SUPPORT

1. EDWARD LACSON VS MAOWEE AND MAONAA LACSON

The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters
of petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was born on
December 4, 1974, while Maonaa, a little less than a year later. Not long after the birth
of Maonaa, petitioner left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother
and children to seek, apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else. For a
month, they stayed with Lea's mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her (Lea's) mother
and then with her brother Noel Daban. After some time, they rented an apartment only
to return later to the house of Lea's mother. As the trial court aptly observed, the sisters
and their mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a period of eighteen (18) years, shuttled
from one dwelling place to another not their own.

It appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her husband
Edward for support, relying initially on his commitment memorialized in a note dated
December 10, 1975 to give support to his daughters. As things turned out, however,
Edward reneged on his promise of support, despite Lea's efforts towards having him
fulfill the same. Lea would admit, though, that Edward occasionally gave their children
meager amounts for school expenses. Through the years and up to the middle part of
1992, Edward's mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave small amounts to help in the schooling
of Maowee and Maonaa, both of whom eventually took up nursing at St. Paul's College
in Iloilo City. In the early part of 1995 when Lea, in behalf of her two daughters, filed a
complaint against Edward for support before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,
Branch 33, Maowee was about to graduate. aowee and Maonaa, thru their mother,
averred that their father Edward, despite being gainfully employed and owning several
pieces of valuable lands, has not provided them support since 1976. They also alleged
that, owing to years of Edward's failure and neglect, their mother had, from time to
time, borrowed money from her brother Noel Daban. As she would later testify, Lea had
received from Noel, by way of a loan, as much as P400,000.00 to P600,000.00. He
explained, however, that his lack of regular income and the unproductivity of the land
he inherited, not his neglect, accounted for his failure at times to give regular support.
He also blamed financial constraint for his inability to provide the P12,000.00 monthly
allowance prayed for in the complaint. Following trial, the RTC rendered on June 26,
1997 judgment finding for the plaintiff sisters, as represented by their mother. In that
judgment, the trial court, following an elaborate formula set forth therein, ordered their
defendant father Edward to pay them a specific sum which represented 216 months, or
18 years, of support in arrears.|||
Edward appealed to the CA but it was dismissed.
Issue: 1. W/N GRANT OF SUPPORT SHOULD START FROM 1976 TO 1994,
2. W/N SHOULD PAY THE UNCLE OF THE RESPONDENTS WHO PROVIDE SUPPORT WHILE
HE CANNOT PROVIDE ANY.
3. W/N PETITIONER SHOULD STILL PROVIDE SUPPORT TO RESPONDENTS EVEN IF THE
OBLIGATION OF THE FORMER HAS BEEN COMPLETETLY SATISFIED BY THE PROCEEDS OF
HIS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY.
Ruling:
1.) Yes the petitioner contention that he should pay support only from the filing date is
not correct. conveniently glossed over the fact that he veritably abandoned the
respondent sisters even before the elder of the two could celebrate her second
birthday. To be sure, petitioner could not plausibly expect any of the sisters during
their tender years to go through the motion of demanding support from him, what
with the fact that even their mother (his wife) found it difficult during the period
material to get in touch with him. For another, the requisite demand for support
appears to have been made sometime in 1975. It may be that Lea made no
extrajudicial demand in the sense of a formal written demand in terms and in the
imperious tenor commonly used by legal advocates in a demand letter. Nonetheless,
what would pass as a demand was, however, definitely made. Asking one to comply
with his obligation to support owing to the urgency of the situation is no less a
demand because it came by way of a request or a plea. As it were, the trial court
found that a demand to sustain an award of support in arrears had been made in
this case and said so in its decision.
2.) YES. The family code states that When the person obliged to support another
unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently needed by the latter, any third
person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement
from the person obliged to give support. Because the uncle of the respondents is the
one that gave them education and sustenance.
3.) No. The property that has been sold is not his exclusive property Petitioner, unlike
any good father of a family, has been remiss in his duty to provide respondents with
support practically all throughout their growing years.
SUSAN LIM-LUA, Petitioner, vs. DANILO Y. LUA, Respondent.
G.R. Nos. 175279-80 June 5, 2013
SUMMARY
Mother of two seeks spousal and child support from rich husband.
FACTS
On September 3, 2003, petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity of
her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua, to the RTC. In her prayer for support pendente lite
for herself and her two children, petitioner sought the amount of P500,000.00 as monthly
support, citing respondent’s huge earnings from salaries and dividends in several companies
and businesses here and abroad. After due hearing, RTC cited Art. 203 of the Family Code,
stating that support is demandable from the time plaintiff needed the said support but is
payable only from the date of judicial demand, and thus also granted support pendente lite of
P250,000.00 (x 7 corresponding to the 7 months that lapsed). Respondent filed an MFR
asserting that petitioner is not entitled to spousal support considering that she does not
maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their children and respondent has continued to
support the family for their sustenance and well-being in accordance with family’s social and
financial standing. As to the P250,000.00 granted by the trial court as monthly support
pendente lite, as well as the P1,750,000.00 retroactive support, respondent found it
unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law for not having considered the needs of
the respondent. The MFR was denied. His second MFR also having been denied, respondent
filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. CA nullified RTC’s ruling and changed the amount to
P115,000.00. The appellate court said that the trial court should not have completely
disregarded the expenses incurred by respondent consisting of the purchase and maintenance
of the two cars, payment of tuition fees, travel expenses, and the credit card purchases
involving groceries, dry goods and books, which certainly inured to the benefit not only of the
two children, but their mother (petitioner) as well, and thus ordered the deduction of the
amount of PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in arrears of Danilo to his wife,
Susan Lim Lua and their two children. It also noted the lack of contribution from the petitioner
in the joint obligation of spouses to support their children. Petitioner appealed.
ISSUE
W/N the CA erred in deducting said amount from the current total support in arrears
DECISION
The SC declared that the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. As a matter of law, the amount of
support which those related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to give
each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the
recipient. Such support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family. The general rule is to the effect that when a father is required by a divorce decree to pay
to the mother money for the support of their dependent children and the unpaid and accrued
installments become judgments in her favor, he cannot, as a matter of law, claim credit on
account of payments voluntarily made directly to the children. Here, the CA should not have
allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to be credited against the accrued support
pendente lite. The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a commendable act
of petitioner, should be continued by him considering the vast financial resources at his
disposal.
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
CARAM V SEGUI

Doctrine: Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child
and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal
requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost
child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over
him.37 Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child
custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has
been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.

Facts:

Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram(Christina) had an amorous relationship with Marcelino
Gicano Constantino III (Marcelino) and eventually became pregnant with the latter’s child
without the benefit of marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino into
believing that she had an abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of her
pregnancy. During this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon
Home for Children (Sun and Moon) in Parañaque City to avoid placing her family in a potentially
embarrassing situation for having a second illegitimate son.5
On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial Medical
Center, Marikina City.6Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical expenses. On
August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary
Commitment7 to the DSWD.

On November 26, 2009, Marcelino suffered a heart attack and died 8 without knowing about the
birth of his son. Thereafter, during the wake, Christina disclosed to Marcelino’s family that she
and the deceased had a son that she gave up for adoption due to financial distress and initial
embarrassment. Marcelino’s family was taken aback by the revelation and sympathized with
Christina. After the emotional revelation, they vowed to help her recover and raise the
baby.9 On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, through Secretary Esperanza I. Cabral issued a
certificate10 declaring Baby Julian as "Legally Available for Adoption." A local matching
conference was held on January 27, 2010 and on February 5, 2010, Baby Julian was "matched"
with the spouses Vergel and Filomina Medina (Medina Spouses) of the Kaisahang Bahay
Foundation. Supervised trial custody then commenced.11
On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the
DSWD asking for the suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption proceedings. She also said she
wanted her family back together.12

On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Marijoy D. Segui, sent a
Memorandum13 to DSWD Assistant Secretary Vilma B. Cabrera informing her that the certificate
declaring Baby Julian legally available for adoption had attained finality on November 13, 2009,
or three months after Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary Commitment which terminated
her parental authority and effectively made Baby Julian a ward of the State.

On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition 17 for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC
of Quezon City seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from Atty. Segui, Atty. Escutin, Assistant
Secretary Cabrera and Acting Secretary Celia C. Yangco, all of the DSWD.

Christina argued that by making these misrepresentations, the respondents had acted beyond
the scope of their legal authority thereby causing the enforced disappearance of the said child
and depriving her of her custodial rights and parental authority over him.

Issue: whether or not a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining
parental authority and custody of a minor child

Held:
The Court rejects petitioner’s contentions and denies the petition.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo covers extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof.

In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers caused her "enforced
separation" from Baby Julian and that their action amounted to an "enforced disappearance"
within the context of the Amparo rule. Contrary to her position, however, the respondent
DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian's whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of
the DSWD's May 28, 2010 Memorandum 35 explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody
of the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted
in her petition for review on certiorari that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian
before the RTC during the hearing held in the afternoon of August 5, 2010. 36 There is therefore,
no "enforced disappearance" as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth
elements are missing.

Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and
placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal
requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost
child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over
him.37 Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child
custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has
been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.

To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial
killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the
perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or a private
individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to life, liberty and
security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 17, 2010 and September 6, 2010 Orders of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 106, Quezon City in Sp. Proc. Case No. Q-10-67604 are AFFIRMED
without prejudice to petitioner's right to avail of proper legal remedies afforded to her by law
and related rules.

G.R. No. 111180 November 16, 1995

DAISIE T. DAVID, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R. VILLAR, respondents. 

MENDOZA, J.:

Topic: Who exercises parental authority

Facts:

Petitioner Daisie T. David, secretary of private respondent had a relationship Ramon R. Villar, a
married businessman in Angeles City with four children. Christopher J., was born on March 9,
1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine,
born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.
The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to
Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's
legal wife.

After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were
eventually accepted by his legal family.

In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go
with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child.
Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year.

On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.

RTC ruled in favor of Petitioner and gave Christopher J.’s custody to her.

CA reversed RTC ruling and stated that it is for the best interest of Christopher J that he should
temporarily remain under the custody of respondent-appellant until the issue on custody and
support shall have been determined in a proper case.

Hence, this petition.

Issue:
WoN petitioner should have custody of Christoper J.

Held:

Yes.

Rule 102, §1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by
which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."

It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that the determination of the right to the
custody of minor children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each
other, are for some reason separated from each other. It does not follow, however, that it
cannot arise in any other situation. For example, in the case ofSalvaña v. Gaela, 1 it was held
that the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of
a minor daughter even though the latter be in the custody of a third person of her free will
because the parents were compelling her to marry a man against her will.

In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his
father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the
child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the
parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such
authority, is entitled to have custody of him.  2 Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of
her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering
him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of
the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless
the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." 3

Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner of the
custody of her children, especially considering that she has been able to rear and support them
on her own since they were born. Petitioner is a market vendor and a secretary at the
Computer System Specialist, Inc. earning a monthly income of P4,500.00. She has an
arrangement with her employer so that she can personally attend to her children. She works up
to 8:00 o'clock in the evening to make up for time lost during the day. That she receives help
from her parents and sister for the support of the three children is not a point against her.
Cooperation, compassion, love and concern for every member of the family are characteristics
of the close family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made it what it is.

Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private respondent promises
if the child lives with him. It is enough, however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is
able to support her children according to her means.

In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years
of age at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's
custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's custody over him
will have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his
mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child over
seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the
mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if private respondent loves his
child, he should not condition the grant of support for him on the award of his custody to him
(private respondent).

Cresencio Libi and Amelia Yap Libi, petitioners, vs Hon. Intermediate Appelate Court, Felipe
Gotiong and Shirley Gotiong, respondents.
G.R. No. 70890
September 18, 1992

Wendell Libi, son of petitioners, and Julie Ann Gotiong, the daughter of private
respondent spouses, were sweethearts until Julie broke up with Wendell upon finding out of his
sadistic and irresponsible character.
Wendell tried hard to reconcile with Julie Ann but when the latter refused, Wendell
started making threats. On that fateful day of January 14, 1978, Julie Ann and Wendell died
from a single gunshot wound each coming from the same Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the
name of petitioner Cresencio Libi.
 There being no eyewitnesses to the crime, petitioners and private respondents herein
advanced conflicting versions of the case. Private respondents claimed that with the use of the
same gun, Wendell took his own life after killing Julie Ann. On the other hand, the petitioners
argued that an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased by reason of his work
as a narcotic informant, must have caused the death of Wendell and Julie Ann.
As a result of the death of Julie Ann, private respondents filed an action to recover
damages arising from the vicarious liability of the parents of Wendell (petitioners herein) under
Article 2180 of the New Civil Code. After trial, the case was dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence. Likewise, the counterclaim filed by the petitioners was dismissed for lack of merit.
On appeal lodged by private respondents, the respondent court set aside the dismissal
of the case and held petitioners liable under Art. 2180 of the NCC. Hence this case.
Herein petitioners seek for the reversal of judgment of requiring them to pay
P30,000.00 for moral damages, P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, P20,000.00 as attorney's
fees and costs.

Issue: Are petitioners liable for vicarious liability under Art 2180 of the NCC?
Held:
              The Libi spouses are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from
criminal offenses committed by their minor son under their legal authority or control, and who
lives in their company.
Petitioners Libi failed to prove that they had exercised due diligence of a good father of
a family over their son Wendell as shown by the fact that it was only when Wendell died that
petitioners came to know that their son Wendell was a CANU agent and that the gun of
petitioner Cresencio Bili was missing from their safety deposit box.
Petitioners are indeed liable under Art. 2180 of the NCC because it is still the duty of the
parents to know the activity of their children and, in this case, had the petitioners been diligent
in supervising the activities of Wendell and in keeping said gun from his reach, the death of Julie
and Wendell could have been prevented.
Petitioners are indeed liable under Art. 2180 of the NCC because it is still the duty of the
parents to know the activity of their children and, in this case, had the petitioners been diligent
in supervising the activities of Wendell and in keeping said gun from his reach, the death of Julie
and Wendell could have been prevented. The liability of the parents for damages caused by
their children imposed under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligation arising from
both quasi delict and criminal offenses.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with costs against petitioners.
ESPIRITU VS CA
Facts:

Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City. Teresita left for Los Angeles to
work as a nurse where she was able to acquire immigrant status sometime later. Reynaldo was
sent by his employer to Pittsburgh as its liaison officer. Reynaldo and Teresita began to
maintain a common-law relationship of husband and wife where a child was born, Rosalind
Therese. During their vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married and by the
time they returned to the United States, Reginald Vince was born. The relationship soon
deteriorated and Teresita left her family to go back to California. Because his assignment is not
yet completed, Reynaldo had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug, in the
Philippines.

Results of child psychology tests on Rosalind when she was five years old show that the child
experiences great anxiety at the thought of having to go back to the U.S. to live with her
mother. She even stated in one of these tests that she saw her mother kissing a “bad” man
who worked for her father. Both children are now over seven years of age and prefer to stay
with their father and aunt.

Issue: Whether or not custody of the children should be awarded to the mother.

Held:

NO, AS BOTH CHILDREN ARE NOW OVER SEVEN YEARS OF AGE, THEIR CHOICE OF PARENT
SHOULD BE GIVEN RESPECT BY THE COURT.

The rule that a child below seven years of age should not be separated from the mother, unless
there are compelling reasons is not applicable in this case anymore. As the children can now
ascertain what is right and moral, the court should give due respect to their decision to stay
with their father and aunt in the Philippines. Furthermore, a mother’s constant flirtations from
one man to another is considered by the court as a compelling reason not to award the
children’s custody to her, for said behaviour forms an immoral environment especially to a
growing child. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting two requirements
found in Article 213(1) of the Family Code.
Santos v CA (G.R. 113054)
FACTS:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were
married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born
July 18, 1987. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter,
he had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents herein,
Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household,
where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit
and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his
hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.
The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel
Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent. After
an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the same day
awarding custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals. In its decision dated April 30, 1992,
respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's order.
Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to award custody
of his minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art. 214 of
the Family Code, substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper only when both
parents are dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to him, has not been
successfully shown by private respondents.
ISSUE:
Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.
RULING:
The minor should be given to the legitimate father. When a parent entrusts the custody of a
minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely
temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Only in case
of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised
by the surviving grandparent.
The court held the contentions of the grandparents are insufficient as to remove petitioner's
parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor. Private
respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate
father is still preferred over the grandparents.
The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the
present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. While petitioner's previous
inattention is inexcusable, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the
unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be
regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help
enhance the bond between parent and son.
The Court also held that his being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the
boy. So many men in uniform who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service
of the nation, are still the natural guardians of their children.
Also, petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though
unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.
PEREZ VS CA
Facts: Ray Perez, a doctor, and Nerissa, a registered nurse were married. They had a son named
RJ. In 1998, Nerissa began working in the United States. She became a resident alien in
February 1992. Ray stayed with her in the U.S. twice but unlike his wife, however, he had only a
tourist visa and was not employed.

In 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to
the U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a five-week vacation and that they all had
round-trip tickets. However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick mother and
promised to follow her with the baby. According to Ray, they had agreed to reside permanently
in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York, she changed her mind and continued
working. She was supposed to come back immediately after winding up her affairs there.

When Nerissa came home a few days before RJ's first birthday, the couple was no longer on
good terms. Nerissa was forced to move to her parents home. Nerissa filed a petition for
habeas corpus asking respondent Ray to surrender the custody of their son, RJ, to her.

The trial court awarded the custody of RJ to Nerissa, citing the second paragraph of Article 213
of the Family Code which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The CA
reversed the trial court's order and awarded custody of the boy to his father.
Issue: As between father and mother, who should have rightful custody of a child under 7 years
of age?

Held: When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family Code is the
applicable law. It provides:

"ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the
parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations,
especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.

No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise."

Since the Code does not qualify the word separation to mean legal separation decreed by a
court, couples who are separated in fact, such as petitioner and private respondent, are
covered within its terms.

The provisions of law quoted above clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall
not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
The use of the word shall in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised
Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.
The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother
finds its raison detre in the basic need of a child for his mothers loving care. Only the most
compelling of reasons shall justify the courts awarding the custody of such a child to someone
other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past the
following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and
parental authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a
communicable disease.

The decision under review casts doubt on petitioners capability to take care of the child,
particularly since she works on twelve-hour shifts thrice weekly, at times, even at night. There
being no one to help her look after the child, it is alleged that she cannot properly attend to
him. This conclusion is as unwarranted as it is unreasonable. First, her present work schedule is
not so unmanageable as to deprive her of quality time for Ray II. Quite a number of working
mothers who are away from home for longer periods of time are still able to raise a family well,
applying time management principles judiciously. Second, many a mother, finding herself in
such a position, has invited her own mother or relative to join her abroad, providing the latter
with plane tickets and liberal allowances, to look after the child until he is able to take care of
himself. Others go on leave from work until such time as the child can be entrusted to day-care
centers. Delegating child care temporarily to qualified persons who run day-care centers does
not detract from being a good mother, as long as the latter exercises supervision, for even in
our culture, children are often brought up by housemaids or yayas under the eagle eyes of the
mother. (Nerissa Perez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118870. March 29, 1996)
VANCIL V BELMES

Facts:

Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a US Navy serviceman who died in 1986.
During his lifetime, Reeder had two children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law
wife, Helen G. Belmes.

Bonifacia obtained a favorable court decision appointing her as legal and judicial guardian over
the persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent.
Helen submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she
had already filed a similar petition for guardianship before the RTC of Pagadian City. Helen
followed her opposition with a motion for the Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a New
One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and exercising parental
authority over the subject minors at Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are
permanently residing. She also states that at the time the petition was filed, Bonifacia was a
resident of Colorado, U.S.A., being a naturalized American citizen.

The trial court rejected and denied Helen’s motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as
guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. The CA reversed the RTC decision. 

Since Valerie had reached the age of majority at the time the case reached the Supreme Court,
the issue revolved around the guardianship of Vincent.

Issue: 

Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian?

Held:

Respondent Helen Belmes, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right
over that of petitioner  Bonifacia to be his guardian. Article 211 of the Family Code provides:

"Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons
of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless
there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx."

Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, Helen has the corresponding natural and
legal right to his custody.

"Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that ‘the right of parents to
the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood,’ a right
supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by
the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship."
(Sagala-Eslao vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 317 [1997])

Bonifacia contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent.

Bonifacia’s claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute
parental authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code, thus:
"Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority
shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. xxx."

In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals (242 SCRA 407 (1995), this Court ruled:

"The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their
common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall
continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents’ death, absence or
unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent."

Bonifacia, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case
of death, absence or unsuitability of Helen. Considering that Helen is very much alive and has
exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent,   Bonifacia  has to prove, in asserting
her right to be the minor’s guardian, Helen’s unsuitability. Bonifacia, however, has not
proffered convincing evidence showing that Helen is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent.
Bonifacia merely insists that Helen is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her
live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a
subject of this guardianship proceeding.

Even assuming that Helen is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still Bonifacia cannot qualify as
a substitute guardian. She is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will
not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. In fact, in her
petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like
her. To be sure, she will merely delegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify
as a guardian.

There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as
administrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no
statutory requirements upon this question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities of
protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in
complying with this duty by appointing administrators and guardians who are not personally
subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the courts
should not consent to the appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not
personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here. (Bonifacia Vancil vs. Helen G. Belmes,
G.R. No. 132223, June 19, 2001).
  

Masbate and Spouses Masbate, v. Relucio, G.R. No. 235498, July 30, 2018

Petitioners: Mother and maternal grandparents [parents of the mother] of minor child Queenie

Respondent: Father of minor child Queenie

FACTS:

After the erstwhile partners’ separation, their minor child’s custody was given to the
respondent. Petitioners (grandparents), who were armed with an SPA executed by petitioner
(mother) who went to Manila to study and which granted them full parental rights, authority
and custody, took the minor child. This prompted respondent to file a petition for habeas
corpus and child custody, which was however, not given due course by the trial court.

Trial court ruled among others that custody belongs to the mother per the tender- age
presumption, and that since the child was born out of wedlock, parental authority shall be with
the mother, per Article 176 of the Family Code. Upon appeal, CA remanded the case to the trial
court and held, inter alia, that since the issue in the case was neglect by the mother of the
minor child, the case involved a question of fact which must be resolved by trial. CA also gave
visitation rights to the respondent. Nonetheless, the appellate court granted custody to the
mother pending outcome of the case, since it was solely the child’s mother who has parental
authority over her as she is an illegitimate child.

One of the more interesting contentions in this case was whether or not a trial [to prove that
the mother of an illegitimate child under seven years of age is unfit] is needed. Petitioners
argue that a trial to dispute the fitness of the mother only applies to married couples, under
Article 213 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Since the minor child is a child born out of
wedlock, Article 176, and not article 213, should govern the present case. Article 176 did not
say whether the fitness of the mother of an illegitimate child can be disputed.

ISSUES:

1. Can there be a remand of the case for further trial to ascertain the unfitness of the mother of
an illegitimate child under seven years of age?

2. Can the custody of an illegitimate child be given to his/her illegitimate father?

3. Can the courts grant temporary custody to the respondent?

HELD:
1. YES. The reliance of petitioners in their cited jurisprudence is grossly misplaced, since the said
case limiting the application of Article 213 to married couples is with regard to the question of
whether or not an illegitimate child over ten years of age can choose which parent he prefers to
live with.

Simply put, the choice of a child over seven years of age (first paragraph of Article 213 of the
Family Code) and over ten (10) years of age (Rule 99 of the Rules of Court) shall be considered
in custody disputes ONLY BETWEEN MARRIED PARENTS because said parents are accorded joint
parental authority over the persons of their common children. On the other hand, this choice is
not available to an illegitimate child, much more one of tender age such as subject minor child,
because sole parental authority is given only to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit or
unsuitable.

In addition, the Supreme Court pointed out that the second paragraph of Article 213 does not
even distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate children- and hence, does not factor in
whether or not the parents are married -in declaring that "no child under seven [(7)] years of
age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise."

2. YES. In the event that the mother is found unfit or unsuitable to care for her daughter, Article
214 of the Family Code mandates that substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the
surviving grandparent. However, in default of parents or judicially- appointed guardians, the
child’s actual custodian can exercise substitute parental authority over said child.

It was not disputed that respondent was in actual physical custody of his minor illegitimate
child before her maternal grandparents took her. As such, respondent had already assumed
obligations and enjoyed privileges of a custodial character, giving him a cause of action to file a
case of habeas corpus to regain custody of his minor child as her actual custodian.

Added the Court:

“Indeed, it may be argued that Article 176 of the Family Code has effectively disqualified the
father of an illegitimate child from exercising substitute parental authority under Article 216
even if he were the actual custodian of the child under the premise that no one is allowed to do
indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly. However, the Court cannot adopt a rigid view,
without running afoul to the overarching consideration in custody cases, which is the best
interest of the minor.” The best interests of the minor refer to the totality of the circumstances
and conditions as are most congenial to the survival, protection, and feelings of security of the
minor encouraging to her physical, psychological and emotional development. It also means the
least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the growth and development of the
minor."

3. NO. It should be stressed that Section 15 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC provides for temporary
visitation rights, not temporary custody. It is only after trial, when the court renders its
judgment awarding the custody of the minor to the proper party, that the court may likewise
issue "any order that is just and reasonable permitting the parent who is deprived of the care
and custody of the minor to visit or have temporary custody.”

By granting temporary albeit limited custody ahead of trial, the appellate court overturned the
tender-age presumption with nothing but respondent’s bare allegations, to which the Court
cannot give its imprimatur. As earlier intimated, the issue surrounding the mother’s fitness
must be properly threshed out in the trial court before she can be denied custody, even for the
briefest of periods, over her minor child.

St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitanos, GR No. 143363

Posted: October 5, 2011 in Case Digests

0
The Case

The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals as well as the resolution denying reconsideration,

holding petitioner liable for damages arising from an accident that resulted in the death of a student who had joined a campaign to

visit the public schools in Dipolog City to solicit enrollment.

The Facts

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

“Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed

on June 9, 1995 a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio

Villanueva and St. Mary’s Academy before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City.

“On 20 February 1997, Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City rendered its decision the dispositive portion of

which reads as follows:

“‘WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in the following manner:

1. Defendant St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City, is hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs William Carpitanos and Luisa Carpitanos,

the following sums of money:

a. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) indemnity for the loss of life of Sherwin S. Carpitanos;

b. FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00) actual damages incurred by plaintiffs for burial and related expenses;

c. TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for attorney’s fees;

d. FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) for moral damages; and to pay costs.

2. Their liability being only subsidiary, defendants James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel are hereby ordered to pay herein

plaintiffs the amount of damages above-stated in the event of insolvency of principal obligor St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog

City;
3. Defendant James Daniel II, being a minor at the time of the commission of the tort and who was under special parental

authority of defendant St. Mary’s Academy, is ABSOLVED from paying the above-stated damages, same being adjudged against

defendants St. Mary’s Academy, and subsidiarily, against his parents;

4. Defendant Vivencio Villanueva is hereby ABSOLVED of any liability. His counterclaim not being in order as earlier

discussed in this decision, is hereby DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.”’ (Decision, pp. 32-33; Records, pp. 205-206).”

“From the records it appears that from 13 to 20 February 1995, defendant-appellant St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City

conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools

from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the

campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi

jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was

driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless

manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle.

“Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident.”

In due time, petitioner St. Mary’s academy appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.

On February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reducing the actual damages to P25,000.00 but otherwise

affirming the decision a quo, in toto.

On February 29, 2000, petitioner St. Mary’s Academy filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. However, on May 22,

2000, the Court of Appeals denied the motion

Hence, this appeal.

The Issues
1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award of moral damages against the petitioner.

The Court’s Ruling

We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Mary’s Academy liable for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles 218[7] and

219[8] of the Family Code, pointing out that petitioner was negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in not having a teacher

accompany the minor students in the jeep.

Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor child while under their

supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution

engaged in child care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or

outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions

and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.[9]

Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are

principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their

supervision, instruction, or custody.

However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate

cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident.

“In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the ‘injury for which recovery is sought must

be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and

natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.’ In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause

of the injury. For, ‘negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the
injury complained of.’ And ‘the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken

by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.’”

In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.

Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of

petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.

In their comment to the petition, respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted the documentary exhibits establishing that

the cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was not the

recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva. Respondents, including the spouses

Carpitanos, parents of the deceased Sherwin Carpitanos, did not dispute the report and testimony of the traffic investigator who

stated that the cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide that caused the jeep to turn turtle.

Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of

the school authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. Hence, the respondents’ reliance on Article 219 of the Family

Code that “those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for

damages caused by acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor” was unfounded.

Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio

Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep.

He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident.

Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering

wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was

only a remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minor’s

parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.

“The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient

intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.”
Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by

respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. Mary’s Academy had no control, and which was the proximate

cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.

Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise cannot be held liable for moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00 awarded by

the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s

wrongful act or omission. In this case, the proximate cause of the accident was not attributable to petitioner.

For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable for the accident, the decision of the Court of Appeals ordering petitioner to

pay death indemnity to respondent Carpitanos must be deleted. Moreover, the grant of attorney’s fees as part of damages is the

exception rather than the rule. The power of the court to award attorney’s fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands

factual, legal and equitable justification.  Thus, the grant of attorney’s fees against the petitioner is likewise deleted.

Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle was respondent Villanueva. He never denied and in

fact admitted this fact. We have held that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily

be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways

or streets.” Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident

occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the

vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals and that of the trial court. The

Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants, excluding petitioner St. Mary’s

Academy, Dipolog City.

No costs.