Facts:: Legarda V Saleeby General Characteristics of Torrens System

Villa, Shally Mae P.
Land Titles and Deeds

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LEGARDA v SALEEBY
General characteristics of Torrens system
Facts:
Consuelo Legarda and Mauro Prieto filed a petition for the
registration of their lot. The Court of Land Registration granted the
same. It decreed that the title under their names be registered and to
issue to them the original certificate provided for under the Torrens
system. The registration and certificate included the stone wall.
After four years, the predecessors of N.M. Saleeby filed a petition

for the registration of their lot. The same was also granted by the court.
The description of the lot given in the petition of Saleeby’s predecessors
also included the wall.
When Legarda and Consuelo discovered that the wall which had
been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included
in the certificate granted to the predecessors of Saleeby, they filed a
petition for an adjustment and correction
The trial court denied the petition on the ground that Legarda
failed to make any objection to the registration of the lot during the
pendency of the predecessors of Saleeby’s petition to register the same.
Issue:
Whether or not the predecessors of Saleeby have the better right
to the subject wall?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
In a case where two certificates of title include or cover the same
land, the earlier in date must prevail as between the original parties,
whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly or only in
part comprised in the earlier certificate. In successive registrations
where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular
interest in land, the person holding under the prior certificate is entitled
to the land as against the person who obtained the second certificate.
The decree of registration is conclusive upon and against all persons.
In this case, the predecessors of Saleeby were the first negligent in

not opposing the registration in the name of Legarda and Prieto.
Therefore, Legarda and Prieto, being the owner of the earlier certificate,
are the owners of the land.
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The real purpose of the Torrens system of land registration is to

quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of
the title, except claims which were noted, at the time of registration, in
the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the
purpose of the law, it would seem that once the title was registered, the
owner might rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals
of the court, or sitting in the mirador de su casa to avoid the possibility
of losing his land. The proceeding for the registration of land under the
Torrens system is a judicial proceeding, but it involves more in its
consequences than does an ordinary action.
The registration under the Torrens system and the issuance of a

certificate of title do not give the owner any better title than he had. He
does not obtain title by virtue of the certificate. He secures his certificate
by virtue of the fact that he has a fee simple title. If he obtains a
certificate of title, by mistake, to more land than he really and in fact
owns, the certificate should be corrected. If he does not already have a
perfect title, he cannot secure his certificate. Having a fee simple title,
and presenting sufficient proof of that fact, he is entitled to a certificate
of registration. The certificate of registration simply accumulates, in one
document, a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee
simple title, which the owner, in fact, has. The certificate, once issued, is
the evidence of the title which the owner has. The certificate should not
be altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except to correct
errors, in some direct proceedings permitted by law. The title
represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified,
enlarged or diminished in a collateral proceeding.
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CONSTANTINO v ESPIRITU
Facts:
On 3 December 1959, Pastor Constantino filed a complaint against
the Herminia Espiritu, praying among other things that pending this
suit, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining the Herminia,
her agents, attorneys, representatives, or any other persons acting in
her behalf, to absolutely abstain from further alienating or otherwise
disposing of the subject property and that, after trial, the same be made
permanent; and that Herminia be forthwith ordered to execute a deed of
absolute conveyance of the said property in favor of Pastor Constantino,
Jr., the beneficiary, free from all liens and encumbrances.
Pending the case filed by Pastor, Herminia executed a purported

deed of sale of the subject property in favor of Nicanor B. Aves on 31
December 1960. As a result of which, a transfer certificate of title was
issued in favor of Nicanor. Subsequently, on 26 January 26 1961,
Nicanor mortgaged the property in favor of the Philippine Banking
Corporation.
Nicanor then admitted being the purchaser of the subject

property but claimed lack of knowledge of the pendency of the litigation
between the Pastor and Herminia; that he is an innocent purchaser in
good faith and for value; that the sale was consummated only after the
title which appeared to be clean and free from all liens and
encumbrances had been shown to him; that after having been assured
by Herminia to that effect, he mortgaged the property as an exercise of
ownership and dominion and; and that his title to the property cannot
be attacked collaterally in the present motion.
Issue:
Whether or not Nicanor has acquired better right over the subject
property?
Held:
Yes.
Ruling:
The real purpose of the system is to quiet title of land; to put a
stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims
which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which
may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it
would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure,
without the necessity of waiting in the portals of a court, or sitting in the
mirador de su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land. For such
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title accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of

the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the
absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real
interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions,
should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified,
enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by
law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. Such a
principle applies not only to the holder of the title but to one who buys
it from him for value.
The notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world

that a particular real property is in litigation, and serves as a warning
that one who acquires and interest over said property does so at his
own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said
property. Where, however, the notice of lis pendens was already
cancelled by virtue of a court order at the time of the purchase of the
land, a subsequent decision of the court ordering the restoration of such
notice on the ground that there was bad faith in its cancellation will not
affect the rights of said purchaser whose purchase was made in good
faith and for value.
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REPUBLIC v UMALI
Facts:
Florentina Bobadilla purchased on installment from the
government the land in question situated in Tanza, Cavite. Bobadilla
eventually transferred her rights in the said land in favor of Martina,
Tomasa, Gregorio, and Julio, all surnamed Cenizal. After which, Tomasa
and Julio assigned their shares to Martina, Gregorio, and Maria. The
three then purportedly signed a joint affidavit to support their claim
that they were entitled to the issuance of a certificate of title over the
said land on which they said they have already made full payment. A
TCT was then registered in favor of the three.
The government they filed a complaint for reversion against

Remedios Miclat, Juan Pulido, Rosalina Luz, and Enrique Naval for the
return of the property to the State on the grounds of forgery and fraud.
The Republic alleged that Gregorio and Maria could not have signed the
joint affidavit because they were already both dead when the same was
executed. Meanwhile, Pulido and Naval denied any participation in the
joint affidavit; and that they have acquired the property in good faith
and for value. Miclat, on the other hand, alleged that the government
had no cause of action; and that the government was not the real party-
in-interest.
Issue:
Whether or not the government may recover the land?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
Every registered owner under the Torrens system and every
subsequent purchaser thereof for value and in good faith holds the same
free from all encumbrances except those noted on the certificate. Thus,
under Section 44 of P.D. 1529, every registered owner receiving a
certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every
subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for
value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances
except those noted on the certificate and any of the encumbrances
which may be subsisting, and enumerated in the law. Under said
provision, claims and liens of whatever character, except those
mentioned by law as existing against the land prior to the issuance of
certificate of title, are cut off by such certificate if not noted thereon, and
the certificate so issued binds the whole world, including the
government.
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In this case, the land being now registered under the Torrens
system is no longer part of the public domain. The land being now
registered under the Torrens system in the names of the Umali, the
government has no more control or jurisdiction over it. It is no longer
part of the public domain or of the Friar Lands. The subject property
ceased to be public land when an original certificate of title was issued
to Bobadilla in 1910.
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LIGON v COURT OF APPEALS

Court of competent jurisdiction
Facts:
Iglesia ni Kristo filed a complaint for specific performance with
damages against the Islamic Directorate of the Philippines. INK alleged
that by virtue of an Absolute deed of sale, IDP sold to it two parcels of
land; that they stipulated in the deed of sale that IDP shall undertake to
evict all squatters and illegal occupants in the property within 45 days
from the execution of the contract; and that IDP failed to fulfill said
obligation. On the other hand, IDP asserted that it was INK which
violated the contract by delaying the payment of the purchase price; as
such, IDP prayed that the contract of sale be rescinded and annulled.
Thereafter, INK also filed a motion praying that Leticia Ligon, who was
in possession of the certificates of title over the properties as mortgagee
of IDP, be directed to surrender the same to the Register of Deeds for
the registration of the absolute deed of sale in its name. On the other
hand, Ligon filed an opposition contending that she was not served the
copy of the motion; and that the ownership of INK is still in issue since
rescission was sought by IPD. The trial court rendered judgment
ordering Ligon to surrender to INK the owner’s copy of the certificates
of title. On appeal, Ligon argued that the trial court had no jurisdiction
of the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court have jurisdiction of the case?
Held:
Yes.
Ruling:
Regional Trial Courts now have the authority to act not only on
applications for original registration but also over all petitions filed
after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all
questions arising upon such applications or petitions. Under Section 2 of
P.D. No. 1529, it is now provided that “Courts of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Courts) shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all
applications for original registration of titles to lands, including
improvements and interest therein and over all petitions filed after
original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all
questions arising upon such applications or petitions.” The above
provision has eliminated the distinction between the general
jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction
conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral
court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits the change has simplified
registration proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial courts the
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authority to act not only on applications for original registration but

also over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power
to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or
petitions.
In this case, the summary judgment issued by the trial court

granting the reliefs sought by INK was an exercise of its general
jurisdiction. The principal action filed by INK before the trial court was
for specific performance with damages based on a document of sale.
Such action was well within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court. When IDP did not question the genuineness and validity of
said deed of sale and its obligations thereunder, the summary judgment
issued by the court granting the reliefs sought by INK was also an
exercise of its general jurisdiction. As such, the judgment issued by the
court ordering Ligon to surrender the certificates of title was an
exercise of its general jurisdiction.
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CLOMA v Court of Appeals

Facts:
Spouses Tomas and Victoria Cloma were the owners of two
parcels of land situated in Pasay City, Metro Manila; but the realty taxes
on the subject lots for the years 1983 to 1985 were not paid. The City
Treasurer of Pasay City then sent notice to the spouses Cloma
concerning their tax delinquency. However, despite the second call and
final notice sent by the City Treasurer, the realty taxes arrears remained
unpaid. The City Treasurer then included the subject properties in the
list of delinquent properties scheduled to be sold by public auction, to
which Mariano Nocom was the highest bidder. Spouses Cloma failed to
redeem the properties. As a result of which, Nocom sought for the
cancellation of the TCT in the names of the spouses Cloma and the
issuance of new titles in his name. Spouses Cloma opposed the same,
contending that the auction sale was attended by irregularities; that the
City Treasurer has no authority to conduct the sale; and that the
purchase price for the two properties is grossly inadequate. The trial
court rendered judgment in favor of Nocom and against spouses Cloma.
On appeal, spouses Cloma alleged that the trial court had

jurisdiction to hear the validity/invalidity of the tax sale and the
cancellation of their title to the subject properties.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the case?
Held:
Yes.
Ruling:
Under Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree, Regional
Trial Courts now have the authority to act not only on applications for
original registration but also over all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions
arising upon such applications or petitions. This abolished the
difference between the general jurisdiction of a regular court and the
limited jurisdiction of a registration court.
Moreover, Spouses Cloma did not assail the jurisdiction of the trial
court when they filed their answer containing a prayer for affirmative
reliefs. It is too late in the day for spouses Cloma to question the
jurisdiction of the trial court. The records show that they did not assail
the jurisdiction of the trial court when they filed their Answer
containing a prayer for affirmative reliefs. Voluntarily submitting to the
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jurisdiction of the trial court, spouses Cloma freely participated in all the
hearings of the case and adduced their own evidence. It was only after
an adverse judgment that petitioners raised the trial court’s alleged lack
of jurisdiction. Our law and policy do not sanction such a somersault.
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IGNACIO v COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Jesus Ignacio in consideration of PhP 1,000,000.00, purchased
under a pacto de retro contract from spouses Renato and Marina Yalung
a house and lot situated in Pasig, Metro Manila. The Deed of Sale under
Pacto De Retro provided that the spouses Yalung reserve the right to
repurchase the property within a period of 90 days. However, spouses
Yalung failed to repurchase the property. Ignacio then filed a petition
for consolidation of ownership. Spouses Yalung opposed the same and
contended that they only intended to enter into an equitable mortgage
to secure prompt payment of the loan given to them by Ignacio; and that
they had remained in actual possession of the property. The trial court
upheld the validity of the Deed of Sale under Pacto De Retro; but the
same was reversed by the appellate court on appeal by the spouses
Yalung.
Issue:
Held:
Yes.
Ruling:
Generally, an issue properly litigable in an ordinary civil action
under the general jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court should not be
resolved in a land registration proceeding. However in this jurisdiction,
the Regional Trial Court also functions as a land registration court. If the
parties acquiesced in submitting the issue for determination in the land
registration proceeding and they were given full opportunity to present
their respective sides and evidence, then the defendants are placed in
estoppel to question the jurisdiction of the said court to pass upon the
issue.
Therefore, whether a particular issue should be resolved by the

Regional Trial Court in its limited jurisdiction as a land registration
court is not a jurisdictional but a procedural question. Indeed, a
Regional Trial Court is a court of general jurisdiction, and whether a
particular issue should be resolved by it in its limited jurisdiction as a
land registration court is not a jurisdictional question. It is a procedural
question involving a mode of practice which may be waived.
The distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the

Regional Trial Court and its limited jurisdiction when acting as a land
registration court has been eliminated by P.D. No. 1529. This
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amendment was aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits and at

expediting the disposition of cases. Regional Trial Courts now have the
authority to act not only on applications for original registration but
also over all petitions filed after the original registration of title, with
power to hear and determine all questions arising from such
applications or petitions. Indeed, the land registration court can now
hear and decide controversial and contentious cases and those involving
substantial issues.
In this case, the trial court, although sitting as a land registration

court, took cognizance of the petition as an ordinary civil action under
its general jurisdiction. It did not decide the case summarily, but
afforded both Ignacio and spouses Yalung the opportunity to present
their respective documentary and testimonial evidence.
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LAUREL v GARCIA
Inalienable lands of the public domain
Facts:
There were four properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine
government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan.
The properties were part of the indemnification to the Filipino people
for their losses in life and property and their suffering during the World
War II. One of the four properties acquired by the Philippine
government was the Roponggi property. It became the site of the
Philippine Embassy until the same was transferred to Nampeidai when
the Roponggi building needed major repairs. The Roponggi property
remained undeveloped since that time. Later on, a proposal was
presented to then President Corazon Aquino by former Philippine
Ambassador to Japan, Carlos Valdez, to make the property the subject of
a lease agreement with Kajima Corporation, a Japanese firm. However,
the government has not acted favorably on this proposal. Instead,
President Aquino created a committee to study the disposition and
utilization of Philippine government properties in Japan.
Salvador Laurel objects to the alienation of the Roponggi property

to anyone; that the same is classified as one of public dominion, and not
of private ownership; that being one of public dominion, no ownership
by anyone can attach to it, not even by the State; that it cannot be
appropriated since it is outside the commerce of man; that it cannot be
alienated nor be the subject matter of contracts; and that the same
remains property of public dominion so long as the government has not
used it for other purposes nor adopted any measure constituting a
removal of its original purpose. Meanwhile, Dionisio Ojeda alleged
unjustified bias of the Philippine government in favor of selling the
property to non-Filipino citizens and entities.
Issue:
Whether or not the Roponggi property can be alienated by the
Philippine government?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
Roponggi property is of public domain unless it is convincingly
shown that the property became patrimonial. As property of public
dominion, the Roponggi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be
alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use
and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and
resides in the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a
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juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common and
public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation. The Roponggi
property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the
Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended for some
public service.
Moreover, the Roponggi property has not become patrimonial

property. The fact that the Roponggi site has not been used for a long
time for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to
patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property
is withdrawn from public use. A property continues to be part of the
public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership
until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to
withdraw it from being such.
As such, abandonment cannot be inferred from non-use. An

abandonment of the intention to use the Roponggi property for public
service and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the
Civil Code must be definite. It cannot be inferred from the non-use alone
especially if the non-use was attributable not to the government’s own
deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to
repair and improve the property. Abandonment must be certain and
positive act based on correct legal premises.
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Director of Forestry v Villareal

Facts:
On 25 January 1949, Ruperto Villareal applied for the registration
of a parcel of land consisting of 178,113 square meters of mangrove
swamps located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiza. Villareal alleged
that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
land for more than forty years. However, he was opposed by several
persons including the Director of Forestry on behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines.
After trial, the application was approved by the lower court. The
decision was affirmed by the appellate court.
The Director of Forestry argued that the land in dispute was

forestall in nature and not subject to private appropriation and asked
that the registration of the same be reserved. On the other hand,
Villareal insisted that the subject land is alienable as agricultural land.
Issue:
Whether or not the legal classification of the mangrove swamps is
agricultural and therefore may be alienated?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
Mangrove swamps should be understood as comprised within the
public forests of the Philippines as defined in the Section 1820 of the
Administrative Code of 1917. The legislature having so determined, the
courts have no authority to ignore or modify its decision, and in effect
veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The statutory definition
remains unchanged to date and no less noteworthy is accepted and
invoked by the executive department. More importantly, the said
provision has not been challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or
unconstitutional assuming the requisite conditions, to justify our
judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid and
so must be respected. The classification of mangrove swamps as forest
lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. That determination
having been made and no cogent argument having been raised to annul
it, the judges have no further duty but to apply it.
It follows then that the land under contention being admittedly a

part of the mangrove swamps of Sapian, and for which a minor forest
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license had in fact been issued by the Bureau of Forestry from 1920 to
1950, it must be considered forest land. It could therefore not be the
subject of the adverse possession and consequent ownership claimed by
the private respondent in support of his application for registration. To
be so, it had first to be released as forest land and reclassified as
agricultural land pursuant to the certification the Director of Forestry
may issue under Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Furthermore, the mere existence of such a plan would not have

the effect of converting the mangrove swamps, as forest land, into
agricultural land. Such approval is ineffectual because it is clearly in
officious. The Director of Lands was not authorized to act in the
premises. Under the law, it is the Director of Forestry who has the
authority to determine whether forest land is more valuable for
agricultural rather than forestry uses, as a basis for its declaration as
agricultural land and release for private ownership.
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Republic v IAC
Facts:
In May 1974, Anlesmo Logronio, in his official capacity as officer-
in-charge of the Bohol Reforestation Project of the Bureau of Forest
Development, bulldozed two parcels of land which he believed to be
forest lands located at Talibon, Bohol, occupied the same, and planted
mulberry and other trees.
Thereafter, Hilario Rama commenced a complaint for recovery of

possession, ownership, and damages against Logronio. Rama alleged
that he is the absolute owner and possessor of the two parcels of land
occupied by Logronio.
On the other hand, Logronio claimed that the two parcels of land
are forest lands; that the questioned acts were performed by him in the
regular and lawful performance of his duties as officer-in-charge of the
Bohol Reforestation Project of the Bureau of Forest and Development.
Furthermore, he Republic argued that Logronio’s acts were authorized
the government in connection with the reforestation program; that the
subject lands are forest lands; that said lands were never released by
the government as alienable and disposable lands; and that said lands
are not susceptible of disposition or private appropriation.
Rama countered the same by arguing the Republic is guilty of

estoppel for having caused the issuance of the certificate of title
covering said lands. He claimed that if his title is to be cancelled, and he
is deprived of ownership over the parcels of land, he should be paid by
the Republic for all existing improvements plus whatever expenses he
has incurred in connection with the improvement of said lands.
Issue:
Whether or not Rama may be declared as the lawful owner of the
subject lands?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
In the present case, the parcel of land titled in the name of Rama is
covered by an original Torrens title issued in Rama’s name on 4 May
1967. Earlier, he applied for the issuance of title based on a patent
which was given on 13 January 1967. The fact that he applied for a
patent title shows a recognition on his part that the parcel is part of the
public domain. True, government officials caused the issuance of the
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patent title and the original Torrens title covering the land in Rama’s
name. However, the well-entrenched principle is that the State cannot
be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents.
Considering that the subject parcel of land is forest land, the

patent and original certificate of title covering the subject parcel issued
to Rama did not confer any validity to his possession or claim of
ownership. The titles are void ab initio. The titles issued cannot ripen
into private ownership. In effect, Rama’s possession of the parcel from
the beginning was fraudulent and illegal. He was merely a squatter on
the parcel. Under these circumstances, we cannot see any reason why
Rama should be considered a possessor in good faith as defined in
Article 526 of the Civil Code.
The concept of possessors in good faith given in Art 526 of the

Civil Code and when said possession loses this character under Art 528,
needs to be reconciled with the doctrine of indefeasibility of a Torrens
title. Such reconciliation can only be achieved by holding that the
possessor with a Torrens title is not aware of any flaw in his title which
invalidates it until his Torrens title is declared null and void by final
judgment of the Courts.
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REPUBLIC v NAGUIAT
Facts:
Celestina Naguiat filed for an application for registration of title to
four parcels of land located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales. Naguiat alleged
that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by
purchase from the LID Corporation which acquired the same from
Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga, Fauste Monje, and their
predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more
than thirty years.
However, the Republic filed an opposition to the application on

the ground that neither Naguiat nor her predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto;
that the muniments of title and tax payment receipts of Naguiat do not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition
of the lands applied for; that the parcels of land applied for are part of
the public domain belonging to the State not subject to private
appropriation; and that Naguiat has not established that the lands in
question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable
and disposable property.
Issue:
Whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the
status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified and
released by positive act of the Government so that they may form part of
the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, are not capable
of private appropriation. As to these assets, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the
Constitution classifying lands of the public domain into agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks, do not necessarily
refer to a large tract of wooded land or an expanse covered by dense
growth of trees and underbrush. A forested area classified as forest land
of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because
loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to
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crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have

to be on mountains or in out of the way places. The classification is
merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
In this case, Naguiat never presented the required certification

from the proper government agency or official proclamation
reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and disposable. Matters of
land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. It calls for
proof. Aside from tax receipts, respondent submitted in evidence the
survey map and technical descriptions of the lands, which, needless to
state, provided no information respecting the classification of the
property. However, these documents are not sufficient to overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the
public domain.
Declassification of forest and mineral lands, as the case may be,

and their conversion into alienable and disposable lands need an
express and positive act from the government.
Unclassified lands cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or

possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long,
cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.
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CHAVEZ v PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY

Facts:
The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency
tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the
leasing and selling functions of the Department of Environmental and
Natural Resources insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed
foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA then sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and
Development Corporation, a private corporation, of the ownership of
77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156
hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to Amari.
Issue:
Whether or not the transfer is valid?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be
transferred to Amari as private lands will sanction a gross violation of
the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind
of alienable land of the public domain.
The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom

Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are
alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged
areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public
domain. The transfer, as embodied in a joint venture agreement, to
AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the
Freedom Islands, is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of
the Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring
any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the
Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to Amari ownership of 290.156
hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for
being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution which
prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural
lands of the public domain.
Submerged lands and lands reclaimed from the sea by

government are part of the State’s inalienable natural resources. The
mere reclamation of certain foreshore land and submerged areas does
not convert these alienable natural resources into alienable lands of
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public domain. There must be a law or presidential proclamation

officially classifying such as alienable or disposable and open for
disposition or concession.
Although PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the

government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable,
and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the
transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to
AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.
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SECRETARY OF DENR v MAYOR JOSE YAP

Facts:
On 10 November 10 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos

issued Proclamation No. 1801, declaring Boracay Island, among other
islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and
marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism
Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA
Circular 3-82 dated 3 September 1982, to implement Proclamation No.
1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82

precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, Mayor Jose Yap, Jr.
and others filed a petition for declaratory relief. Mayor Yap and the
others alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82
raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands;
that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation in Boracay since 12 June 1945, or earlier since time
immemorial; that they declared their lands for tax purposes and paid
realty taxes on them. They further posited that Proclamation No. 1801
and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the
commerce of man; since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it
was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names
through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The

Republic countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the
public domain; that it formed part of the mass of lands classified as
“public forest,” which was not available for disposition; that since
Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable,
whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
Issue:
Whether or not Mayor Yap and the other claimants have a right to
secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
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Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an

unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064.
Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under P.D. No. 705.
P.D. No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified
lands of the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of P.D. No. 705
defines a public forest as “a mass of lands of the public domain which
has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the
determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which
are not.” Applying P.D. No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in
Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. P.D. No. 705,
however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into

agricultural, forest or timber, such classification modified by the 1973
Constitution. The 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution
classification with one addition of the national parks. Of these, only
agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of
22 May 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and
administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay
was an unclassified land of the public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is

required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the
Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act
of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may
also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to
have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and
disposable. The burden of proof in overcoming such presumption is on
the person applying for registration or claiming ownership, who must
prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
In this case, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative

action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The
records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions
of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.
Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed

to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President
Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or
forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as
President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in
Proclamation No. 1801.
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FIL-ESTATE MANAGEMENT INC v TRONO

Previously registered property
Facts:
On 9 November 1994, George, Ma. Teresa, Edgardo, Ma. Virginia,
Jose, Ma. Cristina, Inocencio Jr., Carmen, and Zenaida, all surnamed
Trono, filed an application for registration of a parcel of land located at
Bo. Almanza, Las Piñ as City, Metro Manila, consisting of 245,536 square
meters. Thereafter, the Land Registration Authority issued a Notice of
Initial Hearing.
After which, on 11 August 1995, Fil-Estate Management Inc.,

Megatop Realty Development Inc., Peaksun Enterprises and Export
Corp., Arturo Dy, and Elena Dy-Jao, filed an opposition to the Trono’s
application. They alleged that the Trono’s property partly overlaps their
lot; and that as early as 28 April 1989, the lot was registered in their
names under a transfer certificate of title. They also filed a motion to
dismiss the Trono’s application for registration on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. They claimed that since the property was previously
Torrens registered in their names, the trial court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the proceedings.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the application
for registration of the Trono’s?
Held:
Yes.
Ruling:
Section 2 of P.D. No. 1529 partly provides, “Registration of lands
throughout the Philippines shall be in rem, and shall be based on the
generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system. Courts of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to lands,
including improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions
filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions.”
Pursuant to the above provisions, the trial court has the authority
to act, not only on applications for original registration of title to land,
but also on all petitions filed after the original registration of title. Thus,
it has the authority and power to hear and determine all questions
arising from such applications or petitions.
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Moreover, Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529 provides, “A certificate of

title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with
law.”
The Trono’s application for registration of a parcel of land already

covered by a Torrens title is actually a collateral attack against
petitioner’s title not permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a
Torrens title. It is well settled that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally
attacked; the issue on the validity of title, as to whether or not it was
fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted
for the purpose.
Hence, whether or not the Trono’s have the right to claim title
over the property in question is beyond the province of the instant
proceeding. That should be threshed out in a proper action. It has been
invariably stated that the real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet
title to land and to stop forever any question as to its legality. Once a
title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the mirador de su casa to
avoid the possibility of losing his land.
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CRUZ AND EUROPA v SECRETARY OF DENR

Ancestral domain
Facts:
Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought a suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the
Indigenous People Rights Act of 1997, and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations. They alleged that the IPRA Law amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as
well as minerals and other natural resources, in violation of the Regalian
Doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
On the other hand, the Chairperson and Commissioners of the

National Commission on Indigenous People, the government agency
created under the IPRA to implement its provisions defended the
constitutionality of the IPRA Law and pray that the petition be
dismissed for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not the IPRA Law is unconstitutional?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
The provisions of IPRA Law do not contravene the Constitution.
Examining the IPRA Law, there is nothing in the law that grants to the
ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral
domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains
remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA Law to the
ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely
gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources
are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and
at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and
exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part

of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to
the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that
existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right
of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains
is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate
the same.
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BORROMEO v DESCALLAR
Who may apply: Filipino citizens
Facts:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the Philippines in 1983
after he was assigned by his employer to work a project in Mindanao.
When Jambrich transferred to Cebu in 1984, he met Antoinetta Opalla-
Descallar, a separated mother of two boys who was working as a
waitress at St. Moritz Hotel. Thereafter, Jambrich and Descallar fell in
love. The two first rented a house until they transferred to their own
house and lots at Agro-Macro Subdivision, Cabancalan, Mandaue City. In
the Contracts to Sell covering the said properties, both Jambrich and
Descallar were referred to as the buyers. A Deed of Absolute Sale was
later on issued in their favor. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale
was presented for registration before the Register of Deeds, registration
was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not
acquire alienable lands of the public domain. Consequently, Jambrich’s
name was erased from the document but his signature remained on
several pages of the document. As a result of which, the transfer
certificate of title of the said properties was issued in Descallar’s name
alone. However, their relationship only lasted until April 1991.
Meanwhile, in 1986, Jambrich met Camilo Borromeo who was

engaged in the real estate business. Jambrich purchased an engine and
some accessories for his boat from Borromeo, for which Jambrich
became indebted for about PhP 150,000.00. To pay for his debt, he sold
his rights and interests in the Agro-Macro properties to Borromeo.
When Borromeo sought to register the deed of assignment, he
discovered that the titles to the three lots have been transferred in the
name of Descallar. Borromeo then filed a complaint against Descallar for
recovery of real property, alleging that the Deed of Absolute Sale do not
reflect the true agreement of the parties since Descallar did not pay a
single centavo of the purchase price and was not in fact a buyer; that it
was Jambrich alone who paid for the properties using his exclusive
funds; and that Jambrich was the real and absolute owner of the
properties.
On the other hand, Descallar alleged that she solely and

exclusively used her own personal funds to defray and pay for the
purchase price of the subject lost in question; and that Jambrich, being
an alien, was prohibited to acquire or own real properties in the
Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not Jambrich should be declared as the owner of the
subject properties?
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Held:
Yes.
Ruling:
It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
It is only a means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to
the world at large. Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere
possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property.
Thus, the mere fact that Descallar has the titles of the disputed
properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely
make her the owner.
The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to

Descallar. A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet, and that it is
perfect, absolute and indefeasible. However, there are well-defined
exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not a holder in good
faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable
consideration. This is the situation in the instant case. Descallar did not
contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the properties. She had
no income of her own at that time, nor did she have any savings. She and
her two sons were then fully supported by Jambrich.
Descallar argued that aliens are prohibited from acquiring private

land. This is embodied in Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
which is basically a reproduction of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935
Constitution, and Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. The
capacity to acquire private land is dependent on the capacity “to acquire
or hold lands of the public domain.” Private land may be transferred
only to individuals or entities “qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain.” Only Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60% of
the capital of which is owned by Filipinos are qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain. Thus, as the rule now stands, the
fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or
holding title to private lands, except only by way of legal succession or if
the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.
Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-

Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would
have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the
properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. However, if land is
invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino
citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.
While the acquisition and the purchase of Wilhelm Jambrich of the

properties under litigation were void ab initio since they were contrary
to the Constitution of the Philippines, he being a foreigner, yet, the
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acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from

him, has cured the flaw in the original transaction and the title of the
transferee is valid.
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CHEESMAN v IAC
Who may apply: Aliens
Facts:
Thomas Cheesman and Criselda Cheesman were married on 4
December 1970 but have been separated since 15 February 1981.
On 4 June 1974, a Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights

were executed by Armando Altares conveying a parcel of unregistered
land and house thereon in favor of Criselda. Thomas, although aware of
the deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife. Tax
declarations for the property purchased were issued in the name only of
Criselda, again, with the knowledge of and without protest by Thomas.
Criselda assumed exclusive management and administration of

said property. On 1 July 1981, Criselda sold the property to Estelita
Padilla, without the knowledge or consent of Thomas. Thirty days later,
Thomas brought suit against Criselda and Estelita praying for the
annulment of the sale on the ground that the transactio had been
executed without his knowledge and consent.
On the other hand, Criselda contended that the property sold was
paraphernal, having been purchased by her with funds exclusively
belonging to her; that Thomas, being an American, was disqualified to
have any interest or right of ownership in the land; and that Estelita was
a buyer in good faith.
Issue:
Whether or not Cheesman should be declared as the owner of the
subject properties?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
The fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential
land. Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains that, “Save
in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified
to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”
Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge of this

prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in
question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right
whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in
attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and
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clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him

was null and void.
In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to

question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the
theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a
husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would
permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the
property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien
husband a not insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would
then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right
that the Constitution does not permit him to have.
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RAMIRES v VDA. DE RAMIREZ

Facts:
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on 11
December 1864, with only his widow as compulsory heir. Maria Luisa
Palacios was appointed administratix of the estate.
On 23 June 1966, Maria Luisa submitted a project of partition

wherein the property of Ramirez is to be divided into two parts. One
part shall go to the widow in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part
shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez; one-third of the free portion is
charged with the widow’s usufruct and the remaining two-thirds with a
usufruct in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition. They alleged

that Wanda’s usufruct is invalid because the grant of usufruct over a real
property in the Philipppines in favor Wanda, who is an alien, violates
Section 5, Article III of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the grant of usufruct in favor of Wanda violates
the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by alines?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
The court upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on
the ground that the Constitution covers not only succession by
operation of law but also testamentary succession. The Constitutional
provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend
to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for
naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the
prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for
a devise of a piece of land.
This opinion notwithstanding, the usufruct in favor of Wanda

should be upheld because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest
title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in
favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
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ESTATE OF SERRA SERRA v HEIRS OF HERNAEZ

Facts:
On 27 December 1967, a petition for reconstitution of alleged lost
original certificates of titles and owner’s duplicate copies in the name of
Eleuterio Hernaez was filed by his successors-in-interest, Primitivo,
Rogaciana, and Luisa, all surnamed Hernaez. The trial court granted the
petition and ordered the reconstitution of the subject original
certificates of title and its duplicate copies.
Upon learning of the existence of said certificates of title, Salvador

Serra Serra, for and in behalf of his co-heirs, registered their adverse
claim and moved for the cancellation of the reconstituted titles. They
averred that they are holders of valid and existing certificates of title
over the subject properties; and that they have been in continuous and
actual possession thereof.
Issue:
Whether or not the Serra Serra’s should be declared as the owner
of the subject properties?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
Both the trial court and the appellate found that the Serra Serra’s
are Spanish citizens and as such, disqualified from acquiring lands in the
Philippines. As a rule, only a Filipino citizen can acquire private lands in
the Philippines and the only instances when a foreigner can own private
lands are by hereditary succession and if he was formerly a natural-
born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship. The records are
bereft of any showing that the Serra Serra’s derived their title by any
mode which would qualify them to acquire private lands in the country.
The Serra Serra’s bare allegation that they acquired the subject lots
from Salvador Serra Serra has no probative value lacking sufficient
proof that he latter is not disqualified to own or hold private property
and was able to legally transmit to petitioner’s title thereto.
The Serra Serra’s alleged possession of TCTs and actual

possession of the subject lands, although strong proof of ownership, are
not necessarily conclusive where the assertion of proprietary rights is
founded on dubious claim of ownership. They claimed that their title
over the subject properties emanated from Salvador Serra Serra; yet
they failed to present in evidence the OCT in the name of the latter.
Since the Serra Serra’s impugn the proprietary claim of Hernaez over
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the properties, the burden rests on them to establish their superior

right over the latter. To recall, the trial court found that the evidence
they presented have not established superior proprietary rights over
the respondents on the subject lots. It held that the non-presentation of
the OCTs cast doubt on the veracity of their claim. He who asserts must
prove.
It is also undisputed that the Serra Serra’s are all Spanish citizens.
Under Philippine law, foreigners can acquire private lands only by
hereditary succession or when they were formerly natural-born
Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship. In this case, petitioners
did not present proof that they acquired the properties by inheritance.
Neither did they claim to be former natural-born Filipinos. On the
contrary, they declare in this petition that they are all Spanish citizens
residing in Mallorca, Spain.
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DIRECTOR OF LANDS v BUYCO

Facts:
Charles Hankins, an American who was married to Laura Crescini,
died on 31 May 1937. He was survived by his widow; his sons,
Alexander and William; and his grandchildren, Ismael, Samuel, and
Edgar. Laura then died on 22 December 1941.
On 30 July 1948, Laura’s share in the estate of Charles was

partitioned among her children. Thereafter, William sold his hereditary
shares in the estate of his parents to Marcelino Buyco, who later on
donated to his children the subject property. The Buyco brothers then
partitioned among themselves the properties acquired by inheritance
from their grandparents and by donation from their father.
Meanwhile, Edgar and Samuel Buyco became naturalized

American citizens. They then filed an application for the registration of a
parcel of land, alleging that they acquired the same by inheritance and
donation inter vivos.
Issue:
Whether or not the Buyco brothers should be declared as the
owner of the subject properties?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
As could be gleaned from the evidence adduce, the Buyco brothers
do not rely on fee simple ownership based on a Spanish grant or
possessory information title under Sec 19tion of the Land Registration
Act. They did not present any proof that they or their predecessors-in-
interest derived title from an old Spanish grant. The primary basis of
their claim is possession, by themselves and their predecessors-in-
interest, since time immemorial.
It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must prove
that (a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the
concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial, or for the
period prescribe in the Public Land Act. An applicant for registration
under Section 48 of the Public Land Act must secure a certification from
the Government that the lands which he claims to have possessed as
owner for more than thirty (30) years are alienable and disposable. It is
the burden of the applicant to prove its positive averments.
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In the instant case, the Buyco brothers offered no evidence at all

to prove that the property subject of the application is an alienable and
disposable parcel of land of the public domain. On the contrary, based
on their own evidence, the entire property which is alleged to have
originally belonged to Charles Hankins was pasture land. According to
witness Jacinta Gomez Gabay, this land has been pasture land, utilized
for grazing purposes, since the time it was “owned” by the spouses
Charles Hankins and Laura Crescini up to the time that she testified.
As to the second matter to be proved, the applicant must present

evidence of an imperfect title such as those derived from the old Spanish
grants. He must also show that he has been in continuous, open and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership and for the
period prescribed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Simply
put, a person who seeks the registration of title to a piece of land on the
basis of possession by himself and his predecessors-in interest must
prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence; he should not rely on
the weakness of the evidence of the oppositors. This rule is certainly not
new. In order that a petitioner may be entitled to have a parcel of land
registered under the Torrens system, he has to show that he is the real
and absolute owner, in fee simple, of the said land; moreover, it is the
duty of the court, even in the absence of any oppositor, to require the
petitioner to show, by a preponderance of the evidence and by positive
and absolute proof, so far as it is possible, that he is the owner in fee
simple of the land in question. This rule was to find anchorage in policy
considerations based no less on one of the fundamental objectives of the
Constitution, namely the conservation and utilization of our natural
resources. There would be a failure to abide by its command if the
judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to private
ownership of real estate. This Court then set the quantum of evidence
needed to be established by the applicant, to wit: well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence.
In the instant case, the Buyco brothers’ evidence miserably failed

to establish their imperfect title to the property in question. Their
allegation of possession since time immemorial, which was conceded by
the land registration court and the public respondent, is patently
baseless. There is an evident failure to comprehend the meaning and
import of the term immemorial. As defined, immemorial simply means
beyond the reach of memory, beyond human memory, or time out of
mind. When referring to possession, specifically “immemorial
possession,” it means possession of which no man living has seen the
beginning, and the existence of which he has learned from his elders.
Such possession was never present in the case of the private
respondents. The trial court and the public respondent based the
finding of the more than eighty (80) years of possession by the private
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respondents and their predecessors-in-interest on the sole testimony of

Mrs. Gabay who was eighty-three (83) years old when she testified in
October of 1979. Thus, she must have been born in 1896. If the asserted
possession lasted for a period of more than eighty (80) years at the time
she testified the same must have commenced sometime in 1899, or at
the time that she was barely three (3) years old. It is quite impossible
that she could fully grasp, before coming to the age of reason, the
concept of possession of such a big tract of land and testify on the same
some eight (8) decades later. In short, therefore, she cannot be relied
upon to prove the possession by Charles Hankins of the said property
from 1899.
Charles Hankins was an American citizen. There is no evidence to

show the date of his birth, his arrival in the Philippines, particularly in
Odiongan, Romblon, or his acquisition of the big tract of land; neither is
there any evidence to prove the manner of his acquisition thereof. Thus,
there does not even exist a reasonable basis for the finding that the
private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest possessed the
land for more than eighty (80) years, much less since time immemorial.
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JG SUMMIT HOLDINGS, INC v COURT OF APPEALS

Who may apply: Corporations
Facts:
On 27 January 1997, the National Investment and Development
Corporation, a government corporation, entered into a Joint Venture
Agreement with Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. Of Kobe, Japan, for the
construction, operation and management of the Subic National
Shipyard, Inc. Under the JVA, the NIDC and Kawasaki will contribute
PhP330,000,000.00 for the capitalization of the said shipyard in the
proportion of 60%-40%, respectively. One of its salient features is the
grant to the parties pf the right of first refusal should either of them
decide to sell, assign, or transfer its interest in the joint venture.
Consequently, the NIDC transferred all its rights, title, and interest
in PHILESCO to the Philippine National Bank. After which, it deemed it
best to sell the National Government’s share in PHILESCO to private
entities. Thereafter, JG Summit Holdings Inc. was declared as the highest
bidder, subject to the rights of Kawasaki Heavy Industries to top its bid
by 5%.
JG Summit alleged that no right of first refusal can be exercised in

a public bidding or auction sale; and that PHILESCO continues to violate
the constitutional prohibition on landholdings.
Issue:
Whether or not Kawasaki had a valid right of refusal?
Held:
Yes.
Ruling:
The validity of the mutual rights of first refusal under the JVA
between Kawasaki and NIDC must be upheld. The right of first refusal is
a property right of PHILSECO shareholders, Kawasaki and NIDC, under
the terms of their JVA. This right allows them to purchase the shares of
their co-shareholder before they are offered to a third party.
The agreement of co-shareholders to mutually grant this right to

each other, by itself, does not constitute a violation of the provisions of
the Constitution limiting land ownership to Filipinos and Filipino
corporations. If PHILSECO still owns land, the right of first refusal can
be validly assigned to a qualified Filipino entity in order to maintain the
60%-40% ratio. This transfer, by itself, does not amount to a violation of
the Anti-Dummy Laws, absent proof of any fraudulent intent. The
transfer could be made either to a nominee or such other party which
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the holder of the right of first refusal feels it can comfortably do

business with. Alternatively, PHILSECO may divest of its landholdings,
in which case Kawasaki, in exercising its right of first refusal, can exceed
40% of PHILSECO’s equity. In fact, it can even be said that if the foreign
shareholdings of a landholding corporation exceeds 40%, it is not the
foreign stockholders’ ownership of the shares which is adversely
affected but the capacity of the corporation to own land, that is, the
corporation becomes disqualified to own land. This finds support under
the basic corporate law principle that the corporation and its
stockholders are separate juridical entities. In this vein, the right of first
refusal over shares pertains to the shareholders whereas the capacity to
own land pertains to the corporation. Hence, the fact that PHILSECO
owns land cannot deprive stockholders of their right of first refusal. No
law disqualifies a person from purchasing shares in a landholding
corporation even if the latter will exceed the allowed foreign equity,
what the law disqualifies is the corporation from owning land. This is
the clear import of the provisions in the Constitution.
40
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RD OF RIZAL v UNG SIU TEMPLE

Facts:
The Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal refused to accept
for record a deed of donation executed by Jesus Dy, a Filipino citizen,
conveying a parcel of residential land in favor of the unregistered
religious organization Ung Siu Temple, operating three trustees of
Chinese nationality. The same was upheld by the lower court, on the
ground that the Constitution limits the acquisition of land in the
Philippines to its citizens, or to corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of the capital stock of which is owned by such citizens.
The counsel for Ung Siu Temple argued that the acquisition of the
land in question, for religious purposes, is authorized and permitted by
Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission.
Issue:
Whether or not Ung Siu Temple may validly own the subject land?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
The Constitution makes no exception in favor of religious
associations. Neither is there any such saving found in Sec 1 and 2 of Art
XIII, restricting the acquisition of public agricultural lands and other
natural resources to “corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens” (of the
Philippines).
The fact that the Ung Siu Temple has no capital stock does not
suffice to escape the Constitutional inhibition, since it is admitted that
its members are of foreign nationality. The purpose of the sixty per
centum requirement is obviously to ensure that corporations or
associations allowed to acquire agricultural land or to exploit natural
resources shall be controlled by Filipinos; and the spirit of the
Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock, the
controlling membership should be composed of Filipino citizens.
To permit religious associations controlled by non-Filipinos to

acquire agricultural lands would be to drive the opening wedge to
revive alien religious land holdings in this country. The historical fact
that complaints against land holdings of that kind were among the
factors that sparked the revolution of 1896 cannot be ignored.
41
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As to the complaint that the disqualification under Art XIII is

violative of the freedom of religion guaranteed by Art III of the
Constitution, we are by no means convinced (nor has it been shown)
that land tenure is indispensable to the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession or worship; or that one may not worship the Deity
according to the dictates of his own conscience unless upon land held in
fee simple.
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ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF DAVAO V

LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION
Facts:
On 4 October 1954, Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen, executed a
Deed of Sale of a parcel of land in favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Administrator of Davao Inc., a corporation sole organized and existing in
accordance with Philippine Laws, with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a Canadian
citizen, as actual incumbent.
The Register of Deeds of Davao required said corporation sole to

submit affidavit declaring that 60 per centum of their members are
Filipino citizens. The corporation sole was willing to submit an affidavit,
but not in the same tenor as that made the Progress of the Carmelite
Nuns. They explained that the congregation of the Carmelite Nuns had
five incorporators, the corporation sole has only one; that according to
their articles of incorporation, the organization of the Carmelite Nuns
became the owner of properties donated to it; that in this case, the
totality of the Catholic population of Davao would become the owner of
the property bought to be registered.
After which, the land registration court declared that the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc. was not qualified to
acquire private lands in the Philippines in the absence of proof that at
least 60 per centum of its capital, property, or assets was actually
owned or controlled by Filipino citizens. It further ordered the Register
of Deeds to deny the registration.
The Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc

contended that the deed of sale is actually in favor of the Catholic
Church which is qualified to acquire private agricultural lands for the
establishment and maintenance of places of worship; and that
corporation sole, irrespective of the citizenship of its incumbent, is not
prohibited or disqualified to acquire and hold real properties.
Issue:
Whether or not Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao
Inc. may validly own the subject land?
Held:
Yes.
Ruling:
According to the Corporation Law, a corporation sole is organized
and composed of a single individual, the head of any religious society or
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church, for the administration of the temporalities of such society or

church. By “temporalities” is meant estate and properties not used
exclusively for religious worship.
The Corporation Law also provides that the power of a

corporation sole to purchase real property is not restricted. As provided
by law, lands held in trust for specific purposes may be subject of
registration. It can be also maintained that the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Church in the Philippines has no nationality and that the framers of the
Constitution did not have in mind the religious corporations sole when
they provided that 60% of the capital thereof be owned by Filipino
citizens.
Corporation sole in the Philippines are mere administrators of the

“temporalities” or properties titled in their name and for the benefit of
the members of their respective religion composed of an overwhelming
majority of Filipinos.
It has been shown before that: (1) the corporation sole is

composed of only one persons, usually the head or bishop of the
diocese; (2) the corporation sole is only the administrator and not the
owner of the temporalities located in the territory comprised by said
corporation sole; (3) such temporalities are administered for and on
behalf of the faithful residing in the diocese or territory of the
corporation sole; and (4) the latter, as such, has no nationality and the
citizenship of the incumbent ordinary has nothing to do with the
operation, management or administration of the corporation sole, nor
effects the citizenship of the faithful connected with their respective
dioceses or corporation sole.
In this case, Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc.

has presented evidence to establish that the clergy and lay members of
their religion fully cover the percentage of Filipino citizens required by
the Constitution.
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REPUBLIC v COURT OF APPEALS AND NAGUIT

Modes of acquiring title: Open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession
Facts:
On 5 January 1993, Corazon Naguit, filed a petition for
registration of title of parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nalabas,
Aklan. The application sought judicial confirmation of Naguit’s
imperfect title over the said land.
On 20 February 1995, the court held the initial hearing on the

application. The public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and
Jose Angeles, representing the heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed the
petition.
Naguit attested that the subject land was originally declared for
taxation purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano, who executed a Deed
of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Honorato Maming on 9 July 1992,
wherein Urbano renounced all his rights to the subject property.
Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a Deed of Absolute Sake in
favor of Naguit.
On the other hand, the Republic, thru the Office of the Solicitor
General, argued that the land applied for was declared alienable and
disposable only on 15 October 1980; and that the appellate court erred
in ruling that there is no need for the government’s prior release of the
subject lot from the public domain before it can be considered alienable
and disposable.
Issue:
Whether or not it is necessary that the subject kand be first
classified as alienable and disposable before Naguit’s possession under
a bona fide claim of ownership could even start?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
There are three requisites for the filing of an application for
registration of title under Sec 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529: (1) that the
property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain; (2) that the applicants by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation, and; (3) that such possession is
under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
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The Republic suggests an interpretation that the alienable and

disposable character of the land should have already been established
since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain
meaning of Sec 14(1). “Since 12 June 1945,” as used in the provision,
qualifies its antecedent phrase “under a bona fide claim of ownership.”
Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words
or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those
distantly or remotely located. Besides, absurdity would result if the
Republic’s interpretation is adopted. Absent a legislative amendment,
the rule would be, adopting the OSG’s view, that all lands of the public
domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before 12 June
1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the
length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation
renders par 1 of Sec 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the
government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public
agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of
the situation would even be aggravated considering that before 12 June
1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Sec 14(1) is that it

merely requires the property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of
title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet
deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition,
the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to
utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the
State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good
faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable
and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on
the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the
property.
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REPUBLIC v T.A.N. PROPERTIES INC

Facts:
T.A.N Properties Inc. filed an application for Original Registration
of Title located at San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas. The Notice of
Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette and People’s Journal
Taliba. The same was also posted in a conspicuous place on the bulletin
board of the Municipal Building of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, as well as in a
conspicuous place on the land. All adjoining owners and all government
agencies and offices concerned were notified of the initial hearing.
When the case was called, there was no oppositor except the
opposition by Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of
Lands.
During the hearings conducted, TAN. Properties presented three

witnesses, who all testified that Prospero Dimayuga, known as
Kabesang Puroy had peaceful, adverse, open, and continuous possession
of the land in the concept of an owner since 1942; that upon his death,
Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son, Antonio Dimayuga; that on
27 September 1960, Antonio executed a Deed of Donation covering the
land in favor of one of his children, Fortunato Dimayuga; that later on,
Antonio gave another piece of land to Fortunato; that on 26 April 1961,
Antonio executed a Partial Revocation of Donation; that the land was
adjudicated to one of Antonio’s children, Prospero Dimayuga; that on 8
August 1997, Prospero sold the land to TAN Properties.
Both the lower court and the appellate court ruled in favor of TAN
Properties.
The Republic contended that there is an absence of showing that

it or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation in the concept of an owner since
12 June 1945 or earlier; and that TAN Properties is a corporation which
is disqualified to acquire the subject tract of land.
Issue:
Whether or not TAN Properties may validly own the land?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
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TAN Properties failed to prove that the land is alienable and

disposable. In this case, the certifications from DENR and CENRO are not
sufficient. TAN Properties applied for registration of lot that is over 50
hectares. There is also the discrepancy as to when the land allegedly
became alienable and disposable. The DENR Secretary certified that the
land became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925. However,
the certificate on the blue print plan states that it became alienable and
disposable on 31 December 1985.
There was no open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious

possession and occupation in the concept of an owner. Evangelista
testified that Kabesang Puroy had been in possession of the land before
1945. Yet, Evangelista only worked on the land for three
years. Evangelista testified that his family owned a lot near Kabesang
Puroy’s land. Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded
by Fortunato. However, he admitted that he did not know the exact
relationship between Kabesang Puroy and Fortunato, which is rather
unusual for neighbors in a small community. He did not also know the
relationship between Fortunato and Porting. In fact, Evangelista’s
testimony is contrary to the factual finding of the trial court that
Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio, not by Fortunato
who was one of Antonio’s children. Antonio was not even mentioned in
Evangelista’s testimony.
Evangelista’s uncorroborated testimony is insufficient to prove

that TAN Properties’ predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of
the land in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years.
Lastly, TAN Properties, a private corporation, cannot apply for

registration of the land of the public domain. Sec 3, Art XII of the 1987
Constitution provides: “Private corporations or associations may not
hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.” The
1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. In the present
case, respondent has failed to prove that any portion of the land was
already private land when respondent acquired it from Porting in 1997.
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ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF KALIBO, AKLAN v MUNICIPALITY OF

BURUANGA, AKLAN
Facts:
Sometime in 1990, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, Aklan,
filed a complaint for declaration of ownership and quieting of title to
land against the Municipality of Buruanga, Aklan. The Roman Catholic
Bishop alleged that it is the lawful owner and possessor of a parcel of
residential and commercial land located at the poblacion of
the Municipality of Buruanga, Aklan; that in 1894, the Roman Catholic
Church was built in the middle portion of the said lot and has been in
existence since then up to the present; that sometime in
1978, the Municipality of Buruanga constructed its municipal building
on the northeastern portion of the subject lot after it obtained the
permission of Fr. Jesus Patio, then parish priest of Buruanga; that the
municipality promised to remove all the improvements it constructed if
and when the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo needed the said land;
that in 1989, said municipal building was razed by fire; that on
25 November 1989, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, through its
counsel, wrote to the Municipal Mayor of Buruanga requesting the
officials of the said municipality to refrain from constructing its new
building on the same site because it is the property of the church, and it
needed the said land for its social action projects. However, the letters
went unheeded as the construction of the new municipal building on the
same site proceeded.
The Municipality contended that the said lot was surveyed as

property of the municipality on 3 February 1909 in accordance with Sec
58 of Act 926; that thereafter, a decree was issued on 14 March 1919 in
favor of the Municipality; that the said land was again surveyed in the
name of the Municipality; and that the municipality alone had possessed
the said land under the claim of title exclusively for over fifty years,
exclusive of all other rights and adverse to all other claimants.
The lower court declared the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo as

the lawful owner and possessor of Lot 138-B and the Municipality
of Buruanga as the lawful owner and possessor of Lots 138-A and 138-C,
the said lots being public plaza for public use.
Issue:
Whether or not the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, Aklan may
validly own the entire subject property?
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Held:
No.
Ruling:
The Roman Catholic Bishop has not shown that, at one time after
the church was built in 1894 in the middle of Lot 138-B, it exercised acts
of ownership or possession over Lots 138-A and 138-C as well. It has
not shown that it exercised proprietary acts or acts of dominion over
Lots 138-A and 138-C, to the exclusion of others, to buttress its claim of
ownership over these lots.
Whether the disputed lot was on the same block as the church or
separated therefrom by a street was not the crucial factor which
constrained the Court in Harty to rule against the church’s claim of
ownership over the said property. Rather, it was the fact that the church
was not able to prove its ownership or possession thereof.
Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of

dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise
over his own property.
In this case, the Roman Catholic Bishop has been in open,

continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of Lot 138-B since 1894 as evidenced by the church structure built
thereon. However, the record is bereft of any evidence that would tend
to show that such possession and occupation extended to Lots 138-A
and 138-C beginning the same period. No government grant or title to
Lots 138-A and 138-C had vested upon the Roman Catholic
Bishop ipso jure or by operation of law.
Lots 138-A and 138-C comprise the public plaza and are property
of public dominion; hence, may not be the object of appropriation either
by the petitioner or respondent municipality.
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REPUBLIC v BUYCO
Modes of acquiring title: Open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession
Facts:
Charles Hankins, an American who was married to Laura Crescini,
died on 31 May 1937. He was survived by his widow; his sons,
Alexander and William; and his grandchildren, Ismael, Samuel, and
Edgar. Laura then died on 22 December 1941.
On 30 July 1948, Laura’s share in the estate of Charles was

partitioned among her children. Thereafter, William sold his hereditary
shares in the estate of his parents to Marcelino Buyco, who later on
donated to his children the subject property. The Buyco brothers then
partitioned among themselves the properties acquired by inheritance
from their grandparents and by donation from their father.
Meanwhile, Edgar and Samuel Buyco became naturalized

American citizens. They then filed an application for the registration of a
parcel of land, alleging that they acquired the same by inheritance and
donation inter vivos.
Issue:
Whether or not the Buyco brothers may validly own the land?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
As could be gleaned from the evidence adduce, the Buyco brothers
do not rely on fee simple ownership based on a Spanish grant or
possessory information title under Sec 19tion of the Land Registration
Act. They did not present any proof that they or their predecessors-in-
interest derived title from an old Spanish grant. The primary basis of
their claim is possession, by themselves and their predecessors-in-
interest, since time immemorial.
It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must prove
that (a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the
concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial, or for the
period prescribe in the Public Land Act. An applicant for registration
under Section 48 of the Public Land Act must secure a certification from
the Government that the lands which he claims to have possessed as
owner for more than thirty (30) years are alienable and disposable. It is
the burden of the applicant to prove its positive averments.
51
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In the instant case, the Buyco brothers offered no evidence at all

to prove that the property subject of the application is an alienable and
disposable parcel of land of the public domain. On the contrary, based
on their own evidence, the entire property which is alleged to have
originally belonged to Charles Hankins was pasture land. According to
witness Jacinta Gomez Gabay, this land has been pasture land, utilized
for grazing purposes, since the time it was “owned” by the spouses
Charles Hankins and Laura Crescini up to the time that she testified.
As to the second matter to be proved, the applicant must present

evidence of an imperfect title such as those derived from the old Spanish
grants. He must also show that he has been in continuous, open and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership and for the
period prescribed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Simply
put, a person who seeks the registration of title to a piece of land on the
basis of possession by himself and his predecessors-in interest must
prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence; he should not rely on
the weakness of the evidence of the oppositors. This rule is certainly not
new. In order that a petitioner may be entitled to have a parcel of land
registered under the Torrens system, he has to show that he is the real
and absolute owner, in fee simple, of the said land; moreover, it is the
duty of the court, even in the absence of any oppositor, to require the
petitioner to show, by a preponderance of the evidence and by positive
and absolute proof, so far as it is possible, that he is the owner in fee
simple of the land in question. This rule was to find anchorage in policy
considerations based no less on one of the fundamental objectives of the
Constitution, namely the conservation and utilization of our natural
resources. There would be a failure to abide by its command if the
judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to private
ownership of real estate. This Court then set the quantum of evidence
needed to be established by the applicant, to wit: well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence.
In the instant case, the Buyco brothers’ evidence miserably failed

to establish their imperfect title to the property in question. Their
allegation of possession since time immemorial, which was conceded by
the land registration court and the public respondent, is patently
baseless. There is an evident failure to comprehend the meaning and
import of the term immemorial. As defined, immemorial simply means
beyond the reach of memory, beyond human memory, or time out of
mind. When referring to possession, specifically “immemorial
possession,” it means possession of which no man living has seen the
beginning, and the existence of which he has learned from his elders.
Such possession was never present in the case of the private
respondents. The trial court and the public respondent based the
finding of the more than eighty (80) years of possession by the private
52
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respondents and their predecessors-in-interest on the sole testimony of

Mrs. Gabay who was eighty-three (83) years old when she testified in
October of 1979. Thus, she must have been born in 1896. If the asserted
possession lasted for a period of more than eighty (80) years at the time
she testified the same must have commenced sometime in 1899, or at
the time that she was barely three (3) years old. It is quite impossible
that she could fully grasp, before coming to the age of reason, the
concept of possession of such a big tract of land and testify on the same
some eight (8) decades later. In short, therefore, she cannot be relied
upon to prove the possession by Charles Hankins of the said property
from 1899.
Charles Hankins was an American citizen. There is no evidence to

show the date of his birth, his arrival in the Philippines, particularly in
Odiongan, Romblon, or his acquisition of the big tract of land; neither is
there any evidence to prove the manner of his acquisition thereof. Thus,
there does not even exist a reasonable basis for the finding that the
private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest possessed the
land for more than eighty (80) years, much less since time immemorial.
53
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SPOUSES AGUIRRE v HEIRS OF VILLANUEVA

Modes of acquiring title: By prescription
Facts:
The heirs of Lucas Villanueva filed a complaint for annulment or
declaration of nullity of deed of exchange, tax declarations, and recovery
of ownership and possession and damages against Spouses Anita and
Honorio Aguirre. The heirs of Villanueva alleged that they are the
legitimate children and grandson of Lucas Villanueva; that during the
lifetime of Lucas Villanueva, he owned a parcel of residential land; that
spouses Villanueva possessed the subject parcel of land during their
lifetime openly, publicly, and continuously in the concept of an owner;
that after their death, the spouses Villanueva were succeeded by their
children; and that sometime in August 1997, spouses Aguirre and their
hired laborers fenced the whole land in question without their
knowledge and consent.
On the other hand, Spouses Aguirre claimed that Anita Aguirre is

the lawful owner and actual possessor of the land in question; that the
same was a portion of a bigger parcel of land she inherited from her
deceased parents; that the land was first fenced with bamboos in 1981
and with cement hollow blocks in 1985 without any opposition from the
heirs of Villanueva; and that the heirs of Villanueva are barred by
prescription and are guilty of laces in failing to assert their alleged right
of ownership after the lapse of more than fifty years.
The lower court ruled that the spouses Aguirre did not acquire the
land via extraordinary acquisitive prescription considering that their
possession only lasted for 26 years from 1971 to 1997. The same was
affirmed by the appellate court.
Issue:
Whether or not the spouses Aguirre had acquired title over the
property by ordinary prescriptive prescription?
Held:
Yes.
Ruling:
Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring or losing
ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner
and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession
should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted
and adverse. Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or
extraordinary.
54
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Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good

faith and with just title for 10 years. Without good faith and just title,
acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character which
requires uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years.
Thus, for ordinary acquisitive prescription to set in, possession

must be for at least 10 years, in good faith and with just title. Possession
is “in good faith” when there is a reasonable belief that the person from
whom the thing is received has been the owner thereof and could
thereby transmit his ownership. There is “just title” when the adverse
claimant comes into possession of the property through any of the
modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real
rights, but the grantor is neither the owner nor in a position to transmit
the right.
In thid case, there is sufficient evidence to support Spouses

Aguirre’s claim that the requirements for ordinary prescription are
present. There is no question that the heirs of Villanueva have been in
public, and uninterrupted possession of the land in question in the
concept of an owner for a span of 26 years from the time the land in
question was included in the deed of exchange in 1971 up to the time
the spouses Aguirre complained in 1997. There is also no question that
the heirs’ possession of the land in question was with just title. Just title
in the sense that the defendants acquired the land in question by way of
exchange which is one of the modes recognized by law in acquiring
ownership.
The spouses Aguirre possessed the property in good faith.

Petitioner Anita Aguire’s father, Eutiquiano Salazar, bought the subject
property from Ciriaco Tirol. Thus, spouses Aguirre honestly believed
that ownership of the subject parcel of land was transmitted to Anita by
succession from his deceased father, and who thereafter possessed the
property and exercised dominion over it.
Moreover, the action is barred by laches which is defined as the

failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has
either abandoned or declined to assert it. This equitable defense is
based upon grounds of public policy, which requires the
discouragement of stale claims for the peace of society.
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BINALAY v MANALO
Modes of acquiring title: By accretion
Facts:
On 9 May 1959, Guillermo Manalo acquired 8.65 hectares of a land
originally owned by a certain Judge Juan Taccad. Later in 1964, Manalo
purchased the other 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba, who had
earlier acquired the same from Judge Taccad. Thereafter, the two
parcels of land were consolidated into one lot, designated as Lot 307.
Manalo thereafter applied for the registration of Lot 821, where

he claimed that it also belongs to him by way of accretion to the
submerged portion of the property to which it is adjacent.
On the other hand, Simplicio Binalay, who is in possession of Lot

821, insisted that they own Lot 821; and that they occupy the outer
edges of Lot 821.
Issue:
Whether or not Manalo acquired the Lot 821 by accretion?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
There was no evidence to prove that Lot 821 is an increment to
Lot 307 and the bed of the eastern branch of the river. Accretion as a
mode of acquiring property under Art 457 of the Civil Code requires the
concurrence of three (3) requisites: (a) that the deposition of soil or
sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (b) that it be the result of the
action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (c) that the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast).
In this case, the parcels of land bought by Manalo border on the eastern
branch of the Cagayan River. Any accretion formed by this eastern
branch which Manalo may claim must be deposited on or attached to
Lot 307. As it is, the claimed accretion of Lot 821 lies on the bank of the
river not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly opposite Lot 307 across the
river.
Besides, it is important to note that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91

hectares. Lot 821 is the northern portion of the strip of land having a
total area of 22.72 hectares. It is difficult to suppose that such a sizable
area as Lot 821 resulted from slow accretion to another lot of almost
equal size. The total landholding purchased by Manalo is 10.45 hectares,
in fact even smaller than Lot 821 which he claims by way of accretion.
The cadastral survey showing that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 hectares
56
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was conducted in 1969. If Manalo’s contention were accepted, it would

mean that in a span of only ten years, he had more than doubled his
landholding in the process of accretion.
Moreover, Manalo’s claim over Lot 821 rests on accretion coupled

with alleged prior possession. He alleged that the parcels of land he
bought separately from Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad were
formerly owned by Judge Juan Taccad who was in possession thereof
through Judge Taccad’s tenants. When ownership was transferred to
him, Manalo took over the cultivation of the property and had it
declared for taxation purposes in his name. When Binalay forcibly
entered into his property, he twice instituted the appropriate action.
Against Manalo’s allegation of prior possession, Binalay presented tax
declarations standing in their respective names. They claimed lawful,
peaceful and adverse possession of Lot 821 since 1955.
If Manalo had proved prior possession, it was limited physically to

Lot 307 and the depressed portion or the eastern river bed. The
testimony of Dominga Malana who was a tenant for Justina Taccad did
not indicate that she was also cultivating Lot 821. In the same manner,
the tax declarations presented by Binalay conflict with those of Manalo.
Under Art 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff in an action for quieting of
title must at least have equitable title to or interest in the real property
which is the subject matter of the action. The evidence of record on this
point is less than satisfactory and the Court feels compelled to refrain
from determining the ownership and possession of Lot 821, adjudging
neither Binalay nor Manalo as owner(s) thereof.
57
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REPUBLIC v COURT OF APPEALS

Modes of acquiring title: By reclamation
Facts:
On 22 June 22 1957, Republic Act No. 1899 was approved, thereby
granting authority to all municipalities and chartered cities to
undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by
dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them,
and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and
adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and
chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Secretary of
Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the
City of Pasay for the reclamation of foreshore lands within their
jurisdiction and entered into an agreement with Republic Real Estate
Corporation for the said project.
However, the Republic questioned the agreement; contending that

the agreement between RREC and the City of Pasay was void for the
object of the contract is outside the commerce of man, it being a
foreshore land.
On the other hand, the City of Pasay and RREC countered that the
object in question is within the commerce of man because R.A. No. 1899
gives a broader meaning on the term “foreshore land” than that in the
definition provided by the dictionary.
Issue:
Whether or not the City of Pasay can validly reclaim the subject
property?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
Under R.A. No. 1899, the term “foreshore lands” does include
submerged areas. It bears stressing that the subject matter of the City of
Pasay Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the
Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the intendment
and scope of R.A. No. 1899; therefore, ultra vires and null and void.
In this case, there is no proof that RREC had really reclaimed 55

hectares. As a matter of fact, no witness ever testified on any
reclamation work done by RREC, and extent thereof, as of 26 April 1962.
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Although the City of Pasay and RREC did not succeed in their
undertaking to reclaim any area within subject reclamation project, it
appearing that something compensable was accomplished by them,
following the applicable provision of law and hearkening to the dictates
of equity, that no one, not even the government, shall unjustly enrich
oneself/itself at the expense of another, we believe; and so hold, that
Pasay City and RREC should be paid for the said actual work done and
dredge-fill poured in, worth PhP 10,926,071.29, as verified by the
former Ministry of Public Highways, and as claimed by RREC itself in its
aforequoted letter dated 25 June 1981.
59
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CHAVEZ v PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY

Modes of acquiring title: By reclamation
Facts:
The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency
tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the
leasing and selling functions of the Department of Environmental and
Natural Resources insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed
foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA then sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and
Development Corporation, a private corporation, of the ownership of
77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156
hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to Amari.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property may be validly reclaimed?
Held:
Yes.
Ruling:
The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom
Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are
alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged
areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public
domain.
Submerged lands and lands reclaimed from the sea by

government are part of the State’s inalienable natural resources. The
mere reclamation of certain foreshore land and submerged areas does
not convert these alienable natural resources into alienable lands of
public domain. There must be a law or presidential proclamation
officially classifying such as alienable or disposable and open for
disposition or concession.
Although PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the

government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable,
and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the
transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to
AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.
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DIRECTOR OF LANDS v REYES

Registration requirements and procedures: Survey
Facts:
On 24 February 1964, Alipio Alinsunirin sought the registration of
title of a land with an area of 16,800 hectares situated at Laur, Nueva
Ecija. Alinsunirin claimed ownership in fee simple by inheritance from
Maria Padilla.
However, his registration was opposed by the Director of Lands,

Director of Forestry, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. They
alleged that Alinsunirin was without sufficient title; that he was not in
open, continuous, and notorious possession and occupation of the land
in question for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
his application; and that portion of the said land consist of the military
reservation of Fort Magsaysay.
Later on, Alinsunurin filed a motion for substitution of parties, to

which the Paranaque Investment and Development Corporation was
considered the applicant in his place. It claimed that Melecio Padilla
acquired the land by virtue of a possessory information title issued
during the Spanish regime; that upon his death, he transmitted the
ownership and possession thereof to his daughter, Maria; and that
Maria in turn continued to cultivate the land thru tenants.
Issue:
Whether or not PIDC complied with the requirement of
submitting the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
The submission of the original tracing cloth plan is a statutory
requirement of mandatory character. Unless a plan and its technical
description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same are
not of much value.
In this case, the plan of the land applied for, which must be
approved by the Director of Lands, was not submitted in evidence. It is
true that blueprints were presented before the trail court. The first
blueprint copy of a plan of land was not formally presented in evidence.
The second plan of land, as surveyed by the PIDC, even if submitted,
lacked the approval of the Director of Lands.
61
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DIVINA v COURT OF APPEALS

Registration requirements and procedures: Application
Facts:
The subject lot was originally owned by Antonion Berosa who
sold it to Teotimo Berosa. Later on, spouses Berosa sold the same to Jose
Gamos. When Gamos acquired the adjoining lot of the subject lot, he had
the property resurveyed. The resurvey plan showed the consolidated
properties of Gamos, the subject which he acquired from the spouses
Berosa and the adjoining lot from the heirs of Felix Arimado. However,
it seemed that Teotimo Berosa conveyed to Vicente Divina a portion of
the subject lot.
Meanwhile, Gamos sold his consolidated properties to Vilma Gajo-

Sy. Gajo-Sy then filed an application for registration of title to the said
properties, which was granted by the land registration court.
Pending issuance of the final decree of registration, Divina filed a

petition, alleging that he is the owner of a portion of the lot; that it was
conveyed to him by Teotimo Berosa; that he was unaware of the
registration proceedings due to Gajo-Sy’s failure to give him notice and
post any notice in the subject lot; and that Gajo-Sy fraudulently
misrepresented herself as the owner despite her knowledge that
another person has acquired the same.
On the other hand, Gajo-Sy contended that the registration had

long become final and executory; that the court no longer had any
jurisdiction on the matter; and that lack of personal notice to Divina of
the registration proceeding did not constitute actual fraud.
Issue:
Whether or not there was deliberate misrepresentation
constituting actual fraud on Gajo-Sy’s part when she failed to give or
post notice to Divina of her application for registration of the contested
land?
Held:
Yes.
Ruling:
Section 15 of the Property Registration Decree is explicit in
requiring that in the application for registration of land titles, the
application shall also state the full names and addresses of all occupants
of the land and those of the adjoining owners if known, and if not know,
it shall state the extent of the search made to find them. A mere
statement of the lack of knowledge of the names of the occupants and
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adjoining owners is not sufficient but what search has been made to find
them is necessary.
In this case, the name of Divina did not appear in the survey plan
as an adjacent owner, nor claimant, nor possessor. The sister of Gajo-Sy
admitted that she had a conversation with the cousin of Divina about
Divina’s apprehension that their land may have been included in Gajo-
Sy’s application for registration. Gajo-Sy’s omission of this material
information prevented Divina from having his day in court. It is fraud to
knowingly omit or conceal a fact upon which benefit is obtained to the
prejudice of a third person.
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SALAS JR. v AGUIL

Registration requirements and procedures: Application
Facts:
Juan Salas Jr. and Eden Aguila were married. However, five
months after Aguila gave birth to their daughter, Salas left their conjugal
dwelling. As a result of which, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Aguila
further averred that “they have no conjugal properties whatsoever.” The
lower court then declared the nullity of the marriage of Salas and Aguila,
and ordered the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, if any.
Later on, Aguila filed a Motion and Manifestation stating that she
discovered certain properties where the registered owner is Juan Salas
married to Rubina Salas.
On his opposition, Salas argued that there is no conjugal property

to be partitioned; that Aguila waived her right to the discovered
properties; that he was not accorded due process for failing to attend
the hearing of Aguila’s manifestation.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is a conjugal property?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
There is no proof that the subject properties were registered in
the name of Aguila.
On both Salas and Rubina’s contention that Rubina owns the

Discovered Properties, we likewise find the contention unmeritorious.
The TCTs state that “Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas” is the
registered owner of the Discovered Properties. A Torrens title is
generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to,
because there is a strong presumption that it is valid and regularly
issued. The phrase “married to” is merely descriptive of the civil status
of the registered owner. Furthermore, Salas did not initially dispute the
ownership of the Discovered Properties in his opposition to the
manifestation. It was only when Rubina intervened that Salas supported
Rubina’s statement that she owns the Discovered Properties.
64
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DIRECTOR OF LANDS v COURT OF APPEALS

Registration requirements and procedures: Publication, mailing,
and posting
Facts:
Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his
title over 648 sq.m. of land under P.D. No. 1529. However, during the
pendency of his petition, Teodoro died. As a result of which, his heirs
were substituted as applicants.
Later on, the land registration court dismissed the petition for
want of jurisdiction. The heirs of Abistado then appealed the decision of
the land registration court to the appellate court. The appellate court set
aside the decision of the land registration court and ordered the
registration of the title in the name of Abistado.
The Director of Lands contended that the notice of initial hearing

shall be published both in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of
general circulation. It further explained that publication in the Official
gazette is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and in a
newspaper of general circulation to comply with the notice requirement
of due process.
On the other hand, the heirs of Abistado argued that the failure to
comply with the requirement of publication in a newspaper of general
circulation is a mere procedural defect and that the publication in the
Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the land registration court can validly confirm and
register the title of Abistado notwithstanding the absence of any
publication in a newspaper of general circulation?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 provides for the requirement of initial
hearing and publication. The law used the term “shall” in prescribing the
work to be done by the Commission of Land Registration upon the
Commission’s receipt of the court order setting the time for initial
hearing. The word “shall” denotes an imperative and thus indicates the
mandatory character of a statute. Publication in a newspaper of general
circulation is imperative since the law included such requirement in its
detailed provision.
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It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in

rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the
land as against all persons, including the state. An in rem proceeding is
validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process
must strictly be complied with.
Lastly, publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be

deemed mandatory because of the reality that the Official Gazette is not
as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed
in its circulation.
66
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REPUBLIC v HERBIETO
Registration requirements and proceedings: Publication, mailing,
and posting
Facts:
Jeremias Herbieto and David Herbieto filed a single application for
registration of two parcels of land. They claimed that they were owners
in fee simple of the same which they purchased from their parents.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines filed an opposition to the
Herbieto’s application for registration contending that the Herbieto
brothers failed to comply with the period of adverse possession; that
their muniments of title were not genuine; and that the subject lots
were part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and were not
subject to private appropriation. Later on, the lower court rendered
judgment ordering the registration and confirmation of the title of the
Herbieto brothers. The same was appealed by the appellate court.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court has been invested with
jurisdiction as a land registration court with respect to the application
of the Herbieto brothers?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
A land registration case is a proceeding in rem, and jurisdiction in
rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land
through publication and service of notice. P.D. No. 1529 requires that
the public be given Notice of the Initial Hearing of the application for
land registration by means of publication; mailing; and posting. The
publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the land registration court, while publication in a
newspaper of general circulation is mandatory for the land registration
court to validly confirm and register the title of the applicant or
applicants. Thus, publication of the notice in a newspaper of general
circulation, is essential and imperative, and must be strictly complied
with.
In this case, the notice of initial hearing was only published in a

newspaper of general circulation more than three months after the
initial hearing. Such publication, way after the date of the initial hearing,
was worthless and ineffective. This late publication in the newspaper of
general circulation is tantamount to no publication at all.
67
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Owing to such defect in the publication of the notice, the lower

court failed to constructively seize the subject lots and to acquire
jurisdiction over Herbieto brothers’ application for registration thereof.
Therefore, the lower court’s judgment is null and void for having been
issued without jurisdiction.
68
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HEIRS OF LOPEZ v ENRIQUEZ

Registration requirements and procedures:
Facts:
Alfonso Sandoval and Roman Ozatea Jr. filed an application for
registration of title. The land registration court then issued an order of
general default and hearings on the application followed. It later on
granted the application.
After which, the heirs of Eugenio Lopez Sr. filed a motion alleging
that Sandoval and Ozatea sold the subject lots to Eugenio Lopez Sr.
Notwithstanding the motion of the heirs of Lopez, the Register of Deeds
issued the corresponding original certificate of title in favor of Sandoval
and Ozatea and their spouses.
Thereafter, the heirs of Lopez filed another motion to declare void

the OCT issued by the RD. They also filed an application to annotate the
notice of lis pendens with the RD but the same was denied. In the
resolution of the Land Registration Authority, it declared that the heirs
of Lopez are not parties in the land registration case, since an order of
general default was already issued, the same binding with the whole
world. On appeal by the heirs of Lopez, the same was dismissed by the
appellate court contending that the heirs failed to file a motion to lift the
order of general default in the land registration case.
Issue:
Whether or not the heirs of Lopez can file a motion to declare void
the decrees issued by the land registration court despite the fact that the
court has not lifted the general order of default?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
In this case, the motion filed by the heirs of Lopez is insufficient to
give them standing in the land registration proceedings for purposes of
filing an application of a notice of lis pendens. However, to file a motion
to lift the order of general default would also not cure the defect of not
having a standing in the land registration case. A motion to lift the order
of general default should be filed before entry of final judgment. It
should be noted that the land registration court, in this case, granted the
application for registration of title on 31 May 1966 and issued a
certificate of finality on 8 March 1991. The heirs only filed their motion
on 16 July 1997. Thus, even if the heirs filed a motion to lift the order of
general default, the order of default could not be set aside because the
motion was filed out of time.
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A party declared in default loses his standing in court. As a result

of his loss of standing, a party in default cannot appear in court, adduce
evidence, be heard, or be entitled to notice. A party in default cannot
even appeal from the judgment rendered by the court, unless he files a
motion to set aside the order of default under the grounds provided in
the Rules of Civil Procedure.
70
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VERGEL v COURT OF APPEALS

Registration requirements and proceedings: Opposition and
default
Facts:
On 26 May 1994, Divina Vergel, Eduardo Salvacruz, Beatriz
Maacop, Felicisima Flores, Generoso Salvacruz, Blandino Salvacruz,
Milagros Evangelista, and the heirs of Corazon Santiago filed an
application for registration of a parcel of land for titling purposes.
However, on 20 July 1994, the Republic of the Philippines

represented by the Director of Lands filed an opposition to the
application for registration.
On 15 December 1994, he trial court then issued an order of

general default against the whole world with the exception of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Later, on 3 October 1995, Dorotea Gonzales filed an urgent motion

to set aside the order of general default, claiming that the she is the
owner of the subject land of the registration. Gonzales further prayed
for the suspension of the proceedings.
The trial court then rendered judgment denying Gonzales’ motion.

Gonzales then appealed said decision with the appellate court, which
annulled the trial court’s order and ordered to set aside the trial court’s
order of general default.
Issue:
Whether or not the order of general default may be lifted in favor
of Gonzales?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
In this case, Gonzales’ failure to file timely opposition to the
application for land registration because she missed reading the
publication of the notice in the Official Gazette or in the newspaper
Malaya issued in itself may not be considered excusable negligence.
There is no showing or finding of fraud, accident or excusable neglect
that prevented Gonzales from timely opposing the application.
71
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SPOUSES LEE v PUNZALAN

Registration requirements and procedures: Opposition and default
Facts:
On 14 May 1968, spouses Rodolfo Lee and Lydia Liscano filed an
application for the registration of two parcels of land. No opposition
having been interposed despite due publication, the lower court issued
an order of general default.
However, on 26 November 1968, Florencio Punzalan filed a

petition for reopening and/or review. Punzalan alleged that the spouses
Lee had committed fraud in not disclosing in their application that he is
the owner of a house standing on the lots applied for; and that he has
usufructuary rights over said properties. On the other hand, spouses Lee
denied the allegations.
The trial court rendered judgment denying the reopening and/or

review. On appeal, Punzalan announced his intention to appeal to the
Supreme Court. As a result of which, the trial court ordered the
transmittal of the records to the appellate court. The appellate court
then certified the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the order of general default may be lifted in favor
of Punzalan?
Held:
Yes.
Ruling:
An order of general default is interlocutory in character, subject to
the control of the court, and may be modified or amended as the court
may deem proper at any time prior to the rendition of the final
judgment.
In this case, it was evident that the objective of Punzalan was to be

given a chance to present evidence to substantiate his allegations of
ownership. In fact, he had asked for new trial. The interests of
substantial justice and the speedy determination of the controversy,
therefore, should have impelled the trial court to lift the order of general
default in respect of Punzalan, and once lifted, to have allowed appellant
to file an opposition to the application. Thereby, Punzalan could have
been afforded the opportunity to present his evidence challenging the
spouses Lee’s right to registration, and perchance, a decision on the
merits shall have been already rendered by this time.
72
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REPUBLIC v GUINTO-ALDANA
Registration requirements and procedures: Initial hearing and
presentation of evidence
Facts:
Zenaida Guinto-Aldana filed an application for registration of title
over two pieces of land. They claimed that they are co-owners of these
lots having acquired them by succession from their predecessors; that
until the time of the application, they and their predecessors-in-interest
have been in actual, open, peaceful, adverse, exclusive and continuous
possession of these lots in the concept of an owner and that they had
consistently declared the property in their name for purposes of real
estate taxation. In support of their application, Guinto-Aldana submitted
to the court the pertinent tax declarations, together with the receipts of
payment thereof.
Issue:
Whether or not the submission of blueprint constitutes
compliance of the mandate under P.D. No. 1529?
Held:
Yes.
Ruling:
The provision denotes that it is imperative in an application for
original registration that the applicant must submit to the court, aside
from the original or duplicate copies of the muniments of title, a copy of
a duly approved survey plan of the land sought to be registered. The
survey plan is indispensable as it provides a reference on the exact
identity of the property.
Thus, sound is the doctrinal precept laid down that while the best
evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes is the
original tracing cloth plan issued by the Bureau of Lands, blueprint
copies and other evidence could also provide sufficient identification.
In this case, the submission of the blueprint, together with the

technical description of the property, operates as substantial
compliance with the legal requirement of ascertaining the identity of Lot
Nos. 4 and 5 applied for registration. The blueprint, which is shown to
have been duly executed by Geodetic Engineer Rolando Roxas, attached
to the application and subsequently identified, marked, and offered in
evidence, shows that it proceeded officially from the Lands Management
Services and, in fact, bears the approval of Surveys Division Chief
Ernesto Erive. It also shows on its face that the survey of the property
was endorsed by the Community Environment and Natural Resources
73
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Office of the DENR. This, compounded by the accompanying technical

description of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 duly executed and verified also by Roxas,
should substantially supply as it did the means by which the identity of
Lot Nos. 4 and 5 may be ascertained.
74
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DIRECTOR OF LANDS v REYES

Facts:
On 24 February 1964, Alipio Alinsunirin sought the registration of
title of a land with an area of 16,800 hectares situated at Laur, Nueva
Ecija. Alinsunirin claimed ownership in fee simple by inheritance from
Maria Padilla.
However, his registration was opposed by the Director of Lands,

Director of Forestry, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. They
alleged that Alinsunirin was without sufficient title; that he was not in
open, continuous, and notorious possession and occupation of the land
in question for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
his application; and that portion of the said land consist of the military
reservation of Fort Magsaysay.
Later on, Alinsunurin filed a motion for substitution of parties, to

which the Paranaque Investment and Development Corporation was
considered the applicant in his place. It claimed that Melecio Padilla
acquired the land by virtue of a possessory information title issued
during the Spanish regime; that upon his death, he transmitted the
ownership and possession thereof to his daughter, Maria; and that
Maria in turn continued to cultivate the land thru tenants.
Issue:
Whether or not the land should be granted in favor of PIDC?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is
inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the
land involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, at
the time of the hearing, it was conceded that approximately 13,957
hectares of said land consist of public forest. During the lifetime of
Melecio Padilla, only a small portion thereof was cleared and cultivated
under the “kaingin” system, while some portions were used as grazing
land. After his death, his daughter, Maria Padilla, caused the planting of
vegetables and had about 40 tenants for the purpose. During the
Japanese occupation, Maria Padilla died. Alipio Alinsunurin and
Encarnacion Caballero took possession of the land approximately in
1950, but they had to abandon the place due to the unsettled peace and
order conditions in the area. In 1955, entry by them was prevented by
the Army.
75
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GONZAGA v COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Jose Eugenio had once been the registered owners of two parcels
of land. Eugenio later on sold the two lots to Luis Gonzaga, who
subsequently sold the same to Guillermo Macarias. However, another
Torrens title covers the same two lots in the name of Lilia Sevilla,
married to Jose Seelin.
The spouses Jose Seelin and Lilia Sevila filed a complaint for
annulment of Gonzaga’s Torrents Title insofar as it embraced the
identical lots which are also described in their own title. On the other
hand, Gonzaga interposed, alleging that they no longer gave a cause of
action against him. As a result of which, the spouses Seelin filed an
amended complaint and included Macarias as party-defendant. The
lower court rendered judgment in favor of the spouses Seelin. It
declared that the the TCT of the spouses Seelin as valid and legal, and
ordered the cancellation of Gonzaga’s and Macarias’ TCT as the same
were null and void. The appellate court affirmed the findings and rulings
of the lower court.
Issue:
Whether or not the transfer certificate title of Gonzaga and
Macarias must be invalidated?
Held:
Yes.
Ruling:
In the present controversy, judicial adjudication hinges on the
question as to who, between the heirs of Gonzaga including Macarias
and the spouses Leelin, have the legal and valid title to the two lots.
Although Gonzaga’s title was issued in 1940, it will be noted that

Gonzaga’s title over Lots 2693 and 2695 both with an area of 599
square meters was based on the Cadastral Survey of Kaloocan City,
Cadastral Case No. 34, while spouses Leelin’s title was derived from OCT
No. 994 issued on 19 April 1917.
A certificate is not conclusive evidence of title if it is shown that

the same land had already been registered and an earlier certificate for
the same is in existence. Since the land in question has already been
registered under OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, the subsequent
registration of the same land on 3 May 1917 is null and void.
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SANTIAGO v SBMA
Facts:
Victoria Rodriguez, Armando Mateo, and Pedro Santiago filed a
complaint for recovery of possession against Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority. They alleged that Victoria is the sole heir and administrator
of the estate of Hermogenes; that Hermogenes was the owner of parcels
of land; that Victoria in her capacity as the heir and administrator of
Hermogenes leased to Pedro and Armando for a period of 50 years, two
parcels of land of Hermogenes; that by virtue of the lease contract,
Pedro is presently occupying the said parcel of lands; that despite the
fact that SBMA is not the owner of said two parcels of land, it is using
the same for its own commercial and other purposes.
On the other hand, SBMA argued that Liwanag Santiago, wife of

Pedro, availed herself of the housing privilege by virtue of her
employment with SBMA; that Liwanag was allowed to lease a housing
unit; that the lease agreement shall be terminated if the lessees are no
longer employed with SBMA; that Liwanag’s employment contract later
on concluded and was not renewed; that Liwanag and her family were
asked to vacate and return possession of the subject housing unit. The
lower court then denied the action by Pedro since Spanish title can no
longer be utilized as evidence of ownership.
Issue:
Whether or not Spanish titles are inadmissible ad evidence of
ownership of lands?
Held:
Yes.
Ruling:
Spanish titles are subject to prescription. A holder of a Spanish
title may still lose his ownership of the real property to the occupant
who actually possesses the same for the required prescriptive period.
The tenor of the whole presidential decree is to discontinue the use of
Spanish titles and to strip them of any probative value as evidence of
ownership. It had clearly set a deadline for the filing of applications for
registration of all Spanish titles under the Torrens system, after which,
the Spanish titles may no longer be presented to prove ownership.
In this case, the successors of Hermogenes had only until August

14, 1976 to apply for a Torrens title in their name covering the subject
property. In the absence of an allegation in their complaint that the
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predecessors-in-interest of Hermogenes complied with P.D. No. 892,

then it could be assumed that they failed to do so. Since they failed to
comply with P.D. No. 892, then the successors of Hermogenes were
already enjoined from presenting the Spanish title as proof of their
ownership of the subject property in registration proceedings.
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REPUBLIC v SAYO
Registration requirements and procedures: Judgment and decree
of registration of land issued by LRA
Facts:
Spouses Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez filed an original
application for registration of a tract of land. Oppositions were filed by
the Government, through the Director of Lands and the Director of
Forestry, and the heirs of Liberato Bayaua. The case dragged on for
about twenty years until a compromise agreement was entered into by
the parties, where the heirs of Sandoval renounced their claims and
ceded in favor of Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Forest Development, heirs
of Bayaua, and Philippine Cacao and Farm Products Inc. certain parcels
of the land. The remaining 5,500 hectares were adjudicated to and
acknowledged as owned by the heirs of Sandoval; 1,500 hectares of
which were assigned to their counsel, Jose Reyes, in payment of his
attorney’s fees. The Judge approved the compromise agreement and
confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in accordance with the
same.
However, the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the

Philippines, alleged that the decision was patently void; and that no
evidence whatever was adduced by the parties in support of their
petitions for registration.
Issue:
Whether or not there was sufficient evidence to show claim of
ownership?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
In this case, the principal document relied upon and presented by
the applicants for registration, to prove the private character of the
large tract of land subject of their application, was a photocopy of a
certification of the National Library, to the effect that according to the
Government, the property in question was registered under the Spanish
system of land registration as private property of Don Liberato Bayaua.
However, a Spanish document cannot be considered a title to property,
it not being one of the grants made during the Spanish regime, and
obviously not constituting primary evidence of ownership. It is an
inefficacious document on which to base any finding of the private
character of the land in question.
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LABURDA v LRA
Registration requirements and procedures: Judgment and decree
of registration of land issued by LRA
Facts:
Spouses Mariano Laburada and Erlinda Laburada applied for the
registration of a parcel of land. The trial court rendered judgment
confirming and ordering the registration of the title of spouses
Laburada. After the finality of its decision, the trail court required the
Land Registration Authority to issue the corresponding decree.
However, the LRA refused as it was found out that the said parcel of
land might be a portion of the parcels of land decreed in another case;
that the same was covered by a TCT in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda.
de Buenaflor; and that to issue the corresponding decree in favor of
spouses Laburada would result in the duplication of titles over the same
parcel of land.
Issue:
Whether or not the LRA can be compelled to issue the
corresponding decree in favor of spouses Laburada?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial
function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act which may be
compelled through mandamus. It is well-settled that the issuance of
such decree is not compellable by mandamus because it is a judicial act
involving the exercise of discretion.
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VDA DE. BARROGA v ALBANO

Cadastral proceedings
Facts:
On 31 July 1941, the Cadastral Court rendered a decision
adjudicating a parcel of land known as Lot No. 9821 in favor of Delfina
Aquino. One of the oppositors was Ruperta Pascual, who was declared
in default. However, the decree of registration did not issue except until
after the lapse of 14 years or so, or on 14 October 1955; and it was only
after 24 years had passed, or on 17 November 1979, that an original
certificate of title was issued in Aquino’s name.
On 11 August 1970, after the decree of registration had been

handed down but before title issued in Delfina Aquino’s favor, the
children and heirs of Ruperta Pascual brought suit against the children
and heirs of Aquino. The heirs of Pascual alleged that they, and their
mother had been in possession of Lot 9821 since 1941 and were the real
owners thereof; and they prayed that Aquino’s title be voided and
cancelled, that the defendants be commanded to reconvey the land to
them, and that a new title be made out in their names.
It appears that Aquino’s title encroached upon a 4-square-meter

portion of an adjoining lot, No. 9822, belonging to a Cesar Castro. So,
Castro filed, with leave of court, a complaint in intervention on February
22, 1987 for the recovery thereof.
Issue:
Whether or not a writ of possession may still be issued?
Held:
Yes.
Ruling:
A party in whose favor a decree of registration is issued by a
cadastral court in accordance with the Torrens Act, or his successor-in-
interest, has a perfect right not only to the title of the land, but also to its
possession; has the right to a writ of possession as against any party to
the registration proceeding and who is directly and personally affected
and reached by the decree or who had been served with process therein
but had not appeared nor answered; and his right to obtain a writ of
possession is not subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
regarding execution of judgments, since the decree is to exist forever.
These doctrines have since been reiterated and reaffirmed.
The fundamental rule is that a writ of possession can be issued

not only against the original oppositors in a land registration case and
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their representatives and successors-in-interest, but also against any

person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any time before
and up to the issuance of the final decree. Neither laches nor the statute
of limitations applies to a decision in a land registration case.
In this case, the writ may correctly be enforced against the heirs of
Pascual, who was a party in the registration proceedings which resulted
in the declaration of Aquino as the owner of the land subject thereof;
and the heirs of Aquino are entitled to said writ of possession, despite
the lapse of many, many years, their right thereto being imprescriptible
at least as against the persons who were parties to the cadastral case or
their successors-in-interest. The heirs of Pascual, it must be said, have
succeeded in prolonging the controversy long enough. They should no
longer be allowed to continue doing so.
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SILVESTRE v COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
On 2 May 1959, Rufino Dimson, filed an action against Fidel
Silvestre for the reconveyance of Lot No. 1185 of the Cadastral Survey of
Hermosa, Bataan, containing an area of 124,135 square meters and for
the cancellation of the homestead patent and certificate of title issued in
favor of Silvestre on the ground that the property was private land and
not a disposable or alienable public land which could be granted as
homestead patent by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
Dimson alleged that the lot in question was, before World War II
adjudicated in a cadastral case in favor of the Spouses Mariano
Batungbakal and Hilaria Vergara; that by virtue of a “Compromiso de
Venta” executed by spouses Batungbakal sometime in 1927 over several
properties, including the lot in question, he took possession of said Lot
No. 1185; and that has since 1927 paid all the real estate taxes due
thereon. He further alleged that no decree of registration was issued
due to the outbreak of war.
On the other hand, Silvestre maintained that he is the true owner

of the lot in question, having acquired the same through Homestead
Patent No. 72493 issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources; and that he has been in actual and open possession of the
same since 1927 and has been paying the realty taxes thereon.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property was validly granted to
Silvestre?
Held:
Yes.
Ruling:
In cases of annulment and/or reconveyance of title, a party
seeking it should establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence
but by clear and convincing evidence that the land sought to be
reconveyed is his.
In this case, Dimson not only failed to establish by a

preponderance of evidence that he has a better right over the land in
dispute but even failed to establish private ownership of his alleged
predecessor in interest. Although it is alleged that a decision was
rendered in a cadastral case in favor of the spouses Batungbakal, he
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failed to produce a copy thereof, or to show when the alleged decision

was rendered, but merely asserts that it was before the war. On the
contrary, Silvestre fully established by convincing proofs that Lot 1185
was formerly public land, applied for under the homestead law,
patented on 27 November 1956 and the corresponding certificate of
title issued on 8 December 1956.
The evidence of amply shows that defendant Silvestre has been

occupying this parcel of land since 1923 and his occupation is coupled
with a claim of ownership. An application for a homestead grant from
the proper authorities has been filed. A survey notification card was
given to defendant Fidel Silvestre. It is a notice by an official of the
Bureau of Lands who was conducting the cadastral survey of the area
where Silvestre was occupying a lot, that is Lot 1185, that said parcel of
land is to be surveyed under the cadastral survey. This exhibit is more
than 30 years old and bears the same Lot 1185 which is the same land
involved in the present controversy. This piece of document is a strong
corroborating evidence to the claim of Silvestre that he has been in
possession of the land since the year 1923. To make his possession of a
portion of the public domain ripen into ownership he filed an
application for homestead.
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ACEDO v COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
On 26 July 1916, a homestead patent was awarded to Carolina
Aggasid for a parcel of land located in Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. The lot
was later subdivided into two, Lot 984 and Lot 985. Carolina then sold
Lot 985 to Tomas Marcos. Time passed and Carolina’s land was passed
over to her daughter, Victoria Paculla, who later passed it over to her
son, Alberto Crisostomo who then sold it to Teresa Soriano.
At that time, a cadastral proceeding subjected the two lots. Lot

984 was properly claimed by the heirs of Carolina, but Lot 985 was not
claimed by anyone, not even Marcos. Since no one claimed Lot 985, it
was declared by the cadastral court as public land.
Eventually, Trinidad Agsunod was able to obtain a homestead

patent for Lot 985. Agsunod later sold the land to Alfonso Acedo.
Soriano then claimed that they are the owners of the adjoining lot.
Issue:
Whether or not spouses Acedo validly acquired the subject
property?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
A cadastral court has absolutely no jurisdiction to declare as
public land that which had been previously registered already under the
Torrens system with or without the opposition of the holder of the
registered title or his successors-in-interest. This is not only a definitely
settled question but is a direct consequence of the indefeasibility of a
Torrens title.
The adverse claimant has a period of one year from the date of
issuance of title to contest on the ground of fraud the right of the
patentee, otherwise, he is forever barred from questioning the rights of
the patentee, as the title issued by virtue of the patent duly registered
shall then have acquired all the characteristics that determine the
finality and indefeasibility of a Torrens title.
However, the doctrine that an adverse claimant has a period of

one year from the issuance of title within which to contest on the
ground of fraud cannot apply to Soriano in so far as the homestead
patent of Agsunod is concerned for the simple reason that said patent is
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null and void, the land covered by it having been previously registered
already as private land in the name of Aggasid.
Where the certificate of title issued on a piece of land is null and

void for lack of jurisdiction of the cadastral court to declare it public
land and award it to subsequent possessors thereof, the title
subsequently issued is null and void and subsequent purchasers for
value of said land innocently relying on said invalid title are not
protected.
In this case, it does not appear that either Aggasid, the original
owner of the disputed land or any of her successors-in-interest has ever
conveyed to or otherwise disposed of in favor of Agsunod or her
successors-in-interest, spouses Acedo, any part of the land herein
involved. The only transfer of said land that appears is that of Aggasid to
Marcos involving one-half thereof pro-indiviso.
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CASIMIRO DEVELOPMENT CORP. v MATEO

Attributes and limitations of a certificate of title
Facts:
The subject property of this case is a registered land with an
areaof 6,693 sq.m. situated in Pulang Lupa, Las Piñ as City, that was
originally owned by Isaias Lara. Upon the death of Isaias, the propery
passed on to her children. The co-heirs then decided to transfer the full
and exclusive ownership to Felecidad Lara. After which, Felecidad
executed a deed of sale covering the whole property in favor of her
daughter, Laura Mateo.
In due course, Laura used the subject property as collateral to

secure a succession of loans. The first loan was obtained from the
Bacoor Rural Bank, the second from Parmenas Perez, the third from
Rodolfo Pe, and the last from China Banking Corporation. In the end,
China Bank foreclosed the mortgaged and a title was issued in its name.
Thereafter, China Bank and Casimiro Development Corporation

executed a deed of absolute sale; to which a title was issued in favor of
CDC. The CDC then brought an action for unlawful detainer against the
heirs of Isaias; who in turn, brought an action for quieting of title.
Issue:
Whether or not the heirs of Isaia should be declared as the lawful
owner of the subject property?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
There is no doubt that the land in question, although once a part
of the public domain, has already been placed under the Torrens system
of land registration. The Government is required under the Torrens
system of registration to issue an official certificate of title to attest to
the fact that the person named in the certificate is the owner of the
property therein described, subject to such liens and encumbrances as
thereon noted or what the law warrants or reserves. The objective is to
obviate possible conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely
upon the face of the Torrens certificate and to dispense, as a rule, with
the necessity of inquiring further. The Torrens system gives the
registered owner complete peace of mind, in order that he will be
secured in his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of
any right over the covered land.
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The Government has adopted the Torrens system due to its being
the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and
to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is
established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the
assurance that the sellers title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk
of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all, which
will not only be unfair to him as the purchaser, but will also erode public
confidence in the system and will force land transactions to be attended
by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof
of ownership. The further consequence will be that land conflicts can be
even more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government, recognizing
the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept
the validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by
the law are satisfied.
Yet, registration under the Torrens system, not being a mode of

acquiring ownership, does not create or vest title. The Torrens
certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title in the
particular property described therein. In that sense, the issuance of the
certificate of title to a particular person does not preclude the possibility
that persons not named in the certificate may be co-owners of the real
property therein described with the person named therein, or that the
registered owner may be holding the property in trust for another
person.
Nonetheless, it is essential that title registered under the Torrens

system becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible.
To start with, one who deals with property registered under the
Torrens system need not go beyond the certificate of title, but only has
to rely on the certificate of title. He is charged with notice only of such
burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. The pertinent law on
the matter of burdens and claims is Section 44 of the Property
Registration Decree. In short, considering that China Bank’s title was a
clean title, that is, it was free from any lien or encumbrance, CDC had the
right to rely, when it purchased the property, solely upon the face of the
certificate of title in the name of China Bank.
The vendees notice of a defect or flaw in the title of the vendor, in

order for it to amount to bad faith, should encompass facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious person to make
further inquiry into the vendors title, or facts and circumstances that
would induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the
title of the property in litigation. In other words, the presence of
anything that excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the
vendee to look beyond the certificate and to investigate the title of the
vendor appearing on the face of said certificate.
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JM TUASON & CO. v COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc. instituted an action for reconveyance
against Guillermo Renosa. Renosa claimed that he had constructed his
residence thereon; that he bought the disputed portion of land from
Capt. Faustino Cruz by virtue of a compromise agreement; that Cruz
sold to him the subject property as allocated in the agreement.
The trial court ruled in favor of JM Tuason, declaring that it is the

registered owner of the land and as owner, is entitled to possession; and
that Renosa’s claim of the right to possess is without any legal basis.
Issue:
Whether or not Renosa acquired a valid right to own and possess
the subject land?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
Capt. Cruz, not being a registered owner of the disputed land at
the time, could not have assigned a better right to private respondent
Renosa. It is obvious that respondent Renosa never claimed ownership
of the disputed land, and that he admitted JM Tuason’s ownership over
the same.
Mere possession of whatever length cannot defeat the

imprescriptible title to the holder of registered Torrens title to real
property, and that registered real property under the Torrens system
cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. JM Tuason, the
registered owner of the disputed land has a right to possess and recover
the same, as against Renosa who merely claims a right to possess from
his predecessor-in-interest Capt. Cruz who likewise never acquired any
right to possess the disputed property. Both Capt. Cruz and respondent
Reñ osa cannot be considered exactly as possessors in good faith
because both of them knew at the time they entered into possession
that JM Tuason was the registered owner of the disputed land. Capt.
Cruz cannot be considered a possessor in good faith because as
beneficiary of the compromise agreement he should be in a position to
know that there were suspensive conditions attached to his possible
acquisition of the disputed property and that if the conditions were not
fulfilled, his right as beneficiary would never arise. Aside from the
compromise agreement as the only basis of Capt. Cruz’ alleged right to
the property in question, he and respondent Reñ osa were never able to
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prove transfer to ownership of the same from JM Tuason to Capt. Cruz,

thus strengthening the obvious fact that the suspensive conditions
imposed in the compromise agreement were never fulfilled and hence
petitioner never transferred title to the reserved properties in favor of
the beneficiaries therein.
As registered owner of the land and in the absence of any equal or

better right on the part of Renosa to possess the disputed land, JM
Tuason is entitled to possession and initiated the correct action when it
brought the recovery of the same.
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SPOUSES AVILA v JUDGE TAPUCAR

Facts:
In 1918, spouses Pedro Bahan and Dominga Exsaure acquired a
parcel of land situated at Tubay, Agusan Del Norte. In 1965, said
property was inherited by Julito Bahan and four others as successors-in-
interest.
On 11 October 1960, Magdalena Avila bought a parcel of land

situated at Tubay, Agusan Del Norte from Luis Cabalan and his wife.
On 3 November 1971, the heirs of Pedro Bahan filed a free patent

application of the land; however, the same was not granted to them.
They instead file an action for quieting of tile, claiming that they were
the successors-in-interest of a parcel of coconut land; that the northwest
portion was already in the possession of the spouses Avila; that the
spouses Avila was harvesting the fruits thereof.
On the other hand, spouses Avila argued that they purchased the
parcel of land; and they had been in open, continuous, public, peaceful,
and uninterrupted possession of the same.
Issue:
Whether or not the heirs of Bahan validly acquire the right to
possess and own the subject land?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
The pronouncements that the heirs of Bahan’s title to the
property has become indefeasible and incontestable is a prejudgment
and uncalled for inasmuch as the parties have not as yet finally rested
their cases and the trial is still in progress.
It is axiomatic in this jurisdiction that while land registration is a

proceeding in rem and binds the whole world, the simple possession of
a certificate of title under the Torrens systems does not necessarily
make the holder a true owner of all the property described therein. If a
person obtains a title under the Torrens system, which includes by
mistake or oversight land which can no longer be registered under the
system, he does not, by virtue of the said certificate alone, become the
owner of the lands illegally included.
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In this case, the free patent issued to the heirs of Bahan is

erroneous as it embraced and comprised in portions thereof lands
which belong to the spouses Avila. The subsequent registration of the
portion of land belonging to the spouses Avila by the heirs of Bahan
could not make the latter owners thereof. It has been held in
registration proceedings, a cadastral court has no authority to award a
property in favor of persons who have not put in any claims to it and
have never asserted any right of ownership thereon, and the certificate
of title issued under the circumstances to such persons would be
declared null and void subject to the right of innocent purchasers for
value.
Registration does not vest title. It is not a mode of acquiring

ownership but is merely evidence of such title over a particular
property. It does not give the holder any better right than what he
actually has, especially if the registration was done in bad faith. The
effect is that it is as if no registration was made at all.
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HALILI v CIR
Facts:
The Halili Bus Drivers and Conductors Union entered to an
Agreement with the Administratix of Fortunato Halili’s estate for their
claims of unpaid overtime. Thereafter, the Administratix executed a
Deed of Conveyance of Real Property, thereby transferring a parcel of
land to the Union. A Deed of Conveyance was then registered without
encumbrance in the name of the Union.
On 9 August 1982, the Union requested for authority to sell and

disposes the property. The same motion was filed by Atty. Benjamin
Pineda, counsel of the Union. The Court, however, merely noted the
motion. By virtue of the resolution received by Atty. Pineda, the Union
then effected the sale of the property in favor of Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, Inc. The title of the Union was cancelled, and a new one was
registered in the name of MMCPI.
However, the Union filed a complaint to compel MMCPI to

reconvey to the Union the property bought on the ground that it was
sold without the proper authority from the Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Union may recover the subject property?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
The fact that the subject real property was registered under the
Torrens system of registration in the name of respondent MMPCI under
transfer certificate of title by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on 14
June 1983, makes the instant petition all the more dismissible,
considering that the best proof of ownership of a piece of land is the
Certificate of Title.
A certificate of title accumulates in one document a precise and

correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The
certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows
exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very
few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed,
modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding
permitted by law. Otherwise, all security in registered titles would be
lost.
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In this case, the Union seeks from respondent MMPCI the recovery
of the subject property. It is evident that the objective of such claim is to
nullify the title of private respondent to the property in question, which
thereby challenges the judgment pursuant to which the title was
decreed. This is apparently a collateral attack which is not permitted
under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title. It is well settled
that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue on the
validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only
be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Hence,
whether or not the Union have the right to claim ownership of the land
in question is beyond the province of the instant proceeding.
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NEYPES v COURT OF APPEALS

Remedies of party aggrieved by registration
Facts:
Domingo Neypes filed an action for annulment of judgment and
titles and/or reconveyance and/or reversion against the Bureau of
Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines, and
the heirs of Del Mundo.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss filed by the heirs of
Del Mundo on the ground that there were factual matters that could be
determined only after trial. The heirs filed a motion for reconsideration
of the order denying their motion to dismiss. However, the same was
still denied by the appellate court on the ground that it was filed out of
the 15-day period to appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the appeal was filed within the 15-day period to
appeal?
Held:
Yes.
Ruling:
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to
afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the
notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40

governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to
the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to
the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or
partial) or any final order or resolution.
The heirs of Del Mundo seasonably filed their notice of appeal

within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from 22 July 1998 (the date
of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This
pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules
which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word
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or signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another.

It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily
implies. Hence, the use of or in the above provision supposes that the
notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment
or within 15 days from notice of the final order, which refer to the 1 July
1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39
of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to
hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal remains
and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period
of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial
court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity
to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error
of judgment.
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SPOUSES LEE v PUNZALAN

Facts:
On 14 May 1968, spouses Rodolfo Lee and Lydia Liscano filed an
application for the registration of two parcels of land. No opposition
having been interposed despite due publication, the lower court issued
an order of general default.
However, on 26 November 1968, Florencio Punzalan filed a

petition for reopening and/or review. Punzalan alleged that the spouses
Lee had committed fraud in not disclosing in their application that he is
the owner of a house standing on the lots applied for; and that he has
usufructuary rights over said properties. On the other hand, spouses Lee
denied the allegations.
The trial court rendered judgment denying the reopening and/or

review. On appeal, Punzalan announced his intention to appeal to the
Supreme Court. As a result of which, the trial court ordered the
transmittal of the records to the appellate court. The appellate court
then certified the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for reopening and/or review filed by
Punzalan is the proper remedy?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
The petition for review contemplated in the foregoing provision
clearly envisages the issuance of a decree of registration. It presupposes
the rendition of a Court’s decision. In fact, it has even been held that a
petition for review under the aforequoted provision “may be filed at any
time after the rendition of the Court’s Decision and before the expiration
of one year from the entry of the final decree of registration.
In this case, no judgment has as yet been rendered by the lower

Court, and much less has any decree of registration been issued. The
fixing of a petition for reopening and/or review by appellant, therefore,
is decidedly premature. Indeed, in the absence of any decision and/or
decree, there is nothing to be reviewed or reopened.
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REPUBLIC v COURT OF APPEALS AND BERNABE

Remedies of a party aggrieved by registration
Facts:
On 6 July 1965, Lot 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was segregated
from the forest zone and released and certified as an agricultural land
under the disposition of the Public Land Act. It was then declared a
public land in a decision of the cadastral case.
On 26 April 1967, Emilio Bernabe Sr. and his successors-in-

interest filed a petition to reopen said cadastral case. They alleged that
they have acquired ownership and possession of said parcels of land by
purchase from its original owners; and that they have always been in
continuous, open, active, exclusive, adverse, and in the concept of
owners thereof for more than 30 years.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition to reopen is the proper remedy?
Held:
Yes.
Ruling:
The basic elements for the allowance of the reopening or review
of a decree, are: (1) that the petitioner has real or dominical right; (2)
that he has been deprived thereof through fraud; (3) that the petition is
filed within one year from the issuance of the decree and (4) that the
property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser. It
has been held however that the action to annul a judgment, upon the
ground of fraud would be unavailing unless the fraud be extrinsic or
collateral and the facts upon which it is based have not been
controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be
annulled was rendered. Review of the decree demands a showing of
actual, not constructive, fraud, i.e. actual malice.
In this case, it cannot be said that Bernabe employed actual fraud

in procuring titles over parcels of land of the public domain as it is a
matter of record that the land in question was opened for disposition
and alienation only on 6 July 1965. Actual malice is therefore absent.
However, it has been held that, if a decree issued in pursuance of a

valid decision, obtained by fraud, may be annulled within one year from
entry of said decree, there is more reason to hold that the same is true if
entered in compliance with a decision suffering from a fatal infirmity,
such as want of due process, or lack of jurisdiction of the court that
decided the cadastral case.
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Thus the case can properly be the subject of review, it having been
shown that the Solicitor-General was not properly furnished the
requisite notices and copy of the assailed decision but more
importantly, the lower court as previously stated had no jurisdiction to
re-open the cadastral proceeding under Republic Act 931 as amended
by R.A. No. 2061.
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CAL JR. v ZOSA

Facts:
Vidal Jimeno died intestate and was survived by his widow, Salud
Montemayor-Jimeno, and their four children. On 17 September 1949,
Salud filed a petition for letters of administration of the estate of her
husband. Thereafter, Salud died intestate and was survived by her four
children. The heirs of Jimeno then filed a petition for letters for
administration over the estate of their parents.
Thereafter, Atty. Mariano Zosa was hired by the heirs of Jimeno as

their counsel. On 28 August 1957, they executed a deed of assignment
conveying to Atty. Zosa all their rights and interests in the parcel of land
in Bulangan, Toledo City as payment for his legal services. The same was
approved by the trial court.
On various dates, the heirs of Jimeno sold their pro-indiviso

shares of the same lot to spouses Felix and Pacita Barba.
In the meantime, the Bureau of Lands effected a cadastral survey

to the lots located in the Toledo City. Atty. Zosa then claimed ownership
of said lot. At the same time, spouses Barba also filed their answer
claiming that they are the true owners thereof and they have validly
sold the same to spouses Prisco Cal Jr. and Alice Canoy.
After the trail court rendered judgment adjudicating the parcel of

land to Atty. Zosa, the spouses Ca filed a petition for review or
reopening of the decree on the ground that Atty. Zosa acquired the
decree through extrinsic fraud.
Issue:
Whether or not the decree issued in favor of Atty. Zosa was
attended with actual fraud?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
The right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or interest
therein by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual or
extrinsic fraud is recognized by law under Section 32 of P.D. No. 1529.
Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive

fraud proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means of the
misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. Constructive fraud
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is construed as a fraud because of its detrimental effect upon public

interests and public or private confidence, even though the act is not
done with an actual design to commit positive fraud or injury upon
other persons.
Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded

as intrinsic where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the
original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could
have been litigated therein. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it
prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to
the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the
judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured, so that there
is not a fair submission of the controversy. Extrinsic fraud is also actual
fraud, but collateral to the transaction sued upon.
The “fraud” contemplated by Section 32, P.D. No. 1529 is extrinsic.

For fraud to justify a review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or
collateral, and the facts upon which it is based have not been
controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be
annulled was rendered.
Thus, relief is granted to a party deprived of his interest in land

where the fraud consists in a deliberate misrepresentation that the lots
are not contested when in fact, they are; or in willfully misrepresenting
that there are no other claims; or in deliberately failing to notify the
party entitled to notice; or in inducing him not to oppose an application;
or in misrepresenting about the identity of the lot to the true owner by
the applicant causing the former to withdraw his application. In all
these examples, the overriding consideration is that the fraudulent
scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day
in court or from presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is one that
affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court.
Relief on the ground of fraud will not be granted where the

alleged fraud goes into the merits of the case, is intrinsic and not
collateral, and has been controverted and decided, like what is very
much obtaining in the present case.
In this case, the spouses Cal failed to prove that then respondent
Atty. Zosa committed acts constituting extrinsic fraud in obtaining his
title. Indeed, there is no showing how Barba, their predecessors-in-
interest, was prevented by the said respondent from presenting his
case.
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AGREDA v AGREDA
Facts:
On 1 April 1963, Ildefonso Agreda filed an action to compel
Santiago Agrda to reconvey to them their alleged respective share in Lot
3400 of the cadastral survey of Janiuay, Iloilo. Ildefonso claimed
ownership over 4/12 thereof, while his co-appellants claimed
owenrshop of 7/12 of said lot, the remaining 1/12 portion being the
only one admitted to belong to Santiago.
On the other hand, Santiago filed a motion to dismiss on the

ground that the cause of action stated therein was barred by a prior
judgment, where the subject property was already declared to be his.
The trial court dismissed the petition of Ildefonso on the ground

that instead of filing the action for reconveyance, they should have
exhausted their remedies in the cadastral proceeding by filing the
corresponding petition to set aside the decision rendered in favor of
Santiago.
Issue:
Whether or not the filing of the petition for reconveyance is
proper?
Held:
Yes.
Ruling:
It is true that even after the issuance of the decree of registration
the same, together with the decision rendered in the case, may still be
reviewed and set aside upon an application for that purpose filed within
one year from the issuance of said decree, pursuant to the provisions of
Section 38 of Act No. 496, such remedy is not exclusive of, and does not
bar any other to which the aggrieved party may be entitled. Moreover, if
even after the rendition of a decision for the registration of a parcel of
land in favor of one party, and the issuance of the decree of registration,
both may still be reviewed, there is no valid reason to bar an action for
reconveyance, such as the one filed below, before the actual issuance of
the decree.
The action for reconveyance filed by Ildefonso in this case is based

upon the facts alleged in their complaint. They purport to show that
Santiago is a mere trustee of his co-heirs in respect to their share in Lot
3400. As alleged, it would seem that they are sufficient to constitute a
cause of action against appellee. Of course, whether Ildefonso will be
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able to establish them with competent evidence during the trial is, a
different matter. However, Ildefonso’s action should be allowed to
continue and take its course until final judgment instead of it being
dismissed on the ground that (a) there is another action pending
between the same parties upon the same cause of action, and that (b)
appellants should first attempt to enforce their right in the cadastral
proceeding through a petition for review of the decree of registration
pursuant to Section 38 of Act No. 496.
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VDA. DE RETUERTO v BARZ

Facts:
Spoues Esteban Perez and Lorenza Sanchez were occupying a part
of Hacienda de Mandaue, identified as Lot No. 896. When the spouses
Perez died, their rights over the property were inherited by their
daughter, Juana Perez.
On 16 April 1929, Juana executed a deed confirming her execution

of a deed of absolute sale in favor of Panfilo Retuerto over a parcel of
land known as Lot 896-A. however, Panfilo failed to secure the
appropriate decree due to the Second World War that ensued.
Two decades later, Juana died intestate and was survived by her
son, Pedro Barz. Pedro then filed an application for the confirmation of
his title over Lot No. 896. Panfilo did not file any opposition to the
application. As a result of which, Pedro was declared as the lawful
owner of Lot No. 896.
Later on, Panfilo died intestate and was survived by his widow,
Catalina Retuerto and their children, who adjudicated unto themselves
as the owners of the subject property.
The heirs of Pedro then filed a complaint for quieting of title

against the heirs of Panfilo.
Issue:
Whether or not the action for reconveyance of the subject
property on the ground of fraud will prosper?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
It is a fundamental principle in land registration that a certificate
of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to
the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. Such
indefeasibility commences after the lapse or expiration of one year from
the date of entry of the decree of registration. The act of registration is
considered a constructive notice to all persons respecting title to
property; hence, after the lapse of one year, title to the property can no
longer be contested. This system was so effected in order to quiet title to
land.
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Constructive trusts are created in equity to prevent unjust

enrichment, arising against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of
confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought
not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.
In this case, the heirs of Panfilo failed to substantiate their

allegation that their predecessor-in-interest had acquired any legal right
to the property subject of the present controversy. Nor had they
adduced any evidence to show that the certificate of title of Pedro was
obtained through fraud.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that Pedro acquired title to

the property through mistake or fraud, petitioners are nonetheless
barred from filing their claim of ownership. An action for reconveyance
based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes within ten years
from the time of its creation or upon the alleged fraudulent registration
of the property. Since registration of real property is considered a
constructive notice to all persons, then the ten-year prescriptive period
is reckoned from the time of such registering, filing or entering. Thus,
the heirs of Panfilo should have filed an action for reconveyance within
ten years from the issuance of title in 16 November 1968 which they
failed to do so.
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PINO v COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Lot 6 of the Echague cadastral was acquired by spouses Juan
Gaffud and Rafaela Donato and was originally registered in the names of
Rafaela and their sons, Raymundo and Cicero, as co-owners in fee
simple.
On 25 February 1967, Rafaela sold a portion of Lot 6 in favor of

Fortunato Pascua known as Lot 6-A. Thereafter, on 10 June 1970,
Rafaela sold to Felicisima Pino Lot 6-B. As a result of which, a transfer
certificate of title was issued in the name of Felicisima.
On 9 March 1982, the heirs of Cicero Gaffud then filed a complaint

for nullity of sale and reconveyance against Felicisma. On the other
hand, Felicisima argued that the she is an innocent purchaser for value;
that the action of the heirs of Cicero was already barred by prescription
when it was filed; and the transfer of the subject property from Rafael to
her was valid.
Issue:
Whether or not the action of the heirs of Cicero was already
barred by prescription?
Held:
Yes.
Ruling:
Where the certificate of title is in the name of the vendor when the
land is sold, the vendee for value has the right to rely on what appears
on the certificate of title. In the absence of anything to excite or arouse
suspicion, said vendee is under no obligation to look beyond the
certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face
of said certificate.
In this case, Felicisima being an innocent purchaser for value, the

heirs of Cicero will have no cause of action against her. The issue alone
that Felicisima is a purchase in good faith and for value sufficiently
constitutes a bar to the complaint of the heirs of Cicero.
If an action for reconveyance based on constructive trust cannot

reach an innocent purchaser for value, the remedy of the defrauded
party is to bring an action for damages against those who caused the
fraud or were instrumental in depriving him of the property. And it is
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now well-settled that such action prescribes in ten years from the
issuance of the Torrens Title over the property.
In this case, the transfer certificate of title was issued in the name
of Rafaela Donato on 2 March 1967. The present action for
reconveyance was filed only on 9 March 1982. Clearly then, the action
has already prescribed because it was filed 15 years after the issuance
of the transfer certificate of title.
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SPOUSES DE GUZMAN JR. v THE NATIONAL TREASURER AND THE

REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA CITY
Facts:
On 1 July 1985, Urlan Milambiling and Asuncion Velarde
purchased a parcel of land situated in Antipolo, Rizal. The spouses
Milambiling entrusted the deed of sale of the parcel of land to Marilyn
Belgica, who volunteered to register the sale and transfer the titles in
their names. However, Belgica failed to give the title to the spouses
Milambiling.
Upon finding the certificate of title covering the said parcel of land
had been transferred in their names but was subsequently cancelled
and the title transferred in the name of spouses Francisco and Amparo
De Guzman Jr., the spouses Milambiling filed an action against spouses
De Guzman for declaration of nullity of sale.
Thereafter, the spouses De Guzman filed an action for damages

against the assurance fund.
Issue:
Whether or not the assurance fund is liable for the loss of spouses
De Guzman?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
It may be discerned from P.D. No. 1529 that the persons who may
recover from the Assurance Fund are:
1. Any person who sustains loss or damage under the following
conditions:
a. that there was no negligence on his part; and
b. that the loss or damage sustained was through any omission,
mistake or malfeasance of the court personnel, or the Registrar
of Deeds, his deputy, or other employees of the Registry in the
performance of their respective duties under the provisions of
the Land Registration Act, now, the Property Registration
Decree; or
2. Any person who has been deprived of any land or interest therein
under the following conditions:
a. that there was no negligence on his part;
b. that he was deprived as a consequence of the bringing of his
land or interest therein under the provisions of the Property
Registration Decree; or by the registration by any other person
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as owner of such land; or by mistake, omission or

misdescription in any certificate of owners duplicate, or in any
entry or memorandum in the register or other official book or
by any cancellation; and
c. that he is barred or in any way precluded from bringing an
action for the recovery of such land or interest therein, or claim
upon the same.
In this case, the circumstances of spouses De Guzman do not fall

under the first case. They have not alleged that the loss or damage they
sustained was through any mission, mistake or malfeasance of the court
personnel, or the Registrar of Deeds, his deputy, or other employees of
the Registry in the performance of their respective duties. Moreover,
they were negligent in not ascertaining whether the impostors who
executed a deed of sale in their favor were really the owners of the
property.
Nor does the spouses De Guzman’s situation fall under the second
case. They were not deprived of their land as a consequence of the
bringing of the land or interest therein under the provisions of the
Property Registration Decree. Neither was the deprivation due to the
registration by any other person as owner of such land, or by mistake,
omission or misdescription in any certificate or owners duplicate, or in
any entry or memorandum in the register or other official book or by
any cancellation.
The claim of spouses De Guzman is not supported by the purpose

for which the Assurance Fund was established. The Assurance Fund is
intended to relieve innocent persons from the harshness of the doctrine
that a certificate is conclusive evidence of an indefeasible title to land.
They did not suffer any prejudice because of the operation of this
doctrine. On the contrary, they sought to avail of the benefits of the
Torrens System by registering the property in their name.
Unfortunately, the original owners were able to judicially recover the
property from them. That spouses De Guzman eventually lost the
property to the original owners, however, does not entitle them to
compensation under the Assurance Fund.
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SPOUSES MAMADSUAL v MOSON

Facts:
Spouses Hadji Ali and Hadji Salika Mamadsual filed a complaint
against Spouses Kagui Abdula and Kagui Rakma Macarapan for quieting
of title to property and annulment of original certificate of title.
On the other hand, spouses Macarapan argued that spouses

Mamadsual have no title to the property which is the subject of the suit;
that their action to quiet title is not proper; that the spouses Mamadsual
are not the proper parties to ask for the annulment or cancellation of
their certificate of title; and that the action, being based on implied trust
has already prescribed and could not be maintained.
The spouses Mamadsual contended that the title referred to by

them in the complaint means the legal title or ownership or dominion
over the land in dispute acquired by them from their ancestors by
operation of the law on succession; that they are real party in interest
because they will be benefited by the judgment or entitled to the avails
of the suit in their own right; and that since they are in possession of the
land, an action to quite title does not prescribe.
Issue:
Whether or not the action of spouses Mamadsual to quiet the title
has already prescribed?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
A reading of the complaint shows that it is an action for quieting
title. Therein, it is alleged that spouses Mamadsual are in “actual,
continuous, and adverse possession” of the land in question “since time
immemorial” in the concept of owners.
An action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the plaintiffs are in

possession of the property.
It is an established rule of American jurisprudence that actions to

quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are
imprescriptible. The prevailing rule is that the right of a plaintiff to have
his title to land quieted, as against one who is asserting some adverse
claim or lien thereon, is not barred while the plaintiff or his grantors
remain in actual possession of the land, claiming to be owners thereof,
the reason for this rule being that while the owner in fee continues
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liable to an action, proceeding, or suit upon the adverse claim, he has a

continuing right to the aid of a court of equity in his favor to ascertain
and determine the nature of such claim and its effect on his title, or to
assert any superior equity in his favor. He may wait until his possession
is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his
right. But the rule that the statute of limitations is not available as a
defense to an action to remove a cloud from title can only be invoked by
a complainant when he is in possession. One who claims property which
is in the possession of another must, it seems, invoke his remedy within
the statutory period.
In this case, spouses Mamadsual alleged that recently spouses

Macarapan have disturbed their possession of the property by
surreptitiously constructing dikes. The rule is that spouses Mamadsual
may wait until their possession is disturbed or their title is attacked
before they may take steps to vindicate their right. The statute of
limitation is not available as a defense to an action to remove a cloud
from title over property in possession of the petitioners.
In an action to quiet title the plaintiff “must” have legal or

equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject
matter of the action. It interpreted legal title to mean registered
ownership and equitable title to mean beneficial ownership.
It is not necessary that the person seeking to quiet his title is the
registered owner of the property in question. The action to be one for
quieting of title where the plaintiffs alleged ownership and actual
possession since time immemorial of the property in question by
themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, while
defendants secured a certificate of title over said property through
fraud, misrepresentation and deceit.
Thus, “title” to property does not necessarily mean the original

transfer certificate of title. It can connote acquisitive prescription by
possession in the concept of an owner thereof. Indeed, one who has an
equitable right or interest in the property may also file an action to
quiet title under the law.
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PAJOMAYO v MANIPON
Facts:
On 5 June 1963, Mariano Pajomayo filed a complaint alleging that
they are owners pro-indiviso of the parcel of land; that they had
acquired the land as an inheritance from their late father; that they and
their predecessor-in-interest had been in actual, peaceful, and
uninterrupted possession of said property in the concept of owners for
a period of more than 70 years; and that Rodrigo Manipon and Perfecta
Zulueta dispossessed them of said property.
On the other hand, Manipon and Zulueta argued that they are the
exclusive owners of a parcel of land; that said land have bene
adjudicated to them in the cadastral proceedings; that they had
acquired the land mentioned by inheritance from their deceased father;
that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual,
peaceful, and adverse possession of said land for more than 70 years to
the reclusion of Pajomayo; that they are possessors in good faith; and
that Pajomayo’s action was barred by res judicata and/or prescription.
Issue:
Whether or not the title of Manipon and Zulueta should prevail?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
Necessarily when one of the two titles is held to be superior over
the other, one should be declared null and void and should be ordered
cancelled. And if a party is declared to be the owner of a parcel of land
pursuant to a valid certificate of title said party is entitled to the
possession of the land covered by said valid title. The decree of
registration issued in the cadastral proceedings does not have the effect
of annulling the title that had previously been issued in accordance with
the provisions of the Land Registration Law.
Thus, once a homestead patent granted in accordance with the

Public Land Act registered pursuant to Section 122 of Act No. 496, the
certificate of title issued in virtue of said patent has the force and effect
of a Torrens Title under the Land Registration Act.
It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that where two certificates

of title are issued to different persons covering the same land in whole
or in part, the earlier in date must prevail as between the original
parties, and in case of successive registration where, more than one
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certificate is issued over the land the person holding under the prior
certificate is entitled to the land as against the person who relies on the
second certificate
In this case, the OCT upon which Manipon and Zulueta base their
claim of ownership over the land in question was issued on 1 April
1957, while the OCT upon which Pajomayo base a similar claim was
issued on 27 November 1931, under the law and the authorities. The
latter certificate of title should prevail, and the former should be
cancelled.
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REPUBLIC v GUERRERO
Facts:
Sometime in December 1964, Benjamin Guerrero filed a
miscellaneous sales patent application. The same was approved and a
miscellaneous sales patent was issued in favor of Guerrero together
with the corresponding original certificate of title.
On the other hand, the Republic assailed the validity of the sales
patent on the ground that Guerrero was guilty of actual fraud in the
acquisition of his miscellaneous sales patent; and that the certificate of
title was acquired through fraud and misrepresentation.
Issue:
Whether or not Guerrero procured the miscellaneous sales patent
through fraud?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
Section 38 of Act No. 496 recognizes the right of a person
deprived of land to institute an action to reopen or revise a decree of
registration obtained by actual fraud.
Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive

fraud proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means of the
misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. Constructive fraud
is construed as a fraud because of its detrimental effect upon public
interests and public or private confidence, even though the act is not
done with an actual design to commit positive fraud or injury upon
other persons.
Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded

as intrinsic where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the
original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could
have been litigated therein. The fraud is extrinsic if it is employed to
deprive parties of their day in court and thus prevent them from
asserting their right to the property registered in the name of the
applicant.
The distinctions assume significance because only actual and

extrinsic fraud had been accepted and is contemplated by the law as a
ground to review or reopen a decree of registration. Thus, relief is
granted to a party deprived of his interest in land where the fraud
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consists in a deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are no contested

when in fact they are; or in willfully misrepresenting that there are no
other claims; or in deliberately failing to notify the party entitled to
notice; or in inducing him not to oppose an application; or in
misrepresenting about the identity of the lot to the true owner by the
applicant causing the former to withdraw his application. In all these
examples, the overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of
the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court or
from presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and
goes into the jurisdiction of the court.
Relief on the ground of fraud will not be granted where the

alleged fraud goes into the merits of the case, is intrinsic and not
collateral, and has been controverted and decided. Thus, the denial of
relief where it appears that the fraud consisted in the presentation at
the trial of a supposed forged document, or a false and perjured
testimony, or in basing the judgment on a fraudulent compromise
agreement, or in the alleged fraudulent acts or omissions of the counsel
which prevented the petitioner from properly presenting the case were
underscored.
In this case, the Republic failed to justify a review of the decree

constitute actual and extrinsic fraud. It has not adduced adequate
evidence that would show that Guerrero employed actual and extrinsic
fraud in procuring the patent and the corresponding certificate of title.
The Republic miserably failed to prove that it was prevented from
asserting its right over the lot in question and from properly presenting
its case by reason of such fraud. It did not specifically allege how fraud
was perpetrated by respondent in procuring the sales patent and the
certificate of title. Nor was any evidence proffered to substantiate the
allegation. Fraud cannot be presumed, and the failure of petitioner to
prove it defeats it own cause.
Well-settled is the rule that the party alleging fraud or mistake in

a transaction bears the burden of proof. The circumstances evidencing
fraud are as varied as the people who perpetrate it in each case. It may
assume different shapes and forms; it may be committed in as many
different ways. Thus, the law requires that fraud be established, not just
by preponderance of evidence, but by clear and convincing evidence.
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CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY LANDLESS ASSOCIATION INC. v COURT OF

APPEALS
Land patents
Facts:
On 4 September 1956, the Bureau of Lands released Lot No. 1982
of Cadastral 237 at Cagayan de Oro City as alienable and disposable
public land. Thereafter, on 29 January 1964, the Bureau of Lands issued
a survey authority granting the Cagayan de Oro City Landless
Association Inc. to survey the land for purposes of subdivision into
residential lots. After which, COCLAI filed for a miscellaneous sales
application.
Meanwhile, on 22 August 1979, the National Housing Authority

filed an expropriation proceeding to acquire Cadastral Lot No. 1982.
COCLAI intervened. However, the NHA sought the suspension of said
expropriation proceedings.
Subsequently, on 10 May 1993, the President issued Proclamation

No. 2292, thereby reserving the entire Cadastral Lot No. 1982 for the
Slum Improvement and Resettlement Project. As a result of which, a
special patent and an original certificate of title was issued in the name
of NHA.
The NHA filed a complaint for quieting of title against the COCLAI.
Issue:
Whether or not COCLAI has better right over NHA?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
The original certificate of title issued to the NHA serves as a
concrete and conclusive evidence of an indefeasible title to the property.
Accordingly, once a decree of registration is issued under the Torrens
systems and the one year period from the issuance of the decree of
registration has lapsed, without said decree being controverted by any
adverse party, the title becomes perfect and cannot later on be
questioned.
Furthermore, in this case, the original certificate of title was

issued by the Register of Deeds, under an administrative proceeding.
Thus, it is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a judicial
registration proceeding as the land covered by said certificate is a
disposable public land within the contemplation of the Public Land Law.
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Moreover, the said certificate of title was not controverted by COCLAI in

a proper proceeding nor did it show that the issuance of the Original
Certificate of Title by the register of deeds to NHA was tainted with bad
faith or fraud. Hence, said certificate of title enjoys the presumption of
having been issued by the register of deeds in the regular performance
of its official duty.
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MENESES v COURT OF APPEALS

Land patents
Facts:
On 1 March 1977, the District Land Officer of Los Bañ os, Laguna
issued to Pablito Meneses a free patent and original certificate of title
for Lot 190 located in Los Bañ os, Laguna. Meneses claimed that he
acquired the property from Silverio Bautista; that the same was in
consideration of Bautista’s love and affection and some monetary
obligations in favor of him; that he took possession of the land.
On the other hand, the Quisimbing family contended that their

ownership of the land dated as far back as 6 September 1919 through
their matriarch. The Quisimbing family then filed a civil case for
nullification of the free patents and title issued to Meneses; that the
Mayor of Los Bañ os illegally occupied the same; and that it was obtained
through fraud.
Issue:
Whether or not Meneses has better right over the property?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
In this case, the principle of indefeasibility of title should not favor
Meneses notwithstanding that the one year period provided for by law
to impugn their title had elapsed. Meneses also urged that, having been
granted by the state, their title is superior to that of the Quisumbings.
However, that in the light of the fraud attending the issuance of

the free patents and titles of Meneses, said assertions crumble. Such
fraud was confirmed by this Court in Meneses v People which held
Meneses therein liable for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act in the issuance of the same free patents and titles.
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SILVESTRE v COURT OF APPEALS

Land patents
Facts:
On 2 May 1959, Rufino Dimson, filed an action against Fidel
Silvestre for the reconveyance of Lot No. 1185 of the Cadastral Survey of
Hermosa, Bataan, containing an area of 124,135 square meters and for
the cancellation of the homestead patent and certificate of title issued in
favor of Silvestre on the ground that the property was private land and
not a disposable or alienable public land which could be granted as
homestead patent by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
Dimson alleged that the lot in question was, before World War II
adjudicated in a cadastral case in favor of the Spouses Mariano
Batungbakal and Hilaria Vergara; that by virtue of a “Compromiso de
Venta” executed by spouses Batungbakal sometime in 1927 over several
properties, including the lot in question, he took possession of said Lot
No. 1185; and that has since 1927 paid all the real estate taxes due
thereon. He further alleged that no decree of registration was issued
due to the outbreak of war.
On the other hand, Silvestre maintained that he is the true owner

of the lot in question, having acquired the same through Homestead
Patent No. 72493 issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources; and that he has been in actual and open possession of the
same since 1927 and has been paying the realty taxes thereon.
Issue:
Whether or not Silvestre has better right over the property?
Held:
Yes.
Ruling:
In cases of annulment and/or reconveyance of title, a party
seeking it should establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence
but by clear and convincing evidence that the land sought to be
reconveyed is his.
In this case, Dimson not only failed to establish by a

preponderance of evidence that he has a better right over the land in
dispute but even failed to establish private ownership of his alleged
predecessor in interest. Although it is alleged that a decision was
rendered in a cadastral case in favor of the spouses Batungbakal, he
failed to produce a copy thereof, or to show when the alleged decision
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was rendered, but merely asserts that it was before the war. On the
contrary, Silvestre fully established by convincing proofs that Lot 1185
was formerly public land, applied for under the homestead law,
patented on 27 November 1956 and the corresponding certificate of
title issued on 8 December 1956.
The evidence of amply shows that defendant Silvestre has been

occupying this parcel of land since 1923 and his occupation is coupled
with a claim of ownership. An application for a homestead grant from
the proper authorities has been filed. A survey notification card was
given to defendant Fidel Silvestre. It is a notice by an official of the
Bureau of Lands who was conducting the cadastral survey of the area
where Silvestre was occupying a lot, that is Lot 1185, that said parcel of
land is to be surveyed under the cadastral survey. This exhibit is more
than 30 years old and bears the same Lot 1185 which is the same land
involved in the present controversy. This piece of document is a strong
corroborating evidence to the claim of Silvestre that he has been in
possession of the land since the year 1923. To make his possession of a
portion of the public domain ripen into ownership he filed an
application for homestead.
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GARCIA v COURT OF APPEALS

Subsequent registration
Facts:
Atty. Pedro Garcia and Remedios Garcia sold Lot 17 situated at Bel
Air II Village, Makati, to their daughter, Ma. Luisa Magpayo. Thereafter,
on 5 March 1981, the spouses Magpayo mortgaged the land to the
Philippine Bank of Communications. However, it was only on 9 March
1981 that a transfer certificate of title was issued in the name of the
spouses Magpayo.
The spouses Magpayo failed to pay the loan upon its maturity. As
a result of which, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and
PBCom was the highest bidder who bought the land. The redemption
period of the foreclosed mortgage expired, as such, the title over the
land was consolidated in favor of PBCom.
PBCom filed a petition for the issuance of writ of possession,

which was received by Jose Ma. Garcia, who refused to honor the same.
Garcia then filed a suit for recovery of realty, claiming that he inherited
the land as one of the heirs of his parents; and that PBCom had acquired
no right thereover.
Issue:
Whether or not Garcia may be held as the lawful owner of the
subject property?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
Garcia’s possession which started only in 1986 could not ripen
into ownership. He has no valid title thereto. His possession in fact was
that of an intruder, one done in bad faith. His possession is certainly not
in the concept of an owner. This is so because as early as 1981, title
thereto was registered in the name of the spouses Magpayo which title
was subsequently cancelled when the property was purchased by
PBCom in a public auction sale resulting in the issuance of title in favor
of the latter in 1985.
Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership

exists when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to
his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights
of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is
the right to dispose of the thing by way of sale. Atty. Garcia and his wife
exercised their right to dispose of what they owned when they sold the
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subject property to the spouses Magpayo. On the other hand, possession

is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally,
to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or
without right. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in
the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. A possessor in the
concept of an owner may be the owner himself or one who claims to be
so. On the other hand, one who possesses as a mere holder
acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be
ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong.
In this case, Garcia occupied the property not in the concept of an

owner for his stay was merely tolerated by his parents. An owner’s act
of allowing another to occupy his house, rent-free does not create a
permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the latter’s favor.
Consequently, it is of no moment that Gacria was in possession of the
property at the time of the sale to the spouses Magpayo It was not a
hindrance to a valid transfer of ownership.
The mortgage to PBCom by the spouses Magpayo is valid

notwithstanding that the transfer certificate of title over the property
was issued to them after the mortgage contract was entered into.
Registration does not confer ownership, it is merely evidence of such
ownership over a particular property. The deed of sale operates as a
formal or symbolic delivery of the property sold and authorizes the
buyer to use the document as proof of ownership. All said, the spouses
Magpayo were already the owners when they mortgaged the property
to PBCom.
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MINGOA v LAND REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATOR

Subsequent registration
Facts:
On 15 July 1987, a deed of donation of several parcels of land was
executed by Atty. Plaridel Mingoa in favor of his children. The deed was
forwarded to the Register of Deeds of Romblon for registration by
registered mail on 9 September 1988. It was entered in the primary
entry book of the Register of Deeds on 20 September 1988.
However, the Register of Deeds suspended registration of the

donation until Atty. Mingoa secured the proper clearances from the
Department of Agrarian Reform, pursuant to R.A. No. 6657.
On the other hand, Atty. Mingoa argued that the date of the
mailing should be considered as the date of filing of the document in the
office of the Register of Deeds.
Issue:
Whether or not the date of mailing should be considered as the
date of filing of the document in the office of the Register of Deeds?
Held:
Yes.
Ruling:
The Register of Deeds is required, upon payment of the entry fees,
to enter in the primary book of entry, in the order of reception, all
instruments including copies of writs and processes filed with him
relative to registered land; the date, hour and minute shall be noted in
said book which shall be regarded as the date of registration of the
instrument; and the memorandum of each instrument on the certificate
of title shall bear the same date.
The rule clearly provides that the date of mailing of the motion,
pleading, or any other papers, which may include instruments as the
deed of donation, is considered the date of filing as shown by the post
office stamp on the envelope or registry receipt.
Therefore, the date of mailing of an instrument to the Register of

Deeds for purposes of registration should be considered the date of
filing and receipt thereof by the Register of Deeds. It is this date that
should be entered in the primary entry book of the Register of Deeds
which shall be regarded as the date of its registration.
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In this case, the deed of donation was admittedly sent by

registered mail to the Register of Deeds on 9 September 1988, said date
is in effect the date of filing, receipt and registration of the instrument,
although the instrument was actually received by said office only on 20
September 1988.
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CHAN v COURT OF APPEALS

Voluntary instruments
Facts:
Teoville Development Corporation is the owner of several parcels
of land located at Muntinlupa, Rizal. TDC filed a petition for correction
on account of an alleged typographical error in the decree number
76377, as the same must be 76477. The petition was thereafter granted
and the necessary corrections were made by TCT.
However, in the year 1974, Henry Munar Chan applied for the
registration of certain parcels covering the same parcel of land that was
already registered under the name of TDC.
TDC then filed a complaint for quieting of title on the ground that
the titles under the name of Chan are all null and void as titles thereto
have already been registered in TDC’s predecessors-in-interest as early
as 17 May 1919.
On the other hand, Chan countered that the titles of TDC were
fake and spurious; that the complaint is a collateral attack on his decree
of registration; and that TDC is barred by res judicata.
Issue:
Whether or not Chan has better right over the property?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
Chan’s contention is untenable. Here is really a case of double
registration. The parcels of land involved were the subject of land
registration proceedings instituted separately by Chan, and El Colegio
de San Jose, predecessor-in-interest of the private respondent.
Conformably, when two certificates of title are issued to different
persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date
must prevail, and, in case of successive registrations where more than
one certificate is issued over the same land, the person holding a prior
certificate is entitled to the land as against a person who relies on a
subsequent certificate. In the case under scrutiny, TDC’s title being prior
in registration than that of the Chan, must prevail.
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HEIRS OF GONZAGA v COURT OF APPEALS

Voluntary instruments
Facts:
Jose Eugenio had once been the registered owners of two parcels
of land. Eugenio later on sold the two lots to Luis Gonzaga, who
subsequently sold the same to Guillermo Macarias. However, another
Torrens title covers the same two lots in the name of Lilia Sevilla,
married to Jose Seelin.
The spouses Jose Seelin and Lilia Sevila filed a complaint for
annulment of Gonzaga’s Torrents Title insofar as it embraced the
identical lots which are also described in their own title. On the other
hand, Gonzaga interposed, alleging that they no longer gave a cause of
action against him. As a result of which, the spouses Seelin filed an
amended complaint and included Macarias as party-defendant. The
lower court rendered judgment in favor of the spouses Seelin. It
declared that the the TCT of the spouses Seelin as valid and legal, and
ordered the cancellation of Gonzaga’s and Macarias’ TCT as the same
were null and void. The appellate court affirmed the findings and rulings
of the lower court.
Issue:
Whether or not the transfer certificate title of Gonzaga and
Macarias must be invalidated?
Held:
Yes.
Ruling:
In the present controversy, judicial adjudication hinges on the
question as to who, between the heirs of Gonzaga including Macarias
and the spouses Leelin, have the legal and valid title to the two lots.
Although Gonzaga’s title was issued in 1940, it will be noted that

Gonzaga’s title over Lots 2693 and 2695 both with an area of 599
square meters was based on the Cadastral Survey of Kaloocan City,
Cadastral Case No. 34, while spouses Leelin’s title was derived from OCT
No. 994 issued on 19 April 1917.
A certificate is not conclusive evidence of title if it is shown that

the same land had already been registered and an earlier certificate for
the same is in existence. Since the land in question has already been
registered under OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, the subsequent
registration of the same land on 3 May 1917 is null and void.
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HEIRS OF SARILI v LAGROSA

Mortgages
Facts:
On 17 February 2000, Pedro Lagrosa represented by his attorney-
in-fact, filed a complaint against spouses Sarili. He alleged that he is the
owner of a certain parcel of land situated in Caloocan City; that he has
been rigorously paying the real estate taxes therefrom since its
acquisition on 29 November 1974; that he is a resident of California;
that during his vacation in the Philippines, he discovered that a new
certificate of title to the subject property was issued in the name of
Victorino Amparo pursuant to a falsified deed of sale purportedly
executed by him and his wife. Lagrosa then prayed that the spouses
Sarili deliver to him the possession of the subject property.
On the other hand, the spouses Sarili maintained that they are
innocent purchases for value; that they have purchased the property
from Ramon Rodriguez; and that they deny any participation in the
preparation of the falsified deed of sale.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a valid conveyance of the subject property
in favor of the spouses Sarili?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
It is well-settled that even if the procurement of a certificate of
title was tainted with fraud and misrepresentation, such defective title
may be the source of a completely legal and valid title in the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value. Where innocent third persons, relying on
the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over
the property, the court cannot disregard such rights and order the total
cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such an outright cancellation
would be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for
everyone dealing with property registered under the Torrens system
would have to inquire in every instance whether the title has been
regularly or irregularly issued. This is contrary to the evident purpose of
the law.
The general rule is that every person dealing with registered land
may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued
therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the
certificate to determine the condition of the property. Where there is
nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the
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ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser

is not required to explore further than what the Torrens Title upon its
face indicates in quest for any hidden defects or inchoate right that may
subsequently defeat his right thereto.
However, a higher degree of prudence is required from one who

buys from a person who is not the registered owner, although the land
object of the transaction is registered. In such a case, the buyer is
expected to examine not only the certificate of title but all factual
circumstances necessary for him to determine if there are any flaws in
the title of the transferor. The buyer also has the duty to ascertain the
identity of the person with whom he is dealing with and the latter’s legal
authority to convey the property.
The strength of the buyer’s inquiry on the seller’s capacity or legal

authority to sell depends on the proof of capacity of the seller. If the
proof of capacity consists of a special power of attorney duly notarized,
mere inspection of the face of such public document already constitutes
sufficient inquiry. If no such special power of attorney is provided or
there is one but there appears to be flaws in its notarial
acknowledgment, mere inspection of the document will not do; the
buyer must show that his investigation went beyond the document and
into the circumstances of its execution.
In this case, it is undisputed that spouses Sarili purchased the

subject property from Rodriguez on the strength of the latter’s
ostensible authority to sell under the subject SPA. The said document,
however, readily indicates flaws in its notarial acknowledgment since
the Lagrosa’s community tax certificate number was not indicated
thereon. Under the governing rule on notarial acknowledgments at that
time, when an individual subject to the community tax acknowledges
any document before a notary public, it shall be the duty of the
administering officer to require such individual to exhibit the
community tax certificate. Despite this irregularity, however, spouses
Sarili failed to show that they conducted an investigation beyond the
subject SPA and into the circumstances of its execution as required by
prevailing jurisprudence. Hence, spouses Sarili cannot be considered as
innocent purchasers for value.
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SPOUSES VILBAR v OPINION

Mortgages
Facts:
On 10 July 1979, spouses Bernadette and Rodulfo Vilbar entered
into a Contract to Sell with Dulos Realty and Development Corporation
involving two lots, LOT 20-A and LOT 20-B. Sometime in August 1979,
spouses Vilbar took possession of Lot 20-B in the concept of owners and
exercised acts of ownership thereon with the permission of Dulos Realty
after making some advance payment.
On 1 June 1981, upon full payment of the purchase price for Lot
20, Dulos Realty executed a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of the spouses Vilbar and their co-purchases Elena. Dulos Realty
also surrendered and delivered the owner’s duplicate copy covering Lot
20 to them.
However, spouses Vilbar and Elena were not able to register and
transfer the title in their names because Dulos Realty allegedly failed to
have the lot formally subdivided despite its commitment to do so, until
Juan Dulos died without the subdivision being accomplished.
Spouses Vilbar and Dulos Realty also executed a Contract to Sell

covering Lot 21. To pay for the balance of the purchase price, spouses
Vilbar obtained a housing loan from the Development Bank of the
Philippines secured by a real estate mortgage over the said lot. Dulos
Realty facilitated the approval of the loan, the proceeds of which were
immediately paid to it as full payment of the purchase price.
In 1991, the spouses Vilbar were able to pay the loan in full and
DBP issued the requisite Cancellation of Mortgage. The spouses Vilbar
have been in actual, open and peaceful possession of Lot 21 and occupy
the same as absolute owners since 1981.
On the other hand, Angelitio Opinion claimed that he legally

acquired Lots 20 and 21 through extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage
constituted over the said properties by Otilio Gorospe Sr. and Otilio
Gorospe Jr. They defaulted in payment, prompting Opinion to file a
petition for extra-Judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage.
Subsequently, the subject properties were sold at a public auction
where Opinion emerged as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was
issued in his favor on 18 December 1995 and annotated on the transfer
certificate of title of the properties. The Gorospes failed to redeem the
properties within the reglementary period resulting in the eventual
cancellation of their titles. Thus, the issuance of the titles in favor of
Opinion.
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On 13 February 1997, Opinion filed a petition for issuance of a

writ of possession against the Gorospes. The spouses Vilbar and Elena
were served with a notice to vacate the premises. However, the writ was
quashed when spouses Vilbar filed an urgent motion for the quashal of
the writ and presented their title to Lot 21, while Elena presented the
deed of absolute sale executed by Dulos Realty covering Lot 20.
Consequently, Opinion filed a complaint for accion reinvindicatoria.
Issue:
Whether or not the spouses Vilbar have better right over the
property?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
The settled rule that levy on attachment, duly registered, takes
preference over a prior unregistered sale. This result is a necessary
consequence of the fact that the properties involved were duly covered
by the Torrens system which works under the fundamental principle
that registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer
or creates a lien upon the land.
In this case, there is no reason to doubt that the predecessors-in-

interest of the Opinion with respect to the said properties, the Gorospes,
likewise acquired the same through lawful means. Indeed, and as
acknowledged by both Opinion and spouses Vilbar, Dulos Realty
previously owned the above parcels of land. However, the titles were
cancelled after the Decision dated 01 April 1982 rendered in favor of
Gorospe, Sr. was implemented or executed.
In effect, Gorospe, Sr. acquired through lawful means a valid right

to the properties, and he and his son had a legal right to mortgage the
same to Opinion. As a consequence, the Goropes transmitted property
rights to Opinion, who, in turn, acquired valid rights from the Gorospes.
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DE LA MERCED v GSIS
Mortgages
Facts:
Jose Zulueta validly own five registered parcels of land located
within the Antonio Subdivision. Later, the spouses Zulueta mortgaged
several lots contained to the Government Service Insurance System,
which eventually foreclosed on the mortgaged properties, including the
subject properties. Upon consolidation of GSIS’ ownership, a transfer
certificate of title was issued in favor of it.
Upon learning of the foreclosure, Francisco Dela Merced iled a

complaint praying for the nullity of the GSIS foreclosure on the subject
properties on the ground that he, not the Zuluetas, was the owner of
these lots at the time of the foreclosure. Dela Merced further argued
that, due to the nullity of GSIS’ foreclosure over the subject properties, it
had no ownership right that could be transferred to Elizabeth
Manlongat.
Issue:
Whether or not the heirs of Dela Merced have better right over the
property?
Held:
Yes.
Ruling:
The rights of ownership of the heirs of Dela Merced over the
properties in dispute, albeit unregistered, are superior to the registered
mortgage rights of GSIS over the same. The execution and validity of the
contract to sell dated 3 September 1957 executed by spouses Zulueta
spouses, as the former subdivision owner, in favor of dela Merced, are
beyond cavil. There is also no dispute that the contract to sell was
entered into by the parties before the third mortgage was constituted
on 15 October 1957 by the spouses Zulueta in favor of GSIS. dela Merced
was able to fully pay the purchase price to the vendor, who later
executed a deed of absolute sale in his favor. However, the spouses
Zulueta defaulted on their loans; hence, the mortgage was foreclosed
and the properties were sold at public auction to GSIS as the highest
bidder.
The state’s registered mortgage right over the property is inferior

to that of the heirs of dela Merced unregistered right. The unrecorded
sale is preferred for the reason that if the original owner had parted
with his ownership of the thing sold then he no longer had ownership
and free disposal of that thing so as to be able to mortgage it again.
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Registration of the mortgage is of no moment since it is understood to

be without prejudice to the better right of third parties.
In this case, the registered right of GSIS as mortgagee of the

property is inferior to the unregistered right of dela Merced. The
unrecorded sale between dela Merced as the vendee of the property and
the spouses Zulueta, the original owners, is preferred.
132
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SAJONAS v COURT OF APPEALS

Involuntary dealings/transactions
Facts:
The case is for cancellation of the inscription of a notice of levy on
execution from a certificate of title covering a parcel of real property.
The inscription was caused to be made by Domingo Pilares, issued in
the name of the spouses Ernesto Uychocde and Lucita Jarin, and was
later carried over to and annotated on another transfer certificate of
title No. N-109417 of the same registry, issued in the name of the
spouses Alfredo and Conchita Sajonas.
The subject property was bought by Sajonas spouses on

September 1983 and caused the annotation of their adverse claim on
August 1984. The deed of sale was executed upon the full payment of
the purchase price and the same was registered only on August 1985.
Meanwhile, without the knowledge of the spouses Sajonas, there

has been a compromise agreement between the spouses Uychocde and
Pilares, and a notice of levy on execution was issued on 12 February
1985.
Issue:
Whether or not the adverse claim inscribe din the transfer
certificate of title is still in force when Pilares caused the notice of levy
on execution to be registered and annotated?
Held:
Yes.
Ruling:
The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to
protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property, and serves
as a notice and warning to third parties dealing with said property that
someone is claiming an interest on the same or has a better right than
the registered owner thereof. A subsequent sale cannot prevail over the
adverse claim which was previously annotated in the certificate of title
over the property.
If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto
lose force and effect after the lapse of thirty days, then it would not have
been necessary to include the foregoing caveat to clarify and complete
the rule. For then, no adverse claim need be cancelled. If it has been
automatically terminated by mere lapse of time, the law would not have
required the party in interest to do a useless act.
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Construing the provision as a whole would reconcile the apparent

inconsistency between the portions of the law such that the provision
on cancellation of adverse claim by verified petition would serve to
qualify the provision on the effectivity period. The law, taken together,
simply means that the cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary
to render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will remain annotated
and shall continue as a lien upon the property. For if the adverse claim
has already ceased to be effective upon the lapse of said period, its
cancellation is no longer necessary and the process of cancellation
would be a useless ceremony.
It should be noted that the law employs the phrase may be

cancelled, which obviously indicates, as inherent in its decision making
power, that the court may or may not order the cancellation of an
adverse claim, notwithstanding such provision limiting the effectivity of
an adverse claim for thirty days from the date of registration. The court
cannot be bound by such period as it would be inconsistent with the
very authority vested in it. A fortiori, the limitation on the period of
effectivity is immaterial in determining the validity or invalidity of an
adverse claim which is the principal issue to be decided in the court
hearing. It will therefore depend upon the evidence at a proper hearing
for the court to determine whether it will order the cancellation of the
adverse claim or not.
To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as absolute

and without qualification limited to thirty days defeats the very purpose
for which the statute provides for the remedy of an inscription of
adverse claim, as the annotation of an adverse claim is a measure
designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property
where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise
provided for by the Land Registration Act, and serves as a warning to
third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an
interest or the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof.
The reason why the law provides for a hearing where the validity
of the adverse claim is to be threshed out is to afford the adverse
claimant an opportunity to be heard, providing a venue where the
propriety of his claimed interest can be established or revoked, all for
the purpose of determining at last the existence of any encumbrance on
the title arising from such adverse claim.
In this case, the disputed inscription of adverse claim on the

transfer certificate of title was still in effect on 12 February 1985 when
Quezon City Sheriff Roberto Garcia annotated the notice of levy on
execution thereto. Consequently, he is charged with knowledge that the
property sought to be levied upon on execution was encumbered by an
interest the same as or better than that of the registered owner thereof.
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Such notice of levy cannot prevail over the existing adverse claim
inscribed on the certificate of title in favor of the petitioners.
135
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HEIRS OF LOPEZ v ENRIQUEZ

Facts:
Alfonso Sandoval and Roman Ozatea Jr. filed an application for
registration of title. The land registration court then issued an order of
general default and hearings on the application followed. It later on
granted the application.
After which, the heirs of Eugenio Lopez Sr. filed a motion alleging
that Sandoval and Ozatea sold the subject lots to Eugenio Lopez Sr.
Notwithstanding the motion of the heirs of Lopez, the Register of Deeds
issued the corresponding original certificate of title in favor of Sandoval
and Ozatea and their spouses.
Thereafter, the heirs of Lopez filed another motion to declare void

the OCT issued by the RD. They also filed an application to annotate the
notice of lis pendens with the RD but the same was denied. In the
resolution of the Land Registration Authority, it declared that the heirs
of Lopez are not parties in the land registration case, since an order of
general default was already issued, the same binding with the whole
world. On appeal by the heirs of Lopez, the same was dismissed by the
appellate court contending that the heirs failed to file a motion to lift the
order of general default in the land registration case.
Issue:
Whether or not the notice of lis pendens should have been
annotated?
Held:
Yes.
Ruling:
Lis pendens literally means a pending suit. The doctrine of lis
pendens refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court
acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of
the action, and until final judgment.
The purposes of lis pendens are (1) to protect the rights of the
party causing the registration of the lis pendens, and (2) to advise third
persons who purchase or contract on the subject property that they do
so at their peril and subject to the result of the pending litigation.
The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect. First, it

keeps the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court
until the entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final
136
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judgment by successive alienations. Second, it binds a purchaser, bona

fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree
that the court will promulgate subsequently. However, the filing of a
notice of lis pendens does not create a right or lien that previously did
not exist.
Without a notice of lis pendens, a third party who acquires the

property after relying only on the certificate of title is a purchaser in
good faith. Against such third party, the supposed rights of a litigant
cannot prevail, because the former is not bound by the property owners
undertakings not annotated in the transfer certificate of title.
The notice of lis pendens is ordinarily recorded without the

intervention of the court where the action is pending. The notice is but
an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does not
affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively advise,
or warn, all people who deal with the property that they so deal with it
at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the property
in any voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the action, and
may well be inferior and subordinate to those which may be finally
determined and laid down therein. The cancellation of such a
precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in the action, and
may be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time.
And its continuance or removal is not contingent on the existence of a
final judgment in the action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits
thereof.
A notice of lis pendens may involve actions that deal not only with
title or possession of a property, but also with the use or occupation of a
property. The litigation must directly involve a specific property which
is necessarily affected by the judgment. The cases where a notice of lis
pendens is appropriate:
A notice of lis pendens is proper in the following cases, viz:

a) An action to recover possession of real estate;
b) An action to quiet title thereto;
c) An action to remove clouds thereon;
d) An action for partition; and
e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title
to the land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon.
On the other hand, the doctrine of lis pendens has no application

in the following cases:
a) Preliminary attachments;
b) Proceedings for the probate of wills;
c) Levies on execution;
d) Proceedings for administration of estate of deceased persons; and
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e) Proceedings in which the only object is the recovery of a money

judgment.
138
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VDA. DE ALCANTARA v COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Aniceto Cruz filed a complaint for specific performance against
Rebecca Desamito vda. de Alcantara and Gerondina Alcantara. He
claimed ownership over ½ undivided portio of the two lots covered by
virtue of a facto de retro sale executed on their favor by Leona vda. de
Alcantara.
On the other hand, Alcantara claimed that the sale was null and
void because at the time it was executed, Leona was no longer the
owner of the ½ portion of the lots as the same has already been
transferred by Leona in her favor.
Issue:
Whether or not Alcantara is the owner of the remaining ½ portion
of the property?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
While the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition was registered ahead of
the Facto de Retro Sale, it did not, however, rise to the level of a valid
instrument of conveyance of the one-half share of Leona in the subject
property in favor of Ernesto and Gerondina, since it merely mentions of
an alleged sale executed by Leona on 13 March, 1972. The said deed of
sale was never offered in evidence by Alcantara. If it really existed, no
impediment could have prevented its offer as evidence especially
considering that it was allegedly acknowledged before the same notary
public who notarized the deed of extrajudicial partition. There is, as
well, no proof that it was registered.
Without the production of the alleged deed of sale, the

registration of the deed of extrajudicial partition was an idle ceremony
or an exercise in futility insofar as the transfer of Leona’s ownership is
concerned. Such registration did not operate as a registration of the
deed of sale. Insofar as third persons are concerned, what could validly
transfer or convey Leona’s share in the property to Ernesto and
Gerondina is the registration of the deed of sale and not of the deed of
extrajudicial partition which only mentions the former.
It also bears stressing that although the deed of extrajudicial

partition was executed on 22 January 1974, it was not registered until
16 November 1983, or two months after the execution of the facto de
139
COL 2A
retro sale in favor of Cruz. Moreover, although that deed was registered,
no corresponding annotation thereof was made.
140
COL 2A
CONSTANTINO v ESPIRITU
Facts:
On 3 December 1959, Pastor Constantino filed a complaint against
the Herminia Espiritu, praying among other things that pending this
suit, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining the Herminia,
her agents, attorneys, representatives, or any other persons acting in
her behalf, to absolutely abstain from further alienating or otherwise
disposing of the subject property and that, after trial, the same be made
permanent; and that Herminia be forthwith ordered to execute a deed of
absolute conveyance of the said property in favor of Pastor Constantino,
Jr., the beneficiary, free from all liens and encumbrances.
Pending the case filed by Pastor, Herminia executed a purported

deed of sale of the subject property in favor of Nicanor B. Aves on 31
December 1960. As a result of which, a transfer certificate of title was
issued in favor of Nicanor. Subsequently, on 26 January 26 1961,
Nicanor mortgaged the property in favor of the Philippine Banking
Corporation.
Nicanor then admitted being the purchaser of the subject

property but claimed lack of knowledge of the pendency of the litigation
between the Pastor and Herminia; that he is an innocent purchaser in
good faith and for value; that the sale was consummated only after the
title which appeared to be clean and free from all liens and
encumbrances had been shown to him; that after having been assured
by Herminia to that effect, he mortgaged the property as an exercise of
ownership and dominion and; and that his title to the property cannot
be attacked collaterally in the present motion.
Issue:
Whether or not Nicanor has acquired better right over the subject
property?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
The real purpose of the system is to quiet title of land; to put a
stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims
which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which
may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it
would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure,
without the necessity of waiting in the portals of a court, or sitting in the
mirador de su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land. For such
141
COL 2A
title accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of

the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the
absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real
interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions,
should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified,
enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by
law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. Such a
principle applies not only to the holder of the title but to one who buys
it from him for value.
The notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world

that a particular real property is in litigation, and serves as a warning
that one who acquires and interest over said property does so at his
own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said
property. Where, however, the notice of lis pendens was already
cancelled by virtue of a court order at the time of the purchase of the
land, a subsequent decision of the court ordering the restoration of such
notice on the ground that there was bad faith in its cancellation will not
affect the rights of said purchaser whose purchase was made in good
faith and for value.
142
COL 2A
LIGON v COURT OF APPEALS

Petitions/actions after original registration
Facts:
Iglesia ni Kristo filed a complaint for specific performance with
damages against the Islamic Directorate of the Philippines. INK alleged
that by virtue of an Absolute deed of sale, IDP sold to it two parcels of
land; that they stipulated in the deed of sale that IDP shall undertake to
evict all squatters and illegal occupants in the property within 45 days
from the execution of the contract; and that IDP failed to fulfill said
obligation. On the other hand, IDP asserted that it was INK which
violated the contract by delaying the payment of the purchase price; as
such, IDP prayed that the contract of sale be rescinded and annulled.
Thereafter, INK also filed a motion praying that Leticia Ligon, who was
in possession of the certificates of title over the properties as mortgagee
of IDP, be directed to surrender the same to the Register of Deeds for
the registration of the absolute deed of sale in its name. On the other
hand, Ligon filed an opposition contending that she was not served the
copy of the motion; and that the ownership of INK is still in issue since
rescission was sought by IPD. The trial court rendered judgment
ordering Ligon to surrender to INK the owner’s copy of the certificates
of title. On appeal, Ligon argued that the trial court had no jurisdiction
of the case.
Issue:
Whether or not Ligon may be compelled to surrender the title?
Held:
Yes.
Ruling:
Under our land registration law, no voluntary instrument shall be
registered by the Register of Deeds unless the owner’s duplicate
certificate is presented together with such instrument, except in some
cases or upon order of the court for cause shown. In case the person in
possession of the duplicate certificates refuses or fails to surrender the
same to the Register of Deeds so that a voluntary document may be
registered and a new certificate issued.
In this case, the subsisting mortgage lien of petitioner appears in

the certificates of title Nos. 26520 and 26521. Hence, the order of the
trial court directing the surrender of the certificates to the Register of
Deeds in order that the deed of sale in favor of INK can be registered,
cannot in any way prejudice her rights and interests as a mortgagee of
the lots. Any lien annotated on the previous certificates of title which
143
COL 2A
subsists should be incorporated in or carried over to the new transfer

certificates of title.
This is true even in the case of a real estate mortgage because

pursuant to Art. 2126 of the Civil Code it directly and immediately
subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor
may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was
constituted. It is inseparable from the property mortgaged as it is a right
in rem, a lien on the property whoever its owner may be. It subsists
notwithstanding a change in ownership; in short, the personality of the
owner is disregarded.
Thus, all subsequent purchasers must respect the mortgage

whether the transfer to them be with or without the consent of the
mortgagee, for such mortgage until discharged follows the property. It is
clear therefore that the surrender by petitioner of the certificates of title
to the Register of Deeds as ordered by the trial court will not create any
substantial injustice to her.
144
COL 2A
CLOMA v COURT OF APPEALS

Petitions/actions after original registration
Facts:
Spouses Tomas and Victoria Cloma were the owners of two
parcels of land situated in Pasay City, Metro Manila; but the realty taxes
on the subject lots for the years 1983 to 1985 were not paid. The City
Treasurer of Pasay City then sent notice to the spouses Cloma
concerning their tax delinquency. However, despite the second call and
final notice sent by the City Treasurer, the realty taxes arrears remained
unpaid. The City Treasurer then included the subject properties in the
list of delinquent properties scheduled to be sold by public auction, to
which Mariano Nocom was the highest bidder. Spouses Cloma failed to
redeem the properties. As a result of which, Nocom sought for the
cancellation of the TCT in the names of the spouses Cloma and the
issuance of new titles in his name. Spouses Cloma opposed the same,
contending that the auction sale was attended by irregularities; that the
City Treasurer has no authority to conduct the sale; and that the
purchase price for the two properties is grossly inadequate. The trial
court rendered judgment in favor of Nocom and against spouses Cloma.
On appeal, spouses Cloma alleged that the trial court had

jurisdiction to hear the validity/invalidity of the tax sale and the
cancellation of their title to the subject properties.
Issue:
Held:
Yes.
Ruling:
Under Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree, Regional
Trial Courts now have the authority to act not only on applications for
original registration but also over all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions
arising upon such applications or petitions. This abolished the
difference between the general jurisdiction of a regular court and the
limited jurisdiction of a registration court.
Moreover, Spouses Cloma did not assail the jurisdiction of the trial
court when they filed their answer containing a prayer for affirmative
reliefs. It is too late in the day for spouses Cloma to question the
jurisdiction of the trial court. The records show that they did not assail
the jurisdiction of the trial court when they filed their Answer
containing a prayer for affirmative reliefs. Voluntarily submitting to the
145
COL 2A
jurisdiction of the trial court, spouses Cloma freely participated in all the
hearings of the case and adduced their own evidence. It was only after
an adverse judgment that petitioners raised the trial court’s alleged lack
of jurisdiction. Our law and policy do not sanction such a somersault.
146
COL 2A
LEE v REPUBLIC
Reconstitution
Facts:
On 7 September 1993, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu-Lee
filed a petition for reconstitution of title. They claimed that they were
the widows of the deceased Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting, who were
the heirs of Lee Liong; that Lee Liong died intestate in February 1944;
that his two sons executed an extra-judicial settlement of the estate of
Lee Liong, adjudicating to themselves the subject parcel of kand; that
they acquired the same by virtue of succession.
The Register of Deeds issued a certification that a transfer

certificate of title over the property was issued; however, the same was
burned during the war.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General filed a petition for

annulment of reconstitution on the ground that Lee Liong did not
acquire title to the lot because he was a Chinese citizen and was
constitutionally not qualified to own the subject land.
Issue:
Whether or not the certificate of title must be reconstituted?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
It must be mentioned that reconstitution of the original certificate
of title must be based on an owner’s duplicate, secondary evidence
thereof, or other valid sources of the title to be reconstituted. In this
case, reconstitution was based on the plan and technical description
approved by the Land Registration Authority. This renders the order of
reconstitution void for lack of factual support. A judgment with
absolutely nothing to support it is void.
A reconstitution of title is the re-issuance of a new certificate of

title lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. It does not pass
upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title.
Any change in the ownership of the property must be the subject of a
separate suit. Thus, although the widows of Lee are in possession of the
land, a separate proceeding is necessary to thresh out the issue of
ownership of the land.
147
COL 2A
SAN AGUSTIN v MEÑEZ

Reconstitution
Facts:
On 8 July 1992, Maximo Meñ ez Jr. filed a petition for the issuance
of owner’s duplicate copy to replace the lost one. The same was granted
by the trial court after Meñ ez presented his evidence ex-parte.
On 13 October 1992, Jesus San Agustin filed a motion to reopen

reconstitution proceedings in the ground that this was the first time he
became aware of the case; that he was the present occupant of the
property; and that Meñ ez’ failure to send notice to him renders the
proceeding invalid.
Issue:
Whether or not San Agustin is entitled to notice?
Held:
No.
Ruling:
Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in
interest, the court may, after notice and due hearing, direct the issuance
of a new duplicate certificate, which shall contain a memorandum of the
fact that it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in
all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate,
and shall thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes of this decree.
In this case, the respective certificate of title of the properties in

question on file with the Register of Deeds are existing, and it is the
owner’s copy of the certificate of title that was alleged to have been lost
or destroyed. Consequently, it is sufficient that the notice under Section
109 is sent to the Register of Deeds and to those persons who are
known to have, or appear to have, an interest in the property as shown
in the Memorandum of encumbrances at the back of the original or
transfer certificate of title on file in the office of the Register of Deeds.
From a legal standpoint, there are no other interested parties who
should be notified, except those abovementioned since they are the only
ones who may be deemed to have a claim to the property involved. A
person dealing with registered property is not charged with notice of
encumbrances not annotated on the back of the title.
Here, San Agustin does not appear to have an interest in the

property based on the memorandum of encumbrances annotated at the
back of the title. His claim that he is an heir of the original owner of the
lot covered by the disputed lot and the present occupant thereof is not
148
COL 2A
annotated in the said memorandum of encumbrances. Neither was his

claim entered on the certificate of titles in the name of their
original/former owners on file with the Register of Deeds at the time of
the filing or pendency of the case. Clearly, San Agustin is not entitled to
notice.
149

Facts:: Legarda V Saleeby General Characteristics of Torrens System

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Villa, Shally Mae P.

Land Titles and Deeds

After four years, the predecessors of N.M. Saleeby filed a petition

In this case, the predecessors of Saleeby were the first negligent in

The real purpose of the Torrens system of land registration is to

The registration under the Torrens system and the issuance of a

Pending the case filed by Pastor, Herminia executed a purported

Nicanor then admitted being the purchaser of the subject

title accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of

The notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world

The government they filed a complaint for reversion against

LIGON v COURT OF APPEALS

authority to act not only on applications for original registration but

In this case, the summary judgment issued by the trial court

CLOMA v Court of Appeals

On appeal, spouses Cloma alleged that the trial court had

IGNACIO v COURT OF APPEALS

Therefore, whether a particular issue should be resolved by the

The distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the

amendment was aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits and at

In this case, the trial court, although sitting as a land registration

Salvador Laurel objects to the alienation of the Roponggi property

Moreover, the Roponggi property has not become patrimonial

As such, abandonment cannot be inferred from non-use. An

Director of Forestry v Villareal

The Director of Forestry argued that the land in dispute was

It follows then that the land under contention being admittedly a

Furthermore, the mere existence of such a plan would not have

Thereafter, Hilario Rama commenced a complaint for recovery of

Rama countered the same by arguing the Republic is guilty of

Considering that the subject parcel of land is forest land, the

The concept of possessors in good faith given in Art 526 of the

However, the Republic filed an opposition to the application on

crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have

In this case, Naguiat never presented the required certification

Declassification of forest and mineral lands, as the case may be,

Unclassified lands cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or

CHAVEZ v PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY

The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom

Submerged lands and lands reclaimed from the sea by

public domain. There must be a law or presidential proclamation

Although PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the

SECRETARY OF DENR v MAYOR JOSE YAP

On 10 November 10 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82

The Republic opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is

In this case, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative

Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed

FIL-ESTATE MANAGEMENT INC v TRONO

After which, on 11 August 1995, Fil-Estate Management Inc.,

Moreover, Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529 provides, “A certificate of

The Trono’s application for registration of a parcel of land already

CRUZ AND EUROPA v SECRETARY OF DENR

On the other hand, the Chairperson and Commissioners of the

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part

Meanwhile, in 1986, Jambrich met Camilo Borromeo who was

On the other hand, Descallar alleged that she solely and

The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to

Descallar argued that aliens are prohibited from acquiring private