CIVIL PROCEDURE

1. City of Manila v. Judge Grecia-Cuerdo, et al – Court of Tax Appeals has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over decisions, orders, or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided
or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction, there is no
categorical statement under RA 1125 as well as the amendatory RA 9282, which provides that
the CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by the
RTC in local tax cases filed before it.
2. Medical Plaza Makati Condominium Corp v.Cullen - the intra-corporate dispute between
petitioner and respondent is still within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a special commercial
court and not the HLURB. An intra-corporate controversy is one which pertains to any of the
following relationships: (1) between the corporation, partnership or association and the public;
(2) between the corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar as its franchise,
permit or license to operate is concerned; (3) between the corporation, partnership or
association and its stockholders, partners, members or officers; and (4) among the stockholders,
partners or associates themselves. 22 Thus, under the relationship test, the existence of any of
the above intra-corporate relations makes the case intra-corporate. While the CA may be
correct that the RTC has jurisdiction, the case should have been filed not with the regular court
but with the branch of the RTC designated as a special commercial court . Considering that the
RTC of Makati City, Branch 58 was not designated as a special commercial court, it was not
vested with jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the SEC. 31 The CA, therefore, gravely
erred in remanding the case to the RTC for further proceedings.
3. Spouses Rebamonte v. Spouses Lucero - According to Section 33(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP)
129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act
No. (RA) 7691,24 the MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title
to, or possession of, real property located outside Metro Manila, or any interest therein where
the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed P20,000.00 . In the
instant case, reckoned from the date of the receipt of the respondents Sps. Lucero's Complaint
in 1990 to the filing of the instant Petition in 2018, which was the first time the ground of lack of
jurisdiction was invoked by the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte, an outstandingly long period of 28
years has passed. To make matters worse, the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte fail to make any
justification whatsoever explaining why they failed to raise the ground of lack of jurisdiction
after almost three decades of litigation. Therefore, the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte are estopped
from invoking the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The Court refuses to reward the petitioners Sps.
Rebamonte's lethargy and ineptitude by taking cognizance of their argument on lack of
jurisdiction. Equity, fair play, and public policy prevent the Court from doing so.
4. Sandoval v. Caneba – Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 957 the National Housing
Authority (NHA) was given the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide certain cases as follows:

SEC.1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and business and in
addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing
Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:

A. Unsound real estate business practices:

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium

unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman;and

C. Cases  involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by

buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman. (Emphasis supplied.)
 Considering that the trial court has no jurisdiction under the circumstances obtaining
in this case, the decision it rendered is null and void ab initio. It is as if no decision
was rendered by the trial court at all.

5. Magpale v CSC - The February 5, 1990 decision of the MSPB did not involve dismissal or
separation from office, rather, the decision exonerated petitioner and ordered him reinstated to his
former position. Consequently, in the light of our pronouncements in the aforecited cases of Mendez
v. Civil Service Commission and Paredes vs. Civil Service Commission, the MSPB decision was not
a proper subject of appeal to the CSC.

6. De Murga v. Chan - In relation to the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the municipal court over the case,
it is to be noted that, after the lessor and the lessee had failed to agree on the renewal of the lease which
terminated on January 31, 1959, the lessor, on February 19, 1959, sent the demand letter hereinabove
quoted, Exhibit J. It was, then, as it is now, the contention of the lessee that such demand is not that kind
of demand contemplated in the Rules of Court as complying with the jurisdictional requirement — that
demand to vacate is indispensable in order to determine whether the tenant's possession has become
illegal.

7. Padlan v. Dinglasan - Respondents filed the complaint in 1999, at the time BP 129, the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, was already amended by RA No. 7691, An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Section 3 of RA
7691 expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts to include all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession, of real property, or any interest therein which does not exceed P20,000
or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed P50, 000.

8. Quesada v. DOJ - A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, must be filed with the Court of Appeals whose decision may then be appealed to this Court by
way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the same Rules. 9 A direct recourse to this
Court is warranted only where there are special and compelling reasons specifically alleged in the
petition to justify such action. Such ladder of appeals is in accordance with the rule on hierarchy of
courts.

9. Lumbuan v. Ronquilo - It is noteworthy that under the aforequoted provision, the confrontation
before the Lupon Chairman or the pangkat is sufficient compliance with the precondition for filing the
case in court.

10. People v Cawaling - The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force
at the time of the institution of the action. Once the court acquires jurisdiction, it may not be ousted
from the case by any subsequent events, such as a new legislation placing such proceedings under the
jurisdiction of another tribunal. The only recognized exceptions to the rule, which find no application in
the case at bar, arise when: (1) there is an express provision in the statute, or (2) the statute is clearly
intended to apply to actions pending before its enactment. In relation to the above, Section 4-a-2 of PD
1606, as amended by PD 1861, quoted earlier, lists two requisites that must concur before the
Sandiganbayan may exercise exclusive and original jurisdiction over a case: (a) the offense was
committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office; and (b) the penalty prescribed by law is
higher than prision correccionalor imprisonment for six (6) years, or higher than a fine of six thousand
pesos (P6,000).Sanchez vs. Demetriou clarified that murder or homicide may be committed both by
public officers and by private citizens, and that public office is not a constitutive element of said crime,
viz.:

11. Zamora v. Heirs of Carmen - in Diu v. Court of Appeals,21 we held that "notwithstanding the
mandate in Section 410(b) of R.A. No. 7160 that the Barangay Chairman shall constitute a Pangkat if he
fails in his mediation efforts," the same "Section 410(b) should be construed together with Section
412(a) of the same law (quoted earlier), as well as the circumstances obtaining in and peculiar to the
case." Here, while the Pangkat was not constituted, however, the parties met nine (9) times at the Office
of the Barangay Chairman for conciliation wherein not only the issue of water installation was discussed
but also petitioners' violation of the lease contract. It is thus manifest that there was substantial
compliance with the law which does not require strict adherence thereto. Section 19(a) permits the
filing of such pleading only when the ground for dismissal of the complaint is anchored on lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure by the complainant to refer the subject matter of his/her
complaint "to the Lupon for conciliation" prior to its filing with the court.

12. Sps. Belvin v Sps. Erola - Unfortunately,  they  failed  to  arrive  at  any  amicable settlement.51 
Thereafter, upon agreement of the parties, the Office of the Punong Barangay issued a Certification to
File Action.52 During pre-trial, the parties again underwent mediation before the PMC and JDR before
the court. Still, no settlement was reached.53  Given the foregoing, the Court finds that the purposes of
the law, i.e., to provide avenues for parties to amicably settle their disputes and to prevent the
"indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts,"54 have been sufficiently  met. Considering that the instant
complaint for unlawful detainer, an action governed by the rules of summary procedure, has been
pending for 6 years, the Court finds it proper to relax the technical rules of procedure in the interest of
speedy and substantial justice.

13. Complaint-Affidavit of Elvira N. Enables, Rebecca H. Angeles, and Estelita B. Ocampo - To

hold a magistrate administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that his or her
action was erroneous; it must also be proven that it was driven by bad faith, dishonesty, or ill motive.
The 24-month period does not run immediately upon the filing of a petition before this Court,
but only when the last pleading, brief, or memorandum has been submitted. While the 24-
month period provided under the 1987 Constitution is persuasive, it does not summarily bind
this Court to the disposition of cases brought before it. It is a mere directive to ensure this
Court's prompt resolution of cases, and should not be interpreted as an inflexible rule. Besides,
on October 10, 2018, respondent has already vacated her office due to her mandatory
retirement, rendering complainants' Administrative Complaint moot.

14. Gios-Samar, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and Communications, et al. – the DOTC
[9]
and the CAAP issued the Instructions to Prospective Bidders (ITPB),  which provided that prospective
bidders are to pre-qualify and bid for the development, operations, and maintenance of the airports.
GIOS-SAMAR, Inc., represented by its Chairperson Gerardo M. Malinao (petitioner), suing as a taxpayer
and invoking the transcendental importance of the issue, filed the present petition for prohibition.
[14]
 Petitioner alleges that it is a non-governmental organization composed of subsistence farmers and
fisherfolk from Samar, who are among the victims of Typhoon Yolanda relying on government assistance
[15]
for the rehabilitation of their industry and livelihood.  It assails the constitutionality of the bundling of the
Projects and seeks to enjoin the DOTC and the CAAP from proceeding with the bidding of the same.

Petitioner raises the following arguments:

First, the bundling of the Projects violated the "constitutional prohibitions on the anti-dummy and the grant
[16]
of opportunity to the general public to invest in public utilities,"  citing Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
[17]
Constitution.  According to petitioner, bundling would allow companies with questionable or shaky
financial background to have direct access to the Projects "by simply joining a consortium which under
the bundling scheme adopted by the DOTC said [P]rojects taken altogether would definitely be beyond
[18]
the financial capability of any qualified, single Filipino corporation."

Second, bundling violates the constitutional prohibition on monopolies under Section 19, Article XII of the
Constitution because it would allow one winning bidder to operate and maintain several airpm1s, thus
establishing a monopoly. Petitioner asserts that, given the staggering cost of the Bundled Projects, the
same can only be undertaken by a group, joint venture outfits, and consortiums which are susceptible to
combinations and schemes to control the operation of the service for profit, enabling a single consortium
to control as many as six airports.

[20]
Third, bundling will "surely perpetrate an undue restraint of trade."  Mid-sized Filipino companies which
may have previously considered participating in one of the six (6) distinct Projects will no longer have a
realistic opportunity to participate in the bidding because the separate projects became two (2)
gargantuan projects. This effectively placed the Projects beyond the reach of medium-sized Filipino
[21]
companies.

Fourth, the PBAC of the DOTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction
[22]
when it bundled the projects without legal authority.

Fifth, bundling made a mockery of public bidding because it raised the reasonable bar to a level higher
[23]
than what it would have been, had the projects been bidded out separately.
In support of petitioner's prayer, for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, it states that there is extreme urgency to enjoin the bidding of the Bundled Projects
[24]
so as not to cause irreparable damage and injury to the coffers of the government.

[25]
In its comment,  the DOTC counters that: (1) the petition is premature because there has been no
actual bidding yet, hence there is no Justiciable controversy to speak of; (2) petitioner has no legal
standing to file the suit whether as a taxpayer or as a private individual; (3) petitioner's allegation on the
violation of anti-dummy and equal opportunity clauses of the Constitution are speculative and conjectural;
(4) Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution is not applicable to the bidding process assailed by
petitioner; (5) the bundling of the Projects does not violate the prohibitions on monopolies or combinations
in restraint of trade; and (6) the DOTC and the CAAP did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts operates to: (1) prevent inordinate demands
upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction;[176] (2) prevent further overcrowding of the
Court's docket;[177] and (3) prevent the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or
otherwise, in the adjudication of cases which often have to be remanded or referred
to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as the court
better equipped to resolve factual questions. The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of
judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority from
different decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into
the following categories:

1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case

2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by
the facts of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the
operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.

As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of
judicial review:

1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;

2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement;

3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;

4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

15. Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al. v. Aquino III, et al. - This resolves a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition,1 praying that a temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction be issued to annul the Social Security System premium
hike. Petitioners claim that the increase in contribution rate violates Section 4(b)
(2) of the Social Security Act,16 which states that the "increases in benefits shall
not require any increase in the rate of contribution[.]" They argue that this proviso
prohibits the increase in contributions if there was no corresponding increase in
benefits. Petitioners pray that a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction be issued to stop the implementation of the increase in
contributions. Maintaining that a majority of them are Social Security System members
directly affected by the premium hike, petitioners assert having the requisite locus
standi to file the Petition.
 I. The president cannot be charged with any suit, civil or criminal in
nature, during his or her incumbency in office. This is in line with the doctrine of
the president's immunity from suit.
II. Here, nothing in the records shows that petitioners filed a case
before the Social Security Commission or asked for a reconsideration of the
assailed issuances. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
ensures that this legislative power is respected by courts. Courts cannot ignore
Congress' determination that the Social Security Commission is the entity with
jurisdiction over any dispute arising from the Social Security Act with respect to
coverage, benefits, contributions, and penalties. The Social Security Commission,
then, must be given a chance to render a decision on the issue, or to correct any
alleged mistake or error, before the courts can exercise their power of judicial
review.

16. Inmates of the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City v. De Lima, et al . –

Respondents contend that the petition of Edago et al. did not comply with all the
elements of justiciability as the requirement of an actual case or controversy vis-a-
vis the requirement of ripeness has not been complied with. For them, the claimed
injury of petitioners has not ripened to an actual case requiring this Court's
intervention: First, the MSEC has not been constituted yet so there is effectively no
authority or specialized body to screen, evaluate and recommend any applications for
time credits based on R.A. No. 10592. Second, none of petitioners has applied for the
revised credits, making their claim of injury premature, if not anticipatory. And third,
the prison records annexed to the petition are neither signed nor certified by the
BUCOR Director which belie the claim of actual injury resulting from alleged extended
incarceration. What petitioners did was they immediately filed this case after obtaining
their prison records and computing the purported application of the revised credits for
GCTA under R.A. No. 10592

It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or

governmental act may be heard and decided unless the following requisites for judicial
inquiry are present: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case.

17. Victoria Manufacturing Corporation Employees Union v. Victoria Manufacturing

Corporation - VMC and VMCEU held a grievance meeting to settle various issues,
including the company's decision to withhold income tax from the wages of the union
members who were earning the statutory minimum wage. Unfortunately, the parties
failed to resolve the issue. The appellate court, after brushing aside VMC's resort to the
wrong remedy,14 held that the jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrator is limited to labor disputes. In
order to validly try a civil case, must be possessed of two types of jurisdiction: (1) jurisdiction
over the subject matter; and (2) jurisdiction over the parties.  It is axiomatic that a judgment
rendered by a court without jurisdiction over the subject matter produces no legal effect.
Relevantly, the Labor Code vests in VAs the power to hear and decide labor disputes, viz.:

Art. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. The Voluntary

Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies x x x.

Art. 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including
unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks.
Ruling that the jurisdiction of VAs is limited to labor disputes, the Court declared that the company and
the union should have submitted the question to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR).
First, lack of jurisdiction was timely raised. To be sure, not even a year had elapsed between the
commencement of the arbitration proceedings and the invocation of the jurisdictional issue. By no
stretch of the imagination can this be compared to the factual milieu of Sibonghanoy, where lack of
jurisdiction was raised only 15 years after the case was filed. On the other hand, VMC, in the position
paper that it filed before the VA, merely prayed that "the complaint of [VMCEU] be dismissed with
prejudice for utter lack of merit."

18. Republic of the Philippines, et al. v. Heirs of Paus, et al. - Under Batas Pambansa Blg.
129,35 the RTC has jurisdiction over the following civil cases:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.— Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

xxxx

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except
actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which
is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts;

xxxx

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of
the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).

As further confirmation that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case is the fact that the NCIP does not
have jurisdiction over issues involving non-Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs)/Indigenous Peoples
(IPs). The NCIP's jurisdiction is defined in Section 66 of the IPRA:

SEC. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. — The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be
brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary
laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in
the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a
condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.

Here, although the dispute involves the rights of the Heirs of Ikang Paus, who claim to be members of
the Ibaloi tribe, the Complaint involves non-ICCs/IPs such as the Republic, the Register of Deeds of
Baguio, and even the LRA.

19. Metro Bottled Water Corporation v. Andrada Construction & Development Corporation,
Inc. -

20. Fruehauf Electronics Philippines Corporation v. Techonology Electronics

Assembly and Management Pacific Corporation - Quasi-judicial bodies can only
exercise such powers and jurisdiction as are expressly or by necessary implication
conferred upon them by their enabling statutes. In other words, quasi-judicial bodies
are creatures of law.
As a contractual and consensual body, the arbitral tribunal does not have any inherent
powers over the parties. It has no power to issue coercive writs or compulsory
processes. Thus, there is a need to resort to the regular courts for interim measures of
protection82 and for the recognition or enforcement of the arbitral award. 83

The arbitral tribunal acquires jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter
through stipulation. Upon the rendition of the final award, the tribunal becomes functus
officio and - save for a few exceptions 84 - ceases to have any further jurisdiction over
the dispute.85 The tribunal's powers (or in the case of ad hoc tribunals, their very
existence) stem from the obligatory force of the arbitration agreement and its ancillary
stipulations.86 Simply put, an arbitral tribunal is a creature of contract.

WEEK II - Rules of Court Proper

1. Tamano v Ortiz – As alleged in the complaint, petitioner and

Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code.
Hence, contrary to the position of petitioner, the Civil
Code is applicable in the instant case. Assuming that
indeed petitioner and Tamano were likewise married
under Muslim laws, the same would still fall under the
general original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.

Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation

where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim
rites. Consequently, the sharia courts are not vested with
original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to
marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws.
Consequently, the Regional Trial Courts are not divested
of their general original jurisdiction under Sec. 19, par.
(6) of BP Blg. 129 which provides -

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. -  Regional Trial Courts

shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x (6) In all
cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions x x x x

2. Domagas v Jensen - The ruling of the CA that the petitioner’s complaint for forcible
entry of the petitioner against the respondent in Civil Case No. 879 is an action quasi in
rem, is erroneous. The action of the petitioner for forcible entry is a real action and one in
personam.

The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. 18 Whether a
proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature
and purpose, and by these only.19 A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal
rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person,
although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to
compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. 20 The purpose
of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or
liability directly upon the person of the defendant.21 Of this character are suits to compel a
defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. 22 An
action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against the person, as
distinguished from a judgment against the propriety to determine its state. It has been held that an
action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is
 brought against the person. As far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled that
it is an injunctive act in personam.

On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to subject
the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. 26 In an action quasi in rem, an
individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests
therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. 27 Actions quasi in rem deal with the
status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on these
questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off
the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon the
parties who joined in the action.

In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly
try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does not voluntarily
appear in court can be acquired by personal service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted
service may be made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country,
any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (a) substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2)
personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of
court; or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient. 32

Thus, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and
void.

The service of the summons on a person at a place where he was a visitor is not considered to
have been left at the residence or place or abode, where he has another place at which he
ordinarily stays and to which he intends to return.

3. Yu v Pacleb - Thus, the complaint filed by the petitioners is an action in

personam and is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded therein
and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. So, the action cannot
bind the respondent since he was not a party therein and considering the
fact that his signature and that of his late first wife were forged in the deed
of sale. Hence, the petition is denied and the Court affirms the ruling of the
CA finding the respondent having a better right over the property as the
true owner thereof.

4. Cabutihan vs Landcenter – notebook

5. Citizen Surety vs Melencio-Herrera – Notebook

6. Go vs UCPB – Petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Alberto T. Looyuko are co-

owners of Noah’s Ark International, Noah’s Ark Sugar Carriers, Noah’s
Ark Sugar Truckers, Noah’s Ark Sugar Repacker, Noah’s Ark Sugar
Insurers, Noah’s Ark Sugar Terminal, Noah’s Ark Sugar Building, and
Noah’s Ark Sugar Refinery.

Sometime in August 1996, petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Alberto T.

Looyuko applied for an Omnibus Line accommodation with respondent
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) in the amount of Nine Hundred
Million (P900,000,000) Pesos,5 and was favorably acted upon by the
latter. The transaction was secured by Real Estate Mortgages over
parcels of land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
64070, located at Mandaluyong City with an area of 24,837 square
meters, and registered in the name of Mr. Looyuko; and TCT No. 3325,
also located at Mandaluyong City. On 21 July 1997, the approved
Omnibus Line accommodation granted to petitioner was subsequently
 cancelled6 by respondent UCPB. As a consequence, petitioner Jimmy T.
Go demanded from UCPB the return of the two (2) TCTs (No. 64070
and No. 3325) covered by Real Estate Mortgages earlier executed. As
a result, the public auction sale of the mortgaged property was set on
11 April 2000 and 03 May 2000.

To protect his interest, petitioner Jimmy T. Go filed a complaint for

Cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage and damages, with prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction,
against respondent bank and its officers with the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 266.

There, we held that an action for nullification of the mortgage

documents and foreclosure of the mortgaged property is a real action
that affects the title to the property. Petitioner in this case contends
that a case for cancellation of mortgage is a personal action and since
he resides at Pasig City, venue was properly laid therein.

An action for cancellation of real estate mortgage is necessarily an

action affecting the title to the property. It is, therefore, a real action
which should be commenced and tried in Mandaluyong City, the place
where the subject property lies.

7. Gochan vs Gochan - The Court of Appeals found that the complaint

was one for specific performance and incapable of pecuniary
estimation. We do not agree.

It is necessary to determine the true nature of the complaint in

order to resolve the issue of whether or not respondents paid the
correct amount of docket fees therefor. In this jurisdiction, the
dictum adhered to is that the nature of an action is determined
by the allegations in the body of the pleading or complaint itself,
rather than by its title or heading. 13 The caption of the complaint
below was denominated as one for specific performance and
damages. The relief sought, however, is the conveyance or
transfer of real property, or ultimately, the execution of deeds of
conveyance in their favor of the real properties enumerated in
the provisional memorandum of agreement. Under these
circumstances, the case below was actually a real action,
affecting as it does title to or possession of real property.

However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional

docket fee until the case was decided by this Court on May 7,
1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the
government, this Court held that the court a quo did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case and that the amended complaint could
not have been admitted inasmuch as the original complaint was
null and void.

In the case at bar, therefore, the complaint filed with the trial
court was in the nature of a real action, although ostensibly
denominated as one for specific performance. Consequently, the
basis for determining the correct docket fees shall be the
assessed value of the property, or the estimated value thereof as
alleged by the claimant. Rule 141, Section 7, of the Rules of
Court.
The deplorable practice of forum-shopping is resorted to by
litigants who, for the purpose of obtaining the same relief, resort
to two different fora to increase his or her chances of obtaining a
favorable judgment in either one.