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Mental mathematics, emergence of strategies, and the enactivist theory of

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DOI: 10.1007/s10649-013-9480-8

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Proulx, J. (2013). Mental mathematics, emergence of strategies, and the enactivist theory of
cognition. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 84(3), 309-328.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10649-013-9480-8

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Mental mathematics, emergence of strategies, and the enactivist theory of cognition

Mental calculations represent a brilliant and new aspect of our teaching.

The teacher and even the students constantly invent new ways of running without failing.
This sort of exercise is sane for the spirit. (Alain, 1932, p. 81, my translation)

Introduction
In his 2002 Educational Studies in Mathematics article, John Threlfall boldly suggests
considering strategy development in mental mathematics along a different angle, that is, one
about emergence. He criticizes the usual ways of perceiving or analyzing strategy
development/production in mental mathematics situations, that is, in terms of flexibility and
choice of strategies, where students would “choose” from an existing group of possible strategies
for solving a problem. He insists on the emergence of strategies and their contingency in function
of the solver (i.e. what he knows, understands, prefers, has experienced before with these
problems, has confidence with, makes sense of the solving context, etc.) and the importance of
considering these aspects when the solver “meets” a task. He offers to conceive strategies
development as an emergent phenomenon, simultaneously taking into account the solver and the
task as mutually influential on the strategy engaged with.
In this article, I explore and push further Threlfall’s suggestion of looking at strategies in
terms of an emergent phenomenon. To do so, I first outline Threlfall’s argument for clarifying the
underlying ideas that he puts forth. I then offer a theoretical response to his proposition by
discussing aspects of the enactivist theory of cognition in order to ground theoretically the
possibility of looking at strategy processes in mental mathematics through issues of emergence.
After developing the theoretical perspective to support a view of mental mathematics strategies as
an emergent phenomenon, I illustrate what an analysis in these terms might mean by looking at
data taken from two mental mathematics projects, one on mental algebraic equation solving and
another on mental operations on functions.
This article is, therefore, partly theoretical, offering a grounding framework for thinking about
strategy development in a mental mathematics context, and partly practical, using data from two
empirical research projects to make sense and offer illustrations of the theoretical proposition.
The discussion is framed around an intention to theorize and develop greater understandings of

strategy development processes in mental mathematics contexts, for pushing further and
grounding this idea of emergence of strategies, from a theoretical and practical point of view.

Threlfall’s argument
Threlfall is clear from the start in his abstract: “In this article it is argued that strategy choice is a
misleading characterization of efficient mental calculations.” (p. 29). He therefore attempts to
question, critique and offer an alternative view to the idea of solvers choosing strategies for
solving a mental mathematics problem. At the same time, because “choice” is for him a
misleading avenue, developing students’ flexibility in choosing strategies –that is, their being
able to choose flexibly and wisely among various methods– is also an issue being questioned and
critiqued, as is the idea of teaching students sets of strategies and how to choose. (However, in
this article I do not tackle teaching issues, but restrict myself to issues of solvers’ strategies).1
If choice is a possibility then, Threlfall argues, it must be possible to offer characterizations
and general types of strategies through a classification system. By outlining and comparing
numerous mental strategy classifications offered in the literature by various authors and research
teams (from the work of Carpenter, Fuson, Heuvel-Panhuizen, Klein & Beishuizen, Thompson,
Yackel, QCA2), Threlfall shows how these do not overlap, how none of these classifications takes
into account other strategies or has room for them, or how some strategies do not cohere well in
the varied classifications.
One reaction to this (unsuccessful) comparison might be to critique the researchers’
classifications and say that more careful attention to and analyses of strategies would have
produced more exhaustive or fine-grained categories that take “everything” into account. Wisely,
Threlfall does not opt for this route and instead questions the idea of classifying in itself, arguing
that it is somehow an illusory process. One argument is that in mental mathematics diversity is
commonplace. Speaking of data he gathered in his own project, he asserts:
Although the data drawn on to make this list arose in a particular project, it is important to
note that they are not special data, and that diversity of this kind is commonplace. Similar
data can be collected at any time in any school. Ask a group of children to calculate a
problem mentally, and say how they did it, and it is very likely that different approaches

1
In a subsequent article in ZDM, Threlfall (2009) continues the discussion of some of these aspects. When relevant, I
refer to some of these additional arguments, often in footnotes.
2
In his 2009 paper, Threlfall extends this comparison to include Torbeyns’ classification.

will be manifested. (p. 33)

This is at the grass roots of Threlfall’s argument for the futility of classification and choice of
strategies, for no mapping of classifications of strategies produced by students appears
satisfactory. This said, even if some authors, as Threlfall highlights, recognize the variety in
strategies as too great to contain them in categories and that these would need to be broadened
enough to encompass them all, he insists that not even broad categories would successfully
account for the diversity in strategies from one author to another. Categories or classifications
somehow become useful fictions, that can even be seen to serve a questionable purpose,
especially when it comes to teaching these strategies. Thus, “This begins to suggest that more
may be involved in flexible mental calculation than the choice of an identifiable general strategy.”
(p. 35).
For Threlfall, focusing on categorizations does not offer an adequate picture of the
phenomenon of strategy processes in mental mathematics contexts; and, he insists, this can even
be detrimental to students’ learning, as teachers might focus on a particular classification of
strategies and avoid or focus on specific approaches to problems3. In that sense, Threlfall
explains that strategies vary as much as problems do. Decisions about the “right choice” or the
“good method” to choose “cannot be arrived at in advance of actually moving forward into
calculating the problem” (p. 38). This leads Threlfall to address an issue at the core of his
alternative view of strategy processes, that is, the interaction between the problem and the solver.
As Heirdsfield and Cooper (2004) illustrate, a number of researchers pointed out that it is the
problem and its attributes (numbers, didactic variables, structure of the problem, etc.) that
influence the nature of the strategies opted for by solvers. However, at the same time, other
researchers have focused on solvers’ attributes (knowledge, preference, etc.) as a major influence
in solving strategies. Threlfall, sometimes implicitly and at other times explicitly in his discourse,
highlights the fact that both play an important role in strategy processes when solving mental
mathematics problems. Building on Siegler (1996), who also questions the idea of
conscious/mindful strategy choice for solving problems, Threlfall explains that the problem and

3
As well, even if Threlfall does not discuss this issue, it could be argued that at the level of research itself the idea of
offering classifications and categories is not a fruitful route for obtaining adequate “information” and understandings
about students’ strategy processes in mental mathematics contexts. Threlfall’s view displaces the focus, as I have
argued elsewhere (Proulx, 2012a,b), away from knowing categories of solving and more toward understanding the
nature of the mathematical activity students are engaging with in mental mathematics contexts, for characterizing the
kind of mathematics they generate in these.

its characteristics can orient ways of solving, as “some problems do seem to suit some ‘strategies’
more than others” (p. 39), but that the solver’s knowledge and preferences for solving are as
important. One simple example that he gives is for calculating 24 x 12: a child who knows his 12-
times tables could calculate this by doubling the answer for 12 x 12, for example, but another,
who does not know these tables, would probably would be wiser to seek another method. So
obviously, when one does not know, it is difficult to expect him to display this knowledge. Also,
one displays strategies that are related/relevant to the problem and thus are guided by this
problem in the solving process.
In continuing to explore this junction of solver and problem as influencing the strategy
process, Threlfall points out the notion that solvers identify/notice the characteristics of the
problem at hand.
When faced with a fresh problem, the child or adult who follows different solution paths
depending on the numbers does not do so by thinking about what the alternatives are and
trying to decide which one to do. Rather, he or she thinks about the numbers in the
problem, noticing their characteristics and what numbers they are close to, and considering
possibilities for partitioning or rounding them. (p. 41)
In this, it is the solver who points to those characteristics, thus taking into consideration (a) the
capacity of the solver to “see” these characteristics (i.e. influence of the solver) and (b) the
problem itself, as these characteristics are not taken arbitrary but are related to the problem (i.e.
influence of the problem). It is thus a match between the noticed elements and the
capacities/knowledge of the solver: “What the individual notices about the numbers in the
problem leads on to what is done” (p. 41). The strategy can vary depending on what is and can be
observed/noticed by the solver. Then, Threlfall goes on to suggest that strategies are emergent,
generated in the context of solving:
In this way, flexible mental calculation can be seen as an individual and personal reaction
with knowledge, manifested in the subjective sense of what is noticed about the specific
problem. As a result of this interaction between noticing and knowledge, each solution
‘method’ is in a sense unique to that case, and is invented in the context of the particular
calculation – although clearly influenced by experience. […] The ‘strategy’ (in the holistic
sense of the entire solution path) is not decided, it emerges. (p. 42)

These strategies are seen to some extent as unique, new, generated/produced in the act of
solving. This last provocative idea and his earlier argument that leads to it represent the
conceptualization that he proposes about strategy processes in mental mathematics contexts. He
then continues to explain how this can be worked on in teaching, principally through the idea of
paying attention not to the “type” of strategy engaged in, but mainly to the meaning that it can
offer to the concepts worked on (number sense, operations, etc., what he calls “possibilities for
numbers”).
This conceptualization, this proposition about strategy processes in mental mathematics
contexts, has significant worth, and I continue exploring it deeper in this article. In the following
section, I ground it within a theoretical framework that has at its core these elements of
emergence and co-influence of problem and solver, that is, the enactivist theory of cognition.

Grounding ideas of emergence in the enactivist theory of cognition

Threlfall’s proposition, which offers a new conceptualization for strategy development in mental
mathematics, has not however been integrated into an encompassing theoretical framework.
Grounding these ideas in a strong theoretical framework appears essential for structuring and
elaborating on this conceptualization by developing its foundation and meaning, and for leading
to a better understanding of its underpinning dynamic and implications for mental mathematics
practices. Threlfall’s conceptualization about the contingency of strategies that emerge where
various factors meet and where the solver plays an important role, aligns strongly with various
aspects of the enactivist theory of cognition (from the work, e.g, of Maturana, 1987, 1988;
Maturana & Varela, 1992; Varela, 1996, 1999; Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991), which has
been concerned in mathematics education research with issues of emergence, adaptation and
contingency of learners’ mathematical activity (see also Maheux, Proulx & Simmt, 2012). It can
thus offer a means of grounding theoretically this conceptualization about students’ strategy
development in mental mathematics.
Enactivism is an encompassing term given to a theory of cognition that views human
knowledge and meaning-making as processes understood and theorized from a biological and
evolutionary standpoint. By adopting a biological point of view on knowing, enactivism
considers the organism as interacting with/in an environment. A biological perspective has often

been adopted as a metaphor for thinking about knowledge and learning4, for example with ideas
of adaptation and evolution. However, for Maturana and Varela, knowing is a biological
phenomenon. Thus, through this lens, a student is considered as an organism that evolves with/in
its environment in an adapted fashion: his strategies or mathematical solutions are not necessarily
optimal, but are functional (what Reid, 1996, and Zack & Reid, 2003, 2004, call “good-enough”),
with/in a context, a problem, that is itself evolving under the influence of the solver. In this sense,
mathematical strategies are not considered as existing a priori (or a posteriori) of the moment
when they appear: they are the real-time product of interaction, of the meeting, of the solver and
his environment, directly and continually influenced by both. At the core of this theorization, and
grounded in Darwin’s (1867) theory of evolution, are concepts of structural coupling and
structural determinism.

Structural coupling and structural determinism

To make sense of the process of evolution and survival of organisms, Darwin uses the concept of
“fitting.” For an organism to survive, it must continually adapt to its environment, to fit within it.
Otherwise, it would perish. In a sense, Darwin offers a pejorative or negative view of the survival
of organisms: organisms that survive simply do not die—and continue to adapt. The idea of
fitting escapes notions of absolutism and of the best or fittest organism. The idea is that
organisms are compatible and fit with/in their environment; it does not represent the absolute
organism but simply a fitting organism, one adequate for the fluctuating circumstances of the
moment.
Fitting is not a static concept where the environment is constant and only the organism evolves
and continues to adapt. Darwin explained that organisms and environment co-evolve; Maturana
and Varela (1992) add that they co-adapt to each other, meaning that each influences the other in
the course of evolution (which is why I mention above that the context, the problem, also evolves
through its solving). In other words, the fit is evolving, where both parties evolve, which leads
Capra (1996) to assert that this creates a shift from evolution to co-evolution5. Maturana and
Varela call this co-evolution structural coupling, because both environment and organism

4
See e.g. the work of Glasersfeld (1995), Morss (1990), Siegler (1996), or the review of Davis (2004a).
5
Even if I do not go down this explanatory route (for simple matters of irrelevance for this article), there exist points
of junction as well as points of rupture between Darwin’s theory of evolution and what Maturana and Varela offer.
For more details on this, see Maturana and Mpodozis (2000).

interact and experience a mutual history of evolutionary changes and transformations. Both
environment and organism undergo changes in their structure in the process of evolution, and this
makes them adapted and compatible with each other.
Every ontogeny occurs within an environment […] the interactions (as long as they are
recurrent) between [organism] and environment will consists of reciprocal perturbations.
[…] The results will be a history of mutual congruent structural changes as long as the
[organism] and its containing environment do not disintegrate: there will be a structural
coupling. (1992, p. 75)
From this notion of structural coupling, it follows that the environment does not act as a
selector nor does it predetermine or cause evolution: rather, it is a “trigger” for the organism to
evolve. Events and changes are occasioned by the environment, but are determined by the
organism’s structure.
Therefore, we have used the expression “to trigger” an effect. In this way we refer to the
fact that the changes that results from the interaction between the living being and its
environment are brought about by the disturbing agent but determined by the structure of
the disturbed system. The same holds true for the environment: the living being is a source
of perturbations and not of instructions. (1992, p. 96)
Maturana and Varela call this phenomenon structural determinism, meaning that it is the
structure of the organism that allows for changes to occur, changes “triggered” by the interaction
of the organism with/in its environment. They give the following example: A car that hits a tree
can be destroyed, whereas the same thing would not happen to an army tank (note that the
environment, the tree, is also affected by this interaction)6. Hence it is claimed that changes do
not reside either inside the “trigger” or the organism: they come from (and are dependant on) the
organism’s interaction with the “trigger”. Thus the “triggers” from the environment are essential,
but they cannot determine changes.
If structural determinism is used to explain the solving process, one can conceive of the
solver’s answer/reaction/strategy as coming from, emerging in, the interaction of the solver and
the environment in which the solver is immersed (e.g. a mathematical task to solve, a specific

6
Referring to living systems, Davis (2004b) illustrates the idea of structural determinism by explaining that one
cannot predict the behavior of a dog when kicked, since what it does does not depend on how it is kicked but on the
dog’s structure: “The way that a complex system responds to a situation is determined by the system itself, not the
situation”.

teaching milieu, a particular group of students7, the previous classroom sessions, etc.). Being
dependent on this environment, this response/reaction/strategy is determined by the solver’s way
of making sense. Students’ change, reactions or strategy development are not seen as causal
events determined by external stimuli (even if they are “triggered” by this external stimulus).
Rather, they arise from the participants’ own structure in interaction with/in their environment: an
environment that is not static, but is also in a continual flux of evolution through this interaction,
which “triggers” back additional reactions. This underlines the importance of the solver in the
solving process. If one accepts the concept of structural determinism, then one accepts that
anything offered as a situation, a task, a comment, and so forth, for students to explore, think
about, or learn is at most a “trigger” for the change/reaction/strategy that occurs8. The students’
explorations or strategies are oriented by their own understandings and meanings of these
situations and tasks and by what constitutes issues for them to explore through these “triggers”.
Varela (1996) refers to this issue as problem posing.

Problem solving and problem posing

Varela (1996; Varela et al., 1991) explains aspects of structural determinism in terms of a
difference between problem solving and problem posing9. Problem solving implies already
existing problems situated in the world and lying “out there” waiting to be solved, independent of
us as knowers. For Varela, because of our co-determination with the environment in which we
live, because we have a structure, and because we are coupled with this environment, we specify
the problems that we encounter through the meanings that we make of the world in which we
live, which leads us to recognize things in specific ways and how we deal with them. We do not
“choose” or “take” problems as if they were lying “out there,” objective and independent of our
actions: we bring them forth, we pose them, we specify the problems that we encounter because
of our structure, which enables us to act and recognize things in specific ways.
The most important ability of all living cognition is precisely, to a large extent, to pose the
relevant questions that emerge at each moment of our life. They are not predefined but

7
This is an issue that Towers and Davis (2002) discuss in their article about the coupling, that is, mutual influence,
of students’ activities.
8
To avoid interpreting this notion in a causal manner, Kieren (e.g. 1995, 1997) has often used the expressions “to
occasion” or “occasioning” to depict Maturana’s idea of trigger. For the same reason, I use the expression in quotes,
that is, “trigger”.
9
Note that Varela’s distinction does not refer to Brown and Walter’s (e.g. 1983) or Silver’s (e.g. 1994) work on
mathematical problem posing/solving.

enacted, we bring them forth against a background, and the relevance criteria are oriented
by our common sense, always in a contextualized fashion. (Varela, 1996, p. 91, my
translation)
The problems that we encounter and the questions that we undertake are thus as much a part of
us as they are part of the environment; they emerge from our interaction with it. We interpret
events as issues to address; we see them as problems to solve10. We are not acting on preexisting
situations: our co-determination and continual interaction with/in the environment creates,
enables and specifies the possible situations toward which to act. The problems that we solve are
then implicitly relevant for us and are part of our structure, as we allow these to be problems for
us while the environment “triggers” them in us.
Hence it is claimed that reactions to a mathematical task do not reside inside either the solver
or the task: they emerge from the solver’s interaction with the task, through posing the task. If
one adheres to this perspective for (mental) mathematics teaching and learning, one cannot
assume, as René de Cotret (1999) notes, that instructional properties are present in the (mental
mathematics) tasks offered and that these will determine learners’ reactions. Butlen & Peizard
(1992), Heirdsfield and Cooper (2004) and Rezat (2011) have indeed shown the occasional
futility in mental mathematics of varying the type of problem or its didactical variables to
provoke specific strategies in students11. Mathematical strategies emerge in the interaction of
solver and task, enacted at the moment of interaction with tasks (Bautista & Roth, 2012; Maheux
& Roth, 2011; Thom, Namukasa, Ibrahim-Didi & McGarvey, 2009). As Davis (1995) explains,
mathematical strategies are inseparable from the knower and from the task itself, emerging from
both, being “new” to some extent12, dependent on/influenced by the task and its context, but
determined by the learner with regard to his experiences in (mental) mathematics, his experiences
in solving similar and other problems, his successes in mathematics with specific solving
approaches, and so forth: one’s own complex histories and situations (Brown & Coles, 2012;
Davis, Sumara & Kieren, 1996). In this perspective, the solver does not choose from a group of

10
The problems and the strategies for solving them are thus not arbitrary. To paraphrase Nùñez, Edwards and Matos
(1999), “they are motivated by our everyday experience – especially our bodily experience, which is biologically
constrained” (p. 52).
11
This said, as one reviewer noted, “tasks can be designed to be so constraining that there is an appearance of the
task causing the student’s behaviour”, not leaving or opening much space of engagement. However, that causation,
as Varela et al. (1991) explain, is to be seen strictly as an appearance, inferred after the fact by an external observer.
12
Not that strategies are “new” in a sense that nothing similar has been attempted before, but are generated for the
tasks faced, locally tailored to them, and thus reflect both the task and the solver.

predetermined strategies to solve the task, but engages with the problem in a certain way and
develops a strategy tailored to the task (both of which also evolve and are co-defined in the
posing). Strategies are thus not predetermined, but continually generated for solving tasks.
These issues represent powerful distinctions because they offer a frame that explains that the
issues addressed and explored in mental mathematics tasks are those that resonate with and
emerge from students’ structures or ways of knowing, although these are “triggered” by the task
offered. Students “transform” the mathematical tasks for themselves, making them their own
(which is often different from the designer’s intentions, as René de Cotret, 1999, expresses), and
generating a strategy tailored to the problem they posed. In this sense, the posing is emergent as
well as its solving. Acts of posing and solving are not predetermined, but are generated in
interaction with tasks, and influence one another as acts of posing influence the strategies
engaged with, which also modifies the problem being solved, and so forth.
If one adheres to this perspective and accepts that this describes the solving environment of
the solver in mental mathematics contexts, then one accepts that when facing a mental
mathematics task the solver brings forward a strategy to solve a task; a task that is not static and
that also evolves through its solving, as it is problem posed by the solver. Thus, the solver does
not choose from a group of possible strategies, because the solver “enters” the problem in a
specific way and in relation to his experiences, of what he “sees” in the task that leads him to act
in a specific way: to pose the task. The strategy is thus emergent, brought forth at the moment of
meeting with the task, at the moment of engagement with it, at the moment of posing it. Again, as
Threlfall explains,
As a result of this interaction between noticing and knowledge, each solution ‘method’ is
in a sense unique to that case, and is invented in the context of the particular calculation –
although clearly influenced by experience. It is not learned as a general approach and then
applied to particular cases. The solution path taken may be interpreted later as being the
result of a decision or choice, and be called a ‘strategy’, but the labels are misleading. The
‘strategy’ (in the holistic sense of the entire solution path) is not decided, it emerges. That
is why the classifications of strategies do not map easily onto the differences that there are
in practice. They are a post-hoc construct applied to a different kind of cognitive product.
(p. 42)

Thus in mental mathematics, students are seen to generate their strategies in order to solve
“their” tasks. These strategies are thus adapted responses, tailored to the(ir) tasks and emerging
from interaction with them: an interaction that is not singular or static, but that continues through
the solving process.
This dynamic entry through enactivist ideas can act as a framework for grounding Threlfall’s
proposition/conceptualization of strategy development in mental mathematics. This
emergent/adapted perspective on strategy development offers a specific way of talking about
strategies, avoiding ideas of possession (acquisition of, choice of, of “having” things, etc.) in
favor of issues about emergence, flux, movement, interactions, relations, actions, and so forth. It
is this frame or perspective that orients the following analyses conducted on data excerpts from
students’ strategies in a mental mathematics context. These are offered as illustrations of what an
analysis along these “emergent” terms might mean, and how it offers ways of understanding
(what happens in) the solving process in mental mathematics and how it helps in understanding
(what happens in) this solving process.

Considering mental mathematics strategies through an “emergence” lens

The data excerpts that I present here are taken from two mental mathematics projects, part of a
larger research program on mental mathematics with mathematical objects other than numbers,
and focused on understanding students’ mathematical activity and strategy development in
mental mathematics. The first example is taken from a mental algebra context where students had
to solve algebraic equations. The second example is taken from a mental mathematics project on
operations on functions where students had to operate on functions in a graph13. Before getting
into the data, I offer a clarification of what is meant by mental mathematics.
As Rezat (2011) explains, in the research literature, studies on mental mathematics mostly
focus on numbers (with the use of expressions like mental arithmetic, mental calculations, or in
French calcul mental), which for Thompson (2009) only represents a “subset of mental
mathematics”. However, no formal comprehensive definition appears in the literature for mental
mathematics. Usual definitions for mental arithmetic/calculations usually follow the vein of

13
For those two examples, I make use of usual data material used in mental mathematics studies, that is, students’
oral explanations of their strategies and ways of solving. Obviously, this can raise methodological issues that are
worth considering (for the data collection and analysis). However, those issues are not tackled here, as the focus of
the article is elsewhere, related to conceptualizing/theorizing strategy development in mental mathematics.

Hazelkemp (1986), as the computing of answers without paper-and-pencil or other

computational/material aids. Thus, albeit thought about for numbers, this definition has potential
for being adapted/extended to mathematical objects other than numbers (like in algebra,
geometry, functions, etc.); fitting with what is presented as data excerpts in this article. My
definition of what is mental mathematics aligns itself with the current body of research on mental
calculations/arithmetic and extends it to objects other than numbers: Mental mathematics is the
solving of mathematical tasks without paper and pencil or other computational/material aids. This
definition helps understanding the “classroom environment” in which the work is undertaken, the
“constraints” to which the students are subjected to – in the same way that a technological
environment (e.g. computer, calculators) could be defined as the context in which the work is
taking place for students (or one in which students would have to use manipulatives to solve
problems). The major issue here for mental mathematics is that students do not have access to
any material aid, be it paper-and-pencil or other, to depend on for solving the problems offered to
them.

Example 1. Solving algebraic equations through generating a context

This first example comes from a mental algebra activity that took place in a mathematics teacher
education course. The activity involved asking students to solve various algebraic equations of
the form Ax+B=C, Ax+B=Cx+D, Ax/B=C/D, Ax2+Bx+C=0, and their variants, without paper and
pencil or other material aids. The classroom organization was simple: about 10 students sat at
their desks, and the teacher educator wrote equations on a transparency projected on the board.
Students had approximately 10 seconds to read and solve the equation mentally and were asked
to explain the strategies they had engaged with. For this example, I present strategies developed
for the equation of the form x2–4=5, which generated four approaches: (1) Transforming the
equation; (2) Solving a system of equations; (3) Finding zeros of the function; and (4) Solving
followed by validation14. After presenting them, I discuss them in terms of issues of emergence.
(1) Transforming the equation.
“You transfer the 4 to the 5 and then you take the square root”; “My number was squared and
then 4 was taken away, thus I need to add 4 and take the square root”. These gave +/-3 as an

14
Those are not to be seen as exclusive and can be seen as overlapping. As well, they are not meant to represent an
exhaustive list of possibilities for solving this task, as others can be developed in another context.

answer. These are similar to inverse methods of solving found in Hewitt (1996), Filloy and
Rojano (1989), or even Nathan and Koedinger’s (2000) “unwinding”, where operations are
arithmetically “undone” to arrive at a value for x. As Filloy and Rojano explain, when using this
method “it is not necessary to operate on or with the unknown” (p. 20), as it becomes a series of
arithmetical operations performed on numbers.
In this particular case, solving the algebraic equation is focused on finding a way to isolate x,
in an arithmetic context. Even if these are reminiscent of paper-and-pencil work, the major
difference is that there is no paper-and-pencil work and thus a personal dialogue takes place
between the student and his task while solving. Because he cannot leave written traces or
transform the equation in writing, and thus cannot interact with what is obtained after each
written step through manipulating the equation, the monitoring of the solution is done through
personal dialogue, a story told in which he engages through telling the story itself. Narrating the
solution –“My number was squared and then 4 was taken away, thus I need to add 4 and take the
square root”– the student reports on each “step” being taken after another to keep track of the
operations being conducted. These “steps”, oriented by the task at hand, orient in return the next
steps. Solving is done through the action of solving, and not through applying a known
procedure. There is an ad-hoc-ness to the nature of the solving strategy, that emerges and is
oriented through the solving.
(2) Solving a system of equations.
Another strategy was to depict the equation as the comparison of two equations in a system of
equations (y=x2–4 and y=5) and to find the intersecting point of those two equations in the graph
by imagining the graph. This graphical entry leads to thinking of the equation as a comparison
between two equations for finding the common x, those that satisfy both equations in a common
y. To do so, the student pictured the line y=5 in the graph and also positioned y=x2–4. The latter
was referred to the quadratic function y=x2, which crosses y=5 at x = 5 . In the case of y=x2–4,
the function is translated of 4 downwards in the graph, and then the 5 of the line y=5 becomes a 9
in terms of distances. Hence, how to obtain an image of 9 with the function y=x2? With an x=3 or
€
x=–3. For these, the function y=x2–4 cuts the line y=5. Solving an algebraic equation in this case
is not about finding the value that makes the equation true, but mainly about finding the x that
satisfies both equations for the same y. Figure 1 offers an illustration of what the student pictured
mentally and then explained to the group.

Figure 1. A graphical system of equations approach for solving x2–4=5

The interrelation of posing and solving the task is of interest here. The solving of x2–4=5 as a
system of equations made emerge, posed, the task (x2–4=5) as a system of equation task. Then,
this posed system of equation task led to considering its graph for solving it (and not only, e.g.,
its algebra). This again modified the context of the task itself, which became a graph/system of
equation task. This obviously influenced in return the type of solution obtained, which became
about distances, translations, and so forth. There was thus an ongoing loop of influence between
the posing and the solving of the task, making the strategy emerge on-the-spot through solving, in
the action of.
(3) Finding the zeros of the function.
Another strategy engaged in is about finding the values of x that give a null y-value, or what is
commonly called finding the zeros of the function where the function intersects the x-axis at y=0.
That strategy emerged for the student, particularly after he had “transferred the 5 to the left”, as
he mentioned. Thus, x2 – 9 = 0 and then (x + 3)(x – 3) = 0.
The quest is not to search for the values that make the equation true (even if it could be done),
but mainly finding the values that nullify the function y=x2–9, that give the point(s) for which the
image is zero. It is thus midway between the quadratic function and the solving of the equation
with algebraic manipulations. Here again, this zeros-of-the-function orientation was engaged with
in relation to previous ad-hoc steps (i.e. of joining the constants of the equation). This first step

led the student to see how to continue the solving in relation to what was obtained, making it a
zero of function task (which it was not necessarily about at first, when the step of transferring the
5 was thought of).
(4) Solving followed by validation.
The fourth strategy resembles the first, where x2–4=5 is rapidly transformed into x2=9.
However, here the answer obtained is 3. Because the student is in a mental mathematics situation
and is aware that his answers in this context are often rapidly enunciated and can lack precision,
this “triggers” him to verify his answer. By mentally verifying if (3)2=9, he realizes that (–3)2
also gives 9 and he then readjusts his solution. This manner of solving the equation gets close to
the idea not only of finding one value that makes the equation true, but also of finding all values
that make it true. We again see here an interaction between the solver and the task through the
solving, in adaptation to what is obtained in it, far from applying or rehearsing a known strategy
beforehand.
These four strategies hint at a variety of meaning for solving algebraic equations: isolating x,
solving a system of equations, finding all values that satisfy the equations, finding the zeros of
the function. Through solving this “purely” mathematical equation (x2–4=5), students create their
context for solving, through contextualizing the equation in their own ways, by bringing out a
context of functions, of arithmetic, of system of equations, and so forth. These created contexts
transform the equation, which is no longer the same: the equation has been assigned specific
meanings. Through solving, students brought forth these context, they posed their problem, and
solved within that context. They posed their own equation; they found their way of entering in the
problem. These contexts did not really “exist” before they were posed by students in the solving:
they emerged at/through the interaction of the solver and the task.
Also the task itself needs to be seen as evolving through the posing and solving. Through these
emergences, contexts took form as solving took form: both co-evolved. The example of solving
x2–4=5 as a system of equations is a case in point: the posing made emerge the system of
equation task, which brought out the possibility of the graph, which made the task a graphical one
(even if no graph was provided), which oriented the kind of solution obtained. There is thus a
mutually influential relation between the solving, which generates a context for solving the task,
and the generated context itself, which modifies the solving in return, in a continual loop of
mutual influence. It is thus not a static “posing of problem” that would give a fixed task to solve;

it is one that continually evolves as the task is solved: the posing and the solving are mutually
influential and co-evolving.
What students posed was in fact solving contexts, that led to engage within them via
specifically generated strategies. And these in return transformed the context, which transformed
the strategies for solving it, and so forth. Through generating/creating a context, when
solving/posing the task, students brought forth a space of engagement, which in turn influenced
the process of posing/solving. These spaces of engagement are not arbitrary (Nùñez, Edwards &
Matos, 1999) and are as much part of them as solvers as they are part of the task offered,
emerging from the interaction of both.

Example 2. Operating on functions through making cues emerge

This second example comes from an operation on functions context that took place in two Grade
11 classrooms (approximately 30 students). Two 75-minute session for each group were
organized, amounting to 300 minutes of work, in which the regular Grade 11 teacher conducted
the activities with his class and asked his students to solve specific tasks. Again, the classroom
organization was simple: students sitting at their desks, the teacher offering graphical tasks to
solve on the board (Smart board). For example, a typical task would be to have two functions
represented in the same graph for which students have to add or subtract the two functions
without paper and pencil or other material aids. Figure 2 shows the kind of graphs that would be
offered for solving f(x)+g(x) mentally15.

Figure 2. Example of an addition of function task (f+g)

15
The presence of the y=x line was used as a referent for helping students in writing their answers.

Students had 20 seconds to think of their solutions, and at the teacher’s signal 10 seconds to
write their answer (on blank sheets of paper (5½in.x8½in.) with a Cartesian graph on it with y=x
drawn on it again as a referent, see Figure 3). When they had finished, the students had to lift
their paper for the teacher to see; some were then asked to explain the strategies in which they
had engaged.

Figure 3. The Cartesian graph given to students for writing their answers
Here is a strategy, among others (see Proulx, 2012b), in which students engaged for solving
tasks. This involved paying attention to specific points in the graphs of functions. By using these
points, students obtained varied “answers” in the graph, which they combined to find the
resulting function. To do so, they brought forth particular cues from specific points on the graph
of both given functions to determine what the resulting function would look like for these points.
In the example shown in Figure 4, students had to find the function resulting from the addition of
both f and g.

Figure 4. Graph given for the addition of f and g

Students fixed their attention on specific points (see Figure 5), for example: (1) where f
crossed the x-axis (x-intercept); (2) where both f and g intersected; (3) where f and g crossed the
y-axis (y-intercept); and (4) where g crossed the x-axis (x-intercept).

3
2

1 4

Figure 5. Points students engaged in for adding f and g (of Figure 4)

For case (1), the operation consists of adding the image for f (which is 0) with that for g,
which results in an image for f+g that is the same as that for g. For case (2), the operation is the
addition of both image at f and g, the same value, and thus the resulting image being of double-
value than where the intersection point is. For case (3), the same approached calculation applies,
as both image are added. Then, case (4) is like case (1). When doing this, students obtained new
points for the resulting function, and then drew a line linking these points. A similar approach
was engaged with, e.g., solving non-linear functions like the following addition task in Figure 6.

Figure 6. Another addition of function task (f+g)

In this case, some students drew out specific points as well as global aspects (see Bell &
Janvier, 1981; Even, 1998) of the functions to add: they worked with points like ones from 1 to 5
(see Figure 7) and at the same time considered the symmetry of other parts of the function for
finding the resulting function (which “cancelled” out, e.g., in terms of variation, but gave points
aligned with the other “highlighted” points). This gave them a line with image of double the
value of those for points 1 and 5.

3
4

4
4

1 4
5

4


3
2
4

Figure 7. Points students engaged in for adding f and g (of Figure 6)

For both kinds of examples cited, students produced precise points to obtain indications of the
appearance of the graph of the function. Attention was paid to numbers or coordinates that had
meaning in the graph for them at that moment. These generated strategies illustrate well
Threlfall’s ideas about students’ development in action of ways of solving, as emergent adapted
responses to the(ir) task. The strategies reported were enacted on-the-spot, as emergent and
tailored reactions.
By generating points to pay attention to, students posed tasks offered to them, posing their
own problems, which made them about points (and graphical properties). As Varela (1996)
would explain, the points were not “there” in themselves waiting. Students brought them forth
and made them present. They made these points emerge as possible cues with which to engage,
as significant points in the graph, for advancing toward the resulting function; as Kieren (1995)
would say, they brought forth a world of mathematical significance. Obviously one can “see”
these points in the graph (particularly after they have been pointed to), but they are not “there”

explicitly, “giving” information on the function (in fact, not all tasks made similar cues emerge,
as other cues were brought forth for other tasks).
Through their posing, students generated aspects to work with/in the tasks, making them
emerge to work with. Their numerical/pointwise reading produced a numerical/pointwise
approach, whereas in other cases not reported here, an algebraic reading produced an algebraic
approach, a graphical reading produced a graphical approach, and so forth (see Proulx, 2012b).
Depending on the task, and on who they were as solvers, various strategies emerged. Students
posed the problems they could pose, from the task they were given, and solved the problems that
they made emerge.
This, as mentioned, oriented the solving in return in a continual loop of interaction. As they
focused and made points to engage with emerge, the task became “about these points”. As it was
solved in this way, the students paid attention to and engaged with other points, again making the
task evolve through its solving. The same can be said for the hybrid pointwise/global solving,
where attention was paid to other points or global properties as the initial points were considered.
The posing/solving of the tasks generated strategies for finding the resulting functions, which in
return transformed the task engaged with, which again generated (or confirmed) strategies for
solving, and so forth. The posing/solving is emergent, emerging through this continual flow of
interaction between solver and task.

Additional and concluding remarks

Laying down a path in walking (A. Machado, in Varela, 1987)
Threlfall’s ideas about strategy development in mental mathematics have important merit. Even if
classifying strategies in relation to their nature are significant for being aware of possible
strategies for solving, it does not give much justice or credit to the nature of students’
mathematical activity when they engage in these strategies in a mental mathematics context.
This process of problem posing/problem solving contributes to understandings of issues of the
emergence of strategies in a mental mathematics context. More than a theoretical argument, the
data show this process unfolding in the doing, through solving the tasks. Through the generation
of cues, whether contexts in the case of x2–4=5 or of specific points in the case of functions,
students showed how they posed the problem (it became a task about these contexts or these
cues) and how they solved it (about these specific contexts or cues). It can thus be seen as a

continually double-emergent phenomenon, from the posing to the solving, and on. This
posing/solving is also nested in the tasks themselves where, as Davis (1995) explains,
mathematical strategies are inseparable from the solver and from the task itself, emerging from
both. And as Nùñez et al. (1999) would say for “constructed meanings”, this emergent process is
not arbitrary, because “It is subject to constraints which arise from biological embodied processes
that take place in the ongoing interaction between mutually constituted sense-makers and the
medium in which they exist.” (p. 53, my emphasis)16. These contexts or points were not generated
“out of the blue”, they were connected to the task through its posing; it was points that could be
pointed to in the graph, it was a system of equations drawn from both sides of the equation, etc.,
and ones that the students could point to or draw out. Also, as Nùñez et al. (1999) highlight, the
strategies engaged with/in the task and the tasks themselves were mutually constituted and in an
ongoing interaction.
In this sense, what students did in these mental mathematics contexts was to pose their
problem, by finding how to “get into” the task offered. By posing the problem, students generated
a context in which to solve it: a system of equations context, a zeros-of-functions context, a
point-by-point context, and so forth. The task then became about this for students. The intention
was to find an answer, but it was first and foremost to find a way in: it was about posing the
problem and finding cues to grasp for solving the task. This posed problem in return influenced
its solving, which posed/transformed anew the problem to solve, thus creating an emergent
coupling between the problem posed and the strategy to solve that problem posed. It is this
continual posing of the problem, and the generation of strategies for solving it, those cues enacted
on-the-spot at the meeting with the mental mathematics tasks, that characterizes the nature of the
mathematical activity in which students engaged. This co-evolution of problem posing and
solving, this mutual influence, this inseparability, offers an illustration of how students engaged
with the mental mathematics tasks and the mathematical activity generated through this mental
mathematics context.
Threlfall’s ideas, grounded in enactivism, change how we can think of mental mathematics
solving, which leads to another way of conceptualizing the mathematical activity in it. It is not
that completely-never-used-before strategies are created or that the students engage in strategies

16
Even if I do not discuss this, mainly due to space constraints but also for the direct relevance to the issues under
consideration here, an argument could be made, and has been by others (see e.g. Kieren & Simmt, 2009; Maheux &
Roth, 2011; Pirie & Kieren, 1994), that meanings and strategies engaged with are one and the same.

in which they have never before engaged. The idea is that these strategies are thought about in the
meeting, in the interaction, with the(ir) task, resulting in a way of solving of-the-moment. It is not
an idea of stepping back, looking in the toolbox, and choosing the appropriate strategy for
solving. In his 2009 paper, Threlfall adds that this “assumption that the strategy used to complete
a calculation is selected from alternatives formulated in the mind in advance of being used” (p.
545) would imply too many strategies to keep in mind when solving/choosing. As he explains,
Strategic choice is difficult to accept as a model for calculation-strategy-flexibility based
on task-characteristics because there are just too many possible reasoning-based
calculation-strategies that would have to be held in mind in making a choice, and because
there is not a plausible task-related basis for choosing between them. (2009, p. 547)
Once a strategy is offered, one could in fact question if the student really “had” this strategy in
mind before solving or being presented with the problem.
By their entry into the tasks, students posed the tasks offered to them, making them algebraic,
geometric, numerical, etc. Somehow, the path was laid down in walking. Their posing/solving of
the tasks generated strategies for finding a good enough answer. Indeed, students have a
background, developed through various mathematical experiences, preferences, habits, last
attempts and successes/failures, comprehensions, and so forth. It is with/in this structure, this
complex history, that students interact with the environment in which they are structurally
coupled and thus generate ways of solving (connected to the student and the environment that
“triggered” it); ways of solving that in return make the environment, the task, evolve through this
coupling. As Threlfall mentions,
The solution path followed by the individual then depends on which elements of what has
been noticed chime with their knowledge of feasible steps in calculations, and which of
the possibilities sits most easily with knowledge they are comfortable with (2002, p. 41).
It is thus not a creation anew, made from scratch, but an emergent production of a way of
solving for this task, at that moment. Even more, as the data illustrate, this is not a static, once
and for all fixed, event. The way of solving influences back what is to be solved, which again
influences how to solve: the posing and the solving are continually affecting one another in the
process. Again, the path is laid down in walking it, which influences how one walks in/on it!
This leads to the development, as mentioned, of local ways of solving tasks, emergent at the
moment of solving. As Butlen and Pézard (1990) explain, in mental mathematics tasks make

specific strategies emerge, which do not always have “universal” possibilities (i.e., for solving
large classes of problems): students develop particular strategies, for solving particular problems,
efficient in particular ways, locally. This is also discussed in Plunkett (1979), who refers to
mental strategies as “fleeting and often difficult to catch hold of [as] variable [and] active” (p. 3,
emphasis in original). Referring to Plunkett’s work, Murphy (2004) explains that these strategies
are thus seen as:
Invented ‘on the spot’ by the user for that calculation and may not even be remembered
for future use […] mental calculation strategies [are] seen as ‘active’ as they are created
by the user to suit the numbers involved (pp. 3-4).
This also relates to Zack and Reid’s (2003, 2004; Reid, 1996) analyses of students’ ways of
solving in terms of “good-enough” strategies, that is, not optimal or universal, but functional for
the time being in solving the tasks: “‘good-enough for the time being’ is not only a good move, it
is one which we make all the time when in the midst of learning […] assigning a general meaning
and then going on.” (2003, p. 43). This is mainly what happened here, as students generated ideas
that helped them carry on their solving. This was their way of keeping on, of “making do”, as
Zack and Reid would say. Thus, these emergent strategies generated in this mental mathematics
context were (continually) good-enough for solving the (posed) tasks. The goal was not to find
the optimal way of doing; it was mainly to do it, to be able to enter in the task by generating a
way of making sense of and solving it. Again, it is a case of laying down a path in walking.
This conceptualization of mental mathematics tasks solving, which I have grounded in aspects
of the enactivist theory of cognition, appears fruitful for better understanding the processes at
play in mental mathematics. It offers a specific, or different, way of understanding the
phenomenon, toward, e.g., understanding the nature of the mathematical activity students are
engaging with/in mental mathematics contexts, characterizing the kind of mathematics that
students generate in these, studying the mathematical potential of doing mental mathematics for
students’ learning and for teachers’ teaching of concepts, investigating the
difference/similarities/influence of mental mathematics work on students’ understanding of
concepts, problem solving skills and procedures, and so forth. This shifts the focus of
investigation away from the nature of the strategy used by students and toward the nature of the
mathematical activity that students engaged in. In this sense, it offers a way to understand better

the type of mathematical meanings students are engaged in when solving mental mathematics
tasks: an issue of fundamental importance in mathematics education research.

Acknowledgements
I wish to thank Nadine Bednarz, Tom Kieren, Jean-François Maheux, and Elaine Simmt for their
insightful suggestions and helpful comments on this article.

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