Use, Possession, Fruits and Disposition

Perez v. Evite (G.R. No. L-16003, March 29, 1961)

A person may be declared owner, but he may not be entitled to possession. The possession
may be in the hands of another either as a lessee or a tenant. A person may have
improvements thereon of which he may not be deprived without due hearing. A lessee is
not the owner; yet a declaration of ownership in another person does not necessarily mean
his ouster.

Olego vs. Rebueno (G.R. No. L-39350, October 29, 1975)

The general rule is that the adjudication of ownership does not include the possession of
the property. The exception is that the adjudication of ownership would include the
delivery of possession if the defeated party has not shown any right to possess the land
independently of his claim of ownership which was rejected.

Nazareno vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 138842, October 18, 2000)

Dispossession of property through a simulated sale is ineffective and void. Dispossession

through an absolute sale with lack of consideration is void.

Flancia vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 146997, April 26, 2005)

In a contract of sale, title to property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing
sold while in a contract to sell, ownership is reserved by the vendor and is not passed to the
vendee until full payment of the purchase price. Aside from the jus utendi and the jus
abutendi inherent in the right to enjoy the thing, the right to dispose, or the jus disponendi,
is the power of the owner to alienate, encumber, transform and even destroy the thing
owned.

Vda. De Bautista vs. Marcos (G.R. No. L-17072, October 31, 1961)
It is an essential requisite for the validity of a mortgage that the mortgagor be the absolute
owner of the thing mortgaged. If the mortgage was constituted before the issuance of the
patent to the mortgagor, the mortgage is void and ineffective.

Doctrine of Self-Help

German Management & Services vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 76216. September 14,
1989)

When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the
recovery of property. As stated in Article 536: in no case may possession be acquired
through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who
believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing must
invoke the aid of the competent court, if holder should refuse to deliver the thing.

Surface Rights of Landowner (Art. 437): Extent & Limitations

Republic vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-43938. April 15, 1988)

The owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything
underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. The rights over the land
are indivisible and the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The
classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or
completely agricultural.

Actions available to owner: 1. Recovery of Personal Property: Replevin

Arabesque Industrial Phils. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 101431 December 14,
1992)

A writ of replevin cannot be properly directed against a lawful possessor of a chattel.

Chua vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 79021 May 17, 1993)
Replevin will not lie for property in custodia legis. A thing is in custodia legis when it is
shown that it has been and is subjected to the official custody of a judicial executive officer
in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ.

2. Recovery of Real Property:

a. Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

Peralta-Labrador vs. Bagarin (G.R. No. 165177, August 25, 2005)

An action for forcible entry is a quieting process and the one year time bar for filing a suit is
in pursuance of the summary nature of the action. After the lapse of the one-year period,
the suit must be commenced in the RTC via an accion publiciana, a suit for recovery of the
right to possess which is also an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of realty independently of title. It also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the
expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful
withholding of possession of the realty independently of title. Likewise, the case may be
instituted before the same court as an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover
ownership as well as possession.

Nuñez vs. SLTEAS (G.R. No. 180542, April 12, 2010)

In addition to being conferred by law, jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by
the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. The rule is no
different in actions for forcible entry where the following requisites are essential for the
MeTC's acquisition of jurisdiction over the case: (a) the plaintiffs must allege their prior
physical possession of the property; (b) they must assert that they were deprived of
possession either by force, intimidation, strategy, threat or stealth; and, (c) the action must
be filed within one (1) year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their
deprivation of the physical possession of the property.

Dela Cruz vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 139442, December 6, 2006)
Jurisdiction is the power or capacity given by the law to a court or tribunal to entertain,
hear and determine certain controversies. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred
by law. Exclusive and original jurisdiction for ejectment cases is lodged with first level
courts.

Ocampo vs. Dionisio (G.R. No. 191101, October 1, 2014)

In an action for forcible entry and detainer, the only issue is possession in fact, or physical
possession of real property, independently of any claim of ownership that either party may
put forth in his pleading. If plaintiff can prove prior physical possession in himself, he may
recover such possession even from the owner, but, on the other hand, if he cannot prove
such prior physical possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry and detainer
even if he should be the owner of the property. Determination is only limited to the issue of
who has "actual prior possession" of the subject property regardless of the ownership of
the same.

Suarez vs. Emboy (G.R. No. 187944, March 12, 2014)

Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be
brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one
year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than
one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s
possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal
detainer, but an accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to
recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil
proceeding.

b. Accion Publiciana and Accion Reivindicatoria

Bokingo vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 161739, May 4, 2006)

What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action (accion
publiciana) and from a reinvindicatory action (accion reinvindicatoria) is that the first is
limited to the question of possession de facto. An unlawful detainer suit (accion interdictal)
together with forcible entry are the two forms of an ejectment suit that may be filed to
recover possession of real property. Aside from the summary action of ejectment, accion
publiciana or the plenary action to recover the right of possession and accion
reinvindicatoria or the action to recover ownership which includes recovery of possession,
make up the three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession.

Hilario vs. Salvador (G.R. No. 160384. April 29, 2005)

An accion reivindicatoria is a suit which has for its object the recovery of possession over
the real property as owner. It involves recovery of ownership and possession based on the
said ownership. On the other hand, an accion publiciana is one for the recovery of
possession of the right to possess. It is also referred to as an ejectment suit filed after the
expiration of one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful
withholding of possession of the realty.

Urieta vs. Aguilar (G.R. No. 164402, July 05, 2010)

The objective in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. However,
where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to
determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property. This
adjudication, however, is not a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership; it
is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is
inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership,
being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the
property.

Bongato vs. Malvar (G.R. No. 141614. August 14, 2002)

Forcible entry is a quieting process, and the restrictive time bar is prescribed to
complement the summary nature of such process. The one-year period within which to
bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the
land. However, when entry is made through stealth or strategy, the one-year period is
counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it. After the lapse of the one-year period,
the party dispossessed of a parcel of land may file either an accion publiciana, which is a
plenary action to recover the right of possession; or an accion reivindicatoria, which is an
action to recover ownership as well as possession.

Encarnacion vs. Amigo (G.R. No. 169793, September 15, 2006)

The remedies of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are granted to a person deprived of
the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or
a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or
assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person. If the dispossession has not
lasted for more than one year, an ejectment proceeding is proper and the proper MTC
acquires jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the dispossession lasted for more than one year,
the proper action to be filed is an accion publiciana which should be brought to the proper
RTC.

Manlapaz vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-39430. December 3, 1990)

In an action for forcible entry and detainer, the main issue is one of priority of possession.
The legal right thereto is not essential to the possessor's cause of action, for no one may
take law into his own hands and forcibly eject another or deprive him of his possession by
stealth, even if his title thereto were questionable or actually disputed in another case.
Firmly settled is the rule that a municipal court has jurisdiction over forcible entry or
unlawful detainer cases even if the ownership of the property is in disputed.
Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 132424, May 2, 2006)

The jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer actions, which are summary in
nature, lies in the proper MTC. Both actions must be brought within one year from the date
of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in
case of unlawful detainer.

c. Action to Recover is based on Ownership

Caro vs. Sucaldito (G.R. No. 157536. May 16, 2005)

The essence of an action for reconveyance is that the decree of registration is respected as
incontrovertible but what is sought instead is the transfer of the property which has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its rightful owner or to
one with a better right.

PEZA vs. Fernandez (G.R. No. 138971. June 6, 2001)

Reconveyance is a remedy for those whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another’s name. However, this cannot be availed once the property has passed
to an innocent purchaser for value. An unduly excluded heir may seek a new settlement of
the estate within two (2) years after the settlement and distribution of an estate. However,
this prescriptive period will not apply to those who had not been notified of the settlement.

Gasataya vs. Mabasa (G.R. No. 148147, February 16, 2007

Reconveyance is available not only to the legal owner of a property but also to the person
with a better right than the person under whose name said property was erroneously
registered.

d. Other actions for Recovery of Possession: i. Injunction

Bokingo vs. Court of Appeals, supra.

What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action (accion
publiciana) and from a reinvindicatory action (accion reinvindicatoria) is that the first is
limited to the question of possession de facto. An unlawful detainer suit (accion interdictal)
together with forcible entry are the two forms of an ejectment suit that may be filed to
recover possession of real property. Aside from the summary action of ejectment, accion
publiciana or the plenary action to recover the right of possession and accion
reinvindicatoria or the action to recover ownership which includes recovery of possession,
make up the three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession.

Idolor vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 141853. February 7, 2001)

Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests.

Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: 1)
there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; 2) the act against
which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. Failure to exercise the
right of redemption would entitle the purchaser to possession of the property.

Federated Realty Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 127967, December 14,
2005)

Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests.

The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests in the existence of
a cause of action and in the probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary
compensation and the prevention of multiplicity of suits. To be entitled to injunctive relief,
the following must be shown: (1) the invasion of a right sought to be protected is material
and substantial; (2) the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (3) there is an
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

ii. Writ of Possession

Vencilao vs. Vano (G.R. No. L-25660, Feb. 23, 1990)

In a registration case, the judgment confirming the title of the applicant and ordering
its registration in his name necessarily carried with it the right of ownership. The
issuance of the writ of possession is therefore sanctioned by existing laws in this
jurisdiction and by the generally accepted principle upon which the administration of
justice rests. A writ of possession may be issued not only against the person who has
been defeated in a registration case but also against anyone unlawfully and adversely
occupying the land or any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings up
to the issuance of the final decree.

Jetri Construction Corp. vs. BPI (G.R. No. 171687. June 8, 2007)

After the consolidation of title in the buyer’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem
the property, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right, and its issuance to a
purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is merely a ministerial function.

A.G. Development Corp vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 111662. October 23, 1997)

The issuance of a writ of possession is not a judgment on the merits. A writ of possession is
generally understood to be an order whereby the sheriff is commanded to place a person in
possession of a real or personal property, such as when a property is extra-judicially
foreclosed. The issuance of a writ of possession is summary in nature, so the same cannot
be considered a judgment on the merits which is defined as one rendered after a
determination of which party is right.

Maglente vs. Baltazar-Padilla (G.R. No. 148182. March 7, 2007)

A writ of possession shall issue only in the following instances: (1) land registration
proceedings; (2) extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) judicial
foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has possession and no third party has
intervened, and (4) execution sales. A writ of possession complements the writ of execution
only when the right of possession or ownership has been validly determined in a case
directly relating to either. Furthermore, the rule is that the enforcement of a judgment may
not vary or alter the tenor of the judgment but must strictly conform to it. It should be in
harmony with the judgment that gives it life and not exceed it.

Action to Recover: 1. Requisites (Art. 434)

Heirs of L. Vencilao Sr. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 123713. April 1, 1998)

In order that an action to recover ownership of real property may prosper, the person who
claims that he has a better right to it must prove not only his ownership of the same but
also satisfactorily prove the identity thereof.

Heirs of Anastacio Fabela vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 142546. August 9, 2001)

In an action for reconveyance, there is presumption that the current possessor or holder of
the property is the rightful owner. To overwhelm this presumption, the averse claimant
must prove ownership based on the strength of his claim and not the weakness of the
defense. He accomplishes the same by presenting convincing evidence of just title as well as
the incontrovertible identity of the property he seeks.

Quantum of Proof

Republic vs. Carrasco (G.R. No. 143491. December 6, 2006.)

A person claiming ownership must present proof of specific acts of ownership to

substantiate his claim and cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions
of law than factual evidence of possession. While tax receipts and declarations are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute, at the least, proof that the holder
has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for
taxation purposes not only manifests one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the
property, but also announces an adverse claim against the State and all other interested
parties with an intention to contribute needed revenues to the government. Such an act
strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.

Ramos-Balalio vs. Ramos (G.R. No. 168464. January 23, 2006)

Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no
one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at
least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of
title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation
purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property
and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also
the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government.

Spouses Azana vs. Lumbo (G.R. No. 157593. March 22, 2007)

When an owner of real property is disturbed in any way in his rights over the property by
the unfounded claim of others, he may bring an action for quieting of title. The purpose of
the action is to remove the cloud on his title created by any instrument, record,
encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact
invalid and prejudicial to his title. Non-declaration of a property for tax purposes does not
necessarily negate ownership.

Fule vs. Legare (G.R. No. L-17951, February 28, 1963)

A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some
other persons has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for
the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of
some other persons in the property. Good faith consists in an honest intention to abstain
from taking any unconscientious advantage of another.
Rumarete vs. Hernandez (G.R. No. 168222. April 18, 2006)

The requisites for an action for quieting of title are: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a
legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the
deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or
legal efficacy.

RIGHT OF ACCESSION (ART. 440)

Rules where builder/sower/planter builds/sows/plants on a land not belonging to him: i.

Builder/Sower/Planter in Good Faith (Art. 448)

a. Good Faith

Rosales vs. Castelltort (G.R. No. 157044. October 5, 2005)

A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the land he is building on is
his, or that by some title one has the right to build thereon, and is ignorant of any defect or
flaw in his title. Article 527 of the Civil Code provides that good faith is always presumed,
and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof.
The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner of the
building to remove it from the land.

JM Tuazon Co., Inc. vs. Vda de Lumanlan (G.R. No. L-23497. April 26, 1968)

A builder who has presumptive knowledge that another person may be the owner of a
property and not his vendor is not a builder in good faith.
Quevada vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 140798. September 19, 2006)

In their exercise of rights and performance of duties, everyone must act with justice. The
builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than
that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the
land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity.

Macasaet vs. Macasaet (G.R. Nos. 154391-92. September 30, 2004)

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of
retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of
refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing
may have acquired by reason thereof. A land owner has the right to appropriate as his own
the building and other improvements on the subject lots, but only after (1) refunding the
expenses of petitioners or (2) paying the increase in value acquired by the properties by
reason thereof.

Mores vs. Yu-Go (G.R. No. 172292. July 23, 2010)

Tenants cannot be said to be builders in good faith as they have no pretension to be owners
of the property. Indeed, full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the
premises until reimbursement is made applies only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one
who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. It does not apply where
one's only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it would always be
in the power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord out of his property.

Del Campo vs. Abesia (G.R. No. L-49219. April 15, 1988)

Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot apply where a co-owner builds, plants or sows on the
land owned in common for then he did not build, plant or sow upon land that exclusively
belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner. The co-owner is not a third person under
the circumstances, and the situation is governed by the rules of co-ownership. However,
when the co-ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears that the house of
defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of the land pertaining to another which the
defendants obviously built in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 should apply.

Boyer-Roxas vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 100866. July 14, 1992)

Properties registered in the name of the corporation are owned by it as an entity separate
and distinct from its members. While shares of stock constitute personal property, they do
not represent property of the corporation. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the
person who built, planted or sown on the land of another but also on the part of the owner
of such land, the rights of one and the other shall be the same as though both had acted in
good faith.

Sarmiento vs. Agana (G.R. No. 57288. April 30, 1984)

The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith,
shall have the right, to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment
of the indemnity. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its
value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or
trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in
case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.

b. Option Given to Landowner: Reason for the Option

Ochoa vs. Apeta (G.R. No. 146259. September 13, 2007)

Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory
definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice
and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. Applied to
possession, one is considered in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in his title or
mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. The landowner can make a choice - either
by appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay
the price of the land. The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with
the principle of accession that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way
around.

c. Right of Landowner to Remove or Demolish Improvement

Rosales vs. Castelltort, supra.

The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of
accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. Even
as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The
landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner of the
building to remove it from the land.

Depra vs. Dumlao (G.R. No. L-57348. May 16, 1985)

The owner of the land on which improvement was built by another in good faith is entitled
to removal of improvement only after landowner has opted to sell the land and the builder
refused to pay for the same. Res judicata doesn’t apply wherein the first case was for
ejectment and the other was for quieting of title.

d. Builder’s/Sower’s/Planter’s Right to Retain Improvement

Nuguid vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 151815. February 23, 2005)

While the law aims to concentrate in one person the ownership of the land and the
improvements thereon in view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-
ownership, it guards against unjust enrichment insofar as the good-faith builder's
improvements are concerned. The right of retention is considered as one of the measures
devised by the law for the protection of builders in good faith. Its object is to guarantee full
and prompt reimbursement as it permits the actual possessor to remain in possession
while he has not been reimbursed (by the person who defeated him in the case for
possession of the property) for those necessary expenses and useful improvements made
by him on the thing possessed. A builder in good faith cannot be compelled to pay rentals
during the period of retention nor be disturbed in his possession by ordering him to vacate.
The owner of the land is prohibited from offsetting or compensating the necessary and
useful expenses with the fruits received by the builder-possessor in good faith.

ii. Builder/Planter/Sower in Bad Faith (Art. 449-452)

a. Instances of Bad Faith

Mindanao Academy, Inc. vs. Yap (G.R. No. L-17681. February 26, 1965)

Although the bad faith of one party neutralizes that of the other and hence as between
themselves their rights would be as if both of them had acted in good faith at the time of the
transaction, this legal fiction of the buyer's good faith ceased when the complaint against
him was filed. A possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits only so long as his
possession is not legally interrupted, and such interruption takes place upon service of
judicial summons. A possessor in good faith cannot recover the value of a new building
constructed after the filing of an action for annulment of the sale of land on which it is
constructed, thus rendering him a builder in bad faith who is denied by law any right of
reimbursement.

Lumungo vs. Usman (G.R. No. L-25359. September 28, 1968)

Trees are improvements, not "necessary expenses of preservation", which a builder,

planter or sower in bad faith may recover. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the
land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.

Santos vs. Mojica (G.R. No. L-25450. January 31, 1969)

The owners of the land where a house had been constructed in bad faith may choose to
appropriate the house or require its demolition at the expense of the builder. A son in
possession of a land, who built his house thereon after his predecessors-in-interest had
been summoned in an action for partition of the property, is a builder in bad faith who
must lose his improvement to the owners of the land without right to indemnity.

Alluvion

Office of the City Mayor vs. Ebio (G.R. No. 178411. June 23, 2010)

Alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the
alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have
been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining
property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial
property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.

Republic vs. Abrille (G.R. No. L-39248, May 7, 1976)

Registration proceedings must be done to put under the operation and coverage of the
Land Registration Law a former river bed . An accretion does not automatically become
registered land just because the lot which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens
title.

Grande vs. CA (G.R. No. L-17652, June 30, 1962)

An accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot which
receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. Ownership of a piece of land is one
thing; registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is another. Ownership over
the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code.

Ignacio vs. Director of Lands (G.R. No. L-12958. May 30, 1960)
Land formed by the action of the sea is property of the state, and continue to be part of the
public domain until a formal declaration on the part of the Government, through the
executive department or the legislature, to the effect that land is no longer needed for coast
guard service, for public use or for special industries.

Heirs of Emiliano Navarro vs. IAC (G.R. No. 68166, Feb. 12, 1997)

Accretion as a mode of acquiring property requires the concurrence of the following

requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2)
that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river: and (3) that the land where the
accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river. Lands added to the shores by
accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public
domain.

QUIETING OF TITLE (ART. 476-481)

a. Cloud on Title

b. Action to Quiet Title:

1. Meaning

Heirs of E. Diaz v. Virata (G.R. No. 162037. August 7, 2006)

An action for quieting of title is a remedy which may be availed of only when by reason of
any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which appears valid but is, in
fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, a cloud is thereby cast on the
complainant's title to real property or any interest therein. In an action to quiet title, the
party bringing the action must have a legal or, at least, an equitable title to the real
property subject of the action and that the alleged cloud on his title must be shown to be in
fact invalid. For an action to quiet title to prosper, two requisites must concur: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property
subject of the action and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be
casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its
prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

2. Requisites

Calacala vs. Republic (G.R. No. 154415. July 28, 2005)

For an action to quiet title to prosper, two requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the
action and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on
his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

Robles v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 123509, March 14, 2000)

An action to quiet title is a common-law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or
uncertainty on the title to real property. It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to
have a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject
matter of the action. Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged
as a cloud on plaintiff's title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its
prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

3. Suitor

Pingol vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 102909. September 6, 1993)

A vendee in an oral contract to convey land who had made part payment thereof, entered
upon the land and had made valuable improvements thereon, is entitled to bring suit to
clear his title against the vendor who had refused to transfer the title to him. It is not
necessary that the vendee has an absolute title, an equitable title being sufficient to clothe
him with personality to bring an action to quiet title.