Way, | AM CHRISTIAN LEADING THINKERS EXPLAIN WHY THEY BELIFVE NORMAN L. GEISLER AND PAUL K. HOFFMAN, EDITORS Pg BakerBooksothe Dar- ned) with says That atwe Jown ood feet ort of The hg, hyst- nated at he is he msof Sains ful h not ro ime rime Wry | AM NOT A MORAL RELATIVIST FRANCIS J. BECKWITH ‘Allan Bloom made the observation tat “there is one thing a professor can he absolutely certain of: almost every student entering the universtty believes, or says he believes, thar truth is wlative. ... The students, of course, cannot defend their opinion. It is something with which they have been indoctrinated.” Bloom was talking about both moral relativism and eprs- temological relativism. The latter is the view that there is mo such thing as sbjective truth, that knowledge is relative to one's self, culeure, and/or point of view, This type of relativism will be aukltesscd in the next chapter. In this chapter, however, [will focus on moral relativism, a view that is not limited to indoctrinated college freshmen but is dominant in North American culture. “Moral relativism isthe view that when it comes to questions of morality, there are no absolutes and no objective right ur wrong; moral rules are merely personal preferences and/or the result of one’ cultural, sexual, or ethnic orientation. The fact that one believes there are exceptions of, to be more precise, exemptinns £0 moral rules does not make one a mural relativist. For example, many peaple who [i influential work, The Closing ofthe American Mind, the late philosopher 15Way | Beueve iw Terk believe lying is wrong nonetheless helieve i i tect somenne's life. These people are not moml FHeLnbslons toa rule one muse fr acknowlele the general validite et Mee The moral relatiis rejects the ide that any sich moral lesen ae Many people see relativism ay necessary for promtitg tolerance, non- hudunentalise, and inclusivenes, for they think if one lignes oeek moral Ferm iecaptect and others! incorrect, one isclosed-minnded and iclern Fs blcaly consider moral relavivism the indispensable comes ‘of our bluralste and modem democratic saciety, Unless we sll entrees sclativism, they fear we will ikely severe to wuraistically medieval eaieey Iu this chapter, we will see why the arguments for relstvien Eat Sepa iGeltcannos live up to itso reputation. But why, you may ical evaluation of relativism is jot wrong to Hie fn onder to pre relativst, for to peimnt certain and why rel- ask, isacrit- important tothe cave for tne Clrtian fal’ Hise stanly teaches that chrc ar ojeceve maa none lar agp per. ‘sot in all places and at all times. Relativistn says that there: ‘ure No such: norms. Iftelativism iste, therefore, \Christinicy must he false. But ifrel tect, Christianity cannot be dismiss! on the moral norms. Second, it moral norms exist, then materialisit us a wo lUview is fife: bscause moral norms are nonnateval things It mateidiga ale ee Ges monmareral things such as Gv angels and souleatnutteraleg ee the grounds thar they are: ‘not material. Thus, the fal: sity of materialism helps sup- port the truth of C ‘hristianity. Ultimate ly, che claim “Lam nota moral relativist” ig not based on the fact that I am a Christian, Rather, Lam a ‘Christian at least in pant because T am convinced that nu: ral relativism is completely false. In this chapter, I will firse briefly discuss how moral relativism has affected our ability to engage in moral discourse. Then I will Present und critique two. arguiuents for moral relativism, Finally, I will argue: that given the existence of ebjective moral norms, the God of theism ir the here explanation of the source of their existence lativisinisincor- ernuinds chat it affirms objective MORAL RELATIVISM AND MoRAt Discourse Moral relativism has stunted our ability to grusp the nature of moral claims People in o ur Culture often confuse preference claims with moral caine reduce the latter to the former, Ta nderstand what Lane by this, consider two statements:* 1. Llike vanilla ice cream, 2 Killing people without justification is wrong statement isa preference claim, since it isa des not a narmative cla do. Iris nat saying, 16 ctiption of a per. iin. Iris not a claim ahout what one ought or ought nor 1 ‘Since I like vanilla ice cream, ticul tion’ of wt ucts mor is,“ alwa und T fact, prog thes the her. tea ‘The ers,¢ trou Furt nigh plefp10" wel Fist, ll per- ctive sthen huton sup ivi’ tleast fected Je two of the aims. ims or sider aper what cream, WHY | AM NOt A MUKAL RELATIVIST the government ought to coerce you to eat it as well” of, “Everyone iat the world ought to like vanilla ice cream tao,” A claim of subjective preference tells tsnothing about what one ought to think or da. For example, ifsomeone were to sats like to torture children for fun,” this would tell us nothing about wwhetlte itis wrong of right to torture children for fun ‘The second claim, however, is quite different. It has litte ifanything to do with what one likes or dislikes. In fact, one may pref to kill another person ‘without justification and still know that itis morally wrong todo so, Thissrate- tent is a moral clait, [tis not a descriptive claim, for it does not tell us what, ‘why, ar how things are, or how a majarity of people in fact behave and think Nor sia preference claim, for it dues not tell us what anyone's subjective pret ference may he or how one prefers ww behave and think. Rather, it isa clair about what persons aught ro do, which may be contrary to how persons in fact behave and how they prefer to behave. Unfortunately, the esponsal of moral relativisit las made it difficult for many people in ourculture to distinguish herween preference claims and moral claims Rather than pondering and straggling with arguments (or and against a par ticular moral peropective, people somerimes reduce the disagreement toa ques- tion of personal preference or subjective opinion. Take, for example, the issue Of whether parents and other concerned citivens have a right to boycott pred tucts that are advertised during television programs these citizens find to be totally inappropriate, especialy for children. The usual reply ro these citizens is “If you don’t like a particular program, you don't have ro watch it. You can always cluage the channel.” But does the person who employs rhis reply really understand what these citizens are saying? "These groups are uot merely saying chat they don’t prefer these programs. In fact, these citizens and their children may actually be tempted to watch these programs: chat is, in terms of sheer untutored appetite, they may actually prefer these programs, though they still may know these programs are not good for them, just as one may prefer a caridy bar but still know it’s not good for him or her To put it anarher way, these citizens ate saying something a bit more sub- tle and profound than their detractors are likely to recognize let alone admit: These programs convey .nessagesand create a moral climate that will affect oth. xs, especially children, ina way thar isadverse to the public good. Hence, what troubles these citizens is that you 2nd your children will not change the channel Furthermore, itconcers these people thar there is probably somewhere in Amer jca an unsupervised ten-year-old who 1s, on a consistent basis, watching late night HBO o listening to radio shock-jock Howard Stem. Most of these peo- ple fear that their ten-year olds, who are not watching or listening to such pro- tas, may have to interact socially with the unsupervised ten-year-old. Oth fs, wu uray not have young children, are concerned for the declining moral hhealth of dics communities, which is sometimes manifested in an increasing level of radenes, distespect,incivility, crime, or verbal and physical violence. WWay 1 Betieve is Tet There ate, in fact, many well-educated and rewsonuble peuple who believe dat such a eonimunity coneer i justified, capecilly in light of what we know ubvut Liow cesta forms of entertainment and mediu uffect people, expecially the young Just asa concem for people's lungs and physicul wlth lw resulted in criicisi of ain teprisals against tobacco companies, convex for people® souls an sputual health sometimes results in criticisms of wid reprisal against different media. Thus such concems cannot be relegated rou question of one penonal preference. The rel question {8 whether any commmuaity or social action isever permupoible aud would best serve the public good. Moral elativist, to be Cconsisient, must aiswer ho, while common sense seems 1 tll ws otherwise ‘Consider anutlei example: the debate over abortion right.’ Many who defend a woman’ right to abortion (pro-ehoicers) sometimes tell dhose who oppose uburiivu nights (pio-lifes), “If you don't like abortien, then don’t have one.” The intent nud effect of such rhetoric is to reduce the abortion debate to amere preference claim. That is, the objective moral rightness or wronguiess of abortion (ie., whether or uot it invelves killing an innocent human person) declared, without anument, to be irrelevant. But this is clearly u mistake, for those who oppose burlion do so because they believe thet the fetus (during most if not all ofa wonnan’s pregnancy) isa human person wih u right life, and icis generally wiuns, both objectively and universally, to violate u person right co life. For tis reason, when the pro-lfer hears the pro-choicer cell let that if she doesn’t like abortion she doesn’t have to have one, it sounds w het asthe pro-choiver is saying, "If you don't like murder, chendon’c kill uny into cent persons.” Understarnably, the pro-lifer, committed to objecti moral ‘norms, finds such rhetone perplesiig as well as unpersuasive. Of course, a num ber of sophisticated pro-choice advocates are not moral relaivists und revo ie che error of substituting preference claims for substantive moral debute.” But it does seem that in the popular debate, pro-cholcers rend to reduce te question of abortion to a question of preference, proving they have been more affected by moral relativisun Una live their opponents. ARGUMENTS TOR MORAL RELATIVISM. ‘Two arguments are often used to defend moral relativism. The first is the ‘argument from cultural and individual differences and the second is the argu ment from tolerance THE ARGUMENT FROM CULTURAL AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES In this argument, the relativise concludes that there are nw objective moral norms because culnites and individuals disagree on unoral isues. To defend this premise the relarivistrypically cites a numberof examples, sucla esoss-cultural and intra-cultural diferences over the morality ofsexual practices, abortion, Wat, 18 and capit donically hat ple comy roast heef from cult Relatid about sor L were t agreeme the fact t tion of w ton to e vidualsa nobody of moral culture, ifthe normsd tively cc tion, for opinior actions that pr Disag rclativi that dis ‘The rel: that un taken imoralit does n¢ tneans is the c nent” hus of iment wath] tion, Dis pier vor tha ull pl Massaring ite, her aber oral cog, pate * the isthe sarge NCES moral nd this cultural Way | AM NOT A MORAL RELATIVIST sid capital punishment. Hadley Arkes, an opponent of moral relativism, hassar- donically observed, “In one socicty, a widow is burned on the funeral pyre of her husband: in another, she is burned on the beach in Miami. In one society, peo- ple complain to the chef about the roast beef, in another, they send hark the toast beet wud eat the chef.”” There ae at least four problems with the argument from cultural and individual differences. Relativism does not follow from disagreement. The fact that people disagree about something does not mean that there is no truth. For example, if you and Twere to disayiee on the question of whether the earth is round, our dis- agreement would certainly not be proof that the earth has no shape. Likewise, the fact chat a skinhead (a type of neo-Nazi) and I may disagree on the ques- tion of wheuer we should treat people equally is certainly not sufficient rea- son to conclude tat equality is not an objective moral value, Even if indi- viduals and culuures hold ne values in common, it simply does not follow that nobody is ever right or wrong about the correct values. Despite the existence of moral disagreciuent, itis still quite possible that an individual or an entire culture, such as Adolf Iitler and Nazi Germany, are simply mistaken. If the mere fact of disagreement were sufficient to conclude that objective norms donot exist, we would then have to acknowledge that there is no objec- tively correct position ott such issues as slavery, genocide, and child molesta- tion, for the slave owner, genocidal maniac, and pedophile clearly have an opinion thar differs from the oute held by those of us who condemn theit actions. In the end, moral disugrceiient is simply a sociological observation that proves nothing about the true nature of morality, Disagreement actually counts against relutivism. Suppose, however, that the relativist, despite the logical failure uf his cave, sticks to his guns and maintains thar disagreement over objective norms proves the correctness of relativism. ‘The relativischassec down a principle—lissyreeiment means there isn truth— that unravels his own case. Afcerall, uve of usbelieve that relativism isa mis- taken view. We, in other words, disagree with the relativist over the nature of morality. We believe thar objective moral norms exist whereas the relativist does not. But according to the relarivist’s own principle (ix, “disagreement means there isno truth”), he oughe to abandon his vwn opinion tat relativism is the correct position, To make matters worse for the relativist, his “disayee- ment” principle isa proposition for which there iso universal agreement au thus on its own grounds must be rejected. As Arkes points out, “My disagiee: ‘ment establishes that the proposition [Le., disagreement means there is no truth] does not enjoy a universal assent, and by the very terms of the proposi- tion, that should be quite sufficient to determine its own invalidity.” Disagreement is overated. Although it is true that people and cultures dis- agree on moral issues, it does not follow that they do not share the same values or that certain moral norms are not binding on all nations at all times and in all places. Take, for example, the Salem witch trials. During colonial days in Massachusetts, certain individuals were put to death as punishment for 19WAY 1 BeLieve IN TRUTH practicing witchcraft. We do not execute witches today, but not because our ‘moral norms have changed. Rather, we don’t execute witches because we do nnorbelieve, asthe seventeenth-century residents of Massachuserts did, chat the practice of witchcraft has a fatal effect on the community. But suppose we had evidence that the practice of witchcraft affects people in the sarce way that sec- ondhand cigarette smoke affects nonsmokers. We would alter the practice of ‘our values to take into consideration this factual change. We may set up non witch secrions in restaurants and ban the casting of spells on interstate airplane flights. The upsboo of all this is that the good of the community isa value we slau with the seventeenth-century residents of Salem, but we simply believe they were factually weep, about the actual effect of witches on the community. Philespher James Rachels presents another example of how the know! eile of certain facts may help us understand why it seems other people have different values." [e points to the Eskimos’ practice of infanticide (on pri- sarily female babies). On the surface, this practice seems to show that the skimoshaves ralically different value of human life than we do. And because ‘one’s view af Inia life iss fanlamental, it seems to follow from this that ‘moral relativisin iscunteet Rac ielscloes not apiee. Heexplains hat once one realizes that certain factinal considerations have made the practice of infant cide a necessary evil for the Eakins, one sees thar the Eskimos’ value of life is mo all vat differen from ants. Writes Rachels Dut suppose we ask why the Eskimos do this. The explanation is not that they hhave les affection for their children or less respect for human life. An Eskimo always protect its babies if conditions permit. But they lve ina harsh rent, where food is often in short supply... Infant girls are readily dis posed of hecause first, in thissociety the males are the primary food providers— they are the hunters, acconlins to the caditional division of tabor—and i is cobywunly inportant to maintain asuficient numberof ood gatherers. But there isan important second reason as well, Becauze che hunter: suffer u high cus ally rate, Use adult men who die prematurely ar outnumber the women who dic early Thusif male and female infants survived in equal numbers, the female adulr populntion would greatly outnumber the male adult population. Exam- ining the avallable statistics, one writer conclucied chat “were it ro for female infamivide . .. chere would be approximately one-and-a-half times as many females in the average Eskimo local group as there arc food-producing mi ‘So among the Eskimos, infanticide does not signal a fundamentally diff ‘ent atitude toward children. Instead, it is a recognition that drastic measures aresnmerimesneeded roensite the famly'ssurvwval. Even then, however, killing the baby isnot the frst option considered. Adoption is common; childless cou: ples are expecially happy to uke « more fertile couple's usplus.” Killing is only the let resort, emphasize this in order to show chat the raw data che anthro- pologists ean be islets ic can make due differences in values between cul- tures appear greater than they are. The Eskimos’ values arc not all that differ ent from ont values. Ir only that life forces upon them choices that the rest of us do not have to make," wo This isn persuade th shows that all, after on sicide, ispe ‘Consides tnoral and hold incom taken, fort Fst, ea sights cepa awhiy both s Tie ava eniy? (or just, must fume value Iu dient by w possible On the breiewes th life Forex sistent wi ball game. of anther thaconecs are person death oft ‘The pr to life. He shey are my have the k ‘She jus since such human pe Thus. conflict fundamen Absind objective the follow terthan A Yet to denase out se we do ‘up none aiplane vale we y believe munity.” e knowl ple have “(on prie thar the ibecmuse this that finfan- afhurnan atthey Eskimo alah lily dis ders nd itis athere h cas 1 why female Exam female males ifer- silling only anthro en cule cdr the rest Wity | AM Nor A MORAL REIATIVIST This is not to say dat the Eskimos are right or that we should not try ro persuade them to believe their practice is wrong. Rather, this example simply ‘Shows that so-called nmotal differences may not really be moral differences at all, after one carefully exatnines why a certain practice, such as female infar fresde, is performed, ‘Consider again the issue of abortion. The conventional wisdom is that the moral and legal debate over abortion is a dispute between two factions thar hold incommensurable value systems. But the conventional wisdom is mis- taken, for these factions hold many values in common. First, each side believes da all human persons possess certain inalienable nights regardless of whether theit governments protect these rights. That is tuhy hath sides appeal to whit each believes isa fundamental right. The pro- lifeadvocate appeals 0 “life” wlieseas the pro-choice advocate appeals to “Lib- erty” (or “choice"). Both believe that a constitutional regime, in order to be just, must uphold fundamental tights. ‘Second, each side believes that its position best exemplifies its opponent's fundamental value. The pro-chuice advocate docs not deny that life is a value hut argues that his position’s appeal to human liberty is anecessary ingee- dient by which an individual cau pursue the fullest and most complete life possible (On the other hand, the pro-life advocate docs not eschew liberty. She believes that all human liberty is limited by another human pereon's right to lie. For example, one has aright wo fively pursue any goal one believes isc sistent with one’s happiness, such as attending a Los Angeles Lakers basket- ball game. One has no right, however, tu freely pursuc this goal at the expense of another's hfe or liberty, such as rurminng over pedestrians with one’s car so that one can get to the game on time. The pro-life advocate argues that fetuses are persons with a full right to life. Since the act of abortion results in the death of the unborn, abortion. with few exceptions, is not morally justitied “The pro-choice advocate does nut deny that human persons have a right to life. He just helieves that this right to life is not extended to fetuses since they are not human persons, The pro-life advocate docs not deny that people have the likerty ta make choices that they believe are in their best interests She just believes that this liberty does nt entail the right ro choose abortion finee such a choice conflicts with dhe life, liberty, and interests of another fhuman person (the ferus). Thus, when all is said and done, the debate over abortion isnot really about conflicting value systems, for we all generally agree that life and liberty are fundamental values. "Absurd consequences follow from moral relativism, Firs, if it is true that no ‘objective moral norms apply to all persons at all times and in all places, then the following moral judgments must be denieal: Mother Teresa was morally bet ter than Adolf Hitler; rape is always wrong i is wrong to torture babies for fun. Yer to deny that there judgments are universally true certainly seems absurd.Wuy | BELIEVE IN TRUTH Every instinct within ustells us that at least some moral judgments are absolutely censeet regardless of what other cultures or individuals may think, Secu, ifthe selativise claims that morality isrelative tothe individual, what happens when inutividal morales conflict? For example, Jeffrey Dahmer’ morality upparenily persnitted him to cannibalize his neighbor; his unfortu nate neighbor likely dll not slate: Dahmer's peculiar tastes. What would the relarivist suggest be done 1 resalve this moral conflict between the cannibal and his relucrane dinner? Since nobuxly’smrality isin principle superior, should ‘we then flip a coin or simply conclude that “right makes ight”? In adkition, if the moral life is no more than a reflection af people’ inutividual tastes, pret erences, and orientations, chen we have no legitimate bass for telling young people that it is morally wrong to le, steal, cheat, and kill their newharns Third, even ifthe relativist were to make the more modesc claim that moral- ity tsnor relative to the individual but to the individual’ culeure (ve, chat one isanly ohhigated to follow the dictates of one’s society), other problems follow. First, the culrumal relanivit's position isself-refuting. J.P, Moreland explains what it means for a position to he self-refurings When a statement fils co sats itelf (te. to conform cots own criteria of validity or acceptability), tesself-rfuring Coansidersome exauples Tea nor say a ion i English is selefatinns when uttered in English, “I do not text” is selvefutng, for one must exist to utter it. The claim “there are no truths" is ell-refutng. Ife sale, ehen i fale. Burfi is tue then itis alse as wel, for in that ease there would be no truths, including thestatement itsell™ How is cultural relativism sel-refuting? Ihe supporter of cultural relativism maintains that there are no objective and universal moral norms and for that reason cveryone ought to follow the moral norms of his or her own culture But che cultural rclativst is making an absolute and universal moral claim, namely, that everyone is morally obligated to follow the moral norms of his orher own culture. If this moral norm is absolute and universal, then cultural relativism is false. But if this moral norm is neither absclute nor universal, then cultural relativism is still false, for in that case I would not have a moral obligation to follow the moral norms of my culture, Second, since each of us belongs toa number of different “societies” or “cul Lunes," thete is no way to determine objectively which culsure’s norms should be followed when they conflict. Tor example, suppose a woman named Sheena is a resident of liberal upscale neighborhood in Hollywood, Californi ateends a Christian clitch, snd isa partner in a prestigious law firm. In her neighborhood, having an alulternis ullar is considered “enlightened,” and those who do not pursue such unions wre camsiclesed repressed prudes. At her church, however, adultery is condemned uss, while her law firm adul- tery is neither encouraged nor discouraged. Suppose further that Sheena chooses to commit adultery tn the firm’s back office with a fellow chun hyet, Donat deme halfwa aressin progte the pr mereh ural n can re instan it si Ina refort Ik rel ish cod Mo Th real n pose t 1 Ma sud rect of op embr for to argubsolutely ual, what Dahmer’ unfortu vould the cannibal of should addition, tes pref ng young borns. at morale sthatone us follow, Lexplains wala of Lean: donot etal ise elarivism for that n culture, ral clam, rms of his ncultural universal, amoral S"or"cul- ms should -dSheena ‘alifornia, sa. Ip her ned,” and cs. Ather firm adul Sheena rchgocs, WHY TAM Not A MORAL RELATIVIST Donald, who resides in a conservative neighborhood in which adultery is con- demned, The office, ie tums out, is adjacent to the church as well as precisely halfway between Sheena'sneishboshood and Donalds neighborhood. Which society's morality should apply? Ifthe cultural relativist responds that Sheena is free to choose, then we have regressed to individual relativism, which we have alteady determined to be absurd. Thied, if morality is reducible to culture, there can be no real moral progress, The only way one can meaningfully say that a culture is getting better or pro- utessiny is if here are objective moral norms that exist independently of the progressing culture. There must be some superior moral principles to which. the proytessiing society uray draw closer. Lowever, if what is morally good is nerely what one culture says is morally good, then we can say only that cul- tural noms change, nut that society is progressing or getting better. Yet who can reaxottably deuy Uvat the abolition of slavery in the United States was an instance of genuine moral progtess? Did America change for the better, or did itsimply chanwe? Inaddition, if cultural relativism is ue, there can be no true or admirable reformers of culture, Morekuul writes: If fcultucal] clativism is true, then it is impossible in principle to have a true moral reformer who changesa society's eode and does not merely bring out what was already implicit in that code. For moral reformers, by definition, change a society's code by arguing that i issomehow morally nalespate. Bor f [cultural] relativism strue, an act right of and only fitisin society's code; so the reformer is by definition immoral (since he adopts a ser of values outside the society's cee and atveinpts wo cliauige hac case in keeping with these values), Ibis kd, tosay the leat for someone tool that every moral reformer who ever lived Moses, Jesus, Gandhi, Martin Luther King—was immoral by definition. Any ‘moral view which implies that is surely false" I hus, in order to remain consistent, the cultural relativist must deny that real moral progress or real moral reformers exist, for such judgments presiip- pose the existence of objective and absolute moral norms. THE ARGUMENT FROM TOLERANCE Many people see relativism as necessary for promoting tolerance, non judgmentalism, and inclusiveness. If you believe your moral position is eur- rect and others’ incorrect, you are viewed as closed-minded and intolerant, even bigoted. They usually base this premise on the well-known differences of opinion on morality between cultures and individuals. The moral relativist embraces the view that one should not judge other cultures and individuals, for to do so would be intolerant. There are at least four problems with this argument, all of which maintain that tolerance (rightly understood) and rel- ativism are actually incompatible with each other. 2BWat | BeLtEVE IN TRUTH Tolerance supports objective morality, no relauvis. Lronécally, the cull eo tole exanve by reltivists presupposes rhe existence uf at east one nonrelative, uni versal, and objective notm: tolerance. Bioethicist Tom Beauchamp explains: If we interpret normative relativism as requiring toleranee cf other views, the whole theary is imperiled by inconsistency. The proposition that we ought £0 qolerae rhe views of others, ox that ft is right not w interfere with others 8 poe Gladed by che very stctutes ofthe theuty, Such a proposition beat all the marks Gla marielative account of moral rightness, one based on, but nor reducible to, the otossculiural findings of anthropologists... But ithis moral principle fof toletance) is ecogniced a valid, it can of couse be employed as an instru ihent for enticing such culcural practices as the denial ef human rights to tminarities and such belief is that of racial superiority. A moral commitment Ta alerance of walter practices and beliefs thus leads inexerably to the aban- clativism.” donment af normative everyone ought tobe tolerant, then tolerance isan objective ural norm. “Therefane, moral relativism is false. Also, tolerance presupposes that there is something; pod about being tolerant, such as heing able ro learn fiom others vith whi one disagrees or to impart knowledge and wisdom to uthers. But that prewposes objective moral values, namely, thar knowledge and wisdom dre goual things. Moreover, tolerance presupposes that someone nay be cor- fect shan his orher moral perspective. That ito say itseems that part ofthe notivation for advocating tolerance is to encourage people to be upet to the posibiliy that one may be able to gain truth and insight (including eoral Fruth snul insight) from another who may possess it. If thar is the case, then objective: moral truths exist that one can lear Relaivamn i itself a closed minded and intolerant position, After all, the rela tivist dewanatically asserts that there is no moral truth. o illustrate his, 200 Siler dialeyuc (based loosely on a real-life exchange) between a lu school Teacher ral her student Elizabeth.” Lhe teacher instructsher class, "Welcome, Srudents. This is the frst day of class, and so f want ro lay down soune ground fules. Firs, since no one has the truth about morality, you should be open minded ta the opinions of your fellow students” “The tem her recognizes the raised hand of Elivabeth, who asks, "If nobody thas the tnith, isn’ that a good reason for me nor fo listen co my fellow stu dents? Afier all, if nobody has the truth, why should [ waste my Lune listen ing to other people and their opinions! What's the point! Only if somebody has the truth does it make sense to be open-minded. Don’t you ar "No, Iilon', Ave you claiming to know the truth? Is't that bit auogant and dogmatic?” ‘Not at all, Rather I think it's dogmatic as well as arroganc to anseat that nosingle prison on earth knows the truth. After all, have you met every pet fon in the would and quizeed them exhaustively? If nat, how can you make uch aclaitn? Also, I believe it is actually the opposite o! arrogance to say that 4 Lwill ae if Liapy and wou youuut were suy “This Ano laughte Relax to says sivist, Tus, wioig. exclude exclusi autour partisa Tole is withi whilen roleran viewpdcall to tol- ative, unt explains: ews, the nughe to spre marks sducible rinciple instr ights wo 3 aban oral norm, at there is om others thers, But pd wisdom ay be core part of the pen to the jing moral case, then I the rela- this, con- igh school ‘Welcome, me ground d be open- “If nobody fellow stu- ime listen. somebody it arrogant assert that every pet- \ you make tosay that Wry | AM Nor 4 Monat RELATIVIST Luill alter my opinions to fic che ruth whenever and wherever I find it. And if Thappen to rhink that | have good reason to believe I do know the truth and would hike ra share it with you, why wouldn’c you listen co me? Why would ‘you automatically discredit my opinion before it is even uttered? I thought we "were supposed ta listen to everyone’s opinion.” “This should prove ta be an interesting semester.” Another student blurts out, “Ain't that the truth,” provoking the class «0 laughter. Relativism is judgmental, exchusieist, and partisan. Thais may seem an odd ing tosay since the relativist asserts that his viewpoint is nonjudgmental, inclu sivist, and neutral when it comes to moral heliefs. Bur consider the following. First, che relativst says that if you believe in objective moral truth, you are ‘wrong, Hence, relativism is judgmental. Second, ir follows that relacivism ‘excludes your beliets from the realm of legitimate options. Thus, relativism is cxclusivist. And third, because relativism is exclusive, all nonrelativists are ‘automatically not members of the “correct thinking” party. So relativism is parison Tolerance makes sense only within the framework of a moral arder, for it iswithin such a framework that one can morally justify tolerating same things while not tolcrating others. Tolerance without a moral framework, or absolute tolerance, leads to a dogmatic relativism, and thus to an intolerance af any viewpoint that does not embrace relativism. ‘The “tolerance” of moral relativism cither condones barbarism ori self-refutong As | pointed out above, some moral relativists embrace tolerance because they believe that such a posture is appropriate given the diversity of moral and cul- tural daditions in the world today. Humanist author Xiaorong Li points out the fallacy in this reasoning: Dut the existence of moral diversity does no more to justify that we ought to reapect different moral values than the existence of disease, humger, torture, tTavery do to justify that we ought to value them. Empirical clanms thus are not saitable a the basis for developing moral principles such as "Never judge other cultures" or “We ought to tolerate different values.” ‘What if the respected or tolerated culture dineapects and advocates violence against individuals wlio dissent? When a gil fights to eseape female genital ce tuuicision oF foot-binding or arranged marriage, when a widow does not want tobe burned to death to honor her dead husband, the relativist i abligared to *eapeet” the cultural or traditional customs from which the individuals are ty ing to escape. In so doing, the relaivist is not merely distespecting the ini- vidal hur ffecrvely endorsing the moral ground for torture, rape and murder. (On moral issues, ethical relacvsts car noc posibly remain neutral—they are com mitted either wo individual or 0 the dominane force within a culture Relativsts have made explicit one central value—equal respect and toler ance of other ways of life, which they insist to be absolute and universal. Eth cal relativism is thus repudiated by isl. 25Wor 1 Brute in TRUTH GOD AND MORALITY Given the failure of moral relativism, it must be the case that objective and universal moral norms exist.'* But if they exist, what is their source? Where do they come from? will argue that the God of theism best explainsthe existence of universal and objective moral norms. The case I will make here is certainly not irrefutable proof of God's existence. Itis more like a prosecutor’ legal argu- ment fora defendant's guilt based on circumstantial evidence. In other words, given the “fingerprints” one finds on moral novms when cine velles on thei nature, they arc best explained as the result of the hand and mind of the God of theism. Although one may reject this conclusion (ie, one may conclude that “teasonable douli” exists), itis difficult to conceive of a becter explana- awhole. In the words of philosopher Paul Copan, “Objective moral values are quite at home in a theistic universe. Given God's existence, moral realism is natural. But given an atheistic universe... objec ‘ive morality—along with its assumptions of human dignity rights, and moral responsibility —is unnatural and surprising and ‘quees." 1s for the evidence take THE NATURE OF MORALITY Given the existener of moral noms, there are some observations we can. make about them. First, they are known, for if they were not known, then we would have wo be moral skeptics. The above critique of moral relativism, how- ever, shows that moral skepticism is not an option. Second, moral norms are not physical, They have no physical properties such as extension, weight, height, and they do nor consist af chemicals, par ticles, or other parts that can he measured hy scientific instruments. We do not discover them hy using our sense organs; rather, we encounter them through introspection and reflection. Thus, if moral rules exist and they are not physical, then materialism as a worldview is talse. Third, moral norms are a form of communication, an activity in which one mind through statements conveys meaning to another mind. Moral novus ave found in imperatives (e.g., "One ought to keep one’s promises”), cx (e.,"Keep your promises”), and descriptions (e.g, “Keeping promises is good"). Fourth, there is an incumbeney to moral norms. As Gregory Koukl puts it, ‘moral noun “have a force we can uctuully feel prior to any behavior. This is called due incumbency, the ‘ougheness' of morality... Ir appeals to our will, compelling us w acc in a cercain way, though we may disregard its force and choose not to obey." Fifth, when we break a significant and clear moral rule, it is wally accom panied by feelings of painful guilt and sometimes satu, for we ate cognizant of our moral failure and realise we deseave to be punished. Only suciopaths succeed in ovescouniny, heir conscience completely, THE Sou Moral nor communica feel paintul sources of th accidents, a Morality i have seen in real; i is not Moral nor of chance, d seem adequa no justficat ble the letter buy a plane dence in Bal phrase and is the appearat speaking.” A suppose, it is necessa tery, murder, rion “choos the preserva liwithina: aun sone ( then these tion. Ther changes.” Behavioral p of what we c First, sine evolutionaril why is it tha tunate than have this sen lution. That are at least 6 whether evo presupposed tion. (2) Becective and ‘Where do existence certainly legal argu her words, eson their ofthe God y conclude sr explana- aulCopan, iven God's ws objec and moral mn, then we ism, how- | properties nical, par nts. We do inter them nd they arc \which one dluwimsare cemucaids esisyood). oukl puts it, vior, This is ro our will, ts force and ally accom. fe cognizant sociopaths Wity | AM Nor A MORAL RELATIVIST ‘THE SOURCE OF MORALITY Moral norms, therefore, are knows wunmatetial realities that are a form of communication for which we have a seu of incumbency and about which we feel painful guilt when we violate diem. I believe there are only three possible sources of these moral norms: (1) They ate an illusion; (2) they exist bur are accidents, a product of chance; or (3) hey ate the product of an intelligence. ‘Morality isan illusion. This, of course, isthe position of the rlativist. As we have seen in this chapter, however, is position fails. Morality therefore, is real; it isnot an illusion. Moral nonms are accidents, products of dunce. [F moral norms are producta of chance, then they are the result of unguided evolution, But this docs not seem adequate, for if moral norms have io witsd behind them, then there is no justification to obey them. Consider this illustration: If while playing Scrab He the letters randomly spell, “Go to Baltimore,” sliould [obey the command, huy a plane ticket, make hotel reservations, and/or take up temporary « dence mn Baltimore? Of course not, for “the coumiand” is a chance-created phrase and is thus really no command at all. Ay Kouk! puints out, “Commands ate communications between two minds. Charice aight conceivably ercate the appearance of a moral rule, but there cant be nw command if no one is speaking.” A command created by accident “can be safely ignored.” Suppose, however, that an evolutionist replies ist morality exists because it ts necessary for survival. According to this view, oral rules against adul tery, murder, stealing, and so on are the result of the forces of natural selec tion “chonsing” those genes that perpetuate traits hut are more conducive to the preservation of the human species. In the words of Robert Wright: If withina species there is variation among individuals in their hereditary traits, and some traits ure usore conducive to survival and reproduction than others, then those traits wil (obviously) become more widespread within the popsla- ton There (obviur thatthe seca rool erecta tas change Behavioral patterns that help sustain these species-preserving traits are part of what we call “morality.” There are several problems with this viewpoint. Ficst, since helping the weak, the genetically marred, and the needy are not evolutionarily helpful (i.e., they do not advance the “survival of the fittest”), why is it that we have a sense of duty and mcumhency to help thase less for- tunate than ourselves? Suppose the evolutionist answers that we would noc have this sense of duty and incumbency unless it were helpful to human evo- lution. That is, it must be helpful even if we do not know exactly how. There are at least two problems with this answer. (1) The question we are asking is whether evolution can explain all our moral senses. It is circular reasoning to presuppose that whatever moral senses we have must be the result of evolu- tion, (2) Because itis clear that not every human heing hasa moral sense thatWit | Believe IN TRUTUE he of she has a duty and incumbeney to help chose less fortunate, on what grounds could the evolurionist say that these human beings aie mistaken in their moral viewpoint? Afterall, people who lack chis moral sense have existed all over the globe for generations, and if they coo are the products of evolue tion, pethaps having such people in our population is necessary for the preses- vation of the species If that is the case, then "moral sense” is personally vel- ative and is not universally binding. Bur this pure relativism, and ws we ave seen, it fails as a moral theory. Cn the other hand, suppose the evolutionist bites the bullet and maintains that those who lack the moral sense to see that they have an obligation to those weaker than themselves are morally wom regardless of what moral sense they may feel. Then there is a morality above ‘evolution by which we can make moral judgments about the moral senses of different segments of our population that resulted from unguided evolution. Thus, evolution lacks explanatory power in accounting for morality. Second, evolution is concemed only with the sorts of behavior that wre wost- ducive to the preservation of the species. But morality is more than just beliav- ior, for it includes, among other things, motive and intent. In fact, « moral judgment is incomplete without taking these into consideration, for one cant be immoral without any behavior, simply on the basis of motive and intent For example, I can intend to carry out a murder and by my sloth or incompe- tence fail to do so. My bad intentions alone are clearly immoral. One can also be immoral simply on the basis of motive and intent even if the behavior hus good” results. For example, if] intend to trip someone in order to harm them, bout it results in the person not being hit hy a car and thus saving his or her life, the results are good even thaugh what I did was clearly immoral “ Bad" results may be part of a morally good act simply on the basls of motive and intent. For example, ifa surgeon operates on a terminal parent with the intent to remove a cancer, but during the operation the patient dies of car- diac arrest, the surgeon has not acted immorally. Since evolution, at best, can only describe what behaviors are conducive to the preservation of the species ‘and does not address the role of motive and intent in evaluating those behav- iors, evolution is an inadequate explanation for the existence of moral norms. Third, the evolutionary explanation of morality is merely descrip. ‘That isto say, it merely tells us what behaviors in the past may have been conducive to the survival of the species and why I may have on occasion moral feelings toact consistently with those behaviors. But evalution cannot tell me whether Tought to act on those feelings in the present and in the furure. Granted, | am srateful that people in the past behaved in ways that made my existence pos sible. But why should I emulate only those behaviors that many people today say are "good"? After all, some people in the past raped, stale, and murdered. ‘And I know of many people today who have feelings to rape, steal, and mur- der. Perhaps these behaviors are just as important for my existence and the prescrvation of the species a the "good’ behaviors, Unless there isa morality above the morality of evolution, itis difficult to see how one can distinguish between me to the prese Moral rd sory not th source in a the existe: gence is thi Temustt not be a cor dependent morality, a another, fr of morality has the mo source of m of authority CONCLU Moral re moral rela tolerance— relativism, exist, mara product oft seen that f ‘moral norm600 what mistaken in nave existed ts of evolu- the preser- sonally rel Jaswe have -volutionist c tosce that rally weong ality above ral senses of| J evolution. lity. hat are con: 1 just behav. act, a moral for one can and intent. or incompe One can also schavior has harm them, ig his or her ral sisof motive ent with the t dies of car- , at best, can f the species hose behav- noral norms, siptive. That conducive oral feelings |me whether ianted, am rstence pos- people today nd murdered. eal, and mur- we and the a morality ni distinguish Why | AM Not A MORAL RELATIVIST between morally good and had actions if oth types may have been voulucive to the preservation of the species. Moral rides ave the produ of intelligence, Since moral norms are neither ilu sory nor the product of chance, only one option remains: They have their source in an intelligent heing. As C. S. Lewis explained in Mere Cliistianity, the existence of moral law implies 2 moral laugiver. But what son of intelli gence is this being, this Inwgiver? Temust be the sort of heing who could be the ground of morality. Ie could not be contingent intelligence, one whose existence and moral authotity is dependent upon something else outside itself, for in order wo be de round of morality, a being must nor receive its existence and moral authority from, another, for that other heing, ifr snot contingent, would then be the ground of morality. Moreaver, the source of morality must be the sort of being who has the moral authority ta enforce universal moral nonus. Therefore, the source of morality must he a selFexistent, perfectly good being whose realm of authority is the entire universe. It seems ficting co call such being “God.” CONCLUSION ‘Moral relativism is a philosophical failure. The two main arguments for uuoral telativism—the argument from disagreement and the argument from toleiance—are seriously flawed in numerous ways. Given the failure of moral relativism, we must conclude that objective moral norms do exist. Since they exist, morality cannot be an illusion, and if it ie not an illusion, itis either 9 product of unguided evolution (i.e, chance) ora selt-existent mind. We have seen that the second option clearly makes more sense. hus, the objective tnoral norms that exist arc best explained by a being we call God.NOTES Introduction late thedefinien of Chrstian wath varying dezmees ol spec fy cr dct we al accept yor will he sivel” (Rom. 10:9) The particu Iarexpresion of faih described here by Faul, genuine, brings wth ita supematural tans: truly changes as. Jesar his Esbeing “bom again” (lok 3:7) anyone i in Caris, he it cle hes gone, she ne ha ‘come! Al th sisfiom Ged" [2 Cor. :17-18). Chapter 1 1 Allan Bloom, The car, Mind (New York 1987), 25. 2 There are many works that ceed the thatthe Bible eackes okjecsive moral See, for example, Nerman L. Geiser, cf the Ameri mn & Schuster, ry Atkes's work, Frat Things: An {rng me the Fre Principles of Morality and ie (Princeton, N=Princeten University hes, [985), wr better undewtand th: diffrence between the 5. Foran overview ofthe aberton debate {ror diferont sides, see Louis P. Poyruan and Francis J. Becewieh, els, The Aborion Con- troversy 25 Yoars fer Rocw. Wade; A Recden, ide. Bekrcax, Cait: Wadwort, 1998), 6. See, fo: exemple, Louis Buies: Discover f jocd Asgumerc" in Abortion, Consoeerss, 275-99, 7. Ashes, Fase Things, 49. Defense of Abortion and Iafanticc tien Controversy, 208-33; Poiman, "Abortion: A\ Defense of the Personal Angumean” in ‘Aaertion Conecversy, 275-96; and Mary Ana, Warren, “On the Mo-al and Legal Seatus of ‘Fights (Grand Rapics: Baker, cis J. Beckwith, Abyrior and tue Senceiy of Leo, Abortion ane Urdoe Herm (Washington, D.c: The Catholic University ‘Anmetica Press, 1956); J.P, Moreland seal Scott B. Rae, Bay and Seu (Dowrers Grove, InterVasiryPress 1000}; Stephen Schwire, Tre Moral Cuestion of Abortion (Chicago: L>y- aad Don Marquis, “FeJaeralo!Phi- 86 (Apuil 1989): 183-202, |, Sealing the Saculrr City Baler, $87’, 92. [An Innoducion to Maral Phibsophy New York McGraw-Hill, 1382) logue is pesented in slightly 298 28. The angunent {am presenting n this sectian was devaloped by Gregory P Ke tion in this chapter dif Koukl's version, of exe ang ntako haw afinities with. S, Lewis's au smentin ter Cusion'y (New Yorks acral nn 1948), chaps 1-5, S, Paul Copan, ‘Can Michoel Martin Be Moral Realise Siz ee Nor," Phlasophia ois seies2, Lypo. 2 (1999): 58 12C. Koukl, Relaiion, 166 21 tid, 167. 22, Robert Wright, The Moral Animai— Why We Are the Way We Ave: The New Se cence of Evahuicnary Psichology (New York Pantheon, 1994), 23. Chapter 2 “This follows the dicusion in “Truck, Nature o6" im Baker Enoycbpedia of Christan Apogee, ed. Noman L. Ge sler (Grand epics Baker, '999), 761-45 dence view oftrth, Tah, trars.J.V-Mi Enguiry Corcersng Hem Jndersnding, ed. Chas, %. Hendel (N or: Libera Ans, 955), ht linesoftheko ime, Dialogues Concerning N vera Religon (1779, reprint, In Bobb Merl, 1982) 9. lmmanve! Kant, Crigue of Puce Re trars. Nomman Kemp Smith (New York Marci’, 1965). 2. By now itispecbably clear tha: Joi positivism \-iefeatine, How de we fy thac he propcsition “The means of ver pearingfulness © 2 Cerainly not by mat geal postivin by itsown standarch meaningles ged ciique cf agnos ‘Agesticsm (New Yorke Se 4.N L, Geile, TiriteGodisn,” nEa Broyclepediaef Chision Apologetics. 246~ 5, Fora penetrating ertque of Kang Stuart Hackeet, The Resurrecion of Tht icages Mood, 1957), pare 1 16. See the discussion in N. L. Geis sume De Baler En-yebpeliof sian Apologetics, 342-44 17. David Hame, The Later of Da Hune, 2 vols, ed. T. Greig (Oxlo Clarenden Press, 1992), 1187 293