Planas v.
COMELEC proposed by the 1971 Convention was not validly ratified in
49 SCRA 105; January 22, 1973
Ponente: Concepcion, C.J.
FACTS:
While the 1971 Constitution Convention was in session on
September 21, 1972, the president issued Proclamation No.
1081 placing the Philippines under martial law. On
November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its proposed
constitution. The next day the president issued PD No. 73
submitting to the people for ratification or rejection the
proposed constitution as well as setting the plebiscite for
said ratification. On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed
a petition to enjoin respondents from implemented PD No.
73 because the calling of the plebiscite among others is
lodged exclusively in the Congress. On December 17, 1972,
the president issued an order temporarily suspending the
effects of PD 1081 for the purpose of the free and open
debate on the proposed constitution. On December 23, the
president announced the postponement of the plebiscite, as
such, the Court refrained from deciding the cases. On
January 12, the petitioners filed for an “urgent motion”
praying that the case be decided “as soon as possible”.
ISSUES:
1.    Is the validity of PD 73 justiciable?
2.    Is PD 73 valid?
3.    Does the 1971 Constitutional Convention have the
authority to pass the proposed constitution?
HELD:
The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of PD 73 not
only because of a long list of cases decided by the Court but
also of subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935
Constitution which expressly provides for the authority of
the Court to review cases revolving such issue. The validity
of the decree itself was declared moot and academic by the
Court. The convention is free to postulate any amendment
as long as it is not inconsistent with what is known as Jus
Cogens.
Javellana v. Executive Secretary
50 SCRA 30; March 31, 1973
Ponente: Concepcion, C.J
FACTS:
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed a prohibition
case to restrain respondents from implementing any of the
provisions of the proposed constitution not found in the
present constitution. Javellana maintained that the
respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in
implementing proposed constitution and that the president
is without power to proclaim the ratification of the
constitution. Similar actions were filed by Vidal Tan,
Gerardo Roxas, among others. Petitioners pray for the
nullification of Proclamation 1102 (Citizens Assemblies) and
any order, decree, and proclamation which are similar in
their objectives.
ISSUES:
1.    Is the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 justiciable?
2.    Was the constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention ratified validly in compliance with
applicable laws?
3.    Was the proposed Constitution acquiesced by the
people?
4.    Are the petitioners entitled to relief?
5.    Is the proposed Constitution in force?
HELD:
Whether a constitutional amendment has been properly
adopted according to an existing constitution is a judicial
question as it is the absolute duty of the judiciary to
determine whether the Constitution has been amended in
the manner required by the constitution. The Constitution
accordance with Article XV section 1 of the 1935
Constitution which provides only one way for ratification
(election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and only
with qualified voters). Due to the environmental and social
conditions in the Philippines (i.e. martial law), the Court
cannot honestly say that the people acquiesced to the
proposed Constitution. The majority ruled to dismiss the
cases as the effectivity of the proposed Constitution is the
basic issue posed by the cases which considerations other
than judicial are relevant and unavoidable. The new
constitution is in force as there are not enough votes to say
otherwise.
Aquino v. Enrile
May 24, 2018
Constitutional Law. Political Law. Powers of the President.
Aquino v. Enrile
59 SCRA 183
FACTS:
The cases are all petitions for habeas corpus, the
petitioners having been arrested and detained by the
military by virtue of Proclamation 1081. The petitioners
were arrested and held pursuant to General Order No.2 of
the President “for being participants or  for having given aid
and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state
power in the country and to take over the Government by
force…” General Order No. 2 was issued by the President in
the exercise of the power he assumed by virtue of
Proclamation 1081 placing the entire country under martial
law.
ISSUES:
1) Is the existence of conditions claimed to justify the
exercise of the power to declare martial law subject to
judicial inquiry?; and
2) Is the detention of the petitioners legal in accordance
with the declaration of martial law?
HELD:
5 Justices held that the issue is a political question, hence,
not subject to judicial inquiry, while 4 Justices held that the
issue is a justiciable one. However, any inquiry by this
Court in the present cases into the constitutional sufficiency
of the factual bases for the proclamation of martial law has
become moot and academic. Implicit in the state of martial
law is the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus with respect to persons arrested or detained for acts
related to the basic objective of the proclamation, which is
to suppress invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or to
safeguard public safety against imminent danger thereof.
The preservation of society and national survival takes
precedence. The proclamation of martial law automatically
suspends the privilege of the writ as to the persons referred
to in this case.
Sanidad v. COMELEC
73 SCRA 333; October 12, 1976
Ponente: Martin, J
FACTS:
On September 27, 1976, Pablo Sanidad and Pablito Sanidad
petitioned for prohibition with preliminary injunction to
enjoin COMELEC from holding and conducting the
Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without
force and effect PD Nos. 991 and 1033, as well as PD.
1031. Petitioners contend that the president has no power
to propose amendments to the new constitution, as such,
the referendum-plebiscite has no legal basis.
ISSUE:
1.    Is the case at bar justiciable?
2.    Does the president have the authority to propose
amendments to the Constitution?
3.    Is the submission to the people of the proposed
amendments within the time frame allowed sufficient and
proper submission?
HELD:
The issue of whether the President can assume the power
of a constituent assembly is a justiciable question since it is
not the wisdom but the constitutional authority of the
president to perform such act is in question. The president
has the authority to propose amendments as the
governmental powers are generally concentrated to the
president in times of crisis. The time for deliberation of the
referendum-plebiscite questions, 3 weeks, is not too short
especially since the questions are issues of the day and the
people have been living with them since the proclamation of
martial law.
Occena vs. Commission on Elections
[GR 56350, 2 April 1981]; also Gonzales vs. National
Treasurer [GR 56404]
En Banc, Fernando (CJ): 8 concur, 1 dissents in separate
opinion, 1 on official leave
Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings
against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa
Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments, goes
further than merely assailing their alleged constitutional
infirmity. Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both
members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the
1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present
Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox
aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973
Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling
to the contrary notwithstanding.
Issue: Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in
force and effect when the Batasang Pambansa resolutions
and the present petitions were promulgated and filed,
respectively.
Held: It is much too late in the day to deny the force and
applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive
portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing
petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its
ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six
to four. It then concluded: "This being the vote of the
majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new
Constitution being considered in force and effect." Such a
statement served a useful purpose. It could even be said
that there was a need for it. It served to clear the
atmosphere. It made manifest that as of 17 January 1973,
the present Constitution came into force and effect. With
such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the
recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme
Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be
obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as
a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973
Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple as that.
What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of
judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect. As
was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black and
Murphy, the Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate.
In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts
of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity.
In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was
done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient.
The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That
is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana.
Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present
Constitution. The latest case in point is People v. Sola,
promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year
alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at least
ten cases may be cited.
Philippine Bar Association v. COMELEC
140 SCRA 455
FACTS:
A number of petitions assail the validity of B.P Blg. 883
calling for a special election for a President and Vice-
president on February 7, 1986. Marcos gave a conditional
resignation where he shall vacate the position only when a
winner has been proclaimed and qualified by taking his oath
10 days after the proclamation. Petitioners question the
validity of Marcos’ resignation as it did not create the
vacancy needed for a special election to be held and pray
for prohibition to acts in relation to B.P. Blg. 883
ISSUE:
Is the B.P Blg. 883 unconstitutional?
HELD:
The Court failed to have 10 votes to declare B.P. Blg. 883.
Unconstitutional. Whereas the original issue on B.P Blg.
883’s constitutionality, the issue has now transformed into
a political question where only the sovereign people can
decide in a fair, clean and honest election. As such, the
Court dismissed the petitions and denied their prayers of
prohibition.
People v. Perfecto
277 SCRA 268
FACTS:
About August 20, 1920, Fernando Guerrero, the Secretary
of the Philippine Senate discovered that certain documents
which constituted the records of testimony by witnesses in
the investigation of oil companies had disappeared from his
office. On September 7, 1920, the newspaper La Nacion,
edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto published an article
criticizing the Senate and its members in general. As a
result, he was charged guilty of violating Article 256 of the
Penal Code by the CFI of Manila. Petitioner filed an appeal
to the Supreme Court praying for the dismissal of the case
on the ground that said Article is no longer in force.
ISSUE:
Is Article 256 of the Penal Code still in force despite the
change of Spanish sovereignty to American sovereignty
over the Philippines?
HELD:
It is a general principle of the public law that the previous
political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated.
All laws, ordinances, and regulations in conflict with the
political character, institutions, and constitution of the new
government are at once displaced. Article 256 was enacted
to protect Spanish officials which were representatives of
the King. Such intent is contradictory to the ideology of the
new government where “In the eye of our (American)
Constitution and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler
and a freeman, and has equal rights with every other man”.
As such, Article 256 is deemed abrogated and the case is
consequently dismissed and judgment reversed.
Lambino vs.COMELEC
[G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006]
(case digest/notes)
 FACTS
Petitioners Lambino group commenced in gathering
signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution modifying Article 6 and Article 7 and adding
transitory provision. 
The proposed change will shift the present Bicameral-
Presidential System to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of
government.
They petitioned to COMELEC and had the support of 6M
individuals constuting at least 12% of all registers votes
with each legislative district represented by at least 3% of
its registered voters.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the Lambino group complied on the ground
of their acquisition?
PRINCIPLES/HELD
The phrase "directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition" - means that the draft of the
proposed constitutional amendment should be ready and
shown to the people before they sign such proposal.
Before they sign the proposal, a draft must already been
shown to them. The entire proposal on its face is a petition
by the people.
Two (2) essential elements:
1.  The people must author and thus sign the entire
proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their
behalf.
2. As an intiative upon a petition, the proposal must be
embodied in a petition.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either
written on the face of the petition or attached to it. If
attached, the petition must state such fact of attachment.
The requirement is that, the people must first see the full
text of the proposed amendments before they sign to
signify their assent, and that the people must sign on an
initiative petition that contains full text of proposed
amendments.
Rationale: It can pose a significant potential for fraud.
Purpose: To provide sufficient information so that the
registered voters can intelligently evaluate whether to sign
the initiative petition or not.
The initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing
the nature and effect of that which is proposed. Otherwise,
deceptive and misleading will render the initiative void.
Proponents bear the burden of proving that the complied
with the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures.
The Lambino group did not attach to their present petition
the copy of the paper that the people signed, they only
submitted a signature sheet, merely asking a question of
the shift.
Logrolling- when the initiative petition incorporates an
unrelated subject matter in the same petition.
Effect: To nullify the entire proposition and not only the
unrelated subject matter.
Combining multiple propositions into one proposal
constitutes "logrolling". It confuses and deceives people.
Three(3) modes of amending/revising the Constitution:
1. Congress upon vote of 3/4 of ALL its members.
2. Constitutional Convention
3. Amendments to the Constitution through People's
Initiative
The framers intended that Congress and Constitutional
Convention may propose revision to the Constitution,
however, People's Initiative may only propose
amendments.
It is a fundamental principle that a Constitution can only be
revised or amended in the manner prescribed by the
instrument itself, and that any attempt to revise a
constitution in a manner other than the one provided in the
instrument is treated as Extra-Constitutional or
Revolutionary.
Revision- broadly implies a change that alters a basic
principle in the Constitution. (E.g. altering the principles of
separation of powers or the system of checks and balances)
If the change alters the substantial entirety of the
Constitution, as when the change affects substantial
provisions of the Constitution.
Amendment- broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces
or deletes without altering the basic principle involved.
Revision, generally affects several provisions of the
Constitution.
Amendment, generally affects only the specific provision
being amended.
Two(2) part test:
1. Quantitative Test -asks whether the proposed change is
so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the
substantial entirety of the constitution by the deletion or
alteration of numerous existing provisions.
The court examines only the number of provisions affected
and does not consider the degree of change.
2. Qualitative Test- inquires into the qualitative effects of te
proposed change in the constitution.
The main inquiry is whether the change will accomplish
such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision.
Lambino's group initiative is Revision. By any legal test and
under any jurisdiction, a shift from Bicameral-Presidential to
a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving abolition of
the office of the President and chamber of Congress is
beyond doubt a Revision.
Revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions,
but also the altered principles.
De Leon v. Esguerra
153 SCRA 602
FACTS:
Alfredo De Leon was elected Barangay Captain in the
elections on May 17, 1982. On February 9, 1987, petitioner
received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986, but
signed by OIC Governor Esguerra on February 8, 1987,
designating Florentino Magno as Barangay Captain of
Barangay Dolores Taytay, Rizal. Petitioners pray that the
memorandum is null and void in accordance with Section 3
of Barangay Election Act of 1982. Petitioner further that
with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent
OIC governor no longer has authority to designate
successors and replace them.
ISSUE:
Is the dismissal order of De Leon et. Al. by respondent OIC
Governor valid?
HELD:
The constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2,
1987. By that date, the Provisional Constitution has been
superseded. As such, respondent OIC Governor could no
longer rely on Section 2 Article III of said Constitution. The
Memoranda was declared to be of no legal force and the
writ of prohibition enjoining respondents from proceeding
with the take-over was granted.
Manila Prince Hotel v GSIS (DIGEST)
 
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner v GSIS, respondent
(DIGEST)
G.R. No. 122156; February 3, 1997
TOPIC: Non-Self Executing v Self Executing Constitutional
Provisions
FACTS:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided
to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC).
In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share, and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its
hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder and the execution of the contracts, the MPHC
matched the bid price  in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a
manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, which
GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps
apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid, MPHC came to the Court on prohibition and
mandamus.
Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has
been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically
become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy
of Philippine heritage and culture.
Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of
the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and
policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires
implementing legislation(s).
ISSUE:
Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly
Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.
RULING:
Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-
executing provision.
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as
those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually
not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in
itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants
may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act
is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution
are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are
treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically
nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its
very words the provision does not require any legislation to
put it in operation.
TANADA VS. ANGARA
GR No. 118295     May 2, 1997
FACTS
The Philippines joined World Trade Organization as a
founding member with the goal of improving Philippine
access to foreign markets, especially its major trading
partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports. The
President also saw in the WTO the opening of new
opportunities for the services sector, the reduction of costs
and uncertainty associated with exporting and the
attraction of more investments into the country. On April
15, 1994, respondent Navarro, then DTI Secretary, signed
in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations. On
December 14, 1994, the Senate concurred in the ratification
of the President of the Philippines of the Agreement
Establishing the WTO which includes various agreements
and associated legal instruments. On December 16,
1994,the President signed the Instrument of Ratification.
ISSUES
1. Whether the WTO Agreement violated the mandated
economic nationalism by the Constitution
2. Whether the provisions of the WTO Agreement restricts
and impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically the
legislative power vested in the Congress
3. Whether the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement
and its annexes but not in the other documents referred to
in the Final Act is defective and insufficient and thus
constitutes abuse of discretion
RULING
1. No. The Constitution did not intend to pursue an
isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments,
goods and services in the development of the Philippine
economy. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign
competition that is unfair. The constitutional policy of a self-
reliant and independent national economy does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods
and services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion
nor mendicancy in the international community.
2. No. While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed
absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is
however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily
agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a
member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the
Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the
country from the rest of the world. By the doctrine of
incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted
principles of international law, which are considered to be
automatically part of our laws. A treaty engagement is not
a mere moral obligation on the parties. By their inherent
nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of
sovereignty. The Philippines has effectively agreed to limit
the exercise of its sovereign powers of taxation, eminent
domain and police power. The underlying consideration in
this partial sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the
other contracting states in granting the same privilege and
immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its citizens.
The same reciprocity characterizes the same commitments
under WTO-GATT. The point is that a portion of sovereignty
may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on
the rationale that the Philippines adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part  of the law
of the land and adheres to the policy of cooperation and
amity with all nations.
3. No. The petitioners submit that concurrence in the WTO
Agreement alone is flawed because it is in effect a rejection
of the Final Act. The Court held that a final act is an
instrument which records the winding up of the proceedings
of a diplomatic conference and not the treaty itself. On the
other hand, the WTO Agreement itself expresses what
multilateral agreements are deemed included as its integral
parts. It should be added that the Senate was well-aware of
what it was concurring in as shown by the member’s
deliberation.
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Kilosbayan vs. Morato (G.R. No. 118910. July
17, 1995)
25APR
KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA,
CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C.
CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO,
FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE
TAN, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO,
JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN.
FREDDIE WEBB, SEN. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, REP.
JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners,  with similar lease agreements which the PCSO could have
vs.
MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the
PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
Ponente: MENDOZA
FACTS:
[T]his suit was filed seeking to declare the ELA invalid on
the ground that it is substantially the same as the Contract
of Lease nullified in the first case [decision in G.R. No.
113375 (Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, 232 SCRA
110 (1994)) invalidating the Contract of Lease between the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the
Philippine Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC)].
Petitioners maintain (1) that the Equipment Lease
Agreement (ELA) is a different lease contract with none of
the vestiges of a joint venture which were found in the
Contract of Lease nullified in the prior case; (2) that the
ELA did not have to be submitted to a public bidding
because it fell within the exception provided in E.O. No.
301, §1 (e); (3) that the power to determine whether the
ELA is advantageous to the government is vested in the
Board of Directors of the PCSO; (4) that for lack of funds
the PCSO cannot purchase its own on-line lottery
equipment and has had to enter into a lease contract; (5)
that what petitioners are actually seeking in this suit is to
further their moral crusade and political agenda, using the
Court as their forum.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ELA between the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming Management
Corp. is invalid.
HELD:
NO. Petition for prohibition, review and/or injunction was
dismissed. Pertinent to the issue, the SC held:
xxx
(3) that the ELA is valid as a lease contract under the Civil
Code and is not contrary to the charter of the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office;
(4) that under §1(A) of its charter (R.A. 1169), the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office has authority to enter
into a contract for the holding of an on-line lottery, whether
alone or in association, collaboration or joint venture with
another party, so long as it itselfholds or conducts such
lottery; and
(5) That the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) in question
did not have to be submitted to public bidding as a
condition for its validity.
RATIO:
E.O. No. 301, §1 applies only to contracts for the purchase
of supplies, materials and equipment. It does not refer to
contracts of lease of equipment like the ELA. The provisions
on lease are found in §§ 6 and 7 but they refer to the lease
of privately-owned buildings or spaces for government use
or of government-owned buildings or spaces for private
use, and these provisions do not require public bidding. It is
thus difficult to see how E.O. No. 301 can be applied to the
ELA when the only feature of the ELA that may be thought
of as close to a contract of purchase and sale is the option
to buy given to the PCSO. An option to buy is not of course
a contract of purchase and sale.
ADVERTISEMENT
REPORT THIS AD
Indeed the question is not whether compared with the
former joint venture agreement the present lease contract
is “[more] advantageous to the government.” The question
is whether under the circumstances, the ELA is the most
advantageous contract that could be obtained compared
made with other parties. Petitioners have not shown that
more favorable terms could have been obtained by the
PCSO or that at any rate the ELA, which the PCSO
concluded with the PGMC, is disadvantageous to the
government.
OPOSA VS FACTORAN
Posted by kaye lee on 3:58 PM
G.R. No. 101083 July 30 1993
FACTS:
Forty-four children, through their parents, sought to make
the DENR Secretary stop issuing licenses to cut timber,
invoking their right to a healthful environment (Secs. 16,
15 Article II, 1987 Constitution). The petitioners further
asserted that they "represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn." They further claimed that the
Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in granting
Timber License Agreements to cover more areas for logging
than what is available.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have a cause of action to file
the case.
RULING:
Yes. the Court stated that even though the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies of the Constitution and not
under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the rights enumerated in the
latter: “[it] concerns nothing less than self-preservation and
self-perpetuation, the advancement of which may even be
said to predate all governments and constitutions”.  The
right is linked to the constitutional right to health, is
“fundamental”, “constitutionalised”, “self-executing” and G.R. No. L-18463             October 4, 1922
“judicially enforceable”. It imposes the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment. 
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellee,
The court stated that the petitioners were able to file a
vs.
class suit both for others of their generation and for
GREGORIO PERFECTOR, defendant-appellant.
succeeding generations as “the minors' assertion of their
right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time,
the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection Alfonso E. Mendoza and the appellant in behalf of the latter.
of that right for the generations to come.” Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1, Environmental
Law, Oposa vs Factoran case digest
QUA CHEE GAN v. DEPORTATION BOARD (CASE
DIGEST)
30 September 1963
GR No. L-10280 MALCOLM, J.:
TOPIC:
“People” as Inhabitants The important question is here squarely presented of
FACTS: whether article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code, punishing
The Court of First Instance denied the petition for writs of "Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or
habeas corpus, mandamus and certiorari by the petitioners. insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority
On May 12, 1952, Special Prosecutor Emilio L. Galang . . .," is still in force.
charged petitioner before the Deportation Board. The
crimes: About August 20, 1920, the Secretary of the Philippine
•Purchasing $130,000 with license from Central Bank and Senate, Fernando M. Guerrero, discovered that certain
remitted it to Hong Kong documents which constituted the records of testimony given
•Attempted bribery of Phil and US officials.  by witnesses in the investigation of oil companies, had
In effect, Deportation Board issued a warrant of arrest for disappeared from his office. Shortly thereafter, the
petitioner (E.O. No 398, series of 1951). Upon fixing of Philippine Senate, having been called into special session by
bonds, petitioner was temporarily set free. the Governor-General, the Secretary for the Senate
ISSUE/S: informed that body of the loss of the documents and of the
1. Whether or not the President has authority to deport steps taken by him to discover the guilty party. The day
aliens. following the convening of the Senate, September 7, 1920,
2. Whether or not the Deportation Board also has authority the newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto,
to file warrants of arrest. published an article reading as follows:
HELD:
1. YES
Half a month has elapsed since the discovery, for
Section 69 of Act NO. 2711 of the Revised Administrative
the first time, of the scandalous robbery of records
Code – Deportation of subject to foreign power. — Asubject
which were kept and preserved in the iron safe of
of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be
the Senate, yet up to this time there is not the
deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or
slightest indication that the author or authors of the
repatriated to his own country by the President of the
crime will ever be discovered.
Philippines EXCEPT UPON PRIOR INVESTIGATION,
conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the
ground upon which Such action is contemplated. In such To find them, it would not, perhaps, be necessary
case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge to go out of the Sente itself, and the persons in
or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less charge of the investigation of the case would not
than these days for the preparation of his defense. He shall have to display great skill in order to succeed in
also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to their undertaking, unless they should encounter the
produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine insuperable obstacle of offical concealment.
the opposing witnesses.”
* In effect, the President (Quezon, May 29, 1936) created In that case, every investigation to be made would
the Deportation Board to conduct investigations. be but a mere comedy and nothing more.
2. Yes but only after investigation has resulted to the actual
order of deportation. Arrest would have been necessary for After all, the perpetration of the robbery, especially
deportation to take effect. However, in the case at bar, under the circumstances that have surrounded it,
investigations were still ongoing and no order for does not surprise us at all.
deportation was yet made. Decision: E.O. No 398, series of
1951: declared illegal
The execution of the crime was but the natural
Deportation may be effected in 2 ways:
effect of the environment of the place in which it
1. by order of President, after due investigation, pursuant
was committed.
to Section 69 of the RAC
2. by Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation
by the Board of Commissioners under Section 37 of How many of the present Senators can say without
Commonwealth Act No. 613 remorse in their conscience and with serenity of
Crime was an act profiteering, hoarding or blackmarketing mind, that they do not owe their victory to electoral
of US dollars. robbery? How may?
 The author or authors of the robbery of the records
from the said iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps,
but followed the example of certain Senators who
secured their election through fraud and robbery.
The Philippine Senate, in its session of September 9, 1920,
adopted a resolution authorizing its committee on elections
and privileges to report as to the action which should be
taken with reference to the article published in La Nacion.
On September 15, 1920, the Senate adopted a resolution
authorizing the President of the Senate to indorse to the
Attorney-General, for his study and corresponding action,
all the papers referring to the case of the newspaper La
Nacion and its editor, Mr. Gregorio Perfecto. As a result, an
information was filed in the municipal court of the City of
Manila by an assistant city fiscal, in which the editorial in
question was set out and in which it was alleged that the
same constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal
Code. The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in
the municipal court and again in the Court of First Instance
of Manila.
During the course of the trial in the Court of First Instance,
after the prosecution had rested, the defense moved for the
dismissal of the case. On the subject of whether or not
article 256 of the Penal Code, under which the information
was presented, is in force, the trial judge, the Honorable
George R. Harvey, said:
This antiquated provision was doubtless
incorporated into the Penal Code of Spain for the
protection of the Ministers of the Crown and other
representatives of the King against free speech and
action by Spanish subjects. A severe punishment
was prescribed because it was doubtless considered
a much more serious offense to insult the King's
representative than to insult an ordinary individual.
This provision, with almost all the other articles of
that Code, was extended to the Philippine Islands
when under the dominion of Spain because the
King's subject in the Philippines might defame,
abuse or insult the Ministers of the Crown or other
representatives of His Majesty. We now have no
Ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority
in the Philippines representing the King of Spain,
and said provision, with other articles of the Penal
Code, had apparently passed into "innocuous
desuetude," but the Supreme Corut of the Philippine
Islands has, by a majority decision, held that said
article 256 is the law of the land to-day. . . .
The Helbig case is a precedent which, by the rule
of stare decisis, is binding upon this court until
otherwise determined by proper authority.
In the decision rendered by the same judge, he concluded
with the following language:
In the United States such publications are usually
not punishable as criminal offense, and little
importance is attached to them, because they are
generally the result of political controversy and are
usually regarded as more or less colored or
exaggerated. Attacks of this character upon a
legislative body are not punishable, under the Libel
Law. Although such publications are reprehensible,
yet this court feels some aversion to the application
of the provision of law under which this case was
filed. Our Penal Code has come to us from the
Spanish regime. Article 256 of that Code prescribes
punishment for persons who use insulting language
about Ministers of the Crown or other "authority."
The King of Spain doubtless left the need of such
protection to his ministers and others in authority in
the Philippines as well as in Spain. Hence, the
article referred to was made applicable here.
Notwithstanding the change of sovereignty, our
Supreme Court, in a majority decision, has held
that this provision is still in force, and that one who
made an insulting remark about the President of the
United States was punishable under it.
(U.S. vs. Helbig, supra.) If it applicable in that case,
it would appear to be applicable in this case. Hence,
said article 256 must be enforced, without fear or
favor, until it shall be repealed or superseded by
other legislation, or until the Supreme Court shall
otherwise determine.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the court
finds the defendant guilty as charged in the
information and under article 256 of their Penal
Code sentences him to suffer two months and one
day of arresto mayor and the accessory penalties
prescribed by law, and to pay the costs of both
instances.
The fifteen errors assigned by the defendant and appellant,
reenforced by an extensive brief, and eloquent oral
argument made in his own behalf and by his learned
counsel, all reduce themselves to the pertinent and decisive
question which was announced in the beginning of this
decision.
It will be noted in the first place that the trial judge
considered himself bound to follow the rule announced in
the case of United States vs. Helbig (R. G. No. 14705, 1 not
published). In that case, the accused was charged with
having said, "To hell with the President and his
proclamations, or words to that effect," in violation of
article 256 of the Penal Code. He was found guilty in a
judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila
and again on appeal to the Supreme Court, with the writer
of the instant decision dissenting on two principal grounds:
(1) That the accused was deprived of the constitutional
right of cross-examination, and (2) that article 256 of the
Spanish Penal Code is no longer in force. Subsequently, on
a motion of reconsideration, the court, being of the opinion
that the Court of First Instance had committed a prejudicial
error in depriving the accused of his right to cross-examine
a principal witness, set aside the judgment affirming the
judgment appealed from and ordered the return of the
record to the court of origin for the celebration of a new
trial. Whether such a trial was actually had, is not known,
but at least, the record in the Helbig case has never again
been elevated to this court.
There may perchance exist some doubt as to the authority
of the decision in the Helbig case, in view of the
circumstances above described. This much, however, is
certain: The facts of the Helbig case and the case before us,
which we may term the Perfecto case, are different, for in
the first case there was an oral defamation, while in the
second there is a written defamation. Not only this, but a
new point which, under the facts, could not have been
considered in the Helbig case, is, in the Perfecto case,
urged upon the court. And, finally, as is apparent to all, the
appellate court is not restrained, as was the trial court, by
strict adherence to a former decision. We much prefer to
resolve the question before us unhindered by references to
the Helbig decision.
This is one of those cases on which a variety of opinions all
leading to the same result can be had. A majority of the
court are of the opinion that the Philippine Libel Law, Act
No. 277, has had the effect of repealing so much of article
256 of the Penal Code as relates to written defamation,
abuse, or insult, and that under the information and the
facts, the defendant is neither guilty of a violation of article
256 of the Penal Code, nor of the Libel Law. The view of the
Chief Justice is that the accused should be acquitted for the
reason that the facts alleged in the information do not
constitute a violation of article 156 of the Penal Code. Three
members of the court believe that article 256 was
abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to
American sovereignty over the Philippines and is
inconsistent with democratic principles of government.
Without prejudice to the right of any member of the court
to explain his position, we will discuss the two main points
just mentioned.
1. Effect of the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, on
article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code. — The Libel
Law, Act No. 277, was enacted by the Philippine
Commission shortly after organization of this
legislative body. Section 1 defines libel as a
"malicious defamation, expressed either in writing,
printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, or
public theatrical exhibitions, tending to blacken the
memory of one who is dead or to impeach the
honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the
alleged or natural deffects of one who is alive, and
thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt or
ridicule." Section 13 provides that "All laws and
parts of laws now in force, so far as the same may
be in conflict herewith, are hereby repealed. . . ."
That parts of laws in force in 1901 when the Libel Law took
effect, were in conflict therewith, and that the Libel Law
abrogated certain portion of the Spanish Penal Code, cannot
be gainsaid. Title X of Book II of the Penal Code, covering
the subjects of calumny and insults, must have been
particularly affected by the Libel Law. Indeed, in the early
case of Pardo de Tavera vs. Garcia Valdez ([1902], 1. Phil.,
468), the Supreme Court spoke of the Libel Law as
"reforming the preexisting Spanish law on the subject
of calumnia  and injuria." Recently, specific attention was
given to the effect of the Libel Law on the provisions of the
Penal Code, dealing with calumny and insults, and it was
found that those provisions of the Penal Code on the
subject of calumny and insults in which the elements of
writing an publicity entered, were abrogated by the Libel
Law. (People vs. Castro [1922], p. 842, ante.)
The Libel Law must have had the same result on other
provisions of the Penal Code, as for instance article 256.
The facts here are that the editor of a newspaper published
an article, naturally in writing, which may have had the
tendency to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation of
members of the Philippine Senate, thereby possibly
exposing them to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule,
which is exactly libel, as defined by the Libel Law. Sir J. F.
Stephen is authority for the statement that a libel is
indictable when defaming a "body of persons definite and
small enough for individual members to be recognized as
such, in or by means of anything capable of being a libel."
(Digest of Criminal Law, art. 267.) But in the United States,
while it may be proper to prosecute criminally the author of
a libel charging a legislator with corruption, criticisms, no
matter how severe, on a legislature, are within the range of
the liberty of the press, unless the intention and effect be
seditious. (3 Wharton's Criminal Law, p. 2131.) With these
facts and legal principles in mind, recall that article 256
begins: Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame,
abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person
in authority," etc.
The Libel Law is a complete and comprehensive law on the
subject of libel. The well-known rule of statutory
construction is, that where the later statute clearly covers
the old subject-matter of antecedent acts, and it plainly
appears to have been the purpose of the legislature to give
expression in it to the whole law on the subject, previous
laws are held to be repealed by necessary implication. (1
Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, p. 465.) For
identical reasons, it is evident that Act No. 277 had the
effect so much of this article as punishes defamation,
abuse, or insults by writing.
Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, the Treason and
Sedition Law, may also have affected article 256, but as to
this point, it is not necessary to make a pronouncement.
2. Effect of the change from Spanish to Amercian
sevoreignty over the Philippine son article 256 of
the Spanish Penal Code. — Appellant's main
proposition in the lower court and again
energetically pressed in the appellate court was that
article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is not now in
force because abrogated by the change from
Spanish to American sovereignty over the
Philippines and because inconsistent with
democratic principles of government. This view was
indirectly favored by the trial judge, and, as before
stated, is the opinion of three members of this
court.
Article 256 is found in Chapter V of title III of Book II of the
Spanish Penal Code. Title I of Book II punishes the crimes
of treason, crimes that endanger the peace or
independence of the state, crimes against international law,
and the crime of piracy. Title II of the same book punishes
the crimes of lese majeste, crimes against the Cortes and
its members and against the council of ministers, crimes
against the form of government, and crimes committed on
the occasion of the exercise of rights guaranteed by the
fundamental laws of the state, including crime against
religion and worship. Title III of the same Book, in which
article 256 is found, punishes the crimes of rebellion,
sedition, assaults upon persons in authority, and their
agents, and contempts, insults, injurias, and threats against
persons in authority, and insults, injurias, and threats
against their agents and other public officers, the last being
the title to Chapter V. The first two articles in Chapter V
define and punish the offense of contempt committed by
any one who shall be word or deed defame, abuse, insult,
or threathen a minister of the crown, or any person in
authority. The with an article condemning challenges to
fight duels intervening, comes article 256, now being
weighed in the balance. It reads as follows: "Any person
who, by word, deed, or writing, shall defame, abuse, or
insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in
authority, while engaged in the performance of official
duties, or by reason of such performance, provided that the
offensive minister or person, or the offensive writing be not
addressed to him, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor," — that is, the defamation, abuse, or insult of
any Minister of the Crown of the Monarchy of Spain  (for
there could not be a Minister of the Crown in the United
States of America), or other person in authority in the
Monarchy of Spain.
It cannot admit of doubt that all those provisions of the
Spanish Penal Code having to do with such subjects as
treason, lese majeste, religion and worship, rebellion,
sedition, and contempts of ministers of the crown, are not
longer in force. Our present task, therefore, is a
determination of whether article 256 has met the same
fate, or, more specifically stated, whether it is in the nature
of a municipal law or political law, and is consistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States and the
characteristics and institutions of the American
Government.
It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition
of territory the previous political relations of the ceded
region are totally abrogated. "Political" is here used to
denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by
the inhabitants to the sovereign. (American Insurance
Co. vs. Canter [1828], 1 Pet., 511; Chicago, Rock Island
and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542;
Roa vs. Collector of Customs [1912], 23 Phil., 315.) Mr.
Justice Field of the United States Supreme Court stated the
obvious when in the course of his opinion in the case of
Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn,
supra, he said: "As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances
and regulations in conflict with the political character,
institutions and Constitution of the new government are at
once displaced. Thus, upon a cession of political jurisdiction
and legislative power — and the latter is involved in the
former — to the United States, the laws of the country  in
support of an established religion or abridging the freedom
of the press, or authorizing cruel and unusual
punishments, and he like, would at once cease to be of
obligatory force without any declaration to that effect." To
quote again from the United States Supreme Court: "It
cannot be admitted that the King of Spain could, by treaty
or otherwise, impart to the United States any of his royal
prerogatives; and much less can it be admitted that they
have capacity to receive or power to exercise them. Every
nation acquiring territory, by treaty or otherwise, must hold
it subject to the Constitution and laws of its own
government, and not according to those of the government
ceding it." (Pollard vs. Hagan [1845], 3 Hos., 210.)
On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions
of the President to the Military Commander dated May 28,
1898, and by proclamation of the latter, the municipal laws
of the conquered territory affecting private rights of person
and property and providing for the punishment of crime
were nominally continued in force in so far as they were
compatible with the new order of things. But President
McKinley, in his instructions to General Merritt, was careful
to say: "The first effect of the military occupation of the
enemy's territory is the severance of the former political
relation of the inhabitants and the establishment of a new
political power." From that day to this, the ordinarily it has
been taken for granted that the provisions under
consideration were still effective. To paraphrase the
language of the United States Supreme Court in
Weems vs. United States ([1910], 217 U. S., 349), there
was not and could not be, except as precise questions were
presented, a careful consideration of the codal provisions
and a determination of the extent to which they accorded
with or were repugnant to the "'great principles of liberty
and law' which had been 'made the basis of our
governmental system.' " But when the question has been
squarely raised, the appellate court has been forced on
occasion to hold certain portions of the Spanish codes
repugnant t democratic institutions and American
constitutional principles. (U.S. vs. Sweet [1901], 1 Phil.,
18; U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 273;
U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 533;
Weems vs. U.S., supra.)
The nature of the government which has been set up in the
Philippines under American sovereignty was outlined by
President McKinley in that Magna Charta of Philippine
liberty, his instructions to the Commission, of April 7, 1900.
In part, the President said:
In all the forms of government and administrative
provisions which they are authorized to prescribe,
the Commission should bear in mind that he
government which they are establishing is designed
not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our
theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, and
prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands,
and the measures adopted should be made to
conform to their customs, their habits, and even
their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with
the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites
of just and effective government. At the same time
the Commission should bear in mind, and the
people of the Islands should be made plainly to
understand, that there are certain great principles
of government which have been made the basis of
our governmental system, which we deem essential
to the rule of law and the maintenance of individual
freedom, and of which they have, unfortunately,
been denied the experience possessed by us; that
there are also certain practical rules of government
which we have found to be essential to the
preservation of these great principles of liberty and
law, and that these principles and these rules of
government must be established and maintained in
their islands for the sake of their liberty and
happiness, however much they may conflict with
the customs or laws of procedure with which they
are familiar. It is evident that the most enligthened
thought of the Philippine Islands fully appreciates
the importance of these principles and rules, and
they will inevitably within a short time command
universal assent.
The courts have naturally taken the same view. Mr. Justice
Elliott, speaking for our Supreme Court, in the case of
United States vs. Bull ([1910], 15 Phil., 7), said: "The
President and Congress framed the government on the
model with which American are familiar, and which has
proven best adapted for the advancement of the public
interests and the protection of individual rights and
privileges."
Therefore, it has come with somewhat of a shock to hear
the statement made that the happiness, peace, and
prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands and their
customs, habits, and prejudices, to follow the language of
President McKinley, demand obeisance to authority, and
royal protection for that authority.
According to our view, article 256 of the Spanish Penal
Code was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect
Spanish officials who were the representatives of the King.
With the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a
new theory of government, as set up in the Philippines. It
was in no sense a continuation of the old, although merely
for convenience certain of the existing institutions and laws
were continued. The demands which the new government
made, and makes, on the individual citizen are likewise
different. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a
person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen
must speak of him only with bated breath. "In the eye of
our Constitution and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler
and a freeman, and has equal rights with every other man.
We have no rank or station, except that of respectability
and intelligence as opposed to indecency and ignorance,
and the door to this rank stands open to every man to
freely enter and abide therein, if he is qualified, and
whether he is qualified or not depends upon the life and
character and attainments and conduct of each person for
himself. Every man may lawfully do what he will, so long as
it is not malum in se  or malum prohibitum  or does not
infringe upon the qually sacred rights of others."
(State vs. Shepherd [1903], 177 Mo., 205; 99 A. S. R.,
624.)
It is true that in England, from which so many of the laws
and institutions of the United States are derived, there were
once statutes of scandalum magnatum, under which words
which would not be actionable if spoken of an ordinary
subject were made actionable if spoken of a peer of the
realm or of any of the great officers of the Crown, without
proof of any special damage. The Crown of England,
unfortunately, took a view less tolerant that that of other
sovereigns, as for instance, the Emperors Augustus,
Caesar, and Tiberius. These English statutes have,
however, long since, become obsolete, while in the United
States, the offense of scandalum magnatum  is not known.
In the early days of the American Republic, a sedition law
was enacted, making it an offense to libel the Government,
the Congress, or the President of the United States, but the
law met with so much popular disapproval, that it was soon
repealed. "In this country no distinction as to persons is
recognized, and in practice a person holding a high office is
regarded as a target at whom any person may let fly his
poisonous words. High official position, instead of affording
immunity from slanderous and libelous charges, seems
rather to be regarded as making his character free plunder
for any one who desires to create a senation by attacking
it." (Newell, Slander and Libel, 3d ed., p. 245;
Sillars vs. Collier [1890], 151 Mass., 50; 6 L.R.A., 680.)
Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius and
fundamental principles of the American character and
system of government. The gulf which separates this article
from the spirit which inspires all penal legislation of
American origin, is as wide as that which separates a
monarchy from a democratic Republic like that of the
United States. This article was crowded out by implication
as soon as the United States established its authority in the
Philippine Islands. Penalties out of all proportion to the
gravity of the offense, grounded in a distorted monarchical
conception of the nature of political authority, as opposed
to the American conception of the protection of the
interests of the public, have been obliterated by the present
system of government in the Islands. 1awph!l.net
From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted
that this article punishes contempts against executive
officials, although its terms are broad enough to cover the
entire official class. Punishment for contempt of non-judicial
officers has no place in a government based upon American
principles. Our official class is not, as in monarchies, an
agent of some authority greater than the people but it is an
agent and servant of the people themselves. These officials
are only entitled to respect and obedience when they are
acting within the scope of their authority and jurisdiction.
The American system of government is calculated to
enforce respect and obedience where such respect and
obedience is due, but never does it place around the
individual who happens to occupy an official position by
mandate of the people any official halo, which calls for
drastic punishment for contemptuous remarks.
The crime of lese majeste disappeared in the Philippines
with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. Ministers of the
Crown have no place under the American flag.
To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the
court are of the opinion, although for different reasons, that
the judgment should be reversed and the defendant and
appellant acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered.
Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ARAULLO, C.J.,  concurring:
I concur with the dispositive part of the foregoing decision,
that is, with the acquittal of the accused, for the sole
reason that the facts alleged in the information do not
constitute a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code; for
although that article is in force with respect to calumny,
injuria, or insult, by deed or word, against an authority in
the performance of his duties or by reason thereof, outside
of his presence, it is repealed by the Libel Law in so far as it
refers to calumny, injuria, or insult committed against an
authority by writing or printing, as was that inserted in the
said information.
ROMUALDEZ, J.,  concurring:
I concur with the result. I believe that the responsibility of
the accused has not been shown either under article 256 of
the Penal Code or under the Libel Law.
I am of the opinion that article 256 of the Penal Code is still
in force, except as it refers to "Ministers of the Crown,"
whom we do not have in our Government, and to
calumny, injuria, or insult, by writing or printing, committed
against an authority in the performance of his duties or by
reason thereof, which portion was repealed by the Libel
Law.
Johnson, Street, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Republic vs. Villasor (Consti1)
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon. Guillermo P.
Villasor, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch I, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, the Sheriff of the
City of Manila, the Clerk of Court of First Instance of Cebu,
P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International
Construction Corporation, respondents.
November 28, 1973
Fernando, J:
Facts:
The decision that was rendered in favor of respondents P.J.
Kiener Co., Ltd, Gavino Unchuan and International
Construction Corporation was declared final and executory
by Respondent Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor.
Pursuant to the said declaration, the corresponding Alias
Writ of Execution was issued. And for the strength of this
writ, the provincial sheriff served notices of garnishment
with several banks, specially on the 'monies due the Armed
Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits; the
Philippines Veterans Bank received the same notice of
garnishment.
The funds of the AFP on deposit with the banks are public
funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of
pensions of retireees, pay and allowances of military and
civillian personnel and for maintenance and operations of
AFP.
Petitioner filed a petition against Villasor for acting in
excess jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the
properties of AFP, hence the notices and garnishments are
null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not the Writ of Execution issued by respondent
Judge Villasor is valid.
Held:
No
Ratio:
What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity
with the dictates of the Constitution. It is a fundamental
postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic
concept of sovereignty that the state and its government is
immune from suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is
exempt from suit not because of any formal conception or
obsolete theory but on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends.
Everything Legal
Del Mar vs Philippine Veterans Administration [G.R. L-
27299] June 27, 1973
by  Quolete
Facts:
del Mar, the petitioner, was was relieved with honorable
discharge with permanent total physical disability. Philippine
Veterans administration granted him pension but was soon
discontinued because he received the same pension under
the United States Veterans Administration.
Issue:
The PVA decided that:
(1) Petitioner is barred from receiving any pension from the
Philippine Veterans Administration.
“The PVA reiterated its contention that del Mar’s receipt of
a similar pension from the United States Government
effectively barred him from claiming and receiving from the
Philippine Government the monthly life pension granted
him as well as the monthly allowances he claimed for his
five living unmarried minor children below eighteen years of
age.”
(2) The filing of the case is premature.
“the action of del Mar was premature because of his failure
to exhaust administrative remedies before invoking judicial
intervention”
(3) The case is a suit against the state.
“the court  a quo was without jurisdiction to try the case as
del Mar demand partakes of a money claim against the PVA
— a mere agency of the Philippine Government — and, in
effect, of a suit against the Government which is not
suitable without its consent.”
(4) It was discretionary on the part of PVA to discontinue
pension.
Held:
(1) When a case is a suit against the state:
“As a general proposition, the rule — well-settled in this
jurisdiction — on the immunity of the Government from suit
without its consent holds true in all actions resulting in
“adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in
the disbursements of funds or loss of property.”
(2) Suits against the state must be dismissed
(3) When a case is not a suit against the state:
“where a claimant institutes an action against a functionary
who fails to comply with his statutory duty to release the
amount claimed from the public funds already appropriated
by statute for the benefit of the said claimant.”
(4) The case is not premature. Administrative liability is not
required.
“Suffice it to state that where a case as in the present
controversy — involves a question solely of a legal nature,
there arises no need for the litigant to resort to all
administrative remedies available to him before seeking
judicial relief.”
(5) The act committed by the PVA, in suspending a
provision of law, is against the constitution.
“… the Constitution limits the authority of the President, in
whom all executive power resides, to take care that the
laws be faithfully executed. No lesser administrative
executive office or agency then can, contrary to the express
language of the Constitution, assert for itself a more
extensive prerogative. Necessarily, it is bound to observe
the constitutional mandate. There must be strict compliance
with the legislative enactment. Its terms must be followed.
The statute requires adherence to, not departure from, its
provisions. No deviation is allowable.”