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Mind Over Matter- The State of Consciousness in Neuroscience

Poster · November 2018

DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.21352.72969

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Umut Altuntaş Sebastian Steiner Ekström

University of Warsaw University of Warsaw
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 Sebastian Steiner Ekström, Umut Altuntaş
University of Warsaw, Faculty of Psychology
Neuroscientific Background
In accordance with the classical neuroscientific approach, consciousness can be investigated into two main
components: awareness (e.g. being aware of one’s self and the environment) and arousal (i.e. wakefulness)
(Laureys, Owen & Schiff, 2004). Although neuroscience and case studies have provided a large body of evidence,
it is still difficult to mention certain set of brain structures “minimally sufficient” or “necessary” for consciousness
related to those components. It is important to remember that it is a highly complicated mental function. Therefore,
there are various cortical and subcortical areas related to consciousness in the brain. “Awareness“ is thought to be
provided by the functional framework of cortical areas and their connections to subcortical regions. On the other
hand, “arousal“ derives from neuron populations and their projection to corticothalamic system (Laureys et al.,
2004). It is remarkable that, cerebellar lesions have almost no effect on conscious state, despite cerebellum’s rich
structure of neural connections and neurotransmitters (Yu et. al., 2014).
In contrast to general belief, consciousness may not necessarily require awareness, therefore sensory information.
For example, dreams provide a lively conscious experience although there is no sensory information during sleep.
Moreover, clinical evidence also indicates that consciousness is independent from sensory input or motor output.
People with retinal damage suffer from blindness, however, they can still imagine and have dreams if they have
previous visual experience (Sabo & Kirtley, 1982). Additionally, certain Locked-In Syndrome patients suffer from
almost complete body immobilization, but they still preserve their conscious state (Tononi, Boly, Gosseries &
Laureys, 2016).
Sometimes people use the word “consciousness” as a verbal replacement for “awareness” in daily language,
especially in situations which involve lack of attention. Traditionally, consciousness and attention are thought to be
mutually prerequisite. However, recent studies conducted on different schools of attention showed that it can still
be present without consciousness (Tononi et al., 2016). On the other hand, deep concentration does not cause total
disconnection from the external world either. Let us consider people listening to music while studying. One can still
focus on the context and enjoy the company of music. Therefore, it is noticable that conscious state is possible
without attention too (Tononi et al., 2016).
As another important concept to mention, sleep is the only state when total deprivation of subjective experience
can be observed in healthy human subjects. It is characterized by dramatic decrease in several functions such as
physical activity, awareness or responsiveness. During early non-rapid eye movement (NREM) sleep, metabolic
activity decreases in cortical regions as well as in thalamic nuclei although primary sensory cortexes are not
completely deactivated (Tononi et. al., 2016). Moreover, a study conducted by Boly and her colleagues revealed
modification of the hierarchical organization of large-scale networks into smaller independent modules during
NREM sleep (Boly et al., 2012). On the other hand, during rapid eye movement sleep (REM), the phase of the sleep
which dreams are most vivid and frequent, corticothalamic system is almost fully active except certain regions
such as dorsolateral prefrontal cortex which considered to be a reason for reduction of voluntary control Tononi
et. al., 2016). It is remarkable that those regions are reactivated during lucid dreaming experience (Dresler et al.,
2012).
The Easy and Hard Problems of Consciousness
An aspect of consciousness which has yet to be mentioned is the enigma of subjective experience. The internal
subjective experience is one of the most familiar concepts to everyone, yet it is also one which science has had
most difficulty in explaining. Subjective experience is most easily described as the phenomenon which accompanies
functional processes, like the sensation of a color, bodily sensations or the constant stream of conscious thought
(Chalmers, 2010). David Chalmers, philosopher and primary promoter of the problem of subjective experience, also
known as the “hard” problem of consciousness, argues that it is undeniable that at least some organisms are the
subject of experience, but why and how subjective experience arises from physical processing is still unknown.
How does objective processing in the brain give rise to subjective experience and more specifically, why? It might
seem trivial, but we never expect our computer to have the same experience as we do whilst playing film,
although the computer too is conducting objective processing, similar to what our brain is doing to us. One might
argue that it is a question of the complexity and processing capacity of the brain rather than the subjective nature
of the experience. However, Chalmers argues that there is an explanatory gap between the functions (the “easy”
problem) and experience (the “hard” problem) in consciousness. For example, how come that the waveforms that
hit our retina, are processed and discriminated quantitatively by the visual system and are being experienced as
qualitatively very different experiences such as the colors red and blue? (Chalmers, 2010). The problem of
subjective experience ,therefore, seems to be a different kind of problem than that of processing and function.
Although modern neuroscience has succeeded in explaining visual pathways from sensory inputs to complex visual
processing, it has yet to explain how and why this gives rise to the experience accompanying it. Chalmers claims
that this is because experience is a fundamentally different question than that of processing, which is why
reductionist approaches of cognitive neuroscience has failed to explain it. For example, all that is needed to
explain the process of vision in the brain is the way in which waveforms of light are adapted into neural firings
and further transferred in the brain, as well as describing its represented pathways and structures. What makes
the hard problem of consciousness truly “hard” is that conscious experience goes beyond problems about
performance of functions. Chalmers agrees that it might be difficult to explain subjective experience in purely
physicalist terms, which has led to some neuroscientists to disregard the idea that subjective consciousness will
ever be explained in science. Yet, Chalmers insists that it can be, but that it requires a new approach within
science, quite different from the standard way of reductionism and explanation of functional mechanisms.
References
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Consciousness: Neurobiology and Neuropathology, 45-53. doi:10.1016/s0079-6123(05)50004-9
Baars, B. J. (2017). The Global Workspace Theory of Consciousness. The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, 227-242. doi:10.1002/9781119132363.ch16
Boly, M., Perlbarg, V., Marrelec, G., Schabus, M., Laureys, S., Doyon, J., et al., 2012. Hierarchical clustering of brain activity during human nonrapid eye movement sleep. Proc.
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Chalmers, D. J. (2010). Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness in The Character of Consciousness.(pp. 3-28) Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Casali AG, Gosseries O, Rosanova M, Boly M, Sarasso S, et al. (2013) A theoretically based index of consciousness independent of sensory processing and behavior. Science
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neurology, 138(Pt 6), e353.
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Theories of Consciousness
The Global Workspace Theory is one of the most established cognitive theories on consciousness. Baars, the creator
of GWT, metaphorically describes consciousness as a theatre, where the stage is consciousness, composed of a
specific part of working memory that can collect information from the whole brain, a global workspace. There is a
“spotlight of selective attention” that can move across the stage and highlight specific information, stimuli and
thoughts. Thus, the consciousness system, works like a funnel, selectively bringing information to our limited
conscious awareness from a seemingly vast unconscious (Baars, 1997). Although the theater metaphor might imply
there is a specific area in the brain designated as this “theater”, however the “theater” rather refers to a vast
communication network that spans across and below cortical structures (Dehaene, 2014). This network, created by
large amount of neurons that synchronise into a global network, not only relies on input- output data but seems to
be active constantly, resulting in what is called “stream of consciousness” as a flow of thoughts occasionally
seeking sensory information (Dehaene, 2014; Baars, 1997). Although GWT holds up well in modelling the function
and processes of consciousness, it fails to explain the hard problem of consciousness (Baars, 2017; Chalmers,
2010). As noted by Chalmers, nothing in the theory explains why the information in GWT is experienced, but rather
begs the question, it is experienced because it is globally accessible. (Chalmers, 2010). Therefore, GWT is as lacking
as any other reductionist theory in explaining how subjective experience emerges.
Neural Darwinism, sometimes referred to as “Dynamic Core Theory”, explains consciousness through neuronal
group selection, and holds many similarities to Global Workspace Theory (Baars, 2005). Originally developed by
Edelman in the 1970s, it has since been evolved and expanded into a theory of neural selectionism, where the
brain possesses highly adaptive selectional properties, similar to the immune system (Seth & Baars, 2005). Over
time, groups of neurons build stronger connections with other neurons providing multiple alternate pathways for
functions, creating a system known as the Dynamic Core. The process, known as degeneracy, is generated
through cell death, migration, growth of axons, but also by later mechanisms such as strengthening and weakening
of synapses. The result is a widespread, low amplitude, relatively fast interactions in the thalamocortical core of
the brain (Seth & Baars, 2005). Edelman and his colleagues argue that it is this flexibility which selectionist
systems have, that complicates simulating biological processes artificially as in instructionist and non-adaptive
systems within computers (Edelman & Gally, 2001). Subjective experience has been discussed on many occasions in
Neural Darwinism, where Edelman himself considered a scientific theory explaining the hard problem of
consciousness to be impossible. The replication of experience that both describes and explains it, would be like
“developing a theory of hurricanes that is actually windy” (Seth & Baars, 2005). However, later theories by
h
Edelman & Tononi suggest that sensations of experience accompany complex discriminations created by the
dynamic core of neural networks because of the complexity of discrimination itself. For example, the sensation of
redness is not a discrimination among a small number of colors, but rather is the state of the entire dynamic core.
The qualitative sensation is thus a consequence of the vast amount of information disclosed by the core by being in
one state out of many other possible ones. The qualitative difference between these experiences is explained as
different underlying neural systems of the dynamic core (Seth & Baars, 2005). However, Chalmers is not
convinced by the explanation, and claims that there is still no justification of why the discrimination process should
be accompanied by experience (Chalmers, 2010).
Integrated Information Theory (IIT) was first developed by Tononi in 2004, and has been developing ever since. In
contrast to previous theories presented, IIT is not based on physical systems, unlike neuroscience, but instead tries
to implement a phenomenological approach to consciousness. In order to tackle the “hard” problem of on
consciousness, IIT begins to accept the existence of consciousness as certain, and builds its theory around the basic
principles of consciousness, or axioms. From these axioms, IIT can then infer what properties of physical systems
are needed for the existence of consciousness to what degree and the particular experience each individual
system (Oizumi et al., 2014). Through mathematical postulates IIT can show how systems, based on either logic
gates or neurons, can form complexes that account for properties of consciousness, such as composition,
information and integration. One could argue that IIT is going the opposite way of Neuroscience. Rather than
answering under which circumstances neural mechanisms can give rise to consciousness, IIT asks how the
phenomenological system of consciousness can be implemented by physical mechanisms (Oizumi et al., 2014). By
operationalizing the properties of consciousness, IIT allows for direct predictions and inferences about the
consciousness of the system, e.g some simple systems can be shown to be minimally conscious, whilst some
complex systems can be shown to be unconscious. IIT has predicted and explained loss and recovery of
consciousness using information integration, which was supported by a high- density electroencephalography
(Casali et al., 2013). A strength of IIT is the width of which the theory can be implemented. IIT can be used to
measure and explain conscious mechanisms and experience in areas which would not be possible in other
techniques, such as making inferences or comparisons of the minds of animals, as well as reasoning about the
consciousness of computers, all based on its mathematical postulates (Oizumi et al., 2014). Chalmers, both a praiser
and critic of IIT, praises that IIT incorporates a new approach to solving the hard problem of consciousness by
choosing fundamentalism instead of reductionism, whilst at the same time criticising that IIT sometimes
oversimplifies consciousness in its postulates.
Conclusion
Although none of the presented theories provide a universal theory for consciousness, they provide important
pieces of information in unfolding the nature of consciousness. Global Workspace Theory provides a global access
system, the need for a “funnel” type processing that actively selects and incorporates information from the whole
brain and how consciousness itself is a separate and active processor of selecting information into one's conscious
awareness. As clinical and neuroscientific findings suggest, neither sensory info nor motor output is prerequisite for
consciousness. Moreover, several studies conducted on attention revealed that it can be present without
consciousness. Although consciousness without attention is more controversial, it is still considered to be possible to
some extent. Dreams are also conscious experiences without any specific sensory input. Additionally, Neural
Darwinism explains the need for an adaptive neural network to hold such a complex consciousness system. Without
the flexibility of such biological networks, consciousness might in fact never have been possible. There seems to be
a consensus about the role of the corticothalamic system on consciousness among researchers and clinicians, thus
one can suggest that the concept of “Dynamic Core” may be considered as a specific neuronal network lies in such
a system. Lastly, Integrated Information Theory shows consciousness as its own entity from a non-physical point of
view, explaining consciousness as a fundamental consequence of phenomenological processes. It is suggested, that
any system that has the capability to produce these phenomenological axioms of consciousness can possess
subjective experience, which opens the possibility for non-biological systems to give rise to consciousness. Although
consciousness and subjective experience are among the concepts that are the most familiar to us, it is only in the
last decades that the great mystery of all human experience has begun to unravel. Still, there are many
unanswered questions about consciousness and the nature of human subjective experience, perhaps foremostly, the
reason of its existence. However, by evaluating current theories of consciousness and research findings, one can
only conclude that given enough time, the enigma of human consciousness will be revealed.