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< An additional material is
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1
Department of Marketing,
University of Otago, Dunedin,
New Zealand
2
Department of Marketing,
Massey University, Palmerston
North, New Zealand
3
Department of Public Health,
University of Otago, Wellington,
New Zealand
Correspondence to
Janet Hoek, Department of
Marketing, University of Otago,
PO Box 56, Dunedin 9054, New
Zealand;
janet.hoek@otago.ac.nz
Received 24 February 2011
Accepted 19 July 2011
Hoek J, Vaudrey R, Article
Copyright Gendall P, et al. Tobacco
author
Research paper
Tobacco retail displays: a comparison of industry
arguments and retailers’ experiences
Janet Hoek,1 Rhonwyn Vaudrey,1 Philip Gendall,2 Richard Edwards,3
George Thomson3
ABSTRACT
Background Tobacco companies have opposed the
removal of tobacco retail displays, arguing this would
compromise retailers’ safety, increase retail crime,
reduce retailers’ income, impose additional costs and be
inconvenient. These arguments have successfully
delayed policy development in several jurisdictions.
Methods In-depth interviews conducted with New
Zealand retailers who had voluntarily removed tobacco
from open display in their stores.
Results Retailers who had removed tobacco displays did
so primarily to reduce their security risk and found their
stores had become less vulnerable to retail crime. They
did not find removing displays costly or inconvenient nor
had this decision significantly reduced their revenue.
Conclusions Removing in-store tobacco displays may
increase rather than decrease store safety. Our findings
reveal that retailers’ experiences differed in many ways
from tobacco companies’ predictions and suggest that
industry arguments against display removal lack
objective support and are self-serving.
INTRODUCTION
Tobacco displays play an important role in adver-
tising brands,1 promoting smoking initiation and
movement from experimental to regular
smoking,2e4 stimulating impulse purchase and
inducing lapsing among quitters.5e7 Industry
documents and tobacco companies’ role in
supplying display units to retailers highlight the
role point of sale (POS) strategies play in their
overall marketing plans.8 9
Several governments, including Iceland,
Thailand, Ireland, Canadian provinces and five of
Australia’s eight states and territories, have recog-
nised the effects of POS displays by passing legis-
lation removing tobacco products from open
display in retail stores. New Zealand’s Smoke-free
Environments Amendment Bill 2003 allows Point
of sale (POS) displays but specifies the display size
and number of brand facings allowed. However,
tobacco manufacturers have proliferated brand
variants, resulting in large visual brand blocks, as
figures 1 and 2 illustrate. This led to calls for
stronger controls, culminating in the Smoke-Free
Environments (Controls and Enforcement)
Amendment Bill, which passed its first reading in
late 2010 (by 108 votes to 3). The bill proposes
removal of tobacco retail displays, a measure that
will primarily affect corner shops (known as dairies
in New Zealand), convenience stores and service
stations, all of which have large tobacco displays
behind their checkouts.
(orControl
their (2011). doi:10.1136/tc.2011.043687
employer) 2011. Produced
by BMJ Publishing Group Ltd under licence.
Tobacco companies and interest groups have
opposed Point of sale (POS) restrictions and
successfully delayed the removal of in-store displays
by arguing that their removal would reduce store
safety and place staff at risk of crime.10e13 In this
paper, we evaluate arguments used to oppose the
removal of tobacco retail displays and compare
these with the experiences of retailers who have
voluntarily removed tobacco from display.
Arguments opposing removal of in-store tobacco
displays
As well as arguing that they have a right to display
their ‘legal products’,10 tobacco companies have
adduced four further arguments against removing
Point of sale (POS) displays. They claim that such
a policy would reduce staff security (as staff would
turn their back on customers to retrieve tobacco
products), inconvenience staff, result in lost
revenue and increase compliance costs. Collectively,
they allege that these outcomes will be dispropor-
tionately negative relative to the likely reductions
in smoking prevalence.10 14
Because tobacco is a monetarily valuable and
easily traded product, large retail displays that
attract consumers’ attention may also attract
criminal activity, such as shoplifting, burglary and
break-ins.15 Small stores, such as dairies (drug
stores), convenience stores and service stations, are
particularly vulnerable to tobacco theft because
they are small and open late. Thus, removing open
Point of sale (POS) displays would reduce imme-
diate criminal temptation. Even if tobacco products
remained behind counters (concealed), opportuni-
ties for shoplifting of other items would logically be
no greater than at present and could decrease if
tobacco was stocked in drawers and staff no longer
had to turn their backs to retrieve packs. Evidence
from Saskatchewan does not suggest tobacco thefts
have increased with tobacco-free displays,16 so this
claim also lacks empirical support.
New Zealand tobacco retailers each sell approx-
imately 80e150 tobacco products every day10;
Philip Morris has argued that retail staff would be
seriously inconvenienced if these products were
difficult to access, while customers would allegedly
become frustrated by increased transaction times.14
We were unable to locate empirical evidence that
either of these outcomes had eventuated in coun-
tries requiring removal of open tobacco displays.
Retailers fear that they may suffer reduced sales or
be affected by market distortions that could occur if
smokers altered their tobacco buying habits and
patronised larger rather than smaller retailers.10 17
While these economic concerns are understandable,
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Research paper

Point of sale (POS) displays have not suffered unduly high

compliance costs or been forced out of business and reveals that,
in many cases, tobacco companies met any renovation costs.1 22 26
In summary, tobacco companies’ claims are at odds with
evidence from countries that have required removal of tobacco
displays. Yet despite this evidence, disputes over the alleged
impact of removing tobacco displays have impeded policy
development and remain largely untested. To date, few studies
have explored the experiences of retailers who have voluntarily
removed tobacco retail displays or the background to their
decision. Such knowledge would provide a new perspective
against which to assess tobacco companies’ claims and could
inform policy development. We therefore investigated retailers’
experience of putting tobacco out of sight, the reasons they did
so, and the reactions of their customers.

METHODS
We conducted in-depth interviews with a sample of New
Figure 1 Tobacco Retail Display in Dairy.
Zealand retailers who had removed tobacco products from open
display. ASH (New Zealand) provided a list of stores that had
retailers in countries where tobacco displays are no longer
received Asthma Foundation awards certifying their ‘out of
permitted do not appear to have suffered these consequences.18
sight’ decision. An interviewer made contact with each retailer
Furthermore, analyses of these claims19 have revealed their
via telephone or email and spoke with the store owner or
methodological and logical deficiencies, including inconsistent
franchisee who had taken the decision to remove tobacco from
use of data and failure to provide evidence.20
open display.
Claims that retailers would lose revenue also overlook the
Of the 26 retailers contacted, 11 agreed to be interviewed.
compelling incentives tobacco companies have for maintaining
Nine retailers declined because they were too busy (these
strong relationships with retailers and ensuring their brands
retailers were typically small family-run businesses with
remain available, even if hidden.1 Evidence suggests tobacco
extended hours). One retailer was no longer in the country, one
companies already make payments to retailers in the form of
had no contact details, one store had changed owners and one no
slotting allowances and volume incentives21; this practice may
longer sold tobacco products. After deducting ineligible partici-
even increase following removal of Point of sale (POS) displays.
pants, the response rate was 50%.i
For example, an ASH Scotland report on Saskatchewan retailers
The 11 participants had all removed tobacco from open display
found that ‘tobacco industry payments to retailers have increased
but still sold tobacco products. Store types ranged from small-scale
significantly’ since retail displays were banned there (p. 7).22
dairies (three), to convenience stores, minimarts or small super-
Retailer payments also occur in New Zealand but are covert and
markets (four), grocery stores, general stores and mid-size super-
difficult to monitor.23 24
markets (three) and one food barn (a bulk food warehouse). As
In addition to losing revenue, tobacco companies and interest
two retailers were unwilling to give interviews without permis-
groups have argued retailers would find the costs of alternative
sion from their head offices, the final sample did not include
storage units prohibitive. The New Zealand Association of
participants from larger retail franchises; aside from this differ-
Convenience Stores estimated that removing Point of sale (POS)
ence, retailers who participated represented similar outlets to
displays would cost retailers between $45 and $51 million,25 with
those who could not be contacted or who chose not to participate.
individual retailer costs between $8000 and $14 000.10 However,
While participants came from throughout New Zealand, most
international evidence suggests that retailers who have removed
(nine) were based in the upper North Island and the sampling
frame provided listed few South Island stores. Participants’ distri-
bution may reflect the location of ‘Stay Displays’ members, who
were more strongly represented in the South Island than in other
areas. Four retailers had not had tobacco on open display for
>5 years, while four others had taken the decision to remove
displays within the last year, with the remainder falling within
these times. Despite differences in the duration of their ‘out of
sight’ experiences, retailers’ responses did not vary by this attribute.
We used McCracken’s ‘long interview’ approach to develop
the interview protocol, which comprised loosely structured
questions that promoted discussion.27 Participants were asked
why they had placed tobacco products out of sight, the practi-
cality of doing so and the costs and benefits, both material and
social, of their decision. A supplementary file contains the
protocol used. As participants’ locations varied, most interviews
were conducted by phone, although one was conducted face-to-
face. Interviews lasted between 20 and 40 min.

i
Figure 2 Tobacco Retail Display in Service Station. RR¼(11/(26e4))*100¼50%.

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With participants’ permission, the interviews were recorded;
they were subsequently transcribed, returned to participants for
review and then analysed following Braun and Clarke’s approach
to thematic analysis.28 The two lead authors worked indepen-
dently to identify idea elements within the transcripts, map and
test early idea relationships and develop preliminary themes.
Because two key themes dominated the interviews, comparison
of the two initial coding schedules revealed very high agreement.
We then tested the preliminary themes against other coded and
uncoded items to promote coherence within themes. Both inter-
viewers undertook this analysis and agreed on the final themes.
To enhance validity, we drew on Whittemore et al’s29 criteria.
We promoted credibility by illustrating themes with partici-
pants’ own words, authenticity by using skilled interviewers
and criticality and integrity by testing our interpretations with
colleagues who had no involvement in the research design or
data collection. We addressed explicitness and vividness by
developing a clear audit trail and rechecking our data against the
transcripts and wider literature. Ethical issues were reviewed and
approved by an internal ethics reviewer at the University of
Otago prior to data collection.
RESULTS
We identified two main themes in retailers’ explanations of their
decision to remove tobacco Point of sale (POS) displays: a desire
to improve their overall store security and a wish to sell tobacco
in a more socially responsible manner. Several commented on
past robberies and break-ins and the risk of having highly visible
tobacco products:
“We’ve had trouble with break-ins, because they’re [cigarettes] very
visible from outside the store.” (Small supermarket)
Even retailers who had not experienced burglaries felt
concerned about the security risk visible tobacco created. For
these participants, covering tobacco or removing it from open
display reduced the potential for theft, if only because it would
take prospective thieves longer to access the products:
“The person who’s going to come in there and pinch my smokes,
has actually got to walk into restricted areas and physically open
doors and it’s not just open the door and grab, they’ve actually
got a series of doors to get through before they get my smokes,
two doors, that interlock. It should reduce your cigarette theft.”
(Mini-market)
Retailers who had experienced thefts reported that the crime
directed at their store had reduced significantly since they had
removed tobacco displays:
“The break-ins when the store’s closed, you know, after hours
break-ins, it’s completely ceased at the moment, which is
amazing.” (Small supermarket)
They concluded that removing tobacco from open display
reduced the temptation to steal cigarettes or shoplift other items.
“I would say it has decreased. Because . there’s no temptation
there.” (Food barn)
“The temptation’s there, isn’t it, if it’s left on the counter, the
temptation’s there.” (Convenience store)
While a desire for greater security dominated retailers’
comments, several also wanted to act responsibly within their
communities:
“I just feel it’s things that aren’t really healthful for people, so I feel
a little bit like, . morally, we’re selling things that are actually not
Hoek J, Vaudrey R, Gendall P, et al. Tobacco Control (2011). doi:10.1136/tc.2011.043687
Research paper
good for people’s health on the cigarettes side and the alcohol side
of things.” (Mini-market)
Removing tobacco products from display enabled these
retailers to act in accordance with their own values:
“I suppose more of a personal thing, to sort of say, ‘well, that’s not
what we believe in’, so if we have to stock it, we might as well do it
responsibly.” (Mid-size supermarket)
Several retailers wanted to support quitters and felt removing
open Point of sale (POS) displays supported these people:
“Customers that have been wanting to give up smoking. They’ve
appreciated the fact that the cabinets were shut because they
couldn’t see them, so therefore they didn’t want them.” (Dairy)
Implementing change
Participants did not find it difficult or expensive to remove
tobacco from open display. Some were already changing their
store layout and saw this as an opportunity to remove cigarette
displays at the same time:
“We had a really old tobacco stand, and we knew it was outdated,
and we’d have to replace it anyway.” (Mini-market)
Retailers’ main priority in making changes was that the new
arrangements were convenient and easy to use, criteria they
found easy to meet by covering the racks or carousels, or putting
tobacco under the counter.
“It’s actually great; I like having it [cupboard door] down, that way
if someone does charge into the shop when our backs are turned, no
one can pull for it [reach across counter for tobacco]. It keeps it
secure.” (Mini-market)
Some retailers incurred no costs as they used existing fittings
and extended their regular security procedures:
“The cabinets were already there, the doors were already on them.
It’s normal procedure for the doors on the cabinets, so when you
lock up at night you can lock all the cabinets so nobody can get the
smokes [.] just pull the doors down, that’s all it was.” (Dairy)
In other cases, a tobacco company paid for the new arrange-
ments as this enabled them to retain a strong relationship with
the retailer, offered some control over the alternative display
unit and ensured the retailer still stocked tobacco:
“The tobacco company picked up the costs. that was made quite
clear from the start. And that was including. an electrician to
move a plug, so yeah, no cost to us whatsoever.” (Mini-market)
Those who paid to refit their store reported costs ranging from
$40 to $20 000. However, the store reporting costs of $20 000
was undertaking a major refit, including installing a gambling
outlet; removing tobacco displays was only a small component
of these changes, a point the retailer concerned made clear:
“If a store was looking just to put their cigarettes into drawers I
really don’t think it would be a huge expense.” (Small supermarket)
Benefits of change
The retailers interviewed reported very positive reactions from
local schools and Maori (indigenous) groups and saw the
changes as bringing multiple benefits:
“Yes, it all works out to the community, because of course, not only
helping the non-smokers or those that are giving up and things like
that, but it’s also making the shop safer.” (Dairy)
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Research paper
“Non-smokers that obviously come from the local marae [meeting
area with special significance for Maori]; they supported ASH, they
noticed it a lot.” (Mid-size supermarket)
Feedback from regular customers or the community was also
either positive or neutral:
“No one’s even commented. Most of them will just say: ‘have you
got _ ?’ and we’ll just say ‘oh yeah, we’ve got that one.’” (Food barn)
Although one participant noted confusion from infrequent
customers, others stated that people would ask if they could not
see the items they wanted and suggested good service would
pre-empt any uncertainty:
“A couple of people have come in and they don’t think we sell them
and they’re about to leave and you’re usually: ‘how can I help
you’?” (Mini-market)
However, most participants reported that smokers were not
confused by the change because they knew what they wanted
and did not need to see tobacco products on display:
“Most people know what they want to smoke, so you ask them
what they want.” (Dairy)
“You don’t have to have them on display for people to know that
you’ve got them.” (Mid-size supermarket)
Business implications
Although retail groups have expressed concerns over reduced
revenue, most interviewees found removing tobacco from
display had little effect on their sales:
“The sales haven’t gone down or haven’t gone up, so in that sense it
hasn’t affected us.” (Mini-market)
“There might have been a slight drop in the sales of cigarettes, but I
don’t think that’s due to my out-of-sight, I think it’s the fact that
people are giving up.” (Dairy)
“It’s more positive on a social responsibility level, but it hasn’t
affected our sales in tobacco at all, it hasn’t had a negative effect.”
(Mid-size supermarket)
Where changes had occurred, they were small:
“Sales probably dropped say three percent.” (Mini-market)
and retailers saw them as part of a trend in declining sales:
“Tobacco sales have just dropped, you know, over the years. So it’s
not like we’re selling a lot of tobacco anyway.” (Food barn)
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This study compared arguments advanced by tobacco compa-
nies and interest groups they support with the experiences of
retailers who had voluntarily removed tobacco products from
open display in their stores. Specifically, we explored whether
the retailers’ decision had increased their security risk, inconve-
nienced them or created a financial burden (through lost sales or
compliance costs).
Many of the retailers we interviewed had placed tobacco out
of sight to improve their store security, and they reported
reduced vulnerability to retail crime since implementing this
decision. We found no evidence that retailers’ in-store security
had reduced following their decision.10 14
Nor did retailers appear inconvenienced by their decision,
with most reporting they adapted quickly to the new arrange-
4 of 5
What this paper adds
< Those opposing removal of tobacco retail displays rely on
claims this measure will have negative effects on retailers.
However, little is known about whether these claims reflect
the experiences of retailers who have actually removed in-
store displays.
< This qualitative study found sharp discrepancies between
tobacco industry claims and retailers’ experiences. Removing
tobacco retails displays increased store safety, was not
expensive or difficult to implement and did not result in stores
becoming uneconomic. In addition, it enabled retailers to
demonstrate commitment to their communities, particularly to
children, which elicited positive feedback from parents,
schools and marae.
< Untested tobacco industry arguments have impeded policy
progress and require validation. The unsubstantiated claims
the industry has advanced are not equivalent to the robust
empirical evidence on which sound policy should be based.
ments. Neither did removing open tobacco displays impose
a significant financial burden on retailers. Participants did not
incur high costs, and some received financial assistance from
tobacco companies, who wanted to ensure the on-going avail-
ability of their brands. This finding parallels evidence from other
jurisdictions, such as Saskatchewan and Scotland.1 22
Most respondents did not suffer a significant decline in trade;
any reductions in revenue were small and not difficult to absorb,
and tobacco was already declining in importance to their busi-
ness. Retailers did not report a loss in regular customers and
noted that even new customers would ask for tobacco products
since they knew what they wanted and did not need to see
a brand display to make their choice.
Our study has some limitations. Participants had voluntarily
taken a decision that differentiates them from other retailers;
furthermore, as they did not respond to regulation, they had
more control over the changes made and when these occurred.
As no service stations have voluntarily removed tobacco
displays, we did not include this group in our sample nor were
we able to include franchisees from large retail chains; it is
possible that these retailers’ experiences could have differed from
the grocery and dairy owners who we interviewed. Within the
grocery sector, however, our sample was varied and included
retailers from different outlets and locations.
Even bearing these caveats in mind, our findings raise ques-
tions about tobacco industry claims. Participants’ experiences
differed sharply from those predicted by tobacco companies and
their interest groups and present an alternative view that policy
makers should consider. Perhaps most importantly, they ques-
tion tobacco industry claims that removing tobacco would
create potential security risks, impose financial burdens on
retailers and result in financial hardship. Currently, the indus-
try’s case against the removal of open displays relies on a small
number of unsubstantiated assertions that cannot be regarded as
a reliable basis for policy making.
Acknowledgements We are grateful to the retailers who agreed to participate in
this research and whose detailed responses provided the basis of this article.
Funding Cancer Society of New Zealand.
Competing interests Although we do not consider it a competing interest, for the
sake of full disclosure we note that JH, PG, GT and RE have undertaken work for
Hoek J, Vaudrey R, Gendall P, et al. Tobacco Control (2011). doi:10.1136/tc.2011.043687
 Downloaded from tobaccocontrol.bmj.com on August 17, 2011 - Published by group.bmj.com
tobacco control NGOs and the New Zealand Ministry of Health and have received
funding for tobacco-related research from the Health Research Council of New
Zealand.
Ethics approval This study was conducted with the approval of the University of
Otago (Category “B” approval).
Contributors JH and RV designed the study with feedback on the protocol from PG,
GT and RE. RV and JH conducted the interviews with participants and prepared the
first draft of the paper. All authors have either reviewed the submitted paper (JH, PG,
GT and RE) or an earlier version of it (RV) and provided feedback on it. JH, PG and RE
responded to the reviewers’ suggestions.
Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.
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Tobacco retail displays: a comparison of

industry arguments and retailers'
experiences
Janet Hoek, Rhonwyn Vaudrey, Philip Gendall, et al.

Tob Control published online August 17, 2011

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