LEGAL ETHICS REVIEWER 1. Philippine Constitution Art. VIII, Sec.

5(5)
Vanessa M. Velasco JD 1-C Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
Topic Page rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
1. Philippine Constitution Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5) 1 law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
2. RA 9225 1 provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
3 shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
3. RA 7662
5 modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
4. Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
5. Cases
a. Cayetano vs. Monsod, 201SCRA 210, 3 2. RA 9225
September 1991
b. In Bar Matter No. 914, 1 October 1999 5 Congress of the Philippines
c. Bar Matter No. 1678: Petition for Leave 9 Twelfth Congress
to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin Dacanay, Third Regular Session
December 17, 2007
10 Begun held in Metro Manila on Monday, the twenty-eighth day of July, two
d. In Bar Matter No. 1153, Re: Letter of thousand three.
Atty. Estilito P. Mendoza Proposing Reforms in
the Bar Examinations through Amendments to Republic Act No. 9225             August 29, 2003
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, March 9, 2010
e. Re: 2003 Bar Examinations, B.M. No. 11 AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO
1222, February 4, 2004 ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT.
f. Re: 2003 Bar Examinations, B.M. No. 19 AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, AS
AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
1222, April 24,2009
g. B.M. No. 1161, Re: Proposed Reforms in 23
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippine Congress
the Bar Examinations, issued on 8 June 2004 and Assembled:
the SC Resolution dated September 3, 2013
lifting the Five Strike Rule Section 1. Short Title – this act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and
h. B.M. No. 2265 RE: REFORMS IN THE 25 Re-acquisition Act of 2003."
2011BAR EXAMINATIONS, Promulgated on
January 18, 2011. Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all
Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
i. Aguirre vs. Rana, B.M. No. 1036, June 28
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
10, 2003
j. In re: Need that Law Student Practicing 31 Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the
Under Rule 138-A Be Actually Supervised contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
During Trial, Bar Matter No. 730, June 13, 1997 citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine
32 citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
k. Cruz vs. Mina et al, G.R. No. 154207,
April 27, 2007 "I _____________________, solemny swear (or affrim) that I will support
and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the

1|Page
 laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme
authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.
Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire
Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizenship of the
Philippines.
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the
country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned
officers in the armed forces of the country which they are
naturalized citizens.
Section 6. Separability Clause - If any section or provision of this Act is held
unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or provision not affected thereby shall
remain valid and effective.
Section 7. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Section 8. Effectivity Clause – This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be following its publication in the Official Gazette or two (2) newspaper of general
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the circulation.
Philippines and the following conditions:
Approved,
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage must Meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act
No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of FRANKLIN DRILON JOSE DE VENECIA JR.
2003" and other existing laws; President of the Senate Speaker of the House of Representatives

(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the This Act, which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2130 and House Bill No. 4720
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution was finally passed by the the House of Representatives and Senate on August 25,
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of 2003 and August 26, 2003, respectively.
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath; OSCAR G. YABES ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary of Senate Secretary General
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an House of Represenatives
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted
authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce Approved: August 29, 2003
their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall President of the Philippines
apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice; and

(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the
Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:

2|Page
3. RA 7662
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7662
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REFORMS IN THE LEGAL EDUCATION,
CREATING FOR THE PURPOSE, A LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Legal Education Reform Act of
1993."
Section 2. Declaration of Policies. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to
uplift the standards of legal education in order to prepare law students for advocacy,
counselling, problem-solving, and decision-making, to infuse in them the ethics of
the legal profession; to impress on them the importance, nobility and dignity of the
legal profession as an equal and indispensable partner of the Bench in the
administration of justice and to develop social competence.
Towards this end, the State shall undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education
system, require proper selection of law students, maintain quality among law
schools, and require legal apprenticeship and continuing legal education.
Section 3. General and Specific Objective of Legal Education. - (a) Legal education
in the Philippines is geared to attain the following objectives:
(1) to prepare students for the practice of law;
(2) to increase awareness among members of the legal profession
of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society;
(3) to train persons for leadership;
(4) to contribute towards the promotion and advancement of justice
and the improvement of its administration, the legal system and
legal institutions in the light of the historical and contemporary
development of law in the Philippines and in other countries.
(b) Legal education shall aim to accomplish the following specific
objectives:
(1) to impart among law students a broad knowledge of law and its
various fields and of legal institutions;
(2) to enhance their legal research abilities to enable them to
analyze, articulate and apply the law effectively, as well as to
allowthem to have a holistic approach to legal problems and issues;
(3) to prepare law students for advocacy, counselling, problem-
solving and decision-making, and to develop their ability to deal
with recognized legal problems of the present and the future;
(4) to develop competence in any field of law as is necessary for
gainful employment or sufficient as a foundation for future training
beyond the basic professional degree, and to develop in them the
desire and capacity for continuing study and self-improvement;
(5) to inculcate in them the ethics and responsibilities of the legal
profession; and
(6) to produce lawyers who conscientiously pursue the lofty goals
of their profession and to fully adhere to its ethical norms.
Section 4. Legal Education Board; Creation and Composition. - To carry out the
purpose of this Act, there is hereby created the Legal Education Board, hereinafter
referred to as the Board, attached solely for budgetary purposes and administrative
support to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports.
The Board shall be composed of a Chairman, who shall preferably be a former
justice of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals, and the following as regular
members: a representative of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP); a
representative of the Philippine Association of Law Schools (PALS); a
representative from the ranks of active law practitioners; and, a representative from
the law students' sector. The Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports, or his representative, shall be an ex officio member of the Board.
With the exception of the representative of the law students' sector, the Chairman
and regular members of the Board must be natural-born citizen of the Philippines and
members of the Philippine Bar, who have been engaged for at least ten (10) years in
the practice of law, as well as in the teaching of law in a duly authorized or
recognized law school.
Section 5. Term of Office; Compensation. - The Chairman and regular members of
the Board shall be appointed by the President for a term of five (5) years without
reappointment from a list of at least three (3) nominees prepared, with prior
authorization from the Supreme Court, by the Judicial and Bar Council, for every
position or vacancy, and no such appointment shall need confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Of those first appointed, the Chairman and the
representative of the IBP shall hold office for five (5) years, the representatives of
3|Page
the PALS and the PALP, for three (3) years; and the representative from the ranks of
active law practitioners and the representative of the law students' sector, for one (1)
year, without reappointment. Appointments to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpire portion of the term of the predecessor.
The Chairman and regular members of the Board shall have the same salary and rank
as the Chairman and members, respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions:
Provided, That their salaries shall not be diminished during their term of office.
Section 6. Office and Staff Support. - The Department of Education, Culture and
Sports shall provide the necessary office and staff support to the Board, with a
principal office to be located in Metropolitan Manila.
The Board may appoint such other officers and employees it may deem necessary in
the performanceof its powers and functions.
Section 7. Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving the objectives of
this Act, the Board shall havethe following powers and functions:
(a) to administer the legal education system in the country in a manner
consistent with the provisions of this Act;
(b) to supervise the law schools in the country, consistent with its powers
and functions as herein enumerated;
(c) to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account,
among others, the size of enrollment, the qualifications of the members of
the faculty, the library and other facilities, without encroaching upon the
academic freedom of institutions of higher learning;
(d) to accredit law schools that meet the standards of accreditation;
(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum
qualifications and compensation of faculty members;
(f) to prescribe the basic curricula for the course of study aligned to the
requirements for admission to the Bar, law practice and social
consciousness, and such other courses of study as may be prescribed by the
law schools and colleges under the different levels of accreditation status;
(g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar
which a law student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or
public law office or firm or legal assistance group anytime during the law
course for a specific period that the Board may decide, but not to exceed a
total of twelve (12) months. For this purpose, the Board shall prescribe the
necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the specifications of such
internship which shall include the actual work of a new member of the Bar.
(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the
Board may provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in
such courses and for such duration as the Board may deem necessary; and
(i) to perform such other functions and prescribe such rules and regulations
necessary for the attainment of the policies and objectives of this Act.
Section 8. Accreditation of Law Schools. - Educational institutions may not operate a
law school unless accredited by the Board. Accreditation of law schools may be
granted only to educational institutions recognized by the Government.
Section 9. Withdrawal or Downgrading of Accreditation. - The Board may withdraw
or downgrade the accreditation status of a law school if it fails to maintain the
standards set for its accreditation status.
Section 10. Effectivity of Withdrawal or Downgrading of Accreditation. - The
withdrawal or downgrading of accreditation status shall be effetive after the lapse
ofthe semester or trimester following the receipt by the school of the notice of
withdrawal or downgrading unless, in the meantime, the school meets and/or
upgrades the standards or corrects the deficiencies upon which the withdrawal or
downgrading of the accreditation status is based.
Section 11. Legal Education Fund. - There is hereby created a special endowment
fund, to be known as the Legal Education Fund, which shall be under the control of
the Board, and administered as a separate fund by the Social Security System (SSS)
which shall invest the same with due and prudent regard to its solvency, safety and
liquidity.
The Legal Education Fund shall be established out of, and maintained from, the
amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 13 hereof, and from sixty
percent (60%) of the privilege tax paid by every lawyer effective Fiscal Year 1994;
and from such donations, legacies, grant-in-aid and other forms of contributions
received by the Board for the purposes of this Act.
Being a special endowment fund, only the interests earned on the Legal Education
Fund shall be used exclusively for the purposes of this Act, including support for
faculty development grants, professorial chairs, library improvements and similar
programs for the advancement of law teaching and education in accredited law
schools.
4|Page
The Fund shall also be used for the operation of the Board. For this purpose, an
amount not exceeding ten percent (10%) of the interest on the Fund shall be utilized.
The Board, in consultation with the SSS, shall issue the necessary rules and
regulations for the collection, administration and utilization of the Fund.
Section 12. Coverage. - The provisions of this Act shall apply to all schools and
colleges of law which are presently under the supervision of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports. Hereafter, said supervision shall be transferred to the
Board. Law schools and colleges which shall be established following the approval
of this Act shall likewise be covered.
Section 13. Appropriation. - The amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) is
hereby authorized to be charged against the current year's appropriation of the
Contingent Fund for the initial expenses of the Board.
To form part of the Legal Education Fund, there shall be appropriated annually,
under the budget of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, the amount of
Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) for a period of ten (10) years effective Fiscal
Year 1994.
Section 14. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act is declared
unconstitutional or the application thereof to any person, circumstance or transaction
is held invalid, the validity of the remaining provisions of this Act and the
applicability of such provisions to other persons, circumstances and transactions
shall not be affected thereby.
Section 15. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, executie orders, rules and
regulations, issuances or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act is hereby repealed or
amended accordingly.
Section 16. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following
the completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in any two (2) newspapers
of general circulation.
Approved: 23 December 1993.
4. Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court
RULE 138-A
Law Student Practice Rule
Section 1. Conditions for student practice. — A law student who has successfully
completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is
enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by
the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or
administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent
indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
Section 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule,
shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions,
briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising
attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
Section 3. Privileged communications. — The Rules safeguarding privileged
communications between attorney and client shall apply to similar communications
made to or received by the law student, acting for the legal clinic.
Section 4. Standards of conduct and supervision. — The law student shall comply
with the standards of professional conduct governing members of the Bar. Failure of
an attorney to provide adequate supervision of student practice may be a ground for
disciplinary action. (Circular No. 19, dated December 19, 1986).
5. a) Cayetano vs. Monsod, 201SCRA 210, 3 September 1991
b) In Bar Matter No. 914, 1 October 1999
EN BANC
 BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,
vs. VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an
alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has
reached the age of majority? This is the question sought to be resolved in the present
case involving the application for admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D.
Ching.
The facts of this case are as follows:
5|Page
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and
Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11
April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St.
Louis University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar
Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was
allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to
the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the
following documents:
1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of
Accountancy of the Professional Regulations Commission showing
that Ching is a certified public accountant;
2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B.
Cerezo, Election Officer of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a
registered voter of the said place; and
3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B.
Cerezo, showing that Ching was elected as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992
synchronized elections.
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching
was one of the successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar
examinees was scheduled on 5 May 1999. However, because of the questionable
status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the
resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was required to submit further proof
of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on
the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate
child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was
a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he
elected Philippine citizenship" 1 in strict compliance with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which the
Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother
is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best was only an
inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching the
age of majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must
concur in order that the election of Philippine citizenship may be effective, namely:
(a) the mother of the person making the election must be a citizen of the Philippines;
and (b) said election must be made upon reaching the age of majority." 3 The OSG
then explains the meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"
The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed
to mean a reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which
had been interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3)
years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70,
s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has always
considered himself a Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422,
s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But in Cuenco, it was held
that an election done after over seven (7) years was not made
within a reasonable time.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine
citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time"
allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances
surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule
on the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to
elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath
as a member of the Philippine Bar.
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of
Election of Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July
1999. In his Manifestation, Ching states:
1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as
one in my school records and other official documents;
3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant)
reserved for Filipino citizens;
4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was
eligible to vote;
5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan from 1992 to 1995;
6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance
with Commonwealth Act No. 625;
6|Page
 7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to
by me before a notary public;
8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the
oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines;
9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of
allegiance to (sic) the Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and
10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question
raised is whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In
the affirmative, whether his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the
bar examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution.
Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a
legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship
of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine
citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973
Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant
to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens
of the Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried
over to the 1987 Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973
of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority" are Philippine citizens. 6 It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and
1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be
understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of
citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a person
was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under
the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the
effectivity of the new Constitution. 8
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a
valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children
born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such
intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any
officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period
within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935
Charter only provides that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of
majority." The age of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21)
years. 9 In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of
election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time
period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution.
In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn,
based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States
Government to the effect that the election should be made within a "reasonable time"
after attaining the age of majority. 10 The phrase "reasonable time" has been
interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from
reaching the age of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 12 that the three (3)
year period is not an inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable
period after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of
Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect
Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted
to above, which period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when the person concerned has always
considered himself a Filipino. 13
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine
citizenship is not indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16,
1923. He became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of
citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-
eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had reached
the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not been made
"upon reaching the age of majority." 14
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-
five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15
June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority.
Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority,"
Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable
period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection,
that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a
registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine
citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by election.
7|Page
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching
erroneously labels as informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in
the case of In re: Florencio Mallare, 15 the pertinent portion of which reads:
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally
married to an alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage
when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship. It has been established that Esteban Mallare
was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early as
1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already
participating in the elections and campaigning for certain
candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his preference for
Philippine citizenship. 16
Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining
therein are very different from those in the present case, thus, negating its
applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and
procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing
Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare
was an obiter since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for
Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he
being a natural child of a Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is
therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to
confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine
citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs.
Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-
4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28,
1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that
he is a non-filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to
which he is rightfully entitled. 17
The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral
Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 18 where we held:
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and
an informal process.
In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the
Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of
the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when
he came of age constitutes a positive act of
Philippine citizenship. (p. 52: emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has
established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot
be excepted to have elected Philippine citizenship as they were
already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
xxx xxx xxx
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a
requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For those
already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of
deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a
profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where
citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running
for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are
themselves formal manifestations for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person
electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a
national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr.
Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of
the private respondent would not only have been superfluous but it
would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino
citizen elect Philippine citizenship? 19
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if
we consider the special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the
Philippines all his life and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling
statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with the recommendation of the
OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship.
The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of
majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is
clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching
the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his
election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine
8|Page
citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of
the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and,
thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and
unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed
when needed and suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect
Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he
should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case,
Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result. this
golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's
application for admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
c. Bar Matter No. 1678: Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law,
Benjamin Dacanay, December 17, 2007
EN BANC
B.M. No. 1678             December 17, 2007
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to
resume the practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until
he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments.
He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical
aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May
2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On
that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and
now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether
petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he
gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2,
Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. –
Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of
the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character,
and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme
Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges
against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in
any court in the Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the
qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It
recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines,
conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain
modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so delicately
affected with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through
this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare.3
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of
morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the
mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for
membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice
law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the
trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued
exercise of his professional privilege.4
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted
as a member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with
the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is
entitled to practice law.
9|Page
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in
accordance with the statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing
is entitled to practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates
that an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5
He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed
or are pending in any court in the Philippines.6
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing
satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other qualifications;7 passing the bar
examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and
receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice. 10
The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a
continuing requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly,
payment of annual membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional
tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement;13
faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being
continually subject to judicial disciplinary control.14
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice
law in the Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall
be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino
citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the
practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates
the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege
denied to foreigners.16
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a
citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is
because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA
9225]."17 Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is
deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in
accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his
membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines
and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply
with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice." 18 Stated
otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225
can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do
so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the
IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal
education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s
knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of
his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but
also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the
Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby
GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and submission
of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath
as a member of the Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.
d. In Bar Matter No. 1153, Re: Letter of Atty. Estilito P. Mendoza
Proposing Reforms in the Bar Examinations through Amendments to Rule 138
of the Rules of Court, March 9, 2010
Bar Matter No. 1153
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated
March 9, 2010
"B.M. No. 1153 (Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing Reforms in the
Bar Examinations Through Amendments to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court). - The
Court Resolved to APPROVE the proposed amendments to Sections 5 and 6 of Rule
138, to wit:
10 | P a g e
SEC. 5.Additional Requirement for Other Applicants. — All applicants for
admission other than those referred to in the two preceding sections shall, before
being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily show that they have successfully
completed all the prescribed courses for the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its
equivalent degree, in a law school or university officially recognized by the
Philippine Government or by the proper authority in the foreign jurisdiction where
the degree has been granted.
No applicant who obtained the Bachelor of Laws degree in this jurisdiction shall be
admitted to the bar examination unless he or she has satisfactorily completed the
following course in a law school or university duly recognized by the government:
civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private
international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence,
taxation and legal ethics.
A Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law school shall be admitted to the
bar examination only upon submission to the Supreme Court of certifications
showing: (a) completion of all courses leading to the degree of Bachelor of Laws or
its equivalent degree; (b) recognition or accreditation of the law school by the proper
authority; and (c) completion of all the fourth year subjects in the Bachelor of Laws
academic program in a law school duly recognized by the Philippine Government.
SEC. 6.Pre-Law. — An applicant for admission to the bar examination shall present
a certificate issued by the proper government agency that, before commencing the
study of law, he or she had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and
recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a
four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's
degree in arts or sciences.
A Filipino citizen who completed and obtained his or her Bachelor of Laws degree
or its equivalent in a foreign law school must present proof of having completed a
separate bachelor's degree course.
The Clerk of Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, is hereby directed to
CIRCULARIZE this resolution among all law schools in the country."
e. Re: 2003 Bar Examinations, B.M. No. 1222, February 4, 2004
EN BANC
[B.M. NO. 1222 : February 4, 2004]
Re: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On 22 September 2003, the day following the bar examination in Mercantile Law,
Justice Jose C. Vitug, Chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee, was
apprised of a rumored leakage in the examination on the subject. After making his
own inquiries, Justice Vitug reported the matter to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., and to the other members of the Court, recommending that the bar examination
on the subject be nullified and that an investigation be conducted forthwith. On 23
September 2003, the Court adopted the recommendation of Justice Vitug, and
resolved to nullify the examination in Mercantile Law and to hold another
examination on 04 October 2003 at eight oclock in the evening (being the earliest
available time and date) at the De La Salle University, Taft Avenue, Manila. The
resolution was issued without prejudice to any action that the Court would further
take on the matter.
Following the issuance of the resolution, the Court received numerous petitions and
motions from the Philippine Association of Law Schools and various other groups
and persons, expressing agreement to the nullification of the bar examinations in
Mercantile Law but voicing strong reservations against the holding of another
examination on the subject. Several reasons were advanced by petitioners or
movants, among these reasons being the physical, emotional and financial
difficulties that would be encountered by the examinees, if another examination on
the subject were to be held anew. Alternative proposals submitted to the Court
included the spreading out of the weight of Mercantile Law among the remaining
seven bar subjects, i.e., to determine and gauge the results of the examinations on the
basis only of the performance of the examinees in the seven bar subjects. In a
resolution, dated 29 September 2003, the Court, finding merit in the submissions,
resolved to cancel the scheduled examination in Mercantile Law on 04 October 2003
and to allocate the fifteen percentage points among the seven bar examination
subjects. In the same resolution, the Court further resolved to create a Committee
composed of three retired members of the Court that would conduct a thorough
investigation of the incident subject of the 23 September 2003 resolution.
In a resolution, dated 07 October 2003, the Court adopted the computation in the
allocation of the fifteen percentage points for Mercantile Law among the remaining
seven bar examination subjects, to wit:
Subject  Origi Adjus Adju
na ted Rela sted
Perce Perce tive Relat
ntage ntage Wei ive
Weig Weig ght Wei
ht ht ght
11 | P a g e
 Politic would have benefited from, the incident in question and to recommend measures to
al and the Court to safeguard the integrity of the bar examinations.
Interna
tional 17.64 3.53 On 15 January 2004, the Investigating Committee submitted its report and
Law 15% 7% 3 % recommendation to the Court, herein reproduced in full; thus -crvll
Labor
and In the morning of September 21, 2003, the third Sunday of the 2003 bar
Social examinations, the examination in commercial law was held in De la Salle University
Legisla 11.76 2.35 on Taft Avenue, Manila, the venue of the bar examinations since 1995. The next day,
tion 10% 5% 2 % the newspapers carried news of an alleged leakage in the said examination. 1 ςrνll
Civil 17.64 3.53
15% 3
law 7% % Upon hearing the news and making preliminary inquiries of his own, Justice Jose C.
Taxati 11.76 2.35 Vitug, chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee, reported the matter to the
10% 2
on 5% % Chief Justice and recommended that the examination in mercantile law be cancelled
Crimin 11.76 2.35 and that a formal investigation of the leakage be undertaken.
10% 2
al law 5% %
Remed Acting on the report and recommendation of Justice Vitug, the Court, in a resolution
23.52 4.71
ial 20% 4 dated September 23, 2003, nullified the examination in mercantile law and resolved
9% %
Law to hold another examination in that subject on Saturday, October 4, 2003 at eight
Legal oclock in the evening (being the earliest available time and date) at the same venue.
Ethics However, because numerous petitions, protests, and motions for reconsideration
and were filed against the retaking of the examination in mercantile law, the Court
Practic cancelled the holding of such examination. On the recommendation of the Office of
al the Bar Confidant, the Court instead decided to allocate the fifteen (15) percentage
Exercis 5.882 1.18 points for mercantile law among the seven (7) other bar examination subjects
es 5% %   1 % (Resolution dated October 7, 2003).
100%  20%
In a Resolution dated September 29, 2003, the Supreme Court created an
In another resolution, dated 14 October 2003, the Court designated the following Investigating Committee composed of three (3) retired Members of the Court to
retired Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to compose the Investigating conduct an investigation of the leakage and to submit its findings and
Committee: recommendations on or before December 15, 2003.

Justice Carolina The Court designated the following retired Associate Justices of the Supreme Court
Chairman: C. Griño- to compose the Committee:ςηαñrοblεš Î½Î¹r†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Aquino
Justice Jose A.R. Chairman: JusticeCAROLINA GRIO-AQUINO
Members:
Melo
Justice Vicente Members: Justice JOSE A. R. MELO
V. Mendoza
Justice VICENTE V. MENDOZA
The Investigating Committee was tasked to determine and identify the source of
leakage, the parties responsible therefor or who might have benefited therefrom, The Investigating Committee was directed to determine and identify the source of
recommend sanctions against all those found to have been responsible for, or who the leakage, the parties responsible therefor and those who benefited therefrom, and
to recommend measures to safeguard the integrity of the bar examinations.

12 | P a g e
The investigation commenced on October 21, 2003 and continued up to November 7,
2003. The following witnesses appeared and testified at the
investigation:ςηαñrοblεš Î½Î¹r†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
1.Associate Justice Jose C. Vitug, chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations
Committee;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
2.Atty. Marlo Magdoza-Malagar, law clerk in the office of Justice Vitug
3.Atty. Marcial O. T. Balgos, examiner in mercantile
law;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
4.Cheryl Palma, private secretary of Atty. Balgos;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
5.Atty. Danilo De Guzman, assistant lawyer in the firm of Balgos &
Perez;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
6.Atty. Enrico G. Velasco, managing partner of Balgos &
Perez;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
7.Eduardo J. F. Abella, reviewer in commercial law at the Lex Review
Center;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
8.Silvestre T. Atienza, office manager of Balgos & Perez;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
9.Reynita Villasis, private secretary of Atty. De Guzman;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
10.Ronan Garvida, fraternity brother of Atty. De
Guzman;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
11.Ronald F. Collado, most illustrious brother of the Beta Sigma Lambda
Fraternity;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
12.Jovito M. Salonga, Asst. Division Chief of Systems Development for Judicial
Application, MlSO;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Committee held nine (9) meetings - six times to conduct the investigation and
three times to deliberate on its report.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOSE C. VITUG, chairman of the Bar Examinations
Committee, testified that on Monday morning, September 22, 2003, the day after the
Bar examination in mercantile or commercial law, upon arriving in his office in the
Supreme Court, his secretary,2 Rose Kawada, informed him that one of the law
clerks, Atty. Marlo Magdoza-Malagar, told her that a friend of hers named Ma.
Cecilia Delgado-Carbajosa, a bar examinee from Xavier University in Cagayan de
Oro City, who was staying at the Garden Plaza Hotel in Paco, confided to her that
something was wrong with the examination in mercantile law, because previous to
the examination, i.e., on Saturday afternoon, the eve of the examination, she received
a copy of the test questions in that subject. She did not pay attention to the test
questions because no answers were provided, and she was hard-pressed to finish her
review of that subject, using other available bar review materials, of which there
were plenty coming from various bar review centers.cr11
However, upon perusing the questions after the examinations, Cecilia noticed that
many of them were the same questions that were asked in the just-concluded-
examination.
Justice Vitug requested Marlo to invite her friend to his office in the Supreme Court,
but Carbajosa declined the invitation. So, Justice Vitug suggested that Marlo and
Rose invite Carbajosa to meet them at Robinsons Place, Ermita. She agreed to do
that.
Cecilia Carbajosa arrived at Robinsons Place at the appointed time and showed the
test questions to Rose and Marlo. Rose obtained a xerox copy of the leaked questions
and compared them with the bar questions in mercantile law. On the back of the
pages, she wrote, in her own hand, the differences she noted between the leaked
questions and the bar examination questions.
Rose and Marlo delivered the copy of the leaked questions to Justice Vitug who
compared them with the bar examination questions in mercantile law. He found the
leaked questions to be the exact same questions which the examiner in mercantile
law, Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos, had prepared and submitted to him as chairman
of the Bar Examinations Committee. However, not all of those questions were asked
in the bar examination. According to Justice Vitug, only 75% of the final bar
questions were questions prepared by Atty. Balgos; 25% prepared by Justice Vitug
himself, were included in the final bar examination. The questions prepared by
Justice Vitug were not among the leaked test questions.
Apart from the published news stories about the leakage, Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. and Justice Vitug received, by telephone and mail, reports of the leakage
from Dean Mariano F. Magsalin, Jr. of the Arellano Law Foundation (Exh. H) and a
certain Dale Philip R. De los Reyes (Exh. B -B-3), attaching copies of the leaked
questions and the fax transmittal sheet showing that the source of the questions was
Danny De Guzman who faxed them to Ronan Garvida on September 17, 2003, four
days before the examination in mercantile law on September 21, 2003 (Exh. B-1).
ATTORNEY MARLO MAGDOZA-MALAGAR was subpoenaed by the
Committee. She identified the copy of the leaked questions that came from Cecilia
13 | P a g e
Carbajosa (Exh. A). She testified that, according to Carbajosa, the latter received the
test questions from one of her co-bar reviewees staying, like her, at the Garden Plaza
Hotel in Paco, and also enrolled in the review classes at the Lex Review Center at the
corner of P. Faura Street and Roxas Boulevard, Ermita. She did not pay for the hand-
out because the Lex Review Center gives them away for free to its bar reviewees.
ATTORNEY MARCIAL O. T. BALGOS, 71 years of age, senior partner in the law
firm of BALGOS AND PEREZ with offices in Rm. 1009 West Tektite Tower,
Exchange Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, testified that in November 2002, Justice
Jose C. Vitug, as chair of the Committee on the 2003 Bar Examinations, invited him
to be the examiner in commercial law. He accepted the assignment and almost
immediately began the preparation of test questions on the subject. Using his
personal computer in the law office, he prepared for three consecutive days, three (3)
sets of test questions which covered the entire subject of Mercantile Law (pp. 3-5,
tsn, Oct. 24, 2003). As he did not know how to prepare the questionnaire in final
form, he asked his private secretary, Cheryl Palma, to format the questions (p. 13,
tsn, Oct. 24, 2003) .And, as he did not know how to print the questionnaire, he
likewise asked Cheryl Palma to make a print-out (Id., pp. 14-15). All of this was
done inside his office with only him and his secretary there. His secretary printed
only one copy (Id., p. 15). He then placed the printed copy of the test questions,
consisting of three sets, in an envelope which he sealed, and called up Justice Vitug
to inform him that he was bringing the questions to the latters office that afternoon.
However, as Justice Vitug was leaving his office shortly, he advised Atty. Balgos to
give the sealed envelope to his confidential assistant who had been instructed to keep
it. When Atty. Balgos arrived in the office of Justice Vitug, he was met by Justice
Vitugs confidential assistant to whom he entrusted the sealed envelope containing
the test questions (pp. 19-26, tsn, Oct. 24, 2003).
Atty. Balgos admitted that he does not know how to operate a computer except to
type on it. He does not know how to open and close his own computer which has a
password for that purpose. In fact, he did not know, as he still does, the password. It
is his secretary, Cheryl Palma, who opened and closed his computer for him (p. 45,
tsn, Oct. 24, 2003).
Atty. Balgos testified that he did not devise the password himself. It was Cheryl
Palma who devised it (Id., p. 71).
His computer is exclusively for his own use. It is located inside his room which is
locked when he is not in the office. He comes to the office every other day only.
He thought that his computer was safely insulated from third parties, and that he
alone had access to it. He was surprised to discover, when reports of the bar leakage
broke out, that his computer was in fact interconnected with the computers of his
nine (9) assistant attorneys (tsn, pp. 30,45). As a matter of fact, the employees -
Jovito M. Salonga and Benjamin R. Katly - of the Courts Management Information
Systems Office (MISO) who, upon the request of Atty. Balgos, were directed by the
Investigating Committee to inspect the computer system in his office, reported that
there were 16, not 9, computers connected to each other via Local Area Network
(LAN) and one (1) stand-alone computer connected to the internet (Exh. M). Atty.
Balgos law partner, former Justice Secretary Hernando Perez, also had a computer,
but Perez took it away when he became the Secretary of Justice.
The nine (9) assistant attorneys with computers, connected to Attorney Balgos
computer, are:
1. Zorayda Zosobrado (she resigned in July 2003)
2.Claravel Javier
3. Rolynne Torio
4. Mark Warner Rosal
5. Charlynne Subia
6. Danilo De Guzman (resigned on October 22, 2003 [Exh. D])
7. Enrico G. Velasco, managing partner
8. Concepcion De los Santos
9. Pamela June Jalandoni
Upon learning from Justice Vitug of the leakage of the bar questions prepared by
him in mercantile law, Atty. Balgos immediately called together and questioned his
office staff. He interrogated all of them except Atty. Danilo De Guzman who was
absent then. All of them professed to know nothing about the bar leakage.
He questioned Silvestre Atienza, the office manager, Atienza is only a second year
law student at MLQU. But he is an expert in installing and operating computers. It
was he and/or his brother Gregorio who interconnected the computers in the law
office, including Attorney Balgos computer, without the latters knowledge and
permission.
Atienza admitted to Attorney Balgos that he participated in the bar operations or bar
ops of the Beta Sigma Lambda law fraternity of which he is a member, but he
clarified that his participation consisted only of bringing food to the MLQU bar
examinees (Tsn, pp. 46-47, Oct. 24, 2003).
14 | P a g e
The next day, Attorney Balgos questioned Attorney Danilo De Guzman, also a
member of the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity, FEU chapter. De Guzman admitted to
him that he downloaded the test questions from Attorney Balgos computer and faxed
a copy to a fraternity brother. Attorney Balgos was convinced that De Guzman was
the source of the leakage of his test questions in mercantile law (Tsn, p. 52, Oct. 24,
2003).
Attorney Balgos prepared a COMPARISON (Exh. E) of the juxtaposed final bar
questions and his proposed test questions, with marginal markings made by Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza (Ret.), indicating whether the questions are similar: (S); or
different: (D), together with the percentage points corresponding to each question.
On the basis of this comparative table and Atty. Balgos indications as to which
questions were the same or different from those given in the final questionnaire,
Justice Mendoza computed the credit points contained in the proposed leaked
questions. The proposed questions constituted 82% of the final bar questions.
Attached to this Report as Annex A is the comparative table and the computation of
credit points marked as Exh. E-1.
CHERYL PALMA, 34 years old, private secretary of Attorney Balgos for the past
six years, testified that she did not type the test questions. She admitted, however,
that it was she who formatted the questions and printed one copy as directed by her
employer. She confirmed Atty. Balgos testimony regarding her participation in the
operation of his personal computer. She disclosed that what appears in Atty. Balgos
computer can be seen in the neighborhood network if the other computers are open
and not in use; that Silvestre Atienza of the accounting section, can access Atty.
Balgos computer when the latter is open and not in use.
ATTORNEY ENRICO VELASCO, managing partner of the firm, testified that on
October 16, 2003, he sent De Guzman a memo (Exh. C) giving him 72 hours to
explain in writing why you should not be terminated for causing the Firm an
undeserved condemnation and dishonor because of the leakage aforesaid.
On October 22, 2003, De Guzman handed in his resignation effective immediately.
He explained that:ςηαñrοblεš Î½Î¹r†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Causing the firm, its partners and members to suffer from undeserved condemnation
and humiliation is not only farthest from, but totally out of, my mind. It is just
unfortunate that the incident subject matter of your memorandum occurred. Rest
assured, though, that I have never been part of any deliberate scheme to malign the
good reputation and integrity of the firm, its partners and members. (Exh. D)
DANILO DE GUZMAN testified that he joined Balgos & Perez in April 2000. He
obtained his LLB degree from FEU in 1998. As a student, he was an awardee for
academic excellence. He passed the 1998 bar examinations with a grade of 86.4%. In
FEU, he joined the Beta Sigma Lambda law fraternity which has chapters in MLQU,
UE and MSU (Mindanao State University). As a member of the fraternity, he was
active during bar examinations and participated in the fraternitys bar ops.
He testified that sometime in May 2003, when he was exploring Atty. Balgos
computer, (which he often did without the owners knowledge or permission), to
download materials which he thought might be useful to save for future use, he
found and downloaded the test questions in mercantile law consisting of 12 pages.
He allegedly thought they were quizzers for a book that Atty. Balgos might be
preparing. He saved them in his hard disk.
He thought of faxing the test questions to one of his fraternity brods, a certain Ronan
Garvida who, De Guzman thought, was taking the 2003 bar examinations. Garvida is
also a law graduate from FEU. He had taken the 2002 bar examinations, but did not
pass.
On September 17, 2003, four days before the mercantile law bar examination,
DeGuzman faxed a copy of the 12-page-test questions (Exhs. I, I-1, I-2, I-3) to
Garvida because earlier he was informed by Garvida that he was retaking the bar
examinations. He advised Garvida to share the questions with other Betan
examinees. He allegedly did not charge anything for the test questions. Later, after
the examination was over, Garvida texted (sent a text message on his cell phone) him
(De Guzman), that he did not take the bar examination.
Besides Garvida, De Guzman faxed the mercantile law bar questions to another
fraternity brother named Arlan (surname unknown), through Reynita (Nanette)
Villasis, his secretary (Tsn, pp. 20-28, Oct. 29, 2003). But he himself faxed the
questions to still another brod named Erwin Tan who had helped him during the bar
ops in 1998 when he (De Guzman) took the bar examinations (Id., p. 28). He
obtained the cell phone numbers of Arlan and Erwin Tan from Gabby Tanpiengco
whom he informed by text message, that they were guide questions, not tips, in the
mercantile law examination.
When he was confronted by Attorney Velasco on Wednesday after the examination,
(news of the leakage was already in all the newspapers), De Guzman admitted to
Attorney Velasco that he faxed the questions to his fraternity brothers, but he did not
reveal where he got the test questions.
De Guzman received a text message from Erwin Tan acknowledging that he received
the test questions. However, Erwin informed him that the questions were kalat na
kalat (all over the place) even if he did not share them with others (Tsn, pp. 54-55,
Oct. 29, 2003).
De Guzman also contacted Garvida who informed him that he gave copies of the test
questions to Betans Randy Iigo and James Bugain.
15 | P a g e
Arlan also texted De Guzman that almost all the questions were asked in the
examination. Erwin Tan commented that many of the leaked questions were asked in
the examination, pero hindi exacto; mi binago (they were not exactly the same; there
were some changes).
De Guzman tried to text Garvida, but he received no response.
De Guzman disclosed that he learned how to operate a computer from Silvestre
Atienza, the office manager, and through self-study, by asking those who are
knowledgeable on computers. He has been using computers since 1997, and he
bought his own computer in 2001, a Pentium 3, which he uses at home.
REYNITA VILLASIS, the 36-year-old legal secretary of Attorney De Guzman,
submitted her affidavit (Exh. F) and orally affirmed her participation in the
reproduction and transmittal by fax of the leaked test questions in mercantile law to
Ronan Garvida and Arlan, as testified by De Guzman.
RONAN GARVIDA, appeared before the Investigating Committee in compliance
with the subpoena that was issued to him. Garvida graduated from FEU College of
Law in 2000. He is about 32 years of age. While still a student in 1998, he was
afflicted with multiple sclerosis or MS, a disease of the nervous system that attacks
the nerve sheaths of the brain and spinal cord. It is a chronic disabling disease
although it may have periods of remission. It causes its victim to walk with erratic,
stiff and staggering gait; the hands and fingers may tremble in performing simple
actions; the eyesight can be impaired, and speech may be slow and slurred (p. 737,
Vol. 2, Readers Digest Medical Encyclopedia, 1971 Ed., compiled by Benjamin F.
Miller, M.D.). All these symptoms were present when Garvida testified before the
Committee on November 6, 2003 to answer its questions regarding his involvement
in the leakage of the examiners test questions in mercantile law.
Garvida testified that when he was a freshman at FEU, he became a member of the
Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity where he met and was befriended by Attorney De
Guzman who was his senior by one and a half years. Although they had been out of
touch since he went home to the province on account of the recurrence of his illness,
De Guzman was able [to] get this cell phone number from his compadre, Atty.
Joseph Pajara. De Guzman told Garvida that he was faxing him possible questions in
the bar examination in mercantile law. Because the test questions had no answers, De
Guzman stressed that they were not tips but only possible test questions.
Garvida had intended to take the 2003 bar examinations. He enrolled in the
Consortium Review Center in FEU, paying P10,000.00 as enrollment fee. However,
on his way to the Supreme Court to file his application to take the bar examination,
he suffered pains in his wrist - symptoms that his MS had recurred. His physician
advised him to go to the National Orthopedic Hospital in Quezon City for treatment.
This he did.
He gave up his plan to take the 2003 bar examinations. Nevertheless, he continued to
attend the review classes at the Consortium Review Center because he did not want
to waste completely the P10,000-enrollment fee that he paid for the review course
(Nahihinayang ako). That was presumably why De Guzman thought that Garvida
was taking the bar exams and sent him a copy of the test questions in mercantile law.
Upon receipt of the test questions, Garvida faxed a copy to his brod Randy Iigo who
was reviewing at the Consortium Review Center. Randy photocopied them for
distribution to other fraternity brods. Some of the brods doubted the usefulness of the
test questions, but Randy who has a high regard for De Guzman, believed that the
questions were tips. Garvida did not fax the questions to any other person than
Randy Iigo. He allegedly did not sell the questions to Randy. I could not do that to a
brod, he explained.
In view of the fact that one of the copies of the leaked test questions (Exh. H) bore
on the left margin a rubber stamp composed of the Greek initials BEA-MLQU,
indicating that the source of that copy was the Beta Sigma Lambda chapter at
MLQU, the Committee subpoenaed Ronald Collado, the Most Illustrious Brother of
the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity of MLQU.
RONALD COLLADO is a senior law student at the MLQU. He admitted that his
fraternity conducted Bar Ops for the 2003 bar exams. Bar Ops are the biggest
activity of the fraternity every year. They start as soon as new officers of the
fraternity are elected in June, and they continue until the bar examinations are over.
The bar operations consist of soliciting funds from alumni brods and friends to be
spent in reproducing bar review materials for the use of their barristers (bar
candidates) in the various review centers, providing meals for their brod-barristers on
examination days; and to rent a bar site or place near De la Salle University where
the examinees and the frat members can convene and take their meals during the
break time. The Betans bar site for the 2003 bar examinations was located on Leon
Guinto Street, Malate. On September 19 and 21, before [the] start of the
examination, Collados fraternity distributed bar review materials for the mercantile
law examination to the examinees who came to the bar site. The test questions (Exh.
H) were received by Collado from a brod, Alan Guiapal, who had received them
from Randy Iigo.
Collado caused 30 copies of the test questions to be printed with the logo and initials
of the fraternity (BEA-MLQU) for distribution to the 30 MLQU examinees taking
the bar exams. Because of time constraints, frat members were unable to answer the
test questions despite the clamor for answers, so, they were given out as is - without
answers.
DEAN EDUARDO J. F. ABELLA of theJoseRizalUniversity law school in
Mandaluyong City, was the reviewer in Mercantile Law and Practical Exercises at
the Lex Review Center which is operated by the Lex Review & Seminars Inc., of
16 | P a g e
which Dean Abella is one of the incorporators. He learned about the leakage of test
questions in mercantile law when he was delivering the pre-week lecture on Legal
Forms at the Arellano University. The leaked questions were shown to him by his
secretary, Jenylyn Domingo, after the mercantile law exam. He missed the Saturday
lecture in mercantile law because he was suffering from a touch of flu. He gave his
last lecture on the subject on Wednesday or Thursday before the exam. He denied
having bought or obtained and distributed the leaked test questions in Mercantile
Law to the bar reviewees in the Lex Review Center.
FINDINGS
The Committee finds that the leaked test questions in Mercantile Law were the
questions which the examiner, Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos, had prepared and
submitted to Justice Jose C. Vitug, as chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations
Committee. The questions constituted 82% of the questions asked in the examination
in Mercantile Law in the morning of September 21, 2003, Sunday, in some cases
with slight changes which were not substantial and in other cases exactly as proposed
by Atty. Balgos. Hence, any bar examinee who was able to get hold of the leaked
questions before the mercantile law examination and answered them correctly, would
have been assured of passing the examination with at least a grade of 82%!
The circumstance that the leaked test questions consisted entirely of test questions
prepared by Atty. Balgos, proves conclusively that the leakage originated from his
office, not from the Office of Justice Vitug, the Bar Examinations Chairman.
Atty. Balgos claimed that the leaked test questions were prepared by him on his
computer. Without any doubt,the source of the leaked test questions was Atty.
Balgos computer. The culprit who stole or downloaded them from Atty. Balgos
computer without the latters knowledge and consent, and who faxed them to other
persons, was Atty. Balgos legal assistant, Attorney Danilo De Guzman, who
voluntarily confessed the deed to the Investigating Committee. De Guzman revealed
that he faxed the test questions, with the help of his secretary Reynita Villasis, to his
fraternity brods, namely, Ronan Garvida, Arlan (whose surname he could not recall),
and Erwin Tan.
In turn, Ronan Garvida faxed the test questions to Betans Randy Iigo and James
Bugain.
Randy Iigo passed a copy or copies of the same questions to another Betan, Alan
Guiapal, who gave a copy to the MLQU-Beta Sigma [Lambdas] Most Illustrious
Brother, Ronald F. Collado, who ordered the printing and distribution of 30 copies to
the MLQUs 30 bar candidates.
Attorney Danilo De Guzmans act of downloading Attorney Balgos test questions in
mercantile law from the latters computer, without his knowledge and permission,
was a criminal act of larceny. It was theft of intellectual property; the test questions
were intellectual property of Attorney Balgos, being the product of his intellect and
legal knowledge.
Besides theft, De Guzman also committed an unlawful infraction of Attorney Balgos
right to privacy of communication, and to security of his papers and effects against
unauthorized search and seizure - rights zealously protected by the Bill of Rights of
our Constitution (Sections 2 and 3, Article III, 1987 Constitution).
He transgressed the very first canon of the lawyers Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that [a] lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the
laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes.
By transmitting and distributing the stolen test questions to some members of the
Beta Sigma Lambda Fraternity, possibly for pecuniary profit and to given them
undue advantage over the other examiners in the mercantile law examination, De
Guzman abetted cheating or dishonesty by his fraternity brothers in the examination,
which is violative of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, as well as Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for members of the Bar, which
provide:ςηαñrοblεš Î½Î¹r†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct
Canon 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
De Guzman was guilty of grave misconduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. He
violated the law instead of promoting respect for it and degraded the noble
profession of law instead of upholding its dignity and integrity. His actuations
impaired public respect for the Court, and damaged the integrity of the bar
examinations as the final measure of a law graduates academic preparedness to
embark upon the practice of law.
However, the Investigating Committee does not believe that De Guzman was solely
responsible for the leakage of Atty. Balgos proposed test questions in the mercantile
law examination. The Committee does not believe that he acted alone, or did not
have the assistance and cooperation of other persons, such
as:ςηαñrοblεš Î½Î¹r†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Cheryl Palma, Atty. Balgos private secretary, who, according to Atty. Balgos
himself, was the only person who knew the password, who could open and close his
computer; and who had the key to his office where his computer was kept. Since a
computer may not be accessed or downloaded unless it is opened, someone must
17 | P a g e
have opened Atty. Balgos computer in order for De Guzman to retrieve the test
questions stored therein.
Silvestre Atienza, also a fraternity brod of De Guzman, who was responsible for
interconnecting Atty. Balgos computer with the other computers outside Atty.
Balgos room or office, and who was the only other person, besides Cheryl Palma,
who knew the password of Atty. Balgos computer.
The following persons who received from De Guzman, and distributed copies of the
leaked test questions, appear to have conspired with him to steal and profit from the
sale of the test questions. They could not have been motivated solely by a desire to
help the fraternity, for the leakage was widespread (kalat na kalat) according to
Erwin Tan. The possible co-conspirators were: Ronan Garvida, Arlan, Erwin Tan,
Randy Iigo, Ronald Collado, and Allan Guiapal
The Committee does not believe that De Guzman recklessly broke the law and risked
his job and future as a lawyer, out of love for the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity.
There must have been an ulterior material consideration for his breaking the law and
tearing the shroud of secrecy that, he very well knows, covers the bar examinations.
On the other hand, the Committee finds that the theft of the test questions from Atty.
Balgos computer could have been avoided if Atty. Balgos had exercised due
diligence in safeguarding the secrecy of the test questions which he prepared. As the
computer is a powerful modern machine which he admittedly is not fairly familiar
with, he should not have trusted it to deep secret the test questions that he stored in
its hard disk. He admittedly did not know the password of his computer. He relied on
his secretary to use the password to open and close his computer. He kept his
computer in a room to which other persons had access. Unfamiliar with the use of
the machine whose potential for mischief he could not have been totally unaware of,
he should have avoided its use for so sensitive an undertaking as typing the questions
in the bar examination. After all he knew how to use the typewriter in the use of
which he is quite proficient. Atty. Balgos should therefore have prepared the test
questions in his trusty typewriter, in the privacy of his home, (instead of his law
office), where they would have been safe from the prying eyes of secretaries and
assistant attorneys. Atty. Balgos negligence in the preparation and safekeeping of his
proposed test questions for the bar examination in mercantile law, was not the
proximate cause of the bar leakage; it was, in fact, the root cause. For, if he had taken
those simple precautions to protect the secrecy of his papers, nobody could have
stolen them and copied and circulated them. The integrity of the bar examinations
would not have been sullied by the scandal. He admitted that Mali siguro ako, but
that was what happened (43 tsn, Oct. 24, 2003).
RECOMMENDATION
This Honorable court in the case of Burbe v. Magulta, A.C. No. 5713, June 10, 2002,
383 SCRA 276, pronounced the following reminder for lawyers: Members of the bar
must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in
the fidelity, the honesty and integrity of the profession. In another case, it likewise
intoned: We cannot overstress the duty of a lawyer to at all times uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession. He can do this by faithfully performing his duties
to society, to the bar, to the courts, and to his clients. (Reyes v. Javier, A.C. No.
5574, February 2, 2002, 375 SCRA 538). It goes without saying that a lawyer who
violates this precept of the profession by committing a gross misconduct which
dishonors and diminishes the publics respect for the legal profession, should be
disciplined.
After careful deliberation, the Investigating Committee recommends that:
1.Attorney Danilo De Guzman be DISBARRED for he had shown that he is morally
unfit to continue as a member of the legal profession, for grave dishonesty, lack of
integrity, and criminal behavior. In addition, he should make a written PUBLIC
APOLOGY and pay DAMAGES to the Supreme Court for involving it in another
bar scandal, causing the cancellation of the mercantile law examination, and
wreaking havoc upon the image of this institution.
2.Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos should be REPRIMANDED by the Court and
likewise be required to make a written APOLOGY to the Court for the public
scandal he brought upon it as a result of his negligence and lack of due care in
preparing and safeguarding his proposed test questions in mercantile law. As the
Court had to cancel the Mercantile Law examination on account of the leakage
ofAttorney Balgos test questions, which comprised 82% of the bar questions in that
examination, Atty. Balgos is not entitled to receive any honorarium as examiner for
that subject.
3.FURTHER INVESTIGATION of Danilo De Guzman, Cheryl Palma, Silvestre
Atienza, Ronan Garvida, Arlan, Erwin Tan, Randy Iigo, James Bugain, Ronald
Collado and Allan Guiapal by the National Bureau of Investigation and the
Philippine National Police, with a view to their criminal prosecution as probable co-
conspirators in the theft and leakage of the test questions in mercantile law.
With regard to recommending measures to safeguard the integrity of the bar
examinations and prevent a repetition of future leakage in the said examinations,
inasmuch as this matter is at present under study by the Courts Committee on Legal
Education and Bar Matters, as an aspect of proposals for bar reforms, the
Investigating Committee believes it would be well-advised to refrain from including
in this report what may turn out to be duplicative, if not contrary, recommendations
on the matter.3 ςrνll
18 | P a g e
The Court adopts the report, including with some modifications the recommendation,
of the Investigating Committee. The Court, certainly will not countenance any act or
conduct that can impair not only the integrity of the Bar Examinations but the trust
reposed on the Court.
The Court also takes note that Mr. Jovito M. Salonga and Mr. Benjamin R. Katly,
two of its employees assigned to the Management Information Systems Office
(MISO), who were tasked by the Investigating Committee to inspect the computer
system in the office of Atty. Balgos, found that the Courts Computer-Assisted Legal
Research (CALR) database4 was installed in the computer used by Atty. Balgos. Mr.
Salonga and Mr. Katly reported that the system, which was developed by the MISO,
was intended for the exclusive use of the Court. The installation thereof to any
external computer would be unauthorized without the permission of the Court. Atty.
Velasco informed the two Court employees that the CALR database was installed by
Atty. De Guzman on the computer being used by Atty. Balgos. The matter would
also need further investigation to determine how Atty. De Guzman was able to
obtain a copy of the Courts CALR database.
WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the recommendations of the Investigating
Committee, hereby resolves to -
(1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice of law effective upon
his receipt of this RESOLUTION;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(2) REPRIMAND Atty. MARCIAL O.T. BALGOS and DISENTITLE him from
receiving any honorarium as an Examiner in Mercantile
Law;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(3) Direct the National Bureau of Investigation (a) to undertake further investigation
of Danilo De Guzman, Cheryl Palma, Silvestre Atienza, Ronan Garvida, Erwin Tan,
Randy Iigo, James Bugain, Ronald Collado and Allan Guiapal with a view to
determining their participation and respective accountabilities in the bar examination
leakage and to conduct an investigation on how Danilo De Guzman was able to
secure a copy of the Supreme Courts CALR database.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of the records of Danilo De Guzman in
the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and copies to be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the Office of the
Court Administrator to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
f. Re: 2003 Bar Examinations, B.M. No. 1222, April 24,2009
EN BANC
[B.M. NO. 1222 : April 24, 2009]
RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS
ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN, Petitioner,
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This treats the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated November 10,
2008 filed by petitioner Danilo de Guzman. He prays that this Honorable Court "in
the exercise of equity and compassion, grant petitioner's plea for judicial clemency,
and thereupon, order his reinstatement as a member in good standing of the
Philippine Bar."1
To recall, on February 4, 2004, the Court promulgated a Resolution, in B.M. No.
1222, the dispositive portion of which reads in part:
WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the recommendations of the Investigating
Committee, hereby resolves to'
(1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice of law effective upon
his receipt of this RESOLUTION;
xxx
The subject of the Resolution is the leakage of questions in Mercantile Law during
the 2003 Bar Examinations. Petitioner at that time was employed as an assistant
lawyer in the law firm of Balgos & Perez, one of whose partners, Marcial Balgos,
was the examiner for Mercantile Law during the said bar examinations. The Court
had adopted the findings of the Investigating Committee, which identified petitioner
as the person who had downloaded the test questions from the computer of Balgos
and faxed them to other persons.
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) has favorably recommended the
reinstatement of petitioner in the Philippine Bar. In a Report dated January 6, 2009,
the OBC rendered its assessment of the petition, the relevant portions of which we
quote hereunder:
Petitioner narrated that he had labored to become a lawyer to fulfill his father's
childhood dream to become one. This task was not particularly easy for him and his
family but he willed to endure the same in order to pay tribute to his parents.
19 | P a g e
Petitioner added that even at a very young age, he already imposed upon himself the
duty of rendering service to his fellowmen. At 19 years, he started his exposure to
public service when he was elected Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) of
Barangay Tuktukan, Taguig City. During this time, he initiated several projects
benefiting the youth in their barangay.
Thereafter, petitioner focused on his studies, taking up Bachelor of Arts in Political
Science and eventually pursuing Bachelor of Laws. In his second year in law school,
he was elected as the President of the Student Council of the Institute of Law of the
Far Eastern University (FEU). Here, he spearheaded various activities including the
conduct of seminars for law students as well as the holding of bar operations for bar
examinees.
Despite his many extra-curricular activities as a youth and student leader, petitioner
still managed to excel in his studies. Thus, he was conferred an Academic Excellence
Award upon his graduation in Bachelor of Laws.
Upon admission to the bar in April 1999, petitioner immediately entered government
service as a Legal Officer assigned at the Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig.
Simultaneously, he also rendered free legal services to less fortunate residents of
Taguig City who were then in need of legal assistance.
In March 2000, petitioner was hired as one of the Associate Lawyers at the Balgos
and Perez Law Offices. It was during his stay with this firm when his craft as a
lawyer was polished and developed. Despite having entered private practice, he
continued to render free legal services to his fellow Taguigeños.
Then in February 2004, by a sudden twist of fate, petitioner's flourishing career was
cut short as he was stripped of his license to practice law for his alleged involvement
in the leakage in the 2003 Bar Examinations.
Devastated, petitioner then practically locked himself inside his house to avoid the
rather unavoidable consequences of his disbarment.
On March 2004, however, petitioner was given a new lease in life when he was taken
as a consultant by the City Government of Taguig. Later, he was designated as a
member of the Secretariat of the People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB). For the
next five (5) years, petitioner concentrated mainly on rendering public service.
Petitioner humbly acknowledged the damaging impact of his act which
unfortunately, compromised the integrity of the bar examinations. As could be borne
from the records of the investigation, he cooperated fully in the investigation
conducted and took personal responsibility for his actions. Also, he has offered his
sincerest apologies to Atty. Balgos, to the Court as well as to all the 2003 bar
examinees for the unforeseen and unintended effects of his actions.
Petitioner averred that he has since learned from his mistakes and has taken the said
humbling experience to make him a better person.
Meanwhile, as part of his Petition, petitioner submitted the following testimonials
and endorsements of various individuals and entities all attesting to his good moral
character:
1) Resolution No. 101, Series of 2007, "Resolution Expressing Full Support to
Danilo G. De Guzman in his Application for Judicial Clemency, Endorsing his
Competence and Fitness to be Reinstated as a Member of the Philippine Bar and for
Other Purposes" dated 4 June 2007 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, City of Taguig;
2) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman
ang Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Southeast People's Village
Homeowners Association, Inc. (SEPHVOA) kay Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang
Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa
Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang
Abogado" dated 1 June 2007 of the Southeast People's Village Homeowners
Association, Inc. (SEPHVOA), Ibayo-Tipas, City of Taguig;
3) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman
ang Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahang Residente ng Mauling
Creek, Inc. (SAREMAC) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong
Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang
Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated
1 June 2007 of the Samahang Residente ng Mauling Creek, Inc. (SAREMAC),
Lower Bicutan, City of Taguig;
4) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman
ang Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahan ng mga Maralita
(PULONG KENDI) Neighborhood Association, Inc. (SAMANA) kay G. Danilo G.
De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong
Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo
ng Isang Abogado" dated 1 June 2007 of the Samahan ng mga Maralita (PULONG
KENDI) Neighborhood Association, Inc. (SAMANA), Sta. Ana, City of Taguig;
5) "An Open Letter Attesting Personally to the Competence and Fitness of Danilo G.
De Guzman as to Warrant the Grant of Judicial Clemency and his Reinstatement as
Member of the Philippine Bar" dated 8 June 2007 of Miguelito Nazareno V.
Llantino, Laogan, Trespeses and Llantino Law Offices;
6) "Testimonial to the Moral and Spiritual Competence of Danilo G. De Guzman to
be Truly Deserving of Judicial Clemency and Compassion" dated 5 July 2007 of
Rev. Fr. Paul G. Balagtas, Parish Priest, Archdiocesan Shrine of St. Anne;
20 | P a g e
7) "Testimonial Letter" dated 18 February 2008 of Atty. Loreto C. Ata, President,
Far Eastern University Law Alumni Association (FEULAA), Far Eastern University
(FEU);
8) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman
ang Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahang Bisig Kamay sa
Kaunlaran, Inc. (SABISKA) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong
Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang
Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated
8 July 2008 of the Samahang Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc. (SABISKA);
9) Board Resolution No. 02, Series of 2008, "A Resolution Recognizing the
Contributions of Danilo G. De Guzman to the People's Law Enforcement Board
(PLEB) - Taguig City, Attesting to his Utmost Dedication and Commitment to the
Call of Civic and Social Duty and for Other Purposes" dated 11 July 2008 of the
People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB);
10) "A Personal Appeal for the Grant of Judicial Forgiveness and Compassion in
Favor of Danilo G. De Guzman" dated 14 July 2008 of Atty. Edwin R. Sandoval,
Professor, College of Law, San Sebastian College - Recoletos;
11) "An Open Letter Personally Attesting to the Moral competence and Fitness of
Danilo G. De Guzman" dated 5 September 2008 of Mr. Nixon F. Faderog, Deputy
Grand [Kn]ight, Knights of Columbus and President, General Parent-Teacher
Association, Taguig National High School, Lower Bicutan, Taguig City;
12) "Testimonial Letter" dated 5 September 2008 of Atty. Primitivo C. Cruz,
President, Taguig Lawyers League, Inc., Tuktukan, Taguig City;
13) "Testimonial Letter" dated 21 October 2008 of Judge Hilario L. Laqui, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trail Court (RTC), Branch 218, Quezon City; andcralawlibrary
14) "Testimonial Letter" dated 28 October 2008 of Justice Oscar M. Herrera, former
Justice, Court of Appeals and former Dean, Institute of Law, Far Eastern University
(FEU).
Citing the case of In Re: Carlos S. Basa, petitioner pleaded that he be afforded the
same kindness and compassion in order that, like Atty. Basa, his promising future
may not be perpetually foreclosed. In the said case, the Court had the occasion to
say:
Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of
California and the Philippine Islands. Recently, he was charged in the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila with the crime of abduction with consent, was found
guilty in a decision rendered by the Honorable M.V. De Rosario, Judge of First
Instance, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two years, eleven
months and eleven days of prision correccional. On appeal, this decision was
affirmed in a judgment handed down by the second division of the Supreme Court.
xxx
When come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should be taken
by the court, we do so regretfully and reluctantly. On the one hand, the violation of
the criminal law by the respondent attorney cannot be lightly passed over. On the
other hand, we are willing to strain the limits of our compassion to the uttermost in
order that so promising a career may not be utterly ruined.
Petitioner promised to commit himself to be more circumspect in his actions and
solemnly pledged to exert all efforts to atone for his misdeeds.
There may be a reasonable ground to consider the herein Petition.
In the case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino to Take the Lawyer's Oath (Bar Matter
712), which may be applied in the instant case, the Court said:
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al
Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice
the legal profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr.
Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various
certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic
duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts, to atone for the
death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt,
taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and
uncalculating.
xxx
Meanwhile, in the case of Rodolfo M. Bernardo v. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia
(Administrative Case No. 2984), the Court [in] deciding whether or not to reinstate
Atty. Mejia to the practice of law stated:
The Court will take into consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to
the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred,
21 | P a g e
his conduct subsequent to the disbarment and the time that has elapsed in between
the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.
Petitioner was barely thirty (30) years old and had only been in the practice of law
for five (5) years when he was disbarred from the practice of law. It is of no doubt
that petitioner had a promising future ahead of him where it not for the decision of
the Court stripping off his license.
Petitioner is also of good moral repute, not only before but likewise, after his
disbarment, as attested to overwhelmingly by his constituents, colleagues as well as
people of known probity in the community and society.
Way before the petitioner was even admitted to the bar, he had already manifested
his intense desire to render public service as evidenced by his active involvement and
participation in several social and civic projects and activities. Likewise, even during
and after his disbarment, which could be perceived by some as a debilitating
circumstance, petitioner still managed to continue extending his assistance to others
in whatever means possible. This only proves petitioner's strength of character and
positive moral fiber.
However, still, it is of no question that petitioner's act in copying the examination
questions from Atty. Balgos' computer without the latter's knowledge and consent,
and which questions later turned out to be the bar examinations questions in
Mercantile Law in the 2003 Bar Examinations, is not at all commendable. While we
do believe that petitioner sincerely did not intend to cause the damage that his action
ensued, still, he must be sanctioned for unduly compromising the integrity of the bar
examinations as well as of this Court.
We are convinced, however, that petitioner has since reformed and has sincerely
reflected on his transgressions. Thus, in view of the circumstances and likewise for
humanitarian considerations, the penalty of disbarment may now be commuted to
suspension. Considering the fact, however, that petitioner had already been disbarred
for more than five (5) years, the same may be considered as proper service of said
commuted penalty and thus, may now be allowed to resume practice of law.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended that the
instant Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated 10 November 2008 of
petitioner DANILO G. DE GUZMAN be GRANTED. Petitioner's disbarment is now
commuted to suspension, which suspension is considered as served in view of the
petitioner's five (5) year disbarment. Hence, petitioner may now be allowed to
resume practice of law.
The recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant is well-taken in
part.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
We deem petitioner worthy of clemency to the extent of commuting his penalty to
seven (7) years suspension from the practice of law, inclusive of the five (5) years he
has already served his disbarment.
Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders. 2
While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also
knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its
purpose.3
In cases where we have deigned to lift or commute the supreme penalty of
disbarment imposed on the lawyer, we have taken into account the remorse of the
disbarred lawyer4 and the conduct of his public life during his years outside of the
bar.5 For example, in Valencia v. Antiniw, we held:
However, the record shows that the long period of respondent's disbarment gave him
the chance to purge himself of his misconduct, to show his remorse and repentance,
and to demonstrate his willingness and capacity to live up once again to the exacting
standards of conduct demanded of every member of the bar and officer of the court.
During respondent's disbarment for more than fifteen (15) years to date for his
professional infraction, he has been persistent in reiterating his apologies and pleas
for reinstatement to the practice of law and unrelenting in his efforts to show that he
has regained his worthiness to practice law, by his civic and humanitarian activities
and unblemished record as an elected public servant, as attested to by numerous civic
and professional organizations, government institutions, public officials and
members of the judiciary.6
And in Bernardo v. Atty. Mejia,7 we noted:
Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejia's disbarment, it also
cannot close its eyes to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. While the
age of the petitioner and the length of time during which he has endured the
ignominy of disbarment are not the sole measure in allowing a petition for
reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his
disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been attributed to him, and he has
shown remorse. Obviously, he has learned his lesson from this experience, and his
punishment has lasted long enough. x x x
Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated the remorse expected of him considering the
gravity of his transgressions. Even more to his favor, petitioner has redirected focus
since his disbarment towards public service, particularly with the People's Law
Enforcement Board. The attestations submitted by his peers in the community and
other esteemed members of the legal profession, such as retired Court of Appeals
Associate Justice Oscar Herrera, Judge Hilario Laqui, Professor Edwin Sandoval and
Atty. Lorenzo Ata, and the ecclesiastical community such as Rev. Fr. Paul Balagtas
testify to his positive impact on society at large since the unfortunate events of 2003.
22 | P a g e
Petitioner's subsequent track record in public service affords the Court some hope
that if he were to reacquire membership in the Philippine bar, his achievements as a
lawyer would redound to the general good and more than mitigate the stain on his
record. Compassion to the petitioner is warranted. Nonetheless, we wish to impart to
him the following stern warning:
"Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the
laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and
override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bands of society,
argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the
insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic."8
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Judicial Clemency and
Compassion is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The disbarment of DANILO G. DE
GUZMAN from the practice of law is hereby COMMUTED to SEVEN (7)
YEARS SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW, reckoned from
February 4, 2004.
SO ORDERED.
g. B.M. No. 1161, Re: Proposed Reforms in the Bar Examinations, issued
on 8 June 2004 and the SC Resolution dated September 3, 2013 lifting the Five
Strike Rule
BAR MATTER No. 1161
RE: PROPOSED REFORMS IN THE BAR EXAMINATIONS
RESOLUTION
ON
REFORM IN THE BAR EXAMINANTIONS
WHEREAS, pursuant to its Constitutional authority to promulgate rules concerning
the admission to the practice of law, the Supreme Court en banc item in its
Resolution of 21 March 2000, created a "Special Study Group on Bar Examination
Reforms" to conduct studies on steps to further safeguard the integrity of the Bar
Examinations and to make them effective tools in measuring the adequacy of the law
curriculum and the quality of the instruction given by law schools";
WHEREAS, the Special Study Group, with Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA)
Chancellor Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera as a chairperson and retired
Justice Jose Y. Feria and retired Justice Camilo D. Quiason as members, submitted
to the Supreme Court its Final Report, dated 18 September 2000, containing its
findings and recommendations;
WHEREAS, on 21 August 2001, the Supreme Court en banc referred, for further
study, report and recommendation, the Final Report of the Special Study Group to
the Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters (CLEBM) headed by Justice
Jose C. Vitug;
WHEREAS, in connection with the discussion on the proposed reforms in the bar
examinations, Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, then a Member of the CLEBM,
submitted a Paper, entitled "Toward Meaningful Reforms in the Bar Examination"
with a Primer, proposing structural and administrative reforms, changes in the design
and construction of questions, and the methodological reforms concerning the
marking anf grading of the essay questions in the bar examination;
WHEREAS, proposals and comments were likewise received from the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Philippine Association of Law Schools, the Philippine
Association of Law Professors, the Commission on Higher Education, the University
of the Philippines College of Law, Arellano Law Foundation, the Philippine Lawyers
Association, the Philippine Bar Association and other prominent personalities from
the Bench and the Bar;
WHEREAS, considering her Memorandum to the Chief Justice on "Proposed
Technical Assistance Project on Legal Education," dated 27 February 2003, Program
Director Evelyn Toledo-Dumdum of the Program Management Office (PMO) was
invited to a meeting of the CLEBM;
WHEREAS, under the auspices of the PMO, the CLEBM conducted fur (4) regional
round-table discussions with the law deans, professors, the students and members of
the Integrated Bar of he Philippines for (a) the National Capital Region, at Manila
Diamond Hotel on 19 November 2003; (b) Mindanao, at the Grand Regal Hotel
Davao City on 23 January 2004; (c) the Visayas, at the Montebello Hotel in Cebu
City on January 2004; and (d) Luzon, at the Pan Pacific Hotel in Manila on 6
February 2004.
WHEREAS, in a Special Meeting of the CLEBM at the Pan Pacific Hotel on 23
April 2004, the Committee heard the views of Ms. Erica Moeser, the Chief
Executive Officer and President of the National Conference of Board Examiners in
the United States of America on a number of proposed bar reforms;
WHEREAS, the CLEBM, after extensive deliberation and consultation, has arived at
certain recommendations for consideration by the Supreme Court and submitted its
report , dated 21 May 2004, to the Court en banc;
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court, sitting en banc, hereby RESOLVES to approve
and adopt the following Bar Examination Reforms:
A. For implementation within one (1) up to two (2) years:
23 | P a g e
1. Initial determination by the Chairman of admission to the bar
examinations of candidates (on the merits of the each case) to be
passed upon by the Court en banc.
2. Submission by law deans of a certification that a candidate has no
derogatory record in school and, if any, the details and status
thereof.
3. Disqualification of a candidate after failing in three(3)
examinations, provided, that he may take a fourth and fifth
examination if he successful completes a one (1) year refresher
course for each examination; provided, further, that upon the
effectivity of this Resolution, those who have already failed in
five(5) or more bar examinations shall be allowed to take only one
(1) more bar examination after copleting (1) year refresher course.
4. Promulgation of disciplinary measures for those involved in (a)
attempts to violate or vitiate the integrity and confidentiality of the
bar examination process; (b) improper conduct during the bar
examination; and (c) improper conduct of "bar examinations."
5. Disqualification of a Bar Examination Chairperson:
a. kinship with an examinee who if his or her spouse or
relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity;
b. having a member of his or her office staff as an examinee,
or when the spouse or child of such staff member is an
examinee; and
c. being a member of the governing board, faculty or
administration of a law school.
6. Desirable qualifications of Examiners:
a. membership in good standing in the Philippine Bar;
b. competence in the assigned subject;
c. a teacher of the subject or familiarity with the principles
of test construction; and
d. commitment to check test papers personally and promptly
pending the creation and organization of the readership
panels provided for in item B(6) below
7. Disqualifications of Examiners:
a. kinship with an examinee who is his or her spouse or
relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity;
b. having a member of his or her office staff as an examinee;
or when the spouse or child of such staff member is an
examinee;
c. being a member of the governing board, faculty or
administration of a law school
d. teaching or lecturing in any law school, institution or
review center during the particular semester following the
bar examinations;
e. having any interest or involvement in any law school, bar
review center or group; and
f. suspension or disbarment from the practice of law or the
imposition of any other serious disciplinary sanction.
8. Personal preparation, by handwriting or using a typewriter, of fifty
(50) main questions, excluding subdivisions, and their submission
to the Chairperson in sealed envelope at least forty-five (45) days
before the schedule examination on any particular subject;
examiners should not use computers in preparing questions;
9. Apportionment of examination questions among the various topics
covered by the subject;
10. Burning and shredding of rough drafts and carbon papers used in
the preparation of questions or in any other act connected with
such preparation;
11. Publication of names candidates admitted to take the bar
examinations;
12. Disqualification of a candidate who obtains a grade below 50% in
any subject;
13. Fixing at June 30 of the immediately preceding year as the cut-off
date for laws and Supreme Court decisions and resolutions to be
included in the bar examinations; and
14. Consideration of suggested answers to bar examinations questions
prepared by the U.P. Law Center and submitted to the Chairperson.
B. For implementation within two (2) years up to five (5) years:
1. Adoption of objective multiple-choice questions for 30% to 40%
of the total number of questions;
2. Formulation of essay test questions and "model answers" as part of
the calibration of test papers;
3. Introduction of performance testing by way of revising and
improving the essay examination;1awphil.net
4. Designation of two(2) examiners per subject depending on the
number of examinees ;
5. Appointment of a tenured Board of Examiners with an incumbent
Supreme Court Justice as Chairperson;
6. Creation and organization of readership panels for each subject
area to address the issue of bias or subjectivity and facilitate the
formulation of test questions and the correction of examination
booklets; and
7. Adoption of the calibration method in the corrections of essay
questions to correct variations in the level of test standards.1awph!
l.ñêt
C. For implementation within five(5) years and beyond is the further
computerization or automation of the bar examinations to facilitate
application, testing, and reporting procedures.
24 | P a g e
 D. Items not covered by this resolution, such as those that pertain to a
possible review of the coverage and relative weights of the subjects of
the bar examinations, are maintained.
E. For referral to the Legal education Boards:
1. Accreditation and supervision of law schools.
2. Inclusion of a subject on clinical legal education in the law
curriculum, including an apprenticeship program in the Judiciary,
prosecution service, and law offices.
3. Imposition of sanctions on law schools that fail to meet the
standards as may be prescribed by the Legal Education Board.
4. Mandatory Law School Admission Test.
This resolution shall take effect on the fifteenth day of July 2004, and shall be
published in two newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
Promulgated this 8th day of June 2004.
Lifting of the 5-strike rule now official but some questions remain
  Prof. Manuel R. Riguera
On 3 September 2013 the Supreme Court en banc issued a resolution adopting the
recommendation of the Committee on Continuing Legal Education and Bar Matters
to lift the 5-strike rule.  The resolution provides that the Legal Education Board
(LEB) shall prepare a refresher review class curriculum and accredit law schools
which would be authorized to give refresher classes.  Just this January 13, the LEB
issued an order ratifying its provisional rules on refresher review curriculum and
accreditation.
 
History of the 5-strike rule  2011, which reads as follows:
The 5-strike rule was laid down by the Supreme Court in Bar Matter No. 1161 issued
on 8 June 2004.  Under the 5-strike rule, a bar candidate shall be disqualified after
failing thrice; provided that the candidate may take a fourth or fifth examination if he
successfully completes a one-year refresher course for each examination.  The 5-
strike rule was first implemented in the 2005 bar examinations, although those who
have reached or exceeded 5 takes as of 2004 would be allowed to take the bar one
more time upon completion of a one-year refresher course.  Prior to 5-strike rule,
there was no limit to the number of times a candidate could take the bar.
3 September 2013 Resolution  "Section 11. Annual examination. - Examinations for admission to the bar of the
As early as 2011, there were unofficial reports that the 5-strike rule would be
suspended or even lifted outright. These reports gave hope to those who had struck
out five times, with some even enrolling in refresher classes in anticipation of the
rule’s abandonment.  On 3 September 2013 the Supreme Court en banc issued its
much awaited resolution lifting the 5-strike rule.   The resolution reads as follows:
B.M. No. 1161 (Re:  Proposed Reforms in the Bar Examinations). - - The Court
resolved, upon the recommendation of the Committee on Continuing Legal
Education and Bar Matters, to LIFT the five-strike rule on bar repeaters, provided
that the candidates have enrolled in and passed in regular fourth year review classes
as well as attended a pre-bar review course every time they take the Bar
Examinations after failing for the third time, under a curriculum prepared by the
Legal Education Board (LEB), and in law schools accredited by it for that purpose. 
This rule shall take effect beginning with the 2014 Bar Examinations. 
The resolution provides that the refresher candidates shall attend fourth year review
classes under a curriculum prepared by the LEB and in law schools accredited by the
LEB for the purpose.   Hence the passage by the LEB of the appropriate rules was
required for the implementation of the resolution.
h. B.M. No. 2265 RE: REFORMS IN THE 2011BAR EXAMINATIONS,
Promulgated on January 18, 2011.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated FEBRUARY 8,
"B.M. No. 2265 (Re: Letter of Justice Roberto A. Abad Proposing Changes for
Improving the Conduct of the Bar Examinations). - The Court Resolved to NOTE
the Letter dated January 28, 2011 of Justice Roberto A. Abad re: Amendment to
Section 11, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court (Annual Examination), incident to the
implementation of B.M. No. 2265 (Reforms in the 2011 Bar Examinations).
The Court further Resolved to APPROVE the Amendment to Section 11, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Philippines shall take place annually in the City of Manila. They shall be held in four
days to be designated by the chairman of the committee on bar examiners. The
subjects shall be distributed as follows: First day: Political and International Law,
and Labor and Social Legislation (morning) and Taxation (afternoon); Second day:
Civil Law (morning) and Mercantile Law (afternoon); Third day: Remedial Law, and
25 | P a g e
Legal Ethics and Forums (morning) and Criminal Law (afternoon); Fourth day: Trial (b) APPROVE the Reforms in the 2011 Bar Examinations, hereto attached
Memorandum (morning) and Legal Opinion (afternoon)". (adv107) as Annex "A"; and

Very truly yours, (c) NOTE Resolution No. 12-991-2010 dated October 1, 2010 of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Cebu, Cebu City Hall, praying anew that the
(Sgd.)ENRIQUETA E. VIDAL Supreme Court, through the Bar Committee will extend the venue of the
Clerk of Court Bar Examinations to Cebu City, and hold simultaneous annual examinations
in Manila and Cebu City." (adv14)
Honorable Roberto A. Abad (x)
Associate Justice and Chairperson Very truly yours,
2011 Committee on Bar Examinations
Supreme Court ENRIQUETA E. VIDAL
Clerk of Court
Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa (x)
Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court SUPREME COURT
Manila
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT EN BANC
Manila
B.M. No. 2265
EN BANC
RE: REFORMS IN THE 2011 BAR EXAMINATIONS
NOTICE
Preliminary Statement
Sirs/Mesdames:
The Court has found merit in the proposed changes in the conduct of the bar
Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated JANUARY 18, examinations that the Chairperson of the 2011 Bar Examinations and Philippine
2011, which reads as follows: Association of Law Schools recommended.

"B.M. No. 2265 (Re: Reforms in the 2011 Bar Examinations [Letter of Justice
Roberto A. Abad Proposing Changes for Improving the Conduct of the Bar
Examinations]. Acting on the Letter dated January 10, 2011 of Associate Justice
Roberto A. Abad, proposing to move the 2011 Bar Examinations from September to
November, the Court Resolved to NOTE the said Letter and GRANT the proposal of
Justice Abad to MOVE the 2011 Bar Examinations from September to November.
The Court further Resolved to
(a) NOTE the Letter dated September 2, 2010 of Justice Antonio Eduardo
B. Nachura, Chairperson, Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters,
recommending the final approval by the Court En Banc of the proposed
changes for improving the conduct of the bar examinations by Justice Abad,
inasmuch as the Court En Banc had provisionally approved the proposals
One recommendation concerns the description of the coverage of the annual bar
examinations that in the past consisted merely of naming the laws that each subject
covered. This description has been regarded as too general and provides no specific
understanding of the entry-level legal knowledge required of beginning law
practitioners.
A second recommendation addresses the predominantly essay-type of bar
examinations that the Court conducts. Because of the enormous growth of laws,
doctrines, principles, and precedents, it has been noted that such examinations are
unable to hit a significant cross-section of the subject matter. Further, the huge
number of candidates taking the examinations annually and the limited time
available for correcting the answers make fair correction of purely essay-type
examinations difficult to attain. Besides, the use of multiple choice questions,

26 | P a g e
properly and carefully constructed, is a method of choice for qualifying professionals Political Law — 15%
all over the world because of its proven reliability and facility of correction.
Labor Law — 10%
A third recommendation opts for maintaining the essay-type examinations but Civil Law — 15%
dedicating these to the assessment of the requisite communication skills, creativity,
and fine intellect that bar candidates need for the practice of law. Taxation — 10%
Mercantile Law — 15%
Approved Changes
Criminal Law — 10%
The Court has previously approved in principle the above recommended changes. It
now resolves to approve the following rules that shall govern the future conduct of Remedial Law — 20%
the bar examinations: Legal Ethics/Forms — 5%

1. The coverage of the bar examinations shall be drawn up by topics and

sub-topics rather than by just stating the covered laws. The test for
including a topic or sub-topic in the coverage of the examinations is
whether it covers laws, doctrines, principles and rulings that a new lawyer
needs to know to begin a reasonably prudent and competent law practice.
The coverage shall be approved by the Chairperson of the Bar Examination
in consultation with the academe, subject to annual review and re-approval
by subsequent Chairpersons.
2. The bar examinations shall measure the candidate’s knowledge of the law
and its applications through multiple-choice-questions (MCQs) that are to
be so constructed as to specifically:
2.1. Measure the candidate’s knowledge of and ability to recall the
laws, doctrines, and principles that every new lawyer needs in his
practice;
2.2. Assess the candidate’s understanding of the meaning and
significance of those same laws, doctrines, and principles as they
apply to specific situations; and
2.3. Measure his ability to analyze legal problems, apply the
correct law or principle to such problems, and provide solutions to
them.
3. The results of the MCQ examinations shall, if feasible, be corrected
electronically.
4. The results of the MCQ examinations in each bar subject shall be given
the following weights:
5. Part of the bar examinations shall be of the essay-type, dedicated to
measuring the candidate’s skills in writing in English, sorting out the
relevant facts in a legal dispute, identifying the issue or issues involved,
organizing his thoughts, constructing his arguments, and persuading his
readers to his point of view. The essays will not be bar subject specific.
5.1. One such essay examination shall require the candidate to
prepare a trial memorandum or a decision based on a documented
legal dispute. (60% of essays)
5.2 Another essay shall require him to prepare a written opinion
sought by a client concerning a potential legal dispute facing him.
(40% of essays)
6. The essays shall not be graded for technically right or wrong aswers, but
for the quality of the candidate’s legal advocacy. The passing standard for
correction shall be work expected of a beginning practitioner, not a
seasoned lawyer.
7. The examiners in all eight bar subjects shall, apart from preparing the
MCQs for their respective subjects, be divided into two panels of four
members each. One panel will grade the memorandum or decision essay
while the other will grade the legal opinion essay. Each member shall read
and grade the examination answer of a bar candidate independently of the
other members in his panel. The final grade of a candidate for each essay
shall be the average of the grades given by the four members of the panel
for that essay.
8. The results of the a) MCQ and b) essay-type examinations shall be given
weights of 60% and 40%, respectively, in the computation of the
candidate’s final grade.

27 | P a g e
 9. For want of historical data needed for computing the passing grade in
MCQ kind of examinations, the Chairperson of the 2011 Bar PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
JR. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Examinations shall, with the assistance of experts in computing MCQ
examination grades, recommend to the Court the appropriate conversion
table or standard that it might adopt for arriving at a reasonable passing TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
ARTURO D. BRION
grade for MCQs in bar examinations. CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
10. In the interest of establishing needed data, the answers of all candidates
in the essay-type examinations in the year 2011 shall be corrected DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
irrespective of the results of their MCQ examinations, which are sooner Associate Justice Associate Justice
known because they are electronically corrected. In future bar examinations,
however, the Bar Chairperson shall recommend to the Court the MARIANO C. DEL
disqualification of those whose grades in the MCQ are so low that it would ROBERTO A. ABAD
CASTILLO
serve no useful purpose to correct their answers in the essay-type Associate Justice
Associate Justice
examinations.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
11. Using the data and experience obtained from the 2011 Bar Associate Justice Associate Justice
Examinations, future Chairpersons of Bar Examination are directed to study
the feasibility of:
MARIA LOURDES P. A.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ SERENO
11.1. Holding in the interest of convenience and economy bar Associate Justice Associate Justice
examinations simultaneously in Luzon, the Visayas, and
Mindanao; and
i. Aguirre vs. Rana, B.M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003
11.2. Allowing those who pass the MCQ examinations but fail the B. M. No. 1036               June 10, 2003
essay-type examinations to take removal examinations in the DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, Complainant,
immediately following year. vs. EDWIN L. RANA, Respondent.

12. All existing rules, regulations, and instructions that are inconsistent with DECISION
the above are repealed.
CARPIO, J.:
This Bar Matter shall take effect immediately, and shall be published in two
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines. The Case

January 18, 2011. Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral
integrity for membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of
RENATO C. CORONA greater importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a
Chief Justice privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit
cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.

CONCHITA CARPIO The Facts

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
MORALES
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

28 | P a g e
Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") was among those who passed the 2000
Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar
examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre
("complainant") filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the
Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave
misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the
scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention
Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of
Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took
the lawyer’s oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up
to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave
misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared
as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of
Election Canvassers ("MBEC") of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges
that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the
Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as "counsel
for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan," and signed the
pleading as counsel for George Bunan ("Bunan").
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal
government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon,
Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in
any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses
respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan
("Bunan") without the latter engaging respondent’s services. Complainant claims that
respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning
vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the
lawyer’s oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is
cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court required
respondent to comment on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his "specific assistance" to
represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that "he decided to assist and
advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law." Respondent
admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain
votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a
lawyer or represented himself as an "attorney" in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that
he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the
same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable
Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent
further claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering that
complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of
Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of
merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Comment and refuted
the claim of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend
specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily
Estipona-Hao ("Estipona-Hao") filed a petition for proclamation as the winning
candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition.
When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his
appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and
(2) he was an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondent’s Comment) reiterating his
claim that the instant administrative case is "motivated mainly by political vendetta."
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant
("OBC") for evaluation, report and recommendation.
OBC’s Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for
Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that
respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that
respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyer’s
oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that respondent’s misconduct casts a
serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes
that respondent’s unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to
the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied
admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which
respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a
government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his resignation was
accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before the
MBEC.
29 | P a g e

The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the
Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show
that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before
respondent took the lawyer’s oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the
Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor
dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as "counsel for George Bunan." In the first
paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was the "(U)ndersigned
Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN."
Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had "authorized Atty.
Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him" before the MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also "retained"
respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed
the MBEC that "Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC
as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party." Respondent
himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his "appearance as
counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-
PPC." On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the
petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the
winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyer’s oath. Clearly,
respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine
Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, 1 the Court elucidated that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice
to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the
law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held
to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics
supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod,2 the Court held that "practice of law" means any activity, in
or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are
usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is
to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the
proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so.
Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent
called himself "counsel" knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar.
Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing that he had no authority to practice
law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar. 3
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is
limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of
integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust4 since a
lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to
practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a
privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if
the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license. 5
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v.
Abad,6 a candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed
the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing law even
before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect
contempt of court.7
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s
oath.1âwphi1 However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes
one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-
law.8 Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer
still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court
and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.9
On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow
respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body
since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
30 | P a g e
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to
the acts complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter
dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer
of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning "effective upon
your acceptance."10 Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondent’s resignation effective 11
May 2001.11 Thus, the evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as
counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that
Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the
MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent
nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine
Bar.
SO ORDERED.
j. In re: Need that Law Student Practicing Under Rule 138-A Be
Actually Supervised During Trial, Bar Matter No. 730, June 13,
1997
BAR MATTER NO. 730 June 13, 1997
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated
June 10, 1997.
IN RE: NEED THAT LAW STUDENT PRACTICING UNDER RULE 138-A BE
ACTUALLY SUPERVISED DURING TRIAL (BAR MATTER NO. 730).
The issue in this Consulta is whether a law student who appears before the court
under the Law Student Practice Rule (Rule 138-A) should be accompanied by a
member of the bar during the trial. This issue was raised by retired Supreme Court
Justice Antonio P. Barredo, counsel for the defendant in Civil Case No. BCV-92-11
entitled Irene A. Caliwara v. Roger T. Catbagan filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Bacoor, Cavite.
The records show that the plaintiff in civil Case No. BCV-92-11 was represented by
Mr. Cornelio Carmona, Jr., an intern at the Office of Legal Aid, UP-College of Law
(UP-OLA). Mr. Carmona conducted hearings and completed the presentation of the
plaintiff's evidence-in-chief without the presence of a supervising lawyer. Justice
Barredo questioned the appearance of Mr. Carmona during the hearing because the
latter was not accompanied by a duly accredited lawyer. On December 15, 1994,
Presiding Judge Edelwina Pastoral issued an Order requiring Mr. Carmona to be
accompanied by a supervising lawyer on the next hearing. In compliance with said
Order, UP-OLA and the Secretary of Justice executed a Memorandum of Agreement
directing Atty. Catubao and Atty. Legayada of the Public Attorney's Office to
supervise Mr. Carmona during the subsequent hearings.
Justice Barredo asserts that a law student appearing before the trial court under Rule
138-A should be accompanied by a supervising lawyer. 1 On the other hand, UP-
OLA, through its Director, Atty. Alfredo F. Tadiar, submits that "the matter of
allowing a law intern to appear unaccompanied by a duly accredited supervising
lawyer should be . . . left to the sound discretion of the court after having made at
least one supervised appearance." 2
For the guidance of the bench and bar, we hold that a law student appearing before
the Regional Trial Court under Rule 138-A should at all times be accompanied by a
supervising lawyer. Section 2 of Rule 138-A provides.
Sec. 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule,
shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions,
briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed the by supervising
attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
The phrase "direct supervision and control" requires no less than the physical
presence of the supervising lawyer during the hearing. This is in accordance with the
threefold rationale behind the Law Student Practice Rule, to wit: 3
1. to ensure that there will be no miscarriage of justice as
a result of incompetence or inexperience of law students,
who, not having as yet passed the test of professional
competence, are presumably not fully equipped to act a
counsels on their own;
2. to provide a mechanism by which the accredited law
school clinic may be able to protect itself from any
potential vicarious liability arising from some culpable
action by their law students; and
3. to ensure consistency with the fundamental principle
that no person is allowed to practice a particular
profession without possessing the qualifications,
particularly a license, as required by law.
31 | P a g e
The matter of allowing a law student to appear before the court unaccompanied by a
supervising lawyer cannot be left to the discretion of the presiding judge. The rule
clearly states that the appearance of the law student shall be under the direct control
and supervision of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited
by law schools. The rule must be strictly construed because public policy demands
that legal work should be entrusted only to those who possess tested qualifications,
are sworn to observe the rules and ethics of the legal profession and subject to
judicial disciplinary control. 4 We said in Bulacan v. Torcino: 5
Court procedures are often technical and may prove like snares to the
ignorant or the unwary. In the past, our law has allowed non-lawyers to
appear for party litigants in places where duly authorized members of the
bar are not available (U.S. vs. Bacansas, 6 Phil. 539). For relatively simple
litigation before municipal courts, the Rules still allow a more educated or
capable person in behalf of a litigant who cannot get a lawyer. But for the
protection of the parties and in the interest of justice, the requirement for
appearances in regional trial courts and higher courts is more stringent.
The Law Student Practice Rule is only an exception to the rule. Hence, the presiding
judge should see to it that the law student appearing before the court is properly
guided and supervised by a member of the bar.
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court,
where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student
may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34
Rule 138 provides;
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the
peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent
or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney.
In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of
an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a
party without the supervision of a member of the bar.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that a law student appearing before the Regional
Trial Court under the authority of Rule 138-A must be under the direct control and
supervision of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by
the law school and that said law student must be accompanied by a supervising
lawyer in all his appearance.
Padilla and Francisco, J.J., on leave.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of court
k. Cruz vs. Mina et al, G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 154207             April 27, 2007
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA
LAGUILLES, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
grounded on pure questions of law, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing
the Resolution dated May 3, 2002 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil Case No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction against the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch
45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705;1 and the RTC’s Order dated June 5,
2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary injunction was
issued by this Court.
The antecedents:
On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a
formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for
Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance
as private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-
lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant.
The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity
of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to
be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.
32 | P a g e
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for
petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19
governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules
of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the
Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.3
On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for
Reconsideration seeking to reverse the February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule
138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the effect of superseding
Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the source itself of
the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.
In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order
against the private respondent and the public respondent MeTC.
After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public respondent
MeTC Judge from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the
Certiorari proceedings, the RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved to
deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the ground that the crime of Grave
Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is one that can be prosecuted de
oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that therefore, the intervention
of a private prosecutor is not legally tenable.
On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration.
The petitioner argues that nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave
Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June
10, 1997 which expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the
inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, even without the supervision
of a member of the bar.
Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC,
the petitioner filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the
MeTC seeking the reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial Order of the said court, on
the strength of Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Trial
dated June 10, 2002 of Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the outcome of the
certiorari proceedings before the RTC.
On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioner’s Second
Motion for Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the
ground that the RTC had already denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner before
the MeTC.
On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant Petition and
assigns the following errors:
I.
the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it resolved to deny the
prayer for the writ of injunction of the herein petitioner despite petitioner having
established the necessity of granting the writ;
II.
THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION,
TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, WHEN IT RESOLVED TO
DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND
THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN
PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE] THREATS HAS NO CIVIL
ASPECT, FOR THE SAID BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE
LAW;
III.
THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE
TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION and WHEN THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS
YET TO DECIDE ON THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;
IV.
THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW WHEN
THEY PATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR MANDATE OF
THE LAPUT, CANTIMBUHAN AND BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR
MATTER NO. 730, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS
BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS (MTC’S).4
This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the
nature of the issues reviewed, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before
it.5
33 | P a g e
Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and
implementation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730,
Circular No. 19 governing law student practice and Rule 138-A of the Rules of
Court, and the ruling of the Court in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes cognizance of
herein petition.
The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an
inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant.
The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule
138-A of the Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering
his appearance in behalf of his father, the private complainant in the criminal case
without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.
Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has successfully
completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is
enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by
the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or
administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent
indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule,
shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions,
briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising
attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En
Banc clarified:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court,
where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student
may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34,
Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court,
a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a
party without the supervision of a member of the bar.7 (Emphasis supplied)
The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is
subsequently changed to "In the court of a municipality" as it now appears in Section
34 of Rule 138, thus:8
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a municipality a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by
him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may
conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must be
either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)
which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of Appearance
with the MeTC on September 25, 2000. No real distinction exists for under Section
6, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, the term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these
Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule
138-A. In the former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party
litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law
student, not as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a
quo must have been confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law
student in his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used by the
courts a quo in denying permission to act as private prosecutor against petitioner for
the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioner’s appearance.
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-
lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly
clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may
appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer
before inferior courts.
Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no
civil liability may flow from the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the
intervention of a private prosecutor is not possible.
34 | P a g e
It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
RTC. In denying the issuance of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision Associate Justice
that there was no claim for civil liability by the private complainant for damages, and
that the records of the case do not provide for a claim for indemnity; and that ATTESTATION
therefore, petitioner’s appearance as private prosecutor appears to be legally
untenable. I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable except in instances when no actual damage results from CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
an offense, such as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and Associate Justice
crime against popular representation.9 The basic rule applies in the instant case, such Chairperson, Third Division
that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with criminal
action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute CERTIFICATION
it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. 10
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
institution of the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
aspect arising from Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.
REYNATO S. PUNO
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of Chief Justice
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to
ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a
private prosecutor under the direct control and supervision of the public prosecutor.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. >MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

35 | P a g e