VOL. 189,AUGUST 30, 1990 117 unjustified.

Chua-Qua vs.Clave
PETITION for certiorari to review the resolution of the
G.R. No. 49549. August 30, 1990. *

Presidential Executive Assistant.

EVELYN CHUA-QUA, petitioner, vs. HON. JACOBO
C. CLAVE, in his capacity as Presidential Executive The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Assistant, and TAY TUNG HIGH SCHOOL, INC., William C. Gunitang and Jaime Opinion for
respondents. petitioner.
Certiorari; Labor Laws; Findings of fact must be Laogan Law Offices for private respondent.
supported by substantial evidence.—Considering that there
was no formal hearing conducted, we are constrained to REGALADO, J.:
review the factual conclusions arrived at by public
This would have been just another illegal dismissal case
respondent, and to nullify his decision through the
were it not for the controversial and unique situation
extraordinary writ of certiorari if the same is tainted by
absence or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
that the marriage of herein petitioner, then a classroom
The findings of fact must be supported by substantial
teacher, to her student who was fourteen (14) years her
evidence; otherwise, this Court is not bound thereby.
junior, was considered by the school authorities as
Same; Same; Dismissal; Burden of proving just and
sufficient basis for terminating her services.
valid cause for dismissal of an employee rests on his
Private respondent Tay Tung High School, Inc. is an
employer.—It would seem quite obvious that the avowed
educational institution in Bacolod City. Petitioner had
policy of the school in rearing and educating children is being
been employed therein as a teacher since 1963 and, in
unnecessarily bannered to justify the dismissal of petitioner.
1976 when this dispute arose, was the class adviser in
This policy, however, is not at odds with and should not be
the sixth grade where one Bobby Qua was enrolled.
capitalized on to defeat the security of tenure granted by the
Since it was the policy of the school to extend remedial
Constitution to labor. In termination cases, the burden of
instructions to its students, Bobby Qua was imparted
proving just and valid cause for dismissing an employee rests
on the employer and his failure to do so would result in a
such instructions in school by petitioner. In the course 1

finding that the dismissal is thereof, the couple fell in love and on December 24,
_______________
1975, they got married in a civil ceremony solemnized
* SECOND DIVISION. in Iloilo City by Hon. Cornelio G. Lazaro, City Judge of
Iloilo. Petitioner was then thirty (30) years of age but
2

118
Bobby Qua, being sixteen (16) years old, consent and
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED advice to the marriage was given by his mother, Mrs.
Chua-Qua vs. Clave Concepcion Ong. Their marriage was ratified in
3
accordance with the rites of their religion in a church respondent raised issues on the fact that petitioner
wedding solemnized by Fr. Nick Melicor at Bacolod City stayed alone with Bobby Qua in the classroom after
on January 10, 1976. 4 school hours when everybody had gone home, with one
On February 4, 1976, private respondent filed with door allegedly locked and the other slightly open.
the sub-regional office of the Department of Labor at On September 17, 1976, Executive Labor Arbiter
Bacolod City an Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr., without conducting any formal
_______________ hearing, rendered an “Award” in NLRC Case No. 956 in
favor of private respondent granting the clearance to
1 Rollo, 189.
2 Ibid., 84. terminate the employment of petitioner. It was held
3 Ibid., 14; Annex A, Petition. therein that—
4 Ibid.,id.,: Annex B. id.
“The affidavits x x x although self-serving but were never
119
disputed by the respondent pointed out that before the
VOL. 189, AUGUST 30, 1990 119 marriage of respondent to Bobby Qua, fourteen (14) years her
junior and during her employment with petitioner, an
Chua-Qua vs. Clave amorous relationship existed between them. In the absence
application for clearance to terminate the employment of evidence to the contrary, the undisputed written
of petitioner on the following ground: “For abusive and testimonies of several witnesses convincingly picture the
unethical conduct unbecoming of a dignified school circumstances under which such amorous relationship was
teacher and that her continued employment is inimical manifested within the premises of the school, inside the
to the best interest, and would downgrade the high classroom, and within the sight of some employees. While no
moral values, of the school.” 5 direct evidences have been introduced to show that immoral
Petitioner was placed under suspension without pay acts were committed during
_______________
on March 12, 1976. Executive Labor Arbiter Jose Y.
6

Aguirre, Jr. of the National Labor Relations 5 Ibid.,id., Annex C, id.

Commission, Bacolod City, to whom the case was 6 Ibid., 43, Annex I, id.
7 Annexes N-1 to N-4, Petition.

certified for resolution, required the parties to submit 8 Rollo, 15; Annex F, Petition.

their position papers and supporting evidence.

120
Affidavits were submitted by private respondent to
7

bolster its contention that petitioner, “defying all 120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
standards of decency, recklessly took advantage of her Chua-Qua vs. Clave
position as school teacher, lured a Grade VI boy under these times, it is however enough for a sane and credible
her advisory section and 15 years her junior into an mind to imagine and conclude what transpired and took
place during these times. x x x.”
amorous relation.” More specifically, private
9
8
Petitioner, however, denied having received any copy of
the affidavits referred to. 10
On October 7, 1976, petitioner appealed to the
National Labor Relations Commission claiming denial
of due process for not having been furnished copies of
the aforesaid affidavits relied on by the labor arbiter.
She further contended that there was nothing immoral,
nor was it abusive and unethical conduct unbecoming of
a dignified school teacher, for a teacher to enter into
lawful wedlock with her student. 11
On December 27, 1976, the National Labor Relations
Commission unanimously reversed the Labor Arbiter’s
decision and ordered petitioner’s reinstatement with
backwages, with the following specific findings:
“Affiant Maselliones deposed and said that he saw appellant
and Qua sitting on the student desk inside a classroom after
classes. The depositions of affiants Despi and Chiu are of the
same tenor. No statements whatever were sworn by them
that they were eyewitnesses to immoral or scandalous acts.
xxx
“Even if we have to strain our sense of moral values to
accommodate the conclusion of the Arbiter, we could not
deduce anything immoral or scandalous about a girl and a
boy talking inside a room after classes with lights on and
with the door open.
xxx
“Petitioner-appellee naively insisted that the clearance
application was precipitated by immoral acts which did not
lend dignity to the position of appellant. Aside from such
gratuitous assertions of immoral acts or conduct by herein
appellant, no evidence to support such claims was introduced
by petitioner-appellee. We reviewed the sequence of events
from the beginning of the relationship between appellant
Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua up to the date of the filing of
the present application for clearance in search of evidence
that could
_______________
9 Rollo, 60-61.
10 Ibid., 74.
11 Ibid., 73-75.
121
VOL. 189, AUGUST 30, 1990 121
Chua-Qua vs. Clave
have proved detrimental to the image and dignity of the
school but none has come to our attention. x x x.”
12
The case was elevated by private respondent to the
Minister of Labor who, on March 30, 1977, reversed the
decision of the National Labor Relations Commission.
The petitioner was, however, awarded six (6) months
salary as financial assistance. 13
On May 20, 1977, petitioner appealed the said
decision to the Office of the President of the
Philippines. After the corresponding exchanges, on
14
September 1, 1978 said office, through Presidential
Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave, rendered its
decision reversing the appealed decision. Private
respondent was ordered to reinstate petitioner to her
former position without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and with full back wages from the time
she was not allowed to work until the date of her actual
reinstatement. 15
Having run the gamut of three prior adjudications of
the case with alternating reversals, one would think
that this decision of public respondent wrote finis to
petitioner’s calvary. However, in a resolution dated
December 6, 1978, public respondent, acting on a considered by them as not healthy for a school campus,
motion for reconsideration of16 herein private believing that a school teacher should at all times act with
respondent and despite opposition utmost circumspection and conduct herself beyond reproach
thereto, reconsidered and modified the aforesaid
17
and above suspicion;”19

decision, this time giving due course to the application In this petition for certiorari, petitioner relies on the
of Tay Tung High School, Inc. to terminate the services following grounds for the reversal of the aforesaid
of petitioner as classroom teacher but giving her resolution of public respondent, viz.:
separation pay equivalent to her six (6) months salary. 18

In thus reconsidering his earlier decision, public 1. 1.The dismissal or termination of

respondent reasoned out in his manifestation/comment petitioner’s employment, despite Tay
filed on August 14, 1979 in this Court in the present Tung’s claim to the contrary, was actually
case: based on her marriage with her pupil and
_______________
is, therefore, illegal.
12 Ibid., 85-87. 2. 2.Petitioner’s right to due process under
13 Ibid., 111-114. the Constitution was violated when the
14 Ibid., 115-122.
hearsay affidavits of Laddy Maselliones,
15 Ibid., 137.

16 Ibid., 138-142.
Eleuterio Despi, Pina D. Chiu, and Ong
17 Ibid., 143-144. Lee Bing, were admitted and considered
18 Ibid., 146. in evidence without presenting the
122
affiants as witnesses and affording the
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED petitioner the right to confront and cross-
examine them.
Chua-Qua vs. Clave
3. 3.No sufficient proofs were adduced to
“That this Office did not limit itself to the legal issues
involved in the case, but went further to view the matter show that petitioner committed serious
from the standpoint of policy which involves the delicate task misconduct or breached the trust reposed
of rearing and educating of children whose interest must be on her by her employer or committed any
held paramount in the school community, and on this basis, of the other grounds enumerated in
this Office deemed it wise to uphold the judgment and action Article 283 (Now Article 282) of the Labor
of the school authorities in terminating the services of a Code which will justify the termination of
teacher whose actuations and behavior, in the belief of the her employment. 20

school authorities, had spawned ugly rumors that had cast

serious doubts on her integrity, a situation which was 4. VOL. 190, OCTOBER 18, 1990 815
 Orcino vs. Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 92869. October 18, 1990. * and is contradicted by evidence on record [Salazar v.
ZENAIDA ORCINO, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION and RUFINA B. MOTI, respondents.
Courts; Appeals; The rule that factual findings of the
Court of Appeals are given a certain measure of finality, is not
an absolute rule.—As a rule, the Court respects the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies
like the CSC, giving them a certain measure of finality.
However, the rule is not without clearly
________________
5 RAB 10-02-00114-88, entitled Edgardo N. Maliza vs. Continental are contrary to the evidence on record or the factual
Arrastre and Stevedoring Co., Inc.
* EN BANC.
816
816 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED National Labor Relations Commission, 128 SCRA 180
Orcino vs. Civil Service Commission
defined exceptions. Findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals (in this case, the Civil Service Commission) are not
conclusive and may be set aside when: x x x xxx xxx x x x (1)
the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the Court
of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings
are contrary to the admission of both appellant and appellees
[Roque v. Buan, 21 SCRA 648 {1967}]; (6) the findings of facts
of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(7) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (8) the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents [Garcia v.
CA, 33 SCRA 622 {1970}]; and (9) when the finding of fact of
the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence
Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 243 {1970}]." (Tolentino v. De Jesus, 56
SCRA 167, 172 [1974])
Same; Same; Same; Quasi-Judicial Agencies; Factual
findings of a quasi-judicial institution which are not
supported by substantial and credible evidence do not bind
the Supreme Court.—In Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd.
Employees Association-Natu v. Insular Life Assurance Co.
Ltd. (76 SCRA 50 [1977]), we ruled that factual findings of a
quasi-judicial institution which are not supported by
substantial and credible evidence do not bind this Court, e.g.
the findings and conclusions have no basis in the records or
determinations of an appellate body are contrary to those of
the initial fact-finding agency. (See also San Miguel Corp, v.
[1984]; Cuales v. National Labor Relations Commission, 121
SCRA 812 [1983]; Chong Guan Trading v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 172 SCRA 831 [1989]; Villamor v.
Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 574 [1988]; Ongsiako v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 152 SCRA 627 [1987]; Metro
Port Service, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 365 [1984];
and Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Metro Port Service,
Inc., G.R. No. 83613, February 21,1990)
Labor
Relations; Dismissal; Reinstatement; Teachers; Where
relations between the employee and his employer are so
strained or where the employee would no longer be useful
because the employer has lost trust and confidence in him, the
Court will not order reinstatement, even if the employee was
eventually cleared of the charges.—And even assuming that
Ms. Moti was not at fault, it is not what pleases her but
817
VOL. 190, OCTOBER 18, 1990 817
 Orcino vs. Civil Service Commission
the best interests of the service which form the primary
criterion. In labor cases where relations between an
employee and his employer are so strained or where an
employee would no longer be useful because his employer has
lost trust and confidence in him, this Court has ordered full
backwages plus separation pay in lieu of reinstatement even
where the employee was eventually cleared of the charges.
Paramount are the continued health and best interests of the
company and all its other employees. (Bautista v. Inciong,
158 SCRA 665 [1988]; Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v.
Ople, 152 SCRA 219 [1987]; Quezon Electric Cooperative v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 172 SCRA 88 [1989];
Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corp. v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 174 SCRA 550
[1989]; Citytrust Finance Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 157 SCRA 87 [1988]).
PETITION to review the resolutions of the Civil
Service Commission.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Gonzales, Batiller, Bilog & Associates for
petitioner.
Thelma S. Panganiban-Gaminde, Rogelio C.
Limare and
Cresencia A. Violante-Pedrosa for Civil Service
Commission.
Fernando T. Collantes for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The petitioner questions the resolutions of the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) which reversed the findings
of the CSC Merit Systems Board and the Department of
Education, Culture, and Sports on the validity of the
private respondent's reassignment. She contends that if
the CSC resolutions are sustained, it would result in the
"triumph of discourtesy and insubordination over that
of order and efficiency in the performance of official
duty." (Rollo, p. 2)
On the other hand, the private respondent contends
that the declaration of excess teacher in the Malvar
Elementary School, her transfer by the Division
Superintendent of City Schools to another school, and
other acts of harassment constitute removal not for
cause but because of personal ill-motives of the
petitioner.
The comments filed by the private respondent and
the Civil Service Commission are treated as answers
and the petition is
818
818 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Orcino vs. Civil Service Commission
decided accordingly. Significantly, the Solicitor General
agrees with the petitioner and recommends that the
CSC resolutions be set aside.
Rufina B. Moti was appointed "National (City)
Elementary Grades Teacher" in the Division of City
Schools, Manila on September 1, 1970. Her status was
"Regular (Permanent) Reappointment." The position to
be filled was "Item No. 15-702, RA 4092 (Intermediate)."
The controversy which led to this case arose at the
beginning of school year 1984-1985 when the student
population of Malvar Elementary School significantly
decreased. Classes in the intermediate level were
reduced from eleven to ten resulting in an overall excess
of one teacher. There was, however, a vacancy in Grade
IV in the primary level.
Following the "Guidelines Governing Excess
Teachers", Circular No. 10, Series of 1982 of the
Division of City Schools, the 58 teachers of Malvar
Elementary School were evaluated. The performance
rating showed that Rufina B. Moti ranked No. 55 with
Rebecca Estrella, Elena Morelos, and Rosario Alarcon
ranking Nos. 56,57, and 58 respectively. When length of
service and relative fitness were added to performance
ratings, Rufina B. Moti ranked last. She was, therefore,
declared as excess teacher. When efforts to find an
acceptable position in the intermediate grades were
unsuccessful, she was assigned to the Grade IV class.
Respondent Moti refused to accept the new
assignment and insisted on any class provided it was in
the intermediate grades. The refusal prompted
petitioner Zenaida Orcino, principal of the school, to
recommend that Ms. Moti be reassigned to another
school. The then Superintendent Josefina Navarro
assigned the respondent first to Lakandula Elementary
School and later, to Moises Salvador Elementary
School.
Instead of complying with the order of the Division
Superintendent, respondent Moti filed a protest with
the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS).
The MECS sustained the Superintendent's order and
ruled that Ms. Moti's s transfer to Moises Salvador
Elementary School was justified by the facts and the
law. The respondent decided to go to the Civil Service
Commission.
The CSC Merit Systems Board ruled that the
reassignment of
819
VOL. 190, OCTOBER 18, 1990 819
Orcino vs. Civil Service Commission
Ms. Moti to another school was in order and dismissed
her complaint. On appeal to the Commission itself, the
CSC set aside the orders of the Merit Systems Board
and ordered Ms. Moti restored to her former position of
Grade VI classroom teacher. Disciplinary action against
Orcino was also ordered. Hence, this petition.
The petitioner raises the following arguments in her
petition:
I
THE HONORABLE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
GRAVELY ERRED IN INTRODUCING MATTERS BELIED
BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
II
THE COMMISSION A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
ORDERING THAT 'APPROPRIATE DISCIPLINARY
ACTION' BE METED ON PETITIONER ZENAIDA
ORCINO WHO ACTED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HER
AUTHORITY AND SUSTAINED BY HER SUPERIORS.
III
THE COMMISSION A QUO REVERSIBLY ERRED IN
DEPRIVING PETITIONER ZENAIDA ORCINO THE
OPPORTUNITY TO REBUT THE CHARGES OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT IN THE LATTER'S APPEAL WITH THE
COMMISSION.
IV
THE COMMISSION A QUO ERRED IN REINSTATING
RUFINA MOTI DESPITE HER PROVEN ACTS OF
INSUBORDINATION AND ADAMANCE CLEARLY
INIMICAL TO THE SERVICE. (Petition, pp. 5-6)
As a rule, the Court respects the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies like the
CSC, giving them a certain measure of finality.
However, the rule is not without clearly defined
exceptions. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals (in
this case, the Civil Service Commission) are not
conclusive and may be set aside when:
820
820 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Orcino vs. Civil Service Commission
xxx xxx xxx
x x x (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference made
is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the
Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its
findings are contrary to the admission of both appellant and
appellees [Roque v. Buan, 21 SCRA 648 {1967}]; (6) the
findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those
of the trial court; (7) said findings of facts are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(8) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents [Garcia v. CA, 33 SCRA 622 {1970}]; and (9)
when the finding of fact of the Court' of Appeals is premised
on the absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on
record [Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 243 {1970}]."
(Tolentino v. De Jesus, 56 SCRA 167, 172 [1974])
In Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd. Employees
Association-Natu v. Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd. (76
SCRA 50 [1977]), we ruled that factual findings of a
quasi-judicial institution which are not supported by
substantial and credible evidence do not bind this
Court, e.g. the findings and conclusions have no basis in
the records or are contrary to the evidence on record or
the factual determinations of an appellate body are
contrary to those of the initial fact-finding agency. (See
also San Miguel Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 128 SCRA 180 [1984]; Cuales v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 121 SCRA
812 [1983]; Chong Guan Trading v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 172 SCRA 831 [1989]; Villamor
v. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 574 [1988]; Ongsiako v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 152 SCRA
627 [1987]; Metro Port Service, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 131 SCRA 365 [1984]; and Fireman's Fund
Insurance Co. v. Metro Port Service, Inc., G.R. No.
83613, February 21, 1990)
In this particular case, both the Regional Director
and the Minister of the MECS and CSC's own Merit
System's Board sustained the recommendations made
by the petitioner and upheld the actions of the Division
Superintendent of City Schools. We have examined the
records carefully and agree with the Solicitor General
that the questioned CSC resolutions are not supported
by the evidence on record.
 There can be no question that the decreased
enrollment in the Malvar Elementary School led to a
reduction of classes. Faced with an excess of teachers it
was the duty of the petitioner as school principal to
recommend a solution to the problem.
There is no factual basis for the CSC conclusion that
the reassignment of respondent Moti to another class or
another school violated her security of tenure and the
statutory restriction that any reassignment should not
involve a reduction in rank, status or salary.
A reassignment from Grade VI to Grade IV involves
no reduction in rank, status, or salary. There is no
showing in the records that there is less honor in
teaching Grades I to IV than in teaching Grades V to
VI. It is erroneous for the CSC to even intimate that an
intermediate teacher is demoted when asked to teach a
lower grade. The best teachers should welcome
assignments to teach Grade One as this is where young
minds need the best guidance and inspiration from om
talented and dedicated mentors. In this case, the
reassignment was not only justified but also necessary.
As to whether the transfer from one school to another
was disciplinary, the records show that respondent Moti
was appointed "National (City) Elementary Grades
Teacher" in the Division of City Schools, Manila. (Annex
1, Petition; Rollo, p. 88) The Solicitor General correctly
observes that her appointment is without specific
station and does not specify any assignment as Grade
VI teacher. As Elementary Grades Teacher, she could
be assigned to any public elementary school in Manila
and ordered to teach any Grade or subject within her
competence.
The entries in the lower half of her appointment
paper, alongside and below the signature of the
appointing authority are merely informative, specifying
where she would be assigned and stating some personal
data. The Solicitor General states that "these words do
not constitute the appointment." (Manifestation in Lieu
of Comment, p. 16) Among them are—Position to be
filled: Item No. 15-702, Page No. 303, RA 4092
(Intermediate); Authorized Salary Range 35,
Authorized Salary Rate 3264 and such entries as title,
place, and date of teacher's examination, maiden name,
performance rating, highest educational attainment,
last station, who recommended her, etc. (Rollo, p.88)
The respondent cannot rely on her initial assignment
to fill a specific vacancy in the Intermediate Grades in
a particular school as giving her a vested right to that
item. She can be assigned to any grade anywhere in the
City of Manila in the best interests of the service.
Neither can the alleged length of experience of the
respondent strengthen her case. The CSC finding that
Ms. Moti taught Grade VI for 13 years is pointed out by
the Solicitor General as contradicted by the evidence. It
was only in 1983-1984 or the year before her questioned
transfer that she was assigned to Grade VI-2.
(Manifestation in Lieu of Comment, p. 14)
The CSC disregarded the record before it—the
revised check list to determine the allotment of teachers
based on number of classes, the maximum teaching
loads in specific subject areas per teacher, the number
of subject preparations, and the table on how the
number of classroom and special teachers for a certain
number of pupils and grades is determined. The records
show that all relevant factors were considered when
MECS and the Merit Systems Board reviewed the
Superintendent's action and sustained it. (See Original
Records, pp. 48-65)
There are other findings of the CSC which are
contrary to the records.
The CSC stated that there could have been no
reduction of intermediate classes from eleven (11) to ten
(10) because in 1984-1985, there were still the same five
sections in Grade VI. This is non-sequitur.
"Intermediate" consists of Grades V and VI, not Grade
VI alone. Moreover, teachers in those grades teach
according to subject areas instead of teaching all
subjects in one class of one grade. This matter was
thoroughly studied by the Division Superintendent and
she was not misled on the number of classes and
teachers in the entire school before she issued the
appointments and transfer orders. There is likewise
nothing arbitrary in the selection of the respondent as
"excess" teacher. She ranked 58th out of 58 teachers
evaluated for performance, length of service, and
relative fitness.
The CSC found something wrong in the transfer of
Merly Evangelista to Malvar Elementary School and
the reassignment of a provisional substitute teacher as
elementary grade teacher. It also questioned why
respondent Moti was reassigned to Grade IV and then
transferred to two other schools in June and July, 1984.
The records show that when Ms. Moti became an
excess teacher and pending her assignment to Grade IV,
she was asked to do office work, library work, and other
assignments. There is nothing wrong in this. She could
not be twiddling her thumbs while being paid her usual
salaries. She was given her choice of a morning Grade
IV class, with three other teachers yielding to her.
When she refused, another teacher was assigned to the
morning class. When she also turned down the
remaining afternoon class, another teacher was
appointed. Precisely, the reassignments and the
appointments subject of her complaints were prompted
by the changes in school population and her stubborn
refusal to obey lawful orders. A cooperative attitude and
a certain degree of flexibility are required of all who
profess to be educators.
The CSC found personal motives, bias, and injustice
behind the petitioner's acts. That there is bad blood
between the petitioner and the private respondent is
apparent from the records. On June 27, 1984 or one day
before the petitioner recommended to Superintendent
Navarro that Ms. Moti be declared an "excess teacher",
the latter filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan
alleging among others that Ms. Orcino was collecting
P1.00 each from teachers who failed to sign the city
share payrolls and P10.00 each for the purchase of an
image of the Sto Niño for the school premises. This was,
however, immediately denied by some teachers who
claimed that there were contributions for whoever was
following up their payrolls at City Hall and for the Sto.
Niño, but these were purely voluntary on the teachers'
initiative and Ms. Orcino had nothing to do with them.
The complaint was dismissed by the Tanodbayan on
March 20, 1985 (Original Records, pp. 4-9; pp. 93-96)
On the other hand, Ms. Orcino filed also on June 28,
1984, a complaint with the Superintendent of City
Schools against Ms. Moti charging her with non-
cooperation in specified school activities, reading
newspapers during rehearsals for gradu-ation exercises
even with the Principal and Assistant Principal around,
talking and laughing during baccalaureate mass to the
annoyance of the priest, refusal to submit lesson plan
and record book and to sit with the evaluators of the
performance ratings and other acts of defiance of
specified school regulations. The charges were found
valid and Director Modesta G. Boquiren of the MECS
National Capital Region fined Ms. Moti the equivalent
of five (5) days salary. (Original Records, pp. 38-47)
The private respondent charged Ms. Orcino with
coercing and embarrassing her and telling her to stop
attending meetings of teacher associations, cease
making representations for better professional and
economic benefits of teachers, avoid joining delegations
to Malacañang for the upgrading of teachers' benefits,
etc.
Significantly, in all these charges and
countercharges, the petitioner was sustained by the
Division Superintendent, Regional Director,
Department Head, and CSC Merit Systems Board. Only
the CSC arrived at different findings without, as earlier
stated, any factual basis on record for its conclusions.
At any rate, even assuming that the CSC is correct
and that its findings are not based on surmises and
presumptions, there is no explanation why the
petitioner, a purely recommendatory authority should
be the one penalized and disciplined while the
Superintendent of City Schools who ordered the
transfer and the higher MECS authorities who did not
reverse it, remain free of blame. If there was any abuse
of authority or arbitrariness, the Division
Superintendent of City Schools who makes all the
appointments, transfers, and other personnel action
should have been charged and not the Principal. The
Superintendent could have rejected the
recommendation to transfer Ms. Moti and ordered her
retention in Malvar Elementary School and the
petitioner would have been bound to obey.
As earlier stated, an appointment as "Elementary
Grades Teacher" in Manila means that the teacher can
be assigned to any school in Manila. The choice of grade,
subject area, primary or intermediate level, school, and
district is pure policy and the determination as to the
capabilities of the teacher and the assignment where
she would be most useful are, in the absence of
arbitrariness or whimsicality, best left to the
administrators concerned. In Brillantes v. Guevarra (27
SCRA 138 [1969]) this Court held that an excellent
principal in a model and centrally located school may be
transferred to a struggling school in a less attractive
community to improve standards and to "spur the
improvement of small schools" (at p. 149). In other
words, the interest of the service may dictate that the
worst school should get the best principal. The same
principle applies to classroom teachers. No one has the
vested right to balk at difficult assignments ordered for
the best interests of the service. There would be nothing
disciplinary in this and other transfers.
Because of the bad blood existing between Ms. Moti
and Ms. Orcino, the Division Superintendent of Schools
had to choose between transferring one or the other.
Since Ms. Moti was clearly at fault, Superintendent
Navarro exercised her sound discretion in reassigning
the private respondent to another school. We see no
error, much less grave abuse of discretion in her choice.
Our ruling in Sta. Maria v. Lopez (31 SCRA 637, 652-
654 [1970]) on transfers that are valid and which do not
amount to removal squarely applies:
xxx xxx xxx
"4. Concededly transfers there are which do not amount
to removal. Some such transfers can be effected without the
need for charges being preferred, without trial or hearing,
and even without the consent of the employee.
"The clue to such transfers may be found in the 'nature of
the appointment.' Where the appointment does not indicate
a specific station, an employee may be transferred or
reassigned provided the transfer affects no substantial
change in title, rank and salary. Thus, one who is appointed
'principal in the Bureau of Public Schools' and is designated
to head a pilot school may be transferred to the post of
principal of another school.
"And the rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as
anathema to security of tenure applies only to an officer who
is appointed—not merely assigned—to a particular station.
Such a rule does not prescribe a transfer carried out under a
specific statute that empowers the head of an agency to
periodically reassign the employees and officers in order to
improve the service of the agency. The use of approved
techniques or methods in personnel management to harness
the abilities of employees to promote optimum public service
cannot be objected to. Neither does illegality attach to the
transfer or reassignment of an officer pending the
determination of an administrative charge against him, or to
the transfer of an employee from his assigned station to the
main office, effected in good faith and in the interest of the
service pursuant to Section 32 of the Civil Service Act." And
even assuming that Ms. Moti was not at fault, it is not
what pleases her but the best interests of the service
which form the primary criterion. In labor cases where
relations between an employee and his employer are so
strained or where an employee would no longer be
useful because his employer has lost trust and
confidence in him, this Court has ordered full
backwages plus separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement even where the employee was eventually
cleared of the charges. Paramount are the continued
health and best interests of the company and all its
other employees. (Bautista v. Inciong, 158 SCRA
665 [1988]; Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v.
Ople, 152 SCRA 219 [1987]; Quezon Electric
Cooperative v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 172 SCRA 88 [1989]; Philippine
Associated Smelting and Refining Corp. v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 174 SCRA 550 [1989];
and Citytrust Finance Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 157 SCRA 87 [1988]).
The CSC should adopt the reasons behind the above
policy when considering the setting aside of
reassignment or transfer orders. Where the discipline
and morale of a teaching force, the peace and quiet
essential to the learning process, the welfare of the
student body, and the educational standards of a school
require that unseemly wranglings and squabbles
should be abated, remedial acts such as those
questioned in this case should be sustained.
It is not the welfare of the parties alone which is
considered when disciplinary action involving
classroom teachers or school principals is taken. The
school children, their parents, other teachers, the
community and nation are all affected by what goes on
in a school. Their interlocking interests dictate that
prudence and caution should be exercised when
nullifying remedial transfers and other corrective
actions. Except when there is strong showing of willful
and arbitrary conduct, the school administrators
deserve all the assistance they can get in maintaining
discipline in their schools and solving the problems of
education. There is no showing of arbitrary or
illmotivated conduct in this case. The resolutions of the
respondent CSC are, therefore, tainted by grave abuse
of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
The questioned RESOLUTIONS of the Civil Service
Commission are SET ASIDE. The private respondent's
COMPLAINT is DISMISSED. The Temporary
Restraining Order dated August 7, 1990 is made
PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-
Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bi
din, Sarmiento, Cortés, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Petition granted. Resolutions set aside.
Note.—Findings of fact of Intermediate Appellate
Court, when based on substantial evidence, are
respected. (Bermudez vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 143 SCRA 351.)
termination cases, the burden of proving just and
valid cause for dismissing an employee rests on the
employer and his failure to do so would result in a
finding that the dismissal is unjustified.
The charge against petitioner not having been
substantiated, we declare her dismissal as unwarranted
and illegal. It being apparent, however, that the
relationship between petitioner and private respondent
has been inevitably and severely strained, we believe
that it would neither be to the interest of the parties nor
would any prudent purpose be served by ordering her
reinstatement.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
GRANTED and the resolution of public respondent,
dated December 6, 1978 is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Private respondent Tay Tung High School, Inc.
is hereby ORDERED to pay petitioner backwages
equivalent to three (3) years, without any deduction or
qualification, and separation pay in the amount of one
(1) month for every year of service.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-
Herrera (Chairman), Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., On leave.
Petition granted. Resolution annulled and set aside
Note—Rule that the decisions of voluntary
arbitrators based on their findings of fact and
application of the law are entitled to great respect.
(Phil. Geothermal Inc. vs. Noriel, 164 SCRA 532.)