for the
wrongs done, once duly proven.
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts,
the “connecting factor” or “point of contact” could be the place or
places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And
applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the
Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the
alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the
Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a
Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly
believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the
performance of its duties, “act with justice, give her her due and
observe honesty and good faith.” Instead, petitioner failed to protect
her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly
occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our view what is
important here is the place where the
493
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998 493

over-all harm or the totality of the alleged injury to the person,

reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had
lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein private respondent). All
told, it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the situs of the
alleged tort.
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci
:
delicti commissi, modern theories and rules on tort liability61 have been
advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches to arrive at just results. In
keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort liability, we find here
an occasion to apply the “State of the most significant relationship” rule,
which in our view should be appropriate to apply now, given the
factual context of this case.
In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most
significant relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into
account and evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue: (a) the place where the injury occurred;
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the
domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties; and (d) the place where the relationship, if any,
between the parties is centered.62
As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that overall injury
occurred and lodged in the Philippines. There is likewise no question
that private respondent is a resident Filipina national, working with
petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged here in the business
of international air carriage. Thus, the “relationship” between the
parties was centered here, although it should be stressed that this suit is
not based on mere labor law violations. From the record, the claim that
the Philippines has the most significant contact
________________
61Includes the (1) German rule of elective concurrence; (2) “State of the
most significant relationship” rule (the Second Restatement of 1969); (3)
State-interest analysis; and (4) Caver’s Principle of Preference.
:
62
Supra, note 37, p. 396.
494

with the matter in this dispute,63 raised by private respondent as

plaintiff below against defendant (herein petitioner), in our view, has
been properly established.
Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of the tort
complained of and the place “having the most interest in the problem,”
we find, by way of recapitulation, that the Philippine law on tort
liability should have paramount application to and control in the
resolution of the legal issues arising out of this case. Further, we hold
that the respondent Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter of the complaint; the appropriate venue is
in Quezon City, which could properly apply Philip-pine law. Moreover,
we find untenable petitioner’s insistence that “[s]ince private
respondent instituted this suit, she has the burden of pleading and
proving the applicable Saudi law on the matter.”64 As aptly said by
private respondent, she has “no obligation to plead and prove the law
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since her cause of action is based on
Articles 19 and 21” of the Civil Code of the Philippines. In her
Amended Complaint and subsequent pleadings, she never alleged that
Saudi law should govern this case.65 And as correctly held by the
respondent appellate court, “considering that it was the petitioner who
was invoking the applicability of the law of Saudi Arabia, then the
burden was on it [petitioner] to plead and to establish what the law of
Saudi Arabia is.”66
:
Lastly, no error could be imputed to the respondent appellate court in
upholding the trial court’s denial of defendant’s (herein petitioner’s)
motion to dismiss the case. Not only was jurisdiction in order and
venue properly laid, but appeal after trial was obviously available, and
expeditious trial itself indicated by the nature of the case at hand.
Indubitably, the
________________
63
Supra, note 59, p. 79, citing Ruben v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288, 305,
113 N.E. 2d 424, 431.
64
Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 22; rollo, p. 170.
65
Memorandum for Private Respondent, pp. 21-22; rollo, pp. 202-203.
66 CA Decision, p. 10; rollo, p. 97.
495
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998 495

Philippines is the state intimately concerned with the ultimate outcome

of the case below, not just for the benefit of all the litigants, but also for
the vindication of the country’s system of law and justice in a
transnational setting. With these guidelines in mind, the trial court must
proceed to try and adjudge the case in the light of relevant Philippine
law, with due consideration of the foreign element or elements
involved. Nothing said herein, of course, should be construed as
prejudging the results of the case in any manner whatsoever.
:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED
Civil Case No. Q-93-18394 entitled “Milagros P. Morada vs. Saudi
Arabia Airlines” is hereby REMANDED to Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 89 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed, Civil Case No. Q-93-18394 remanded to lower court.
Notes.—Forum-shopping originated as a concept in private

international law, where non-resident litigants are given the option to
choose the forum or place wherein to bring their suit for various reasons
or excuses, including to secure procedural advantages, to annoy and
harass the defendant, to avoid overcrowded dockets, or to select a more
friendly venue. (First Philippine International Bank vs. Court of Appeals,
252 SCRA 259 [1996])
After having acquired jurisdiction over a plaintiff foreign corporation

by virtue of the filing of the original complaint, the Philippine court
now has the discretion, based on the facts of the case, to either give due
course to the suit or dismiss it, on the principle of forum non
conveniens. (Communication Materials and Design, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 260 SCRA 673 [1996])
——o0o——
496

Everett Steamship Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
:
G.R. No. 122494. October 8, 1998.*
EVERETT STEAMSHIP CORPORATION,

petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
HERNANDEZ TRADING CO., INC.,
respondents.
Common Carriers; Contracts; Bills of Lading; A stipulation in the bill of lading
limiting the common carrier’s liability for loss or destruction of a cargo to a
certain sum, unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value, is sanctioned
by law.—A stipulation in the bill of lading limiting the common carrier’s
liability for loss or destruction of a cargo to a certain sum, unless the
shipper or owner declares a greater value, is sanctioned by law,
particularly Articles 1749 and 1750 of the Civil Code.
Same; Same; Same; Contracts of Adhesion; Contracts of adhe-L; sion are not
invalid per se.—The trial court’s ratiocination that private respondent
could not have “fairly and freely” agreed to the limited liability clause
in the bill of lading because the said conditions were printed in small
letters does not make the bill of lading invalid. We ruled in PAL, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals that the “juris-prudence on the matter reveals the
consistent holding of the court that contracts of adhesion are not invalid
per se and that it has on numerous occasions upheld the binding effect
thereof.” Also, in Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Sweet
Lines, Inc. this Court, speaking through the learned Justice Florenz D.
Re-galado, held: “x x x Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals, et al., instructs us
that ‘contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready-made form
of contract on the other x x x are contracts not entirely prohibited. The
one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he
:
adheres he gives his consent.’ In the present case, not even an allegation of
ignorance of a party excuses non-compliance with the contractual stipulations
since the responsibility for ensuring full comprehension of the provisions of a
contract of carriage devolves not on the carrier but on the owner, shipper, or
consignee as the case may be.” (Emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Same; Greater vigilance is required of the courts when
dealing with contracts of adhesion in that the said con-
________________
* SECOND DIVISION.
497
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998 497

tracts must be carefully scrutinized “in order to shield the unwary (or weaker
party) from deceptive schemes contained in ready-made contracts.”—Greater
vigilance, however, is required of the courts when dealing with
contracts of adhesion in that the said contracts must be carefully
scrutinized “in order to shield the unwary (or weaker party) from
deceptive schemes contained in ready-made covenants,” such as the bill
of lading in question. The stringent requirement which the courts are
enjoined to observe is in recognition of Article 24 of the Civil Code
which mandates that “(i)n all contractual, property or other relations,
when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral
dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other
handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.”
Same; Same; Same; Even if the consignee is not a signatory to the contract of
:
carriage between the shipper and the carrier, the consignee can still be bound by
the contract.—The next issue to be resolved is whether or not private
respondent, as consignee, who is not a signatory to the bill of lading is
bound by the stipulations thereof. Again, in Sea-Land Service, Inc. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court (supra), we held that even if the consignee
was not a signatory to the contract of carriage between the shipper and
the carrier, the consignee can still be bound by the contract. Speaking
through Mr. Chief Justice Narvasa, we ruled: “To begin with, there is no
question of the right, in principle, of a consignee in a bill of lading to
recover from the carrier or shipper for loss of, or damage to goods being
transported under said bill, although that document may have been—as in
practice it oftentimes is—drawn up only by the consignor and the carrier
without the intervention of the consignee. x x x.
Same; Same; Same; When the consignee formally claims reimbursement for the
missing goods from the common carrier and subsequently files a case against
the latter based on the very same bill of lading, it accepts the provisions of the
contract and thereby makes itself a party thereto.—When private respondent
formally claimed reimbursement for the missing goods from petitioner
and subsequently filed a case against the latter based on the very same
bill of lading, it (private respondent) accepted the provisions of the
contract and thereby made itself a party thereto, or at least has come to
court to enforce it. Thus, private respondent cannot now reject or
disregard the carrier’s limited liability stipulation in the bill of lading.
In
498

:
other words, private respondent is bound by the whole stipulations in
the bill of lading and must respect the same.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Soo, Gutierrez, Leogardo & Lee for petitioner.
Atilano Huaben B. Lim for private respondent.
MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioner Everett Steamship Corporation, through this petition for

review, seeks the reversal of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated
June 14, 1995, in CA-G.R. No. 428093, which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 126, in Civil Case No. C-
15532, finding petitioner liable to private respondent Hernan-dez
Trading Co., Inc. for the value of the lost cargo.
Private respondent imported three crates of bus spare parts marked as

MARCO C/No. 12, MARCO C/No. 13 and MARCO C/No. 14, from its
supplier, Maruman Trading Company, Ltd. (Maruman Trading), a
foreign corporation based in Inazawa, Aichi, Japan. The crates were
shipped from Nagoya, Japan to Manila on board
“ADELFAEVERETTE,” a vessel owned by petitioner’s principal,
Everett Orient Lines. The said crates were covered by Bill of Lading No.
NGO53MN.
Upon arrival of the port of Manila, it was discovered that the crate
marked MARCO C/No. 14 was missing. This was confirmed and
admitted by petitioner in its letter of January 13, 1992 addressed to
:
private respondent, which thereafter made a formal claim upon
petitioner for the value of the lost cargo amounting to One Million Five
Hundred Fifty Two
________________
1
Penned by Justice Pacita Canizares-Nye and concurred in by Justices
Conchita Carpio-Morales and Antonio P. Solano; Rollo, pp. 33-40.
499
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998 499

Thousand Five Hundred (¥1,552,500.00) Yen, the amount shown in an

Invoice No. MTM-941, dated November 14, 1991. However, petitioner
offered to pay only One Hundred Thousand (¥100,000.00) Yen, the
maximum amount stipulated under Clause 18 of the covering bill of
lading which limits the liability of petitioner.
Private respondent rejected the offer and thereafter instituted a suit for
collection docketed as Civil Case No. C-15532, against petitioner before
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 126.
At the pre-trial conference, both parties manifested that they have no

testimonial evidence to offer and agreed instead to file their respective
memoranda.
On July 16, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment2 in favor of private
respondent, ordering petitioner to pay: (a) ¥1,552,500.00; (b) ¥20,000.00
or its peso equivalent representing the actual value of the lost cargo and
the material and packaging cost; (c) 10% of the total amount as an
:
award for and as contingent attorney’s fees; and (d) to pay the cost of
the suit. The trial court ruled:
“Considering defendant’s categorical admission of loss and its failure to

overcome the presumption of negligence and fault, the Court
conclusively finds defendant liable to the plaintiff. The next point of
inquiry the Court wants to resolve is the extent of the liability of the
defendant. As stated earlier, plaintiff contends that defendant should be
held liable for the whole value for the loss of the goods in the amount of
¥1,552,500.00 because the terms appearing at the back of the bill of
lading was so written in fine prints and that the same was not signed by
plaintiff or shipper thus, they are not bound by the clause stated in
paragraph 18 of the bill of lading. On the other hand, defendant merely
admitted that it lost the shipment but shall be liable only up to the
amount of ¥100,000.00.
“The Court subscribes to the provisions of Article 1750 of the New Civil
Code—
Art. 1750. ‘A contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by the
owner or shipper for the loss, destruction or de-
________________
2
Penned by Judge Oscar M. Payawal, Rollo, pp. 43-50.
500

terioration of the goods is valid, if it is reasonable and just under the

:
circumstances, and has been fairly and freely agreed upon.’
“It is required, however, that the contract must be reasonable and just
under the circumstances and has been fairly and freely agreed upon.
The requirements provided in Art. 1750 of the New Civil Code must be
complied with before a common carrier can claim a limitation of its
pecuniary liability in case of loss, destruction of deterioration of the
goods it has undertaken to transport.
“In the case at bar, the Court is of the view that the requirements of said
article have not been met. The fact that those conditions are printed at
the back of the bill of lading in letters so small that they are hard to read
would not warrant the presumption that the plaintiff or its supplier was
aware of these conditions such that he had “fairly and freely agreed” to
these conditions. It can not be said that the plaintiff had actually entered
into a contract with the defendant, embodying the conditions as printed
at the back of the bill of lading that was issued by the defendant to
plaintiff.”
On appeal, the Court of Appeals deleted the award of attorney’s fees

but affirmed the trial court’s findings with the additional observation
that private respondent can not be bound by the terms and conditions
of the bill of lading because it was not privy to the contract of carriage.
It said:
“As to the amount of liability, no evidence appears on record to show

that the appellee (Hernandez Trading Co.) consented to the terms of the
Bill of Lading. The shipper named in the Bill of Lading is Maruman
Trading Co., Ltd. whom the appellant (Everett Steamship Corp.)
contracted with for the transportation of the lost goods.
:
“Even assuming arguendo that the shipper Maruman Trading Co., Ltd.
accepted the terms of the bill of lading when it delivered the cargo to
the appellant, still it does not necessarily follow that appellee
Hernandez Trading Company as consignee is bound thereby
considering that the latter was never privy to the shipping contract.
xxx xxx xxx
“Never having entered into a contract with the appellant, appellee

should therefore not be bound by any of the terms and conditions in the
bill of lading.
501
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998 501

“Hence, it follows that the appellee may recover the full value of the
shipment lost, the basis of which is not the breach of contract as
appellee was never a privy to the any contract with the appellant, but is
based on Article 1735 of the New Civil Code, there being no evidence to
prove satisfactorily that the appellant has overcome the presumption of
negligence provided for in the law.”
Petitioner now comes to us arguing that the Court of Appeals erred (1)
in ruling that the consent of the consignee to the terms and conditions
of the bill of lading is necessary to make such stipulations binding upon
it; (2) in holding that the carrier’s limited package liability as stipulated
in the bill of lading does not apply in the instant case; and (3) in
allowing private respondent to fully recover the full alleged value of its
lost cargo.
:
We shall first resolve the validity of the limited liability clause in the bill
of lading.
A stipulation in the bill of lading limiting the common carrier’s liability

for loss or destruction of a cargo to a certain sum, unless the shipper or
owner declares a greater value, is sanctioned by law, particularly
Articles 1749 and 1750 of the Civil Code which provide:
“ART. 1749. A stipulation that the common carrier’s liabilityis limited to

the value of the goods appearing in the bill of lading,unless the shipper
or owner declares a greater value, is binding.”
“ART. 1750. A contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by the
owner or shipper for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods
is valid, if it is reasonable and just under the circumstances, and has
been freely and fairly agreed upon.”
Such limited-liability clause has also been consistently upheld by this

Court in a number of cases.3 Thus, in Sea-Land
________________
3St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. vs. Macondray & Co., 70 SCRA
122 [1976]; Sea Land Services, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 153
SCRA 552 [1987]; Pan American World Airways, Inc. vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 164 SCRA 268 [1988]; Phil. Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 255 SCRA 63 [1996].
502

:
Service, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,4 we ruled:
“It seems clear that even if said section 4 (5) of the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act did not exist, the validity and binding effect of the liability
limitation clause in the bill of lading here are nevertheless fully
sustainable on the basis alone of the cited Civil Code Provisions. That
said stipulation is just and reasonable is arguable from the fact that it
echoes Art. 1750 itself in providing a limit to liability only if a greater
value is not declared for the shipment in the bill of lading. To hold
otherwise would amount to questioning the justness and fairness of the
law itself, and this the private respondent does not pretend to do. But
over and above that consideration, the just and reasonable character of
such stipulation is implicit in it giving the shipper or owner the option
of avoiding accrual of liability limitation by the simple and surely far
from onerous expedient of declaring the nature and value of the
shipment in the bill of lading.”
Pursuant to the afore-quoted provisions of law, it is required that the

stipulation limiting the common carrier’s liability for loss must be
“reasonable and just under the circumstances, and has been freely and
fairly agreed upon.”
The bill of lading subject of the present controversy specifically

provides, among others:
“18. All claims for which the carrier may be liable shall be adjusted and
settled on the basis of the shipper’s net invoice cost plus freight and
insurance premiums, if paid, and in no event shall the carrier be liable
for any loss of possible profits or any consequential loss.
“The carrier shall not be liable for any loss of or any damage to or in
:
any connection with, goods in an amount exceeding One Hundred
Thousand Yen in Japanese Currency (¥100,000.00) or its equivalent in
any other currency per package or customary freight unit (whichever is
least) unless the value of the goods higher than this amount is declared in
writing by the shipper before receipt of the goods by the carrier and inserted in
the Bill of Lading and extra freight is paid as required.” (Emphasis supplied)
________________
4
153 SCRA 552 [1987].
503
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998 503

The above stipulations are, to our mind, reasonable and just. In the bill
of lading, the carrier made it clear that its liability would only be up to
One Hundred Thousand (¥100,000.00) Yen. However, the shipper,
Maruman Trading, had the option to declare a higher valuation if the value of
its cargo was higher than the limited liability of the carrier. Considering that
the shipper did not declare a higher valuation, it had itself to blame for not
complying with the stipulations.
The trial court’s ratiocination that private respondent could not have
‘‘fairly and freely’’ agreed to the limited liability clause in the bill of
lading because the said conditions were printed in small letters does not
make the bill of lading invalid.
We ruled in PAL, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals 5 that the “jurisprudence on the
matter reveals the consistent holding of the court that contracts of
adhesion are not invalid per se and that it has on numerous occasions
:
upheld the binding effect thereof.” Also, in Philippine American General
Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Sweet Lines, Inc. 6 this Court, speaking through the
learned Justice Florenz D. Regalado, held:
“x x x Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals, et al., instructs us that ‘contracts of

adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready-made form of contract on
the other x x x are contracts not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres
to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres he gives his
consent.’ In the present case, not even an allegation of ignorance of a party
excuses non-compliance with the contractual stipulations since the
responsibility for ensuring full comprehension of the provisions of a contract of
carriage devolves not on the carrier but on the owner, shipper, or consignee as
the case may be.” (Emphasis supplied)
It was further explained in Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals 7 that

stipulations in contracts of adhesion are valid and binding.
________________
5
255 SCRA 48, 58 [1996].
6 212 SCRA 194, 212-213 [1992].
791 SCRA 223 [1979]; Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 255
SCRA 63 [1996].
504

“While it may be true that petitioner had not signed the plane ticket x x,
:
he is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. ‘Such provisions
have been held to be a part of the contract of carriage, and valid and
binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter’s lack of knowledge
or assent to the regulation.’ It is what is known as a contract of
‘adhesion,’ in regards which it has been said that contracts of adhesion
wherein one party imposes a ready-made form of contract on the other,
as the plane ticket in the case at bar, are contracts not entirely
prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to
reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his consent. x x x, a contract
limiting liability upon an agreed valuation does not offend against the policy of
the law forbidding one from contracting against his own negligence.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Greater vigilance, however, is required of the courts when dealing with

contracts of adhesion in that the said contracts must be carefully
scrutinized “in order to shield the unwary (or weaker party) from
deceptive schemes contained in ready-made covenants,”8 such as the
bill of lading in question. The stringent requirement which the courts
are enjoined to observe is in recognition of Article 24 of the Civil Code
which mandates that “(i)n all contractual, property or other relations,
when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral
dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other
handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.”
The shipper, Maruman Trading, we assume, has been extensively

engaged in the trading business. It can not be said to be ignorant of the
business transactions it entered into involving the shipment of its goods
to its customers. The shipper could not have known, or should know
the stipulations in the bill of lading and there it should have declared a
higher valuation of the goods shipped. Moreover, Maruman Trading
:
has not been heard to complain that it has been deceived or
________________
8
Ayala Corporation vs. Ray Burton Development Corporation, G.R. No.
126699, August 7, 1998. See also Qua Chee Gan vs. Law Union and Rock
Insurance Co., Ltd., 98 Phil. 95 [1955].
505
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998 505

rushed into agreeing to ship the cargo in petitioner’s vessel. In fact, it

was not even impleaded in this case.
The next issue to be resolved is whether or not private respondent, as

consignee, who is not a signatory to the bill of lading is bound by the
stipulations thereof.
Again, in Sea-Land Service, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (supra), we

held that even if the consignee was not a signatory to the contract of
carriage between the shipper and the carrier, the consignee can still be
bound by the contract. Speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Narvasa, we
ruled:
“To begin with, there is no question of the right, in principle, of a

consignee in a bill of lading to recover from the carrier or shipper for loss
of, or damage to goods being transported under said bill, although that
document may have been—as in practice it oftentimes is—drawn up only by
the consignor and the carrier without the intervention of the consignee. x x x.
:
‘x x x the right of a party in the same situation as respondent here, to recover
for loss of a shipment consigned to him under a bill of lading drawn up only by
and between the shipper and the carrier, springs from either a relation of
agency that may exist between him and the shipper or consignor, or his status
as stranger in whose favor some stipulation is made in said contract, and who
becomes a party thereto when he demands fulfillment of that stipulation, in this
case the delivery of the goods or cargo shipped. In neither capacity can he assert
personally, in bar to any provision of the bill of lading, the alleged circumstance
that fair and free agreement to such provision was vitiated by its being in such
fine print as to be hardly readable. Parenthetically, it may be observed that
in one comparatively recent case (Phoenix Assurance Company vs.
Macondray & Co., Inc., 64 SCRA 15) where this Court found that a
similar package limitation clause was “printed in the smallest type on the back
of the bill of lading,” it nonetheless ruled that the consignee was bound thereby
on the strength of authority holding that such provisions on liability limitation
are as much a part of a bill of lading as though physically in it and as though
placed therein by agreement of the parties.
There can, therefore, be no doubt or equivocation about the validity and

enforceability of freely-agreed-upon stipulations in a contract of
carriage or bill of lading limiting the liability of the carrier to an agreed
valuation unless the shipper declares a higher value
506

and inserts it into said contract or bill. This proposition, moreover, rests
upon an almost uniform weight of authority.” (Italics supplied)
:
When private respondent formally claimed reimbursement for the
missing goods from petitioner and subsequently filed a case against the
latter based on the very same bill of lading, it (private respondent)
accepted the provisions of the contract and thereby made itself a party
thereto, or at least has come to court to enforce it.9 Thus, private
respondent cannot now reject or disregard the carrier’s limited liability
stipulation in the bill of lading. In other words, private respondent is
bound by the whole stipulations in the bill of lading and must respect
the same.
Private respondent, however, insists that the carrier should be liable for
the full value of the lost cargo in the amount of ¥1,552,500.00,
considering that the shipper, Maruman Trading, had “fully declared the
shipment x x x, the contents of each crate, the dimensions, weight and
value of the contents,”10 as shown in the commercial Invoice No. MTM-
941.
This claim was denied by petitioner, contending that it did not know of
the contents, quantity and value of “the shipment which consisted of
three pre-packed crates described in Bill of Lading No. NGO-53MN
merely as ‘3 CASES SPARE PARTS.’ ”11
The bill of lading in question confirms petitioner’s contention. To defeat

the carrier’s limited liability, the aforecited Clause 18 of the bill of lading
requires that the shipper should have declared in writing a higher
valuation of its goods before receipt thereof by the carrier and insert the
said declaration in the bill of lading, with the extra freight paid. These
requirements in the bill of lading were never complied with by the
shipper, hence, the liability of the carrier under the limited liability
clause stands. The commercial Invoice No. MTM-
:
________________
9
See Mendoza vs. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 90 Phil. 836, 845-846.
10
Rollo, p. 116.
11
Rollo, p. 13.
507
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998 507

941 does not in itself sufficiently and convincingly show that petitioner
has knowledge of the value of the cargo as contended by private
respondent. No other evidence was proffered by private respondent to
support its contention. Thus, we are convinced that petitioner should be
liable for the full value of the lost cargo.
In fine, the liability of petitioner for the loss of the cargo is limited to
One Hundred Thousand (¥100,000.00) Yen, pursuant to Clause 18 of the
bill of lading.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 14, 1995
in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 42803 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Actg. C.J.), Melo, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed and set aside.
Notes.—Parties to sales contracts and/or bills of lading are bound by

:
arbitration clauses thereat. (Puromines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 220
SCRA 281 [1993])
The validity of provisions limiting the liability of carriers contained in

bills of lading have been consistently upheld, though the Supreme
Court has likewise cautioned against blind reliance on adhesion
contracts where the facts and circumstances warrant that they should be
disregarded. (Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 48
[1996])
A contract of adhesion is one in which one of the contracting parties

imposes a ready-made form of contract which the other party may
accept or reject, but cannot modify. (Polotan, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, 296
SCRA 247 [1998])
——o0o——
508
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Everett Steamship v. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 496, G.R. No. 122494, October 8, 1998

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SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES,

petitioner, vs. COURT OF

G.R. No. 122191. October 8, 1998.*

Conflict of Laws; Actions; Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish

470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to its

Same; Same; A party effectively submits to the trial court’s jurisdiction by

VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998 471

reliefs under the premises. Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA has

Same; Choice-of-law problems seek to answer two important questions: (1)

Same; Although ideally, all choice-of-law theories should intrinsically advance

Same; Characterization or Doctrine of Qualification; Words and Phrases;

Same; Same; An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a “test”

472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ship (such as property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or

VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998 473

had lodged.—Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one

474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

paramount application to and control in the resolution of the legal issues

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for petitioner.

VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998 475

Padilla, Jimenez, Kintanar & Asuncion Law Offices for private

This petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

“On January 21, 1988 defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a Flight

On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, plaintiff

5Issued by respondent Judge Hon. Rodolfo A. Ortiz of Branch 89,

7 Annex “B,” PETITION, October 13, 1995; rollo, p. 40.

476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later, several SAUDIA

Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian

VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998 477

Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to

In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi

On July 3, 1993, a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the

Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her employer,

Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed

10 Decision, pp. 2-4; see rollo, pp. 89-91.

terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being informed of

On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint13 for damages

On January 19, 1994, SAUDIA filed an Omnibus Motion To Dismiss14

On February 10, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition (To Motion to

On June 23, 1994, Morada filed an Amended Complaint17 wherein Al-

From the Order of respondent Judge20 denying the Motion to Dismiss,

VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998 479

Respondent Judge subsequently issued another Order24 dated February

“Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration of defendant Saudi Arabian

Consequently, on February 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed its Petition for

480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order26

Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution with

In another Resolution28 promulgated on September 27, 1995, now

“The Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is

However, during the pendency of the instant Petition, respondent Court

VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998 481

On May 7, 1996, SAUDIA filed its Supplemental Petition for Review

Petitioner SAUDIA raised the following issues: