The Athletes of War An Evaluation of The PDF

‘THE ATHLETES OF WAR’: AN EVALUATION OF THE AGONISTIC
ELEMENTS IN GREEK WARFARE1
John Dayton
Students of Greek warfare can scarcely avoid becoming saturated with the
agonistic model of hoplite battle. In various manifestations it has dominated scholarship
for over seventy years, and through all that time it has provoked very little criticism
before some recent work of Peter Krentz, which has provided much of the groundwork
for the present study.2 Our purpose here will be to undertake a more thorough survey of
the long history of scholarship on the matter; this should reveal some of the intellectual
background from which the idea arose, as well as the ancient evidence which has most
often been adduced. An evaluation of the latter should in turn assist us to put the theory in
better perspective.
Agonism in hoplite battle is not a monolithic concept and no description could be
written to which all of the major proponents would subscribe in all respects, but various
elements commonly recur: Archaic and Classical Greeks practiced a limited, highly
regulated form of battle, centered on a decisive infantry clash largely devoid of ruse. The
victor contented himself with a demonstration of superior arete; the antagonists did not
seek to assimilate one another or impose political changes, nor did they confiscate large
1
I wish to thank W. Robert Connor and to Peter Krentz, without whose works this study could not
have been written and who provided much advice and encouragement. No less gratitude, on the same
grounds, is due to Alan Boegehold and Charles Fornara, and also to Deborah Boedeker, Kurt Raaflaub,
David Konstan, and Nathan Rosenstein (who gave some pointers on the Roman themes).
1
swathes of territory. They issue a formal declaration of war through heralds, and may
even establish a time and place for the battle. Hostilities should be restricted to the
summer months and in addition must cease at certain other times, such as the pan-
Hellenic festivals. There was a general aversion to arms other than the traditional hoplite
panoply, and projectile weapons were even expressly forbidden at times. Invaders would
commence destroying grain, vineyards, and groves as a ritual provocation; once the
enemy had come forth to present resistance, the battle opened with a ritual challenge and
acceptance. The victorious army did not press their pursuit of the foe, but returned the
dead under a truce and erected a perishable trophy. Armies respected sanctuaries,
heralds, and suppliants; they generally did not kill or mistreat prisoners, but liberated
them for ransom. Such protocols were restricted to battles of Greek vs. Greek and did not
apply to barbarians.3 The majority of scholars believe that these agonistic strictures
broke down during the Peloponnesian War, though other suggestions range from as early
as Cleisthenes to as late as Chaeronea.4 Some disagreement also exists concerning the
motives and the ultimate effects of agonism, but various scholars have insisted that it
mitigated unnecessary bloodshed and destruction produced a low casualty rate overall.
This will suffice for a starting-point; we will have occasion to examine many of the
elements in more detail.
The significance of the agonal spirit as an animating force in Greek life was
illuminated above all by Jacob Burckhardt in the last quarter of the nineteenth century,
but the antecedents for its application to Greek warfare appear even before him. The
founding work on ancient Greek military history, Rüstow’s 1852 Geschichte des
2
Krentz (1997 and 2002)
3
For two typical summaries see Berve (1966) 6-12; Ober (1994)
2
griechishen Kriegswesens, thus described the phalanx battle: “...victory is more a point of
honor than a useful means to an end, more a trial of arms than a battle of annihilation,
where Greeks fought against Greeks”.5 While such impressions would later become
incorporated into a belief in the essential agonism of Greek warfare, Rüstow was not
thinking in terms of the athletic analogy which that word implies. A Prussian officer, his
sentiments came naturally to a professional corps still very much grounded in its
eighteenth-century ethics, and feeling the tension placed on these by the revolutionary
and Napoleonic era; the above quote reflects the language of Clausewitz.6
Burckhardt had begun his course of lectures at Basel in 1872, and in their
posthumous published form (1898-1902) they became the great Griechische
Kulturgeschichte. All study of the Greek agon is descended from this work. For our
purposes it is important to note that Burckhardt did not identify the agonal spirit of the
Greeks with their warfare. Quite the contrary; the wars between the poleis are vile affairs
where lust for supremacy has free rein, unrestrained by the ennobling principles of the
agon, and where enemies seek to inflict enduring shame on one another.7 This view of
Greek warfare was adopted by Burckhardt’s younger colleague Nietzsche, who gave it
vivid expression in Homers Wettkampf. Apparently not until after World War I did
anyone make a direct equation between agon and Greek warfare. E.M. Walker wrote
thus in 1926 concerning the aftermath of Sepeia:
4
Schaefer 179 n.1; Lonis (1979) 20
5
Rüstow-Köchly 145: “...der Sieg ist mehr Ehrensache als nützliches Mittel zum Zweck, die
Schlacht mehr ein Waffenduel, als ein Vernichtungskampf, wo Griechen gegen Griechen fechten”.
6
e.g., Vom Kriege 7.3: “The defeat of the enemy is the goal of war, and the annihilation of the
enemy forces is the means”. (“Das Niederwerfen des Feindes ist das Ziel des Krieges, Vernichtung der
feindlichen Streitkräfte das Mittel”).
7
Burckhardt (I) 292-309
3
We have been taught in the modern world to regard victory in the field as a
means to an end, that end being the destruction of the enemy’s force. To the
Greeks a battle was in the nature of a duel; it was an agôn, in which honor was
satisfied, and the pursuit ceased, when the enemy acknowledged defeat by asking
for a truce for the burial of his dead.8
Walker echoes the anti-Clausewitzian sentiment of Rüstow, which had no doubt been
reinforced in the aftermath of the Great War.
But agonism and battle first became a serious issue among German-speaking
scholars, who took their inspiration from Burckhardt. Helmut Berve was among the first
to explore the idea; in his Griechische Geschichte of 1931, he described Greek battle as a
lofty affair, void of material motives, aimed at exalting the victory of training and arete.9
In the same year Johannes Hasebroek explained the athletic agon as a cultural offshoot of
the martial aristocracies (Kriegerzünfte), a type of gymnastic which hardened them for
their battle exploits.10 In the following year Berve’s student Hans Schaefer, in a work
responding to Hasebroek, offered a far more extensive interpretation of the agon in Greek
warfare and political structures than anything which had appeared previously.11 He too
stressed the bellicosity of the early aristocratic societies (Ritterzeit, Rittertum)
corresponding to Hasebroek’s Kriegerzünfte, a notion which may have owed something
to the student duelling societies at the German universities12 and in general accorded well
with the country’s recrudescent military ethos. Such men required no pressing material
grounds to engage in battle, but delighted in taking the measure of worthy opponents (9);
a conflict such as this better merits the name of agon than polemos. The terms “agonal”
8
CAH IV 166
9
Berve (I 1931)145-146
10
Hasebroek 233
11
Schaefer; pages cited in text; see in general 175-272. See also Hasebroek’s review, Gnomon 9
(1933) 572-578.
12
Brelich (16 n.10)
4
and “political” are used in opposition throughout the work, the former referring to the
procedures developed for this sort of aristocratic contest by mutual consent, which
followed a specific code, ended with the conclusion of hostilities, and was devoid of
political consequences (71). Schaefer even insists that the victors in Archaic battles did
not take the trouble to capture prisoners, and that the Athenians broke precedent here in
506 when they took Boeotian and Chalcidian captives (179 n.1; see Hdt. 5.77), heralding
the collapse of the agonal way of life. The final breakdown, though, was not
consummated until the Peloponnesian War, when the spirit of contest gave way to war à
outrance (236).
Work continued on the theme through World War II and even in the decade
afterward, which was otherwise relatively barren of military scholarship. Victor
Ehrenberg added his voice, interpreting the athletic agon as a response to the phalanx age
and its diminishing opportunities for personal heroics – though some of the agonistic
mindset, he maintains, continued to influence phalanx battles.13 Other notable
contributors included Johan Huizinga, Franz Kiechle, and Hans Speier, who as early as
1941 set forth a general definition of “agonistic fighting”, which he distinguished from
“absolute war” and “instrumental war”, and which shows many of the characteristics and
the individual laws which later writers would find in hoplite battles.14
In Rome, Angelo Brelich, who was familiar with the works of his German
predecessors as well as with more recent Structuralist thought, produced the small
volume Guerre, agoni, e culti nella Grecia arcaica in 1962. This work offered a curious
theory on the origin of Archaic wars: at a primitive stage, neighboring peoples would pit
13
Ehrenberg 63-96
14
Huizinga (esp. 71-75, 89-104, 208-211); Kiechle; Speier
5
their youths against each other in a bloody initiation festival held at a border sanctuary,
with fixed numbers and weapons. The victors would take possession of the sanctuary
and impose ritual lamentation on their defeated opponents, until the requisite interval of
years brought the next battle. The cycle transformed itself into genuine longstanding
rancor, which helps explain the recurrent hostilities between certain Archaic poleis.
Probably few today would be willing to accept this thesis literally, but something about it
definitely set fire to the scholarly imagination of the time. To judge from citations,
Brelich’s work was the single most important inspiration for the authors who produced
the next period’s major works on the agon and Greek battle.
In 1964 the Centre de Recherches Comparées sur les Sociétés Anciennes
undertook an investigation of warfare which attracted some of the most illustrious French
classicists. It bore fruit in the 1968 volume of essays edited by Jean-Pierre Vernant,
Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce ancienne, a landmark in the rejuvenation of ancient
military studies. Vernant himself sets the tone in the introduction, introducing the
concept of agôn and heavily accenting the analogy of le jeu. The following is a typical
formulation:
...cities in conflict do not seek so much to annihilate the adversary, nor even to
destroy his army, but to make him acknowledge, in the course of a contest
regulated like a tournament, their superior strength. War is limited in time, the
campaign taking place normally in summer in order to end before winter. Apart
from minor harrying operations against enemy territory, surprise raids to destroy
his crops, or sieges for which the infantry is poorly equipped, the decisive battle
is carried out on chosen ground, a pedion where the two phalanxes of heavy-
armored footsoldiers are able to deploy...In principle the enemy is not to be
pursued; it is necessary, and it is enough, that his line did not hold, that oneself
has remained master of the field, that he has asked to take back his dead, that a
trophy has been raised. The treaty of peace will do no more than to sanctify this
6
superior power of cratein which one of the parties will have demonstrated against
the other on the field of battle.15
Ironically, the concept of agonism has now resulted in a version of classical Greek
warfare completely the opposite of Burckhardt’s. A certain unity of perspective is
discernible among the authors of this volume who address the theme. Detienne’s essay
(“La Phalange: Problèmes et Contoverses”) further amplifies the battle-game: it is an
agôn, on demarcated ground, a champ clos, and victory accrues not to the side which
inflicts the greatest carnage but to the one which exerts the stoutest push and dislodges
the foemen from their ground. The victors do not undertake pursuit since it would carry
them outside the closed field, which has the character of a ritual space. He adduces two
parallels: Nestor’s invalidation of his victory in single combat over Ereuthalion when he
leaped over the boundary of the lists (Ariaithos, FGrH F 7), and the ritual combat of
Spartan youths on the Platanistas, where the opponents attempted to dash one another
into the Eurotas (Paus. 3.14.8-10).16 Jacqueline de Romilly’s essay (“Guerre et Paix
Entre Cités”) sets out to codify a body of laws observed by poleis in wartime, admittedly
unwritten and not uniformly applied. These include a seasonal truce which confined
hostilities to the summer, official formalities establishing states of war and peace,
observance of truces for pan-Hellenic festivals, burial of the slain, and sparing of
15
Vernant 18: “...les cités en conflit ne cherchent pas à anéantir l’adversaire, ni même à détruire
son armée, qu’à lui faire reconnaître, au cours d’une épreuve réglée comme un tournoi, leur superiorité de
force. La guerre est limitée dans le temps, la campagne se déroulant normalement dans la belle saison pour
se terminer avant l’hiver. En dehors des opérations mineures de harcèlement sur le territoire adverse, de
coups de mains pour détruire ses récoltes, ou des sièges pour lesquels l’infanterie est mal équipée, la
bataille décisive se livre sur un terrain choisi, un pedion où peuvent se déployer les deux phalanges de
fantassins lourdement harnachés...En principe l’ennemi n’a pas à être poursuivi; il faut et il suffit que sa
ligne n'ait pas tenu, qu’on soit resté maître du terrain, qu’il ait demandé à relever ses morts, qu’on ait édifié
un trophée. Le traité de paix n’aura plus qu’à consacrer ce pouvoir supérieur de cratein dont une des
parties aura, sur le champ de bataille, fourni contre l’autre la démonstration”.
16
Detienne 123-124
7
prisoners and non-combatants. Despite her qualifications, her essay lends to the agonistic
code a somewhat formal and legal nature which has proved attractive to successors.17
All of the above ideas were congenial to the general opinion of classicists,
especially in France, where Garlan and Lonis expanded on them in the years following.18
The number of prestigious names which were now advocating the kinship of battle and
agon in ancient Greece is remarkable; apparently a number of intellectual determinants
crystallized at just this time to endow the concept with tremendous appeal. The influence
of Lévi-Strauss is evident in the tendency to treat agonistic battle as a cultural axiom
rather than a result of historical causes. One also senses that the particular elegance of
this vision shares a general affinity with French martial institutions as a whole; these
came of age during the Enlightenment era and have forever afterward been stamped by a
certain classicism.19 More immediate events may also have left their mark here. The
warfare project of the Centre de Recherches Comparées began in 1964, hard on the heels
of the Algerian War, which caused such a rift between the intelligentsia and political
authorities; American society was soon to know this phenomenon as well. One of the
contributors to Vernant’s collection, Pierre Vidal-Naquet, was also a standard-bearer in
the intellectuals’ dissidence toward the Algerian War; a good one-third of his opus
consists of protest literature. His essay “La Tradition de l’Hoplite Athénien” is suffused
with the agonistic mentality; the battlefield is “fixed by common accord” in the pristine
times, whereas during the Peloponnesian War, “battle becomes far more costly, the
agonistic spirit yielding to the will to annihilate, while the war of ‘coups de mains’
(surprise attacks), of ‘commandos’, of ‘guerrillas’, of which the heroes are the peltasts,
17
de Romilly (1968) 211-212
18
Garlan (1972) 14-17, 95, 198; Lonis (1979) 25-40
8
competes in the battle”; observe his employment of three terms well-known from the
Algerian maquis.20
It does not seem too much to suggest that some of the proponents of the hoplite
agon reacted to the tribulations of their own times by adhering to an alternative, a more
graceful manner of battle. In the present, they saw a war which they considered a great
power’s abuse of colonial victims, and which tended to the dissolution of societal bonds –
did this encourage them to see in antiquity a style of waging war strictly between peers,
which promoted civic identity? As noted, the experience of a traumatic war and
intellectual disaffection was soon to reproduce itself in America, where a version of the
agonistic model has become as prevalent as it has in France among students of Greek
warfare. Through the twentieth century there was mounting a sense that war had lost all
human scale; a recent essay on agonistics writes of:
...the Materialschlacht of World War I and the Holocaust and Hiroshima of

World War II, all of which demonstrated only too well that the agon in the
original sense of combative honor has long been overtaken and dishonored by
technologized procedures of impersonal, instantaneous mass extermination.21
By the age of Algeria and Vietnam this disillusion had engendered visions of an older
and better world, often verging into idealism. In 1966 Norman Brown wrote:
In the archaic age, the age of the pre-Socratic philosophers, the sixth century BC,
the era of Spartan hegemony, the relations between cities were fraternal and
agonal; a concordia discors, out of opposites the fairest harmony...The old
agonal warfare was between brothers; conducted according to rules; limited in
objective and limited in time, in a necessary alternation of peace and war; the
19
See Lynn
20
Vidal-Naquet (1968) 166: “fixé d’un commun accord”; 173: “la bataille devient beacoup plus
coûteuse, l’esprit agonistique cédant à la volonté d’anéantissement, cependant que la guerre de ‘coups de
mains’, de ‘commandos’, de ‘guérillas’, dont les héros sont les peltastes, fait concurrence à la bataille.”
21
Lungstrum and Sauer 2
9
brothers need each other to fight another day. The new warfare is total; it seeks
an end to war, an end to brotherhood.22
In 1983 came the first edition of Hanson’s Warfare and Agriculture in Classical
Greece with its thesis that the practice of ravaging enemy land did no crushing material
damage but constituted another element of the hoplite protocol, a form of psychological
challenge; thus Hanson continued a proclivity to diminish the destructive capacity of
ancient Greek battle. W. Robert Connor, who had elsewhere written vividly of the
Vietnam War’s consequences on his perspective23, published the essay “Early Greek
Land Warfare as Symbolic Expression” in 1988. The works of Walter Burkert as well as
the French scholars were influential here: “Land warfare for the early Greeks was an
elaborate and stylized system; it constituted a code, functioned as a ritual, especially in its
echoes of the Greek pattern of animal sacrifice, and as a representation of social
reality”24; in consequence, like a sacrificial festival, it strengthened the communal
solidarity of the polis. A new era was at hand. The following year arrived Hanson’s The
Western Way of War (1989), followed by the collection Hoplites: The Classical Greek
Battle Experience (1991), which took Vernant’s 1968 volume as a point of departure, and
The Other Greeks (1995). This body of work has set the tone for the currently reigning
communis opinio: “From that agrarian phalanx evolved an entire protective mechanism of
rules and practices that ensured the importance of geôrgoi in the nascent community for
nearly three centuries”.25 Hanson’s great contribution has been to find a credible cause
for the hoplite protocol. He locates it in an agrarian basis, presenting the conventions as a
22
Brown 18-19
23
Connor (1984) 7
24
Connor (1988) 29
25
Hanson (1995) 239
10
matter of mutual consent among farmers to settle conflicts quickly and decisively, with a
minimum of damage to their own lives and to the fields on which these depended, either
through outright destruction or through neglect born of long training and campaigns. A
typical summation is the following:
Hoplite battle...for over two centuries was real war in an artificial climate – the
private domain of a rural, middle class where all of like circumstance could fight
and yet never really endanger their mutual agricultural prosperity. For one of the
few times in history, bloodletting served in the long run to spare, rather than to
expend, lives. In short, Greek warfare for over two centuries was a wonderful,
absurd conspiracy.26
Hanson prefers terms more accessible terms such as “protocol” and “ritual” to agon, but
the above statement has very much in common with an “agonistic” vision of phalanx
battle.
Thus the theory of an agonal code in Greek warfare has proved durable both in
time and space; its first symptoms appear in the nineteenth century, and in matured in the
twentieth in the work of three major “schools”. The first, which emerged mainly in
Germany around 1930, was inspired by Burckhardt’s conception of the “agonal man”.
The second flourished in the 1960’s and ’70’s; while Brelich’s work gave the impetus, it
pervades French scholarship especially, and has a Structuralist tone. The most recent
school of interpretation centers around the work of Hanson and Ober, and stresses the
interconnection of agonistic protocols and the agrarian cycle. For long it was one of the
least criticized concepts in classical studies, generating no significant opposition before
the recent work by Peter Krentz. He has pointed out an uncomfortably high incidence of
contrary practice even before the Peloponnesian War, and demonstrated the infirmity of
26
Hanson (1993) 6
11
the evidence for most of the laws which have been tabulated. Noting that much of the
ancient evidence attesting the code dates from periods later than when it allegedly held
sway, he proposes that the Persian War victories resulted in a glorification of phalanx
combat27, readily perpetuated by the likes of Isocrates, Demosthenes, and Polybius.
The above survey mentions most of the major authors associated with this theme;
the next stage is to consider the ancient evidence which they most commonly adduce, and
we should begin with a word on the terminology. The use of agon’s adjectives in the
study of warfare is modern; neither the Greek ἀγωνιστικός nor the Latin agonalis appears
in any military context. Writers now use their derivants ‘agonistic’ and ‘agonal’
interchangeably, although Ehrenberg at least insisted on a conceptual difference between
the two.28 These terms obviously imply analogy with athletic competition, and their root
word ἀγών has received thorough study.29 When modern scholars speak of the classical
Greek battle as an agon30, they are making the term imply a distinction which the
ancients would not have recognized. By the early fifth century any type of struggle could
be dubbed an agon. This word and its verbal derivatives, when applied to armed conflict
by classical Greek authors, do not distinguish a ‘limited’ conflict from war à outrance
(they first seem to do so in Strabo). Schaefer implies that Greek enemies were viewed
mainly as antagonistai or antipaloi and barbarians as polemioi31, and this belief appears
to have influenced subsequent thought.32 But it finds no linguistic support. Herodotus
27
Krentz (2002)
28
Ehrenberg 64
29
Ellsworth, esp. 56-94
30
e.g, Vernant 21; Detienne 123
31
Schaefer 176-177
32
e.g., Berve (1966) 9; Ober (1994) 18; Lonis (1969) 1-2, 149ff., where this viewpoint is
contested; Feugère 9-10
12
has ἀνταγωνιευµένους for Ionians fighting Phoenicians (5.109.2) and ἀντίπαλοι for the
Persian foe (7.236.2). We also find such phrases as ἀνταγωνιστὰς τοῖς βαρβάροις for
Athens’ ancestral hatred of barbarians (Isoc. 4.75). Polemioi is of course an ordinary
expression for Greek enemies (Hdt. 1.30.5, 6.77.3, 7.149.3)
If the notion of the phalanx agon has no basis in the ancient terminology, it must
be sought in the narrative details. In examining the major authors, it becomes apparent
that there are four major sources or incidents commonly cited, two from the Archaic
period and two from periods later than the alleged floruit of agonistic protocols. They
are:
1) the Lelantine War (Archil. F 3; Plb. 13.3.4; Str. 10.1.12)
2) the Battle of the Champions (Hdt. 1.82)
3) Demosthenes’ Third Philippic, on Philip’s military practices (9.47-52)
4) Polybius 13.3, contrasting the wars of former times with those of the present (part of
which also figures as evidence for the Lelantine War)
Many other passages can be, and have been, cited, but very few can stand on their own;
they must be interpreted in light of the above four if they are to serve as evidence for
agonism. For example, Mardonius’ famous depiction of hoplite battle (Hdt. 7.9B.1), has
struck some readers as describing a staged event, as though we should imagine a search
for a suitable field upon which the armies agree to muster by appointment.33 But such a
conclusion goes well beyond the Herodotean text itself, and requires a reading
predisposed by the above passages of Demosthenes or Polybius.
The two dozen-odd individual battles before the Peloponnesian War for which
testimony survives do not uniformly display the agonal characteristics mentioned at the
13
beginning. Two of them do: a Lelantine War encounter of uncertain date, and the Battle
of the Champions for the plain of Thyreatis, ca. 544 BC. The ancient testimonia are
summarized below:
I) The Lelantine War
Strabo, following Ephorus, speaks of a treaty between Chalkis and Eretria, recorded in
the temple of Artemis Amarynthia in the latter city:
Τὸ µὲν οὖν πλέον ὡµολόγουν ἀλλήλαις αἱ πόλεις αὗται, περὶ δὲ Ληλάντου

διενεχθεῖσαι οὐδ’ οὕτω τελέως ἐπαύσαντο, ὥστε τῷ πολέµῳ κατὰ αὐθάδειαν
δρᾶν ἕκαστα, ἀλλὰ συνέθεντο, ἐφ’ οἷς συστήσονται τὸν ἀγῶνα. δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ
τοῦτο ἐν τῷ Ἀµαρυνθίῳ στήλη τις, φράζουσα µὴ χρῆσθαι τηλεβόλοις. καὶ γὰρ
δὴ καὶ τῶν πολεµικῶν ἐθῶν καὶ τῶν ὁπλισµῶν οὐθὲν οὔτ’ ἐστὶν οὔτ’ ἦν ἔθος·
(10.1.12)
(“For the most part these cities were in mutual accord, and in fighting over Lelanton they
did not so completely cease from this as to act ruthlessly toward each other in the war,
but they came to agreement on what terms they would join battle (ἀγῶνα). The stele in
the Amarynthion testifies to this, stating that there would be no use of long-range
missiles. And truly, there neither was nor is any custom concerning rules of war or
weapons”).
The particles in the last sentence, which point up the remarkable ciricumstances of this
war, are difficult to render in English. The choice of the word ἀγών for once has special
significance; Strabo alone apparently restricts it to fights governed by fixed rules, a trait
seen in no earlier author34; thus he also uses it for the Battle of the Champions (8.6.17)
and for a combat of gladiators (6.2.6), instead of his more usual µάχη. Strabo continues,
33
Ehrenberg 88-89; Detienne 124; Vidal-Naquet (1968) 166; Dawson 49
34
Ellsworth 56-94; Parker 117-118; Wheeler (1987) 162
14
in 10.1.13, by attesting the renown of the ancient Euboeans in hand-to-hand combat. All
of this information shows affinities with the well-known lines of Archilochus:
οὔτοι πόλλ’ ἐπὶ τόξα τανύσσεται, οὐδὲ θαµειαὶ

σφενδόναι, εὖτ’ ἂν δὴ µῶλον Ἄρης συνάγῃ
ἐν πεδίῳ· ξιφέων δὲ πολύστονον ἔσσεται ἔργον·
ταύτης γὰρ κεῖνοι δάµονές εἰσι µάχης
δεσπόται Εὐβοίης δουρικλυτοί.
(F 3 West)
(“Many bows will not be stretched, nor will there be thick-falling slingstones, if Ares
brings on the tumult in the plain. It will be the lamentable work of swords. For the
spear-famed lords of Euboia are skilled in that sort of battle”).
Finally, Polybius may have the same compact in mind when he speaks of the penchant
for honorable conduct in war among the earlier Greeks, with which he contrasts the
habits of Philip V:
διὸ καὶ συνετίθεντο πρὸς σφᾶς µήτ’ ἀδήλοις βέλεσι µήθ’ ἑκηβόλοις χρήσασθαι
κατ’ ἀλλήλων, µόνην δὲ τὴν ἐκ χειρὸς καὶ συστάδην γινοµένην µάχην ἀληθινὴν
ὑπελάµβανον εἶναι κρίσιν πραγµάτων. (13.3.4)
(“Therefore they agreed not to use unseen nor long-range missiles against one another,
and believed the closed hand-to-hand battle to be the only true judge of affairs”).
The relationship between the three texts raises enormous complications, as does
the Lelantine War in general. W.G. Forrest has rejected the historicity of Strabo’s report
altogether35, and Everett Wheeler also vigorously opposes the existence of the Chalkis-
Eretria treaty, tracing its invention to Ephorus and the pan-Hellenic climate of the fourth
century, a highly plausible scenario given the nature of that period.36 In this case, of
35
Forrest 162-164
36
Wheeler (1987) 174ff.
15
course, the verses of Archilochus would mean only that the redoubtable Euboean lords
preferred close combat to keeping their distance (cf. the boast of Idomeneus, “I don’t
fancy standing far from my enemies when I fight”, Il. 13.262-263: οὐ γὰρ ὀΐω/ ἀνδρῶν
δυσµενέων ἑκὰς ἱστάµενος πολεµίζειν). Later writers then forced the lines to mean an arms-
control agreement. This suggestion receives support from Archilochus’ use of a future
conditional sentence (εὖτ’ ἂν) in lines 2-3, which would seem to make the war a
possibility rather than an event already covenanted.37 But Victor Parker has defended the
treaty’s authenticity, and those who do the same will certainly find themselves in good
company.38 For our purpose it suffices that, despite reservations, one cannot prove the
treaty spurious with no more text or details than we possess.
II) The Battle of the Champions
The account of this affair, given by Herodotus (1.82), is less problematical in terms of
narrative or chronology. It is placed at the time of Cyrus’ Lydian campaign, hence ca.
544:
1)...τοῖσι δὲ καὶ αὐτοῖσι [sc. τοῖσι Σπαρτιήτῃσι] κατ’ αὐτὸν τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον
συνεπεπτώκεε ἔρις ἐοῦσα πρὸς Ἀργείους περὶ χώρου καλεοµένου Θυρέης...3)
βοηθησάντων δὲ Ἀργείων τῇ σφετέρῃ ἀποταµνοµένῃ, ἐνθαῦτα συνέβησαν ἐς
λόγους συνελθόντες ὥστε τριηκοσίους ἑκατέρων µαχέσασθαι, ὁκότεροι δ’ ἂν
περιγένωνται, τούτων εἶναι τὸν χῶρον· τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τοῦ στρατοῦ
ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι ἑκάτερον ἐς τὴν ἑωυτοῦ µηδὲ παραµένειν ἀγωνιζοµένων τῶνδε
εἵνεκεν, ἵνα µὴ παρεόντων τῶν στρατοπέδων ὁρῶντες οἱ ἕτεροι ἑσσουµένους τοὺς
σφετέρους ἐπαµύνοιεν. 4) συνθέµενοι ταῦτα ἀπαλλάσσοντο, λογάδες δὲ
ἑκατέρων ὑπολειφθέντες συνέβαλον. µαχοµένων δὲ σφεων καὶ γινοµένων
ἰσοπαλέων ὑπελίποντο ἐξ ἀνδρῶν ἑξακοσίων τρεῖς, Ἀργείων µὲν Ἀλκήνωρ τε καὶ
Χρόµιος, Λακεδαιµονίων δὲ Ὀρθρυάδης· ὑπελείφθησαν δὲ οὗτοι νυκτὸς
ἐπελθούσης. 5) οἱ µὲν δὴ δύο τῶν Ἀργείων ὡς νενικηκότες ἔθεον ἐς τὸ Ἄργος,
ὁ δὲ τῶν Λακεδαιµονίων Ὀθρυάδης σκυλεύσας τοὺς Ἀργείων νεκροὺς καὶ
προσφορήσας τὰ ὅπλα πρὸς τὸ ἑωυτοῦ στρατόπεδον ἐν τῇ τάξει εἶχεν ἑωυτόν.
ἡµέρῃ δὲ δευτέρῃ παρῆσαν πυνθανόµενοι ἀµφότεροι. 6) τέως µὲν δὴ αὐτοὶ
ἑκάτεροι ἔφασαν νικᾶν, λέγοντες οἱ µὲν ὡς ἑωυτῶν πλεῦνες περιγεγόνασι, οἱ δὲ
37
Forrest 163; Wheeler (1987) 162
38
Parker 100-102
16
τοὺς µὲν ἀποφαίνοντες πεφευγότας, τὸν δὲ σφέτερον παραµείναντα καὶ
σκυλεύσαντα τοὺς ἐκείνων νεκρούς. 7) τέλος δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἔριδος συµπεσόντες
ἐµάχοντο· πεσόντων δὲ καὶ ἀµφοτέρων πολλῶν ἐνίκων Λακεδαιµόνιοι. (1.82)
(“At this same time a strife arose between the Spartans and the Argives over the land
called the Thyrea... When the Argives came to the rescue of their captured territory, they
held a parley and agreed that three hundred men from each side would do battle, and that
the land would belong to whoever prevailed. The mass of the army withdrew each to his
own side so as to leave the combatants alone, lest, if the forces were present, they might
attempt to help their own men when they saw them imperilled. They agreed to these
terms and departed, and the chosen men who remained of each side joined battle. They
fought and proved equal in the contest, and out of the six hundred men there remained
three, Alkenor and Chromios of the Argives, and Orthryades of the Spartans. These still
survived as night came on. The two Argives, supposing they had won, ran back to Argos,
while the Spartan Orthryades stripped the Argive dead, and after carrying the arms back
to his own camp remained in his position. On the next day both sides came to learn what
had happened. For some time they both claimed to have won, the one side saying that
more of their men had survived, and the other, that their man remained on the field and
stripped the enemy dead. At last they fell from arguing to fighting. After many had
fallen on both sides the Spartans prevailed”).
Here the word ἀγωνιζοµένων (1.82.3) means nothing more specific than “fighting” or
“doing battle”, as Herodotus uses the verb elsewhere in this sense (1.76.4; 1.77.5;
5.103.1; 6.45.2). This tale obviously was becoming mythologized by the point when
Herodotus set it down, and invites some challenges to its historicity. Luigi Moretti
suggests a memorable encounter between two units, one probably the Spartan Hippeis, in
17
one sector of the larger battle, which oral tradition made into a discrete event39; or a
glorified border clash leading to a more serious conflict.40 The work of legend may
indeed have woven a more archaic practice into the historical account, but nevertheless,
the mass duel of picked warriors is a well-attested institution in Indo-European cultures,
as well as others, and this aspect of the story cannot be dismissed out of hand.41
The first of the above two cases displays a pre-battle agreement touching on
weapons; the second is more detailed, restricting the number of combatants, enjoining the
rest of the army to withdraw, stipulating a certain prize for the victors, and perhaps also
fixing the boundaries of the battlefield. The latter provision is made somewhat more
obvious in the preliminary terms drawn up by Spartan and Argive delegates in 420,
proposing another battle for the Thyreatis under the same conditions as the earlier affair:
διώκειν δὲ µὴ ἐξεῖναι περαιτέρω τῶν πρὸς Ἄργος καὶ Λακεδαίµονα ὅρων (“pursuit would not
be permitted beyond the borders of Argos and Lacedaimonia”, Thuc. 5.41.2). The extant
accounts of other hoplite battles afford no clear parallels to these two cases. Efforts to
see in historical conflicts some tacit agreement to banish weapons other than the
traditional hoplite armament, or to determine a battlefield in advance, have already been
cross-examined by Krentz.42
But a different tradition does afford many analogies: the single combat by
consent. Most of the examples come from legendary matter, though a few are recorded
for historical times. The notable monomachies were already known to Glotz, and have
39
Moretti 209-212; also Detienne 135-137
40
Tomlinson 88
41
Examples include: the Combat of Thirty in Brittany (1351); the battle of sixty clansmen of
MacDonald and Cuwhele fought before Robert III of Scotland (1396, the theme of Scott’s Fair Maid of
Perth); the Challenge of Barletta, between thirteen each of French and Italian knights (1503). The
phenomenon is known also among Australian and Siberian native peoples. See Kiernan 22-23.
42
Krentz (2002) 27-29
18
also been tabulated by A. Armstrong, Pritchett, and Fernandez Nieto, who has added
valuable comments and bibliography.43 Duels which share some features with the treaty
of Artemis Amarynthia or with the Battle of the Champions include the following:
1) Paris and Menelaus in the Iliad: The terms of this combat, sealed with oath and
sacrifice (3.268-291), provide a specific aethlon for the victor: if Menelaus prevails,
the Trojans restore Helen and pay an indemnity; if Paris wins, he keeps Helen and the
Achaians depart. The duelling arena seems to have appointed boundaries: Ἕκτωρ δὲ
Πριάµοιο πάις καὶ δῖος Ὀδυσσεὺς/ χῶρον µὲν πρῶτον διεµέτρεον (“Hector son of Priam and
the godlike Odysseus first measured off the ground”, 3.314-315). There is also some
regulation of the use of weapons: drawing of lots awards the right of the first spear-
cast (3.315-317). The intervention of Pandarus with his bow negates the agreement
(4.112-168) – the Spartans and Argives had taken care to avoid just such a mischance
(Hdt. 1.82.3). The duel of Hector and Ajax at 7.37ff. has much less formality, and
that between Hector and Achilles none to speak of (22.90ff.); conventions thus
deteriorate as the war increases in scope.
2) Nestor and Ereuthalion: A scholion to the Iliad (Ariaithos FGrH 316 F 7) elucidates
the combat with the Arcadian king narrated by Nestor in Il. 7.132-160, fought over a
border region. The significance of the combat arena’s boundaries nowhere receives
greater emphasis: one of two versions recounts that Nestor first defeated Ereuthalion,
apparently without dealing him a lethal wound, and through joy leapt over the
boundaries of the lists. The Arcadians then claim that Ereuthalion has rightfully won,
since he has remained within bounds. A second round is fought with the boundaries
43
Glotz 273-274; Armstrong; Pritchett (IV 1985) 17-20; Fernandez Nieto (I) 37-69; (II) 11-46
19
clearly marked (καὶ συµβαλόντες ἐκ δευτέρου περιγράφουσι χωρίον) and Ereuthalion is
slain.
3) Melanthos (or Melainos) and Xanthios: This is another instance of a monomachia by
consent for possession of a territory. Strabo explicitly compares the longstanding
conflict of Athens and Boiotia over the frontier region of Oropus to that of Argos and
Sparta for the Thyreatis (1.4.7). Hellanikos (FGrH 4 F 125) and Ephorus (FGrH 70 F
22) provide the chief accounts44, and Vidal-Naquet has written a noted
interpretation.45 The mythical Boiotian king, Xanthios, is slain by Melainos either
through a ruse, or through the intervention of Dionysus, and Attika wins possession
of the territory. Pausanias 9.5.16 adds that the Boiotians swear off of monarchy, and
implicitly monomachies, thereafter.
4) Hyllus and Echemus: Herodotus 9.26.3-5 recounts that Hyllus led the Heracleidae to
the Isthmus, where the Peloponnesians had gathered to oppose them. Hyllus
challenges his enemies to send forth a champion for a duel on the following terms: if
Hyllus prevails, the Heracleidae will take possession of the Peloponnese; if he is
defeated, they will withdraw and attempt no further invasion for a hundred years.
Hyllus proposes this explicitly to spare the mass of the armies, the most frequently
attested justification for single combat: ὡς χρεὸν εἴη τὸν µὲν στρατὸν τῷ στρατῷ µὴ
ἀνακινδυνεύειν συµβάλλοντα (“we must avoid the peril of army clashing with army”,
9.26.3; see also Il. 3.99-102; Eur. Phoin. 1227-1228; Theoc. 22.171-180; Str. 8.3.33;
Livy 1.23.9; Plu. Mor. 309D). The Tegean king Echemus answers the challenge and
kills Hyllus.
44
See Brelich (53) for other references.
45
Vidal-Naquet (1986)
20
5) Perinthians and Paionians: Herodotus 5.1.2-3 tells of the Paionians making war upon
the Perinthians at the prompting of an oracle, dated only as long prior to Darius’
campaign in the Hellespont (5.2.1). A triple combat between pairs of men, horses,
and dogs precedes a general engagement won by the Paionians. This and the example
below comprise the closest Greek analogies to the Battle of the Champions.
6) Tegeans and Pheneans: To end a taxing war, both the parties agree to a triple duel
between pairs of brothers; after two Tegeans fall, the one survivor succeeds in
dispatching all three Pheneans by shamming flight (Plu. Mor. 309D). This tale
apparently inspired that of the Horatii and Curiatii (Livy 1.23-26).
7) Pittacus and Phrynon: This duel in the course of Athens’ and Mytilene’s dispute over
Sigeion and Axileis (607 BC) testifies to some sense of propriety over choice of
weapons. According to Polyaenus 1.25, the combatants had agreed to the same
weapons beforehand, but Pittacus slew the Athenian general with the help of a net
hidden under his shield. Apparently this gave the Athenians cause for disputing the
decision, and Diogenes Laertius reports that Periander of Corinth arbitrated in their
favor (1.74). Herodotus 5.95 reports Periander’s arbitration similarly but does not
mention the duel (earning Plutarch’s censure, Mor. 858A).
The nature of the above material renders it impossible to establish the historical
details of any particular judicial combat. The institution was dwindling even before
historical times superseded myth. The last monomachia recorded from the world of the
polis took place in the Aiginetan war of the 480’s, between the Argive Eurybates and
Sophanes of Dekeleia (Hdt. 6.92, 9.75), and to all appearances was not a judicial combat.
There are later occurrences among Macedonians and Epirots, a fact significant in itself,
21
as these peoples still bore some traits characteristic of a pre-polis state of development
(Diod. 17.19, 18.31; Plu. Pyrrh. 7, Demetr. 41). There is also one notice for Hieron of
Syracuse in the third century (Just. 23.4.12), as well as some impromptu battlefield
combats in Homeric style, such as those fought by Philopoimen (Plu., Philop. 7.6; Plb.
11.18). But we can isolate the agonistic features which the earlier combats share with the
Lelantine and Thyreatic wars:
- most represent true judicial combats fought under terms, which most commonly
award possession of territory to the victor;
- the usual cause is to restrict the dangers to those most immediately concerned and
spare the majority (see 4 above);
- occasionally (1 and 2) there is an effort to limit the space of the encounter, basically
as a practical device to restrict flight and force the action, though the creation of
“ritual space” is probable here also46;
- multiple combats are attested (5 and 6);
- at least one case testifies to some agreement concerning the weapons to be used (7).
Study of the agonistic judicial duel in Greece has made no great advance since Glotz in
1904, who defined it thus: “that which gives a judicial character to the duel is the prior
contract, by virtue of which it has for its sanction the settlement of a legal dispute. The
challenge is a secondary matter. The manner of combat is of little importance”.47 This
differs somewhat from the definition of agonistic hoplite battle deduced at the beginning
of this chapter, wherein the alleged protocols on which the sides have tacitly agreed
46
See Huizinga 120-121
22
concern the conduct of the battle more than a specific point of contention. But the
essential point remains the same: the combat has a contractual nature. The story of David
and Goliath provides a fine illustration: “choose you a man for you, and let him come
down to me. If he be able to fight with me and to kill me, then will we be your servants:
but if I prevail against him, and kill him, then shall ye be our servants, and serve us” (1
Samuel 17:8-9).
There are some further characteristics to be emphasized in the judicial duel. All
of the Greek testimonia recount duels fought to settle disputes between peoples, and no
clear-cut individual case exists, legendary or historical, of the gaige de bataille between
members of one community, of the sort well known from medieval law. Athenaeus 154D
does indicate that Demonax established this custom in the Mantineian and Cyrenean
constitutions ca. 55048, and Glotz believes that traces thereof may be seen in the duel of
Ajax and Diomedes for Sarpedon’s armor (Il. 23.802-825), and in such myths as the
chariot race of Oinomaus. But the institution dissipated more rapidly in Greece than in
medieval Europe, from lack of monotheistic belief in an impartial God who would
vindicate the just party49, to be replaced by litigating procedures. Glotz does not clarify
why, if mythology reflects any genuine practice, the judicial combat remained more
prevalent in conflicts between peoples, but the answer is probably the obvious one, the
lack of legal alternatives outside the sphere of a homogeneous community. Strabo felt it
to be a characteristic institution of early Greece: εἰς µονοµαχίαν προελθεῖν κατὰ ἔθος τι
47
Glotz 273: “Ce qui donne au duel un caractère juridique, c’est le contrat préalable en vertu
duquel il a pour sanction le règlement d’une question litigieuse. Le défi est chose secondaire. La manière
de se battre importe peu”. On the conventions of single combat see also Fernandez Nieto (I) 37-69.
48
Glotz 282; Wheeler (1982) 226
49
Glotz 278-287
23
παλαιὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων (“to come forth to single combat according to an ancient custom of
the Greeks”, 8.3.33).
But even in this form it did not outlive the Archaic period. The latest example
from our list which can be dated is the duel of Pittacus and Phrynon in 607 BC. If less
sanguinary legal mechanisms ousted it from individual communities, we must ask what
causes gradually expunged it as a means of ameliorating warfare. V. Ilari has proposed a
similar legal phenomenon here: from the sixth century on, arbitration grew increasingly
more common in disputes over border regions, and settled many of the less serious
quarrels which in earlier times would have required a champion’s spear50; more deeply
rooted conflicts, by contrast, still provoked mass battles. The state of knowledge for the
Archaic period of course makes any such theory difficult to prove or refute definitively,
and I wish to suggest a different perspective on the disappearance of arbitration by
monomachy. The known examples date from a period when war was very likely to be a
private, “pre-state” affair51, touching most immediately the interests of kings, oligarchs,
and, later, tyrants, additions to whose domains much resembled those to a private estate.
The Iliad presents the most detailed portrait of the phenomenon, down to the grievances
of allies and dependents not receiving the rewards of the principals and hence not sharing
their enthusiasm (Achilles at 1.148-171; Thersites at 2.225-242). Under these conditions
there could exist a procedure for confining the dangers of war to those most affected.
The monomachy’s personal display of valor also, of course, reinforced the validity of an
individual’s rule. Pittacus indeed is said to have received the rule of the Mytileneans for
50
Ilari 60
51
Garlan (1972) 12
24
his victory over Phrynon (Diog. Laert. 1.75); Xanthios won the Attic throne by stepping
in for Thymoites.
Even so, if the legendary duels have any claim to verisimilitude, the custom can
hardly be called a stable or satisfactory form of litigation, as Armstrong has noted.52 The
tales fairly reek with ploys of ruse and deceit. In addition to those from the collection
above, we have the story of the Aetolian Pyraechmes, the Epeian Degmenos, and their
duel for possession of Elis (Strabo 8.3.33) – Degmenos appeared with a bow, expecting
his opponent to arrive with hoplite arms, but Pyraechmes, “when he learned of the ruse”
(ἐπειδὴ κατέµαθε τὸν δόλον), brought a sling and outranged his foe. A frequent motif in the
monomachy stories is the suggestion of an illicit helper. In the Iliad we see Aphrodite
and Pandarus coming to the succor of Paris (3.380-382; 4.93 ff.), and later Athena joining
Hector in the guise of Deiphobus (22.226 ff.). In the duel over the daughters of
Leucippus as told in Theocritus’ twenty-second Idyll, Idas and Polydeuces agree to stand
aside while Lynceus and Castor do battle; but when Lynceus falls, Idas moves to attack
his brother’s slayer, and Zeus in turn intervenes, destroying Idas with a thunderbolt (206-
211). The duel for Oropus climaxes when Melanthos deceitfully accuses Xanthios of
bringing a second to the combat – Xanthios turns to look behind and is struck down (thus
Hellanikos, FGrH 4 F 125; a scholion to Aristophanes Pax 890 explains this as an
epiphany of Dionysus). Yet another story has the Aenianian and Inachian kings, Phemius
and Hyperochus, duelling for the latter’s country. A dog follows Hyperochus to the
combat, and Phemius reproaches him for bringing an illegal second; when Hyperochus
turns to shoo the dog away, Phemius kills him with a rock (Plu. Mor. 294B-C). It would
52
Armstrong 74
25
seem that even picked champions often would not fight by the book when their lives were
at stake, and in such a climate of bad faith, without a third party to act as referee, it is
small wonder that we find a number of monomachies without satisfactory endings. A
duel would threaten to become a melee any time that sufficient numbers on either side
were willing and able to commit to a mass battle.
We should thus look for a change in the recipients on whom the benefits of a
winning combat would devolve. The rise of the demos and their expanded share in the
benefits of polis government must have made themselves felt in the realm of military
practice.53 Probably the hoplite revolution took place not only through the actual
mechanism of the phalanx – which appears to have some Near Eastern as well as
Homeric precursors - but in the morale of the soldiers who comprised it. They did not
invent the phalanx, but they made it effective to a degree thitherto impossible. The mass
levies of revolutionary France may present a similar case – if their column tactics were
not altogether new, still, “Revolutionary enthusiasm does seem to have been an important
element in French capability. It was probably necessary for the greater morale needed for
effective shock action....”.54 With the change of a few words, the same statement could
be made about the phalanx. Once war had become a civic concern, once all of the
potential fighters had their share in its potential profits and losses, the conditions
favorable to the judicial monomachy dissipated. The mindset which Pausanias attributes
to the Boeotians after the defeat of Xanthios well expresses the political aspect of the
monomachy: τὸ δὲ ἐντεῦθεν διὰ πλειόνων πολιτεύεσθαι µηδὲ ἀπ’ ἀνδρὸς ἑνὸς ἠρτῆσθαι τὰ
πάντα ἄµεινον ἐφαίνετο τοῖς Θηβαίοις (“from then on it appeared better to the Thebans to be
53
Detienne 141-142; Garlan (1972) 96; Hanson (1995)221-244; Raaflaub 132-141
54
Black 229
26
governed by a majority and not to let all depend on one man”, 9.5.16). S.P Oakley’s
study of Roman single combat reveals a pattern for the Republic similar on a number of
counts: there, too, judicial combat with enemy peoples became extinct at a very early
epoch, perhaps with the Servian reforms and the emergence of a capable rank and file,
and it has left even fewer traces in the Roman world than in Greece, with no historical
cases and only one from myth, the duel of the Horatii and Curiatii. Polybius, however,
asserts that it once existed among the Romans (6.54.4) and Oakley sees a vestige in the
rite of the spolia opima.55 The other manifestation of single combat, the impromptu
challenge within the frame of a larger conflict, persisted to a later period, as it did in
Greece, if the duel of Sophanes and Eurybates is any indication. But it was much more
common in the Roman army, perhaps out of the even greater prestige of martial feats in
their society vis-a-vis the Greek poleis; Oakley finds thirty-one incidents in Republican
history.
To return to the Lelantine War and the Battle of the Champions: the numerous
points of contact with the legendary duels, and the lack of similarity with the known
hoplite battles, indicate that these conflicts should not be classed with the latter at all, any
more than the combat of Phrynon and Pittacus. They belong to an earlier era of judicial
duelling. We know nothing more about the battle prescribed on the Amarynthian stele
than what Strabo has told, but if it took place at all, comparison suggests that it too
provides for a massed duel of chosen captains, a single incident in a longer war, similar to
the duel over Sigeion.56 Despite the criticisms their statements have received57, the old
55
Oakley 398
56
Parker’s belief (104 n.453) that the ban remained effective for the sixty years of the war rests on
the questionable assumption that the Amarynthian stele must mark the beginning of the war and is thus
earlier than the Archilochus fragment.
27
analyses of Von Scala58 and Gardner seem to have hit closest to the mark: speaking of the
ban on projectiles, the latter writes:
Such an agreement was unique, so far as I know, in ancient history.....It was a

kind of fighting match or ordeal by combat; and did not permanently embitter the
relations between the two cities. It was a knightly combat which taught the cities
to respect one another, but left little rancour. The Chalcidians were noted for
their knightly character.59
Though certain details here might raise objection, circumstances conducive to this
procedure did exist in archaic Euboea, where the Hippobotai ruled in Chalkis and horse-
loving aristocrats dominated Eretria as well (Hdt. 5.77.2-3; Arist. Pol. 1289B).60 The
lines of Archilochus also testify to the dominance of these noblemen on the battlefield:
ταύτης γὰρ κεῖνοι δάµονές εἰσι µάχης/ δεσπόται Ἐυβοίης δουρικλυτοί (F 3 West).61 Wheeler
has advanced an argument against identifying this combat as a type of monomachy the
major contention is that “the rules of monomachia did not prohibit missile weapons”.62
But the question here concerns a particular provision rather than the general rules. The
judicial monomachy in fact had no universal rules allowing or prohibiting anything; each
case depended upon an individual prior agreement, as Glotz has stated, and the examples
support him. Nothing prevented the Euboean champions from agreeing to interdict
projectiles. Terms of single combat do seem to have dealt with territory more often than
57
Parker 95
58
Cited and followed in Walbank (II 1967) 416
59
Gardner 91
60
An emendation suggested by C.F. Hermann (Die Kämpfe zwischen Chalkis und Eretria um das
lelantische Gefilde (Göttingen 1849) 194) to a scholion on Hesiod Op. 654-656, which cites Plutarch,
would make Amphidamas of Chalkis a casualty of a monomachy rather than a sea-battle during the
Lelantine War (µονοµαχοῦντα for ναυµαχοῦντα). This emendation would support the above thesis, but it does
not seem to me justifiable, being based on the argument that this date is too early for a naval battle.
Whether the sea-battle is historically accurate, and whether Plutarch wrote that it happened, are two
different questions.
61
Parker (13 n.12, 96 n.408) explains this as a literary convention, equivalent to similar
expressions in the Catalogue of Ships. But aristocrats also dominate the Iliad’s fighting and arrange duels.
28
weapons, but at least one duel, that of Pittacus and Phrynon, does show some concern
over equality of arms. If the weapons ban in the Chalkis-Eretria treaty was meant for a
full-scale phalanx battle rather than a massed duel, it represented a transitional phase, an
effort to adapt some of the ancient conventions to the hoplite age.63 This movement had
no future, so far as the extant sources record. It should be added as a final note that the
archaeological record does not support any widespread abstention from missiles in the
hoplite era; on the contrary, finds of arrowheads increase considerably after the Dark
Ages, and Snodgrass suggests that this resulted from the mass target afforded by the
serried phalanx.64 Strabo himself knew of no parallels to the Amarynthian treaty: καὶ τῶν
πολεµικῶν ἐθῶν καὶ τῶν ὁπλισµῶν οὐθὲν οὔτ’ ἐστὶν οὔτ’ ἦν ἔθος (10.1.12).
The Battle of the Champions is a clearer case. The duel of the six hundred should
never have been equated with a massed hoplite battle, such as in fact occurred on the
second day. The Herodotean narrative makes it clear that the first combat is a contracted
duel, a substitute phenomenon which vainly attempts to thwart a full-scale battle. This
type of ordeal is especially well known from the Middle Ages, but one could not
reconstruct medieval warfare from the “Combat of the Thirty” held in Brittany in 1351.
Nor would anyone wish to describe the wars of the Israelites and Philistines as agonistic,
based on the judicial duel of David and Goliath. The choice of three hundred champions
is an unusually large number, but that fact in itself may be revealing. The mid-sixth
century was long past the flourishing years of the judicial duel between communities, and
it made an ill match with the new social conditions. The much greater homogeneity of
62
Wheeler (1987) 171
63
Fernandez Nieto (I) 73-76
64
Snodgrass 156
29
the Spartan hoplites65 compared with a Homeric army made it difficult to single out
specific individuals, who had more reason for risking combat than any of their comrades.
Hence also the heightened danger of a melee and the special provision to avoid this
(1.82.3). It is small wonder that the judicial combat failed. The account might serve as a
parable of how artificial restraints and distinctions could no longer operate in the phalanx
era. Some sixty-five years later, at Plataia, the Spartans do not even deign to answer a
challenge by Mardonius proposing a mass duel very similar to that for the Thyreatis (Her.
9.48.4-49.1).
A postlude remains to the Battle of the Champions. Thucydides 5.41 relates the
proceedings over the Thyreatis in 420, when Sparta and Argos were attempting to reach
an alliance. The proposed terms would have allowed either city to challenge the other
anew for possession of the region, under agonistic rules as in the past (5.41.2: ὥσπερ καὶ
προτερόν ποτε, ὅτε αὐτοὶ ἑκάτεροι ἠξίωσαν νικᾶν, “such as they once did in the past, when
they both believed they had won”). It might at first appear that an agonal combat could
still be taken seriously in 42066, but Thucydides says essentially the opposite, reporting
that the Spartans considered it foolishness (µωρία, 5.41.3), though they acquiesced.
Probably the Argive ambassadors were under pressure from their compatriots to win
some concessions over the Thyreatis – it was the first point they addressed (5.41.1) – and
when the Spartans proved unyielding, they at least insisted on a concession “on paper”
and could technically claim they had fulfilled expectations. In any case the treaty was
never concluded, and no occurrence of such a contractual combat is known elsewhere at
this late period.
65
Much less is known of the Argives at this period (Tomlinson 87).
66
Thus Lonis (1979) 28-29
30
The arguments presented above lead to the conclusion that both later ancient
historians such as Polybius and Strabo, and their modern successors, have conflated the
properties of primitive judicial combat with the pitched battle. The agonistic features of
the ordeal by combat have no counterpart in a hoplite battle and are in fact antithetical to
it; their very purpose is to exclude mass involvement and restrict the circumference of
violence. The Iliad again reveals the difference most explicitly: the duel of Paris and
Menelaus, arranged by appointment, has a great deal of prescription; that of Hector and
Ajax, which arises spontaneously from a mass battle, is far less carefully regulated; the
mass combats themselves have no procedures at all. The significance of this fact for the
agonistic model of hoplite battle becomes obvious when one realizes to what extent the
latter relies on the Lelantine and Thyreatic wars as examples. Schaefer called both of
them to witness, as well as the triple combat of the Perinthians and Paionians, assuming
that these gave a fair illustration of Archaic warfare as a whole.67 Generalizations
appearing thereafter become even more explicit:
...rules of war were agreed upon by Chalcis and Eretria at the time of the
Lelantine War. If we bear in mind, in addition, the prearranged single combats
and truces of the Iliad and the efforts of the Amphictionic League to ameliorate
warfare, it may be possible to believe that the Greeks at one time tried to regulate
the use of weapons and to reduce warfare to pitched battles, more or less
prearranged.68
Brelich made the Lelantine and Thyreatic combats the basis of his work, comprising the
first third thereof, and his successors followed the example. Even in the Archaic period,
Sparta’s wars with Messenia and Tegea, or that of Croton and Sybaris, ill suit the model
of the tightly controlled ordeal by combat. Homeric mass armies fight when they
67
Schaefer 178-179
68
Larsen 259
31
encounter one another, on the first suitable ground, and with the most effective weapons
at their disposal. Fifth-century phalanx armies do the same. It would demand a very
great change of habit during the intervening years to make pitched battles by appointment
a widespread martial tradition.
Moving to the fourth century we find ourselves in another environment. The
Peloponnesian War brought a sea-change in martial attitudes; of that there is no question.
But instead of a decline from restricted to ruthless war, something closer to the opposite
may have taken place: the remorselessness of that conflict may have stimulated a
revulsion and led to calls for restraint between Greeks fighting Greeks.69 Traces of this
feeling appear even during the war, in several of Aristophanes’ dramas and in Gorgias’
Epitaphios (VS fr.5b). At times it produced more than words: Callicratidas, serving as
Spartan admiral in 406 BC, refused to enslave the Methymnean prisoners despite
pressure from his allies, declaring that while he was in command no Greek would be sold
as a slave (though in the end he did sell the captured Athenian garrison – Xen. Hell.
1.6.14-15). The calls gradually crescendo during the fourth century. One of the
grievances of Sparta which fomented the Elean War of 399 was occasioned when Agis, at
the behest of an oracle, attempted to make sacrifice at the sanctuary of Zeus for victory in
war, no doubt against Athens. The Eleans refused on the pretext that an ancient law
forbade consulting an oracle for victory against fellow Greeks (Xen. Hell. 3.2.22). This
was a spurious claim, a snub to the Spartans and taken as such – the ‘ancient law’ in fact
reflected the sentiment of the times. To the figure of Agesilaus became attached quite a
69
de Romilly (1968) 217-218; Kiechle 553-556
32
number of traits which accord well with the agonistic model of war. Xenophon reports
his clemency toward his enemies and his kindness to prisoners (Ages. 1.20-22). He
lamented the slaughter of his Greek enemies at Coroneia in 394, saying that such men
would have better served to conquer the barbarian (Ages. 7.5; Plut. Mor. 211 F). At the
same battle he allowed to depart unharmed some eighty foemen who had taken refuge in
a temple (Ages. 2.13, Hell. 4.3.20). He felt a victory over Greeks to be a misfortune, he
decried exterminating members of a kindred race, he spoke against enslaving Greek
cities, and he would not capture one if that would mean its destruction (Ages. 7.4-6).
Still, the Greeks’ incapacity to halt their carnage during the Corinthian and the Theban
wars and their willingness to invite Persia into their affairs, climaxing in the Peace of
Antalcidas, disillusioned the more reflective minds, and their desires for a more humane
environment, manifested especially in pan-Hellenism, were compounded by certain other
traits of the intellectual climate. In Athens particularly, the humiliating surrender, the
dismemberment of her empire, and her failure to revive it, all coalesced in a peculiar
image of the past, where nobility and moderation in warfare become reified from a
speculation to a historical practice; their fathers, they came to believe, had fought with a
chivalry long vanished from the world.
Lysias set the tone at the opening of the century in his funeral oration during the
Corinthian War. The ancient Athenians took Adrastus’ part for the sake of reverence
toward the gods and the common laws of Hellas:
καὶ οὐκ ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης ἐπαρθέντες µείζονος παρὰ Καδµείων τιµωρίας
ἐπεθύµησαν, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνοις µὲν ἀντὶ τῆς ἀσεβείας τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀρετὴν
ἐπεδείξαντο, αὐτοὶ δὲ λαβόντες τὰ ἆθλα ὧνπερ ἕνεκα ἀφίκοντο, τοὺς Ἀργείων
νεκρούς, ἔθαψαν ἐν τῇ αὑτῶν Ἐλευσῖνι. (Epitaphios 2.10)
33
(“And they did not become swollen by good fortune and desire a greater punishment
from the Cadmeans, but in place of the latters’ impiety showed them their own valor, and
having taken the prize on whose account they had set out, the bodies of the Argives, they
buried them in their own land of Eleusis”). The agonal imagery is stronger here
compared with the terse battle summations of Thucydides or Xenophon: the war with
Thebes becomes a contest of virtue over the prize of the fallen Argives, a contest wherein
Athens stays within bounds and does not harm her opponent more than victory demands.
This vision of antique piety emerges out of an implied contrast with more recent woes.
The hearers are probably meant to recall the conduct of the Thebans themselves when
tyche turned in their favor, refusing to return the Athenian bodies after Delion (424 BC,
Thuc. 4.97-99), or demanding the extirpation of Athens after her surrender (404, Xen.
Hell. 2.2.19-20). The rite of the epitaphios, with its consecration of past struggles, was
often repeated through the bloody years from the Peloponnesian War to Chaeronea and
contributed much to the emotional milieu which conceived the agonistic ideal of battle.
Some of the intellectual raw materials essential to the concept of military agonism
are present abundantly in Isocrates. Obvious among these are his intense pan-Hellenism,
which is always in proportion to the danger from the barbarian.70 He attributes it as well
to the national character of Athens as far back as the Ionian migrations, when Athens
rescued the Hellenes of Asia (4.34-37). He also extends it to the behavior of the Hellenes
in past wars. The forefathers of the Spartans and Athenians were wiser than the current
rulers; the latter seek to ruin each other and the rest of the cities, while the former held
their fellow Greek states as sacrosanct and directed their efforts against the common
barbarian enemy (12.161-163, Panathenaicus). During the Persian threat Sparta and
34
Athens carried out an agon of valor (οὐκ ἐχθροὺς ἀλλ’ ἀνταγωνιστὰς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς εἶναι
νοµίζοντες, 4.85; πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀγωνιῶντες, 4.91: “considering themselves to be not
enemies but competitors”, “in rivalry with one another”) rather than abetting the
barbarian to enslave fellow Greeks. The Athenians of old established the Olympic Truce
(rather than Iphitus of Elis, more generally credited), composing the quarrels among
Greeks and stengthening their sense of kinship (4.43). Justice rather than might has
decided the wars of the past (6.36, To Archidamus) and victories over Greeks have
always been matters of woeful necessity, eliciting tears rather than hymns (4.158). The
trophies of Spartans over barbarians inspire admiration, but those over their Greek foes
merit disgust (5.148, To Philip, quoting Gorgias (VS F 5b)). Those who prevail in war
are not those who destroy cities by force, but “those who take care for Hellas with greater
reverence and mildness” (τοὺς ὁσιώτερον καὶ πραότερον τὴν Ἑλλάδα διοικοῦντας, 14.39,
Plataicus). The dilemma of to dikaion and to sympheron which lies at the foundation of
Thucydidean politics would not appear to exist for Isocrates. Wars for the benefit of
Hellas are a historical fact, an ethical imperative, and a justification for Athenian
supremacy all at the same time.
In the same period, Plato’s Republic (ca. 380) emerged from the longings of the
spiritually tormented period when internecine Greek wars seemed to defy human powers,
unwanted but inescapable. In Book V (468 B – 471 C) is prescribed the standard of
conduct appropriate to Greek enemies as opposed to barbarians: Greeks will not be
reduced to slavery and none will so much as own a Greek slave. The victors will not
despoil the enemy dead, nor dedicate their arms in temples. Invaders of enemy territory
may not burn houses nor ravage the land, but will only take the year’s harvest. The latter
70
de Romilly (1968) 217
35
point occasions an exposition on the character of inter-Greek wars as familial disputes, to
be pursued only so far as necessary toward a reconciliation of the wayward members.
War against barbarians, by contrast, is natural, permanent and unrestricted. A sharpening
of hostile sentiment against Persia becomes discernible after the Peace of Antalcidas.
Plato by this set of agonistic protocols damns contemporary practices both
implicitly and explicitly: Ἐγὼ µέν, ἔφη, ὁµολογῶ οὕτω δεῖν πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους τοὺς
ἡµετέρους πολίτας προσφέρεσθαι· πρὸς δὲ τοὺς βαρβάρους, ὡς νῦν οἱ Ἔλληνες πρὸς ἀλλήλους
(471 B: “I agree, he said, that we must deal thus with enemies who are our own citizens,
but against the barbarians, as the Greeks now deal with one another”). It has been
claimed that he advocates a return to an earlier agonal style of war.71 But he nowhere
makes appeal to a better example from former days. If any of his protocols ever became
flesh, they did so during Plato’s lifetime rather than earlier. Protest against enslavement
of Greeks first went on record with Callicratidas, after the capture of pro-Athenian
Methymna in 406 BC (Xen. Hell. 1.6.14). The practice had been common through the
fifth century and in the sixth, to judge from the scant evidence for the latter, but swelled
to such appalling frequency during the Peloponnesian War that cries of protest make
themselves heard from higher-minded men such as Xenophon and Plato, though few
evidently heeded and mass enslavement remained a fixture of warfare through the fourth
71
e.g., de Romilly (1968) 217; Ilari 146: “Plato thought that, for the present, the idea of the
abolition of war among the Greek cities was not realizable. One should aim, however, toward its
humanization, re-instituting that old style which had distinguished the ancient agonal wars, fought (like the
battles cited in the Greater Alcibiades) to decide controversies pertaining to ‘justice’ ”. (“Platone riteneva
che, per l’immediato, l’idea dell’abolizione della guerra fra le città greche fosse irrealizabile. Si doveva
puntare, piuttosto, su una sua umanizzazione, riprendendo quel vecchio stile che era stato proprio delle
antiche guerre agonale, combattute (come le battaglie citate nell’ Alcibiade (Primo)), per decidere
controversie relative alla <giustizia>”)). The battles in the relevant passage of the Greater Alcibiades (112
A-C), including the Trojan War, Tanagra, and first Coronea, are indeed said to have been fought over
claims of justice, but do not have any of the usual agonal characteristics.
36
century.72 Despoliation of the enemy slain and dedication of their arms in sanctuaries
had long figured as one of war’s supreme honors73, with only the Spartans abstaining, as
Plutarch reports (Mor. 224 B & F).74 The pan-Hellenic shrines abounded with
dedications of Greek arms in Archaic times, and only by the fifth century, when we
should expect to see the collapse of agonistic restraints, does a decline of such offerings
appear to set in.75 Olympia harbored spoils taken from Thurians by Taras in the 430’s
(Meiggs and Lewis 57); Delphi received offerings from a battle between Tegea and
Mantineia in 423 BC (Thuc. 4.134), and from Agesilaus’ booty taken at Coroneia in 394
(Xen. Hell. 4.3.21).76 The words of Socrates in the Republic (469 E-470 A) imply that
the practice still continued ca. 380.
Socrates’ final postulate (470 A-471 B) would put an end to burning houses or
ravaging land (γῆς τµήσεως, γῆν τέµνειν) when campaigning against Greeks. We have
little indication that such humanity had been widely exercised in any earlier period,
although the idea must have exerted some attraction. Polybius tells of the ancient
immunity (patrion asylia) granted to the land of Elis by all the Greeks on account of the
Olympic Games, and apparently with the assumption of Elean neutrality; it supposedly
remained in force until 219 BC (Plb. 4.73.9-4.74.8). However, this asylia never existed;
Polybius has repeated a tale which probably originated with Ephorus (Strabo 8.3.33 (C
358) = FrGH 70 Ephorus F 115; see also Diod. 8.1; Strabo 8.3.30 (C 355) tells a similar
72
See Pritchett (V 1991) 226-234
73
See Jackson
74
Possibly contradicted by Hdt. 1.82.5, Thuc. 5.74.2; see Pritchett (III 1979) 292-293, Jackson
231-232, 241.
75
Jackson 246-247
76
Mistakenly reported as Asian booty by Pritchett (V 1991) 514
37
story of Pisa).77 So we have a historical fiction generated by the humanizing trend of the
fourth century. The few other protoypes for permanent asylia prior to the Hellenistic
period do not very well match Plato’s idea.78 There remain a few isolated occurrences.
Three Atthidographers, and perhaps Sophocles, affirm that the Lacedaimonian invaders
of Attica during the Peloponnesian War spared the sacred olive trees of Athena (µορίαι),
but this immunity did not extend to trees not boasting divine lineage (Androtion FGrH
324 fr.39; Philochorus FGrH 328 fr.125; Istros FGrH 334 fr.30; Sophocles OC 694-
706).79 Istros adds that the invaders spared the Marathonian Tetrapolis, where the
Herakleidai had come as suppliants. Plato himself here implies that during wars of stasis,
the parties on some occasions would refrain from destroying property and would only
seize the crops of their opponents (470 D-E). One interesting anecdote supports this:
Plutarch (Mor. 295 B-C) tells of early civil strife kindled by Corinth among the five
villages of the Megarid, when the enemies spared one another’s farmers and crops, and
treated captives with elaborate chivalry. Plutarch’s accounts of archaic Greece often
carry little historical weight, and serve rather to enhance a philosophical portrait of
Greece presented for the benefit of Trajan and Hadrian. The tale of the Megarid civil
strife comes by way of an etymology for an erroneous reading of the word doruxenos
(“ally”, not “captured guest” as Plutarch would have it); on the other hand, the tale is not
likely to have arisen from nothing simply for an etymology, and we cannot dismiss it out
of hand.
77
Bauslaugh 42-43; Rigsby 43-44. Some earlier writers, however, attributed Polybius’ story to
anti-Spartan sources ca 150; see Walbank (I 1957) 526.
78
Rigsby 44-53
79
Hanson (1998) 143-147, 236-237, 241-242
38
But such scruple could not have been common; Plato elsewhere deems civil wars
the cruellest of all conflicts (Leg. 629-630). All testimony for the wars of poleis makes
such torching and ravaging a routine business of campaigns prior to Plato’s time.80 His
heightened sensitivity to the matter may well result from the extremes of the
Peloponnesian War and the terrible devastation of Attica especially, which left deep
wounds in the Athenian psyche.81 It does not appear that these ethical objections had
great effect, although the idea of introducing some limits to agricultural devastation must
have continued to surface at times. Polybius takes up the complaint of Plato’s Republic
(a work known to him – 6.47.7) in castigating the destruction of trees and farming
equipment belonging to kindred peoples; damage which endures well past the term of
hostilities tends to foster perpetual hatred. Polybius too wishes that only the year’s
harvest be taken (τοὺς ἐπετείους καρποὺς παραιρεῖσθαι, 23.15.1 – cf. Plato’s phrase τὸν
ἐπέτειον καρπὸν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, Rep. 470 A).82 Once again, the idea of self-imposed limits on
agricultural damage, if not the practice, is a product of the 4th century and later, rather
than of the agonistic age.
In outlining the proper conduct toward enemy territory Plato explains his own
rationale at some length. Two sorts of human conflict exist, stasis and polemos, the
former between kindred and the latter between aliens. All the Greek race is kindred, a
common household, and conflicts between Greeks therefore represent stasis, a kind of
domestic disease, to be cured with only so much harshness as necessary. Martial force is
in fact merely an unfortunate expedient for restoring peace to the Hellenic household.
80
Ibid. 49-76
81
Ober (1985) 51-66
82
See Walbank (III 1979) 247
39
But all barbarians are enemies by nature (πολεµίους φύσει εἶναι, 470 C 6-7), and against
them polemos will be prosecuted without quarter.
The importance of this discourse can hardly be overstated both for its pan-
Hellenic expressions and its implicit declaration of eternal warfare upon barbarians.
Only in the early fourth century do we find an explicit code of restraint for inter-Greek
wars, which is expressly refused to barbarians. By modern consensus, these features of
the code should have been in place for at least two centuries, but Socrates shows no
knowledge of them. An exclusive code between Greeks demands a certain consciousness
of Hellenism which in turn demands a wider frame of Greek – Barbarian polarity. This
ideological structure did not mature until the fourth century, and it is in that period if ever
when we can begin to detect an agonistic attitude in warfare. At the beginning of this
chapter we have seen Agesilaus’ propensity toward moderation and humaneness in wars
against Greeks; Xenophon joins this to a proportionate inimicality toward the barbarian,
depicting his pan-Hellenism and his anti-barbarism in antithetically placed passages
(Ages. 7.4-7). In addition to his lament that the fallen of second Coroneia would have
better served to fight the barbarian, he spoke against annihilating the enemies of kindred
race, as that would deplete the numbers ready for the conquest of Asia (7.5-6). We
should note too that the understanding of the Iliad as a Hellenic venture against the
barbarian did not appear until the eve of the Peloponnesian War (Hdt. 1.4-5) and only
reached full development with Isocrates, Plato’s Laws, and the campaigns of Alexander.83
Many other readers beginning with Thucydides (1.3.3) have noticed the lack of a mature
Greek identity or any stringent barriers between Achaeans and barbarians in the Iliad
itself. Likewise, the pan-Hellenic mindset of the fourth century read a parallel into the
40
two great victories of 480, at Salamis over the Persians and at Himera over the
Carthaginians, as though a great common war against barbarians had been waged at
opposite ends of the Greek world.84
At all times we find that Greek unity and enmity against barbarians found their
strongest advocates at Athens, a fact which probably reflects something more than the
preponderant Athenian origin of the sources. Plato’s Menexenus is an important text for
themes already broached in the passage of the Republic above; the dialogues are probably
close in date. When Plato sets forth his own wartime protocols in the Republic (via
Socrates), he does not credit their observance to any Athenians of the past. In Aspasia’s
speech in the Menexenus, which parodies contemporary epitaphioi and other rhetorical
productions, we find that Athenians have been doing just that:
µετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πολλοῦ πολέµου γενοµένου, καὶ πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων

ἐπιστρατευσάντων καὶ τεµόντων τὴν χώραν καὶ ἀναξίαν χάριν ἐκτινόντων τῇ
πόλει, νικήσαντες αὐτοὺς ναυµαχίᾳ οἱ ἡµέτεροι καὶ λαβόντες αὐτῶν τοὺς
ἡγεµόνας Λακεδαιµονίους ἐν τῇ Σφαγίᾳ, ἐξὸν αὐτοὺς διαφθεῖραι ἐφείσαντο,
ἡγούµενοι πρὸς µὲν τὸ ὁµόφυλον µέχρι νίκης δεῖν πολεµεῖν, καὶ µὴ δι’ ὀργὴν ἰδίαν
πόλεως τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων διολλύναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς βαρβάρους µέχρι
διαφθορᾶς. (242 C-D)
(“After this a great war arose, and all the Hellenes took the field against us and ravaged
our land, showing poor gratitude to our city. But our men defeated them in a sea battle
and captured their Spartan leaders at Spagia, and though it was possible to kill them we
spared them, gave them back and made peace, for we felt that we ought make war against
a kindred race only to the point of victory, and not through one city’s wrath to destroy the
community of the Hellenes; but against the barbarians we would fight to the death”).
83
Ilari 74
84
Garlan (1970)
41
Thus, some fifty years after the Archidamian War, we learn that an agonistic code had
indeed been in force all along, which forbade war to the knife against a kindred Greek
race but reserved it for the barbarian; reverence for this had induced the Athenians to
spare their Spartan prisoners from Sphakteria (also Sphagia, which is the island’s current
name). Readers of Thucydides 4.41, who know of the Athenians’ decision to hold the
prisoners as hostages against the ungrateful Spartan incursions, and to kill them if
necessary, will know that Aspasia’s rendition of the affair falls little short of mendacity.
But it does indicate that, along with the general aggrandized vision of Athens’ past which
was taking shape after her defeat, some of her citizens had come to believe in, or at least
to speak of, a traditional magnanimity and forbearance displayed in her hostilities against
Greeks.85 When Socrates in the Republic speaks of a code of common humanity in Greek
warfare, he prescribes it for an imaginary city; when Aspasia speaks of it, she pretends
that it actually exists.
As often happens, the desire for a mitigated form of hostilities against Hellenes
proceeds in tandem with an identity defined largely in antithesis to the barbarian world:
πρὸς µὲν τὸ ὁµόφυλον µέχρι νίκης δεῖν πολεµεῖν....πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους µέχρι διαφθορᾶς. This
claim of moderation toward Greek foes is embedded in an interpretation of Athens which
makes opposition to the barbarian the essence of her entire existence. At the beginning of
the historical account, her citizens’ autochthony is lovingly set forth (237 B – 238 B), as
well as her mythic wars with barbarian Thracians and Amazons, and Thebans and
Argives among Greeks (239 B); these themes return in a ring as the present day is
85
Schaefer ((1932) 179), on the other hand, takes the passage literally as evidence for an earlier
agonism: “The awareness of the agonal style of combat against a Greek enemy lingered into late times;
Plato has said so in the Menexus”. (“Noch bis in späte Zeiten ist das Bewußtsein von der agonaler Art des
Kampfes gegen einen griechischen Feind geblieben: Plato im Menexenos hat es gesagt (242 D)”).
42
reached, and we find that autochthonic purity has decreed the Athenians’ lasting aversion
to the Persians and other foreigners (245 D). Here, too, it emerges that the Thebans and
Argives are not real Greeks at all, but barbarians passing under the name of Hellenes,
descendants of such exogenes as Pelops, Cadmus, Aigyptos, and Danaus (a position held
seriously by Isocrates, 12.80). In between, the Persian Wars figure as the supreme event
of history. The most salient event of the Peloponnesian War is the betrayal of the
Hellenic koine (line 3 below) by the enemies of Athens:
ὃ δ’ εἶπον δεινὸν καὶ ἀνέλπιστον τοῦ πολέµου γενέσθαι, τόδε λέγω τὸ εἰς
τοσοῦτον φιλονεικίας ἐλθεῖν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας, ὥστε
τολµῆσαι τῷ ἐχθίστῳ ἐπικηρυκεύσασθαι βασιλεῖ, ὃν κοινῇ ἐξέβαλον µεθ᾿ ἡµῶν,
ἰδίᾳ τοῦτον πάλιν ἐπάγεσθαι, βάρβαρον ἐφ’ Ἕλληνας, καὶ ξυναθροίσαι ἐπὶ τὴν
πόλιν πάντας Ἕλληνάς τε καὶ βαρβάρους. (243 B-C)
(“This I say to be the frightful and despairing thing about the war, that the other Hellenes
had come to such a pitch of violence against our city, they ventured to send heralds to the
most hated king, whom they had repulsed in common with us, to bring him back on their
own account, the barbarian against Greeks; thus all the Greeks and barbarians leagued
against our city”). We may here profitably recall Vernant’s analogy between polis
warfare and the pan-Hellenic games, wartime and peacetime manifestations of the same
phenomenon.86 Introducing the barbarian into the war is akin to introducing him as a
competitor at the Olympics; it disrupts the agonistic balance of the war, which Athens
herself has so reverently observed, and she must now become vituperant toward foes she
would have preferred to treat with indulgence. We should recognize all of this as an
imaginary construction; Plato trusts the reader to perceive how far the epitaphios has
gone adrift from reality by this point. Athens’ willingness to “pardon” the barbarians,
43
doubtless to their great relief, signals not an abatement of hatred, but closer to the
opposite, a recognition that their actions spring from natural inimicality: ἡσυχίαν ἦγεν ἡ
πόλις, τοῖς µὲν βαρβάροις συγγιγνώσκουσα, ὅτι παθόντες ὑπ’ αὐτῆς κακῶς ἱκανῶς οὐκ ἐνδεῶς
ἠµύναντο (244 B: “the city was at peace, and pardoned the barbarians, since they had
suffered pretty badly at our hands and retaliated in like measure”). The inability of the
Athenians to deny an appeal for assistance, on the other hand, has justified their own
dealings with Persia (244 E -245 A).
The dramatic date of the Menexenus directly after the King’s Peace (244 E-246
A) highlights the impact of that event upon the Athenian mentality. It affords occasion
for a brutally anti-barbarian view of all Athens’ past and for claims of solidarity with her
Greek neighbors, including the conceit that Athens’ wars against them have been subject
to a code which imposed limits on victory.
Demosthenes shared with Isocrates many of the stock features of fourth-century
Athenian thought. The general exaltation of progenitors continues, including their love
of their fellow Greeks, whom they never wronged at any time, and amongst whom they
halted any attempts at aggression (40.7, 11, Epitaph.; cf. 3.26, Olynth. III). During the
rise of Philip II Demosthenes made him the chief barbarian bogey in place of the Great
King (3.17,24, Olynth. III; 9.31, Phil. III). In 342 BC, with Philip threatening the
Chersonese, he delivered the Third Philippic. The occasion afforded him opportunity for
a comparison between the dangers posed by the Spartans over sixty years earlier and
those of the present circumstances, in 9.47-52.
(47)...ἐγὼ δ’ ἁπάντων ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν πολλὴν εἰληφότων ἐπίδοσιν, καὶ οὐδὲν

ὁµοίων ὄντων τῶν νῦν τοῖς πρότερον, οὐδὲν ἡγοῦµαι πλέον ἢ τὰ τοῦ πολέµου
86
Vernant 21
44
κεκινῆσθαι κἀπιδεδωκέναι. (48) πρῶτον µὲν γὰρ ἀκούω Λακεδαιµονίους τότε
καὶ πάντας τοὺς ἄλλους, τέτταρας µῆνας ἢ πέντε, τὴν ὡραίαν αὐτήν,
ἐµβαλόντας ἂν καὶ κακώσαντας τὴν χώραν ὁπλίταις καὶ πολιτικοῖς
στρατεύµασιν, ἀναχωρεῖν ἐπ’ οἴκου πάλιν· οὕτω δ’ ἀρχαίως εἶχον, µᾶλλον δὲ
πολιτικῶς, ὥστ’ οὐδὲ χρηµάτων ὠνεῖσθαι παρ’ οὐδενὸς οὐδέν, ἀλλ’ εἶναι νόµιµόν
τινα καὶ προφανῆ τὸν πόλεµον. (49) νυνὶ δ᾿ ὁρᾶτε µὲν δήπου τὰ πλεῖστα τοὺς
προδότας ἀπολωλεκότας, οὐδὲν δ’ἐκ παρατάξεως οὐδὲ µάχης γιγνόµενον·
ἀκούετε δὲ Φίλιππον οὐχὶ τῷ φάλαγγ’ ὁπλιτῶν ἄγειν βαδίζονθ’ ὅποι βούλεται,
ἀλλὰ τῷ ψιλούς, ἱππέας, τοξότας, ξένους, τοιοῦτον ἐξηρτῆσθαι στρατόπεδον.
(50) ἐπειδὰν δὲ τούτοις πρὸς νοσοῦντας ἐν αὑτοῖς προσπέσῃ, καὶ µηδεὶς ὑπὲρ τῆς
χώρας δι’ ἀπιστίαν ἐξίῃ, µηχανήµατ’ ἐπιστήσας πολιορκεῖ. καὶ σιωπῶ θέρος
καὶ χειµῶν’, ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέρει, οὐδ’ ἐστὶν ἐξαίρετος ὥρα τις ἣν διαλείπει. (51)
Ταῦτα µέντοι πάντας εἰδότας καὶ λογιζοµένους, οὐ δεῖ προσέσθαι τὸν πόλεµον εἰς
τὴν χώραν, οὐδ᾿ εἰς τὴν εὐήθειαν τὴν τοῦ τότε πρὸς Λακεδαιµονίους πολέµου
βλέποντας ἐκτραχηλισθῆναι, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐκ πλείστου φυλάττεσθαι τοῖς πράγµασιν
καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς, ὅπως οἴκοθεν µὴ κινήσεται σκοποῦντας, οὐχὶ
συµπλακέντας διαγωνίζεσθαι. (52) πρὸς µὲν γὰρ πόλεµον πολλὰ φύσει
πλεονεκτήµαθ’ ἡµῖν ὑπάρχει, ἂν περ ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι ποιεῖν ἐθέλωµεν ἃ δεῖ,
ἡ φύσις τῆς ἐκείνου χώρας, ἧς ἄγειν καὶ φέρειν ἔστι πολλὴν καὶ κακῶς ποιεῖν,
ἄλλα µυρία· εἰς δ᾿ ἀγῶν’ ἄµεινον ἡµῶν ἐκεῖνος ἤσκηται.
(“Though all things, as they say, have made great progress, and none of the things now in
existence resembles those of former times, I believe that nothing has seen more activity
and progress than warfare. First, I understand that the Lacedaemonians, and all the
others, would invade and ravage a country for four or five months at harvest-time with
their hoplite and citizen armies, and then return home. They were so old-school, or rather
so civil, that they would buy nothing from anyone by money, but war was in its way law-
abiding and open. Now surely you see that traitors have destroyed most everything, and
nothing is done by proper formations and battle. You learn that Philip goes wherever he
will not by leading a phalanx of hoplites, but skirmishers, cavalry, archers, mercenaries –
on such an army does he depend. When with these he attacks people unsound within
their own ranks, and when through mistrust no one will come forth for their country’s
sake, he brings up his engines and lays siege. And I say nothing of summer and winter,
since they differ in nothing, and there is no season in which he leaves off. If you all
45
understand and take account of these things, you must not allow the war into this land,
and you must not be thrown to your ruin by expecting the easy style of war once
practiced by the Spartans, but you must keep the closest watch on developments and
preparations, taking care that he does not stir from home, and that there is no match at
close quarters. For in a war we have many advantages by nature, if we are willing to do
what is necessary, O Athenians: there is the nature of his country, in much of which we
can pillage and wreak harm, and countless other things. For an engagement he is better
trained than we”.)
This passage has always figured as one of the chief witnesses for the agonism of
the traditional Greek war, and it is a great irony that Demosthenes is here speaking of the
Peloponnesian conflict as an epitome of that code upon which it supposedly wrought
havoc.87 We can readily believe, however, that Demosthenes chooses that conflict
simply because it represents the greatest jeopardy ever endured by Athens. As for the
modes of fighting, the historical particulars are less important to his purpose than the
persuasive force of his argument. He places the Peloponnesian conflict in line with the
long tradition of hoplite-centered wars, which had by no means died out in the poleis of
the mid-fourth century; hence the danger that the Athenians will not rightly judge what
manner of enemy now confronts them. In the broad sense of rhetorical criteria,
Demosthenes speaks the truth: they cannot measure Philip by their own long experience
of battle.
87
For various views of the passage, see Vidal-Naquet (1968) 174; Lonis (1979) 20-21; Krentz
(2000) 177-178; Hanson (2000) 204
46
To make this point Demosthenes employs few overt falsehoods, but rather
judicious arrangement of certain facts. The customs of the Greeks are balanced against
Philip’s by antithesis, in a six-figure chiasma as follows:
A) The Spartans and other Greeks campaigned in the summer,
B) they did so with citizen hoplites,
C) and openly, without bribery (9.48).
C) Philip destroys his enemies mainly by treachery,
B) he does so without a phalanx, but light troops, mercenaries, &c. (9.49),
A) and takes no account of seasons (9.50).
This passage above all has given rise to a belief in a trêve saisonnière, a sort of
tacit ban on campaigns outside the summer months, which tended to prevent unrestricted
war.88 Demosthenes states that the Spartans (as well as all the other Greeks) would return
home after their summertime devastation (9.48). He of course does not take Dekeleia
into account, but that is a quibble; as we have noted, he is less concerned with the
particulars of the Peloponnesian War than with the seasonal cycle exhibited as a rule by
the wars of the poleis, which he claims does not impede the movements of Philip. He
does not explicitly say that this restriction in campaigning came about through any wish
on the part of civilized Hellenes to ease the desolation of war. Polybius tells us that only
winter gave some respite to the lawless and inexorable Celtiberian War (35.1.5), and
indeed the same pattern persisted to various degrees into the twentieth century, a fact
which points to its logistical basis, all the more significant in ancient Greece through the
88
Vernant 18; de Romilly (1968) 211-212; Vidal-Naquet (1968) 166, 174
47
slender material surplus of the armies and the forbidding terrain.89 The Spartans had the
additional problem of the Helots to consider. But in immediate juxtaposition to the
Spartans’ summertime ravaging comes the assertion of their civil conduct (ἀρχαίως εἶχον,
µᾶλλον δὲ πολιτικῶς), their eschewal of base bribery, the openness and obedience to
custom seen in their wars (ἀλλ᾿ εἶναι νόµιµον τίνα καὶ προφανῆ τὸν πόλεµον, 9.48). The
listener irresistibly associates short campaigns with a kind of chivalry.
Antithesis reinforces this impression when we learn of the habits of Philip, the
unscrupulous barbarian: καὶ σιωπῶ θέρος καὶ χειµῶν’, ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέρει, οὐδ’ ἐστὶν ἐξαίρετος
ὥρα τις ἣν διαλείπει (9.50). But the conditions have been subtly changed since 9.48. The
sentence which has immediately preceded this runs: ἐπειδὰν δὲ τούτοις πρὸς νοσοῦντας ἐν
αὑτοῖς προσπέσῃ, καὶ µηδεὶς ὑπὲρ τῆς χώρας δι’ ἀπιστίαν ἐξίῃ, µηχανήµατ’ ἐπιστήσας πολιορκεῖ
(9.50). We are no longer considering incursions of hoplites, but siege operations. These
could extend beyond the summer months, but in this respect Philip by no means broke
precedent; the Athenians themselves had begun the Peloponnesian War with a prolonged
siege of Potideia, whose wintertime rigors are well depicted by Plato (Symp. 220 A-B).
Of course Philip’s economic reserves greatly enhanced his capacity for extended sieges,
but he tended to succeed in them more quickly than Athens ever had.90 As for infantry
campaigns, we have no evidence that Philip could conduct them through the winter any
better than the Greek cities. The advances in mobility and logistics attributed to Philip are
known only from Frontinus (4.1.6), who specifies: “he gave orders to those setting out on
the summer campaigns that thirty days’ worth of meal be carried on their backs” (in
aestiva exeuntibus triginta dierum farinam collo portari imperavit; emphasis added). But
89
Krentz (2002) 27: “the timing of campaigns was another matter of military tactics rather than
military conventions.”
48
if Demosthenes has obfuscated the facts concerning the military seasons, he probably
managed to convince his audience of Philip’s relentless energy (cf. 4.42).
The next antithesis contrasts the citizen hoplites of elder days with the army of
Philip: he does not lead a phalanx but a force of psiloi, cavalry, archers, and foreigners
(mercenaries are obviously meant, 9.49). Once again Demosthenes ignores various
events of the Peloponnesian War, in this case the proliferation of light-armed troops at
that time, including those of Sparta under Brasidas. Once again one must not attach too
much importance to the omission – Demosthenes wishes to recall the elder days of
hoplite supremacy as a whole, rather than a specific period. The inaccuracies seem more
serious in his enumeration of Philip’s forces. Most glaring, ostensibly, is his denial of a
Macedonian citizen phalanx, considering the renown of that body. But perhaps a Greek
of conservative temperament would not have recognized this as a phalanx at all. Certain
units such as Iphicrates’ had already challenged the delineation between peltast and
hoplite, and the Macedonian formation, light-armored and maveuverable, might well
have appeared as a body of light troops to an Athenian acquainted with it only from
hearsay.91 It is also true that in 342 Philip had won major victories only over Illyrians
and Phocians, and not against any of the traditional hoplite states. When Demosthenes
claims that Philip leads psiloi, along with cavalry, archers, and foreigners rather than
hoplites, he may well be describing this new model of phalanx. Philip of course did
integrate cavalry with his phalanx on an unprecedented scale and attracted many
freebooters with his vast treasury (Diod. 16.8.7), though he is not known to have fielded
archers to any unusual extent. Unable to convey the altogether unprecedented nature of
90
Cawkwell 162-163
91
Ibid. p.33
49
Macedon’s military forces, and perhaps unable to apprehend it fully himself,
Demosthenes falls back on an analogy which will resonate immediately with his hearers:
the dichotomy of the sturdy citizen phalanx and the light-armed rabble who nevertheless
had gotten the better of it on numerous occasions. This shock to the social order
intimated by Demosthenes implies a fairly conservative mentality still predominant
among the Athenian citizens despite their history of success in innovative warfare. In the
end, they did of course choose to confront Philip the old-fashioned way, that which
Demosthenes very presciently does not recommend here (9.52). The massed phalanx had
humbled the Persians and it had become enshrined as the archetype of everything older
and better, the one honorable means to do battle.92 Once again one must depart from the
factual world to arrive at such conclusions. It would be an obvious absurdity to imply
that the phalanx clash characterized the Peloponnesian War, it is even doubtful how
invariably it decided earlier conflicts.93 But in the ideological sphere, those like the
Spartans who fight in phalanx also behave ἀρχαίως and πολιτικῶς, and their war is open
and legitimate (νόµιµον and προφανῆ). Note the important qualifier τινα: ἀλλ’ εἶναι νόµιµόν
τινα...τὸν πόλεµον; Demosthenes is aware of some approximation in his argument – it is
hard to point to any specific nomoi concerning bribery of enemies. All the same, Philip
has no hoplites and does not commit to pitched battles (οὐδὲν δ’ἐκ παρατάξεως οὐδὲ µάχης
γιγνόµενον, 9.49), and it follows inevitably that his victories bring ethical debasement.
The third pair of antitheses sets this legitimate warfare against corruption and
treachery. The Spartans would attempt nothing by bribery, and Philip attempts nothing
without it. The subject was one of intense concern to Demosthenes, and in a long
92
Krentz (2002) 35-37
93
Krentz (1997) 55-61
50
passage soon before this one (9.36-46) he has named venality as the cause of the
Hellenes’ present abjection, its absence the source of their ancestors’ grandeur. Within
the military domain traitors enable Philip to enslave cities without battle (τὰ πλεῖστα τοὺς
προδότας ἀπολωλεκότας, 9.49); fear of treachery incapacitates their will to resist him and
they become easy targets for his siege artillery. If this argument is ungrateful to the
important services of traitors in Greek sieges since long before Philip, still with his vast
gold reserves and his own acumen he brought bribery to an unusual pitch of perfection.
Demosthenes elsewehere effectively elates the role of corruption in the fall of Olynthus
(19.265-267, On the Embassy), and one recalls Philip’s own brutal statement that for a
small cost he could turn the Athenian orators’ philippics into panegyrics (13.20).
As a final note we should clarify the meaning of the last phrase in the citation
above: εἰς δ’ ἀγῶν’ ἄµεινον ἡµῶν ἐκεῖνος ἤσκηται (9.52). The word agon here has been
over-translated as “pitched battle”.94 Agon can be used for any military encounter but
never until Strabo specifies a particular kind; indeed the most problematical feature of the
word is its generality. The pitched battle is correctly expressed by παράταξις, a term which
Demosthenes in fact employs in 9.49, to state precisely that Philip does not fight pitched
battles. Hence taking 9.52 to mean that Philip is better prepared for one than the
Athenians imputes to Demosthenes a gross contradiction. In this phrase he prolongs an
athletic metaphor which he has begun with συµπλακέντας διαγωνίζεσθαι at the end of 51;
the basic meaning of ἀσκέω is to train for an athletic contest. The word agon refers here
to any direct military engagement95, including one which features treachery and stealth
94
A.N.W. Saunders for Penguin’s Greek Political Oratory (London 1970) 259; Hanson (2000)
204
95
A well-attested meaning for the word; see Ellsworth 59-60
51
rather than open combat. One of Demosthenes’ likely implications is the danger of
Athenian traitors among the pro-Macedonian party, who will prove woefully susceptible
to Philip’s preferred techniques. He is here advising his countrymen to avoid contact
with Philip’s forces altogether and to concentrate their efforts on raiding and plundering
unguarded parts of his country.
It should have become obvious that nothing in this illustration of Demosthenes
can pass as military history; it is much closer to a rhetorical topos. The most tormented
years of the Peloponnesian War have after two generations become attracted into the
stately processional of past wars such as we find in the epitaphioi, which were fought
honorably and kept the common welfare of Greece intact. The techniques here include
many of those identified by Loraux in the funeral orations, which create a persuasive
history while avoiding critical reflection.96 In the face of the Macedonian threat, Sparta
now takes a place with Athens among the preservers of Hellas celebrated in the
epitaphioi. Demosthenes in fact practices something very close to mythology. This is
very appropriate to the matter at hand. He is not composing an essay for a select
audience but is persuading his countrymen to take action against a national emergency.
The mythologizing faculty of humans is something far older and more elemental than the
historicizing one, and strikes the readiest response in a mass assembly. Like all myths,
the description of Philip’s manner of war conveys truth, or facets of it, rather than facts.
Philip has an armament unlike anything seen before, and its victory would bid fair to ruin
the social and ethical structures of the poleis. That truth is brought home by sets of
associations highly acceptable to an audience inclined to equate the old with the virtuous.
The traditional phalanx must be honorable, and the hearers readily infer that its
52
accompanying short campaign season must have ensued from humane principles.
Philip’s year-round mobilizations, without hoplites, then must issue from a ruthlessly
destructive impulse. By 342 BC, the phalanx of hoplites has gone a considerable way
toward becoming a symbol.
A phenomenon observable in the fourth century is an increasing fondness on the
part of numerous authors for athletic imagery and metaphor, very often in connection
with martial affairs. This trend continues into Hellenistic times where one encounters it
to a marked degree in St. Paul and Philo of Alexandria. One might be tempted to connect
all of this with the idea of martial agonism. But I do not believe that the phenomenon in
fact bears any close relation to the themes considered here. It emerges rather from a
growing sense of specialization and professionalism in many disciplines at this period,
including those of athletic and military training.97 Prior to the fourth century, the latter
science had advanced somewhat less rapidly than the former, except perhaps in Sparta or
Crete, and enterprising minds, including Sophists, sought the most beneficial athletic
regimes to apply to the profession of soldiering. Despite such weighty criticism as that of
Solon, Epameinondas and Plato (whose observations are repeated by Philopoimen)98, it
had long been obvious that the same qualities which make for an athletic champion also
serve well in battle – strength, speed, endurance, willingness to face pain and physical
hardship, a determined and combative temperament. This is a universal and still-valid
truth; military personnel won 37 percent of the medals in the 1998 Winter Olympics, and
96
Loraux 132-171
97
On this subject see Pritchett (II 1974) 208-231; Poliakoff 94-103
98
Diod. Sic. 9.2.5; Cor. Nep. Epam. 15.2.4-5, 15.5.4; Plut. Mor. 192 C-D; Plato Rep. 404 A; Plut.
Philop. 3.2. The ancient sources do not present Epameinondas’ views with perfect consistency, since we
also hear that he selected the prime athletes of the palaistrai for the Sacred Band (Plu. Mor. 639 F).
53
25 percent at the 2000 Summer Olympics.99 Such a fact deserves some consideration
when we evaluate arguments like those of Lonis, who advances the martial exploits of
certain Panhellenic champions as evidence for an affinity between war and agon peculiar
to ancient Greece.100 The instances include the following: Spartan champions receive the
honor of fighting beside the king (Plut. Lyc. 22.4, Mor. 639 E); Miltiades after his victory
in the four-horse chariot race took possession of the land of the Dolonci (Hdt. 6.36); Milo
of Croton advanced against the Sybarites wearing his six Olympic crowns (Diod. 12.9.5-
6); the Crotoniates also chose Phayllos, a three-time Pythian victor, to command the
trireme they sent to Salamis (Hdt. 8.47; IG I2 655). Other warrior-athletes are Eurybates
of Argos (Hdt. 6.92, 9.75) and Promachos of Pellene (Paus. 7.27.5-7; cf. 6.8.6).
In the fourth century a more technical tone appears in the association of sport and
war. Nicias in Plato’s Laches speaks thus of military training: οὗ γὰρ ἀγῶνος ἀθλήται
ἐσµεν καὶ ἐν οἷς ἡµῖν ὁ ἀγὼν πρόκειται, µόνοι οὗτοι γυµνάζονται οἱ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς περὶ τὸν
πόλεµον ὀργάνοις γυµναζόµενοι (182 A: “In the agon in which we are athletes and in the
affairs in which we make contest, those alone train who train in the instruments of war”).
The metaphor comes naturally since the context is a discussion of the new technique of
hoplomachia and its possible applications. The question of proper gymnastic and
military exercise intrigued Plato and appears in numerous passages as a starting-point for
epistemological inquiry. In the Greater Alcibiades, the title figure envisions training like
an athlete for rivalry with the statesmen of Athens (119 B); Socrates then directs his
attention to war and to the real opponents, the Spartans and Persians (119 D-120 A).
Variations of the phrase ἀθληταὶ πολέµου recur as a motif through the Republic (416 D,
99
Fabrizio Ceri, “Champions in Uniform”, Ulisse (Alitalia magazine) no. 212 (Nov. 2001)
54
422 B, 521 D, 543 B). In 422 B occurs a simile depicting the ability of the Guardians to
fight superior numbers: it would be like one well-trained boxer with two or more fat rich
men as opponents; a similar metaphor (ἀθληταὶ µὲν γὰρ οἱ ἄνδρες τοῦ µεγίστου ἀγῶνος, “the
men will be athletes in the greatest competition”) appears at 403 E. Others occur in the
Euthydemus (271 C) and the Laws (795 D ff., 813 A ff.). Xenophon’s Socrates employs
the same technique as Plato’s, comparing the contest of war to the Olympic Games
(Mem. 3.12.1), or likening the technique of generalship to that of wrestling and other
skills (Mem. 3.5.21-23).
Demosthenes also attests to a widespread interest in the rapport between sports
and warfare. We have already seen his metaphor in the Third Philippic (9.52). The
Erotic Essay (whose authorship is disputed) praises the sport of “dismounting” (the agôn
apobatikos; cf. Plut. Phoc. 20) which involved leaping beween several horses and
running alongside them, and apparently the handling of weapons; this contest most
realistically approximates the demands of war (41.23-25). In the First Philippic he likens
Philip’s deportment in war to the manner of an untrained barbarian in the boxing ring,
always clasping the spot where he has already been hit rather than watching out for the
next blow (4.40).
Numerous further examples could be adduced, such as the monument of the
Theban generals at Leuctra, where they boast that they did not finish second to
Epameinondas in the course (οὐδ’ Ἐπαµεινώνδα δεύτεροι ἐδράµοµεν, Tod II 130).101 The
most elaborate comparisons between sporting or gaming and war come from Polybius.
An extended simile likens the movements of Hamilcar and Pullus at Eryx to champion
100
Lonis (1979) 27, 34
55
boxers fighting for the crown (1.57.1-2; 1.58.5). The Romans at the time of Pyrrhus’
invasion are like athletes in peak condition (2.20.9). Hannibal encourages his troops by
speaking of the athlon of victory (3.63.4), while the Greeks allied against the Persians
invite all willing contestants “to the agon of valor and the crown of arete” (12.26b.3:
...προκαλουµένων τὸν βουλοµένον ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς ἀνδρείας ἀγῶνα καὶ τὸν περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς
στέφανον); no such metaphors occur in the corresponding sections of Herodotus (7.145,
157-163). The surge of enthusiasm for Perseus throughout Greece results from the same
instinct which causes a crowd to side with an outclassed boxer (27.9-10). In the works of
Diodorus, the phrase ἐν τοῖς πολεµικοῖς ἀγῶσιν occurs repeatedly (4.16.2, 4.17.2, 4.20.1).
These expressions do not issue from an agonal mentality of warfare in the specialized
sense considered here. They originate in a general, universal identification between
athletic and martial exploits such as Huizinga noted102, an identification which was
heightened in fourth-century Greece by the deliberate efforts to apply gymnastic
techniques to military training. In any case such expressions certainly appear with
greater frequency and elaboration well after the proposed age of hoplite agonism.
The rise of Macedon, the attendant loss of political initiative among the old
warring poleis, and the emergence of Stoicism have traditionally received credit for a
diminution of martial severity throughout the Hellenic world.103 Between Thebes in 335
and Mantineia in 223, no Greek city suffered destruction at the hands of fellow Greeks.
Some have interpreted the trend toward humaneness and the “peace movement” entirely
101
Emphasized by Lonis as evidence for agonism in Greek warfare ((1979) 27), but since the
competitors here are fellow-soldiers rather than foes, the significance seems to me quite different.
102
Huizinga 40-41
103
Grimal 63-64; Toynbee 200; Ilari 281-321
56
as a function of the Hellenistic political order.104 The previous section has shown,
however, that both these phenomena made their debut well before Chaeronea, and fourth-
century, especially Platonic, influence persisted in military thought throughout the
Hellenistic period.
During the years between Xenophon and Polybius the consciousness of standards
in war had become considerably heightened. The law of war cited by Xenophon
(Cyrop.7.5.73) can almost be re-defined as the absence of law: the inhabitants of a
conquered city have no rights. In Polybius’ history, expressions proliferate relating to
wartime laws and customs, and outrage at their transgression (1.70.6, 1.84.10, 2.8.12,
2.58.5-11, 4.67.4, 7.14.3, 8.8.4, 14.12.4, 38.8.1). He writes thus of the destruction of the
shrines by Philip V’s army after capturing the Aetolian capital of Thermos (218 BC):
οὐ γὰρ ἐπ’ ἀπωλείᾳ δεῖ καὶ ἀφανισµῷ τοῖς ἀγνοήσασι πολεµεῖν τοῦς ἀγαθοὺς
ἄνδρας, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ διορθώσει καὶ µεταθέσει τῶν ἡµαρτηµένων, οὐδὲ συναναιρεῖν
τὰ µηδὲν ἀδικοῦντα τοῖς ἠδικηκόσιν, ἀλλὰ συσσῴζειν µᾶλλον καὶ συνεξαιρεῖσθαι
τοῖς ἀναιτίοις τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἀδικεῖν. (5.11.5)
“For good men must not wage war to destruction and annihilation on the ignorant, but for
correction and conversion of the guilty, nor should they destroy him who has done no
wrong together with those who have, but should rescue and deliver those suspected of
wrongdoing together with the blameless”.
This passage bears the stamp of Plato’s Republic, whose influence we have noted
elsewhere in Polybius’ ethics of warfare (e.g., 23.15); his strong consciousness of ethics
104
See Ilari 282-283
57
and lawfulness probably owes much to that source.105 It also motivates Polybius’
treatment of Philip V, perhaps the chief antagonist of his history. A great deal of
Polybius’ thought concerning war is formulated in reaction to his negative example. We
mention the larger themes of the work to provide context for Polybius’ reflections on the
wars of earlier times, which have supplied great impetus for a belief in agonism. A
mutilated passage in book XIII tells of Philip’s role in provoking the First Cretan War
with Rhodes (205 BC); a notice of Philip’s growing deviousness introduces the account:
(1)Ἐγένετο περὶ τὴν τοιαύτην κακοπραγµοσύνην, ἣν δὴ βασιλικὴν µὲν οὐδεὶς ἂν

εἶναι φήσειεν, ἀναγκαίαν δὲ βούλονται λέγειν ἔνιοι πρὸς τὸν πραγµάτικον τρόπον
διὰ τὴν νῦν ἐπιπολάζουσαν κακοπραγµοσύνην· (2) οἱ µὲν γὰρ ἀρχαῖοι πολύ τι
τοῦ τοιούτου µέρους ἐκτὸς ἦσαν· τοσοῦτο γὰρ ἀπηλλοτρίωντο τοῦ κακοµηχανεῖν
περὶ τοὺς φίλους χάριν τοῦ τῷ τοιούτῳ συναύξειν τὰς σφετέρας δυναστείας, ὥστ’
οὐδὲ τοὺς πολεµίους ᾑροῦντο δἰ ἀπάτης νικᾶν, (3) ὑπολαµβάνοντες <οὐδὲν> οὔτε
λαµπρὸν οὐδὲ µὴν βέβαιον εἶναι τῶν κατορθωµάτων, ἐὰν µή τις ἐκ τοῦ
προφανοῦς µαχόµενος ἡττήσῃ ταῖς ψυχαῖς τοὺς ἀντιταττοµένους. (4) διὸ καὶ
συνετίθεντο πρὸς σφᾶς µήτ’ ἀδήλοις βέλεσι µήθ’ ἑκηβόλοις χρήσασθαι κατ᾿
ἀλλήλων, µόνην δὲ τὴν ἐκ χειρὸς καὶ συστάδην γινοµένην µάχην ἀληθινὴν
ὑπελάµβανον εἶναι κρίσιν πραγµάτων. (5) ᾗ καὶ τοὺς πολέµους ἀλλήλοις
προύλεγον καὶ τὰς µάχας, ὅτε πρόθοιντο διακινδυνεύειν, καὶ τοὺς τόπους, <εἰς>
οὓς µέλλοιεν ἐξιέναι παραταξόµενοι. (6) νῦν δὲ καὶ φαύλου φασὶν εἶναι
στρατηγοῦ τὸ προφανῶς τι πράττειν τῶν πολεµικῶν. (7) βραχὺ δέ τι λείπεται
παρὰ Ῥωµαίοις ἴχνος ἔτι τῆς ἀρχαῖας αἱρέσεως περὶ τὰ πολεµικά· καὶ γὰρ
προλέγουσι τοὺς πολέµους καὶ ταῖς ἐνέδραις σπανίως χρῶνται καὶ τὴν µάχην ἐκ
χειρὸς ποιοῦνται καὶ <συ>στάδην. (8) ταῦτα µὲν οὖν εἰρήσθω πρὸς τὸν
ἐπιπολάζοντα νῦν ὑπὲρ τὸ δέον ἐν τῇ κακοπραγµοσύνῃ ζῆλον περὶ τοὺς
ἡγουµένους ἔν τε ταῖς πολιτικαῖς καὶ πολεµικαῖς οἰκονοµίαις. (13.3.1-8)
“(Philip) became engaged in that sort of mischief which none would say is at all fitting
for a king, but which some claim is necessary in practical matters due to its prevalence
now. The men of old were very far from taking part in such a thing. To such an extent
did they avoid devising ill against their friends, for the sake of increasing their own
power by such means, that they did not even choose to conquer their enemies through
105
Denied by Walbank ((I 1957) 549), as Plato’s proposed laws are much milder. But see the
58
deceit, but believed that no accomplishments were glorious or lasting, if one did not best
the opponent in spirit by fighting openly. Therefore they agreed with them to employ
neither unseen nor long-range missiles, and believed the closed hand-to-hand battle to be
the only true judge of affairs. Thus they declared their wars and battles beforehand, when
they resolved to commit themselves, and also the places to which they intended to go
forth to deploy. Now men say that it is the mark of a bad general to practice anything in
war openly. Some small trace remains among the Romans of the old way of warfare.
For they make declarations of war, they rarely employ ambushes, and they fight battles
hand-to-hand and at close quarters. Let these things be said regarding the now prevalent
zeal for malpractice among leaders, both in political and military affairs.”
We have already encountered the ancient abjuration from missile weapons in
connection with the Lelantine War. In 13.3 of course we find no mention of that conflict
and Polybius seems to imagine some widely acknowledged ban on projectiles in Archaic
times. Modern scholars have certainly taken the idea seriously and incorporated it into
their reconstructions of Greek warfare, assuming that numerous covenants of this sort
existed.106 But it appears more likely that Polybius knew of no other examples than the
Amarynthian treaty reported by Strabo, along with the associated lines of Archilochus,
and presented them as typical of Archaic battle. We have mentioned the abundance of
arrowheads at Archaic sites, and the well-informed Strabo, writing perhaps less than a
verbal reminiscences, p. 39.

106
e.g., Larsen 259: “...it may be possible to believe that the Greeks at one time tried to regulate
the use of weapons and to reduce warfare to pitched battles, more or less pre-arranged”; Detienne 124.n.20:
“C’est à semblables conventions que fait sans doute allusion POLYBE, XIII, 3” (“It is to similar
conventions that Polybius 13.3 doubtless makes allusion”). Cf. Schaefer 179.
59
century later, obviously knew of no parallels to the Amarynthian treaty: “In truth, there
neither is nor was any custom concerning rules of engagement or weapons” (10.1.12).107
Polybius continues with his assertion of a customary declaration of war by the
earlier Greeks, as well as a prior appointment of the battle site. A general feeling did
appear to exist among Greeks that responsible states should undertake some diplomatic
exchange before commencement of hostilities, although no uniform procedure existed,
nor anything so formal as the Roman fetial law.108 The choice of a battlefield in advance,
the “closed field”, has become part of the ritual complex with which the hoplite agon is
endowed109, and has been inferred not only from Polybius but from Herodotus 7.9B.1.
There is, however, no evidence that this practice ever existed for mass battles. All
accounts for all periods indicate that the opposing armies marshalled on the nearest
suitable ground in the vicinity once they had encountered one another. The procedure
termed the “ritual challenge” or the “challenge to battle” has been adequately covered by
Krentz110; it does not entail a prior agreement of battlefield, nor even a verbal
challenge111, but denotes an army’s assumption of battle array in the presence of the
enemy, expressing their willingness to fight. The characteristic Polybian phrase ἐξ
ὁµολόγου, not found earlier, describes this type of combat, the “pitched” battle (1.87.9,
2.66.1, 3.90.5, 4.8.11, 11.32.7, fr.144). The term perhaps surfaces in the third century
due to the greater number of military options which had become available and the
107
καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τῶν πολεµικῶν ἐθῶν καὶ τῶν ὁπλισµῶν οὐθὲν οὔτ’ ἐστὶν οὔτ’ ἤν ἔθος.
108
Krentz (2002) 25-26
109
Detienne 123-124; Vidal-Naquet (1968) 166; Lonis (1979) 28; Dawson 49
110
Ober (1994) 13; Pritchett (II 1974) 147-155; Krentz (2002) 27-28
111
Xenophon reports Agesilaus issuing one of these at Sardis to any contesting his right to Asia,
meaning the King or his satraps (Ages. 1.33). Diodorus reports that Agesilaus “challenged” the Thebans
(προεκαλεῖτο, 15.32.6; he reports the same for Epameinondas against the Spartans (15.65.4, 15.68.4), and is
followed by Plutarch (Mor. 346 B). Diodorus’ information is unreliable. I know of no other cases for full-
scale battles; Mardonius at Plataia envisions a mass duel (Hdt. 9.48).
60
attendant need for more specific language. But some version of battle by consent
features in all warfare involving large forces, as a tactical necessity: it is difficult to cut
off a large army from any alternatives at all other than battle.
Thus, when Polybius envisioned Archaic armies proclaiming the site where they
would await the foe, he probably had in mind the conventions of single combat and the
“champ clos” such as that marked out for Menelaus and Paris. He may have thought
specifically of the Battle of the Champions at the Thyreatis, when the combatants fought
in an appointed site from which the main armies must withdraw (Hdt. 1.82.3). This mass
duel had become an archetype of archaic valor, as evinced in the series of epigrams
which it inspired.112 At least, no other known event makes a better match with Polybius’
description. As stated, we certainly never hear of this procedure in connection with any
phalanx battle; it would be very strange if the announcement of a battle site had been
routine and yet had left no trace in the sources, even allowing for the dearth of Archaic
evidence. Single combat exerted a particular spell upon the Greek mind long after it had
disappeared, as shown not only by the perpetual attractive powers of the Iliad but by
works such as the Seven Against Thebes and a host of others; a profitable study could
indeed be written on literary depictions of the duel. This phenomenon meshed neatly
with the impulse toward glorifying ancestral wars, so pronounced in the epitaphioi, and it
is easy to see how the imagination could have endowed all the clashes of the past with the
fearlessness and philotimia of single combat. Polybius in fact describes something
similar for a more recent battle; the Romans and Carthaginians fight at Lilybaeum (250
112
Collected in Fernandez-Nieto (II 1975) 34-35
61
BC) as though “the zeal of single combat had arisen among the combatants” (1.45.9).113
Greeks would have imagined their forebears doing battle in the same spirit.
The Romans receive credit, however, for keeping alive something of the old style
of warfare, if only in small measure (13.3.7): they persist in making declaration of war,
they seldom resort to ambush, and they fight hand-to hand. This sentiment appealed to
Livy, who incorporated the Polybian passage in his own history.114 In 171 BC Marcius
Philippus succeeded in duping Perseus into a truce which played into Roman hands and
granted them a breathing space for mobilization. The older senators demurred in their
approval of this diplomatic coup (42.47.5-8), saying:
5. Non per insidias et nocturna proelia, nec simulatam fugam improvisosque ad

incautam hostem reditus, nec ut astu magis quam vera virtute gloriarentur, bella
maiores gesisse: indicere prius quam gerere solitos bella, denuntiare etiam
interdum pugnam et locum finire, in quo dimicaturi essent. 6. Eadem fide
indicatum Pyrrho regi medicum vitae eius insidiantem; eadem Faliscis vinctum
traditum proditorem liberorum; 7. religionis haec Romanae esse, non versutiarum
Punicarum neque calliditatis Graecae, apud quos fallere hostem quam vi superare
gloriosus fuerit. 8. Interdum in praesens tempus plus profici dolo quam virtute;
sed eius demum animum in perpetuum vinci, cui confesso expressa sit se neque
arte neque casu, sed collatis comminus viribus iusto ac pio esse bello superatum.
(“Not by ambush or nocturnal combat, nor by feigning flight and suddenly rounding on
an incautious foe, did our forbears wage war, nor gloried in cunning rather than true
courage; they would declare their wars before waging them, and at times even announced
a battle and designated the place where they would fight. With the same uprightness it
was made known to King Pyrrhus that his doctor was plotting against his life, and he who
betrayed the Faliscans’ children was delivered to them in chains; this is Roman piety, not
Punic subterfuge or Greek wiles; among those peoples it has been more glorious to
113
οἷον εἰ µονοµαχικῆς συνεστώσης περὶ τοὺς ἀγωνιζοµένους τῆς φιλοτιµίας.
62
deceive an enemy than to conquer him by force. At times trickery profits more than
courage for the present moment, but he has been conquered once and for all who makes
confession that he has been overcome not by craft nor chance, but with forces closed
hand-to-hand in a just and righteous war”; cf. Diod. 30.7.1 on the same incident).
Obviously much of this cannot be taken for granted as military history; once
again, there is no example of a Roman army fixing the time and place for a massed battle,
although once again, it does happen in a judicial duel: Livy writes for the duel of the
Horatii and the Curiatii that “the time and place were agreed” (tempus et locus convenit,
1.24.2). But still, Polybius considered the Romans to retain the old Greek values in war,
and Livy felt entitled to adopt his words as an accurate portrayal of the Roman tradition.
This fact is problematic if we believe that the agonal spirit was typically Greek, while the
Romans dealt in something very close to total war and acknowledged no restrictions in
quest of victory. In fact Polybius asserts that the Romans were always at their most
moderate after a success – a policy which he does not wholly recommend (18.8.8-9).
Another statement of Polybius is relevant in this connection. He thus describes one of the
various reactions in Greece to the destruction of Carthage:
Ἕτεροι δὲ καθόλου µὲν πολιτικὸν εἶναι τὸ Ῥωµαϊκὸν ἔθνος ἔφασαν καὶ τοῦτ’
ἴδιον εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ σεµνύνεσθαι τοὺς Ῥωµαίους, ἐπὶ τῷ καὶ τοὺς πολέµους
ἁπλῶς καὶ γενναίως πολεµεῖν, µὴ νυκτεριναῖς ἐπιθέσεσι χρωµένους µηδ’
ἐνέδραις, πᾶν δὲ τὸ δι’ ἀπάτης καὶ δόλου γινόµενον ἀποδοκιµάζοντας, µόνους δὲ
τοὺς ἐκ προδήλου καὶ κατὰ πρόσωπον κινδύνους ὑπολαµβάνοντας αὑτοῖς
καθήκειν. (36.9.9)
(“Others said that the Roman nation was thoroughly civilized, and that it was a
characteristic upon which the Romans prided themselves that they made war
114
Walbank ((II 1967) 416) suggests a derivation from a lost passage in Polybius 37, on
63
straightforwardly and nobly, not employing night attacks or ambushes, and utterly
spurning anything won through deceit and trickery, and that it became them to meet
dangers only openly and face-to face”).
If one were to remove the Romans from this passage, it could easily pass for a
description of Greek combat as it has been generally construed. Yet despite the
testimony of Polybius and Livy, scholars have not rushed to interpret Roman warfare in
terms of agonistic rituals. One of the very few efforts in that direction came, not by
coincidence, in the year following the appearance of Vernant’s Problèmes de la guerre en
Grèce ancienne which did so much to revive the agonal model in the postwar period. In
1969 arrived the next volume of the Centre de Recherches Comparées’ war project:
Problèmes de la guerre à Rome. The editor, Jean-Paul Brisson, endorsed his
predecessors’ model of Greek polis warfare and transferred it intact to Italy, citing de
Romilly 1968 in particular.115 Brisson also emphasizes la compétition and the régles du
jeu.116 Unlike Vernant and his colleagues, he did not inspire any great following; Roman
warfare simply seems too relentless for the agonistic model. Indeed, nearly all writers
who espouse that model for ancient Greece place it in implied or explicit contrast to
Roman practices. To cite only one of the clearest expressions of this phenomenon:
The image of war which issues from the Iliad is that of a codified conflict, in which the
strife is resolved by a fatal and symbolic duel between two heroes. This conception
accurately conveys the concern of a community to limit as much as possible the absurd
and murderous character of mass conflicts: this war, translated, is that of two groups who
acknowledge more common values than reasons for strife. It is a very different matter
when Greeks struggle against barbarians; the rules established for wars opposing two
city-states no longer apply, and these combats gradually take on an increasing scope. It is
only with Alexander that war becomes the principal instrument of an imperialist policy,
chronological grounds.
115
Brisson (1969, 1969b)
116
Brisson (1969) 7, 10
64
the normal expression of the ambitions of one state upon another. It is this conception
which, to build its territory, the Roman republic of the third century will adopt.117
Many other authors have noted facets of a perceived essential difference between
classical Greek and Roman belligerent practices.118 But we must account for the fact that
Polybius 13.3, perhaps the most significant source for the rules of city-state wars, names
the Republican Romans as the heirs of this tradition to some degree, an opinion endorsed
by Livy. The ancients, it would seem, tended to liken rather than contrast the traditional
Greek and the Roman military ethos.
When they state that the ancients sought to crush the spirit of their foes by open
combat, Polybius and Livy attest to an aristocratic disposition which prizes both openness
and physical valor.119 The eschewal of military ruse and diplomatic chicanery serve the
same end: to bring about a decisive pitched battle. The imaginary restrictions of
weaponry and battlefield among the ancients nevertheless speak the truth in a certain
way: one side of both the Greek and Roman military cultures shows an instinctive
tendency to go for the closest, most severe, and often most effective mode of combat.
Hector thus proclaims the sentiment in his duel with Aias: “ἀλλ’ οὐ γάρ σ’ ἐθέλω βαλέειν
τοιοῦτον ἐόντα/ λάθρῃ ὀπιπεῦσας, ἀλλ’ ἀµφάδον, αἴ κε τύχωµι” (“But I do not wish to smite
such a one as you by watching in secret, but openly, if I can”, Il. 7.242-243). This ideal
117
Feugère 9-10: “L’image de la guerre qui découle de l’Iliade est celle d’un conflit codifié, dans
lequel l’affrontement se résout au cours d’un duel mortel et symbolique entre deux héros. Cette conception
traduit justement le souci d’un collectivité de limiter autant que possible le caractère absurde et meurtrier
des conflits généralisés: cette guerre transposée est celle de deux groupes qui se reconnaissent plus de
valeurs communes que de raisons d’affrontement. Il en va tout autrement quand les Grecs luttent contre les
Barbares; les règles édictées pour les guerres opposant deux Cités ne s’appliquent plus, et ces combats
prennent avec le temps une ampleur croissante. Ce n’est qu’à partir d’Alexandre que la guerre devient
l’instrument principal d’une politique impérialiste, l’expression normale des ambitions d’un Etat sur un
autre. C’est cette conception qu’adoptera, pur constituer son territoire, la République romaine du –IIIe s”.
118
e.g., Hanson (1995) 307-308, 318; Dawson 112 (“Roman warfare always evokes the metaphor
of a machine, and traditional Greek warfare, that of a duel”).
119
Eckstein (1995) 28-55, 84-117
65
never ceases to recur throughout Greek history; it appears in Sophocles’ Philoctetes, in
Demosthenes (20.74, Against Leptines), and in the famous words of Alexander: “It is
disgraceful to steal victory. Alexander must win openly and without trickery” (Arrian,
Anab. 3.10.1).120
But this is only one side of an extemely complex dichotomy, which Wheelock has
described as the Achilles/Odysseus opposition; Vidal-Naquet depicts something similar
in his contrast between the Black Hunter and the hoplite ideal.121 Another standard has
always existed, which has little use for austere heroism and which values results more
than methods. Hector’s words illumine one quality of the Homeric warrior, but the
Doloneia betrays the simultaneous acceptance of another standard. The defense of the
bow in Euripides’ Heracles (188-201) also aligns itself with this perspective. The heroic
spirit suffers a painful parody in the Rhesus, a kind of anti-Philoctetes, where the
mentality often thought characteristic of the Greek heroes is more suited to the oafish
Thracian of the title. The theme is not restricted to literary expression; a very high
frequency of deception has been tabulated for Classical battles122, and by the fourth
century Xenophon openly champions deceit as supreme in warfare (Hipparch. 5.9-11).
Polybius, for all his temperamental attraction toward the open battle, echoes him: “in
military practices what is accomplished openly by might and main is less than that done
by trickery and timing; this can easily be learned from past events by anyone so inclined”
(9.12.2).123
120
... αἰσχρὸν εἶναι κλέψαι τὴν νίκην, ἀλλὰ φανερῶς καὶ ἄνευ σοφίσµατος χρῆναι νικῆσαι Ἀλέξανδρον.
121
Wheeler (1988) xiii-xiv, 55 et passim; Vidal-Naquet (1986); also Eckstein 281
122
See Krentz (2000).
123
ὅτι µὲν οὖν ἐστι τῶν κατὰ πόλεµον ἔργων ἐλάττω τὰ προδήλως καὶ µετὰ βίας ἐπιτελούµενα τῶν µετὰ
δόλου καὶ σὺν καιρῷ πραττοµένων, εὐχερὲς τῷ βουλοµένῳ καταµαθεῖν ἐκ τῶν ἤδη γεγονότων.
66
The same tension exists in the Roman martial tradition, and on this matter some
important literature exists. Ogilvie rejected the historicity of all Roman stratagems in the
early books of Livy as annalistic invention, and Giovanni Brizzi has described a strong
element of fides and artlesseness in Roman belligerent practices up to the Second Punic
War, when they paid frightfully for their obsolete martial ethic, their refusal to cozen an
enemy or to conceal their own intentions.124 Wheeler’s study of the Greek and Latin
stratagemic vocabulary has some sharp criticism of Brizzi, maintaining that ruse had
always existed in Latin practice125; certainly by the first century AD, manuals of
stratagemata such as Valerius Maximus book & and Frontinus appear without much
apology. Wheeler also takes the dismal and time-honored view of Polybius as a
mouthpiece of Roman propaganda for his statements at 13.3.7.126 In truth, this partly
reflects the way the Romans preferred to see themselves. However, when it comes to a
contemporary matter of which Polybius had great personal experience, I am less ready to
dismiss his judgment. We should believe Polybius when he assures us that the Romans
harbored a greater distaste than their Greek counterparts for any means of victory other
than open battle.
It is a fact that we find the appeal of open battle expressed more often and more
bluntly in a Roman than in a Greek context. The affair with Pyrrhus mentioned by Livy
is related in more detail by Aulus Gellius (3.8), naming Quadrigarius and Valerias Antias
as his sources: the Senate’s letter of warning to Pyrrhus contains such phrases as “it
seems proper that we should wish you safe, so that we might have the possibility of
defeating you by arms” and “it pleases us not to do battle by money or bribes or
124
Ogilvie (1965) 117-118, 585-589 et passim; Brizzi. On fides see also Heurgon.
125
Wheeler (1988) x, 51-52
67
treachery” (3.8.8).127 Livy makes the Numidian Syphax say, when he rallies the
survivors after Scipio’s incendiary night attack: ...scire incendio, non proelio cladem
acceptam; eum bello inferiorem esse qui armis vincatur (30.7.12: “I know that the defeat
was suffered through fire, not fighting, and in war the lesser man is the one defeated by
arms”). Polybius reports the matter in far more general terms: κατὰ δὲ τοὺς κινδύνους
ἀνυποστάτους ὑπάρχειν καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ τοῖς καθοπλισµοῖς (14.7.7: “...in facing perils they
were irresistible due to their courage and their armament”). The difference in emphasis is
no coincidence. Many other such loci exist in Latin and we need not repeat them all.128
If a sense of a “fair fight” an agonistic trait it belongs most properly to the Roman mind.
It is even to be suspected that Polybius’ description of the old Greek battles in
13.3 was suggested to him by his experience of the Roman army. A strong belief in a
type of evolutionary degeneracy underpins his military thought. He also felt that the
Macedonians up to the time of Pyrrhus had rigidly observed a code of warfare in the open
(ἐν τοῖς ὑπαίθροις, 18.3.7), if he himself shared the sentiments he put into the mouth of
Alexander of Isos. The latter’s words in 18.3, like the statements in 13.3, archaize in
order to denigrate the present conduct of Philip V. Observing the generally more pristine
state of society at Rome, he reasoned that Greeks must have shared these qualities at an
earlier time; his statement at 13.3.7 (βραχὺ δέ τι λείπεται παρὰ Ῥωµαίοις ἴχνος ἔτι τῆς
ἀρχαῖας αἱρέσεως περὶ τὰ πολεµικά) implies a belief that the two peoples will have gone
through similar stages of evolution. Thus, the Romans prefer fair and open battles; the
Romans are in a younger stage of historical development than Greece; therefore the
126
Ibid. 24. On this view see the references in Eckstein 194-195, 234
127
visum ut te salvum velimus, ut esset quem armis vincere possemus.....nobis non placet pretio
aut praemio aut dolis pugnare.
68
Greeks too formerly practiced fair and open battles. By this logic, the Romans will also
pass from simplicity to subtlety in warfare, and indeed have begun to do so, starting with
the destruction of Carthage (36.9). Such a belief accords perfectly with his famous
scheme of social and constitutional evolution (6.5-6.9).
This tendency in Polybius readily combines with his knowledge of a few
celebrated incidents in Archaic times, among them the Lelantine War, to produce the
illusionary vision of early Greek warfare in 13.3. Like the passage in Demosthenes’
Third Philippic, which may have influenced it, this locus is heavily influenced by his own
preoccupations, including a conviction of contemporary degeneracy, his view of Philip V
as a negative archetype, and his theory of Roman historical development. The passage
cannot be read prima facie as evidence of Archaic warfare.
There is no general agreement on the causative factors in the agonal system.
Love of contest and philotimia are often cited as motives by earlier scholars, but a desire
to limit destruction also figures prominently when origins are discussed, and has assumed
an important place in the works of Hanson. It thus seems necessary to examine the
relationship between the alleged agonistic protocols and battlefield fatalities.
For the hoplite era, the outright fatality rate itself is as well known as it is ever
likely to be from the ancient evidence: 14% for the vanquished and 5% for the victors129,
or 9.5% overall, assuming an initial parity of strength, as seems justified; most battles on
record display roughly equal numbers of opponents, and an outnumbered people could
128
Other examples: Livy 1.53.4, 5.27.7, 22.22.6, 28.42.8; Caes. BG 1.40.8, BA 73; Val. Max. 7.4
ex.2, 7.4.4; Tac. Ann. 1.68. See also Polybius 36.9.9
129
Krentz (1985)
69
choose to stay within their walls.130 The numbers take into account nearly all of the
relevant data for the years 479-371 and leave little room for amendment, although we
should note that most of the bloodiest hoplite battles on record – the defeat of the
Sybarites in 511, the battle of Sepeia in 494, those at Megara in 458 and Tanagra in 457,
the slaughter of Ambraciots in 426 – have left us without numbers. We must also take
into account Rubincam’s important study on casualty figures in Thucydides, which finds
strong evidence of extensive approximations and rounding.131 This finding warns us to
allow for a margin of error in the results, but does not affect the procedure. We have no
better figures than those Thucydides provides us; we must either accept them as a basis
for calculation or dismiss the whole question as insoluble.
If the mean fatality rate of 9.5% is well accepted, disagreement prevails over a
more complex quality, the severity of this figure. Not all of Hanson’s predecessors in the
agonistic field shared his mild assessment. Brelich took some pains to emphasize that his
battles of ritual initiation were not stage pieces but fully lethal affairs with losses nearly
to the last man in some cases.132 One may well wonder if communities could endure
initiation rites which risked the extermination of their youth, and by Vernant’s 1968
volume a desire to de-emphasize bloodshed has become discernible. Detienne’s
choreography for a hoplite battle contains strictures that would almost certainly result in a
low body count, since victory ensues through ejecting the enemy from the field and
killing becomes a secondary matter.133 Since in every hoplite battle the side which holds
the field always inflicts more fatalities than it suffers, it is difficult to see what basis
130
Krentz (1997) 61 and n.7
131
See Rubincam
132
Brelich 78-79
133
Detienne 123-124
70
exists for Detienne’s statement, which logically denies any importance to the casualty
figure (the affair at Solygia recounted in Thuc. 4.44 does not constitute an exception
since the Athenians here intended to inflict damage, not hold the field). The alleged
abstention from pursuit would also greatly enhance the survival rate of hoplites134;
military observers from Vegetius to Clausewitz and Ardant du Picq have recognized that
the majority of losses in any battle take place during retreat.
But Lonis felt that earlier writers had gone too far. Probably speaking apropos of
Vernant’s contributors, he wrote:
...when we speak of ludic aspects we do not intend to signify that the conflicts in which
the cities come to blows are fictive combats: the wars which bring the hoplite armies
face-to-face are a cruel and bloody reality. A. Brelich has shown that in the wars of the
archaic era... the confrontation results in the majority of cases in an almost complete
massacre. Likewise, in the classical age, there are numerous battles which give rise to
shocking carnage. It thus appears difficult, as has been done at times, to see in these rules
a wish to diminish the danger of annihilation, to humanize the war in some way.135
Connor and Garlan have joined him in finding the outcome of a phalanx battle quite
grave136, but the other camp has its adherents. A former Harvard professor reportedly
was fond of saying that the wars of Greek poleis were “only slightly more dangerous
than American football”.137 No one considered here has made so bold a statement, but
we find such influential voices as Lazenby’s speaking of “the comparatively low levels
in hoplite battles”.138
134
Noted by Lazenby (101)
135
Lonis (1979) 28: “... quand nous parlons d’aspects ludiques nous n’entendons pas signifier que
les combats qui mettent aux prises les cités sont des combats fictifs: les guerres qui mettent face à face les
armées hoplitiques sont une dure et sanglante realité. A. Brelich a montré que dans les guerres de l’époque
archaïque...l’affrontement aboutit, dans la plupart des cas, à un massacre quasi général. De même, à
l’époque classique, nombreuses sont les batailles qui donnent lieu à d’épouvantables carnages. Il paraît
donc difficile, comme l’on a fait quelqefois, de voir dans ces règles une volonté de diminuer les risques
d’anéantissement, d’humaniser la guerre en quelque sort”.
136
Connor (1988) 21-22; Garlan in Brulé & Oulhen 29
137
Grossman 12
138
Lazenby 101
71
Hanson, as stated, has made the idea an important component of his
reconstruction, calling it “the decisive hoplite clash without extensive battle fatalities”
and rooting it in the hoplites’ wish to maintain a stable agrotopia.139 His most thorough
discussion of the matter appears in The Other Greeks, where he notes the sound
protection of the hoplites’ panoply and their ponderous advance.140 Neither of these
proposals is closed to discussion, since we do not know that all hoplites enjoyed the
security of a bronze corslet (quite a bit of evidence exists for leather and linen models;
see Alcaeus F140 line 11; Xen. Anab. 3.3.20)141, and a slow advance is attested only for
the Spartans (Thuc. 5.70.1; here, on the other hand, the Argives advance impetuously).
But it is otiose to debate these points before considering the death tolls themselves.
Periods which knew similar weapons and tactics will serve as the best point of
comparison for the hoplite age, to wit, Hellenistic, Roman, and medieval battles.
Hanson underlines the shockingly high body counts, as well as percentages, of Issus,
Cannae, second Chaeronea, and Munda, next to which phalanx battles appear quite
benevolent; Lazenby, too, notes the contrast of hoplite carnage with Lake Trasimene
and Cannae.142 Citing the mere presence of the higher totals, however, ignores
demography, as Brulé has warned: “it applies, in effect, more to numbers than to rates,
more to deaths than to mortality”.143 One cannot judge severity by comparing sheer
numbers of deaths between battles of poleis and battles which opposed the manpower of
whole empires (Hanson shows an awareness of this problem but does not pursue its
139
Hanson (1993) 6
140
Hanson (1995) 306-312
141
Anderson 21-23
142
Lazenby 101
143
Brulé 54: “il s’applique, en effet, plus aux effectifs qu’aux taux, aux morts qu’à la mortalité”.
72
implications).144 To provide a measure of perspective, at the battle of Cannae, the forty-
eight to seventy thousand Roman dead (Livy 22.49.16; Plb. 3.117.3) came from a
population capable of fielding seven hundred thousand infantry and seventy thousand
cavalry near the war’s outset (Plb. 2.24.16).145 In terms of population rates, then, the
loss probably tolled somewhat lower than that of the Athenians during the retreat from
Syracuse (thirty-six thousand men lost (Thuc. 7.75.5 and 7.82.3) though we do not
know how many were Athenian citizens)146; and it was certainly much lower than the
rate of the Argive losses at Sepeia (Hdt. 6.83.1). A battle such as Cannae in any case is
more comparable in circumstances to the Athenian disasters in Egypt or at Ennea Hodoi
than to hoplite battles.
All the Hellenistic and Roman battles noted by Hanson appear in a record of
fourteen engagements compiled by Gabriel and Metz from 334-45 BC. From these they
have computed a rate of 37.7% for the defeated force and 5.5% for the victors.147 The
list, however, includes the battles of the Granicus, Issus, and the Arbela, where the
numbers of the Persian forces are too uncertain for any percentages, and an even more
serious problem infects Hellenistic and Roman battle narratives. The historiographical
school championed by Duris and Phylarchus extended its sensationalist influence to
include casualty reports, where giddy expansions become a regular feature both among
144
Hanson (1995) 308
145
It has been widely accepted since Beloch that this total has counted twice those men actually
under arms in 225 BC and is somewhat too high, though not sufficiently so to affect our point here; see
Walbank (I 1957) 196-199. Recently Lo Cascio ((1999) 166-168 and (2001) 129-133) has vigorously
defended the Polybian numbers.
146
Strauss 71-73, 179-182 has ventured on some calculations for Athenian deaths in the
Peloponnesian War, in individual battles and overall. Because he did not take account of engagements for
which no specific figures are given, his totals are too low, perhaps very much so. He calculates a total loss
of 5470 hoplites and 12,600 thetes in the war; Brulé ((1999) 61) calculates 18,100 and 20,500 deaths for
these classes. See also Hanson (1995) 309.
147
Gabriel and Metz 83-86
73
Greek historians and the Romans whom they inspired, compounding a proclivity in
human nature already noted by Archilochus (F 101). Thus we have Pompeius Trogus’
figure of two hundred thousand slain Persians at Marathon (Just. 2.9.20) and thirty-two
or even forty thousand Macedonian dead at Cynoscephalae (Claudius Quadrigarius and
Valerius Antias respectively; Livy 33.10.8-9). Pausanias reports an entire Achaian
army of fourteen thousand infantry and six hundred horse at the Isthmus in 146 (15.4.7),
but elsewhere we learn they suffered twenty to twenty-seven thousand dead (Orosius
5.3.3). Polybius’ ten thousand Carthaginian dead at the Metaurus (11.3.3) become
56,000 in Livy (27.49.6). The trend is pervasive and comes in for specific criticism by
Polybius (29.12.2-3). It renders some of the Gabriel and Metz figures barren of
historical value, such as the ninety thousand German dead at Aix (actually 100,000-
200,000 in the sources: Plut. Mar. 18.2; Vell. Pat. 2.12.4; Livy epitome 68) or the loss
of more than 100,000 of the Mithridatic forces at second Chaeronea vs. twelve Roman
dead (App. Mith.41,45; Plut. Sull. 11.1).
Clearly, a reliable record of the death rates for the Hellenistic and Republican
Roman periods is required, rather than argumentation, if we are to have any basis for
evaluating the severity of phalanx battles. Just as clearly, this enterprise raises vastly
greater problems than does the like task for the Classical Greek era, for which we have
a reliable core of data from Thucydides and Xenophon. The position of these authors
also enabled them to consult both sides in many cases, but for later battles we often
have only the victors’ word. The probable tendency is inflation of the losses which they
inflicted, and de-emphasis of those they suffered; Orosius writes:
it is the habit of the ancient writers not to set down the number of slain on the
side which has prevailed, lest the victors’ losses smirch the glory of their victory,
74
except perhaps when so few fall that the slightness of their losses increases
admiration and terror at their valor (4.1.12).148
Nevertheless, several points of comparison are possible. We have noted that most
authors believe the agonistic system to have broken down during the Peloponnesian War.
In that case, we should expect to see increasing casualty rates in battles of Greek vs,
Greek as we move through the fourth century and into Hellenistic times. Krentz has
included the data from all battles up to 371 BC. For battles after that date up to the end
of Greek sovereignty, all of the data which I have found are tabulated below:
GREEK VS. GREEK (POST 371 BC)
Date Battle Victor Vanquished Source

357 Syracuse Dion Dionysius II Plut. Dion 22.5, 27.3,
1.3% (74) unknown 30.8; Diod. 16.9.6
352 Crocus Macedonians Phocians Diod. 16.35.4-6

Field unknown 29.3% (6000)
344 Hadranum Timoleon Hicetas Diod. 16.68.9-11;

unknown 6% (300) Plut. Tim. 12.3
331 Megalopolis Macedonians Peloponnesians Diod. 17.62.7-17.63.3

8.8% (3500) 24.1% (5300)
322 Crannon Macedonians Greek allies Diod. 18.16.4-18.17.5

.3% (130) 1.8% (500)
317 Paraetacene Eumenes Antigonus Diod. 19.27.1-19.31.5

1.3% (540) 10.3% (3754)
312 Gaza Ptolemy Demetrius Diod. 19.80.4-

unknown 3% (500) 19.85.3; Plut.
Demetr. 5.2
148
...scriptorum veterum mos est ex ea parte quae vicerit occisorum non commendare numerum,
ne victoriae gloriam maculent damna victoris, nisi forte cum adeo pauci cadunt, ut admirationem
terroremque virtutis augeat paucitas perditorum.
75
219 Apelaurus Macedonians Eleans Plb. 4.68.1-4.69.7
unknown 43.5% (1000)
218 Stratus Macedonians Aetolians Plb. 5.14.1-6

unknown 2.5% (100)
218 Menelaion Macedonians Spartans Plb. 5.21.1; 5.23.5

unknown 5% (100)
217 Leontium Achaeans Eleans Plb. 5.94.3-5

unknown 19.4% (400)
217 Raphia Ptolemaic forces Seleucids Plb. 5.79; 5.86.5-6

2.9% (2200) 15.1% (10,300)
197 Nemea R. Achaeans Macedonians Livy 33.34.1-33.35.16

unknown 25% (1500)
Notes:
1) Syracuse: Diod. 16.9.6 records Dion’s forces as 20,000; I have preferred Plutarch’s
5,800 as less approximate, a principle which in general will be observed throughout.
2) Paraetacene: In Diodorus’ account, Antigonus technically won the battle through
holding the field and the enemy dead, but he had clearly had the worst of the fighting.
3) Gaza: Plutarch gives the slain of Demetrius’ army as 5,000 (Demetr. 5.2); Diodorus
as 500 (19.85.3). The latter definitely takes precedence, as his phalanx fled before
engaging and Diodorus specifies here that most of the dead were cavalry.
4) Leontium: A discrepancy exists in Polybius’ account, which reports 400 Eleans killed
and 2000 captured from a total force of only 2060. I have used 400 out of 2060 to
calculate the percentage of fatalities.
Average:
Victor, 2.9%; vanquished, 15.4%
Krentz’ figures for the battles up to 371 BC, we recall, are 5% vs. 14%.
Obviously, this range was not exclusive to the hoplite age, but remained valid essentially
76
for as long as Greeks fought one another. It is thus very difficult to credit agonistic
protocols for maintaining a low casualty rate among the Greeks, unless their influence
extended well past their supposed demise in the late fifth century. Battles between
Greeks and barbarians during this period have a much higher fatality rate, but the same is
also true for the hoplite era: think of the Carthaginians’ defeat at Himera, the Persian
defeat at the Eurymedon, or those of the Athenian expeditions to Ennea Hodoi or Egypt.
The death rate in hoplite battles has also been contrasted with much higher totals
from Roman conflicts. As we have seen, one has to consider the much higher population
base which suffered these losses; in addition, nearly all of the examples which have been
adduced involve battles with foreign enemies, which everywhere result in greater
bloodshed. Roman vs. Roman battles provide a more just point of comparison with
hoplite battles. The pool of evidence is smaller here, but some reliable evidence exists
from the Civil Wars in the first century:
ROMAN VS. ROMAN

Date Battle Victor Vanquished Source
48 Pharsalus Caesar Pompey Caes. BC 3.88, 89, 99;
5.5% (1200) 12.8% (6000) App. BC 2.70.82;
Plut. Caes. 46.2
46 Thapsus Caesar Pompeians App. BC 2.97;

unknown 12.5% (10,000) Caes. BA 86;
Plut. Caes. 53.2
42 Philippi I Brutus/Cassius Octavian/Antony App. BC 4.108, 112;

uncertain 14.8% (16,000) Plut. Brut. 45.1
Notes:
1) Pharsalus: Caesar himself reports Pompey’s losses at 15,000 and his own as 230
(3.99); Appian, however, cites Asinius Pollio (who was present in Caesar’s army) as
stating that 6000 bodies of Pompeian soldiers were found (BC 2.82). This account,
77
which also appears in Plutarch with the addition that many of the other dead were
camp-followers (Caes. 46.2), seems the more detailed and preferable. The same locus
of Appian repeats Caesar’s number for his own dead, but mentions that other authorities
record 1200, a more probable estimate. The total strengths of both sides come from
Caesar (BC 3.88-89; also App. BC 2.70) and are hardly beyond suspicion, but according
to Appian all sources agree that Pompey’s forces well outnumbered Caesar’s.
2) Thapsus: The record of 10,000 Pompeian dead in the Bellum Africanum (86)
obviously takes precedence over Plutarch’s 50,000. The total Pompeian strength
comes from Appian.
3) Philippi: These calculations cover the first round of the battle, Oct. 3, which was a
stalemate despite the apparently heavier losses on Octavian’s side. Appian (BC
4.108) reports Octavian and Antony with 19 full-strength legions, which should
equal 95,000 men, as well as 13,000 cavalry; 4.112 enumerates the dead. Plutarch
(Brutus 45.1) repeats the figure for Octavian’s dead and attributes it to Messala, in
Brutus’ camp.
Average:
Victor, one example of 5.5%; vanquished, 13.4%
Although some patching from different accounts is necessary to arrive at these results,
the information appears as sound as almost any which exists for ancient casualties, and
the records for other encounters of the Second Civil War, while not allowing
calculations, do not appear to deviate greatly; the battle of Munda apparently exceeded
this percentage somewhat (see Caesar BH 30-31).149 The correspondence with the
figures for Greek battles is remarkable, and probably more than coincidence; an average
of around 10% fatalities seems to represent the maximum which large citizen armies, of
similar composition, can inflict upon one another in most circumstances. Figures from
more recent periods tend to bear this out, as we shall see.
78
The pattern suggests that casualties in ancient battles are better explained not by
the presence or absence of agonistic protocols, but by the far more general element of
cultural and tactical symmetry. Students of military history have long noted that, when
“primitive” warriors get the better of a civilized force, there is a far graver risk of
massacre or crushing defeat than when two civilized armies engage.150 The converse of
course also holds true. Pure military factors partially account for this fact, but “inter-
specific” war, between heterogeneous peoples, tends to be more brutal than that between
groups sharing common cultural traits. In practice, the effects of cultural and tactical
asymmetry in battle can barely be distinguished from one another; tactics, after all, are a
facet of culture. Thus, similarity of culture, tactics, and military organization tended to
impose limits on the lethality of ancient battle, as it does in all periods, which explains
our results for Greek-vs.-Greek and Roman-vs.-Roman encounters. As these factors
diminished, fatalities would mount proportionately.
Some proponents of agonism have also taken the carnage of more recent periods
as a point of comparison to illuminate the success of hoplite protocols.151 At first it does
seem a truism that technical advances in destructive armament would have greatly
increased the lethality of modern war. But examination of the available battle statistics
makes this conclusion very far from obvious. Data become reasonably plentiful by the
sixteenth century, when armies contained a high percentage of hardened mercenaries and
professionals. These troops can generally withstand greater losses than citizen armies
without breaking, and casualties in this era stood quite high, at approximately 10% for the
149
But the report of 100,000-120,000 deaths for this battle given by Hanson ((1995) 308) is
inflated; Caes. BH 31 records 34,000 total.
150
Bell 410; Keeley 71-76
79
victors and 40% for the defeated, with the slain greatly outnumbering the wounded.152
But the small scale of the armies more than counterbalanced this unhappy record and
battle fatality was lower in the overall population than in any succeeding centuries.153 As
armies grow larger, fatality rates diminish. By the Thirty Years’ War, total casualties had
become very comparable to those of ancient Greece, at 15% vs. 30%, with the number of
dead falling below that of the wounded. This proportion fell to 11% vs. 23% by the reign
of Louis XIV, and the wounded/killed ratio reached the traditional 3:1, a proportion
which works remarkably well for battles from the mid-seventeenth century until WWI
(hence approximately 2.8% fatalities for the victors vs. 5.8% for the age of Louis
XIV).154 These numbers continued to decline until the Napoleonic wars, when they
flared up appreciably, though not to the level of the Thirty Years’ War; the battles from
Austerlitz through Waterloo averaged 18.7% killed and wounded for both sides, or ca.
4.6% fatalities, using the three-to-one rule.155 In European wars throughout the
nineteenth century casualty rates fell to record lows, with the total of dead and wounded
not exceeding 14% (or app. 3.5% dead) in any conflict; both the American Civil War and
the Russo-Japanese War follow this pattern, despite widespread impressions to the
contrary.156 World War One certainly deserves its reputation for a frightful rise in
mortality, though perhaps not to the extent sometimes imagined: a major battle such as
the Somme resulted in 13.5% fatalities for the British forces, and for WWI as a whole
they have been estimated at 11-14% of all men mobilized.157 World War Two defies any
151
Hanson (1989) 224-225, de Romilly (2000) 8-9
152
Bodart 14
153
Wright 656
154
Bodart 18-19; Keegan (1993) 361
155
Bodart 119
156
Ibid. 16
157
Keeley 194; Wright 664
80
attempt at a concise assessment, with hopelessly inadequate data and losses varying
drastically among nations and theaters; the general severity of military losses on all sides
probably approximated that of WWI.158
Such a comparison between different epochs swarms with difficulties, such as the
general absence in ancient accounts of figures for the wounded, or the diminishing ratio
of combat to rear-echelon troops in modern times and especially the twentieth century;
this “tooth-to-tail” ratio is a phenomenon very difficult to translate into ancient
practice.159 Obviously our numbers increasingly fail to reflect the actual danger to a
soldier in combat as they move closer to the present. A really meaningful account of
losses must also consider civilian deaths as well as those from disease and captivity.
Reckoning the ultimate criterion – the percentage of battle deaths in a total population
over a given period – is probably impossible for ancient Greece. But it does seem clear
that the proportion of direct combat fatalities in phalanx battle has little claim to modesty
in comparison with modern wars. Since the 1600's, probably only the two world wars
have surpassed it – and of course the nearly sixty years of general peace in Europe after
WWII has no counterpart in antiquity.
Closely related to the question of casualties is that of pursuit after the trope.
Military observers including Xenophon (Lac. Pol. 9.1), Clausewitz (4.4) and Ardant du
158
This impression has been derived from various works, including Louis L. Snyder’s Historical
Guide to World War II (Westport, CT 1982) and G.F. Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in
the Twentieth Century, trans. C. Barnard (London 1997)
159
In Gabriel and Metz ((1991) 89) is found an attempt to account for this ratio and calculate the
risk to a front-line soldier. It suffers from certain difficulties, such as assuming that all reported deaths
affected only combat personnel (e.g., their figures for American “KIA” in WWII in fact include deaths
from accident, very numerous in mechanized forces. It also includes deaths of non-combat personnel from
bombardment &c., so it is erroneous to use this figure to calculate the death rate among the “engaged
strength”).
81
Picq have long recognized that the great majority of losses befall a defeated army during
the retreat.160 Thus, the notion of a low mortality rate in hoplite battles is probably
reinforced by a cherished belief that victorious hoplites did not harry their enemies for
long once they had turned their backs. Rüstow in 1852 proclaimed that Greek soldiers of
the classical period satisfied their honor by claiming the field, building a trophy, and
granting their beaten foemen’s request to bury their dead; they did not undertake
pursuit.161 Droysen followed him in 1888162, and no other plank of the agonistic code has
been so often repeated with such conviction down to the present day.163 Some of the
scholars may have had in mind a sustained strategic pursuit, which was indeed beyond
the means of a hoplite army, but others clearly believe that hoplites broke contact very
quickly after the trope. Krentz alone has questioned the dogma.164 Generally we will not
go over ground here which he has already covered, but this matter merits special
emphasis in view of the widespread support it has gained.
Clausewitz in 4.4 and 4.12 of Vom Kriege declares the importance of tenacious
pursuit in maximizing victory; he stresses that this is a new phenomenon inaugurated by
the Napoleonic battles, and repugnant to the martial ethics of the previous age, which saw
bloodshed after a decision as unnecessarily brutal. His sustained, organized pursuit was a
different creature from the immediate chase after the trope, but the ethical fallout was the
same: it demanded killing men who were no longer a threat. We have already remarked
on the tensions inflicted upon the traditional military mind by post-Napoleonic warfare,
160
Ardant du Picq 63-64, 149; see also Grossman, “Back-Stabbing and the Chase Instinct”, 127-
129
161
Rüstow-Köchly 145
162
Droysen 93
163
A list by no means exhaustive: Walker in CAH IV 166; Kromayer-Veith 85; Vernant 18;
Detienne 124; Connor (1988) 14; Ober (1994) 13; Hanson (1995) 268
164
Krentz (2002) 230-231
82
and here we see one of the most vivid cases: strategic principles now enjoined an action
which violated an older ethical canon, the refusal to harm men once they could no longer
inflict harm themselves. Something of this dilemma informed Rüstow and Droysen when
they attributed honorable non-pursuit to the Greeks, and it also colors Walker’s statement
already cited.
Rüstow based his observations on the battles of Mantineia and Corinth, Spartan
victories both, and his successors supplied the ancient sources. It comes as a surprise that
this longstanding belief originates essentially from one passage in Thucydides’ narrative
of the battle of Mantineia: ἡ µέντοι φυγὴ καὶ ἀποχώρησις οὐ βίαιος οὐδὲ µακρὰ ἦν· οἱ γὰρ
Λακεδαιµόνιοι µέχρι µὲν τοῦ τρέψαι χρονίους τὰς µάχας καὶ βεβαίους τῷ µένειν ποιοῦνται,
τρέψαντες δὲ βραχείας καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ πολὺ τὰς διώξεις (5.73.4: “the flight and the retreat were
not harried nor drawn-out, for the Lacedaimonians hold their ground and do battle long
and steadfastly up to the rout of the enemy, but after routing him they do not make a long
pursuit”). It seems that no one before Krentz had questioned why Thucydides felt such
an explication necessary, or restricted it to the Spartans, when he was describing a
practice which scholars for a hundred fifty years have assured us was common to all
Greek hoplites. Thucydides does not clarify the Spartan rationale, and not before
Plutarch do we find it made into a point of honor: in two nearly identical passages he
makes Lykourgus introduce the custom, on the grounds that “it is ignoble and un-Greek
to slay those who have yielded” (οὔτε γενναῖον οὔτε Ἑλληνικὸν φονεύειν τοὺς
παρακεχωρηκότας; Mor. 228F; cf. Lyc. 22.9-10). Plutarch adds that Lykourgus thought it
good tactics also, as enemies would sooner flee than fight when they could do so in safety
(Vegetius turns this prescription on its head, recommending that enemies be allowed a
83
route to escape so as to kill all the more when they flee (3.21)).165 Plutarch’s life of
Lycurgus deliberately breaks with the analyses of Aristotle’s Politics and Plato’s Laws in
asserting the mildness and humanity of the original Spartan laws, an aspect of Plutarch’s
ennoblement of Greek institutions which has its sources in fourth-century pan-Hellenism
(Plutarch cites Demetrius of Phaleron on Lycurgan praotes, Lyc. 23.1).166 In fact there
did not exist even in Imperial times any fast consensus concerning the Spartan motives in
avoiding pursuit. Polyaenus not surprisingly sides with the second and more tactical of
Plutarch’s reasons (1.16.3), while Pausanias offers another possibility: ἦν δὲ αὐτοῖς (sc.
τοῖς Λακεδαιµονίοις) καὶ ἄλλως πάτριον σχολαιοτέρας τὰς διώξεις ποιεῖσθαι, µὴ διαλῦσαι τὴν
τάξιν πλείονα ἔχοντας πρόνοιαν ἤ τινα ἀποκτεῖναι φεύγοντα (4.8.11: “and moreover it was
their custom to be rather leisurely in pursuit, taking more care not to lose formation than
to kill some foeman in flight”). This reason best suits the circumstances of Thucydides’
period, when Sparta’s oliganthropia made her more solicitous of guarding her citizens’
lives than adding to the enemy dead. Dispersed pursuers could fall victim to reversals at
the hands of rallied enemies (Thuc. 3.108.2-3; Xen. Hell. 3.5.19). Thus, even in Sparta’s
case, this caution could well have evolved relatively late, rather than in the heyday of
agonism, when she was far more militant.
Hoplites of the other poleis who lacked the Spartans’ discipline found it much
more difficult to restrain themselves when the enemy turned in flight, a much-studied
principle of human and animal behavior which has been described as “an almost
uncontrollable urge to kill among those presented with a view of the enemy’s backs”.167
Hanson definitely flouts the weight of opinion when he writes of “an unspoken dislike of
165
Ilari 85-87 and n.116
166
See Ilari 84-88; Lamberton 84-91
84
spearing fellow Greeks in the back”.168 Where details of pursuit exist in the ancient
narratives, they usually confirm the instinctive tendency toward a prolonged and bloody
chase. At the Battle of Olpae cited above (Thuc. 3.108.2-3) the victorious Ambraciots
pursued their enemies all the way to their refuge at Amphilochian Argos before the tables
were turned on them, and they themselves suffered a long harrying back to Olpae. A
great number of Thebans died in their retreat to Mount Helicon after the battle of
Coronea (Xen. Hell. 4.3.19, Ages. 2.12). Other examples noted by Krentz include
Tyrtaeus F 23a.20-22; Diod. 12.10.1 (battle of the Traeis River, 510); Thuc. 1.106.1-2
(Megara, 460); Thuc. 4.96.7-8 (Delium, 424); Xen. Hell. 3.5.19 (the Long Walls, 392).
Observations such as Lazenby’s on the inadequacy of armored hoplites for a pursuit role
carry some weight169, but Xenophon does not seem to have shared this view completely;
he writes thus on the merits of soldiers conditioned by hunting: τεταγµένοι δὲ ἐν τῷ
πρόσθεν οὐ λείψουσι τὰς τάξεις διὰ τὸ καρτερεῖν δύνασθαι. ἐν φυγῇ δὲ τῶν πολεµίων ὀρθῶς καὶ
ἀσφαλῶς διώξονται τοὺς ἐναντίους ἐν παντὶ χωρίῳ διὰ συνήθειαν (Cyn. 12.3-4: “arrayed in the
front rank they will stay in formation, through their ability to remain steadfast. In the
rout of the enemy they will readily and unfalteringly pursue their opponents, habituated
to every sort of terrain”). Probably the men weakened by wound and shocks, along with
the less fit individuals, were the main quarry. But the most vivid description of
victorious hoplites in all Greek literature comes from Xenophon’s Hiero (2.15.16):
15) αἱ µὲν γὰρ πόλεις δήπου ὅταν κτρατήσωσι µάχῃ τῶν ἐναντίων, οὐ ῥᾴδιον
εἰπεῖν, ὅσην µὲν ἡδονὴν ἔχουσιν ἐν τῷ τρέψασθαι τοὺς πολεµίους, ὅσην δ’ ἐν τῷ
διώκειν, ὅσην δ᾿ ἐν τῷ ἀποκτείνειν τοὺς πολεµίους, ὡς δὲ γαυροῦνται ἐπὶ τῷ
ἔργῳ, ὡς δὲ δόξαν λαµπρὰν ἀναλαµβάνουσιν, ὡς δ’ εὐφραίνονται τὴν πόλιν
167
Keegan (1976) 149
168
Hanson (1995) 269
169
Lazenby 101
85
νοµίζοντες ηὐξηκέναι. 16) ἕκαστος δέ τις προσποιεῖται καὶ τῆς βουλῆς
µετεσχηκέναι καὶ πλείστους ἀπεκτονέναι, χαλεπὸν δὲ εὑρεῖν ὅπου οὐχὶ καὶ
ἐπιψεύδονται, πλέονας φάσκοντες ἀπεκτονέναι ἢ ὅσοι ἂν τῷ ὄντι ἀποθάνωσιν.
οὕτω καλόν τι αὐτοῖς δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ πολὺ νικᾶν.
(“But when the cities defeat their enemies in battle, it is not easy to relate how great is
their joy in the rout of the foemen, how great it is in pursuing them and killing them, how
they revel in the deed, how they gain splendid glory, how they exult in believing they
have magnified their city! Each one claims that he had a part in the counsel, and that he
killed the most men, and it is hard to find any place where they are not lying, saying that
they killed more than the number that actually died. Such a glorious thing their great
victory seems to them!”). While this text comes from the fourth century, one would have
to posit a deterioration of the Greek spirit greater than any imagined by Demosthenes or
Polybius to believe that hoplites held back from pursuit in prior times.
To conclude: an aversion to pursuit did not characterize hoplite armies other than
Sparta’s and did not materialize until the eighteenth century, when a cosmopolitan officer
corps, with draconian control over well-trained soldiers, was able to impose some
restraint upon the “ancient carnage when one force strikes the other in the back”170; from
a military manual of 1778: “A commander shows his greatest skill when he knows when
to set proper limits on his victory. There is only a certain point to which it is permissible
to press your advantages”.171 Even for this period one cannot generalize, for vigorous
pursuit had its advocates, including the Marshal de Saxe and Frederick the Great. Easy
killing has been observed to arouse pleasure responses in most men172, a theme of inquiry
which edges into the darkest spaces of the human soul. The controversy thus strikes a
170
Ardant du Picq (149)
171
K. Gaigne, quoted in Duffy 258
172
Keegan (1976) 238
86
deep ethical nerve wherever it arises. This has probably influenced an impulse to
dissociate the Greek hoplites from the practice of sanguinary pursuit.
Our study cannot treat in detail all of the arguments related to agonism which
have been brought forward in seven decades. I feel it a sufficient beginning to have
shown that, of the four sources or incidents which provide the major evidence for the
idea, two of them, the Amarynthian Treaty and the Battle of the Champions, belong to a
type of conflict which cannot be classified with the phalanx battle, and that duelling
champions belong to a different social environment than that of the hoplites. The other
two, the passages of Demosthenes and Polybius, are retrospective judgements highly
conditioned by contemporary circumstances, which cannot be taken as straight evidence
for Archaic or Classical Warfare.
A long tradition of scholarship often engenders a body of beliefs not strictly
exigible from the evidence. In the case of the agonistic character of Greek warfare, we
might well wonder if some external pressure has altered our perspective. Anxiety over
the potential of warfare in the industrial age is the one property shared by high-minded
Prussian officers such as Rüstow and Parisian antiwar intellectuals a century later. It
would be entirely natural and commendable to look to the cultural forebears of modern
Europe for a more reassuring example. Perhaps the durable belief in principled and
ceremonial wars between Greeks shares some elements with the belief in the peaceable
savage, who fights only for his own honor or in his own defense. This conception still
exerts great cultural influence although thoroughly disprovable by any objective criterion.
But it persists precisely because it is a myth, not in spite of that fact; its lament for
87
primordial bliss speaks to a faculty older than reason. To judge from Demosthenes and
Polybius, the ancients themselves at times found it congenial to envision battles of former
ages as tournaments of a kind, entirely obedient to the guidance of human will.
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‘THE ATHLETES OF WAR’: AN EVALUATION OF THE AGONISTIC

ELEMENTS IN GREEK WARFARE1

agonistic model of hoplite battle. In various manifestations it has dominated scholarship

Agonism in hoplite battle is not a monolithic concept and no description could be

as Cleisthenes to as late as Chaeronea.4 Some disagreement also exists concerning the

elements in more detail.

posthumous published form (1898-1902) they became the great Griechische

thus in 1926 concerning the aftermath of Sepeia:

reinforced in the aftermath of the Great War.

stressed the bellicosity of the early aristocratic societies (Ritterzeit, Rittertum)

corresponding to Hasebroek’s Kriegerzünfte, a notion which may have owed something

afterward, which was otherwise relatively barren of military scholarship. Victor

mindset, he maintains, continued to influence phalanx battles.13 Other notable

In 1964 the Centre de Recherches Comparées sur les Sociétés Anciennes

Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce ancienne, a landmark in the rejuvenation of ancient

warfare completely the opposite of Burckhardt’s. A certain unity of perspective is

(“La Phalange: Problèmes et Contoverses”) further amplifies the battle-game: it is an

agon in ancient Greece is remarkable; apparently a number of intellectual determinants

of Lévi-Strauss is evident in the tendency to treat agonistic battle as a cultural axiom

contributors to Vernant’s collection, Pierre Vidal-Naquet, was also a standard-bearer in

human scale; a recent essay on agonistics writes of:

...the Materialschlacht of World War I and the Holocaust and Hiroshima of

challenge; thus Hanson continued a proclivity to diminish the destructive capacity of

echoes of the Greek pattern of animal sacrifice, and as a representation of social

reality”24; in consequence, like a sacrificial festival, it strengthened the communal

typical summation is the following:

least criticized concepts in classical studies, generating no significant opposition before

combat27, readily perpetuated by the likes of Isocrates, Demosthenes, and Polybius.

interchangeably, although Ehrenberg at least insisted on a conceptual difference between

to have influenced subsequent thought.32 But it finds no linguistic support. Herodotus

Athens’ ancestral hatred of barbarians (Isoc. 4.75). Polemioi is of course an ordinary

expression for Greek enemies (Hdt. 1.30.5, 6.77.3, 7.149.3)

1) the Lelantine War (Archil. F 3; Plb. 13.3.4; Str. 10.1.12)

2) the Battle of the Champions (Hdt. 1.82)

3) Demosthenes’ Third Philippic, on Philip’s military practices (9.47-52)

which also figures as evidence for the Lelantine War)

predisposed by the above passages of Demosthenes or Polybius.

I) The Lelantine War

the temple of Artemis Amarynthia in the latter city:

Τὸ µὲν οὖν πλέον ὡµολόγουν ἀλλήλαις αἱ πόλεις αὗται, περὶ δὲ Ληλάντου

of this information shows affinities with the well-known lines of Archilochus:

οὔτοι πόλλ’ ἐπὶ τόξα τανύσσεται, οὐδὲ θαµειαὶ

spear-famed lords of Euboia are skilled in that sort of battle”).

treaty spurious with no more text or details than we possess.

II) The Battle of the Champions

fallen on both sides the Spartans prevailed”).

the mass duel of picked warriors is a well-attested institution in Indo-European cultures,

traditional hoplite armament, or to determine a battlefield in advance, have already been

deteriorate as the war increases in scope.

3) Melanthos (or Melainos) and Xanthios: This is another instance of a monomachia by

consent for possession of a territory. Strabo explicitly compares the longstanding

interpretation.45 The mythical Boiotian king, Xanthios, is slain by Melainos either

implicitly monomachies, thereafter.

Hyllus prevails, the Heracleidae will take possession of the Peloponnese; if he is

apparently inspired that of the Horatii and Curiatii (Livy 1.23-26).

mention the duel (earning Plutarch’s censure, Mor. 858A).

Lelantine and Thyreatic wars:

award possession of territory to the victor;

spare the majority (see 4 above);

“ritual space” is probable here also46;

- multiple combats are attested (5 and 6);

challenge is a secondary matter. The manner of combat is of little importance”.47 This

to be a characteristic institution of early Greece: εἰς µονοµαχίαν προελθεῖν κατὰ ἔθος τι