PRIVATE HOSPITALS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.

vs. 
HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND THE ACTING
SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

G.R. No. 234448, November 06, 2018

Tijam, J.

CASE : Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition to declare unconstitutional and

void the duty imposed upon hospitals, medical practitioners and
employees to prevent actual death or injury and providing for liability
clause, among others, under Sections 1, 4, 5, 7 and 8 of RA 10932,
otherwise known as an Act Strengthening the Anti-Hospital Deposit
Law.

FACTS :

 In 1984, BP 702 entitled An Act Prohibiting the Demand of Deposits or Advance

Payments for the Confinement or Treatment of Patients in Hospitals and Medical
Clinics in Certain Cases was enacted making it unlawful for any director,
manager or any other officer of a hospital or medical clinic to demand any
deposit or any other form of advance payment for confinement or treatment in
such hospital or medical clinic in emergency or serious cases and penalizes such
erring director, manager or any other officer of a hospital or medical clinic with a
fine or imprisonment, or both.

 On August 25, 1997, BP 702 was amended by R.A. No. 8344 making it unlawful
to demand, request, solicit, and accept any deposit or advance payment as a
prerequisite for confinement or medical treatment in emergency or serious cases
and to refuse to administer medical treatment and support as dictated by good
practice of medicine to prevent death or permanent disability unlawful. And, in
case the hospital or the medical clinic has no adequate medical capabilities, RA
8344 outlines the procedure for the transfer of the patient to a facility where
appropriate care can be given after the hospital or medical clinic has
administered medical treatment and support.

 On August 3, 2017, R.A. No. 10932 was enacted making it unlawful to request,
solicit, demand, or accept deposit or advance payment as a prerequisite not only
for confinement or medical treatment but also for administering basic emergency
care and it expanded the scope of "basic emergency care" to include medical
procedures and treatment administered to a woman in active labor.

 Among others, R.A. No. 10932 introduced the three-strike rule, or when upon 3
repeated violations committed pursuant to an established policy or upon
instruction of the management, the health facility's license to operate shall be
revoked by the Department of Health (DOH) and made the president, chairman,
board of directors, or trustees and other officers of the health facility solidarily
liable for damages. And, the hospital, medical clinic, and the official, medical
practitioner, or employee involved shall be presumed liable in the event of death,
permanent disability, serious impairment or permanent injury to or loss of an
 unborn child, proceeding from the denial of admission to a health facility pursuant
to a policy of requiring deposits or advance payments for confinement or
treatment.

 Meanwhile, pending resolution of the instant petition, the DOH issued

Administrative Order No. 2018-0012 implementing R.A. No. 10932.

ISSUE/S :

Whether or not, in determining the constitutionality of RA 10932 and its

implementing, the Court can discharge its power of judicial review under petitions for
certiorari and prohibition; its resort to the Court proper; petitioners have the requisite
legal standing; and the petition is ripe for adjudication.

HELD :

The Court dismissed the petition declaring that while the remedies
of certiorari and prohibition are proper legal vehicles to assail the constitutionality of a
law, the requirements for the exercise of the Court's judicial review even under its
expanded jurisdiction must nevertheless first be satisfied.

RATIONALE :

Propriety of Certiorari and Prohibition

Petitioner seeks to declare as unconstitutional certain provisions of R.A. No.

10932 under the remedy of certiorari and prohibition.

The rule is settled that the allegations in the complaint and the character of the
relief sought determine the nature of the action and the court that has jurisdiction over
it. The petition specifically alleged that R.A. No. 10932 is unconstitutional for being
violative of substantive due process, the presumption of innocence, and the equal
protection of laws and as such, seeks that the enforcement and implementation thereof
be prohibited.

Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the ground for review in certiorari and
prohibition is grave abuse of discretion, and there is grave abuse of discretion when an
act is done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or executed
whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias. Petitions
for certiorari and prohibition are thus appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
questions.

Judicial power—traditional and expanded

jurisdiction

Grave abuse of discretion as a ground for review does not only appear under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court but also under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
defining judicial power. As constitutionally defined, judicial power includes not only the
duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but also, the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. This is known as the Court's "traditional jurisdiction"
and "expanded jurisdiction," respectively.

Expanded jurisdiction under the Constitution

As expressly granted by the Constitution, the Court's expanded jurisdiction when

invoked permits a review of acts not only by a tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also by any branch or instrumentality
of the Government. "Any branch or instrumentality of the Government" necessarily
includes the legislative and the executive, even if they are not exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions.”

Writ of certiorari or prohibition may be

issued to correct errors of jurisdiction

In Pedro Agcaoili, Jr., et al. v. The Honorable Representative Rodolfo C. Fariñas,

et al., the Court affirmed the availability of the extraordinary writs for determining and
correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the legislative and executive branches following the earlier case of Judge
Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, where the Court held that the remedies
of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ
of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not
only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of
the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions.

Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to

raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative
and executive officials.

Certiorari and prohibition, proper remedy

even when the governmental actions are
not ministerial

The Court held that following the trend in jurisprudence, petitioner correctly
availed of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 to assail the constitutionality of
RA10932 and enjoin its enforcement, notwithstanding that these governmental actions
do not involve the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.

Hierarchy of Courts

Jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and prohibition are shared by the Court,

the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Courts thus the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition are available to assail the constitutionality of a law,
the question as to which court should the petition be properly filed consequently arises
given that the hierarchy of courts "also serves as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs.”

General rule, direct recourse to the Court

improper being the Court of last resort
 Under the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, "recourse must first be made to the
lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.” As a rule,
"direct recourse to this Court is improper because the Supreme Court is a court of last
resort and must remain to be so in order for it to satisfactorily perform its constitutional
functions, thereby allowing it to devote its time and attention to matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction and preventing the overcrowding of its docket.”

Exceptions—if there are compelling

reasons, or if warranted by the nature of
the issues

In The Diocese of Bacolod, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., the Court held that its role
to interpret the Constitution and act in order to protect constitutional rights when these
become exigent is never meant to be emasculated by the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. The Court possesses full discretionary authority to assume jurisdiction over
extraordinary actions for certiorari filed directly before it for exceptionally compelling
reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the
petition.

Direct resort, when allowed

In The Diocese of Bacolod, the Court enumerated the instances when direct
resort to the Court: (a) when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be
addressed at the most immediate time; (b) when the issues involved are of
transcendental importance; (c) in cases of first impression; (d) the constitutional issues
raised are better decided by the Supreme Court; (e) the time element or exigency in
certain situations; (f) the filed petition reviews an act of a constitutional organ; (g) when
there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; (h)
the petition includes questions that are dictated by public welfare and the advancement
of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders
complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly
an inappropriate remedy.

Present petition, improper as there is no

compelling reason for direct resort to the
Court

While the petition is directed against an act of a co-equal branch of the

government and concerns a legislative measure directly affecting the health and well-
being of the people, it actually presents no prima facie challenge as to be so
exceptionally compelling to justify direct resort to this Court.

Requisites of Judicial Review

The Court held that it cannot exercise its power of judicial review, even under its
expanded jurisdiction, when the requisites for the exercise thereof are not satisfied.

The power of judicial review is the power of the courts to test the validity of
executive and legislative acts for their conformity with the Constitution. When exercised,
the judiciary does not arrogate upon it a position superior to that of the other branches
of the government but merely upholds the supremacy of the Constitution.
Exercise of power of review, requisites

In Congressman Garcia v. The Executive Secretary, the Court laid down the

requisites for a proper exercise of its power of review: (1) an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have
standing to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

Lack of actual controversy and legal standing

The Court held that there is no actual controversy and petitioners have no legal
standing warranting the outright dismissal of the instant petition.

Actual Case or Controversy, defined

An actual case or controversy is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an

assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished
from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. To be justiciable, the case or
controversy must present a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and
enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.

Expanded jurisdiction invoked, actual case

or controversy satisfied when grave of
discretion is assailed in governmental act

When the Court's expanded jurisdiction is invoked, the requirement of an actual

case or controversy is satisfied upon a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion
in the assailed governmental act. In Alexander A. Padilla, et al. v. Congress of the
Philippines,  the Court emphasized that to exercise its power of judicial review and give
due course to a petition for certiorari, the petitioners should set forth their material
allegations to make out a prima facie case for certiorari.

Controversy ripe for adjudication when an

act already performed or accomplished

Interrelated with the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the

requirement of ripeness. A question is considered ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual or entity challenging
it. The question of ripeness asks whether a case involves contingent events that may
not occur as anticipated and whether there is actual injury to the party being suit. Thus,
it is required that an act had been accomplished or performed by either branch of the
government and that there is an immediate or threatened injury to the petitioner as a
result of the challenged action before courts may interfere. 

It was held in Province of North Cotabato, et al. v. Gov't. of the Rep. Of the Phils.
Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), et al., that when an act of a branch of
government is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only
the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.”
Petition failed to show prima facie grave
abuse of discretion

The Court held that the allegations set forth in the petition failed to meet the
requirement of a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Congress relative to the provisions of RA 10932. While RA 10932 and its implementing
rules are accomplished acts of a co-equal branch of the government, the petition is
bereft of any allegation that petitioner, nor any of its members, had thereby suffered an
actual or direct injury as a result of a discretion gravely abused.

Enjoys presumption of constitutionality

The challenged law also enjoys the presumption of constitutionality which the
Court cannot disturb in the absence of a prima facie showing of grave abuse of
discretion and, upon delving into the merits, in the absence of a clearest showing that
there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution.

Legal Standing required to raise

constitutionality

Legal standing or locus standi is defined as a personal and substantial interest in

a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged.

Legal standing, requisites

As a rule, a party is allowed to raise a constitutional question when (1) he can

show that he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury because of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

Petitioner is not a hospital, medical facility

or practitioner

Petitioner is an association—not a hospital, medical facility, medical practitioner

or employee. RA 10932 governs the conduct of hospitals, medical facilities, medical
practitioners and employees inasmuch as the law imposes upon the latter certain
obligations and imposes corresponding sanctions in case of violation.

Juridical persons, defined

The Rules of Court provides that juridical persons authorized by law may be
parties in a civil action while the Civil Code enumerates the juridical persons having
capacity to sue which includes corporations, partnerships and associations for private
interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct
from that of each shareholder, partner or member.

Capacity to sue must be alleged

Under the Rules of Court, the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the
authority in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association
of persons as a party must be averred.
Direct injury must be shown

Assuming a hospital is found liable for violating the provisions of RA10932, the
liability or direct injury inures not to the petitioner association itself but to the member-
hospital.

Exceptions on standing

The rule on standing admits of recognized exceptions: the over breadth doctrine,
taxpayer suits, third party standing and the doctrine of transcendental importance. Thus,
an association filing a case on behalf of its members must not only show that it stands
to suffer direct injury, but also that it has been duly authorized.by its members to
represent them or sue in their behalf.

Petitioner does not fall under the exception

as it was not authorized to question the
constitutionality of the law

Petitioner, a non-stock and non-profit organization of purely privately owned

health facilities dedicated to the management and concerns of private hospitals, failed
to demonstrate that ample authority had been extended to it by its members to file the
instant petition. The Board Resolutions and Secretary’s Certificate did not authorize
petitioner to file the necessary petition to question the constitutionality of the law before
any court. Thus, petitioner cannot benefit from the third party exception to the
requirement of locus standi.

REPUBLIC GAS CORPORATION, et. al.

vs.
PETRON CORPORATION, et. al.

G.R. No. 194062, June 17, 2013

Peralta, J.

CASE : Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing the complaint
for alleged violations of Sections 155 and 168 of Republic Act (RA) No.
8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines

FACTS :
 Petron Corporation ("Petron" for brevity)—owner of the trademark Gasul—and
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation ("Shell" for brevity)—owner of the
trademark Shellane—are two of the largest bulk suppliers and producers of LPG
in the Philippines.

 Petron and Shell are the entities authorized to allow re-fillers and distributors to
refill, use, sell, and distribute Gasul LPG and Shellane LPG containers, products
and its trademarks, respectively.

 Republic Gas Corporation ("REGASCO" for brevity) is an entity duly licensed to

engage in, conduct and carry on, the business of refilling, buying, selling,
distributing and marketing at wholesale and retail of Liquefied Petroleum Gas
("LPG").

 LPG Dealers Associations acting on reports that certain entities were engaged in
the unauthorized refilling, sale and distribution of LPG cylinders bearing the
petitioners’ registered tradenames and trademarks filed a complaint with the NBI
for alleged illegal trading of petroleum products and/or under-delivery or
underfilling in the sale of LPG products.

 As part of its investigation, the NBI conducted a test-buy operation bringing with
them 4 empty LPG cylinders bearing the trademarks of Shellance and Gasul and
included the same with the purchase of J&S, a REGASCO’s regular customer.
Inside REGASCO’s refilling plant, REGASCO’s employees refilled the LPG
empty cylinders which were later found to be under refilled.

 Thereafter, a search warrant was issued upon application and served upon
respondents where several empty and filled Shellane and Gasul cylinders as well
as other allied paraphernalia were seized.

 The NBI lodged before the Department of Justice against the private respondents
for alleged violations of RA 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property
Code of the Philippines.

 The Investigating Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the complaint as no

proof introduced by the petitioners that would show that private respondent
REGASCO was engaged in selling petitioner’s products or that it imitated and
reproduced the registered trademarks of the petitioners. There was no deception
on the part of REGASCO in the conduct of its business of refilling and marketing
LPG.

 On appeal, the Secretary of the Department of Justice affirmed the prosecutor’s

dismissal of the complaint since the empty Shellane and Gasul LPG cylinders
were specifically for refilling. Refilling the same empty cylinders is by no means
an offense in itself – it being the legitimate business of Regasco to engage in the
refilling and marketing of liquefied petroleum gas. It stated that the empty
cylinders were merely filled by the employees of Regasco because they were
brought precisely for that purpose. They did not pass off the goods as those of
complainants’ as no other act was done other than to refill them in the normal
course of its business.
  The CA reversed and set aside the assailed DOJ Resolution of the DOJ and the
motion for reconsideration was denied.

 Hence, the petition.

ISSUE/S :

The core issue is whether probable exist to hold petitioners liable for the crimes
of trademark infringement and unfair competition defined and penalized under RA 8293.

HELD :

The Court denied the petition and the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals was affirmed.

RATIONALE:

Acts constituting trademark infringement

Under Section 155 of RA 8293, trademark infringement is committed by any

person who shall, without the consent of the owner of the registered mark:

155.1 Use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or

colorable imitation of a registered mark of the same container or a
dominant feature thereof in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, advertising of any goods or services including other
preparatory steps necessary to carry out the sale of any goods or services
on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive; or

155.2 Reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate a registered

mark or a dominant feature thereof and apply such reproduction,
counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages,
wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in
commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with
which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive, shall be liable in a civil action for infringement by the registrant x
x x regardless of whether there is actual sale of goods or services using
the infringing material.

Mere unauthorized use of a container

deemed infringement

Thus, the mere unauthorized use of a container bearing a registered trademark

in connection with the sale, distribution or advertising of goods or services which is likely
to cause confusion, mistake or deception among the buyers or consumers can be
considered as trademark infringement.

Petitioners committed infringement

 Petitioners have actually committed trademark infringement when they refilled,
without the respondents’ consent, the LPG containers bearing the registered marks of
the respondents. Petitioners’ acts will inevitably confuse the consuming public, since
they have no way of knowing that the gas contained in the LPG tanks bearing
respondents’ marks is in reality not the latter’s LPG product after the same had been
illegally refilled. The public will then be led to believe that petitioners are authorized re-
fillers and distributors of respondents’ LPG products, considering that they are
accepting empty containers of respondents and refilling them for resale.

Acts constituting unfair competition

Under Section 168.3, in relation to Section 170, of R.A. No. 8293 unfair
competition is committed by (a) any person, who is selling his goods and gives them the
general appearance of goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods
themselves or in the wrapping of the packages in which they are contained, or the
devices or words thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance, which would be
likely to influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of a
manufacturer or dealer, other than the actual manufacturer or dealer, or who otherwise
clothes the goods with such appearance as shall deceive the public and defraud
another of his legitimate trade, or any subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent of
any vendor engaged in selling such goods with a like purpose; x x x

Unfair competition as defined in jurisprudence

From jurisprudence, unfair competition has been defined as the passing off (or
palming off) or attempting to pass off upon the public of the goods or business of one
person as the goods or business of another with the end and probable effect of
deceiving the public.

Passing off (or palming off) takes place where the defendant, by imitative devices
on the general appearance of the goods, misleads prospective purchasers into buying
his merchandise under the impression that they are buying that of his competitors.
Thus, the defendant gives his goods the general appearance of the goods of his
competitor with the intention of deceiving the public that the goods are those of his
competitor.

In the present case, the refilling and selling LPG cylinders bearing respondents’
registered marks, petitioners are selling goods by giving them the general appearance
of goods of another manufacturer. Thus, the mere use of those LPG cylinders bearing
the trademarks "GASUL" and "SHELLANE" will give the LPGs sold by REGASCO the
general appearance of the products of the petitioners.

The Court found sufficient evidence to warrant the prosecution of petitioners for
trademark infringement and unfair competition, considering that petitioner Republic Gas
Corporation, being a corporation, possesses a personality separate and distinct from
the person of its officers, directors and stockholders. Petitioners, being corporate
officers and/or directors, through whose act, default or omission the corporation
commits a crime, may themselves be individually held answerable for the crime.

Officers of the Corporation held liable and

cannot hide behind separate corporate
personality
 As pointed out by the CA, petitioners, being in direct control and supervision in
the management and conduct of the affairs of the corporation, must have known or are
aware that the corporation is engaged in the act of refilling LPG cylinders bearing the
marks of the respondents without authority or consent from the latter which, under the
circumstances, could probably constitute the crimes of trademark infringement and
unfair competition. The existence of the corporate entity does not shield from
prosecution the corporate agent who knowingly and intentionally caused the corporation
to commit a crime. Thus, petitioners cannot hide behind the cloak of the separate
corporate personality of the corporation to escape criminal liability. A corporate officer
cannot protect himself behind a corporation where he is the actual, present and efficient
actor.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG

G.R. No. 118075, September 5, 1997

Bellosillo, J.

CASE : Appeal from the decision of the RTC convicting the accused for
Violation of PD 532—the Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law of
1974

FACTS :

 Emiliano Catantan (Catantan) and Jose Macven Ursal alias "Bimbo" (Bimbo)

were charged with violation of PD No. 532 otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy
and Highway Robbery Law of 1974 committed while armed with a firearm and a
bladed weapon, acting in conspiracy with one another, by means of violence and
intimidation, wilfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and inflicted physical
injuries on Eugene Pilapil and Juan Pilapil Jr. who were then fishing in the
seawaters of Tabogon, Cebu, and seized their fishing boat, to their damage and
prejudice.
 The Cebu Regional Trial Court of Cebu found both accused guilty of the crime
charged and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua
 Only Catantan appealed.

ISSUE/S :

 Whether or not the court erred in convicting accused as charged when the facts
proven merely constitutes grave coercion.

HELD :

The Court affirmed the conviction and sentence of the accused as the Court
found no reversible error in the decision appealed from.

RATIONALE :

Piracy defined.

Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as any attack upon or seizure
of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or
the personal belongings of the complement or passengers, irrespective of the value
thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things,
committed by any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said
vessel, in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be
considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided.

The prosecution proved that the brothers—Eugene and Juan Pilapil—were

fishing at about 3 a.m. in the sea some 3 kilometers away from the shores of Tabogon,
Cebu when suddenly, another boat caught up with them where accused Catantan,
boarded the victims’ pump boat and leveled his gun at Eugene. With his gun, Catantan
struck Eugene on the left cheekbone and ordered him and Juan Jr. to "dapa." Then
Catantan told Ursal to follow him to the pumpboat of the Pilapils, hogtied Eugene,
forced him to lie down at the bottom of the boat, covered him with a tarpaulin up to his
neck, stepped on him and ordered Juan Jr. to ferry them to Daan Tabogon. They left
behind the other pumpboat which the accused had earlier used together with its
passengers one of whom was visibly tied.

Eugene was told to be quiet otherwise they will be killed when he reminded
Catantan that they were already far out in sea. The Pilapil boat conked out twice and
when accused saw another pumpboat—a new one owned by Juanito—near the
shoreline, the brothers were ordered to approach it cautioning them not to move or say
anything. On the pretext that they were buying fish Catantan boarded the "new"
pumpboat, then he ordered the operator Juanito to take them to another town of Cebu.
When Juanito tried to beg-off, Catantan drew his revolver and said, "You choose
between the two, or I will kill you." Juanito, obviously terrified, immediately obeyed and
Ursal hopped in from the other pumpboat and joined Catantan. While Ursal was
transferring to the "new" pumpboat, its outrigger caught the front part of the pumpboat
of the Pilapils so he kicked hard its prow; it broke. The jolt threw Eugene into the sea
and he landed on the water headlong. Juan Jr. then untied his brother's legs and the
two swam together clinging to their boat. Fortunately, another pumpboat passed by and
towed them safely ashore.

Grave coercion as defined under the RPC

Under Article 286 of the RPC, grave coercion is committed by any person who,
without authority of law, shall, by means of violence, prevent another from doing
something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do something against his will,
whether it be right or wrong.

Accused guilty of piracy

The Court held the instant case falls squarely within the purview of piracy. While
it may be true that Eugene and Juan Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere other than
their place of destination, such compulsion was obviously part of the act of seizing their
boat. It was proven that accused actually seized the vessel through force and
intimidation.

To sustain otherwise would be to ignore that a fishing vessel cruising in

Philippine waters was seized by the accused by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons and were ordered to "dapa" or lie down with face downwards,
and then one of them struck with a revolver, after which, Catantan told his victims at gun
point to take them to Daan Tabogon. The Pilapil brothers were easily intimidated and
were impelled to completely surrender to the marauders. The moment Catantan jumped
into the pumpboat he had full control of his victims. The sight of a drawn revolver in his
hand drove them to submission. This is the essence of the issuance of PD No. 532 to
avert situations like the case at bar and discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine
waters.

Though the use of a revolver by the appellant to seize the boat was not produced
in evidence cannot exculpate him from the crime, the Court stated that the fact remains
that Catantan and his co-accused Ursal seized through force and intimidation the
pumpboat of the Pilapils while the latter were fishing in Philippine waters.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
ROMEO MENDOZA y REYES and JAIME REJALI y LINA

G.R. No. 104461, February 23, 1996

Panganiban, J.

CASE :

FACTS :

 Appellants Romeo Mendoza and Jaime Rejali were charged before the Pasig
RTC of the crime of Robbery with Homicide (PD 532, Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highway Robbery Law of 1974

 The Information charged that both accused, armed with gun and knives,
conspiring and confederating together with one alias Jack (identity and
whereabouts unknown), and mutually helping and aiding one another with intent
to gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, rob and divest one Glory Oropeo of cash money while the said
victim was aboard a passenger jeep; and that on the occasion of said robbery
(hold-up), accused attacked, assaulted and employed personal violence upon
one of the passengers, one Ramilyn Zulueta, by hitting her head with a gun and
kicking her out of the passenger jeep causing her to fall and hit her head on the
pavement thereby inflicting upon her mortal injuries which directly caused her
death, while her sister, Ma. Grace Zulueta, was punched in the face and hit her
head with a gun resulting in physical injuries requiring medical attendance for a
period of less than nine (9) days and incapacitated her from performing her
customary labor for the same period of time.

 The prosecution was able to prove the allegations in the information and that the
arrest of Mendoza came about when Grace saw him selling ice cream and
thereafter, arrested and identified in a police line-up.

 The accused interposed denial and alibis as defense.

 The trial court found both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery
Law of 1974)In this appeal, appellants fault the trial court for giving credence to
the "inconsistent, conflicting and contradictory testimonies" of prosecution
witnesses Grace Zulueta and Glory Oropeo and for convicting them of the crime
charged "despite the failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt." 28

ISSUE/S :
 The main question is whether the accused should be convicted of highway
robbery with homicide punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532, or of robbery with
homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.

Or corollarily, guilty of the felony of robbery with homicide under Art. 294 of the
Revised Penal Code.

HELD :

The Court modified the decision of the RTC as it found accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

RATIONALE :

The positive identification of the appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, their
alibis are worthless. The defense failed to meet the requisites for alibi to be considered
as a valid defense. It is not enough that the appellants were somewhere else when the
crime transpired. They must likewise duly establish that they were so far away that it
was not physically possible for them to be present at the crime scene or its immediate
vicinity at or about the time of its commission. Balic-balic in Sampaloc, Manila and
Aurora Boulevard in San Juan, Metro Manila are not very distant from each other
considering the numerous public transportation facilities plying between said places.

While there is proof beyond reasonable doubt to lay culpability on the appellants
for the killing of Ma. Ramilyn Zulueta, the physical injuries sustained by her sister Grace
and the asportation of Glory Oropeo's thirty pesos, the Court did not agree with the trial
court that the crime committed by appellants is covered by P.D. No. 532.

Highway Robbery or Robbery with Homicide

Conviction under P.D. No. 532 requires not only intent to gain, unlawful taking of
property of another, violence against or intimidation of any person, on a Philippine
Highway and death of Ramilyn and physical injuries upon but the purpose of brigandage
is indiscriminate highway robbery. However, if the purpose is only a particular robbery,
the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed participants.

Thus, PD 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only acts of robbery

perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine
highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery committed against only a
predetermined or particular victim.

Highway robbery—commit robbery

indiscriminately

To obtain a conviction for highway robbery in this case, the prosecution should
have proven that the accused were organized for the purpose of committing robbery
indiscriminately. There, however, was a total absence of such proof. There was also no
evidence of any previous attempts at similar robberies by the accused to show the
"indiscriminate" commission thereof.
Aurora Boulevard not a highway within the
contemplation of PD 532

The Court citing an earlier case held that it would be absurd to adopt a literal
interpretation that any unlawful taking of property committed on our highways would be
covered thereby.

If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be
the determinant for the application of PD 532, it would not be far-fetched to expect
mischievous, if not absurd, effects on the corpus of our substantive criminal law.

Hence, in charging a crime under PD532, it is important to consider whether or

not the very purpose for which the law was promulgated has been transgressed. Citing
the "whereas clauses" of PD 532 in an earlier case, the Court said that it is hard to
conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular person chosen by the
accused as their specific victim could be considered as committed on the "innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another," and which single act of
depredation would be capable of "stunting the economic and social progress of the
people" as to be considered "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by
the penal statutes of all countries," and would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the
economic, social, educational and community progress of the people," such that said
isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or brigandage contemplated and
punished in said decree. This would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous. 

Petty robbery in public transport vehicles (with or without personal violence and
death) committed against the middle and lower economic classes of society is as
reprehensible as (if not more so than) large-scale robbery committed against the
economically well-heeled. Nonetheless, the law must be interpreted not only to bring
forth its aim and spirit but also in light of the basic principle that all doubts are to be
resolved liberally in favor of the accused.

As such, appellants may not be held liable under P.D. No. 532 but only under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

Guilty for the special complex crime of

robbery with homicide under the RPC

In the interpretation of an information, what controls is not the designation but the
description of the offense charged and considering the allegations in the information,
accused should be liable for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide under
Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code, robbery having been duly established beyond
reasonable doubt by the asportation of cash from Glory. It is immaterial that Ramilyn's
death was accidental because it was produced by reason or on the occasion of the
robbery.  The physical injuries inflicted upon Grace Zulueta during the commission of
the crime are absorbed in the crime of robbery with homicide.

Conspiracy duly proven

Conspiracy was duly proven by the coordinated actions of the appellants and
their companion of depriving Glory of her money and injuring both Ramilyn and Grace
which resulted in Ramilyn's accidental death. Since both appellants took part in the
robbery, they shall be liable for the complex crime of robbery with homicide in the
absence of proof that they endeavored to prevent the accidental killing of Ramilyn. The
penalty of reclusion perpetua as the single and indivisible penalty for robbery with
homicide shall be imposed on each of the appellants regardless of the mitigating and
aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime.
 Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., et. al.
vs.
Anti-Terrorism Council, et. al.

G.R. No. 178552. October 5, 2010

x--------------------------x

Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et. al.

vs.
Hon. Eduardo Ermita, et. al.

G.R. No. 178554

x--------------------------x

Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), et. al.

vs.
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et. al.

G.R. No. 178581

x--------------------------x

Karapatan, et. al.

vs.
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et. al.

G.R. No. 178890

x--------------------------x

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), et. al.

vs.
Executive Secretary, et. al.

G.R. No. 179157

x--------------------------x

Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog (BAYAN-ST), et. al.

vs.
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et. al.

G.R. No. 179461

x--------------------------x
Carpio-Morales, J.

CASE : Petitions challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, otherwise

known as "An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People
from Terrorism," otherwise known as the Human Security Act of
2007

FACTS :

 Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007, several petitions were filed
assailing its constitutionality

ISSUE/S :

Whether RA 9372 is unconstitutional.

HELD :

The Court dismissed the petition.

RATIONALE :

Resort to certiorari, improper

Certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-
judicial functions. The Rules of Court is clear and certiorari will lie, among others, when
any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

Petitioners failed to allege with any modicum of particularity how respondents

acted without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Power of judicial review, limitations

The power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, (a) there must
be an actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue
of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.

In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the
most essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous.

Petitioners lack locus standi

 Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.

In Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary, the

Court summarized the rule on locus standi as a personal and substantial interest in a
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged.

Personal or direct interest must be alleged

A party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and
personal interest. It must show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid,
but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It
must show that it has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which it is
lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute or act complained of.

Personal injury must be shown

A concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question must show that

(1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

Transcendental public importance, concept

In Chavez v. PCGG, the Court held that transcendental public importance

dispenses with the requirement that petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of
suffering direct and personal injury, cases involving the constitutionality of penal
legislation belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional litigation.

Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA 9372.

Locus standi as taxpayers

Locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners as taxpayers and citizens

however a taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or
taxing power of Congress, whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and personal
interest in the proceeding.

RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from
Congress for its implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has
alleged any direct and personal interest in the implementation of the law.

It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion

of a public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal interest
is key.
Petitioners failed to present an actual case
or controversy

By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or
controversy.

In the early of Angara v. Electoral Commission, the Court ruled that the power of
judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is

appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of
the court would amount to an advisory opinion.

It was reiterated in Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v.

COMELEC, where the Court held that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic
questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The
controversy must be justiciable—definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interests. The pleadings must show an active antagonistic
assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other hand; that
is, it must concern a real and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to
be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree
conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be
upon a hypothetical state of facts.

In another case, the Court ruled that the petition to declare unconstitutional a law
converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City premature as it was
tacked on uncertain, contingent events. Similarly, a petition that fails to allege that an
application for a license to operate a radio or television station has been denied or
granted by the authorities does not present a justiciable controversy, and merely
wheedles the Court to rule on a hypothetical problem.

The Court in Philippine Press Institute v. Commission on Elections dismissed the

petitionfor failure to cite any specific affirmative action of the Commission on Elections to
implement the assailed resolution. It refused, in Abbas v. Commission on Elections, to
rule on the religious freedom claim of the therein petitioners based merely on a
perceived potential conflict between the provisions of the Muslim Code and those of the
national law, there being no actual controversy between real litigants.

In a recent case, the US Supreme Court, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,

allowed the pre-enforcement review of a criminal statute, challenged on vagueness
grounds, since plaintiffs faced a "credible threat of prosecution and should not be
required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking
relief. Prevailing American jurisprudence allows an adjudication on the merits when an
anticipatory petition clearly shows that the challenged prohibition forbids the conduct or
activity that a petitioner seeks to do, as there would then be a justiciable controversy.

Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder, however, petitioners have failed to show that the
challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally protected conduct or activity
that they seek to do. No demonstrable threat has been established, much less a real
and existing one.
Mere declaratory relief, no original jurisdiction

Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for
declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Declaratory actions
characterized by "double contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend to
undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie
beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.

A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed

only in free speech cases, wherein certain
rules of constitutional litigation are rightly
excepted

The doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the

present case since these doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and that RA 9372
regulates conduct, not speech.

In earlier cases, the Court stated that "the overbreadth and the vagueness
doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases," and are "not appropriate
for testing the validity of penal statutes."

In another case, the Court stated that a facial invalidation of criminal statutes is
not appropriate, it nonetheless proceeded to conduct a vagueness analysis, and
concluded that the therein subject election offense under the Voter’s Registration Act of
1996, with which the therein petitioners were charged, is couched in precise language.

The doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine

of overbreadth do not operate on the same
plane

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks

comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.

The overbreadth doctrine decrees that a governmental purpose to control or

prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms.

As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes

that individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from
that behavior, even though some of it is protected.

A "facial" challenge is likewise different

from an "as-applied" challenge.

Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts

affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law,
pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the
parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.

The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to
avert the "chilling effect" on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all
times be abridged.

The application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge

and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech
cases.

By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of
invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under
situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially
overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being
substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants.

Penal statute may be assailed for being

vague

Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to
petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is
legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against them.

The void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process clause has
been utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at least three
cases, the Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance penalizing the
non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment punishable
under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2)
of the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in these cases were
actually charged with the therein assailed penal statute, unlike in the present case.

There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372

regulates speech so as to permit a facial
analysis of its validity

From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA
9372, the following elements may be culled: (1) the offender commits an act punishable
under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under any of the
enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and
creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to
give in to an unlawful demand.

However, the law seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech thus not applicable.

Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a
predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases
in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the government to accede
to an "unlawful demand." Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at
singling out or highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot
recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech.

Petitioners’ notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it

unduly focuses on just one particle of an element of the crime.

Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal
conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish socially harmful conduct nor the
essence of the whole act as conduct and not speech. This holds true a fortiori in the
present case where the expression figures only as an inevitable incident of making the
element of coercion perceptible.

It is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were as in most
instances brought about through speaking or writing. But it has never been deemed an
abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely
because the conduct was, in part, initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of
language, either spoken, written, or printed. Such an expansive interpretation of the
constitutional guaranties of speech and press would make it practically impossible ever
to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of trade as well as many other
agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to society.

Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected conduct, because they
merely evidence a prohibited conduct. Since speech is not involved here, the Court
cannot heed the call for a facial analysis.

Also, the petitioners were not charged with the pertinent crimes challenged on
vagueness grounds thus the Court found no basis to review the assailed penal statute
on its face and in its entirety.