March 15, 2017

24) G.R. No. 195021

NICOLAS VELASQUEZ and VICTOR VELASQUEZ, Petitioners 

vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, Ponente

FACTS

Spouses Jesus and Ana Del Mundo (Del Mundo Spouses) left their home to sleep in their nipa hut. Upon
arriving, the Del Mundo Spouses saw Ampong and Nora Castillo (Nora) in the midst of having sex in their
nipa hut. Aghast at what he perceived to be a defilement of his property, Jesus shouted invectives at
Ampong and Nora, who both scampered away. Jesus decided to pursue Ampong and Nora. Jesus went
to the house of Ampong's aunt, but neither Ampong nor Nora was there. He began making his way back
home when he was blocked by Ampong and his fellow accused. Without provocation, petitioner Nicolas
hit the left side of Jesus' forehead with a stone. Petitioner Victor also hit Jesus' left eyebrow with a stone.
Accused Felix did the same, hitting Jesus above his left ear. Accused Sonny struck Jesus with a bamboo,
hitting him at the back, below his right shoulder. Ampong punched Jesus on his left cheek. The accused
then left Jesus on the ground, bloodied.

Jesus testified on his own ordeal. The prosecution also presented the testimony of Maria Teresita Viado
(Maria Teresita) who saw the accused mauling Jesus from a vantage point.

According to the accused, Jesus, who was supposedly inebriated, vented his ire upon Nicolas and the
other accused, as well as on Mercedes. The accused thus responded and countered Jesus' attacks,
leading to his injuries.

The Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City found petitioners and Felix Caballeda guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of attempted murder in relation to Article 6, of the Revised Penal Code.

The Court of Appeals found that petitioners and Caballeda were only liable for serious physical injuries
because "first, intent to kill was not attendant inasmuch as the accused-appellants, despite their
superiority in numbers and strength, left the victim alive and, second, none of the injuries or wounds
inflicted upon the victim was fatal

The accused petitioners pray that the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals be
reversed and set aside, and that they be absolved of any criminal liability. Petitioners insist on their
version of events, particularly on how they and their co-accused allegedly merely acted in response to
Jesus Del Mundo's aggressive behavior.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to prove justifying circumstance existed in this case?
2. Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to convict the petitioners?

RULING:

1. No, petitioners' entire defense rests on proof that unlawful aggression originated from Jesus.
 However, petitioners offered nothing more than a self-serving, uncorroborated claim that Jesus
appeared out of nowhere to go berserk in the vicinity of their homes. They failed to present
independent and credible proof to back up their assertions.

The Court takes judicial notice of the big difference in the physical built of the private complainant
and accused. Private complainant is shorter in height and of smaller built than all the accused.
The said accused could have had easily held the private complainant, who was heavily drunk as
they claim, and disarmed him without the need of hitting him.

Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and

competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself.

Even if it were to be granted that Jesus was the initial aggressor, the beating dealt to him by
petitioners and their co-accused was still glaringly in excess of what would have sufficed to
neutralize him. It was far from a reasonably necessary means to repel his supposed aggression.
Petitioners thereby also failed in satisfying the second requisite of self-defense and of defense of
a relative.

38. Bernardo Lacanilao vs. Hon. Court of Appeals; G.R. No. L-34940; 27 June 1988.
Facts

The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 found the petitioner, a policeman, guilty of homicide for the death
of one Ceferino Erese, and was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision
mayor, as the minimum, to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as the
maximum, to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P20,000.00, and to pay the costs. The
petitioner subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a decisionthat the accused, the
petitioner herein, acted in the performance of a duty but that the shooting of the victim was not the
necessary consequence of the due performance thereof, therefore, crediting to him the mitigating
circumstance consisting of the incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty.

Thus, the respondent court lowered the penalty merely by one period applying Article 64, paragraph 2, of
the same Code, appreciating as it did incomplete justification (incomplete fulfillment of duty or lawful
exercise of right or office) as a mere generic or specific mitigating circumstance lowering the penalty to
the minimum period. Accordingly, the penalty originally imposed by the Court of First Instance of Manila
was modified and lowered by the Court of Appeals to six years and one day of prision mayor, as the
minimum, to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum. 4

Issues

Whether or not the Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code can be applied under the circumstance of
incomplete fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a right?

Ruling

The respondent Court erred. Incomplete justification is a special or privileged mitigating circumstance,
which, not only can not be offset by aggravating circumstances but also reduces the penalty by one or
two degrees than that prescribed by law. Articulating the basis of the special or privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete justification, expressly provides for its applicability to the instances
enumerated in Article 11, on Justifying Circumstances, and Article 12, on Exempting Circumstances, of
the Revised Penal Code, when not all of the conditions required to justify the act or to exempt from
criminal liability are present. Unquestionably, the present case would have fallen under No. 5 of Article
11 5 if the two conditions therefor, viz.: (1) that the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office and (2) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary
consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office, concurred.
But here only the first condition is fulfilled; the second is wanting. Consequently, Article 69 is applicable,
for the requirement "that the majority of such conditions be present" is immaterial since there are only two
conditions in order that the circumstance in No. 5 of Article 11 may be taken into account. Basic is the rule
that penal laws in favor of the accused should be given liberal construction without, of course, going
beyond the obvious intention of the legislature. Article 69 is, obviously, in favor of the accused as it
provides for a penalty lower than that prescribed by law when the crime committed is not wholly
justifiable, the intention of the legislature being to mitigate the penalty by reason of the diminution of either
freedom of action, intelligence, or intent, or of the lesser perversity of the offender.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.. The petitioner is hereby SENTENCED to an indeterminate

penalty of from two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional, to eight years and one day
of prision mayor. The questioned judgment is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
39.

G.R. Nos. 149430-32             February 23, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, 

vs.
CARMELO CATBAGAN, appellant.

PANGANIBAN, Artemio., ponente

FACTS:

After receiving complaints about the gunshots coming from the residence of Danilo Lapidante, who was
then was celebrating his birthday, appellant Carmelo Catbagan, an investigator of the Criminal
Investigation Service, Philippine National Police, went to the latter’s house to verify who among their
group had been firing the Armalite rifle. Suddenly, a piece of stone was hurled from the direction of the
celebrant’s house, hitting Catbagan. Irritated, he ordered his companion, Zosimo Pavabier, to look for the
one who threw the stone. At that moment, Sgt. Celso Suico of the Philippine Air Force and of the
Presidential Security Group, the one responsible for firing the shots, approached and extended his hand
towards Catbagan as he introduced himself. Completely ignoring the gesture of the latter, Catbagan drew
out his .9mm automatic pistol and fired successively at Suico. Ernesto Lacaden, companion of Suico, who
was abruptly awakened as the shots were fired, disembarked from the parked owner-type jeep where he
was sleeping. Unexpectedly, two shots were also fired at him by Catbagan. Almost simultaneously,
Catbagan directed his attention to Lapidante who was then inside their compound and running towards
the main door of their house upon the prompting of his wife to evade the assailant. But before he could
reach the safety of their abode, two rapid shots were fired by Catbagan, one of which hit him in the upper
part of his body. As a consequence of the injuries they sustained, Suico and Lapidante died, whereas
Lacaden had to be treated and confined in the hospital.

In his defense, Catbagan argued that he was justified in shooting the victims, as he was merely defending
himself and fulfilling his sworn duties. He claimed that the victims were rushing and encircling him,
Lacaden toting an ice-pick while Suico drew a gun from his waist and aimed the pistol at him.
Simultaneously, he heard Lapidante shouting, which he believed was asking for a long gun. Threatened
of his safety, he drew his own gun fired at the aggressors. He then surrendered himself and his firearms
to his superior officer at the CIDG Office. The lower court, nonetheless, convicted him with the crime of
homicide, murder, and frustrated murder.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the appellant was justified in shooting the victims as a direct result of his fulfillment of a
duty.
2) Whether or not the appellant was entitled to a justifying circumstance of self-defense.
3) Whether or not the appellant was entitled to a mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

RULING:

1) No. Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides that a person who acts in the fulfillment of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office does not incur any criminal liability, provided that the
following requisites must concur: 1) the accused must have acted in the performance of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office; and 2) the injury caused or the offense committed should have been
the necessary consequence of such lawful exercise. In the instant case, the above mentioned requisites
were absent. The appellant was not performing his duties at the time of the shooting as there was no
proof that he had personal knowledge on who had been firing the Armalite, nor he was there to effect an
arrest. The fatal injuries that he inflicted on the victims were not a necessary consequence of the
performance of his duty as a police officer.

2) No. Article 11 of the RPC provides that anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights do not incur
criminal liability, provided that the following circumstances concur: 1) unlawful aggression; 2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and 3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself. In the circumstances surrounding the shooting of Suico, only a majority of
the elements of self-defense were present. However, he may still be credited with a mitigating
circumstance in accordance with Article 13 of the RPC. With regard to the circumstances surrounding the
shooting of Lapidante and Lacaden, no unlawful aggression was shown. Thus, the justifying circumstance
of self-defense will not apply.

3) Yes. In order for voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the following elements must concur: 1)
the offender has not been actually arrested; 2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority;
and 3) the surrender was voluntary. It is sufficient that that act be spontaneous and clearly indicative of
the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally. At the time of his surrender, appellant had not
actually been arrested. He surrendered himself and his firearm to a person in authority, the chief of the
Assistant Directorate for Intelligence of the Philippine National Police. Finally, the surrender was voluntary
and spontaneous; it thus showed intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities. Thus, he was
credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE:

1. There can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed
unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense.

40. Rufino Mamangan vs. People of the Philippines; G.R. No. 149152; 2 February 2007.

Facts:
Policeman (PO2) Rufino Mamangun was responding to a robbery-holdup call, with his fellow police
officers, at Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan. A certain Liberty Contreras was heard shouting,
which prompted residents to respond and chase the suspect, who entered the yard and proceeded to
the rooftop of Antonio Abacan.  Mamangun, with PO2 Diaz and Cruz, each armed with a drawn
handgun, searched the rooftop and saw a man who they thought was the robbery suspect.
Mamangun, who was ahead of the group, fired his gun once and hit the man, who turned out to be
Gener Contreras (not the suspect) – Contreras died of the gunshot wound.

According to the lone witness Crisanto Ayson, he accompanied the policemen to the lighted rooftop.
He was beside Mamangun when he (Ayson) recognized the deceased. According to Ayson,
Mamangun pointed his gun at the man, who instantly exclaimed “Hindi ako, hindi ako!” to which
Mamangun replied, “Anong hindi ako?” and shot him.

The defense rejects this testimony, alleging that they were the only ones at the dark rooftop when
Mamangun noticed a crouching man who suddenly continued to run. Mamangun shouted “Pulis,
tigil!” whereupon the person stopped and raised a steel pipe towards Mamangun’s head. This
prompted Mamangun to shoot the person. The three police claim that Contreras only said “Hindi
ako, hindi ako” only when they approached him. Mamangun then asked “Why did you go to the
rooftop? You know there are policemen here.” Mamangun reported the incident to the desk officer
who directed investigator Hernando Banez to investigate the incident. Banez later on found a steel
pipe on the roof.

 
Issue:
W/N the death of the victim was the necessary consequence of the petitioner’s fulfillment of his duty
 
Held:
No. The Court denies the instant petition and affirms Sandiganbayan’s decision after finding the
petitioner’s testimony to be nothing but a concocted story designed to evade criminal liability. Per
Sandiganbayan’s observations, the defense was self-serving for the accused and biased with respect
to his co-policemen-witnesses because:
1. After supposed introductions and forewarnings uttered allegedly by Mamangun, it is
contrary to human experience for a man (who is not the suspect) to attack one of three
policemen with drawn guns
2. Mamangun’s admission that he did not ask the victim “Why did you try to hit me, if you are
not the one?” clearly belies their claim
3. The location of the entry of bullet belies their claim because it appears that the victim
instinctively shielded himself instead
Additionally, petitioner’s pretense that Contreras struck him was not initially reported to the desk
and was only conveniently remembered when the investigator found a pipe in the crime scene.

Acts in the fulfillment of duty and self-defense does not completely justify the petitioner’s firing the
fatal gunshot. The element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim was absent, which leads
to the failure of the petitioner’s plea. Also, there can only be incomplete justification (a privileged
mitigating circumstance) in the absence of a necessary justifying circumstance the injury was caused
by necessary consequence of due performance of duty.

Facts
That on or about the 31st day of July 1992, in the Municipality of Meycauyan, (sic) Province
of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
Rufino S. Mamangun, a public officer, being then a Police
Officer (PO2), duly appointed as such and acting in relation to his office, armed with a gun,
with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery,
evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, attack, assault and shoot one Gener
M. Contreras with the said gun, hitting the latter on his body, thereby inflicting (sic) him
serious physical injuries which directly cause (sic) his death.
Issues:
petitioner is charged with the burden of adducing convincing evidence to show that the
killing was done in the fulfillment of his duty as a policeman.
Ruling:
Self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, cannot be appreciated as a valid justifying
circumstance in this case. For, from the above admitted, uncontroverted or established
facts, the most important element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim to... justify
a claim of self defense was absent.  Lacking this essential and primary element of unlawful
aggression, petitioner's plea of self-defense, complete or incomplete, must have to fail.
To be sure, acts in the fulfillment of a duty, without more, do not completely justify the
petitioner's firing the fatal gunshot at the victim.  True,  petitioner,  as  one  of  the policemen
responding to a reported robbery  then
 in progress, was performing his duty as a police officer as well as when he was trying to
effect the arrest of the suspected robber and in the process, fatally shoot said suspect,
albeit the wrong man.  However, in the absence of the equally necessary justifying...
circumstance  that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the
due performance of such duty, there can only be incomplete justification, a privileged
mitigating circumstance under Articles 13 and 69 of the Revised Penal Code.
There can be no quibbling that there was no rational necessity for the killing of Contreras. 
Petitioner could have first fired a warning shot before pulling the trigger against Contreras
who was one of the residents chasing the suspected robber.
41 Luis Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, et al.
G.R. Nos. 103501-03; 17 February 1997

Adolfo Peralta vs. Sandiganbayan, et al.

G.R. No. 103507; 17 February 1997.

Facts:
Petitioners Tabuena and Peralta were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having
malversed the total amount of P55 Million of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA)
funds during their incumbency as General Manager and Acting Finance Services Manager.
President Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the
president's office and in cash what the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) owes the
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), which is pursuant to the memorandum of
then Minister Trade and Industry Roberto Ongpin. According to the Petitioners, it is "out of the
ordinary" and "not based on the normal procedure". Tabuena agreed and about a week later,
he received from the private secretary of Pres. Marcos a Presidential Memorandum dated
reiterating such verbal instruction. With compliance to President Marcos' verbal instruction and
memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo G. Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, released P 55
Million of MIAA funds by means of three (3) withdrawals. It was only upon delivery of the P5
Million that Mrs. Gimenez issued a receipt for all the amounts she received from Tabuena.

Petitioners Tabuena and Peralta were charged for malversation of funds, while Gerardo
G. Dabao remained at large. Tabuena claimed that he was merely complying with the MARCOS
Memorandum and he acted in good faith. Sandiganbayan rejected this claim. Thus, it was
raised in the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court was struck by the way the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the
questioning of a defense witness and of the accused themselves. There is no impediment for
the SC to consider such matter as additional basis for a reversal since the settled doctrine is
that an appeal throws the whole case open to review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate
court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from whether they are
made the subject of assignments of error or not.

Issue:
1. Whether or not Petitioner were denied due process by the active participation of the
Sandiganbayan Justices in questioning the witnesses.

Held:
1. Yes. The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge" requirement of due process was certainly
denied in Tabuena and Peralta when the court assumed the dual role of magistrate and
advocate. The majority believes that the interference by the Sandiganbayan Justices
was just too excessive that it cannot be justified under the norm applied to a jury trial, or
even under the standard employed in a non-jury trial where the judge is admittedly given
more leeway in propounding questions to clarify points and to elicit additional relevant
evidence.
42. G.R. No. 138203 - July 3, 2002

LILIA J. VICOY, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

The Court finds the accused Lilia Vicoy y Jumagdao guilty for violation of City Ordinance No.
365-B for peddling fish outside the Agora Public Market, and for Resistance and Serious
Disobedience To Agents Of A Person In Authority.On the same date, August 24, 1995,
petitioner filed an application for probation.4 On September 18, 1995, however, petitioner filed a
motion to withdraw her application for probation and simultaneously filed a notice of appeal.5

In an Omnibus Order the MTCC of Tagbilaran granted petitioner's withdrawal of her application
for probation but denied her notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration of the denial of her appeal, however, the same was denied.Hence,
petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch
3, contending that the MTCC of Tagbilaran gravely abused its discretion in denying her the right
to appeal.. The parties were ordered by the court to submit their memorandum within 10 days,
after which, the case was submitted for judgment on the pleadings.7

The RTC denied the reconsideration of order of dismissal due to the petitioner’s non-compliance
to furnish the Office of the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran copies of the questioned judgment and
their memorandum, and for the City Prosecutor to submit within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, his memorandum or any pleading on the matter

Issue: Whether or not the petition for certiorari was validly dismissed by the Regional Trial Court
on the ground of petitioner's failure to comply with its Order dated August 2, 1996.

Ruling

In the case at bar, the trial court categorically directed petitioner, in its August 2, 1996 Order, to
furnish the City Prosecutor's Office with a copy of her memorandum and of the assailed
judgment. Petitioner's counsel did not comply, prompting the court to dismiss the petition for
certiorari on February 9, 1998. Every court has the power to enforce and compel obedience to
its orders, judgments, and processes in all proceedings pending before it.11 The Regional Trial
Court's dismissal of petitioner's special civil action, therefore, was but a valid exercise of said
power.

Moreover, even assuming that the Regional Trial Court did not order the said dismissal,
petitioner's special civil action, questioning the denial of her notice of appeal, would still fail.
Note that petitioner filed an application for probation. Section 7, Rule 120, of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure is explicit that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final when the
accused has applied for probation. This is totally in accord with Section 4 of Presidential Decree
No. 968 (Probation Law of 1976, as amended), which in part provides that the filing of an
application for probation is deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.12 Thus, there was no more
opportunity for petitioner to exercise her right to appeal, the judgment having become final by
the filing of an application for probation.
43 G.R. No. L-31563 January 16, 1930

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs. 
LUCIANO BARROGA Y SALGADO, Defendant-Appellant.

PONENTE: ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NORBERTO ROMUALDEZ

Governing Principle:
In order to exempt from guilt, obedience must be due, it must be a compliance with a lawful order not
opposed to a higher positive duty of a subaltern, and that the person commanding, act within the
scope of his authority.

FACTS:
Convicted of the crime of falsification of a private document, the defendant, Barroga, appeals
from the judgment  sentencing him to one year, eight months and twenty-one days of prision
correccional, .

The defendant freely admits that he prepared the falsified documents with full knowledge of their
falsity; but he alleges that he did so from data furnished by his immediate chief, the now
deceased Baldomero Fernandez, and only in obedience to instructions from him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Barroga is liable for the crime of falsification of private document.

RULING:

YES. Barroga is libable for the crime. With respect to the alleged instructions given by said
Baldomero Fernandez, even supposing that he did give them, and that the defendant
committed the crime charged inasmuch as such instructions were not lawful, they do not legally
shield the appellant, nor relieve him from criminal liability.
44

G.R. Nos. 111517-19 July 31, 1996

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
ROGER AUSTRIA Y NAVARRO  alias "BERNIE," accused-appellant.

FACTS:
On the 25th day of September 1989, in the morning, in Barangay Domalandan West, Lingayen,
Pangasinan - the appellant, who was the Samsons' next door neighbor, suddenly entered their house,
without their knowledge and consent, and proceeded to the room where Myrna and her two sons were
sleeping. He stabbed Myrna and Tyrone with a "balisong" several times. The victims managed to run
away but appellant chased them, continuing with the stabbing until Myrna fell dead by the stairs and
Tyrone in front of the altar, in the vacant third bedroom.
He then stabbed Mylene Samson in her dwelling. The accused having thus performed all the acts of
execution which would have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence but which, nevertheless,
did not produce by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, the timely medical
assistance rendered to said Mylene Samson which prevented her death, to her damage and prejudice.
Dr. Noel Manaois examined Mylene and found two (2) stab wounds, both of which were deep and could
have caused her death were it not for the timely medical attention given.
Appellant sought to establish the defense of insanity by presenting Dr. Constantine D. Della, a psychiatrist
at Baguio General Hospital, who examined and treated appellant on April 23, 1991 and who issued a
"Psychiatric Evaluation" dated November 14, 1991.
Appellant pleaded not guilty to each of the crimes charged in the foregoing Informations. The three cases
were tried jointly and on June 14, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the three (3) crimes of Murder on two (2) counts, defined and penalized of
Frustrated Murder, under Art 248 and in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, appellant argues, the trial court erred in presuming that he was mentally stable since being
released from confinement, as it was only the schizophrenic manifestations that disappeared - not the
disease itself. Thus, this present appeal.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the accused was insane at the time of the commission of the crime
RULING:
YES. The Court is convinced that the testimonial and documentary evidence marshalled in this case by
acknowledged medical experts have sufficiently established the fact that appellant was legally insane at
the time he committed the crimes. His previous confinements, as early as 1972, his erratic behaviour
before the assaults and Dr. Della's testimony that he was having a relapse all point to a man deprived of
complete freedom of will or a lack of reason and discernment that should thus exempt him from criminal
liability. However, he is still civilly liable under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code the accused must
make indemnification to the heirs of his victims, Myrna C. Samson and Tyrone Samson and to the victim
who survived, Mylene Samson., in the following amounts:
Since appellant is not criminally responsible, the aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of
superior strength are not applicable either.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Court ACQUITS appellant Roger Austria of the crimes of Murder and
Frustrated Murder by reason of insanity and he is ordered confined at the National Mental Hospital for
treatment until further notice. The Court further orders appellant to indemnify... the heirs of Myrna dela
Cruz Samson in the amount of P50,000.00, the heirs of Tyrone Samson in the same amount of
P50,000.00, and Mylene Samson in the amount of P40,000.00.

46
People of the Philippines vs. Alberto Medina
G.R No. 113691 February 6, 1998

Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the Philippines

Accused-Appellant: Alberto Medina y Catud

Facts:
June – October 1982, Medina was confined in the National Mental Hospital for schizophreniform
disorder, where he was subsequently released. Relatives say that his condition did not seem to improve.
He was referred to Dr. Adigue for further examinations. May 20, 1991, 11 pm, a party was attended by
both Dalisay and Medina, as well as Larry Andal, where the both Dalisay and Medina danced the chacha
together. Afterwards, Dalisay invited Andal to go home, with Dalisay walking in front of Larry. They were
waylaid by Medina who stabbed Dalisay. Dalisay fell down and the two grappled on the ground. Dalisay
was able to run away but he was chased and once more stabbed repeatedly by Medina. Andal was so
stunned that he wasn’t able to help Dalisay, who was brought DOA to the hospital.
The Trial Court convicted Medina of murder & said that his defense of insanity is not meritorious
since Dr. Adigue was not qualified as an expert witness, that his sister’s testimony didn’t constitute
sufficient proof of insanity, and that he was actually mentally agile during trial.

Issues:
1. Whether or not medina was insane therefore exempt from criminal liability.
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in not appreciating Medina’s voluntary surrender

Rulings:

1. No. The decision was not based on the qualifications of Dr. Adigue as a doctor but as a
witness. What mattered was the failure of Dr. Adigue’s testimony to establish the legal insanity of Medina
as shown in the results of the tests she conducted which merely says that Medina has a mild depression
and emotional disturbances. The testimony also did not establish the complete deprivation of reason on
Medina’s part. Art. 12, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, requires a complete deprivation of rationality in
committing the act; i.e., that the accused be deprived of reason, that there be no consciousness of
responsibility for his acts, or that there be complete absence of the power to discern. The presumption of
law, per Art. 800 of the Civil Code, always lies in favor of sanity, and, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, every person is presumed to be of sound mind. The defense of insanity or imbecility must be
clearly proved. Hence, in the absence of positive evidence that the accused had previously lost his
reason or was demented moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, the courts will always
presume that he was in a normal state of mind. Care must be taken to distinguish between insanity or
lack of reason and failure to use reason or good judgment due to extreme anger or passion. Moral
insanity or mere mental depravity – results not from the disease of the mind but from a perverted
condition of the moral system; person is sane and is not exempted from the criminal liability.
2. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should have been credited in favor of the
appellant. The solicitor general concurs and notes that appellant, after having earlier given himself up to a
certain Col. Faltado, surrendered at midnight on May 20, 1992, or about an hour after the stabbing
incident, to Wilfredo Sevillano, former desk officer of the Batangas City Police Station. Hence, the
evidence sufficiently established the elements of voluntary surrender, namely: (1) the offender has not
been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or an agent of a person in
authority; and (3) his surrender was voluntary.
47

G.R. No. 216671, October 03, 2016

JERWIN DORADO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
On April 15, 2004, at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening, Ronald was talking to his friends
Raniel, Delon Busar, Annan Luna, Jerome Amergo and a certain Erwin (Ronald's group) along
A. Reyes Street, Lower Bicutan, Taguig. At that very time, Dorado, carrying a sumpak, and his
friends, Confessor and Cabiaso (Dorado's group), arrived and threw stones and bottles at
Ronald's group. Ronald's group scampered for shelter toward the talipapa and hid inside to
avoid being hit by the stones and bottles. When Ronald thought that Dorado's group was no
longer-in the vicinity, they came out of hiding. Dorado's group, however, was out there waiting
for them. When they finally surfaced, Dorado's group resumed throwing stones at Ronald's
group. During the commotion, Dorado fired his sumpak and hit Ronald between the eyes.
Ronald fell unconscious for about ten (10) minutes while Dorado's group ran away. Thereafter,
Ronald was brought to the Rizal Medical Center by Raniel and Delon Busan. The RTC,
nevertheless, appreciated the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority in Dorado's favor as
he was still a minor at the time of the incident. It, however, stated that Dorado was not entitled to
a suspension of sentence because he was above twenty-one (21) years old at the time of the
pronouncement of guilt. Aggrieved, Dorado elevated an appeal before the CA but his motion
was denied by the CA in its assailed resolution.

ISSUES:
WON THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF
THE PETITIONER WHO IS A MINOR FOR THE CRIME CHARGED.

RULING:
The Court finds merit in the petition. After a judicious study of the records, the Court finds that
the prosecution did not make an effort to prove that Dorado, then a sixteen (16)-year old minor,
acted with discernment at the time of the commission of the crime. The RTC decision simply
stated that a privileged mitigating circumstance of minority in favor of Dorado must be
appreciated as it was proven that he was a minor at the time of the incident. Glaringly, there
was no discussion at all on whether Dorado acted with discernment when he committed the
crime imputed against him. Discernment cannot be presumed even if Dorado intended to do
away with Ronald. Discernment is different from intent. Considering that there was no
determination of discernment by the trial court, the Court cannot rule with certainty that Dorado
was criminally responsible.
G.R. No. 199875               November 21, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
EDWIN ISLA Y ROSSELL, Accused-Appellant.

Edwin Isla,the accused, entered the house of AAA and poked a knife on her neck and pulled her
inside the bedroom. Isla placed himself on top of her and had carnal knowledge with her. A knife
was pointed at her while Isla was performing the act.

After Isla was done raping AAA, she found out that she was stabbed with the knife. She tried to take
hold of the knife while shouting for help. In response, Isla struck her the second time. The knife fell to
the floor.and she was able to get hold of it. She threw it outside the broken window. Thereafter, Isla
scampered out of the house through the backdoor.

AAA was taken to the hospital for medical attention and was confined there for five (5) days.

Examination was conducted to AAA , she sustained eleven (11) body injuries, An examination of
AAA’s sexual organ showed congestions and abrasion in the labia minora and yielded negative
result on the presence of spermatozoa. AAA’s attending physician, Dr. Perez, on the other hand,
testified that she had multiple stab wounds on the left side of the chest. He concluded that the stab
wounds were severe and fatal which could have led to AAA’s death had it not been for the timely
medical attendance..

For the defense, accused Edwin Isla was presented together with two (2) psychiatric doctors who
examined him.Isla never denied that he raped AAA on July 21, 1997. Invoking the defense of
insanity.

Dr. Villacorta and Dr. Villacorta testified that Isla was suffering from a major depressive disorder with
psychotic features which impaired his mental faculties.Dr. Villacorta, however, could not say with
definite certainty or not Isla was suffering from such mental disorder on July 21, 1997 as there was
no examination conducted on Isla on the said date. 7

Ruling of the RTC

On April 26, 2004, the RTC convicted Isla of the crimes of rape and frustrated murder. It did not give
credence to his defense of insanity because it noted that Isla committed the crimes charged during a
lucid interval. He knew that what he was doing was unlawful. There was no indication that he was
deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of will when he committed all the acts attending the
commission of the crime. The RTC gave no weight to the assertion of the defense that, based on the
evaluations made by the doctors from NCMH, Isla was suffering from psychosis since 1992. It was
of the impression that there was nothing in the testimony of these expert witnesses that Isla was
suffering from psychosis long before the incident. On this note, his condition could not be equated
9 

with imbecility; hence, he could not be exempt from criminal liability. Thus, the RTC ruled in this
wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment in these cases is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. Q-97-72079, the Court finds accused Edwin Isla y Rosell GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE as defined and penalized under Art. 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, and hereby SENTENCES him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
 perpetua and to indemnify complainant AAA the amount of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity
ex delicto, the amount of Php50,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the cause of suit.

2. In Criminal Case No. Q-97-72078, the Court finds accused Edwin Isla y Rosell GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder and hereby SENTENCES him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum,
and to indemnify complainant the sum of P10,000.00 for actual damages, and to pay the
cause of suit.

SO ORDERED. 10

Ruling of the CA

Aggrieved, Isla interposed an appeal with the CA. On December 17, 2010, the CA denied the appeal
and affirmed the RTC decision which found Isla to have acted with discernment when he committed
the crimes.According to the CA, Isla exactly knew that what he was doing was evil so much so that
he had to employ cunning means, by discreetly closing the windows and the door of the house and
by resorting to threats and violence, to ensure the consummation of his dastardly deed. The fact that
he scampered away after AAA was able to take the knife from him, would only show that he fully
understood that he committed a crime for which he could be held liable.

The CA did not give weight to the expert testimonies given by the two psychiatric doctors either.
Since the mental examination on Isla was taken four to six years after the commission of the crimes,
the doctors could not say with definite certainty that he was suffering from psychosis immediately
before or simultaneous to the commission of the crimes which was very vital for said defense to
prosper. Thus, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. 11

Hence, the present appeal.

Both the prosecution and the defense opted not to file any supplemental briefs and manifested that
they were adopting their arguments in their respective briefs filed before the CA. In his Appellant’s
Brief, the defense presented the following:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED–APPELLANT

NOTWITHSTANDING THAT HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT WAS INSANE AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE.

At the outset, this Court notes that there is no more question as to whether or not AAA was raped by
Isla. The latter never denied this fact which can be gleaned from his direct testimony, to wit:

Atty. Erasmo (defense counsel)

Q: So when you left at 4:00, where did you proceed?

A: To my aunt at Balintawak.

Q: How about AAA, what happened to her if you know?

A: she was raped and stabbed, sir.

Q: Who raped and stabbed AAA, if you know?

A: Me, sir.

Q: What time did this happen?

A: 3:00 o’clock, sir.

Q: Now, how did you rape AAA?

A: I went inside their house. 12

(Emphases supplied)

That being so, what is left for this jurisdiction to resolve is whether or not Isla’s claim of insanity is
creditable so as to exculpate him of the crimes he admittedly committed.

This Court is not convinced with Isla’s defense.

Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides for one of the circumstances which will exempt
one from criminal liability which is when the perpetrator of the act was an imbecile or insane, unless
the latter has acted during a lucid interval. This circumstance, however, is not easily available to an
accused as a successful defense. Insanity is the exception rather than the rule in the human
condition. Under Article 800 of the Civil Code, the presumption is that every human is sane. Anyone
who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and
convincing evidence. It is in the nature of confession and avoidance. An accused invoking insanity
admits to have committed the crime but claims that he or she is not guilty because of insanity. The
testimony or proof of an accused's insanity must, however, relate to the time immediately preceding
or simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is charged. 13

In the case at bench, the defense failed to overcome the presumption of sanity. The respective
testimonies of Dr. Villacorta and Dr. Gomez of the NCMH, as qualified expert witnesses, failed to
support its claim of insanity. As observed by the CA, the mental examination on Isla taken four to six
years after the incident happened in July 1997, in effect, showed that it could not be concluded with
certainty that he was suffering from such psychosis immediately before or simultaneous to the
commission of the crimes. The expert witnesses themselves opined that their findings were not
conclusive as to whether Isla was insane on that fateful day of July 21, 1997, as no examination was
made on said day or for lack of information from other informants during that time. 14

This Court also agrees with the observation of the RTC as affirmed by the CA that Isla acted with
discernment as can be deduced from his acts before, during and after the commission of the crimes
with which he was charged. The RTC wrote:

The overt acts committed by the accused are attributed to a criminal mind, not a lunatic. There is no
indication whatsoever that he was completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of will
when he stood for a while by the door of complainant’s house, then entered it, toyed with a
disconnected telephone set, and cunningly poked a knife at complainant’s neck and dragged her
inside the room where he raped her. The fact that he first discreetly closed the door and the window
before he approached and poked a knife at complainant, then, as he laid on top of her, ordered her
to undress, kissed her breast, separated apart her legs with his own legs, and satisfied his lust, all
the while holding a knife with his right hand poked at complainant’s body, are calculated means to
ensure consummation of his lewd design. These are by no means the workings of an imbecile, but
by one engulfed by lust.15

In the case of People vs. Rafanan, Jr., this Court has held that the defense of insanity may be
accepted as an exempting circumstance on the test of cognition, which requires a complete
deprivation of intelligence, not only of the will, in committing the criminal act. Thus, when the
accused in said case, threatened the victim with death in case she reported her ravishment indicated
that he was aware of the reprehensible moral depravity of that assault and that he was not deprived
of intelligence.
16

If Isla had become insane after the commission of the crime, such fact does not alter the situation
and the Court’s ruling is the same. His defense still fails considering that he was not insane during
the commission of the acts charged. Any problem regarding his present mental condition should be
dealt with administratively.

With respect to the stabbings, it appears that Isla committed two acts. The first was while he was
ravishing AAA. The Court considers this and the rape as one continuous act, the stabbing being
necessary, as far as he was concerned, for the successful perpetration of the crime. When he
testified, Isla claimed that he had to use the knife so he could have sexual intercourse with her.

The second stabbing took place after consummation of the rape act. According to AAA, after her
defilement, she noticed the knife bloodied and she tried to wrest it from him. In their struggle, she
was stabbed under her lower left breast but she was able to force Isla to drop the knife. At this point,
Isla was able to escape through the backdoor. This second stabbing is a separate and distinct
offense as it was not a necessary means to commit the rape. It was intended to do away with her
life. Thus, it has been written, "Where a girl was raped and then strangled to death, the crimes are
the separate crimes of rape and homicide, not complex." This was also the ruling in People v.
17 

Dawandawan, where it was written:

18 

The physical injuries which could have caused the victim's death were not the result of the rape
committed; neither was the slashing a necessary means for committing the rape. Independently of
the slashing of the victim's neck and the stabbing, the accused was able to consummate the rape.
The physical injuries were inflicted after the rape and were not a necessary means to commit the
same. Hence, the crimes committed are the two separate crimes of Rape and Frustrated Homicide.

The Court, however, finds itself unable to agree that the second crime committed was frustrated
murder. In the information, it was alleged that the stabbing was committed with treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength. There is, however, nothing in the records of the case
that would show the presence of the said qualifying circumstances.

Evidently, there was no treachery. For treachery to exist "the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the
offended party might make." It is important in ascertaining the existence of treachery that it be
proven that the attack was made swiftly, deliberately, unexpectedly, and without a warning, thus
affording the unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape the attack. In the case at bench,
19 
Isla’s attack was not sudden, swift, deliberate and without warning. He stabbed AAA during the
course of the struggle. Thus, the prosecution failed to show that the stabbing was so calculated as
not to afford AAA the chance to evade the attack.

Moreover, the attack was not with evident premeditation. The elements of evident premeditation are:
(1) a previous decision by the accused to commit the crime; (2) overt act/acts manifestly indicating
that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time between the decision to commit
the crime and its actual execution sufficient to allow accused to reflect upon the consequences of his
acts. These circumstances were not obtaining in the case at bench. An examination of the facts
would reveal that there was no sufficient time that elapsed for Isla to decide to commit the crime and
reflect on its consequences. Moreover, there was no showing that he performed other overt acts to
show that he was determined to commit murder. The essence of evident premeditation is that the
execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to
carry out the criminal intent, during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. When
20 

Isla stabbed AAA the second time, it was more of a reaction to the possibility of his being disarmed
by his victim rather than a well-planned attack to kill her.

Neither was there an abuse of superior strength. There was no showing that Isla took advantage of
his superior strength to consummate the crime.

For said reasons, the crime charged should have been frustrated homicide only. Consequently the
penalty should be changed.

Under Article 249 of the RPC, the imposable penalty for one found guilty of Homicide is reclusion
temporal, whose duration is from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years.
Considering that the crime is frustrated, Article 250 in relation to Article 50 of the RPC provides that
the penalty next lower in degree of the penalty prescribed by law for the consummated felony should
be imposed. Thus, the penalty should only be prision mayor, the duration of which is from six (6)
years to twelve (12) years.

Considering that there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, Article 64 of the RPC
provides that the penalty should be in its medium period which is eight (8) years and one (1) day to
ten (10) years.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term should be within the range of prision
correccional, the penalty next lower in degree. Hence, for the crime of frustrated homicide, Isla
should suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from four (4) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

With respect to the civil aspect, he should also be made to pay AAA the amount of P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages in addition to the civil indemnity ex delicto and moral damages awarded. Said
award is in consonance with prevailing jurisprudence on simple rape wherein exemplary damages
are awarded in order to set a public example and to protect hapless individuals from sexual
molestation.21

In lieu of the award of P10,000.00 as actual damages, an award of temperate damages should be
given instead. The Court has consistently held that in order for one to be entitled to actual damages,
the claim must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of
certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact
and amount of damages but there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss. Credence
can be given only to claims which are duly supported by receipts. 22
In this case, AAA failed to provide receipts to substantiate her claim. This Court, however, is not
unmindful of the fact that AAA was hospitalized for about five (5) days. Considering that the
expenses she incurred cannot be proved with certainty, an award of temperate damages is but
proper. Temperate damages may be allowed in cases where from the nature of the case, definite
proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced, although the court is convinced that the aggrieved party
suffered some pecuniary loss. An award of P8,000.00 as temperate damages is, to the Court's
23 

mind, just.
1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with ,MODIFICATION the December 17, 2010 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 28761 as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. Q-97-72079, finding the accused Edwin Isla y Rossell guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua; to pay AAA P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, and P50,000.00
as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to pay the cost of suit.

2. In Criminal Case No. Q-97-72078, finding the accused Edwin Isla y Rossell guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Homicide, the Court hereby sentences him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from four (4) years prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum;
to pay AAA the sum of P8,000.00 as temperate damages; and to pay the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR: