V. Application of Foreign Law; Exceptions
The will of an alien who is abroad produces
Civil Code
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
(9a)
Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found. (10a)
Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and
other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the
country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic
or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a
foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws
shall be observed in their execution. Prohibitive laws
concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed
upon in a foreign country. (11a)
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous
marriages as determined by Philippine law. (19a)
Article 124. If the marriage is between a citizen of the
Philippines and a foreigner, whether celebrated in the
Philippines or abroad, the following rules shall prevail:
(1) If the husband is a citizen of the Philippines while the wife is
a foreigner, the provisions of this Code shall govern their
relations;
(2) If the husband is a foreigner and the wife is a citizen of the
Philippines, the laws of the husband's country shall be
followed, without prejudice to the provisions of this Code with
regard to immovable property. (1325a)
Article 815. When a Filipino is in a foreign country, he is
authorized to make a will in any of the forms established by the
law of the country in which he may be. Such will may be
probated in the Philippines. (n)
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Article 816.
effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed
by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the
formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those
which this Code prescribes. (n)
Article 819. Wills, prohibited by the preceding article,
executed by Filipinos in a foreign country shall not be valid in
the Philippines, even though authorized by the laws of the
country where they may have been executed. (733a)
Article 829. A revocation done outside the Philippines, by a
person who does not have his domicile in this country, is valid
when it is done according to the law of the place where the will
was made, or according to the law of the place in which the
testator had his domicile at the time; and if the revocation
takes place in this country, when it is in accordance with the
provisions of this Code. (n)
Article 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of
the nation of the decedent. (n)
Rules of Court
Rule 132, Sec. 25. Parental and filial privilege. — No person
may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct
ascendants, children or other direct descendants. (20a)
Rule 130, Sec. 45. Commercial lists and the like. —
Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons
engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register,
periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as
tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if
that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in
that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them
therein. (39)
A. Proof of Foreign Law
In Re Estate of Johnson (November 16, 1918) – Street
Ebba Ingeborg Johnson, applicant
Topic: Proof of Foreign Law
Short Summary: Emil Johnson, an American citizen had his
will admitted to probate in the Philippines. His daughter with
his ex wife questions the order because she was not afforded
notice of the said probate. The Supreme Court affirmed the
probate stating that a probate proceeding is a proceeding in
rem.
Doctrine: The order admitting the will to probate cannot
be declared null and void merely because the petitioner was
unavoidably prevented from appearing at the original hearing
upon the matter of the probate of the will. The fact that an heir
or other interested party lives so far away as to make it
impossible for such party to be present at the date appointed
for the probate of the will does not render the order of
probate void for lack of due process.
TC merely relied on the presentation of Section 1874
of the Revised Statutes of Illinois as exhibited in a
volume of an annotation and assumed that he could take
JN of the laws of Illinois. It was WRONG! Proper rule is to
require proof of the statutes of the States of the American
Union whenever their provisions are determinative of the
issues in any action litigated in the Philippine courts.
Regardless, (1) petition does not state any fact from which it
would appear that the law of Illinois is different from what the
court found (2) petition did not raise any assignment of error
to question the supposed taking of JN of the court
Facts:
! Emil Johnson, a native of Sweden emigrated to
Chicago, United States and married Rosalie Ackeson
and had a daughter named Ebba Ingeborg. He
embarked to the Philippines as a soldier of the US
army. After he was discharged from service, he
continued to live in the Philippines. His wife Rosalie
was granted a decree of divorce on the ground of
desertion.
! In the Philippines, he appears to have entered in to
marital relations with Alejandra Ibañez, by whom he
had three children Mercedes, Encarnacion and Victor.
He also had two children, Eleonor and Alberto, with
Simeona Ibañez.
! On February 4, 1916 Emil Johnson died and left a
holographic will (a will entirely written by hand) dated
September 9, 1915 disposing his estate worth
P231,800. This document was signed by himself and
two witnesses only, instead of the three witnesses
required by law. (Current law: a holographic will need
not be witnessed, it must only be entirely written,
dated and signed by the hand of the testator)
! Since the will was not executed in conformity with the
law then, it was not probated. A petition was filed on
the ground that Johnson at the time of his death was
a citizen of Illinois and that the will was duly executed
in accordance with the laws of that State, and hence
could properly be probated here pursuant to Sec.
6361 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of
another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law
of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which
might be proved and allowed by the law of his own state or country,
may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and
shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these
islands.
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! The hearing was set for March 6, 1916 and
three weeks publication of notice was made
in the “Manila Daily Bulletin.” On the said
date, the witnesses were examined relative to
the execution of the will, and thereafter
declared to be legal and was admitted to
probate.
! Three months after the will had been
probated, the attorneys for Ebba Ingeborg
Johnson entered an appearance in her behalf
and noted an exception to the order
admitting the will to probate. On October 31,
1916 the attorneys moved that the court vacate the
order admitting the will to probate. On February 20,
1917, the motion was denied. Hence this appeal.
Procedural History: TC Admitted the will to probate. Ebba
appealed to the Supreme Court. Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court’s order.
Issue: WON the order admitting the will to probate
was void because it was made without notice to the
petitioner
Held: No. The order for probate cannot be declared null
and void merely because the petitioner was unavoidably
prevented from appearing at the original hearing upon the
matter of the probate of the will.
Dispositive: The order appealed from is accordingly
affirmed.
Ratio:
! RE: order of publication Petitioner contends that
at the time the court made the order of publication, it
was aware of the fact that she lived in the United
States and that as daughter and heir she was
necessarily interested in the probate of the will. She
insists that the court should have appointed a date for
the probate of the will sufficiently far in the future to
permit the petitioner to be present either in person or
by representation; the failure of the court to postpone
the probate of the will constitutes an infringement
due process.
! Proceedings for the probate of the will were regular
and that the publication was sufficient to give
the court jurisdiction to entertain the
proceeding and to allow the will to be
probated. The proceeding as to the probate
of a will is one in rem, and the state is
allowed a wide latitude in determining the
character of the constructive notice to be
given to the world in a proceeding where it
has absolute possession of the res. A final
judgment rendered on a petition for the
probate of a will is binding upon the whole
world.
 ! Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: ! WON will executed in conformity with the
“Upon such terms as may be just the court may State of Illinois. NOT REALLY SURE, BUT THE
relieve a party or his legal representative from a PETITIONER CANNOT DO ANYTHING
judgment, order or other proceeding taken against ABOUT IT. Courts cannot take Judicial Notice
him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or (JN) of Foreign laws: TC merely relied on the
excusable neglect; PROVIDED that application presentation of Section 1874 of the Revised
therefor be made within a reasonable time, but in Statutes of Illinois as exhibited in a volume of
no case exceeding six months after such an annotation and assumed that he could take JN
judgment, order, or proceeding was taken.” of the laws of Illinois. But it was WRONG!!! Proper
She filed her motion on October 31, 1916 which is rule is to require proof of the statutes of the States of
seven months after the said judgment. the American Union whenever their provisions are
! The order admitting the will of Johnson to determinative of the issues in any action litigated in
probate cannot be declared null and void the Philippine courts. Regardless, (1) petition does
merely because the petitioner was not state any fact from which it would appear that the
unavoidably prevented from appearing at the law of Illinois is different from what the court found
original hearing. The law supplied a remedy (2)petition did not raise any assignment of error to
by which the petitioner might have gotten a question the supposed taking of JN of the court
hearing and have obtained relief form the
order by which she is supposed to have been
injured.
! Where a will is duly probated after publication, the
order admitting the will is, in the absence of fraud,
effective against all persons. The fact that an heir or
other interested party lives so far away as to make it
impossible for such party to be present at the date
appointed for the probate of the will does not render
Miciano v. Brimo, et al. G.R. 22595 – Romualdez, J
the order of probate void for lack of due process.
Appellee: Testate Estate of Joseph Brimo, Juan Miciano,
! RE: Citizenship (not really on topic, just in
administrator
case he asks, I HIGHLY doubt though)
Appellant: Andre Brimo
! WON Section 636 of the Code of Civil
Concept: Proof of Foreign Law
Procedure is not applicable to wills of aliens
residing in RP? Section 636: authorizes probate
Doctrine: Although the Civil Code of the Ph itself provides
by our courts of a will made within the Philippine
that the national of the law of the decedent should govern as
Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or
to matters of legal and testamentary successions in respect of
country, when such will is executed in accordance
substantive matters, failure by Brimo to present evidence of
with the law of the state or country of which the
Turkish law on succession triggers the application of the
testator is a citizen of subject, and which might be
doctrine of processual presumption, whereby it is presumed
proved under the law of such state or country. IT IS
that Turkish laws are the same as Ph laws in the absence of
APPLICABLE: the "state" would include US, and the
proof to the contrary.
operation of law is not limited to wills of aliens. If
Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of US
Short facts: The brother of the decedent-testator opposed
and of the state of Illinois, his will was provable under
the partition submitted by the administrator of the estate, on
this section in the courts of the Philippines, provided
grounds that the will on which said partition was based was
the instrument was so executed as to be admissible
contrary to Turkish law, the latter being the applicable law
to probate under laws of the State of Illinois
since the decedent was a Turkish national. The Court upheld
! WON Decedent a national of Illinois (to
the partition ruling that due to the failure of oppositor to
warrant the application of Illinois law) YES.
present and prove Turkish laws on succession, it is presumed
Proof adduced before TC showed he was indeed a
that these laws are similar to Ph laws on succession.
national of Illinois. Petition merely contests the
residence of the decedent to be in the Philippines,
FACTS:
but not the nationality Why contest residence: US
naturalization laws require residence of at least 5
Joseph Brimo, a Turkish national and decedent in this case, left
years in US and 1 year within the State or territory
a will. One of the will’s provisions contained a condition which
where the court granting the naturalization papers is
required legatees to respect the testator’s intention to
held to grant the certificate of naturalization. Still, no
distribute his estate in accordance with Ph law and not Turkish
other proof to rebut the presumption that he was
law. For this reason, Miciano, the judicial administrator of the
indeed naturalized as a US citizen.
estate of decedent, filed a scheme of partition of this will,

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which Andre Brimo (Brimo), brother of the decedent, opposed
on grounds that the will did not comply with Turkish law.
The lower court approved the partition, ruling that Turkish laws
are irrelevant what with the testator having clearly chosen Ph
law to govern the will’s provisions, and denying Brimo’s
participation in the inheritance because his opposition
constituted a violation of the above-mentioned condition
imposed on legatees named in the will. Hence Brimo’s appeal.
Brimo argued against the ff:
• the approval of the scheme of partition
• the denial of his participation in the inheritance
• the approval of the purchase made by PIetro Lanza of the
decedent’s business, and the deed of transfer of said
business
• the declaration by the lower corut that the Turkish laws are
impertinent to this cause, as well as the failure not to
postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the
delivery of the decedent’s business to Lanza until the
receipt of the depositions requested in reference to
Turkish laws
Brimo further argues that partition puts into effect
provisions of the decedent’s will which are not in
accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality,
for which reason they are void for violating Art. 10 2
of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Which law should apply — Turkish law, or Ph law?
Although the Civil Code of the Ph itself provides that
the national of the law of the decedent should
govern as to matters of legal and testamentary
successions in respect of substantive matters, failure
by Brimo to present evidence of Turkish law on
succession triggers the application of the doctrine of
processual presumption, whereby it is presumed that
Turkish laws are the same as Ph laws in the absence
of proof to the contrary.
RATIO:
1. Brimo failed to prove that the testamentary
dispositions are not in accordance with Turkish laws.
He did not present evidence as to Turkish laws on
succession, and in the absence of evidence on such
laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of
the Ph. There being no evidence on record that the
national law of the decedent was violated by his
testamentary dispositions, which themselves were
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2
Art. 10 Civil Code: "Nevertheless, legal and testamentary
successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the
amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property
or the country in which it may be situated."
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not contrary to Ph law, the latter must be complied
with and executed.
- Brimo himself acknowledged as much when he assigned
as an error of the court in not having deferred the
approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of
certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on
the matter.
- The trial court had discretion on whether or not to give
oppositor another chance to prove Turkish laws. Its choice
of not granting the deferral is not abuse of discretion on
its part, considering it had already granted Brimo enough
opportunity to introduce competence evidence
2. As to Brimo’s alleged exclusion from the will, such exclusion
is based on the last part of the second clause of the will3, which
subjects the institution of legatees to the condition that the
instituted legatees must respect the testator’s will to distribute
his property in accordance with the laws of the Ph and not
Turkish law. According to the will, failure by a legatee to
comply with this condition would bar such person from
receiving his legacy. The condition is void for being
contrary to law, namely Art. 10 of the Civil Code. Art.
792 of the Civil Code 4 in turn considers as not
imposed those conditions in a will that are contrary
to law. Brimo is thus entitled to his legacy.
- Why is the condition contrary to law? Art. 10 of the Civil
Code of the Ph makes it mandatory that the testator’s
national law govern his testamentary dispositions. For
being contrary to the provision, the conditions imposed
upon the legatees is null and void.
- All the remaining clauses of the will as well as their
dispositions and requests remain perfectly valid and
effective, the same not appearing to be contrary to the
testator’s national laws.
HELD: the orders appealed from modified. The distribution of
the estate is directed to be made in a manner that includes
Andre Brimo as one of the legatees and the scheme of
partition be submitted by the judicial administrator in all other
respects.
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3
"Second. I likewise desire to state that although, by law, I am a
Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been conferred upon me by
conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other
hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine
Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now
possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and
everything in connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in
accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Islands, requesting
all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel
beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the
person or persons who fail to comply with this request."
4
"Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals
shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or
legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise
provide.”

Fleumer v. Hix (1930), supra
FACTS:
• A.W. Fleumer, the special administrator of the estate
of Edward Randolph Hix, submitted for probate the
latter's last will and testament.
• However, the Judge of First Instance denied probate
on the grounds that:
o (1) it was not proven that the will was
acknowledged by the testator in the
presence of two competent witnesses, &;
o (2) that these witnesses subscribed to the will
in the presence of the testator and of each
other.
o Hence, this appeal by Fleumer to the
Supreme Court.
• Fleumer asserts that the alleged will was executed by
Hix on November 3, 1925, in Elkins, West Virginia, in
accordance with the West Virginia Code. In other
words, under West Virginia law, the will was duly
executed.
• To prove West Virginian law, Fleumer submitted a
copy of Section 3868 of Act 1882 or the West Virgina
code which was taken from a book, annotated by a
Charles Hogg. Such book was certified by the
Director of National Library.
ISSUE: WON the will may be admitted to probate?
NO
• The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not
prove themselves in Philippines courts. The
courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to
take judicial notice of American laws. Such laws
must be proven as facts.
• Here the foreign laws were not proven.
o There was no showing that the book, from
which the extract of the law offered as
evidence was taken from, was printed or
published under the authority of the State of
West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
o Nor was the extract from the law attested by
the certificate of the officer having charge of
the original, under the seal of the State of
West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
o Neither was evidence was introduced to
show that the extract from the laws of West
Virginia was in force at the time the alleged
will was executed.
• In addition, the due execution of the will was
not established. The only evidence on this point is
to be found in the testimony of Fleumer.
o Aside from this testimony, there was nothing
to indicate that the will was acknowledged
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by the testator in the presence of two
competent witnesses, and that these
witnesses subscribed the will in the presence
of the testator and of each other as the law
of West Virginia seems to require.
o On the supposition that the witnesses to the
will reside without the Philippine Islands, it
would then be the duty of Fleumer to prove
execution by some other means.
• It was also necessary for Fleumer to prove
that the testator had his domicile in West
Virginia; the recital of such fact in the will to be
submitted for probate, and Fleumer's bare testimony,
is not sufficient to establish that fact.
• Also, while the appeal was pending submission in this
court, Fleumer presented a petition asking the court
to accept as part of the evidence some documents
o One of these documents discloses that a
paper writing purporting to be the will of
Edward Randolph Hix was presented for
probate on June 8, 1929, to the clerk of
Randolph Country, State of West Virginia. It
was duly proven by the oaths of Dana
Wamsley and Joseph L. Madden, the
subscribing witnesses thereto, and ordered
to be recorded and filed.
o It was also shown by another document that,
in vacation, on June 8, 1929, the clerk of
court of Randolph Country, West Virginia,
appointed Claude W. Maxwell as
administrator, cum testamento annexo, of
the estate of Edward Randolph Hix.
o In this connection, it is to be noted that the
application for the probate of the will in the
Philippines was filed on February 20, 1929,
while the proceedings in West Virginia
appear to have been initiated on June 8,
1929.
o Petitioner: These facts are strongly
indicative of an intention to make the
Philippines the principal administration and
West Virginia the ancillary administration.
• SC: However, if this is the case, no attempt has been
made to comply with the Code of Civil Procedure, for
no hearing on the question of the allowance of the
will is said to have been PROVED and ALLOWED in
West Virginia.
o Also, there is no showing that the deceased
left any property at any place other than the
Philippine Islands and no contention that he
left any in West Virginia.
o Reference has been made by the parties to a
divorce purported to have been awarded
Edward Randolph Hix from Annie Cousins
Hix on October 8, 1925.
DISPOSITIVE: Probate of the will was denied.

In re: Testate Estate of Jose B. Suntay (1954)— Padilla, J.
Petitioner: Estate of Jose B. Suntay
Respondents: Federico Suntay
Concept: Proof of Foreign Law
Foreign Elements: Will of decedent executed in China and
in Chinese characters; alleged to be probated and allowed by
a Chinese court.
Brief Facts: Heirs of Suntay wanted to have the will executed
by their father in China admitted in probate here in the
Philippines. They claim that such will has already been allowed
and admitted into probate by a Chinese Court.
Doctrine: While wills proved and allowed in foreign countries
may be allowed in probate here in the Philippines, such fact of
admission by a competent court must be alleged and duly
proved. Such include the competence of the foreign court and
its jurisdiction as a probate court, the rules of procedure of a
foreign country in probate matters, and the substantive legal
requirements for the admission of wills in said country.
Facts
1. Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino resident citizen died in the city of
Amoy, Fookien in China, leaving real and personal
properties in the Philippines. Upon his death, Federico
Suntay was appointed administrator of the estate.
2. His widow filed a petition for the probate of a last will
claimed to have been executed and signed in the
Philippines.
• TC denied because of the loss of said will
after the filing of the petition and before the
hearing thereof and of the insufficiency of
the evidence to establish the loss of the said
will
3. After the liberation of the Pacific War, Silvino Suntay filed
a petition in the intestate proceedings to probate a will of
his late father, claiming that he had found it among his
files and documents. Said will was in Chinese
characters executed and signed by the deceased
in China, and recorded and probated in the
Amoy district court in China.
TC: denied probate
Issue:
1. WON the will executed in the Philippines may be
probated? (NO)
2. WON the will executed in China may be admitted in
probate? (NO)
Ruling:
1. NO. The conflicting testimonies of the witnesses
failed to convincingly prove the loss of the said
will
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• The testimonies provided in court were either
conflicting or incredible. One witness testified that
she did not read the whole will but only the
adjudication and saw only the signature of the
decedent and of the witnesses. Such testimonial
evidence is therefore unreliable to prove the contents
of the will.
• Other testimonies cannot be relied upon as they are
hearsay. The testimony of Go Toh, an alleged witness
of the will, only came to know the contents of the will
from the information given to him by Jose Suntay and
from reading the translation of the draft from Spanish
to Chinese.
• Thus, granting arguendo that there was a will duly
executed by Jose Suntay and that it was valid before
his death, the testimonies provided falls short of the
legal requirement that the “provisions of the lost will
must be clearly and distinctly proved by at least two
credible witnesses.” Credible witnesses mean
competent witnesses and those who testify to
facts from or upon hearsay are neither
competent nor credible witnesses.
2. NO. It has not been proved that the will has been
probated in China
• While wills proved and allowed in foreign countries
may be allowed in probate here in the Philippines,
such fact of admission by a competent court must be
alleged and duly proved.
• In the case at bar, Silvino Suntay failed to do so.
o He failed to prove that the municipal district
court in Amoy, China is a probate court.
o The law on Chine on procedure in the
probate of wills must also be proved.
o The legal requirements for the execution of
a valid will in China should also be
established by competent evidence.
• The unverified answers to the questions propounded
to the Consul General of the Republic of China are
also inadmissible
o The office of Consul General does not
qualify and make the person who holds it an
expert on the Chinese law on procedure in
probate matters as consuls are appointed to
attend to trade matters.
o Reliance on such answers deprives the
adverse party of his right to confront and
cross-examine the witness.
• It seems that the proceedings in the Amoy district
court were for the purpose of taking the testimony of
two attesting witnesses to the will and not for the
 purpose of probating a will. It could be likened to a
deposition or to a perpetuation of a testimony.
• In the absence of proof as to the Chinese law of
procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed
that the proceedings in the probate of a will in China
are the same as those provided for in our laws on the
subject. Being a proceeding in rem and for the
validity of such proceedings personal notice or by
publication or both to all interested parties must be
made. Since the evidence shows that no such notice
was received by the interested parties residing in the
Philippines, such proceedings could not be held to be
valid.
Dissenting, J. Paras
• Assuming that the will in China may not be admitted
to probate, it may be used as corroborating
evidence as to the provisions of the lost will in view
of the fact of the testimony that the provisions in the
both wills are the same.
Resolution of the MR: simply affirmed the decision.
SC still pointed to the failure of the petitioners to
sufficiently establish the due execution of the lost will and
the provisions thereof proved clearly and distinctly by at
least two credible witnesses.
Decision: Petition denied
Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher (1961)
Petitioner: CIR
Respondents: Douglas Fisher, Bettina Fisher and the CTA
Foreign Elements:
• Deceased and spouse – California, US citizens
and residents
• Marriage - in Philippines
• Properties in question – located in Philippines
Brief facts:
Deceased, a US citizen and resident, left several properties
to his wife as sole heiress. The wife assigned her rights to Sps
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Fisher. According to the lower court, in determining the tax net
estate of the decedent, ½ of the net estate should be
deducted therefrom as the share of the surviving spouse in
accordance with our law on conjugal partnership. CIR contends
that it is the national law of the decedent husband that should
govern which provides that all properties acquired during the
marriage pertain and belong exclusively to the husband (hence
the share should not have been deducted to arrive at the tax
base). As to the reciprocity issue, the pertinent California law
was proved by respondents however since there is no full
reciprocity in this case, the exemption was not granted.
Doctrine: Following the nationality rule in the OCC (and even
NCC), English law applies since both spouses are foreigners
who just married in the Philippines. English law on this,
however, was not duly proven in the Court so the presumption
is that the law of England on this matter is the same as our law
(processual presumption).
Rules of Court do not exclude the presentation of other
competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law.
Facts:
• Walter G. Stevenson died on February 22, 1951 in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A. where he and his wife moved
and established their permanent residence since May 10,
1945.
o He was born in the Philippines on August 9, 1874 of
British parents and married in the Manila on January
23, 1909 to Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson another
British subject.
• In his will executed in San Francisco and which was duly
probated in the Superior Court of California, Stevenson
instituted his wife Beatrice as his sole heiress to the
following real and personal properties acquired by the
spouses while residing in the Philippines, described and
preliminary assessed as follows:
Gross Estate
Real Property — 2 parcels of land in Baguio P43,500.00
Personal Property
(1) 177 shares of stock of Canacao Estate at
P10.00 each 1,770.00
(2) 210,000 shares of stock of Mindanao
Mother Lode Mines, Inc. at P0.38 per share 79,800.00
(3) Cash credit with Canacao Estate Inc. 4,870.88
(4) Cash, with the Chartered Bank of India,
Australia & China 851.97
Total Gross Assets P130,792.85
• Ancillary administration proceedings were instituted in the
CFI of Manila for the settlement of the estate in the
Philippines. Stevenson's will was duly admitted to probate
by our court and Ian Murray Statt was appointed ancillary
administrator of the estate.
• Statt filed a preliminary estate and inheritance tax return
with the reservation of having the properties declared
therein finally appraised at their values 6 months after the
death of Stevenson. He did this in order to secure the
waiver of the CIR on the inheritance tax due on the
210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode
Mines Inc. which the estate then desired to dispose in the
US.
• Acting upon said return, the CIR accepted the
valuation of the personal properties declared therein,
but increased the appraisal of the two parcels of land
located in Baguio City by fixing their fair market value
in the amount of P52.200.00, instead of P43,500.00.
• After allowing the deductions claimed by the ancillary
administrator for funeral expenses in the amount of
P2,000.00 and for judicial and administration
expenses in the sum of P5,500.00, the Collector
assessed the state the amount of P5,147.98 for estate
tax and P10,875,26 or inheritance tax, or a total of
P16,023.23. Both of these assessments were paid by
the estate on June 6, 1952.
• On September 27, 1952, the Statt filed in amended
estate and inheritance tax return pursuant to his
reservation made at the time of filing of the
preliminary return and for the purpose of availing of
the right granted by section 91 of the National
Internal Revenue Code.
• FIRST AMENDED RETURN:
o the valuation of the 210,000 shares of stock in the
Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. was reduced
from 0.38 per share, as originally declared, to P0.20
per share, or from a total valuation of P79,800.00 to
P42,000.00. -> based by the ancillary administrator
on the market notation of the stock obtaining at
the San Francisco California Stock Exchange six
months from the death of Stevenson
o He also made claim for the following deductions:
Funeral expenses ($1,04326 or P2,086.52),
Administrator's Fee (P1,204.34), Attorney's Fee (P
6,000.00), Judicial and Administration expenses as
of August 9, 1952 (P1,400.05), Real Estate Tax for
1951 on Baguio real properties (P 652.50), Claims
against the estate (P10,000.00), Plus: 4% int. p.a.
from Feb. 2 to 22, 1951 (P 22.47) for a TOTAL OF
P21,365.88
• In the meantime, on December 1, 1952, Beatrice
Mauricia Stevenson assigned all her rights and
interests in the estate to the spouses, Douglas and
Bettina Fisher.
• SECOND AMENDED RETURN (on
RECIPROCITY):
o declared the same assets of the estate
stated in the first amended return, except
that it contained new claims for additional
exemption and deduction to wit:
(1) deduction in the amount of P4,000.00 from
the gross estate of the decedent as provided for
in Section 861 (4) of the U.S. Federal Internal
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Revenue Code which the ancillary administrator
averred was allowable by way of the reciprocity
granted by Section 122 of the NIRC, as then held
by the Board of Tax Appeals in case No. 71
entitled "Housman vs. Collector," August 14,
1952; and
(2) exemption from the imposition of estate
and inheritance taxes on the 210,000 shares of
stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc.
also pursuant to the reciprocity proviso of Section
122 of the NIRC.
o the estate claimed that it was liable only for the
amount of P525.34 for estate tax and P238.06 for
inheritance tax and that, as a consequence, it had
overpaid the government. -> It requested a refund
which the collector denied.
• Spouses Fisher filed a case before the CFI.
• CFI (in relation to RECIPROCITY): held that the
intangible personal property belonging to the estate of
said Stevenson is exempt from inheritance tax, pursuant to
the provision of section 122 of the NIRC in relation to the
California Inheritance Tax Law but not to an exemption of
P4,000.00 in the computation of the estate tax. The shares
of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines were not
exempted from estate and inheritance taxes pursuant to
the same reciprocity proviso in Section 122 and were
instead appraised at 0.38 per share.
• TAX COURT: exempted the Fishers from paying
inheritance tax on the 210,000 shares of stock in the
Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. in virtue of the
reciprocity proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal
Revenue Code, in relation to Section 13851 of the
California Revenue and Taxation Code
• Both parties appealed:
• Collector’s arguments:
o the said proviso of the California Revenue and
Taxation Code has not been duly proven by the
Fishers;
o the reciprocity exemptions granted by section 122 of
the NIRC can only be availed of by residents of
foreign countries and not of residents of a state in
the United States; and
o there is no "total" reciprocity between the
Philippines and the state of California in that while
the former exempts payment of both estate and
inheritance taxes on intangible personal properties,
the latter only exempts the payment of inheritance
tax
Issue:
1. WON Philippine Law on legal partnership between
spouses should be applied in this case? Yes but only
because English law on this was not proved.
2. WON the Spouses Fisher can avail of reciprocity in
exemption from transfer or death taxes between the State
of California and the Philippines? NO.
3. WON deductions representing an indebtedness incurred
by decedent during his lifetime should be granted? NO.

Ratio:
1. No. English law was not duly proven.
• Based on Manresa’s view, the law determinative of the
property relation of the Stevensons, married in 1909,
would be the English law even if the marriage was
celebrated in the Philippines, both of them being
foreigners. But the pertinent English law that allegedly
vests in the decedent husband full ownership of the
properties acquired during the marriage has not been
proven by petitioner. Except for a mere allegation in his
answer, which is not sufficient, the record is bereft of any
evidence as to what English law says on the matter. In the
absence of proof, the Court is justified, therefore, in
indulging in what Wharton calls "processual
presumption," in presuming that the law of England on
this matter is the same as our law.
2. No, they cannot, as there is no complete and total
reciprocity between the NIRC and the California Revenue and
Taxation Code.
• The SC said that in view of the express provisions of both
the Philippine and California laws, exemption would apply
only if the law of the other grants a total exemption from
legacy, succession, or death taxes of every character, there
could not be partial reciprocity.
• *To prove the pertinent California law, counsel for
respondents, testified that as an active member of the
California Bar since 1931, he is familiar with the revenue
and taxation laws of the State of California. When asked
by the lower court to state the pertinent California law as
regards exemption of intangible personal properties, the
witness cited article 4, section 13851 (a) and (b) of the
California Internal and Revenue Code as published in
Derring's California Code, a publication of the Bancroft-
Whitney Company inc. And as part of his testimony, a full
quotation of the cited section was offered in evidence as
Exhibits "V-2" by the respondents.
• *S ection 41, Rule 123 of our Rules of Court prescribes the
manner of proving foreign laws before our tribunals.
However, although we believe it desirable that these laws
be proved in accordance with said rule, we held in the
case of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil.
471, that "a reading of sections 300 and 301 of our Code
of Civil Procedure (now section 41, Rule 123) will convince
one that these sections do not exclude the
presentation of other competent evidence to
prove the existence of a foreign law." In that case,
we considered the testimony of an attorney-at-law of San
Francisco, California who quoted verbatim a section of
California Civil Code and who stated that the same was in
force at the time the obligations were contracted, as
sufficient evidence to establish the existence of said law.
In line with this view, we find no error, therefore, on the
part of the Tax Court in considering the pertinent
California law as proved by respondents' witness.
• Substantive issue: It is clear from the provisions that the
reciprocity must be total, that is, with respect to transfer or
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death taxes of any and every character, in the case of the
Philippine law, and to legacy, succession, or death taxes of
any and every character, in the case of the California law.
Thus, if any of the two states collects or imposes and does
not exempt any transfer, death, legacy, or succession tax
of any character, the reciprocity does not work because
such is the underlying principle of the reciprocity clauses
in both laws.
• The SC explained the differences between the laws
applicable in this case:
o In the Philippines, upon the death of any citizen or
resident, or non-resident with properties therein,
there are imposed upon his estate and its
settlement, both an estate and an inheritance tax.
o Under the laws of California, only inheritance tax is
imposed.
o On the other hand, the Federal Internal Revenue
Code imposes an estate tax on non-residents not
citizens of the United States, but does not provide
for any exemption on the basis of reciprocity.
• The court said that if it applied the aforementioned
laws in the manner the CTA did will result to the
following situation:
o a Californian, who is non-resident in the
Philippines but has intangible personal
properties here, will the subject to the payment
of an estate tax, although exempt from the
payment of the inheritance tax.
• The SC then posited the following question:
Considering the situation mentioned above, will a
Filipino, non-resident of California, but with intangible
personal properties there, be entitled to the
exemption clause of the California law, since the
Californian has not been exempted from every
character of legacy, succession, or death tax because
he is, under our law, under obligation to pay an estate
tax?
o It explained that if we exempt the Californian
from paying the estate tax, we do not thereby
entitle a Filipino to be exempt from a similar
estate tax in California because under the
Federal Law, which is equally enforceable in
California he is bound to pay the same, there
being no reciprocity recognized in respect
thereto.
• Contemplating the various situations that may result,
the court concluded that the Filipino citizen is always
at a disadvantage. -> It said that legislature has not
intended such an unfair situation to the detriment of
our own government and people.
• It then noted that it was aware of the ruling in the
case of Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Lara
exempting the estate of the deceased Hugo H. Miller
from payment of the inheritance tax imposed by the
CIR but it made the following points:
o the issue of reciprocity between the
pertinent provisions of Philippine tax law and
that of the State of California was not there
 squarely raised, and the ruling therein
cannot control the determination of the case
at bar.
3. Approval of the Philippine probate court of this particular
indebtedness of the decedent is necessary.
• Respondent: pursuant NIRC, the amount of P10,022.47
should have been allowed the estate as a deduction,
because it represented an indebtedness of the decedent
incurred during his lifetime. In support thereof, they
offered in evidence a duly certified claim, presented to the
probate court in California by the Bank of California
National Association, which it would appear, that while still
living, Walter G. Stevenson obtained a loan secured by
pledge on of his shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother
Lode Mines, Inc.
• Approval in Philippine probate court of the indebtedness
is necessary because though it is true that we have here in
the Philippines only an ancillary administration in this case,
the distinction between domiciliary or principal
administration and ancillary administration serves only to
distinguish one administration from the other, for the two
proceedings are separate and independent. There is a
regular administration under the control of the court,
where claims must be presented and approved, and
expenses of administration allowed before deductions
from the estate can be authorized. Otherwise, we would
have the actuations of our own probate court, in the
settlement and distribution of the estate situated here,
subject to the proceedings before the foreign court over
which our courts have no control.
• Another reason for the disallowance of this indebtedness
as a deduction, springs from the provisions of NIRC:
(d) Miscellaneous provisions — (1) No deductions shall
be allowed in the case of a non-resident not a citizen of
the Philippines unless the executor, administrator or
anyone of the heirs, as the case may be, includes in the
return required to be filed under section ninety-three the
value at the time of his death of that part of the gross
estate of the non-resident not situated in the Philippines."
• In the case at bar, no such statement of the gross estate of
the non-resident Stevenson not situated in the Philippines
appears in the three returns submitted to the court or to
the office of the petitioner Collector of Internal Revenue.
The purpose of this requirement is to enable the revenue
officer to determine how much of the indebtedness may
be allowed to be deducted
• In other words, the allowable deduction is only to the
extent of the portion of the indebtedness which is
equivalent to the proportion that the estate in the
Philippines bears to the total estate wherever situated.
Stated differently, if the properties in the Philippines
constitute but 1/5 of the entire assets wherever situated,
then only 1/5 of the indebtedness may be deducted. But
since, as heretofore adverted to, there is no statement of
the value of the estate situated outside the Philippines, no
part of the indebtedness can be allowed to be deducted.
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Dispositive: WHEREFORE, as modified in the manner
heretofore indicated, the judgment of the lower court is
hereby affirmed in all other respects not inconsistent herewith.
No costs. So ordered.
PCIB v. Escolin – DODOT
Board of Commissioners on Immigration and Deportation vs.
Dela Rosa
May 31, 1991; Bidin J
Summary: The Board (CID) commenced deportation
proceedings against William Gatchalian, an alleged Chinese
citizen, for violation of the Immigration Act. The Board claims
that Gatchalian is an alien because the alleged marriage of his
grandfather, Santiago, a Filipino, to Chu Gim Tee in China, as
well as the marriage of his father, Francisco to Ong Chiu Kiok
in China, were not supported by any evidence nor was there
any showing what the laws of China were. The Board claims
that for the marriages to be valid in the Philippines, it should
have been shown that they were valid under the laws of China.
Hence, Santiago’s children, including Francisco, followed the
citizenship of their mother, having being born outside of a
valid marriage.
Doctrine: In the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign
laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as
those of the Philippines. The testimonies of Santiago and
Francisco before the Philippine consular regarding their
marriages are not self-serving, but are admissible as evidence
as statements regarding family reputation or tradition in
matters of pedigree. Referring to marriages contracted
abroad, Art. 26 of the Family Code provides that all marriages
performed outside of the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were performed, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country. Bearing in
mind the processual presumption, he who asserts that
marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden of proof
to present the foreign law.
FACTS:
• On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of
William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following
the citizenship of his natural mother, Marciana
Gatchalian. Before the Citizenship Evaluation Board,
Santiago testified that he has five (5) children with his
wife Chu Gim Tee, namely: Jose Gatchalian, Gloria
Gatchalian, Francisco Gatchalian, Elena Gatchalian
and Benjamin Gatchalian. Francisco is William’s
father.
• On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve-
year old minor, arrived in Manila from Hongkong with
other relatives. They had with them Certificates of
Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine
Consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram
bearing the signature of the then Secretary of Foreign
 Affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as
Filipino citizens.
• After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry
rendered a decision dated July 6, 1961, admitting
William Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino
citizens.
• On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners,
after a review motu proprio of the proceedings had in
the Board of Special Inquiry, reversed the decision of
the latter and ordered the exclusion of, among
others, respondent Gatchalian. A warrant of exlusion
was issued on the same date.
• Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as well as
the others covered by the July 6, 1962 warrant of
exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board
of Special Inquiry.
• On March 15, 1973, Acting Commissioner Nituda
issued an order reaffirming the July 6, 1961 decision
of the Board of Special Inquiry thereby admitting
respondent Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and
recalled the warrant of arrest issued against him
• On June 7, 1990, the acting director of the NBI wrote
the Secretary of Justice recommending that
respondent Gatchalian along with the other
applicants covered by the warrant of exclusion dated
July 6, 1962 be charged with violation of the
Immigration Act.
• In response, Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with the RTC presided by public
respondent Dela Rosa.
o The Board filed a MTD, which the RTC
denied. Hence, this petition with the SC.
• Petitioners argue that: 1) the RTC has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case, appellate
jurisdiction being vested with the CA; 2) assuming the
RTC has jurisdiction, it acted with GAD in preempting
their exercise of authority and jurisdiction to hear and
determine the deportation case
• Gatchalian argues the following: 1) petitioners have
no jurisdiction to proceed with the deportation case
until the courts shall have finally resolved the question
of his citizenship; 2) the grounds for which he is
sought to be deported has prescribed.
ISSUE: WON Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen? Yes.
RATIO:
Jurisdiction
• BP 129 does not provide that exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the CA extends to all quasi-judicial
agencies. The quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions
are exclusively appealable to the Court of Appeals
are those which under the law are specifically
appealable to the CA. BP 129 vests the RTC with
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, etc.
• It is true that the Bureau of Immigration has the
exclusive authority to try and hear cases against an
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alleged alien, and determine his citizenship. And a
mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the
Board of its jurisdiction in deportation proceedings
(Miranda vs. Deportation Board). However, this rule
admits an exception, at least insofar as deportation is
concerned. When evidence submitted by a
respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to
immediate review should also be recognized and the
courts should promptly enjoin the deportation
proceedings. If he is a citizen and evidence thereof is
satisfactory, there is no justice in allowing the
deportation proceedings to continue. (Chua Hiong vs.
Deportation Board).
Propriety of remand to the RTC
• Petitioners argue that the case should be remanded
to the RTC to determine his citizenship, but the SC
decided otherwise.
• The SC deem it proper to decide the case at this
instance. And this course of action is not without
precedent for "it is a cherished rule of procedure for
this Court to always strive to settle the entire
controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or
branch to bear the seeds of future litigation.
Citizenship
Petitioners argue that Gatchalian’s alienage has been
settled by the SC in Arocha and Vivo cases, but the majority
disagrees. The SC did not squarely pass on the any question of
citizentship, much less that of William who was not a party in
the said cases.
• Neither can it be argued that the Board of
Commissioners' decision (dated July 6, 1962) finding
respondent's claim to Philippine citizenship not
satisfactorily proved, constitute res judicata. For one
thing, said decision did not make any categorical
statement that respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese.
Secondly, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply
to questions of citizenship (Labo vs. Commission on
Elections)
• In order that the doctrine of res judicata may be
applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be
present: 1) a person's citizenship must be raised as a
material issue in a controversy where said person is a
party; 2) the Solicitor General or his authorized
representative took active part in the resolution
thereof, and 3) the finding or citizenship is affirmed by
this Court.
• a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose
of executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of
arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for
purposes of investigation only, as in the case at bar, is
null and void for being unconstitutional.
• There should be no question that Santiago
Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, is a
Filipino citizen. As a matter of fact, in the very order of
the BOC of July 6, 1962, which reversed the July 6,
1961 BSI order, it is an accepted fact that Santiago
Gatchalian is a Filipino
 o In the sworn statement of Santiago
Gatchalian before the Philippine Consul in
Hongkong, he reiterated his status as a
Philippine citizen being the illegitimate child
of Pablo Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian,
the latter being a Filipino; that he was born
in Manila on July 25, 1905; and that he was
issued Philippine Passport on November 18,
1960 by the Department of Foreign Affairs in
Manila. In his affidavit of January 23, 1961,
Santiago reiterated his claim of Philippine
citizenship as a consequence of his petition
for cancellation of his alien registry which
was granted on February 18, 1960 in C.E.B.;
and that on July 20, 1960, he was recognized
by the Bureau of Immigration as a Filipino
and was issued Certificate No. 1-2123
Important PRIL issue:
• Petitioners, on the other hand, claim that respondent
is an alien. In support of their position, petitioners
point out that Santiago Gatchalian's marriage with
Chu Gim Tee in China as well as the marriage of
Francisco (father of William) Gatchalian to Ong Chiu
Kiok, likewise in China, were not supported by any
evidence other than their own self-serving testimony
nor was there any showing what the laws of China
were. It is the postulate advanced by petitioners that
for the said marriages to be valid in this country, it
should have been shown that they were valid by the
laws of China wherein the same were contracted.
There being none, petitioners conclude that the
aforesaid marriages cannot be considered valid.
Hence, Santiago's children, including Francisco,
followed the citizenship of their mother, having been
born outside of a valid marriage. Similarly, the validity
of the Francisco's marriage not having been
demonstrated, William and Johnson followed the
citizenship of their mother, a Chinese national.
• Since his admission as a Filipino citizen in 1961,
respondent William Gatchalian has continuously
resided in the Philippines. He married Ting Dee Hua
on July 1, 1973 with whom he has (4) minor children.
The marriage contract shows that said respondent is a
Filipino. He holds passports and earlier passports as a
Filipino He is a registered voter of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila where he has long resided and exercised his
right of suffrage. He engaged in business in the
Philippines since 1973 and is the director/officer of
the International Polymer Corp. and Ropeman
International Corp. as a Filipino. He is a taxpayer.
Respondent claims that the companies he runs and in
which he has a controlling investment provides
livelihood to 4,000 employees and approximately
25,000 dependents. He continuously enjoyed the
status of Filipino citizenship and discharged his
responsibility as such until petitioners initiated the
deportation proceedings against him.
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• In Miciano vs. Brimo, this Court held that in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a
particular subject are presumed to be the same as
those of the Philippines. In the case at bar, there
being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage,
there arises the presumption that it is the same as
that of Philippine law.
• The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot
be blamed on Santiago Gatchalian much more on
respondent William Gatchalian who was then a
twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as records indicate,
Santiago was not pressed by the Citizenship
Investigation Board to prove the laws of China
relating to marriage.
• Neither was Francisco Gatchalian's testimony
subjected to the same scrutiny by the Board of
Special Inquiry.
• Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian
and Francisco Gatchalian before the Philippine
consular and immigration authorities regarding their
marriages, birth and relationship to each other are not
self-serving but are admissible in evidence as
statements or declarations regarding family
reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree (Sec. 34,
Rule 130).
• Furtheremore, this salutary rule of evidence finds
support in substantive law.
• Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis,
adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid
where celebrated is valid everywhere. Referring to
marriages contracted abroad, (now Art. 26 of the
Family Code) provides that "(a)ll marriages performed
outside of the Philippines in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were performed,
and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country . . ."
• And any doubt as to the validity of the matrimonial
unity and the extent as to how far the validity of such
marriage may be extended to the consequences of
the coverture is answered by Art. 220 of the Civil
Code in this manner: "In case of doubt, all
presumptions favor the solidarity of the family.
Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward
the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the
marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the
community of property during marriage, the authority
of parents over their children, and the validity of
defense for any member of the family in case of
unlawful aggression." Bearing in mind the
"processual presumption" enunciated inMiciano and
other cases, he who asserts that the marriage is not
valid under our law bears the burden of proof to
present the foreign law.
• Having declared the assailed marriages as valid,
respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship
of his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child
of the latter. Francisco, in turn is likewise a Filipino
being the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who
 (the latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose
Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau
of Immigration in an order dated July 12, 1960.
• William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino
citizens contemplated under Sec. 1, Article IV of the
Constitution, which provides:Sec. 1. The following are
citizens of the Philippines:(1) Those who are citizens of
the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
Dissenting Opinion of J. Felicano:
The claim of William Gatchalian to Philippine citizenship
rests upon three (3) premises, to wit:
a. that Santiago Gatchalian was a Philippine citizen;
b. the supposed filiation of Francisco Gatchalian as a
legitimate son of Santiago Gatchalian, which leads to the
intermediate conclusion that Francisco was a Philippine citizen;
and
c. the supposed filiation of William Gatchalian as a
legitimate son of Francisco Gatchalian leading to the final
conclusion that William Gatchalian is a Philippine citizen
1. the Supposed Philippine citizenship of Santiago:
a. the basic claim of Santiago was that his
mother Maricana Gatchalian was a Philippine
citizen and she was not lawfully married to
Pablo Pacheco. Consequently, Santiago was
an illegitimate son of Marciana.
b. The Order granting the cancellation of
Santiago’s ACR failed to give any weight to
the presumption in law in favor of marriage,
a presumption significantly reinforced by the
parental consent given by Maxima
Gatchalian to the marriage of her daughter
Marciana Gatchalian to one Pablo C.
Pacheco. A related presumption is that in
favor of the legitimacy of offspring born of a
man and woman comporting themselves as
husband and wife.
2. The claim that Francisco was the legitimate son of
Santiago, therefore followed the Philippine citizenship
of Santiago. This premise as in fact two (2) parts: (a)
the physical filiation of Francisco Gatchalian as the
son of Santiago Gatchalian; and (b) that Santiago
Gatchalian was lawfully married to the Chinese
mother of Francisco Gatchalian.
a. Santiago Gatchalian claimed to have been
married in China in 1926 to a Chinese
woman, Chua Gim Tee, out of which
marriage Francisco was allegedly born. No
documentary proof of such marriage in
China, whether primary or secondary, was
ever submitted. Neither was there ever
presented any proof of the contents of the
Chinese law on marriage in 1926 and of
compliance with its requirements.
b. It is firmly settled in our jurisdiction that he
who asserts and relies upon the existence of
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a valid foreign marriage must prove not
only the foreign law on marriage and
the fact of compliance with the
requisites of such law, but also the
fact of the marriage itself.
c. In the instant case, there was absolutely no
proof other than Santiago's bare assertion
that a marriage ceremony between Santiago
and Chua Gim Tee had taken place in China
in accordance with Chinese law. The
contents of the relevant Chinese law on
marriage at the time of the supposed
marriage, was similarly not shown. Should it
be assumed simply that the requirements of
the 1926 Chinese law on marriage are
identical with the requirements of the
Philippine law on marriage, it must be
pointed out that neither Santiago nor
Francisco Gatchalian submitted proof
that any of the requirements of a
valid marriage under Philippine law
had been complied with.
d. The reliance in the majority opinion upon our
conflicts rule on marriage embodied in
Article 71 of the Civil Code (now Article 26 of
the Family Code; then Section 19 of Act No.
3630) is unwarranted. The rule that a foreign
marriage valid in accordance with the law of
the place where it was performed shall be
valid also in the Philippines, cannot begin to
operate until after the marriage performed
abroad and its compliane with the
requirements for validity under the marriage
law of the place where performed, are first
shown as factual matters. There is, in other
words, no factual basis for a presumption
that a lawful marriage under Chinese law had
taken place in 1926 in China between
Santiago Gatchalian and Chua Gim Tee.
3. The supposed filiation of William as legitimate son of
Francisco, which resulted in William’s following the
citizenship of Francisco:
a. Here again, just in the case of Francisco,
there is complete absence of documentary
evidence of the supposed filiation of William
as a legitimate son of Francisco. The only
support presented consisted of merely oral
statements of Santiago, Francisco and
William.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Guerrero
Petitioners: Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or
Chemical Bank (the Bank)
Respondent: Rafael Ma. Guerrero
Topic: Proof of Foreign Law
Foreign Element/s: The bank account is governed by New
York law per stipulation.

Brief Facts: Guerrero filed a complaint for damages against
the Bank. The Bank answered that by stipulation New York law
governs the bank account and New York law does not permit
Guerrero’s claims except actual damages. The Bank moved for
Partial Summary Judgment contending that the trial should be
limited to the issue of actual damages. An affidavit of a New
York attorney, authenticated by the Philippine Consular Office,
supported the Motion. RTC denied the Motion and CA
sustained the denial. SC affirmed.
Doctrine: There can be no summary judgment where
questions of fact are in issue or where material allegations of
the pleadings are in dispute. The resolution of whether a
foreign law allows only the recovery of actual damages is a
question of fact since foreign laws do not prove themselves in
our courts. Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like
any other fact, they must be alleged and proven.
FACTS
• Guerrero filed a complaint for damages against the
Bank seeking payment of damages allegedly for (1)
illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on
his checking account with the Bank; (2) a returned
check worth $18,000 due to signature verification
problems; and (3) unauthorized conversion of his
account.
• The Bank filed its Answer alleging, inter alia, that by
stipulation Guerrero’s account is governed by New
York law and this law does not permit any of
Guerrero’s claims except actual damages.
• The Bank filed a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment seeking the dismissal of Guerrero’s claims
for consequential, nominal, temperate, moral,
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees, and
contending that the trial should be limited to the
issue of actual damages.
o The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York
attorney, supported the Motion. It stated
that Guerrero’s New York bank account
stipulated that the governing law is New
York law and that this law bars all of
Guerrero’s claims except actual damages.
The Philippine Consular Office in New York
authenticated the affidavit.
o Guerrero opposed the motion.
• RTC Manila denied the Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.
• CA sustained the RTC and ruled that the affidavit
does not serve as proof of the New York law and
jurisprudence. It considered the New York law and
jurisprudence as public documents (Rule 132, Section
19), and must be proved following the procedure in
Rule 132, Section 24.
o CA clarified that the affidavit is not the
supporting affidavit referred to in (old) Rule
34, Section 2 (which would allow the Bank to
move with the supporting affidavit for partial
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summary judgment in its favour) that would
prove the lack of genuine issue between the
parties. The Bank must still comply with the
procedure to prove foreign law.
ISSUES/RATIO
1. W/N Summary Judgment is proper – NO
a. The parties’ pleadings show that there are
genuine issues of fact that necessitate formal
trial. Facts are asserted in Guerrero’s complaint
while specific denials and affirmative defences
are set out in the Bank’s answer.
b. The Bank’s motion for partial summary judgment
as supported by the affidavit does not
demonstrate that Guerrero’s claims are sham,
fictitious, or contrived. On the contrary, the
affidavit shows that the facts and material
allegation as pleaded by the parties are disputed
and there are substantial triable issues
necessitating a formal trial.
c. There can be no summary judgment where
questions of fact are in issue or where material
allegations of the pleadings are in dispute. The
resolution of whether a foreign law allows only
the recovery of actual damages is a question of
fact since foreign laws do not prove themselves
in our courts. Foreign laws are not a matter of
judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proven. The conflicting allegations
as to whether New York law or Philippine law
applies to Guerrero’s claims present a clear
dispute on material allegations which can be
resolved only by a trial on the merits.
2. W/N the affidavit may be used to prove that New York law
bars the claims for damages other than actual – NO
a. Under Rule 132, Section 24, the record of public
documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal
may be proved by (1) an official publication
thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody thereof. It must be
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting
officer has the legal custody thereof. The
certificate may be issued by any of the authorized
Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept,
and authenticated by the seal of his office. The
attestation must state, in substance, that the
copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific
part thereof, and must be under the official seal
of the attesting officer.
b. The Bank cannot rely on the exception in
Willamette Iron v. Muzzal or CIR v. Fisher. These
cases involved attorneys testifying in open court
during trial in the Philippines and quoting the
particular foreign laws sought to be established.
On the other hand, the affidavit in this case was
 taken abroad ex parte and the affiant never
testified in open court. It cannot be considered
as proof of New York law not only because it is
self-serving but also because it does not state the
specific New York law on damages.
c. The affidavit states conclusions from the affiant’s
personal interpretation and opinion of the facts
of the case vis-à-vis the alleged laws and
jurisprudence without citing any law in particular.
The citations of various US decisions do not
constitute proof of the official records or
decisions of the US courts. The attached copies
of the US court decisions do not comply with
Rule 132, Section 24 on proof of official records
or decisions of foreign courts. The Bank has only
alleged, but has not proved, what New York law
and jurisprudence are on the matters at issue.
3. W/N Guerrero failed to show the need for a trial on his
claims – NO
a. Rule 35, Section 3 of the old Rules did not make
the submission of an opposing affidavit
mandatory: “x x x The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. x x
x”
b. The Bank had the burden of proving New York
law and jurisprudence even if Guerrero did not
present an opposing affidavit. As the party
moving for summary judgment, the Bank has the
burden of clearly demonstrating the absence of
any genuine issue of fact and that any doubt as
to the existence of such issue is resolved against
the movant.
c. Guerrero need not file an opposing affidavit
because his complaint itself controverts the
matters set forth in the Bank’s motion and
affidavit. A party should not be made to deny
matters already averred in his complaint.
Walton v. Arabian American Oil Company – Frank, Circuit
Judge
Petitioner: Leo Walton
Respondent: Arabian American Oil Company
Concept: Proof of foreign law
Digest by Kat
Brief Facts: Walton, an American citizen, was injured in Saudi
Arabia, where he was a transient. He sued Arabian American
Oil Company in America but did not allege Saudi law in his
complaint or prove it during trial. TC ruled against him.
Doctrine: The burden was on Walton to allege and prove
Saudi law, not on AAOC.
FACTS:
1. Walton, a citizen and resident of Arkansas was seriously
injured when an automobile he was driving collided with a
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truck owned by AAOC, driven by one of its employees.
This took place in Saudi Arabia. Walton was there
temporarily.
2. AAOC was incorporated in Delaware, licensed to do
business in New York, and engaged in extensive business
activities in Saudi Arabia.
3. Walton's complaint did not allege pertinent Saudi Arabian
law, nor did he prove or offer to prove it in at the trial.
4. But under well-established NY decisions, AAOC was
negligent and therefore liable.
5. The trial judge, saying he would not take judicial notice of
Saudi Arabian law, ruled in favor of AAOC.
ISSUE: Should the judge have taken judicial notice of Saudi
Arabian law? (NO)
RATIO:
− In NY decisions, the substantive law applicable to an
alleged tort is the law of the place where the alleged tort
occurred. To hold otherwise would be to interfere with the
authority of the foreign sovereign.
− Where suit is brought in an American court by an
American plaintiff against an American defendant,
complaining of alleged tortious conduct by the defendant
in a foreign country, and that conduct is tortious according
to the rules of the forum, the court, in some
circumstances, should apply the forum's tort rules.
− “Mechanical jurisprudence” - the invariable reference to
the law of the place where the alleged tort happened
− A court, particularly with reference to torts, where conduct
in reliance on precedents is ordinarily absent, should not
perpetuate a doctrine which, upon re-examination, shows
up as unwise and unjust.
− The general federal rule is that the law of a foreign country
is a fact which must be proved. However, under Federal
Rules of Civ Pro, a federal court must receive evidence if it
is admissible according to the rules of evidence of the
state in which the court sits.
− But where comprehension of foreign law is, to say the
least, not easy, then according to the “somewhat narrow
interpretation” of the NY statute by the NY courts, a court
"abuses" its discretion under that statute perhaps if it
takes judicial notice of foreign "law" when it is not
pleaded,and surely does so unless the party, who would
otherwise have had the burden of proving that "law," has
in some way adequately assisted the court in judicially
learning it.
− Walton: The case involves rudimentary tort principles that
the judge should have presumed that these were
recognized in Saudi Arabia.
− Court: In countries where the common law does
not prevail, our doctrines relative to negligence, and
to a master's liability for his servant's acts, may well
not exist or be vastly different. Walton had the
burden to prove Saudi Arabian law.
− This conclusion seems unjust (parties are Americans,
Walton was only a transient, AAOC has extensive
 operations in Saudi and is in a far better position to
find out about the law there) but under the NY
decisions, Walton has the burden, which he did not
discharge.
− Walton: Saudi has no law or legal system and no courts,
only a dictatorial monarch. It's basically “uncivilized”. The
lex loci does not apply "where a tort is committed in an
uncivilized country" or in one "having no law that civilized
countries would recognize as adequate."
− If such were the case, the NY courts should apply the
substantive law of the country which is most closely
connected with the parties and their conduct, which would
be American law, but Walton has not offered any data
showing that Saudi is “uncivilized”.
− At the pre-trial hearings, the question of proving Saudi law
was discussed. When the case came on for trial, Judge
Bicks said that Walton had the burden of proving foreign
law. When Walton's counsel said he was not prepared,
Judge Bicks proposed to adjourn long enough to allow
Walton to prepare such proof.
− When the hearing resumed, Walton's counsel did not wish
to prove the foreign law and wanted no adjournment. He
chose to rely on the applicability of the NY law.
− Since Walton deliberately refrained from establishing an
essential element of his case, the complaint was properly
dismissed.
− It is inappropriate to remand the case for Walton to have a
chance because he already had ample opportunity to
prove Saudi law.
DISPOSITIVE: Affirmed.
LEARY v. GLEDHILL - Vanderbilt, C.J. (Supreme Court of New
Jersey)
Appellant: Thomas Leary
Respondents: William Gledhill
Brief Facts: Leary and Gledhill are US citizens. While in
France, Gledhill told Leary that he needed money. After
returning to his base in Germany, Leary mailed a check
payable to the Gledhill's order without indicating the purpose
of the money. Gledhill never paid Leary. TC ruled in favor of
Leary.
Doctrine: Courts do not dismiss an action for a failure to
plead and prove the applicable foreign law as they would have
dismissed it for a failure to prove other material facts necessary
to establish a cause of action. It was deemed an issue of fact to
be pleaded and proved as other material facts had to be.
FACTS:
1. Leary and Gledhill were friends who had become
acquainted while in the military service. They met in
1943. They corresponded but did not meet again until
1948, when the defendant visited the plaintiff in
Germany where he was stationed. Gledhill was no
longer in the military service but was in Europe
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attempting to sell tractors for the Franam
Corporation.
2. Prior to the trip in Europe, Gledhill had corresponded
with the plaintiff with reference to an investment in
the Franam Corporation. Their correspondence
resulted in the Leary purchasing $1,000 worth of stock
when the Gledhill went to see him in Germany.
3. Gledhill had left the United States with $500 in his
possession and after arriving in Europe had been in
constant need of money to meet his expenses. In
1949, Leary visited Gledhill in Paris where Leary was
told that that Gledhill needed about $4,000 and that
he could raise about $2,000 by selling his Cadillac car.
Gledhill asked Leary to help him, but there was no
mention about selling to Leary the shares of stock.
4. After returning to his base in Germany, Leary mailed a
check payable to the Gledhill's order for $1,500
without indicating on the check or in the
accompanying letter what the money was for. Gledhill
endorsed the check and converted it into traveller’s
check.
5. Parties did not see each other again. Leary had made
many attempts to see Gledhill after they both had
returned to the US, seeking him at his home and
calling him on the telephone at various times, but
always without success.
6. The plaintiff instituted this suit against the defendant
on two counts, the first for $1,000 and the second for
$1,500. The first count was voluntarily dismissed.
a. At the trial the plaintiff testified that the
check for $1,500 was a personal loan to the
defendant but this the defendant denied,
contending that he had never borrowed any
money from the plaintiff.
b. Gledhill moved to dismiss on the ground
that the plaintiff's proofs were insufficient,
there being no promise to repay, no
demand for repayment, and no pleading or
proof of the law of France where the
transaction occurred. This motion was
denied.
7. TC held that it would not take judicial notice of the
law of France. Hence, trial proceeded, first, on the
presumption that the law involving loans is the same
there as in other civilized countries, and, secondly, on
the ground that the issue with respect to the law of
France had not been set forth in the pretrial order.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in
the sum of $1,500, and from the judgment entered
thereon the defendant took this appeal.
ISSUES:
1. WON the rules of law for a foreign country must be
pleaded and proved as facts along with the other
elements of a cause of action to enable a Leary to recover
against the Gledhill? Yes.
2. WON the rules of law of a foreign country are a question
of fact to be determined by the jury? No. It is to be
determined by the court.
RATIO:
1. Under the common law of England as adopted in this
country this common law rule had two great disadvantages; it
made every jury pass on questions of law quite beyond its
competence and the decision of the jury as to the foreign law
was unappealable at common law as were its findings on all
questions of fact.
Courts do not dismiss an action for a failure to plead and
prove the applicable foreign law as they would have dismissed
it for a failure to prove other material facts necessary to
establish a cause of action. It was deemed an issue of fact to
be pleaded and proved as other material facts had to be.
Accordingly, the courts frequently indulged in one or another
of several presumptions:
a. that the common law prevails in the foreign jurisdiction;
b. that the law of the foreign jurisdiction is the same as the law
of the forum, be it common law or statute;
c. that certain fundamental principles of the law exist in all
civilized countries.
d. As a fourth alternative, instead of indulging in any
presumption as to the law of the foreign jurisdiction, the courts
would merely apply the law of the forum as the only law before
the court on the assumption that by failing to prove the foreign
law the parties acquiesce in having their controversy
determined by reference to the law of the forum, be it
statutory or common law.
By the application of these various presumptions the courts
have in effect treated the common law rule that foreign law
could not be noticed but must be pleaded and proved as if it
were a matter of fact merely as a permissive rule whereby
either party could, if it were to his advantage, plead and prove
the foreign law. Thus the failure to plead and prove the foreign
law has not generally been considered as fatal.
In New Jersey, in the absence of proof as to the applicable
foreign law, the courts have frequently applied the
presumption that the common law exists in the foreign
jurisdiction. The presumption as to the existence of the
common law in a foreign jurisdiction is equally applicable in
cases involving other common law countries such as England in
the absence of proof to the contrary.
While the application of the presumption that the common
law exists in the foreign jurisdiction works well in many cases, it
does not produce sound results in a case where the common
law on the subject involved has been substantially changed by
statute here and in the foreign state. If a case involved the
capacity of a married woman to contract or to hold and convey
property, resort to the common law to decide the case might
well result in a decision contrary to long established statutory
enactments here and in the foreign jurisdiction altering the
common law rule. In a proper case, consideration might well
be given to rejecting it in favor of the presumption that the
foreign law is the same as the law of the forum, be it statutory
or common law, or even more preferable, in favor of the
presumption that the parties by their failure to plead and
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prove the foreign law acquiesce in the application of the law of
the forum as the only law before the court.
In the instant case the transaction occurred in France. New
Jersey Courts may properly take judicial knowledge that
France is not a common law, but rather a civil jurisdiction. It
would, therefore, be inappropriate and indeed contrary to
elementary knowledge to presume that the principles of the
common law prevail there. This does not mean, however, that
the plaintiff must fail in his cause of action because of the
absence of any proof at the trial as to the applicable law of
France. In these circumstances any one of the other three
presumptions may be indulged in5.
The court below based its decision upon the presumption
that the law of France in common with that of other civilized
countries recognizes a liability to make repayment under the
facts here present, and its decision is not without substantial
merit in reason and support in the authorities. The utilization of
this presumption has decided limitations, however, for in many
cases it would be difficult to determine whether or not the
question presented was of such a fundamental nature as
reasonably to warrant the assumption that it would be similarly
treated by the laws of all civilized countries. The
presumption that in the absence of proof the parties acquiesce
in the application of the law of the forum, be it statutory law or
common law, does not present any such difficulties for it may
be universally applied regardless of the nature of the
controversy. In the instant case, the rights of the parties are to
be determined by the law of New Jersey which unquestionably
permits recovery on the facts proven.
In certain cases, there might be present factors which
would make it unreasonable for the court to indulge in any
presumption and where the court in the exercise of its sound
discretion might require proof of applicable foreign law to be
laid before the court, but such is certainly not the situation
here. The defendant is in no way prejudiced by the application
of the law of this State. If he had desired to raise an issue as to
the foreign law, he might have done so in his answer or at the
pretrial conference or, with permission of the court, at the trial
itself, and himself have introduced proof as to the law of
France.
2. This contention is without merit here, for in all cases in which
the court, in the absence of proof, indulges in a presumption
as to the applicable foreign law the question is perforce one
for the court rather than for the jury.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is denied.
Digest by: Kiko del Valle
B. Judicial Notice and Foreign Law
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5
, i.e., that the law of France is the same as the law of the forum;
that the law of France, like all civilized countries, recognizes certain
fundamental principles, as, e.g., that the taking of a loan creates an
obligation upon the borrower to make repayment; that the parties by
failing to prove the law of France have acquiesced in having their
dispute determined by the law of the forum.

In the matter of the petition of Yee Bo Mann for Philippine
citizenship (1949) – Reyes, J.
Petitioner: Yee Bo Mann
Oppositor: Republic of the Philippines
Brief facts: Yee Bo Mann was born in China of Chinese
parents, but resided and had his family in Cebu, Philippines.
He studied, worked, and had his business in the Philippines.
Also, his children who are still in secondary education are
enrolled in schools located in Cebu. When asked why he
wanted to become a Filipino citizen, he said that he already
stayed in the country for so long, had many Filipino friends
who he loves and love him back. CFI granted his petition but
an appeal was filed by the Government on the allegation that
he has failed to declare his intention to become Filipino citizen
one year before is filing of petition. Also, the Government
raised the argument that petitioner has failed to prove at the
trial that the laws of China permit Filipinos to naturalize in that
country. The SC granted his petition, his case falling under the
exception from the one year requirement stated above – this is
because Yee Bo Mann’s children are enrilled in Philippine
schools. Also, admitted in evidence is a copy of the Chinese
Naturalization law as certified by the proper consulate.
Doctrine: Applicants for naturalization who have resided
continuously in the Philippines for 30 years or more before the
filing of their petition are exempted from the requirement to
declare their intention to become Filipino citizens one year
before the applcation, provided that they have given primary
and secondary education to all their children in the public
schools or in private schools recognized by the Government
and not limited to any race or nationality.
Foreign elements:
• Born in China
• With Chinese parents who had become naturalized
US citizens
• Married to an Amerizan citizen born in Hawaii
• Daughter partly studied in Hong Kong and partly in
Cebu
• Chinese naturalization law
Facts:
• Yee Bo Mann
o Born in China with Chinese parents, who
became naturalized US citizens
• Immigrated to the Philippines in 1915 and resided in
Cebu since then. In Cebu, Yee Bo Man attended
school, finished commerce, worked as a public
accountant and is a general merchant and purchasing
agent. Also, he speaks and writes in English and in the
Visayan dialect. He was never charged with a crime
involving moral turpitude
• He then married Helen Leu, an American citizen. They
had two children, Nellie and Philip.
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o Nellie partly studied in Hong Kong and
partyl in Cebu (St. Theresa’s College, private
school)
o Philip studied in a public school in Cebu
• In his petition for naturalization, he stated that he
wanted to become a Filipino citizen because “I have
been here so long, I was educated here, I have so
many Filipino friends and I love them and they love
me too. Also, he has decided to spend the rest of his
life in the Philippines.
• CFI granted his petition.
• Government filed an appeal raising the following
arguments:
o Petitioner has failed to declare his intention
to become a Filipino citizen one year before
the filing of his petition
o Failure to prove at the trial that the laws of
China permit Filipinos to naturalize in that
country
Issue: WON petitioner shall be naturalized (Yes)
Ratio: Case at bar falls under the exception from the
requirement stated in Sec. 5 Revised Naturalization Law
• General rule: Sec. 5 – requires an applicant for
naturalization to declare his intention to become a
Filipino citizen one year before the application
• Exception: Sec. 6
o Those who have resided continuously in the
Philippines for 30 years or more before the
filing of their application, provided that the
applicant has given primary and secondary
education to all his children in the public
schools or in private schools recognized by
the Government and not limited to any race
or nationality
o SC explained, as already stated in Rafael Roa
Yrostorza vs RP, that not both primary and
secondary edication by all children are
required; enrollment in the proper school is
sufficient compliance already.
o The case at bar comes within the same
ruling, since his children are actually studying
in school albeit they have not yet finished
secondary education.
• Also, petitioner has presented in evidence a
translation of the Chinese naturalization law certified
to be correct by the Chinese Consulate General in
Manila. Also, the SC has already accepted it as a fact
in previous naturalization cases that the laws of China
permit Filipinos to naturalize in that country.
Disposition: Appealed decision is affirmed.
Delgado v. Republic
Appellee: Luis Delgado
Appellant: Republic of the Philippines
Topic: Judicial Notice and Foreign Law
Brief facts: A Spanish citizen Delgado who has resided in the
PH for more than 10 years was admitted to PH citizenship by
CFI Iloilo. The Government appeals saying that the evidence
presented by Delgado was not competent proof of foreign
legislation.
Doctrine: Since SC has taken cognizance of Spanish law,
Spanish Civil Code and allied legislation, they only determined
WON the quoted provisions are the same as was written in the
testimonial given by the Spanish consul. When SC determined
they were the same, the SC held that the testimonial was
competent evidence.
FACTS:
1. Luis Gutierrez Delgado (Spaniard), residing in PH since
1927 was admitted to PH citizenship by Judge Tacinco (Iloilo
CFI) by proper application
2. This case is the appeal of the Government
3. At the hearing of application, the fiscal objected because
Delgado had not submitted his "Declaration of Intention" one
year before and failed to demonstrate that the Spanish laws
permit the naturalization of PH citizens
4. CFI overruled the objection and made findings that:
a. Delgado came from Azules, Spain where he was born in
1908 and arrived in Manila in Oct 12, 1927 via the 'Blas de
Lezo'.
b. Delgado settled in Visayas Islands became a clerk in a
hacienda in Negros, then a mechanic for the newsprint 'La
Editorial' in Iloilo City and later on as manager of the 'National
Press'
c. Ten years later, in Oct 1937, Delgado married Paz
Gonzales and had 3 children: Maria, Carmen and Jose Luis (the
first two are studying at Colegio de la Asuncion in Iloilo City)
d. For 21 years of staying in the PH, Delgado only went
abroad once in March 1947 on a business trip to Spain and
returned 2 months after
e. Delgado speaks and writes Castillian, English and Illongo
and conducted himself beyond reproach in his entire time of
residence in the country.
f. that Delgado is willing to absolutely give up his fidelity to
any country especially Spain
g. Delgado is not practicing polygamy, nor affiliated in any
association that inculcates doctrines contrary to Government,
nor advocates violence, nor was convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude, nor suffers from insanity or a contagious and
incurable disease.
h. Delgado's social relations with Filipinos shows his desire
to embrace the culture and ideals of the country
i. Delgado is a member of the Spanish Casino, the Rotary
Club of Iloilo and director of YMCA
5. SolGen contends that the court has (1) no sufficient
evidence to show that the petition for naturalization was
published in the Official Gazette as required by law; and (2)
evidence submitted by Delgado to prove Spanish
naturalization laws does not conform with PH rules
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ISSUE:
WON the Testimonial of the Consul-General of Spain is
competent evidence as proof of foreign legislation (YES)
RATIO:
YES. SC has taken cognizance of Spanish Law, the
Spanish Civil Code and allied legislation. Looking
into the statutes indicated, the Court finds that the
provisions of the Decrees quoted are exactly as
transcribed in the certificate.
- First contention cannot be sustained since it was not
raised in the trial court and it is not shown how the non-
publication prejudiced the Government
- To prove that according to Spanish laws Filipinos may
become Spanish citizens, Delgado submitted a Certificate of
the Consul-General of Spain in Manila which states that under
the laws of Spain he has the authority to accomplish
certifications as to Spanish legislation and that;
- According to Spanish legislation and Arts. 17 & 25 of the
Spanish Civil Code, Arts. 102 & 110 of the Civil Registration Act
decree of April 19, 1931 and order of March 9, 1939, there are
two means of acquiring Spanish citizenship:
- a: Obtaining naturalization
- b: By winning (obtaining) a permanent neighborhood
(residence) in any town in the Kingdom of Spain. This acts as a
direct government grant, without limitation of time and special
conditions
- The acquisition of nationality by (b) provides that:
1. A foreigner wins/ obtains a neighborhood (residence) by
the declaration and justification of the neighborhood where
the applicant established his residence as provided for under
Art. 17 of the Spanish Civil Code according to the rules and
conditions set out in the April 19, 1931 decree.
2. A foreigner who has resided for ten years in Spanish
territory is considered to have won a neighborhood (residence)
in Spain which may be attested to by any means set forth in
law.
3. Foreigners who have resided for more than 5 years in
Spain are also considered to have won a neighborhood if he
meets these additional conditions:
- a. married a Spanish woman
- b. introduced or developed in Spain an industry or
an invention of importance not previously implemented
- c. owns or is a director of any agricultural, industrial
exploitation or commercial establishment
- d. has provided distinguished services to Spanish
art, culture or national economy, or has markedly favored
Spanish interests
- SC found that the provisions of the decrees quoted are
exactly as transcribed in the Certificate, and that in accordance
therewith Filipinos may become Spanish citizens
DISPOSITIVE: Appealed decision affirmed.
Testate Estate of Bohanan v Bohanan, et al (1960) – Labrador, J
Appellees: Testate Estate of Bohanan, and Philippine Trust
Co.
Appellants: Magdalena C. Bohanan, Edward C. Bohanan,
and Mary Lydia Bohanan
Topic: Application of Foreign Law
FACTS:
1. The CFI of Manila admitted to probate a last will and
testament of Bohanan. In the said order the court found
that the testator selected Nevada as his domicile, and
therefore at the time of his death, he was a citizen of that
State. Thus, his will and testament, executed in
accordance with the laws of the State of Nevada, must be
admitted to probate.
2. It does not appear that the order granting probate was
ever questioned. Thus the executor, Philippine Trust Co.,
filed a project of partition. Out of the total estate, the
testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of all
shares of stock of several mining companies, and to his
brother and sister the same amount. To his children, he
gave a legacy of only P6,000 each.
3. In this case, the wife Magdalena Bohanan and her two
children question the validity of the testamentary
provisions disposing of the estate in the manner above
indicated, claiming that they have been deprived of their
legitime.
ISSUES:
1. WON Magdalena Bohanan was deprived of her legitime
(NO)
2. WON the two children were deprived of their legitime
(NO)
RATIO:
1. Magdalena was not deprived of her legitime.
a. The will has not given her any share in the estate. It is
argued that it was error for the TC to have recognized the
Reno divorce secured by the testator from his Filipino
wife, and that said divorce should be declared a nullity in
this jurisdiction.
b. The court below refused to recognize the claim of the
widow on the ground that the laws of Nevada, of which
the deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of all his
properties without requiring him to leave any portion of
his estate to his wife.
c. Besides, the right of Magdalena to a share had already
been passed upon adversely against her in an order which
had become final, as Magdalena does not appear to have
appealed therefrom.
a. The said former wife filed a motion to withdraw
P20k from the funds of the estate, chargeable
against her share in the conjugal property, and
the court in its said order found that there exists
no community property owned by the decedent
and his former wife at the time of the decree of
divorce was issued.
b. This decision of the court had become final.
d. Moreover, the court below had found that the testator and
Magdalena were married, and divorced 13 years after.
After 3 years, Magdalena married Carl Aaron, and this
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marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of the
testator.
e. Since no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a
divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada and since the
court below had already found that there was no conjugal
property, Magdalena can have no legal claim.
2. The two children were not deprived of their
legitime.
a. The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case
because the testator died in 1944, expressly provides that
successional rights to personal property are to be
governed by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question.
b. In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found
out and it was decided that the testator was a citizen of
the State of Nevada because he had selected this as his
domicile and his permanent residence.
c. It is not disputed that the laws of Nevada allow a testator
to dispose of all his properties by will. However, the law of
Nevada, being a foreign law, can only be proved in our
courts in the form and manner provided for by our Rules.6
d. We have, however, consulted the records of the case in
the court below and we have found that the foreign law in
question was introduced as evidence by appellants’
counsel. Also, the said law was presented by counsel for
the executor and admitted by the Court during the
hearing of the case. In addition, the other appellants, the
children of the testator, do not dispute the laws of the
State of Nevada.
e. Thus, the law of Nevada can be taken judicial notice of by
us, without proof of such law having been offered at the
hearing of the project of partition.
Zalamea v. Court of Appeals (1993) – Nocon, J
Petitioner: Spouses Cesar & Suthira Zalamea and Liana
Zalamea
Respondents: Transworld Airlines
Concept: Judicial Notice and Foreign Law
Digest by: Joyce Gamonnac
Doctrine:
The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking
has never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves
nor can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other
fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record,
or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such
officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary
of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6
Sec. 41. Proof of public or official record. – An official record or
entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. (Rule 123)
or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
FACTS:
1. Spouses Cesar and Suthira Zalamea, and their
daughter, Liana Zalamea, purchased three (3) airline
tickets from the Manila agent of respondent
TransWorld Airlines, Inc. (TWA) for a flight from New
York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984. The tickets of
the spouses were purchased at a discount of 75%
while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket.
2. All three tickets were confirmed in Manila and re-
confirmed in New York
3. While in New York, on June 4, 1984, the spouses
Zalamea and their daughter received a notice of
reconfirmation of their reservations for said flight.
4. On the appointed date, however, the spouses
Zalamea and their daughter checked in at 10:00 am,
an hour earlier than the scheduled flight at 11:00 am
but were placed on the wait-list because all the seats
were taken.
5. Mr. Zalamea was allowed to board the plane since he
was the one holding the full fare ticket. Mrs. Zalamea
and her daughter were constrained to purchase
tickets from another airline for their trip back to
Manila.
6. Upon their arrival in the Philippines, the spouses
Zalamea filed an action for damages based on breach
of contract of air carriage before the RTC of Makati
which rendered a decision in their favor ordering the
TWA to pay the price of the tickets bought from
American Airlines together with moral damages and
attorney’s fees.
7. On appeal, the CA held that moral damages are
recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a
breach of contract of carriage ONLY where there is
fraud or bad faith. Since it is a matter of record that
overbooking of flights is a common and accepted
practice of airlines in the United States and is
specifically allowed under the Code of Federal
Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board, neither
fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on
TWA.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in accepting the finding that
overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal
Regulations and in holding that there was no fraud or bad faith
on the part of TWA? YES the CA was in error
RATIO:
1. There was fraud or bad faith on the part of TWA when
it did not allow Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter to
board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of
confirmed tickets.
2. The US law or regulation allegedly
authorizing overbooking has never been
proved.
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a. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can
the court take judicial notice of them. Like any
other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
b. Written law may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officers having legal custody of the record, or by
his deputy and accompanied with a certificate
that such officer has custody.
c. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an
embassy or legation, consul-general, consul, vice-
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Phil. stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and
authenticated by the seal of his office.
3. IN THE CAB: TWA relied solely on the testimony of
its customer service agent in her deposition that the
Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics
Board allows overbooking.
a. Aside from said statement, no official publication
of said code was presented as evidence. Thus,
the CA’s finding that overbooking is specifically
allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations
has no basis in fact.
b. That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of
respondent airline when it did not allow
petitioners to board their flight for Los Angeles in
spite of confirmed tickets cannot be disputed.
4. Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations
does exist, the same is not applicable to the case at
bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci
contractus which require that the law of the place
where the airline ticket was issued should be applied
by the court where the passengers are residents and
nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such
State by the defendant airline. Since the tickets were
sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law
in this case would be Philippine law.
5. Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that
overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the
passengers concerned to an award of moral
damages. Where an airline had deliberately
overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive
some passengers of their seats in case all of them
would show up for check in.
a. For the indignity and inconvenience of being
refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said
passenger is entitled to an award of moral
damages.
b. This is so, for a contract of carriage generates a
relation attended with public duty --- a duty to
provide public service and convenience to its
passengers which must be paramount to self-
interest or enrichment.
6. Even on the assumption that overbooking is allowed,
TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not informing its
passengers beforehand that it could breach the
contract of carriage even if they have confirmed
tickets if there was overbooking.
 7. Moreover, TWA was also guilty of not informing its
passengers of its alleged policy of giving less priority
to discounted tickets.
8. Evidently, TWA placed self-interest over the rights of
the spouses Zalamea and their daughter under their
contract of carriage. Such conscious disregard make
respondent TWA liable for moral damages. And to
deter breach of contracts by TWA in similar fashion in
the future, the SC adjudged TWA liable for exemplary
damages, as well.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
MODIFIED to the extent of adjudging respondent TransWorld
Airlines to pay damages to petitioners in the following
amounts, to wit:
PCIB Escolin supra – RON
PCIB v. Escolin
Petitioner:
Respondent:
Concept: Judicial Notice and Foreign Law
Brief Facts:
ISSUE:
WON evidence of Texas Law was still needed (NO)
RATIO:
1. NO. Evidence of foreign law is not required
where there is no controversy among the parties
as to its contents and application.
− The general rule is that our courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws. They must be proven as a fact
with competent and relevant evidence.
− The exception is when “he said laws are already
within the actual knowledge of the court, such as
when they are well and generally known or they have
been actually ruled upon in other cases before it and
none of the parties concerned do not claim
otherwise.”
− However, in In Re Estate of Johnson, it was held that
even if the trial court proceeds to mistakenly take
judicial notice of a foreign law, such cannot be
overturned if, in the first place, there was no fact
stated in the pleadings submitted from which it would
appear that the foreign law in question is different
from what the court found.
− “It is implicit in the above ruling that when, with
respect to certain aspects of the foreign laws
concerned, the parties in a given case do not have
any controversy or are more or less in agreement, the
Court may take it for granted for the purposes of the
particular case before it that the said laws are as such
virtual agreement indicates, without the need of
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requiring the presentation of what otherwise would
be the competent evidence on the point.”
− In the case at bar, no such evidence were present in
the records and from the contentions of the parties.
Wildvalley v. CA – Buena, J.
Petitioner: Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd.
Respondent: Court of Appeals and Phil. President Lines Inc.
Concept: Choice of law
Digest by Kat
Brief Facts: A vessel owned by Phil. President Lines was in
the Orinoco River in Venezuela when it ran aground. Because
of that, a vessel owned by Wildvalley could not sail out.
Wildvalley filed a suit with the RTC of Manila, where it won, but
the CA reversed the judgment.
Doctrine: Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of them. They must be alleged and proved according to
the Rules of Court.
FACTS:
1. The Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine
President Lines, arrived in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to
load iron ore.
2. Upon completion and when the vessel was ready to leave
port, Ezzar del Valle Solarzano Vasquez, an official pilot of
Venezuela, was designated by the harbor authorities in
Puerto Odaz to navigate the PR through the Orinoco River
(150 miles long, takes 12 hours to navigate out of it).
3. The master of the PR, Capt. Nicandro Colon, was at the
bridge with Vasquez, the vessel's third mate (officer on
watch) and a helmsman when the PR left the port at 1:40
AM. Colon left the bridge.
4. The PR experienced vibrations when it entered the San
Roque Channel but the pilot just said that the vibration
was due to the shallowness of the channel.
5. At 4:12 AM, the vessel experienced vibrations again. The
watch officer called the master to the bridge.
6. Colon checked the position of the vessel; it was in the
middle of the channel. He ordered Simplicio Monis, Chief
Officer of the PR, to check all the double bottom tanks.
7. At 4:35 AM, the PR ran aground, obstructing the ingress
and egress of vessels. Because of that, the Malandrinon, a
vessel owned by Wildvalley, was unable to sail out of
Puerto Ordaz.
8. Wildvalley filed a suit with the RTC Manila against PPL and
Pioneer Insurance, underwriter/insurer of the PR for
damages amounting to $400k. The complaint against
Pioneer was dismissed.
9. Wildvalley had also filed a case in Middleburg, Holland,
which was related to the case in Manila, and caused the
arrest of the Philippine Collier, owned by the PPL. No
security for Wildvalley's clam was not given until after the
PC was arrested.
10. The RTC ruled in favor of Wildvalley. Both parties
appealed; Wildvalley contested the non-award of interest.
11. CA reversed the judgment.
ISSUES:
1. Is Venezuelan law applicable to the case? (YES)
2. Was there negligence on the part of PPL that would warrant
damages? (NO)
RATIO:
2. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction
and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of
them. They must be alleged and proved.
− Proving a written law falls under Rule 132, Sec. 247. An
unwritten law may be proved through the oral
testimony of expert witnesses, printed and published
books of reports of decisions of the courts of the
country if proved to be commonly admitted in such
courts.
− The court has interpreted Sec. 24 to include
competent evidence like the testimony of a witness to
prove the existence of a written foreign law.
− Williamette Iron & Steel Works v. Muzzal: The foreign
law is a matter of fact. You ask the witness what the
law is; he may, from his recollection, or on producing
and referring to books, say what it is.
− Capt. Oscar Leon Monzon, Assistant Harbor Master
and Chief of Pilots at Puerto Ordaz has held said
posts for 8 years and is in charge of designating pilots
for maneuvering and navigating the Orinoco River. He
is also in charge of the documents in the office of the
harbor masters. His competency in testifying on the
existence of the Reglamento General de la Ley de
Pilotaje (pilotage law of Venezuela) and the
Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del
Orinoco (rules governing the navigation of the
Orinoco River) is not disputed.
− However, the written laws were not proven in the
manner provided by Sec. 24.
− The Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje was
published in the Gaceta Oficial and the Reglamento
Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco published
in a book issued by the Ministerio de
Comunicaciones, but only photocopies were
presented. Both are considered public documents.
− For a copy of a foreign public document to be
admissible:
a. It must be attested by the officer having legal
custody of the records or by his deputy.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Sec. 24. Proof of official record. -- The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible
for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the
record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in
the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If
the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer
in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country
in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
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b. It must be accompanied by a certificate by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consular or consular agent
or foreign service officer, and with the seal of
his office.
− The latter requisite is intended to justify the giving of
full faith and credit to the genuineness of a document
in a foreign country.
− Capt. Monzon, who attested the documents, should be
the officer who had legal custody of those records. No
such certificate could be found.
− With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is
objectionable. Written law itself is the best evidence –
a duly authenticated copy of the statute.
− The Venezuelan law was not pleaded before the lower
court according to the complaint. A foreign law is
considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in
the pleading about the existence of the foreign law, its
import and legal consequence on the event or
transaction in issue.
(relevant part ends here)
3. There being no contractual obligation, PPL is obliged to
give only the diligence required of a good father of a
family in accordance with the provisions of Art. 11738 of
the Civil Code.
− The diligence of a good father of a family requires
only that diligence which an ordinary prudent man
would exercise with regard to his own property.
− PPL exercised such diligence when the vessel sailed
only after the "main engine, machineries, and other
auxiliaries" were checked and found to be in good
running condition, the master left the officer on watch
with an experienced pilot, and when the master
ordered the inspection of the vessel's double bottom
tanks when the vibrations occurred anew.
− The master remains the overall commander of the
vessel even when there is a pilot on board. He
remains in control of the ship as he can still perform
the duties conferred upon him by law despite the
presence of a pilot who is temporarily in charge of the
vessel. It is not required of him to be on the bridge
while the vessel is being navigated by a pilot. (Code
of Commerice and PPA Admin Order 03-85)
− The Orinoco River being a compulsory pilotage
channel necessitated the engaging of a pilot who was
presumed to be knowledgeable of every shoal, bank,
deep and shallow ends of the river.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in
the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of
the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the
provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to
be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good
father of a family shall be required.
 − In his deposition, Vasquez testified that he is an
official pilot in the harbor at Port Ordaz and he had
been a pilot for 12 years, with experience in
navigating the Orinoco River.
− The law provides that the master can overrule the
order or command of the harbor pilot on board. The
master of the PR deemed it best not to order the pilot
to stop maybe because the latter had assured him
that they were navigating normally before the
grounding.
− Licensed pilots, enjoying the emoluments of
compulsory pilotage, are in a different class from
ordinary employees, for they assume to have a skill
and a knowledge of navigation in the particular waters
over which their licenses extend superior to that of
the master; pilots are bound to use due diligence and
reasonable care and skill.
− The character of the skill and knowledge required of a
pilot in charge of a vessel on the rivers of a country is
very different from that which enables a navigator to
carry a vessel safely in the ocean. the pilot of a river
vessel, like the harbor pilot, is selected for the
individual's personal knowledge of the topography
through which the vessel is steered. The pilot of a
river vessel is selected for the individual's personal
knowledge of the topography through which the
vessel is steered.
− The grounding of the vessel is attributable to the
pilot. When the vibrations were first felt, Vasquez said
that they were in the middle of the channel and that
the vibration was a result of the shallowness of the
channel.
− If it is compulsive upon the master to take a pilot,
and, a fortiori, if he is bound to do so under penalty,
then, and in such case, neither he nor the owner will
be liable for injuries occasioned by the negligence of
the pilot.
− The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to the
case at bar because the circumstances surrounding
the injury do not clearly indicate negligence on the
part of PPL.
o The accident was of such character as to
warrant an inference that it would not have
happened except for defendant's
negligence. b. It must have been caused by
an agency or instrumentality within the
exclusive management or control of the
person charged with the negligence.
o It must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the
person injured.
- There was no negligence and the ship was not controlled
by the master or the owner, so the first two requisites are
absent.
- The Lloyds Register of Shipping confirmed that the vessel
was seaworthy in a Confirmation of Class. It is not required
that the vessel be perfect, as in this case where the top
side tank needed repairs.
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DISPOSITIVE: Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.
C. Exceptions to the Application of Foreign Law
a. Foreign Law is contrary to an important
public policy of the forum
Pakistan International Airlines v. Ople (1990) – Feliciano, J.
Petitioner: Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (“PIA”)
Respondents: Ethelynne Farrales and Maria Mamasig
(Private Respondents); Min. of Labor Ople and Dep. Min.
Leogardo (Public Respondents)
Concept: Exceptions to the Application of Foreign Law >
Foreign Law is Contrary to an Important Public Policy of the
Forum
PIA and the private respondents entered into an employment
contract in which it was agreed that the period of employment
was for a fixed period of 3 years and that employment may be
terminated by PIA either a month before the intended
termination or payment of one month’s salary in lieu thereof. It
was also agreed the laws of Pakistan would apply and that the
courts of Karachi, Pakistan would be the sole venue for the
settlement of disputes between the parties. The SC held that
these provisions were contrary to Philippine law for violating
security of tenure and for ousting Philippine agencies and
courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law.
Doctrine: Parties may not contract away applicable provisions
of law especially peremptory provisions dealing with matters
heavily impressed with public interest. The law relating to
labor and employment is clearly such an area and parties are
not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships
from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply
contracting with each other.
Foreign Elements:
There was partial performance of the contract abroad and it
was agreed in the employment contract that the laws of
Pakistan would apply and that the courts of Karachi, Pakistan
would be the sole venue for the settlement of disputes
between the parties
However, note that the employment contracts were executed
and partially performed in the Philippines, that the private
respondents are Philippine citizens and residents, that they
were based in the Philippines in between their assigned flights
to the Middle East and Europe, and that PIA is a foreign
corporation, but is licensed to do business (and actually doing
business) and hence resident in the Philippines.
FACTS:
1. Pakistan International Airlines ("PIA"), a foreign
corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines,
executed in Manila two (2) separate contracts of
employment with Farrales and Mamasig as flight
attendants. The terms of the contract are as follows:
 a. DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENALTY -
Three (3) years, but can be extended by the
mutual consent of the parties
b. TERMINATION - PIA reserves the right to
terminate this agreement at any time by giving
the EMPLOYEE notice in writing in advance one
month before the intended termination OR in
lieu thereof, by paying the EMPLOYEE wages
equivalent to one month's salary.
c. APPLICABLE LAW - This agreement shall be
construed and governed under and by the laws
of Pakistan, and only the Courts of Karachi,
Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction to consider
any matter arising out of or under this
agreement.
2. Farrales and Mamasig began training in Pakistan.
Aftewards, they began working as flight attendants, with
base station in Manila and flying assignments to different
parts of the Middle East and Europe.
3. One (1) year and four (4) months prior to the expiration of
the contracts of employment, PIA through Benares,
counsel/official of the local branch of PIA, sent letters to
Farrales and Mamasig advising both that their services as
flight stewardesses would be terminated pursuant to the
TERMINATION clause in their contracts.
4. Farrales and Mamasig filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and non-payment of company benefits and
bonuses, against PIA with the then-Ministry of Labor and
Employment (“MOLE”).
a. In PIA’s position paper, it was alleged that
both private respondents were habitual
absentees; that both were in the habit of
bringing in from abroad sizeable quantities
of "personal effects"; and that PIA personnel
at the Manila International Airport had been
discreetly warned by customs officials to
advise private respondents to discontinue
that practice. PIA further claimed that the
services of both private respondents were
terminated pursuant to the provisions of the
employment contract.
b. PIA did not submit any evidence to
substantiate its allegations.
5. MOLE Regional Director - Ordered the reinstatement
with full backwages or, in the alternative, the payment to
them of the amounts equivalent to their salaries for the
remainder of the fixed three-year period of their
employment contracts
a. Private respondents had attained the status
of regular employees after they had
rendered more than a year of continued
service; that the stipulation limiting the
period of the employment contract to three
(3) years was null and void as violative of the
provisions of the Labor Code and IRR on
regular and casual employment; and that the
dismissal, having been carried out without
the requisite clearance from the MOLE, was
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illegal and entitled private respondents to
reinstatement with full backwages.
6. MOLE Deputy Minister – Affirmed the Regional
Director save for the portion thereof giving PIA the option,
in lieu of reinstatement, to pay the private respondents
their salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of
the contracts
ISSUES:
WON MOLE has jurisdiction over the subject matter (YES)
WON petitioner's right to due process was violated (NO)
WON the relationship between the parties was governed by
their contract rather than by the Labor Code (NO)
RATIO:
YES. THE MOLE HAS JURISDICTION.
" PIA’s Argument: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
lodged in the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.
SC:
" At the time the complaint was initiated, the Regional
Director had jurisdiction because Article 278 of the Labor
Code, as it then existed, forbade the termination of the
services of employees with at least one (1) year of service
without prior clearance from the Department of Labor and
Employment:
" Rule XIV, Book No. 5 of the IRR, made clear that in case of
a termination without the necessary clearance, the
Regional Director was authorized to order the
reinstatement of the employee concerned and the
payment of backwages; necessarily, therefore, the
Regional Director must have been given jurisdiction over
such termination cases.
o Sec. 2 IRR: “Shutdown or dismissal without
clearance. -- Any shutdown or dismissal without
prior clearance shall be conclusively presumed to
be termination of employment without a just
cause. The Regional Director shall, in such case,
order the immediate reinstatement of the
employee and the payment of his wages from the
time of the shutdown or dismissal until the time
of reinstatement."
NO. PIA’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WAS NOT
VIOLATED.
" Petitioner was ordered by the Regional Director to submit
its position paper and evidence. Petitioner opted to rely
solely upon its position paper; thus it is assumed it had no
evidence to sustain its assertions. Thus, even if no formal
or oral hearing was conducted, it had ample opportunity
to explain its side.
" Petitioner PIA was also able to appeal his case to the
MOLE.
" At the time the complaint was filed by private respondents
and at the time the Regional Director issued his
questioned order, applicable regulation, as noted above,
specified that a "dismissal without prior clearance shall be
conclusively presumed to be termination of employment
without a just cause", and the Regional Director was
 required in such case to "order the immediate
reinstatement of the employee and the payment of his
wages from the time of the shutdown or dismissal until x x
x reinstatement".
o Under the then applicable rule, the Regional
Director did not even have to require submission
of position papers by the parties in view of the
conclusive (juris et de jure) character of the
presumption created by such applicable law and
regulation.
NO. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS
GOVERNED BY THE LABOR CODE.
" A contract freely entered into should be respected since a
contract is the law between the parties. The principle of
party autonomy in contracts is not, however, an absolute
principle.
o The rule in Article 1306, of our Civil Code is that
the contracting parties may establish such
stipulations as they may deem convenient
"provided they are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy".
" Counter-balancing the principle of autonomy of
contracting parties is the equally general rule that
provisions of applicable law, especially provisions
relating to matters affected with public policy,
are deemed written into the contract.
" The governing principle is that parties may not
contract away applicable provisions of law
especially peremptory provisions dealing with matters
heavily impressed with public interest. The law relating to
labor and employment is clearly such an area and parties
are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their
relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations
by simply contracting with each other.
The contractual provisions invoked by petitioner PIA are
inconsistent with applicable Philippine law and regulations.
Re: DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENALTY and
TERMINATION clauses
" The DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENALTY clause
is inconsistent with Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code
as they existed at the time the contract of employment
was entered into.
o Art. 280: “Security of Tenure. -- In cases of
regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for
a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An
employee who is unjustly dismissed from work
shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and to his backwages computed
from the time his compensation was withheld
from him up to the time his reinstatement.”
o Art. 281: “Regular and Casual Employment. –
“xxx An employment shall be deemed to be
casual if it is not covered by the proceeding
paragraph: provided, that, any employee who
has rendered at least one year of service,
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whether such service is continuous or
broken, shall be considered as regular
employee with respect to the activity in which
he is employed and his employment shall
continue which such actually exists.”
" A contract providing for employment with a fixed period is
not necessarily unlawful. The critical consideration is the
presence or absence of a substantial indication
that the period specified in an employment
agreement was designed to circumvent the
security of tenure of regular employees which is
provided for in Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code.
(Brent School v. Zamora)
o This indication must ordinarily rest upon some
aspect of the agreement other than the mere
specification of a fixed term of the employment
agreement, or upon evidence aliunde of the
intent to evade.
" When the DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENALTY
and TERMINATION clauses are read together, the fixed
period of three (3) years will be seen to have been
effectively neutralized by the provisions of TERMINATION
clause of that agreement.
o The TERMINATION clause took back from the
employee the fixed three (3)-year period
ostensibly granted by rendering such period in
effect a facultative one at the option of the
employer PIA.
o The net effect of the said clauses is to render the
employment of private basically employment at
the pleasure of PIA. They were intended to
prevent any security of tenure from accruing in
favor of private respondents even during the
limited period of three (3) years.
Re: APPLICABLE LAW clause
" The first part of cannot be invoked to prevent the
application of Philippine labor laws and regulations to the
subject matter of this case, i.e., the employer-employee
relationship between PIA and the private respondents.
o Their relationship is much affected with public
interest and that the otherwise applicable
Philippine laws and regulations cannot be
rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon
some other law to govern their relationship.
" The second part, specifying the Karachi courts as the sole
venue for the settlement of disputes between the
contracting parties, cannot be invoked as well.
o Even a cursory scrutiny of the relevant
circumstances of this case will show the
multiple and substantive contacts
between Philippine law and Philippine
courts, on the one hand, and the relationship
between the parties, upon the other show
that:
 ! The contract was not only executed in
the Philippines, it was also performed
here, at least partially
! Private respondents are Philippine
citizens and residents
! Petitioner, although a foreign
corporation, is licensed to do business
(and actually doing business) and hence
resident in the Philippines
! Private respondents were based in the
Philippines in between their assigned
flights to the Middle East and Europe.
o All the above contacts point to the Philippine
courts and administrative agencies as a proper
forum for the resolution of contractual disputes
between the parties. Under these circumstances,
the APPLICABLE LAW clause of the employment
agreement cannot be given effect so as to oust
Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction
vested upon them by Philippine law.
o PIA also did not undertake to plead and prove
the contents of Pakistan law on the matter; it
must therefore be presumed that the applicable
provisions of the law of Pakistan are the same as
the applicable provisions of Philippine law.

DISPOSITIVE: Affirmed.

b. Foreign law is procedural in nature

c. Issues are related to property (Lex Situs)
d. Foreign law pertains to revenue
e. Foreign law is penal in character
f. Foreign law is contrary to good morals
(contra bonus mores)
g. Application of the foreign law will work
injustice to the citizens of the forum
h. Application of the foreign law might
endanger the vital interests of the state
of the forum

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