Scribd Letter To The Prime Minister Theresa May Suggesting Alternatives To The Brexit Process.

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To: 10 Downing Street
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A To: The Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Theresa May MP.
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Regarding: Brexit New Legal Options.
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Wednesday, 30th January 2019.
I have enclosed some of my recent correspondence with the ERG and the Brexit Secretaries
regarding an alternative method of processing Brexit through legal discourse. There are three
parts, with possible alternatives to either renegotiate or extend the process of EU withdrawal.
Could you ask for an extension to the negotiation period as a result of a failure of stewardship
by the EC? There has been a clear infringement of the criteria set by the EC to maintain the
union of nations, the failure was in an inability to control economic targets (See enclosed 1).
Could you ask for the restarting of negotiations as a result of changing the negotiating
methodology, due to inadequate resolution using the existing 'debated' negotiating
methodology? This would reduce the chance of financial compensation claims. (See 2).
Could you re-trigger article 50 under grounds of a different constitutional requirement or

failure of stewardship by the EC? There was a clear infringement of the legal criteria set to
maintain economic union within the EU during the Euro Crisis, this may be better (See 3).
I hope you can see how great an infringement the Euro Crisis was on EC legislation and how
this led to the UK having to leave the EU. I will post the enclosed along with this letter on my
blog, for greater access, enabling you to forward an electronic copy to any of your supporters.
Kind Regards.
Peter James Rhys Morgan.
PJR Morgan: Website: morganisteconomics.blogspot.com

Copyright © 2019 Peter James Rhys Morgan.
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To: House of Commons
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A To: Jacob Rees-Mogg MP.
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Regarding: Brexit Trade Deal is Illegal - Failure in Stewardship.
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Thursday, 3rd January 2019
The currently proposed Brexit agreement may be outside of the expected stewardship
requirements of the governing bodies of the EU. There are legally binding economic targets
which are supposed to be achieved in regards to economic growth, unemployment and
governmental debt. The trade deal negotiated will likely prevent the EU from attaining these
targets, which would conflict with the rights of the populations of both the UK and EU.
For the best chance of reaching the legally required targets of economic prosperity the EC
would have to accept the best, most open, trade deal they can with the UK or it would conflict
with the expectations of effective stewardship set in its own legal framework. The EC, ECB
and Eurostat have to comply to economic governance targets set in the European Treaties,
which necessitate a certain level of competence in governance and economic achievement.
By not offering to accept, or even prohibiting, a stronger more open trade deal with the UK
the EC is obstructing the correct legal protections of effective economic governance of the
EU and in turn impacting the best interests of the remaining EU citizens. There is a clear
failure in stewardship on the part of the European Council, to meet its own agenda, in the
Brexit negotiations, which infringe upon the rights of the remaining population of the EU.
Kind Regards.

Why has the EC acted illegally?
Question.
It's even more absurd to talk about a country itself "breaking" it's own laws! Again, this is
international law, it's a whole different animal than internal civil law.
Answer Part One.
I am assuming by this you mean that because the EC set the laws it can break them? If this is
the case then it is incorrect in its concept. The laws which the EC has broken are legally
binding requirements for nations to enter and be part of the EU and for the successful
governance of its collective economy. The laws were originally set enable the union to exist.
By breaking the laws it would mean the nations within the union are none compliant to the
regulations that are necessary to maintain a successful economic union. By not adhering to
these laws the nation is, not simply breaking the law but, not falling within the economic
achievement requirements needed to make the Euro and EU economy operate effectively.
Breaking these laws and targets .i.e. the Stability and Growth Pact or ECB targets could
impact the Euro value or put financial strain on other EU member states. The same is true for
the EC itself if it does not maintain its objectives for economic governance the outcome is the
same, the Euro value is effected or there is financial strain on other EU member states.
This is why the infringements on EU law are so important when it comes to a nation
maintaining its membership within the EU, there are financial and economic effects of not
attaining the targets set by the EC. Prior to the Euro Crisis the legally binding targets set by
the EC were not met with financial consequences, the trade deal could be a similar example.
Answer Part Two.
The EC failed to attain the required level of economic governance to hold the EU together
and member states are legally entitled to leave, under their own treaties, when this happens.
This is the case and why there is a strong legal case for the UK to withdraw from the EU.
Further infringements of the requirements needed to hold the EU together are imminent with
the proposed agreement's trade deal, which will likely strain the EU economy and the Euro.

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A To: Jacob Rees-Mogg MP.
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Regarding: A way to follow legal process for Brexit.
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Sunday, 16th December 2018.
I think I may have found a way around the debate aspect of the negotiations for Brexit. It
should not be an argued process, it should follow a legal precedence which I believe this
letter will enable you to pursue. The issue is more one of who the negotiator is and how they
can negotiate, there is no reason why it can't be a legal representative instead of a bureaucrat.
Article 50 states negotiation is required, however it does not stipulate who the negotiator
should be or how to negotiate. I would recommend requesting the appointment of a senior
Judge of the European Court of Justice, the highest court in the EU, to 'negotiate' the
withdrawal agreements strictly following the legal framework of the European Union.
Legal discourse will reduce the risk of clashing with existing statutory provisions within the
EC's own legal framework, the senior court ruling can prevent contention. The 'Appointed'
ECJ Judge must follow the EC's legal framework not just the framework of Article 50 of the
Lisbon Treaty and Article 218 (3) of the Treaty of the functioning of the European Union.
By following this legal methodology the EC and UK protect against encroaching on existing
legislation protecting both parties citizens and avoiding compensation cases. The new
appointment of a legal authority turns the process of the UK withdrawing from the European
Union into a Court evaluated and determined endeavour, rather than a debated negotiation.
Precedence is set through existing legislation and legally binding regulations, following the
legal guidelines of the European Court system. The 'Appointed' Judge must make rulings
following these guidelines strictly to not show bias on either side of the legal action. Both
parties may approach the Judge through written communication putting forward their case.
Article 50 states Article 218 (3) must be followed (cited in below pages), it states nominating
a Union negotiator or the head of the Union's negotiating team. There is no statement of who
the negotiator should be or how to negotiate. I request a new nomination of a senior ECJ
Judge and to follow legal process to protect the interests of both parties and their citizens.
Kind Regards.

The highlighted does not state who the negotiator is or how to negotiate.
Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty.
1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own
constitutional requirements.
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its
intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall
negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its
withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That
agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the
Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European
Parliament.
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force
of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in
paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned,
unanimously decides to extend this period.
4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of the
Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of
the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it.
A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union.
5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject to
the procedure referred to in Article 49.

Article 50 states to follow Article 218 (3), which states nominating a Union negotiator or
the head of the Union's negotiating team. There is no statement of who the negotiator
should be or how to negotiate. I request the nomination of a senior ECJ Judge and to
follow legal process to protect the interests of both parties and their citizens.
Article 218 of the Treaty of the functioning of the European Union.
1. Without prejudice to the specific provisions laid down in Article 207, agreements between
the Union and third countries or international organisations shall be negotiated and concluded
in accordance with the following procedure.
2. The Council shall authorise the opening of negotiations, adopt negotiating directives,
authorise the signing of agreements and conclude them.
3. The Commission, or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy where the agreement envisaged relates exclusively or principally to the common
foreign and security policy, shall submit recommendations to the Council, which shall adopt
a decision authorising the opening of negotiations and, depending on the subject of the
agreement envisaged, nominating the Union negotiator or the head of the Union's negotiating
team.
4. The Council may address directives to the negotiator and designate a special committee in
consultation with which the negotiations must be conducted.
5. The Council, on a proposal by the negotiator, shall adopt a decision authorising the signing
of the agreement and, if necessary, its provisional application before entry into force.
6. The Council, on a proposal by the negotiator, shall adopt a decision concluding the
agreement.
Except where agreements relate exclusively to the common foreign and security policy, the
Council shall adopt the decision concluding the agreement:
(a) after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament in the following cases:
(i) association agreements;
(ii) agreement on Union accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
(iii) agreements establishing a specific institutional framework by organising cooperation

procedures;
(iv) agreements with important budgetary implications for the Union;
(v) agreements covering fields to which either the ordinary legislative procedure applies, or
the special legislative procedure where consent by the European Parliament is required.

The European Parliament and the Council may, in an urgent situation, agree upon a time-limit
for consent.
(b) after consulting the European Parliament in other cases. The European Parliament shall
deliver its opinion within a time-limit which the Council may set depending on the urgency
of the matter. In the absence of an opinion within that time-limit, the Council may act.
7. When concluding an agreement, the Council may, by way of derogation from paragraphs
5, 6 and 9, authorise the negotiator to approve on the Union's behalf modifications to the
agreement where it provides for them to be adopted by a simplified procedure or by a body
set up by the agreement. The Council may attach specific conditions to such authorisation.
8. The Council shall act by a qualified majority throughout the procedure.
However, it shall act unanimously when the agreement covers a field for which unanimity is
required for the adoption of a Union act as well as for association agreements and the
agreements referred to in Article 212 with the States which are candidates for accession. The
Council shall also act unanimously for the agreement on accession of the Union to the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; the
decision concluding this agreement shall enter into force after it has been approved by the
Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.
9. The Council, on a proposal from the Commission or the High Representative of the Union
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall adopt a decision suspending application of an
agreement and establishing the positions to be adopted on the Union's behalf in a body set up
by an agreement, when that body is called upon to adopt acts having legal effects, with the
exception of acts supplementing or amending the institutional framework of the agreement.
10. The European Parliament shall be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the
procedure.
11. A Member State, the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission may obtain
the opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an agreement envisaged is compatible with
the Treaties. Where the opinion of the Court is adverse, the agreement envisaged may not
enter into force unless it is amended or the Treaties are revised.

P J R M I
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A To: Rt Hon Dominic Raab MP Brexit Minister.
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Regarding: Contingency. If there is a Brexit 'No Deal'.
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Thursday 23rd August 2018.
I am a freelance macroeconomist and have been developing a legal case on Brexit, which I
previously sent to you. I have also previously written an article regarding the legality of the
Brexit process pertaining to the triggering of article 50, which may not have been performed
correctly. If there is a 'No Deal' result from Brexit negotiations you could claim article 50 was
not triggered correctly and follow the legal case I put forward instead. The enclosed article
explains the grounds, which could buy more time and push the process down the legal route.
Kind Regards.

Is Brexit Legal? Has Article 50 Been Triggered Correctly?
By Peter Morgan.
19:47 16/11/2017.
The whole process of Brexit has become an area of debate in itself, especially in terms of the
legality of the transition of independence from the EU. The Anti-Brexit supporters have
claimed the legal grounds put forward for separation of the UK from the EU may not be
viable and that the corresponding undertakings to enable de-unification, may not have been
performed correctly. The debate seems to surround Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty signed on
13th December 2007, which sets certain criteria that has to be followed throughout Brexit.
This leads to various questions. The first question is whether there was legal justification to
trigger Article 50 in the first place. The second question is whether the EU referendum that
demonstrated the will of the UK population to leave the EU is of high enough authority or
just an advisory vote. The third question is whether the criteria set out in Article 50 has been
processed correctly in regards to the communication with the EC on leaving the EU. If even
one of these questions is proven to be non compliant it could be argued that Brexit is illegal.
Has Article 50 been triggered justifiably? According to the criteria not only does the
European Council have to be notified of any member state leaving the EU, but it has to have
legal grounds due to a constitutional requirement. Apparently the letter put forward by the
British Government's legal team did not provide an appropriate constitutional requirement
and was only a notification of the decision to leave the EU. In short only Article 50 part 2
was compliant with the legal grounds deemed necessary by the EC for the Brexit process.
Is the referendum outcome to leave the EU of high enough authority to trigger Brexit?
Actually it may not be. Due to a Supreme Court ruling for 'Miller' that determined leaving the
EU takes away rights in UK law, which only parliament could allow under statutory
authorisation. Also the referendum is only an advisory vote and not legally binding through
the government itself, unless proven there was a constitutional requirement to leave the EU.
The argument of the letter to the EC for the UK to leave the EU being non-compliant.
Was the act of triggering Article 50 processed correctly? The whole argument is on the basis
of correct or incorrect communication with the EC and the notification of the will to
withdraw from the EU. There has to be clear communication of the will and reason for
leaving the EU, along with correct correspondence with the EC throughout the process.
Apparently if this is not performed appropriately the EC could bring infringement
proceedings against the UK. The extract below demonstrates the legislation it would invoke.

"In such circumstances, it cannot be excluded that the European Commission might
commence infringement proceedings against the UK under Article 258 TFEU alleging a
breach of the procedural obligation under Article 50(2) TEU; a breach of substantive
obligations under the treaty in the event of the UK passing legislation in conflict with EU law
but without actually having withdrawn from the EU; and perhaps also a breach of the
principle of ‘sincere cooperation’ under Article 4(3) TEU." (Armstrong 2017).
Perhaps it is better to put forward another legal case for leaving the EU. This way it will be
made clear that Article 50 part 1, where there needs to be a constitutional requirement to
leave the EU, has been demonstrated. Better grounds to trigger Article 50 would be the
failure of the EC to conform to its legal obligations with EU member states. There was a
failure in Economic Governance throughout the Euro Crisis. This failure was the inability to
implement the correct declaration of national debt figures and control national debt levels.
There was a legal requirement for each EU member state's National Statistical Institution
(NSI) to collect accurate national debt figures. There was also a legal requirement for the
European Statistical System (ESS) and Eurostat to control national debt levels within targets
set out in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), to maintain currency value throughout the
Euro zone. The EC failed to implement control of national debt levels before and throughout
the Euro Crisis, failing to comply to ESA 95 rules, which it was legally bound to achieve.
There was a continual failure. In 2005 a code of best practice was set up called the European
Statistics Code of Practice, followed by the European Statistical Governance Advisory Board
(ESGAB) in 2008 and then the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). All of which failed as
national debt continued to rise, the Euro zone bailout fund also had to be superseded. The
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) used by the EC to help failing states make debt
repayments was replaced by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) on 8th October 2012.
There is clear evidence the EC, ESS and Eurostat failed to comply to the regulations for
controlling national debt levels throughout the Euro zone. If Brexit is put through on new
legal grounds based on the EC's failure of Economic Governance, it would provide
appropriate constitutional requirements to conform to Article 50. As the withdrawal is based
on the EC's legal failings, it negates the need for the referendum outcome to leave the EU.
Parliamentary Authorisation is not needed due to the EC's failure being in breach of contract.
If the process of triggering Article 50 was performed incorrectly it could be submitted again
under the grounds of the EC's failure of Economic Governance, now constitutional
requirement is evident. The two year process would start again, although this may be in the
favour of the British Government who would gain more time for negotiating. It would also
put the onerous of the failings on the EC, which should provide a stronger stance for the
British Government during the negotiating period and get a better deal for de-unification.
Published at Morganist Economics.


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P J R M I

Wednesday, 30th January 2019.

Could you re-trigger article 50 under grounds of a different constitutional requirement or

Peter James Rhys Morgan.

PJR Morgan: Website: morganisteconomics.blogspot.com

Thursday, 3rd January 2019

Peter James Rhys Morgan.

PJR Morgan: Website: morganisteconomics.blogspot.com

Answer Part One.

Answer Part Two.

PJR Morgan: Website: morganisteconomics.blogspot.com

Sunday, 16th December 2018.

Peter James Rhys Morgan.

PJR Morgan: Website: morganisteconomics.blogspot.com

Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty.

PJR Morgan: Website: morganisteconomics.blogspot.com

Article 218 of the Treaty of the functioning of the European Union.

(i) association agreements;

(iii) agreements establishing a specific institutional framework by organising cooperation

(iv) agreements with important budgetary implications for the Union;

PJR Morgan: Website: morganisteconomics.blogspot.com

8. The Council shall act by a qualified majority throughout the procedure.

PJR Morgan: Website: morganisteconomics.blogspot.com

Thursday 23rd August 2018.

Peter James Rhys Morgan.

PJR Morgan: Website: morganisteconomics.blogspot.com

PJR Morgan: Website: morganisteconomics.blogspot.com

Published at Morganist Economics.

Copyright © 2018 Peter James Rhys Morgan.

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