nationalism,

Sovereignty,
and regionalorderin theArab
statessystem
Michael N. Barnett

In the firstaddress to the French Parliamentby a U.S. President since

Woodrow Wilson,in June 1994 PresidentBill Clintonspoke of the growing
challengeposed by nationalismto internationalorder.In decided contrastto
Wilson,who came to Paris afterWorldWar I to championthe idea ofnational
self-determination,Clintonarrivedafterthe cold war to warnhownationalism
underminesinternationalstability.At present,nationalismis less identified
with culturalautonomy,democracy,and sovereigntythan with chauvinism,
expansionism,and assaults on the Westphalianorder.If duringthe cold war
few practitionersor studentsof securitypoliticsfullyconsideredthe impor-
tanceofnationalism,currentcircumstances have forcedthemto do so: someof
themostimportantsourcesof regionaland international clearlyare
instability
rootedin contendingnationaland ethnicclaimsand the failureof the stateto
capturethe loyaltiesof its citizens.1Today scholarsand policymakers are less
likelyto writeofnation-states thantheyare ofnationsagainststates.

The followingindividualscommentedon earlierdraftsofthisarticleand theideas thatproduced

this version: Emanuel Adler, Gehad Auda, Raymond Duvall, Peter Katzenstein,F. Gregory
Gause, Ellis Goldberg, Moshe Maoz, Robert McCalla, Joel Migdal, Craig Murphy,Bruce
Maddy-Weitzman, Malik Mufti,JohnOdell, AvrahamSela, JaniceThomson,CindyWeber,Jutta
Weldes, Alexander Wendt, CrawfordYoung, many others at the Social Sciences Research
Council-sponsoredworkshopat Brown University,26-28 February,1993, and the anonymous
refereesat IntemationalOrganization.I also thankthe researchassistanceof AshshrafRady in
Cairo, Avi Muallen in Tel-Aviv,and Michael Malley in Madison, Wisconsin.This researchwas
supportedbythe MacArthurProgramin InternationalPeace and Securityand the Global Studies
and ResearchProgramat theUniversity ofWisconsin.An earlierversionof thisarticlewillappear
in Thomas Bierstekerand CynthiaWeber,eds., StateSovereignty (Cambridge:
as Social Construct
CambridgeUniversity Press,forthcoming).
1. See, forinstance,StephenVan Evera, "Hypotheseson Nationalismand War," Intemational
Security18 (Spring1994), pp. 5-39; BarryPosen, "The SecurityDilemma and EthnicConflict,"in
Michael Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflictand IntemationalSecurity(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
UniversityPress, 1993), pp. 103-24; J. S. Samuel Barkinand Bruce Cronin,"The State and the
Nation: ChangingNormsand the Rules of Sovereignty in InternationalRelations,"Intemational
Organization48 (Winter 1994), pp. 107-30; Gidon Gottleib,NationAgainstState (New York:
Council on ForeignRelations Press, 1993); and Daniel PatrickMoynihan,Pandaemonium(New
York: OxfordUniversity Press,1993).

IntemationalOrganization
49, 3, Summer1995,pp. 479-510
? 1995byThe IO Foundationand the MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology
480 International
Organization

The explosive mixofnationalism and sovereignty is well-known to students

ofArabpolitics. Although uponindependence Arabstateswerequitewilling to
recognize thelegitimacy ofsovereignty'snormsas thebasisoftheirrelations
withnon-Arab states,theydebatedvigorously amongthemselves themeaning
ofArabnationalism andhowtheyshouldorganizetheirrelations. Twostylized
positionsemerged. PerhapsmostfamouswerethoseArabnationalists who(1)
claimedthatanArabstate'sauthority derivednotfrom itscitizens
butfrom the
largerArabnationthatenvelopeditsborders;(2) urgedArabstatestodevelop
close economic,cultural,and securityties to deepen the Arab political
community; (3) rejectedtheterritorialandjuridicalsegmentation oftheArab
world;and (4) demandedthattheirterritorial divisions be erasedtobringthe
state and the nationinto correspondence. Others,however,championed
interpretations of Arab nationalism thatwereconsistent withtheterritorial
divisionof theArabworldand exclusivity associatedwithsovereignty. King
HusseinofJordancontrasted hisunderstanding ofArabnationalism andhow
theArabworldshouldbe organizedwiththatof Egyptian PresidentGamal
Abdel Nasser inthe followingway:"My own concept ... is quitedifferentfrom
Nasser's.He believesthatArab nationalism can onlybe identified by a
particularbrandofArabunity.I disagree.Arabnationalism can onlysurvive
throughcompleteequality."2 In general,whileall Arab leadersidentified
themselves as Arabnationalists and advocatedArabunity, theyhelddifferent
interpretations of the politicalprojectsassociatedwithArab nationalism,
yieldingverydifferent implicationsfororganizing inter-Arab politics.
National
and aspirations
identities frequentlyclashedwithWestphalian principlesand
notionsofterritorialexclusivity,
depositinga legacyofregional conflict.3
Yet Hussein'svisionlargely has carriedtheday.Whereaspriorto 1967the
principaldebateand a majorsourceofconflict amongArabstatesconcerned
whether Arabnationalism wasorwasnotconsistent withstatesovereignty and
theterritoriallegacy,sincethenArabnationalism as politicalunificationis no
longerchampioned, andArabstates,whicharenowroutinely characterized as
havinga "real"existence andbasisinsociety, seemingly haveagreedon some
basic"rulesofthegame"thatare associatedwiththenormsof sovereignty.
Although inter-Arab rivalriesand conflicts
persist,thedisappearance ofthe
deadlyissueofstateversusnationhasadvancedregional
particularly order.
Thisarticleemploys an institutional
analysisto showthattheemergence of
regionalorderin theArabworldwas a consequenceoftheconsolidation of
statesovereignty and a changedmeaningofArabnationalism. Specifically, I

2. Cited in StephenWalt, TheOriginofAlliances(Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversity

Press,1987),
p. 213.
3. See Gabriel Ben-Dor, State and Conflictin the Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1983);
Michael Hudson,Arab Politics:The SearchforLegitimacy(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1977), p. 54; and Paul Noble, "The Arab State System:Opportunities,Constraints,and
Pressures,"in Baghat Korany and Ali Dessouki, eds., The ForeignPolicies of theArab States
(Boulder,Colo.: Westview,1984),pp. 47-78 and pp. 48-50 in particular.
 Arab states 481

explorehow the Arab states systemmoved fromstate versusnation and the

acrimoniousdebate overtheregion'sorganizingprinciplesto thesimultaneous
existence of separate sovereign states and Arab nationalismand to the
establishmentof relativelystable expectationsand shared normsto govern
inter-Arabrelations.I examinethe originalmembersof the League of Arab
States,namely,Egypt,Iraq, Jordan,Lebanon,Saudi Arabia,Syria,and Yemen.
Althoughthe league's membershiphas expandedconsiderablysince 1945,it is
thisoriginalgroupthatis the focusof most discussionsof inter-Arabpolitics
and highlights thechangingrelationshipbetweenstateand nation.
I focus on three related issues to trace this relationship.First,"neither
internalsovereignty,withitsconceptionofcitizenshipand nationalidentity and
loyalty,nor external sovereignty,with its idea of mutual recognitionof
boundaries and authorityover that territory,has a real counterpartin
Arab-Islamic history."4However, state formationprocesses, which have
increasedthe masses' identification withthe state,and interstateinteractions,
whichhave createdgreaterdifferentiation betweenArab states,have contrib-
uted to theinstitutionalization of sovereignty.
Second, manyof the same domesticand regionalpracticesthatled to the
consolidationof sovereignty also promotedan interpretation ofArab national-
ism that is consistentwith sovereignty.Although Arab nationalism has
evidencedconsiderableconceptualelasticityand been associatedwithvarious
politicalprojects,a strikingdevelopmentis the disappearanceof a definition
thatunderminedsovereignty and the emergenceof a more "centrist"concep-
tionthatis compatiblewithit. Therefore,in contrastto thosewho claim that
the emergenceof statesovereignty came at theexpenseifnottheverydeathof
Arabism,I suggestthattheArab worldhas movedfromstatesversusnationto
statesand nation(s),suggesting thattheterritorialnationalismand sovereignty
ofthevariousArab statesand Arab nationalismcan accommodateeach other.5
It is well-acceptedthatnationalismis "imagined,"and this articlehighlights
howdifferent imaginings of and meaningsassociatedwiththe nationhavevery
different consequencesforregionalpolitics.6
The consolidationof sovereignty and the emergenceof a "centrist"concep-
tion of Arab nationalismenabled Arab states to develop relativelystable
expectationsand shared norms,thatis, to fosterregionalorder.7Arab states

4. Bassam Tibi, "The Simultaneity of the Unsimultaneous:Old Tribes and Imposed Nation-
States in the Modern Middle East," in PhilipKhouryand JosephKostiner,eds., Tribesand State
Formationin theMiddle East (Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1990), pp. 127-52. The
quotationis fromp. 127.
5. The classic statementabout the so-called death of Arabismis Fouad Ajami, "The End of
Pan-Arabism,"ForeignAffairs, vol. 57, no. 2, 1978/79,pp. 355-73.
6. BenedictAnderson,ImaginedCommunities, 2d ed. (New York: Verso Press,1991). Also see
ErnstHaas, "Nationalism:An Instrumental vol. 22, no. 3, 1993,pp.
Social Construct,"Millennium,
505-45.
7. For sociological statementsthat informthis conceptionof order,see Dennis Wrong,The
Problemof Order (New York: Free Press, 1994); Erving Goffman,"The InteractionOrder,"
AmericanSociologicalReview48 (February1983), pp. 1-17; Peter Bergerand Thomas Luckmann
482 InternationalOrganization

have a greaterincentiveand exhibita greaterwillingnessto recognizeeach

other'ssovereignty and honorthe principleof noninterference as thebases of
theirrelations.My understanding of theemergenceof orderin theArab states
system,therefore,contrastswith realist and neoliberal institutionalap-
proaches. Realism claims that regional order is dependent on material
configurations and looks to balances of power, hegemonies,and the like;
neoliberalinstitutionalism examineshow state actorswithgiveninterestsand
identitiesconstructinstitutionsto advance cooperation.In contrast,I buildon
constructiviststatementsto trace how patternedinteractionsamong Arab
states led to the consolidation of sovereigntyand a sovereignty-friendly
conceptionof Arab nationalism-thatis, nothingless thanthe developmentof
new state identities,roles, and interests,whichin turnfacilitatedthe emer-
gence of relativelystable expectationsand shared normsthat are associated
withsovereignty.8
This article'sfirstsectionoffersan institutionalframework forapproaching
the Arab states systemand focuses on the relationshipamong institutions,
roles,and order.The second sectionexamineshow statehoodpresentedArab
stateswithtwopotentiallycontradictory roles (thatof sovereignstateand that
of promoterof the Arab nation) that created regionalinstability. The third
section considers how the self-interested actions of Arab leaders, namely
throughstate formationand interactiveprocesses,promoteda new institu-
tional environmentthat transformedthe meaningof Arab nationalismand
institutionalizedstate sovereigntyand its norms.This developmentin turn
fosteredregionalorder.I thenforwarda seriesofindicatorsto substantiatethe
claim that Arab states have established relativelystable expectationsand
sharednormsassociatedwithsovereignty to organizetheirrelations.

An institutionalapproach to theArab statessystem

Whetherscholarsunderstandinstitutions as relativelystable sets of roles and

interestsor as "persistentand connectedset[s] of rules (formaland informal)
thatprescribebehavioralroles,constrainactivity, and shape expectations,"in
Robert Keohane's words, roles frequent most definitionalproperties of

TheSocial Construction Alexander,Twenty

ofReality(New York: AnchorPress, 1967); and Jeffrey
Lectures(New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press,1987), chap. 1.
8. See, for instance,Alexander Wendt, "Anarchyis What States Make of It: The Social
Constructionof Power Politics,"IntemationalOrganization46 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-426; Rey
Koslowskiand FriedrichV. Kratochwil,"UnderstandingChange in InternationalPolitics:The
Soviet Empire's Demise and the InternationalSystem,"IntemationalOrganization48 (Spring
1994), pp. 215-248; Emanuel Adler and Peter M. Haas, "Conclusion: EpistemicCommunities,
World Order,and the Creationof a ReflectiveResearch Program,"IntemationalOrganization 46
(Winter 1992), pp. 367-90; James Caporaso, "Microeconomics and InternationalPolitical
Economy: The Neoclassical Approach to Institutions,"in Ernst-OttoCzempiel and James
Rosenau, eds., Global Changesand TheoreticalChallenges(Lexington,Mass.: LexingtonPress,
1989),pp. 135-60 and pp. 137-38 in particular.
 Arab states 483

institutions.9Roles can be understood as how the individual (or state)

participatesin societyaccordingto a particularidentity and comesto modifyits
behavioraccordingly.10 The concept of roles raises three key issues for the
present discussion.First,because roles modifyand constrainbehavior,an
importantdistinctionmust be made between positionroles and preference
roles; the formergenerallyare associated withformalinstitutions and have
well-definedand detailed guides to action,while the latterare linkedmore
closely to informalinstitutionsand carryfewer constraintson behavior.1"
Global politics contains both formal and informalinstitutions,and when
investigatingtheireffectson internationalprocessesitis importantto recognize
thateach role typeplaces greateror lesserboundarieson stateaction.Second,
that roles shape but do not determinebehavior highlightsthe necessityof
examiningthestate'sunderstanding of and themeaningit attachesto itsrole.12
The enactmentof a role,then,is shaped byhoweach actorinterprets thatrole,
not unlikehow different actorswillbringdifferent to the same
interpretations
role in a play. Finally, state roles have both internationaland domestic
origins.13To take seriously,first,that states are embedded in domesticand
internationalenvironments and, second,thatrolesdo notdeterminebut shape
behaviorrequiresincorporating bothhow actorsinterprettheirroles and how
internationaland domesticpoliticsaffectthoseroles.
I employan institutional analysisand focuson theconceptofrolesto address
threecentralissues in inter-Arabpolitics:(1) the absence of regionalorder
duringthepre-1967period;(2) theinstitutionalization ofstatesovereignty;and
(3) the increasedregionalorderafterthe 1960s. Institutionalapproaches are
most closelyassociated withtheoriesof change and stability,not theoriesof

9. For thefirstinstitutional see Wendt,"Anarchyis What StatesMake of It," p. 399.

definition,
For the second, see Robert Keohane, International and StatePower (Boulder, Colo.:
Institutions
Westview,1989), p. 3. Also see Oran Young, IntemationalCooperation(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press,1989),p. 5.
10. See Bergerand Luckmann,The Social Construction ofReality,pp. 72-74; Sheldon Stryker,
SymbolicInteractionism: Perspective
A Social Structural (Reading, Mass.: The Benjamin/Cummings
PublishingCompany,1980), p. 57; JamesRosenau, Turbulence in WorldPolitics(Princeton,N.J.:
PrincetonUniversityPress, 1990), p. 212; and J. A. Jackson,ed., Roles (London: Cambridge
University Press,1972).
11. See Donald Searing,"Roles, Rules, and Rationalityin the New Institutionalism," American
PoliticalScience Review85 (December 1991), pp. 1239-60 and p. 1249 in particular.Also see
Rosenau, Turbulence in WorldPolitics,p. 212.
12. See MartinHollis,PhilosophyoftheSocial Science(New York: CambridgeUniversity Press,
1994), pp. 163-82; and AnthonyGiddens,"ErvingGoffmanas a SystematicSocial Theorist,"in
AnthonyGiddens,Social Theory and ModemSociology(Stanford,Calif.:StanfordUniversity Press,
1987),pp. 109-39.As Keohane acknowledges,"Institutions mayalso affecttheunderstandings that
leaders of stateshave of therolestheyshouldplay and theirassumptionsabout others'motivations
and perceivedself-interest." See RobertKeohane, "Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspectiveon
WorldPolitics,"in International and StatePower,p. 6, emphasisadded. Also see K. J.
Institutions
Holsti,"National Role Conceptionsin theStudyofForeignPolicy,"International StudiesQuarterly,
vol. 14,no. 3, 1970,pp. 233-309 and pp. 245-46 in particular.
13. Sovereignty, however,led theearlyadvocatesof role "theory"to minimizesystemicin favor
ofdomesticforces.See Holsti,"National Role Conceptionsin the StudyofForeignPolicy,"p. 243.
484 InternationalOrganization

instability.Yet the recognitionthatstatesare embeddedin myriadinstitutions

that distributedifferent roles and behavioralexpectationssuggeststhat the
state mightoccasionallybe called upon to enact contradictory roles. Specifi-
cally,it is possible that the state's actions that are consistentwith the role
requirements ofand are stabilizingin one institutionmightbe inconsistent with
and destabilizingin those of another. Sheldon Strykersummarizes this
situationby notingthat role conflict"exists when there are contradictory
expectationsthat attach to some position in a social relationship.Such
expectationsmay call forincompatibleperformances;theymay require that
one hold two normsor values whichlogicallycall foropposingbehaviors;or
theymaydemandthatone role necessitatestheexpenditureoftimeand energy
such that it is difficult
or impossibleto carryout the obligationsof another
role."14CrawfordYoung pointsout thatwhile"the role selectedin responseto
anysituationdependsupon thedefinition and perceptionofparticularevents,"
oftensituationsstructurally overlap such that it becomes difficultto predict
which role willpredominate.15 Because actorsmay be unable to conform to the
requirementsof one role, they may be unable to establish the mutual
expectationsthatencourageorder.
The possibility thatpan-Arabismand statesovereignty allocated potentially
contradictory roles informsmy portrayalof the pre-1967 period. If Arab
leaders were reluctantto treat each other as sovereignentities,frequently
challengingone another'sauthorityand territorialbasis of existence,it was
because of the presence of a rivalinstitutionof pan-Arabismthat allocated
potentiallycontradictory roles and behavioralexpectations.That state sover-
eigntyis a social institution(not a natural artifactof states but rather a
consequenceofand dependentupon thediscursiveand nondiscursive practices
of state and nonstate actors) is increasinglyrecognized in international
relationstheory,demonstratedin a varietyof historicalcases, and presentin
the case of the Arab states system.16Because sovereigntyis an informal
institution,the behavioralexpectationsand normsthatexistamongsovereign
stateshavevariedconsiderablyovertheages. That said, theenduringelements

14. Stryker,SymbolicInteractionism, p. 73.

15. The quotation is from CrawfordYoung, The Politics of CulturalPluralism(Madison:
University ofWisconsinPress,1976),p. 38.
16. See Wendt,"Anarchyis What States Makes of It"; Hedley Bull,AnarchicalSociety(New
York: OxfordUniversity Press,1977); JohnRuggie,"Continuityand Transformation in theWorld
Polity,"in RobertKeohane, ed.,Neorealismand Its Critics(New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press,
1986), pp. 131-57; Thomas Bierstekerand Cindy Weber, "The Social Constructionof State
Sovereignty,"in Thomas Bierstekerand CindyWeber, eds., StateSovereignty as Social Construct
(New York: CambridgeUniversityPress, forthcoming). On Europe, see Hendrik Spruyt,The
SovereignState and Its Competitors:An Analysisof SystemsChange (Princeton,N.J.: Princeton
UniversityPress, 1994). On Africa, see CrawfordYoung, "Self-Determination,Territorial
Integrity,and the AfricanState System,"in Frances Deng and WilliamZartman,eds., Conflict
ResolutioninAfrica(Washington,D.C.: BrookingsPress,1991),pp. 320-46 and p. 384 in particular;
Basil Davidson, The WhiteMan's Burden(New York: Times Books, 1992), p. 106; and Robert
Jacksonand Carl Rosberg,"WhyAfrica'sWeak States Persist:The Empirical and Juridicalin
Statehood,"WorldPolitics35 (October 1982),pp. 1-24.
 Arab states 485

ofsovereignty are thatit accordsa measureof possessivenessand exclusivity to

the state: the state has authority both over its domesticspace and to act as a
legitimatememberof internationalsociety,and further, such entitlements are
embodiedin the principleof noninterference.17 Being recognizedas sovereign
amountsto a social permissiongrantedbythe community of statesto act with
certain powers and implies a certain measure of self-restraint by other
membersofthiscommunity, attitude,
a live-and-let-live as itwere.
That Arab nationalismalso is an institutionis less intuitive.Yet it can be
viewed as such, albeit a weak institution,to the extentthat it distributed
particularrolesto Arab statesthatdulyconstrainedand shaped theirinterests,
ifnot also theiridentities,and containeddomesticand regionalsanctionsfor
thosewho were seen as violatingitsnorms.18 This relates,however,to another
importantconceptual issue: Arab nationalismhas evidenced considerable
conceptualelasticityboth historically and spatially,and institutions are taken
as consequentialto the extentthattheyhave some degreeof permanenceand
shape the behavior,if not the identities,of actors.Arab nationalism,in this
reading,can be viewed as an institution to the extentthatArab statesderive
their interestsfromthe Arab nation that envelops their borders and are
expected to work toward political unificationand a strengthening of the
politicalcommunity. It is thismeaningof Arab nationalismthat can best be
understood as an institution,and one that conflictedwith the norms of
sovereignty. Moreover,it is thismeaningofArab nationalismthatcorresponds
to mostdefinitions of nationalism;nationsare understoodas havinga shared
identity,past, and future,and nationalismis a political movementthat
demands a correspondencebetween the nation and political authority.19
However,Arab nationalistshave adopted definitions of thenationthatborrow
alternativelyfromthe Frenchand the Germanictraditions;whereasnational-
istsdrawingon theformerdemandedthata nationis inconceivablewithoutthe
state,others,drawingon the Germanictradition,conceivedofthenationas an
organicentitythatwas reminiscentof Toinnes's notionof gemeinschaft and
thatwas notdependenton a singlepoliticalauthority. A significantissue in the
debate over the meaningof Arab nationalism,therefore,is whethernational-
ismentailsthepoliticalunification oftheArab statesor whetherthenationcan
existand generatepoliticalobligationsamongindependentand sovereignArab

17. For instance, Ruggie argues that the developmentof the institutionof sovereignty
differentiated "amongunitsin termsofpossessionof selfand exclusionof others,"and createdan
international orderthatenabled statesto become theprincipalunitof international life.See John
Ruggie,"Continuityand Transformation in theWorldPolity,"p. 145.
18. For a defenseof pan-Arabismas an institution, see Michael Barnett,"Institutions,Roles,
and Disorder:The Case of theArab States System,"International StudiesQuarterly37 (September
1993),pp. 271-96.
19. See Eric J. Hobsbawn, Nations and NationalismSince 1780 (New York: Cambridge
UniversityPress,1990); ErnestGellner,Nationsand Nationalism(Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversity
Press, 1983); Ellie Kedourie,Nationalism,4th ed. (Cambridge:Basil Blackwell,1994); and Haas,
"Nationalism."
486 InternationalOrganization

states.20In order to maintaindefinitionaland conceptual clarity,I referto

pan-Arabismas that version of Arab nationalismthat demands political
unificationamong Arab states because they derive their authorityand
legitimacyfromthe Arab nation.21In general,an institutional perspectiveon
the issue highlightshow rivalinstitutionsestablishedalternativedemandson
and expectationsfor Arab states and, therefore,impeded the search for
regionalorder.22
That institutionsprovide both the contextfor strategicinteractionand
encourageactorsto occupyroles informsmyunderstanding of the emergence
of regional order in the Arab states system.Specifically,institutionsshape
historical change by providingincentives and constraintsto action and
representing thecontextofstrategicinteraction. To thisextent,an institutional
approachis consistentwiththeviewthathistoricalchangeis path dependent.
Path-dependentpatterns,observes Stephen Krasner,are "characterizedby
self-reinforcingpositivefeedback. Initial choices, often small and random,
determinefuturehistoricaltrajectories.Once a particularpath is chosen, it
precludesothers,even ifthese alternativesmight,in the longrun,have proven
to be more efficientor adaptive."23Initialchoices persistbecause individuals
and social groupscome to identify withand benefitfrompast decisionsand
because thecostsofchangebecome moresignificant overtime.
This path-dependentperspective,moreover,is linkedto institutional change
in a particulardirection:the productionof order. By "order" I mean the
developmentof relativelystable expectationsand shared norms to govern
relationsamongactors,and in the instanceof Arab politicsI am interestedin
the emergenceof the particularorder associated withsovereignty.24 Interna-
are nowwidelyunderstoodas offering
tionalinstitutions thepossibilityoforder
and cooperationamongstatesby encouragingthemto adopt a particularrole
conception and to modifytheir behavior accordingto each other's roles,
behaviors,and expectations.Once stateactorsadopt a particularroletheylimit
theirbehaviorin a continuousand predictablemannerthatharmonizesmutual

20. Tibi,ArabNationalism,2d ed. (New York: St. Martin'sPress,1990),pp. 22-23.

21. This is consistentwithTibi. See ibid.,p. 14.
22. For interesting parallelsbetweenthe emergingEuropean state systemand the Arab state
system,particularly as regardsto leaders' conceptionsof states'interests,
see F. H. Hinsley,Power
and thePursuitofPeace (New York: CambridgeUniversity Press,1963),chap. 8.
23. The quotation is from Stephen Krasner, "Sovereignty:An InstitutionalPerspective,"
ComparativePoliticalStudies21 (April 1988), pp. 66-94 at p. 83. Also see Stephen JayGould,
Wonderful Life: The BurgessShale and theNatureof History(New York: W. W. Norton,1989);
RobertPutnam,MakingDemocracyWork(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity Press,1993),p. 6;
0. Young, International Cooperation,p. 65, and Douglass North,Institutions,Institutional
Change,
and EconomicPerfonnance(New York: CambridgeUniversity Press,1990),pp. 86-87.
24. Wrong,The Problemof Order,especially,chaps. 1 and 3. Oran Young similarlydefines
internationalorderas "broad, framework arrangements governingthe activitiesof all (or almost
all) the membersof internationalsocietyover a wide range of specificissues. We speak of an
international politicalorder,forexample,as a systemofterritoriallybased and sovereignstatesthat
interactwithone anotherin the absence of anycentralgovernment." See 0. Young,International
Cooperation, p. 13.
 Arab states 487

expectationsand increases systemstability;that is, theyestablishrelatively

stable expectationsand shared normsto governtheirrelations.25 This defini-
tiondistinguishes betweenfactualorderand normativeorder,thatis,between
statisticalregularityand behaviorgovernedby sharedrules and norms,and is
consistentwith many internationalrelations theories that emphasize how
sharedrulesof thegame,includingsovereignty, promoteinternational order.26
That said, internationalrelationstheoriescan be categorizedaccordingto
whetherthey view internationalorder as dependent on material factors
(realism); as a consequence of how self-interested statesestablishnormsand
institutionsto furthercooperationand stability(neoliberalinstitutionalism);or
as a consequence of how actorsand institutions are implicatedin a processof
mutualcreation(constructivism). thislast approachdoes notview
Specifically,
institutionsas necessarilya productof consciouschoice and designbut rather
as a consequence of patternedinteractionsand allows forthe possibilitythat
institutions,as a potentialsourceof stateinterestsand identities,can generate
order among actors. Below I brieflydiscuss how the shortcomingsof both
neorealismand neoliberal institutionalism lead me to adopt a constructivist
approachto regionalorderin theArab world.
Neorealistapproaches examinehow balances of power,the distribution of
power,and hegemoniesgeneratestability amongstates.27 In short,theyelevate
militaryforcesto a preeminentpositionin preventing an outbreakofhostilities,
deterringthe use of force,and maintainingstability.Althoughsome sophisti-
cated versionsof neorealismconsiderhow rules mightguide interstatelife,
because such rules are establishedby the powerfulto serve theirneeds, the
ruleswill changewitha change in the powerhierarchy.For instance,Robert
Gilpin argues that "an internationalsystem is stable (i.e., in a stable
equilibrium)ifno statebelievesitprofitableto changethesystem"and predicts
a changeintherulesofthegameas a resultofa shift inthedistributionofpower.28

25. See AlvinMagid," 'Role Theory,'PoliticalScience,and AfricanStudies,"WorldPolitics32

(January1980), p. 328; and BarryBuzan, "From InternationalSystemto InternationalSociety:
StructuralRealism and Regime TheoryMeet the EnglishSchool," International Organization47
(Summer1993),pp. 327-52 and p. 345 in particular.
26. On the distinction betweenfactualand normativeorder,see Wrong,TheProblemof Order,
chap. 3; Alexander, TwentyLectures,chap. 1; and James Rosenau, "Governance, Order, and
Change in WorldPolitics,"in JamesRosenau and ErnstOtto Cziempel,eds., GovernanceWithout
Government: Orderand Changein WorldPolitics(New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1992),
pp. 1-29 and pp. 9-11 in particular.
27. For a good overviewand criticismof the neorealist focus on the role of force for
understanding international stabilityand change.see RichardNed Lebow, "The Long Peace, the
End oftheCold War,and theFailuresofRealism,"International 48 (Spring1994),pp.
Organization
249-77 and pp. 252-59 in particular.On thepolaritydebate,see KennethWaltz,"The Stabilityof
the Bipolar World," Daedelus 93 (Summer 1964), pp. 881-909; and Emerson Niou and Peter
Ordershook,"Stabilityin AnarchicInternationalSystems,"AmericanPoliticalScienceReview84
(December 1990), pp. 1207-34. On hegemonies,see Robert Gilpin, War and Changein World
Politics(New York: CambridgeUniversity Press,1981). On balances ofpower,see KennethWaltz,
Theory ofInternationalPolitics(Reading,Mass.: Addison-Wesley,1979),chap. 6.
28. Gilpin,Warand Changein WorldPolitics,p. 50.
488 InternationalOrganization

As manyrealistsexamine the ongoingnegotiationof internationalorder,

theyhintthatordercannotbe derivedfrompowerpoliticsalone; simplystated,
frequentingtheirdiscussionsare referencesto how sociologicalfactorsalso
accountforinterstatestability.This is particularly trueof manyof the classic
realist accounts that acknowledge how state practices and international
stabilityare affectedbynormativeforces.29 HenryKissingerbegan hisclassicA
WorldRestoredbystatingthatthe centralissue forthe post-Napoleonicorder
was theconstruction of a set of sociallyrecognizedand collectively
legitimated
principles,that is, what is permissibleand prohibited;in short,he situates
militarypower alongside normativepower.30In the foundingneorealist
statement,KennethWaltz argued thatsocializationhelps to accountforhow
statesbecome like-minded.31 AlthoughWaltz's conceptionof socializationis
limitedto a changein behavior,the collectivistand sociologicalimagerypoints
to the possibilitythat internationalorder mightbe fosteredby socializing
processesthatshape stateidentityand interests(whichis moreconsistentwith
sociologicalusage).
This highlights an importantfeatureof manyrealist-inspired narrativesof
global and regionalpolitics:theirinsistenceon the primacyof powerpoliticsis
underminedby a more complexportrayalof the workingsof the interstate
systemthan either their criticsor disciples suggest; and they frequently
underminetheirplea forindividualist purityand the primacyof powerpolitics
by resortingto sociologicalvariables when necessary.By thus resortingto
theoreticalcategoriesthat are residual to theirprimaryclaims,manyrealist
scholars reveal some fundamentaland unsolved tensionsin theirwork and
open thedoor to substantivetheoreticalchallenges.32
These issues surfacein manyrealist accounts of the Arab states system.
Specifically,manyrealistnarrativesalso claimthatthe post-1967periodis one
of greaterregionalstability.This stability, theyargue,was a consequence of a
change in the distribution of power,notablyEgypt'sdefeat in the 1967 war
(whichled Nasser to withdrawhis supportforpan-Arabism)and also of the
rise of the status quo-orientedPersian Gulf states.33While Arab leaders

29. For instance,E. H. Carr writes,"The homo politicuswho pursuesnothingbut poweris as

unreal a mythas the homo economicuswho pursuesnothingbut gain." The TwentyYears' Crisis
(New York: Harper and Row, 1964),p. 97.
30. Moreover,Kissinger'snarrativeintimatesthattheselegitimation principleswere notshaped
by the distributionof militarypower alone. See Henry Kissinger,A WorldRestored(Boston:
HoughtonMifflin, 1964).
31. Waltz, TheoryofInternational Politics,pp. 74-77. Buzan, Jones,and Littlealso focuson the
relationshipbetweensocializationand internationalorder.See BarryBuzan, Charles Jones,and
RichardLittle,TheLogic ofAnarchy(New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press,1993),pp. 39-40.
32. As Alexander writes,"For the sake of interpretationit is often more useful to move
backwards,fromone's discoveryof the residualcategoriesback to the basic tensionswhichthey
havebeen developedto obscure."See his Twenty Lectures,pp. 124-25."It followsfromthis,"writes
Parsons, "that the surestsymptomof impendingchange in a theoreticalsystemis increasingly
general interestin such residualcategories."See Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action,
vol. 1 (New York: Free Press,1968),p. 18.
33. For realist-inspiredexplanations,see P. J. Vatikiotis,Conflictin theMiddleEast (London:
 Arab states 489

frequently exploitedArab nationalismto servetheirends, and whilethe 1967

war had a dramaticimpacton regionalpolitics,viewingArab nationalismas
parasitic on material factors and looking to shiftsin material power to
understandthese regional changes is unsatisfactory in three ways. First,
changes in the regional distributionof power are not correlatedwith the
decline of pan-Arabism.ShibleyTelhami and Stephen Walt, both of whom
offerelegant neorealist explanationsof regional politics,mark the end of
pan-Arabismat radicallydifferent historicalmoments.Specifically,Telhami
claimsthatEgypt'srelativepowervis-a-visotherArab stateswas on the rise,
not the decline,followingthe 1967 war, and that it was not until 1974 that
pan-Arabismfaltered.34Walt stresses how the failed unity talks of the
mid-1960s among Egypt, Iraq, and Syria undermined pan-Arabism and
resulted"in a new patternof inter-Arabalignments,"and, significantly, has
In short,two
littleto say about the effectsof the 1967 war on pan-Arabism.35
compellingneorealistaccounts of inter-Arabpoliticscome to verydifferent
conclusionsabout the timingof pan-Arabism'sdecline, suggestingthat the
distributionof power providesat least an inconclusiveexplanation;indeed,
Walt's explanationarguablylendsgreatersupportto a process-oriented rather
thanstructural model.
Second, while manyof the best-knownhistoricalaccounts adopt a realist
narrativeto explain these post-1967 changes, they frequentlyelevate the
importanceof normativeforces that are independentof power politics to
understandregionaldynamicsand developments.Althoughbest knownas a
statementconcerningtheprimacyofpowerpoliticsin a regionlitteredwiththe
languageof Arabism,Fouad Ajami's classic TheArab Predicamentfrequently
notesthatArab nationalistforcesconstrainedthe actionsof Arab leaders and
attributesthe decline of pan-Arabismto a greatercollectiveawarenessthat
unification was bothremoteand misbegotten(and notsolelydue to changesin
materialpower).36Thoughaspiringto demonstratetheforceofstructuralism in
a regionthat supposedlytakes seriouslyits ideology,Walt remarksthat "a
different formof balancinghas occurredin inter-Arabrelations.In the Arab
world,the mostimportantsource of powerhas been the abilityto manipulate
one's own image and the image of one's rivalsin the minds of other Arab
elites."37In short,manyrealistaccountscall normativeand ideationalforces

GeorgeAllen and Unwin,1971); P. J.Vatikiotis,Arab and RegionalPoliticsin theMiddleEast (New

York: St. Martin's,1984); Walt, The OriginofAlliances;ShibleyTelhami,Powerand Leadershipin
InternationalBargaining(New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1990); and Roger Owen, State,
Power,and Politicsin theMakingof theModem Middle East (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp.
90-92.
34. Telhami,Powerand Leadershipin International Bargaining,pp. 94-104. Moreover,the riseof
theGulfArab statespostdatesthewidelyobserveddeclineofpan-Arabism.
35. Walt,TheOriginofAlliances,p. 87.
36. Fouad Ajami,TheArabPredicament:Arab PoliticalThought-Practice Since1967 (New York:
CambridgeUniversity Press,1981).
37. Ibid.,p. 149.
490 International
Organization

intoplayalongsidethedistribution ofpowerto understand theconstraints on

stateactionand the dynamics of the region,suggesting thatthe emergent
regionalordercannotbe derivedfrom material forcesalone.
Third,althoughrealistsassume that state interestsare constant(and
identitiesare irrelevant as an explanatory variable),manynonetheless insinu-
ate thatan emergence ofnewinterests (and possibly is tiedto the
identities)
decliningsalienceofArabnationalism.38 Thissuggests thatthesystemic focus
overlooks howchangesinstate-society relations alsoshapetheforeign policies
ofstates;specifically,tounderstand whysocietalactorsno longerresponded to
theprospectof unification in thesamewayor demandedthattheirgovern-
mentsbe associatedwiththe normsof pan-Arabism requiresa greater
to changesinthedomestic
sensitivity context. Noneofthesecriticisms implies
thatmaterialfactorsare inconsequential forunderstanding regionalchanges
butthattheyalone cannotaccountfortheobservedemergence of regional
order,andthatmanyrealists infactrefertonormative factorswhenaccounting
forthedynamics ofandtheobserved stabilityinArabpoliticsafterthe1960s.39
Becauseoftheseandotherunresolved tensions inrealistapproaches, many
scholarshaveconsidered howinstitutionsandnorms foster
international order.
It is important to differentiate betweenrationalist and constructivist ap-
proachesto institutions. Rationalist approachesexaminehowstatesestablish
institutions
toclarifynorms, rules,andprinciples toguideanddefinea rangeof
acceptablebehaviorand hencealter(or creategreatercertainty in) a state's
expectations of anotherstate'sbehavior.Because suchdynamics encourage
actorsto havegreatertrustin each otherand thefuture, institutionsenable
statestoescapetheclassiccompetitive trapfostered bytheprisoners' dilemma
and therebyfostercooperationand stability. Moreover,such normsand
institutions
helpto explainthepersistence ofstabilityinthefaceofchangesin
the distribution of power in the international system.40This rationalist
approachisconsistent withtheBritish school.Forinstance, HedleyBullargues
thatstatesconstruct international institutionssuchas sovereigntyto organize
theirrelations andto increasetheprospect oforder.In thisrespect, a primary

38. See, forinstance,Vatikiotis, Araband RegionalPoliticsin theMiddleEast; and Dessouki and

Korany,TheForeignPoliciesoftheArabStates.
39. Anotherviewholdsthesuperpowersresponsibleforthedeclineofpan-Arabismand therise
ofstatism.For thisposition,see Halim Barakat,TheArabWorld(Berkeley:University ofCalifornia
Press, 1993). Althoughthe superpowershave affectedthe region,and the Middle East can be
understoodas a "subordinatesystem"-it is penetratedand affectedby greatpower rivalries-I
agree withthosewho portraythe superpowersas accommodatingthemselvesto, accentuating,or
mitigatingalreadypresentinter-Arabdynamics.See Ajami,TheArabPredicament; Ben-Dor,State
and Conflictin theMiddleEast; L. Carl Brown,Intemational Politicsand theMiddleEast (Princeton,
N.J.:PrincetonUniversity Press,1984); Noble, "The Arab State System";Baghat Koranyand Ali
Dessouki, "The Global Systemand Arab ForeignPolicies," in Koranyand Dessouki, TheForeign
PoliciesofArab States,pp. 19-39; and Walt,TheOriginofAlliances,p. 158.
40. See Robert Keohane, AfterHegemony(Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1984);
and StephenKrasner,ed., International Regimes(Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversityPress,1992).
 Arab states 491

goal of the societyof states is the survivalof the sovereignstate, which is

dependenton therebeing"a sense ofcommoninterests in theelementary goals
of social life." This also parallels Bull's definitionof internationalorder as a
"patternof activity thatsustainsthe elementaryor primary goals of the society
of states, or internationalsociety."'41 The issue in the Arab states system,
however,was an inabilityto establishsome rules of interactionbecause of a
debate overwhether,in fact,Arab statesshouldsurvive.Closer to themarkin
this respect is R. J. Vincent's summationof Bull's view on disorder:"The
precariousnessof orderin internationalsocietycan be understoodas a direct
reflectionof the degree to whichthese sovereignstates have not agreed to
fundamentalrules,particularlythose who view themselvesas victimsof this
system."42
While constructivist approaches acknowledgethat states mightestablish
institutions to encouragecooperation,theydifferfromrationalistapproaches
by raisingthe possibilitythat institutions,first,mightnot be the productof
consciousdesignbut ratheremergeout of patternedinteractions thatbecome
routinizedand institutionalized; second,representan important sourceofstate
identity, roles,and interests;and third,encourageorderbycreatingrelatively
stable expectationsand shared normsamong actors that occupy set roles.43
Roles alwaysare formedin relationto others;it is in theprocessofinteracting
and participating withinan institutionalcontextthatthe actorcomes to occupy
a role.44 Institutions,then, are importantsocializing agents in that they
comprisethesocial contextinwhichnormsand values are transferred fromone
actorto anotherand new identitiesand beliefsare formed.45 They encourage
actorsto occupyparticularrolesand modifytheirbehavioraccordingly.46 To be
sure, actors will obey a particularorder for reasons other than feelingsof
justice or an inherentbeliefin the norms involved,and thissimplyrecognizes
thatorderis producedin partbynormsand in partbycoercion.47 A reasonable

emphasisoriginal.
41. See Bull, TheAnarchicalSociety,pp. 53 and 8, respectively,
42. R. J. Vincent,"Order in InternationalPolitics,"in J.B. D. Millerand R. J.Vincent,eds.,
Orderand Violence(New York: OxfordUniversity Press,1991),p. 54.
43. See Wendt,"Anarchyis What States Make of It"; Adler and Haas, "Conclusion,"p. 368;
Caporaso, "Microeconomicsand InternationalPoliticalEconomy,"pp. 137-38; and Paul Dimag-
gio and Walter Powell "Introduction,"in Paul Dimaggio and Walter Powell, eds., The New
in OrganizationalAnalysis
Institutionalism (Chicago: Universityof ChicagoPress,1991),pp. 1-40.
44. See PeterBerger,"Identityas a Problemin the Sociologyof Knowledge,"EuropeanJournal
ofSociology,vol. 7, no. 1, 1966,pp. 105-115; 0. Young,International Cooperation,p. 197; George
HerbertMead, Mind,Self,and Society(Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 136-43.
Institutionsalso signalwho are the centralagents.See Stryker, SymbolicInteractionism, p. 57. In
thisreading,sovereignty is morethan simplya constrainton state action,forit also denotesthat
statesare thecentralactorsin international politics,whichgivesthemparticularidentities.
45. See G. JohnIkenberryand Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power,"
InternationalOrganization44 (Summer 1990), pp. 283-315 and p. 289 in particular;and Wendt,
"Anarchyis WhatStatesMake of It," p. 399.
46. 0. Young,International Cooperation,p. 212.
47. Erving Goffman,"The InteractionOrder," AmericanSociologicalReview48 (February
1983),pp. 1-17 and pp. 5-7 in particular.
492 International
Organization

assumption, therefore, thatanytypeoforderobtainsthrough

is,first, a mixture
of bothcoercionand consentand, second,thatthismixture can neverbe
determined a prioributonlythrough an empirical examination.
Thisperspective-how shapedtheinterests
institutions and rolesof Arab
states-provides an alternative explanationforunderstanding theemergence
of regionalorder.Once caughtbetweenpan-Arabism and sovereignty, Arab
stateshaveconverged on thelattertoordertheirrelations. To understand this
development requiresan explanatory framework thatdoes notviewregional
orderas a consequence ofbalancing mechanisms orofhegemony andalsonota
resultof how states,withgivenrolesand interests, establishinternational
institutionsto governtheirrelations. Instead,it requiresan accountof how
institutions,
byproviding thecontext ofstrategicaction,might wellshapethe
veryinterests and rolesofstateactorsin sucha manneras to encouragethe
development ofrelatively stableexpectationsandsharednorms.

and Arab nationalism

The emergenceofsovereignty

Untilthelatenineteenth inhabitants
century, oftheFertileCrescentexisted
within a variety
ofoverlappingauthority The Ottoman
andpoliticalstructures.
Empire,Islam,andlocaltribalandvillagestructures allcontested
forandheld
swayovervariousfeaturesof peoples'lives.48 WhiletheOttomanEmpire's
decline,imperialism,andnewideasofnationalism combined tochallengelocal
politicalstructures and identities,
greatpowerintrusions primarilywere
responsible forsettingintomotionstatist
andtransnationalforcesthatcreated
a disjuncturebetweenwherepoliticalauthority wasto resideandthepolitical
loyaltiesoftheinhabitants oftheregion.Specifically,
whilethegreatpowers
established a newgeopoliticalmap,thepoliticalloyaltiesof theinhabitants
envelopedtheseboundariesand challengedtheverylegitimacy ofthatmap.
Because elsewhereI have detailedhowthe simultaneous presenceof pan-
Arabismand statesovereignty createdroleconflict fortheArab statesand
disorderin the Arab statessystem, here I willdiscussthesefeaturesonly
briefly.49
The disintegration oftheOttomanEmpirein combination withtheendof
WorldWarI enabledthegreatpowersto reconstruct theArabworld.In the
aftermath of WorldWar I and through the mandatesystem, Franceruled
Lebanonand Syriaand Britaincontrolled Iraq,Jordan,and Palestine.50
The

48. For an overviewof the internationalrelationsof the Middle East duringthisperiod,see

Kemal Karpat, "The Ottoman Ethnic and ConfessionalLegacy in the Middle East," in Milton
Esman and ItmarRabinovich,eds., Ethnicity, Pluralism,and theStatein theMiddleEast (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 1988), pp. 35-53; AlbertHourani,A Historyof theArab Peoples
(Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversityPress, 1991); and Peter Mansfield,The OttomanEmpire
and Its Successors(New York: St. Martin's,1973).
49. For a fulldiscussion,see Barnett,"Institutions,
Roles, and Disorder."
50. For a detailedstudyof thisperiod,see David Fromkin,APeace toEndAII Peace: TheFall of
 Arabstates 493

mandatesystem represented a powerful forcebehindstatism andsovereignty;

thattheArabworldwas dividedadministratively ratherthanruledwithina
singlepoliticalunitshapedfuturepoliticalactivity. anticolonial
Specifically,
movements foughtfor"state"independence ratherthanArabindependence
per se. GeorgeAntoniusobserves,"WhenGreatBritainoccupiedEgyptin
1882,at a timewhenthenationalawakening had alreadybegunto translate
itselfintoa politically-minded movement, a new currentof ideas emerged
whoseinspiration was specifically Egyptianand whose aim was, firstand
foremost, to agitateforthewithdrawal oftheBritish armyofoccupation. Thus
wasEgyptian nationalism bornandthusdiditsleadersadopta coursewhich, as
the yearswentby, made it increasingly distinctfromthe generalArab
movement."'51 Even if it was not the mandatory powers'intentto calm a
pan-Arabmovement thatwasbeginning togenerateconsiderable supportand
enthusiasm, themandatesystem spawnednewanticolonial movements and,
withthem,newcategories of politicalactors;thatis, thepoliticalactorwas
becoming shapedanddefined-from an Arabpoliticalidentity to an Egyptian
andso on.52Although
politicalidentity, manyindependence movements were
usingthelanguageofArabismandexpressing a greater inotherArab
interest
lands (and particularly in Palestine),the strongest of themdirectedtheir
activitiesat immediate independence and onlysecondarily at Arab unifica-
tion.53
Although mostArableadersfavored theWestern-created map,manyofthe
residentsof thesenewlyestablishedpoliticalunitsdid not sharein their

theOttomanEmpireand theRise of theModem MiddleEast (New York: HenryHolt, 1989). One

reason formandate systemwas to instructthese potentialstates in the normsof international
societyin generaland sovereignty in particular,therebyadheringto the Great Powers' interests.
See Wm. Roger Louis, "The Era of the Mandates Systemand the Non-European World," in
Hedley Bull and Adam Watson,eds., The Expansionof IntemationalSociety(New York: Oxford
University Press,1984),pp. 201-13.
51. George Antonius,TheArabAwakening(New York: CapricornBooks, 1965), p. 100. For an
excellentstudyof Egyptiannationalism,see Israel Gershoniand JamesJankowski, The Searchfor
Egyptian Nationhood(New York: OxfordUniversity Press,1987).
52. This chargethatthe mandate systemwas designedto divide the Arab nationis raised by
Antonius,TheArabAwakening,pp. 248-49, and by Majjid Khadduri,"Towards an Arab Union:
The League ofArab States,"American PoliticalScienceReview40 (February1946),pp. 90-100 and
p. 90 in particular.On theshiftingbasis ofmobilizationand collectiveaction,see Alan Taylor,The
Arab Balance of Power System(Syracuse,N.Y.: Syracuse UniversityPress, 1982), p. 15; John
Breuilly,Nationalismand theState (New York: St. Martin's,1982), p. 124; Antonius,TheArab
Awakening,pp. 325-26; and J. P. Sharma, TheArab Mind:A Studyof Egypt,Arab Unity,and the
World(Delhi: H. K. Publishersand Distributors,1990), p. 18. One possibilityis thathad the Arab
world remained politicallywhole, and not divided into separate administrativeunits, Arab
independence movementsmight have become more pan-Arab in character. For a similar
observationconcerningthe West Africanstates,see Jacksonand Rosberg,"WhyAfrica'sWeak
StatesPersist."
53. Manystatist-oriented movementswere associatedwithparticularclass interests.See Philip
Khoury,Syriaand theFrenchMandate (Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity Press,1987); Albert
Hourani,Syriaand Lebanon:A PoliticalEssay (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1946), p. 118;
and Hanna Batatu,TheOld Social Classesand theRevolutionary Movements inIraq (Princeton,N.J.:
PrincetonUniversity Press,1978).
494 InternationalOrganization

satisfactionand were beginningto expressa commonpoliticalidentitywith

those in other lands. "A map anticipatedreality,not vice versa," observes
BenedictAnderson."A map was a model for,ratherthan a model of,whatit
purportedto represent."'54 Prior to World War I, pan-Arab movements,
respondingto new ideas of nationalism,Jewishimmigrationto Palestine,
increasedvisibilityof Westerninstitutions in everydaylife,and the Ottoman
Empire's attemptto assert controlover the area, and capitalizingon new
means of communication, transportation,and education,began organizingin
Damascus and Beirutand maintainingthatArabs shared commonidentities,
enemies,and interests.These social movements, fillinga politicaland intellec-
tual vacuum because of the inabilityof politicalinstitutions to confrontthe
challengesoftheday,began to articulatean alternativevisionofArab political
lifeand to nurtureand promotean Arab identity.55 At thispoint,however,the
idea of Arab politicalindependenceand unification had littleforcein a region
wheremanyArab nationalistsalso consideredthemselvesOttomanists.56
WorldWar I, the Arab revoltagainstthe OttomanEmpire,the deathof the
Ottoman Empire, and the perceptionthat the regionwas being assailed by
European imperialismthroughthemandatesystemand byJewishimmigration
to Palestinecaused theregion'sinhabitantsto reconsidertheirpoliticalidentity
and what sorts of political arrangementswould be most meaningfuland
desirable.57By the beginningof World War II, Arab nationalismbecame a
potentpoliticalforce.Accordingto AlbertHourani,althoughtherewas stillno
singularmeaningto Arab nationalism,manywho identified themselvesas Arab
nationalists,and thiswas particularlyso forthose in Iraq, Jordan,and Syria,
believedthat(1) "thereis or can be createdan Arab nation,formedof all who
share the Arabic languageand culturalheritage";(2) "thisArab nationought
to forma singleindependentpoliticalunity";and (3) "the creationof such a
unitpresupposesthe developmentamongthe membersof the consciousness
... [and] thattheirbeingmembersis the factorwhichshoulddeterminetheir
politicaldecisionsand loyalties."58
Once theArab statesgainedindependencein themid-1940s,a defining issue
in inter-Arabpoliticsbecame how to reconcilethe existenceof the separate
sovereign states and a pan-Arabism that viewed them as artificialand
demanded their unification.That state elites had a vested interestin this
territorialdivisionbecame immediatelyapparent afterindependencewhen

54. BenedictAnderson,ImaginedCommunities, p. 73.

55. See Rashid Khalidi,"Arab Nationalism:HistoricalProblemsin the Literature,"American
HistoricalReview 96 (December 1991), pp. 1363-73; and Rashid Khalidi et al., eds., Arab
Nationalism(New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press,1991).
56. Tibi,ArabNationalism,p. 16.
57. Hourani,A HistoryoftheArabPeoples,p. 316.
58. Hourani,Syriaand Lebanon,p. 101.For good overviewsofArab nationalism,see A. A. Duri,
The HistoricalFormationof the Arab Nation (New York: Croom Helm, 1987); Tibi, Arab
Nationalism;Khalidi,"Arab Nationalism";Khalidi et al., Arab Nationalism;Antonius,TheArab
Awakening;and Hourani,A History oftheArabPeoples,p. 343.
 Arab states 495

Arab leaders met in Alexandria,Egypt,in 1943 to consider the territorial

future of the Arab world. While Iraqi leader Nuri al-Said proposed a
federationamong Jordan,Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria,whichwould then
join withIraq, theconferencerejectedthispan-Arabaspirationand essentially
embraced sovereigntyand independence. Alan Taylor characterizedthat
outcomebywriting,"it was as ifthe foundingmembers[ofthe Arab League]
... set out deliberatelyto create an Arab systemwhich did not in any
substantialwaythreatenthevestedinterestsoftherespectiveregimes."59
Despite theconstructionofthe League ofArab Stateswithsovereignty at its
core,Arab statescontinuedto occupytwosocial rolesthatconferredcontradic-
torybehavioralexpectations:sovereignty demanded thattheyrecognizeeach
other's legitimacy,borders, and the principle of noninterference;while
pan-Arabismheld thatArab stateswere to defendthe Arab nation,to uphold
regional standards of legitimacy,and indeed to deny the very distinction
betweenthe internationaland the domestic.Because pan-Arabismprovided
the opportunity for-in fact,expected-Arab leaders to involvethemselvesin
each other's domesticaffairs,it severelycomplicatedthe search for stable
expectationsand shared norms upon which any regional order would be
based.60If role conflictand regionaldisorderwere to subside, and if stable
expectationswere to emerge,then eitherpan-Arabismor state sovereignty
wouldhaveto bow to theother,or thenormsassociatedwithone wouldhaveto
become moreconsistentwiththenormsoftheother(myinterpretation).

The emergenceofregionalorder

If the firsttwenty-five years of the Arab states systemwas marked by

tremendousrancoroverhowArab statesshouldorganizetheirrelations,since
thenthosedebateshave quieted and theArab statesapparentlyhave settledon
sovereignty IfArab leaders could beginto breathea
to governtheirrelations.61
littleeasier on the outside,the inside also offeredgreaterrespite.For many
scholarsthesurpriseofthepost-1967periodwas thestability, permanence,and

59. Taylor,TheArabBalance ofPowerSystem, p. 23. Also see RobertMacDonald, TheLeague of

ArabStates:A Studyin theDynamicsofRegionalOrganization (Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity
Press,1965),pp. 33-38.
60. For explanationsof how pan-Arabismled to state policies that violated the principleof
noninterference, see Roger Owen, "Arab Nationalism,Arab Unity,and Arab Solidarity,"in Talal
Asad and Roger Owen, eds., Sociologyof the "DevelopingSocieties":TheMiddleEast (New York:
MonthlyReviewPress,1983), pp. 16-22 and p. 20 in particular;and Ghassan Salame, "Inter-Arab
Politics:The Returnto Geography,"in William Quandt, ed., The Middle East: Ten YearsAfter
CampDavid (Washington:BrookingsPress,1988),pp. 345-46.
61. For a related argumentemphasizingsovereignty, see F. GregoryGause III, "Sovereignty,
Statecraft,and Stabilityin the Middle East," JoumalofIntemational 45 (Winter1992), pp.
Affairs
441-67; and Rex Brynen,"Palestineand theArab State System:Permeability, StateConsolidation,
and the Intifida,"CanadianJoumalofPoliticalScience24 (September1991),pp. 594-621.
496 InternationalOrganization

longevity of manyArab regimes.62While Arab leaders,like theircounterparts

elsewhere,continuallyconcernedthemselveswiththeirdomesticstandingand
respondedautomatically(and frequently repressively)to any hintof turmoil,
such challengeswere targetedat the legitimacyof the government and not at
the state'sborders.The simultaneousand relatedincreasein the Arab states'
juridicaland empiricalsovereigntyaccountsforwhyArab leaders now began
consistentlyto adopt the roles and adhere to the norms associated with
sovereignty.63

State formation
At independence, the Arab states lacked both external and internal
authoritybecause of the colonial legacy in general and pan-Arabismin
particularand were dependenton an Arab identityto legitimatetheirpolicies
and actions.The problemconfronting Arab leaderswas maintaining thestate's
sovereignty against the backdrop of an Arab nationalism that acted as bothan
instrument of politicalsupport and as an obstacle to state sovereignty.In this
way, Arab leaders replayed the dilemma that Andrew Linklater describes as
having confronted European rulersin the seventeenth century:
The modernEuropean stateemergedwithinthe confinesof a singlecivili-
zationunitedbythenormativeand religiouspowerof Christendom. During
itsrisethe statesoughtto freeitselffromthe moraland religiousshackles
of the medievalworld.But whileit pursuedthisaim the statewas awareof
the dangersof totallyundermining earliernotionsof an international
soci-
ety.... Quite clearly,the stateset out to employthenotionof a widersoci-
etyof statesforthe explicitpurposeof maintaining internationalorder.Its
aimwas to enjoythebenefitsofpreserving an internationalsocietywithout
incurringthe riskthatindividualcitizenswould challengethe state'slegiti-
macybyproclaimingtheirallegianceto a highercosmopolitanethic.64
The principaldifference,of course,betweenArab leaders and theirEuropean
compatriotsthree hundredyears earlierwas that the latterdid not have to
contend with the idea of nation-states.The paradox, then,was that Arab
leaders oftenneeded Arab nationalismto providea basis fortheiractions,yet
itslogicalconclusionthreatenedto underminetheirbases ofpower.
To rid themof that paradox and to betterensure theirdomesticsurvival,
radical and conservativeArab leaders alike embarked on state formation
projects that were designed to encourage the transferof subnationaland

62. See the essaysin Giacomo Luciani, ed., TheArab State(Berkeley:University of California
Press,1990).
63. The distinctionbetweenjuridicaland empiricalsovereigntyis consistentwiththatofferedby
RobertJackson,Quasi-States:Sovereignty,IntemationalRelations,and theThirdWorld(New York:
CambridgeUniversity Press,1990).
64. AndrewLinklater,"The Problemof Community in InternationalRelations,"Altematives15
(Spring1990),pp. 135-53.The quotationis drawnfromp. 136.
 Arab states 497

transnationalidentitiesto the state and, therefore,to enhance the state's

legitimacy and domesticstability.Stateformation projectswereinstrumental in
producingnew political identities,shrinkingthe salience of transnational
loyalties,and increasingthe abilityof state actorsto act in a mannerthatis
consistentwithsovereignty.65
State formationcan occur througha myriadof activitiesand processes,but
figuringcentrallyin thecomparativepoliticsand theMiddle Easternliteratures
are materialincentives,externalthreats,and the manipulationof symbols.
First,althoughArab leaders situatedin dependenteconomiesmightopt for
etatistratherthan market-oriented policies for economic reasons (i.e., late
industrialization),etatismofferedimportantpoliticalbenefitsas well. Chief
amongthemis the abilityof the stateto become the caretaker-to act as the
populace's primaryfinancialguardian and materialsource of support.Eco-
nomic developmentcame to be associated solelywitha state-ledeffort(for
good or forbad).66Consequently,citizenslinkedtheirmaterialintereststo the
state and not to local or internationalactors. To be sure, this was a major
reasonwhythecapitalistclass in thenewlyindependentArab statesweremost
loyalto the state'sindependenceand mostresistantto pan-Arabism,and why
the lowerclasses generallywere more sympathetic to pan-Arabismand a new
regionalorder.Accordingly, the promotionof a welfarestate would linkthe
citizens'materialinterests,and politicalloyaltiesand identities,to thestate.In
this model, then,materialforcespropel changes in politicalidentities.The
danger,of course, is that using materialbenefitsto win supportis both no
guaranteethatit will alteran individual'spoliticalidentityand a highlycostly
affairformostresource-poorstates.
Externalthreatshave playedan importantrole historically in the growthof
statepower.Not onlydo wars and externalthreatsgenerallyact as important
impetusesbehindthe state'spenetrationand controloversocietybut also they
can build a sense of "we-ness" and develop a national identity.67 Whereas
conflictsbetweenArab and non-Arabstates increased an Arab identityand
unity(witnesstheincreasein pan-Arabismfollowingthe 1956war),thechronic
infightingand rivalryamongArab stateshas onlyhighlighted theirperceived
differences(more on this later). For instance,as reportedin the New York
Times,some Arab officialssuggestedthatone of the paradoxesof the Persian
GulfWar was thatSaddam Hussein's attemptto cast himselfas leader of the
pan-Arab movementonly "sharpened a sense that pan-Arabistslogans had
outlived their relevance," and consequently increased the sense of

65. For additionalclaimsthatstatebuildinghas hardenedtheArab territorial stateand led to a

decline in pan-Arabism,see Brynen,"Palestine and the Arab State System,"p. 606; and Gause,
"Sovereignty, Statecraft,and Stabilityin theMiddle East."
66. See William Bloom, PersonalIdentity, National Identity,
and IntemationalRelations(New
York: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1990), pp. 100-103; and James Mayall, Nationalismand
IntemationalSociety(New York: CambridgeUniversity Press,1990),p. 121.
67. Michael Barnett,Confronting theCostsof War:Military Power,State,and SocietyinEgyptand
Israel(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity Press,1992).
498 InternationalOrganization

difference betweenneighboring Arab states.68There is littledoubtthatIraq's

invasion of Kuwait bolstered the idea of a Kuwaiti national identity.69
Moreover, separate state-nationalidentitiesalso were reinforcedby the
Arab-Israeliconflict, warsthatwerewaged ostensiblyin thename of theArab
nation (though not for Arab unification).Conscriptswere trained in state
armies,wore state uniforms, were buried in state graves,and were honored
with state holidays. In general, externalconflictaccelerated the sense of
separatenessand thegrowthof state-nationalidentities.70
Finally,Arab leaders have wielded and manipulateda varietyof symbolsto
createa state-national Manufacturing
identity. consentthroughthereconstruc-
tion of politicalidentitycan prove to be a cost-effective methodof creating
support,and evidenceaboundsthatnearlyall Arab leaders attemptedto infuse
the state with a sense of permanence. For instance,even Mu'ammar al-
Kaddafi,who aspired to become the leader of pan-ArabismafterNasser's
death in 1970,attemptedto create a "LibyanArab" nationalidentitythrough
historicaltexts,holidays,and monuments.71 And in Iraq the Ba'athist party,
whichstressespan-Arabismand thesingularity oftheArab people, established
an ongoingprojectto demonstratethe existenceof an Iraqi identitythathad
rootsin Mesopotami.72
Additionally, manyArab leadersattemptedto appropriateand be associated
withthesymbolsofArab nationalism,but in a waythatwas consistentwiththe
state's interests.Because manyArab leaders feared that theircounterparts
wouldseek to appropriatepan-Arabismto enhancetheirregionalpowerand to
destabilizetheirneighbors,theyattemptedto minimizetheirsusceptibility to
transnationalissues by imposing their own interpretationon Arabism's
demands-one that was consistentwiththe state's interests.73 Accordingto
Roger Owen, "Little by little the vocabularyof Arabism was altered to
accommodateideas and concepts designed to highlightregionaldifferences
This attemptto define"Arab" issues in waysthat
and local particularity."74

68. New YorkTimes,8 July1991,p. A2.

69. MiltonViorst,"A Reporterat Large (Kuwait),"New Yorker, 30 September1991,pp. 37-72
and pp. 38-39 in particular.
70. On the relationshipbetweenwar and Iraqi nationbuilding,see Eric Davis, "State Building
in Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War and the GulfCrisis,"in Manus Mildarsky, ed., TheIntemationalization
ofCommunalStnife (London: Routledgeand Kegan Paul, 1992).
71. See Lisa Anderson,"Legitimacy,Identity,and the Writingof Historyin Libya," in Eric
Davis and Nicolos Gavrielides,eds., Statecraft in the Middle East, pp. 71-91 (Miami: Florida
InternationalUniversityPress, 1991), p. 72; and all the contributionsto that volume. For a
discussionof howarcheologyis used byMiddle Easternstatesto forgea nationalidentity, see Neil
Asher Silberman,BetweenPast and Present:Archeology, Ideology,and Nationalismin theModem
MiddleEast (New York: HenryHolt, 1989).
72. See AmatziaBaram,"TerritorialNationalismin theMiddle East," MiddleEastemStudies26
(October 1990), pp. 425-48 and pp. 426-27 in particular;Samir al-Khalil,The Monument:Art,
Vulgarity, inIraq (Berkeley:University
and Responsibility ofCaliforniaPress,1991).
73. See Brynen,"Palestineand theArab State System,"p. 611; and Owen, "Arab Nationalism,
Arab Unity,and Arab Solidarity,"p. 21.
74. Owen,ibid.
 Arab states 499

were consistentwiththe state'sinterestsled to a decreased sensitivity to Arab

causes. For instance,because of Palestine's centralityin Arab politics,Arab
leadersstroveto ensurethattheirdefinition of and solutionto theproblemwas
not outstrippedby another Arab leader's appraisal; the attemptby the
Egyptiangovernmentto insulate its citizenryfrompan-Arabismled to "an
increasing passiveness toward" Arab causes in general and toward the
Palestiniancause in particular.75
In sum,as Arab leaders workedforintegrationat one level,theypromoted
fragmentation at another.76 Solid empiricalevidenceat the regionaland state
levels shows that a state-nationalidentityis betterable to compete withan
Arab identitybecause of a deliberatestrategyto pursue what Baram terms
nationalism,"and thatthese statesare now "legitimatein the eyes
"territorial
ofsociety,or at least of a significant
partofit,"in Hourani'swords.77 Centralto
the situationas it existstodayis thatpopulaces have greaterallegiancesto the
state, that state-based identities are better able to compete with Arab
nationalismforthecitizens'politicalloyalties,thatArab societiesare less likely
to demandthattheirleaders followpan-Arabism'scues, and thatArab leaders
have less incentiveto resort to pan-Arabism'sdemands to enhance their
legitimacy.

Interstateinteractions
Myconcernin thissubsectionis howinter-Arabinteractions contributedto a
decline in pan-Arabismand greater differentiation between Arab states.
AlexanderWendt's discussionof how reciprocalinteractionscan create new
and separate roles and interestsprovides a useful organizingdevice for
consideringhow the interactionbetween Arab states produced a decline in
transnationalidentitiesand obligations.78
While priorto the initialinteraction
actorsmighthave cautiouslyoptimisticor waryfeelingsabout one another,this
firstcontactgeneratesexpectationsforfutureencounters.Not onlydoes such
knowledgeinformfuturebehaviorbut also thispatternedbehaviorencourages
the formationof the roles and interestsof these actors. In short,while the
initial interactioncan be positive or negative,to the extent that it and
subsequentbehaviorappears threatening, "the selfis forcedto 'mirror'such
behaviorin its conceptionof the selfs relationshipto the other," observes
Wendt; ominous behavior produces a more wary and cautious outlook,

75. Brynen,"Palestineand theArab State System,"p. 613.

76. Giacomo Luciani and Ghassan Salame, "The Politicsof Arab Integration,"in Luciani, The
ArabState,p. 398.
77. The quotationsare fromBaram,"TerritorialNationalismin theMiddle East"; and Hourani,
A Historyof theArab Peoples,p. 448, respectively.
Also see p. 451 of the Hourani volume.Gause
showsthatan increasingpercentageof thegrossnationalproductof these statesis utilizedbythe
government, demonstrating thatthecitizens'needs are morecloselylinkedto thestate.See Gause,
"Sovereignty, and Stabilityin theMiddle East," p. 460.
Statecraft,
78. Wendt,"Anarchyis What StatesMake of It," pp. 405-7.
500 InternationalOrganization

a sense of conflictinginterests,and the potential for distinctidentities.79

Path-dependentbehaviorbecomes institutionalized and establishesseparate
roles thatare ratherimperviousto change.80Therefore,anarchyalone cannot
accountforthe emergenceof these roles. Rather,these roles are created by
actorsthemselvesand throughtheiractions;it is structurethroughaction.81
This process-orientedmodel nicely captures how initial pan-Arab senti-
ments, comprisinga sense of shared identityand interests,were steadily
replaced bygreaterfragmentation betweenArab statesand an acceptanceof
therolesand behavioralexpectationsassociatedwithsovereignty. Considerthe
followinghistoricalsketch.At independence,Arab leadersexpressedconsider-
able ambivalencetowardeach other.While theyrecognizedthatArab states
had shared interests,this cooperative spiritwas coated with tremendous
apprehensionand suspicionthat pan-Arabismwas a Trojan horse forArab
leaders. Initialencounters,therefore,were laden withmutualambivalenceif
not outrightsuspicion.This approach-avoidancebehavioremergesas a major
themeofmanyexcellenthistoricalnarrativesof theperiod.82
Future interactionsonly reinforcedthese suspicions and fears. Indeed,
perhaps most damagingto the spiritof pan-Arabismwere the outcomesof
pan-Arab projects.Most significant were the twinfailuresof the 1960s: the
death of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1961 and the 1967Arab-Israeli
War. If the UAR began with much public fanfare,privatelyboth Egyptian
President Nasser and Syrian leaders were only too fearfulof the costs
associated with this unificationagreement.83 Such fears were prophetic.In
1961,SyriawithdrewfromtheUAR amidstchargesthatitwas littlemorethan
a vehicle for Nasser to expand his power at Syria's economic and political
expense.84If the Egyptian-Iraqi-Syrianunificationtalksof the following
years
provideevidencethatunification remaineda formidableforce,thatsuch talks

79. Ibid. pp. 406-7.

80. On interaction,social identitiesand roles,and order,also see Bergerand Luckmann,The
Social Construction of Reality;Nicholas Abercrombie,"Knowledge, Order, and Human Au-
tonomy,"inJ.Hunterand S. Ainlay,eds.,MakingSenseofModem Times:PeterBerger and theVision
ofInterpretiveSociology(New York: Routledgeand Kegan Paul, 1986), pp. 11-30 and pp. 18-19 in
particular;and JonathanTurner,The Theoryof Social Interaction(Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford
UniversityPress,1988).
81. Deirdre Boden, "The World as it Happens: Ethnomethodologyand Conversational
Analysis,"in George Ritzer,ed., Frontiers ofSocial Theory(New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press,
1990),pp. 185-213and p. 189 in particular.This view,of course,is consistentwithWendt'sphrase,
"anarchyis whatstatesmakeofit."
82. See Yehoshua Porath,In SearchofArab Unity(London: FrankCass, 1986); PatrickSeale,
The Struggle for Syria (New Haven, Conn.: Yale UniversityPress, 1986); and Bruce Baddy-
Weitzmann,The Crystallization oftheArab StateSystem(Syracuse,N.Y.: SyracuseUniversity Press,
1993).
83. Seale, TheStruggle forSyria.
84. Malcom Kerr,TheArab Cold War(New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1971); Taylor,The
ArabBalance ofPowerSystem, Arab and RegionalPoliticsin theMiddleEast, p. 84;
p. 37; Vatikiotis,
and Owen,State,Power,and Politicsin theMakingoftheModemMiddleEast, p. 88.
 Arab states 501

ended not witha unificationagreementbut witha flurry of accusationsonly

dampenedthedesireforArab unity.85
The othermajor defeatof pan-Arabismcame as a consequence of Israel's
militaryvictoryin June 1967. Because Arab leaders paved theirroad to war
withIsrael withthe language of pan-Arabism,Israel's victoryrepresenteda
defeatnot onlyforthe Arab statesbut also forpan-Arabism.86 That the 1967
wardealt pan-Arabismitsfatalblow,however,is a testimony to itsalready-frail
condition.It was in thiscontext,the fadingpopularityof pan-Arabismand the
possibleArab responseto Israel, thatArab leaders gatheredin Khartoumin
autumn 1967. If the pretextwas to discuss the collectiveArab response to
Israel's militaryvictory,the prominentsubtextwas the meaning of Arab
nationalism.During the immediatemonthsafterthe Junewar, Arab leaders
exchangedindictments,and the underlyingtheme was the extentto which
pan-Arabism,which representedthe principalcleavage in the Arab world,
could be blamed forthe defeat. Jordanand Saudi Arabia were particularly
vocal in claimingthatany successfulconfrontation of Israel was premisedon
greater inter-Arabcooperation, that is, jettisoningthe radical pan-Arab
agenda. Amman's newspaperad-Dusturreflectedthe emergingmood: "Co-
existenceis a need whichwe mustrecognizeat thepresentstage.An attemptto
forceothersto adopt a certainsystemwould ... eventuallydivide the Arab
ranks."87
To close these divisionsand increase inter-Arabcooperationwould mean
concludingthe five-yearconfrontation in Yemen between Egypt and Saudi
Arabia. The Egyptiantroop interventionin Yemen in 1962 representeda
flashpointbetween radical and conservativeArab states and a symbolof
Nasser's attemptto exporthis revolution;the continuingEgyptianpresence
fiveyearslater,therefore, was an obstacleto inter-Arabcooperation.Accord-
ingly,the continuingconflictin Yemen was an importantagenda itemat the
1967 Khartoumsummit,and the subsequentagreementby Egyptand Saudi
Arabia to end the war was considered one of the summit's crowning
achievements.Nasser agreed to resignas the sponsorof pan-Arabismand to
targethis activitiesand energiesagainstIsrael,and not hisArab brethren,and
Saudi Arabia agreedto help himfinancially to do so.
The resultof these developmentswas a broadeningconsensuson the basic
normsthatshouldgovernArab relations,aptlysymbolizedbyNasser's shiftin
rhetoricfrom"unityof ranks" to "unityof purpose" and the "new pragma-
tism,"which suggestedthat cooperation need not implyunification.88 The
Jordanianad-Dustursummarizedthe prevailingview: "We [the Arab world]

85. For moreon thesetalkssee Kerr,Arab Cold War.

86. Ajami,TheArabPredicament.
87. BBC WorldBroadcast,ME/2519/A/8,18 July1967.
88. Hameid Ansari,Egypt:The Stalled Society(Albany: State Universityof New York Press,
1986),p. 150.
502 InternationalOrganization

have notyetreachedthestatewherewe can overcomeproblemscreatedbythe

existenceofseparateentities,whichwould,thus,pave thewayforthecomplete
eliminationof separateness.This in turnimposes on us the dutyto tolerate
morethanone viewpoint.... Because, ifwe do not toleratethe interactionof
Arab experiments, we will never progresstowardArab coexistenceand will
never approach our basic aim-Arab unity."89 In short,throughan ongoing
interactiveprocess,Arab statesconvergedon both sovereignty and relatively
stableexpectationsconcerninghowto organizetheirrelations.
Inter-Arabrelations since Khartoum only have reinforcedthis path of
fragmentation-abeliefthatArab statesmighthave distinctinterestsand that
they should organize their relationswith each other around sovereignty's
norms.The decision by Nasser and others (but not Syria) to abstain from
interveningin Jordan duringits militarycampaign against the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) in autumn 1970 was viewed by many as
recognitionof the arrivalof sovereigntyand the new conservatism in theArab
world-even the PLO, the representativeof the Palestinianpeople and the
conscience of the Arab world,should not challenge the sovereigntyof the
existingArab states.Althoughthe 1973 war and the subsequentoil embargo
suggestedthepossibilityofa greatercollectivespiritin theArab world,Egypt's
decision to take a separate road to peace with Israel signaled that state
interestsand Arab interestsdid not alwayscoincide,even on definingissues.
The emergenceof subregionalorganizationssuch as the Gulf Cooperation
Council and the Arab MaghrebiUnion ratherthan of pan-Arabassociations
was the dominanttrendin inter-Arabcooperationin the 1980s.90The Iraqi
invasionof Kuwait ushered in a new era in inter-Arabrelations,as Arab
leadersbecame less apologeticabout defendingtheirpoliciesoffurthering the
state's-as opposed to the Arab nation's-interests.91In sum, the historical
legacyof inter-Arabinteractions is notgreatercooperationand a deepeningof
the political community but rathergreaterdifferentiation and particularism
amongArab states.92

89. BBC WorldBroadcasts,ME/2561/A/6,6 September 1967. Also see the editorialsin the
Baghdadi al-Fajral-Jadidand the Egyptianal-Akhbaral-Yawm,reprintedin BritishBroadcasting
Company,BBC WorldBroadcasts,ME/2558/A/3,2 September 1967, and ME/2559/A/4,4
September1967,respectively. For a fullertreatmentof the symbolicsignificanceof the Khartoum
summit,see Ajami,TheArabPredicament.
90. The decline of pan-Arabismalso encouragedmore regionalaffiliations and loyalties:"A
NorthAfrican(maghribi)or a GulfArab (khaliji)identity, whichhad once been an anathema,was
no longerso, and the 'Egypt-first' slogan that had once been held in check graduallybecame
acceptable." See Salame, "Inter-ArabPolitics,"p. 322.
91. For instance,Shaykhal-Nuhayyanof the United Arab Emiratesobservedthat,"The Arab
nation's split and fragmentation existedbefore the Gulf War, but thiswar has aggravatedand
deepened thissplit."See "Presidenton ProspectsforArab Unity,"ForeignBroadcastInformation
Service-Near East (FBIS-NES), 20 March 1994,p. 25. Also see BernardLewis, "Rethinkingthe
Middle East," ForeignAffairs 71 (4 1992) pp. 103-4; and IbrahimKarawan,"Arab Dilemmasin the
1990s:BreakingTaboos and SearchingforSignposts,"MiddleEast Joumal48 (Summer1994), pp.
433-54.
92. The rise of statistinterestsshaped post-PersianGulf War regionalsecuritypatterns.The
 Arab states 503

Althoughsuch developmentsspell the demise of pan-Arabism,theydo not

necessarilymarkthe end of Arab nationalism.If Arab states are more fully
treatingeach otheras havinga real existence,Arab leaders and masses alike
apparentlyhave convergedon a more centristdefinitionof Arab nationalism
that impliesinterstatecooperationand consultation-but littleelse.93Arab
nationalismand sovereignty,therefore,no longerare contradictory concepts.
The meaningof Arab nationalismand the expectedbehaviorsderivedfromit
are increasingly
tantamountto thoseofinternational society.94
The ascendance of thiscentristconceptionofArab nationalismis a product
of some of the same state formationand interactiveprocesses that are
responsiblefortheinstitutionalization
ofsovereignty.Politicalconceptscannot
be divorcedfrompoliticalpractice,fromtheirhistoricalcontext,or fromthe
meaningthatactorsattachto those conceptsand thataddressnew difficulties
in new surroundings.95 Briefly,three broad periods in inter-Arabpolitics,
definedby three differentinternationaland domesticcontexts,affectedthe
debate over and the meaningof Arab nationalism.The firstwas fromthe late
nineteenthcenturythroughthe early twentiethcentury,defined by the
breakdownof the old order as a consequence of the demise of the Ottoman
Empire,the emergenceof nationalism,and the spread of theworldeconomy.
crumbled,individualsin
As theirpolitical,economic,and culturalinstitutions
the FertileCrescentwere forcedto reconsidertheirpoliticalidentityand how
theywanted to live with one another;that is, who constitutedthe political
community.96 Modernityand imperialismprovidedan impetusforArabs to
discovertheircommonidentityand destinyand to suggestthata meaningful
response to these economic, cultural, and political dislocations required

real importance-and the onlysurviving principle-of the Damascus Declaration of 1991,which

was ostensiblydesignedto create a securityalliance betweenthe Gulfstatesand Syriaand Egypt,
was itsinsistenceon sovereignty as thebasis of inter-Arabpolitics.The GulfCooperationCouncil
states insistedthat sovereigntyand securitywere indistinguishable. See FBIS-NES-92-241, 15
December 1992,pp. 10-11. As acknowledgedbythenEgyptianministerBoutrosBoutros-Ghali,in
an undated interview,"The painfulrealities resultingfromIraq's invasionof Kuwait and its
usurpationof the territory of a fraternalArab stateincludethe collapse of the traditionalconcept
of Pan-Arab security."Cited in FBIS-NES-91-059, 27 March 1991, pp. 9-10. Moreover,the
emergenceof statismhas erased the differentiation between Arab and non-Arab states and
thereforeenables the inclusion of all regional actors in strategicalliances and balancing
formulations.See "Arafat Suggests Formation of Mideast 'Regional Order'," FBIS-NES, 4
February1994. Finally,at a recentArab League conferenceArab statesagreed forthe firsttime
that each could identifyits own securitythreats.See Oded Granot,"Outcome of Arab League
ConferenceAnalyzed,"Ma'ariv(Israel), inFBIS-NES, 31 March 1994,p. 3.
93. As Lewis notes, "The decline of Pan-Arabismas a force shaping the policies of Arab
governmentscan be measured in the level and intensityof their support for other Arab
governments and peoples." See Lewis,"Rethinkingthe Middle East," p. 100.
94. Hourani,A History oftheArabPeoples,p. 451.
95. JamesFarr,"UnderstandingConceptualChange Politically,"in TerrenceBall, JamesFarr,
and Russell Hanson, eds., PoliticalInnovationand ConceptualChange (New York: Cambridge
UniversityPress, 1989), pp. 24-46 and p. 33 in particular.For a related discussion,see the
introduction to the second editionofTibi,ArabNationalism.
96. For a discussionlinkingthe demiseof empiresand theriseof nationalism,see CharlesTilly,
"States and Nationalismin Europe, 1492-1992,"Theory and Society,vol. 23,no. 1, 1994,pp. 131-46.
504 International
Organization

collectiveactionon an expansive scale.The emergence ofa pan-Arabism that

attempted to linkup withthe modern-day projectof nationalism and the
creationofa nation-state is directlyrelatedto howindividuals respondedand
attempted tomakesenseofthesefundamental transformations.
The periodfrompoliticalindependence through 1967was definedbythe
coexistenceof statesovereignty and pan-Arabism. Duringthistime,Arab
leadersweredesirousofbuilding strong andmodernstatesinrelation to,first,
an international systemthatleftthemvulnerable; second,other"artificial"
stateswithwhomtheyshareda history, language, anddestiny; andthird, their
ownsocietiesthattreatedthemas illegitimate and artificial.
Therefore, the
debateoverArab nationalism is relatedto the attempt byArab leadersto
reconcilethe desireto protectand promotethe interests of boththeArab
nationand theArabstatedue to transnational and territoriallogics,respec-
tively.Accordingly,thedebateoverArabnationalism was a debatenotonly
overthedegreeto whichArabstateshad uniform interestsbutalso overthe
necessityofpoliticalunification togivemeaning, permanence, andpurposeto
theArabnation.
Due tostateformation projectsandinteractive processes,Arabstatesbegan
to be increasinglyregardedas havinga realbasis.The growing differentiation
amongthestatesproduceda corresponding changein themeaningof Arab
nationalism. thelanguageofArabnationalism
Specifically, canstillbe heardas
Arabscontinueto confront thefundamental changesintheinternational and
domestic within
politics a newcontext-that ofsovereign Arabstatesrespond-
ingto perceived commonchallenges. Whilethereis littlesupportforunifica-
tion,the continuedexistenceof an Arab identity thatservesas a bridge
betweenArabstates,andtheawarenessbyArabstatesofthepermeability of
bordersto culturaland economicforces,preservesan interestin close
Arabnationalism,
relations.97 therefore, stillprovides a powerful pullon Arab
statesand providesa symbolic incentive forcooperation. Thisis particularly
truewhenstatesare viewedas beingunderassaultby non-Arab(notably
Western) forces.
In sum,Arableadershavea greater incentive toactconsistentlywiththerole
allocatedby,and normsassociatedwith,sovereignty becauseofdomestic and
international changes.Stateformation processeshaveincreasedthemasses'
willingnesstoidentifymorecloselywiththestate;accordingly, Arableadersno
longerhave eitherthe same incentive to be seen as working towardArab
unification or the necessityof legitimating theiractionsin the name of
pan-Arabism, becausethatlanguageno longerhas thesamesaliencefortheir
Interstate
citizenry. interactions, moreover, haveundermined pan-Arabism, if
nottheverydesireforclosecooperation, and encouraged greaterdifferentia-
tionamongArabstates.Domesticandinternational processesinstitutionalized
sovereignty,promoted a moresovereignty-friendly ofArabnational-
definition

97. Salame, "Inter-ArabPolitics,"pp. 321,340, and 351.

 Arabstates 505

ism,and enabledArab leadersbothmoreconsistently to adopt the roles

associatedwithsovereigntyand to developrelatively
stable expectations
concerninghowtoorganizetheirrelations.

Indicators of change
The institutionalization of sovereignty and the changedmeaningof Arab
nationalismencouragedArab leaders to act more consistently withthe
behavioralexpectations associatedwithsovereignty, whichin turnincreased
regionalorder.Yet on whatbasis can we claimthatsovereignty has been
institutionalized?
Although manyscholars ofArabpolitics alsohaveobserved a
fundamental shiftin behavioral patterns in theArabstatessystem, thatthey
frequently base theirclaimson selectedhistoricalepisodes(forinstance,
Egyptian President Anwaras-Sadat'stripto Jerusalem, theIraqiinvasionof
Kuwait, andmorerecently theDeclaration ofPrinciplesbetweenIsraelandthe
PLO) raisesa numberofmethodological and conceptualissues.First,actors
might sharecommoninterests, goals,anddefinitions ofthesituation yetdiffer
overtheappropriate measuresandactionsrequired toachievetheirobjectives.
Second,actorsmight havenumerous andpossibly conflicting andthe
interests,
factthatone setofinterests emergesoveranotherat anyparticular moment
does notrepresent conclusive evidencethatotherinterests mightnotalso be
present.As WilliamConnolly putsit,overlooking thesetwoissues"wouldrun
theriskofmisinterpreting a contingent choicereflectingimmediate constraints
foronerepresenting themorebasicandstableinterests oftheagent."98
Third,manyhistorical episodescanbe interpreted as a vindication ofeither
Arabnationalism orofsovereignty; thatis,as theresultofeitherArabnormsor
thenormsofinternational society.ConsiderIraq's invasionofKuwait,which
manyoffer as conclusive evidencethatArabnationalism is dead becauseone
Arab stateinvadedanother,supposedly violatinga cardinaltenetof Arab
nationalism.99Not onlyhaveinter-Arab militaryconflicts occurredregularly
since1945,butthefactthata normhas been brokenis notevidenceof its
absence.Indeed,theimmediate andshockedreaction oftheArabstatestothe
Iraqi invasionof Kuwaitcan be taken as evidencethat the normative
prohibition againstArab statesinvadingeach otherwas broken;thatis,
evidenceof thenormcan be detectedin thereactionof thoseobserving its
violation.Finally,both sovereignty and pan-Arabism permita range of
behaviorsthatoftenoverlap.For instance,because sovereignty allowsfor
it is theoretically
politicalunification, consistentwithpan-Arabism's goal of
neither
unification; theactivenorabandonedsearchbyArabstatesforregional
integrationrepresents conclusive evidenceoftheinstitutionalization ofsover-

98. William Connolly,The Termsfor PoliticalDiscourse,2d ed. (Princeton,N.J.: Princeton

University
Press,1983),p. 70.
99. Lewis,"RethinkingtheMiddle East," pp. 100-101.
506 International
Organization

eignty. In general,thesameeventusedbysometoindicateArabnationalism's
declinecanbe appropriated byotherstoindicatetheveryopposite.
To makethecase thatsovereignty has been institutionalized, pan-Arabism
has declined,and Arabstateshaveestablished relativelystableexpectations
andsharednormstogoverntheirrelations requiresgreaterattention to those
practicesthatare fundamentally inconsistent withsovereignty. Specifically,
thatArabstateshaveceasedchallenging each other'sauthority and debating
therulesof thegameis evidenceof theinstitutionalization of sovereignty.I
briefly discussthreeindicators to supportthe claimthatArab stateshave
converged on sovereignty and itsnormsto organizetheirrelations:(1) the
declineof unitytalksand agreements; (2) the agendasat Arab summit
meetings; and(3) thefailureofArableadersactively topromote themselves as
champions ofpan-Arabism andpoliticalunification.
Perhapstheclearestandsimplest expression oftheriseofsovereignty is the
nearextinction of unificationtalksand treaties.Whereassevenunityagree-
mentsbetweenArabstatesoftheFertileCrescent wereinforcebetween1949
and 1964,thelonepost-1967 instancecameinOctober1978betweenIraq and
Syria.100The dramatic downturn in thenumberofunification efforts
suggests
theinstitutionalization of sovereignty.Recognizethatin contrast to current
Europeanintegration effortsthatare advocatedprimarily on economicand
politicalgrounds, Arabunification efforts derivedfroma beliefin theArab
andlackoflegitimacy
states'artificiality andinthedesiretobringthestateand
nationinto correspondence. What matters,then,is not the attemptof
integration per se butratherthemeaningand motivation attributedto such
actions.Therefore, a declineinunification talkssuggests a decreasedbeliefin
of the Arab stateamongArab state and nonstateactors.
the artificiality
Moreover, becausea prominent interpretation of theseunification efforts is
thattheyrepresent an attempt byArab leadersto maintaintheirdomestic
legitimacy, a declinein suchefforts providesan indirect indicator ofbothan
increasein the Arab states'legitimacy and empiricalsovereignty and/ora
decrease in the lusterof pan-Arabclaims.Relatedly,the languageof
legitimation has changed:whileArab leadersstillclaimthattheiractions
further theinterests of theArabnation(thoughafterthePersianGulfWar
Arabstatesare less reservedin defending theirpoliciesin thenameofstate
interests),theyno longerpresenttheiractionsas designedto accomplish the
ultimate goalofpoliticalunification.
The agendasofArabsummit meetings represent anotheravenuefortracing
theriseof sovereignty, thedeclineofpan-Arabism, and thedevelopment of
sharednormsand relatively stableexpectations to organizethe relations

100. Malik Mufti,Pan-Arabismand State Formationin Syriaand Iraq (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
UniversityPress, forthcoming).Indeed, the 1978 Syrian-Iraqiagreementproduced littleexcite-
outsidea narrowpoliticalspectrumor the state'sborders,as
mentand was givenlittlesignificance
it was widelyinterpretedby otherArab leaders as a blatantattemptby Iraq to replace Egyptas
leader of the Arab world and by Assad to consolidatehis domesticposition.See Owen, State,
Power,and Politicsin theMakingoftheModemMiddleEast, p. 91.
 Arabstates 507

amongstates.'01 Although theformal agendasofpre-1967 meetings concerned

Arab-Israeli issues,theirinformal agendasand manypresummit preparatory
meetings had as a centralissuethe debateoverpan-Arabism and political
unification.102Simplyput,beingdebatedwerethe basic normsthatshould
governinter-Arab relations.The post-1967agenda,however,is no longer
coloredby issuesof politicalunification or debatesoverhow to organize
interstaterelations.Although thesesummits arestillfraughtwithconflict, such
tensionsrevolvearounddifferences overhowto solveand coordinatetheir
responses toissuesofmutualconcern, ratherthanwhether Arabstatesshould
acceptthenormsofsovereignty toguidetheirrelations.
Another methodfordemarcating theemergence ofsovereignty derivesfrom
thedefinition of thethreatto regionalstability. Threatsmayoriginate from
considerations otherthanmilitary poweralone:theymightderivefromthose
stateand nonstateactorsthatchallengetheprinciple ofsovereignty and the
authority of the state.In thisrespect,revolutionary actorsare thosethat
presentand promotean alternative principlefororganizing international
relations.Priortothe1960s,thethreat frequently posedbyArabstateswasnot
military butpresentational:theirwillingness andability toforward a particular
understanding oftheArabstate'sroleandrelationship tootherArabstates.By
suggesting thatthe purposeof theArab statewas to worktowardpolitical
unification,thoseArab leaderswho alignedthemselves withpan-Arabism
undermined thestate'sexternal andinternal sovereignty. Accordingly, anArab
statethatsuccessfully wieldedthepan-Arabcardthreatened to subvertthe
state'sinternalandexternal security.In thisrespect,evenrelatively weakstates
represented a potentialthreattostronger states.
It is noteworthy thatwhilethepost-1967 periodstillcontainsattempts by
Arableadersto claimleadership in theArabworld,suchbidsrevolvearound
leadership onissuesofmutualinterest rather thanonoverturning ordefending
the region'sorganizing principles.For example,Waltcataloguesnumerous
alliancesin theMiddleEast sincethe 1950s;however, theirnumbersignifi-
cantlydecreasesafter1967and the identified sourceof thesethreatsis no
longerassociatedwithArabistchallenges, thatis, a threatto the region's
organizing Inshort,
principles.103 thechangeddefinition ofthethreat ingeneral
andthatArableadersno longeractively promote themselves as thechampion
ofpoliticalunificationsuggest theinstitutionalization ofsovereignty.104

101. For a fulltreatment of themethodologicaland theoreticalissues involvedin usingagendas

to trace shiftsin internationalpolitics,see Richard Mansbach and JohnVasquez, In Search of
Theory(New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press,1981),chap. 4. Sela arguesthattheverydecisionto
convenean Arab summitin 1964signaledthatNasserwas beginningto abandon pan-Arabism.See
Avraham Sela, "Middle East Politics and the Arab-Israeli conflict,"manuscript,Hebrew
University ofJerusalem.
102. That no summitoccurredin 1966 was testimony to the re-emergenceof Arab radicalism.
Vatikiotis,Arab and RegionalPolitics,p. 87.
103. Walt,TheOriginofAlliances,pp. 287-88.
104. For otherargumentsand indicatorsconcerningthewillingness ofArab leadersto recognize
the principleof noninterference, see Salame, "Inter-ArabPolitics"; Brynen,"Palestine and the
Arab State System,"p. 603; and Lewis,"RethinkingtheMiddle East," p. 117.
508 International
Organization

Changesin thesethreeindicators-unity attempts,the agendasof Arab

summits, and a changedpresentation of purposefortheArabstateand the
definition of thethreat-underscore a significant
development in inter-Arab
politics:theinstitutionalization theacceptanceofa meaning
ofsovereignty, of
Arabnationalism withsovereignty,
thatis consistent and thedevelopment of
relativelystableexpectationsandsharednormsfororganizing regionallife.

Conclusion

Sincethebeginning oftheArabstatessystem stateand nonstateactorshave

engagedin an activeand occasionally violentdialogueoverhowregionallife
shouldbe organizedin generaland howtheArabstatesshouldmanagethe
legacyofWestphalia andthedemandsofArabnationalism inparticular.Such
a debatehighlights howWestphaliaand the normsof international society
conflictedwith(and shaped)theexisting (and emerging) regionalsociety.105
Arabstateswerenotonlysovereign statesbutalso,at a basiclevel,Arabstates,
derivingtheirlegitimacy fromand representatives of theArabnation;these
differentsocial identities
containedverydifferent behavioralexpectations.
Interstateconflict,
therefore,was notsolelya productofinsecurity drivenby
anarchy; ratheritwas a productofinsecurity drivenbytransnational forces.
The transfer of sovereigntyto the Arab worldrepresented an institutional
revolutionfororganizing regionalpoliticallife;andas withmostrevolutions, it
wasneither uncomplicated norconflict-free.
State sovereignty emergedonce the stateunderstood itselfas occupying
certainrolesand a "revolution in loyalties"occurred, suchthatsubnational
weretransferred
loyalties to thestateand transnational loyaltiesrecededin
importance.106The combinedeffects of regionalinteractions and somewhat
successfulstateformation projectsincreasedthestate'sinternal and external
sovereigntyandencouraged thedifferentiation betweendomestic andinterna-
tionalspace.The boundariesof theArabstatessystem and thedesiredand
realizednormative structure,therefore,werea resultof bothmaterialand
ideationalforces.Materialforces,embodiedin external and internal threats,
thecollapseofempires, andeconomicforces, decidedly alteredtheincentives
andinterestsofstateandnonstate actors.Yet ideationalforces, reflectedboth
by contending and shiftingnationalidentitiesand by new intersubjective
understandings oftheroleandpurposeoftheArabstate,also contributed to
thedevelopment ofsharednormstogovern In anyevent,institutions
relations.
suchas sovereignty generatetheirstabilizing propertiesonce actorsconsis-
tentlyadopta particular roleconception; modify theirbehavioraccording to

105. For the general themeof the interactionbetweenthe expandingnormsof international

societyand regionalsystems,
see Bull and Watson,TheExpansionofIntemationalSociety.
106. Linklater,"The Problemof Community in InternationalRelations,"p. 149.
 Arabstates 509

each other'sroles,behaviors,and expectations; andgeneraterelatively

stable
expectations and sharednorms.My approachto regionalorder,therefore,
highlightsnotbalancing mechanisms intheinternational system,
orhowstates
withpreestablished interests construct
and identities institutions,
butrather
how,first, preexisting encourage(and socialize)stateactorsto
institutions
adhereto a stablesetof rolesand behavioralexpectations, and second,how
roles,and sharednormsdevelopfromthe interaction
institutions, among
actors.
Yet sovereignty
is notpermanentlyanchored. Arableadersmustcontinually
workto reproducethe state'ssovereignty, its domesticand international
authority,andthedistinctionbetweendomestic space.While
andinternational
pan-Arabism has recededas a threatto thestate'sauthorityand,as summa-
rizedbyGhassanSalame,Arabstatesarenotgenerally "threatened
bya higher
levelofintegration,... ideologiesarestillunabletoconvince
statist theArabs
thatthepresent statesareresilient
againstall kindsofchallenges,
orthatthere
is no possibleloyaltybeyondstateborders.In fact,bothnationalism and
and qutriyya)seem to be in a historicalimpasse."107
isolationism(qawmiyya The
failureof statistideologieshas resurrected primordial, ethnic,and, most
famously,religious whichinturnrepresent
identities, a potentialthreattostate
The existenceof social forcesthatcontinually
sovereignty.108 challengethe
state'ssovereignty remindus thatstateleaders are endlesslyengagedin
betweendomesticand international
differentiating space. Far froma com-
pletedtask,thereproduction ofstatesovereignty is an ongoing, all-consuming
projectfornearlyallArableaders.
Manyofthesocialprocessesandpatterns thatfurthered theconsolidation
of
sovereigntyalso alteredthemeaningof and thepoliticalprojectsassociated
withArabnationalism. Thischallengeshowwe generally studyArabnational-
ismandtherelationship betweennationalism andinternational order.Muchof
thescholarshipon Arabnationalism has an either/or quality:theArabnation
eithertakesprecedenceoverall otheridentities or it is meaningless;either
Arabnationalism or itis without
politicalunification
necessitates force.Arab
nationalism'sconsistentmeaningis theexpectation ofa strengthening ofthe
Arabpoliticalcommunity, butsucha desirehas notalwaysbeen associated

107. Ghassan Salame, "Integrationin the Arab World: The InstitutionalFramework,"in

Giacomo Luciani,ed., ThePoliticsofArabIntegration (New York: CroomHelm, 1988),pp. 278-79.
108. WhileIslamicmovementsmayor maynotbe compatiblewithjuridicalsovereignty, theydo
challenge the internal sovereigntyof many Arab states. For an argumentconcerningthe
compatibility see JamesPiscatori,Islam in a Worldof
between Islam and juridical sovereignty,
Nation-States (New York: CambridgeUniversity Press,1986). For the opposingclaim,see Bassam
Tibi, "Religious Fundamentalismand Ethnicityin the Crisis of the Nation-Statein the Middle
East," workingpaper 5.4, Center for German and European Studies,Universityof California,
Berkeley,1992. For a discussionof the relationshipbetweenIslam and Arabism,see Tibi,Arab
Nationalism,pp. 17-20. On subnational identities,see Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner,
"Introduction:Tribes and the Complexitiesof State Formationin the Middle East," in Philip
Khoury and Joseph Kostiner,eds. Tribesand State Formationin the Middle East (Berkeley:
University of CaliforniaPress,1990),pp. 1-22.
510 International
Organization

witha demandfor politicalunification.109 The dangerof adheringto a

restrictive
definitionofnationalism, then,is thatitprematurelydismisses both
the presenceof nationalsentiments and the possibility of mass political
mobilization forpoliticalprojects
shortofpoliticalunification.
Relatedly, whereasonce the prominent themeof inter-Arab politicswas
nationversusstate,overthelastfewdecadesit is increasingly nation(s)and
state.An intriguing featureof Arab politicsis the existenceof contending
nationalidentities and politicalallegiancesthatoccasionally accommodate
each other,sometimes blurintoone another,and do not alwaysportend
regionalinstability.In otherwords,thoughit is tempting to assumethat
nationalidentitiesare mutuallyexclusiveand have clearlydifferentiated
boundaries-that is,the"us" and"them"areclearly demarcated, Arabpolitics
suggeststhatnationalidentities are morefluidthanare frequently acknowl-
edged.It is quitepossible,forinstance,foran Iraqito identify withtheIraqi
and theArab nation;in Jordan,Palestinian, Jordanian,and Arab national
mingleand onlyoccasionally
identities comeintoconflict. Therefore, as we
continueto thinkaboutthe relationship betweennationsand statesin the
modernera,itisperhapswisetoavoid"pigeonholed ofnation"that
definitions
discountthepossibility ofthesimultaneous existence ofnation-state
national-
ismsand moreinclusive nationalismsand to recognize howdifferentconcep-
tionsofnationalism holddifferent consequences forinternational
order.110

109. For examples of statementsthat do not equate nationalismwith the creation and
maintenanceof a territorialstate, see AnthonySmith,National Identity(Reno: Universityof
Nevada Press, 1991), chap. 1; and JohnHall, "Nationalisms:Classifiedand Explained,"Daedulus
122 (Summer1993),pp. 1-28.
110. Linda Layne,Home and Homeland:TheDialogicsof Tribaland NationalIdentities inJordan
(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity Press,1994),p. 20.