Segovia vs. Climate Change Commission, G. R. No.

211010 (March 7, 2017)

FACTS:
1. Petitioners wrote respondents regarding their pleas for implementation of the Road
Sharing Principle, demanding the reform of the road and transportation system in
the whole country within thirty (30) days from receipt of the said letter - foremost,
through the bifurcation of roads and the reduction of official and government fuel
consumption by fifty percent (50%).8 Claiming to have not received a response, they
filed this petition.

2. Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their Comment seeking

the outright dismissal of the petition for lack of standing and failure to adhere to the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts.17 Moreover, respondents argue that petitioners are
not entitled to the reliefs prayed for. Specifically, respondents assert that petitioners
are not entitled to a writ of kalikasan because they failed to show that the public
respondents are guilty of an unlawful act or omission; state the environmental law/s
violated; show environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life,
health or property of inhabitants of two or more cities; and prove that non-
implementation of Road Sharing Principle will cause environmental damage.
Respondents likewise assert that petitioners are similarly not entitled to a
Continuing Mandamus.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have standing to file the petition;

2. Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for failing to adhere to the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts; and

3. Whether or not a writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing Mandamus should issue.

RULING:

The petition must be dismissed.

1. YES.

Petitioners counter that they filed the suit as citizens, taxpayers, and representatives;
that the rules on standing had been relaxed following the decision in Oposa v.
Factoran;22 and that, in any event, legal standing is a procedural technicality which
the Court may set aside in its discretion.23

The Court agrees with the petitioners' position. The RPEC did liberalize the
requirements on standing, allowing the filing of citizen's suit for the enforcement of
rights and obligations under environmental laws.24 This has been confirmed by this
Court's rulings in Arigo v. Swift,25 and International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-
BioTech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines). 26 However, it
bears noting that there is a difference between a petition for the issuance of a writ
of kalikasan, wherein it is sufficient that the person filing represents the inhabitants
 prejudiced by the environmental damage subject of the writ;27 and a petition for the
issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus, which is only available to one who is
personally aggrieved by the unlawful act or omission.

2. NO. Under the RPEC, the writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy covering
environmental damage of such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. It is designed for a narrow
but special purpose: to accord a stronger protection for environmental rights, aiming,
among others, to provide a speedy and effective resolution of a case involving the
violation of one's constitutional right to a healthful and balanced ecology that
transcends political and territorial boundaries, and to address the potentially
exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats. 32 At the very least, the magnitude
of the ecological problems contemplated under the RPEC satisfies at least one of the
exceptions to the rule on hierarchy of courts, as when direct resort is allowed where
it is dictated by public welfare.1âwphi1 Given that the RPEC allows direct resort to
this Court,33 it is ultimately within the Court's discretion whether or not to accept
petitions brought directly before it.

3. The court finds that the petitioners failed to establish the requisites for the issuance
of the writs prayed for.

For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur:

1. there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and

healthful ecology;

2. the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or private individual or entity; and

3. the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of

such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more
cities or provinces.34

It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ
of kalikasan has to show that a law, rule or regulation was violated or would be violated. 35
In this case, apart from repeated invocation of the constitutional right to health and to a
balanced and healthful ecology and bare allegations that their right was violated, the
petitioners failed to show that public respondents are guilty of any unlawful act or omission
that constitutes a violation of the petitioners' right to a balanced and healthful ecology.

Petitioners have not been able to show that respondents are guilty of violation or neglect of
environmental laws that causes or contributes to bad air quality. Notably, apart from bare
allegations, petitioners were not able to show that respondents failed to execute any of the
laws petitioners cited.

Similarly, the writ of continuing mandamus cannot issue.

In this case, there is no showing of unlawful neglect on the part of the respondents to
perform any act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty - there being nothing in the
executive issuances relied upon by the petitioners that specifically enjoins the bifurcation of
roads to implement the Road Sharing Principle. To the opposite, the respondents were able
to show that they were and are actively implementing projects and programs that seek to
improve air quality.1âwphi1

Absent a showing that the executive is guilty of "gross abuse of discretion, manifest
injustice or palpable excess of authority,"44 the general rule applies that discretion cannot
be checked via this petition for continuing mandamus. Hence, the
continuing mandamus cannot issue.1âwphi1
OSMENA VS GARGANERA

FACTS:

1. The Inayawan landfill served as the garbage disposal area of Cebu City. 4 Inayawan
landfill was formally closed after the directive of Mayor Rama.

In 2016, however, under the administration of Mayor Osmeña, the City

Government sought to temporarily open the Inayawan landfill.

2. On September 23, 2016, Joel Capili Garganera for and on his behalf, and in
representation of the People of the Cities of Cebu and Talisay and the future
generations, including the unborn (respondent) filed a petition for writ
of kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Environmental
Protection Order (TEPO) before the CA.19

Respondent asserted that the continued operation of the Inayawan landfill causes
serious environmental damage which threatens and violates their right to a
balanced and healthful ecology.20 Respondent also asserted that the Inayawan
landfill has already outgrown its usefulness and has become ill-suited for its
purpose.

The writ of kalikasan was hereby granted thus this Petition for Review
on Certiorari1

ISSUES:

1) whether the 30-day prior notice requirement for citizen suits under R.A.
9003 and R.A. 8749 is needed prior to the filing of the instant petition;

2) whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirements for the grant of the
privilege of the writ of kalikasan were sufficiently established.

RULING:

1. Given that the writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy and the RPEC
allows direct action to this Court and the CA where it is dictated by public
welfare,33 this Court is of the view that the prior 30 day notice requirement for
citizen suits under R.A. 9003 and R.A. 8749 is inapplicable. It is ultimately
within the Court's discretion whether or not to accept petitions brought directly
before it.

2. The court affirmed the CA when it ruled that the requirements for the grant of
the privilege of the writ of kalikasan were sufficiently established.

Under Section 1 of Rule 7 of the RPEC, the following requisites must be present
to avail of this extraordinary remedy: (1) there is an actual or threatened
violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the
actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a
 public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and (3) the actual or
threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or
more cities or provinces.35

Expectedly, the Rules do not define the exact nature or degree of environmental
damage but only that it must be sufficiently grave, in terms of the territorial
scope of such damage, so as to call for the grant of this extraordinary remedy.
The gravity of environmental damage sufficient to grant the writ is, thus, to be
decided on a case-to-case basis.36

Arigo vs. Swift, G.R. No. 206510 (Sept. 16, 2014)

FACTS:

In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations Educational Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site.

On April 6, 2010, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067, otherwise known
as the “Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009” “to ensure the protection
and conservation of the globally significant economic, biological, sociocultural,
educational and scientific values of the Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity for the
enjoyment of present and future generations.” Under the “no-take” policy, entry into
the waters of TRNP is strictly regulated and many human activities are prohibited
and penalized or fined, including fishing, gathering, destroying and disturbing the
resources within the TRNP. The law likewise created the Tubbataha Protected Area
Management Board (TPAMB) which shall be the sole policy-making and
permitgranting body of the TRNP.

The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy.

In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic
clearance for the said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines
and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment,
maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for
Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa,
Japan.

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call
in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu
Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha
Reefs, about 80 miles eastsoutheast of Palawan. No cine was injured in the incident,
and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.

ISSUE:

1. W/N the petitioners have legal standing.

2. Whether or not immunity from suits can be invoked within territorial waters.

RULING:
1. There is no dispute on the legal standing of petitioners to file the present petition.

The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to minors

and generations yet unborn, is now enshrined in the Rules which allows the filing of
a citizen suit in environmental cases. The provision on citizen suits in the Rules
"collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that
humans are stewards of nature."

2. The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the
public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary
citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is
removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation
usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the
powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be
liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by
his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction.

In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding
officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and
its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the
USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they we:re performing official
military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials
will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the
suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity
therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of
respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.

In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on the matter
of compensation and rehabilitation measures through diplomatic channels.
Resolution of these issues impinges on our relations with another State in the
context of common security interests under the VFA.

It is settled that "[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is

committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative-"the political"
--departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision."

On the other hand, we cannot grant the additional reliefs prayed for in the petition to
order a review of the VFA and to nullify certain immunity provisions thereof.
MILA CABOVERDE TANTANO AND ROSELLER CABOVERDE, PETITIONERS,
VS.
DOMINALDA ESPINA-CABOVERDE, EVE CABOVERDE-YU, FE CABOVERDE-
LABRADOR AND JOSEPHINE E. CABOVERDE, RESPONDENTS.
JULY 29, 2013
GR NO. 203585

The power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one and should be exercised with
extreme caution and only under circumstances requiring summary relief or where
the court is satisfied that there is imminent danger of loss, lest the injury thereby
caused be far greater than the injury sought to be averted

CASE: REMEDIAL LAW (RECEIVERSHIP)

FACTS:

Petitioners Mila Caboverde Tantano (Mila) and Roseller Caboverde (Roseller) are
children of respondent Dominalda Espina-Caboverde (Dominalda) and siblings of
other respondents in this case, namely: Eve Caboverde-Yu (Eve), Fe Caboverde-
Labrador (Fe), and Josephine E. Caboverde (Josephine). Petitioners and their
siblings, Ferdinand, Jeanny and Laluna, are the registered owners and in possession
of certain parcels of land, having purchased them from their parents, Maximo and
Dominalda Caboverde. The present controversy started when respondents Eve and
Fe filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court where they prayed for the
annulment of the Deed of Sale purportedly transferring certain parcels of land from
their parents Maximo and Dominalda in favor of petitioners Mila and Roseller and
their other siblings, Jeanny, Laluna and Ferdinand. During the pendency of the civil
case, Maximo died. Eve and Fe filed an Amended Complaint with Maximo substituted
by his eight (8) children and his wife Dominalda.

Fearing that the contested properties would be squandered, Dominalda filed with the
Regional Trial Court a Verified Urgent Petition/Application to place the controverted
parcels of land under receivership. Mainly, she claimed that while she had a legal
interest in the controverted properties and their produce, she could not enjoy them,
since the income derived was solely appropriated by petitioner Mila in connivance
with her selected kin. She alleged that she immediately needs her legal share in the
income of these properties for her daily sustenance and medical expenses. Also, she
insisted that unless a receiver is appointed by the court, the income or produce from
these properties is in grave danger of being totally dissipated, lost and entirely spent
solely by Mila and some of her selected kin.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the
appointment of a receiver despite clear showing that the reasons advanced by the
applicant are not any of those enumerated by the rules; and

(2) Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the
Resolution of the RTC and ruling that the receivership bond is not required prior to
appointment despite clear dictates of the rules.

HELD:

SC IMPORTANT DISCUSSIONS

ISSUE #1

First, Dominalda’s alleged need for income to defray her medical expenses and
support is not a valid justification for the appointment of a receiver. The approval of
an application for receivership merely on this ground is not only unwarranted but
also an arbitrary exercise of discretion because financial need and like reasons are
not found in Sec. 1 of Rule 59 which prescribes specific grounds or reasons for
granting receivership. The RTC’s insistence that the approval of the receivership is
justified under Sec. 1(d) of Rule 59, which seems to be a catch-all provision, is far
from convincing. To be clear, even in cases falling under such provision, it is
essential that there is a clear showing that there is imminent danger that the
properties sought to be placed under receivership will be lost, wasted or injured.

Second, there is no clear showing that the disputed properties are in danger of being
lost or materially impaired and that placing them under receivership is most
convenient and feasible means to preserve, administer or dispose of them.

Third, placing the disputed properties under receivership is not necessary to save
Dominalda from grave and immediate loss or irremediable damage.

ISSUE #2

Sec. 2 of Rule 59 is very clear in that before issuing the order appointing a receiver
the court shall require the applicant to file a bond executed to the party against
whom the application is presented. The use of the word "shall" denotes its mandatory
nature; thus, the consent of the other party, or as in this case, the consent of
petitioners, is of no moment. Hence, the filing of an applicant’s bond is required at all
times. On the other hand, the requirement of a receiver’s bond rests upon the
discretion of the court.