G.R. No. 109373 March 20, 1995 Benefit due its members as employees of PaBC.
Benefit due its members as employees of PaBC. In its order dated September 13, 1991, the trial court
PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION, PAULA S. PAUG, and its
officers and members, petitioners,  The Liquidator received a copy of the order on September 16, 1991. On October 16, 1991, he filed a
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VITALIANO N. NAÑAGAS II, as Liquidator of Pacific
Banking Corporation, respondents.
G.R. No. 112991 March 20, 1995
THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, as Liquidator of
the Pacific Banking Corporation , petitioner,  ground that it was late, i.e., more than 15 days after receipt of the decision. The judge declared his
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, DEPUTY SHERIFF RAMON
ENRIQUEZ and ANG ENG JOO, ANG KEONG LAN and E.J ANG INT'L. LTD., represented by their
Attorney-in-fact, GONZALO C. SY, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
These cases have been consolidated because the principal question involved is the same: whether a
petition for liquidation under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265, otherwise known as the Central Bank Act, is a
special proceeding or an ordinary civil action. The Fifth and the Fourteenth Divisions of the Court of
Appeals reached opposite results on this question and consequently applied different periods for
appealing.
The facts are as follows:
I.
Proceedings in the CB and the RTC
On July 5, 1985, the Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) was placed under receivership by the Central
Bank of the Philippines pursuant to Resolution No. 699 of its Monetary Board. A few months later, it was
placed under liquidation1 and a Liquidator was appointed.2
On April 7, 1986, the Central Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 31, a petition
entitled "Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Pacific Banking Corporation." 3 The petition was
approved, after which creditors filed their claims with the court.
On May 17, 1991, a new Liquidator, Vitaliano N. Nañagas, 4 President of the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation (PDIC), was appointed by the Central Bank.
On March 13, 1989 the Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization (Union for short),
petitioner in G.R. No. 109373, filed a complaint-in-intervention seeking payment of holiday pay, 13th
month pay differential, salary increase differential, Christmas bonus, and cash equivalent of Sick Leave
ordered payment of the principal claims of the Union.5
Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the order. In his order of December 6, 1991, the judge
modified his September 13, 19916 but in effect denied the Liquidator's motion for reconsideration. This
order was received by the Liquidator on December 9, 1991. The following day, December 10, 1991, he
filed a Notice of Appeal and a Motion for Additional Time to Submit Record on Appeal. On December
23, 1991, another Notice of Appeal was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General in behalf of Nañagas.
In his order of February 10, 1992, respondent judge disallowed the Liquidator's Notice of Appeal on the
September 13, 1991 order and subsequent orders to be final and executory and denied reconsideration.
On March 27, 1992, he granted the Union's Motion for issuance of a writ of Execution.
Ang Keong Lan and E.J. Ang Int'l., private respondents in G.R. No. 112991, likewise filed claims for the
payment of investment in the PaBC allegedly in the form of shares of stocks amounting to
US$2,531,632.18. The shares of stocks, consisting of 154,462 common shares, constituted 11% of the
total subscribed capital stock of the PaBC. They alleged that their claim constituted foreign exchange
capital investment entitled to preference in payment under the Foreign Investments Law.
In his order dated September 11, 1992, respondent judge of the RTC directed the Liquidator to pay
private respondents the total amount of their claim as preferred creditors.7
The Liquidator received the order on September 16, 1992. On September 30, 1992 he moved for
reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the court on October 2, 1992. He received the order
denying his Motion for Reconsideration on October 5, 1992. On October 14, 1992 he filed a Notice of
Appeal from the orders of September 16, 1992 and October 2, 1992. As in the case of the Union,
however, the judge ordered the Notice of Appeal stricken off the record on the ground that it had been
filed without authority of the Central Bank and beyond 15 days. In his order of October 28, 1992, the
judge directed the execution of his September 11, 1992 order granting the Stockholders/ Investors'
claim.
II.
Proceedings in the Court of Appeals
The Liquidator filed separate Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus  in the Court of Appeals
to set aside the orders of the trial court denying his appeal from the orders granting the claims of Union
and of the Stockholders/Investors. The two Divisions of the Court of Appeals, to which the cases were
separately raffled, rendered conflicting rulings.
In its decision of November 17, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27751 (now G.R. No. 09373) the Fifth
Division8 held in the case of the Union that the proceeding before the trial court was a special
proceeding and, therefore, the period for appealing from any decision or final order rendered therein is
30 days. Since the notice of appeal of the Liquidator was filed on the 30th day of his receipt of the
decision granting the Union's claims, the appeal was brought on time. The Fifth Division, therefore, set
aside the orders of the lower court and directed the latter to give due course to the appeal of the
Liquidator and set the Record on Appeal he had filed for hearing.
On the other hand, on December 16, 1993, the Fourteenth Division9 ruled in CA-G.R. SP No. 29351
(now G.R. No. 112991) in the case of the Stockholders/Investors that a liquidation proceeding is an
ordinary action. Therefore, the period for appealing from any decision or final order rendered therein is
15 days and that since the Liquidator's appeal notice was filed on the 23rd day of his receipt of the
order appealed from, deducting the period during which his motion for reconsideration was pending, the
notice of appeal was filed late. Accordingly, the Fourteenth Division dismissed the Liquidator's petition.
III.
Present Proceedings
The Union and the Liquidator then separately filed petitions before this Court.
In G.R. No. 109373 the Union contends that:
1. The Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of
the suit.
2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in taking cognizance of the petition
for certiorari filed by Nañagas who was without any legal authority to file it.
3. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the case is a special proceeding
governed by Rules 72 to 109 of the Revised Rules of Court.
4. The Court of Appeals erred seriously in concluding that the notice of appeal filed by
Nañagas was filed on time.
5. The Court of Appeals erred seriously in declaring that the second notice of appeal
filed on December 23, 1991 by the Solicitor General is a superfluity.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 112991 the Liquidator contends that:
1. The Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Pacific Banking Corporation s a
Special Proceeding case and/or one which allows multiple appeals, in which case the
period of appeal is 30 days and not 15 days from receipt of the order/judgment
appealed from.
2. Private respondents are not creditors of PaBC but are plain stockholders whose
right to receive payment as such would accrue only after all the creditors of the
insolvent bank have been paid.
3. The claim of private respondents in the amount of US$22,531,632.18 is not in the
nature of foreign investment as it is understood in law.
4. The claim of private respondents has not been clearly established and proved.
5. The issuance of a writ of execution against the assets of PaBC was made with
grave abuse of discretion.
The petitions in these cases must be dismissed.
First. As stated in the beginning, the principal question in these cases is whether a petition for
liquidation under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265 is in the nature of a special proceeding. If it is, then the period
of appeal is 30 days and the party appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial
court a record on appeal in order to perfect his appeal. Otherwise, if a liquidation proceeding is an
ordinary action, the period of appeal is 15 days from notice of the decision or final order appealed from.
BP Blg. 129 provides:
§39. Appeals. — The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted
from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment or decision appealed
from: Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases the period for appeal shall be
forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from.
No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu thereof, the entire
record shall be transmitted with all the pages prominently numbered consecutively,
together with an index of the contents thereof.
This section shall not apply in appeals in special proceedings and in other cases
wherein multiple appeals are allowed under applicable provisions of the Rules of
Court.
The Interim Rules and Guidelines to implement BP Blg. 129 provides:
19. Period of Appeals. —
(a) All appeals, except in habeas corpus  cases and in the cases
referred to in paragraph (b) hereof, must be taken within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the judgment, order, resolution or award
appealed from.
(b) In appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109
of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals are
allowed, the period of appeals shall be thirty (30) days, a record on
appeal being required.
The Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals held that the proceeding is an ordinary action similar to
an action for interpleader under Rule 63. 10 The Fourteenth Division stated:
 The petition filed is akin to an interpleader under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court where
there are conflicting claimants or several claims upon the same subject matter, a
person who claims no interest thereon may file an action for interpleader to compel
the claimants to "interplead" and litigate their several claims among themselves.
(Section I Rule 63).
An interpleader is in the category of a special civil action under Rule 62 which, like an
ordinary action, may be appealed only within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or order appealed from. Under Rule 62, the preceding rules covering
ordinary civil actions which are not inconsistent with or may serve to supplement the
provisions of the rule relating to such civil actions are applicable to special civil
actions. This embraces Rule 41 covering appeals from the regional trial court to the
Court of Appeals.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, under Section 1 Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, an action is defined as "an
ordinary suit in a court of justice by which one party prosecutes another for the
enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong." On the
other hand, Section 2 of the same Rule states that "every other remedy including one
to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact shall be by special
proceeding."
To our mind, from the aforequoted definitions of an action and a special proceeding,
the petition for assistance of the court in the liquidation of an asset of a bank is not
"one to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact." Contrary to the
submission of the petitioner, the petition is not intended to establish the fact of
insolvency of the bank. The insolvency of the bank had already been previously
determined by the Central Bank in accordance with Section 9 of the CB Act before
the petition was filed. All that needs to be done is to liquidate the assets of the bank
and thus the assistance of the respondent court is sought for that purpose.
It should be pointed out that this petition filed is not among the cases categorized as a
special proceeding under Section 1, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court, nor among the
special proceedings that may be appealed under Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules.
We disagree with the foregoing view of the Fourteenth Division. Rule 2 of the Rules of Court provide:
§1. Action defined. — Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which the
party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong.
§2. Special Proceeding Distinguished. — Every other remedy, including one to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact, shall be by special
proceeding.
Elucidating the crucial distinction between an ordinary action and a special proceeding, Chief Justice
Moran states:" 11
Action is the act by which one sues another in a court of justice for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while special proceeding
is the act by which one seeks to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular
fact. Hence, action is distinguished from special proceeding in that the former is a
formal demand of a right by one against another, while the latter is but a petition for a
declaration of a status, right or fact. Where a party litigant seeks to recover property
from another, his remedy is to file an action. Where his purpose is to seek the
appointment of a guardian for an insane, his remedy is a special proceeding to
establish the fact or status of insanity calling for an appointment of guardianship.
Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation should be classified a
special proceeding and not an ordinary action. Such petition does not seek the enforcement or
protection of a right nor the prevention or redress of a wrong against a party. It does not pray for
affirmative relief for injury arising from a party's wrongful act or omission nor state a cause of action that
can be enforced against any person.
What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of the corporation's insolvency so that its
creditors may be able to file their claims in the settlement of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put
in another way, the petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put in
another way, the petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's state of insolvency and the
concomitant right of creditors and the order of payment of their claims in the disposition of the
corporation's assets.
Contrary to the rulings of the Fourteenth Division, liquidation proceedings do not resemble petitions for
interpleader. For one, an action for interpleader involves claims on a subject matter against a person
who has no interest therein. 12 This is not the case in a liquidation proceeding where the Liquidator, as
representative of the corporation, takes charge of its assets and liabilities for the benefit of the
creditors.13 He is thus charged with insuring that the assets of the corporation are paid only to rightful
claimants and in the order of payment provided by law.
Rather, a liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding for the settlement of state of deceased
persons under Rules 73 to 91 of the Rules of Court. The two have a common purpose: the
determination of all the assets and the payment of all the debts and liabilities of the insolvent
corporation or the estate. The Liquidator and the administrator or executor are both charged with the
assets for the benefit of the claimants. In both instances, the liability of the corporation and the estate is
not disputed. The court's concern is with the declaration of creditors and their rights and the
determination of their order of payment.
Furthermore, as in the settlement of estates, multiple appeals are allowed in proceedings for liquidation
of an insolvent corporation. As the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals, quoting the Liquidator,
correctly noted:
A liquidation proceeding is a single proceeding which consists of a number of cases
properly classified as "claims." It is basically a two-phased proceeding. The first
phase is concerned with the approval and disapproval of claims. Upon the approval of
the petition seeking the assistance of the proper court in the liquidation of a close
entity, all money claims against the bank are required to be filed with the liquidation
court. This phase may end with the declaration by the liquidation court that the claim
is not proper or without basis. On the other hand, it may also end with the liquidation
court allowing the claim. In the latter case, the claim shall be classified whether it is
 ordinary or preferred, and thereafter included Liquidator. In either case, the order
allowing or disallowing a particular claim is final order, and may be appealed by the
party aggrieved thereby.
The second phase involves the approval by the Court of the distribution plan prepared
by the duly appointed liquidator. The distribution plan specifies in detail the total
amount available for distribution to creditors whose claim were earlier allowed. The
Order finally disposes of the issue of how much property is available for disposal.
Moreover, it ushers in the final phase of the liquidation proceeding — payment of all
allowed claims in accordance with the order of legal priority and the approved
distribution plan.
Verily, the import of the final character of an Order of allowance or disallowance of a
particular claim cannot be overemphasized. It is the operative fact that constitutes a
liquidation proceeding a "case where multiple appeals are allowed by law." The
issuance of an Order which, by its nature, affects only the particular claims involved,
and which may assume finality if no appeal is made therefrom, ipso factocreates a
situation where multiple appeals are allowed.
A liquidation proceeding is commenced by the filing of a single petition by the Solicitor
General with a court of competent jurisdiction entitled, "Petition for Assistance in the
Liquidation of e.g., Pacific Banking Corporation. All claims against the insolvent are
required to be filed with the liquidation court. Although the claims are litigated in the
same proceeding, the treatment is individual. Each claim is heard separately. And the
Order issued relative to a particular claim applies only to said claim, leaving the other
claims unaffected, as each claim is considered separate and distinct from the others.
Obviously, in the event that an appeal from an Order allowing or disallowing a
particular claim is made, only said claim is affected, leaving the others to proceed with
their ordinary course. In such case, the original records of the proceeding are not
elevated to the appellate court. They remain with the liquidation court. In lieu of the
original record, a record of appeal is instead required to be prepared and transmitted
to the appellate court.
Inevitably, multiple appeals are allowed in liquidation proceedings. Consequently, a
record on appeal is necessary in each and every appeal made. Hence, the period to
appeal therefrom should be thirty (30) days, a record on appeal being required.
(Record pp. 162-164).
In G.R. No. 112991 (the case of the Stockholders/Investors), the Liquidator's notice of appeal was filed
on time, having been filed on the 23rd day of receipt of the order granting the claims of the
Stockholders/Investors. However, the Liquidator did not file a record on appeal with the result that he
failed to perfect his appeal. As already stated a record on appeal is required under the Interim Rules
and Guidelines in special proceedings and for cases where multiple appeals are allowed. The reason
for this is that the several claims are actually separate ones and a decision or final order with respect to
any claim can be appealed. Necessarily the original record on appeal must remain in the trial court
where other claims may still be pending.
Because of the Liquidator's failure to perfect his appeal, the order granting the claims of the
Stockholders/Investors became final. Consequently. the Fourteenth Division's decision dismissing the
Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari,Prohibition and Mandamus must be affirmed albeit for a different
reason.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 109373 (case of the Labor Union), we find that the Fifth Division
correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari. Prohibition and Mandamus. As already noted,
the Liquidator filed a notice of appeal and a motion for extension to file a record on appeal on December
10, 1991, i.e., within 30 days of his receipt of the order granting the Union's claim. Without waiting for
the resolution of his motion for extension, he filed on December 20, 1991 within the extension sought a
record on appeal. Respondent judge thus erred in disallowing the notice on appeal and denying the
Liquidator's motion for extension to file a record on appeal.
The Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus and its decision should, therefore, be affirmed.
Second. In G.R. No. 109373, The Union claims that under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265, the court
merely assists  in adjudicating the claims of creditors, preserves  the assets of the institution,
and implements  the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board and that, therefore, as
representative of the Monetary Board, the Liquidator cannot question the order of the court or appeal
from it. It contends that since the Monetary Board had previously admitted PaBC's liability to the
laborers by in fact setting aside the amount of P112,234,292.44 for the payment of their claims, there
was nothing else for the Liquidator to do except to comply with the order of the court.
The Union's contention is untenable. In liquidation proceedings, the function of the trial court is not
limited to assisting in the implementation of the orders of the Monetary Board. Under the same section
(§29) of the law invoked by the Union, the court has authority to set aside the decision of the Monetary
Board "if there is a convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith." 14 As this
Court held in Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc.  v. Court of Appeals: 15
There is no question, that the action of the monetary Board in this regard may be
subject to judicial review. Thus, it has been held that the Court's may interfere with
the Central Bank's exercise of discretion in determining whether or not a distressed
bank shall be supported or liquidated. Discretion has its limits and has never been
held to include arbitrariness, discrimination or bad faith (Ramos v. Central Bank of the
Philippines, 41 SCRA 567 [1971]).
In truth, the Liquidator is the representative not only of the Central Bank but also of the insolvent bank.
Under §§28A-29 of Rep. Act No. 265 he acts in behalf of the bank "personally or through counsel as he
may retain, in all actions or proceedings or against the corporation" and he has authority "to do
whatever may be necessary for these purposes." This authority includes the power to appeal from the
decisions or final orders of the court which he believes to be contrary to the interest of the bank.
Finally the Union contends that the notice of appeal and motion for extension of time to file the record
on appeal filed in behalf of the Central Bank was not filed by the office of the Solicitor General as
counsel for the Central Bank. This contention has no merit. On October 22, 1992, as Assistant Solicitor
General Cecilio O. Estoesta informed the trial court in March 27, 1992, the OSG had previously
authorized lawyers of the PDIC to prepare and sign pleadings in the case. 16 Conformably thereto the
Notice of Appeal and the Motion for Additional Time to submit Record on Appeal filed were jointly
signed by Solicitor Reynaldo I. Saludares in behalf of the OSG and by lawyers of the PDIC. 17
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 109373 and G.R. No 112991, the decisions appealed from are
AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 192828               November 28, 2011
RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC., Petitioners,  Ramon as the prime suspect and he now stands as the lone accused in a criminal case for
vs.
HON. JANSEN R. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 6, JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME CHENG, MERCEDES IGNE AND LUCINA SANTOS,
substituted by her son, EDUARDO S. BALAJADIA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
December 14, 2009 Decision2 and July 8, 2010 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 99856. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the
petition filed in this case and AFFIRMING the assailed Orders dated March 15, 2007 and May 16, 2007
issued by the respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, in Manila in Civil Case No.
02-105251.4
The assailed Resolution denied the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
The Factual Antecedents
Sometime between November 25, 2002 and December 3, 2002,5 the respondents filed a
Complaint6 against the petitioners and Stronghold Insurance Company, Global Business Bank, Inc.
(formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu Del Pilar, Asia Atlantic Resources Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds of
Manila and Malabon, and all persons claiming rights or titles from Ramon Ching (Ramon) and his
successors-in-interest.
The Complaint, captioned as one for "Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver,
Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer
for [the] Issuance of [a] Temporary Restraining Order and [a] Writ of Preliminary Injunction," was
docketed as Civil Case No. 02-105251 and raffled to Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(RTC).
In the Complaint, the respondents alleged the following as causes of action:
First Cause of Action. They are the heirs of Lim San, also known as Antonio Ching / Tiong
Cheng / Ching Cheng Suy (Antonio). Respondents Joseph Cheng (Joseph) and Jaime Cheng
(Jaime) are allegedly the children of Antonio with his common-law wife, respondent Mercedes
Igne (Mercedes). Respondent Lucina Santos (Lucina) claimed that she was also a common-
law wife of Antonio. The respondents averred that Ramon misrepresented himself as Antonio's
and Lucina's son when in truth and in fact, he was adopted and his birth certificate was merely
simulated. On July 18, 1996, Antonio died of a stab wound. Police investigators identified
murder filed against him. Warrants of arrest issued against him have remained unserved as he
is at large. From the foregoing circumstances and upon the authority of Article 9197 of the New
Civil Code (NCC), the respondents concluded that Ramon can be legally disinherited, hence,
prohibited from receiving any share from the estate of Antonio.
Second Cause of Action. On August 26, 1996, prior to the conclusion of the police
investigations tagging Ramon as the prime suspect in the murder of Antonio, the former made
an inventory of the latter's estate. Ramon misrepresented that there were only six real estate
properties left by Antonio. The respondents alleged that Ramon had illegally transferred to his
name the titles to the said properties. Further, there are two other parcels of land, cash and
jewelries, plus properties in Hongkong, which were in Ramon's possession.
Third Cause of Action. Mercedes, being of low educational attainment, was sweet-talked by
Ramon into surrendering to him a Global Business Bank, Inc. (Global Bank) Certificate of Time
Deposit of ₱4,000,000.00 in the name of Antonio, and the certificates of title covering two
condominium units in Binondo which were purchased by Antonio using his own money but
which were registered in Ramon's name. Ramon also fraudulently misrepresented to Joseph,
Jaime and Mercedes that they will promptly receive their complete shares, exclusive of the
stocks in Po Wing Properties, Inc. (Po Wing), from the estate of Antonio. Exerting undue
influence, Ramon had convinced them to execute an Agreement8 and a Waiver9 on August 20,
1996. The terms and conditions stipulated in the Agreement and Waiver, specifically, on the
payment by Ramon to Joseph, Jaime and Mercedes of the amount of ₱22,000,000.00, were
not complied with. Further, Lucina was not informed of the execution of the said instruments
and had not received any amount from Ramon. Hence, the instruments are null and void.
Fourth Cause of Action. Antonio's 40,000 shares in Po Wing, which constitute 60% of the
latter's total capital stock, were illegally transferred by Ramon to his own name through a
forged document of sale executed after Antonio died. Po Wing owns a ten-storey building in
Binondo. Ramon's claim that he bought the stocks from Antonio before the latter died is
baseless. Further, Lucina's shares in Po Wing had also banished into thin air through Ramon's
machinations.
Fifth Cause of Action. On October 29, 1996, Ramon executed an Affidavit of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Estate10 adjudicating solely to himself Antonio's entire estate to the prejudice of
the respondents. By virtue of the said instrument, new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs)
covering eight real properties owned by Antonio were issued in Ramon's name. Relative to the
Po Wing shares, the Register of Deeds of Manila had required Ramon to post a Surety Bond
conditioned to answer for whatever claims which may eventually surface in connection with the
said stocks. Co-defendant Stronghold Insurance Company issued the bond in Ramon's behalf.
Sixth Cause of Action. Ramon sold Antonio's two parcels of land in Navotas to co-defendant
Asia Atlantic Business Ventures, Inc. Another parcel of land, which was part of Antonio's
 estate, was sold by Ramon to co-defendant Elena Tiu Del Pilar at an unreasonably low price.
By reason of Ramon's lack of authority to dispose of any part of Antonio's estate, the
conveyances are null and void ab initio.
Since Ramon is at large, his wife, Belen Dy Tan Ching, now manages Antonio's estate. She has no
intent to convey to the respondents their shares in the estate of Antonio.
The respondents thus prayed for the following in their Complaint:
1. x x x a temporary restraining order be issued restraining the defendant RAMON CHING and/or his
attorney-in-fact Belen Dy Tan Ching from disposing, selling or alienating any property that belongs to
the estate of the deceased ANTONIO CHING;
xxx
4. x x x
a.) Declaring that the defendant RAMON CHING who murdered his father ANTONIO CHING
disqualified as heir and from inheriting to (sic) the estate of his father;
b.) Declaring the nullity of the defendant RAMON CHING transfer (sic) of the six [6] parcels of
land from the name of his father ANTONIO CHING to his name covered by TCT No. x x x;
c.) Declaring the nullity of the AGREEMENT and WAIVER executed by plaintiffs x x x in favor
of x x x RAMON CHING for being patently immoral, invalid, illegal, simulated and (sic) sham;
d.) Declaring the nullity of the transfer of the shares of stocks at (sic) PO WING from the
names of ANTONIO CHING and LUCINA SANTOS to the defendant ANTONIO CHING's
name for having been illegally procured through the falsification of their signatures in the
document purporting the transfer thereof;
e.) Declaring the nullity and to have no force and effect the AFFIDAVIT OF SETTLEMENT OF
ESTATE executed by x x x RAMON CHING for being contrary to law and existing
jurisprudence;
f.) Declaring the nullity of the DEED OF SALES (sic) executed by x x x RAMON CHING (i) over
two (2) parcels of land x x x to defendant ASIA ATLANTIC BUSINESS VENTURES, Inc.; and
(ii) one (1) parcel of land x x x sold to x x x ELENA TIU DEL PILAR for having illegally
procured the ownership and titles of the above properties;
x x x.11
The petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss12 alleging forum shopping, litis pendentia, res
judicata and the respondents as not being the real parties in interest.
On July 30, 2004, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order13 denying the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss.
The respondents filed an Amended Complaint14 dated April 7, 2005 impleading Metrobank as the
successor-in-interest of co-defendant Global Bank. The Amended Complaint also added a seventh
cause of action relative to the existence of a Certificate of Premium Plus Acquisition (CPPA) in the
amount of ₱4,000,000.00 originally issued by PhilBank to Antonio. The respondents prayed that they be
declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA and that it be immediately released to them. Alternatively,
the respondents prayed for the issuance of a hold order relative to the CPPA to preserve it during the
pendency of the case.
On April 22, 2005, the petitioners filed their Consolidated Answer with Counterclaim.15
On October 28, 2005, the RTC issued an Order16 admitting the respondents' Amended Complaint. The
RTC stressed that Metrobank had already filed Manifestations admitting that as successor-in-interest of
Global Bank, it now possesses custody of Antonio's deposits. Metrobank expressed willingness to abide
by any court order as regards the disposition of Antonio's deposits. The petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration filed to assail the aforecited Order was denied by the RTC on May 3, 2006.
On May 29, 2006, the petitioners filed their Consolidated Answer with Counterclaim to the respondents'
Amended Complaint.
On August 11, 2006, the RTC issued a pre-trial order.17
On January 18, 2007, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss 18 the respondents' Amended Complaint
on the alleged ground of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Complaint. The
petitioners argued that since the Amended  Complaint sought the release of the CPPA to the
respondents, the latter's declaration as heirs of Antonio, and the propriety of Ramon's disinheritance,
the suit partakes of the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action for declaration of
nullity. Hence, jurisdiction pertains to a probate or intestate court and not to the RTC acting as an
ordinary court.
On March 15, 2007, the RTC issued an Order19 denying the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss on grounds:
In the case at bar, an examination of the Complaint would disclose that the action delves mainly on the
question of ownership of the properties described in the Complaint which can be properly settled in an
ordinary civil action. And as pointed out by the defendants, the action seeks to declare the nullity of the
Agreement, Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates
of Title, which were all allegedly executed by defendant Ramon Ching to defraud the plaintiffs. The
relief of establishing the status of the plaintiffs which could have translated this action into a
special proceeding was nowhere stated in the Amended Complaint. With regard [to] the prayer
to declare the plaintiffs as the rightful owner[s] of the CPPA and that the same be immediately
released to them, in itself poses an issue of ownership which must be proved by plaintiffs by
substantial evidence. And as emphasized by the plaintiffs, the Amended Complaint was intended to
implead Metrobank as a co-defendant.
As regards the issue of disinheritance, the court notes that during the Pre-trial of this case, one of the
issues raised by the defendants Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties is: Whether or not there can be
disinheritance in intestate succession? Whether or not defendant Ramon Ching can be legally
disinherited from the estate of his father? To the mind of the Court, the issue of disinheritance, which is
one of the causes of action in the Complaint, can be fully settled after a trial on the merits. And at this
stage, it has not been sufficiently established whether or not there is a will.20 (Emphasis supplied.)
The above Order, and a subsequent Order dated May 16, 2007 denying the petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration, became the subjects of a petition for certiorari filed with the CA. The petition, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 99856, raised the issue of whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion
when it denied the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss despite the fact that the Amended Complaint sought to
establish the status or rights of the respondents which subjects are within the ambit of a special
proceeding.
On December 14, 2009, the CA rendered the now assailed Decision21 denying the petition
for certiorari on grounds:
Our in-depth assessment of the condensed allegations supporting the causes of action of the amended
complaint induced us to infer that nothing in the said complaint shows that the action of the private
respondents should be threshed out in a special proceeding, it appearing that their allegations
were substantially for the enforcement of their rights against the alleged fraudulent acts
committed by the petitioner Ramon Ching. The private respondents also instituted the said
amended complaint in order to protect them from the consequence of the fraudulent acts of
Ramon Ching by seeking to disqualify Ramon Ching from inheriting from Antonio Ching as well
as to enjoin him from disposing or alienating the subject properties, including the ₱4 Million
deposit with Metrobank. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such issues,
which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court.
Furthermore, we agree with the trial court that the probate court could not take cognizance of the prayer
to disinherit Ramon Ching, given the undisputed fact that there was no will to be contested in a probate
court.
The petition at bench apparently cavils the subject amended complaint and complicates the issue of
jurisdiction by reiterating the grounds or defenses set up in the petitioners' earlier pleadings.
Notwithstanding, the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of
the complaint without regard to whether or not the private respondents (plaintiffs) are entitled to recover
upon all or some of the causes of action asserted therein. In this regard, the jurisdiction of the court
does not depend upon the defenses pleaded in the answer or in the motion to dismiss, lest the question
of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the petitioners (defendants). 22 Hence, we focus our
resolution on the issue of jurisdiction on the allegations in the amended complaint and not on the
defenses pleaded in the motion to dismiss or in the subsequent pleadings of the petitioners.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still
subject the action of the petitioners in a special proceeding since the nullification of the subject
documents could be achieved in the civil case, the lower court should proceed to evaluate the
evidence of the parties and render a decision thereon upon the issues that it defined during the pre-trial
in Civil Case No. 02-105251.23 (emphasis supplied)
The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA through a Resolution 24 issued on July
8, 2010.
The Issue
The instant Petition for Review on Certiorari25 is anchored on the issue of:
Whether or not the RTC should have granted the Motion to Dismiss filed by the PETITIONERS on the
alleged ground of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Amended Complaint, to
wit, (a) filiations with Antonio of Ramon, Jaime and Joseph; (b) rights of common-law wives, Lucina and
Mercedes, to be considered as heirs of Antonio; (c) determination of the extent of Antonio's estate; and
(d) other matters which can only be resolved in a special proceeding and not in an ordinary civil action.
The petitioners argue that only a probate court has the authority to determine (a) who are the heirs of a
decedent; (b) the validity of a waiver of hereditary rights; (c) the status of each heir; and (d) whether the
property in the inventory is conjugal or the exclusive property of the deceased spouse.26 Further, the
extent of Antonio's estate, the status of the contending parties and the respondents' alleged entitlement
as heirs to receive the proceeds of Antonio's CPPA now in Metrobank's custody are matters which are
more appropriately the subjects of a special proceeding and not of an ordinary civil action.
The respondents opposed27 the instant petition claiming that the petitioners are engaged in forum
shopping. Specifically, G.R. Nos. 17550728 and 183840,29 both involving the contending parties in the
instant petition were filed by the petitioners and are currently pending before this Court. Further,
in Mendoza v. Hon. Teh,30 the SC declared that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the
RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction, is not a jurisdictional
issue but a mere question of procedure. Besides, the petitioners, having validly submitted themselves to
the jurisdiction of the RTC and having actively participated in the trial of the case, are already estopped
from challenging the RTC's jurisdiction over the respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint.31
The Court's Ruling
We resolve to deny the instant petition.
The petitioners failed to comply with a lawful order of this Court directing them to file their reply to the
respondents' Comment/Opposition to the instant Petition. While the prescribed period to comply expired
on March 15, 2011, the petitioners filed their Manifestation that they will no longer file a reply only on
October 10, 2011 or after the lapse of almost seven months.
Further, no reversible errors were committed by the RTC and the CA when they both ruled that the
denial of the petitioners' second motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 02-105251 was proper.
Even without delving into the procedural allegations of the respondents that the petitioners engaged in
forum shopping and are already estopped from questioning the RTC's jurisdiction after having validly
submitted to it when the latter participated in the proceedings, the denial of the instant Petition is still in
order. Although the respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint sought, among others, the
disinheritance of Ramon and the release in favor of the respondents of the CPPA now under
Metrobank's custody, Civil Case No. 02-105251 remains to be an ordinary civil action, and not a special
proceeding pertaining to a settlement court.
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters
relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the
decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of
specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. 32 A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party
seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.33 It is distinguished from an ordinary civil action
where a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.34 To initiate a special proceeding, a petition and not a complaint should be filed.
Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected only through a will wherein the legal cause
therefor shall be specified. This Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that while the respondents in
their Complaint and Amended Complaint sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument
supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever mentioned.  Hence, despite the prayer
for Ramon's disinheritance, Civil Case No. 02-105251 does not partake of the nature of a special
proceeding and does not call for the probate court's exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
The petitioners also argue that the prayers in the Amended Complaint, seeking the release in favor of
the respondents of the CPPA under Metrobank's custody and the nullification of the instruments subject
of the complaint, necessarily require the determination of the respondents' status as Antonio's heirs.
the properties alleged to have been illegally transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the RTC, in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot be restrained from taking cognizance of respondents'
Complaint and Amended Complaint as the issues raised and the prayers indicated therein are matters
which need not be threshed out in a special proceeding.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The petitioners' (a) Opposition to the respondents'
Motion to Admit Substitution of Party;38 and (b) Manifestation39 through counsel that they will no longer
file a reply to the respondents' Comment/Opposition to the instant petition are NOTED.

It bears stressing that what the respondents prayed for was that they be declared as the rightful owners SO ORDERED.
of the CPPA which was in Mercedes' possession prior to the execution of the Agreement and Waiver.
The respondents also prayed for the alternative relief of securing the issuance by the RTC of a hold
order relative to the CPPA to preserve Antonio's deposits with Metrobank during the pendency of the
case. It can thus be said that the respondents' prayer relative to the CPPA was premised on Mercedes'
prior possession of and their alleged collective ownership of the same, and not on the declaration of
their status as Antonio's heirs. Further, it also has to be emphasized that the respondents were parties
to the execution of the Agreement35 and Waiver36 prayed to be nullified. Hence, even without the
necessity of being declared as heirs of Antonio, the respondents have the standing to seek for the
nullification of the instruments in the light of their claims that there was no consideration for their
execution, and that Ramon exercised undue influence and committed fraud against them.
Consequently, the respondents then claimed that the Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Antonio’s
estate executed by Ramon, and the TCTs issued upon the authority of the said affidavit, are null and
void as well. Ramon's averment that a resolution of the issues raised shall first require a declaration of
the respondents' status as heirs is a mere defense which is not determinative of which court shall
properly exercise jurisdiction.

In Marjorie Cadimas v. Marites Carrion and Gemma Hugo,37 the Court declared:

It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction
of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to
dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant.
What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the
allegations in the complaint. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are
the matters to be consulted.1âwphi1

In sum, this Court agrees with the CA that the nullification of the documents subject of Civil Case No.
02-105251 could be achieved in an ordinary civil action, which in this specific case was instituted to
protect the respondents from the supposedly fraudulent acts of Ramon. In the event that the RTC will
find grounds to grant the reliefs prayed for by the respondents, the only consequence will be the
reversion of the properties subject of the dispute to the estate of Antonio. Civil Case No. 02-105251
was not instituted to conclusively resolve the issues relating to the administration, liquidation and
distribution of Antonio's estate, hence, not the proper subject of a special proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of a deceased person under Rules 73-91 of the Rules of Court.

The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the RTC may not be strategically sound,
because a settlement proceeding should thereafter still follow, if their intent is to recover from Ramon

G.R. No. 168913             March 14, 2007
ROLANDO TING, Petitioner, 
vs.
HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO, namely: FLORA A. LIRIO, AMELIA L. ROSKA,
AURORA L. ABEJO, ALICIA L. DUNQUE, ADELAIDA L. DAVID, EFREN A. LIRIO
and JOCELYN ANABELLE L. ALCOVER, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In a Decision of December 10, 1976 in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-983,
then Judge Alfredo Marigomen of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 7,
granted the application filed by the Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza for
registration of title to Lot No. 18281 (the lot) of the Cebu Cadastral 12 Extension,
Plan Rs-07-000787.
The decision in LRC No. N-983 became final and executory on January 29, 1977.
Judge Marigomen thereafter issued an order of November 10, 1982 directing the
Land Registration Commission to issue the corresponding decree of registration and
the certificate of title in favor of the spouses Lirio.
On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu an application for registration of title to the same lot. The application
was docketed as LRC No. 1437-N.1
The herein respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, namely: Flora A. Lirio, Amelia L. Roska,
Aurora L. Abejo, Alicia L. Dunque, Adelaida L. David, Efren A. Lirio and Jocelyn
Anabelle L. Alcover, who were afforded the opportunity to file an opposition to
petitioner’s application by Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, filed their Answer 2 calling
attention to the December 10, 1976 decision in LRC No. N-983 which had become
final and executory on January 29, 1977 and which, they argued, barred the filing of
petitioner’s application on the ground of res judicata.
After hearing the respective sides of the parties, Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, on
motion of respondents, dismissed petitioner’s application on the ground of res
judicata. 31ªvvphi1.nét
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari which raises the sole issue of
whether the decision in LRC No. N-983 constitutes res judicata in LRC No. 1437-N.
Petitioner argues that although the decision in LRC No. N-983 had become final and
executory on January 29, 1977, no decree of registration has been issued by the
Land Registration Authority (LRA);4 it was only on July 26, 2003 that the "extinct"
decision belatedly surfaced as basis of respondents’ motion to dismiss LRC No.
1437-N;5and as no action for revival of the said decision was filed by respondents
after the lapse of the ten-year prescriptive period, "the cause of action in the dormant
judgment passé[d] into extinction."6
Petitioner thus concludes that an "extinct" judgment cannot be the basis of res
judicata.7
The petition fails.
Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree
provides:
SEC. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of decree. – The
judgment rendered in a land registration proceeding becomes final upon the
expiration of thirty days8 to be counted from the date of receipt of notice of the
judgment. An appeal may be taken from the judgment of the court as in ordinary civil
cases.
After judgment has become final and executory, it shall devolve upon the court to
forthwith issue an order in accordance with Section 39 of this Decree to the
Commissioner for the issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding
certificate of title in favor of the person adjudged entitled to registration. (Emphasis
supplied)
In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land, with or
without opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the title of the applicant or
oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its registration in his name constitutes,
when final, res judicata against the whole world.9 It becomes final when no appeal
within the reglementary period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and
registration.10
The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration court’s approval
in LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza’s application for
registration of the lot settled its ownership, and is binding on the whole world
including petitioner.
Explaining his position that the December 10, 1976 Decision in LRC No. N-983 had
become "extinct," petitioner advances that the LRA has not issued the decree of
registration, a certain Engr. Rafaela Belleza, Chief of the Survey Assistance Section,
Land Management Services, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), Region 7, Cebu City having claimed that the survey of the Cebu Cadastral
Extension is erroneous and all resurvey within the Cebu Cadastral extension must
first be approved by the Land Management Services of
the DENR, Region 7, Cebu City before said resurvey may be used in court; and that
the spouses Lirio did not comply with the said requirement for they instead submitted
to the court a mere special work order.11
There is, however, no showing that the LRA credited the alleged claim of Engineer
Belleza and that it reported such claim to the land registration court for appropriate
action or reconsideration of the decision which was its duty.
Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the
decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the
orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the
court and with the data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the
matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the
preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the
court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and not as
administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are
specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and
cadastral land registration proceedings."12 (Emphasis supplied)
As for petitioner’s claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reading:
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory
judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of
its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also
be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter
by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations[,]
the December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of the failure of
respondents and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to execute the same within the
prescriptive period, the same does not lie.
Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al. 13 enunciates the raison d’etre why Section 6, Rule 39 does
not apply in land registration proceedings, viz:
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE DECISION
RENDERED IN THIS LAND REGISTRATION CASE ON NOVEMBER 28, 1931 OR
TWENTY SIX YEARS AGO, HAS NOT YET BECOME FINAL AND
UNENFORCEABLE.
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the above
assignment, except in so far as it supports his theory that after a decision in a land
registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period
of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision.
Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that
judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within
10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules refers to civil
actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land
registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately
enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure
to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules
makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special
proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land
registration proceedings, the
ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the
ownership has been proved and confirmed
by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is
necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of
the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule
39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to
place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a
land registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes
final without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an
appeal.WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, DENIED.
Costs against petitioner, Rolando Ting.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. NO. 129242       January 16, 2001
PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, and
ISABELITA MANALO ,petitioners,  in the filling of an Omnibus Motion 8 on July 23, 1993 seeking; (1) to seat aside and reconsider
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA (BRANCH
35), PURITA S. JAYME, MILAGROS M. TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO, ROSALINA M.
ACUIN, ROMEO S. MANALO, ROBERTO S. MANALO, AMALIA MANALO and IMELDA
MANALO, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar S. Vda De Manalo, et. Al.,
seeking to annul the Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 affirming the Orders 3 of the
Regional Trial Court and the Resolution 4 which denied petitioner' motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts 5 are as follows:
Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on
February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11)
children, namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano,
Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo,
Orlando Manalo and Imelda Manalo, who are all of legal age.1âwphi1.nêt
At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties
located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style
Manalo's Machine Shop with offices at No. 19 Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon City and at
NO. 45 General Tinio Street, Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the
late Troadio Manalo, namely; Purita, Milagros, Belen Rocalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and
Imelda filed a petition 6 with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila 7 of the judicial
settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their
brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.
On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing on
February 11, 1993 and directing the publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, and further directing service by
registered mail of the said order upon the heirs named in the petition at their respective
addresses mentioned therein.
On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an order
'declaring the whole world in default, except the government," and set the reception of
evidence of the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993. However, the trial court upon motion of
set this order of general default aside herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S.
Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted then (10) days within
which to file their opposition to the petition.
Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating
the Order of the trial court dated July 9, 1993 which denied the motion for additional
extension of time file opposition; (2) to set for preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses
as grounds for dismissal of the case; (3) to declare that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors; and (4) for the immediate inhibition of the
presiding judge.
On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order9 which resolved, thus:
A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the oppositors on July 20,
1993, only for the purpose of considering the merits thereof;
B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of their affirmative
defenses as ground for the dismissal of this proceeding, said affirmative defenses
being irrelevant and immaterial to the purpose and issue of the present proceeding;
C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the
oppositors;
D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this Presiding Judge;
E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular administrator
in the intestate estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo for hearing on September 9,
1993 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 39851, after the trial court in its
Order 10 dated September 15, 1993. In their petition for improperly laid in SP. PROC. No. 92-
63626; (2) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the
surviving spouse was included in the intestate proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest
efforts toward compromise among members of the same family; and (5) no certification of
non-forum shopping was attached to the petition.
Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari in
its Resolution11promulgated on September 30, 1996. On May 6, 1997 the motion for
reconsideration of the said resolution was likewise dismissed.12
The only issue raised by herein petitioners in the instant petition for review is whether or not
the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the respondent
trial court which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial
settlement of estate despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts
toward a compromise involving members of the same family have been made prior to the
filling of the petition but that the same have failed.
Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary
civil action involving members of the same family. They point out that it contains certain
averments, which, according to them, are indicative of its adversarial nature, to wit:
X      X      X
Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO MANALO, since the death of his father,
TROADIO MANALO, had not made any settlement, judicial or extra-judicial of the
properties of the deceased father TROADIO MANALO.
Par. 8. xxx the said surviving son continued to manage and control the properties
aforementioned, without proper accounting, to his own benefit and advantage xxx.
X      X      X
Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is managing and controlling the estate of the
deceased TROADIO MANALO to his own advantage and to the damage and
prejudice of the herein petitioners and their co-heirs xxx.
X      X      X
Par. 14. For the protection of their rights and interests, petitioners were compelled to
bring this suit and were forced to litigate and incur expenses and will continue to incur
expenses of not less than, P250,000.00 and engaged the services of herein counsel
committing to pay P200,000.00 as and attorney's fees plus honorarium of P2,500.00
per appearance in court xxx.13
Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the same should be dismissed under Rule 16,
Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a
complaint may be filed on the ground that a condition precedent for filling the claim has not
been complied with, that is, that the petitioners therein failed to aver in the petition in SP.
PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made involving
members of the same family prior to the filling of the petition pursuant to Article 222  14 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
The instant petition is not impressed with merit.
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the
averments15 and the character of the relief sought 16 in the complaint, or petition, as in the
case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful srutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of
Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estatein SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies
herein petitioners' claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said
petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate
of a deceased person such as the fat of death of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14,
1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of
death of the decedent and of his residence within he country are foundation facts upon which
all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest.17 The petition is
SP.PROC No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs
including a tentative list of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled
in the probate proceedings. In addition, the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no
room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein)
to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo, to wit;
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed for of this Honorable Court:
a. That after due hearing, letters of administration be issued to petitioner ROMEO
MANALO for the administration of the estate of the deceased TROADIO MANALO
upon the giving of a bond in such reasonable sum that this Honorable Court may fix.
b. That after all the properties of the deceased TROADIO MANALO have been
inventoried and expenses and just debts, if any, have been paid and the legal heirs of
the deceased fully determined, that the said estate of TROADIO MANALO be settled
and distributed among the legal heirs all in accordance with law.
c. That the litigation expenses of these proceedings in the amount of P250,000.00
and attorney's fees in the amount of P300,000.00 plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per
appearance in court in the hearing and trial of this case and costs of suit be taxed
solely against ANTONIO MANALO.18
Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certain averments which may
be typical of an ordinary civil action. Herein petitioners, as oppositors therein, took advantage
of the said defect in the petition and filed their so-called Opposition thereto which, as
observed by the trial court, is actually an Answer containing admissions and denials, special
and affirmative defenses and compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral and exemplary
damages, plus attorney's fees and costs 19 in an apparent effort to make out a case of an
ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules
of Court vis-à-vis,  Article 222 of civil of the Civil Code.
It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the
essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising
matters that as irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the
trial court, siting as a probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction 20and cannot hear and
dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an
ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a
court, as well as the concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the averments in the
complaint and not by the defenses contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not
be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by
simple strategem.21 So it should be in the instant petition for settlement of estate.
The Petition for issuance of letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in
SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the
petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. 26 the petitioners
therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to establish the fat of death of their father
and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they
can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of
the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the probate
court.1âwphi1.nêt

Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to be WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED for lack of merit, Costs
considered as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person, Rule against petitioners.
16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à-visArticle 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
would nevertheless apply as a ground for the dismissal of the same by virtue of ule 1, Section SO ORDERED.
2 of the Rules of Court which provides that the 'rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceedings.' Petitioners contend that the term
"proceeding" is so broad that it must necessarily include special proceedings.

The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the
provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of
the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough. To wit:

Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it
should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same
have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035(underscoring supplied).22

The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear
from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or
other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him
for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. 23 A civil
action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the
enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.24 Besides, an excerpt form
the Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code
Commission to make that legal provision applicable only to civil actions which are essentially
adversarial and involve members of the same family, thus:

It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between
members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward
a compromise before litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is
know that lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than
stranger.25

It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP.
PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was imploded therein.

G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973
ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners,  It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO,
LOURDES CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO,
CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA CUENCO GONZALEZ, respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla Law Office for petitioner.
Jalandoni and Jamir for respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
34104-R, promulgated 21 November 1964, and its subsequent Resolution promulgated 8 July
1964 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The pertinent facts which gave rise to the herein petition follow:
On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors' Hospital,
Manila. He was survived by his widow, the herein petitioner, and their two (2) minor sons,
Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus Salvador, both surnamed Cuenco, all residing at 69 Pi y Margal
St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by his children of the first marriage, respondents
herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen
Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and
residing in Cebu.
On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late Senator) 1 respondent Lourdes
Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the court of first instance of Cebu
(Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R), alleging among other things, that the late senator died intestate in
Manila on 25 February 1964; that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and that
he left real and personal properties in Cebu and Quezon City. On the same date, the Cebu
court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on 10 April 1964, directing that due
notice be given to all the heirs and interested persons, and ordering the requisite publication
thereof at LA PRENSA, a newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of Cebu.
The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a new and modified
one released on 13 March 1964, in view of the fact that the petition was to be heard at
Branch II instead of Branch I of the said Cebu court. On the same date, a third order was
further issued stating that respondent Lourdes Cuenco's petition for the appointment of a
special administrator dated 4 March 1964 was not yet ready for the consideration of the said
court, giving as reasons the following:
acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding, the requisite publication of the
notice of hearing not yet having been complied with. Moreover, copies of the
petition have not been served on all of the heirs specified in the basic petition
for the issuance of letters of administration.2
In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing of the Cebu
petition) herein petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition with the court of first
instance of Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the deceased's last will and testament and
for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in
the said last will and testament. The said proceeding was docketed as Special Proceeding
No. Q-7898.
Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa Cayetano
Cuenco filed in said Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 30 March 1964,
as well as an Opposition to Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator, dated 8 April
1964. On 10 April 1964, the Cebu court issued an order holding in abeyance its resolution on
petitioner's motion to dismiss "until after the Court of First Instance of Quezon City shall have
acted on the petition for  probate of that document purporting to be the last will and testament
of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco." 3 Such order of the Cebu court deferring to
the  probate proceedings in the Quezon City court was neither excepted to nor sought by
respondents to be reconsidered or set aside by the Cebu court nor did they challenge the
same by certiorari or prohibition proceedings in the appellate courts.
Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss,
dated 10 April 1964, opposing probate of the will and assailing the jurisdiction of the said
Quezon City court to entertain petitioner's petition for probate and for appointment as
executrix in Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 in view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her
petition in the Cebu court in Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R. Said respondent prayed that Sp. Proc. No.
Q-7898 be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue.
In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a
principal reason the "precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding."4 The
said court further found in said order that the residence of the late senator at the time of his
death was at No. 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City. The pertinent portion of
said order follows:
On the question of residence of the decedent, paragraph 5 of the opposition
and motion to dismiss reads as follows: "that since the decedent Don
Mariano Jesus Cuenco was a resident of the City of Cebu at the time of his
death, the aforesaid petition filed by Rosa Cayetano Cuenco on 12 March
 1964 was not filed with the proper Court (wrong venue) in view of the
provisions of Section 1 of Rule 73 of the New Rules of Court ...". From the
aforequoted allegation, the Court is made to understand that the oppositors
do not mean to say that the decedent being a resident of Cebu City when he
died, the intestate proceedings in Cebu City should prevail over the probate
proceedings in Quezon City, because as stated above the probate of the will
should take precedence, but that the probate proceedings should be filed in
the Cebu City Court of First Instance. If the last proposition is the desire of
the oppositors as understood by this Court, that could not also be entertained
as proper because paragraph 1 of the petition for the probate of the will
indicates that Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco at the time of his death was a
resident of Quezon City at 69 Pi y Margal. Annex A (Last Will and Testament
of Mariano Jesus Cuenco) of the petition for probate of the will shows that
the decedent at the time when he executed his Last Will clearly stated that
he is a resident of 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and also
of the City of Cebu. He made the former as his first choice and the latter as
his second choice of residence." If a party has two residences, the one will
be deemed or presumed to his domicile which he himself selects or
considers to be his home or which appears to be the center of his affairs. The
petitioner, in thus filing the instant petition before this Court, follows the first
choice of residence of the decedent and once this court acquires jurisdiction
of the probate proceeding it is to the exclusion of all others.5
Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration of the Quezon City court's said
order of 11 April 1964 asserting its exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceeding as
deferred to by the Cebu court was denied on 27 April 1964 and a second motion for
reconsideration dated 20 May 1964 was likewise denied.
On 11 May 1964, pursuant to its earlier order of 11 April 1964, the hearing for probate of the
last will of the decedent was called three times at half-hour intervals, but notwithstanding due
notification none of the oppositors appeared and the Quezon City court proceeded at 9:00
a.m. with the hearing in their absence.
As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May 1964, the Quezon City court noted that
respondents-oppositors had opposed probate under their opposition and motion to dismiss on
the following grounds:
(a) That the will was not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence
on the part of the beneficiary or some other persons for his benefit;
(c) That the testator's signature was procured by fraud and/or that the
testator acted by mistake and did not intend that the instrument he signed
should be his will at the time he affixed his signature thereto.6
The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the notice of the hearing
had been duly complied with and that all the heirs had been duly notified of the hearing, and
after receiving the testimony of the three instrumental witnesses to the decedent's last will,
namely Atty. Florencio Albino, Dr. Guillermo A. Picache and Dr. Jose P. Ojeda, and of the
notary public, Atty. Braulio A. Arriola, Jr., who ratified the said last will, and the documentary
evidence (such as the decedent's residence certificates, income tax return, diplomatic
passport, deed of donation) all indicating that the decedent was a resident of 69 Pi y Margal
St., Quezon City, as also affirmed by him in his last will, the Quezon City court in its
said order of 15 May 1964 admitted to probate the late senator's last will and testament as
having been "freely and voluntarily executed by the testator" and "with all formalities of the
law" and appointed petitioner-widow as executrix of his estate without bond "following the
desire of the testator" in his will as probated.
Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the will to probate and
naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof, respondents filed a special civil action
of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with respondent Court of Appeals
(docketed as case CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) to bar the Rizal court from proceeding with case
No. Q-7898.
On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of respondents
(petitioners therein) and against the herein petitioner, holding that:
Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of a deceased person, covers both testate and intestate
proceedings. Sp. Proc. 2433-R of the Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it is
that court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and which first attached. It is
that court which can properly and exclusively pass upon the factual issues of
(1) whether the decedent left or did not leave a valid will, and (2) whether or
not the decedent was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death.
Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the Cebu CFI
(Special Proceeding 2433-R), it follows that the said court must exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the petition for probate
was filed by the respondent Rosa Cayetano Cuenco (Special Proceeding Q-
7898). The said respondent should assert her rights within the framework of
the proceeding in the Cebu CFI, instead of invoking the jurisdiction of another
court.
The respondents try to make capital of the fact that on March 13, 1964,
Judge Amador Gomez of the Cebu CFI, acting in Sp. Proc. 2433-R, stated
that the petition for appointment of special administrator was "not yet ready
for the consideration of the Court today. It would be premature for this Court
to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this
proceeding ... . " It is sufficient to state in this connection that the said judge
was certainly not referring to the court's jurisdiction over the res, not to
 jurisdiction itself which is acquired from the moment a petition is filed, but
only to the exercise of jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings.
At all events, jurisdiction is conferred and determined by law and does not
depend on the pronouncements of a trial judge.
The dispositive part of respondent appellate court's judgment provided as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the writ of prohibition will issue, commanding and directing
the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, and
the respondent Judge Damaso B. Tengco to refrain perpetually from
proceeding and taking any action in Special Proceeding Q-7898 pending
before the said respondent court. All orders heretofore issued and actions
heretofore taken by said respondent court and respondent Judge, therein
and connected therewith, are hereby annulled. The writ of injunction
heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to
costs.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution of respondent Court of
Appeals, dated 8 July 1965; hence the herein petition for review on certiorari.
The principal and decisive issue at bar is, theretofore, whether the appellate court erred in
law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court ordering it to refrain
perpetually from proceeding with the testateproceedings and annulling and setting aside all
its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the decedent's last will and
testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond in compliance
with the testator's express wish in his testament. This issue is tied up with the issue submitted
to the appellate court, to wit, whether the Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the
probate proceedings filed with it, in pursuance of the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964
expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings
that it (the Quezon City court) should first act "on the petition for probate of the document
purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco" -
which order of the Cebu court respondents never questioned nor challenged by prohibition
or certiorari proceedings and thus enabled the Quezon City court to proceed without any
impediment or obstruction, once it denied respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion to dismiss
the probate proceeding for alleged lack of jurisdiction or improper venue, to  proceed with the
hearing of the petition and to admit the will to probate upon having been satisfied as to its due
execution and authenticity.
The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court erred in law in issuing the
writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings
and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate
of the deceased's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof
without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's express wish, for the following
considerations: —
1. The Judiciary Act7 concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First Instance
over "all matter of probate, both of testate and intestate estates." On the other hand, Rule 73,
section of the Rules of Court lays down the rule of venue, as the very caption of the Rule
indicates, and in order to prevent conflict among the different courts which otherwise may
properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts." The cited Rule provides:
Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the Province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,
the Court of First Instance of the province in which he had estate. The court
first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence, of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)8
It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate
is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. This was lucidly
stated by the late Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa vs. Co Ho9 as follows:
We are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that in probate cases
the place of residence of the deceased is regarded as a question of
jurisdiction over the subject-matter. But we decline to follow this view
because of its mischievous consequences. For instance, a probate case has
been submitted in good faith to the Court of First Instance of a province
where the deceased had not resided. All the parties, however, including all
the creditors, have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and
the case is therein completely finished except for a claim of a creditor who
also voluntarily filed it with said court but on appeal from an adverse decision
raises for the first time in this Court the question of jurisdiction of the trial
court for lack of residence of the deceased in the province. If we consider
such question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court
over the subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole
proceedings including all decisions on the different incidents which have
arisen in court will have to be annulled and the same case will have to
be commenced anew before another court of the same rank in another
province. That this is of mischievous effect in the  prompt administration of
justice is too obvious to require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio &
Co., G.R. No. 48206, December 31, 1942) Furthermore, section 600 of Act
No. 190, 10 providing that the estate of a deceased person shall be settled in
the province where he had last resided, could not have been intended as
 defining the jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject-matter, because
such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with
procedural matters, and, as we have said time and again, procedure is one
thing and jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. (Attorney-General
vs. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of jurisdiction — Act
No. 136, 11Section 56, No. 5 — confers upon Courts of First Instance
jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of
the deceased. Since, however, there are many courts of First Instance in the
Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue
or the place where each case shall be brought. Thus, the place
of residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the
subject-matter but merely of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the new
Rules of Court the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be
settled is properly called "venue".
It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate
or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.
The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts."
A fair reading of the Rule — since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and
co-ordinate jurisdiction — indicates that the court with whom the petition is first filed, must
also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over
it to the exclusion of all other courts.
Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last
will has been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal
domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation
of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestatemay be actually false,
may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and
instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the
decedent's alleged last will.
2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it a motion to
dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in abeyance its action on the
dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon City court, awaiting its action on the petition
for probate before that court. Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly
admitted to probate, by the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take
cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and
improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of
all other courts. Likewise by its act of deference, the Cebu court left it to the Quezon City
court to resolve the question between the parties whether the decedent's residence at the
time of his death was in Quezon City where he had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu
City as claimed by respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated that it would decline to take
cognizance of the intestate petition before it and instead defer to the Quezon City
court, unless the latter would make a negative finding as to the probate petition and the
residence of the decedent within its territory and venue.
3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and
deferring to the Quezon City court.
Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction
in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the
Cebu court must first take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise
jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as
is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court
indisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.
Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the  probate petition before it and assumed
jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon
City court should be left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City court
their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing
despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared, as the appellate court did, to
have acted without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent's will and appointing
petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in accordance with the
testator's testamentary disposition.
4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental 12 with
facts analogous to the present case 13 is authority against respondent appellate court's
questioned decision.
In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate proceedings over
intestate proceedings in this wise:
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the
distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance with
the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate
matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true,
however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction,
testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person
take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it
has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings
pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a
last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate
 proceedings even if at that state an administrator had already been
appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the
estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This
however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last
will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an
intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings
for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. 14
The Court likewise therein upheld the jurisdiction of the second court, (in this case, the
Quezon City court) although opining that certain considerations therein "would seem to
support the view that [therein respondent] should have submitted said will for probate to the
Negros Court, [in this case, the Cebu court] either in a separate special proceeding or in an
appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No.
6344," 15 thus:
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros
Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can
not accept petitioner's contention in this regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to
consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper venuetherefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely
a waivable procedural defect, and, in the light of the circumstances obtaining
in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has
waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by
laches. It is enough to consider in this connection that petitioner knew of the
existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19,
1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed in
Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice
of the existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of
the filing of the petition for its probate with the Manila Court since August 28,
1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of Special
Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963
that he filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an
Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and
annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling
the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with the will annexed
but also to admit said will to probate more than five months earlier, or more
specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of
jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of
all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a
premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court
is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the
latter was not the  proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have
the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction;
more so in a case like the present where the objection against said
proceedings is raised too late. 16
5. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of jurisdiction over the
decedent's estate on the basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and
finding that Quezon City was the first choiceof residence of the decedent, who had his
conjugal home and domicile therein — with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu
court — could not be contested except by appeal from said court in the original case. The last
paragraph of said Rule expressly provides:
... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule
73)
The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record" could
probably be properly invoked, had such deference in comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon
City court not appeared in the record, or had the record otherwise shown that the Cebu court
had taken cognizance of the petition before it and assumed jurisdiction.
6. On the question that Quezon City established to be the residence of the late senator, the
appellate court while recognizing that "the issue is a legitimate one" held in reliance on Borja
vs. Tan  17 that.
... The issue of residence comes within the competence of whichever court is
considered to prevail in the exercise jurisdiction - in this case, the Court of
First Instance of Cebu as held by this Court. Parenthetically, we note that the
question of the residence of the deceased is a serious one, requiring both
factual and legal resolution on the basis of ample evidence to be submitted in
the ordinary course of procedure in the first instance, particularly in view of
the fact that the deceased was better known as the Senator from Cebu and
the will purporting to be his also gives Cebu, besides Quezon City, as his
residence. We reiterate that this matter requires airing in the proper court, as
so indicated in the leading and controlling case of Borja vs. Hon. Bienvenido
Tan, et al., G.R. L-7792, July 27, 1955.
In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of
the intestate petition first filed with it and deferred to the testate proceedings filed with the
Quezon City court and in effect asked the Quezon City court to determine the residence of
the decedent and whether he did leave a last will and testament upon which would depend
the proper venue of the estate proceedings, Cebu or Quezon City. The Quezon City court
having thus determined in effect for both courts — at the behest and with the deference and
consent of the Cebu court — that Quezon City was the actual residence of the decedent who
died testate and therefore the proper venue, the Borja ruling would seem to have no
applicability. It would not serve the practical ends of justice to still require the Cebu court, if
the Borja ruling is to be held applicable and as indicated in the decision under review, to
determine for itself the actual residence of the decedent (when the Quezon City court had
already so determined Quezon City as the actual residence at the Cebu court's behest and
respondents have not seriously questioned this factual finding based on documentary
evidence) and if the Cebu court should likewise determine Quezon City as the actual
residence, or its contrary finding reversed on appeal, only then to allow petitioner-widow after
years of waiting and inaction to institute the corresponding proceedings in Quezon City.
7. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it is taken into
consideration that Rule 76, section 2 requires that the petition for allowance of a will must
show: "(a) the jurisdictional facts." Such "jurisdictional facts" in probate proceedings, as held
by the Court in Fernando vs. Crisostomo 18 " are the death of the decedent, his residence at
the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant
of a foreign country, his having left his estate in such province."
This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that "(T)he probate of a
will is a proceeding in rem. The notice by publication as a pre-requisite to the allowance of a
will, is a constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of
the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State. The probate of a will by a court
having jurisdiction thereof is conclusive as to its due execution and validity." 19 The Quezon
City court acted regularly within its jurisdiction (even if it were to be conceded that Quezon
City was not the proper venue notwithstanding the Cebu court's giving way and deferring to
it,) in admitting the decedent's last will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix
thereof. Hence, the Quezon city court's action should not be set aside by a writ of prohibition
for supposed lack of jurisdiction as per the appellate court's appealed decision, and should
instead be sustained in line with Uriarte, supra, where the Court, in dismissing
the certiorari petition challenging the Manila court's action admitting the decedent's will to
probate and distributing the estate in accordance therewith in the second proceeding, held
that "it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had
in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be
to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction." As
stressed by Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa, supra, "the mischievous effect in the
administration of justice" of considering the question of residence as affecting the jurisdiction
of the trial court and annulling the whole proceedings only to start all over again the same
proceedings before another court of the same rank in another province "is too obvious to
require comment."
8. If the question of jurisdiction were to be made to depend only on who of the decedent's
relatives gets first to file a petition for settlement of the decedent's estate, then the
established jurisprudence of the Court that Rule 73, section 1 provides only a rule of venue in
order to preclude different courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so and
creating conflicts between them to the detriment of the administration of justice, and that
venue is waivable, would be set at naught. As between relatives who unfortunately do not see
eye to eye, it would be converted into a race as to who can file the petition faster in the court
of his/her choice regardless of whether the decedent is still in cuerpo presente and in
disregard of the decedent's actual last domicile, the fact that he left a last will and testament
and the right of his surviving widow named as executrix thereof. Such dire consequences
were certainly not intended by the Rule nor would they be in consonance with public policy
and the orderly administration of justice.
9. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-widow, who under all the applicable
rules of venue, and despite the fact that the Cebu court (where respondent Lourdes Cuenco
had filed an intestate petition in the Cebu court earlier by a week's time on 5 March
1964) deferred to the Quezon City court where petitioner had within fifteen days (on March
12, 1964) after the decedent's death (on February 25, 1964) timely filed the decedent's last
will and petitioned for letters testamentary and is admittedly entitled to  preference in the
administration of her husband's estate, 20 would be compelled under the appealed decision to
have to go all the way to Cebu and submit anew the decedent's will there for probate either in
a new proceeding or by asking that the intestate proceedings be convertedinto
a testate proceeding — when under the Rules, the proper venue for the testate proceedings,
as per the facts of record and as already affirmed by the Quezon City court is Quezon City,
where the decedent and petitioner-widow had their conjugal domicile.
It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix
of the decedent's last will and settle his estate in accordance therewith, and a disregard of
her rights under the rule on venue and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much
more time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court everytime she
has an important matter of the estate to take up with the probate court.
It would doubly be an unfair imposition when it is considered that under Rule 73, section
2, 21 since petitioner's marriage has been dissolved with the death of her husband, their
community property and conjugal estate have to be administered and liquidated in the estate
proceedings of the deceased spouse. Under the appealed decision, notwithstanding that
petitioner resides in Quezon City, and the proper venue of the testate proceeding was in
Quezon City and the Quezon City court properly took cognizance and exercised exclusive
jurisdiction with the deference in comity and consent of the Cebu court, such proper exercise
of jurisdiction would be nullified and petitioner would have to continually leave her residence
in Quezon City and go to Cebu to settle and liquidate even her own community property and
conjugal estate with the decedent.
10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did not act without
jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in declining to take cognizance of
the intestate petition and instead deferring to the testateproceedings filed just a week later by
petitioner as surviving widow and designated executrix of the decedent's last will, since the
record before it (the petitioner's opposition and motion to dismiss) showed the falsity of the
allegation in the intestate petition that the decedent had died without a will. It is noteworthy
that respondents never challenged by certiorari or prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's
order of 10 April 1964 deferring to the probate proceedings before the Quezon City court,
thus leaving the latter free (pursuant to the Cebu court's order of deference) to exercise
jurisdiction and admit the decedent's will to probate.
For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have acted without
jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the decedent's will to probate and
appointing petitioner as executrix in accordance with its testamentary disposition, in the light
of the settled doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule of venue,
not of jurisdiction.

Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City court's order of May

15, 1964 admitting the will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix thereof, and said
court concededly has jurisdiction to issue said order, the said order of probate has long since
become final and can not be overturned in a special civic action of prohibition.

11. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority
over all inferior courts, 22 it may properly determine, as it has done in the case at bar,
that venue was  properly assumed by and transferredto the Quezon City court and that it is
the interest of justice and in avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's
exercise of jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent (with the due deference and
consent of the Cebu court) and its admission to probate of his last will and testament and
appointment of petitioner-widow as administratrix without bond in pursuance of the
decedent's express will and all its orders and actions taken in the testate proceedings before
it be approved and authorized rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly had and to
repeat and duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu court only to revert once more to
the Quezon City court should the Cebu court find that indeed and in fact, as already
determined by the Quezon City court on the strength of incontrovertible documentary
evidence of record, Quezon City was the conjugal residence of the decedent.

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction originally filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No.
34104-R) is ordered dismissed. No costs.

Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Fernando and Castro, JJ., took no part.

[G.R. No. 124715. January 24, 2000] properties by (sic) Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 613494, 363123, 236236
and 263236 are excluded from these proceedings.
RUFINA LUY LIM petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AUTO TRUCK TBA
CORPORATION, SPEED DISTRIBUTING, INC., ACTIVE DISTRIBUTORS, ALLIANCE SO ORDERED."
MARKETING CORPORATION, ACTION COMPANY, INC. respondents.
Subsequently, Rufina Luy Lim filed a verified amended petition[9] which contained the
DECISION following averments:

BUENA, J.: "3. The late Pastor Y. Lim personally owned during his lifetime the following
business entities, to wit:
May a corporation, in its universality, be the proper subject of and be included in the inventory
of the estate of a deceased person? Business Entity Address:

Petitioner disputes before us through the instant petition for review on certiorari, the X X X X
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 18 April 1996, in CA-GR SP No. 38617,
which nullified and set aside the orders dated 04 July 1995[2], 12 September 1995[3] and 15 Alliance Marketing ,Inc. Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca
September 1995[4] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, sitting as a probate
court. BF Homes,

Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of the late Pastor Y. Lim whose estate is the Paraaque,
subject of probate proceedings in Special Proceedings Q-95-23334, entitled, "In Re: Intestate
Estate of Pastor Y. Lim Rufina Luy Lim, represented by George Luy, Petitioner".
Metro Manila.
Private respondents Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing Corporation, Speed
Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing, Inc. and Action Company are corporations formed, X X X X
organized and existing under Philippine laws and which owned real properties covered under
the Torrens system. Speed Distributing Inc. 910 Barrio Niog,

On 11 June 1994, Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Herein petitioner, as surviving spouse and Aguinaldo Highway,
duly represented by her nephew George Luy, filed on 17 March 1995, a joint petition [5] for the
administration of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Bacoor, Cavite.

Private respondent corporations, whose properties were included in the inventory of the X X X X
estate of Pastor Y. Lim, then filed a motion[6] for the lifting of lis pendens and motion[7] for
exclusion of certain properties from the estate of the decedent. Auto Truck TBA Corp. 2251 Roosevelt Avenue,

In an order[8] dated 08 June 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, sitting Quezon City.
as a probate court, granted the private respondents twin motions, in this wise:
X X X X
"Wherefore, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to lift,
expunge or delete the annotation of lis pendens on Transfer Certificates of
Active Distributors, Inc. Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca BF
Title Nos. 116716, 116717, 116718, 116719 and 5182 and it is hereby further
ordered that the properties covered by the same titles as well as those
Homes, Paraaque,
Metro Manila. Copies of the above-mentioned Transfer Certificate of Title and/or Tax
Declarations are hereto attached as Annexes "C" to "W".
X X X X
X X X X
Action Company 100 20th Avenue
"7. The aforementioned properties and/or real interests left by the late Pastor
Murphy, Quezon City Y. Lim, are all conjugal in nature, having been acquired by him during the
existence of his marriage with petitioner.
or
"8. There are other real and personal properties owned by Pastor Y. Lim
which petitioner could not as yet identify. Petitioner, however will submit to
92-D Mc-Arthur Highway
this Honorable Court the identities thereof and the necessary documents
covering the same as soon as possible."
Valenzuela Bulacan.
On 04 July 1995, the Regional Trial Court acting on petitioners motion issued an order [10],
"3.1 Although the above business entities dealt and engaged in business with thus:
the public as corporations, all their capital, assets and equity were however,
personally owned by the late Pastor Y Lim. Hence the alleged stockholders
"Wherefore, the order dated 08 June 1995 is hereby set aside and the
and officers appearing in the respective articles of incorporation of the above
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to reinstate the
business entities were mere dummies of Pastor Y. Lim, and they were listed
annotation of lis pendens in case said annotation had already been deleted
therein only for purposes of registration with the Securities and Exchange
and/or cancelled said TCT Nos. 116716, 116717, 116718, 116719 and
Commission.
51282.
"4. Pastor Lim, likewise, had Time, Savings and Current Deposits with the
Further more (sic), said properties covered by TCT Nos. 613494, 365123,
following banks: (a) Metrobank, Grace Park, Caloocan City and Quezon
236256 and 236237 by virtue of the petitioner are included in the instant
Avenue, Quezon City Branches and (b) First Intestate Bank (formerly
petition.
Producers Bank), Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation and in other banks
whose identities are yet to be determined.
SO ORDERED."
"5. That the following real properties, although registered in the name of the
above entities, were actually acquired by Pastor Y. Lim during his marriage On 04 September 1995, the probate court appointed Rufina Lim as special
with petitioner, to wit: administrator[11] and Miguel Lim and Lawyer Donald Lee, as co-special administrators of the
estate of Pastor Y. Lim, after which letters of administration were accordingly issued.
Corporation Title Location
In an order[12] dated 12 September 1995, the probate court denied anew private respondents
motion for exclusion, in this wise:
X X X X

"The issue precisely raised by the petitioner in her petition is whether the
k. Auto Truck TCT No. 617726 Sto. Domingo
corporations are the mere alter egos or instrumentalities of Pastor Lim,
Otherwise (sic) stated, the issue involves the piercing of the corporate veil, a
TBA Corporation Cainta, Rizal matter that is clearly within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court and not
the Securities and Exchange Commission. Thus, in the case of Cease vs.
q. Alliance Marketing TCT No. 27896 Prance, Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 483, the crucial issue decided by the regular
court was whether the corporation involved therein was the mere extension
Metro Manila
 of the decedent. After finding in the affirmative, the Court ruled that the
assets of the corporation are also assets of the estate.
A reading of P.D. 902, the law relied upon by oppositors, shows that the
SECs exclusive (sic) applies only to intra-corporate controversy. It is simply a
suit to settle the intestate estate of a deceased person who, during his
lifetime, acquired several properties and put up corporations as his
instrumentalities.
SO ORDERED."
On 15 September 1995, the probate court acting on an ex parte motion filed by petitioner,
issued an order[13] the dispositive portion of which reads:
"Wherefore, the parties and the following banks concerned herein under
enumerated are hereby ordered to comply strictly with this order and to
produce and submit to the special administrators , through this Honorable
Court within (5) five days from receipt of this order their respective records of
the savings/current accounts/time deposits and other deposits in the names
of Pastor Lim and/or corporations above-mentioned, showing all the
transactions made or done concerning savings /current accounts from
January 1994 up to their receipt of this court order.
XXX XXX XXX
SO ORDERED."
Private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari[14], with an urgent prayer for a
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, before the Court of Appeals questioning the
orders of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a probate court.
On 18 April 1996, the Court of Appeals, finding in favor of herein private respondents,
rendered the assailed decision[15], the decretal portion of which declares:
"Wherefore, premises considered, the instant special civil action for certiorari
is hereby granted, The impugned orders issued by respondent court on July
4,1995 and September 12, 1995 are hereby nullified and set aside. The
impugned order issued by respondent on September 15, 1995 is nullified
insofar as petitioner corporations" bank accounts and records are concerned.
SO ORDERED."
Through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, herein petitioner Rufina Luy Lim
now comes before us with a lone assignment of error[16]:
"The respondent Court of Appeals erred in reversing the orders of the lower
court which merely allowed the preliminary or provisional inclusion of the
private respondents as part of the estate of the late deceased (sic) Pastor Y.
Lim with the respondent Court of Appeals arrogating unto itself the power to
repeal, to disobey or to ignore the clear and explicit provisions of Rules
81,83,84 and 87 of the Rules of Court and thereby preventing the petitioner,
from performing her duty as special administrator of the estate as expressly
provided in the said Rules."
Petitioners contentions tread on perilous grounds.
In the instant petition for review, petitioner prays that we affirm the orders issued by the
probate court which were subsequently set aside by the Court of Appeals.
Yet, before we delve into the merits of the case, a review of the rules on jurisdiction over
probate proceedings is indeed in order.
The provisions of Republic Act 7691[17], which introduced amendments to Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, are pertinent:
"Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
"Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value
of the estate exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in
probate matters in Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000);
xxx xxx xxx
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
Civil Cases.-Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
 1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and
probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the
grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the
value of the personal property, estate or amount of the
demand does not exceed One Hundred Thousand
Pesos(P100,000) or, in Metro Manila where such personal
property, estate or amount of the demand does not exceed
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000), exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation
expenses and costs, the amount of which must be
specifically alleged, Provided, that interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorneys, litigation expenses and costs shall
be included in the determination of the filing fees, Provided
further, that where there are several claims or causes of
actions between the same or different parties, embodied in
the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the
totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective
of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or
different transactions;
xxx xxx xxx"
Simply put, the determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over matters of probate
depends upon the gross value of the estate of the decedent.
As to the power and authority of the probate court, petitioner relies heavily on the principle
that a probate court may pass upon title to certain properties, albeit provisionally, for the
purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the
inventory.
In a litany of cases, We defined the parameters by which the court may extend its probing
arms in the determination of the question of title in probate proceedings.
This Court, in PASTOR, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS,[18] held:
"X X X As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which
the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in
the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title
thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject
to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title."
We reiterated the rule in PEREIRA vs. COURT OF APPEALS : [19]
"X X X The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator is one clearly within the competence of the probate court.
However, the courts determination is only provisional in character, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action which may
be instituted by the parties."
Further, in MORALES vs. CFI OF CAVITE[20] citing CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE[21], We made
an exposition on the probate courts limited jurisdiction:
"It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings
whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to
outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is
to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory
or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no
dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator and
the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court
cannot do so."
Again, in VALERA vs. INSERTO[22], We had occasion to elucidate, through Mr. Justice
Andres Narvasa[23]:
"Settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court),
acting as a probate court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no
power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property
claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and
all other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or
impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate court for
adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced, the
reason for the exception being that the question of whether or not a particular
matter should be resolved by the court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g. probate, land
registration, etc.), is in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence of procedural
one, involving a mode of practice which may be waived. x x x
x x x. These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the
Torrens title is not in the decedents name but in others, a situation on
which this Court has already had occasion to rule x x x."(emphasis Ours)
Petitioner, in the present case, argues that the parcels of land covered under the Torrens
system and registered in the name of private respondent corporations should be included in
the inventory of the estate of the decedent Pastor Y. Lim, alleging that after all the
determination by the probate court of whether these properties should be included or not  is
merely provisional in nature, thus, not conclusive and subject to a final determination in a
separate action brought for the purpose of adjudging once and for all the issue of title.
Yet, under the peculiar circumstances, where the parcels of land are registered in the name
of private respondent corporations, the jurisprudence pronounced in BOLISAY vs.,
ALCID[24] is of great essence and finds applicability, thus:
"It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to
support her claim of ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have a
Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is endowed with
incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the
law itself, which, of course, does not include, bringing up the matter as a
mere incident in special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
deceased persons. x x x"
"x x x. In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a
property covered by Torrens title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness
of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong
compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered
as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or
modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case
at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title. x
x x"
A perusal of the records would reveal that no strong compelling evidence was ever presented
by petitioner to bolster her bare assertions as to the title of the deceased Pastor Y. Lim over
the properties. Even so, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, " The Property Registration Decree",
proscribes collateral attack on Torrens Title, hence:
"xxx xxx xxx
Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.
- A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be
altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law."
In CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE, where similarly as in the case at bar, the property subject of the
controversy was duly registered under the Torrens system, We categorically stated:
"x x x Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in
the possession of third parties and more important, covered by a transfer
certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent
court should have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and
excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of the
estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their possession
and ownership of the property. x x x"
Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the late Pastor Y.
Lim are in the possession of and are registered in the name of private respondent
corporations, which under the law possess a personality separate and distinct from their
stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the
presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of private respondents should stand
undisturbed.
Accordingly, the probate court was remiss in denying private respondents motion for
exclusion. While it may be true that the Regional Trial Court, acting in a restricted capacity
and exercising limited jurisdiction as a probate court, is competent to issue orders involving
inclusion or exclusion of certain properties in the inventory of the estate of the decedent, and
to adjudge, albeit, provisionally the question of title over properties, it is no less true that such
authority conferred upon by law and reinforced by jurisprudence, should be exercised
judiciously, with due regard and caution to the peculiar circumstances of each individual case.
Notwithstanding that the real properties were duly registered under the Torrens system in the
name of private respondents, and as such were to be afforded the presumptive
conclusiveness of title, the probate court obviously opted to shut its eyes to this gleamy fact
and still proceeded to issue the impugned orders.
By its denial of the motion for exclusion, the probate court in effect acted in utter disregard of
the presumption of conclusiveness of title in favor of private respondents. Certainly, the
probate court through such brazen act transgressed the clear provisions of law and infringed
settled jurisprudence on this matter.
Moreover, petitioner urges that not only the properties of private respondent corporations are
properly part of the decedents estate but also the private respondent corporations
themselves. To rivet such flimsy contention, petitioner cited that the late Pastor Y. Lim during
his lifetime, organized and wholly-owned the five corporations, which are the private
respondents in the instant case.[25] Petitioner thus attached as Annexes "F"[26] and "G"[27] of the
petition for review affidavits executed by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao which among
others, contained averments that the incorporators of Uniwide Distributing, Inc. included on
the list had no actual participation in the organization and incorporation of the said
corporation. The affiants added that the persons whose names appeared on the articles of
incorporation of Uniwide Distributing, Inc., as incorporators thereof, are mere dummies since
they have not actually contributed any amount to the capital stock of the corporation and have
been merely asked by the late Pastor Y. Lim to affix their respective signatures thereon.
It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct from that of the
persons composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that of the persons composing it.
It may not be held liable for the personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the
entities connected with it.[28]
Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a personality distinct and
separate from its stockholders or members. In the same vein, a corporation by legal fiction
and convenience is an entity shielded by a protective mantle and imbued by law with a
character alien to the persons comprising it.
Nonetheless, the shield is not at all times invincible. Thus, in FIRST PHILIPPINE
INTERNATIONAL BANK vs. COURT OF APPEALS[29], We enunciated:
"x x x When the fiction is urged as a means of perpetrating a fraud or an
illegal act or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation, the
circumvention of statutes, the achievement or perfection of a monopoly or
generally the perpetration of knavery or crime, the veil with which the law
covers and isolates the corporation from the members or stockholders who
compose it will be lifted to allow for its consideration merely as an
aggregation of individuals. x x x"
Piercing the veil of corporate entity requires the court to see through the protective shroud
which exempts its stockholders from liabilities that ordinarily, they could be subject to, or
distinguishes one corporation from a seemingly separate one, were it not for the existing
corporate fiction.[30]
The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil may be pierced when a corporation
is just but the alter ego of a person or of another corporation. Where badges of fraud exist,
where public convenience is defeated; where a wrong is sought to be justified thereby, the
corporate fiction or the notion of legal entity should come to naught.[31]
Further, the test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate
fiction is as follows: 1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete
domination, not only of finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the
transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no
separate mind, will or existence of its own; (2) Such control must have been used by the
defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a statutory or other positive
legal duty, or dishonest and unjust act in contravention of plaintiffs legal right; and (3) The
aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss
complained of. The absence of any of these elements prevent "piercing the corporate veil".[32]
Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the
capital stock of a corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of
separate corporate personalities.[33]
Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the wrong-doing
must be clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be presumed.[34]
Granting arguendo that the Regional Trial Court in this case was not merely acting in a
limited capacity as a probate court, petitioner nonetheless failed to adduce competent
evidence that would have justified the court to impale the veil of corporate fiction. Truly, the
reliance reposed by petitioner on the affidavits executed by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao
is unavailing considering that the aforementioned documents possess no weighty probative
value pursuant to the hearsay rule. Besides it is imperative for us to stress that such affidavits
are inadmissible in evidence inasmuch as the affiants were not at all presented during the
course of the proceedings in the lower court. To put it differently, for this Court to uphold the
admissibility of said documents would be to relegate from Our duty to apply such basic rule of
evidence in a manner consistent with the law and jurisprudence.
Our pronouncement in PEOPLE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. LEONIDAS [35] finds
pertinence:
"Affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally
prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing
the affiants statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood
by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the
opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this reason, affidavits are
generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiant themselves are
placed on the witness stand to testify thereon."
As to the order[36] of the lower court, dated 15 September 1995, the Court of Appeals correctly
observed that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93 acted without jurisdiction in issuing said
order; The probate court had no authority to demand the production of bank accounts in the
name of the private respondent corporations.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals which nullified and set
aside the orders issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, acting as a probate court,
dated 04 July 1995 and 12 September 1995 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Judge,
Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch Vl, petitioners,  after due hearing.
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B.
GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner,  interest against the estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable as administratrix
vs.
HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAÑO, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. GARCIA, respondents.
Francisco Carreon for petitioners.
Augusto G. Gatmaytan for private respondents.
MARTIN, J.:
These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word "resides" in
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring to the situs of the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, means. Additionally, the rule in the
appointment of a special administrator is sought to be reviewed.
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at
Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of
administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26,
1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the
City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in
other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same time, she
moved  venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of Amado G. Garcia, and
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even date,
May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, 1973,
contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was
issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters of administration
has been served upon all persons interested in the estate; there has been no delay or
cause for delay in the proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as
the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment
of a special administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G.
Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed that she be appointed special
administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and as regular administratrix
While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court, Preciosa
B. Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground raised in the motion for
reconsideration of May 8, 1973 that her appointment was obtained through erroneous,
misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has adverse
and as officer of the court.
In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration filed
by Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was published
on May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in the Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general
circulation in Southern Luzon.
On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the
Appointment of Regular Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental
petition modified the original petition in four aspects: (1) the allegation that during the
lifetime of the deceased Amado G. Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional Delegate
for the First District of Laguna and his last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna;
(2) the deletion of the names of Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs
of Amado G. Garcia; (3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as
heir in the original petition, is the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she
has expressly renounced her preferential right to the administration of the estate in
favor of Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be appointed as the regular
administratrix. The admission of this supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa
B. Garcia for the reason, among others, that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the
Court of First Instance of Laguna, of which the court was not possessed at the
beginning because the original petition was deficient.
On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and
supplemental petitions for letters of administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction,
disqualification of Virginia G Fule as special administratrix.
An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973, praying for
authority to take possession of properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of
third persons as well as to secure cash advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion,
calling attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the power of the special
administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of the personal and real properties making
up the state of the deceased."
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order, received by
Preciosa B. Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to
reconsider the order of May 2, 1973, appointing Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix, and admitting the supplementation petition of May 18,1973.
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1)
jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest has not been acquired by
the court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in
interest as she is not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia.
On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to substitute
Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, reasoning that the said Virginia G. Fule
admitted before before the court that she is a full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde,
an illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with whom the deceased Amado G. Garcia has
no relation.
Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one, to enjoin
the special administratrix from taking possession of properties in the hands of third
persons which have not been determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another,
to remove the special administratrix for acting outside her authority and against the
interest of the estate; and still another, filed in behalf of the minor Agustina B. Garcia,
to dismiss the petition for want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue.
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion of Virgina
G. Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving the motion to
dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the powers of the special administratrix are those
provided for in Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, 1subject only to the previous
qualification made by the court that the administration of the properties subject of the
marketing agreement with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association should remain with the latter; and that the special administratrix had
already been authorized in a previous order of August 20, 1973 to take custody and
possession of all papers and certificates of title and personal effects of the decedent
with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon
Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.,
was ordered to deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her name without
any qualifying words like "married to Amado Garcia" does not appear. Regarding the
motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the issue of jurisdiction had already been
resolved in the order of July 2, 1973, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to
reconsider the appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental
petition, the failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original petition for letters of
administration in the place of residence of the decedent at the time of his death was
cured. Judge Malvar further held that Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections thereto by praying to be
appointed as special and regular administratrix of the estate.
An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27, 1973 to clarify or
reconsider the foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in view of previous court order
limiting the authority of the special administratrix to the making of an inventory.
Preciosa B. Garcia also asked for the resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions
for lack of cause of action, and also that filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia.
Resolution of her motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix was
likewise prayed for.
On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first, denying
Preciosa B. Garcia's motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix, and
the second, holding that the power allowed the special administratrix enables her to
conduct and submit an inventory of the assets of the estate.
On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the foregoing
orders of November 28, 1973 and December 19, 1973, insofar as they sustained or
failed to rule on the issues raised by her: (a) legal standing (cause of action) of Virginia
G. Fule; (b) venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and removal of
special administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special administratrix of checks and
papers and effects in the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc.
On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying Preciosa B.
Garcia's motion for reconsideration of January 7, 1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar
issued the other three questioned orders: one, directing Ramon Mercado, of the
Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish Virginia G.
Fule, as special administratrix, copy of the statement of accounts and final liquidation
of sugar pool, as well as to deliver to her the corresponding amount due the estate;
another, directing Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles
presumably belonging to the estate; and another, directing Ramon Mercado to deliver
to the court all certificates of title in his possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia,
whether qualified with the word "single" or "married to Amado Garcia."
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C) before Judge
Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule presented the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing
that his residence at the time of his death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B.
Garcia presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three
months before his death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also
testified that Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his
death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first
district of Laguna.
On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special
action for certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before
Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in the
alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of that court, viz., one dated March 27,
1974, denying their motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to
dismiss the criminal and supplemental petitions on the issue, among others, of
jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing the delivery of
certain properties to the special administratrix, Virginia G. Fule, and to the court.
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the
proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First
Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule forthwith
elevated the matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. L-
40502.
However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of
Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for letters
of administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch,
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia.
On February 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as
special administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and
appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00.
Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed the office.
For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge Ericta of
the pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the Court of First Instance
of Laguna, and the annulment of the proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on
January 30, 1975. She manifested, however, her willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-
19738 should the decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the proceedings before
the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become final, it
being the subject of a motion for reconsideration.
On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings before his
court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court of the final outcome of the case pending
before the Court of Appeals. This notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on
December 11, 1975, an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations."
On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question Venue
and Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in the previous special appearance of
March 3, 1975, and calling attention that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration had been appealed to this Court;
that the parties had already filed their respective briefs; and that the case is still
pending before the Court.
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge Ericta, issued
an order granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate
Obligations" in that the payments were for the benefit of the estate and that there
hangs a cloud of doubt on the validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the
Court of First Instance of Laguna.
A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January 12,1976.
On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition for
certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No.
Q-19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani Cruz Paño from further acting in the case. A
restraining order was issued on February 9, 1976.
We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-
42670 for the reasons and considerations hereinafter stated.
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his
will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and
if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in
which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want
of jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to letters of
administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the
petition therefor should affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make the
appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as death, the
name and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets,
intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the right of the person who seeks
administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death
of the intestate and his last residence within the country are foundation facts upon
which all subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and that if
the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no
assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of
administration. 3
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so
far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is
in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of
Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It could not have been intended to define the
jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of
procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over
the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter
"existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is
not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the power or
authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not
exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting
to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose
jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack
of something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at
once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the
parties. 5
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction
over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Because of
the existence of numerous Courts of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court,
however, purposedly fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. A
fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and
issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that the Revised
Rules of Court properly considers the province where the estate of a deceased person shall
be settled as "venue." 6
2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to
the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the
doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms "residing"
and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the
statute or rule in which it is employed. 7 In the application of venue statutes and rules —
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature — residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it
is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases
make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." 8 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense,
the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. 9Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's
domicile. 10 No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the
residence must be more than temporary. 11
3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the
residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. In her original petition
for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G.
Fule measely stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of
Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal
properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement and improper laying of venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no domicile
or residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "property owner of Calamba,
Laguna," he also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the
contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death certificate presented by
Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court and in other papers, the last residence of
Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City.
Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G.
Garcia's "last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna."
On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was
at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A
death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his
death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence
by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of
residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the
deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death; the
Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971 turning over the
administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring part of
his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and
certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents
that Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion
becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration
was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the
long-settled rule is that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of
the Revised Rules of Court states: "When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to
dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the case before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold
that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did
not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court of First
Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to alternative remedy to
assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the
proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.
4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special administratrix is
another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to the appointment as
surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or
disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and
charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and
executors or administrators appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator
was only proper when the allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new
Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment and such appointment is now allowed
when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or administration by any cause e.g.,
parties cannot agree among themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special
administrator or not lies in the probate court. 15 That, however, is no authority for the judge to Proc. No. Q-19738, subject matter of G.R. No. L-42670, and ordering the Canlubang Sugar
become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, Estate to deliver to her as special administratrix the sum of P48,874.70 for payment of the
his judgment. Exercise of that discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal sum of estate obligations is hereby upheld.
principle. There is no reason why the same fundamental and legal principles governing the
choice of a regular administrator should not be taken into account in the appointment of a IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L-
special administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the judge to consider the order of preference in 40502 and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
the appointment of a regular administrator in appointing a special administrator. After all, the
consideration that overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee SO ORDERED.
in the estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession
over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal
partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in administering
the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. The good or bad administration of a
property may affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of a property. 18

Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of the late
Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no
relation whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the
latter, incapable of any successional rights. 19 On this point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia
is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix. It needs be emphasized
that in the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a
regular administrator is appointed, 20 the appointing court does not determine who are entitled
to share in the estate of the decedent but who is entitled to the administration. The issue of
heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on
the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of distribution. 21The
preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed
by the deceased Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he
indicated therein that he is married to Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate of candidacy for
the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for the First District of Laguna filed on
September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his
spouse. 23 Faced with these documents and the presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage,
Preciosa B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado
G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. 24

5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs. Court of
Appeals, 25 this Court under its supervisory authority over all inferior courts may properly
decree that venue in the instant case was properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon
City and that it is in the interest of justice and avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon
City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the deceased Amado
G. Garcia and the appointment of special administratrix over the latter's estate be approved
and authorized and the Court of First Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from continuing
with the case and instead be required to transfer all the records thereof to the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings.

6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975, granting the
"Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp.
G.R. No. 92436             July 26, 1991
MARIA VDA. DE REYES, EFREN REYES, ELVIRA REYES-TIMBOL, ERLINDA REYES-
VALERIO, ERNESTO REYES, ELIZABETH REYES, ALEX, RAFAEL II, EMELINA and
EVELYN, all surnamed REYES, represented by their mother, MARIA VDA. DE
REYES, petitioners,  vendee, this parcel corresponds to Lot No. 1-A-14 of the subdivision plan aforestated. The
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES DALMACIO GARDIOLA and ROSARIO
MARTILLANO respondents.
De Lara, De Lunas & Rosales for petitioners.
Santos, Pilapil & Associates for private respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Assailed before Us in this appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 11934, promulgated on 20
October 1989,1 reversing the decision of 1 October 1986 of Branch 21 (Imus, Cavite) of the
Regional Trial Court of the Fourth Judicial Region in Civil Case No. RTC-BCV-83-17
entitled Maria vda. de Reyes, et al. vs. Spouses Dalmacio Gardiola and Rosario Martillano,
and Spouses Ricardo M. Gardiola and Emelita Gardiola,2 and the resolution of 1 March 1990
denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
As culled from both decisions and the pleadings of the parties, the following facts have been
preponderantly established:
During his lifetime, one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land of approximately 70 hectares,
more or less, located at Sangayad, Ulong-Tubig, Carmona, Cavite. He sought to bring said
land under the operation of the Torrens System of registration of property. Unfortunately, he
died in 1921 without the title having been issued to him. The application was prosecuted by
his son, Marcelo Reyes, who was the administrator of his property.
In 1936 the above property was surveyed and subdivided by Gavino's heirs (Exh. "6"). In the
subdivision plan, each resultant lot was earmarked, indicated for and assigned to a specific
heir. It appears therein that two lots, one of which is Lot No. I A-14 (Exh. "6-A"), were allotted
to Rafael Reyes, Sr., one of Gavino's children. Per testimony of Juan Poblete, the children
thereafter secured tax declarations for their respective shares.
In 1941, or about twenty (20) years after the death of Gavino, the original certificate of title for
the whole property — OCT No. 255 — was issued. It was, however, kept by Juan Poblete,
son-in-law of Marcelo Reyes, who was by then already deceased. The heirs of Gavino were
not aware of this fact.
On 3 December 1943, Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold a parcel of land with an area of 23,431 square
meters, more or less, to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola (Exh. "5"). According to the
deed of sale, however, did not specifically mention Lot No. 1-A-14. The vendee immediately
took possession of the property and started paying the land taxes therein.
In 1945 or thereabouts, Juan Poblete "revalidated" the original Certificate of Title. As
reconstituted, the new title is OCT (0-4358) RO-255  (Exhs. "4" to "4-A").
On 21 October 1967, when the heirs of Gavino Reyes executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate (Exh. "D") based on the aforestated subdivision plan (Exh. "6"), the lot
that was intended for Rafael Reyes, Sr., who was already deceased, was instead adjudicated
to his only son and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr. (the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners
herein). Private respondent Rosario Martillano signed the deed in representation of her
mother, Marta Reyes, one of the children of Gavino Reyes.
As a result of the Extrajudicial Settlement, OCT RO-255 was cancelled and in lieu thereof,
several transfer certificates of title covering the subdivided lots were issued in the names of
the respective adjudicatees. One of them is TCT No. 27257 in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr.
covering Lot No. 1-A-14. The Transfer Certificates of Title were, however, kept by one
Candido Hebron. On 10 January 1969, some of the heirs of Gavino Reyes filed a case of
Annulment of Partition and Recovery of Possession before the Court of First Instance of
Cavite City, which was docketed therein as Civil Case No. 1267. One of the defendants in
said case is herein private respondent Rosario Martillano. The case was dismissed on 18
September 1969, but Candido Hebron was ordered by the trial court to deliver to the heirs
concerned all the transfer certificates of title in his possession.3
After obtaining the Transfer Certificate of Title for Lot No. 1-A-14 from Hebron, pursuant to
the aforesaid order in Civil Case No. 1267, petitioners herein, as successors-in-interest of
Rafael Reyes, Jr., filed on 14 March 1983 with the Regional Trial Court the above-mentioned
Civil Case No. RTC-BCV-83-17 against private respondents (defendants therein) for recovery
of possession or, in the alternative, for indemnification, accounting and damages. They allege
therein that after "having definitely discovered that they are the lawful owners of the property,"
(Lot No. 1-A-14), they, "including Rafael Reyes, Jr., during his lifetime, made repeated
demands to (sic) defendants to surrender the possession of and vacate the parcel of land
belonging to the former, but defendants refused to vacate and surrender the possession of
the said land to herein plaintiffs;" the last of the demands was allegedly made on 8 October
1982. They further allege that they have been deprived by said defendants of the rightful
possession and enjoyment of the property since September 1969 — which coincides with the
date of the order in Civil Case No. 1267.4
In their answer, private respondents deny the material averments in the complaint and assert
that they are the owners of the lot in question, having bought the same from Rafael Reyes,
Sr., that the issuance of TCT No. 27257 is null and void, for such sale was known to Rafael
Reyes, Jr.; that they have been in possession of the property and have been paying the land
taxes thereon; and that petitioners are barred by prescription and/or laches.5
Petitioners amended their complaint on 21 March 1985 to implead as additional defendants
the spouses Ricardo M. Gardiola and Emerita Gardiola, on the basis of the following claims:
x x x           x x x          x x x
9. Meanwhile, during the presentation of the defendants spouses Dalmacio Gardiola
and Rosario Martillano's evidence the former testified that they mortgaged the
subject land to the Rural Bank of Carmona Inc. For their failure to redeem the
mortgage the same was foreclosed by the bank.
10. However, within the period of one(1) year from such foreclosure the questioned
land was redeemed by the original defendants' son in the person of Ricardo M.
Gardiola, who was knowledgeable/aware of the pendency of the above captioned
case. The corresponding redemption was effected through a deed of
conveyance, . . . .6
The prayer of the amended complaint now contains the alternative relief for indemnification
for the reasonable value of the property "in the event restitution of the property is no longer
possible."7
In its decision of 1 October 1986,8 the trial court concluded that petitioners' "title over the
subject property is valid and regular and thus they are entitled to its possession and
enjoyment," and accordingly decided thus:
WHEREFORE, the defendants or anyone acting for and in their behalf are hereby
ordered to relinguish possession or vacate the property in question which is covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257 in favor of the plaintiffs.
All other claims and/or counterclaims of the parties relative to this case are dismissed
for lack of proper substantiation.
The conclusion of the trial court is based on its finding that (a) there is no evidence that the
heirs of Gavino Reyes entered into any written agreement of partition in 1936 based on the
subdivision plan; (b) there is no identity between Lot No. 1-14-A and the land sold to private
respondents by Rafael Reyes, Sr., or otherwise stated, the description of the latter as
indicated in the deed of sale (Exh. "5") does not tally with the description of the former; and
(c) moreover:
Granting, arguendo, that the sale made by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to the defendants
covered the land in question — Lot No. 1-A-14 — and that Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-27257 was obtained by means of fraud, the claim of the defendants over the
said property is already barred. Action for reconveyance prescribes in four (4) years
from the discovery thereof. If there was fraud, the defendant could have discovered
the same in 1967 when the partition was made in as much as defendant Rosario
Martillano was a party to that partition. Let us grant further that the issuance of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257 to Rafael Reyes, Jr. created a constructive
or implied trust in favor of the defendants, again, the claim of the defendants is also
barred. From 1967 to the filing of their answer (let us consider this as an action for
reconveyance) to this case sometime in July, 1983, a period of about sixteen (16)
years had already elapsed. Prescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on
implied or constructive trust is ten (10) years.
The trial court further held that the continued possession by private respondents, which it
found to have started in 1943, did not ripen into ownership because at that time, the property
was already registered, hence it cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.9
Private respondents appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals which docketed the
appeal as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 11934. In its decision of 20 October 1989, the respondent Court
of Appeals formulated the issues before it as follows:
I
Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring that the property of the late Gavino
Reyes consisting of 70 hectares was partitioned only in 1967 by his grandchildren
after discovery of the existence of OCT No. 255 and that no actual partition was
made in 1936 by the decedent's children.
II
Whether or not the lower court erred in concluding that the parcel of land sold by the
appellees' predecessor-in-interest, the late Rafael Reyes, Sr. to appellant Dalmacio
Gardiola was not the same parcel of land under litigation.10
and resolved such issues, thus:
On the first issue, We believe that the lower court committed a reversible error when
it declared that the landed estate of the late Gavino Reyes was partitioned only in
1967 by the latter's grandchildren; and that no actual partition was made in 1936 by
the decedents' (sic) children. The evidence on record bears out the existence of a
subdivision plan (Exh. 6) which was not controverted nor denied by the appellees. In
like manner, the lower court itself recognized the fact that the property of the late
Gavino Reyes consisting of 70 hectares was surveyed and subdivided in 1936 as
evidenced by the said subdivision plan (Exh. 6). With the existence of a subdivision
plan, and from the uncontroverted testimony of appellants' witness, We can only infer
that at least an oral partition, which under the law is valid and binding, was entered
into by the heirs of Gavino Reyes regarding his properties in 1936. As held in a long
line of decisions, extrajudicial partition can be done orally, and the same would be
valid if freely entered into (Belen v. Belen, 49 O.G. 997, March 1953). The reason for
this is because a partition is not exactly a conveyance for the reason that it does not
involve transfer of property from one to the other but rather a confirmation by them of
their ownership of the property. It must also be remembered that when Gavino Reyes
died on March 7, 1921, his property was admittedly not yet covered by a torrens title,
as it was only in 1941 when said properties were brought into the application of the
torrens system. With this factual milieu, it can also be concluded that his heirs have
indeed settled, subdivided and partitioned Gavino Reyes' landed estate without
formal requirements of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court when a parcel of land is covered
by a torrens title. As told earlier, the Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6) undisputedly showed
on its face that the 70 hectares of land belonging to the late Gavino Reyes was
subdivided and partitioned by his children in 1936. On this score, the partition of the
said property even without the formal requirements under the rule is valid as held in
the case of Hernandez vs. Andal, 78 Phil. 176, which states:
x x x           x x x          x x x
Moreover, in the Deed of Sale dated December 3, 1943 (Exh. 5) executed by Rafael
Reyes, Sr. in favor of appellant Dalmacio Gardiola, the land sold therein was
described as "na aking minana sa aking ama." This alone would confirm the
contention of the appellants that there was already an actual partition (at least an oral
partition) of the property of Gavino Reyes in 1936. As aforestated, the presence of
the Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6) is an (sic) evidence of such partition which appellees
failed to controvert not to mention the fact that the lower court itself recognized the
existence of said plan, in the same manner that it concluded that the property was
already surveyed and actually subdivided in 1936 (page 3, pars. 3 and 4, Decision).
From the foregoing considerations it is evident that the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate (Exh. D) executed by the grandchildren of the late Gavino
Reyes in 1967 is of no moment considering that the property subject of the partition
in the deed was already partitioned in 1936 by the children of Gavino Reyes. It is for
this reason that the lots supposedly inherited by the grandchildren named in the deed
of 1967 were the same lots inherited and given to their respective fathers or mothers
in 1936 while the land was not yet covered by the torrens system. Hence, in the case
of Rafael Reyes, Sr., the land inherited by him was two (2) parcels of land known as
Lots Nos. 1-A-3 and 1-A-14 described in the Subdivision plan of 1936 (Exh. 6), which
were the same parcels of land allegedly inherited by Rafael Reyes, Jr. from Gavino
Reyes in representation of his father, pursuant to the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
of Estate for which TCT No. 27257 was issued.
Coming to the second issue, the lower court likewise erred when it concluded that the
parcel of land sold by appellee's predecessor-in-interest to appellant Dalmacio
Gardiola was not the same parcel of land under litigation. It must be pointed out that
the identity of the parcel of land which the appellees sought to recover from the
appellants was never an issue in the lower court, because the litigants had already
conceded that the parcel identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257 was the
same parcel of land identified as Cadastral Lot No. 1228 and 1235 described in Tax
Declaration No. 4766. Despite this admission, however, the lower court declared that
"as described in the deed of sale (Exh. 5), the land's description does not tally with
the description of Lot No. 1-A-14, the land in litigation." As correctly pointed out by
the appellants however, the discrepancy in the description was due to the fact that
the description of the land sold in the Deed of Sale was expressed in layman's
language whereas the description of Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257 was done in
technical terms. This was so because, when Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold the property in
dispute to appellant Dalmacio Gardiola on December 3, 1943, the only evidence of
title to the land then available in so far as Rafael Reyes, Sr. was concerned was Tax
Declaration No. 4766, because at that time, neither he nor appellant Dalmacio
Gardiola was aware of the existence of OCT No. 255 as in fact TCT No. 27257 was
issued only in 1967. Consequently, the land subject of the Deed of Sale was
described by the vendor in the manner as described in Tax Declaration No. 4766.
However, the description of the land appearing in the Deed of Sale (Exh. 5) was
exactly the same land identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in the Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6) of
1936. Accordingly, the assumption of the lower court that "if the land sold by Rafael
Reyes, Sr. was the one now in litigation, he could have easily indicated Lot No. 1-A-
14" is bereft of merit under the foregoing circumstances. Interestingly enough, the
appellees never denied the identity of the subject lot during the hearing at the lower
court. What they were denying only was the sale made by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to
appellant Dalmacio Gardiola which does not hold true because of the document
denominated as Deed of Sale (Exh. 5).11
It concluded that the trial court erred when it ordered the private respondents or anyone
acting in their behalf to relinquish the possession or vacate the property in question. It thus
decreed:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment is ordered REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
a new one is rendered declaring appellants to be the lawful owners of the lot
identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257. No 
costs.12
Their motion to reconsider the above decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals in
its resolution of 1 March 1990,13 petitioners filed the instant petition on 6 April 1990 after
having obtained an extension of time within which to file it.
The petition does not implead original new defendants Ricardo Gardiola and Emelita
Gardiola.
As ground for their plea for the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioners
allege that said court has decided questions of substance in a way not in accord with law or
applicable jurisprudence when it held that "the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate (Exh.
"D") executed by the grandchildren of the late Gavino Reyes in 1967 is of no moment
considering that the property subject of the partition was already partitioned in 1936 by the
children of Gavino Reyes." In support thereof, they claim that (a) TCT No. 27257 covers two
parcels of land; the lot described in paragraph 1 thereof is owned by petitioners and that
ownership was confirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 79882, hence, the Court of Appeals
should have affirmed the decision of the trial court; (b) private respondent Rosario Martillano
was a party to the extrajudicial settlement of estate which was duly registered in the Registry
of Deeds in 1967; said registration is the operative act that gives validity to the transfer or
creates a lien upon the land and also constituted constructive notice to the whole world. The
court cannot disregard the binding effect thereof Finally, the pronouncement of the Court of
Appeals that private respondents are the lawful owners of the lot in question "militates against
the indefeasible and incontrovertible character of the torrens title,"14 and allows reconveyance
which is not tenable since the action therefor had already prescribed, as stated in the
decision of the trial court.
In the resolution of 7 May 1990, We required respondents to comment on the petition. But
even before it could do so, petitioner, without obtaining prior leave of the Court, filed on 29
May 1990 a so-called Supplemental Arguments in Support of The Petition For Review
On certiorari15 wherein they assert, among others, that: (a) the findings of facts of respondent
Court are contrary to those of the trial court and appear to be contradicted by the evidence on
record thus calling for the review by this Court;16 (b) it also committed misapprehension of the
facts in this case and its findings are based on speculation, conjecture and surmises; (c)
private respondents' attack on petitioners' title is a collateral attack which is not allowed; even
if it is allowed, the same had already prescribed and is now barred.
It was only on 15 June 1990 that private respondents filed their Comment.17 We required
petitioners to reply thereto, which they complied with on 8 August 1990.18 A rejoinder was
filed by private respondents on 29 August 1990.
We gave due course to the petition on 19 September 1990 and required the parties to submit
simultaneously their respective memoranda which they complied with.
Attached as Annex "A" to private respondent's Memorandum, which was filed on 10
December 1990, is the Resolution of this Court (Third Division) of 20 August 1990 in G.R. No.
92811 entitled Spouses Artemio Durumpili and Angustia Reyes vs. The Court of Appeals and
Spouses Dalmacio Gardiola and Rosario Martillano, which also involves the property of
Gavino Reyes, the partition thereof among his children in 1936, and the extrajudicial
settlement in 1967.
In said resolution, this Court held:
. . . The partition made in 1936, although oral, was valid. The requirement in Article
1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the creation, transmission,
modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property must appear in
a public instrument is only for convenience and not for validity or enforceability as
between the parties themselves. [Thunga Hui vs. Que Bentec, 2 Phil. 561 (1903)]
The subsequent execution by the heirs of the Extrajudicial Partition in 1967 did not
alter the oral partition as in fact the share pertaining to Angustia Reyes corresponded
to that previously assigned to her father. Considering that Angel Reyes sold this
property to Basilio de Ocampo who, in turn, sold the same to respondents, we agree
with the Court of Appeals that the latter lawfully acquired the property and are entitled
to ownership and possession thereof.
In answer to the charge of private respondents that petitioners deliberately failed to cite this
resolution, the latter, in their reply-memorandum dated 15 March 1991 and filed three days
thereafter, allege:
Our failure to mention the aforementioned resolution before this Honorable Court is
not deliberate nor with malice aforethought. The reason is that to date, we have not
yet received any resolution to our Motion For Leave of Court To Refer Case To The
Honorable Supreme Court En Banc. Moreover, we honestly feel that the resolution
that will be issued therein will not be applicable to the case before this Honorable
Court's Second Division. It should be mentioned that in the Durumpili case before the
Third Division, the Court of Appeals relied on the alleged confirmation of the sale
executed by Angustia Reyes, while in the Reyes case before this Second Division,
there was no sale that was executed by the petitioners Reyes' predecessor-in-
interest, Rafael Reyes, Jr.
The foregoing claim is not supported by the rollo of G.R. No. 92811, which reveals the
following: (a) On 18 September 1990, petitioners therein, represented by De Lara, De Lunas
and Rosales, who are the lawyers of petitioners in the instant case, filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the resolution of 20 August 1990.19 b) This motion was denied in the
resolution of 1 October 1990.20 c) On 17 November 1990, petitioners therein, through the
same lawyers, filed a Motion For Leave Of Court To Refer Case To The Honorable Supreme
Court En Banc And/Or Motion For Reconsideration21 wherein they specifically admit that said
case and the instant petition have "identity and/or similarity of the parties, the facts, the
issues raised," even going to the extent of "graphically" illustrating where such similarities
lie.22 d) This motion was denied in the resolution of 28 November 1990. Copy thereof was
furnished the attorneys for petitioners.23 e) Entry of judgment had already been made therein
and a copy thereof was sent to petitioner's counsel per Letter of Transmittal of the Deputy
Court and Chief of the Judicial Records Office dated 20 December 1990.
What comes out prominently from the disquisitions of the parties is this simple issue: whether
or not respondent Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in setting aside the
decision of the trial court.
We find none. The reversal of the trial court's decision is inevitable and unavoidable because
the legal and factual conclusions made by the trial court are unfounded and clearly
erroneous. The Court of Appeals was not bound to agree to such conclusions. The trial court
erred in holding that: (a) there was no partition among the children of Gavino Reyes in 1936
since there is no written evidence in support thereof; yet, it admits that there was a survey
and subdivision of the property and the adjudication of specific subdivision lots to each of the
children of Gavino; (b) the land sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondents is not
identical to Lot No. 1-A-14, the lot specified for and adjudicated to Rafael Reyes, Jr. in the
partition agreement; and (c) if the land sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent
Dalmacio Gardiola is indeed Lot No. 1-A-14 and that TCT No. T-27257 was obtained through
fraud, the remedy open to the vendee was an action for reconveyance, which should have
been brought within four (4) years from the discovery thereof in 1967 when the Extrajudicial
Settlement was executed since private respondent Rosario Martillano, wife of Dalmacio, was
a party thereto.
The Court of Appeals correctly held that the partition made by the children of Gavino Reyes in
1936, although oral, was valid and binding. There is no law that requires partition among
heirs to be in writing to be valid.24 In Hernandez vs. Andal, supra, this Court, interpreting
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, held that the requirement that a partition be put in
a public document and registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the
same time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of
registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity
of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when there
are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. Where no such rights are involved,
it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a
manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law. There is nothing in said section
from which it can be inferred that a writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the
validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral partition is valid.
Barcelona, et al. vs. Barcelona, et al., supra, provides the reason why oral partition is valid
and why it is not covered by the Statute of Frauds: partition among heirs or renunciation of an
inheritance by some of them is not exactly a conveyance of real property for the reason that it
does not involve transfer of property from one to the other, but rather a confirmation or
ratification of title or right of property by the heir renouncing in favor of another heir accepting
and receiving the inheritance.
Additionally, the validity of such oral partition in 1936 has been expressly sustained by this
Court in the Resolution of 20 August 1990 in G.R. No. 92811.25
But even if We are to assume arguendo that the oral partition executed in 1936 was not valid
for some reason or another, We would still arrive at the same conclusion for upon the death
of Gavino Reyes in 1921, his heirs automatically became co-owners of his 70-hectare parcel
of land. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent.26 The estate of the decedent would then be held in co-ownership by the heirs. The
co-heir or co-owner may validly dispose of his share or interest in the property subject to the
condition that the portion disposed of is eventually allotted to him in the division upon
termination of the co-ownership. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
In Ramirez vs. Bautista,27 this Court held that every co-heir has the absolute ownership of his
share in the community property and may alienate, assign, or mortgage the same, except as
to purely personal rights, but the effect of any such transfer is limited to the portion which may
be awarded to him upon the partition of the property.
In the case at bar, the lot sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola
is his share in the estate of his deceased father, Gavino Reyes. It is the same property which
was eventually adjudicated to his son and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr., represented in turn by his
heirs-petitioners herein-in the extrajudicial settlement of 1967.
In respect to the issue as to whether the property sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. is identical to Lot
No. 1-14-A, the trial court based its conclusion that it is not, on his observation that the
description of the former does not tally with that of the latter, moreover, if Rafael did intend to
sell Lot No. 1-14-A, he should have specifically stated it in the deed since at that time, the
property had already been partitioned and said lot was adjudicated to him. In addition to the
contrary findings and conclusion of the respondent Court on this issue to which We fully
agree, it is to be stressed that Rafael had this property declared for taxation purposes and the
tax declaration issued was made the basis for the description of the property in the deed of
sale. Upon the execution of the deed of sale, vendee — herein private respondent Dalmacio
Gardiola — immediately took possession of the property. This is the very same property
which is the subject matter of this case and which petitioners seek to recover from the private
respondents. The main evidence adduced for their claim of ownership and possession over it
is TCT No. T-27257, the certificate of title covering Lot No. 1-14-A. They therefore admit and
concede that the property claimed by private respondent, which was acquired by sale from
Rafael Reyes, Sr., is none other than Lot No. 1-14-A.
The participation of private respondent Rosario Gardiola in the Extrajudicial Settlement did
not place private respondents in estoppel to question the issuance of TCT No. T-27257. As
correctly maintained by private respondents, she signed it in representation of her deceased
mother, Marta Reyes, a daughter and an heir of Gavino Reyes. She did not sign for and in
behalf of her husband, Dalmacio Gardiola, vendee of the share of Rafael Reyes, Sr.
The same did not operate to divest the vendee of the share of Rafael Reyes, Sr. in the estate
of Gavino.1âwphi1Petitioners, as mere successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., son of
Rafael Reyes, Sr., can only acquire that which Rafael, Jr. could transmit to them upon his
death. The latter never became the owner of Lot No. 1-A-14 because it was sold by his father
in 1943. The issuance of TCT No. T-27257 in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr., in so far as Lot
No. 1-14-A is concerned, was clearly erroneous because he never became its owner. An
extrajudicial settlement does not create a light in favor of an heir. As this Court stated in
the Barcelona case,28 it is but a confirmation or ratification of title or right to property. Thus,
since he never had any title or right to Lot No. 1-14-A, the mere execution of the settlement
did not improve his condition, and the subsequent registration of the deed did not create any
right or vest any title over the property in favor of the petitioners as heirs of Rafael Reyes, Jr.
The latter cannot give them what he never had before. Nemo dare potest quod non habet.

There is one more point that should be stressed here. Petitioners' immediate predecessor-in-
interest, Rafael Reyes, Jr., never took any action against private respondents from the time
his father sold the lot to the latter. Neither did petitioners bring any action to recover from
private respondents the ownership and possession of the lot from the time Rafael Reyes, Jr.
died. As categorically admitted by petitioners in their complaint and amended complaint, it
was only in or about September 1969 when, after the delivery of TCT No. 27257 by Candido
Hebron to them, that they definitely discovered that they were the owners of the property in
question. And yet, despite full knowledge that private respondents were in actual physical
possession of the property, it was only about thirteen and one-half (13 1/2) years later that
they decided to file an action for recovery of possession. As stated earlier, the original
complaint was filed in the trial court on 14 March 1983. There was then absolutely no basis
for the trial court to place the burden on private respondents to bring an action for
reconveyance within four (4) years from their discovery of the issuance of the transfer
certificate of title in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr.

The instant petition then is without merit.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the petition with costs against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 198680               July 8, 2013
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y.
BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y.
PEÑALOSA, PETITIONERS,  while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with Magdaleno in a
vs.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City,
Branch 59 (RTC), through a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, raising a pure question of law. In particular, petitioners assail the July
27, 20112 and August 31, 20113 Orders of the RTC, dismissing Civil Case No. T-
2246 for lack of cause of action.
The Facts
On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins, 4 filed a complaint
for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint)
against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E. Ypon"
(Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246.5 In their complaint, they alleged that
Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on June 28, 1968, leaving
behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A.6 Claiming to be the sole heir of
Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the
cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their subsequent
transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638, 7 to the prejudice of
petitioners who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.8
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced
by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c)
a certified true copy of his passport.9 Further, by way of affirmative defense, he
claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the complaint
fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by the real parties-
in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared
as Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.10
The RTC Ruling
On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order,11 finding that the
subject complaint failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso. It observed that
previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration, 12 this did not
mean that they could already be considered as the decedent’s compulsory heirs.
Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is
Magdaleno’s son – and hence, his compulsory heir – through the documentary
evidence he submitted which consisted of: (a) a marriage contract between
Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of Live Birth; (c) a Letter
dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport.13
The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied
on August 31, 2011 due to the counsel’s failure to state the date on which his
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance was issued.14
Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-
2246,15 sought direct recourse to the Court through the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the
RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state a
cause of action was proper.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another.16 It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by
the allegations in the complaint.17 In this relation, a complaint is said to assert a
sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct,
the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for.18Accordingly, if the allegations
furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should
not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the
defendants.19
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein,
alleged that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed
that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared null and
void and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the latter’s favor be cancelled.
While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would consequently warrant
the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the determination of a
decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special
proceeding20 precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and
reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v.
CA,21 the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the determination of who
are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for
such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or
possession, as in this case:
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the
deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an
ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property.1âwphi1 This
must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership.
The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of
heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in
a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a
civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made
only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of
heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil
action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x:
In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated
its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated
in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the
purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court
held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent's
estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was
for the recovery of property.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations
omitted)
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the
determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when
the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and
already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had
consequently rendered judgment thereon,23 or when a special proceeding had been
instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-
opened.24
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to
exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to
determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of
Civil Case No. T-2246.
Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the
same fails to state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to
the proper appreciation of the questions before it.25 Thus, concordant with applicable
jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary
action for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No.
T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that the RTC erred
in ruling on Gaudioso’s heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out
and determined in the proper special proceeding. As such, the foregoing
pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal effect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 is
hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to any subsequent proceeding to determine
the lawful heirs of the late Magdaleno Ypon and the rights concomitant therewith.
SO ORDERED.
  
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioner did not have the
legal personality to sue because his birth certificate names him as Joselito Musni Muno.
Apropos, there was yet a need for a judicial declaration that Joselito Musni Puno and Joselito
Musni Muno were one and the same.
 
The court ordered that the proceedings be held in abeyance, ratiocinating that
JOSELITO MUSNI PUNO G.R. No. 177066 petitioners certificate of live birth was no proof of his paternity and relation to Carlos L. Puno.
(as heir of the late Carlos Puno),    
Petitioner, Present: Petitioner submitted the corrected birth certificate with the name Joselito M. Puno,
    certified by the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila, and the Certificate of Finality thereof. To
  YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., hasten the disposition of the case, the court conditionally admitted the corrected birth
  Chairperson, certificate as genuine and authentic and ordered respondent to file its answer within fifteen
  CHICO-NAZARIO, days from the order and set the case for pretrial.[3]
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,  
  NACHURA, and On October 11, 2005, the court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which
  PERALTA, JJ. reads:
     
    WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering Jesusa Puno
PUNO ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by Promulgated: and/or Felicidad Fermin to allow the plaintiff to inspect the corporate books
JESUSA PUNO,   and records of the company from 1962 up to the present including the
Respondent. September 11, 2009 financial statements of the corporation.
     
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x The costs of copying shall be shouldered by the plaintiff. Any
  expenses to be incurred by the defendant to be able to comply with this order
  shall be the subject of a bill of costs.
DECISION  
  SO ORDERED.[4]
NACHURA, J.:  
  On appeal, the CA ordered the dismissal of the complaint in its Decision dated October 11,
Upon the death of a stockholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders 2006. According to the CA, petitioner was not able to establish the paternity of and his filiation
of the corporation; neither are they mandatorily entitled to the rights and privileges of a to Carlos L. Puno since his birth certificate was prepared without the intervention of and the
stockholder. This, we declare in this petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals participatory acknowledgment of paternity by Carlos L. Puno. Accordingly, the CA said that
(CA) Decision[1] dated October 11, 2006 and Resolution dated March 6, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV petitioner had no right to demand that he be allowed to examine respondents books.
No. 86137. Moreover, petitioner was not a stockholder of the corporation but was merely claiming rights
  as an heir of Carlos L. Puno, an incorporator of the corporation. His action for specific
The facts of the case follow: performance therefore appeared to be premature; the proper action to be taken was to prove
  the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L. Puno in a petition for the settlement of the estate
Carlos L. Puno, who died on June 25, 1963, was an incorporator of respondent Puno of the latter.[5]
Enterprises, Inc. On March 14, 2003, petitioner Joselito Musni Puno, claiming to be an heir of  
Carlos L. Puno, initiated a complaint for specific performance against respondent. Petitioner Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution[6] dated March
averred that he is the son of the deceased with the latters common-law wife, Amelia Puno. As 6, 2007.
surviving heir, he claimed entitlement to the rights and privileges of his late father as  
stockholder of respondent. The complaint thus prayed that respondent allow petitioner to In this petition, petitioner raises the following issues:
inspect its corporate book, render an accounting of all the transactions it entered into from  
1962, and give petitioner all the profits, earnings, dividends, or income pertaining to the
shares of Carlos L. Puno.[2]
 I.                   THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
RULING THAT THE JOSELITO PUNO IS ENTITLED TO THE
RELIEFS DEMANDED HE BEING THE HEIR OF THE LATE
CARLOS PUNO, ONE OF THE INCORPORATORS [OF]
RESPONDENT CORPORATION.
 
II.                HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
FILIATION OF JOSELITO PUNO, THE PETITIONER[,] IS NOT
DULY PROVEN OR ESTABLISHED.
 
III.             THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT
JOSELITO MUNO AND JOSELITO PUNO REFERS TO THE ONE
AND THE SAME PERSON.
 
IV.             THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
RULING THAT WHAT RESPONDENT MERELY DISPUTES IS THE
SURNAME OF THE PETITIONER WHICH WAS MISSPELLED AND
THE FACTUAL ALLEGATION E.G. RIGHTS OF PETITIONER AS
HEIR OF CARLOS PUNO ARE DEEMED ADMITTED
HYPOTHETICALLY IN THE RESPONDENT[S] MOTION TO
DISMISS.
 
V.                THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THEREFORE
ERRED I[N] DECREEING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED
TO INSPECT THE CORPORATE BOOKS OF DEFENDANT
CORPORATION.[7]
 
The petition is without merit. Petitioner failed to establish the right to inspect
respondent corporations books and receive dividends on the stocks owned by Carlos L.
Puno.
 
Petitioner anchors his claim on his being an heir of the deceased
stockholder. However, we agree with the appellate court that petitioner was not able to prove
satisfactorily his filiation to the deceased stockholder; thus, the former cannot claim to be an
heir of the latter.
Incessantly, we have declared that factual findings of the CA supported by
substantial evidence, are conclusive and binding.[8] In an appeal via certiorari, the Court may
not review the factual findings of the CA.  It is not the Courts function under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court to review, examine, and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence
presented.[9]
 
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of the certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of
an illegitimate child on the information of a third person. [10] As correctly observed by the CA,
only petitioners mother supplied the data in the birth certificate and signed the same. There
was no evidence that Carlos L. Puno acknowledged petitioner as his son.
 
As for the baptismal certificate, we have already decreed that it can only serve as
evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not of the veracity
of the entries with respect to the childs paternity.[11]
 
In any case, Sections 74 and 75 of the Corporation Code enumerate the persons
who are entitled to the inspection of corporate books, thus
 
Sec. 74. Books to be kept; stock transfer agent. x x x.
 
The records of all business transactions of the corporation and the
minutes of any meeting shall be open to the inspection of any director,
trustee, stockholder or member of the corporation at reasonable hours on
business days and he may demand, in writing, for a copy of excerpts from
said records or minutes, at his expense.
 
xxxx
 
Sec. 75. Right to financial statements. Within ten (10) days from
receipt of a written request of any stockholder or member, the corporation
shall furnish to him its most recent financial statement, which shall include a
balance sheet as of the end of the last taxable year and a profit or loss of
statement for said taxable year, showing in reasonable detail its assets and
liabilities and the result of its operations.[12]
 
The stockholders right of inspection of the corporations books and records is based
upon his ownership of shares in the corporation and the necessity for self-protection. After all,
a shareholder has the right to be intelligently informed about corporate affairs.[13] Such right
rests upon the stockholders underlying ownership of the corporations assets and property.[14]
 
Similarly, only stockholders of record are entitled to receive dividends declared by the
corporation, a right inherent in the ownership of the shares.[15]
Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders
of the corporation and acquire the rights and privileges of the deceased as shareholder of the
corporation. The stocks must be distributed first to the heirs in estate proceedings, and the
transfer of the stocks must be recorded in the books of the corporation. Section 63 of the
Corporation Code provides that no transfer shall be valid, except as between the parties, until
the transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation. [16] During such interim period, the
heirs stand as the equitable owners of the stocks, the executor or administrator duly
appointed by the court being vested with the legal title to the stock. [17]Until a settlement and
division of the estate is effected, the stocks of the decedent are held by the administrator or
executor.[18] Consequently, during such time, it is the administrator or executor who is entitled
to exercise the rights of the deceased as stockholder.
 
Thus, even if petitioner presents sufficient evidence in this case to establish that he is
the son of Carlos L. Puno, he would still not be allowed to inspect respondents books and be
entitled to receive dividends from respondent, absent any showing in its transfer book that
some of the shares owned by Carlos L. Puno were transferred to him. This would only be
possible if petitioner has been recognized as an heir and has participated in the settlement of
the estate of the deceased.
 
Corollary to this is the doctrine that a determination of whether a person, claiming
proprietary rights over the estate of a deceased person, is an heir of the deceased must be
ventilated in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of settling the estate of
the latter. The status of an illegitimate child who claims to be an heir to a decedents estate
cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action, as in a case for the recovery of property.
[19]
 The doctrine applies to the instant case, which is one for specific performance to direct
respondent corporation to allow petitioner to exercise rights that pertain only to the deceased
and his representatives.
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated October 11, 2006 and Resolution dated March 6, 2007 are AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 133743             February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner, 
vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029             February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,  cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have
vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September
12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners’
motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo),
who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo
contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of
which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On
August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a
son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a
Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United
States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding
Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed
Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire
Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived
with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-
3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the
decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro
Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by
his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both
conjugal and exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not
have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated
and that letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a
been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to
his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was
still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in
seeking the dismissal 10of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an
Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo
exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in
New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further,
she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit,
State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been
dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of
paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate
respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in
derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion
to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for
reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal
standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for
disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge
Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even
date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition.
The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position
papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On
May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in
his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed
their position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It
held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of
the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and
not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition
for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void
ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry
Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It
also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied
because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but
said motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the
trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term
"place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his
estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of
abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although
Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang,
Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by
virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry
Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26,
Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus –
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of
the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the
enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view —
sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code,
contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed,
courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and
effect to the express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the
Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to
remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and
petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can
institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were denied by
the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on
certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which
was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject
petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death,
Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in
Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38"residence" is synonymous
with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one
intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time.
Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration should
have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous
because it was performed during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They
argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair
vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be
considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent
has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of
the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he
resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid
down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as contradistinguished from domicile –
of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it
is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between
the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms
are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual
or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of
time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval
and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases.
Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and
"residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and
"domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which
when absent, one has the intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue
under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal
residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it
is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from
1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute
Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property.
She also presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese
General Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo
at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of
membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country
Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s children to him at
his Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is
at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is
in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition
for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial
jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993.
At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court
of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were
then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the
subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his
alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s
marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took
effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the
provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient
jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his
Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad
by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse
alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected.
The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had
no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the
Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to
free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to
bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law.
When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again,
that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer
be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her
marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still marriedto private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should
not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized
the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is
not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the
severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each
other,  hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by
his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on
December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code
provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in
the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital
ties between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a
necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien
spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn  stating that "if the foreigner
obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law." 59In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in
relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative
intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26
thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No.
227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A
second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.  (Emphasis
supplied)
x x x x
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn  case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated
to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and
paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through
judicial precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to
one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way
should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two
parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered
released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs
where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this
case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void
under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court’s
rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against
in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add,
by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern
of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as
this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law
and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws
that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of
its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature
and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we
do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as
the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is
worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are
warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond
them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish
to render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the
facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential
ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that
will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the
law be dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by
Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with
the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the
records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by
Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving
foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by
the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines,
such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A.,
she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family
Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with
the said law. As stated in Garcia,  however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on
the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for
letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the
properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted
to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in
part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the
petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such
as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must
be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct
interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was
not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to
remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of
the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further
This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband proceedings.
and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It
provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or SO ORDERED.
their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership,
it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie  presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed
equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the
applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in
Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living
together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of
Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before
the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property regime
under this provision as follows:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not
legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and
wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of
money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.

xxxx

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-
ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property is essential. x x x

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved
by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence
and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his
co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and
affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’
motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for

G.R. No. 189121               July 31, 2013
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER
QUIAZON, Petitioners,  his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,7 the petition for
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE
QUIAZON, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, primarily assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision rendered by the Ninth Division of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589,1the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated March 11, 2005, and the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 275, Las Piñas City are AFFIRMED in toto.2
The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon
(Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and daughter. The
petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo
was married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria
Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother,
Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.3 In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise
claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time
when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity
of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by
claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the
latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent,
Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of
Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left
real properties worth ₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth ₱2,100,000.00. In order to
preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her
appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children,
Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death
Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of
settlement of decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas
City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no
factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of
Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the
venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position
taken by the petitioners that Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The
dispositive of the RTC decision reads:
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any disqualification or
incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of administration over the estate of the
decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after
the approval by this Court of a bond in the amount of ₱100,000.00 to be posted by her.9
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008
Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the
findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and
Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s
death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court
of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of
Las Piñas City. The petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of
Appeals in its Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.
The Issues
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and
Resolution on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO
QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION
FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC
OF LAS PIÑAS;
 II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA
GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO
PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON
HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION.12
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at
the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now
Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is
an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it
is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor.13Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence
and not domicile in the technical sense.14 Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant."15In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual
or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.16 It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for
special proceedings have one and the same meaning.18 As thus defined, "residence," in the
context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of
abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.19
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming
the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly
laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at
No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue
for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in
Eliseo’s Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate
should be settled. While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a
decedent’s residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on
the courts. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with
Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in
1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial
partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the
ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to the extent of
taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable petitioners’
position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It
disproves rather than supports petitioners’ submission that the lower courts’ findings arose
from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of the trial court,
when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this
Court.21
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring
Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage
has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the
marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime
of the parties to the marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the
marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code,
making the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Niñal,
the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after the death of their
father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death
of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it
but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.24
It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot
be the source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to
the marriage.25
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be
prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage
even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an
action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably,
Elise, as a compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity
of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage
does not extinguish such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia, we now proceed
to determine whether or not the decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage
between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of
Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of
San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent
evidence of marriage and the certification from the National Archive that no information
relative to the said marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries
therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was celebrated more than 50
years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of marriage can no longer be found in the
National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely remote. Consequently, in the
absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and
Eliseo’s marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is
bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention that Elise has not
shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are
entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in the
will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in
the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or
next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or
next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it
may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to
such other person as the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of
Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the
petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of
the creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate,
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate
proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent Is
such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.28
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution
of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on
record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack
of interest in the administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway
this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be
appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right
as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the
estate are satisfied.29 Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his
natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of
the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly,
the Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution,
arc AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 128314. May 29, 2002]
RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO
JAO, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag and
Andrea V. Jao, who died intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively. The decedents left real
estate, cash, shares of stock and other personal properties.
On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of administration
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99, over the estate of his parents,
docketed as Special Proceedings No. Q-91-8507.[1] Pending the appointment of a regular
administrator, Perico moved that he be appointed as special administrator. He alleged that
his brother, Rodolfo, was gradually dissipating the assets of the estate. More particularly,
Rodolfo was receiving rentals from real properties without rendering any accounting, and
forcibly opening vaults belonging to their deceased parents and disposing of the cash and
valuables therein.
[2]
Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper venue.  He
argued that the deceased spouses did not reside in Quezon City either during their lifetime or
at the time of their deaths. The decedents actual residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga,
where his late mother used to run and operate a bakery. As the health of his parents
deteriorated due to old age, they stayed in Rodolfos residence at 61 Scout Gandia Street,
Quezon City, solely for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment and
hospitalization. Rodolfo submitted documentary evidence previously executed by the
decedents, consisting of income tax returns, voters affidavits, statements of assets and
liabilities, real estate tax payments, motor vehicle registration and passports, all indicating
that their permanent residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga.
[3]
In his opposition,  Perico countered that their deceased parents actually resided in
Rodolfos house in Quezon City at the time of their deaths. As a matter of fact, it was
conclusively declared in their death certificates that their last residence before they died was
at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City.[4] Rodolfo himself even supplied the entry appearing
on the death certificate of their mother, Andrea, and affixed his own signature on the said
document.
Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave the information regarding the decedents
residence on the death certificates in good faith and through honest mistake. He gave his
residence only as reference, considering that their parents were treated in their late years at
the Medical City General Hospital in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Their stay in his house was
merely transitory, in the same way that they were taken at different times for the same
purpose to Pericos residence at Legaspi Towers in Roxas Boulevard. The death certificates
could not, therefore, be deemed conclusive evidence of the decedents residence in light of
the other documents showing otherwise.[5]
The court required the parties to submit their respective nominees for the position. [6] Both
failed to comply, whereupon the trial court ordered that the petition be archived.[7]
V.
Subsequently, Perico moved that the intestate proceedings be revived.[8] After the
parties submitted the names of their respective nominees, the trial court designated Justice
Carlos L. Sundiam as special administrator of the estate of Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea
Jao.[9]
On April 6, 1994, the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Rodolfo was denied, to wit:
A mere perusal of the death certificates of the spouses issued separately in 1988 and 1989,
respectively, confirm the fact that Quezon City was the last place of residence of the
decedents. Surprisingly, the entries appearing on the death certificate of Andrea V. Jao were
supplied by movant, Rodolfo V. Jao, whose signature appears in said document. Movant,
therefore, cannot disown his own representation by taking an inconsistent position other than
his own admission. xxx xxx xxx.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, this court DENIES for lack of merit
movants motion to dismiss.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Rodolfo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 35908. On December 11, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion of the court a quo having
been shown, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned order of the
respondent Judge is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.[11]
 Rodolfos motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in the assailed
resolution dated February 17, 1997.[12] Hence, this petition for review, anchored on the
following grounds:
I VII
RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN
ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE APPLICABLE
DECISION ALREADY RENDERED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
II
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE
COURT IN THE CASE OF EUSEBIO VS. EUSEBIO, 100 PHILS. 593, WHICH CLEARLY
INTERPRETED WHAT IS MEANT BY RESIDENCE IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 OF THE RULES
OF COURT.
III
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PHYSICAL PRESENCE IN A PLACE
AT THE TIME OF DEATH IS DETERMINATIVE OF DECEDENTS RESIDENCE RATHER
THAN THE INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT
RESIDENCE IN ANOTHER PLACE.
IV
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING BY ANALOGY THE RESIDENCE
CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 2 OF RULE 4 FOR THE PURPOSE OF SERVING SUMMONS
TO A DEFENDANT IN A PERSONAL ACTION TO THE RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN
SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING VENUE IN THE
SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED.
V of death, the following factors must be considered, namely, the decedent had: (a) capacity to
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE ENTRY OF
PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE RESPECTIVE DEATH
CERTIFICATES OF THE DECEDENTS RATHER THAN THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE
SHOWING THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR
PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.
VI
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL AS
AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH CAN NOT BE MORE PERSUASIVE THAN THE CLEAR
INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS THEMSELVES TO ESTABLISH PERMANENT
RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
DESPITE THE CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT IN
INSISTING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF SP. PROCEEDING NO. Q-91-8507.[13]
The main issue before us is: where should the settlement proceedings be had --- in
Pampanga, where the decedents had their permanent residence, or in Quezon City, where
they actually stayed before their demise?
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Where estate of deceased persons be settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved,
or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested
in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (underscoring ours)
Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of
administration granted in the proper court located in the province where the decedent resides
at the time of his death.
Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et al.,[14] where
we held that the situs of settlement proceedings shall be the place where the decedent had
his permanent residence or domicile at the time of death. In determining residence at the time
choose and freedom of choice; (b) physical presence at the place chosen; and (c) intention to
stay therein permanently.[15] While it appears that the decedents in this case chose to be
physically present in Quezon City for medical convenience, petitioner avers that they never
adopted Quezon City as their permanent residence.
The contention lacks merit.
The facts in Eusebio were different from those in the case at bar. The decedent therein,
Andres Eusebio, passed away while in the process of transferring his personal belongings to
a house in Quezon City. He was then suffering from a heart ailment and was advised by his
doctor/son to purchase a Quezon City residence, which was nearer to his doctor. While he
was able to acquire a house in Quezon City, Eusebio died even before he could move
therein. In said case, we ruled that Eusebio retained his domicile --- and hence, residence ---
in San Fernando, Pampanga. It cannot be said that Eusebio changed his residence because,
strictly speaking, his physical presence in Quezon City was just temporary.
In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have transferred to
petitioners Quezon City residence. Petitioner failed to sufficiently refute respondents
assertion that their elderly parents stayed in his house for some three to four years before
they died in the late 1980s.
Furthermore, the decedents respective death certificates state that they were both
residents of Quezon City at the time of their demise. Significantly, it was petitioner himself
who filled up his late mothers death certificate. To our mind, this unqualifiedly shows that at
that time, at least, petitioner recognized his deceased mothers residence to be Quezon
City. Moreover, petitioner failed to contest the entry in Ignacios death certificate,
accomplished a year earlier by respondent.
The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in evidence, were thus
properly considered and presumed to be correct by the court a quo. We agree with the
appellate courts observation that since the death certificates were accomplished even before
petitioner and respondent quarreled over their inheritance, they may be relied upon to reflect
the true situation at the time of their parents death.
The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents residence at the time of
death, over the numerous documentary evidence presented by petitioner. To be sure, the
documents presented by petitioner pertained not to  residence at the time of death, as
required by the Rules of Court, but to permanent residence or domicile. In Garcia-Fule v.
Court of Appeals,[16] we held:
xxx xxx xxx the term resides connotes ex vi termini actual residence as distinguished from
legal residence or domicile. This term resides, like the terms residing and residence, is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it
is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even
where the statute uses the word domicile still it is construed as meaning residence and not
domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms residence
and domicile but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term inhabitant. In other words, resides should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required
though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.[17]
Both the settlement court and the Court of Appeals found that the decedents have been
living with petitioner at the time of their deaths and for some time prior thereto. We find this
conclusion to be substantiated by the evidence on record. A close perusal of the challenged
decision shows that, contrary to petitioners assertion, the court below considered not only the
decedents physical presence in Quezon City, but also other factors indicating that the
decedents stay therein was more than temporary. In the absence of any substantial showing
that the lower courts factual findings stemmed from an erroneous apprehension of the
evidence presented, the same must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.
Petitioner strains to differentiate between the venue provisions found in Rule 4, Section
2,[18] on ordinary civil actions, and Rule 73, Section 1, which applies specifically to settlement
proceedings. He argues that while venue in the former understandably refers to actual
physical residence for the purpose of serving summons, it is the permanent residence of the
decedent which is significant in Rule 73, Section 1. Petitioner insists that venue for the
settlement of estates can only refer to permanent residence or domicile because it is the
place where the records of the properties are kept and where most of the decedents
properties are located.
Petitioners argument fails to persuade.
It does not necessarily follow that the records of a persons properties are kept in the
place where he permanently resides. Neither can it be presumed that a persons properties
can be found mostly in the place where he establishes his domicile. It may be that he has his
domicile in a place different from that where he keeps his records, or where he maintains
extensive personal and business interests. No generalizations can thus be formulated on the
matter, as the question of where to keep records or retain properties is entirely dependent
upon an individuals choice and peculiarities.
At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he differentiates between venue
in ordinary civil actions and venue in special proceedings. In Raymond v. Court of
Appeals[19] and Bejer v. Court of Appeals,[20] we ruled that venue for ordinary civil actions and
that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, residence, in
the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a persons actual residence or
place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.[21] All told, the
lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly held that venue for the settlement of the
decedents intestate estate was properly laid in the Quezon City court.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35908 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 149926. February 23, 2005]
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EDMUND SANTIBAEZ and
FLORENCE SANTIBAEZ ARIOLA, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court which seeks the reversal of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 2001
in CA-G.R. CV No. 48831 affirming the dismissal[2] of the petitioners complaint in Civil Case
No. 18909 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M.
Santibaez entered into a loan agreement[3] in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount was
intended for the payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-
Purpose Diesel Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory
note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations
of P43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981 and every May 31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985.
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement,
[4]
 this time in the amount of P123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the purchase
price of another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories,
and one (1) unit Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund,
executed a promissory note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such
promissory note, they also signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement [5] for the loan dated
December 13, 1980.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.[6] Subsequently in
March 1981, testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 7,
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 2706. On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs,
was appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the decedent.[7] During the
pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence
Santibaez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement[8] dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to
divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2)
tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume the
indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by
them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities[9] was
executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC
as the assignor, among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank.
Demand letters[10] for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union Bank of
the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay.
Thus, on February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint[11] for sum of money against the
heirs of Efraim Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 150,
docketed as Civil Case No. 18909. Summonses were issued against both, but the one
intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was no
information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines.[12] Accordingly, the
complaint was narrowed down to respondent Florence S. Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer[13] and alleged
that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that
the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate
court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint
agreement.
On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-raffled to the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 63.[14] Consequently, trial on the merits ensued and a decision was subsequently
rendered by the court dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The decretal portion of the
RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit.[15]
The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the
probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibaez was pending, as
the sum of money being claimed was an obligation incurred by the said decedent. The trial
court also found that the Joint Agreement apparently executed by his heirs, Edmund and
Florence, on July 22, 1981, was, in effect, a partition of the estate of the decedent. However,
the said agreement was void, considering that it had not been approved by the probate court,
and that there can be no valid partition until after the will has been probated. The trial court
further declared that petitioner failed to prove that it was the now defunct Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC had assigned its assets and liabilities. The court also
agreed to the contention of respondent Florence S. Ariola that the list of assets and liabilities
of the FCCC assigned to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank did not clearly refer to the
decedents account. Ruling that the joint agreement executed by the heirs was null and void,
the trial court held that the petitioners cause of action against respondent Florence S. Ariola
must necessarily fail.
 The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated its case to the Court of
Appeals (CA), assigning the following as errors of the trial court:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT
(EXHIBIT A) SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID
PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN
PROBATED.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD
WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE
PROCEEDING.[16]
The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation of the deceased had passed to
his legitimate children and heirs, in this case, Edmund and Florence; the unconditional
signing of the joint agreement marked as Exhibit A estopped respondent Florence S. Ariola,
and that she cannot deny her liability under the said document; as the agreement had been
signed by both heirs in their personal capacity, it was no longer necessary to present the
same before the probate court for approval; the property partitioned in the agreement was not
one of those enumerated in the holographic will made by the deceased; and the active
participation of the heirs, particularly respondent Florence S. Ariola, in the present ordinary
civil action was tantamount to a waiver to re-litigate the claim in the estate proceedings.
On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintained that the money claim of
the petitioner should have been presented before the probate court.[17]
The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held that the
petitioner should have filed its claim with the probate court as provided under Sections 1 and
5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. It further held that the partition made in the agreement was
null and void, since no valid partition may be had until after the will has been probated.
According to the CA, page 2, paragraph (e) of the holographic will covered the subject
properties (tractors) in generic terms when the deceased referred to them as all other
properties. Moreover, the active participation of respondent Florence S. Ariola in the case did
not amount to a waiver. Thus, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 63, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[18]
In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the following errors to the CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT
AGREEMENT SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID
PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS OF THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ UNTIL AFTER THE
WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD
WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE
PROCEEDING.
IV.
RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE
PRINCIPAL DEBTOR THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ ON THE STRENGTH OF THE
CONTINUING GUARANTY AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER-
APPELLANT UNION BANK.
V.
THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN THE SUM OF P128,000.00 AND
DECEMBER 13, 1980 IN THE AMOUNT OF P123,000.00 CATEGORICALLY
ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT THE RESPONDENTS BOUND THEMSELVES JOINTLY
AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE LATE DEBTOR EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER UNION BANK.[19]
The petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were transmitted to the heirs
as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; there was thus no need for the probate court to
approve the joint agreement where the heirs partitioned the tractors owned by the deceased
and assumed the obligations related thereto. Since respondent Florence S. Ariola signed the
joint agreement without any condition, she is now estopped from asserting any position
contrary thereto. The petitioner also points out that the holographic will of the deceased did
not include nor mention any of the tractors subject of the complaint, and, as such was beyond
the ambit of the said will. The active participation and resistance of respondent Florence S.
Ariola in the ordinary civil action against the petitioners claim amounts to a waiver of the right
to have the claim presented in the probate proceedings, and to allow any one of the heirs
who executed the joint agreement to escape liability to pay the value of the tractors under
consideration would be equivalent to allowing the said heirs to enrich themselves to the
damage and prejudice of the petitioner.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both the trial and appellate courts
failed to consider the fact that respondent Florence S. Ariola and her brother Edmund
executed loan documents, all establishing the vinculum juris or the legal bond between the
late Efraim Santibaez and his heirs to be in the nature of a solidary obligation. Furthermore,
the Promissory Notes dated May 31, 1980 and December 13, 1980 executed by the late
Efraim Santibaez, together with his heirs, Edmund and respondent Florence, made the
obligation solidary as far as the said heirs are concerned. The petitioner also proffers that,
considering the express provisions of the continuing guaranty agreement and the promissory
notes executed by the named respondents, the latter must be held liable jointly and severally
liable thereon. Thus, there was no need for the petitioner to file its money claim before the
probate court. Finally, the petitioner stresses that both surviving heirs are being sued in their
respective personal capacities, not as heirs of the deceased.
In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintains that the
petitioner is trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim Santibaez; thus the
claim should have been filed with the probate court. She points out that at the time of the
execution of the joint agreement there was already an existing probate proceedings of which
the petitioner knew about. However, to avoid a claim in the probate court which might delay
payment of the obligation, the petitioner opted to require them to execute the said agreement.
According to the respondent, the trial court and the CA did not err in declaring that the
agreement was null and void. She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily
executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the approval
of the court as it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties. Furthermore, she had not
waived any rights, as she even stated in her answer in the court a quo that the claim should
be filed with the probate court. Thus, the petitioner could not invoke or claim that she is in
estoppel.
Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she had not signed any continuing
guaranty agreement, nor was there any document presented as evidence to show that she
had caused herself to be bound by the obligation of her late father.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the partition in the
Agreement executed by the heirs is valid; b) whether or not the heirs assumption of the
indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c) whether the petitioner can hold the heirs liable
on the obligation of the deceased.
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine
all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered.[20] The said court is primarily
concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.[21]
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until
after the will has been probated:
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has
been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because
unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to
dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides
no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance
with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.[22]
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same
properties embraced in the will.[23] In the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibaez, left a
holographic will[24] which contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my
demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding
paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-encompassing
provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his
mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter.
Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the
said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement [25] executed by Edmund and
Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time
of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late fathers
holographic will covering the said tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over all
the properties of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any way
without the probate courts approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the
Court cannot allow.[26] Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and
legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an
exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.[27] Thus, in executing any joint agreement
which appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court
approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that
part of the estate. Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the
identity of the heirs of the decedent.[28] In the instant case, there is no showing that the
signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of the decedent. When it was executed,
the probate of the will was still pending before the court and the latter had yet to determine
who the heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola to
adjudicate unto themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the
other possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate of the
deceased.
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs assumption of the
indebtedness of the decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing the joint
agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties thereto have agreed to divide between
themselves and take possession and use the above-described chattel and each of them to
assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as herein after stated which is in
favor of First Countryside Credit Corp. [29] The assumption of liability was conditioned upon the
happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take possession and use of their
respective share under the agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the partition,
and that they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were
each to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not
receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any
force and effect.
 The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The petitioner,
purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim
with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which provides:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred; exceptions. All
claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the
same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of
the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time
limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as
counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the
claimants. Where an executor or administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action
already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the
claims he has against the decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the court as
herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each other in such action; and if
final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be
considered the true balance against the estate, as though the claim had been presented
directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent,
may be approved at their present value.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is
mandatory.[30] As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:[31]
Countryside Credit Corporation and Union Bank of the Philippines [34] However, the
documentary evidence[35] clearly reflects that the parties in the deed of assignment with
assumption of liabilities were the FCCC, and the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the
conformity of Bancom Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can the petitioners participation
therein as a party be found. Furthermore, no documentary or testimonial evidence was
presented during trial to show that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now, in fact,
petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines. As the trial court declared in its decision:
[T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant that plaintiff failed to prove or did
not present evidence to prove that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now the Union Bank
of the Philippines. Judicial notice does not apply here. The power to take judicial notice is to
[be] exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety
exists; and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be promptly resolved in the
negative. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504).[36]
This being the case, the petitioners personality to file the complaint is wanting.
Consequently, it failed to establish its cause of action. Thus, the trial court did not err in
dismissing the complaint, and the CA in affirming the same.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed
Court of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the
executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim
and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious
design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early
delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires the
prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to
settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.
[32]

Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence
S. Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence
presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were
executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner
failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as
co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of
course, subject to any defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner. As the court had
not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve into the
matter further.
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner had not sufficiently shown
that it is the successor-in-interest of the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the
FCCC assigned its assets and liabilities.[33] The petitioner in its complaint alleged that by
virtue of the Deed of Assignment dated August 20, 1981 executed by and between First

[G.R. No. 134100. September 29, 2000]
PURITA ALIPIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO G. JARING,
represented by his Attorney-In-Fact RAMON G. JARING, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
The question for decision in this case is whether a creditor can sue the surviving spouse
for the collection of a debt which is owed by the conjugal partnership of gains, or whether
such claim must be filed in proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent. The
trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in the affirmative. We reverse.
The facts are as follows:
Respondent Romeo Jaring[1] was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond in Barito,
Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan. The lease was for a period of five years ending on September 12,
1990.On June 19, 1987, he subleased the fishpond, for the remaining period of his lease, to
the spouses Placido and Purita Alipio and the spouses Bienvenido and Remedios
Manuel. The stipulated amount of rent was P485,600.00, payable in two installments
of P300,000.00 and P185,600.00, with the second installment falling due on June 30,
1989. Each of the four sublessees signed the contract.
The first installment was duly paid, but of the second installment, the sublessees only
satisfied a portion thereof, leaving an unpaid balance of P50,600.00. Despite due demand,
the sublessees failed to comply with their obligation, so that, on October 13, 1989, private
respondent sued the Alipio and Manuel spouses for the collection of the said amount before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Dinalupihan, Bataan. In the alternative, he prayed for the
rescission of the sublease contract should the defendants fail to pay the balance.
Petitioner Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that her husband,
Placido Alipio, had passed away on December 1, 1988.[2] She based her action on Rule 3, 21
of the 1964 Rules of Court which then provided that "when the action is for recovery of
money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of
First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in
these rules." This provision has been amended so that now Rule 3, 20 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure provides:
When the action is for the recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and
the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending
at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue
until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be
enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the
estate of a deceased person.
The trial court denied petitioner's motion on the ground that since petitioner was herself
a party to the sublease contract, she could be independently impleaded in the suit together
with the Manuel spouses and that the death of her husband merely resulted in his exclusion
from the case.[3] The Manuel spouses failed to file their answer. For this reason, they were
declared in default.
On February 26, 1991, the lower court rendered judgment after trial, ordering petitioner
and the Manuel spouses to pay private respondent the unpaid balance of P50,600.00 plus
attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court erred in
denying her motion to dismiss. In its decision[4] rendered on July 10, 1997, the appellate court
dismissed her appeal. It held:
The rule that an action for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon must be dismissed
when the defendant dies before final judgment in the regional trial court, does not apply
where there are other defendants against whom the action should be maintained. This is the
teaching of Climaco v. Siy Uy, wherein the Supreme Court held:
Upon the facts alleged in the complaint, it is clear that Climaco had a cause of action against
the persons named as defendants therein. It was, however, a cause of action for the recovery
of damages, that is, a sum of money, and the corresponding action is, unfortunately, one that
does not survive upon the death of the defendant, in accordance with the provisions of
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
x x x x x x x x x
However, the deceased Siy Uy was not the only defendant, Manuel Co was also named
defendant in the complaint. Obviously, therefore, the order appealed from is erroneous
insofar as it dismissed the case against Co. (Underlining added)
Moreover, it is noted that all the defendants, including the deceased, were signatories to the
contract of sub-lease. The remaining defendants cannot avoid the action by claiming that the
death of one of the parties to the contract has totally extinguished their obligation as held
in Imperial Insurance, Inc. v. David:
We find no merit in this appeal. Under the law and well settled jurisprudence, when the
obligation is a solidary one, the creditor may bring his action in toto against any of the debtors
obligated in solidum.Thus, if husband and wife bound themselves jointly and severally, in
case of his death, her liability is independent of and separate from her husband's; she may be
sued for the whole debt and it would be error to hold that the claim against her as well as the
claim against her husband should be made in the decedent's estate. (Agcaoili vs. Vda. de
Agcaoili, 90 Phil. 97).[5]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied on June 4, 1998. [6] Hence
this petition based on the following assignment of errors:
A. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
APPLYING CLIMACO v. SIY UY, 19 SCRA 858, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT
THE PETITIONER WAS NOT SEEKING THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE
AGAINST REMAINING DEFENDANTS BUT ONLY WITH RESPECT TO THE
CLAIM FOR PAYMENT AGAINST HER AND HER HUSBAND WHICH
SHOULD BE PROSECUTED AS A MONEY CLAIM.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
APPLYING IMPERIAL INSURANCE INC. v. DAVID, 133 SCRA 317, WHICH IS
NOT APPLICABLE BECAUSE THE SPOUSES IN THIS CASE DID NOT BIND
THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT
JARING.[7]
The petition is meritorious. We hold that a creditor cannot sue the surviving spouse of a
decedent in an ordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum of money chargeable against
the conjugal partnership and that the proper remedy is for him to file a claim in the settlement
of estate of the decedent.
First. Petitioner's husband died on December 1, 1988, more than ten months before
private respondent filed the collection suit in the trial court on October 13, 1989. This case
thus falls outside of the ambit of Rule 3, 21 which deals with dismissals of collection suits
because of the death of the defendant during the pendency of the case and the subsequent
procedure to be undertaken by the plaintiff, i.e., the filing of claim in the proceeding for the
settlement of the decedent's estate. As already noted, Rule 3, 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure now provides that the case will be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment.
A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein will then be enforced in the manner
especially provided in the Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased
person. The issue to be resolved is whether private respondent can, in the first place, file this
case against petitioner.
Petitioner and her late husband, together with the Manuel spouses, signed the sublease
contract binding themselves to pay the amount of stipulated rent. Under the law, the Alipios'
obligation (and also that of the Manuels) is one which is chargeable against their conjugal
partnership. Under Art. 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for
All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where
she may legally bind the partnership.[8]
When petitioner's husband died, their conjugal partnership was automatically
dissolved[9] and debts chargeable against it are to be paid in the settlement of estate
proceedings in accordance with Rule 73, 2 which states:
Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. When the marriage is dissolved by the
death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and
liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate
or intestate proceedings of either.
As held in Calma v. Taedo,[10] after the death of either of the spouses, no complaint for
the collection of indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal partnership can be brought
against the surviving spouse. Instead, the claim must be made in the proceedings for the
liquidation and settlement of the conjugal property. The reason for this is that upon the death
of one spouse, the powers of administration of the surviving spouse ceases and is passed to
the administrator appointed by the court having jurisdiction over the settlement of estate
proceedings.[11] Indeed, the surviving spouse is not even a de facto  administrator such that
conveyances made by him of any property belonging to the partnership prior to the liquidation
of the mass of conjugal partnership property is void.[12]
The ruling in Calma v. Taedo was reaffirmed in the recent case of Ventura v. Militante.
[13]
 In that case, the surviving wife was sued in an amended complaint for a sum of money
based on an obligation allegedly contracted by her and her late husband. The defendant, who
had earlier moved to dismiss the case, opposed the admission of the amended complaint on
the ground that the death of her husband terminated their conjugal partnership and that the
plaintiff's claim, which was chargeable against the partnership, should be made in
the proceedings for the settlement of his estate. The trial court nevertheless admitted the
complaint and ruled, as the Court of Appeals did in this case, that since the defendant was
also a party to the obligation, the death of her husband did not preclude the plaintiff from filing
an ordinary collection suit against her. On appeal, the Court reversed, holding that
as correctly argued by petitioner, the conjugal partnership terminates upon the death of either
spouse. . . . Where a complaint is brought against the surviving spouse for the recovery of an
indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal [partnership], any judgment obtained thereby
is void. The proper action should be in the form of a claim to be filed in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse.
In many cases as in the instant one, even after the death of one of the spouses, there is no
liquidation of the conjugal partnership. This does not mean, however, that the conjugal
partnership continues. And private respondent cannot be said to have no remedy. Under Sec.
6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court, he may apply in court for letters of administration in
his capacity as a principal creditor of the deceased . . . if after thirty (30) days from his death,
petitioner failed to apply for administration or request that administration be granted to some
other person.[14]
The cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals in support of its ruling, namely, Climaco
v. Siy Uy[15] and Imperial Insurance, Inc. v. David,[16] are based on different sets of
facts. In Climaco, the defendants, Carlos Siy Uy and Manuel Co, were sued for damages for
malicious prosecution. Thus, apart from the fact the claim was not against any conjugal
partnership, it was one which does not survive the death of defendant Uy, which merely
resulted in the dismissal of the case as to him but not as to the remaining defendant Manuel
Co.
With regard to the case of Imperial, the spouses therein jointly and severally executed
an indemnity agreement which became the basis of a collection suit filed against the wife
after her husband had died. For this reason, the Court ruled that since the spouses' liability
was solidary, the surviving spouse could be independently sued in an ordinary action for the
enforcement of the entire obligation.
It must be noted that for marriages governed by the rules of conjugal partnership of
gains, an obligation entered into by the husband and wife is chargeable against their conjugal
partnership and it is the partnership which is primarily bound for its repayment. [17] Thus, when
the spouses are sued for the enforcement of an obligation entered into by them, they are
being impleaded in their capacity as representatives of the conjugal partnership and not as
independent debtors such that the concept of joint or solidary liability, as between them, does
not apply. But even assuming the contrary to be true, the nature of the obligation involved in
this case, as will be discussed later, is not solidary but rather merely joint,
making Imperial still inapplicable to this case.
From the foregoing, it is clear that private respondent cannot maintain the present suit
against petitioner. Rather, his remedy is to file a claim against the Alipios in the proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of petitioner's husband or, if none has been commenced, he
can file a petition either for the issuance of letters of administration[18] or for the allowance of
will,[19]depending on whether petitioner's husband died intestate or testate. Private respondent
cannot short-circuit this procedure by lumping his claim against the Alipios with those against
the Manuels considering that, aside from petitioner's lack of authority to represent their
conjugal estate, the inventory of the Alipios' conjugal property is necessary before any claim
chargeable against it can be paid. Needless to say, such power exclusively pertains to the
court having jurisdiction over the settlement of the decedent's estate and not to any other
court.
Second. The trial court ordered petitioner and the Manuel spouses to pay private
respondent the unpaid balance of the agreed rent in the amount of P50,600.00 without
specifying whether the amount is to be paid by them jointly or solidarily. In connection with
this, Art. 1207 of the Civil Code provides:
The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors in one and the same
obligation does not imply that each one of the former has a right to demand, or that each one
of the latter is bound to render, entire compliance with the prestations. There is a solidary
liability only when the obligation expressly so estates, or when the law or the nature of the
obligation requires solidarity.
Indeed, if from the law or the nature or the wording of the obligation the contrary does not
appear, an obligation is presumed to be only joint, i.e., the debt is divided into as many equal
shares as there are debtors, each debt being considered distinct from one another.[20]
Private respondent does not cite any provision of law which provides that when there are
two or more lessees, or in this case, sublessees, the latter's obligation to pay the rent is
solidary. To be sure, should the lessees or sublessees refuse to vacate the leased property
after the expiration of the lease period and despite due demands by the lessor, they can be
held jointly and severally liable to pay for the use of the property. The basis of their solidary
liability is not the contract of lease or sublease but the fact that they have become joint
tortfeasors.[21]In the case at bar, there is no allegation that the sublessees refused to vacate
the fishpond after the expiration of the term of the sublease. Indeed, the unpaid balance
sought to be collected by private respondent in his collection suit became due on June 30,
1989, long before the sublease expired on September 12, 1990.
Neither does petitioner contend that it is the nature of lease that when there are more
than two lessees or sublessees their liability is solidary. On the other hand, the pertinent
portion of the contract involved in this case reads:[22]
2. That the total lease rental for the sub-leased fishpond for the entire period of three (3)
years and two (2) months is FOUR HUNDRED EIGHT-FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
(P485,600.00) PESOS, including all the improvements, prawns, milkfishes, crabs and related
species thereon as well all fishing equipment, paraphernalia and accessories. The said
amount shall be paid to the Sub-Lessor by the Sub-Lessees in the following manner, to wit:
A. Three hundred thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos upon signing this contract; and
B. One Hundred Eight-Five Thousand Six-Hundred (P185,6000.00) Pesos to be paid on June
30, 1989.
Clearly, the liability of the sublessees is merely joint. Since the obligation of the Manuel
and Alipio spouses is chargeable against their respective conjugal partnerships, the unpaid
balance of P50,600.00 should be divided into two so that each couple is liable to pay the
amount of P25,300.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Bienvenido Manuel and Remedios Manuel are
ordered to pay the amount of P25,300.00, the attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00
and the costs of the suit. The complaint against petitioner is dismissed without prejudice to
the filing of a claim by private respondent in the proceedings for the settlement of estate of
Placido Alipio for the collection of the share of the Alipio spouses in the unpaid balance of the
rent in the amount of P25,300.00.
SO ORDERED.