Juan Ponce Enrile vs.

Sandiganbayan, and the People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015

J. Bersamin

Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was charged by the Office of the Ombudsman with plunder before the
Sandiganbayan because of his alleged involvement in the misappropriations and misuse of the Priority
Development Assistance Fund. He filed a motion to post bail, but the Sandiganbayan denied it on the
ground that the motion has been filed prematurely because he has not yet been arrested, nor has he
surrendered. Sandiganbayan then issued an order to arrest Enrile.

Enrile voluntarily surrendered to the CIDG. He was confined at the PNP General Hospital and moved to
be detained there. He then filed a motion to fix bail stating that the prosecution has yet to establish that
their evidence was strong; the penalty that will be imposed to him was not reclusion perpetua but
reclusion temporal; and that he was not a flight risk given his age and health.

However, the Sandiganbayan denied it subsequently on the ground that only after the presentation of
the evidence of the prosecution can he demand bail. The Court also reminded Enrile that the presence
of mitigating circumstances is not considered for purposes of bail.

Sandiganbayan denied his motion for reconsideration. Thus, Enrile sought refuge in the Supreme Court.

Enrile raised similar issues he presented before the Sandiganbayan. He contends that he is entitled to
bail as a matter of right before judgment of conviction in addition to the fact that the prosecution has
yet to prove that their evidence of his guilt was strong.

The Ombudsman commented that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary because he was charged with a
capital offense and that it is mandatory that a hearing for the bail be conducted to determine if the
evidence of his guilt is strong.

Issue:

Whether or not Enrile is entitled to bail.

Held:

Yes. Admission to bail in offenses punished by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is subject
to judicial discretion. However, such discretion may only be exercised when a hearing had already taken
place to ascertain if the evidence of the accused’s guilt is strong. A hearing is required because this is the
time when the prosecution is allowed to present their evidence for the purpose of determining whether
or not the evidence of guilt is strong to grant or deny bail of the applicant.

The Supreme Court is guided by the Constitution as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It
is a national commitment to uphold human rights as well as the right to bail upon a clear and convincing
showing that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community and that there exist a
special, humanitarian, and compelling circumstances.

The Court recognized that his social and political standing and his voluntary surrender indicates that he
will not be a flight risk. Enrile has exhibited his great respect for the legal processes even before this case
when he was charged with rebellion and was granted bail because he was not seen as a flight risk.
The Court also recognized his fragile state of health and his age to justify his admission to bail. In his
doctor’s testimony, it was found that Enrile is a geriatric patient with several complicated medical
conditions. Based on the testimonies of the doctor, there is no question that his advanced age and ill
health required a special medical attention.

Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged should be allowed
independently of the merits of the charge, provided that his continued incarceration is clearly shown to
be injurious to his health or life. If the court denies his bail despite these circumstances, the true
objective of preventive detention will not be attained. Enrile’s illness and age is a circumstance, and the
humanity of law makes it a consideration which should influence the court to exercise its discretion to
admit him to bail. Indeed, granting him his bail will enable him to have his illness properly addressed and
therefore the true objective of bail—which is to ensure his appearance at the trial—can be achieved.

However, to wait for the trial to have his application to bail considered by the Sandiganbayan, will
defeat the purpose of bail which is to have a provisional liberty pending trial. There may be
circumstances decisive of the issue of bail—whose existence is either admitted by the prosecution, or is
properly the subject of judicial notice—that the courts can already consider in resolving the application
for bail without awaiting the trial to finish.