G.R. No.
116692 March 21, 1997 years, without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, or in the event
SAMAR II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE INCORPORATED,
represented by PONCIANO R. ROSALES, General Manager, petitioner,  from January 1, 1976 up to and including the three (3) years imputed service
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
FROILAN RAQUIZA, respondents.
 ROMERO, J.:
This petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeks the
annulment of the March 10, 1994, decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission in NLRC Case No. V-0307-92, as well as its order dated April
28, 1994, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
The antecedent facts follow.
Private respondent Froilan V. Raquiza was employed by petitioner Samar II
Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SAMELCO II) as probationary power plant
operator on January 1, 1976, and became a regular employee on July 1, 1976.
On February 9, 1980, he was appointed as switchboard operator and
sometimes alternated as acting plant superintendent.
Raquiza's problems began when a major breakdown of the pielstick engine
causing electric failure to the whole franchise area for a period of four
months occurred during his shift on January 21, 1988. On January 22, 1988,
he was immediately asked to explain the incident, which he did the following
day. After investigation, however, SAMELCO II General Manager Ponciano
Rosales found Raquiza and his two companions in the shift, Manuel Balasbas
and Pascual Martinez, guilty of gross negligence in the performance of their
duty. The three were placed under preventive suspension from January 27,
1988, until their termination on February 29, 1988. Nine months later, or on
December 5, 1988, Raquiza filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal
dismissal, praying for reinstatement and payment of unpaid wages, unpaid
overtime pay, attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages, and the cost of
suit.
Labor Arbiter Gabino A. Velasquez, Jr. rendered a decision on September 25,
1992, finding Raquiza's dismissal to be based on a just cause. On appeal,
however, the NLRC reversed and set aside his ruling, and ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision appealed from is
hereby reversed and set aside, and a new one entered to wit:
1) declaring the dismissal of the complainant-appellant (Raquiza) due to
gross negligence as illegal;
2) ordering respondents (herein petitioners) to reinstate the complainant-
appellant to his former position with full backwages not exceeding three (3)
Rule VII.
reinstatement is no longer feasible due to the realities of the situation, to pay
him his separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service
for which backwages was awarded;
3) ordering respondents further to pay attorney's fees of 10% of the total
monetary award.
All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of sufficient basis.
SO ORDERED.
Its motion for reconsideration having likewise failed, petitioner filed the
instant petition.
Petitioner's present action is premised solely on the grave abuse of discretion
allegedly exercised by the NLRC in reversing the labor arbiter's decision. Its
arguments, however, fail to persuade this Court, and a closer examination of
the questioned judgment would reveal that the NLRC disposed of the case
judiciously.
Labor Arbiter Velasquez opined that since Raquiza was not able to
specifically deny the charges against him, he should be deemed to have
admitted them. Technical rules of evidence are not, however, strictly
followed in labor cases. The Labor Code itself affirms this liberality, viz.:
Art. 221. Technical Rules not binding and prior resort to amicable settlement.
— In any proceeding before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters,
the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be
controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Code that the Commission
and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable
means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without
regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due
process. . . . 1
This rule is reiterated in the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, to wit:
Rule V.
Sec. 7. Nature of Proceedings. — The proceedings before a Labor Arbiter
shall be non-litigious in nature. Subject to the requirements of due process,
the technicalities of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in the courts of
law shall not strictly apply thereto. The Labor Arbiter may avail himself of
all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of the controversy speedily,
including ocular inspection and examination of well-informed persons.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 10. Technical rules not binding. — The rules of procedure and evidence
prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling and the
Commission shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or
procedure, all in the interest of due process.
xxx xxx xxx
Raquiza's failure to specifically deny or explain the charges against him
should not, therefore, be deemed fatal to his claim.
Our laws as well as this Court have consistently recognized and respected an
employer's right to terminate the services of an employee for just or
authorized causes. This prerogative, however, must be exercised in good
faith. As we held in Mercury Drug Corp. v. NLRC, et al.: 2
Management also has its own rights, which, as such, are entitled to respect
and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Out of its concern for
those with less privileges in life, the Supreme Court has inclined more often
than not toward the worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the
employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded the Court to rule that
justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the
established facts and applicable law and doctrine. 3
Petitioner as employer is duty-bound to establish the existence of a clear,
valid and just ground for dismissing Raquiza. It cannot merely allege that its
employee was grossly negligent in the performance of his duty thereby
causing great damage to its property and resulting in great pecuniary loss.
Raquiza's dismissal was based on three factors, namely, (a) leaving his work
assignment while on duty; (b) not properly checking the engine before
starting it; and (c) authorizing the continued running of pielstick (engine) no.
2 in spite of the discovery that there was an oil leakage.
In the case of Citibank, N.A. v. Gatchalian, 4 we ruled that "(g)ross
negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or
diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of
consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.
While it is true that Raquiza left his place of work to go to the administration
building to get the proceeds of his loan during the testing period of the
engine, such act cannot be perceived to be so serious as would amount to
gross negligence. As to the claim that he did not check the engine, the NLRC
found that he actually made several inspections of the engine before actually
starting it. We find no reason to disturb this finding in view of the respect and
finality which this Court has constantly accorded to factual findings of quasi-
judicial agencies such as the NLRC. 5 Finally, the fact that Raquiza failed to
prevent the occurrence of the incident does not sufficiently show nor can it be
inferred that he was grossly negligent. At most, it can be considered an error
of judgment on his part when he continued to operate the engine. It must be
remembered that the purpose of the operation of said engine was to
synchronize it with the National Power Corporation's Geothermal Plant in
Tangonan, Leyte to augment power during the peak hours in the early
evenings. 6 Stoppage of the operation would have defeated such purpose and
violated the very franchise of petitioner.

The investigation conducted by petitioner revealed that "the breakdown was

due to the serious error committed by Froilan V. Raquiza, Manuel Balasbas,
and Pascual Martinez, although complainant's command responsibility,
liability and negligence, . . . , was most serious and the gravest."  7 Yet, despite
this collective error, only Raquiza was dismissed; the other two were merely
suspended. Such discrimination cannot be sanctioned by this Court.

Furthermore, the NLRC correctly pointed out from the evidence that there
was no clarity or confirmation as to the cause of the pielstick engine
breakdown. Thus, it stated:

More significantly, the findings of the consultant who inspected pielstick

Engine No. 2 at the instance of the respondents cost (sic) a serious doubt on
the alleged negligence of the complainant-appellant as the proximate cause
for the damage of the said engine. It appears from the said inspection result
that the said unit bogged down in September 1986, and in that incident all
con/rod bearings were replaced with old sets taken from Dorelco Units. The
same con/rod bearings were likewise noted to be due for replacement in (sic)
December 17, 1987. Lastly, the said engine unit at the time it broke down had
a total running hours [of] 21,332.1 far exceeding the tolerable maximum
requirement of 18,000 hrs. The above attendant circumstances shows (sic)
that Pielstick Engine No. 2 broke down last January 21, 1988 not due to the
negligence of the complainant but due to worn out spare parts and its
continued operation beyond the schedule of replacement of con/rod bearing
on December 17, 1987. 8

Petitioner claimed below that Raquiza's dismissal was not solely attributable
to the January 21, 1988, incident but was, in fact, a result of a "long string of
neglect and violations of company R & R (rules and regulations)." But this is
beside the point. What is significant is that the employer bears the burden of
proving that the dismissal of an employee is for a just cause, failing which
the dismissal cannot be deemed justified thus entitling the latter to
reinstatement. 9 The decision to dismiss must be in accord with the law and
the evidence and not merely the whim or caprice of the employer. 10

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for failing to

show that respondent National Labor Relations Commission committed grave
abuse of discretion in arriving at its assailed decision dated March 10, 1994,
and order dated April 28, 1994.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 141702-03. August 2, 2001]
CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS, LTD., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and MARTHA Z.
SINGSON, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the 20 September
1999 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals declaring respondent Martha Z.
Singson illegally dismissed by petitioner Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd., and
thus should be reinstated with full back wages and awarded moral as well as
exemplary damages.
This petition traces its origin to two (2) petitions for certiorari under Rule 65
initially filed with the Supreme Court: Martha Z. Singson v. National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) and Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd., SP Case
No. 52104, and Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. National Labor Relations
Commission and Martha Z. Singson, SP Case No. 52105, which were
consolidated[2] and referred[3] to the Court of Appeals in consonance with the
St. Martin Funeral Homes doctrine.
Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. (CATHAY), is an international airline company
engaged in providing international flight services while Martha Z. Singson
was a cabin attendant of CATHAY hired in the Philippines on 24 September
1990 with home base in Hongkong.
On 26 August 1991 Singson was scheduled on a five (5)-day flight to London
but was unable to take the flights as she was feeling fatigued and exhausted
from her transfer to a new apartment with her husband. On 29 August 1991
she visited the company doctor, Dr. Emer Fahy, who examined and
diagnosed her to be suffering from a moderately severe asthma attack. She
was advised to take a Ventolin nebulizer and increase the medication she was
currently taking, an oral Prednisone (steroid). Dr Fahy thereafter conveyed to
Dr. John G. Fowler, Principal Medical Officer, her findings regarding
Singsons medical condition as a result of which she was evaluated as unfit
for flying due to her medical condition.
On 3 September 1991 Singson again visited Dr. Fahy during which time the
latter declared her condition to have vastly improved. However, later that
day, Cabin Crew Manager Robert J. Nipperess informed Singson that
CATHAY had decided to retire her on medical grounds effective
immediately based on the recommendation of Dr. Fowler and Dr. Fahy.
Martha Z. Singson was surprised with the suddenness of the notification but
nonetheless acknowledged it. Later, she met with Nipperess and inquired of
possible employment that entailed only ground duties within the
company. She was advised to meet with certain personnel who knew of the
employment requirements in other departments in the company, and to await
a possible offer from the company.
On 20 December 1991 Singson filed before the Labor Arbiter a complaint
against CATHAY for illegal dismissal, with prayer for actual, moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Efforts on initial settlement having
failed, trial followed.
Robert J. Nipperress and Dr. John G. Fowler appeared as witnesses for
CATHAY. Nipperess confirmed that the decision to retire respondent was
made upon the recommendation of Dr. Fowler. In turn, Dr. Fowler testified
that the affliction of respondent with asthma rendered her unfit to fly as it
posed aviation risks, i.e., asthma disabled her from properly performing her
cabin crew functions, specifically her air safety functions.
On the other hand, Singson presented herself and Dr. Benjamin Lazo, a
doctor in the country specializing in internal medicine and pulmonary
diseases. She denied being afflicted with asthma at any point in her life,
while Dr. Lazo confirmed the same declaring that at the time of his
examination of Singson he found her to be of normal condition.
On the basis of the evidence presented before him, Labor Arbiter Pablo C.
Espiritu Jr. declared CATHAY liable for illegal dismissal and ordered the
airline to pay Singson HK$531,150.80 representing full back wages and
privileges, HK$54,137.70 for undisputed benefits due her, HK$100,000.00 as
actual damages, HK$500.00 as moral damages, HK$500.00 as exemplary
damages, and HK$168,528.85 as attorneys fees. Furthermore, CATHAY was
ordered to reinstate Singson to her former position as airline stewardess
without loss of seniority rights, benefits and privileges.
On 19 March 1993 CATHAY appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to
the National Labor Relations Commission. On 29 December 1994 the NLRC
reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and declared valid Singsons
dismissal from service.[4] Relying on the testimony of Dr. Fowler and the
affidavit and medical records submitted by Dr. Fahy, admitted as newly-
discovered evidence, the NLRC found Singson to be indeed afflicted with
asthma that rendered her unfit to fly and perform cabin crew
functions. Consequently, the NLRC withdrew the back wages, moral and
exemplary damages awarded to Singson for lack of factual or legal basis. It
however ordered CATHAY to retain her services as ground stewardess, with
salaries and benefits, noting that she had been reinstated therein since 12
March 1993. In turn, Singson was granted the option to continue her
employment with CATHAY.
Thereafter, both parties filed their respective motions for
reconsideration[5] before the NLRC which on 31 August 1995 were denied for
lack of merit. Petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 were subsequently filed
by both parties before the Supreme Court which, after consolidation, were
referred to the Court of Appeals for resolution.[6]
Meanwhile, pursuant to the decision of the NLRC, Singson was reinstated as
cabin stewardess with ground duties on 12 March 1993 pending the
resolution of the petitions.
On 20 September 1999 the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the NLRC
and reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter declaring Singson to have
been illegally terminated. The appellate court anchored its judgment on the
following findings: First, Dr. Fowlers opinion about Singsons medical
condition was based on the personal examination of Dr. Fahy, and not his
own. The appellate court held that a personal and prolonged examination of a
patient was necessary and crucial before he or she could be properly
diagnosed as afflicted with asthma,[7] and thus Dr. Fowlers expert opinion
was unreliable and mere hearsay. Second, CATHAY disregarded Sec. 8, Rule
I, Book VI, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code [8] which
requires a certification by a competent public health authority when disease is
the reason for an employees separation from service, since it relied merely on
the diagnosis of its company doctors, Dr. Fowler and Dr. Fahy. Third,  the
NLRC erroneously relied on the affidavit executed by Dr. Fahy since she was
not personally presented as a witness to identify and testify on its
contents. Fourth, respondent passed the medical examination required of
prospective flight cabin attendants, the International Labor Organizations
Occupational Health and Safety in Civil Aviation examination, prior to her
employment and found to be fit for flight-related service. Fifth, CATHAY
failed to adequately prove the health standards required in aviation,
particularly the non-qualification of flight attendants afflicted with asthma to
flight-related service.[9]
Consequently, the appellate court awarded respondent full back wages with
reinstatement, as well as moral exemplary damages, while deleting the award
of actual damages reasoning that no undue damage inured to her since her
husband nonetheless remained in Hongkong managing two (2)
corporations. The appellate court however declared the option given to
respondent to continue her employment as a ground stewardess with
CATHAY to have been erroneously issued and consequently nullified the
same.
CATHAY now argues that the Court of Appeals should have confined its
inquiry to issues of want or excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of
discretion and not into the factual findings of the NLRC since the petition
before it was made under Rule 65.
This Court is not persuaded. CATHAYs petition for certiorari filed before the
Court of Appeals assailed specifically the judgment of the NLRC granting
respondent the choice to continue her employment with CATHAY as ground
stewardess as, in fact, she had been reinstated as such since 12 March
1993. On the other hand, respondents petition attacked the NLRC decision
declaring her dismissal valid and nullifying the award of damages in her
favor on the basis of Dr. Fowlers testimony and not Dr. Lazos. Consequently,
it was inevitable for the Court of Appeals to examine the evidence anew to
determine whether the factual findings of the NLRC were supported by the
evidence presented and the conclusions derived therefrom accurately
ascertained. As pointed out by the appellate court, this became even more
essential in view of the fact that there was a conflict of decision between the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. We thus find no error in the appellate courts
evaluation of the evidence despite the pleadings being petitions for certiorari
under Rule 65.
CATHAY next argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not admitting as
evidence the affidavit of Dr. Fahy. We agree. The appellate court may have
overlooked the principle in labor cases that the rules of evidence prevailing in
courts of law or equity are not always controlling. [10] It is not necessary that
affidavits and other documents presented conform to the technical rules of
evidence as the Court maintains a liberal stance regarding procedural
deficiencies in labor case.[11] Section 3, Rule V, of the New Rules of
procedure of the NLRC specifically allows parties to submit position papers
accompanied by all supporting documents including affidavits of their
respective witnesses which take the place of their testimonies.[12] Thus, the
fact that Dr. Fahy was not presented as witness to identify and testify on the
contents of her affidavit was not a fatal procedural flaw that affected the
admissibility of her affidavit as evidence.
The non-presentation of Dr. Fahy during the trial was duly explained she was
no longer connected with CATHAY and had transferred residence to
Ireland. It is for this same reason that we find no error in the NLRCs
admission of Dr. Fahys written medical notes as newly-discovered
evidence. Moreover, the submission of additional evidence before the NLRC
is not prohibited by the New Rule of Procedure of the NLRC, such
submissions not being prejudicial to the party for the latter could submit
counter-evidence.[13]
Notwithstanding the foregoing, we find Singson to have been illegally
dismissed from the service. Granting without admitting that indeed
respondent was suffering from asthma, this alone would not be valid ground
for CATHAY to dismiss her summarily. Section 8, Rule I, Book VI, of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code requires a certification by a
competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or at such
a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months even with
proper medical treatment.
In the instant case, no certification by competent public health authority was
presented by CATHAY. It dismissed Singson based only on the
recommendation of its company doctors who concluded that she was afflicted
with asthma. It did not likewise show proof that Singsons asthma could not
be cured in six (6) months even with proper medical treatment. On the
contrary, when Singson returned to the company clinic on 3 September 1991
or five (5) days after her initial examination on 29 August 1991, Dr. Fahy
diagnosed her condition to have vastly improved.
CATHAY could not take refuge in Clause 22 of the Conditions of Service it
entered into with Singson. Although a certification by a competent public
health authority is not required, still CATHAY is obliged to follow several
steps under the Conditions of Service before terminating its employee. The
pertinent part of Clause 22 thereof provides
Clause 22. Sick Leave. xxxx In case of serious illness the Company will
grant sick leave with full pay for the first three months and with 2/3 of pay
for the fourth month. Consideration will be given to granting the cabin crew
further sick leave, either with pay or off pay up to a further two months, or
retiring the cabin crew on medical ground xxxx
Thus, even on the assumption that asthma is a serious illness, this again
would not excuse CATHAY from ignoring procedure specified in its
employment contract with Singson. Under the contract, Cathay must first
allow Singson to take a leave of absence and not to terminate her services
right there and then. It is only after the employee has enjoyed four (4) months
of sick leave that the option to retire the employee based on medical ground
arises. In the instant case, Singson went to the company clinic on 29 August
1991. On 3 September 1991 she returned to the company clinic only to be
told that effective immediately she was dismissed on medical grounds.
We agree with the Court of Appeals in its award of moral and exemplary
damages to respondent. CATHAY summarily dismissed Singson from the
service based only on the recommendation of its medical officers, in effect,
failing to observe the provision of the Labor Code which requires a
certification by a competent public health authority. Notably, the decision to
dismiss Singson was reached after a single examination only. CATHAYs
medical officers recommended Singsons dismissal even after having
diagnosed her condition to have vastly improved. It did not make even a
token offer for Singson to take a leave of absence as what it provided in its
Contract of Service. CATHAY is presumed to know the law and the
stipulation in its Contract of Service with Singson.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 September
1999 declaring the dismissal of respondent Martha Z. Singson by petitioner
CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS, LTD. as illegal and ordering her
reinstatement to her former or an equivalent position without loss of seniority
rights, with full back wages and benefits, and to pay her HK$500.00 as moral
damages, HK$500.00 as exemplary damages plus ten percent (10%) of the
total monetary award as attorneys fees, is AFFIRMED. The amounts received
by respondent representing her six (6) months retirement gratuity and one (1)
month pay in lieu of notice should be DEDUCTED from respondents
computed back wages, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118943      September 10, 2001
MARIO HORNALES, petitioner,  promising that they would procure another job for him. Later, private
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, JOSE
CAYANAN AND JEAC INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT
CONTRACTOR SERVICES, respondents.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
It is sad enough that poverty has impelled many of our countrymen to seek
greener pastures in foreign lands. But what is more lamentable is when a
Filipino recruiter, after sending his unlettered countrymen to a foreign land
and letting them suffer inhuman treatment in the hand of an abusive
employer, connives with the foreign employer in denying them their rightful
compensation. Surely, there shall be a day of reckoning for such a recruiter
whose insatiable love for money made him a tyrant to his own race.
At bench is a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside
the (a) Decision1 dated July 28, 1994 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) reversing the Decision2 of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) in POEA Case No. (L) 92-07-
939,3 and (b) Resolution4 dated October 6, 1994 denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.1âwphi1.nêt
The facts as shown by the records are:
On July 15, 1992, Mario Hornales (herein petitioner) filed with the POEA a
complaint5 for non-payment of wages and recovery of damages against JEAC
International Management & Contractor Services (JEAC) and its owner, Jose
Cayanan (herein private respondents). As private respondents' surety,
Country Bankers Insurance Corporation (Country Bankers) was later on
impleaded by petitioner. The complaint alleged that on October 8, 1991,
private respondents sent petitioner, together with other Filipinos, to
Singapore. At their departure, they were advised that someone would meet
them in Singapore. True enough, they were welcomed by Victor Lim, the
owner of Step-Up Employment Agency (Step-Up Agency). 6 He informed
them that they would be working as fishermen with a monthly salary of US
$200.00 each. Thereafter, they boarded Ruey Horn #3, a vessel owned by
Min Fu Fishery Co. Ltd. of Taiwan.
On board the vessel, petitioner was subjected to inhumane work conditions,
like inadequate supply of food and water, maltreatment by the ship captain,
and lack of medical attendance. He was also required to work for twenty-two
hours a day without pay. Unable to bear his situation any longer, he joined
the other Filipino workers in leaving the vessel while it was docked at
Mauritius Islands on July 15, 1992.
Upon his return to the Philippines, petitioner asked private respondents to pay
his salaries. Instead of doing so, they required him to surrender his passport
respondents gave him the amount of five hundred pesos (P500.00).
Private respondents filed an answer7 claiming that, petitioner, Victor Lim and
Min Fee Fishery Co. Ltd are all "total strangers" to them. To bolster the
claim, they offered in evidence the Joint Affidavit8 of Efren B. Balucas and
Alexander C. Natura, petitioner's co-workers in Singapore, stating that while
they were in Singapore, petitioner admitted to them that he did not apply in
any agency in the Philippines; that he came to Singapore merely as a tourist;
and that, he applied directly and personally with Step-Up Agency. These
statements were corroborated by the "Certification"9 issued by Step-Up
Agency.
On January 23, 1993, petitioner filed a Supplemental Affidavit10 claiming that
he was not a "total stranger" to private respondents, and that, as a matter of
fact, he knew respondent Cayanan since 1990, when they used to go to the
San Lazaro Hippodrome to watch horse races. He also averred that while the
vessel was docked at Mauritius Islands on June 1992, respondent Cayanan
reminded him and his co-workers of their loan obligations by sending them
photocopies of the PNB checks he (respondent Cayanan) issued in favor of
their relatives, and the agreements whereby they authorized Victor Lim to
deduct from their salaries the amount of their loan obligations.
On January 5, 1994, the POEA rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents JEAC International
Management and Contractor Services, Jose E. Cayanan and Travellers
Insurance Corp. are hereby ordered, jointly and severally to pay complainant
the amount of US DOLLARS: ONE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FORTY
SIX AND 66/100 (US$ 1, 646.66) representing his unpaid salaries and US $
164.66 as and by way of attorney's fees. Payment shall be made in Philippine
Currency at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment.
For want of jurisdiction, the claim for moral and exemplary damages is
denied.
All other claims and counterclaims are denied.
SO ORDERED."11
Incidentally, the POEA dismissed petitioner's claim against Country Bankers
on the ground that the surety bond which was effective at the time of
petitioner's deployment was that of Travelers Insurance Corporation.
On appeal, respondent NLRC vacated the decision of the POEA and
dismissed petitioner's complaint mainly on the ground that there was no
employer-employee relationship between the parties. The NLRC ratiocinated
as follows:
"At the outset, we note that the record is bereft of any showing that
complainant applied with the respondent agency as a job applicant and
subsequently entered into an overseas contract with the latter which was later
processed and approved by the POEA. X x x What appears is that
complainant used the agency as a stepping stone to enter Singapore as a
tourist and obtain employment thereat on his own. This is evidenced by
Annexes "A-1 " to '"H" of Complainant's Reply (See pp. 65-72, record)
which purports to show that the batch of complainant was obligated to pay
back respondent Jose Cayanan the expenses for their deployment. No less
than the POEA noted that the respondent agency "is a service contractor and
is not authorized to deploy fishermen." Based on this fact, the respondent
agency could not have deployed complainant as an overseas contract worker.
What is apparent is that it obtained a tourist passport and plane ticket for
complainant as a travel agent on a clearly "fly now pay later" plan.
We cannot rely on the employment agreements and checks (See pp. 66-67,
record) presented by complainant to show proof of employment relations
considering that his name does not appear in any of the documents, hence
they are merely hearsay."12
In reversing the POEA's finding, respondent NLRC gave considerable weight
to the Joint Affidavit of Natura and Balucas.
Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Petitioner now comes to this Court via a petition for certiorari, imputing
grave abuse of discretion to public respondent NLRC. He asserts that private
respondents were the ones who deployed him to Singapore to work as
fisherman; and that, respondent NLRC's conclusion that respondent JEAC
was a mere "travel agency" and petitioner, a mere tourist, has no basis in fact
and in law.
For their part, private respondents maintain that respondent NLRC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion when it set aside the decision of the POEA,
since petitioner failed to show any POEA record or document to prove that
they deployed him to work in Singapore. Neither did he present a Special
Power of Attorney to prove that Step-Up Agency authorized private
respondents to recruit and deploy contract workers in its behalf nor
an Affidavit of Responsibility to show that they (private respondents and
Step-Up Agency) assumed solidary liability to petitioner.13 Private
respondents likewise insist that the photocopies of the PNB
checks and agreements are hearsay and inadmissible in evidence.
The Solicitor General, in his comment, 14 joins petitioner in assailing the
decision of respondent NLRC as "baseless and erroneous." According to him,
the conclusion of respondent NLRC directly contradicts private respondents'
defense that petitioner was a "total stranger." Further, he contends that
the Joint Affidavit of Balucas and Natura are hearsay.
The cardinal issue in this case hinges on the question - Are private
respondents responsible for petitioner's recruitment and deployment to
Singapore?
Let us take a closer look at the scale of evidence.
On one arm of the scale are petitioner's evidence consisting of photocopies of
the PNB checks and agreementswhich were intended to disprove private
respondents' claim that petitioner, Victor Lim and Step-Up Agency are "total
strangers." The PNB checks represent the payments made by respondent
Cayanan to the relatives of petitioner's co-workers (including Balucas and
Natura). The checks show the name of LIM Chang Koo &/or Jose
Cayanan, as drawers. While the agreements, denominated "For Fisherman
Deployed For Work To Singapore,"constitute authorization to Victor Lim to
deduct from the monthly salaries of the workers the amounts of their
obligations to private respondents. Petitioner's own undertaking to private
respondents reads:
"I hereby certify that my expenses abroad in going to Singapore as fisherman
amounting to SIXTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P16,000.00) shall be
temporarily shouldered by JEAC INT'L MGT & CONT. SERVICES and
as soon as I arrive in Singapore, said amount will be charged by MR.
VICTOR LIM and will be remitted to Eng. Jose E. Cayanan.
(Sgd.) Mario Hornales
F. CREW" 15
On the other side of the scale are the Joint Affidavit secured by private
respondents from petitioner's co-workers, Balucas and Natura, and
a Certification issued by Step-Up Agency. These evidence were intended to
prove the alleged admission of petitioner to Balucas and Natura that he went
as a tourist to Singapore and that he applied directly with Step-Up Agency.
The Certification of Step-Up Agency re-echoes the allegations in the Joint
Affidavit.
The scale of evidence must tilt in favor of petitioner.
In a catena of labor cases, this Court has consistently held that where the
adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants,
affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiant
themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. 16 Private
respondents' Joint Affidavit has no probative value. It suffers from two
infirmities, first, petitioner was not given the opportunity to cross-examine
the two affiants regarding the contents thereof, and second, the two affiants
merely swore as to what petitioner told them but not as to the truth of the
statements uttered.17
In the same vein, the Certification must not be given weight. Private
respondents not only failed to present Victor Lim before the POEA to be
cross-examined by petitioner, but the Certification was also not verified or
under oath.18 To our mind, it is just a last-ditch attempt on the part of Step-Up
Agency to help private respondents free themselves from liability to
petitioner. It bears noting that private respondents, Victor Lim and Step-Up
Agency, as shown by petitioner's evidence, acted in concert in his
deployment to Singapore. Hence, such certification is, at most, self-serving.
On the other hand, the PNB Checks and the agreements presented by
petitioner strongly disprove private respondents' total strangers" theory .It
may be observed that, in their attempt to exculpate themselves from monetary
liability, private respondents adopted an extreme position, i.e., that they have
nothing to do with petitioner, Victor Lim and Step-Up Agency. Such strategy
proved to be disastrous to them. The mere presentation of documents bearing
private respondents' names and that of Step-Up Agency and Victor Lim is
enough to defeat their theory. More so, when the documetary evidence
consist of bank checks showing the existence of a joint account, and
authorization agreements revealing a contract of agency.
Private respondents' argument that petitioner's evidence are mere,
photocopies and therefore cannot be considered as the best evidence on the
issue does not persuade us. The best evidence rule enshrined in the Revised
Rules on Evidence provides that "when the subject of an inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself."19 This rule is not without exception. Some of the
exception are when the original has been lost or destroyed; cannot be
produced in court without bad faith on the part of the offeror; or when the
original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice.20 It would be unreasonable to demand from petitioner the presentation
of the original PNB Checks considering that it is a banking practice that for a
check to be encashed, the same must be surrendered to the bank first. These
checks are, therefore, most likely in the possession of the bank. As to
the agreements, it is reasonable to conclude that respondent Cayanan was the
one in possession of the originals thereof. It maybe recalled that
these agreements were executed by the workers for his security and benefit.
At any rate, it is worthy to note that private respondents did not disown
the PNB checks nor deny the existence of the agreements.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it must be emphasized that the proceedings
before the POEA is non-litigious in nature. The technicalities of law and
procedure and the rules obtaining in the courts of law shall not strictly apply
thereto and a hearing officer may avail himself of all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts of the case.21 On the applicability of the Rules of Court to
labor cases, the Supreme Court has ruled in Shoemart, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission22:
"The argument cannot be sustained. Whatever merit it might have in the
context of ordinary civil actions, where the rules of evidence apply with more
or less strictness, disappears when adduced in connection with proceedings
before Labor Arbiters and the National Labor Relations Commission; for in
said proceedings, the law is explicit that 'the rules of evidence prevailing in
courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the (law's) spirit and
intention that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall
use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or
procedure, all in the interest of due process.' Indeed, it is not the Rules of
Court enacted by the Supreme Court but rather the regulations promulgated
by the National Labor Relations Commission which govern "the hearing and
disposition of cases before it and its regional branches**.' The 'Revised Rules
of Court of the Philippines and prevailing jurisprudence,' the law says, may
be applied to labor cases only under quite stringent limits, i.e., 'in the absence
of any applicable provision (in the Rules of the Commission), and in order to
effectuate the objectives of the Labor Code**, in the interest of expeditious
labor justice and whenever practicable and convenient, by analogy or in a
suppletory character and effect." Under these rules, the proceedings before a
Labor Arbiter are 'non-litigious in nature' in which, 'subject to the
requirements of due process, the technicalities of law and procedure and the
rules obtaining in the courts of law ** (do not) strictly apply."
Undoutedly, the factual and legal bases of respondent NLRC's conclusions
are bereft of substantial evidence - the quantum of proof in labor cases. As
aptly said by the Solicitor General, its decision is "baseless and erroneous."
Its disposition is manifestly a grave abuse of discretion.23
In concluding that respondent JEAC was a mere "travel agency" and
petitioner, a mere "tourist, " respondent NLRC came up with a new theory
which find no support even from the evidence of private respondents, the
party in whose favor the decision was rendered. First, there is nothing in the
record which shows that respondent JEAC is a mere travel agency. Even
private respondents consistently plead that respondent JEAC is a "licensed
recruitment agency authorized to recruit and deploy overseas Filipino
contract workers."
Second, the evidence upon which respondent NLRC based its findings
consist of agreements authorizing Victor Lim to deduct from the salaries of
petitioner and his co-workers the amount of their obligations to respondent
Cayanan. It would be too much of a coincidence to say that petitioner and his
co-workers are all mere tourists who allowed a certain Victor Lim to deduct
from their salaries the amount of their obligations to respondent Cayanan.
What is evident here is that there is an internal arrangement between
respondent Cayanan and Victor Lim brought about by the fact that the former
deployed these workers to serve the latter. As correctly pointed out by the
POEA, there must be a "previous arrangement" between private respondents
and Victor Lim.
Significantly, from these pieces of evidence respondent NLRC could already
see the falsity in private respondents' "total strangers" theory. How could
there be an arrangement between two persons who do not know each other?
Note how respondent NLRC conveniently closed its eye to the name of
Victor Lim, as mentioned in theagreements, when it ruled that Victor Lim
and Step-Up Agency are indeed " total strangers" to private respondents. We
sustain the findings of the POEA, being more convincing and supported by
substantial evidence, thus:
"[C]omplainant applied at the office of respondent agency and was able to
seek employment in Singapore through Engineer Jose Cayanan, owner of
respondent agency. Complainant's allegations are supported by the Annexes
he attached to his Reply (Annexes "'A" to "H"). These documents readily
show that it was not only complainant who was recruited by respondent
agency through Engr. Cayanan and as agreed upon, the expenses in going to
Singapore shall be advanced by respondents. Thus their loans payable to
Engr. Cayanan and charged against their salaries. The checks representing
the salaries of the complainant and his co-workers show that they are
drawn from the account of Lim Chang Khoo and/or Jose Gayanan.
From the foregoing, it is properly noted that complainant's salaries were
taken from the funds of respondents which means that the latter had a
hand or participated in his recruitment and deployment.
We cannot give credence to respondents' contentions that complainant is
a total stranger to them and that MIN Fee Fishery Co. Ltd. is not its
principal, neither do we believe that respondents do not know Mr. Victor
Lim who met complainant in Singapore. Annex "B" in respondents'
position paper belies respondents' contentions. How could respondents
write to a certain Step Up Employment Agency in Singapore,
complainant's employer, when the latter is not even mentioned in his
complaint? We wonder where respondents got the name of this employer
if the same is really not known to them.
It is very unlikely for complainant to proceed to Singapore as a tourist
without knowing anybody at the site and just to apply for work. Had
there not been previous arrangements with respondents, it is not all
possible for complainant to land on a job in Singapore because he is only
a tourist.
Respondents had to resort to this misrepresentation of allowing its recruits to
leave as tourist because it is a service contractor and it is not authorized to
deploy fishermen."24
Private respondents further argue that they cannot be held liable by petitioner
because no employment contract between him and Step-Up Agency had been
approved by the POEA. They also claim that the absence of aSpecial Power
of Attorney and an Affidavit of Responsibility, as required under Sections 1
and 2, Rule 1, Book III of the POEA Rules and Regulations25 only proves
that they did not deploy petitioner to Singapore.
Their argument is far from persuasive. Surely, they cannot expect us to utilize
their non-compliance with the POEA Rules and Regulations as a basis in
absolving them. To do so would be tantamount to giving premium to acts
done in violation of established rules. At most, private respondents' act of
deploying petitioner to Singapore without complying with the POEA
requirements only made them susceptible to cancellation or suspension of
license as provided by Section 2, Rule I, Book VI of POEA Rules and
Regulations:
SEC.2.Grounds for suspension/cancellation of license.
x x x      x x x
m. Deploying workers whose employment and travel documents were not
processed by the Administration;
n. Deploying workers workers or seafarers to vessels or principals not
accredited by the Administration;
But of course, such violations should be threshed out in a proper
administrative proceeding for suspension or cancellation of license.
Meantime, we just uphold POEA's Decision holding private respondents and
Travelers Insurance Corporation jointly and severally liable to petitioner.
Section 2 (e), Rule V, Book I of the Omnibus Rules lmplementing the Labor
Code requires a private employment agency to assume all responsibilities for
the implementation of the contract of employment of an overseas
worker.26 This provision is substantially reiterated in Section 1 (f) (3) of Rule
II, Book II of the POEA Rules and Regulations which provides:
"Section 1. Requirements for Issuance of License - Every applicant for
license to operate a private employment agency or manning agency shall
submit a written application together with the following requirements:
x x x      x x x
f) a verified undertaking stating that the applicant:
xxx
(3) shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer which may
arise in connection with the implementation of the contract, including but not
limited to payment of wages, health and disability compensation and
repatriation.
With respect to private respondents' surety, its liability is founded on Section
4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and Regulations. Cash and surety
bonds are required by the POEA from recruitment and employment
companies precisely as a means of ensuring prompt and effective recourse
against such companies when held liable for applicant's or worker's claims.
The cash and surety bonds shall answer for all valid and legal claims arising
from violations of the conditions for the grant and use of the license, and/or
accreditations and contracts of employment. The bonds shall likewise
guarantee compliance with the provisions of the Code and its implementing
rules and regulations relating to recruitment and placement, the POEA Rules
and relevant issuances of the Department and all liabilities which the POEA
may impose.27
Accordingly, we find it proper to reinstate the Decision dated January 5, 1994
of the POEA subject to the modification that the amount of P16,000, the
amount which petitioner admitted to have been advanced by respondent
JEAC for his expenses in going to Singapore 28 be deducted from the total
amount to be awarded to him which includes a) US$ 1,646.66 corresponding
to his unpaid salaries and b) attorney's fees. The award of attorney's fees
amounting to ten percent (10%) of the total award is justified under Article
111 (a) of the Labor Code. The solidary liability of Travelers Insurance
Corp., as surety of respondent JEAC, is maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the respondent
NLRC's a) Decision dated July 28, 1994, andb) Resolution dated October 6,
1994 are SET ASIDE. The Decision of POEA Administrator Felicisimo O.
Joson in POEA Case No. (L) 92-07-939 is REINSTATED with
the MODIFICATION that the sum of P16,000.00 be deducted from the total
amount to be awarded to petitioner. 1âwphi1.nêt
Payment should be made in Philippine currency at the prevailing rate of
exchange at the time of payment.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 126625 September 18, 1997
KANLAON CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES CO., INC., petitioner,  respondents and agreed to pay their wage differentials and thirteenth-month
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, 5TH DIVISION,
and BENJAMIN RELUYA, JR., EDGARDO GENAYAS, ERNESTO
CANETE, PROTACIO ROSALES, NESTOR BENOYA, RODOLFO
GONGOB, DARIO BINOYA, BENJAMIN BASMAYOR, ABELARDO
SACURA, FLORENCIO SACURA, ISABELO MIRA, NEMESIO
LACAR, JOSEPH CABIGKIS, RODRIGO CILLON, VIRGILIO
QUIZON, GUARINO EVANGELISTA, ALEJANDRO GATA,
BENEDICTO CALAGO, NILO GATA, DIONISIO PERMACIO,
JUANITO SALUD, ADOR RIMPO, FELIPE ORAEZ, JULIETO
TEJADA, TEOTIMO LACIO, ONOFRE QUIZON, RUDY ALVAREZ,
CRESENCIO FLORES, ALFREDO PERMACIO, CRESENCIO
ALVIAR, HERNANI SURILLA, DIOSDADO SOLON, CENON
ALBURO, ZACARIAS ORTIZ, EUSEBIO BUSTILLO, GREGORIO
BAGO, JERRY VARGAS, EDUARDO BUENO, PASCUAL HUDAYA,
ROGELIO NIETES, and REYNALDO NIETES, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Kanlaon Construction Enterprises
Co., Inc. seeks to annul the decision of respondent National Labor Relations
Commission, Fifth Division and remand the cases to the Arbitration Branch
for a retrial on the merits.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the construction business
nationwide with principal office at No. 11 Yakan St., La Vista Subdivision,
Quezon City. In 1988, petitioner was contracted by the National Steel
Corporation to construct residential houses for its plant employees in
Steeltown, Sta. Elena, Iligan City. Private respondents were hired by
petitioner as laborers in the project and worked under the supervision of
Engineers Paulino Estacio and Mario Dulatre. In 1989, the project neared its
completion and petitioner started terminating the services of private
respondents and its other employees.
In 1990, private respondents filed separate complaints against petitioner
before Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City. Numbering forty-
one (41) in all, they claimed that petitioner paid them wages below the
minimum and sought payment of their salary differentials and thirteenth-
month pay. Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were named co-respondents.
Some of the cases were assigned to Labor Arbiter Guardson A. Siao while
the others were assigned to Labor Arbiter Nicodemus G. Palangan.
Summonses and notices of preliminary conference were issued and served on
the two engineers and petitioner through Engineer Estacio. The preliminary
conferences before the labor arbiters were attended by Engineers Estacio and
Dulatre and private respondents. At the conference of June 11, 1990 before
Arbiter Siao, Engineer Estacio admitted petitioner's liability to private
pay on June 19, 1990. As a result of this agreement, Engineer Estacio
allegedly waived petitioner's right to file its position paper.  1 Private
respondents declared that they, too, were dispensing with their position
papers and were adopting their complaints as their position paper. 2
On June 19, 1990, Engineer Estacio appeared but requested for another week
to settle the claims. Labor Arbiter Siao denied this request. On June 21, 1990,
Arbiter Siao issued an order granting the complaint and directing petitioner to
pay private respondents' claims. Arbiter Siao held:
xxx xxx xxx
Considering the length of time that has elapsed since these cases were filed,
and what the complainants might think as to how this branch operates and/or
conducts its proceedings as they are now restless, this Arbiter has no other
alternative or recourse but to order the respondent to pay the claims of the
complainants, subject of course to the computation of the Fiscal Examiner II
of this Branch pursuant to the oral manifestation of respondent. The Supreme
Court ruled: "Contracts though orally made are binding on the parties." (Lao
Sok v. Sabaysabay, 138 SCRA 134).
Similarly, this Branch would present in passing that "a court cannot decide a
case without facts either admitted or agreed upon by the parties or proved by
evidence." (Yu Chin Piao v. Lim Tuaco, 33 Phil. 92; Benedicto v. Yulo, 26
Phil. 160)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent is hereby ordered to pay
the individual claims of the above-named complainants representing their
wage differentials within ten (10) days from receipt of this order.
The Fiscal Examiner II of this Branch is likewise hereby ordered to compute
the individual claims of the herein complainants.
SO ORDERED. 3
On June 29, 1990, Arbiter Palangan issued a similar order, thus:
When the above-entitled cases were called for hearing on June 19, 1990 at
10:00 a.m. respondent thru their representative manifested that they were
willing to pay the claims of the complainants and promised to pay the same
on June 28, 1990 at 10:30 a.m.
However, when these cases were called purposely to materialize the promise
of the respondent, the latter failed to appear without any valid reason.
Considering therefore that the respondent has already admitted the claims of
the complainants, we believe that the issues raised herein have become moot
and academic.
WHEREFORE premises considered, the above-entitled cases are hereby
ordered Closed and Terminated, however, the respondent is hereby ordered to
pay the complainants their differential pay and 13th-month pay within a
period of ten (10) days from receipt hereof based on the employment record
on file with the respondent.
SO ORDERED. 4
Petitioner appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission. It
alleged that it was denied due process and that Engineers Estacio and Dulatre
had no authority to represent and bind petitioner. Petitioner's appeal was filed
by one Atty. Arthur Abundiente.
In a decision dated April 27, 1992, respondent Commission affirmed the
orders of the Arbiters.
Petitioner interposed this petition alleging that the decision of respondent
Commission was rendered without jurisdiction and in grave abuse of
discretion. Petitioner claims that:
I
THE QUESTIONED DECISION RENDERED BY THE HONORABLE
COMMISSION IS A NULLITY, IT HAVING BEEN ISSUED WITHOUT
JURISDICTION;
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
ARBITRARILY, CAPRICIOUSLY AND WHIMSICALLY MAKING THE
FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS BASED NOT ON FACTS AND BUT ON
SPECULATION, SURMISE AND EVIDENCE CONJECTURE:
A. Petitioner was deprived of the constitutional right to due process of law
when it was adjudged by the NLRC liable without trial on the merits and
without its knowledge;
B. The NLRC erroneously, patently and unreasonably interpreted the
principle that the NLRC and its Arbitration Branch are not strictly bound by
the rules of evidence;
C. There is no legal nor actual basis in the NLRC's ruling that petitioner is
already in estoppel to disclaim the authority of its alleged representatives.
D. The NLRC committed manifest error in relying merely on private,
respondents' unsubstantiated complaints to hold petitioner liable for
damages. 5
In brief, petitioner alleges that the decisions of the labor arbiters and
respondent Commission are void for the following reasons: (1) there was no
valid service of summons; (2) Engineers Estacio and Dulatre and Atty.
Abundiente had no authority to appear and represent petitioner at the
hearings before the arbiters and on appeal to respondent Commission; (3) the
decisions of the arbiters and respondent Commission are based on
unsubstantiated and self-serving evidence and were rendered in violation of
petitioner's right to due process.
Service of summons in cases filed before the labor arbiters is governed by
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule IV of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC.
They provide:
Sec. 4. Service of Notices and Resolutions. — (a) Notices or summons and
copies of orders, resolutions or decisions shall be served on the parties to the
case personally by the bailiff or duly authorized public officer within three
(3) days from receipt thereof or by registered mail; Provided that where a
party is represented by counsel or authorized representative, service shall be
made on such counsel or authorized representative; provided further that in
cases of decision and final awards, copies thereof shall be served on both the
parties and their counsel; provided finally, that in case where the parties are
so numerous, service shall be made on counsel and upon such number of
complainants as may be practicable, which shall be considered substantial
compliance with Article 224 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. Proof and completeness of service. — The return is prima facie proof
of the facts indicated therein.Service by registered mail is complete upon
receipt by the addressee or his agent. . . .
Under the NLRC Rules of Procedure, summons on the respondent shall be
served personally or by registered mail on the party himself. If the party is
represented by counsel or any other authorized representative or agent,
summons shall be served on such person.
It has been established that petitioner is a private domestic corporation with
principal address in Quezon City. The complaints against petitioner were
filed in Iligan City and summonses therefor served on Engineer Estacio in
Iligan City. The question now is whether Engineer Estacio was an agent and
authorized representative of petitioner.
To determine the scope or meaning of the term "authorized representative" or
"agent" of parties on whom summons may be served, the provisions of the
Revised Rules of Court may be resorted to. 6
Under the Revised Rules of Court, 7 service upon a private domestic
corporation or partnership must be made upon its officers, such as the
president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. These
persons are deemed so integrated with the corporation that they know their
responsibilities and immediately discern what to do with any legal papers
served on them. 8
In the case at bar, Engineer Estacio, assisted by Engineer Dulatre, managed
and supervised the construction project.  9 According to the Solicitor General
and private respondents, Engineer Estacio attended to the project in Iligan
City and supervised the work of the employees thereat. As manager, he had
sufficient responsibility and discretion to realize the importance of the legal
papers served on him and to relay the same to the president or other
responsible officer of petitioner. Summons for petitioner was therefore
validly served on him.
Engineer Estacio's appearance before the labor arbiters and his promise to
settle the claims of private respondents is another matter.
The general rule is that only lawyers are allowed to appear before the labor
arbiter and respondent Commission in cases before them. The Labor Code
and the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, nonetheless, lists three (3)
exceptions to the rule, viz:
Sec. 6. Appearances. — . . . .
A non-lawyer may appear before the Commission or any Labor Arbiter only
if:
(a) he represents himself as party to the case;
(b) he represents the organization or its members, provided that he shall be
made to present written proof that he is properly authorized; or
(c) he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly recognized by
the Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases
referred thereto by the latter. . . . 10
A non-lawyer may appear before the labor arbiters and the NLRC only if: (a)
he represents himself as a party to the case; (b) he represents an organization
or its members, with written authorization from them: or (c) he is a duly-
accredited member of any legal aid office duly recognized by the Department
of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases referred to by the
latter. 11
Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were not lawyers. Neither were they duly-
accredited members of a legal aid office. Their appearance before the labor
arbiters in their capacity as parties to the cases was authorized under the first
exception to the rule. However, their appearance on behalf of petitioner
required written proof of authorization. It was incumbent upon the arbiters to
ascertain this authority especially since both engineers were named co-
respondents in the cases before the arbiters. Absent this authority, whatever
statements and declarations Engineer Estacio made before the arbiters could
not bind petitioner.
The appearance of Atty. Arthur Abundiente in the cases appealed to
respondent Commission did not cure Engineer Estacio's representation. Atty.
Abundiente, in the first place, had no authority to appear before the
respondent Commission. The appellants' brief he filed was verified by him,
not by petitioner. 12 Moreover, respondent Commission did not delve into the
merits of Atty. Abundiente's appeal and determine whether Engineer Estacio
was duly authorized to make such promise. It dismissed the appeal on the
ground that notices were served on petitioner and that the latter was estopped
from denying its promise to pay.
Nevertheless, even assuming that Engineer Estacio and Atty. Abundiente
were authorized to appear as representatives of petitioner, they could bind the
latter only in procedural matters before the arbiters and respondent
Commission. Petitioner's liability arose from Engineer Estacio's alleged
promise to pay. A promise to pay amounts to an offer to compromise and
requires a special power of attorney or the express consent of petitioner. The
authority to compromise cannot be lightly presumed and should be duly
established by evidence.13 This is explicit from Section 7 of Rule III of the
NLRC Rules of Procedure, viz:
Sec. 7. Authority to bind party. — Attorneys and other representatives of
parties shall have authority to bind their clients in all matters of procedure;
but they cannot, without a special power of attorney or express consent, enter
into a compromise agreement with the opposing party in full or partial
discharge of a client's claim.
The promise to pay allegedly made by Engineer Estacio was made at the
preliminary conference and constituted an offer to settle the case amicably.
The promise to pay could not be presumed to be a single unilateral act,
contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General. 14 A defendant's promise to pay
and settle the plaintiff's claims ordinarily requires a reciprocal obligation
from the plaintiff to withdraw the complaint and discharge the defendant
from liability. 15 In effect, the offer to pay was an offer to compromise the
cases.
In civil cases, an offer to compromise is not an admission of any liability, and
is not admissible in evidence against the offeror. 16 If this rule were otherwise,
no attempt to settle litigation could safely be made. 17 Settlement of disputes
by way of compromise is an accepted and desirable practice in courts of law
and administrative tribunals. 18 In fact, the Labor Code mandates the labor
arbiter to exert all efforts to enable the parties to arrive at an amicable aside and the case is remanded to the Regional Arbitration Branch, Iligan
settlement of the dispute within his jurisdiction on or before the first City for further proceedings.
hearing. 19
SO ORDERED.
Clearly, respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion in affirming
the decisions of the labor arbiters which were not only based on unauthorized
representations, but were also made in violation of petitioner's right to due
process.

Section 3 of Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure provides:

Sec. 3. Submission of Position Papers/Memorandum. — Should the parties

fail to agree upon an amicable settlement, in whole or in part, during the
conferences, the Labor Arbiter shall issue an order stating therein the matters
taken up and agreed upon during the conferences and directing the parties to
simultaneously file their respective verified position papers

xxx xxx xxx

After petitioner's alleged representative failed to pay the workers' claims as

promised, Labor Arbiters Siao and Palangan did not order the parties to file
their respective position papers. The arbiters forthwith rendered a decision on
the merits without at least requiring private respondents to substantiate their
complaints. The parties may have earlier waived their right to file position
papers but petitioner's waiver was made by Engineer Estacio on the premise
that petitioner shall have paid and settled the claims of private respondents at
the scheduled conference. Since petitioner reneged on its "promise," there
was a failure to settle the case amicably. This should have prompted the
arbiters to order the parties to file their position papers.

Article 221 of the Labor Code mandates that in cases before labor arbiters
and respondent Commission, they "shall use every and all reasonable means
to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard
to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process." The
rule that respondent Commission and the Labor Arbiters are not bound by
technical rules of evidence and procedure should not be interpreted so as to
dispense with the fundamental and essential right of due process. 20 And this
right is satisfied, at the very least, 'when the parties are given the opportunity
to submit position papers. 21 Labor Arbiters Siao and Palangan erred in
dispensing with this requirement.

Indeed, the labor arbiters and the NLRC must not, at the expense of due
process, be the first to arbitrarily disregard specific provisions of the Rules
which are precisely intended to assist the parties in obtaining the just,
expeditious and inexpensive settlement of labor disputes. 22

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of

the National Labor Relations Commission, Fifth Division, is annulled and set

FIRST DIVISION
 
GOVERNMENT SERVICE G.R. No. 166556
INSURANCE SYSTEM,
Petitioner, Present:
 
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
LUZ M. BAUL, Promulgated:
Respondent.
July 31, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
 
DECISION
 
 
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
 
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the May 31, 2004
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76461 which
reversed the Decision[2] of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC)
in ECC Case No. GM-12984-202 denying the claim for compensation
benefits of Luz M. Baul under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 626, as
amended.
 
Luz M. Baul was employed by the Department of Education and Culture and
Sports (DECS), Tarlac South District, as an elementary school teacher
on August 1, 1962.
Medical records show that due to extreme dizziness, headache, chest pain,
slurred speech, vomiting and general body weakness, she was admitted to the
St. Martin de Porres Hospital inside Hacienda Luisita, San Miguel, Tarlac
from July 1 to 9, 1993. Dr. Salvador A. Fontanilla, the medical director of the
hospital, diagnosed her illness as Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease
(HCVD)-Essential Hypertension. Prognosis was poor and guarded.[3] To
monitor her health condition, she had frequent consultation and treatment as
an outpatient until her compulsory retirement on May 2, 1998.[4]
 
On January 19 to 20, 1999, Luz was
the Ramos General Hospital in Ligtasan, Tarlac City. Dr. Conrado M.
Orquiola, a cardiologist, corroborated the earlier findings of Dr. Fontanilla
that she had a HCVD. On May 17, 1999, she consulted Dr. Ernesto Cunanan,
an internal medicine specialist, and the doctor noted that her hypertension
had worsened to Transient Ischemic Attack (TIA), Essential Hypertension
Stage III (moderate to severe hypertension). Eventually, on April 17, 2000,
she suffered from a Cerebro-Vascular Accident (CVA), i.e., stroke, and was
rushed to the Ramos General Hospital where she stayed for four days under
the medical supervision of Dr. Orquiola and Dr. Albert Lapid, a neurologist.
[5]
 The CT Scan result revealed the impression ischemic infarct, right occipital
lobe.[6]
Convinced that her hypertension supervened by reason and in the course of
her employment with the DECS and persisted even after her retirement, she
filed a claim on June 10, 1999 before the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), Tarlac Branch, for disability and hospital medical benefits
under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 626, as amended.[7]
 
On August 15, 2001, GSIS Tarlac Branch Manager Amando A. Inocentes
denied petitioners claim due to the alleged absence of proof to confirm that
there was a resulting permanent disability due to hypertension prior to
retirement.[8]
 
In its January 23, 2003 decision, the Employees Compensation Commission
(ECC) sustained the conclusions of the GSIS,[9] holding that although
hypertension is among the listed compensable illnesses in Annex A of the
Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, its compensability is
qualified. The ECC declared that petitioner failed to establish that her
hypertension had caused an impairment of body organ functions resulting in
permanent disability. In the same way, even if her CVA is an occupational
disease under No. 19 of Annex A of the Amended Rules of the ECC, she
failed to show the existence of such conditions as required by the Rules.
 
Luz filed a petition for review with the CA for the reversal of the ECC
decision. On May 31, 2004, the appellate court reversed the ECC ruling and
ordered the GSIS to pay petitioner the benefits corresponding to permanent
partial disability before retirement and permanent total disability after
retirement benefits.[10] The CA ruled that probability, not certainty, is the
touchstone of workmens compensation. Since hypertension is listed as a
compensable occupational disease, it is presumed that such illness is
reasonably work-connected. Petitioner had proved by substantial evidence
that her hypertension was work-related; it emanated from the stress caused by
the mental strain of teaching many pupils aside from the loads of obligations
and responsibilities appurtenant to the profession.
 
The ECC filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[11] which the CA denied.[12]
The GSIS, now petitioner, sought relief in this Court via a petition for review
on certiorari. Petitioner insists that the ruling of the CA rests on mere
presumptions, and points out that an award of disability benefits cannot
depend on surmises and conjectures. The beneficiary must present evidence
confined at to prove that the illness was caused by employment or that the working
conditions increased the risk of contracting the disease. Also, there is no
showing that respondents ailment is at all considered permanent partial or
total disability by the GSIS and approved by the ECC medical groups.
 
Petitioner also claims that the Court must respect the findings of quasi-
judicial agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under
their special technical knowledge and training. In this case, respondent failed
to file the claim before retirement and adduce evidence to prove
compensability of her illness; there was no such finding of permanent partial
or total disability at the time of her retirement. Moreover, her sickness, which
developed after her retirement, could not be attributed to her former
occupation but to factors independent thereof.
The petition is denied.
 
Cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are considered as
occupational diseases under Nos. 19 and 29, respectively, of Annex A of the
Implementing Rules of P.D. No. 626, as amended. Thus, it is not necessary
that there be proof of causal relation between the work and the illness which
resulted in the respondents disability. The open-ended Table of Occupational
Diseases requires no proof of causation. In general, a covered claimant
suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.[13]
 
However, although cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are
listed occupational diseases, their compensability requires compliance with
all the conditions set forth in the Rules. In short, both
are qualified occupational diseases. For cerebro-vascular accident, the
claimant must prove the following: (1) there must be a history, which should
be proved, of trauma at work (to the head specifically) due to unusual and
extraordinary physical or mental strain or event, or undue exposure to
noxious gases in industry; (2) there must be a direct connection between the
trauma or exertion in the course of the employment and the cerebro-vascular
attack; and (3) the trauma or exertion then and there caused a brain
hemorrhage. On the other hand, essential hypertension is compensable only if
it causes impairment of function of body organs like kidneys, heart, eyes and
brain, resulting in permanent disability, provided that, the following
documents substantiate it: (a) chest X-ray report; (b) ECG report; (c) blood
chemistry report; (d) funduscopy report; and (e) C-T scan.
 
The degree of proof required to validate the concurrence of the above-
mentioned conditions under P.D. No. 626 is merely substantial evidence, that
is, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection
and not direct causal relation. It is enough that the hypothesis on which the
workmens claim is based is probable. [14] As correctly pointed out by the CA,
probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in
compensation proceedings.[15] For, in interpreting and carrying out the
provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations,
the primordial and paramount consideration is the employees welfare. To
safeguard the workers rights, any doubt as to the proper interpretation and
application must be resolved in their favor.[16]
In the instant case, medical reports and drug prescriptions of respondents
attending physicians sufficiently support her claim for disability benefits.
Neither the GSIS nor the ECC convincingly deny their genuineness and due
execution. The reports are made part of the record and there is no showing
that they are false or erroneous, or resorted to as a means of deceiving the
Court, hence, are entitled to due probative weight. The failure of respondent
to submit to a full medical examination, as required by the rules, to
substantiate her essential hypertension, is of no moment. The law is that
laboratory reports such as X-ray and ECG are not indispensable prerequisites
to compensability,[17] the reason being that the strict rules of evidence need
not be observed in claims for compensation.[18] Medical findings of the
attending physician may be received in evidence and used as proof of the fact
in dispute.[19] The doctors certification as to the nature of claimants disability
may be given credence as he or she normally would not make untruthful
certification. Indeed, no physician in his right mind and who is aware of the
far reaching and serious effect that his or her statements would cause on a
money claim against a government agency would vouch indiscriminately
without regarding his own interests and protection.[20]
Significantly, even medical authorities have established that the exact
etiology of essential hypertension cannot be accurately traced:
 
The term essential hypertension has been employed to indicate those cases of
hypertension for which a specific endocrine or renal basis cannot be found,
and in which the neural element may be only a mediator of other influences.
Since even this latter relationship is not entirely clear, it is more properly
listed for the moment in the category of unknown
etiology. The term essential hypertension defines simply by failing to define;
hence, it is of limited use except as an expression of our inability to
understand adequately the forces at work.[21]
 
It bears stressing, however, that medical experiments tracing the etiology of
essential hypertension show that there is a relationship between the sickness
and the nature and conditions of work.[22] In this jurisdiction, we have already
ruled in a number of cases[23] the strenuous office of a public school teacher.
The case of Makabali v. Employees Compensation Commission,[24] which we
have re-affirmed in the subsequent cases of De Vera v. Employees
Compensation Commission,[25] Antiporda v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission,[26] and De la Torre v. Employees Compensation Commission,
[27]
 amply summarized, thus:
 
We are well aware of the fact that only a handful of public elementary school
teachers are fortunate enough to be assigned in urban areas where the
working conditions are comparatively much better than those in the rural
areas. A large majority of public elementary school teachers, as in the case of
the petitioner, work in remote places such as sitios and barrios under poor
working conditions. Thus, the daily task of conducting classes (normally
composed of 40 to 50 pupils in urban areas and up to 70 pupils in rural areas)
in an atmosphere that is, by any standard, not conducive to learning becomes
even more physically taxing to the teachers. Tremendous amount of paper
work during and after office hours (from correcting examination papers,
assignments, school projects and reports to writing lesson plans and the
computation and recording of grades) can be very physically draining
especially to the senior members of the teaching profession such as the
petitioner. Such and other related school activities of a teacher, aggravated by
substandard, if not adverse, working conditions, give rise to increased
tension, if not emotional and psychological disturbance on the part of the
teachers. This is especially true in the case of public elementary school
teachers whose pupils, being of tender age and immature, need to be
disciplined and to be taught good manners and right conduct, as well as to be
assisted in their formal school lessons
 
[We] must not also neglect to mention the fact that public elementary school compensation must be resolved in favor of the employee or laborer. Verily,
teachers are the lowest paid government workers, considering the nature and the policy is to extend the applicability of the law on employees
importance of the services they render. They are the most reliable and compensation to as many employees who can avail of the benefits
dedicated public servants being constantly called upon by officials of the thereunder.[33]
local and national government to assist in various extra-curricular and civic IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack
activities which contribute to the welfare of the community and the country. of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76461
Their responsibility in molding the values and character of the young is AFFIRMED. No costs.
generations of the country, cannot be overestimated.  
  SO ORDERED.
Significantly, even Republic Act No. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna  
Charta for Public School Teachers, mandates in one of its provisions that
'teachers shall be protected against the consequences of employment injury in
accordance with existing laws. The effects of the physical and nervous strain
on the teacher's health shall be recognized as compensable occupational
diseases in accordance with existing laws. (Calvero v. ECC, et al., 117 SCRA
462 [1982].[28]
 
The fact that the essential hypertension of respondent worsened and resulted
in a CVA at the time she was already out of service is inconsequential. The
main consideration for its compensability is that her illness was contracted
during and by reason of her employment, and any non-work related factor
that contributed to its aggravation is immaterial.[29]
 
Indeed, an employees disability may not manifest fully at one precise
moment in time but rather over a period of time. It is possible that an injury
which at first was considered to be temporary may later on become
permanent or one who suffers a partial disability becomes totally and
permanently disabled from the same cause. [30] The right to compensation
extends to disability due to disease supervening upon and proximately and
naturally resulting from a compensable injury. Where the primary injury is
shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every natural
consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the
employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause
attributable to claimants own negligence or misconduct. Simply stated, all
medical consequences that flow from the primary injury are compensable.[31]
 
P.D. No. 626, as amended, is said to have abandoned the presumption of
compensability and the theory of aggravation prevalent under the Workmens
Compensation Act. Nonetheless, we ruled in Employees Compensation
Commission v. Court of Appeals,[32] that:
 
Despite the abandonment of the presumption of compensability established
by the old law, the present law has not ceased to be an employees'
compensation law or a social legislation; hence, the liberality of the law in
favor of the working man and woman still prevails, and the official agency
charged by law to implement the constitutional guarantee of social justice
should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for
compensability, especially in light of the compassionate policy towards labor
which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances. Elsewise stated, a
humanitarian impulse, dictated by no less than the Constitution itself under
the social justice policy, calls for a liberal and sympathetic approach to
legitimate appeals of disabled public servants; or that all doubts to the right to
G.R. No. L-55624 November 19, 1982  A careful consideration of the records of this petition convinces us that there
BAGUIO COUNTRY CLUB CORPORATION, petitioner,  is merit in this petition. The summary procedures used by the public
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FIRST DIVISION,
LABOR ARBITER BENIGNO AYSON and JIMMY
SAJONAS, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
On August 18, 1978, the Baguio Country Club Corporation filed with the
Ministry of Labor office at Baguio City an application for clearance to
terminate the services of respondent Jimmy Sajonas for willful breach of
trust, telling lies in an investigation, taking money paid by customers,
threatening a fellow employee, committing dishonesty against guests and
committing four violations of the club rules and regulations which would
constitute valid grounds for dismissal.
On August 28, 1978, Jimmy Sajonas filed his opposition alleging that his
dismissal was without justifiable grounds to support it and that it would
contravene his constitutional right to security of tenure.
After a notice of investigation was issued, the case was referred to a
conciliator who recommended the preventive suspension of the respondent.
The Regional Director suspended Sajonas and indorsed the case for
compulsory arbitration to Labor Arbiter Benigno Ayson.
On December 11, 1978, the labor arbiter came out with a decision denying
the application for clearance to dismiss Jimmy Sajonas for insufficiency of
evidence. The petitioner was ordered to reinstate Sajonas with backwages
from the time of suspension up to reinstatement and without loss of seniority
rights.
The case was appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. On
January 17, 1980, the Commission rendered a decision dismissing the appeal
and affirming the decision of the labor arbiter.
The petitioner charges the public respondents with grave abuse of discretion
for, having rendered an "unlawful, unconstitutional, and unprecedented
decision."
The main issue in this petition is the contention of the petitioner that it was
denied due process because its evidence was not considered by both the labor
arbiter and the NLRC. The petitioner states that as a result of this ignoring of
its evidence, the decisions of the public respondents are contrary to the facts
and the applicable law.
respondents were too summary to satisfy the requirements of justice and fair
play.
The decision of the respondent Commission which affirmed the order to
reinstate Mr. Sajonas with full backwages was based on two grounds - First,
the evidence available to the labor arbiter when he decided this case was such
that the respondent had not sufficiently shown a just cause for the
complainant's dismissal. Second, the evidence to support the application for
clearance to dismiss the complainant was submitted too late because it was
submitted only on appeal.
The respondent Commission committed grave abuse of discretion when it
affirmed the irregular and one-sided procedure adopted by the labor arbiter in
arriving at his finding of insufficiency of evidence and when it decided to
uphold a decision not only contrary to the facts but obviously unfair and
unjust.
When the Baguio office of the Ministry of Labor issued as part of the
conciliation process a notice of investigation for September 7, 1978 and
September 15, 1978, the petitioner Baguio Country Club submitted a position
paper accompanied by copies of the application to terminate employment and
the sworn statements of witnesses taken during the investigation of the
alleged anomalies. Jimmy Sajonas did not submit any position paper. No
position paper was served on the petitioner or its counsel. The only document
submitted was one with a short two paragraphs comprising the grounds for
opposition.
As a result of the conciliator's recommendation, the case was indorsed for
arbitration to the labor arbiter. Noting that Mr. Sajonas did not appear at the
arbitration proceedings and did not present any position paper but left it to
some union members to speak for him and allegedly because Mr. Sajonas had
promised to quietly resign, the petitioner merely adopted the position paper
filed during the conciliation proceedings.
The irregular procedures used by the labor arbiter started at this point.
The labor arbiter allowed a last minute position paper of respondent Sajonas
to be filed and without requiring a copy to be served upon the Baguio
Country Club and without affording the latter an opportunity to refute or
rebut the contents of the paper, forthwith decided the case.
The public respondents now argue in their comment that "it is of no moment
that petitioner was not furnished with a copy of Sajonas' position paper"
because as early as the conciliation stage it was already apprised of the
position of the employee, having been furnished Sajonas' opposition and that
it cannot feign ignorance. This stand of the public respondents is erroneous.
Since the case was decided on the basis of position papers, the petitioner had
a right to be served a copy of the respondent's position paper admitted and
considered by the arbiter and an opportunity to introduce evidence to refute
it. As explained by the petitioner, it had been lulled into thinking that because
the private respondent had offered to resign and the employer had agreed to
forego the prosecution of criminal charges, there would no longer be any
complete or full-scale arbitration proceedings Mr. Sajonas denies that he
promised to resign and contends that criminal proceedings were an
afterthought to harass the poor laborer. The fact that there were two divergent
and clashing allegations before them, not only on this point but also on the
'Principal issues of dishonesty and intimidation of co-employees, the public
respondents should have adopted fairer and more accurate methods of
ascertaining truth.
As pointed out by the petitioner, "while an administrative tribunal possesed
of quasi-judicial powers is free from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements, it does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it
entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of
due process." (Serrano v. PSC, 24 SCRA 867; and Singco v. COMELEC,
101 SCRA 420).
The petitioner's position paper, passed upon by the labor arbiter, stated that
the petitioner had furnished the oppositor (Jimmy Sajonas) and the ALU (the
union of workers in the club) copies of the application to terminate, as well as
the investigations of witnesses against Jimmy Sajonas, which distinctly show
the infractions committed by oppositor, particularly that of the incident of
August 6, 1978 wherein Sajonas was supposed to have pocketed a cash
payment of a customer of the BCC, constituting qualified theft. The
petitioner specifically stressed to the arbiter that it was "adopting the
investigations which were enclosed with the application to terminate, which
are now parts of the record of the Ministry of Labor, as part and parcel of
this position paper. "
In other words, the petitioner submitted its case on the basis of the complete
records of the conciliation proceedings.
The position paper was before the arbiter but minus sworn statements
comprising the investigations which formed part of the records of the same
labor office.
Inexplicably, the arbiter came out with the conclusion that "there is thus no
document nor statement of evidence value or of evidencing character which
we can consider as evidence to support, the enumerated violations for which
Sajonas is supposed to be dismissed . " Instead of calling for the records
submitted to the concilliator in the same small Baguio office, the arbiter
denied the application for the clearance on the ground that all that was before
it was a position paper with mere quotations about an investigation conducted
by Major Pagala.
The error could have been corrected by the respondent Commission when the
petitioner urged that the sworn statements thus ignored by the labor arbiter
should be considered on appeal.
In the appeal to the commission, the petitioner argued that " submitted with
this application to terminate are the investigation of Erdulfo Pagala on
Bernadette Saliquio, Alma Jean Quidasol, Cristina Rico, and Clarissa Adalla.
The respondent Commission may not have committed grave abuse of
discretion when it rejected the affidavits of these witnesses, the information
for estafa against Jimmy Sajonas filed by the assistant city fiscal, did the
resolution of the fiscal's office on the complaint for grave threats, on the
ground that "evidence cannot be submitted for the first time on appeal."
However, it was a denial of elementary principles of fair play for the
Commission not to have ordered the elevation of the entire records of the
case with the affidavits earlier submitted as part of the position paper but
completely ignored by the labor arbiter. Or at the very least, the case should
have been remanded to the labor arbiter consonant with the requirements of
administrative due process.
The ever increasing scope of administrative jurisdiction and the statutory
grant of expansive powers in the exercise of discretion by administrative
agencies illustrate our nation's faith in the administrative process as an
efficient and effective mode of public control over sensitive areas of private
activity. Because of the specific constitutional mandates on social justice and
protection to labor, and the fact that major labor management controversies
are highly intricate and complex, the legislature and executive have reposed
uncommon reliance upon what they believe is the expertise, the rational and
efficient modes of ascertaining facts, and the unbiased and discerning
adjudicative techniques of the Ministry of Labor and Employment and its
instrumentalities.
Experience has shown this faith to be justified. In the great majority of
petitions for ' review of decisions from the Ministry of Labor and
Employment, we have sustained agency determinations and denied due
course to the petitions. However, we have never hesitated to exercise our
corrective powers and to reverse labor ministry decisions where the ministry
or a labor tribunal like the respondent commission has sustained irregular
procedures and through the invocation of summary methods, including rules
on appeal, has affirmed an order which tolerates a violation of due process.
This Court will reverse or modify an administrative decision where the rights
of a party were prejudiced because the administrative findings, conclusions,
or decisions are in violation of constitutional provisions; in excess of
statutory authority, or jurisdiction; made upon irregular procedure; vitiated by
fraud, imposition or mistake; not supported by substantial evidence adduced
at the hearing or contained in the records or disclosed to the parties; or
arbitrary, capricious, or issued with grave abuse of discretion, (Pajo v. Ago,
108 Phil. Castaneda v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 186; Manuel v. Villena,
37 SCRA 745; Asprec v. Itchon, 16 SCRA 921; Garcia v. Executive
Secretary, 6 SCRA 1; Air Manila v. Balatbat, 38 SCRA 489; Sichangco v.
Board of Commissioners, 94 SCRA 61).
The instant petition is a timely reminder to labor arbiters and all who wield
quasi-judicial power to ever bear in mind that evidence is the means,
sanctioned by rules, of ascertaining in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding,
the truth respecting a matter of fact. (Section 1, Rule 128) The object of
evidence is to establish the truth by the use of perceptive and reasoning
faculties. (See Martin, Rules of Court, Vol. 5 on Evidence, p. 2 citing
Chamberlayne on Trial Evidence and Thayer on Prelim. Treat.) The statutory
grant of power to use summary procedures should heighten a concern for due
process, for judicial perspective in administrative decision making, and for
maintaining the visions which led to the creation of the administrative office.
From the records which form part of the position paper submitted to the labor
arbiter and those raised on appeal to the respondent commission, the
following have been establish.
At about 10:30 in the morning of August 6, 1978, Miss Bernadette Saliquio, a
waitress of the Baguio City Country Club served two glasses of orange juice
tot he maid and the children of Mrs. Solon . Bartender Jimmy Sajonas
pocketed the cash payment of P7.00 for the juice and utilized Chit No.
183100 signed by Dr. Lodzinski for two bottles of beer to cover for the order
of orange juice which was changed to two beers. In other words, one chit was
used twice. Miss Alma Jean Quisadol, checker, who corroborated the
testimony of Miss Saliquio, who checks the orders for drinks, and who
mentioned an earlier anomaly involving four loaves of raisin bread, was
threatened several days later by Sajonas for reporting the incident to
management. Miss Cristina Rico, nutritionist, corroborated the utterance of
the threat "papatayin." An information for estafa was filed in Criminal Case
No. 40292 of the Baguio City Court but the case for grave threats where the
office of the City Fiscal "arrived at the indubitable conclusion that the
respondent indeed uttered threatened., remarks" was dismissed for having
prescribed. We agree with the petitioner that the loss of trust and confidence
and the wedge driven into the relationship of the private respondent with both
management and his co-employees warrant the grant of clearance to
terminate his employment. We likewise note the petitioner's statement that
Mr. Sajonas has been working as bartender for a hotel in Pangasinan since
March, 1979 and was about to be promoted to a hotel in Manila in
November, 1979.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted. The decision dated
January 17, 1980 of the National Labor Relations Commission affirming the
December 11, 1978 decision of the labor arbiter is set aside. The appropriate
office of the Ministry of Labor and Employment is ordered to give the
petitioner a clearance to terminate the employment of the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 139368           November 21, 2002]
ROBIN M. CANO, petitioner, 
vs.
THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, EDGAR C.
GALVANTE, as Police Director for Personnel and Records
Management, PNP, 
and the DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails (a) the order1 dated May 17,
1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224, in Civil Case
No. Q-98-36370, dismissing the complaint filed on December 21, 1998 by
petitioner against respondents for payment of back salaries and allowances
amounting to P301,018; and (b) the order of said court denying on July 15,
1999, his motion for reconsideration.
The factual background of the instant petition, as culled from the records of
the case, is as follows:
For the alleged bungled investigation of the Eileen Sarmenta and Allan
Gomez rape-slay, a complaint for grave misconduct was filed with the
National Police Commission under the Department of Interior and Local
Government against petitioner, then Police Chief Inspector of the Calauan
Police Station. The Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP) found
petitioner guilty and ordered his summary dismissal from the service, in a
decision2 dated July 12, 1995. Petitioner appealed his dismissal to the
National Appellate Board of the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM). On May 15, 1997, the NAPOLCOM reversed the decision
of the PNP Chief:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find respondent appellant, Chief
Inspector ROBIN M. CANO administratively culpable for Simple
Misconduct and hereby orders (sic) his suspension for a period of three (3)
months. Considering, however, that said respondent had been under
suspension since August 7, 1995, pursuant to Special Order No. 1690 dated
August 8, 1995, the penalty imposed is considered deemed served.
Respondent-Appellant is strongly warned to be more prudent and responsible
in the exercise of his duties as a member of the PNP.3
The NAPOLCOM decision having been allowed by both parties to become
final and executory, petitioner was restored to full duty status effective May
15, 1997. He also received all benefits and emoluments pertaining to his post
pursuant to PNP Special Order No. 1341. With the modification of his
penalty to three (3) months suspension, petitioner filed a claim for payment
of back salaries and other allowances corresponding to the period he was
allegedly unjustly discharged from service until he was restored to full duty
status, or from August 7, 1995 to May 15, 1997. However, this claim,
computed by the PNP Regional Police Comptrollership and Finance Division
to be Three Hundred One Thousand Eighteen Pesos (P301,018.00), was
denied by respondent Police Director Edgar C. Galvante of the PNP
Directorate for Personnel and Records Management (DPRM) on the strength
of a Memorandum/Opinion from the PNP Legal Service. Petitioner forthwith
asked for a reconsideration of the denial but the same was rejected.
On account of said denial, petitioner filed on December 23, 1998 a
complaint4 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the recovery
of his back salaries and other allowances for the said period. The court a quo
dismissed the complaint in an order dated May 17, 1999. Said the trial court:
The Court is prone to agree with the stand and position of the defendants that
plaintiff's claim should not be granted because plaintiff has not shown any
clear and legal right which would entitle him to back salaries, allowances and
other benefits and besides, plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative
remedies no[t] discounting the fact that his claim against defendants is
actually a suit against the state.
xxx
This complaint is actually a suit against the government because the ultimate
liability for payment of back salaries, etc. will fall on the government. This
being so, this case should be dismissed because the government cannot be
sued without its consent.
Accordingly, therefore, the Court has to dismiss this case without costs
against the plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED.5
On May 31, 1999, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the trial court's
decision, but his motion was denied in an order dated July 15, 1999.
Accordingly, petitioner filed the instant appeal via petition for review on
certiorari, raising only one issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to his claim for back salaries and
allowances under the terms of the decision of the NAPOLCOM Appellate
Board.6
Mainly involved in this controversy is petitioner's entitlement to back salaries
and other allowances upon the reduction of his penalty of dismissal to mere
suspension for three months. But secondarily, it should be asked whether
petitioner failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him so as
to render the filing of the complaint with the trial court premature?
At the outset, we note that the principal issue raised before us is a mixed
question of fact and law. There is a question of fact when doubt or difference
arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts,7 and there is a question
of law where the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts.8 Here, petitioner seeks to recover back salaries and allowances
allegedly due him from August 7, 1995, when he was unjustly discharged
from the service, to May 15, 1997, when he was restored to full duty status.
The determination of petitioner's entitlement to said back salaries and
allowances is a mixed question as it involves the determination of his duty
status for the period of his claim and the resolution of whether the petitioner
was acquitted by the NAPOLCOM Appellate Board in its decision finding
him liable only for simple misconduct, not gross misconduct.
Under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, an appeal by certiorari to
this Court should raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set
forth in the petition. It is elementary that a review is not a matter of right, but
of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special
and important reasons therefor.9 As the error raised herein includes one of
fact and law, and not a proper subject for a petition for review on certiorari,
we are constrained to decline exercise of our equity jurisdiction in this case.
At any rate, petitioner also failed without justifiable cause to observe due
regard for the hierarchy of courts. Even on this reason alone, we are
constrained to deny the petition. The policy of this Court respecting the
hierarchy of courts and, consequently, prohibiting the filing of a petition in
this Court in view of the concurrent jurisdiction with the lower courts has
been consistently observed in the absence of any compelling reason for
departing from such policy.10 Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court,11 petitioner should have taken his appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Having ruled for the denial of the petition, we need not tarry on the other
issues that may have been raised in the petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The order of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 224, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-98-36370 is
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 130209            March 14, 2001
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,  Pascual, Sr. and Santos San Pascual, Jr. — Dr. Alicia M. Mercurio, Jenny
vs.
LARRY LAVAPIE, SIMEON LACHANO, ARNOLD BUATES,
SANTOS SAN PASCUAL, SR., SANTOS SAN PASCUAL, JR., REY
SAN PASCUAL, BENIGNO CATINA, JR. and SEVERAL
DOES, accused.
LARRY LAVAPIE and SANTOS SAN PASCUAL, SR., accused-
appellants.
BUENA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated December 16, 1996, of the
Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 36,2 finding accused-appellants
Larry Lavapie and Santos San Pascual, Sr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder, sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim, Sonny Sierva, jointly and
severally, the amount of P7,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as death
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Accused-appellants Larry Lavapie and Santos San Pascual, Sr., together with
Simeon Lachano, Arnold Buates, Santos San Pascual, Jr., Rey San Pascual,
Benigno Catina, Jr. and several Does, were charged in an information which
reads:
"That on or about the 29th day of March, 1989, at Sitio Tastas, Barangay San
Vicente, (Buraburan) Municipality of Buhi, Province of Camarines Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, armed with bolos, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident
premeditation, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and hack with said bolos one Sonny Sierva, thereby inflicting upon
the latter [a] mortal wound which directly caused his death, to the damage
and prejudice of his heirs in the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00),
plus other forms of damages that may be proven in court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW."3
Upon their arraignment on October 17, 1989, accused Larry Lavapie and Rey
San Pascual pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, or on January 29, 1990, the
other accused — Benigno Catina. Jr., Santos San Pascual, Sr. and Santos San
Pascual, Jr. also pleaded not guilty.5 Accused Simeon Lachano, likewise,
pleaded not guilty on July 16, 1991.6 Accused Arnold Buates remained at
large.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses against
accused Larry Lavapie, Rey San Pascual, Benigno Catina, Jr., Santos San
Cordial, Enrico Sierva, Domingo Samonte, Rogelio Sierva and Sgt. Jaime
Patiam. The following witnesses, on the other hand, testified against accused
Simeon Lachano — Erlinda Sierva and Rogelio Sierva. In their defense, all
of the six (6) accused, who were brought before the jurisdiction of the trial
court, testified in court, in addition to Felix Lavapie, Juan Bongais and
Loreto Camasis.
For the prosecution, eyewitness Domingo Samonte testified that on March
29, 1989, at around 11 p.m., he came from the dance hall in San Vicente with
Rogelio Sierva and the victim Sonny Sierva. 7 While on their way, Rogelio
and Sonny talked with some ladies, then, Rogelio went home ahead, and left
Domingo and Sonny behind.8 While approaching Rogelio's house, Domingo
and Sonny noticed a group of persons coming towards them. Domingo
stepped backwards towards Sonny. Sonny focused the flashlight, which he
was holding, on accused-appellant Santos San Pascual, Sr. and accused-
appellant Larry Lavapie, who was then holding a bolo. Accused-appellant
Santos San Pascual, Sr. suddenly held the hands of Sonny behind his back,
while accused-appellant Larry Lavapie hacked Sonny.9 Domingo testified
that Sonny was hit on the neck, the same witness pointing to the left side of
his neck.10 When Sonny fell on the ground, Domingo ran towards
some pili trees. Then, Domingo saw two (2) persons, a boy and a girl, who
were following them and holding a torch which they used to lighten the fallen
body of Sonny. Domingo, however, was not able to recognize these two (2)
persons. On cross-examination, Domingo testified that when he witnessed the
hacking incident, there were other persons at the scene of the crime but he
was not able to recognize them. 11 Domingo further recounted that after he
saw the hacking incident, he ran towards the back of a pili tree and stayed
there until dawn of the following day.12 At dawn, he proceeded to his house
in Buraburan.13 He did not report the incident to anybody else but a certain
friend and his wife. Domingo also admitted that when accused-appellant
Santos San Pascual, Sr. held the hands of Sonny behind the latter's back, he
did not tell Santos San Pascual, Sr. to stop but just took a step backwards.14
Jenny Cordial, a 15-year-old ward of Sonny Sierva's aunt, testified that on
March 29, 1989, at around 11 p.m., she and Rico Sierva 15 came from a dance
in San Vicente, Buraburan and were on their way home when they came
upon the body of Sonny Sierva lying on the middle of the road. 16 They
recognized Sonny Sierva because Cordial was then holding a torch.17 Cordial
and Enrico Sierva came upon Sonny Sierva, who was lying prostrate on the
road, with a hack wound on the neck, and was almost beheaded.18 At that
instance, Cordial saw accused-appellant Larry Lavapie, who was holding
a bolo, standing at a distance of about five (5) to six (6) meters from the body
of Sonny Sierva.19 Aside from accused-appellant Larry Lavapie, Cordial also
saw other persons at the scene of the crime but she was not able to recognize
them. Thereafter, Cordial and Enrico Sierva ran away and went home to
inform the father of Sonny Sierva of what happened but they were told by his
wife that Rogelio Sierva was also hacked. Incidentally, while on cross-
examination, the prosecutor informed the trial court that Cordial actually
grew up under the care of Rogelio Sierva's sister. Cordial testified on cross-
examination that when she and Enrico Sierva saw the body of Sonny Sierva
lying on the road, they were only about one (1) meter away from the body.
When they saw accused-appellant Larry Lavapie, he was holding
a bolo which was pointed downwards. Cordial clearly recognized accused-
appellant Larry Lavapie because she was then holding a torch. Cordial
described the bolo held by accused-appellant Larry Lavapie as "shiny and
sharp," and "clear and clean."20 Cordial also noticed that the other persons,
who were at scene of the crime, were standing still, facing the body of Sonny
Sierva, about a meter away from accused-appellant Larry Lavapie, and that
some of these persons were smoking.21 Cordial did not recognize these other
persons because according to her "it was dark." 22On further cross-
examination, she estimated these other persons at the scene of the crime to
number about seven (7) persons.
Enrico Sierva, 15-year-old cousin of the victim, Sonny Sierva, testified that
on March 29, 1989, at around 11 p.m., he and Jenny Cordial came from a
dance in San Vicente, Buhi and were on their way home. Near the house of
the victim's father, Rogelio Sierva, they saw a man lying prostrate on the
road. They went closer to the body and saw that the said man sustained a
hack wound on the neck. They recognized the man lying on the road as
Sonny Sierva.23 Glancing around, Enrico saw accused-appellant Larry
Lavapie holding a bolo and standing by the road with accused-appellant
Santos San Pascual, Sr.24 According to Enrico, both accused-appellants were
at a distance of about five (5) to six (6) meters away from him when he saw
them. He also saw other persons at the scene of the crime but he was not able
to recognize them because they were in a "dark place." 25 Thereafter, he and
Jenny Cordial ran towards the house of Rogelio Sierva, located about 30
meters away, and informed Rogelio's wife, Erlinda Velasco, that her son was
lying dead on the road. Erlinda Velasco told them that her husband was also
hacked and was being brought to a hospital. On cross-examination, Enrico
Sierva testified that he told his uncle, Rogelio Sierva, that it was the group of
accused-appellant Larry Lavapie who hacked Sonny Sierva,26 and that
accused-appellants Larry Lavapie and Santos San Pascual, Sr. were
there.27 Enrico further testified that the torch they were carrying on the night
of March 29, 1989 was made of a round bottle of gin.
Dr. Alicia M. Mercurio, Municipal Health Officer of Buhi II, Camarines Sur,
conducted the autopsy on the body of Sonny Sierva and prepared an autopsy
report28 dated April 25, 1989, with the following findings:
"Lesions:
"Incised wound at the neck, right side cutting the whole neck structure with a
portion of the skin only on the left side holding it in place about 3 in. long.
"Cause of Death — Incised wound, neck (almost whole neck) with secondary
hemorrhage (massive)."29
Dr. Mercurio explained that due to the hack wound (or incised wound)
sustained by the victim, Sonny Sierva, the victim's head was almost severed
from the body, with only three (3) inches of flesh on the left side of the neck,
connecting the neck to the body.30 According to Dr. Mercurio, the hack
wound could have been caused by a sharp instrument like a very sharp bolo.
Dr. Mercurio further opined that the victim could have died at around 1 or 2
a.m. of March 30, 1989.
Rogelio Sierva, father of the victim, Sonny Sierva, testified that on March 29,
1989, at around 11 p.m., he came from a dance in Buraburan, San Vicente,
together with his son, Sonny Sierva and his brother-in-law, Felix
Buendia.31 On their way home, they passed by the house of a certain Teresita
Gaite, where Sonny Sierva was left behind with his friends. Rogelio and
Felix proceeded on their way home. When they were already near his house,
Rogelio saw six (6) of the seven (7) identified accused. 32 Rogelio continued
to testify that he was hacked on his right ear by accused Arnold Buates.
Rogelio and Felix then ran towards Rogelio's house. When Rogelio was
about to open the door of his house, he was hacked on the right arm by
accused Santos San Pascual, Jr. Rogelio then entered the house and got
a bolo but his assailants already retreated to the place where he was first
hacked. Thereafter, Rogelio sought the assistance of his brother, Silvestre
Sierva, whose house was located about 20 meters away, 33 and requested that
he be brought to a hospital. On their way to the hospital, they saw Sonny
Sierva, who was almost beheaded, lying on the road. When Rogelio
discovered that Sonny was already dead, they proceeded to the San Vicente
Assistance Center and reported the hacking incident. Afterwards, they
proceeded to the Mediatrix Hospital where Rogelio was treated for his
wounds. Rogelio also testified that he spent more or less P7,000.00 which he
incurred due to the death of Sonny Sierva. 34 On cross-examination, Rogelio
admitted that he was previously charged for the attempted rape of the
daughter of accused Santos San Pascual, Sr.35
Because accused Simeon Lachano was arrested only after the prosecution had
already presented the foregoing witnesses against the five (5) other accused,
the prosecution presented anew, Rogelio Sierva and an additional witness,
Erlinda Sierva, to testify against accused Simeon Lachano.
Erlinda Sierva, mother of the victim, Sonny Sierva, testified that she spent
less than P10,000.00 as burial and funeral expenses on account of the death
of Sonny Sierva.36
Rogelio Sierva, in testifying against accused Simeon Lachano, merely
reiterated his previous testimony against the five (5) other accused.
For the defense, on the other hand, all of the six (6) accused, who were
brought before the jurisdiction of the trial court, testified together with Felix
Lavapie, Juan Bongais and Loreto Camasis.
Accused-appellant Larry Lavapie, in his defense, interposed denial and alibi.
Lavapie testified that on March 29, 1989, at around 8 p.m., he was at a dance
in San Vicente, Buhi,37 with accused Santos San Pascual, Jr., a certain Rep. Act No. 7659, as charged in the information, and there being no generic
Santiago Sanorjo and Danny Belardo.38 Lavapie, Santos San Pascual, Jr., aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, [the Court] hereby sentences the
Santiago Sanorjo39 and Danny Belardo left the dance hall at past 11:30 p.m. said accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to pay, jointly and
and went to the barn of Santiago Sanorjo, arriving thereat at around 1 severally the heirs of the deceased, Sonny Sierva, spouses Rogelio and
a.m.40 They slept in the said barn and went to their respective houses on the Erlinda Sierva the following:
following day.
a) P7,000.00 as actual damages,
Accused Santos San Pascual, Jr. corroborated the testimony of accused-
appellant Larry Lavapie that they attended a dance in San Vicente, Buhi. b) P50,000.00 as death indemnity,
They left the dance hall at past 12 midnight 41 and went to the house of
Santiago Sanorjo where they slept until 6 o'clock of the following morning.42
c) P50,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs;
Juan Bongais testified that in the evening of March 29, 1989, he was at a
dance in San Vicente, Buraburan. He arrived at the dance at 7 p.m. and left at "2. [T]he [other] accused, Santos San Pascual, Jr., Rey San Pascual, Benigno
about 12:30 a.m. of the following day.43 He left the dance with Jenny Cordial, Catina, Jr., and Simeon Lachano, not guilty of the crime charged in the
Rico Sierva and Liza San Pascual.44 On their way home, they met Rogelio information and [the Court] hereby acquits them thereof for insufficiency of
Sierva who was hacked and being carried by Dionesio Coronel and Felicito evidence. The bonds posted for their provisional liberty are hereby ordered
Conas. They continued walking for several meters until they came upon the cancelled and released.
dead body of Sonny Sierva, lying on the road.45 On cross-examination,
Bongais testified that when they were about to leave the dance at around "With respect to the accused, Arnold Buates, who was never brought to the
12:30 a.m. of March 30, 1989, accused-appellant Larry Lavapie and his co- jurisdiction of this [C]ourt, let the records of this case be sent to the archives
accused Santos San Pascual, Jr. were still at the dancing hall.46 to be revived as soon as this [C]ourt acquires jurisdiction over [the] said
accused.
Accused-appellant Santos San Pascual, Sr., likewise, claimed denial and
alibi. San Pascual, Sr. testified that in the evening of March 29, 1989, he was "SO ORDERED."50
resting in his house in sitio Tastas, Labawon, Buhi.47 He slept at 7 p.m. and
awoke at 5 o'clock of the following day. 48 San Pascual, Sr. further claimed
that Rogelio Sierva, father of the victim, was actuated by ill-motive to
implicate him in this crime, i.e., he filed a complaint against Rogelio for the
attempted rape of his daughter, Gina San Pascual.49 On cross-examination,
San Pascual, Sr. testified that sitioLabawon is adjacent to barangay San
Vicente.
The three (3) other accused, Rey San Pascual, Simeon Lachano and Benigno
Catina, Jr., likewise, interposed denial and alibi in their respective
testimonies before the trial court.
On January 23, 1997, the trial court rendered a Decision dated December 16,
1996, finding accused-appellants Larry Lavapie and Santos San Pascual, Sr.
guilty of murder qualified by treachery. The four (4) other accused, Santos
San Pascual, Jr., Rey San Pascual, Benigno Catina, Jr. and Simeon Lachano
were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive part of the said
Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds —
"1. The accused, Larry Lavapie and Santos San Pascual, Sr., guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal[s] of the crime of murder defined and penalized
under Article [2]48 of the Revised Penal Code, prior to its amendment by
In convicting accused-appellants, Larry Lavapie and Santos San Pascual, Sr.,
the trial court relied primarily on the testimony of prosecution witness
Domingo Samonte that accused-appellant Larry Lavapie was the one who
hacked Sonny Sierva on the neck with the use of a bolo while accused-
appellant Santos San Pascual, Sr. was at the back of Sonny Sierva, holding
the latter's hands.51 The trial court also relied heavily on the testimony of
prosecution witness Jenny Cordial that she saw accused-appellant Larry
Lavapie, standing about five (5) meters away from the dead body of Sonny
Sierva; and on the testimony of prosecution witness Enrico Sierva that he saw
accused-appellants, Larry Lavapie and Santos San Pascual, Sr., standing five
(5) meters away from the dead body of Sonny Sierva.52 The trial court further
maintained that Jenny Cordial's description of Sonny Sierva's body when
they came upon it, lying prostrate on the road, was supported by the medical
findings stated in the autopsy report of Dr. Alicia M. Mercurio. 53 The trial
court rejected the defenses of denial and alibi raised by accused-appellants,
and ruled that denial and alibi cannot prevail over positive identification, and
that accused-appellants' alibi was not corroborated by any credible and
disinterested witness.54 In ruling that the killing was qualified by treachery,
the trial court explained that accused-appellants awaited, in ambush, for their
victim;"55 and that the suddenness of the attack on Sonny Sierva and the fact
that his hands were being held at his back by accused-appellant Santos San
Pascual, Sr. while he was hacked by accused-appellant Larry Lavapie,
rendered him "helpless to put up any defense."56 The trial court also found
that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, based on the fact that
". . .they [accused-appellants] are related to each other (uncle and nephew)
and from their concerted acts in killing Sonny Sierva."57
On February 3, 1997, accused-appellants filed a Motion for New Trial,
alleging that prosecution witnesses, Jenny Cordial and Domingo Samonte
retracted their respective testimonies.58 However, in an Order dated March
12, 1997, the trial court denied the foregoing motion, for lack of merit.59
Hence, this appeal.
In their appellant's brief, accused-appellants raise a lone assignment of error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
RETRACTION OF PROSECUTION WITNESS[ES] JENNY CORDIAL
AND DOMINGO SAMONTE [AS] NEWLY-DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
WHICH SHALL JUSTIFY THE HOLDING OF A NEW TRIAL.
We find merit in this appeal.
The conviction of accused-appellants by the trial court was predicated
primarily on the testimony of prosecution witness Domingo Samonte who
"positively identified [accused-appellant] Larry Lavapie as the one who
hacked Sonny Sierva with a bolo at his neck while accused[-appellant]
Santos San Pascual, Sr., was at the rear of Sonny Sierva, holding his
hands;"60 and on the testimonies of the two (2) witnesses who arrived at the
scene of the crime shortly after the hacking incident occurred — Jenny
Cordial, who "saw accused[-appellant] Larry Lavapie standing about five [5]
meters away from the dead body of Sonny Sierva" 61 and Enrico Sierva, who
"saw and recognized the same accused[-appellant] Larry Lavapie and
accused[-appellant] Santos San Pascual, Sr., standing [five] 5 meters away
from the dead body of Sonny Sierva."62 According to the trial court, Jenny
Cordial's description of the condition of Sonny Sierva's body when they came
upon it, ". . . is supported by the medical findings" as stated in the autopsy
report.63 Furthermore, the trial court observed that accused-appellants failed
to show "any improper motive on the part of the said witnesses to falsely
testify against them."64
While it is settled to the point of being elementary that on the issue of
credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will not disturb the findings arrived
at by the trial court, which was certainly in a better position to rate the
credibility of the witnesses after hearing them and observing their deportment
and manner of testifying during the trial; this rule stands absent any showing
that certain facts and circumstances of weight and value have been
overlooked, misinterpreted or misapplied by the trial court which, if
considered, would affect the result or outcome of the case.65 After a careful
review of the records of this case, particularly, the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses, the Court finds that significant facts and circumstances were
overlooked and disregarded by the trial court, which, if properly considered,
would have affected the result of this case. The records show that there are
strong and cogent reasons that justify a departure from the trial court's
findings.
In the case at bar, prosecution eyewitness Domingo Samonte testified that
accused-appellant Larry Lavapie suddenly hacked Sonny Sierva, hitting the
latter on his neck; Samonte demonstrated by pointing to the left side of his
neck, thus:
"PROSECUTOR:
"Q:         All right. You said Larry Lavapie suddenly hacked Sonny Sierva[,]
was Sonny Sierva hit?
[WITNESS DOMINGO SAMONTE]:
"A:         Yes, sir.
"Q:         Where was he hit?
"A:         He was hit on his neck. (Witness pointing to the left side of his
neck.)
"Q:         After Sonny Sierva was hacked by Larry Lavapie[,] what happened
to Sonny Sierva, Mr. Samonte?
"A:         He fell down, sir."66 (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing testimony of Samonte is belied by the physical evidence that
the deceased, Sonny Sierva sustained an "incised wound at the neck, right
side cutting the whole neck structure with a portion of the skin only on the
left side holding it in place about 3 in. long." 67 (Emphasis supplied.) While
Samonte categorically testified that Sonny Sierva was hacked on the neck, at
the same time, Samonte demonstrated by pointing to the left side of his neck;
the autopsy report clearly revealed that Sonny Sierva was hacked on the right
side of his neck and not on the left side. This material inconsistency,
consequently, casts a serious doubt on the testimony of Samonte. As we have
ruled in People vs. Vasquez,68 since the physical evidence on record runs
counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses, conclusions
as to physical evidence should prevail. It bears reiteration that physical
evidence is that mute but eloquent manifestations of truth which rate high in
our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. 69 In the light of the physical evidence
obtaining in this case, contrary to oral assertions cannot normally prevail.
Greater credence is given to physical evidence as evidence of the highest
order because it speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses.70
Moreover, Samonte's claim that on March 29, 1989, at around 11 p.m., he
came from the dance hall in San Vicente with Rogelio Sierva and the victim
Sonny Sierva,71 and that while on their way, Rogelio and Sonny talked with
some ladies, then, Rogelio went ahead, leaving Domingo and Sonny
behind,72 was even contradicted by Rogelio's (one of Samonte's alleged
companions on that fateful night) testimony on two (2) different
instances,73that on March 29, 1989, at about 11 p.m., he was with his son,
Sonny Sierva and his brother-in-law, Felix Buendia, 74 without any reference
to the alleged presence of Samonte, thus:
"ROGELIO SIERVA'S FIRST TESTIMONY WHICH WAS TAKEN ON
AUGUST 16, 1990:
"PROSECUTOR:
"Q:         Mr. Sierva, on March 29, 1990 [should be 1989] at about 11 o'clock
in the evening, where were you?
[WITNESS ROGELIO SIERVA]:
"A:         We came from a dance at Sitio Buraburan, San Vicente, Buhi,
Camarines Sur.
"Q:         You said we, who were your companions during that time[,] Mr.
Sierva?
"A:         My son Sonny Sierva and my brother-in-law, Felix Buendia.
"Q:         While you together with your late son Sonny Sierva and your
brother-in-law Felix Buendia were on your way home from centro
Buraburan, Buhi, Camarines Sur, do you recall of any incident that
happened?
"A:         Yes, sir."75 (Emphasis supplied.)
"ROGELIO SIERVA'S SECOND TESTIMONY WHICH WAS TAKEN ON
AUGUST 5, 1993:
"PROSECUTOR:
"Q:         Mr. Sierva, where were you on March 29, 1989 at about 11 o'clock
in the evening?
[WITNESS ROGELIO SIERVA]:
"A:         I was then at San Vicente, Buraburan, Buhi, Camarines Sur.
"Q:         Why did you happen to be there, Mr. Sierva during the aforesaid
date and time?
"A:         I accompanied my son to the dancing hall.
"Q:         Where was this dancing hall?
"A:         At Centro San Vicente, Bura-buran.
"Q:         What were you doing at the aforesaid place during the aforesaid
date and time?
"A:         I was watching the dance.
"Q:         Who were with you, if any, during that time, Mr. Sierva?
"A:         My son and my brother-in-law.
"xxx           xxx           xxx"
"Q:         After watching the dance, what did you do, if any?
"A:         We went home.
"Q:         You said "we went home". Who were with you?
"A:         My brother-in-law and my son.
"Q:         What is the name of your brother-in-law?
"A:         Felix Buendia.
"Q:         While you were on your way home together with your brother-in-
law and your son Sonny Sierva, do you recall of any incident that happened,
Mr. Sierva?
"A:         Yes, sir."76 (Emphasis supplied.)
Certainly, the foregoing testimonies of Rogelio Sierva, which we find to be
consistent on material points, further cast serious doubt on the veracity of
Samonte's testimony.
In addition, we find Samonte's response to the occurrence to be contrary to
ordinary human experience and behavior. If indeed Samonte was present at
the scene of the crime when the victim, Sonny Sierva, whose hands were held
at the back by accused-appellant Santos San Pascual, Sr., was hacked on the
neck by accused-appellant Larry Lavapie, while the other accused,
numbering at least five (5), were apparently merely observing the incident; it
was then unnatural and against common experience that Samonte ran away
towards some pilitrees and simply stayed there until dawn of the following
day, even as he had already seen a boy and a girl discovered the fallen body
of Sonny Sierva shortly after the incident occurred. Considering the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Jenny Cordial and Enrico Sierva, that
after discovering the dead body of Sonny Sierva lying prostrate on the
ground, and seeing the several accused standing near the dead body of Sonny
Sierva, they were able to run away and go to Rogelio Sierva's house to report
what they saw, without the several accused following them or even
attempting to threaten them in any way, it appears that the several accused
posed no threat to Samonte, which could have forced him to remain near
some pili trees. It is also perplexing why Samonte did not see, inform or seek
the help of Rogelio Sierva, Felix Buendia, Silvestre Sierva and an
unidentified person, who also happened to come upon the dead body of
Sonny Sierva while on their way to the hospital. This Court finds occasion, at
this point, to apply a long-held doctrine that to be credible, testimonial
evidence should come not only from the mouth of a credible witness but it
should also be credible, reasonable and in accord with human
experience.77 While we take judicial notice that eyewitnesses to a crime are
often reluctant to report the incident, the Court finds the response of Samonte
to the occurrence contrary to human experience, and his testimony not
credible, thus, we reject his testimony.
In view of the resulting lack of positive identification, accused-appellants'
conviction or acquittal would now depend primarily on the sufficiency of the
circumstantial evidence against them, based on the testimonies of the other
prosecution witnesses, particularly, Jenny Cordial and Enrico Sierva. Section
4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
In the instant case, prosecution witness Jenny Cordial testified that she saw
accused-appellant Larry Lavapie, who was holding a bolo, standing at a
distance of about five (5) to six (6) meters from the body of Sonny
Sierva;78while prosecution witness Enrico Sierva testified that after he
recognized the man lying on the road as Sonny Sierva, he saw accused-
appellant Larry Lavapie with a bolo, standing by the road, with accused-
appellant Santos San Pascual, Sr.79 The above circumstance, in the absence of
other corroborative evidence, does not satisfy the requirements under Section
4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court nor point with moral certainty to the guilt
of accused-appellants. As we have consistently held, the mere presence of
accused-appellants at the locus criminiscannot be solely interpreted to mean
that they committed the killing. The mere presence of accused appellants at
the crime scene, without more, is inadequate to support the conclusion that,
indeed, they committed the crime.80We also observe that as testified by
prosecution witness Jenny Cordial, the bolo allegedly held by accused-
appellant Larry Lavapie was "shiny and sharp," and "clear and clean."81 If
indeed it was accused-appellant Larry Lavapie who hacked Sonny Sierva on
the neck, the bolo, which he allegedly used in hacking Sonny Sierva, would
not have been "clear and clean." It should also be noted that aside from the
two (2) accused-appellants, there were at least five (5) other persons who
were at the scene of the crime, and who could have been responsible for the
killing, but unfortunately, they were not recognized by prosecution witnesses,
Jenny Cordial and Enrico Sierva. According to Jenny Cordial, the other
persons, numbering about seven (7), who were at the scene of the crime,
standing still and facing the body of Sonny Sierva, were only about a meter
away from accused-appellant Larry Lavapie,82 but she was not able to
recognize them because "it was dark."83 In corroboration, Enrico Sierva
testified that both accused-appellants were at a distance of about five (5) to
six (6) meters away from him when he saw them; and that he also saw other
persons at the scene of the crime but he was not able to recognize them
because they were in a "dark place."84
In resume, considering the evidence for the prosecution and the attendant
circumstances, the Court entertains reasonable doubt as to the culpability of
accused-appellants.
WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the accused-appellants are guilty of the crime charged, the
Decision dated December 16, 1996, of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court
of Iriga City in Criminal Case No. IR-2639 is hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The accused-appellants are ACQUITTED, and their immediate
release from confinement is ordered unless some other lawful cause warrants
their further detention.
The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to implement this Decision and to
report to this Court immediately the action taken hereon within five (5) days
from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-52080 May 28, 1993
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner-
appellant,  Pursuant to the open policy clause of the insurance policies, the GSIS, as is
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and AGRICULTURAL CREDIT
ADMINISTRATION (ACA), respondents-appellees.
MELO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the annulment of
respondent court's resolutions dated May 7, 1979 and November 23, 1979
rendered in CA-G.R. No. 59286-R.
The facts of the case, as established by record, being undisputed, we quote
with approval the following concise summary thereof made by petitioner
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in its brief filed before
respondent court:
On June 20, 1961, Fire Policy No. N-29704 (Exh. 533 and D) was issued by
the Property Insurance Fund of the defendant-appellee Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) to cover the insurance of various grades of Virginia
leaf tobacco owned by the plaintiff-appellant and stored in Warehouse F
belonging to the Philippine Tobacco Flue-Curing and Redrying Corporation
(PTFC & RC), located at Baesa, Novaliches, Quezon City, with a declared
value of P21,459.66 and for the period from July l, 1961 to July 2, 1962.
On November 17, 1961 another Fire Policy No. N-30871 (Exhs. 534 and H)
was issued by the Property Insurance Fund of the GSIS to cover the
insurance of various grades of Virginia leaf Tobacco belonging to the
plaintiff-appellant and stored in the said Warehouse F, with the declared
value of P2,048,518.50 and for the period from September 30, 1961 to
September 30, 1962.
The said insurance policies provide among other things that in the event of
loss, whether total or partial the amount thereof shall be subject to appraisal
and that the liability of the GSIS, if established shall be limited to the actual
loss, subject to the applicable terms, conditions, warranties and clauses of the
policies, and in no case to exceed the amount of the policies. This is the open
policy clause of the said insurance policies. (Exhs. 533-A-1 and 534-A-1).
On February 15, 1962 at about 7:20 in the evening thereof, a fire occurred
which burned the said Warehouse F and practically all the tobacco stored
therein. As already stated, the said warehouse was owned by the Philippine
Tobacco Flue-Curing and Redrying Corporation, then controlled by the well
known Harry Stonehill. The said warehouse is one of the warehouses in the
Baesa compound of the PTFC & RC.
Subsequently, plaintiff-appellant filed with the GSIS its fire claim, Exhs. N-1
to N-4.
the practice in the insurance business, employed three insurance adjusters to
ascertain the actual loss suffered by the plaintiff-appellant. Said adjusters are
the Manila Adjustment Company, H. H. Bayne Adjustment Company and the
Allied Adjustment Company. The said adjusters examined the records of the
plaintiff-appellant and of the Philippine Tobacco Flue-Curing and Redrying
Corporation and they employed two tobacco experts to assist them in
evaluating the loss of the plaintiff-appellant. Said tobacco experts were Mr.
George Flagg and Edrington S. Penn. After the adjusters, with the assistance
of Mr. Flagg and Penn, had verified the records of the plaintiff-appellant and
of the PTFC & RC and had employed the hogshead metal strap recovery
method, the said adjusters rendered a report on September 25, 1962 (Exh.
538) and a final report on September 25, 1963 (Exhs. 29 to 529-F; also
marked as Exhs. Q to Q-6 and Exhs, 537 to 537-H). In said final report, the
adjusters recommend as the basis for the adjustment of the appellant's claims
the amount of P12,557,968.68. Their verification showed that only 15,467
hogshead of tobacco of various grades were inside the Warehouse F at the
time of the fire.
Plaintiff-appellant refused to accept the correctness of the said report and so
conferences were had between the officials of plaintiff-appellant and the
GSIS, together with the adjusters, and as a result, the GSIS offered as final
payment of the appellant's claim the amount of P13,500,000.00. Said offer
was embodied in the letter of December 7, 1964 of then General Manager
Ramon A. Diaz, which read as follows:
Please be advised that we are now preparing partial payment of the captioned
loss in the amount of P2,295,873.21. We shall effect payment of the balance
(of the P13,500,000.00 proposed settlement) as soon as possible.
We sincerely believe that the amount of P13,500,000.00 is just and fair
indemnity for the loss. Inasmuch as that office refused to execute the required
Sworn Statement in Proof of Loss, we wish to ask your written agreement to
the following conditions (which were embodied in our letter of July 17, 1964
to the Central Bank of the Philippines) before we remit the above-mentioned
partial payment and subsequent payments of the balance:
1 In the event that ACA claims for additional indemnity (in excess of the
amount of P13,500,000.00) the burden of proving such additional claim shall
be its own responsibility.
2 That should ACA be able to present additional proof and evidence for
additional indemnity, the same shall be referred for adjudication to a
competent court.
(Ex. EE; Exh. 530; pp. 13-14, tsn, May 19, 1972)
Plaintiff-appellant accepted the offer and its acceptance is embodied in the
letter of Mr. Amado A. Lansang, Officer-in-Charge, dated December 16,
1964. Thus, the body of said letter, Exh. FF (also Exh. 631) reads as follows:
In attention to your letter of December 7th which was transmitted to us by the
Central Bank under its 1st Indorsement dated December 14, 1964, please be
advised that we agree to the following condition set by you in your aforesaid
letters, viz: —
1 That in the event ACA claim further indemnity in excess of the amount of
P13,500,000.00, the burden of proving such additional amount shall be of
ACA's responsibility.
2 That ACA shall present additional proof and evidence for further indemnity
to a competent court for adjucation.
(pp. 14-16, tsn, May 19, 1972)
Pursuant to the said agreement of the parties, the GSIS paid to the plaintiff-
appellant the amount of P13,500,000.00. (p. 17, tsn, May 19, 1972).
Since it claims that its loss from the fire is P23,610,571.61, the plaintiff-
appellant filed the present action in Court, praying among other things, that
the defendant-appellee be ordered to pay the difference of P10,110,571.61
(p.11 Record on Appeal) (pp. 2-7, Brief for Defendant-Appellee Government
Service Insurance System; p. 83, Rollo)
ACA's complaint was filed with the then Court of First Instance of Manila on
September 21, 1965 and docketed as Civil Case No. 62683. On September
9,1975, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. ACA
appealed to respondent Court of Appeals where the appeal was docketed as
CA-G.R. No. 59286-R. On December 29,1978 respondent court promulgated
its decision affirming the decision of the trial court (de Castro (P), Reyes,
Sundiam, JJ.). However, upon ACA's motion, respondent court issued a
resolution (penned by Justice Samuel Reyes who had taken over from Justice
Pacifico de Castro due to the latter's promotion to the Supreme Court; and
with the addition of Justice Isidro Borromeo as third member) on May 7,
1979, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHREREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby Granted and
consequently, the decision in this case dated December 29, 1978 is
REVERSED, thus, entitling plaintiff-appellant the balance of P10,110,571.61
on the two (2) fire insurance policies issued by defendant-appellee covering
its tobacco stocks stored at the PTFC & REC Warehouse "F". (p. 77, Rollo)
On July 16, 1979, GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of
May 7, 1979, and on November 23, 1979, the respondent court issued a
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the present petition under the following assigned errors.
I hogsheads stored there.
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in its Resolution of May 7, 1979 and
November 23, 1979 in making a wrong interpretation and application of the
term "additional proof and evidence for further indemnity" as stipulated in
the agreement of the parties.
II
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in its Resolution of May 7, 1979 and
November 23, 1979 in making a wrong interpretation and application of the
said term as originally made by respondent Court of Appeals in its Decision
of December 29, 1978.
III
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in refusing, and thus committed a grave
abuse of discretion, to make a physical count of the withdrawals of tobacco
hogsheads indicated in ACA's own evidence, Exhibits QQ to QQ-2024, in the
face of the repeated protestations of petitioner GSIS that the allegation of
ACA's witness, Patrocinio Torres, that the withdrawals recorded in said
exhibits totaled only 12,922 hogsheads is a brazen lie.
IV
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the withdrawals
recorded in ACA's Exhibits QQ to QQ-2024 totaled 15,679 hogsheads of
tobacco, and not just 12,922 hogsheads.
V of the letter of offer of GSIS dated December 7, 1964 and the letter of
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in totally ignoring and in not finding that
there were additional withdrawals of 1,994 hogsheads as shown in Exhs. 134
to 368.
VI
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in concluding that ACA's evidence on the
withdrawals is correct since such conclusion is not supported by the evidence
on record and adduced during the trial.
VII
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in making a glaring misapprehension of
fact in concluding that Joseph Singh confirmed ACA's contention that the
tobacco stocks were intact at the time of the fire, as the evidence is clear that
what were brought out of the warehouse were the contents of the tobacco
VIII
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the whole contents of
warehouse F were substituted with rotten tobacco before the fire.
IX
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining its original decision of
December 29, 1978 and the decision of the trial court.
X appellant and appellee; (6) the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing the complaint of
respondent-appelle Agricultural Credit Administration. (pp. 1-4, Brief for
Petitioner-Appellant Government Service Insurance System; p.160, Rollo)
The decisive issue involved in the case at bar is the quantity of tobacco stored
in Warehouse "F" at the time said warehouse was totally destroyed by fire on
February 15, 1962. Petitioner GSIS maintains that a total of 17,623
hogsheads of tobacco were withdrawn from Warehouse "F" before the fire
occurred. On the other hand, respondent ACA contends that only 12,922
hogsheads of tobacco were withdrawn.
Before resolving said issue, we shall dispose of an incidental issue which
appears to preoccupy both parties i.e. whether or not the testimony of ACA's
witnesses, Dorotea Toledo, Aurelio B. de Jesus, Demetrio P. Tabije, and
Patrocinio Torres, is " additional proof of evidence" within the contemplation
acceptance of ACA dated December 16, 1964. The discussion by the parties
of said issue is a futile exercise in semantics.
The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines vests upon the Supreme
Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts (par. 5 sec. 4, Art. VIII, Constitution). Even the
provision in both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions that are the rules of
court promulgated by the Supreme Court may be "repealed, altered or
supplemented" by the legislature does not appear in the 1987 Constitution.
Parties have, therefore, no discretion or power to alter, modify or
circumscribe the rules on evidence to suit their particular needs in a case
brought before the courts.
We, therefore, rule that the admissibility of the testimony of ACA's witnesses
must be determined by the rules of court. Since this testimony is relevant to
the facts in issue and said witnesses are competent witnesses, we hold that the
said testimony is admissible in evidence and we shall take it into
consideration in resolving the issue involved.
As the general rule the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding
upon this Court (De Gala-Sison vs. Manalo, 8 SCRA 595 [1963]; Chan vs.
Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 416 [1970]; Evangelista & Co., vs. Santos, 51
SCRA 416 [1973]. However, said rule admits of exceptions. The exceptions,
as set forth in Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals (100 SCRA 73 [1980])
are:
The findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties
and on the Supreme Court, unless (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmise, and conjectures; (2) the inference made is
manifestly mistaken; (3) there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment
is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond
the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admission of both
contrary to those of the trial court; (7) said findings of facts are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (b) the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and (9) when the finding of facts of the Court of
Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence and is contradicted by
evidence on record.
This Court retains the power to review and rectify findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals where said court manifestly overlooked, ignored, or
misinterpreted certain facts or circumstances of weight and significance
(Carolina Industries, Inc., vs. CMS Stock Brokerage, 97 SCRA 734 [1980];
People vs. Arciaga, 98 SCRA 1 [1980]). Considering that the findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals conflict with those of the trial court, the exercise of
our power of review over the decision of the Court of Appeals is not
unjustified.
As aforementioned, the quantity, the quantity of tobacco delivered to
Warehouse "F" is not dispute. The issue in dispute is the quantity of tobacco
withdrawn from said warehouse before the fire of February 15, 1962.
Withdrawals of tobacco from Warehouse "F" are recorded in the Delivery
Order and Tally-Out Sheets, Exhibits QQ to Q-2022 and Exhibits 134 to 368.
The Court of Appeals, in its resolution of May 7, 1979, mainly based its
findings, that 120,270 hogsheads of tobacco were stored in Warehouse "F"
immediately before the fire, on Exhibit GG, a summary of the withdrawals
based on Exhibit QQ to Q-2022. The Court of Appeals should not have
merely relied on the summary but should have gone to the original sources
and the bases thereof and should have scrutinized Exhibits QQ to QQ-2022
and Exhibits 134 to 368, the tally-out sheets for these are the primary
documents recording each and every withdrawal of tobacco from the
warehouse at the time of delivery. These exhibits constitute the best evidence " QQ-1022 52 (p. 41 Rollo)
to prove the withdrawal of tobacco from the warehouse. —
Total 5,348 Therefore, according to ACA's own documentary evidence, 15,669 hogshead
Nor may the tally sheet summary be of any significance. The contents of the of tobacco were withdrawn from the warehouse from 1955 to 1959.
tally sheet summary were supposed to have been merely copied from the Crop Year 1957:
weighers' tally sheets prepared right at the ramps. The inability of SVTPA to In addition thereto, Exhibits 134 to 368, delivery orders dated August 13, to
produce the original of the weighers' tally sheets or even explain its non- Exhs. QQ-36 to QQ-78 414 16, 1959, indicate that were further withdrawals of 1,944 hogsheads from the
production creates the impression that no delivery was actually made. As " QQ-116 15 warehouse during said period. 15,669 hogsheads plus 1,944 additional
testified to by the plaintiff's witness Maria Malabanan, the weighers' tally " QQ-158 to QQ-201 404 hogsheads, gives us a total of 17,613 hogsheads of tobacco withdrawn from
sheets are prepared at the same time that the weighing and grading of the " QQ-202 to QQ-243 309 the warehouse. Deducting 17,613 hogsheads of tobacco from a total of
delivered tobacco are made in the presence of the respective grader and the " QQ-324 6 15,457 tobacco hogsheads inside the warehouse at the time of the fire on
weigher of FVTR and PVTA. " QQ-450 7 February 15, 1962. The documentary evidence on record, therefore, clearly
— supports the position of petitioner GSIS.
xxx xxx xxx Total 1,155
The presentation of the testimony of ACA's witnesses, Doroteo Toledo,
The best evidence available, therefore, is that which relates directly or has a Crop Year 1958: Aurelio B. de Jesus, Demetrio P. Tabije, and Patronicio Torres is nothing but
direct connection with the deliver and which affirm the presence of the a convoluted attempt of ACA to minimize and neutralize the impact of
tobacco delivered at the FVTR warehouse. (Santiago Virginia Tobacco Exhs. QQ-654 2 Exhibits QQ to QQ-2022 and Exhibits 134 to 368. Their testimony consisted
Planters Asso., Inc. vs. Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, 31 " QQ-657 to QQ-678-B 60 mainly in trying to explain away, vary, and modify the meaning and
SCRA 528, 538-541 [1970]) " QQ-679 to QQ-703 295 significance of Exhibits QQ to QQ-2022 and Exhibits 134 to 368.
" QQ-752 to QQ-755 1,150 Testimonial evidence is easy of fabrication and there is very little room for
According to Exhibits QQ to QQ-2022, the withdrawals of tobacco from " QQ-765 to QQ-767 800 choice between testimonial evidence and documentary evidence (Marvel
Warehouse "F" during the period 1955 to 1959 were as follows: " QQ-999 5 Building Corporation vs. David, 94 Phil. 376 [1954]). Generally,
" QQ-1003 to QQ-1021 185 documentary evidence prevails over-testimonial evidence.
Crop Year 1955 Number of Hogsheads " QQ-1023 to QQ-1027 336
Exhs. QQ-452 to QQ-463 87 " QQ-1029 to QQ-1061 246 WHEREFORE, the resolution dated May 7, 1979, as well as that of
" QQ-465 to QQ-466 13 " QQ-1064 to QQ-1214 1238 November 23, 1979, of respondent Court of Appeals are hereby
" QQ-500 to QQ-502 23 —— ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the complaint filed in Civil Case No.
" QQ-652 2 Total 4,317 62683 is hereby DISMISSED.
" QQ-678-A 1
— Crop Year 1959: SO ORDERED.
Total 26
Exhs. QQ-1215 to QQ-1425 1,226
Crop Year 1956: " QQ-1426 to QQ-177 2,019
" QQ-1771 to QQ-2024 1,478
Exhs. QQ, QQ-1 to QQ-35 320 ———
" QQ-79 to QQ-115 276 Total 4,723
" QQ-117 to Q-157 316
" QQ-244 to QQ-323 691 (pp. 40-41, Rollo)
" QQ-325 to QQ-449 980
" QQ-451 22 Adding the withdrawal by crop years, we arrive at the following figures:
" QQ-464 7
" QQ-467 to QQ-499 299
" QQ-503 to QQ-651 1,170 Crop Year 1955 126 Hogsheads
" QQ-653 5 Crop Year 1956 5,348 "
" QQ-655 to QQ-674 162 Crop Year 1957 1,155 "
" QQ-678 184 Crop Year 1958 4,317 "
" QQ-704 to QQ-751 742 Crop Year 1959 4,723 "
" QQ-756 to QQ-764 122 ————
Total 15,669 Hogsheads
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RODRIGO BALLENO
y PERNETES, appellant. G.R. No. 149075, August 7,2003
This is an appeal from the decision[1] dated January 17, 2001, of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Criminal Case No. 00-0408,
finding accused-appellant Rodrigo Balleno y Pernetes guilty of rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Information reads:
That on or about the 18th day of March 2000, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then the stepfather of complainant Jacquelyn Balandra
y Alzate, a minor 13 years of age, with force and intimidation did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
complainant against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.[2]
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial on
the merits ensued.
The facts of the case as established by the prosecution:
At 12:15 p.m. of March 18, 2000, thirteen year-old Jacquelyn Balandra was
with her step-sisters, Titin and Crismarie, inside the room of their home
located at Old Air Academy, ATO, Don Carlos Village, Pasay City.
Appellant Rodrigo Balleno, the live-in partner of Jacquelyns mother, Lorna,
entered the room and ordered Titin and Crismarie to go out.[3] When they
were alone, appellant sat at the side of the bed where Jacquelyn was lying
down. Then he touched her thighs, placed her hands on her back and covered
her mouth. He then removed Jacquelyns shorts and panties, lay on top of her
and kissed her lips. He took off his shorts and inserted his penis into
Jacquelyns vagina who tried to push him away.[4]
Jacquelyn went to her friends, Toochie, Nanette and Mylene and related to
them what happened. They accompanied her to the local barangay where she
reported the incident. On the same day, barangay officials Luis Alintana,
Efren Bais and Rogelio Basagre arrested appellant Rodrigo Balleno.
[5]
 Jacquelyn executed her Sinumpaang Salaysay[6] and submitted herself to a
medical examination.[7]
Dr. Estela Guerrero Manalo, a physician assigned at the Child Protection
Unit of the Philippine General Hospital, Manila, conducted a physical and
genital examination on Jacquelyn on March 20, 2000. Her examination
showed that the victims external genitalia and hymen were normal. [8] There
was no evidence of spermatozoa. She, however, claimed that it was possible
that the victim was sexually abused even if the result of the examination
showed a normal genital.[9]
In his defense, appellant denied the charge against him, and claimed that on
March 18, 2000, he had a drinking spree at home with his cousin Lito
Balleno and Sammy Alzate, uncle of Jacquelyn, from 11 a.m. to 1 p.m. They
consumed three bottles of gin.[10] He admitted that he kissed Jacquelyn
because the latter took care of his youngest child. Thereafter, Jacquelyn
pushed him away and left. He fell asleep and was awakened by the barangay
officials who arrested him. Appellant further alleged that the crime was
imputed to him because Jacquelyn wanted her real father, Charlie, to be
reunited with her mother.[11]
After trial, judgment was rendered against appellant, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove the qualifying
circumstance of stepparent relationship between the accused and the
complainant, as alleged in the information, this Court finds the accused guilty
for simple rape.
It would appear therefore that accused Rodrigo Balleno y Pernetes and the
mother of the victim were not married to each other and therefore not the
stepfather of the victim, hence, the Court finds the accused guilty of simple
rape and hereby sentences him to reclusion perpetua. He is likewise ordered
to pay civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 and moral damages in the
amount of P50,000.00 to the victim Jacquelyn Balandra y Alzate with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.[12]
In this appeal, appellant contends that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT
WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
The appeal lacks merit.
Appellant assails Jacquelyns credibility by referring to the inconsistency
between her testimony and her sworn statement. In her statement before the
police, Jacquelyn stated that there was no insertion of the penis inside her
vagina Hindi ko naramdaman na naipasok niya kasi po sa may itaas po ng
pepe ko ito naramdaman. Sa loob ng labi ng ari ko.[13] In open court,
however, she testified that appellant inserted his penis inside her vagina.[14]
It has been held that some discrepancies between the affidavit and the
testimony of the witness in open court do not necessarily impair the
credibility of her testimony, for affidavits are generally taken ex parte and are
often incomplete or even inaccurate for lack of searching inquiries by the
investigating officer.[15] An affidavit is not a complete reproduction of what
the declarant has in mind because it is generally prepared by the
administering officer and the affiant simply signs it after it has been read to
him. In any case, open court declarations take precedence over written
affidavits in the hierarchy of evidence. Unlike written statements, there is
flexibility on the part of the questioner to adapt his questions to elicit the
desired answer in order to ferret out the truth.[16]
In the case at bar, appellant has not shown any material discrepancy between
the sworn statement and testimony of the victim that would seriously taint her
credibility and warrant a reversal of the trial courts factual findings. Even
assuming for the sake of argument, that there was no penile penetration of
private complainants vagina because her legs were not spread apart, it has
been consistently ruled that the mere touching of the labia of the woman
consummates the crime of rape.[17] Hence, the fact that no laceration and no
ruptured hymen were found in this case, does not necessarily negate rape.
The fact that the hymen was intact upon examination does not, likewise, belie
rape, for a broken hymen is not an essential element of rape, nor does the fact
that the victim remained a virgin exclude the crime. In a prosecution for rape,
the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the
rape, which the prosecution in this case was able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt.[18] In any event, a medical examination is not essential in the
prosecution of a rape case. A medical examination and a medical certificate
are merely corroborative in character. They are not indispensable
requirements for conviction, for what matters greatly is the clear, unequivocal
and credible testimony of the victim.[19]
Similarly, it must be stressed that the absence of spermatozoa in the victims
sex organ does not disprove rape. It could be that the victim washed or
urinated prior to her examination, which may well explain the absence of
spermatozoa.[20]
Appellant contends that he could not have possibly raped Jacquelyn inside a
room in a thickly populated squatters area wherein a commotion can be easily
heard by their neighbors and where houses were built close to each other. The
argument deserves scant consideration. Lust is no respecter of time and place.
Several times, we held that rape can be committed even in places where
people congregate, in parks, along the roadsides, in school premises, in a
house where there are other occupants, in the same room where other
members of the family are also sleeping, and even in places which, to many,
would appear unlikely and high risk venues for its commission.[21]
Moreover, appellants allegation that there was no force or intimidation
because private complainant did not suffer injuries and her clothes were not
torn is not well taken. The testimony of Jacquelyn established the fact that,
through force and intimidation, appellant pinned her hands at her back,
covered her mouth and succeeded in abusing her. The absence of external
signs of physical injuries does not prove that rape was not committed, for
proof thereof is not an essential element of the crime of rape. [22] Settled is the
rule that the force employed in rape need not be irresistible so long as it is
present and brings the desired result. All that is necessary is that the force be
sufficient to fulfill its evil end, or that it be successfully used; it need not be
so great or be of such a character that it could not be repelled.[23] Indeed, the
degree of force or intimidation required for the act to constitute rape is
relative, and must be viewed in the light of the complainant's perception and
judgment at the time of the commission of the offense.[24]
In the case at bar, Jacquelyns testimony is clear, candid, straightforward and
consistent. She had positively identified appellant as her malefactor. No
ulterior motive was offered to explain why the victim would concoct a story
charging appellant with the crime of rape. Jacquelyn testified:
Q: As a matter of fact, you do not treat your stepfather, the suspect in this
case, as your father?
A: I consider him as my father.
Q: Was it true that before this incident happened on March 18, 2000 your
mother Lorna and your stepfather has a serious quarrel?
A: No, sir.
Q: Your father Charlie Balandra is not the friend of your stepfather, am I
correct?
A: Yes, they are friends.
Q: They have quarreled before this incident, am I correct?
A: None.[25]
Time and again, we have consistently held that when a woman, more so if a
minor, states that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to
show that rape was committed. For no woman, least of all a child, would
weave a tale of sexual assaults to her person, open herself to examination of
her private parts and later be subjected to public trial or ridicule if she was
not, in truth, a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done
to her.[26] Hence, we find no basis to depart from the well-settled rule that trial
courts assessment of the credibility of complainants testimony is entitled to
great weight, absent any showing that some facts were overlooked which, if
considered, would affect the outcome of the case.[27]
The Information alleged that appellant was the stepfather of the victim. This
was inaccurate. The word step, when used as prefix in conjunction with a
degree of kinship, is repugnant to blood relationship and is indicative of a
relationship by affinity.[28] Since appellant and the victims mother were not
married, no such relationship by affinity existed between appellant and the
victim. The records indicate that the victims mother, Lorna, and the appellant
were live-in partners, the former, in fact, lawfully married to Charlie
Balandra, the victims father. A stepfather-stepdaughter relationship
presupposes a legitimate relationship, i.e., the appellant should have been
legally married to Lorna, the victims mother. A stepfather is the husband of
ones mother by virtue of a marriage subsequent to that of which the person
spoken of is the offspring.[29] A stepdaughter is a daughter of ones spouse by
previous marriage or the daughter of one of the spouses by a former
marriage.[30]
In People v. Fraga,[31] we held that although the rape of a person under
eighteen (18) years of age by the common-law spouse of the victims mother
is punishable by death, this penalty cannot be imposed on accused-appellant
x x x because his relationship was not what was alleged in the information.
What was alleged was that he is the stepfather of the complainant. The
filiation or kinship with the accused must be alleged in the information as
part of the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.[32] Therefore, the failure to accurately
allege the relationship between appellant and his victim in the information
bars his conviction of rape in its qualified form. [33] The appellant, having been
referred to as the stepfather of the victim in the information, is thus
auspiciously spared from the supreme punishment of death by this technical
flaw.[34]
Thus, the trial court correctly convicted appellant of simple rape and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353,
otherwise known as The Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which reads:
ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed.- Rape is committed.
1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
ART. 266-B. Penalties.- Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article
shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Lastly, in line with the prevailing jurisprudence, the award of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity for the crime of rape should be reduced to P50,000.00.
[35]
 Civil indemnity is separate and distinct from the award of moral damages
which is automatically granted in rape cases.[36] Moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.00 are additionally awarded without need of pleading or proof of
the basis thereof. This is because it is recognized that the victims injury is
concomitant with and necessarily resulting from the odiousness of the crime
to warrant per se the award of moral damages.[37]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Criminal Case No. 00-0408, finding
appellant Rodrigo Balleno y Pernetes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and
ordering him to pay the offended party P50,000.00 as moral damages, is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the civil indemnity in the
amount of P75,000.00 is reduced to P50,000.00.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 146284-86. January 20, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ABDUL MACALABA y
DIGAYON, appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Appellant Abdul Macalaba y Digayon (hereafter ABDUL) was charged
before the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, with violations of the
Presidential Decree No. 1866[1]; Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code [2]; and
Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act
No. 6425), as amended, in Criminal Cases Nos. 1236, 1237 and 1238,
respectively. The accusatory portions of the informations in these cases read
as follows:
Criminal Case No. 1236
That on or about April 12, 1999, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province
of Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
said accused without the required permit/license from the proper authorities,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control one (1) caliber .45 pistol with Serial No.
909904, and one (1) magazine with five (5) live ammunition thereof.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Criminal Case No. 1237
That on or about April 12, 1999, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province
of Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in
his possession, custody and control two (2) ONE THOUSAND PESOS bill
with Serial Numbers BG 021165 and BG 995998, knowing the same to be
forged or otherwise falsified with the manifest intention of using such
falsified or forged instruments.
[4]
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 1238
That on or about April 12, 1999, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province
of Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused without being authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and
control one (1) self-sealing transparent plastic bag of methamphetamine
hydrochloride shabu weighing 226.67 grams (3 medium sized transparent
plastic bags and 1 big heat-sealed transparent plastic bag).
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
The three cases were consolidated and raffled to Branch 31 of said
court. Upon his arraignment, ABDUL entered in each case a plea of not
guilty.
At the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses SPO1 Generoso Pandez,
PO3 Ernani Mendez, Police Inspector Anacleta Cultura and Police Inspector
Lorna Tria. ABDUL was the sole witness for the defense.
SPO1 Pandez, a PNP member of the Laguna Criminal Investigation
Detection Group (CIDG), testified that on 12 April 1999, at 5:15 p.m., Major
R Win Pagkalinawan ordered the search of ABDUL, alias Boy Muslim,
based on a verified information that the latter was driving a carnapped
Mitsubishi olive green car with Plate No. UPV 511 and was a drug-pusher in
San Pedro, Laguna. Two teams were formed for the search. The first was
headed by Major Pagkalinawan, with SPO4 Aberion and five others as
members; and the second was led by Capt. Percival Rumbaoa, with SPO1
Pandez and PO3 Mendez as members.[6]
Between 6:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m., the two groups proceeded to Barangay
Nueva, San Pedro, Laguna, on board a car and a van. They went to ABDULs
apartment where he was reportedly selling shabu, but they learned that
ABDUL had already left. While looking for ABDUL, they saw the suspected
carnapped car somewhere at Pacita Complex I, San Pedro, Laguna, going
towards the Poblacion. When it stopped due to the red traffic light, the CIDG
officers alighted from their vehicles. Capt. Rumbaoa positioned himself at the
passenger side of the suspected carnapped car, while Major Pagkalinawan
stood in front of the car. SPO1 Pandez, with PO3 Mendez beside him, went
straight to the driver and knocked at the drivers window. ABDUL, who was
driving the car, lowered the glass window. SPO1 Pandez introduced himself
as a member of the Laguna CIDG and asked ABDUL to turn on the light and
show them the cars certificate of registration.[7]
When the light was already on, SPO1 Pandez saw a black Norinco .45 caliber
gun[8] inside an open black clutch/belt bag placed on the right side of the
drivers seat near the gear. He asked ABDUL for the supporting papers of the
gun, apart from the cars certificate of registration, but the latter failed to show
them any.[9] When ABDUL opened the zipper of the clutch/belt bag, the
CIDG officers saw inside it four plastic sachets of what appeared to be
shabu. They likewise found a self-sealing plastic bag which contained the
following items: two fake P1,000 bills, a list of names of persons, a magazine
and five ammunitions for a .45 caliber gun. They confiscated the gun, the
shabu, and the fake P1,000 bills and thereafter brought ABDUL to the CIDG
office.[10]
PO3 Mendez substantially corroborated the testimony of SPO1 Pandez.[11]
The two P1,000 bills were found to be counterfeit after an examination
conducted by Police Inspector Anacleta Cultura, [12] a document examiner at
Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna. The white crystalline substance
contained in the four small plastic bags was subjected to physical and
laboratory examination conducted by Police Inspector Lorna Tria, a Forensic
Chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory, Region IV, Camp Vicente Lim. Her
findings[13] were as follows: (a) the three small plastic sachets weighed 29.46
grams, while the big plastic sachet weighed 197.21 grams, or a total weight
of 226.67 grams; (b) representative samples taken from the specimens thereof
were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated
drug; and (c) the improvised tooter and the rolled aluminum foil with residue
found in the self-sealing plastic bag were also positive of the presence
for shabu residue.
As expected, ABDUL had a different story to tell. He testified that on 12
April 1999, between 6:50 and 7:00 p.m., he was driving a borrowed
Mitsubishi Galant Car with Plate No. UPV 501 somewhere in San Pedro,
Laguna. With him was Rose, his live-in partner, whom he fetched from
Angeles City, Pampanga. He had borrowed the car from his friend Ferdinand
Navares, who instructed him to return it in front of the latters store at San
Pedro Public Market.[14]
ABDUL was about to park the car when a man knocked hard on the glass
window on the drivers side of the car and pointed at the former a .45 caliber
pistol. Another one who was armed with an armalite rifle positioned himself
in front of the car, while the third one positioned himself near the window on
the passenger side and pointed a gun at his live-in partner Rose.ABDUL then
lowered the cars window. The man near him opened the door, held him, and
told him to alight. When the man asked him whether he was Boy Muslim, he
answered in the negative. The same man opened the back door of the car and
boarded at the back seat. Rose remained seated at the front passenger seat. [15]
The other men likewise boarded the car, which was thereafter driven by one
of them. While inside the car, they saw a .45 caliber pistol at the edge of the
drivers seat. They asked him whether he had a license. He showed his gun
license and permit to carry. After taking his gun, license, and permit to carry,
they tried to remove his belt bag from his waist, but he did not allow them.[16]
Upon reaching the headquarters, ABDUL learned that these people were
C.I.S. agents. There, he was told to surrender the belt bag to the officer who
would issue a receipt for it. He did as he was told, and the money inside his
belt bag was counted and it amounted to P42,000. They then got his money
and the cellular phone, which was also inside the bag, together with some
other pieces of paper. They also took another cell phone from the car. He was
never issued a receipt for these items.[17]
Thereafter, a man entered the office with a white plastic bag allegedly taken
from the borrowed car. ABDUL denied ownership over the plastic bag. That
same man then told him that it contained shabu. ABDUL and Rose were
detained at the headquarters. The next morning, Rose was allowed to get out;
and in the afternoon, he was transferred to San Pedro Municipal Jail.[18]
After the trial, the trial court acquitted ABDUL in Criminal Cases Nos. 1236
and 1237 for violations of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and Article 168 of
the Revised Penal Code, respectively, due to insufficiency of
evidence. However, it convicted him in Criminal Case No. 1238 for violation
of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act
No. 6425), as amended,[19] and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000, as well as the costs of
the suit.
Dissatisfied with the judgment, ABDUL interposed the present appeal,
alleging that the trial court erred in (1) convicting him for violation of
Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended,
despite insufficiency of evidence; and (2) admitting the evidence presented
by the prosecution although it was obtained in violation of his constitutional
rights.
In his first assigned error, ABDUL argues that the prosecution failed to prove
the material allegations in the information. The information charges him,
among other things, that without being authorized by law, [he] did then and
there willfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control
methamphetamine hydrochloride. However, the prosecution did not present
any certification from the concerned government agency, like the Dangerous
Drugs Board, to the effect that he was not authorized to possess shabu, which
is a regulated drug.Thus, his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
In his second assigned error, ABDUL asserts that he was not committing a
crime when the CIS agents boarded his car, searched the same and ultimately
arrested him. He was about to park his borrowed car per instruction by the
owner when he was harassed by the operatives at gunpoint. The gun seen was
properly documented; thus, there was no reason for the CIS agents to bring
him and his companion to the headquarters. The shabu allegedly found in the
car was brought in by somebody at the time he was under interrogation. It
was taken in violation of his constitutional right against illegal search and
seizure. Being a fruit of a poisonous tree it should not have been admitted in
evidence.
Moreover, the members of the CIDG merely relied on the information
received from an anonymous telephone caller who said that ABDUL was
driving a carnapped vehicle. They had no personal knowledge of the veracity
of the information. Consequently, there was no legal basis for his warrantless
arrest.
In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains
that ABDUL had the burden of proving that he was authorized to possess
shabu, but he failed to discharge such burden. Therefore, it is presumed that
he had no authority; consequently, he is liable for violation of Section 16,
Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The OSG
likewise refutes ABDULs argument that there was a violation of his right
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The general rule is that if a criminal charge is predicated on a negative
allegation, or that a negative averment is an essential element of a crime, the
prosecution has the burden of proving the charge. However, this rule is not
without an exception. Thus, we have held:
Where the negative of an issue does not permit of direct proof, or where the
facts are more immediately within the knowledge of the accused, the onus
probandi rests upon him. Stated otherwise, it is not incumbent upon the
prosecution to adduce positive evidence to support a negative averment the
truth of which is fairly indicated by established circumstances and which, if
untrue, could readily be disproved by the production of documents or other
evidence within the defendants knowledge or control. For example, where a
charge is made that a defendant carried on a certain business without a
license (as in the case at bar, where the accused is charged with the selling of
a regulated drug without authority), the fact that he has a license is a matter
which is peculiarly within his knowledge and he must establish that fact or
suffer conviction.[20]
In the instant case, the negative averment that ABDUL had no license or
authority to possess methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated
drug, has been fairly indicated by the following facts proven by the
testimonies of the CIDG officers and the forensic chemist: (a) ABDUL was
driving the suspected carnapped vehicle when he was caught, and he
appeared to be healthy and not indisposed as to require the use of shabu as
medicine; (b) the contents of the sachets found in ABDULs open clutch bag
inside the car were prima facie determined by the CIDG officers to be shabu;
and (c) the said contents were conclusively found to be shabu by the forensic
chemist. With these established facts, the burden of evidence was shifted to
ABDUL. He could have easily disproved the damning circumstances by
presenting a doctors prescription for said drug or a copy of his license or
authority to possess the regulated drug. Yet, he offered nothing.
And now on the second issue. The Constitution enshrines in its Bill of Rights
the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose.[21] To give full protection to it, the Bill of Rights also ordains the
exclusionary principle that any evidence obtained in violation of said right is
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.[22]
It is obvious from Section 2 of the Bill of Rights that reasonable searches and
seizures are not proscribed. If conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant
issued in compliance with the guidelines prescribed by the Constitution and
reiterated in the Rules of Court, the search and seizure is valid.
The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute.
The recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence are (1) search of
moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs search; (4) waiver or
consented search; (5) stop and frisk situation (Terry search); and (6) search
incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search and
seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an
arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the
Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in
flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped
prisoners.[23] Another exception is a search made pursuant to routine airport
security procedure, which is authorized under Section 9 of R.A. No. 6235.[24]
The warrantless arrest of, or warrantless search and seizure conducted on,
ABDUL constitute a valid exemption from the warrant requirement. The
evidence clearly shows that on the basis of an intelligence information that a
carnapped vehicle was driven by ABDUL, who was also a suspect of drug
pushing, the members of the CIDG of Laguna went around looking for the
carnapped car.[25] They spotted the suspected carnapped car, which was
indeed driven by ABDUL. While ABDUL was fumbling about in his clutch
bag for the registration papers of the car the CIDG agents saw four
transparent sachets of shabu.[26] These sachets of shabu were therefore
in plain view of the law enforcers.
Under the plain view doctrine, unlawful objects within the plain view of an
officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to
seizure and may be presented in evidence. Nonetheless, the seizure of
evidence in plain view must comply with the following requirements: (a) a
prior valid intrusion in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of
their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the
police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent; and (d) the plain view justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search.[27]
We are convinced beyond any shadow of doubt under the circumstances
above discussed that all the elements of seizure in plain view exist in the case
at bar. Thus, the warrantless search and seizure conducted on ABDUL, as
well as his warrantless arrest, did not transgress his constitutional rights.
ABDULs sole defense of denial is unsubstantiated. We have time and again
ruled that mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a
witness. A mere denial, just like alibi, is a self-serving negative evidence
which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between a
categorical testimony that rings of truth on one hand, and a bare denial on the
other, the former is generally held to prevail.[28]
On the issue of credibility between ABDULs testimony and the declarations
of the CIDG officers, we hold for the latter. As has been repeatedly held,
credence shall be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution
witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to the
contrary; moreover in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a
serious crime against the accused, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over accuseds self-serving and
uncorroborated claim of having been framed.[29] ABDUL miserably failed to
rebut this presumption and to prove any ulterior motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses.
Unauthorized possession of 200 grams or more of shabu or
methylamphetamine hydrochloride is punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death under Section 16 of Article III, in relation to Section 20 of Article IV,
of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended
by P.D. Nos. 44, 1675, 1683, and 1707; Batas Pambansa Blg. 179; and R.A.
No. 7659 (now further amended by R.A. No. 9165). These sections provide
as follows:

SEC.16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. -- The penalty of reclusion

perpetua to death and fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any
regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to
the provisions of Section 20 hereof.

SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the

Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. -- The penalties for offenses under
Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of
Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in
any of the following quantities:

3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride.

There is no doubt that the charge of illegal possession of shabu in Criminal

Case No. 1238 was proved beyond reasonable doubt since ABDUL
knowingly carried with him at the time he was caught 226.67 grams
of shabu without legal authority. There being no modifying circumstance
proven, the proper penalty pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal
Code isreclusion perpetua. The penalty imposed by the trial court, including
the fine, is, therefore, in order.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of San
Pedro, Laguna, in Criminal Case No. 1238 convicting appellant ABDUL
MACALABA y DIGAYON of the violation of Section 16 of Article III of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine
ofP500,000 and the costs of the suit, is hereby affirmed in toto.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 140550            February 13, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,  imprisonment in case of insolvency;
vs.
EDGAR AYUPAN, GERRY HABLONA (at large), accused,
EDGAR AYUPAN, appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When the evidence does not establish how the aggression commenced,
treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify a killing to murder. In the present
case, the lone prosecution witness did not see how the attack on the victim
was initiated. Hence, the crime is only homicide, not murder.
The Case
Edgar Ayupan appeals the August 12, 1999 Decision1 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Iloilo City (Branch 33) in Criminal Case No. 32949, finding
him guilty of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
The Information, dated April 17, 1989 and signed by Second Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Irene S. Panigbatan, charged appellant as follows:
"That on or about the 27th day of June, 1984 in the Municipality of Batad,
Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and cooperating,
with an unidentified companion, with treachery, evident premeditation and
taking advantage of their superior strength, and a decided purpose to kill, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and stab
several times the victim FRANCISCO MENDOZA using the bladed weapon
the accused were provided at that time, thereby hitting him and inflicting
upon FRANCISCO MENDOZA several stab wounds on different parts of his
body which caused his death."2
With the assistance of counsel,3 appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned
on November 28, 1995.4 After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"Based on the foregoing, this Court hereby decrees that:
"1. Accused Edgar Ayupan is guilty of the crime of Murder as defined and
penalized by paragraph 1, Article 248 in its further relation to paragraph 16,
article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, as proven beyond reasonable doubt;
"2. Accused Edgar Ayupan is meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua by
reason of the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance;
"3. Accused Edgar Ayupan is directed to indemnify the heirs of deceased-
victim Francisco Mendoza [in] the amount of P50,000.00 without subsidiary
"4. The Director of [the] Bureau of Correction, Muntinlupa City is directed to
credit in favor of the accused Edgar Ayupan the duration of his preventive
detention reckoned from 24 January 1995 until the promulgation of this
Decision.
"SO ORDERED."5
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution’s version of the facts is summarized by the Office of the
Solicitor General, as follows:6
"On June 26, 1984, prosecution witness Helen Batislaong accompanied by
her younger sister, Juvy, and her cousin, Joseph, arrived at the dance hall of
Crossing Hamod, Batad, Iloilo Province at around 9:00 p.m. At around 12:00
o’clock midnight, Batislaong heard a commotion inside the dance hall.
Concerned that her cousin might be involved in the fight, since he was no
longer near her, Batislaong ran to the center of the dance floor. She did not
see her cousin but instead, it was the sight o a bloodied Francisco Mendoza
lying down on the floor which confronted her. Francisco Mendoza, who is
also her relative since her mother and his father are cousins was being
stabbed repeatedly in the chest by appellant Edgar Ayupan who was kneeling
over the victim. Batislaong knows appellant since they both reside in Batad.
Batislaong saw everything clearly since she was only four (4) meters away
from the attacker and the victim. Furthermore, there was a light bulb brightly
illuminating the scene.
"Horrified, Batislaong shouted at appellant, demanding why he was stabbing
Francisco Mendoza when as far as she knew her relative had done no wrong.
She shouted for people to help Mendoza. But since most of the people ran
away, nobody assisted them. Appellant and his companions ran away after
stabbing the victim. Finally, the barangay captain came and investigated the
incident. Weak after witnessing the stabbing incident, Batislaong was
brought home by the barangay captain.
"Batislaong was not able to report the incident immediately because at that
time she was nervous and afraid. A week after the incident, she was able to
relate the circumstances surrounding the killing to Atty. Teodosio. Atty.
Teodosio told her that they ha[d] two other witnesses to the killing which he
felt were quite sufficient in prosecuting appellant. But he told her that he
would call her if the need arises.
"Dr. Noel C. Posadas, a retired rural health physician and a resident of Batad,
conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of the victim. He testified that the
victim received three (3) stab wounds on the chest, the third of which was
fatal. The immediate cause of death was shock and hemorrhage." (Citations
omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant, on the other hand, presented the following version of the facts:7
"Accused Edgar Ayupan testified that he did kn[o]w the victim but he did not
stab him. On June 26, 1984, he and his companions Gerry Hablona, Roquito
Penuela and Efren Hablona were at the dance party. Before entering the
dance hall, the barangay tanod at the gate, frisked him and his companions.
Once inside the hall, he invited a lady to dance with him. At said instance, the
victim slapped his hand. When he turned his head, he saw the victim and the
latter immediately boxed him. Hit at the bridge of his nose, he lost his
consciousness. Gerry Hablona and Roquito Penuela brought him out of the
dance hall when he regained his consciousness. He did not know Helen
Batislaong; he did not leave his barangay. He only learned of the charge
against him when he was arrested on June 21, 1995.
"Roquito Penuela corroborated the testimony of accused Ayupan that before
they entered the dance hall on June 26, 1984 at Barangay Hamod, they were
bodily frisked. At about 1:00 early morning of June 27, 1984, accused
Ayupan approached a woman. At said instance, the hand of the x x x victim
slapped the hand of the accused. Accused Ayupan then boxed the latter on
the nose. Accused fell down. When the victim went away and walked
towards the center of the dance hall, somebody met him and stabbed him
many times and [a] commotion took [place] and people were running. At that
time, accused Ayupan was still lying down. He carried the accused out of the
dance hall and went home when [the] accused regained his consciousness."
Ruling of the Trial Court
Giving full faith and credence to the testimony of Helen Batislaong, the trial
court held that the witness, having been at the locus criminis had the
opportunity to see and observe the specific details of the crime.
The RTC disbelieved appellant’s defense of denial and rejected the evidence
of good moral character offered by the defense witnesses. It held that this
defense was based purely on conjecture and might have even been fabricated,
since it was unsubstantiated by concrete details.8 Further, it ruled that the
flight of appellant after the commission of the crime was an indication of his
guilt.
Hence, this appeal.9
The Issue
Appellant raises this lone assignment of error for our consideration:
"The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant Edgar Ayupan of
the crime of murder despite the insufficient, unreliable testimony of
prosecution lone witness Helen Batislaong."10
This Court’s Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant should be convicted only of
homicide.
Main Issue:
Credibility of Lone Witness
Appellant argues that the lower court erred in relying on the testimony of the
lone prosecution witness, Helen Batislaong, because her testimony was not
corroborated by other witnesses. We disagree.11
It is well-settled that the testimony of a lone witness – if found by the trial
court to be positive, categorical and credible – is sufficient to support a
conviction. This is so, especially if the testimony bore the earmarks of truth
and sincerity and was delivered spontaneously, naturally and in a
straightforward manner.12 Corroborative evidence is necessary only when
there are reasons to suspect that the witness bent the truth, or that his or her
observation was inaccurate.13 Evidence is assessed in terms of quality, not
quantity. It is to be weighed, not counted. 14Therefore, it is not uncommon to
reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a lone witness.15
In the case at bar, the prosecution could have presented two other witnesses,
Rodrigo L. Demayo and Noel T. Estebal, but both died before they could
testify.16 Be that as it may, the trial court found Batislaong’s narration of the
incident straightforward and categorical. She testified thus:
"ATTY TEODOSIO ON DIRECT EXAMINATION:
May it please the honorable court.
Q         Miss Batislaong, you said you are a resident of Batad, Iloilo[;] since
when have you been a resident of Batad, Iloilo?
A         Since I was small.
Q         Do you know the accused in this case Edgar Ayupan?
A         Yes, sir.
Q         If he is present inside this courtroom will you please point to us Edgar
Ayupan?
A         Yes, sir.
Q         Where is he?
A         (Witness pointing to a person inside the courtroom who upon being
asked his name, x x x answered Edgar Ayupan)
Q         On the evening of June 26, 1984, do you remember where were you?
A         I was at the dance hall. Q         Now what did you do when you saw Edgar Ayupan kneeling
COURT: somewhere on the knee portion of the body of Francisco Mendoza, at the
(to witness) same time stabbing Francisco Mendoza?
Where is that dance hall? A         I shouted why he stabbed Francisco Mendoza because he ha[d] no
THE WITNESS: fault.
At Hamod, Batad, Iloilo. Q         In what part of the body of . . Were you able to see if Francisco
x x x           x x x           x x x Mendoza was hit when he was stabbed for several times by Edgar Ayupan?
Q         In going [to] the dance hall from your house, [did] you have any A         Yes, sir.
companions? Q         And could you tell the Court in what part of the body of Francisco
A         My younger sister and my cousin. Mendoza was hit when he was stabbed for several times by Edgar Ayupan?
x x x           x x x           x x x A         On the chest.
Q         What was your purpose in going to the dance hall? Q         Now after you shouted considering that you saw Edgar Ayupan [stab]
A         To watch the dance. Francisco Mendoza for several times what next happened?
Q         At about 12:00 o’clock midnight[,] June 26, 1984, could you tell us if A         I shouted for help [for] Francisco Mendoza.
there was anything unusual that happened in that dance hall? Q         Then what happened next?
A         There was a commotion. A         Nobody help[ed] us because most people ran away.
Q         Where were you when you noticed that there was a commotion? Q         After Edgar Ayupan stabbed Francisco Mendoza for several times[,]
A         I was inside the dance hall on the bench. what [happened next]?
Q         And because you notice that there was a commotion, what did you do A         He ran away.
if any? Q         Aside from – do you know if Edgar Ayupan had other companions?
A         I ran [to] the center of the dance hall to see x x x what happened. A         Yes, sir.
Q         Why did you r[u]n towards the middle of the dance hall to see what Q         And where [were] his companions at that time that he was stabbing
happened? Francisco Mendoza?
A         Because I ha[d] to see x x x who were fighting because my cousin A         Just near him.
was no longer with me. Q         Now you said – what happened to the companions of Edgar Ayupan
Q         And what did you observe when you proceeded to the middle portion after Edgar Ayupan ran away?
of the dance hall? ATTY. LAUREA:
A         I saw Francisco Mendoza lying [down while] being stabbed by Edgar. Incompetent, your honor, he would be incompetent as to what happened to
Q         What is the family name of this Francisco? the companions of Edgar Ayupan after he ran away.
A         Mendoza. COURT:
Q         And what is the family name of this Edgar? What happened to the companions after he ran away?
A         Ayupan. ATTY. TEODOSIO:
Q         This Edgar Ayupan whom you said was stabbing Francisco Mendoza, What happened to the companions of Edgar after Edgar Ayupan ran away?
was he the same Edgar Ayupan whom you identified a while ago as the A         They ran away together.
accused in this case? Q         Now after Edgar Ayupan and his companions ha[d] left, what did you
A         Yes, sir. do?
Q         And do you know what kind of weapon was being used by Edgar A         I shouted and cried for help for Francisco Mendoza.
Ayupan when you saw him [stabbing] Francisco Mendoza? Q         Then what next happened when you were there?
A         A knife. A         When I was there[,] the barangay captain also went there and [saw]
Q         What was the position of Francisco Mendoza when he was stabbed by who was there and he was left there and I was brought by the barangay
Edgar Ayupan? captain, because I was crying[;] since I [could] not walk, they just brought
A         He was lying [down]. me home.
Q         Where was he lying [down]? Q         Were you able to reach your house?
A         At the center of the dance hall. A         Yes, sir, I was brought by my younger sister and my cousin.
Q         And how about this Edgar Ayupan[,] where was he situated in Q         Could you tell the Court how were you able to recognize Edgar
relation to Francisco Mendoza when he stabbed Francisco Mendoza while the Ayupan as the person whom you saw [stab] for several times Francisco
latter was lying on the ground? Mendoza, considering that it was night?
A         Near the knee and he was kneeling. A         Because I already knew him and he is also from Batad."17
x x x           x x x           x x x Moreover, Batislaong had a clear view of the stabbing incident as shown by
Q         How many times did Edgar Ayupan stab Francisco Mendoza? the following:
A         Many times. "ATTY. TEODOSIO:
How far were you from Edgar Ayupan and Francisco Mendoza when you
saw Edgar Ayupan [stab] Francisco Mendoza?
A         Four (4) meters.
Q         And where were you situated in relation to Francisco Mendoza who
was lying on the ground when he was stabbed by Edgar Ayupan?
A         Somewhere on the head of Francisco Mendoza.
x x x           x x x           x x x
Q         What was a condition of the light at that time in that dance hall when
you saw Edgar Ayupan [stab] Francisco Mendoza?
A         The light was bright.
Q         And from where [did] this brightness come x x x?
THE WITNESS:
Because the light [was] near x x x them because they [were] in the center of
the dance hall.
ATTY. TEODOSIO:
That would be all for the witness.
x x x           x x x           x x x
That would be all."18
Based, on the foregoing, we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of
the RTC. Time and time again, we have held that the credibility of witnesses
is a matter best left to the determination of the trial court because of its
unique advantage of observing them firsthand; and of noting their demeanor,
conduct and attitude.19 It is aided by various indicia that could not be readily
seen on the records. The "candid answer, the hesitant pause, the nervous
voice, the undertone, the befuddled look, the honest gaze, the modest blush,
or the guilty blanch"20 – these reveal if the witness is reciting the whole truth
or merely weaving a web of lies and deceptions.
Positive Identification
Well-settled is the rule that the positive identification of the accused – when
categorical and consistent and without any ill motive on the part of the
eyewitness testifying on the matter – prevails over alibi and denial which are
negative and self-serving, undeserving of weight in law.21
In the present case, there is no doubt that Batislaong’s testimony positively
identified appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. First, she had a clear view
of the stabbing incident, as she was standing just four (4) meters from the
victim. Moreover, the dance hall was sufficiently illuminated. As a witness to
a violent incident, she strove to see the appearance of the perpetrators of the
crime and observe the manner in which it was committed. 22 Second,the
medicolegal’s testimony23 and Medical Report24 corroborated her recollection
of the specific details of the crime – the stabbing of the victim on the chest
several times, the use of a knife, and the position of the assailant. A detailed
testimony acquires greater weight and credibility when confirmed by autopsy
findings.25
The fact that Batislaong is a relative of the victim does not necessarily taint
her testimony. We have held that blood relationship between a witness and
the victim does not, by itself, impair the former’s credibility. On the contrary,
relationship may strengthen credibility, for it is unnatural for an aggrieved
relative to falsely accuse someone other than the real culprit.26
On the other hand, while appellant denies being the perpetrator of the crime,
he admits that he was in the dance hall where the victim was stabbed to
death. His claim that he was unconscious at that particular instant does not
persuade.
The denial by appellant is inherently weak and must fail vis-à-
vis Batislaong’s positive declaration affirming that he was at the scene of the
crime and was its perpetrator.27 It was not physically impossible for him to be
at the locus criminis.28 More so, undisputed is his admission that, prior to the
stabbing incident, his hand was slapped by the victim when the former asked
a lady for a dance.29
When there is no evidence to indicate that the principal witness for the
prosecution was moved by an improper motive, the presumption is that such
motive was absent, and that the witness’ testimony is entitled to full faith and
credit.30 Between appellant’s denial and the witness’ positive testimony, there
is no doubt that the latter is entitled to credence.
Delay in Reporting
In a futile attempt to discredit Batislaong, appellant argues that since she did
not immediately report the incident to the police, her testimony deserves
scant consideration. We are not convinced.
We have held that different people react differently to a given stimulus or
type of situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral response when
one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. 31Delay in a
witness’ reporting of a crime to police authorities, when adequately
explained, does not impair that witness’ credibility.32
In the present case, Batislaong explained that, initially, she was nervous and
afraid to report the incident. 33 In fact, she had to be brought home, as she was
weak from crying after witnessing the stabbing incident.34 Thus, it was quite
understandable that she did not immediately report the identity of the
offender after the startling occurrence, which became an even more traumatic
experience because she was related to the victim. 35Moreover, there is no rule
that the suspect in a crime should be immediately named by a witness.36
Appellant’s Flight
The crime happened in June 1984, and the indictments against appellant
commenced only in 1995. In addition, he claims that the prosecution has no
record to show that the facts of the case have been preserved. We disagree.
First, as correctly pointed out by the solicitor general,37 the relevant
documents had been preserved before the case was archived. Second,
appellant is to blame for the delay in the prosecution of this case. A review of
the records reveals that an Order for his arrest was issued on July 24,
1984.38 For failure to serve the warrant of arrest, another Order was issued on
November 22, 1984, implementing an alias warrant of arrest against
him.39Because he remained at large, another alias warrant of arrest was issued
on August 20, 1987.40
Thereafter, the case was archived on November 29, 1989, in view of several
failed attempts to apprehend him. It was only in 1995 – ten years after the
commission of the crime – that he was arrested by the police, although in
connection with another crime attributed to him.
In criminal law, flight means the act of evading the course of justice by
voluntarily withdrawing oneself to avoid arrest or detention or the institution
or continuance of criminal proceedings. The unexplained flight of the
accused may, as a general rule, be taken as evidence tending to establish
guilt.41
In the present case, it is interesting to note that as soon as the Information
was filed and the corresponding warrant of arrest issued, appellant could not
be found in Batad, resulting in the archiving of the case. It is thus plain that
he left the place to avoid arrest and prosecution. 42 If it were true that he never
left Batad, as he claims, he should have been apprehended by the police a
long time ago. Indeed, his flight to Masbate is an indication of his guilt.
Treachery
In his Reply,43 appellant argues that if he was responsible for the death of the
victim, he would be guilty only of homicide, because the qualifying
circumstance of treachery was not proven.
We are convinced. Well-settled is the rule that treachery must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. 44 Any
doubt as to the existence of treachery must be resolved in favor of the
accused.45 There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution
thereof, tending directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 46 To
appreciate treachery, two conditions must be present: (1) the employment of
means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity for self-
defense or for retaliation and (2) the deliberate or conscious adoption of the
means of execution.47
The RTC explained that the crime had been attended by treachery because, at
the moment of its commission, appellant stabbed the victim who was lying
on the ground. It rationalized that such a situation propelled the method of
attack to a successful accomplishment of the criminal act without exposing years eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as
the accused to any possible retaliation from the victim.48 maximum. The civil indemnity awarded by the RTC is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
True, the essence of treachery is the swiftness and the unexpectedness of an
attack upon an unsuspecting and unarmed victim who has not given the SO ORDERED.
slightest provocation.49 However, the suddenness of the attack does not by
itself suffice to support a finding of alevosia, even if the purpose is to kill, so
long as the decision is sudden and the victim’s helpless position is
accidental.50 In order to appreciate treachery as a modifying circumstance in a
continuous aggression, as in the present case, it must be shown to have been
present at the inception of the attack.51

We hold that the second requisite was not sufficiently established by the
prosecution. It was not able to show that appellant had deliberately adopted
the attack, considering that it was executed during a commotion and as a
result of it.52 The lower court failed to consider that the lone eyewitness could
not have had any knowledge of it. She arrived at the scene sometime after the
stabbing started; thus, she could not testify on whether there was provocation
on the part of the victim.53

It must be pointed out that appellant and the victim had an altercation prior to
the stabbing incident. Indeed, the attack could have been done on impulse as
a reaction to the latter’s actual or imagined provocation. Such provocation
negated the presence of treachery, even if the attack may have been sudden
and unexpected.54

Further, the mere fact that, according to the testimony of the medicolegal
officer, several stab wounds were inflicted on the victim – who was either
sitting or lying down – did not show treachery unless there was evidence that
such form of attack had purposely been adopted by the accused.55 Also, the
fact that a bladed weapon was used did not per se make the attack
treacherous.56

Absent any particulars as to the manner in which the aggression commenced,

treachery cannot be appreciated.57One cannot substitute mere suppositions for
a hiatus in the prosecution’s evidence, as the trial court apparently
did.58 Since the lone prosecution witness failed to see how the attack had
been initiated on the victim, the qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot
be applied.59 Thus, appellant can be convicted only of homicide,60for which
the imposable penalty under the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and considering the absence of

aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the proper penalty is prision
mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to reclusion temporal in its
medium period, as maximum.61

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant

is CONVICTED of homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as minimum to 14
[G.R. No. 138933. October 28, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JERRYVIE GUMAYAO
y DAHAO @ BIVIE, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
[1]
This is an appeal from the Decision  dated March 31, 1999 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 8, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, convicting
appellant Jerryvie Gumayao of the crime of murder, sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of his victim
Concordio Sulogan in the sum of P50,000.
The appellant was charged in an Information, docketed as Criminal Case No.
8437-97 which reads:
That on or about the 28th day of December, 1996, in the evening at Purok 2,
barangay Kalasungay, municipality of Malaybalay, province of Bukidnon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with intent to kill by means of treachery, with the use of a
sharp bladed instrument, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally attack, assault and stab CONCORDIO SULOGAN, inflicting upon
the latter mortal wounds which caused the instantaneous death of
CONCORDIO SULOGAN; to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of
CONCORDIO SULOGAN in such amount as may be allowed by law.
Contrary to and in violation of Republic Act No. 7659.[2]
Upon his arraignment, the accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to
the charges. Trial thereafter ensued.
The Case for the Prosecution[3]
Concordio Sulogan and his wife Wilma resided at Zone 2,
Kalasungay, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Concordio was a corn farmer by
profession and tilled his own land, which was about 5.8 hectares. The couple
had three children.[4]
At around 10:00 to 10:45 p.m. on December 28, 1996, Diocrly[5] Binayao was
standing by the Syre Highway at Kalasungay, City of Malaybalay. He and
Concordio Sulogan, were watching a disco party being held at
the plaza of Kalasungay, which was about thirty meters[6] from where they
were. The plaza was adorned with brightly colored blinking lights. There was
a gate surrounding the area of the party place, and an area where the
partygoers had to pay their entrance fees.[7]
Concordio and Diocrly sat down beside each other, cross-legged, by the side
of the asphalt pavement and talked as they watched the ongoing party.[8] An
electric light post, which was about ten meters away, illuminated the street.
Also about ten meters from where Concordio and Diocrly were sitting was a
nearby store, across the street and opposite to the plaza, which was likewise
lighted.[9] The store was owned by SPO1 Ersie Paano.[10]
Jerryvie Gumayao approached the two and joined them. In a recorded in the police blotter. At around 7:10 that same morning, SPO1 Boy
squatting position, he sat beside Concordio, to the latters right.
Edmund Paano had known Concordio since he was seven years old.[11] They
were first cousins[12] and lived near each other in Zone 2, Kalasungay. That
fateful night, Edmund was with his other cousin Kenneth in their aunties
house, which was located near the plaza. [13] Edmund and Kenneth decided to
go to the plaza to check out the ongoing disco party. On the way, they passed
by the Syre highway and saw Diocrly, Concordio, and Jerryvie, who were
sitting at the edge of the asphalt road. [14] Edmund walked towards them and
shook Concordios hand, and thereafter proceeded to the disco place.[15]
When Edmund and Kenneth left, Jerryvie suddenly took out a seven-and-a-
half-inch-long knife[16] with his right hand and stabbed Concordio on the left
side of the chest, and again on the abdomen, also on the left side.
[17]
 Concordio fell, mortally wounded, on his back, the knife still embedded in
his body. Jerryvie hurriedly left the scene, going towards the direction of
their house in Zone 4.[18] Diocrly walked away, and sought help to aid the
fallen Concordio, in the direction of the nearby store.[19]
Edmund and Kenneth did not enjoy the disco because there were no ladies
there for them.[20] They stayed for only about fifteen minutes and headed back
in the direction of the highway.[21] They saw Concordio lying on his back,
bloodied all over.[22] Edmund ran towards the direction of his aunties house
and informed the victims brother, Christopher, that Concordio was stabbed.
[23]
 Edmund went back to the scene of the crime, and found that Concordio
had already been brought to the hospital. He later learned that Concordio had
succumbed to his injuries and had died in the hospital.
SPO1 Paano was fast asleep inside his house. He was suddenly awakened by
one of his daughters and his wife, who informed him that a stabbing incident
had occurred right in front of his residence.[24] He immediately proceeded to
the area, and saw the victim lying prostrate on the ground, beside the road.
[25]
 A crowd had by then already gathered around the crime scene. SPO1
Paanos brother Edmund revealed that the persons who were with the victim
before the incident were Diocrly and Jerryvie.[26] Because he was more
interested in apprehending the suspect and getting on with the investigation,
SPO1 Paano instructed the persons present to bring the victim to the hospital.
[27]
SPO1 Paano immediately went to Diocrlys house and inquired about the
incident. Diocrly told him that the person responsible for the stabbing of
Concordio was Jerryvie.[28] SPO1Paano then proceeded to look for Jerryvie in
Purok 4, Kalasungay, City of Malaybalay, where the latters father lived.
Jerryvie was not there, but his father accompanied SPO1 Paano to his
residence, which was about fifty meters away. [29] Jerryvie was nowhere to be
found.
At around 6:00 a.m. the next day, December 29, 1996, SPO1 Paano went to
the Malaybalay Police Station to verify if the incident had already been
Solito brought Jerryvie to the Malaybalay Police Station.[30]
Wilma Sulogan, the victims widow, testified that her husband sustained two
stab wounds on the chest, above his left nipple. [31] Her husband was buried
on December 31, 1996. They spent P1,500 for the embalmment, and P30,000
for the wake. The coffin was a donation from the barangay. [32] She also
suffered sleepless nights and mental anguish upon her husbands untimely
death.
The Evidence for the Defense[33]
Jerryvie denied the charges against him. He testified that he was a long-time
resident of Kalasungay, City of Malaybalay.[34] He was married to Josalyn
Binayao, and they lived with his mother.
Jerryvie testified that he and a certain Popoy Helacio were enemies. [35] The
misunderstanding apparently came about when Jerryvies cousin drove
without permission the motorcycle of Helacios uncle, about two years ago.
[36]
 On December 24, 1996, Jerryvie had an encounter with Helacio.[37]
At 7:00 p.m. of December 28, 1996, Jerryvie was in his aunties house, which
was about 2 kilometers away from the plaza. He and three others were having
a drinking spree.[38] At around 9:00 p.m., Jerryvie and his companions
thereafter proceeded to the plaza to participate in the ongoing disco. Upon
entering the area, Jerryvie came face to face with Helacio, who challenged
him to a fight.[39] Jerryvie gamely asked where, and Helacio replied, On the
portion outside by (sic) this disco place.[40]
A fight ensued. Jerryvie punched Helacio, and the latter fell. When he got up,
Jerryvie saw that he was armed with a knife and declared, We will kill you
now.[41] Jerryvie replied, Wait for me and ran towards his mother-in-laws
house. When he returned, he saw that Helacio had summoned two more
companions, Edmund and Concordio. The three men surrounded him.
Sulogan was able to take hold of him, twist his head, and say, We will kill
him.[42] Jerryvie struggled to free himself, and was able to do so. He then took
hold of Concordio and stabbed the latter with the knife, which he had tucked
by his waist. Jerryvie testified that he could no longer remember how many
times he stabbed Concordio.[43]
Jerryvie fled from the scene and went to his godfather, George. He told
George that he had stabbed a person in the plaza whose identity he did not
know.[44] Jerryvies father thereafter arrived and told him to surrender to the
authorities. Jerryvie decided to follow his fathers advice and surrendered to
Boy Solito, the husband of his mothers niece, who also happened to be a
policeman. On Solitos advice, Jerryvie surrendered the following morning
where he was brought to the CID to be investigated.
Jerryvie also testified that prosecution witness Diocrly Binayao was his
brother-in-law, and that the two of them had differences because the latter did
not want him to marry her sister in the first place. [45] He insisted that he did
not intend to kill anyone that fateful night, but when Concordio held him, he
had no choice but to stab the latter.[46]
Lilency Liman-ay testified that Jerryvie was her nephew and that she had
known him since he was a small boy. His misunderstanding with Helacio
started during a drinking spree at the house of Lilencys niece. Lilencys son,
along with Jerryvie, apparently used a motorcycle parked near the house. The
motorcycle was owned by Helacios relative, Arlene. Arlene got angry, and
Helacio joined in the fray.
On December 29, 1996, Lilency woke up very early and found out that the
authorities were looking for Jerryvie. She assisted the latters mother in the
search, and they found Jerryvie in Lumayagan, near the BFI Nursery at
Kalasungay, about two kilometers away from the latters residence.
The Verdict of the Trial Court
The trial court rendered a decision on March 31, 1999, finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
The dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Jerryvie Gumayao guilty of murder
and penalized under Republic Act No. 7659. Considering the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender which is not offset by any generic
aggravating circumstance, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of his victim
Concordio Sulogan in the sum of P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[47]
The Case on Appeal
The appellant assails the decision of the trial court contending that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE ANENT THE STABBING
INCIDENT;
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE UNCONTROVERTED
EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND HIS
WITNESS;
III
ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY,
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM OF MURDER AS
THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS ONLY HOMICIDE.[48]
According to the appellant, his passive stance, when Helacios group
confronted him, proved the fact that he was not the unlawful aggressor as the
prosecutions evidence tends to establish. He was surrounded by three men;
Helacio was armed with a knife, and Concordio was backing up the
latter. The use of a knife in inflicting the fatal blow on Concordio was
justified, as it was reasonable under the circumstances then prevailing. The
appellants also points out that he was clearly outnumbered and literally
pushed to the limit, without any means to choose what kind of weapon with
which to defend himself. Popoy Helacio, who was accompanied by the
victim, was determined to attack the appellant, owing to the long-standing
feud between them.
That the appellant acted in self-defense in stabbing the victim is clear and
convincing, as the prosecution did not present rebuttal witnesses to assail the
same. The claim of self-defense is further strengthened by the fact that the
appellant voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after the stabbing incident.
In fact, the trial court had no other recourse but to accept the fact of voluntary
surrender when the prosecution admitted the same during the trial.
The appellant further insists that there was a fight between the appellant and
Helacio prior to the stabbing incident. Thus, when the appellant returned to
the scene, armed with a knife, the victim and his companions were
forewarned of an impending danger. Thus, should the Court render a verdict
of conviction, the crime committed by the appellant would only be homicide.
The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, contends that the appellants
claim that he acted in self-defense when he stabbed the victim is belied by the
location, nature and number of wounds inflicted. The appellant stabbed the
victim on the chest and the abdomen, and the wounds proved to be fatal.
Furthermore, the appellants attack on the victim was sudden, without
affording opportunity on the part of the victim to defend himself. As such,
the appellant committed murder, not homicide.
The Courts Ruling
The appellants contentions are devoid of merit.
The Court has consistently held that like alibi, self-defense is an inherently
weak defense because it is easy to fabricate. [49] In a case where self-defense is
invoked by the accused, the burden of evidence is shifted on him to prove,
with clear and convincing evidence, the following essential requisites: (a)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to repel or prevent it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the person defending himself. There can be no complete or
incomplete self-defense unless the accused proves unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim.[50] The accused must rely on the strength of his evidence
and not on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution. This is so
because in pleading self-defense, the accused thereby admits to the killing
and can no longer be exonerated of the crime charged if he fails to prove the
confluence of the essential requisites of self-defense.[51]
The appellant failed to discharge his burden.
First. After stabbing Concordio, the appellant fled from the situs
criminis. Flight is a veritable badge of guilt and negates the plea of self-
defense.
Second. Although the appellant surrendered to the police authorities early the
next day, he failed to inform them that he acted in self-defense when he
stabbed the victim. Moreover, the records show that the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Malaybalay issued a subpoena on January 10, 1997, requiring
the appellant to submit his counter-affidavit, but the latter failed to do so. It
was only during the trial that the appellant, for the first time, invoked self-
defense.
Third. The appellant stabbed the victim twice on the chest, and both wounds
proved fatal. As correctly contended by the prosecution, the nature and the
number of the wounds of the victim negate the appellants claim that he acted
in self-defense. On the contrary, they prove that the appellant was determined
to kill the victim.[52]
Fourth. As found by the trial court, the appellant made inconsistent and
conflicting statements. During the direct examination, the accused told the
court that it was only with Popoy Helacio that he was to have a confrontation.
It was only when he went back to the plaza with a knife that he found that
Helacio had already summoned two companions.[53] However, when the court
questioned the appellant how he and Helacio met that fateful night at the
disco entrance, the appellants version of the story changed, such that the
victim was already a participant in the fray, even before the appellant went
back to the plaza to get a knife. [54] Thus, the appellants testimony is
inconsistent on material points, and cannot be given credence.
Case law has it that the trial courts findings of facts, its calibration of the
collective testimonies of witnesses, its assessment of the probative weight of
the evidence of the parties, as well as its conclusions anchored on the said
findings, are accorded great weight, and even conclusive effect, unless the
trial court ignored, misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts and
circumstances of substance which, if considered, would alter the outcome of
the case. This is because of the unique advantage of the trial court to observe,
at close range, the conduct, demeanor and the deportment of the witnesses as
they testify.[55] Upon careful review of the records of the case, the Court finds
no cogent reason to overrule the trial courts finding that the appellant stabbed
the victim in cold blood.
An eyewitness account, coupled with the fact of the victims death, are
sufficient proof of the guilt of the appellant, beyond cavil of doubt, for the
crime of murder.[56] In this case, the appellant failed to show any ill or
improper motive on the part of Diocrly to impute the crime of murder to the
appellant, for which the latter could be sentenced to reclusion perpetua. As
this Court had the occasion to state in People v. Sibonga:[57]
This Court has consistently ruled that the testimony of a single prosecution
witness, as long as it is positive, clear and credible is sufficient on which to
anchor a judgment of conviction. Corroborative or cumulative evidence is not
a prerequisite to the conviction of the accused. Truth is established not by the
number of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies.[58]
The trial court found Diocrly to be a credible witness. He testified that he was
very sure that Jerryvie was Concordios assailant, since the scene of the crime
was adequately lighted:
Q: Now, considering that, that was 10:45 in the evening already of December
28, 1996, how were you able to really recognize Jerryvie to be the one who
stabbed Concordio?
A: I saw him.
Q: That is why, why were you very sure that, that was he who stabbed?
A: The moon was bright.
Q: Other than the moon was bright what light [sic], if there was any?
A: The electric lights coming from the electric bulb of the store and the disco
dance area.
Q: Now you mentioned of [the] street lights a little while ago, what kind of
light installed in that street light [sic]?
A: A big lamp.
Q: Have you seen a very big lamp along Fortich Street, is that a big lamp also
at Kalasungay?
[59]
A: Yes.
The Crime Committed by the Appellant No. 7659, and is sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The appellant is ordered to
pay the heirs of the victim Concordio Sulogan P50,000 as civil
indemnity; P50,000 as moral damages; and P25,000 as temperate damages.
The trial court correctly convicted the appellant of murder, qualified by
treachery under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. There is treachery in SO ORDERED.
the commission of the crime when (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was
not in a position to defend himself; (b) the offender consciously and
deliberately adopted the particular means, method and form of attack
employed by him. Even a frontal attack may be considered treacherous when
sudden and unexpected, and employed on an unarmed victim who would not
be in a position to repel the attack or to avoid it.[60]
In this case, the victim was merely sitting on the pavement at the edge of the
road, chatting with a friend as they watched an on-going disco party. The
appellant joined them, without giving the victim any inkling as to the tragedy
that was about to befall the latter. Suddenly, and without warning, the
appellant pulled out the knife hidden in his waist, and stabbed the victim
twice, on vital parts of the body, ensuring the latters immediate death. Thus,
the appellant killed the victim in a treacherous manner.
Reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty.[61] As such, the circumstance of
voluntary surrender will not affect the penalty to be meted on the appellant,
since under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua must be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission of the crime.
Civil Liabilities of the Appellant
The trial court correctly awarded to the heirs of the victim civil indemnity in
the amount of P50,000, which needs no other proof than the death of the
victim.[62] The trial court was, likewise, correct in not awarding actual
damages to the said heirs, considering that there were no receipts to support
them.[63] The heirs are, nevertheless, entitled to temperate damages in the
amount of P25,000.[64]
Finally, the trial court was correct in not awarding damages for lost earnings.
The prosecution merely relied on Wilma Sulogans self-serving statement,
that her husband was earning more or less P40,000 a year as a corn farmer.
Compensation for lost income is in the nature of damages, and requires
adequate proof thereof. For loss of income due to death, there must be
unbiased proof of the deceaseds average income as well as proof of average
expenses. The award for lost income refers to the net income of the deceased;
that is, the total income less average expenses. No proof of the victims
average expenses were adduced in evidence; as such, there can be no reliable
estimate of lost earnings.[65]
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
8, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, in Criminal Case No. 8437-97 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Appellant Jerryvie Gumayao y Dahao is found
GUILTY of murder, qualified by treachery, penalized under Republic Act
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 172322   jeepney.[19]On July 23, 1999, appellant went to Makati leaving xxx at 10:00
Appellee, SO ORDERED.[4] a.m., returning only at 10:00 p.m.[20]
Present:    
  Owing to the imposition of the death penalty, the case was elevated to the On July 30, 1999, between 6:30 to 7:30 a.m.,[21] he was sweeping the ground
Panganiban, C.J., Court for automatic review. Pursuant, however, to the ruling in People v. in front of his house when a white car pulled over. [22] The vehicles occupants
Puno, Mateo,[5] the case was referred to the Court of Appeals for evaluation in a introduced themselves as police officers and asked him if he was Rene
Quisumbing, Resolution dated September 7, 2004.[6] Santos.[23] Thereafter, he was taken to the police headquarters for
Ynares-Santiago, In his appeal, appellant alleged that questioning. Once they arrived at the headquarters, he was detained and
Sandoval-Gutierrez,   remained in detention up to the time of his trial.[24]
- versus - Carpio, 1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE DEFENSE  
Austria-Martinez, OF THE ACCUSED THAT WOULD EXCULPATE HIM FROM THE We have examined the evidence on record and find no cogent reason to
Corona, CRIME OF RAPE. disturb the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. We accord
Carpio-Morales,   great respect on the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses
Callejo, Sr., 2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT IMPOSED UPON THE and their testimonies, for the trial judge observes the behavior and demeanor
Azcuna, ACCUSED THE MAXIMUM PENALTY OF DEATH. of the witnesses in court. His evaluation or assessment of the credibility of
Tinga,   witnesses and of testimony acquires greater significance in rape cases
Chico-Nazario, In its Decision[7] dated October 19, 2005, the appellate court affirmed the because from the nature of the offense, the only evidence that can oftentimes
Garcia, judgment of conviction and, in addition to the P75,000.00 civil indemnity be offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the victims testimony.[25]
Velasco, Jr., JJ. imposed, ordered appellant to pay P50,000.00 as moral damages and  
RENE SANTOS, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. This credibility given by the trial court to the rape victim is an important
Appellant. Promulgated:   aspect of evidence which appellate courts can rely on because of its unique
September 8, 2006 The prosecutions version of the incident narrates that sometime between July opportunity to observe the witnesses, particularly their demeanor, conduct
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------- x 17 and 23, 1999, AAA was playing at the northern portion of xxx Bridge, and attitude during the direct and cross-examination by counsel.[26] It is
  xxx, Pampanga, when she was taken by appellant and brought to his house, likewise well established that the testimony of a rape victim is generally
DECISION which is about one kilometer away from AAAs residence. While inside the given full weight and credit, more so, if she is a 5-year-old child as in this
  house, appellant took off the clothes of AAA and had sexual intercourse with case. The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity has been abused
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: her.[8] The victim felt pain and her vagina bled.[9] deserves full credit, as her willingness to undergo the trouble and the
    humiliation of a public trial is an eloquent testament to the truth of her
  After a complaint was lodged with the barangay and the police authorities, complaint. In so testifying, she could only have been impelled to tell the
For allegedly sexually assaulting 5-year-old AAA, Rene Santos was charged AAA was brought to the Jose B. Lingad Memorial Regional Hospital in San truth, especially in the absence of proof of ill motive.[27]
with Rape in an Information[1] alleging Fernando, Pampanga, where she was examined. [10] The Medico Legal O.B.  
  Gyne Report indicated multiple superficial healed lacerations.[11] The victim, The trial court and the Court of Appeals gave credence to the testimony of
That on or about in the afternoon of between 17th and 23rd of July 1999 in who was already six years old when she testified in court,[12] positively AAA who was only six years old when she narrated the sordid details of her
the [B]arangay of xxx, [M]unicipality of xxx, [P]rovince of Pampanga, identified the appellant during the trial and testified on the affidavit she ravishment, viz:
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- executed before the police officers of xxx, Pampanga.[13]  
named accused, RENE SANTOS, with lewd designs and by means of deceit,   FISCAL PINEDA
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and Appellants version of the incident is one of denial and alibi. He testified that Questioning
feloniously succeeded in having carnal knowledge with AAA, 5 years of age, he was the driver of BBB who lived in Barangay xxx, xxx, Pampanga which  
against her will. is a kilometer away from his place in Sulipan. [14] Appellant usually leaves his If Rene Santos is inside this courtroom, can you point at him?
  house at 7:00 a.m. and stays at his workplace up to 7:30 p.m. or sometimes  
Contrary to law. even up to 10:00 p.m. when necessary.[15] WITNESS
    Answering
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.[2] Trial His job was to drive his employer whenever the latter had appointments  
thereafter ensued, after which the Regional Trial Court of Macabebe, in Manila.[16] When BBB had no appointments, he drove a passenger jeepney Yes, sir.
Pampanga, Branch 55, rendered judgment[3] imposing the death penalty thus: plying San Fernando, Pampanga and Malolos, Bulacan, a route which passed  
  Sulipan.[17] On July 17, 1999, appellant drove his employer to the Wheels Q Please point at him?
WHEREFORE, on the basis of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Motor Shop at E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City leaving Apalit at 9:00 A There he is, sir.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape penalized under Article a.m. and returning at 8:30 p.m. On July 18, 1999, appellant left his house  
335 of the Revised Penal Code, and as a consequence of which, this Court at 6:00 a.m. arriving at his workplace at 7:30 a.m. and from there he INTERPRETER
hereby sentences him to suffer the mandatory penalty of death and to delivered surplus bumpers to Malinta, Manila.[18] On July 19, 20, 21 and 22,  
indemnify the offended party in the amount of P75,000.00 and to pay the 1999, appellant plied the San Fernando-Malolos route on board his passenger Witness pointed to a person inside the courtroom who [when] asked gave his
costs of the proceedings. name as Rene Santos.
    is beyond the mind-set of a six-year old child, like the offended party herein,
Q Between the period of July 17 to 23, 1999, do you remember where were Q When he inserted his penis into your vagina did he have any clothings to fabricate a malicious accusation against appellant if the crime did not truly
you? (sic)? transpire.[30] Verily, when a guileless girl of six credibly declares that she has
A Yes, sir. A . . . been raped, she has said all that is necessary to prove the ravishment of her
    honor.[31]
Q Where were you then? ATTY. VIOLA  
A . . .   Appellants reliance on the corroboration by his wife of his alibi cannot
  Leading, Your Honor. overturn the clear and categorical declarations of the victim identifying him
Q You said you know this Rene Santos, why do you know him?   as the perpetrator of the crime.The corroboration should, furthermore, be
A Because he raped me, sir. COURT received with caution coming as it does from appellants spouse whose
    emotional ties and interest in his acquittal cannot be gainsaid.Indeed, it has
Q Can you remember when was that? Reform the question. even been held that some wives are overwhelmed by emotional attachment to
A Yes, sir. FISCAL PINEDA their husbands such that they knowingly or otherwise suppress the truth and
  Questioning act as a medium for injustice to preponderate.[32]
Q When?    
  When he inserted his penis into your vagina, what was his appearance? In addition to his defense of alibi, appellant further faults the trial court with
WITNESS   acting as the prosecutor and the judge at the same time[33] for allegedly
Answering WITNESS initiating and propounding the questions, short of supplying the desired
I do not know when, sir. Answering answer from the witness.[34]
     
FISCAL PINEDA It was hard, sir. The argument is tenuous. As has been pointed out in People v. Guambor:[35]
Questioning    
  Q What was hard? The trial judge is accorded a reasonable leeway in putting such questions to
Do you recall where? A His penis, sir. witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts to make the record speak
A In their house, sir.   the truth. Trial judges in this jurisdiction are judges of both law and the facts,
  COURT and they would be negligent in the performance of their duties if they
Q And where is that house? Questioning permitted a miscarriage of justice as a result of a failure to propound a proper
A In Sulipan, sir.   question to a witness which might develop some material bearing upon the
  Is this Rene Santos inside this courtroom? outcome. In the exercise of sound discretion, he may put such question to the
Q In Apalit, Pampanga?   witness as will enable him to formulate a sound opinion as to the ability and
A Yes, sir. WITNESS willingness of the witness to tell the truth. A judge may examine or cross-
  Answering examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test the
Q You said that this Rene Santos raped you, what particular actuations did   credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out
he do? Yes, sir. relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support
A He inserted his penis, sir.   or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken
  Q Point to him? against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal
Q Where? A There he is, sir. certain truths which tend to destroy the theory of one party. (Emphasis
A Here, sir, in my vagina.   supplied)
  INTERPRETER  
INTERPRETER   The trend in procedural law is to give a wide latitude to the courts in
  Witness pointed to a person inside the courtroom who when asked gave his exercising control over the questioning of a child witness. [36] Under Sections
Witness pointing to her private organ. name as Rene Santos.[28] (Emphasis and italics supplied) 19 to 21 of the Rules on Examination of a Child Witness,[37] child witnesses
  Counsel for the defense attempted, albeit futilely, to impeach the credibility may testify in a narrative form and leading questions may be allowed by the
Q Where did that happen? of the victim.[29] We have held time and again that testimonies of rape victims trial court in all stages of the examination if the same will further the interest
A In their house, sir. who are young and immature, as in this case, deserve full credence of justice.[38] It must be borne in mind that the offended party in this case is
  considering that no young woman, especially one of tender age, would a 6-year old minor who was barely five when she was sexually assaulted. As
Q In what portion of his house? concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and a child of such tender years not yet exposed to the ways of the world, she
A Inside their house, sir. thereafter pervert herself by being subject to a public trial if she was not could not have fully understood the enormity of the bestial act committed on
  motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed her person.Indeed
Q You said that Rene Santos inserted his penis into your vagina, what did against her. It is highly improbable for an innocent girl of tender years like  
you feel? the victim, who is very naive to the things of this world, to fabricate a charge Studies show that children, particularly very young children, make the perfect
A I felt pain, sir. so humiliating not only to herself but also to her family. Stated succinctly, it victims. They naturally follow the authority of adults as the socialization
process teaches children that adults are to be respected. The childs age and
developmental level will govern how much she comprehends about the abuse
and therefore how much it affects her. If the child is too young to understand
what has happened to her, the effects will be minimized because she has no
comprehension of the consequences. Certainly, children have more
problems in providing accounts of events because they do not understand
everything they experience. They do not have enough life experiences from
which to draw upon in making sense of what they see, hear, taste, smell and
feel.Moreover, they have a limited vocabulary. With her limited
comprehension, the child could not have a perfect way of relating that she
had been sexually abused.[39] (Emphasis and italics supplied)
 
The record discloses that the questions propounded by the judge were
intended to elicit the truth from the child witness. This perceived undue
inquisitiveness of the judge did not unduly harm the substantial rights of the
appellant. In fact, it is only to be expected from the judge who, with full
consciousness of his responsibilities could not, and should not, easily be
satisfied with incompleteness and obscurities in the testimonies of the
witness.[40]
 
While judges should as much as possible refrain from showing partiality to
one party and hostility to another, it does not mean that a trial judge should
keep mum throughout the trial and allow parties to ask questions that they
desire, on issues which they think are important, when the former are
improper and the latter immaterial. If trials are to be expedited, judges must
take a leading part therein, by directing counsel to submit evidence on the
facts in dispute by asking clarifying questions, and by showing an interest in
a fast and fair trial. Judges are not mere referees like those of a boxing bout,
only to watch and decide the results of a game; they should have as much
interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious presentation of evidence,
calling attention of counsel to points at issue that are overlooked, directing
them to ask the question that would elicit the facts on the issues involved, and
clarifying ambiguous remarks by witnesses. Unless they take an active part in
trials in the above form and manner, and allow counsel to ask questions
whether pertinent or impertinent, material or immaterial, the speedy
administration of justice which is the aim of the Government and of the
people cannot be attained.[41]
 
Appellant also invites the Courts attention to what he perceives as
uncharacteristic behavior of the victim who, according to him, should be
traumatized after undergoing the onslaught of sexual molestation.[42] He
insists that it is unnatural for the 6-year old victim to go to school the day
following her supposedly shocking experience. He also points out that she
was answering not as seriously as one who has been sexually molested.[43]
The contention is neither novel nor persuasive. There is no standard form of
behavior that can be expected of rape victims after they have been defiled
because people react differently to emotional stress.[44] Nobody can tell how a
victim of sexual aggression is supposed to act or behave after her ordeal.
[45]
 Certainly, it is difficult to predict in every instance how a person
especially a 6-year old child, as in this case would react to a traumatic
experience.[46] It is not proper to judge the actions of rape victims, especially
children, who have undergone the harrowing experience of being ravished (a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the
against their will by the norms of behavior expected under such nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
circumstances from mature persons.[47] Indeed, the range of emotions shown  
by rape victims is yet to be captured even by calculus. [48] It is thus unrealistic (b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make
to expect uniform reactions from them.[49] In fact, the Court has not laid down use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
any rule on how a rape victim should behave immediately after her Pursuant to the same law, appellant shall not be eligible for parole under Act
ravishment.[50] No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
   
In his attempt to extricate himself from criminal liability, appellant further In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court affirms the award of
insinuates that his sons may be the possible perpetrators of the felony saying P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
that it could have been Rene Santos, Jr. or Michael Santos who could have increases the Court of Appeals award of moral damages from P50,000.00 to
raped the victim considering that AAA and her sister CCC allegedly P75,000.00.[58]
complained earlier that they were raped by the two brothers.[51]  
  WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. H.C. No.
If at all, the foregoing suggestion that his sons may have been the malefactors 01424 finding appellant Rene Santos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
who sexually assaulted the victim and her sister only succeeds in crime of rape and odering him to indemnify the victim the amounts of
underscoring his moral depravity and his capacity to commit the crime. Only P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages,
one whose degree of wickedness plumbs the deepest depths of criminal is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral
perversity would have no qualms of laying the onus of his guilt even on his damages is increased to P75,000.00 and that in lieu of the death penalty,
own offspring and, worse, blacken the memory of one of them who is already appellant Rene Santos is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
dead in his endeavor to exculpate himself from the consequences of his perpetuawithout possibility of parole.
felonious acts.  
  SO ORDERED.
Much less convincing is appellants proposition that ill feelings and ill
motives of the victims mother impelled the filing of the charges against
him. Ill-motives become inconsequential where there are affirmative or
categorical declarations establishing appellants accountability for the felony.
[52]
 We have, furthermore, observed not a few persons convicted of rape have
attributed the charges against them to family feuds, resentment or revenge.
[53]
 However, as borne out by a plethora of cases, family resentment, revenge
or feuds have never swayed us from giving full credence to the testimony of a
complainant for rape, especially a minor who remained steadfast and
unyielding throughout the direct and cross-examination that she was sexually
abused.[54] It would take a certain degree of perversity on the part of a parent,
especially a mother, to concoct a false charge of rape and then use her
daughter as an instrument to settle her grudge.[55]
 
Given the foregoing factual, legal and jurisprudential scenario, we agree with
both the trial and appellate courts that the appellant is guilty as charged. He
was, likewise, correctly meted the penalty of death because rape committed
against a child below seven (7) years old is a dastardly and repulsive crime
which merits no less than the imposition of capital punishment under Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code.[56] That AAA was only five years old when
she was ravished is clear from her birth certificate.[57]
However, with the passage of Republic Act No. 9346 entitled An Act
Prohibiting The Imposition Of The Death Penalty In The Philippines, the
penalty that should be meted isreclusion perpetua, thus:
 
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
 
[G.R. No. 142930. March 28, 2003]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. KAKINGCIO
CAETE, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial
Court of Leyte, Branch 36, in Criminal Case No. 2523, convicting appellant
of rape, imposing on him the death penalty and ordering him to pay damages
to the victim in the amount of P50,000.
Evidence of the Prosecution
The spouses Paquito Caete and Sedaria Caete had three children, one of
whom was Alma, who was born on March 24, 1983. In 1986, the spouses
decided to live separately. Sedaria resided in Pook West, Cubala, Biliran,
with some of her children by Paquito. The latter decided to live in Basey,
Samar, and brought Alma with him. Thereafter, Paquito decided to live with
his older brother, Kakingcio Caete, and the latters common-law wife,
Alejandra Caete, whom Alma called Yaya Alejandra, and their two children,
five and four years old, respectively, in Barangay Gayad, Capoocan,
Leyte. After some years, Paquito and Alma decided to return to and live in
Basey, Samar. In the meantime, Paquito became blind and a paralytic. In
January 1996, Kakingcio had Paquito and Alma fetched from Basey, Samar,
and brought to Barangay Gayad, Capoocan, Leyte, to live with him and his
family. By then, Alma was already twelve years old. She noticed that her
uncle Kakingcio was nice and amiable to her.
On February 1, 1996, Alejandra visited her daughter in Montebello, Kananga,
Leyte, leaving behind Kakingcio and their two young children and Paquito
and Alma. At about 8:00 p.m., Alma was already asleep. Paquito was
sleeping near her feet. The house was dark. Momentarily, Alma was
awakened when she felt someone caressing her. When she opened her eyes,
she saw her uncle Kakingcio who was wearing a pair of short pants but naked
from waist up. He was beside her with his left palm touching her forehead,
down to her face, hand and feet.She could smell liquor from his breath. He
poked an 8-inch long knife on her neck and whispered to her: Ma, dont tell
your yaya because I will do something to you. Kakingcio then removed his
short pants, lifted her skirt and pulled down her panties. He threatened to kill
her if she made a sound. Alma was terrified. Kakingcio then inserted his
private organ into Almas vagina and made a push and pull movement of his
body. Alma felt pain in her private part and could do nothing but cry as
Kakingcio ravished her. In the process, Alma lost consciousness. When she
regained consciousness, it was already 6:00 in the morning of February 2,
1996. She was weak and could hardly stand up. She noticed blood in her
vagina. By then, Kakingcio had already left the house. Alma could do
nothing but cry.
Kakingcio arrived back home after lunch time. Alma hid from her uncle.
On February 3, 1996, at 8:00 in the evening, Alma was asleep in the sala of
their house. She was awakened when she felt her pants being pulled
down. She was aghast when she saw Kakingcio beside her pulling down her
pants. She resisted and ran out of the house to escape from Kakingcio. She
rushed to the house of a neighbor Ka Caring to whom Alma revealed that her
uncle raped her and that he was about to rape her again. Caring adviced Alma
not to return to their house. Alma slept in the house of Caring. Alma returned
to their house the next day, February 4, 1996. By then, Kakingcio was no
longer in the house.
On February 5, 1996, Alejandra went up the hill to gather camote tops. She
was then armed with a bolo. Alma followed Alejandra to the hills and
revealed to her that Kakingcio raped her on February 1, 1996. Alejandra was
livid with rage. She rushed back to the house and confronted Kakingcio with
the charge of Alma. Alejandra and Kakingcio quarreled. She berated him for
having taken advantage of his own flesh and blood. She told him to leave the
house. Kakingcio agreed on the condition that he would bring his personal
belongings with him. After Kakingcio left, Alejandra accompanied Alma to
the barangay captain and complained against Kakingcio. The Barangay
Captain wrote a letter to the local police authorities requesting assistance to
Alejandra and Alma. On February 9, 1996, Dra. Bibiana A. Cardente, the
Municipal Health Officer of Capoocan, Leyte, examined Alma. The doctor
prepared and signed a medico-legal certificate on her examination of Alma
which contains her findings:
Physical Examination Findings:
Breast: normal, no abrasions, no lacerations, no hematoma
Abdomen: normal
Extremities: normal
Pelvic Examination: scanty pubic hair noted
External Genitalia: grossly normal
Internal & Speculum Examination Findings:
Introitus: non-parous, admits 2 fingers with slight difficulty
Cervix: pinkish, soft hymenal healed old lacerations at 6 oclock and 9 oclock
Discharges: scanty brownish discharges
Uterus: small
Adnexa: negative for masses and tenderness[2]
Alma was entrusted to the Lingap Center in Pawing Palo, Leyte.
On April 26, 1996, an Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Leyte, Branch 36, charging Kakingcio with rape, thus:
That on or about the 1st day of February, 1996, in the municipality of
Capoocan, Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent and with
lewd designs and by use of force and intimidation then armed with the short
bladed weapon, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge with ALMA CAETE, a minor (12 years old) against her
will to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
When arraigned on September 18, 1996, Kakingcio, assisted by counsel,
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
When he testified, Kakingcio denied having sexually assaulted Alma. He
interposed the defense of alibi. He claimed that he was a farmer. He planted
root crops such as banana. On February 1, 1996, he went to the house of
Romulo Lukaba located at Barangay Gayad, Capoocan, Leyte, about three
kilometers from his house, for the purpose of accompanying and helping
Rolly Lukaba, the son of Romulo, gather coconuts in the coconut plantation
of Romulo in the mountains. It took Kakingcio thirty minutes to reach the
place. At about 9:00 in the evening, Kakingcio, Rolly and Romulo drank
tuba. By 10:00 in the evening, Rolly and Kakingcio went to sleep. Romulo,
however, left the two. The next day, Rolly and Kakingcio went back to the
mountains and gathered coconuts.
Kakingcio returned to their house on February 7, 1996.
Kakingcio testified that he was not aware of any reason why his wife and
Alma would charge him with rape.
On February 4, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision finding Kakingcio
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and imposing on him the penalty of
death in view of the presence of the special qualifying circumstance of the
minority of private complainant Alma and her relationship to Kakingcio and
the special aggravating circumstance of use of a deadly weapon and without
any mitigating circumstance in the commission of the crime.
In his appellants brief, appellant Kakingcio assails the decision of the trial
court contending that:
I pants?
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PARTICIPATING DIRECTLY AND
ACTIVELY IN THE PRESENTATION AND RECEPTION OF THE
PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE THEREBY FAILING TO UPHOLD THE
COLD NEUTRALITY OF AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF RAPE DESPITE WANT OF CLEAR, POSITIVE AND
CONVINCTING IDENTIFICATION.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT AND IN DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE
ADDUCED BY THE DEFENSE.
IV
ON THE ASSUMPTION HOWEVER THAT THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT IS GUILTY OF RAPE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
IMPOSING UPON HIM THE PENALTY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
RELATIONSHIP WAS NOT ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION,
HENCE, THE APPROPRIATE PENALTY SHOULD ONLY BE
RECLUSION PERPETUA.[4]
On the first three assignments of errors, the appellant avers that the
prosecution had a difficulty proving that the appellant raped the private
complainant in light of her testimony that when the appellant mounted her, he
still had his short pants on. When the prosecution tried to elicit from the
offended party how appellants penis could have been inserted into her vagina
with his pants still on and the appellants counsel objected to the question, the
presiding judge himself took the cudgels for the prosecution and propounded
questions on the private complainant. Worse, the presiding judge posed
leading questions to the private complainant. The presiding judge was biased
and partial to the prosecution. To buttress his contention, the appellants
counsel cited a portion of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken
during the trial on September 17, 1997:
PROS. PERIDA:
Q So, after he laid himself over you with his trouser what else happened?
A His penis was inserted into my vagina, sir.
Q Where did he let his penis exit considering that he is then wearing a short
ATTY. DILOY:
Objection your Honor! It is leading.
COURT:
Q How did he manage to have his penis inserted to your vagina?
A No, sir, because when he placed himself on top of me he pulled down his
shorts and thereafter he inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q At that time what was your apparel going up from your vagina?
A I was wearing then a t-shirt and skirt, sir.
Q About your skirt?
A He pulled up my skirt, sir.
Q What about your t-shirt?
A He did not do anything about my t-shirt.
Q After placing his penis on your vagina, what else transpired?
A He keeps on kissing me sir.
Q At that time he keeps on kissing you, where was his penis in relation to
your vagina?
A It was inside my vagina sir.[5]
The appellant further stresses that when Alma was raped it was nighttime and
the place where she was molested was dark. She could not have recognized
and identified the appellant as her rapist. Furthermore, Alma failed to report
the rape immediately to the police authorities.
The Court does not agree with the appellants submission. In People v.
Ancheta,[6] this Court emphasized that a presiding judge enjoys a great deal of
latitude in examining witnesses within the course of evidentiary rules. The
presiding judge should see to it that a testimony should not be incomplete or
obscure. After all, the judge is the arbiter and he must be in a position to
satisfy himself as to the respective claims of the parties in the criminal
proceedings. In People v. Zheng Bai Hui,[7] this Court reiterated that:
In any case, a severe examination by a trial judge of some of the witness for
the defense in an effort to develop the truth and to get at the real facts affords
no justification for a charge that he has assisted the prosecution with an
evident desire to secure a conviction, or that he had intimidated the witnesses
for the defense. The trial judge must be accorded a reasonable leeway in
putting such questions to witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts
to make the record speak the truth. Trial judges in this jurisdiction are judges
of both the law and the facts, and they would be negligent in the performance
of their duties if they permitted a miscarriage of justice as a result of a failure
to propound a proper question to a witness which might develop some
material bearing upon the outcome. In the exercise of sound discretion, he
may put such question to the witness as will enable him to formulate a sound
opinion as to the ability or the willingness of the witness to tell the truth. A
judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound
clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the
truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that
testimony may tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or the other
party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he
propounds happen to reveal certain truths which tend to destroy the theory of
one party.
In this case, the relevant direct-examination questions posed by the public
prosecutor of the private complainant and her corresponding answers, the
objections thereto by the appellants counsel and the questions propounded by
the trial court were as follows:
Q After taking off your panty or underware (sic) what else transpired?
A He placed himself on top of me sir.
Q Please describe to us your uncle at that moment when he placed himself
over your body!
A He placed himself on top of me in a prone position.
Q What was he wearing at that time when he was carressing (sic) your face
down to your arm?
A He was just wearing a short pants sir.
Q What about the upper portion of his body?
A None sir.
Q At the time he put himself over you on a prone position, what about his
short pants, was it still there?
ATTY. DILOY:
We request Your Honor that the question not be made in a leading manner!
COURT:
Place of record the comment!
PROS. PERIDA:
I withdraw that Your Honor!
Q Where was the short pants which your uncle originally wearing that time?
ATTY. DILOY:
He was wearing it Your Honor as described by the witness!
PROS. PERIDA:
At this moment now, when he was already on top of the victim!
ATTY. DILOY:
It was answered by the witness! According to the witness, accused was We can come back tomorrow.[8] Ma was the nickname of Alma, the private complainant. Yaya was Alejandra
wearing short pants but the upper part of his body the accused had nothing Caete, the common-law wife of the appellant.[11] Moreover, as testified to by
worn! The Court finds nothing improper in the questions posed by the trial the private complainant, the only persons left in the house in the evening of
PROS. PERIDA: court. Neither are the questions prejudicial to the appellant or suggestive of February 1, 1997 were the appellant and his two young children, Paquito,
That is agreed Your Honor. Now my question is, at the time Kakingcio Caete any partiality of the trial court. It bears stressing that from the testimony of who was blind and an invalid, and the private complainant:
was already on top of Alma where was this short pants! the private complainant, the appellant was wearing his short pants before he
ATTY. DILOY: mounted her and even when he was already on top of her and managed to PROS. PERIDA:
It was being worn by the accused! penetrate her sexual organ with his penis. The public prosecutor wanted the
private complainant to explain to the court how the appellant could have Q You stated that on February 1, there was no light at the place where you
PROS. PERIDA: were raped. How did you recognize with certainty that it was Kakingcio
Let the witness answer that Your Honor! inserted his penis into her vagina considering that he was still wearing his
short pants. Although crudely and ungrammatically phrased, the question of Caete who raped you?
ATTY. DILOY:
We submit Your Honor! the public prosecutor where did he let his penis exit considering that he is ATTY. DILOY:
COURT: then wearing a short pants was not leading. The trial court should have
Q What were your uncle, when your uncle placed himself on top of your overruled the objection and allowed the private complainant to answer the I object to that Your Honor. It should have been taken during the direct
body as you said, in a prone position, was he wearing clothes or none? question. However, the trial court was not precluded from asking questions to examination.
A He was still wearing Your Honor. avoid further wrangling between the public prosecutor and the appellants
counsel which may frightened or unnerved the private complainant, a minor PROS. PERIDA:
Q What clothes?
A Short pants Your Honor. and who was unused to judicial proceedings. After all, the trial court was
No, Your Honor. We are already talking about lights Your Honor.
Proceed Fiscal! mandated to discover the truth. As it turned out, the private complainant cried
PROS. PERIDA: profusely as she testified impelling the trial court to order a COURT:
Q So, after he laid himself over you with his trouser, what else happened? continuance. Even the counsel of the appellant agreed to a continuance.
Well, at least for purposes or in the interest of the trial, let the witness
A His penis was inserted into my vagina sir. Parenthetically, under Sections 19 to 21 of the Rule on Examination of a answer!
Q Where did he let his penis exit considering that he is then wearing a short Child Witness which took effect on December 15, 2000, child witnesses may
pants? testify in a narrative form and leading questions may be allowed by the trial WITNESS:
ATTY. DILOY: court in all stages of the examination if the same will further the interest of
Objection Your Honor! It is leading! A Because we were the only one staying in the house, and besides I can
justice. Objections to questions should be couched in a manner so as not to
COURT: detect his smell.
mislead, confuse, frighten and intimidate the child:
Q How did he manage to have his penis inserted to your vagina?
A No sir, because when he placed himself on top of me he pulled down his PROS. PERIDA:
shorts and thereafter he inserted his penis into my vagina. Sec. 19. Mode of questioning. The court shall exercise control over the
questioning of children so as to (1) facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, Q Why? What was his smell?
Q At that time what was your apparel going up from your vagina?
A I was wearing then a T-shirt and skirt sir. (2) ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the WITNESS:
Q About your skirt? developmental level of the child, (3) protect children from harassment or
A He pulled up my skirt sir. undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of time. A Smells like a smoker.[12]
Q What about your t-shirt? When Alejandra Caete confronted the appellant on February 5, 1997, with
A He did not do anything about my t-shirt. The court may allow the child witness to testify in a narrative form.[9] the claim of the private complainant that he raped the latter and demanded
Q After placing his penis on your vagina, what else transpired? that the appellant leave the house, the appellant did not deny the charge and
A He keeps on kissing me sir.
While it may be true that it was dark when the appellant ravished the private even agreed to leave the house on condition that he be allowed to take his
Q At that time he keeps on kissing you, where was his penis in relation to
complainant in his house, it cannot, however, be gainsaid that the private personal belongings with him:
your vagina?
complainant could have sufficiently identified the appellant as the
A It was inside my vagina sir. PROS. PERIDA:
culprit. The appellant was the uncle of the private complainant. She and her
Q While his penis was inside your vagina and the accused keeps on kissing
father Paquito had been living with the appellant and his family off and on Q On the following day, that was Monday, February 5, 1996, what did you
you what else transpired?
for years before she and her father were brought back with appellant in do if any?
A (witness weeping in tears as been directly examined by the Public
January 1996 to Capoocan, Leyte, to live anew with the appellant and his
Prosecutor).
family. The private complainant was thus familiar not only with the physical WITNESS:
COURT:
build of the appellant but also with his voice and peculiar smell. A person
Place it of record that the child witness is crying in the witness stand! A That morning Monday, my auntie Yaya Alejandra went up the hill and I
may be identified by these factors. Once a person has gained familiarity with
PROS. PERIDA: followed them and I told them about my ordeal that I was raped by my Yayo
another, identification is quite an easy task.[10] In this case, the appellant
May we ask for suspension Your Honor! I move for suspension considering Kaking.
poked a knife on her neck and whispered to the private complainant before
the condition of the victim witness Your Honor! Hes already crying!
she raped her: Ma, ayaw pagsumat kan imo yaya kay may-ada ako ha imo
COURT: PROS. PERIDA:
bubuhaton (Ma, dont tell to your yaya because I will do something to you.
Q Who was the companion of your Yaya Alejandra who went up the hill? appellant. The latter threatened to kill her if she revealed what he did to
her. It was thus easy for the appellant to fulfill the threat if she divulged the
WITNESS: violation of her honor.[14] The private complainant could do nothing but
A Her daughter Ate Belen. cry. When the appellant tried in the evening of February 3, 1996 to violate
her again, she ran to a neighbor, Ka Caring, divulged to her that the appellant
PROS. PERIDA: tried to rape her anew and sought her help. In fact, the private complainant
slept in the house of Ka Caring that evening and went back home only the
Q What is her real name? next morning on February 4, 1996. On February 5, 1996, the private
complainant revealed to her Yaya Alejandra, the wife of the appellant, that
WITNESS:
the latter had raped her. In People v. Bea,[15] this Court held that it is not
A Belen Pepito. uncommon for a young girl at the tender age of sixteen years to be
intimidated into silence and conceal the sexual assault on her by the
PROS. PERIDA: appellant.[16]
Q Was he already married? When cross-examined by the public prosecutor, the appellant unabashedly
admitted that he did not know any improper or ill-motive on the part of the
WITNESS:
private complainant for charging him with rape, and on the part of his wife
Alejandra Caete for reporting the sexual assault on the private complainant
A That her family name is the surname of her mother.
by the appellant to the police authorities:
PROS. PERIDA:
Q The complainant here testified in Court that she was raped by you at 9:00
Q When you told your Yaya Alejandra, how did she react to your oclock in the evening of February 1, 1996. Are you aware of that?
information?
A No, sir.
WITNESS:
Q In fact the victim here testified that it was your very own wife who
A Upon learning about the rape incident she was very angry and she reacted accompanied her to report this matter to the barangay (sic) Chairman of
angrily and carried with her the camote tops and went down proceeding Barangay Gayad, and likewise reported this matter to the PNP of
towards their house bringing with her a long bolo, in our dialect it is used for Capoocan. Are you aware of that?
farming and cutting grass and a long pointed bolo, a sharp instrument, and
upon reaching their house they have a quarrel with my uncle. A No, sir.
Q Do you know of any reason or reasons why your own wife would report
PROS. PERIDA:
this rape incident against your person?
Q How about you, did you follow your Yaya in going home?
A I dont know sir what is her reason.
WITNESS:
Q And you dont know likewise of any reason or reasons why your own niece,
A Yes, sir. a twelve (12) year old child would accuse you of rape, right?
PROS. PERIDA: A I dont know also, sir.[17]
Q After they quarrel, what transpired? The records show that the private complainant lived in a rural area,
unaffected by the worldly ways of urban life. It is thus incredible that the
WITNESS: private complainant would weave a story of defloration and undergo a
A My auntie, Yaya Alejandra told my uncle Yayo Kaking to leave the house medical examination of her private parts and charge the appellant with rape
because he ate his own blood, and Yayo Kaking answered in the affirmative, for which, if convicted, he could be meted the penalty of either reclusion
saying Yes, I will leave the house so long I will bring with me all my perpetua or death. As this Court held:
belongings.[13]
Accused failed to attribute any ill motive on the part of the victim to testify
The credibility of the private complainant was not degraded by her and falsely and impute against him the commission of a grave offense such as
Alejandra Caetes reporting the sexual assault to the police authorities only on rape. To the contrary, the trial court observed that the victim lived in place
February 5, 1996. The evidence shows that the private complainant was only more rural than most rural villages in the country, and was still unaffected by
twelve years old when she was raped by the appellant. She and her father, the wordly ways of urban life. It is highly inconceivable for a young barrio
who was completely blind and a paralytic, were living in the house of the
lass, inexperienced with the ways of the world, to fabricate a charge of
defloration, undergo a medical examination of her private parts, subject
herself to public trial, and tarnish her familys honor and reputation unless she
was motivated by a potent desire to seek justice for the wrong committed
against her.[18]
In contrast to the positive and straightforward testimony of the private
complainant, the appellants denial of the charge, which is merely a negative
self-serving evidence, cannot prevail.Equally undeserving of merit is his
defense of alibi. Appellant failed to prove with clear and convincing evidence
that it was physically impossible for him to have been in his house at the time
when the private complainant was raped.[19] The only evidence adduced by
the appellant to prove alibi was his own testimony. By his own admission,
the appellants house was barely a thirty-minute walk to the house of Romulo
Lukaba. It was thus not physically impossible for the appellant to have been
in his house at 8:00 in the evening of February 1, 1996, when the private
complainant was raped.
Proper Penalty on Appellant
The trial court imposed the death penalty on the appellant on its finding that
the appellant used a knife when committing the crime and that the private
complainant was under eighteen years of age and the niece of the appellant
and, hence, a relative of the private complainant within the third civil degree.
This Court agrees with the trial court that the appellant used a knife in
committing the crime charged and that he is the uncle of the private
complainant and, hence, her relative within the third civil degree. However,
as to the latter, there is no allegation in the Information that the appellant is
the uncle of the private complainant as required by Section 8 of Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.[20] In People v. Bernaldez,[21] this
Court held that the minority of the private complainant and her relationship to
the appellant must be alleged in the Information because these circumstances
are special qualifying circumstances for rape to warrant the imposition of the
death penalty. Although this rule took effect on December 1, 2000, or before
the crime charged in the Information was committed, the Court has
consistently applied the rule retroactively. Thus, since the relationship of the
private complainant and the appellant was not alleged in the Information, the
appellant cannot be convicted of qualified rape, otherwise he would be
deprived of his right to be informed of the nature of the charge against
him. The appellant may only be convicted of simple rape with the special
aggravating circumstance of use of a deadly weapon in the commission of the
crime. Rape with use of a deadly weapon is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death under the third paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. Since the prosecution failed to prove any
aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime, the appellant may
be meted only the penalty of reclusion perpetua conformably with Article 63
of the Revised Penal Code.
Civil Liability of Appellant

The trial court ordered the appellant to pay P50,000 as civil indemnity but
failed to award moral damages and exemplary damages considering the
tender age of the private complainant and of the uncle-niece relationship of
the appellant and the private complainant.[22] In light of recent case law, the
Court must order the appellant to pay the private complainant the amounts
of P50,000 as moral damages[23] and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Leyte, Branch 36, in Criminal Case No. 2523, is hereby
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The appellant KAKINGCIO CAETE
is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of simple rape under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is meted the penalty
ofreclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay to private complainant Alma Caete
the amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages
and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 137933            January 28, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,  Venancio Mendoza, live-in husband of Jennelyn, mother of Jennifer
vs.
VALENTIN BARING, JR., accused-appellant.
BUENA, J.:
Valentin Baring, Jr., herein accused-appellant, was indicted for statutory rape
committed against a seven-year-old girl in an information that reads-
"That prior to August 2, 1997 and on several occasions thereto, in the
Municipality of Dasmariñas, Province of Cavite, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, by
means of force, violence and intimidation taking advantage of his superior
strength over the person of the victim who is only seven (7) years old, did,
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge
of one Jennifer Donayre, against her will and consent, to her damage and
prejudice.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."1
On his arraignment accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite rendered a decision dated
January 20, 1999, convicting accused-appellant of rape, to wit –
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
felony of rape, the accused-Valentin Baring Jr. is sentenced to die by lethal
injection and to pay the victim an indemnity of P50,000.00 plus moral
damages of another P50,000.00 plus the cost of this suit.
"SO ORDERED."2
In a sworn complaint,3 Jennifer Donayre accused Valentin Baring, Jr., her
grandmother’s common–law husband, of raping her on several occasions. It
appears that Jennifer was living with her grandmother in Dasmariñas, Cavite.
She does not know her real father since her mother and father were
separated.4 Since 1990, when she was about 8 months old5 until 1997, she
was left under her grandmother’s care and custody. She calls Valentin
Baring, Jr. as "Papa."6
According to Jennifer, the repeated sexual abuse happened when she was
about 6 years old whenever she was left alone in the house. Accused-
appellant would touch her private parts, and on such occasions, accused-
appellant would remove her panty, mount on her and violate her. She
informed her grandmother that accused-appellant sexually abused her.7
On July 29, 1997, Jenelyn Donayre-Mendoza visited her daughter Jennifer,
herein victim, in Dasmariñas, Cavite. She learned from her daughter that the
latter was sexually abused by accused-appellant. Acting on her daughter’s
accounts of sexual abuse, she took Jennifer to the National Bureau of
Investigation and filed a complaint. Thereafter, Jennifer underwent a medical
examination at the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory
Service in Camp Crame, Quezon City. Dr. Dennis G. Bellen, the medico-
legal officer at Camp Crame found that Jennifer was in "non-virgin state
physically." The examination disclosed a "congested, fleshy-type hymen with
shallow healing laceration at 9 o’clock position and the external vaginal
orifice admits tip of the examiner’s smallest finger."8
For his defense, accused-appellant denied the allegations against
him.9 According to accused-appellant, he has been living with Jennifer’s
grandmother for ten (10)10 or eighteen (18) years.11 Accused-appellant
claimed that Jennifer was not living with them during the time the alleged
rape occurred.12 Later on, he testified that prior to July, 1997, Jennifer was
living with them since 1990.13 However, Jennifer was taken from them
sometime in July 1997, but he does not know why.14
The trial court meted out its judgment of conviction on the basis of the
victim’s clear, trustworthy and positive testimony that she was raped several
times by accused-appellant. Because of the penalty imposed, this case is now
before us on automatic review.
On April 20, 1999, accused-appellant, through his counsel, filed a petition
before this Court to dismiss the case that is subject of our automatic review
because (i) the three-page double-spaced decision of the trial court is bereft
of material facts supporting the conviction; (ii) the medico-legal certificate is
merely a scrap of paper since the physician who conducted the examination
was not presented as a witness that deprived accused-appellant of his right to
cross-examination; (iii) the case of attempted homicide filed by the victim’s
grandmother against accused-appellant was provisionally dismissed;
and (iv) accused-appellant was merely a "fall guy" and that another person is
responsible for the commission of the crime charged against him.15
In the appellant’s brief filed on November 4, 1999, accused-appellant assigns
the following errors-
"The lower court erred:
"I. In promulgating a brief and short decision with material facts that have
been omitted with no allusions to the transcripts of records erroneous of
tenses and grammar jotted by the Court Stenographer.
"II. In denying the accused his right to plead for a DNA Test to determine
that the blood found in the panty of the victim is not his but of another man,
Donayre, the victim.
"III. In not finding the accused as a ‘fall guy’ framed up to take the place of
Venancio Mendoza, live-in husband of Jennelyn, mother of Jennifer, whose
behavior in the courtroom as a witness has been beyond normal."16
The Philippine Constitution no less, mandates that no decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based. 17 This vital requirement is not only
demanded from the courts. Quasi-judicial bodies are similarly required to
give basis for all their decisions, rulings or judgments pursuant to the
Administrative Code18 whose roots may also be traced to the Constitutional
mandate.
A decision need not be a complete recital of the evidence presented. So long
as the factual and legal basis are clearly and distinctly set forth supporting the
conclusions drawn therefrom, the decision arrived at is valid. Nonetheless, in
order to effectively buttress the judgment arrived at, it is imperative that a
decision should not be simply limited to the dispositive portion but must state
the nature of the case, summarize the facts with references to the record, and
contain a statement of the applicable laws and jurisprudence and the
tribunal’s assessments and conclusions on the case. This practice would
better enable a court to make an appropriate consideration of whether the
dispositive portion of the judgment sought to be enforced is consistent with
the findings of facts and conclusions of law made by the tribunal that
rendered the decision.19 Compliance with this requirement will sufficiently
apprise the parties of the various issues involved but more importantly will
guide the court in assessing whether the conclusion arrived at is consistent
with the facts and the law.
In the case at bar, the trial court’s decision may cast doubt as to the guilt of
accused-appellant. Such doubt may be engendered not by the lack of direct
evidence against accused-appellant but by the trial court’s failure to fully
explain the correlation of the facts, the weight or admissibility of the
evidence presented for or against the accused, the assessments made from the
evidence presented, and the conclusions drawn therefrom after applying the
pertinent law as basis of the decision.
Accused-appellant claims that the trial court erred in convicting him of the
crime of rape despite prosecution’s failure to present the examining physician
to appear in court depriving him of his constitutional right to confront a
witness against him.20 However, a review of the transcript of stenographic
notes reveal that accused-appellant’s counsel waived presentation of the
medico-legal officer and thus, was not deprived of his constitutional right to
confront said witness, to wit-
"PROS. ORQUIEZA: "COURT: "x x x           x x x           x x x
"Q:     Who is your father?
Your Honor, I was informed by the mother of the private complainant that Will you show that to Atty. Abubakar. "A:     I do not know the name of my father because my father and mother are
the doctor is no longer connected with the Crime Laboratory Service at Camp separated.
Crame, Quezon City but was reassigned to the Eastern Police District at "Q:     If your father is in the courtroom can you point to him?
"ATTY. ABUBAKAR: "A:     Yes, sir. (Witness pointing to a man inside this courtroom when asked
Mandaluyong City.
given [sic] his name as Valentin Baring.)
Yes, your Honor. "Q:     Is he your true father?
"PROS. ORQUIEZA: "A:     No sir. He is my stepfather.
"COURT: "Q:     You were pointing to your stepfather, do you know what things or
I just prefer that a subpoena be sent. We have to ask for the postponement. particular things, if any, he did to you?
"A:     Yes, sir.
Admitted. "Q:     What were those particular things your stepfather had done to you?
"ATTY. ABUBAKAR:
"A:     He raped me.
You dispense the testimony of the doctor.21 "Q:     When your stepfather raped you, what actually did your stepfather do
We can dispense with the testimony. to you?
"A:     He removed my panty.
A medical certificate after all is not indispensable to prove the commission of
"COURT: "Q:     What did your stepfather do after removing your panty?
rape.22 It is well entrenched in our jurisprudence that a medical examination
"A:     He placed himself on top of me.
of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape inasmuch as the
"Q:     Was he naked when he placed himself on top of you?
Provided this is admitted. victim’s testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of
"A:     Yes, sir.
the crime.23 Besides, testimonies of rape victims who are of tender age are
"Q:     When he was on top of you, did he place his penis inside your private
"COURT: credible,24 and the testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and
parts?
credit.25
"A:     Yes, sir.
Do you admit the due execution and authenticity of the report of the doctor? "Q:     What did you feel when his penis was inside your private parts, if any?
Accused-appellant likewise impugns the credibility of the victim by pointing "A:     I felt pain.
out that the rape was filed one year after its commission, which allegedly "Q:     Was your private part bleeding as a result of the insertion of the penis
"ATTY. ABUBAKAR: leaves doubt as to the real identity of the culprit. of your stepfather into your private parts?
"A:     Yes, sir.
We admit everything written here because (sic) doctor says. Delay in reporting an incident of rape does not create any doubt over the "Q:     Did he kiss you while he was on top of you?
credibility of the complainant nor can it be taken against her. 26 The following "A:     Yes, sir.
"COURT: realities justified the delay in the filing of the case against accused-appellant: "Q:     What parts of your body or face was kissed?
(1) the victim was merely six years old when she was sexually abused; (2) the "A:     My cheek.
victim lived separately from her mother and was left under her grandmother’s "Q:     Where did this happen?
Yes, whatever is written there, do you admit that? "A:     Dasmariñas, Cavite.
care; and, (3) the victim’s sexual abuser happens to be her step-grandfather.
"Q:     In whose house or place?
ATTY. ABUBAKAR "A:     In the house of my grandmother.
According to accused-appellant, he was simply ‘framed-up’ and that another
"Q:     Who are the residents of that house at that time?
person also raped the victim.27 He avers that his allegation is supported by the
Yes, your Honor. "A:     At that time nobody was in the house because they were working.
testimony of the victim’s mother Jenelyn that the victim was likewise abused
"xxx           xxx           xxx
by the latter’s husband.
"Q:     Can you recall if the rape you mentioned to us happened while you
"COURT: were 7 years old, 6 years old? What was your age then if you can recall?
The categorical testimony of the victim that she was raped by accused- "A:     6 years old.
No need to present the doctor appellant cannot be overturned by the bare denial and defense of being "Q:     How many times did your stepfather do to you these things you
‘framed-up’ interposed by accused-appellant. The victim made a positive, mentioned to us that is by placing (sic) on top of you and inserting his penis
clear and categorical declaration pointing to accused-appellant as the person into your private parts and kissing you?
"PROS. ORQUIEZA:
who sexually ravaged her- "A:     10 times.
"Q:     Do you know how to count?
We will no longer present Dr. Dennis G. Bellen of the Philippine National "A:     Yes, sir.
"Q:     Are you the same Jennifer Donayre the private complainant against the
Police Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Crame, Quezon City. We have "Q:     How many is this? (prosecutor is depicting two fingers)
accused Valentin Baring, Jr.?
here the xerox copy of the medico legal report no. M-2831-97. "A:     Two, sir.
"A:     Yes, sir.
"Q:     How about this, how many? (Prosecutor is depicting five fingers).
"A:     Five, sir.
"Q:     How about this?(Prosecutor is depicting 10 fingers)
"A:     Ten, sir.28
Accused-appellant even contends that the failure of the prosecution to
establish the dates when the other alleged rapes were committed justifies the
outright dismissal of the case.29
Failure to specify the exact date or time when the rapes occurred does
not ipso facto make the information defective on its face.30 When all the
essential elements of the crime of rape are stated in the information, an
accused is sufficiently apprised of the charged against him. Moreover, the
precise time of the commission of the crime of rape is not an essential
element of rape.31 Neither is the exact date of commission of rape an element
of the crime32 for the gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual intercourse
without consent.33
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court denied him his right to subject
the blood found on the victim’s panty for DNA testing.
The records reveal that accused-appellant’s counsel initially asked the court
to subject the alleged blood found in the victim’s panty to a DNA test for
comparison with accused-appellant’s blood.34 However, he voluntarily
withdrew his proposition.35 Obviously, accused-appellant’s counsel is
misleading the Court. It was even accused-appellant’s counsel who recalled
the submission for DNA testing. The alleged denial of accused’s right to
avail of the DNA tests is a futile attempt to confuse the issues. He lost sight
of the categorical testimony of the victim pinning him down as the
perpetrator. It would have been more prudent for him to attack this damaging
evidence directly. It must be noted that in the prosecution of rape cases, the
presentation of the bloodstained panty is not even essential.36 The victim’s
credible testimony, standing alone, is sufficient basis for the conviction of
accused-appellant.
Cases subject of our review, especially those in the nature of child sexual
abuse, often involve victims of tender years. On account of the increased
number of children coming into the realm of the judicial system, we adopted
the "Rule on Examination of a Child Witness" to govern the examination of
child witnesses who may either be victims, accused or witnesses to a
crime.37 This rule ensures an environment that allows children to give reliable
and complete evidence, minimize trauma, encourage children to testify in
legal proceedings, and facilitate the ascertainment of truth.38
In line with our foregoing thrust to protect children, we observed the peculiar
physical examination performed by the doctor on the seven-year-old victim
in this wise-
"GENITAL
There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora full, convex and slightly gaping
with the pinkish brown labia minora presenting in between. On separating,
the same disclosed a congested, fleshy-type hymen with shallow healing
laceration at 9 o'clock position. External vaginal orifice admits tip of the
examiner’s smallest finger."39 (emphasis ours)
This Court is disturbed by the method of physical examination done on the
seven-year-old victim. We noticed that in the examiner’s effort to show the
existence of abuse, the examining physician inserted his smallest finger, as
shown in the medico-legal report that the ‘external vaginal orifice admits tip
of the examiner's finger.’
It bears to stress that this particular manner of establishing evidence – by
determining the diameter/hymenal opening in rape cases – was a common
practice in the past. With the passage of R.A. 7610, this Court has
nonetheless allowed the utilization of the same kind of evidence in the
prosecution of Child Abuse cases. In light however of radical medical
developments and findings, specifically as to the determination of the
existence of child sexual abuse, this Court deems it necessary to firmly adopt
a more "child sensitive" approach in dealing with this specie or genre of
crime.
In the international scientific community, recent medical studies have shown
that measurement of hymenal opening is unreliable in determining and/or
proving child sexual abuse –
"The diameter of the hymenal opening previously has been used as a
diagnostic criterion for abuse. More recent studies have shown this to be
undependable (Paradise, 1989).Factors affecting hymenal and anal diameter
include the examination position (McCann, Voris, Simon, & Wells, 1990) and
the degree of relaxation of the child. The anal diameter is also affected by the
presence of stool in the ampulla. Hymenal diameter may increase with age
and with the onset of pubertal development."40
In fact, there is no evidence, nor published research studies which show that
enlarged hymenal opening diameter is any more common in abused than in
non-abused children."41 Thus -
"In the latest revision of the classification system, ‘enlarged hymenal
opening’ is also removed as a criterion that should be considered suspicious
for abuse. With labial traction, the hymenal opening may appear quite large,
especially to the less experienced clinician, and internal structures such as
vaginal ridges, rugae, and vaginal columns may be visualized. This is purely
a matter of how much traction is applied, and the degree of patient relaxation,
and has no proven correlation with past sexual abuse. Likewise, it is not
possible to obtain accurate measurements of the dilated hymenal opening,
unless photographs are taken at the point of maximal dilation and
measurements are taken from the photographs using a calibrated measuring
device. Rings of different sizes that are etched into eyepieces of certain types
of colposcopes can be used to estimate diameter size but not to obtain exact
measurements."42
Hence, insertion of a finger or any foreign matter inside the hymenal opening
under the pretext of determining abuse is unnecessary and inappropriate. The
Philippine Judicial Academy [PHILJA] training program for family court
judges,43 through the auspices of the U.P.-P.G.H. Child Protection
Unit, sanctioned that in prepubertal girls44 without active bleeding, all that is
needed is an external examination with a good light source and
magnification. Be that as it may, the physical findings alone will not be
conclusive of child sexual abuse, for a child who gives a clear, consistent,
detailed, spontaneous description of being sexually molested may still have
normal genital examination. Despite the physical or laboratory findings,
however, a child’s clear and convincing description of the abuse has a high
rate of probability.
We are not at all uninformed in this regard for we, in a plethora of cases,
have consistently upheld the full weight of a young victim’s unwavering
testimony.45 Also, there is Section 22 of the Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness, which categorically states:
Section 22. Corroboration.- Corroboration shall not be required of a
testimony of a child. His testimony, if credible by itself, shall be sufficient to
support a finding of fact, conclusion, or judgment subject to the standard
proof required in criminal and non-criminal cases.
What is important at this point, and we do not hesitate to reiterate, is that
forensic examination – inclusive of physical examination and forensic
interview – of sexually assaulted children [adolescents included] must be
conducted with maximum sensitivity to the young victim’s feelings of
vulnerability and embarrassment. Great care must be observed in order to
make the examination less stressful lest they be more traumatic to the victim
than the very assault itself. The value of collecting evidence should always be
weighed against the emotional cost of the procedure and examination of the
child.
We now come to the matter of the death penalty imposed by the trial court.
The single information filed against accused-appellant, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 6334-98, charged him with the crime of "Multiple Statutory
Rape."46 Even then, accused-appellant cannot be held answerable for the
other incidents of rape committed. Each and every charge of rape is a
separate and distinct crime so that each of the other rapes charged should be
proven beyond reasonable doubt.47
Article 266-B, paragraph No.5 of the Revised Penal Code, imposes death
penalty when the victim is a child below seven (7) years old. The allegation
in the information specifically stated that "xxx the victim xxx is only seven
years old" which clearly rules out the application of this specific provision
that can justify the imposition of the capital punishment. Paragraph No. 1 of
the same article which warrants the imposition of the death penalty if the
crime of rape is committed where the victim is under eighteen (18) years of
age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common–law
spouse of the parent of the victim, 48 will not apply for while the victim is
under eighteen (18) years old, the accused-appellant is not the common-law
husband of the victim’s mother. The trial court therefore erred in meting out
the death penalty upon accused-appellant for qualified rape. Thus, accused-
appellant may only be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

In line with our prevailing jurisprudence, 49 we sustain the trial court’s award
of P50,000.00 civil indemnity andP50,000.00 moral damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Imus,

Cavite, in Criminal Case No. 6334-98, finding accused-appellant Valentin
Baring, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the sentence is
reduced to reclusion perpetua.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. NO. 004-07-SC             November 21, 2000
RULE ON EXAMINATION OF A CHILD WITNESS
Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. - Unless otherwise provided, this Rule
shall govern the examination of child witnesses who are victims of crime,
accused of a crime, and witnesses to crime. It shall apply in all criminal
proceedings and non-criminal proceedings involving child witnesses.
Section 2. Objectives. - The objectives of this Rule are to create and maintain
an environment that will allow children to give reliable and complete
evidence, minimize trauma to children, encourage children to testify in legal
proceedings, and facilitate the ascertainment of truth.
Section 3. Construction of the Rule. - This Rule shall be liberally construed
to uphold the best interests of the child and to promote maximum
accommodation of child witnesses without prejudice to the constitutional
rights of the accused.
Section 4. Definitions. -
(a) A "child witness" is any person who at the time of giving testimony is
below the age of eighteen (18) years. In child abuse cases, a child includes
one over eighteen (18) years but is found by the court as unable to fully take
care of himself or protect himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation,
or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition.
(b) "Child abuse" means physical, psychological, or sexual abuse, and
criminal neglect as defined in Republic Act No. 7610 and other related laws.
(c) "Facilitator" means a person appointed by the court to pose questions to a
child.
(d) "Record regarding a child" or "record" means any photograph, videotape,
audiotape, film, handwriting, typewriting, printing, electronic recording,
computer data or printout, or other memorialization, including any court
document, pleading, or any copy or reproduction of any of the foregoing, that
contains the name, description, address, school, or any other personal
identifying information about a child or his family and that is produced or
maintained by a public agency, private agency, or individual.
(e) A "guardian ad litem" is a person appointed by the court where the case is
pending for a child who is a victim of, accused of, or a witness to a crime to
protect the best interests of the said child.
(f) A "support person" is a person chosen by the child to accompany him to
testify at or attend a judicial proceeding or deposition to provide emotional
support for him.
(g) "Best interests of the child" means the totality of the circumstances and
conditions as are most congenial to the survival, protection, and feelings of
security of the child and most encouraging to his physical, psychological, and
emotional development. It also means the least detrimental available
alternative for safeguarding the growth and development of the child.
(h) "Developmental level" refers to the specific growth phase in which most
individuals are expected to behave and function in relation to the
advancement of their physical, socio-emotional, cognitive, and moral
abilities.
(i) "In-depth investigative interview" or "disclosure interview" is an inquiry
or proceeding conducted by duly trained members of a multidisciplinary team
or representatives of law enforcement or child protective services for the
purpose of determining whether child abuse has been committed.
Section 5. Guardian ad litem. -
(a) The court may appoint a guardian ad litem for a child who is a victim of,
accused of, or a witness to a crime to promote the best interests of the child.
In making the appointment, the court shall consider the background of the
guardian ad litem and his familiarity with the judicial process, social service
programs, and child development, giving preference to the parents of the
child, if qualified. The guardian ad litem may be a member of the Philippine
Bar. A person who is a witness in any proceeding involving the child cannot
be appointed as a guardian ad litem.
(b) The guardian ad litem:
(1) Shall attend all interviews, depositions, hearings, and trial proceedings in
which a child participates;
(2) Shall make recommendations to the court concerning the welfare of the
child;
(3) Shall have access to all reports, evaluations, and records necessary to
effectively advocate for the child, except privileged communications;
(4) Shall marshal and coordinate the delivery of resources and special
services to the child;
(5) Shall explain, in language understandable to the child, all legal
proceedings, including police investigations, in which the child is involved;
(6) Shall assist the child and his family in coping with the emotional effects
of crime and subsequent criminal or non-criminal proceedings in which the
child is involved;
(7) May remain with the child while the child waits to testify;
(8) May interview witnesses; and
(9) May request additional examinations by medical or mental health
professionals if there is a compelling need therefor.
(c) The guardian ad litem shall be notified of all proceedings but shall not
participate in the trial. However, he may file motions pursuant to sections 9,
10, 25, 26, 27 and 31(c). If the guardian ad litem is a lawyer, he may object
during trial that questions asked of the child are not appropriate to his
developmental level.
(d) The guardian ad litem may communicate concerns regarding the child to
the court through an officer of the court designated for that purpose.
(e) The guardian ad litem shall not testify in any proceeding concerning any
information, statement, or opinion received from the child in the course of
serving as a guardian ad litem, unless the court finds it necessary to promote
the best interests of the child.
(f) The guardian ad litem shall be presumed to have acted in good faith in
compliance with his duties described in sub-section (b).
Section 6. Competency. - Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness.
However, the court shall conduct a competency examination of a child, motu
proprio or on motion of a party, when it finds that substantial doubt exists
regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate,
distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in
court.
(a) Proof of necessity. - A party seeking a competency examination must
present proof of necessity of competency examination. The age of the child
by itself is not a sufficient basis for a competency examination.
(b) Burden of proof. - To rebut the presumption of competence enjoyed by a
child, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging his competence.
(c) Persons allowed at competency examination. Only the following are
allowed to attend a competency examination:
(1) The judge and necessary court personnel;
(2) The counsel for the parties;
(3) The guardian ad litem;
(4) One or more support persons for the child; and
(5) The defendant, unless the court determines that competence can be fully
evaluated in his absence.
(d) Conduct of examination. - Examination of a child as to his competence
shall be conducted only by the judge. Counsel for the parties, however, can
submit questions to the judge that he may, in his discretion, ask the child.
(e) Developmentally appropriate questions. - The questions asked at the
competency examination shall be appropriate to the age and developmental
level of the child; shall not be related to the issues at trial; and shall focus on
the ability of the child to remember, communicate, distinguish between truth
and falsehood, and appreciate the duty to testify truthfully.
(f) Continuing duty to assess competence. - The court has the duty of
continuously assessing the competence of the child throughout his testimony.
Section 7. Oath or affirmation. - Before testifying, a child shall take an oath
or affirmation to tell the truth.
Section 8. Examination of a child witness. - The examination of a child
witness presented in a hearing or any proceeding shall be done in open court.
Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a
different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.
The party who presents a child witness or the guardian ad litem of such child
witness may, however, move the court to allow him to testify in the manner
provided in this Rule.
Section 9. Interpreter for child. -
(a) When a child does not understand the English or Filipino language or is
unable to communicate in said languages due to his developmental level,
fear, shyness, disability, or other similar reason, an interpreter whom the
child can understand and who understands the child may be appointed by the
court, motu proprio or upon motion, to interpret for the child.
(b) If a witness or member of the family of the child is the only person who
can serve as an interpreter for the child, he shall not be disqualified and may
serve as the interpreter of the child. The interpreter, however, who is also a
witness, shall testify ahead of the child.
(c) An interpreter shall take an oath or affirmation to make a true and
accurate interpretation.
Section 10. Facilitator to pose questions to child. -
(a) The court may, motu proprio or upon motion, appoint a facilitator if it
determines that the child is unable to understand or respond to questions
asked. The facilitator may be a child psychologist, psychiatrist, social worker,
guidance counselor, teacher, religious leader, parent, or relative.
(b) If the court appoints a facilitator, the respective counsels for the parties
shall pose questions to the child only through the facilitator. The questions
shall either be in the words used by counsel or, if the child is not likely to
understand the same, in words that are comprehensible to the child and which
convey the meaning intended by counsel.
(c) The facilitator shall take an oath or affirmation to pose questions to the
child according to the meaning intended by counsel.
Section 11. Support persons. -
(a) A child testifying at a judicial proceeding or making a deposition shall
have the right to be accompanied by one or two persons of his own choosing
to provide him emotional support.
(1) Both support persons shall remain within the view of the child during his
testimony.
(2) One of the support persons may accompany the child to the witness stand,
provided the support person does not completely obscure the child from the
view of the opposing party, judge, or hearing officer.
(3) The court may allow the support person to hold the hand of the child or
take other appropriate steps to provide emotional support to the child in the
course of the proceedings.
(4) The court shall instruct the support persons not to prompt, sway, or
influence the child during his testimony.
(b) If the support person chosen by the child is also a witness, the court may
disapprove the choice if it is sufficiently established that the attendance of the
support person during the testimony of the child would pose a substantial risk
of influencing or affecting the content of the testimony of the child.
(c) If the support person who is also a witness is allowed by the court, his
testimony shall be presented ahead of the testimony of the child.
Section 12. Waiting area for child witnesses. - The courts are encouraged to
provide a waiting area for children that is separate from waiting areas used by
other persons. The waiting area for children should be furnished so as to
make a child comfortable.
Section 13. Courtroom environment. - To create a more comfortable
environment for the child, the court may, in its discretion, direct and
supervise the location, movement and deportment of all persons in the
courtroom including the parties, their counsel, child, witnesses, support
persons, guardian ad litem, facilitator, and court personnel. The child may be
allowed to testify from a place other than the witness chair. The witness chair
or other place from which the child testifies may be turned to facilitate his
testimony but the opposing party and his counsel must have a frontal or
profile view of the child during the testimony of the child. The witness chair
or other place from which the child testifies may also be rearranged to allow
the child to see the opposing party and his counsel, if he chooses to look at
them, without turning his body or leaving the witness stand. The judge need
not wear his judicial robe.
Nothing in this section or any other provision of law, except official in-court
identification provisions, shall be construed to require a child to look at the
accused.
Accommodations for the child under this section need not be supported by a
finding of trauma to the child.
Section 14. Testimony during appropriate hours. - The court may order that
the testimony of the child should be taken during a time of day when the
child is well-rested.
Section 15. Recess during testimony. -
The child may be allowed reasonable periods of relief while undergoing
direct, cross, re-direct, and re-cross examinations as often as necessary
depending on his developmental level.
Section 16. Testimonial aids. - The court shall permit a child to use dolls,
anatomically-correct dolls, puppets, drawings, mannequins, or any other
appropriate demonstrative device to assist him in his testimony.
Section 17. Emotional security item. - While testifying, a child shall be
allowed to have an item of his own choosing such as a blanket, toy, or doll.
Section 18. Approaching the witness. - The court may prohibit a counsel
from approaching a child if it appears that the child is fearful of or
intimidated by the counsel.
Section 19. Mode of questioning. - The court shall exercise control over the
questioning of children so as to (1) facilitate the ascertainment of the truth,
(2) ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the
developmental level of the child, (3) protect children from harassment or
undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of time.
The court may allow the child witness to testify in a narrative form.
Section 20. Leading questions. - The court may allow leading questions in
all stages of examination of a child if the same will further the interests of
justice.
Section 21. Objections to questions. - Objections to questions should be
couched in a manner so as not to mislead, confuse, frighten, or intimidate the
child.
Section 22. Corroboration. - Corroboration shall not be required of a
testimony of a child. His testimony, if credible by itself, shall be sufficient to
support a finding of fact, conclusion, or judgment subject to the standard of
proof required in criminal and non-criminal cases.
Section 23. Excluding the public. - When a child testifies, the court may
order the exclusion from the courtroom of all persons, including members of
the press, who do not have a direct interest in the case. Such an order may be
made to protect the right to privacy of the child or if the court determines on
the record that requiring the child to testify in open court would cause
psychological harm to him, hinder the ascertainment of truth, or result in his
inability to effectively communicate due to embarrassment, fear, or timidity.
In making its order, the court shall consider the developmental level of the
child, the nature of the crime, the nature of his testimony regarding the crime,
his relationship to the accused and to persons attending the trial, his desires,
and the interests of his parents or legal guardian. The court may, motu
proprio, exclude the public from the courtroom if the evidence to be
produced during trial is of such character as to be offensive to decency or
public morals. The court may also, on motion of the accused, exclude the
public from trial, except court personnel and the counsel of the parties.
Section 24. Persons prohibited from entering and leaving courtroom. - The
court may order that persons attending the trial shall not enter or leave the
courtroom during the testimony of the child.
Section 25. Live-link television testimony in criminal cases where the child
is a victim or a witness. -
(a) The prosecutor, counsel or the guardian ad litem may apply for an order
that the testimony of the child be taken in a room outside the courtroom and
be televised to the courtroom by live-link television.
Before the guardian ad litem applies for an order under this section, he shall
consult the prosecutor or counsel and shall defer to the judgment of the
prosecutor or counsel regarding the necessity of applying for an order. In
case the guardian ad ltiem is convinced that the decision of the prosecutor or
counsel not to apply will cause the child serious emotional trauma, he himself
may apply for the order.
The person seeking such an order shall apply at least five (5) days before the
trial date, unless the court finds on the record that the need for such an order
was not reasonably foreseeable.
(b) The court may motu proprio hear and determine, with notice to the
parties, the need for taking the testimony of the child through live-link
television.
(c) The judge may question the child in chambers, or in some comfortable
place other than the courtroom, in the presence of the support person,
guardian ad litem, prosecutor, and counsel for the parties. The questions of
the judge shall not be related to the issues at trial but to the feelings of the
child about testifying in the courtroom.
(d) The judge may exclude any person, including the accused, whose
presence or conduct causes fear to the child.
(e) The court shall issue an order granting or denying the use of live-link
television and stating the reasons therefor. It shall consider the following
factors:
(1) The age and level of development of the child;
(2) His physical and mental health, including any mental or physical
disability;
(3) Any physical, emotional, or psychological injury experienced by him;
(4) The nature of the alleged abuse;
(5) Any threats against the child;
(6) His relationship with the accused or adverse party;
(7) His reaction to any prior encounters with the accused in court or
elsewhere;
(8) His reaction prior to trial when the topic of testifying was discussed with
him by parents or professionals;
(9) Specific symptoms of stress exhibited by the child in the days prior to
testifying;
(10) Testimony of expert or lay witnesses;
(11) The custodial situation of the child and the attitude of the members of
his family regarding the events about which he will testify; and
(12) Other relevant factors, such as court atmosphere and formalities of court
procedure.
(f) The court may order that the testimony of the child be taken by live-link
television if there is a substantial likelihood that the child would suffer
trauma from testifying in the presence of the accused, his counsel or the
prosecutor as the case may be. The trauma must be of a kind which would
impair the completeness or truthfulness of the testimony of the child.
(g) If the court orders the taking of testimony by live-link television:
(1) The child shall testify in a room separate from the courtroom in the
presence of the guardian ad litem; one or both of his support persons; the
facilitator and interpreter, if any; a court officer appointed by the court;
persons necessary to operate the closed-circuit television equipment; and
other persons whose presence are determined by the court to be necessary to
the welfare and well-being of the child;
(2) The judge, prosecutor, accused, and counsel for the parties shall be in the
courtroom. The testimony of the child shall be transmitted by live-link
television into the courtroom for viewing and hearing by the judge,
prosecutor, counsel for the parties, accused, victim, and the public unless
excluded.
(3) If it is necessary for the child to identify the accused at trial, the court
may allow the child to enter the courtroom for the limited purpose of
identifying the accused, or the court may allow the child to identify the
accused by observing the image of the latter on a television monitor.
(4) The court may set other conditions and limitations on the taking of the
testimony that it finds just and appropriate, taking into consideration the best
interests of the child.
(h) The testimony of the child shall be preserved on videotape, digital disc, or
other similar devices which shall be made part of the court record and shall
be subject to a protective order as provided in section 31(b).
Section 26. Screens, one-way mirrors, and other devices to shield child
from accused. -
(a) The prosecutor or the guardian ad litem may apply for an order that the
chair of the child or that a screen or other device be placed in the courtroom
in such a manner that the child cannot see the accused while testifying.
Before the guardian ad litem applies for an order under this section, he shall
consult with the prosecutor or counsel subject to the second and third
paragraphs of section 25(a) of this Rule. The court shall issue an order stating
the reasons and describing the approved courtroom arrangement.
(b) If the court grants an application to shield the child from the accused
while testifying in the courtroom, the courtroom shall be arranged to enable
the accused to view the child.
Section 27. Videotaped deposition. -
(a) The prosecutor, counsel, or guardian ad litem may apply for an order that
a deposition be taken of the testimony of the child and that it be recorded and
preserved on videotape. Before the guardian ad litem applies for an order
under this section, he shall consult with the prosecutor or counsel subject to
the second and third paragraphs of section 25(a).
(b) If the court finds that the child will not be able to testify in open court at
trial, it shall issue an order that the deposition of the child be taken and
preserved by videotape.
(c) The judge shall preside at the videotaped deposition of a child. Objections
to deposition testimony or evidence, or parts thereof, and the grounds for the
objection shall be stated and shall be ruled upon at the time of the taking of
the deposition. The other persons who may be permitted to be present at the
proceeding are:
(1) The prosecutor;
(2) The defense counsel;
(3) The guardian ad litem;
(4) The accused, subject to sub-section (e);
(5) Other persons whose presence is determined by the court to be necessary
to the welfare and well-being of the child;
(6) One or both of his support persons, the facilitator and interpreter, if any;
(7) The court stenographer; and
(8) Persons necessary to operate the videotape equipment.
(d) The rights of the accused during trial, especially the right to counsel and
to confront and cross-examine the child, shall not be violated during the
deposition.
(e) If the order of the court is based on evidence that the child is unable to
testify in the physical presence of the accused, the court may direct the latter
to be excluded from the room in which the deposition is conducted. In case of
exclusion of the accused, the court shall order that the testimony of the child
be taken by live-link television in accordance with section 25 of this Rule. If
the accused is excluded from the deposition, it is not necessary that the child
be able to view an image of the accused.
(f) The videotaped deposition shall be preserved and stenographically
recorded. The videotape and the stenographic notes shall be transmitted to the
clerk of the court where the case is pending for safekeeping and shall be
made a part of the record.
(g) The court may set other conditions on the taking of the deposition that it
finds just and appropriate, taking into consideration the best interests of the
child, the constitutional rights of the accused, and other relevant factors.
(h) The videotaped deposition and stenographic notes shall be subject to a
protective order as provided in section 31(b).
(i) If, at the time of trial, the court finds that the child is unable to testify for a
reason stated in section 25(f) of this Rule, or is unavailable for any reason
described in section 4(c), Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
court may admit into evidence the videotaped deposition of the child in lieu
of his testimony at the trial. The court shall issue an order stating the reasons
therefor.
(j) After the original videotaping but before or during trial, any party may file
any motion for additional videotaping on the ground of newly discovered
evidence. The court may order an additional videotaped deposition to receive
the newly discovered evidence.
Section 28. Hearsay exception in child abuse cases. - A statement made by
a child describing any act or attempted act of child abuse, not otherwise
admissible under the hearsay rule, may be admitted in evidence in any
criminal or non-criminal proceeding subject to the following rules:
(a) Before such hearsay statement may be admitted, its proponent shall make
known to the adverse party the intention to offer such statement and its
particulars to provide him a fair opportunity to object. If the child is
available, the court shall, upon motion of the adverse party, require the child
to be present at the presentation of the hearsay statement for cross-
examination by the adverse party. When the child is unavailable, the fact of
such circumstance must be proved by the proponent.
(b) In ruling on the admissibility of such hearsay statement, the court shall
consider the time, content and circumstances thereof which provide sufficient
indicia of reliability. It shall consider the following factors:
(1) Whether there is a motive to lie;
(2) The general character of the declarant child;
(3) Whether more than one person heard the statement;
(4) Whether the statement was spontaneous;
(5) The timing of the statement and the relationship between the declarant
child and witness;
(6) Cross-examination could not show the lack of knowledge of the declarant
child;
(7) The possibility of faulty recollection of the declarant child is remote; and
(8) The circumstances surrounding the statement are such that there is no
reason to suppose the declarant child misrepresented the involvement of the
accused.
(c) The child witness shall be considered unavailable under the following
situations:
(1) Is deceased, suffers from physical infirmity, lack of memory, mental
illness, or will be exposed to severe psychological injury; or
(2) Is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been
unable to procure his attendance by process or other reasonable means.
(d) When the child witness is unavailable, his hearsay testimony shall be
admitted only if corroborated by other admissible evidence.
Section 29. Admissibility of videotaped and audiotaped in-depth
investigative or disclosure interviews in child abuse cases. - The court may
admit videotape and audiotape in-depth investigative or disclosure interviews
as evidence, under the following conditions:
(a) The child witness is unable to testify in court on grounds and under
conditions established under section 28 (c).
(b) The interview of the child was conducted by duly trained members of a
multidisciplinary team or representatives of law enforcement or child
protective services in situations where child abuse is suspected so as to
determine whether child abuse occurred.
(c) The party offering the videotape or audiotape must prove that:
(1) the videotape or audiotape discloses the identity of all individuals present
and at all times includes their images and voices;
(2) the statement was not made in response to questioning calculated to lead
the child to make a particular statement or is clearly shown to be the
statement of the child and not the product of improper suggestion;
(3) the videotape and audiotape machine or device was capable of recording
testimony;
(4) the person operating the device was competent to operate it;
(5) the videotape or audiotape is authentic and correct; and
(6) it has been duly preserved.
The individual conducting the interview of the child shall be available at trial
for examination by any party. Before the videotape or audiotape is offered in
evidence, all parties shall be afforded an opportunity to view or listen to it
and shall be furnished a copy of a written transcript of the proceedings.
The fact that an investigative interview is not videotaped or audiotaped as
required by this section shall not by itself constitute a basis to exclude from
evidence out-of-court statements or testimony of the child. It may, however,
be considered in determining the reliability of the statements of the child
describing abuse.
Section 30. Sexual abuse shield rule. -
(a) Inadmissible evidence. - The following evidence is not admissible in any
criminal proceeding involving alleged child sexual abuse:
(1) Evidence offered to prove that the alleged victim engaged in other sexual
behavior; and
(2) Evidence offered to prove the sexual predisposition of the alleged victim.
(b) Exception. - Evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the
alleged victim to prove that a person other than the accused was the source of
semen, injury, or other physical evidence shall be admissible.
A party intending to offer such evidence must:
(1) File a written motion at least fifteen (15) days before trial, specifically
describing the evidence and stating the purpose for which it is offered, unless
the court, for good cause, requires a different time for filing or permits filing
during trial; and
(2) Serve the motion on all parties and the guardian ad litem at least three (3)
days before the hearing of the motion.
Before admitting such evidence, the court must conduct a hearing in
chambers and afford the child, his guardian ad litem, the parties, and their
counsel a right to attend and be heard. The motion and the record of the
hearing must be sealed and remain under seal and protected by a protective
order set forth in section 31(b). The child shall not be required to testify at the
hearing in chambers except with his consent.
Section 31. Protection of privacy and safety. -
(a) Confidentiality of records. - Any record regarding a child shall be
confidential and kept under seal. Except upon written request and order of the
court, a record shall only be released to the following:
(1) Members of the court staff for administrative use;
(2) The prosecuting attorney;
(3) Defense counsel;
(4) The guardian ad litem;
(5) Agents of investigating law enforcement agencies; and
(6) Other persons as determined by the court.
(b) Protective order. - Any videotape or audiotape of a child that is part of
the court record shall be under a protective order that provides as follows:
(1) Tapes may be viewed only by parties, their counsel, their expert witness,
and the guardian ad litem.
(2) No tape, or any portion thereof, shall be divulged by any person
mentioned in sub-section (a) to any other person, except as necessary for the
trial.
(3) No person shall be granted access to the tape, its transcription or any part
thereof unless he signs a written affirmation that he has received and read a
copy of the protective order; that he submits to the jurisdiction of the court
with respect to the protective order; and that in case of violation thereof, he
will be subject to the contempt power of the court.
(4) Each of the tape cassettes and transcripts thereof made available to the
parties, their counsel, and respective agents shall bear the following
cautionary notice:
"This object or document and the contents thereof are subject to a protective
order issued by the court in (case title) , (case number) . They shall not be
examined, inspected, read, viewed, or copied by any person, or disclosed to
any person, except as provided in the protective order. No additional copies
of the tape or any of its portion shall be made, given, sold, or shown to any
person without prior court order. Any person violating such protective order
is subject to the contempt power of the court and other penalties prescribed
by law."
(5) No tape shall be given, loaned, sold, or shown to any person except as
ordered by the court.
(6) Within thirty (30) days from receipt, all copies of the tape and any
transcripts thereof shall be returned to the clerk of court for safekeeping
unless the period is extended by the court on motion of a party.
(7) This protective order shall remain in full force and effect until further
order of the court.
(c) Additional protective orders. - The court may, motu proprio or on motion
of any party, the child, his parents, legal guardian, or the guardian ad litem,
issue additional orders to protect the privacy of the child.
(d) Publication of identity contemptuous. - Whoever publishes or causes to be
published in any format the name, address, telephone number, school, or
other identifying information of a child who is or is alleged to be a victim or
accused of a crime or a witness thereof, or an immediate family of the child
shall be liable to the contempt power of the court.
(e) Physical safety of child; exclusion of evidence. - A child has a right at any
court proceeding not to testify regarding personal identifying information,
including his name, address, telephone number, school, and other information
that could endanger his physical safety or his family. The court may,
however, require the child to testify regarding personal identifying
information in the interest of justice.
(f) Destruction of videotapes and audiotapes. - Any videotape or audiotape of
a child produced under the provisions of this Rule or otherwise made part of
the court record shall be destroyed after five (5) years have elapsed from the
date of entry of judgment.

(g) Records of youthful offender. - Where a youthful offender has been

charged before any city or provincial prosecutor or before any municipal
judge and the charges have been ordered dropped, all the records of the case
shall be considered as privileged and may not be disclosed directly or
indirectly to anyone for any purpose whatsoever.

Where a youthful offender has been charged and the court acquits him, or
dismisses the case or commits him to an institution and subsequently releases
him pursuant to Chapter 3 of P. D. No. 603, all the records of his case shall
also be considered as privileged and may not be disclosed directly or
indirectly to anyone except to determine if a defendant may have his sentence
suspended under Article 192 of P. D. No. 603 or if he may be granted
probation under the provisions of P. D. No. 968 or to enforce his civil
liability, if said liability has been imposed in the criminal action. The
youthful offender concerned shall not be held under any provision of law to
be guilty of perjury or of concealment or misrepresentation by reason of his
failure to acknowledge the case or recite any fact related thereto in response
to any inquiry made to him for any purpose.

"Records" within the meaning of this sub-section shall include those which
may be in the files of the National Bureau of Investigation and with any
police department or government agency which may have been involved in
the case. (Art. 200, P. D. No. 603)

Section 32. Applicability of ordinary rules. - The provisions of the Rules of

Court on deposition, conditional examination of witnesses, and evidence
shall be applied in a suppletory character.

Section 33. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on December 15, 2000
following its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
G.R. No. 170338             December 23, 2008 recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings
conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.1
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner, 
vs. In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a privilege speech, "Tale of Two
INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL Tapes," and set in motion a congressional investigation jointly conducted by
DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND the Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND Defense and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and
ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents. Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the
inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. But on
x----------------------x July 5, 2005, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo
Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director
Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House Committees seven alleged
G.R. No. 179275             December 23, 2008 "original" tape recordings of the supposed three-hour taped conversation.
After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee members on the
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually
AGCAOILI, petitioners,  played in the chambers of the House.2
vs.
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend
REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE the hearings indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee
MANUEL VILLAR, respondents. reports based on the said recordings and the testimonies of the resource
persons.3
x----------------------x
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention (Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction,
with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
x----------------------x Injunction4docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent
House Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings of the
"illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO, for any other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any
RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B.
reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the
LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F. respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using the
TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors recordings in any of the House proceedings.5
DECISION Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the
"Garci tapes" abruptly stopped.
NACHURA, J.:
After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused the
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped slumbering issue with a privilege speech, "The Lighthouse That Brought
conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a high- Darkness." In his discourse, Senator Lacson promised to provide the public
ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They "the whole unvarnished truth – the what’s, when’s, where’s, who’s and
captured unprecedented public attention and thrust the country into a why’s" of the alleged wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the perceived
controversy that placed the legitimacy of the present administration on the willingness of telecommunications providers to participate in nefarious
line, and resulted in the near-collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes, wiretapping activities.
notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the
President’s instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacson’s speech was
manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These referred to the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired
by Senator Rodolfo Biazon, who had previously filed two bills6 seeking to
regulate the sale, purchase and use of wiretapping equipment and to prohibit
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral duties.7
In the Senate’s plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued
when Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 42008 if the body were to conduct a legislative
inquiry on the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-
Santiago delivered a privilege speech, articulating her considered view that
the Constitution absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or
communication of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes. However, she
recommended a legislative investigation into the role of the Intelligence
Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other
government entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials.9
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili,
retired justices of the Court of Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275,
seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry.
They argued in the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A.
No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.11
As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its
public hearings on the "Hello Garci" tapes on September 7,12 1713 and
October 1,14 2007.
Intervening as respondents,15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Benigno
Noynoy C. Aquino, Rodolfo G. Biazon, Panfilo M. Lacson, Loren B.
Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.S. Madrigal and Antonio F. Trillanes filed their
Comment16on the petition on September 25, 2007.
The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument.17
On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and
one of the resource persons summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at
its hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.18
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338
and 179275.19
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci"
recordings, they have different objectives–the first is poised at preventing the
playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent inclusion in the
committee reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of
the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.
The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the
second, G.R. No. 179275.
-I-
Before delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first resolve the
issue on the parties’ standing, argued at length in their pleadings.
In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that "‘[l]egal standing’ or locus
standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged
governmental act x x x," thus,
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that
he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable
to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action.21
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."22
However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the
Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo23 articulates that a "liberal policy has been observed,
allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to
prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws,
regulations and rulings."24 The fairly recent Chavez v. Gonzales25 even
permitted a non-member of the broadcast media, who failed to allege a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, to challenge the acts of the
Secretary of Justice and the National Telecommunications Commission. The
majority, in the said case, echoed the current policy that "this Court has
repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as
impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal questions that
greatly impact on public interest, in keeping with the Court’s duty under the
1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of government
have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws, and
that they have not abused the discretion given to them."26
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate the
petition by alleging that he is the person alluded to in the "Hello Garci" tapes.
Further, his was publicly identified by the members of the respondent
committees as one of the voices in the recordings.27 Obviously, therefore,
petitioner Garcillano stands to be directly injured by the House committees’
actions and charges of electoral fraud. The Court recognizes his standing to
institute the petition for prohibition.
In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing by
alleging that they are concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP.
They are of the firm conviction that any attempt to use the "Hello Garci"
tapes will further divide the country. They wish to see the legal and proper
use of public funds that will necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing public
hearings. They are worried by the continuous violation of the laws and
individual rights, and the blatant attempt to abuse constitutional processes
through the conduct of legislative inquiries purportedly in aid of legislation.28
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that
he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not
only of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended
legislation which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a
taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds
involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.29
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution
of the laws and that intervenor Sagge asserts his constitutional right to due
process,30 they satisfy the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic.
Following the Court’s ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of
Representatives,31 we find sufficient petitioners Ranada’s and Agcaoili’s and
intervenor Sagge’s allegation that the continuous conduct by the Senate of
the questioned legislative inquiry will necessarily involve the expenditure of
public funds.32 It should be noted that inFrancisco, rights personal to then
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had been injured by the alleged
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, yet the Court granted
standing to the petitioners therein for, as in this case, they invariably invoked
the vindication of their own rights–as taxpayers, members of Congress,
citizens, individually or in a class suit, and members of the bar and of the
legal profession–which were also supposedly violated by the therein assailed
unconstitutional acts.33
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the
petitioners and intervenor Sagge advance constitutional issues which deserve
the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents. The issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not
only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, and should be resolved
for the guidance of all.34
Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it
has shown in prior cases climaxing in the more recent case of Chavez, the
Court recognizes the legal standing of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and
intervenor Sagge.
- II -
The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and
academic. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the
exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and
resolution of actual cases and controversies.35 By actual cases, we mean
existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court will
amount to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not extend
to hypothetical questions because any attempt at abstraction could only lead
to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities.36 Neither will the Court determine a moot question in a case in
which no practical relief can be granted. A case becomes moot when its
purpose has become stale.37 It is unnecessary to indulge in academic
discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot
have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be
enforced.38
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as
aforementioned, the issuance of an injunctive writ to prohibit the respondent
House Committees from playing the tape recordings and from including the
same in their committee report. He likewise prays that the said tapes be
stricken off the records of the House proceedings. But the Court notes that
the recordings were already played in the House and heard by its
members.39 There is also the widely publicized fact that the committee
reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to the
House in plenary by the respondent committees.40 Having been overtaken by
these events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot and
academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing
of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act
already accomplished.41
- III -
As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate
cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative
inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the
constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he
Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is
intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.42 Publication is
indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.43 What constitutes
publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that
"[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines."44
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on
oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only
in 1995 and in 2006.45 With respect to the present Senate of the
14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced
on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules
when they first opened their session.
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri
v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations,46 we said:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent
Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution,
requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the "duly published rules of
procedure." We quote the OSG’s explanation:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every
Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of
legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it.
Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the
Senate’s membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end
of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may
deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject
hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14 th Senate, are therefore,
procedurally infirm.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion,
reinforces this ruling with the following rationalization:
The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing
legislative body. The present Senate has twenty-four members, twelve of
whom are elected every three years for a term of six years each. Thus, the
term of twelve Senators expires every three years, leaving less than a
majority of Senators to continue into the next Congress. The 1987
Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires a majority of Senators to
"constitute a quorum to do business." Applying the same reasoning inArnault
v. Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a continuing body
because less than majority of the Senators continue into the next Congress.
The consequence is that the Rules of Proceduremust be republished by the
Senate after every expiry of the term of twelve Senators.47
The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our Resolution48 (On the
Motion for Reconsideration) in the same case, viz.:
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees fit to issue
a clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an
institution is "continuing," as it is not dissolved as an entity with each
national election or change in the composition of its members. However, in
the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts
separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. The
Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at
the next session in the same status.
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration
of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if
present for the first time.
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e.,
unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a
particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that
Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress
to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if
presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is
readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress
(which will typically have a different composition as that of the previous
Congress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of
which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body even with respect
to the conduct of its business, then pending matters will not be deemed
terminated with the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of
course, continue into the next Congress with the same status.
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the
opposite nature of the conduct of its business is reflected in its Rules. The
Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senate’s main rules of procedure) states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the
preceding elections shall begin their term of office, the President may
endorse the Rules to the appropriate committee for amendment or revision.
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be
presented at least one day before its consideration, and the vote of the
majority of the Senators present in the session shall be required for its
approval.
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and
shall remain in force until they are amended or repealed.
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new
composition of the Senate after an election and the possibility of the
amendment or revision of the Rules at the start of each session in which the
newly elected Senators shall begin their term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are
intended to be valid from the date of their adoption until they are amended or
repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from theRules.
The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." The latter does not
explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules until they are
amended or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets
of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries)
would continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may
easily adopt different rules for its legislative inquiries which come within the
rule on unfinished business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the
inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of
procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules
for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published
rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses
or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative
inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily
adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated
publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995
and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for
free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page.49
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot
justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without
more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and
does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone
amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules
prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
Justice Carpio’s response to the same argument raised by the respondents is
illuminating:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in
pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tañada v.
Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that
the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form of publication.
Publication in accordance with Tañada is mandatory to comply with the due
process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty at
risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and
detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No.
8792,50 otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support
their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect.
R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as
the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary
purposes.51 In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in
evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or
electronic documents.52 It does not make the internet a medium for publishing
laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could
not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the
legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of
inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall
have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008
issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this
fact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to
be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are
concerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be
undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because no published rules
governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the
other issues raised in the consolidated petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the
petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be
issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or any of
its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on
the "Hello Garci" tapes.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 186228 namely: victim AAA;[6] her brother BBB;[7] and one Moises Boy Banting,
[8]
Plaintiff-Appellee,    a bantay bayan in the barangay. Their testimonies revealed the following:
     
  Present: In the afternoon of 15 March 2000, AAA was left alone at home. [9] AAAs
    father, the appellant, was having a drinking spree at the neighbors place.
[10]
  CARPIO, J.,  Her mother decided to leave because when appellant gets drunk, he has
  Chairperson, the habit of mauling AAAs mother.[11] Her only brother BBB also went out in
-versus- BRION, the company of some neighbors.[12]
  DEL CASTILLO,  
  ABAD, and At around 10:00 oclock in the evening, appellant woke AAA up;[13] removed
  PEREZ, JJ. his pants, slid inside the blanket covering AAA and removed her pants and
    underwear;[14]warned her not to shout for help while threatening her with his
    fist;[15] and told her that he had a knife placed above her head. [16] He
ANTONIO LAUGA Y Promulgated: proceeded to mash her breast, kiss her repeatedly, and inserted his penis
PINA ALIASTERIO,   inside her vagina.[17]
Accused-Appellant. March 15, 2010  
  Soon after, BBB arrived and found AAA crying. [18] Appellant claimed he
scolded her for staying out late. [19] BBB decided to take AAA with him.
    [20]
 While on their way to their maternal grandmothers house, AAA recounted
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x her harrowing experience with their father.[21] Upon reaching their
  grandmothers house, they told their grandmother and uncle of the incident,
DECISION [22]
 after which, they sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting.[23]
   
PEREZ, J.: Moises Boy Banting found appellant in his house wearing only his
  underwear.[24] He invited appellant to the police station,[25] to which appellant
Before Us for final review is the trial courts conviction of the appellant for obliged. At the police outpost, he admitted to him that he raped AAA because
the rape of his thirteen-year old daughter. he was unable to control himself.[26]
   
Consistent with the ruling of this Court in People v. Cabalquinto,[1] the real The following day, AAA submitted herself to physical examination.
name and the personal circumstances of the victim, and any other information [27]
 Dra. Josefa Arlita L. Alsula, Municipal Health Officer of x x x, Bukidnon,
tending to establish or compromise her identity, including those of her issued the Medical Certificate, which reads:
immediate family or household members, are not disclosed in this decision.
   
The Facts
hyperemic vulvae with 4 oclock & 6 oclock freshly lacerated hymen; (+)
 
minimal to moderate bloody discharges 2 to an alleged raping incident[28]
In an Information dated 21 September 2000,[2] the appellant was accused of
the crime of QUALIFIED RAPE allegedly committed as follows:
On the other hand, only appellant testified for the defense. He believed that
the charge against him was ill-motivated because he sometimes physically
That on or about the 15th day of March 2000, in the evening, at Barangay
abuses his wife in front of their children after engaging in a heated argument,
xxx, municipality of xxx, province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the [29]
 and beats the children as a disciplinary measure.[30] He went further to
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the
narrate how his day was on the date of the alleged rape.
father of AAA with lewd design, with the use of force and intimidation, did
 
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally have carnal knowledge
He alleged that on 15 March 2000, there was no food prepared for him at
with his own daughter AAA, a 13 year[s]old minor against her will.[3]
lunchtime.[31] Shortly after, AAA arrived.[32] She answered back when
confronted.[33] This infuriated him that he kicked her hard on her buttocks.[34]
On 12 October 2000, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. [4] During the pre-
 
trial conference, the prosecution and the defense stipulated and admitted: (a)
Appellant went back to work and went home again around 3 oclock in the
the correctness of the findings indicated in the medical certificate of the
afternoon.[35] Finding nobody at home,[36] he prepared his dinner and went to
physician who examined AAA; (b) that AAA was only thirteen (13) years old
sleep.[37]
when the alleged offense was committed; and (c) that AAA is the daughter of
the appellant.[5] On trial, three (3) witnesses testified for the prosecution,
Later in the evening, he was awakened by the members of the Bantay
Bayan headed by Moises Boy Banting.[38] They asked him to go with them to
discuss some matters.[39] He later learned that he was under detention because
AAA charged him of rape.[40]
 
On 8 July 2006, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Malaybalay
City, Bukidnon, rendered its decision[41] in Criminal Case No. 10372-
0, finding appellant guilty of rape qualified by relationship and minority, and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.[42] It also ordered
him to indemnify AAA P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity with exemplary damages of P25,000.00.[43]
 
On 30 September 2008, the decision of the trial court was AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS[44] by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
00456-MIN.[45] The appellate court found that appellant is not eligible for
parole and it increased both the civil indemnity and moral damages
from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.[46]
 
On 24 November 2008, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the
appellants notice of appeal.[47] This Court required the parties to
simultaneously file their respective supplemental briefs,[48] but both
manifested that they will no longer file supplemental pleadings.[49]
 
The lone assignment of error in the appellants brief is that, the trial court
gravely erred in finding him guilty as charged despite the failure of the
prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt,[50] because: (1)
there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother BBB;
[51]
 (2) his extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy Banting was without
the assistance of a counsel, in violation of his constitutional right;[52] and (3)
AAAs accusation was ill-motivated.[53]
Our Ruling
Appellant contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession
with a bantay bayan and the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution.
 
Admissibility in Evidence of an
Extrajudicial Confession before
a Bantay Bayan
 
Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting,
a bantay bayan, the confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was
not assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such requirement.
[54]
 
The case of People v. Malngan[55] is the authority on the scope of the
Miranda doctrine provided for under Article III, Section 12(1)[56] and (3)[57] of
the Constitution. InMalngan, appellant questioned the admissibility of her
extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman and a neighbor of
the private complainant. This Court distinguished. Thus:
 
Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this
particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes
of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When
accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2
January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that
destroyed several houses x x x. She was, therefore, already under custodial
investigation and the rights guaranteed by x x x [the] Constitution should
have already been observed or applied to her.Accused-appellants confession
to Barangay Chairman x x x was made in response to the interrogation made
by the latter admittedly conducted without first informing accused-appellant
of her rights under the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For
this reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman
x x x, as well as the lighter found x x x in her bag are inadmissible in
evidence against her x x x.
[But such does] not automatically lead to her acquittal. x x x [T]he
constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to
those not elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but
given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits x x x as
x x x in the case at bar when accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita
Mendoza, one of the neighbors x x x [of the private complainant].
[58]
 (Emphasis supplied)
 
 
Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this Court needs to
ascertain whether or not a bantay bayan may be deemed a law enforcement
officer within the contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution.
 
In People of the Philippines v. Buendia,[59] this Court had the occasion to
mention the nature of a bantay bayan, that is, a group of male residents living
in [the] area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their
community[,which is] an accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP.[60]
 
Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive
Order No. 309 issued on 11 November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order
Committee in each barangay shall be organized to serve as implementing
arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at the Barangay level.
[61]
 The composition of the Committee includes, among others: (1)
the Punong Barangay as Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang
Kabataan; (3) a Member of the Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4)
a BarangayTanod; and (5) at least three (3) Members of
existing Barangay-Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups or
a Non Government Organization Representative well-known in his
community.[62]
 
This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer
organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the bantay
bayan, are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions
relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus,
without ruling on the legality of the actions taken byMoises Boy Banting, and
the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a bantay bayan,
particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry
he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the
entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article
III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is
concerned.
 
We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken
without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.
 
Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of
the appellant was not deduced solely from the assailed extrajudicial
confession but from the confluence of evidence showing his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.[63]
 
Credibility of the Witnesses for the Prosecution
Appellant assails the inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her
brother BBB. AAA testified that BBB accompanied her to the house of their
grandmother. Thereafter, they, together with her relatives, proceeded to look
for a bantay bayan. On the other hand, BBB testified that he brought her
sister to the house of their bantay bayan after he learned of the incident.
 
Citing Bartocillo v. Court of Appeals,[64] appellant argues that where the
testimonies of two key witnesses cannot stand together, the inevitable
conclusion is that one or both must be telling a lie, and their story a mere
concoction.[65]
 
The principle, however, is not applicable in the case at bar. In Bartocillo, the
two testimonies could not simply stand together because:
 
On one hand, if we are to believe Susan, Orlando could not have possibly
seen the hacking incident since he had accompanied Vicente home. On the
other hand, if we are to accept the testimony of Orlando, then Susan could
not have possibly witnessed the hacking incident since she was with Vicente
at that time.
 
Here, the testimony of AAA does not run contrary to that of BBB. Both
testified that they sought the help of a bantay bayan. Their respective
testimonies differ only as to when the help was sought for, which this Court
could well attribute to the nature of the testimony of BBB, a shortcut version
of AAAs testimony that dispensed with a detailed account of the incident.
 
At any rate, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the assailed
inconsistency is too trivial to affect the veracity of the testimonies.[66] In fact,
inconsistencies which refer to minor, trivial or inconsequential circumstances
even strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as they erase doubts that such
testimonies have been coached or rehearsed.[67]
 
Appellants contention that AAA charged him of rape only because she bore
grudges against him is likewise unmeritorious. This Court is not dissuaded
from giving full credence to the testimony of a minor complainant by motives
of feuds, resentment or revenge.[68] As correctly pointed out by the Court of
Appeals:
 
Indeed, mere disciplinary chastisement is not strong enough to make
daughters in a Filipino family invent a charge that would not only bring
shame and humiliation upon them and their families but also bring their
fathers into the gallows of death.[69] The Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that it is unbelievable for a daughter to charge her own father with rape,
exposing herself to the ordeal and embarrassment of a public trial and
subjecting her private parts to examination if such heinous crime was not in
fact committed.[70] No person, much less a woman, could attain such height of
cruelty to one who has sired her, and from whom she owes her very
existence, and for which she naturally feels loving and lasting gratefulness.
[71]
 Even when consumed with revenge, it takes a certain amount of
psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would
put her own father to jail for the most of his remaining life and drag the rest
of the family including herself to a lifetime of shame. [72] It is highly
improbable for [AAA] against whom no proof of sexual perversity or loose
morality has been shown to fake charges much more against her own
father. In fact her testimony is entitled to greater weight since her accusing
words were directed against a close relative.[73]
 
Elements of Rape
 
Having established the credibility of the witnesses for the
prosecution, We now examine the applicability of the Anti-Rape Law of
1997[74] to the case at bar.
 
The law provides, in part, that rape is committed, among others, [b]y a man
who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat or
intimidation.[75] The death penalty shall be imposed if it is committed with
aggravating/qualifying circumstances, which include, [w]hen the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent.[76]
 
The consistent and forthright testimony of AAA detailing how she was raped,
culminating with the penetration of appellants penis into her vagina, suffices
to prove that appellant had carnal knowledge of her. When a woman states
that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that
rape was committed.[77] Further, when such testimony corresponds with
medical findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that the essential
requisites of carnal knowledge have been established.[78]
The Court of Appeals pointed out that the element of force or intimidation is
not essential when the accused is the father of the victim, inasmuch as his
superior moral ascendancy or influence substitutes for violence and
intimidation.[79] At any rate, AAA was actually threatened by appellant with
his fist and a knife allegedly placed above AAAs head.[80]
 
It may be added that the self-serving defense of appellant cannot prevail over
the positive and straightforward testimony of AAA. Settled is the rule that,
alibi is an inherently weak defense that is viewed with suspicion because it is
easy to fabricate.[81] Alibi and denial must be supported by strong
corroborative evidence in order to merit credibility. [82] Moreover, for the
defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must establish two elements (1) he
was not at the locus delicti at the time the offense was committed; and (2) it PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, 
was physically impossible for him to be at the scene at the time of its vs.
commission.[83] Appellant failed in this wise. JOSE AGRIPA, accused-appellant.
 
Aggravating/Qualifying Circumstances CRUZ, J.:
 
The presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship
with the offender in the instant case has likewise been adequately established. A grisly sight awaited the authorities who had come to investigate reports of
Both qualifying circumstances were specifically alleged in the Information, a stabbing in the house of Jose and Adelfa Agripa at barangay Humapon in
stipulated on and admitted during the pre-trial conference, and testified to by Legazpi City. On the floor awash with blood, Jose was locked in a final
both parties in their respective testimonies. Also, such stipulation and embrace with his wife, who was already dead. Adelfa had sustained fifteen
admission, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon wounds and had expired due to shock and massive hemorrhage. Jose himself
this Court because they are judicial admissions within the contemplation of had four wounds in his body and was hardly alive. Because he refused to
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court. It provides: release his hold on his dead wife, the couple was rolled in a mat and rushed
to the hospital. All this occurred at about one o'clock in the morning of April
  30, 1980.
Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a
party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require That same morning, Corporal Wilfredo Bermas, a member of the
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made investigating team took down the following exchange between him and
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. Jose, 1 whom he believed to be on the verge of death:
  
Penalty Q What is your name please?
 
Finally, in increasing the amount of civil indemnity and damages each
A Jose Agripa.
from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, the Court of Appeals correctly considered
controlling jurisprudence to the effect that where, as here, the rape is
committed with any of the qualifying/aggravating circumstances warranting Q Who stabbed you?
the imposition of the death penalty, the victim is entitled to P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity ex delicto[84] and P75,000.00 as moral damages.[85] However, A I myself.
the award of exemplary damages should have been increased
from P25,000.00to P30,000.00.[86] Also, the penalty of reclusion perpetua in
Q Who stabbed your wife?
lieu of death was correctly imposed considering that the imposition of the
death penalty upon appellant would have been appropriate were it not for the
enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of A I myself.
Death Penalty in the Philippines.[87] We further affirm the ruling of the Court
of Appeals on appellants non-eligibility for parole. Sec. 3 of Republic Act Q Why did you stab your wife?
No. 9346 clearly provides that persons convicted of offenses punished
withreclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced
A Because of problems in the family.
to reclusion perpetua by reason of the law, shall not be eligible for parole.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September Q What do you think, will you die from your wounds?
2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00456-MIN is hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant
Antonio Lauga isGUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape, and is
A No.
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole and to pay AAAP75,000.00 as civil
Q Was it really your intention to kill your wife?
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
  A Yes, I want to die with her.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 72244 May 8, 1992
The statement was not signed by Jose. On Bermas's request, it was witnessed
by the barangay captain, Salustiano Botin, who was present during the
recorded conversation.
Jose survived to face prosecution for parricide two months later. He was
convicted on July 18, 1985. 2
The principal evidence presented against him at the trial was the above-
quoted statement, which was offered as a dying declaration or as part of
the res gestae. Also submitted as an exhibit was the 8-inch bolo-knife used in
the killing, which was turned over by Botin to the police at seven o' clock
that same morning. He had received it from a neighbor of the couple who had
picked it up at the scene of the killing. 3 The police had evidently neglected to
look for it when they went to investigate.
In his defense, Jose gave a different version of the killing of his wife. He said
that he had gone to sleep early that night but was awakened when he felt a
stab wound in his stomach. He could not see his assailant because it was
dark. He covered the wound with his right hand but there was a second thrust
that wounded him again almost in the same place. Instinctively, he curled
himself into a fetal position with his hands at the back of his neck and asked,
"Why did you stab me?" He received no answer but soon enough a third
thrust sliced through his left arm and pierced the right part of his chest. It was
then that he grabbed the fist of his attacker and the two of them wrestled in
the dark for possession of the weapon. He could not recall what happened
afterwards as he must have fainted. He said he also had no recollection of the
statement he supposedly made before he was brought to the hospital. He
recovered consciousness there only on May 4, 1980, and was then told that
his wife had tried to kill him. 4
His statements were corroborated by his 18-year old son, Edwin, who
testified that there was no quarrel between his parents when his father went to
sleep early that night of April 29, 1980. His mother was in her usual angry
mood, however. After studying his lessons, he himself went to sleep while
his mother continued folding clothes. He was awakened later by the sound of
a scuffle, and when he turned on his flashlight he saw his mother stabbing his
father. He amplified his testimony with gestures, swinging his right arm
downward in simulation of stabbing. Afraid to succor his father, he woke up
his two brothers and rushed with them to their grandfather's house to seek his
help. On their way out, they heard his father say, "Why did you stab me?" 5
Edwin identified the bolo-knife as belonging to his mother, who he said
usually carried it on her person for cutting leaves to cover herself whenever it
rained. On two occasions, however, she used it for a different purpose. The
first incident was when Adelfa stabbed Jose on the right side of his body, and
the second was when she hacked Jose's upper right arm. Both incidents were
reported to the barangay captain. 6
Edwin admitted loving his father more than his mother. He recalled that
when he was in Grade I, his mother hanged him by the neck from a coconut
tree with a piece of katsa cloth. 7
The violent nature of Adelfa was affirmed by another witness, Manuel
Cardel, who testified that he was in the store of one Macedonio in the
afternoon of April 29, 1980, when he heard Adelfa say she would stab Jose if
he came home without any money. (As it turned out, Jose did come home
without his salary, saying he would collect it the following day. This could
have been the reason why Edwin observed his mother to be in a sullen mood
that night.) Cardel also recalled one time when Adelfa ran after her husband
with a bolo in her hand. 8
The trial court correctly rejected the above-quoted interrogation as a dying
declaration because it did not comply with all the requirements of this
particular exception to the hearsay rule. The statement does not show that it
was made by the declarant under the consciousness of impending death
(although it is true that Jose was near death at that time). Nevertheless, it was
correctly admitted as part of the res gestae, having been made soon after the
startling occurrence of the multiple stabbing of Jose and Adelfa.
But the mere fact that evidence is admissible does not necessarily mean that
it is also credible. The testimony of a competent witness may be admissible if
relevant but it is not for this reason alone believable. According to Rule 128,
Sec. 3, "evidence is admissible if it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded
by the law or these rules." Credibility depends on the evaluation given to the
evidence by the court in accordance with the guidelinesprovided in Rule 133
of the Rules of Court and the doctrines laid down by this Court. 9
As the Court sees it, Jose's statement, while admissible as part of the res
gestae, is not credible evidence of his criminal liability. It is quite obvious
that he was not in full possession of his faculties when he made that
statement, which, significantly, he did not sign. We note that when the
authorities came upon the wounded couple, Jose refused to let go of his dead
wife and was rolled up with her cadaver in a mat to be brought to the
hospital. That was not the conduct of a rational man. Moreover, Jose was
himself suffering from four stab wounds which could have cost him his life
had he not been treated immediately. Given the condition of his mind and
body at the time the statement was made, Jose could not be expected to think
clearly and to willingly make the serious and damning confession now
imputed to him.
It is true that when the accused invokes the justifying circumstance of self-
defense, he loses the constitutional presumption of innocence and assumes
the burden of proving, with clear and convincing evidence, the justification
for his act. 10 The essential elements of self-defense, according to Article
11(1) of the Revised Penal Code, are: a) unlawful aggression: b) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. We feel
that all these requisites are present and have been sufficiently established in
the case at bar.
The accused-appellant was sound asleep when he was suddenly attacked by
his wife, who fell upon him with intent to kill. There was no warning at all of
the deadly assault. There was no provocation either, unless it be her frenetic
anger over his failure to bring home his salary, which was not the sufficient
provocation required by the law. Jose was totally unprepared for the knife
thrusts in his stomach and chest that posed an immediate threat and danger to
his life. Under this vicious attack, he had no choice but to defend himself
against his unknown assailant and by the only means available to him. He
grabbed the knife from his maddened wife and struck wildly at his would-be
killer. He stabbed blindly, thinking only to save his life even as it drained
from the wounds he had sustained. If it appeared later that he had wounded
his wife no less than fifteen times, it was not because he was a cruel and
bloodthirsty killer. The only reason was that he was fighting desperately for
his very life and, animated only by his mortal fear of his unknown aggressor
and moved like a wild beast by the elemental instinct for survival, did not
know when to stop.
Jose Agripa was a peaceful law-abiding person with no known police record.
He pursued the humble tenor of his life, working quietly as a lowly laborer,
struggling as best he could to provide for his wife and children. If suddenly
he became a killer, it was not by inclination or design or with malice
aforethought. He was merely a hapless pawn of fortune, an unfortunate
victim of tragic circumstances, more so, indeed, than the wife he killed.
The Court sees in this case a man dominated if not terrified by a wife given to
cruelty and violence. It is not unlikely that she was paranoid. Twice before,
she had hacked her husband with her bolo, and there was also that time he ran
for dear life as she chased him with her trusty weapon. The act of hanging a
small child by the neck from a coconut tree can hardly be called the
manifestation of a normal psyche. It was this woman who, heeding the
urgings of her twisted mind, decided to kill her sleeping husband in the dark
even as her children slumbered peacefully nearby.
A Higher Tribunal shall judge Adelfa Agripa. But this Court need not wait a
minute longer to absolve the accused-appellant. Jose Agripa is innocent.
There is no stronger instinct than the instinct for survival, which moved him
without fault to do what he did.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and accused-appellant
Jose Agripa is ACQUITTED on the ground of self-defense. It is the order of
this Court that he be released immediately. No costs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 181037
Appellee,
Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Carpio,*
Austria-Martinez,
Chico-Nazario, and
Leonardo-De Castro,** JJ.
SAIDAMEN MACATINGAG
y NAMRI alias SAI, Promulgated:
Appellant.
January 19, 2009
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
 
DECISION
 
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
 
 
For review is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
01487, which affirmed in toto the June 16, 2005 Decision[2] of the Regional
Trial Court of San Pablo, Laguna, Branch 32 in Criminal Case No. 14730-
SP(04), finding appellant Saidamen Macatingag y Namri guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, also known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002.
In its Brief for the Appellee, [3] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
presents the prosecutions version of the facts as follows:
On January 17, 2004, about 8:00 oclock in the morning, the members of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) in Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang,
Calamba City formed a buy-bust team because of a report from a confidential
informant about the drug pushing activities of a certain Sai, who later turned
out to be appellant. The team was composed of P/Sr. Insp. Julius Cesar V.
Ablan, as leader, and PO3 Marino A. Garcia as the poseur-buyer and PO3
Danilo Leona as the arresting officer, as well as two police officers. After
discussing the buy-bust procedure including the pre-arranged signal which is
the removal of PO3 Garcias cap, and the preparation of two P500.00 bills
initialed with MAG, the police authorities immediately proceeded to the
target area at the vicinity of Phase I, Villa Antonio, San Pablo City.
 
Upon arriving thereat about 11:30 oclock in the morning of that day, PO3
Garcia and the confidential informant waited for appellant at the entrance
gate of Villa Antonio Subdivision in San Pablo City. Some twenty (20)
minutes later, appellant arrived sporting black pants and dark gray t-
shirt. PO3 Garcia was introduced to appellant as the prospective
buyer. Appellant, on the other hand, asked PO3 Garcia about the money
amounting to P52,500.00. PO3 Garcia then pulled out an envelope containing
the two P500.00 bills with the boodle money from his pocket, and demanded
the drugs. Appellant thereafter pulled out from his pocket one plastic sachet
and handed it to PO3 Garcia. Immediately upon giving appellant the marked
money, PO3 Garcia lost no time in giving the pre-arranged signal to PO3
Leona. PO3 Leona thereupon hurriedly seized from appellant the marked
money, while PO3 Garcia recovered the plastic sachet containing suspected
shabu from appellant. The policemen thereafter brought appellant to their
station in Canlubang, Calamba City. PO3 Garcia marked the seized plastic
sachet with markings A and MAG representing his initials, and the date and
time of arrest. After making an inventory on the seized suspected shabu, the
police authorities requested for the laboratory examination thereof with the
PNP Crime Laboratory.
 
The seized suspected sachet of shabu was shown positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride weighing 25.23 grams per Chemistry
Report No. D-54-04 issued by P/Insp. Lorna R. Tria, Forensic Chemical
Officer of PNP Crime Laboratory.[4]
 
On January 19, 2004, appellant was charged with Violation of Section 5,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165,[5] in an Information[6] that reads:
 
That on or about January 17, 2004, in the City of San Pablo, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused
above-named, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell
25.23 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug,
without being authorized by law.
 
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
 
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.[8] He maintained that he
was at home with his wife on January 17, 2004 when four armed men
suddenly entered their house, seized his money, placed handcuffs on his
wrists, and forcibly brought him to the police headquarters in Bgy.
Canlubang. He averred that he was not allowed to talk with anybody when he
was incarcerated for two days and that he was alone during the preliminary
investigation. Thereafter, he was transferred to the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology (BJMP) in San Pablo City, where he was
formally charged with selling shabu.
 
On June 16, 2005, the trial court rendered judgment convicting appellant of
Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS,
accused SAIDAMEN MACATINGAG Y NAMRI alias SAI is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act 9165 also known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, and there being no mitigating circumstance, accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a fine of
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00), and to pay the costs.
 
The effects of the crime are ordered confiscated in favor of the
government. The custodian of the shabu subject of the case is hereby ordered
to submit the same to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition
within 48 hours from receipt of a copy of this judgment and the latter is given
48 hours from receipt of the same to submit an acknowledgment receipt to
this Court to form part of the records of this case.
 
SO ORDERED.[9]
The trial court found that all the elements of the crime charged were present
and proven beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence of the prosecution and
the testimonies of the poseur-buyer and the arresting officer who are
presumed to have performed their duties regularly. It disregarded the
allegations of the defense that appellant was a victim of a frame-up and that
he was not arrested pursuant to a valid buy-bust operation.
 
On July 31, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision which
affirmed in toto the ruling of the trial court. The appellate court held that the
constitutional right of appellant against warrantless arrest and search was not
violated; that appellant failed to assail the legality of the arrest and the
seizure of the sachet of shabu prior to his arraignment or at any stage in the
proceedings of the trial court; that the arrest was pursuant to a buy-bust
operation which is a valid form of entrapment of felons in the execution of
their criminal plan; and that the search conducted on appellant was incidental
to a lawful arrest.[10] The appellate court also gave more weight and credence
to the testimonies of the members of the buy-bust team because they were not
shown to have been impelled by ill-motives in testifying against appellant.
 
Hence, this petition.[11]
 
Appellant avers that the trial court and the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
giving undue credence to the testimonies of the police officers and in
upholding the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official
functions. He also assails the validity of his arrest because the police officers
were not armed with any warrant when he was arrested. Finally, he assails
the propriety of the chain of custody of the shabu allegedly seized from him
due to the non-observation of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.[12]
 
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court
of evidence of corpus delicti.[13]
These elements have been proven to be present in the instant case. PO3
Garcia who acted as the poseur-buyer, categorically testified about the buy-
bust operation from the time he was introduced by the informant to appellant
as the buyer of the shabu; to the time when appellant agreed to the sale; to the
actual exchange of the marked money and the heat-sealed sachet containing a
white crystalline substance; and until the apprehension of appellant, to wit:
 
A I myself together with confidential informant just walked, as well as the
area and waited the poseur at the agreed place situated at the vicinity of
entrance of Villa Antonio, San Pablo City.
 
Q You were waiting for the suspects at the entrance of Villa San Antonio and
then what else transpired next?
A After more or less 20 minutes of waiting maam we saw a man wearing a   A After 30 minutes I saw the pre-arranged signal that this PO3 Marino
black pants and dark gray t-shirts arrived in our position, it was introduced Q After you removed your cap, what happened? Garcia will remove his cap.
our confidential informant, he was introduced our confidential that as the A I saw PO3 Leona arrived and assisted me, after the arresting.  
poseur, likewise I was also introduced as the seller, [sic] I was also   Q You mean to say or to impress this court that Mr. Witness that the
introduced by the confidential informant as the buyer. Q While you were arresting this Saidamen, this accused, what did you do as a informant and Mr. Garcia were together when they had a transaction with the
  matter of procedure, what did you tell him? accused?
Q Who are the supposed to be the buyer, you were introduced as a buyer? A We informed him the constitutional rights, maam. PO2 Leona was able to A Yes, sir because the confidential informant introduced Mr. Marino Garcia
A Yes, maam. recovered this custody control of bodol money. to the accused.
     
FISCAL LAGMAN xxxx xxxx
Q And this suspect who was the seller, is he present in Court today?    
A Yes, maam. Q So, after that, where did you bring Saidamen? FISCAL COMILANG
  A We immediately brought him at our office at Camp Vicente Lim, Q After you saw PO3 Marino Garcia removed his cap, what did you do after
Q Would you kindly point to him? Canlubang, Laguna together with confiscated pieces of evidence for proper that?
A The 6th man from the Steel Cabinet. disposition. A I went to the area to help PO3 Garcia.
     
INTERPRETER Q You said that you were able to buy 1 plastic sachet of shabu that was Q What if any did you find out after helping PO3 Marino Garcia?
Makikitayo, anong pangalan mo? supposed to be worth of P52,500, would you be able to identify the plastic A I arrested Saidamen and I removed from him the 2 pieces of P500 the
  sachet if you will be shown to you? bodol money.
ACCUSED A Yes, maam.  
Saidamen Macatingag po.   xxxx
  Q What markings did you place if any?  
xxxx A I put my exhibit A, my initials, the date and time of arrest included the Q Now after recovering that 2 P500 bills from the accused what will be, were
  month and year, maam. you able to recover?
FISCAL LAGMAN   A I recovered from the accused the money and it was SPO3 Marino Garcia
Q So, after the introductions were made what happened? Q I am showing to you exhibit F, would you kindly tell us if this is the one who recovered the 25 grams of shabu conducted.[15]
A The seller identified the money, maam, which is amounting to P52,500.00. that you brought from Saidamen Macatingag?  
  A Yes, maam.[14] Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the
FISCAL LAGMAN   police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation.[16] It is a fundamental
Q What did you do? PO3 Leona, the back-up arresting officer during the buy-bust operation rule that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and which
A I immediately pull out from my pocket the envelope which is contained the corroborated PO3 Garcias testimony, thus: involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross
2 pieces of P500 bills and the bodol money as agreed amount of   misapprehension of facts; or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported
P52,500. Likewise as also the seller if it has a dangerous drugs, maam. Q After you placed yourself 10 meters a way from the house, from the site conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The reason for this is that
  and likewise Marino Garcia and the informant and the fence near the site, the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses,
Q And then what happened? what happened thereafter? having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of
A I immediately pulled out 1 plastic sachet from his pocket and handed it A I saw a person came out from that way near the hollow blocks fence testifying during the trial. The rule finds an even more stringent application
over to me maam. wearing black pants and green t-shirt and I saw they were talking with our where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.[17]
  confidential informant.  
Q One (1) plastic sachet was handed to you?   The testimonies of police officers Garcia and Leona, and the sachet of shabu
A Yes, maam. FISCAL COMILANG sold by appellant sufficiently proved the crime charged. Moreover, the
  Q Could you see the person who just arrived and talked with your prosecution was able to establish that the substance recovered from appellant
Q After you handed that money? confidential informant on said occasion, is he in Court? was indeed shabu.[18]
A No, maam we handed first to me the sachet and he demanded the payment A Yes, sir.  
of sachet, maam.   In view of these testimonies and evidence of the prosecution, appellants
  Q Could you please point to him if he is present? denial must fail. The Court has consistently stressed that denial, like alibi, is a
xxxx   weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of positive identification
  INTERPRETER of the accused by prosecution witnesses. [19] Moreover, appellant failed to
FISCAL LAGMAN Witness pointed to a person who gave us his name as Saidamen Macatingag. adduce clear and convincing evidence to overturn the presumption that the
Q What happened after the exchanged of the money and plastic sachet?   arresting officers regularly performed their duties. It was not shown, by any
A After I gave him the buy bust money as agreed upon before we discovered FISCAL COMILANG satisfactory degree of proof, that said policemen were impelled by ill-motives
as the bodol money, I immediately executed the pre-arranged signal which is Q Now, Mr. Witness after the confidential informant and the accused had a to testify against him. There is, therefore, no basis to suspect the veracity of
remove my cap, maam. conversation what did if any transpired after this conversation? their testimonies.
 
With regard to the validity of his arrest, evidence shows that appellant was
the subject of a buy-bust operation. In this jurisdiction, the conduct of a buy-
bust operation is a common and accepted mode of apprehending those
involved in illegal sale of prohibited or regulated drugs. It has been proven to
be an effective way of unveiling the identities of drug dealers and of luring
them out of obscurity.[20] It catches the violator in flagrante delicto and the
police officers conducting the operation are not only authorized but duty-
bound to apprehend the violator and to search him for anything that may have
been part of or used in the commission of the crime.[21]
 
Finally, this Court likewise finds no merit in appellants contention that the
police officers failed to comply with the guidelines on the chain of custody
and disposition of the seized sachet of shabu as provided in Section 21,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Testimonies of prosecution witnesses
convincingly state that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
item was properly preserved by the apprehending officers. P03 Garcia
testified that he marked the sachet of shabu with his initials, and the date and
time of appellants arrest.[22] PO3 Leona confirmed that he had seen PO3
Garcia mark the same sachet of shabu sold by appellant; that a letter of
request for the examination of said sachet was made; and such request was
received by the regional crime laboratory office. Thus:
 
Q Were you able to see that the shabu was actually was you said that
recovered PO3 Marino Garcia from the accused?
A Yes, sir.
 
COURT
Q Did you put your initial in the specimen?
A I was only accompanied Marino Garcia in bringing to the crime lab.
 
FISCAL COMILANG
Q Since you have seen Mr. Witness the actual shabu was taken from the
accused, do you know if Mr. Garcia placed any reference on the said article,
if any?
A Yes, sir, the initial of Marino Garcia.
 
Q What is that initial?
A MAG.
 
Q Mr. Witness, why do you know that police officer Marino Garcia actually
placed his initial on the said specimen or item?
A Everytime that we conducted the buy bust, it is our SOP to place the
marking.
 
Q Mr. Witness I will show you that item confiscated Marino Garcia from the
accused on the alleged of the item, could you identify it?
A Yes, sir.
 
Q I will show to you now the plastic sachet big plastic sachet which
contained white crystalline substance, could you please tell us what is the
relationship of this item from that item allegedly taken by Marino Garcia
from the accused on which marking was placed?
A This is the item which is recovered from the accused. Mr. Garcia placed
his initial.
Q What is MAG?
A MAG referred to Marino A. Garcia.
 
xxxx
 
Q After the specimen and the accused were transferred to the investigator of
Regional director what happened to the accused and the specimen?
A The investigator prepared a paper for the filing of theand prepared a letter
request for the examination.
 
Q Would you specify what are those documents prepared by the investigator
as pre-requisite of filing of this case?
A We prepared the letter request for the crime lab request for the accused we
first report to the effectdid not suffer physical injury.
 
xxxx
 
Q Do you know if this document was actually received by the addressee?
A Yes, sir, because I was with them.
 
Q What proof that this document was actually received by the addressee?
A There was a stamp marked of receipt, sir.[23]
 
As can be gleaned from the foregoing, the seized sachet of shabu was
immediately marked for proper identification and, thereafter, forwarded to
the Crime Laboratory for examination. The Chemistry Report of the Regional
Crime Laboratory Office stated that the specimen submitted by the
apprehending officers indeed bore the marking Exh A MAG 171200-01-14
and that the same gave positive result to the tests for the presence of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride. Forensic Chemical Officer Tria confirmed
on the witness stand that she examined the specimen submitted by the PDEA
and that she was the one who prepared the Chemistry Report No. D-54-04.[24]
 
It is thus evident that the identity of the corpus delicti has been properly
preserved and established by the prosecution. Besides, the integrity of the
evidence is presumed to be preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith,
ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. The appellant in
this case has the burden to show that the evidence was tampered or meddled
with to overcome a presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by
public officers and a presumption that public officers properly discharge their
duties.[25] Appellant failed to discharge such burden.
This Court has held that non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is
the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items,
as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence
of the accused.[26]
 
In People of the Philippines v. Del Monte,[27] it was held that:
Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible
when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules.
For evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids
its reception. If there is no such law or rule, the evidence must be admitted
subject only to the evidentiary weight that will accorded it by the courts. One
example is that provided in Section 31 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
wherein a party producing a document as genuine which has been altered and
appears to be altered after its execution, in a part material to the question in
dispute, must account for the alteration. His failure to do so shall make the
document inadmissible in evidence. This is clearly provided for in the rules.
 
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will
bring about the non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due
to non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue
therefore, if there is non-compliance with said section, is not of admissibility,
but of weight evidentiary merit or probative value to be given the evidence.
The weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends on the
circumstances obtaining in each case.[28]
 
All told, We see no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court that
appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of a dangerous
drug, as defined and penalized in Section 5, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165. Under said provision, the illegal sale of any dangerous drug,
regardless of its quantity and purity, is punishable by life imprisonment to
death and a fine of P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00.
 
For illegally selling 25.23 grams of shabu, and there being no modifying
circumstance alleged in the Information, the trial court, as sustained by the
Court of Appeals, correctly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment in
accordance with Article 63 (2) of the Revised Penal Code[29] and a fine
of P500,000.00.
 
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01487 dated July 31, 2007, sustaining the
conviction of appellant Saidamen Macatingag y Namri for violation of
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, and imposing upon him the
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
 
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 121087           August 26, 1999
FELIPE NAVARRO, petitioner,  Añonuevo, to report the incident. In a while, Liquin and Sioco arrived on a
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of
Appeals, dated December 14, 1994, which affirmed the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Lucena City, dated July 27, 1992, finding
petitioner Felipe Navarro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and
sentencing him to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen
(14) years and eight (8) months, and (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, but increased the death indemnity awarded to the heirs of the
victim, Enrique "Ike" Lingan, from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.
The information against petitioner alleged —
That on or about the 4th day of February, 1990, in the nighttime, in the City
of Lucena, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a member of the Lucena
Integrated National Police, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault one Ike Lingan inside the Lucena police
headquarters, where authorities are supposed to be engaged in the discharge
of their duties, by boxing the said Ike Lingan in the head with the butt of a
gun and thereafter when the said victim fell, by banging his head against the
concrete pavement, as a consequence of which said Ike Lingan suffered
cerebral concussion and shock which directly caused his death.
The evidence show that, at around 8:40 in the evening of February 4, 1990,
Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique "Ike" Lingan, who were reporters of the radio
station DWTI in Lucena City, together with one Mario Ilagan, went to the
Entertainment City following reports that it was showing the nude dancers.
After the three had seated themselves at a table and ordered beer, a scantily
clad dancer appeared on stage and began to perform a strip act. As she
removed her brassieres, Jalbuena brought out his camera and took a picture.2
At that point, the floor manager, Dante Liquin, with a security guard, Alex
Sioco, approached Jalbuena and demanded to know why he took a
picture.3 Jalbuena replied: "Wala kang pakialam, because this is my
job."4Sioco pushed Jalbuena towards the table as he warned the latter that he
would kill him.5 When Jalbuena saw that Sioco was about to pull out his gun,
he ran out of the joint followed by his companions.6
Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to report the matter.
Three of the policeman on duty, including petitioner Navarro, were having
drinks in front of the police station, and they asked Jalbuena and his Navarro: Who is that abusing?
companions to join them. Jalbuena declined and went to the desk officer, Sgt.
Lingan: I'm here to mediate. Do not include me in the problem. I'm out of the
motorcycle.7 problem.
Sioco and Liquin were met by petitioner Navarro who talked with them in a xxx     xxx     xxx
corner for around fifteen minutes.8Afterwards, petitioner Navarro turned to
Jalbuena and, pushing him to the wall, said to him: "Putang ina, kinakalaban
mo si Kabo Liquin, anak yan ni Kabo Liquin, hindi mo ba kilala?" 9 Petitioner Navarro: Wala sa akin yan. Ang kaso lang . . .
Navarro then pulled out his firearm and cocked it, and, pressing it on the face
of Jalbuena, said "Ano, uutasin na kita?"10 Lingan: Kalaban mo ang media, pare, Ako at si Stanley, dalawa kami. Okay.
Do not fight with me. I just came here to ayusin things. Do not say bad things
against me. I'm the number one loko sa media. I'm the best media man. . . .
At this point, Lingan intervened and said to petitioner Navarro: "Huwag
namang ganyan pumarito kami para magpa-blotter, I am here to
mediate."11 Petitoner Navarro replied: "Walang press, press, mag-sampu pa Navarro: Huwag tayong mag-lokohan sa ganyan! Huwag na tayong mag-
kayo."12He then turned to Sgt. Añonuevo and told him to make of record the takotan! Huwag mong sabihing loko ka!
behavior of Jalbuena and Lingan.13
Lingan: I'm brave also.
This angered Lingan, who said: "O, di ilagay mo diyan" 14 Petitioner Navarro
retorted: "Talagang ilalagay ko."15The two then had a heated Navarro: Ay lalo na ako. Tahimik lang naman ako. Wala ka namang
exchange.16 Finally, Lingan said: "Masyado kang abusado, alisin mo yang masasabi sa akin dahil nag-tatrabaho lang ako ng ayon sa serbisyo ko.
baril mo at magsuntukan na lang tayo."17 Petitioner Navarro replied: "Ah,
ganoon?"18
Lingan: You are challenging me and him. . . .
As Lingan was about turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle of
the pistol above the left eyebrow. Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing Navarro: Ay walastik ka naman Ike! Pag may problema ka dito sinasabihan
kita na may balita tayong maganda. Pambihira ka Ike. Huwag mong sabihin
down his face. He tried to get up, but petitioner Navarro gave him a fist blow
on the forehead which floored him.19 na . . . Parang minomonopoly mo eh.
Petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and said: "Kita mo yan ha, buhay kang Lingan: Pati ako kalaban ninyo.
testigo, si Ike Lingan and naghamon."20 He said to Sgt. Añonuevo: "Ilagay
mo diyan sa blotter sa harap ni Alex Sioco at Dante Liquin, na si Ike Lingan Navarro: Talagang kalaban namin ang press. Lahat, hindi lang ikaw!
ang naghamon."21 He then poked his gun at the right temple of Jalbuena and
made him sign his name on the blotter.22 Jalbuena could not affix his
Lingan: You are wrong. Bakit kalaban nyo ang press?
signature. His right hand was trembling and he simply wrote his name in
print.23
Navarro: Pulis ito! Aba!
Capt. Coronado, the station commander, called petitioner Navarro to his
office, while a policeman took Lingan to the Quezon Memorial Hospital. The Lingan: Alisin mo ang baril mo! Alisin mo ang baril mo! Suntukan tayo,
station manager of DWTI, Boy, Casañada, arrived and, learning that Lingan sige.
had been taken to the hospital, proceeded there. But Lingan died from his
injuries.24 Navarro: Mayabang ka ah!
Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the (Sounds of a scuffle)
exchange between petitioner and the deceased. 25 The following is an excerpt
from the tape recording:
Navarro: Hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako
nyan, testigo kayo. Alisin ko daw ang baril ko. Hinamon ako nyan. Pare,
Lingan: Pare, you are abusing yourself.
ilagay mo diyan, hinamon ako sa harap ni Stanley. Testigo kayo, hinamon
ako. Pulis tayo eh. Puta, buti nga, suntok lang ang inabot nyan. Sa harap ni
Alex, ni Joe, ni Stanley, hinamon ako. Pare, hinamon ako, kinig nyo ha.
Hinamon ako nyan. Sige, dalhin nyo sa hospital yan.
Petitioner Felipe Navarro claims that it was the deceased who tried to hit him
twice, but he (petitioner) was able to duck both times, and that Lingan was so
drunk he fell on the floor twice, each time hitting his head on the concrete.26
In giving credence to the evidence for the prosecution, the trial court stated:
After a thorough and in-depth evaluation of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution and the defense, this court finds that the evidence for the
prosecution is the more credible, concrete and sufficient to create that moral
certainty in the mind of the court that accused herein is criminally
responsible.
The defense's evidence which consists of outright denial could not under the
circumstance overturn the strength of the prosecution's evidence.
This court finds that the prosecution witnesses, more particularly Stanley
Jalbuena, lacked any motive to make false accusation, distort the truth, testify
falsehood or cause accusation of one who had neither brought him harm or
injury.
Going over the evidence on record, the postmortem report issued by Dra. Eva
Yamamoto confirms the detailed account given by Stanley Jalbuena on how
Lingan sustained head injuries.
Said post-mortem report together with the testimony of Jalbuena sufficiently
belie the claim of the defense that the head injuries of deceased Lingan were
caused by the latter's falling down on the concrete pavement head first.
The Court of Appeals affirmed:
We are far from being convinced by appellant's aforesaid disquisition. We
have carefully evaluated the conflicting versions of the incident as presented
by both parties, and we find the trial court's factual conclusions to have better
and stronger evidentiary support.
In the first place, the mere fact that Jalbuena was himself a victim of
appellant's aggression does not impair the probative worth of his positive and
logical account of the incident in question. In fact, far from proving his
innocence, appellant's unwarranted assault upon Jalbuena, which the defense
has virtually admitted, clearly betrays his violent character or disposition and
his capacity to harm others. Apparently, the same motivation that led him
into assailing Jalbuena must have provoked him into also attacking Lingan
who had interceded for Jalbuena and humiliated him and further challenged
to a fist fight.1âwphi1.nêt
xxx     xxx     xxx
On the other hand, appellant's explanation as how Lingan was injured is too
tenuous and illogical to be accepted. It is in fact contradicted by the number,
nature and location of Lingan's injuries as shown in thepost-mortem report
(Exh. D). According to the defense, Lingan fell two times when he was
outbalanced in the course of boxing the appellant. And yet, Lingan suffered
lacerated wounds in his left forehead, left eyebrow, between his left and right
eyebrows, and contusion in the right temporal region of the head (Exh. E.).
Certainly, these injuries could not have been resulted from Lingan's
accidental fall.
Hence, this appeal. Petitioner Navarro contends:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE CASE
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT. ITS CONCLUSION IS A
FINDING BASED ON SPECULATION, SURMISE OR CONJECTURE;
THE INFERENCE IT MADE IS MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN, ABSURD
OR IMPOSSIBLE; IT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION;
ITS JUDGMENT IS BASED ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS; ITS
FINDING IS CONTRADICTED BY EVIDENCE ON RECORD; AND ITS
FINDING IS DEVOID OF SUPPORT IN THE RECORD.
The appeal is without merit.
First. Petitioner Navarro questions the credibility of the testimony of
Jalbuena on the ground that he was a biased witness, having a grudge against
him. The testimony of a witness who has an interest in the conviction of the
accused is not, for this reason alone, unreliable. 27 Trial courts, which have the
opportunity observe the facial expressions, gestures, and tones of voice of a
witness while testifying, are competent to determine whether his or her
testimony should be given credence.28 In the instant case, petitioner Navarro
has not shown that the trial court erred in according weight to the testimony
of Jalbuena.
Indeed, Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording had made.
It may be asked whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200,
which prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the affirmative. The law
provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as dictaphone or dictagraph of dectectaphone or walkie-
talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or
acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape
record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof,
of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the
effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay
the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents
thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof,
whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of
such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be
covered by this prohibition.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any
information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation
of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in
any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or
investigation.
Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private
communications.29 Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and
Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is
authenticated by the testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded
the conversations; (2) that the tape played in the court was the one he
recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are
claimed to belong.30 In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally
made the voice recording;31 that the tape played in the court was the one he
recorded;32 and that the speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and
Lingan.33 A sufficient foundation was thus laid for the authentication of the
tape presented by the prosecution.
Second. The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that there was
a heated exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in
the police blotter of an entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some
form of violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the
latter getting the worst of it.
Furthermore, Dr. Eva Yamamoto, who performed the autopsy on the body of
Lingan, issued the medical certificate,34 dated February 5, 1990, containing
the following findings:
Post Mortem Findings:
= Dried blood, forehead & face Q   Could a butt of a gun have caused it doctor? A   May be, sir.

= No blood oozed from the ears, nose & mouth
= Swelling, 3 cm x 2 cm, temporal region, head, right
= Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1-2 in depth, lateral eyebrow, Left
= Lacerated wound, 0.5 cm in length, superficial, between the left & right
eyebrow
= Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1 cm in depth, forehead, Left
= Cyanosis of the tips of fingers & toes
CAUSE OF DEATH:
= CEREBRAL CONCUSSION & SHOCK
= BLOW ON THE HEAD
Dr. Yamamato testified:
Q   Give your opinion as to what was the possible cause of this findings
number one, which is oozing of blood from the forehead?
A   It may be due to a blow on the forehead or it bumped to a hard object, sir.
Q   Could a metal like a butt of a gun have caused this wound No. 1.?
A   It is possible, sir.
Q   And in the alternative, could have it been caused by bumping on a
concrete floor?
A   Possible, sir.
FISCAL:
What could have been the cause of the contusion and swelling under your
findings No. 2 doctor?
WITNESS:
It may be caused by bumping to a hard object, sir.
A   The swelling is big so it could have not been caused by a butt of a gun
because the butt of a gun is small, sir.
Q   How about this findings No. 4?
A   By a bump or contact of the body to a hard object, sir.
Q   And findings No. 5 what could have caused it?
A   Same cause, sir.
Q   This findings No. 6 what could have caused this wound?
A   Same thing sir.
Q   How about the last finding, cyanosis of tips of fingers and toes, what
could have caused it doctor?
WITNESS:
It indicates there was cardiac failure, sir.
FISCAL:
In this same post mortem report and under the heading cause of death it
states: Cause of Death: Cerebral concussion and Shock, will you explain it?
A   Cerebral concussion means in Tagalog "naalog ang utak" or jarring of the
brain, sir.
Q   What could have been the cause of jarring of the brain?
A   It could have been caused by a blow of a hard object, sir.
Q   What about the shock, what could have caused it?
A   It was due to peripheral circulatory failure, sir.
Q   Could any one of both caused the death of the victim?
A   Yes, sir.
Q   Could cerebral concussion alone have caused the death of the deceased?
FISCAL:
Which of these two more likely, to cause death?
WITNESS:
Shock, sir.
Q   Please explain further the meaning of the medical term shock?
A   It is caused by peripheral circulatory failure as I have said earlier sir.
xxx     xxx     xxx
FISCAL:
Could a bumping or pushing of one's head against a concrete floor have
caused shock?
WITNESS:
Possible, sir.
How about striking with a butt of a gun, could it cause shock?
A   Possible, sir.35
The above testimony clearly supports the claim of Jalbuena that petitioner
Navarro hit Lingan with the handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow and
struck him on the forehead with his fist.
Third. It is argued that the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation
or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceding the act
should have been appreciated in favor of petitioner Navarro. Provocation is
defined to be any unjust or improper conduct or act of the offended party,
capable of exciting, inciting or irritating anyone.36 The provocation must be
sufficient and should immediately precede the act.37 To be sufficient, it must
be adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, which must accordingly
be proportionate in gravity.38 And it must immediately precede the act so
much so that there is no interval between the provocation by the offended
party and the commission of the crime by the accused.39
In the present case, the remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the
act of petitioner, constituted sufficient provocation. In People
v. Macaso,40 we appreciated this mitigating circumstance in favor of the
accused, a policeman, who shot a motorist after the latter had repeatedly
taunted him with defiant words. Hence, this mitigating circumstance should
be considered in favor of petitioner Navarro.

Furthermore, the mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention

to commit so grave a wrong as that committed should also be appreciated in
favor of petitioner. The frantic exclamations of petitioner Navarro after the
scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him shows that he had no intent to
kill the latter. Thus, this mitigating circumstance should be taken into account
in determining the penalty that should be imposed on petitioner Navarro. The
allowance of this mitigating circumstance is consistent with the rule that
criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.41 In People v. Castro,42 the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed was appreciated in favor
of the accused while finding him guilty of homicide.

However, the aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime in a place

where the public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties
should be appreciated against petitioner Navarro. The offense in this case was
committed right in the police station where policemen were discharging their
public functions.43

The crime committed as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals
was homicide, for which the penalty under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal
Code is reclusion temporal. As there were two mitigating circumstances and
one aggravating circumstances, the penalty should be fixed in its minimum
period.44 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner Navarro
should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which is
within the range of the penalty next lower degree, i.e., prision mayor, and the
maximum of which is reclusion temporal in its minimum period.45

The indemnity as increased by the Court of Appeals from P30,000.00 to

P50,000.00 is in accordance with the current jurisprudence.46

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the

modification that petitioner Felipe Navarro is hereby SENTENCED to suffer
a prison terms of 18 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and 8
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 186459
Appellee,  
  Present:
   
- versus - CARPIO MORALES, J.,
  Chairperson,
  BERSAMIN,
  DEL CASTILLO,*
  VILLARAMA, JR., and
NITA EUGENIO Y PEJER, SERENO, JJ.
Appellant.  
Promulgated:
September 1, 2010
 
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x  check-up and later to the police detachment office where P/Sr. Insp. Chief
 
D E C I S I O N  to the Chief of the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory Office,
 
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
 
Nita Eugenio y Pejer (appellant) was charged before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City[1] for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165) or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, allegedly committed as follows:[2]
On or about May 13, 2003 in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, not being lawfully authorized by law, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to
PO1 Aldrin Mariano, a police poseur-buyer, one (1) heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing three (3) centigrams (0.03 gram) of white crystalline
substance, which was found positive to the test for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.
 
Contrary to law. (underscoring supplied)
 
From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is culled:
 
On the night of May 13, 2003, at around 7:30 p.m., a confidential informant
reported to PO1 Aldrin Mariano (PO1 Mariano), officer-on-duty at the Pasig
City Hall Detachment, that one alias Aruba was selling shabu at Vicper
Compound, Malinao, Pasig City.
 
P/Sr. Insp. Chief Rodrigo Villaruel at once formed a buy-bust team to
conduct an operation composed of, among others, PO3 Amilassan Salisa as
team leader, and PO1 Mariano as poseur-buyer. PO1 Mariano, who was
given two one hundred peso bills bearing Serial Numbers BT219634 and
XN547078 to be used as buy-bust money, wrote his initials ARM thereon at
the lower left portion.
 
The operation was recorded in the police blotter and coordinated with the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) which gave it control number
NOC-1305-03-10.[3]
 
At around 8:00 in the evening, the team, together with the confidential
informant, proceeded to the residence of appellant who was standing in front
of her house. The informant at once introduced PO1 Mariano as buyer. As
appellant inquired how much, PO1 Mariano handed her the two marked bills
upon which appellant drew out one substance-filled sachet from the outside
wall of her house. At that instant, PO1 Mariano removed his cap, the pre-
arranged signal for the team members to, as they did, close in.
PO1 Mariano then held appellants arm, identified himself as a police officer,
and apprised her of her constitutional rights as he retrieved from her the buy-
bust money. He thereafter marked EXH-A arm/05/13/03 on the substance-
filled sachet sold to him by appellant.
 
The buy-bust team brought appellant to the Rizal Medical Center for physical
Villaruel prepared the following memorandum of May 13, 2003[4] addressed
requesting the conduct of laboratory examination on the seized substance-
filled sachet to determine the presence of dangerous drugs and their weight:
 
1.      Respectfully forwarded to your good office herewith/attached (sic)
submitted specimen for laboratory examination to wit:
 
NATURE OF OFFENSE VIOLATION OF RA 9165
 
NAME OF SUSPECT NITA EUGENIO Y PEJER,
57 years old, widow,
Res. At Vicper Compound,
Malinao, Pasig City
 
D.T.P.O. On or about 8:30 PM 13 May
2003 at Vicper Compound,
Malinao, Pasig City
 
ARRESTING OFFICER Elements of Mayors Special
Action Team/ City Hall
Detachment, Pasig City
Police Station represented by
PO1 Aldrin Mariano
 
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED One (1) heat sealed
transparent plastic sachet
containing undetermined
amount of suspected shabu
Marked EXH A ARM
05/13/03
 
2. Request acknowledge (sic) receipt.[5] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Acting on the above-quoted memorandum, P/Sr. Insp. Annalee R. Forro,
Forensic Chemical Officer of the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory
Office, who received the sachet, conducted on the same night of May 13,
2003, at around 8:33 P.M, a laboratory examination of the contents of the
sachet, the result of which she recorded in Chemistry Report No. D-889-
03E[6] wherein she concluded that the substance inside the sachet weighed
0.03 gram and was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
 
Hence, the filing of the Information against appellant.
 
Denying the charge against her, appellant gave the following version:
On May 11, 2003, while fetching water from a nearby well, she was, in the
presence of family and neighbors, accosted by police officers who brought
her to the police station. At the station, she was questioned whether she knew
one Baylene Ramba, to which she replied in the negative. She was later
surprised to learn that an Information for violation of R.A. 9165 had been
filed against her.
Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, by Decision of May 31, 2005,
convicted appellant, disposing as follows:
 
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused NITA EUGENIO y Pejer @ Aruba
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II
of R.A. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002 and imposes upon her the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to
pay a fine of Php500,000.00
 
SO ORDERED.[7] (underscoring supplied)
 
 
By Decision of September 16, 2008,[8] the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
courts decision.
In affirming the trial courts rejection of appellants defense, the appellate
court held:
. . . As correctly observed by the trial court, the claim that accused-appellant
was arrested without reason is not supported by evidence. Not one of the
alleged witnesses to the unlawful arrest, including accused-appellants own
daughter, was presented to corroborate the claim. Hence, the court a quo is
correct in considering the defense incredible for being self-serving and
uncorroborated.[9] (underscoring supplied)
 
 
In her present appeal, appellant claims, in the main, that there was failure to
follow the requirements of Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165, hence, it compromised
the integrity and evidentiary value of the allegedly seized item.
Sec. 21 of R.A. No 9165 provides:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources or dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner:
 
(1)     The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation , physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
persons/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; x x
x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 
Appellant specifically claims that no physical inventory and photographing
of the specimen took place. Respecting the required conduct of an inventory,
since only one sachet was seized, failure to comply therewith may
understandably have been rendered unnecessary.
 
As for the required photograph of the seized item, a reading of the testimony
of PO1 Mariano confirms the prosecutions failure to follow such
requirement:
 
Atty. Ronatay:
Q: Are you aware that it is required under the dangerous drugs law that in
case of the buy-bust operation, the subject specimen their (sic) must be a
picture taken on the subject specimen?
A: What I said is that impossible, we have a buy-bust to verify.
 
 
Atty. Ronatay:
Your Honor, I think the answer is not responsive to the question. We moved
(sic) to strike that out and the witness to answer the question.
 
 
Court: Answer the question.
 
Witness:
A: Not yet maam.
 
Atty. Ronatay:
Q: How many times have you been engaged in buy-bust operation?
A: More or less ten maam.
 
Q: And in those ten cases, was there ever an occasion that the subject
specimen, there was a picture taken on that subject specimen?
 
A: None, maam.
Q: Are you also aware Mr. witness that under the dangerous drugs law, it is
standard operating procedure that in cases of operation specifically in a buy-
bust operation, there has also be (sic) a presence of the media?
 
A: I do not know, maam.
 
Q: In this case was there a media present at the time of the operation?
 
A: None maam. requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. And the defense raised it again
  during the offer of evidence by the prosecution, thus:
Q: Are you also aware that under the dangerous drugs law, it is required that  
there has to be coordination with the Local Brgy.? Atty. Ronatay:
   
A: None maam.[10] (emphasis and underscoring supplied) xxxx
   
  Exh. C - we object to its admission as well as the purpose for which they are
Failing to comply with the provision of Section 2 of R.A. No. 9165 does not being offered for being planted evidence, your honor. [13] (underscoring
necessarily doom the case for the prosecution, however. People v. supplied)
Pringas enlightens: The prosecution having failed to discharge the burden of establishing the
  guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of the evidence did
Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not not shift to the defense to thus leave it unnecessary to pass upon the defense
fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the evidence even if it were considered weak. Appellants acquittal based on
integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items, are reasonable doubt is then in order.
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. Its non-compliance  
will not render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from  
him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the  
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would  
be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision
[11]
 (citation omitted, emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant, Nita Eugenio y Pejer, is
  ACQUITED for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
  reasonable doubt.
The Courts pronouncement in Pringas is based on the provision of Section  
21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations[12] of R.A. No. 9165 Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of
reading: Corrections for Women, Mandaluyong City who is directed to cause the
  immediate release of appellant, unless she is being lawfully held for another
x x x Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements cause, and to inform this Court of action taken within ten (10) days from
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of notice.
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending  
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and SO ORDERED.
custody over said items; (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 
 
Clearly, it was necessary for the prosecution to prove that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the shabu was preserved.
 
As reflected in the above-quoted Memorandum of P/Sr. Insp. Chief Villaruel,
the time of operation was on or about 8:30 P.M., 13 May 2003. If the
allegedly seized substance-filled sachet was confiscated at 8:30 p.m., it is
highly improbable that it was received at the Crime Laboratory at 8:33
P.M or a mere three minutes after the seizure, given that appellant was after
his arrest first brought to a hospital for physical check-up.
Doubt is thus engendered on whether the object evidence subjected to
laboratory examination and presented in court is the same as that allegedly
sold by appellant. In fine, the prosecution failed to prove the integrity and
evidentiary value of the 0.03 gram specimen.
 
Parenthetically, unlike in Pringas, the defense in the present case questioned
early on, during the cross examination of PO1 Mariano, the failure of the
apprehending officers to comply with the inventory and photographing
 PEOPLE OF G.R. No. 181831 On or about November 27, 2003 in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of
THE PHILIPPINES,   this Honorable Court, the accused, not being lawfully authorized by law to
Appellee, Present: possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
    feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control two (2)
  CARPIO MORALES,* Acting heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing two (2) centigrams (0.02
  Chairperson, gram) each, of white crystalline substance, which were found positive to the
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, test for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of
  PERALTA,** said law.
  BERSAMIN, and  
  ABAD,*** JJ. xxxx
RODNIE ALMORFE y Promulgated: Culled from the records of the case is the following version of the
SEDENTE March 29, 2010 prosecution:
and RYAN ALMORFE y    
VALLESTER, At about 7:00 oclock in the evening of November 27, 2003, an informant
Appellants. personally reported to the Pasig Police Station about the rampant selling
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x of shabu in Callejon 64, Purok 6, Villa Antonio, Brgy. Bambang, Pasig by a
  certain Taga, prompting a team belonging to the Mayors Special Action
DECISION Team of Pasig City to conduct a buy-bust operation at the target area.
CARPIO MORALES, J.: The team was composed of PO1 Aldrin Mariano, P01 Roland Panis, PO2 San
Appellants Rodnie Almorfe y Sedente (Rodnie) and Ryan Almorfe y Andres, PO3 Salisa and PO1 Janet Sabo (Janet).
Vallester (Ryan) were convicted of violation of Section 5, Article II of  
Republic Act No. 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act) by the Together with the informant, the team members, in coordination with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 70. Appellant Rodnie was further Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, repaired to and arrived at the target
convicted of violation of Section 11 of the same law. area at around 8:30 p.m. of the same day, November 27, 2003. After the
  service vehicle bearing the team members parked along Akasya St., in a
  vacant lot,[3] a lengthy street [with many alleys intersecting it],[4] Janet,
  together with the informant, at once proceeded to the target address about 50
The Information against appellants for violation of Section 5 (Crim. Case No. meters away, leaving behind the other team members inside the vehicle.
13116-D) reads:[1]  
  On reaching the target address, the informant nodded at one of two men
xxxx standing in front thereof who turned out to be Rodnie a.k.a. Taga. Rodnie at
  once asked the informant what their purpose was, to which the informant
On or about November 27, 2003 in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of replied Iiskor kami. Rodnie then asked Magkano?, and the informant
this Honorable Court, the accused, conspiring and confederating together, answered Dos, pare which means P200 in the drug trade.
and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, not being lawfully  
authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously Janet, who was designated as poseur-buyer, gave the pre-marked P200 (in
sell, deliver and give away to PO1 Janet Sabo y Ampuhan, a police poseur- five P20 and two P50 bills) to Rodnie who placed them inside his
buyer, one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing three (3) pocket. Rodnie thereupon took out a black plastic container[5] from his pants
centigrams (0.03 gram) of white crystalline substance, which was found back pocket from which container he drew two plastic sachets which he,
positive to the test for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, however, returned to the container.
in violation of said law.  
  Rodnie thereafter parted with some of the money bills to his companion who
xxxx turned out to be his co-appellant Ryan, whom he asked Akina yung binigay
  ko sa yo kanina.Ryan at once gave Rodnie a sachet of shabu which Rodnie in
  turn gave to Janet. At that instant, Janet executed the pre-arranged signal to
The Information against appellant Rodnie for violation of Section 11 of the the other members of the team who swooped down on appellants and arrested
same law (Crim. Case No. 13117-D) reads:[2] them. Janet then and there seized the money and the two plastic sachets
  inside the black plastic container in Rodnies possession, and affixed her
xxxx signature thereon, as well as on the plastic sachet subject of the sale.
   
The contents of the three sachets were found positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride by the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory Office,
[6]
 hence, the indictment of appellants.
 
During the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on, inter alia, the existence but not
the source of the three plastic sachets; and the due execution and genuineness
of the result of the examination of the specimens to thus dispense with the
testimony of the Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Lourdeliza Gural-Cejes[7] who
examined and found the contents of the sachets to be positive
for methylamphetamine hydrochloride.[8]
Upon the other hand, appellants gave the following version:
 
On November 27, 2003, as he was assisting his wife who was about to give
birth, Rodnie saw his cousin Ryan being pushed by Janet and four other
companions towards his house. Once inside the house, Janet frisked Ryan
and Rodnie. The members of the team soon took money inside Rodnies
pocket and searched his house which yielded nothing.Appellants were,
however, handcuffed and brought to the police station.[9]
Appellants neighbor, Aida Soriano (Aida), corroborated appellants version.[10]
 
By Decision of July 29, 2005,[11] Branch 70 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig convicted both appellants in the first case and appellant Rodnie in the
second case, disposing as follows:
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
 
In Criminal Case No. 13116-D filed against Rodnie Almorfe and Ryan
Almorfe for violation of Section 5, Article II, Republic Act 9165 (Illegal Sale
of Shabu), they are hereby sentenced to LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to
solidarily pay a Fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
 
In Criminal Case No. 13117-D filed only against Rodnie Almorfe for
violation of Section 11, Article II, Republic Act 9165 (Illegal Possession of
Shabu), said accused is hereby sentenced to Twelve (12) Years and One (1)
Day to Twenty (20) Years and to pay a Fine of Three Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P300,000.00). (underscoring supplied)
 
 
On appeal, the appellate court, by Decision of August 30, 2007,[12] affirmed
that of the trial courts. It discredited appellants claim of frame-up in the
absence of proof of ill-motive on the part of the arresting officers to falsely
accuse them, aside from the fact that the officers are presumed to have
regularly performed their official duty.
 
The appellate court discredited too the testimony of Aida which it found to be
laced with several inconsistencies vis--vis those of appellants.
 
Hence, the present appeal, appellants assigning as sole error of the appellate
court their conviction despite the failure of the prosecution to prove that
the shabu  submitted for laboratory examination is the same one allegedly
taken from them.
 
 
 
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 charts the procedure on the custody and
disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, given
the severity of the penalties imposed for violations of said law, viz:
 
Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall
take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments, paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated,
seized and or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
 
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
 
During the cross-examination of Janet, appellants counsel elicited the
following testimony:[13]
 
Q: Now, madam witness, these two (2) accused were being charged of
violating Section 5 and Section 11, of Republic Act 9165. And it is presumed
that you know R.A. 9165?
A: Section 5 is the only case we filed against them, sir.
 
Q: During the inventory, did you secure the presence of the media team?
A: We did not conduct an inventory, sir.
 
Q: You did not conduct an inventory with regard to this case?
A: We just marked the sachets right then and there for purposes of not
alternating the sachets we recovered from them, sir.
 
[Defense counsel]
Atty. Sorongon:
But the law provides, your Honor, that it should be inventoried.
COURT:
Let the Court decide on that matter. You have already established that there
was no inventory.
 
x x x x (italics and underscoring supplied)
 
Oddly, from the above-quoted testimony of alleged poseur buyer Janet, she
clarified that they filed a case against appellants only for violation of Section
5 of R.A. No. 9165.Appellant Rodnie was, however, additionally indicted for
violation of Section 11.
 
Respecting the teams non-compliance with the inventory, not to mention the
photograph, requirement of R.A. No. 9165, the same does not necessarily
render void and invalid the seizure of the dangerous drugs. There must,
however, be justifiable grounds to warrant exception therefrom, and provided
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/s.[14]
 
For the saving clause to apply, it is important that the prosecution should
explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses[15] and that the integrity and
value of the seized evidence had been preserved:
 
x x x [N]on-compliance with the strict directive of Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecutions case; police procedures in
the handling of confiscated evidence may still have lapses, as in the present
case. These lapses, however, must be recognized and explained in terms of
their justifiable grounds and the integrity and evidentiary value of the
evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved.  [16] (italics in the
original)
 
 
The presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the
offenses,[17] calls for the necessity of proving beyond doubt that they are the
same seized objects. This function is performed by the chain of custody
requirement as defined in Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation
No. 1, Series of 2002,[18] which requirement is necessary to erase all doubts as
to the identity of the seized drugs by establishing its movement from the
accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist, and finally to the court.[19]
In the present case, even if the requirement to conduct an inventory were to
be excused, given that there were only three sachets confiscated, the
prosecution just the same failed to discharge its burden. Although Janet
identified Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3 as the drugs seized from appellants
which she claimed to have marked immediately after the bust,she did not
disclose the name of the investigator to whom she turned them over. And
there is no showing if that same investigator was the one who turned the
drugs over to the forensic chemist, or if the forensic chemist whose name
appears in the physical science report[20] was the one who received them from
that investigator, or where the drugs were kept for safekeeping after the
chemical test was conducted up to the time they were presented in court.
 
It bears recalling that while the parties stipulated on the existence of the
sachets, they did not stipulate with respect to their source.
People v. Sanchez[21] teaches that the testimony of the forensic chemist which
is stipulated upon merely covers the handling of the specimen at the forensic
laboratory and the result of the examination, but not the manner the
specimen was handled before it came to the possession of the forensic
chemist and after it left his possession.
 
While a perfect chain of custody is almost always impossible to achieve,
an unbroken chain becomes indispensable and essential in the prosecution of
drug cases owing to its susceptibility to alteration, tampering, contamination
and even substitution and exchange.[22] Hence, every link must be accounted
for.
 
In fine, the prosecution failed to account for every link of the chain starting
from its turn over by Janet to the investigator, and from the latter to the
chemist.
 
As for the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty relied
upon by the courts a quo, the same cannot by itself overcome the
presumption of innocence nor constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.[23]
Parenthetically, the following testimony of Janet raises a nagging doubt
regarding the buy-bust version of the prosecution:
 
Q: So, you were fifty (50) meters away from your companions, where did
you meet the accused?
A: We entered Callejon 64, and they were standing by in front of their house
where there was a lighted post, sir.
Q: Madam witness, you stated that you entered Callejon 64, which is an
alley, and you left your vehicle fifty (50) meters away from Callejon 64. Was
your vehicle parked perpendicularly to Callejon 64 or, was it parked parallel
to Callejon 64?
A: We parked in one of those alleys named Akasya, when you make a turn,
there was a creek. And after that, there were several other alleys, and there is
a two-way street and then after that, there were alleys again, sir.
Q: From the place where you parked your service vehicle, you have to enter
into different streets before arriving at the house of the accused, am I correct?
A: Yes, sir, when we parked, we walked straight, and when we reached the
street, we walked again. After that, was an alley, Callejon 64, sir.
Q: Will you agree with me, madam witness, that you have to turn from one
street to another before arriving at Callejon 64? You testified that awhile ago,
will you agree with me?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Then, you stated during the direct examination, madam witness, that
before you alighted from your vehicle, there is this agreement of the pre-
arranged signal?
A: Yes, sir.[24] (underscoring supplied)
 
Given Janets description of the target address and the location of her fellow
team members, how could the latter have seen Janet execute the pre-arranged
signal to draw them to close in and arrest appellants?
 
Just as the lack of showing whether the team confiscated the black container
allegedly brought out by Rodnie containing two sachets raises a nagging
doubt. If it did, why was it not presented? If it did not, why? That was an
object evidence which could have lent credibility to the prosecutions version.
 
WHEREFORE, the August 30, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA G.R. H.C. No. 02178 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE for failure of the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of appellants Rodnie
Almorfe y Sedente and Ryan Almorfe y Vallester who are accordingly
hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes charged against them and ordered
immediately RELEASED from custody, unless they are being held for some
other lawful cause. 
 
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to forthwith
implement this decision and to INFORM this Court, within five days from
receipt hereof, of the action taken. 
 
Let a copy of this decision be forwarded to the PNP Director and the Director
General of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for information and
guidance. No costs.  
 
SO ORDERED.
 BSB GROUP, INC., represented G.R. No. 168644
by its President, Mr. RICARDO   Accordingly, respondent was charged before the Regional Trial Court of
BANGAYAN,  
Petitioner, Present:
   
  CORONA, J., Chairperson,
  VELASCO, JR.,
  NACHURA,
-versus- PERALTA, and
  MENDOZA, JJ.
   
   
SALLY GO a.k.a. SALLY GO- Promulgated:
BANGAYAN,  
Respondent. February 16, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
 
 
DECISION
 
 
PERALTA, J.:
 
 
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87600[1] dated
April 20, 2005, which reversed and set aside the September 13, 2004[2] and
November 5, 2004[3] Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 36[4] in Criminal Case No. 02-202158 for qualified theft. The said
orders, in turn, respectively denied the motion filed by herein respondent
Sally Go for the suppression of the testimonial and documentary evidence
relative to a Security Bank account, and denied reconsideration.
 
The basic antecedents are no longer disputed.
 
Petitioner, the BSB Group, Inc., is a duly organized domestic corporation
presided by its herein representative, Ricardo
(Bangayan). Respondent Sally Go, alternatively referred to as Sally Sia Go
and Sally Go-Bangayan, is Bangayans wife, who was employed in the
company as a cashier, and was engaged, among others, to receive and
account for the payments made by the various customers of the company.
 
In 2002, Bangayan filed with the Manila Prosecutors Office a complaint
for estafa and/or qualified theft[5] against respondent, alleging that several
checks[6] representing the aggregate amount of P1,534,135.50 issued by the
companys customers in payment of their obligation were, instead of being
turned over to the companys coffers, indorsed by respondent who deposited
the same to her personal banking account maintained at Security Bank and
Trust Company (Security Bank) in Divisoria, Manila Branch.[7] Upon a
finding that the evidence adduced was uncontroverted, the assistant city
prosecutor recommended the filing of the Information for qualified theft
against respondent.[8]
 
Manila, Branch 36, in an Information, the inculpatory portion of which reads:
 
That in or about or sometime during the period comprised (sic) between
January 1988 [and] October 1989, inclusive, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent [to] gain and without the knowledge and consent of
the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away cash money in the total amount
ofP1,534,135.50 belonging to BSB GROUP OF COMPANIES represented
by RICARDO BANGAYAN, to the damage and prejudice of said owner in
the aforesaid amount of P1,534,135.50, Philippine currency.
 
That in the commission of the said offense, said accused acted with grave
abuse of confidence, being then employed as cashier by said complainant at
the time of the commission of the said offense and as such she was entrusted
with the said amount of money.
 
Contrary to law.[9]
 
Respondent entered a negative plea when arraigned.[10] The trial ensued. On
the premise that respondent had allegedly encashed the subject checks and
deposited the corresponding amounts thereof to her personal banking
account, the prosecution moved for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum /ad
testificandum against the respective managers or records custodians of
Security Banks Divisoria Branch, as well as of the Asian Savings Bank (now
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. [Metrobank]), in Jose Abad Santos, Tondo,
Manila Branch.[11] The trial court granted the motion and issued the
corresponding subpoena.[12]
Respondent filed a motion to quash the subpoena dated November 4, 2003,
addressed to Metrobank, noting to the court that in the complaint-affidavit
filed with the prosecutor, there was no mention made of the said bank
account, to which respondent, in addition to the Security Bank account
identified as Account No. 01-14-006, allegedly deposited the proceeds of the
supposed checks. Interestingly, while respondent characterized the
Bangayan Metrobank account as irrelevant to the case, she, in the same motion,
nevertheless waived her objection to the irrelevancy of the Security
Bank account mentioned in the same complaint-affidavit, inasmuch as she
was admittedly willing to address the allegations with respect thereto.[13]
 
Petitioner, opposing respondents move, argued for the relevancy of the
Metrobank account on the ground that the complaint-affidavit showed that
there were two checks which respondent allegedly deposited in an account
with the said bank.[14] To this, respondent filed a supplemental motion to
quash, invoking the absolutely confidential nature of the Metrobank account
under the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1405.[15] The trial court did
not sustain respondent; hence, it denied the motion to quash for lack of merit.
[16]
 
Meanwhile, the prosecution was able to present in court the testimony of
Elenita Marasigan (Marasigan), the representative of Security Bank. In a
nutshell, Marasigans testimony sought to prove that between 1988 and 1989,
respondent, while engaged as cashier at the BSB Group, Inc., was able to run
away with the checks issued to the company by its customers, endorse the
same, and credit the corresponding amounts to her personal deposit account
with Security Bank. In the course of the testimony, the subject checks were
presented to Marasigan for identification and marking as the same checks
received by respondent, endorsed, and then deposited in her personal account
with Security Bank.[17] But before the testimony could be completed,
respondent filed a Motion to Suppress,[18] seeking the exclusion of
Marasigans testimony and accompanying documents thus far received,
bearing on the subject Security Bank account. This time respondent invokes,
in addition to irrelevancy, the privilege of confidentiality under R.A. No.
1405.
 
The trial court, nevertheless, denied the motion in its September 13, 2004
Order.[19] A motion for reconsideration was subsequently filed, but it was also
denied in the Order dated November 5, 2004. [20] These two orders are the
subject of the instant case.
 
Aggrieved, and believing that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in
acting the way it did, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals
via a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65. Finding merit in the petition, the
Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the trial court
in its April 20, 2005 Decision.[21] The decision reads:
 
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders dated
September 13, 2004 and November 5, 2004 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The testimony of the SBTC representative is ordered stricken from
the records.
SO ORDERED.[22]
 
With the denial of its motion for reconsideration,[23] petitioner is now before
the Court pleading the same issues as those raised before the lower courts.
 
In this Petition[24] under Rule 45, petitioner averred in the main that the Court
of Appeals had seriously erred in reversing the assailed orders of the trial
court, and in effect striking out Marasigans testimony dealing with
respondents deposit account with Security Bank.[25] It asserted that apart from
the fact that the said evidence had a direct relation to the subject matter of the
case for qualified theft and, hence, brings the case under one of the
exceptions to the coverage of confidentiality under R.A. 1405.[26]Petitioner
believed that what constituted the subject matter in litigation was to be
determined by the allegations in the information and, in this respect, it
alluded to the assailed November 5, 2004 Order of the trial court, which
declared to be erroneous the limitation of the present inquiry merely to what
was contained in the information.[27]
 
For her part, respondent claimed that the money represented by the Security
Bank account was neither relevant nor material to the case, because nothing
in the criminal information suggested that the money therein deposited was
the subject matter of the case. She invited particular attention to that portion
of the criminal Information which averred that she has stolen and carried
away cash money in the total amount of P1,534,135.50. She advanced the
notion that the term cash money stated in the Information was not
synonymous with the checks she was purported to have stolen from petitioner
and deposited in her personal banking account. Thus, the checks which the
prosecution had Marasigan identify, as well as the testimony itself of
Marasigan, should be suppressed by the trial court at least for violating
respondents right to due process.[28] More in point, respondent opined that
admitting the testimony of Marasigan, as well as the evidence pertaining to
the Security Bank account, would violate the secrecy rule under R.A. No.
1405.[29]
 
In its reply, petitioner asserted the sufficiency of the allegations in the
criminal Information for qualified theft, as the same has sufficiently alleged
the elements of the offense charged. It posits that through Marasigans
testimony, the Court would be able to establish that the checks involved,
copies of which were attached to the complaint-affidavit filed with the
prosecutor, had indeed been received by respondent as cashier, but were,
thereafter, deposited by the latter to her personal account with Security
Bank. Petitioner held that the checks represented the cash money stolen by
respondent and, hence, the subject matter in this case is not only the cash
amount represented by the checks supposedly stolen by respondent, but also
the checks themselves.[30]
 
We derive from the conflicting advocacies of the parties that the issue for
resolution is whether the testimony of Marasigan and the accompanying
documents are irrelevant to the case, and whether they are also violative of
the absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits and, hence, excluded by
operation of R.A. No. 1405. The question of admissibility of the evidence
thus comes to the fore. And the Court, after deliberative estimation, finds the
subject evidence to be indeed inadmissible.
 
Prefatorily, fundamental is the precept in all criminal prosecutions, that the
constitutive acts of the offense must be established with unwavering
exactitude and moral certainty because this is the critical and only requisite to
a finding of guilt. [31] Theft is present when a person, with intent to gain but
without violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things,
takes the personal property of another without the latters consent. It is
qualified when, among others, and as alleged in the instant case, it is
committed with abuse of confidence.[32] The prosecution of this offense
necessarily focuses on the existence of the following elements: (a) there was
taking of personal property belonging to another; (b) the taking was done
with intent to gain; (c) the taking was done without the consent of the owner;
(d) the taking was done without violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things; and (e) it was done with abuse of confidence. [33] In turn,
whether these elements concur in a way that overcomes the presumption of
guiltlessness, is a question that must pass the test of relevancy and
competency in accordance with Section 3[34] Rule 128 of the Rules of Court.
 
Thus, whether these pieces of evidence sought to be suppressed in this case 
the testimony of Marasigan, as well as the checks purported to have been
stolen and deposited in respondents Security Bank account  are relevant, is
to be addressed by considering whether they have such direct relation to the
fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence; or whether
they relate collaterally to a fact from which, by process of logic, an inference
may be made as to the existence or non-existence of the fact in issue.[35]
 
The fact in issue appears to be that respondent has taken away cash in the
amount of P1,534,135.50 from the coffers of petitioner. In support of this
allegation, petitioner seeks to establish the existence of the elemental act of
taking by adducing evidence that respondent, at several times between 1988
and 1989, deposited some of its checks to her personal account with Security
Bank. Petitioner addresses the incongruence between the allegation of theft
of cash in the Information, on the one hand, and the evidence that respondent
had first stolen the checks and deposited the same in her banking account, on
the other hand, by impressing upon the Court that there obtains no difference
between cash and check for purposes of prosecuting respondent for theft of
cash. Petitioner is mistaken.
 
In theft, the act of unlawful taking connotes deprivation of personal property
of one by another with intent to gain, and it is immaterial that the offender is
able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen because the deprivation
relative to the offended party has already ensued from such act of execution.
[36]
 The allegation of theft of money, hence, necessitates that evidence
presented must have a tendency to prove that the offender has unlawfully
taken money belonging to another. Interestingly, petitioner has taken pains in
attempting to draw a connection between the evidence subject of the instant
review, and the allegation of theft in the Information by claiming that
respondent had fraudulently deposited the checks in her own name. But this
line of argument works more prejudice than favor, because it in effect, seeks
to establish the commission, not of theft, but rather of some other crime 
probably estafa.
Moreover, that there is no difference between cash and check is true in other
instances. In estafa by conversion, for instance, whether the thing converted
is cash or check, is immaterial in relation to the formal allegation in an
information for that offense; a check, after all, while not regarded as legal
tender, is normally accepted under commercial usage as a substitute for cash,
and the credit it represents in stated monetary value is properly capable of
appropriation. And it is in this respect that what the offender does with the
check subsequent to the act of unlawfully taking it becomes material
inasmuch as this offense is a continuing one. [37] In other words, in pursuing a
case for this offense, the prosecution may establish its cause by the
presentation of the checks involved. These checks would then constitute the
best evidence to establish their contents and to prove the elemental act of
conversion in support of the proposition that the offender has indeed indorsed
the same in his own name.[38]
 
Theft, however, is not of such character. Thus, for our purposes, as the
Information in this case accuses respondent of having stolen cash, proof
tending to establish that respondent has actualized her criminal intent by
indorsing the checks and depositing the proceeds thereof in her personal
account, becomes not only irrelevant but also immaterial and, on that score,
inadmissible in evidence.
 
We now address the issue of whether the admission of Marasigans testimony
on the particulars of respondents account with Security Bank, as well as of
the corresponding evidence of the checks allegedly deposited in said account,
constitutes an unallowable inquiry under R.A. 1405.
It is conceded that while the fundamental law has not bothered with the
triviality of specifically addressing privacy rights relative to banking
accounts, there, nevertheless, exists in our jurisdiction a legitimate
expectation of privacy governing such accounts. The source of this right of
expectation is statutory, and it is found in R.A. No. 1405,[39] otherwise known
as the Bank Secrecy Act of 1955. [40]
 
R.A. No. 1405 has two allied purposes. It hopes to discourage private
hoarding and at the same time encourage the people to deposit their money in
banking institutions, so that it may be utilized by way of authorized loans and
thereby assist in economic development.[41] Owing to this piece of legislation,
the confidentiality of bank deposits remains to be a basic state policy in the
Philippines.[42] Section 2 of the law institutionalized this policy by
characterizing as absolutely confidential in general all deposits of whatever
nature with banks and other financial institutions in the country. It declares:
 
Section 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions
in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government
of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are
hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be
examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau
or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of
impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited
or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
 
Subsequent statutory enactments[43] have expanded the list of exceptions to
this policy yet the secrecy of bank deposits still lies as the general rule,
falling as it does within the legally recognized zones of privacy. [44] There is,
in fact, much disfavor to construing these primary and supplemental
exceptions in a manner that would authorize unbridled discretion, whether
governmental or otherwise, in utilizing these exceptions as authority for
unwarranted inquiry into bank accounts. It is then perceivable that the present
legal order is obliged to conserve the absolutely confidential nature of bank
deposits.[45]
 
The measure of protection afforded by the law has been explained in China
Banking Corporation v. Ortega.[46] That case principally addressed the issue
of whether the prohibition against an examination of bank deposits precludes
garnishment in satisfaction of a judgment. Ruling on that issue in the
negative, the Court found guidance in the relevant portions of the legislative
deliberations on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977, which later
became the Bank Secrecy Act, and it held that the absolute confidentiality
rule in R.A. No. 1405 actually aims at protection from unwarranted inquiry
or investigation if the purpose of such inquiry or investigation is merely to
determine the existence and nature, as well as the amount of the deposit in
any given bank account. Thus,
 
x x x The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the
deposit of B&B Forest Development Corporation, as contemplated in the
law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not the
defendant B&B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China
Banking Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so
that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until
further order. It will be noted from the discussion of the conference
committee report on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977which later
became Republic Act No. 1405, that it was not the intention of the lawmakers
to place banks deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final
judgment. Thus:
 
x x x Mr. Marcos: Now, for purposes of the record, I should like the
Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means to clarify this
further. Suppose an individual has a tax case.He is being held liable by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue [(BIR)] or, say, P1,000.00 worth of tax liability,
and because of this the deposit of this individual [has been] attached by the
[BIR].
 
Mr. Ramos: The attachment will only apply after the court has pronounced
sentence declaring the liability of such person. But where the primary aim
is to determine whether he has a bank deposit in order to bring about a
proper assessment by the [BIR], such inquiry is not allowed by this
proposed law.
 
Mr. Marcos: But under our rules of procedure and under the Civil Code, the
attachment or garnishment of money deposited is allowed. Let us assume for
instance that there is a preliminary attachment which is for garnishment or for
holding liable all moneys deposited belonging to a certain individual, but
such attachment or garnishment will bring out into the open the value of such
deposit. Is that prohibited by... the law?
 
Mr. Ramos: It is only prohibited to the extent that the inquiry... is made only
for the purpose of satisfying a tax liability already declared for the protection
of the right in favor of the government; but when the object is merely to
inquire whether he has a deposit or not for purposes of taxation, then
this is fully covered by the law. x x x
 
Mr. Marcos: The law prohibits a mere investigation into the existence and
the amount of the deposit.
 
Mr. Ramos: Into the very nature of such deposit. x x x[47]
 
In taking exclusion from the coverage of the confidentiality rule, petitioner in
the instant case posits that the account maintained by respondent with
Security Bank contains the proceeds of the checks that she has fraudulently
appropriated to herself and, thus, falls under one of the exceptions in Section
2 of R.A. No. 1405  that the money kept in said account is the subject
matter in litigation. To highlight this thesis, petitioner avers, citing Mathay v. logical and reasonable connection to the prosecution of respondent for
Consolidated Bank and Trust Co.,[48] that the subject matter of the action qualified theft. We find full merit in and affirm respondents objection to the
refers to the physical facts; the things real or personal; the money, lands, evidence of the prosecution. The Court of Appeals was, therefore, correct in
chattels and the like, in relation to which the suit is prosecuted, which in the reversing the assailed orders of the trial court.
instant case should refer to the money deposited in the Security Bank  
account.[49] On the surface, however, it seems that petitioners theory is valid A final note. In any given jurisdiction where the right of privacy extends its
to a point, yet a deeper treatment tends to show that it has argued quite off- scope to include an individuals financial privacy rights and personal financial
tangentially. This, because, while Mathay did explain what the subject matter matters, there is an intermediate or heightened scrutiny given by courts and
of an action is, it nevertheless did so only to determine whether the class suit legislators to laws infringing such rights.[52] Should there be doubts in
in that case was properly brought to the court. upholding the absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits against
  affirming the authority to inquire into such accounts, then such doubts must
What indeed constitutes the subject matter in litigation in relation to Section be resolved in favor of the former. This attitude persists unless congress lifts
2 of R.A. No. 1405 has been pointedly and amply addressed in Union Bank its finger to reverse the general state policy respecting the absolutely
of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, [50] in which the Court noted that the confidential nature of bank deposits.[53]
inquiry into bank deposits allowable under R.A. No. 1405 must be premised  
on the fact that the money deposited in the account is itself the subject of the WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
action.[51] Given this perspective, we deduce that the subject matter of the Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87600 dated April 20, 2005, reversing the
action in the case at bar is to be determined from the indictment that charges September 13, 2004 and November 5, 2004 Orders of the Regional Trial
respondent with the offense, and not from the evidence sought by the Court of Manila, Branch 36 in Criminal Case No. 02-202158,
prosecution to be admitted into the records. In the criminal Information filed is AFFIRMED.
with the trial court, respondent, unqualifiedly and in plain language, is  
charged with qualified theft by abusing petitioners trust and confidence and SO ORDERED.
stealing cash in the amount of P1,534,135.50. The said Information makes no
factual allegation that in some material way involves the checks subject of
the testimonial and documentary evidence sought to be suppressed. Neither
do the allegations in said Information make mention of the supposed bank
account in which the funds represented by the checks have allegedly been
kept.
 
In other words, it can hardly be inferred from the indictment itself that the
Security Bank account is the ostensible subject of the prosecutions
inquiry. Without needlessly expanding the scope of what is plainly alleged in
the Information, the subject matter of the action in this case is the money
amounting to P1,534,135.50 alleged to have been stolen by respondent, and
not the money equivalent of the checks which are sought to be admitted in
evidence. Thus, it is that, which the prosecution is bound to prove with its
evidence, and no other.
 
It comes clear that the admission of testimonial and documentary evidence
relative to respondents Security Bank account serves no other purpose than to
establish the existence of such account, its nature and the amount kept in it. It
constitutes an attempt by the prosecution at an impermissible inquiry into a
bank deposit account the privacy and confidentiality of which is protected by
law. On this score alone, the objection posed by respondent in her motion to
suppress should have indeed put an end to the controversy at the very first
instance it was raised before the trial court.
In sum, we hold that the testimony of Marasigan on the particulars of
respondents supposed bank account with Security Bank and the documentary
evidence represented by the checks adduced in support thereof, are not only
incompetent for being excluded by operation of R.A. No. 1405. They are
likewise irrelevant to the case, inasmuch as they do not appear to have any